Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks Volume 10: Journals NB31-NB36 9780691184333, 9780691178981

Citation preview

KIERKEGAARD’S JOURNALS AND NOTEBOOKS

B RU C E H. KIRMMSE GE NERAL EDITOR

KIERKEGAARD’S JOURNALS AND NOTEBOOKS VOLUME 10 Journals NB31–36

Volume Edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, Bruce H. Kirmmse, David D. Possen, Joel D. S. Rasmussen, and Vanessa Rumble

Published in cooperation with the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre Copenhagen

Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford

KIERKEGAARD’S

JOURNALS and NOTEBOOKS Editorial Board Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, Bruce H. Kirmmse, David D. Possen, Joel D. S. Rasmussen, and Vanessa Rumble in cooperation with the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen Volume 10, Journals NB31–NB36 Originally published under the titles Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter: 26 Journalerne NB31–NB36 and Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter: K26 Kommentarer til Journalerne NB31–NB36 © 2009 by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre Foundation, Copenhagen The Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre Foundation at Copenhagen University was established with support from the Danish National Research Foundation. English translation Copyright © 2018 by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre Foundation at the University of Copenhagen, and the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW press.princeton.edu All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Control Number 2011925169 ISBN: 978-0-691-17898-1 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available The publication of Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks is supported by grants from the Danish Ministry of Culture, the United States National Endowment for the Humanities, and Connecticut College. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks is based on Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, which is published with the support of grants from the Danish National Research Foundation and the Danish Ministry of Culture. Except as otherwise noted, all photographs have been provided by the photographic studio of the Royal Danish Library. This book has been composed in Palatino and Optima by Katalin Nun Stewart Text design by Bent Rohde Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Introduction

........................

Journal NB 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Journal NB 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii 1 115

Journal NB 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Journal NB 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247

Journal NB 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Journal NB 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

367

Notes for Journal NB 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

449

Notes for Journal NB 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

505

Notes for Journal NB 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

571

Notes for Journal NB 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

609

Notes for Journal NB 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

629

Notes for Journal NB 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

649

.............................

667

.......................... Concordance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

673

Maps

Calendar

319 417

677

vii

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks Introduction to the English Language Edition Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks is based on Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (hereafter, SKS) [Søren Kierkegaard’s Writings] (Copenhagen: Gad, 1997–2012), which is a Danish scholarly, annotated edition of everything written by Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), and comprises fifty-five volumes. SKS divides the entirety of Kierkegaard’s output into four categories: 1) works published by Kierkegaard during his lifetime (e.g., such well-known titles as Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and The Sickness unto Death); 2) works that lay ready―or substantially ready―for publication at the time of Kierkegaard’s death, but which he did not publish in his lifetime (e.g., titles such as The Book on Adler, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Judge for Yourself!); 3) journals, notebooks, excerpts, and loose papers, collectively titled Kierkegaard’s “journals and notebooks”; and 4) letters and biographical documents. Clearly, Kierkegaard was not only a prolific author, he was also a prolific writer, and his literary activity found expression not only in his published works but also in the mass of writings that were not published in his lifetime. It is these writings, the third category listed above, titled Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks (hereafter, KJN) that constitute the material of the present English language edition. For a detailed account of previous Danish and English language editions of Kierkegaard’s unpublished writings, see pp. vii–xii of the “Introduction to the English Language Edition” in volume 1 of KJN.

I. Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks Based as it is on the new Danish edition of SKS, the present English language edition of Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks employs the SKS principle of organization by archival unit: journals, notebooks, and loose papers. The materials constituting the present edition of KJN consist of the documents mentioned above as the third category of materials included in SKS as volumes 17 through 27. The eleven volumes of KJN contain the translated text of these eleven SKS volumes,

viii

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

plus most of the explanatory notes contained in the eleven SKS commentary volumes that accompany SKS 17–27. Specifically, the textual materials constituting KJN consist of the following documents: a) a set of ten journals to which Kierkegaard affixed labels designating them “AA” through “KK” (as “I” and “J” are identical in the classical Roman alphabet, there is no journal titled “II”); b) fifteen notebooks, designated “1” through “15” by the editors of SKS, sequenced according to the dates on which Kierkegaard first made use of them; Kierkegaard himself assigned titles to four of these notebooks, and the editors retain these titles in parentheses; c) a series of thirty-six quarto-sized, bound journal volumes to which Kierkegaard affixed labels designating them journals “NB,” “NB2,” “NB3,” through “NB36”; and d) a great variety of materials―a large number of individual folio sheets, pages, slips, and scraps of paper―which the editors of KJN, following the editors of SKS, title “loose papers.” There is a good deal of chronological back-and-forth in Kierkegaard’s posthumous papers. Kierkegaard often made use of several of the first twenty-four documents―the ten journals designated “AA” through “KK” and the notebooks “1” through “14”― simultaneously, and there is thus much temporal overlap among these journals and notebooks. (Indeed, it was only after they had been in use for some time, probably in mid- or late 1842, that Kierkegaard assigned the designations “AA” through “KK” to the journal volumes bearing those labels.) Nonetheless, the abovementioned archival units do fall into several broad temporal categories, and these twenty-four journals and notebooks can be collectively assigned to the period 1833–1846. Notebook 15, however, which is entirely devoted to Kierkegaard’s relationship to Regine Olsen, his onetime fiancée, stems from 1849. The journals titled “NB” through “NB36” were assigned their numbered titles in chronological order by Kierkegaard himself and stem from the period 1846–1855, though here, too, these journals contain additions and emendations, some of which stem from later periods, disrupting the general chronological sequence of the journals. The final group of materials, the “loose papers,” spans the entire period 1833–1855.

I NTRODUCTION

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

KJN follows the editors of SKS in the choice of a two-column format, which best reflects Kierkegaard’s practice when keeping his journals and notebooks. Like many of his contemporaries, Kierkegaard’s usual custom with his journals and notebooks was to crease the pages lengthwise (vertically) so that each page had an inner column for the main text and a somewhat narrower outer column for subsequent reflections and additions. In this way, further reflections could be―and very often were―added later, sometimes much later, often on several subsequent occasions, e.g., when Kierkegaard read or thought of something that reminded him of something he had written earlier. As has been noted above, a certain degree of chronological organization is present in the documents themselves, but a strictly chronological presentation of all the material is neither possible nor, perhaps, desirable. A strict and comprehensive chronological organization of the material is impossible, for while we can often detect the sequence in which Kierkegaard altered and emended an original passage in a notebook or journal, it is frequently not possible to ascertain when these alterations and emendations took place―though in his earlier entries Kierkegaard often dated his marginal additions. Furthermore, there are also cases in which the very sequence of such changes cannot be determined with certainty. Finally, even if it could be established, a rigorously chronological sequencing of all the material would not necessarily be desirable, because such a serial presentation would render it more difficult to see the manner in which Kierkegaard could return to a passage on multiple subsequent occasions, adding to, deleting, and altering what he had originally written. (It is hoped that upon completion of all eleven volumes of KJN it will be possible to produce an electronic edition of the entire series; this would make it possible for readers to organize and search through the materials in a variety of ways.)

II. The Format and Organization of the Present Edition 1. Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks (KJN) and Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS) As already noted, KJN is a translation of Kierkegaard’s journals, notebooks, and loose papers, using the text as established by the editors of SKS. The great majority of the materials included in the present volumes is taken from Kierkegaard’s surviving manuscripts, but some manuscripts were lost in the production

ix

x

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

of the first published selection of Kierkegaard’s papers, H. P. Barfod’s nine-volume edition of Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer (hereafter, EP). Thus, particularly in the early volumes of KJN, our only source for a number of Kierkegaard’s journal entries is the version originally published in EP. When this is the case, KJN indicates that the source is the published version from EP by employing justified right-hand margins, while most of the text of KJN, taken as it is from the surviving manuscripts, employs a ragged right-hand margin. In addition, there are a number of cases, typically involving short or fragmentary entries or lines, in which the only surviving source is Barfod’s catalogue of Kierkegaard’s manuscripts, while in still other cases material in the original manuscripts deleted by Kierkegaard has been deciphered and restored by the editors of SKS; both these sorts of material are reproduced in KJN without text-critical commentary. Scholars interested in these source details are referred to the text-critical apparatus of SKS. In addition, there are some cases in which Kierkegaard’s original manuscript cannot be read meaningfully, and the editors of SKS suggest a proposed reading of the passage in question. KJN has adopted most such proposed readings without comment, though in a number of cases such proposed readings are discussed in the explanatory notes. In some cases Kierkegaard’s spelling is erroneous or inconsistent or there is missing punctuation. On rare occasions the editors of SKS have corrected errors of this sort silently, while in other cases missing punctuation has been supplied (but placed within square brackets to indicate that this is the work of the editors of SKS), and in still other cases Kierkegaard’s errors of spelling or punctuation have been allowed to stand because they are indicative of the hasty and informal style that often characterizes his unpublished materials. Where they do not cause significant difficulties for English language readers, the editors of KJN have followed the editors of SKS in allowing a number of Kierkegaard’s spelling errors (e.g., of proper names) and punctuation lapses to remain. On the other hand, where the retention of Kierkegaard’s errors might cause significant difficulties for English language readers, the editors of KJN have absorbed without annotation the corrections made by the editors of SKS (both the silent and the bracketed corrections), and have occasionally corrected instances of erroneous spelling and missing punctuation that have been permitted to remain in SKS. Here―as in the above-mentioned cases involving materials that have their source in Barfod’s catalogue or in text deleted by Kierkegaard and restored by the editors of SKS―scholars who require access to the entire text-critical apparatus of SKS should consult that edition.

I NTRODUCTION

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

2. Two-Column Format in the Main Text As already noted, a two-column format is employed where necessary in order to emphasize the polydimensionality of the original documentary materials; thus, for example, providing a spatial representation of a draft’s character as a draft with multiple alterations. 3. Typographical Conventions in the Main Text a) In Kierkegaard’s time, both “gothic” and “latin” handwriting were in common use among educated people. Generally, when writing Danish and German (which of course accounts for the bulk of his journals and notebooks) Kierkegaard used a gothic hand, while when writing Latin or French (which he did much less frequently than Danish or German) Kierkegaard used a latin hand. Following the editors of SKS, the editors of KJN have sought to preserve this feature by using ordinary roman type to represent Kierkegaard’s gothic hand, and a sans serif typeface to represent Kierkegaard’s latin hand. Greek and Hebrew appear in their respective alphabets. b) As in SKS, italic and boldface are used to indicate Kierkegaard’s degrees of emphasis. Italic indicates underlining by Kierkegaard. Boldface indicates double underlining by Kierkegaard Boldface italic indicates double underlining plus a third, wavy underlining by Kierkegaard. 4. Margins and Reference Format in the Main Text a) The SKS pagination of the journals appears in roman type in the margins of the present edition. This permits the reader to refer to SKS, which contains the entire apparatus of text-critical markers and notes concerning the manuscripts, including indications of Kierkegaard’s own pagination of his journals and notebooks. b) Two separate italic line counters are included in the inner and outer margins in order to facilitate specific line references to each of the two columns. c) The boldface entry numbers in the margins are not Kierkegaard’s own but have been added by the editors of SKS in order to facilitate reference to specific entries. Each journal or notebook has its own entry numbering in arabic numerals, e.g., “AA:1,” “DD:8,” “Not3:2,” “NB34:6” etc., which refer to the first entry in Journal AA, the eighth entry in Journal DD, the second entry in Notebook 3, “the sixth entry in Journal NB34,” etc.

xi

xii

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

Kierkegaard’s marginal additions to journal or notebook entries are indicated with lowercase alphabet letters, e.g., “AA:23.b,” which refers to Kierkegaard’s second marginal addition to the twenty-third entry in Journal AA. If a marginal addition itself has a marginal addition, this is also indicated by another layer of lowercase alphabet letters, e.g., “DD:11.a.a,” which refers to the first marginal note to the first marginal note to the eleventh entry in Journal DD. When Kierkegaard left a reference mark in his main text referring to a marginal note, the marginal note referred to is preceded by a lowercase alphabet letter, set in roman, with no enclosing brackets, e.g. “a.” When Kierkegaard did not leave a reference mark in his main text for a marginal note, but the editors of SKS are not in doubt about the point in Kierkegaard’s main text to which the marginal note refers, the reference symbol (a lowercase alphabet letter) preceding that marginal note is set in roman and is enclosed within roman square brackets, e.g., “[a].” When Kierkegaard did not leave a reference mark in his main text for a marginal note, and the editors of SKS could not determine with certainty the point in Kierkegaard’s main text to which the marginal note refers, the reference symbol (a lowercase alphabet letter) preceding that marginal note is set in italic and is enclosed within italic square brackets, e.g., “[a].” In these cases, the editors of KJN, following the usage of the editors of SKS, have situated Kierkegaard’s marginal additions approximately where they are found on the pages of Kierkegaard’s own journal manuscripts, which, as noted, employed a two-column format. Loose papers are numbered sequentially, “Paper 1,” “Paper 2,” “Paper 3,” etc. Some of these papers constitute a single unit (e.g., Paper 134), but many consist of more than one item and are subdivided using colons as separators, as, e.g., “Paper 3:2,” or in the striking instance of Paper 365, which is subdivided into twenty-four items: “Paper 365:1,” “Paper 365:2,” . . . “Paper 365:24.” If an item has a marginal note associated with it, the designation of such notes is in the same format as that used for marginal notes in the notebooks and the NB journals, e.g., “Paper 371:2.c.” Because of the great mass of material included KJN 11, the volume is divided into two tomes, Volume 11 (Part 1) and Volume 11 (Part 2). Page references to the papers in these volumes are in the format: “Paper 45:1, KJN 11.1, 88,” “Paper 583, KJN 11.2, 297,” etc. If more specific reference than this is necessary, the system of KJN volume number, page number, and line number on the appropriate line counter is employed, e.g., “KJN 1, 56:11,” referring to a passage in the first volume of KJN, page 56, line 11 on the line counter for the inner column. If a marginal note (thus, a note

I NTRODUCTION

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

in the outer column of the page) is referred to in this manner, the reference is in the format “KJN 9, 56m:3,” referring to a marginal note found in volume 9 of KJN, page 56, line 3 on the marginal or outer column line counter. 5. Footnotes in the Main Text a) Kierkegaard’s own footnotes are indicated by superscript arabic numerals, both in the main text and at the beginning of the footnote itself, and are numbered consecutively within a journal entry, with the numbering beginning at “1” for each new journal entry. Kierkegaard’s footnotes appear at the bottom of the text column or at the end of the entry to which they pertain, whichever comes first, but always above the solid horizontal line at the foot of the page. When the source for a footnote by Kierkegaard is Barfod’s EP rather than an original manuscript, the placement in the main text of the superscript reference number for that footnote is of course not known from Kierkegaard, but only from EP; in such cases, Kierkegaard’s footnote will appear at the bottom of the page (though above the solid line) as with all other footnotes by Kierkegaard, but the superscript reference number preceding the footnote will be followed by a close-parenthesis, e.g., “1).” b) Translator’s footnotes appear below the solid horizontal line at the foot of the page. 6. Foreign Language in the Main Text Foreign (non-Danish) words, expressions, and quotations that appear in Kierkegaard’s text are left in the original language. English translations of foreign language text are provided in translator’s footnotes at the foot of the page, below the solid horizontal line. In the event that extreme length or some other technical difficulty makes it impossible to accommodate a translation of a foreign language passage at the foot of the page, it will appear in the explanatory notes at the back of the volume. English translations of the titles of foreign language books, articles, poems, etc. are always in the explanatory notes, not in the translator’s footnotes.

7. Photographs of Original Manuscripts Selected photographs of original manuscript material are included in the main text.

xiii

xiv

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

8. Orthography of Classical Names The orthographical standard for all ancient Greek and Roman names and place names is The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 9. Material Included at the Back of Each Volume a) A brief “Critical Account of the Text” gives a description of the physical appearance, provenance, and whatever chronological information is known concerning a document. If the document is related to others―for example, in the cases where Kierkegaard is known to have used one of the journals in the AA–KK group in tandem with one or more of the notebooks numbered 1–14, which stem from the same period―this is also indicated. b) Each journal or notebook is accompanied by “Explanatory Notes.” In some cases, notes included in SKS have been shortened or omitted in KJN. In a number of cases, notes that do not appear in SKS have been added to KJN; typically, these serve to explain geographical or historical references that are obvious to Danes but are not likely to be known by non-Danes. Notes are keyed by page and entry number to specific lemmata; that is, to key words or phrases from the main text that appear in boldface at the beginning of each note. The running heads on each page of notes indicate the journal or notebook and entry number(s) to which the notes on that page refer, while the numbers in the margins of each column of notes indicate the page and line number in the main text where the lemma under discussion is found. When the text of a note mentions a lemma explained in another note for the same journal or notebook, an arrow (→) accompanied by a large and a small number–e.g., →110,22―serves as a cross-reference, indicating the page and line number (in this case, page 110, line 22) where that lemma occurs in the main text. Each journal or notebook is treated as a separate unit with respect to explanatory notes; thus the notes for a given journal or notebook contain no cross-references to notes for other journals or notebooks. (The explanatory notes for Notebooks 9 and 10 constitute an exception to this rule because those two notebooks are so closely connected that they should perhaps be considered a single document.) The notes are usually confined to clarifying historical, biographical, geographical, and similar information not readily available in a standard English language desk reference volume. Notes do not engage in critical interpretation or in discussions of the scholarly literature. As noted under 6 above, on some occasions―which presumably will be very infrequent, if they occur at all―it may not be possible to translate foreign language passages in translator’s

I NTRODUCTION

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

footnotes at the foot of the main text page, and in such cases the translated passage will appear in an explanatory note at the end of the volume. There are no markers in the main text denoting the existence of an explanatory note pertaining to a particular word or passage. c) Maps of nineteenth-century Copenhagen, Denmark, etc., are provided where appropriate. d) Calendars of the years covered in the volume, indicating days of the week, holidays, etc., are provided. e) Illustrations referred to in Kierkegaard’s text are reproduced. f) A concordance to the Heiberg edition of the Papirer is provided in order to facilitate using the present edition in conjunction with works, including previous translations of Kierkegaard’s posthumous papers, that refer to the Papirer. 10. Abbreviations a) Abbreviations used in the main text In the main text an attempt has been made to preserve something of the feel of the original documents, in which Kierkegaard made liberal use of a great many abbreviations, shortening words in accordance with the common usage of his times. Naturally, many of these abbreviations cannot be duplicated in English, but where it has seemed appropriate a number of commonly used (or easily decipherable) English abbreviations have been employed in order to provide a sense of Kierkegaard’s “journal style.” b) Abbreviations used in “Critical Accounts of the Texts” and in “Explanatory Notes”

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. H. P. Rohde (Copenhagen: The Royal Library, 1967)

B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard [Letters and Documents Concerning Søren Kierkegaard], 2 vols., ed. Niels Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953–1954)

B-cat.

H. P. Barfod, “Fortegnelse over de efter Søren Aabye Kierkegaard forefundne Papirer” [Catalogue of the Pa pers Found after the Death of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard]

xv

xvi

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

Bl.art.

S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter [S. Kierkegaard’s Newspaper Articles, with an Appendix Collected after the Author’s Death, Published as a Supplement to His Other Works], ed. Rasmus Nielsen (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1857)

d.

Died in the year

EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer [From Søren Kierkegaard’s Posthumous Papers], 9 vols., ed. H. P. Barfod and H. Gottsched (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1869–1881)

Jub.

G.W.F. Hegel, Sämtliche Werke [Complete Works]. Jubiläumsausgabe, 26 vols., ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1928–1941)

KA

The Kierkegaard Archive at the Royal Library in Copenhagen

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, 11 vols., ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Joel D. S. Rasmussen, David D. Possen, Vanessa Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007–)

KW

Kierkegaard’s Writings, 26 vols., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978–2000) Occasionally, the explanatory notes will employ different English translations of the titles of Kierkegaard’s works than those used in KW. For example, Kierkegaard’s En literair Anmeldelse, which is translated Two Ages in KW, may appear in the explanatory notes as A Literary Review. All such departures from the English titles as they appear in KW will be explained in the explanatory notes in which they appear. Generally, however, the English titles used in KW will be used; these titles have been assigned standard abbreviations as follows:

I NTRODUCTION AN BA C

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

“Armed Neutrality” in KW 22 The Book on Adler in KW 24 The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress in KW 17 CA The Concept of Anxiety in KW 8 CD Christian Discourses in KW 17 CI The Concept of Irony in KW 2 COR The “Corsair” Affair; Articles Related to the Writings in KW 13 CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript in KW 12 EO 1 Either/Or, part 1 in KW 3 EO 2 Either/Or, part 2 in KW 4 EPW Early Polemical Writings: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap- Cellars in KW 1 EUD Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses in KW 15 FPOSL From the Papers of One Still Living in KW 1 FSE For Self-Examination in KW 21 FT Fear and Trembling in KW 6 JC “Johannes Climacus or De omnibus dubitandum est” in KW 7 JFY Judge for Yourself! in KW 21 LD Letters and Documents in KW 25 M “The Moment” and Late Writings: Articles from Fædrelandet; The Moment, nos. 1–10; This Must Be Said, So Let It Be Said; What Christ Judges of Official Christianity; The Changelessness of God in KW 23 NA “Newspaper Articles, 1854–1855” in KW 23 NSBL “Notes on Schelling’s Berlin Lectures” in KW 2 OMWA On My Work as an Author in KW 22 P Prefaces in KW 9 PC Practice in Christianity in KW 20 PF Philosophical Fragments in KW 7 PV The Point of View for My Work as an Author in KW 22 R Repetition in KW 6 SLW Stages on Life’s Way in KW 11 SUD The Sickness unto Death in KW 19 TA Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary Review in KW 14

xvii

xviii

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS TDIO UDVS WA

WL WS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions in KW 10 Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits in KW 15 Without Authority: The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air; Two Ethical-Religious Essays; Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays; An Upbuilding Discourse; Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays in KW 18 Works of Love in KW 16 “Writing Sampler” in KW 9

NKS

Ny Kongelige Samling [New Royal Collection], a special collection at the Royal Library in Copenhagen

NRSV

Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version with Apocrypha (see part c below)

NT

New Testament

OT

Old Testament

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer [The Papers of Søren Kierkegaard], 2nd ed., 16 vols. in 25 tomes, ed. P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909–1978)

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter [Søren Kierkegaard’s Writings], 28 text volumes and 27 commentary volumes, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, Johnny Kondrup, and Alastair McKinnon (Copenhagen: Gad, 1997–2012) The 28 text volumes of SKS are referred to as SKS 1 through SKS 28. The 27 commentary volumes that accompany the text volumes are referred to as SKS K1 through SKS K28. (The reason there are 27 rather than 28 commentary volumes is that a single commentary volume, SKS K2–3, accompanies the two text volumes SKS 2 and SKS 3, which together comprise the massive two-volume work Enten―Eller [Either/ Or].)

I NTRODUCTION SV1

SV2

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker [Søren Kierkegaard’s Collected Works], 1st ed., 14 vols., ed. A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1901–1906) Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker [Søren Kierkegaard’s Collected Works], 2nd ed., 15 vols., ed. A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1920–1936)

c) The Bible. All biblical quotations are from the following English translations: Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version with Apocrypha (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) (Standard for references to the authorized Danish translation of the New Testament from 1819 and used for many other biblical references.) The Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) (Often used for references to the authorized Danish translation of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha from 1740 and occasionally used for other biblical references.) Occasionally, in order to help the reader understand the text of a journal entry, the translators of KJN may make minor modifications to one of the above Bible translations. Books of the Bible are abbreviated in accordance with the abbreviations used in the NRSV:

Old Testament Gen Ex Lev Num Deut Josh Judg Ruth 1 Sam

Genesis Exodus Leviticus Numbers Deuteronomy Joshua Judges Ruth 1 Samuel

Eccl Song Isa Jer Lam Ezek Dan Hos Joel

Ecclesiastes Song of Solomon Isaiah Jeremiah Lamentations Ezekiel Daniel Hosea Joel

xix

xx

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS 2 Sam 1 Kings 2 Kings 1 Chr 2 Chr Ezra Neh Esth Job Ps Prov

AND

2 Samuel 1 Kings 2 Kings 1 Chronicles 2 Chronicles Ezra Nehemiah Esther Job Psalms Proverbs

N OTEBOOKS Am Ob Jon Mic Nah Hab Zeph Hag Zech Mal

Amos Obadiah Jonah Micah Nahum Habakkuk Zephaniah Haggai Zechariah Malachi

Apocryphal Books Tob Jdt Add Esth Wis Sir Bar 1 Esd 2 Esd Let Jer Song

Tobit Judith Additions to Esther Wisdom Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) Baruch 1 Esdras 2 Esdras Letter of Jeremiah Prayer of Azariah

of Thr Sus Bel 1 Macc 2 Macc 3 Macc 4 Macc Pr Man

and the Song of the Three Jews Susanna Bel and the Dragon 1 Maccabees 2 Maccabees 3 Maccabees 4 Maccabees Prayer of Manasseh

New Testament Mt Mk Lk Jn Acts Rom 1 Cor 2 Cor Gal Eph Phil Col 1 Thess 2 Thess

Matthew Mark Luke John Acts of the Apostles Romans 1 Corinthians 2 Corinthians Galatians Ephesians Philippians Colossians 1 Thessalonians 2 Thessalonians

1 Tim 2 Tim Titus Philem Heb Jas 1 Pet 2 Pet 1 Jn 2 Jn 3 Jn Jude Rev

1 Timothy 2 Timothy Titus Philemon Hebrews James 1 Peter 2 Peter 1 John 2 John 3 John Jude Revelation

I NTRODUCTION

TO THE

E NGLISH L ANGUAGE E DITION

11. Variants While KJN does not include the full text-critical apparatus of SKS, a number of textual variants, deemed by the editors of KJN to be of particular interest, are included in the explanatory notes for each journal or notebook. The notation used to indicate different types of variants is explained below. (A list of selected variants for KJN 1 is included in volume 2, immediately following the explanatory notes for Journal KK.) first written:

changes determined by the editors of SKS to have been made in the manuscript at the time of original writing, including: (a) replacement variants placed in the line, immediately following deleted text; (b) replacement variants written directly on top of the original text; and (c) deletions

changed from: changes determined by the editors of SKS to have been made in the manuscript subsequent to the time of original writing, including: (a) deletions with replacement variants written in the margin or on top of the original text, and (b) deletions without replacement text added:

additions determined by the editors of SKS to have been made to the manuscript subsequent to the time of original writing

12. Symbols []

enclose the KJN editors’ supplements to the SKS text; also enclose reference symbols, added by the editors of SKS, to marginal annotations or footnotes for which Kierkegaard did not leave a symbol, but whose placement is beyond doubt

[]

enclose reference symbols, added by the editors of SKS, to marginal annotations for which Kierkegaard did not clearly assign to a specific locus in a specific main entry

xxi

xxii

K IERKEGAARD’S J OURNALS

AND

N OTEBOOKS

Acknowledgments I am happy to acknowledge the support for Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks that has been provided by the United States National Endowment for the Humanities, the Danish National Research Foundation, the Danish Ministry of Culture, and Connecticut College. Bruce H. Kirmmse, General Editor, for the Editorial Board of Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks.

JOURNAL NB31

JOURNAL NB31 Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse Edited by Joel D. S. Rasmussen

Text source Journal NB31 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Anne Mette Hansen, Klaus Nielsen, and Steen Tullberg

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 1

7

1

•

1854

NB31. Aug. 16th 1854.

3

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 2 1854 •

9

2

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

“Time” Is the Sophistical. Can an eternal blessedness be decided in a moment of time, or can something eternal be decided in time? This is how one could, philosophically, properly address the question to Xnty, and answer it in the negative. Naturally, it does not follow from this that Xnty must abandon its position, because Xnty of course declares itself to be against the understanding, to be paradoxical, a point of view one also does well to uphold in opposition to all mythological views of Xnty―that it is mythology―to which one might address the question whether they could point out any mythology which itself says that it is against the understanding. In general, all objections to Xnty are made by virtue of the understanding―but without sufficient understanding to stop at this sign: that Xnty itself indeed proclaims that it is contrary to the understanding. The summa summarum of all objections is a ridiculous waste of time and bother. Thus philosophy can deny that something eternal can be decided in time. The common treatment of the matter has been to hold that it is altogether too daring of philosophy to deny the thesis flatly― and, thereby, Xnty. People have held the view that 70 years was insufficient, that a long, long series of years was required. Here, by virtue of the sophistical, begins the nonsense. If something eternal can be decided in time, then 70 years, and 10 years, and 5 minutes suffice equally, and nothing would be gained with 170,000 years―the only thing gained is an escape for those who cannot think. If something eternal can be decided in time, then 70 years is more than enough. And the decision cannot take place if, for example, a man in his 30th year solemnly says to himself: [“]Now, you have 40 years ahead for yourself, it is important to use them in making a decision regarding eternity.[”] No, it cannot be done in that way. Nor is it true, because existence, which surely knows what it wants, has of course arranged things such that no one can know whether he will be alive for the next hour―and Xnty believes that precisely this unrest is part of bringing about a decision regarding eternity. For an eternal decision in time is the most intensive intensity, the most intensive leap. 16 summa summarum] Latin, sum of sums, sum total.

5

6

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 2–3

•

1854

But peop. continually seek for escape routes, they constantly want to make sophistical arguments with the help of the sophistical element in time. Indeed, with the help of time, with the help of allowing more time and of giving the appearance that the longer the time, the nearer one comes to an eternal decision― they understand very well that they evade the decision, that this [decision] is reached precisely by the intensive denial of time: the shorter the time, the closer is the possibility of an eternal decision; that is why death is so supportive with respect to an eternal decision, because here the time is so short. But, as with death, a hum. being is naturally afraid of an eternal decision, and therefore he always addresses the matter the wrong way around: that a long, long series of years is needed, that even 70 years is too little, and perhaps millions of years would not be enough―No, it is quite certain: Just as the man who had reserved the right to choose the tree from which he was to be hanged was incapable of finding a suitable tree, so should one be certain that millions of years would merely distance a person more and more from an eternal decision. So when someone presents this popular plausibility, that 70 years is too short a time, that a much longer, much greater series of years is required, one could answer him with the words Abraham spoke to the rich man: They have Moses and the prophets― if they do not believe them, they will not believe, even though someone rose from the dead. Nothing is more certain. It is certainly possible, indeed, that the fact that someone arose from the dead could shake a superstitious fear into their lives, but that is not believing. And similarly, one must also surely say that for the person who believes that 70 years is not a long enough time, who believes that the error lies there and not in himself―he will surely never come any closer to an eternal decision, even if he lived 170,000 years. One also sees this when one takes note of how peop. live. Their so-called efforts over the course of years are neither more nor less than a steady retreat.

The Hum.―The Divine. The hum. being is “a social animal,” and he believes in the power of uniting, of forming groups.

5

10

10

15

20

25

30

35

3

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 3–4

•

1854

25

Therefore, the hum. idea is this: Let us all unite―unite, if possible, all the kingdoms and countries of the earth―and the pyramid-shaped association thus formed, which grows higher and higher, bears upon its summit a super-king― ―he must be assumed to be closest to God, truly to be so close to God that God is worried about him and takes him into account. For Christianity, things are precisely the reverse of this. This very sort of super-king would stand furthest from God, just as God is totally opposed to the entire enterprise of the pyramid. The despised person, rejected by the human race, a poor, single, solitary wretch, an outcast―this, according to Christianity, this is what God chooses, and this is what is closest to him. He hates the business of the pyramid. God is infinite love in such a way that his fatherly eye readily sees how easy it is for this hum. pyramid idea to become cruel to the less fortunate―to those who have been pushed aside, and so on―of the hum. race (the very people of whom the God of love takes care); thus he is also too infinitely wise a majesty to fail to see that if this pyramid received the least bit of acceptance―as if there were some truth, even the least grain of truth, in the notion that as one ascends the pyramid one in fact gets a little closer to God―then hum. beings would not let go of the idea of one day building the pyramid so high that they will believe they can push God off the throne. So God pushes the pyramid over and everything collapses―a generation later, peop. begin the pyramid business all over again.

4

A True Christian in Christendom.

11

10

15

20

30

35

A weak metaphor of a true Christian’s heterogeneity with respect to other people is probably to regard him as having been shot by elves. But wouldn’t this be the profoundest sort of nonsense―if being regarded as having been elf-shot (heterogeneous) were to happen in a country, and among a people, whose official religion was belief in elves, and where 1000 priests were paid to proclaim this faith.

7

8

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 5–7

•

1854

The Freethinker―The Christian Objection.

1

5

10

[a]

The freethinker wants to get rid of the priests, thinking that this will get rid of Xnty. You shortsighted person with your superficial observation—truly, the priests do not stand in any such intimate relation to Xnty. No, the Xn objection expresses a better understanding of the matter: it wants to get rid of the priests—in order to get hold of Xnty.

The freethinker says: If only the priests weren’t there with their Xnty. The Christian objection is: If only these priests weren’t there with their Xnty―which makes Xnty impossible.

Father Forgive Them, for They Know Not What They Do.

12

5

5

6

This does not contain the Socratic view that sin is ignorance. 15

The Criminal Dialectician. Just as a person who is himself a member of the profession recognizes a master among interrogation magistrates, not by his virtuosity in individual skills, but by how he arranges the interrogation, so that when he sees such a master he immediately says: [“]Look, here is the master,[”]― ―so, too, is the criminal dialectician recognizable by how he arranges the entire matter, how he poses the problem. And a criminal dialectician is precisely what Xnty needs.

7

20

25

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 8–10 8

5

13

10

The Law of Subordination. Because no hum. being is the ideal, it is easily seen that everyone reduces the price somewhat―including the apostle. But subordination and common sense dictate that a person whose life is less strenuous is not permitted to say to a person whose life is more strenuous: You, too, are reducing the price. This is what people have done, and this sophistry instantly extinguishes all effort, and the situation becomes sheer nonsense about grace.

9

Strength―Weakness.

15

25

When a girl’s beloved dies or is unfaithful to her, and she says that it will be the death of her―then, a year later, when she gets married, then peop. say: Who would have believed she was so strong[?] The truth is: She was weak. But strength in relation to an idea is regarded as weakness, and physical strength is regarded as strength. People call it strength when a person has the strength to live utterly devoid of ideas; people call it strength when a person has the strength to secure himself profit in everything he does, etc.

10

The Objections to Xnty.

20

30

can be dismissed with the single remark: Are these objections made by someone who has fulfilled Xt’s commands and existential requirements[?] If not, all his objections are nonsense, because Christ of course continually says that a person must do what he says―and then it will be seen that it is truth.

•

1854

9

10

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 10–13

•

1854

But the problem is not in fact to be found in these objections, but in this swarm of professors, priests, etc. who are devoid of character, who similarly fail to follow Christ’s commandments, but write folios defending against what are―from a Christian standpoint―nonsensical objections.

5

14

The Christian Thesis is not intelligere ut credam, nor is it credere, ut intelligam, No, it reads: Obey Xt’s requirements and commands, do the will of the Father―and you will believe. Xnty is absolutely not situated in the sphere of intellectuality.

The Christian Requirement What Xnty constantly aims at is: to suffer for the teaching, to suffer at the hands of hum. beings. When fasting, etc. is what is ordinarily done (that is, what is honored by human opinion), then fasting, etc. is absolutely not Christianity in the stricter sense. No, the characteristic mark of Christian suffering is suffering at the hands of hum. beings. This is a consequence of the view that, according to Xnty, to love God is to hate the world, or that according to Xnty, there is enmity between God and hum. beings.

The System. Personality is aristocratic―the System is a plebeian invention: with the help of the System (that omnibus), everyone comes along. Therefore, in the hum. thieves’ cant, which always talks double-speak, they always say, [“]He was only a personality, he had no system[”]―that is, people make what is inferior into something superior.

8 intelligere ut credam] Latin, I understand, that I might believe. 8 credere, ut intelligam] Latin, I believe, that I might understand. (See also explanatory note.)

11

10

12

15

20

13 25

30

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 14–16 14

15

10

•

1854

The Journalists. These people take their name from [“]the day[”] (journalists). It seems to me that it would be better to name them after the night. Therefore―inasmuch as journalist is a foreign word―I suggest that they be called “night carriers, the guild of night carriers.” I don’t think the word is so appropriate for those to whom it is applied―the people who cart away sewage from septic tanks. But journalists are truly “night carriers[”]: they do not carry filth away at night, which of course is both honest and decent work―no, they carry filth in in the daytime; or, to put it even better, they spread “night” over people: darkness, confusion―in short, they are: night carriers.

15

Chance Witticism

15

30

I have always believed and said that chance, that actuality, is wittier than all witty authors. Here is an example that I will indeed write down, however much I usually refrain from writing such things. The man who has best understood the present moment in Denmark (the whole of this political bustle and busyness of half-men who are devoid of character), the man who has written and continues to write the wittiest satire on it is a shopkeeper (in Farve-Gaden, I think) who advertises every day in Adresse-Avisen a long list of things he rents out, a list that ends: [“]wheels of fortune, and bedpans.[”] The ass, I could envy him―he is wittier than the wittiest author in Denmark. Wheel of fortune―yes, that’s the whole of it. But we don’t play for such high stakes as life and death, no―so what is needed instead is: bedpans. The age of heroes is past: Here we rent out wheels of fortune and bedpans.

16

The Priest Who Is Bound by an Oath.

20

25

35

If it can be shown that from a Christian standpoint the state is not permitted to pay teachers of Xnty, then the priest, who

11

12

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 16–19

•

1854

is bound by an oath on the N.T., is obligated to say No―the circumstance that the state is willing to do is of no help to him whatever. The oath makes the priest responsible before God with respect to the New Testament. 16 5

To Suffer for the Teaching. Were someone to say: [“]But if I lived in a place where all were true Xns, then that [suffering for the teaching] would of course be impossible[”]: to this the answer must be: [“]If that were to be the case (despite the fact that it cannot be true), well, then you are eo ipso a missionary. But people have completely forgotten that to be a Christian is essentially to be a missionary. Christianity at rest is eo ipso not Xnty. As soon this sort of thing seems to emerge, it means: become a missionary. Xnty at rest, in stagnation, produces an obstruction, and it is this frightful obstruction that is Xndom’s sickness.

The Master―The Disciple―The Muddlehead The disciple who became a fisher of men, who casts the net and catches 3000 souls at one time―in his whole life, the Master caught only 12. So, is the disciple indeed greater than the master? Yes, were it not for the fact that in Christianity, everything is reversed. The disciple caught thousands―by reducing the price of Xnty. And then, when someday there lives a disciple at 127th hand of that first disciple’s disciple at 27th hand―a muddlehead: He will catch the whole world for Xnty. This is how things are moving forward for Xnty.

The New Testament. A young girl―“16 summers old”―it is her confirmation day. Among the many different tasteful and beautiful gifts she receives there is also a New Testament in a lovely binding. 13 eo ipso] Latin, by that very fact.

17

10

15

18

20

25

19

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 19–20

5

17

10

15

20

•

1854

This, you see, this is what they call Xnty! Truly, people assume―and this is indeed something they really do―people assume that of course she will read it just as little as the others read it, and just as little in any sort of primitive fashion. She receives the book as a consolation in her life: Here you will find consolation if you should need it―people of course assume that she will not read it any more than other young girls, and above all not primitively: otherwise she would discover that here, here are all the terrors compared to which those that otherwise occur in the world are almost merely a jest. But, you see, this is Christianity. And then this, too, is Xnty, this foolishness with Bible societies that distribute New Testaments by the millions. No, I could be tempted to make another suggestion to Xndom: Let us gather all the New Testaments we have, bring them to an open plaza or up on a mountaintop, and, while we all kneel, have someone say this to God: [“]Take this book back again. We hum. beings, such as we now are, we are not able to get involved with something of this sort―it only makes us unhappy.[”] This, you see, is my suggestion: that we ask Xt to leave our neighborhood, just as those inhabitants did [in the Bible]. That would be honest, human talk―something other than this disgusting, hypocritical priestly prattle to the effect that life would not be of any value to us were it not for the priceless good that is Xnty.

25

20

30

35

The Wrong Turn Taken in Xndom.

To take a specific point in time, the occasion on which Xnty was elevated (i.e., degraded) into a state religion―if there had been hum. honesty that had said: [“]I see that the world has gotten the upper hand, that this is no longer New Testament Xnty, but I am not the God-Man, nor even an apostle, and putting a stop to this requires more than hum. strength―well, I will go along with it, but it must be made known that this is not the Xnty of the New Testament,”―oh, how very much different everything would have been. But instead of this there was a shrewdness that sought to conceal.

13

14

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 20–22

•

1854

But what nonsense this is. God is spirit, Christ is the truth, Xnty is the truth―and then we serve it by seeking to conceal the true state of affairs. No: One can only truly relate to the Xnty of the New Testament and to truth either this way: [“]We truly have this teaching[”]―or we admit truthfully that we do not have it. But shrewdness held the view that this latter approach would never do; it would be dangerous. Excellent! Thus, Xnty was originally truth, and now Xnty has become this: There is a danger that the true state of affairs will become apparent.

5

10

18

Christianity a Fortress Think of a fortress, absolutely impregnable, furnished with provisions for an eternity. Then a new commandant arrives. He gets the idea that the best thing would be to build bridges over the defensive works―in order to attack the besiegers. Charming! He turned the fortress into a rural village―and naturally the enemy conquered it. This is how it is in Xnty. People changed the method―and, of course, the world conquered.

Unless Your Righteousness Exceed That of the Scribes and Pharisees.

21

15

20

22

25

I understand the additional thing required here to be suffering for the teaching, suffering because of the good one does, suffering at the hands of human beings. Thus one sees that the asceticism of the Middle Ages, with its straightforward recognizability, is not what is required by Christianity. Christianity constantly has this in view: suffering at the hands of hum. beings, doing the good and suffering at the hands of hum. beings for having done it―for this is the atmosphere Xnty breathes: there is hatred between God and hum. beings.

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 23–24 23

5

10

19

•

1854

The Hum. Is the Relative, and the Hum. Being Is a Social Animal.

To become or to be the only unhappy one is very burdensome. But isn’t it just as burdensome for a hum. being to be the only one who is blessed―can this be something blessed for a hum. being[?] Here one sees how loftily Xnty is situated and thus what dreadful collisions it points to: to be blessed in contrast to others, in contrast to the peop. one loves most, father, mother, spouse, children―ah, frightful! But such is the unconditioned, and Xnty is the unconditioned. Is it, then, asking too much when I suggest that we at least admit that the way we live is absolutely not the Xnty of the New Testament[?]

15

24

20

25

30

35

The Truth. Every hum. being is more afraid of the truth than of death― this is the truth about all the hypocritical nonsense and the hypocrisy about loving the truth and about being so very willing, if only one could understand it, etc. No, a hum. being is by nature more afraid of the truth than of death―and this is quite natural, because the essence of the natural hum. being is more opposed to the truth than to death. What wonder, then, that he is so afraid of it[?] Being attentive to this truth requires being aside (“Christ took him aside”), being aside from the crowd. And this in itself is enough to make a pers. more anxious and afraid than he is of death. Because the hum. being is a social animal―only in the crowd is he happy: be it the most abysmal nonsense, be it the greatest villainy, to him it is ganz egal―he feels perfectly comfortable when the crowd holds a view, when the crowd does something― ―and he can be a part of the crowd. Because the hum. being is an animal who can become spirit, something that, qua animal, he is by nature more afraid of than of dying. He is an animal―and [“]being aside[”] aims at making him spirit. And, if a hum. being is to enter into the truth, this being aside is more precisely understood as the being aside of being ridiculed, mocked, mistreated by the others, by the crowd―a being aside that is much greater than that first being aside. 30 ganz egal] German, entirely the same.

15

16

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 24–25

•

1854

This, you see, is why a hum. being reworks the concept “truth.” Truth, they say, consists of running with the crowd― and, in addition, it is love. And this has now become Xnty.

The Meaning of Existence All the business about the history of Christianity, etc., is, as noted, nonsense and drivel―and swindlers’ tricks as well―in order to dethrone Xnty as an absolute power. The meaning of this existence is: [for a person] to be examined, to be examined for eternity. And this is how God has arranged this existence: In this world it is impossible truly to relate oneself to the truth without coming to suffer―and eternity judges everyone as to whether, in suffering, he has related to the truth. By contrast, the hum. being wants to get hold of the truth― without coming to suffer. The hum. being, each and every hum. being, has some sense for the truth, but he truly does not want to suffer for it, and he does not want to understand that suffering is in fact linked to the truth. Thus the hum. being has an interest in getting hold of the truth without coming to suffer, which is in fact impossible. Such is existence and the examination it entails. If I were a pagan and spoke Greek, I might say that God has arranged the entire business this way in order to amuse himself: he amuses himself just as a hum. being can amuse himself by putting a bit of pork in a mousetrap and then watch all the tricks the mice employ to get hold of the pork without getting caught― ―this is how God amuses himself over all the leaping, pivoting, twisting, etc. of all these millions of hum. beings in order to get hold of the truth without coming to suffer. All these millions: alas, yes, because the divine has majestic proportions, makes use of millions to get a couple of individuals, uses centuries to let errors have their fun. As noted, existence is arranged in such a way that it is truly impossible to relate oneself to the truth without suffering. Then, when an individual comes along who―at any rate, a bit more honestly―wants to venture out toward the truth, even though he, too, would prefer to have the truth without suffering for it: then Governance takes pity on him and helps him―to actually come to suffer. Naturally, he cries, alas! and woe!, etc., but of course

20

25

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 25–29

•

1854

it is nonetheless loving on the part of Governance insofar as it is certain that one can only relate oneself to the truth by actually suffering, and that eternity judges whether a person has actually suffered for the truth, rejecting all the sophists. 5

21

26

10

27 15

The Exchange Rate or Market Price of Hum. Beings. Now, when the National Pension Fund (ad usus publicos) is established, the best thing would probably be to have the exchange rate or market price for hum. beings posted on a monthly basis: this amount offered by the government, that amount by the National Pension Fund.

The Truth is a trap: you cannot get hold of it without getting caught; you cannot get hold of the truth in such a way that you catch it, but only in such a way that it catches you.

28

To Be Loved by God Is to Love God.

20

Those words of Alcibiades about Socrates: that from [Socrates] being the lover, it ended with him becoming the beloved―those words also express God’s relation to a hum. being: it ends with God becoming the beloved.

25

29

The Turn with Which One Turns away from Christianity.

As soon as the matter is put this way: Now he (Christ) has suffered―now we others are to take it easy, then Xnty has eo ipso 7 ad usus publicos] Latin, for public use. (See also explanatory note.)

17

18

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 29

•

1854

been changed: From what it was in the New Testament (to be a Christian is to suffer, to be tortured), it has been transposed into this hum. villainy of having someone or several people tormented with every sort of suffering―so that we others can take it easy. Truly, here, in this invention, the animal nature, the bestial aspect of a hum. being really emerges. So, as soon as the matter is put this way: Now he has suffered―now we others are to take it easy; then Xnty has been changed. Viewed in this way, the question emerges of whether what are generally understood to be martyrs, blood witnesses, underwent Christian suffering in the stricter sense. For one thing, as I have often emphasized, it must be borne in mind that when someone lives surrounded by peop. who approvingly―indeed, admiringly―express appreciation of one going to one’s death: then it is not exactly Christian suffering. Christian suffering always involves being judged―unfavorably―by hum. beings. Thus, for example, it would be Christian suffering to go to one’s death mocked by the surrounding world, which regarded it as foolishness to venture one’s life for something of this sort. For another thing, one must ask: What was the final thought of these martyrs[?] If that thought was that they wanted to have an easy time in this world, so that they thought that being a Christian was to have an easy time in this world, but that a hostile world would not allow it but persecuted them―if this was the understanding that led to their becoming martyrs, then it is not rlly Christian suffering. No, the New T’s Christianity (that is, the Christianity of Jesus Xt, because the apostle had already altered it somewhat) rests upon the idea that there is strife between life and death, between God and hum. beings: God hates hum. beings, just as hum. beings hate God. So if you want to be loved by God and to love God (and this is what it is to be a Christian), you must be hated, abominated, cursed, etc. (see the New Testament). And God hates this entire existence, a sinful falling away from him and a rebellion against him―being a Christian therefore means that you are to be tormented in every way. What would be best would be if you yourself voluntarily were indefatigable in discovering ways to torment yourself, but if you are not that strong―if there is in fact any truth in you, so that you will hate yourself―then you dare hope that God will have mercy on you and help you come to suffer. You see, this is Xnty. What deceives us hum. beings is that we have no notion of the scale on which God squanders millions and trillions.

5

22 10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 29–30

5

10

•

1854

But, the hum. being―ah, if you would come to know villainy, then study the hum. being!―the hum. being takes pleasure in this bestial cruelty: that one person is tormented with every sort of suffering so that we others can take it easy. No, no, no! To be a Christian is to be tormented―this enormous annex of trillions and quadrillions, who are eating and drinking and begetting children and clinking glasses, etc., doing so altogether lustily, aware of the fact that others have had to groan in utmost torment: from a Christian standpoint, this annex is a misunderstanding.

23

30

15

20

25

30

35

The Examination and Judgment of Existence. The question that existence, if you will, puts to a pers.―a question that has different answers that divide peop. into two qualitatively different classes (the animal class and a class in kinship with the divine)―is: Do you want one or more other hum. beings to be subjected to all possible sorts of suffering so that you may have an easy time of it in the material world[?]; or: Are you yourself willing to be sacrificed for others[?] The person who answers the first question with [“]Yes,[”] is eo ipso an animal; it is just as bestial as when Ole Kollerød sits and eats, using the knife with which he had murdered another pers. What is animalistic is to eat, to live off, another hum. being, off his torment and sufferings. This is the enormous mass of perdition. To be sure, this mass is always great, frightfully great, but false teachers bear major responsibility for the fact that this mass is as great as it is. The second class of peop. answers [“]No[”] to this question. And now they are presented with the question: Are you yourself willing to be sacrificed for others[?] If someone is unconditionally willing to do this, cheerfully certain that this is something God requires of him out of love―yes, he is truly in kinship with God. But if, after all, a person is not so strong that he is willing, with the readiest enthusiasm, to be sacrificed for others in this fashion: if there is nonetheless a willingness in him, then God surely helps him to become sacrificed.

19

20

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 30

•

1854

*

*

If someone wanted to present a better sort of pers. with the question, Do you want another hum. being to be sacrificed for you, amid every possible suffering[?], he would have to answer, If my salvation and blessedness are in any way dependent upon it, I will accept it, but in that case I must also be permitted to say that this other pers. is entirely different from me, qualitatively different from me: I must worship him as a superhuman being. Thus it is in relation to the God-Man. But analogously with the God-Man, albeit on a lower level, the apostles were indeed sacrificed, and thus were witnesses to the truth. Thus here Catholicism is in a certain sense right in wanting to worship the saints, because a saint is a quality higher than the person who wants to live well in the material world by virtue of another person’s sacrifice. Protestantism is the crudest and most brutal plebeianism. People do not want to hear of any qualitative difference between the apostle, the witness to the truth, and themselves, despite the fact that one’s existence is totally different from theirs, as different as eating is from being eaten. *

15

20

25

*

The hum. being is a synthesis. He is an animal, but within him there is also the possibility of something divine. The answer to the question, Do you want another hum. being to be sacrificed for you, amid every possible suffering, so that you may have an easy time of it in the material world[?], reveals whether that pers. is an animal or is in kinship with the divine. *

24

*

In connection with the God-Man being an atoning sacrifice, it must be borne in mind that he of course always insists upon imitation, so he does not bear responsibility for this bestial villainy according to which one person is to be tormented so that others shall eat, drink, beget children, etc., and enjoy this material life. *

5

30

*

How bestial, and what a failure to understand, when there lives a pers.―whom, one understands, really is being sacrificed

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 30–32

5

25

31

15

20

•

1854

for an idea―and then to want to have sympathy for him and to count oneself fortunate for not being sacrificed like that. It is animalistic for a person not to feel in any way called to resemble him, to witness for him, to fight for him, suffer with him, i.e., for the idea. And this is the misunderstanding in this sympathy, because inasmuch as the condition of salvation is bound up with being sacrificed, then he [the person sacrificed] is of course the one who has drawn the longest straw.

The Examination. God’s judgment upon this temporal existence and this world is: It is a sinful, wicked world; it is a vale of tears. He says this in his Word. But this world is in many ways as enchanting and lovely as it is precisely because existence is to be an examination. God knows very well how to examine. He does not put the hum. being into a world that forces a hum. being to recognize in every way that it is a vale of tears―and then utter his Word, that it is a vale of tears, in order to see whether a hum. being will believe him. No, that would be a foolish examination, and it would never be believable. No, the world seems to be a lovely and wonderful world, beyond compare―and then God says in his Word: The whole thing is lies and sin and misery―now let us see if you will believe me.

25

32

30

35

True Christianity―The Possibility of Offense As I have repeatedly insisted, the mark of true Xnty is that it manifests the possibility of offense at every point. Originally, it was like this: Judaism is optimism―and now comes Xnty, which is pessimism and says it is the fulfillment of the promises and the expectations of the Jews, so that God is to remain the same even though there is the greatest possible transformation. Here, the possibility of offense is as clear as possible. In Christendom the same thing is attained with the help of a Xn upbringing. The Xnty in which a child is brought up and which the child assimilates is―Judaism, optimism― ―and now it is a question of whether he will become a Xn when he is older,

21

22

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 32–34

•

1854

when the transformation is from optimism to pessimism, and the possibility of offense is as intense as it is in Judaism, because the child has been taught that this was Xnty, and the child has grown up in―and grown together with―the notion that this optimism is Xnty, whereas the situation is this: precisely in order to properly tauten the pessimism, there must be optimism in the foreground as the defining dialectical element. But one also sees what Christian nonsense and swindlers’ tricks this is, this sentimental drivel in Christendom: that as an adult a person longs to be the sort of Xn he was as a child, that he confesses (you driveller, or you swindler!) that as an adult he is not the sort of Christian he was as a child.

5

10

26

A Gauge for Measuring Existential Specific Gravity.

33

What confuses everything is this thoughtless swindlers’ trick in which peop. pretend as though everything were changed because they adopt expressions and turns of phrase while existentially everything remains the same. In the physical world we have measuring instruments. If, for example, someone took a barrel of water, added coloring, and then wanted to sell it as cognac―people would test it and say: a lie. Thus it would be desirable to have a similar instrument for testing existence. If we had it, people would be surprised to see that we in Christendom have not gone anywhere, but existentially are in paganism or Judaism.

15

God―We Hum. Beings.

34

We hum. beings think: That business of Adam’s fall―that is far, far back in the past and is forgotten; now we are nice peop. For God, the business with Adam happened today. We hum. beings imagine: That business of Xt being put to death, that villainy of the hum. race―well, that was 1800 years ago, very far back in the past, forgotten; now we are nice peop. For God, it happened today.

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 35–36 35

5

10

27 15

20

36

30

35

•

1854

The Hum. Being, according to Xnty, is a fallen spirit who has been punished by being degraded into an animal. Nonetheless, one must possess spirit if one is to be properly able to comprehend this humiliation―the trivial and the bestial are delighted to be animals―i.e., they do not really notice it. If Christianity had not come into the world, the hum. being would probably not have taken note of this sad secret, because Xnty is needed in order to explain to a hum. being the way things truly are: that he was originally something entirely different―and how infinitely deep he has sunk by having become an animal. A hum. being does not think of such a thing on his own, and outside of Xnty only the most eminent individuals have suspected something of this sort. Now one sees the sense in which Xnty is good news, and how bestial Xndom is. Xnty is the good news that opens people’s eyes to a misery of which the natural hum. being has not a clue. Xnty is the good news that makes this earthly existence the greatest misery for a pers., and then into the most anxiety-laden effort in fear and trembling―and then, yes, then Xnty is the good news about eternity. Does this resemble the Christianity of Christendom?

The Human Race―Christianity. As it is quite common that when a pers. has become 40 years old (husband, father, and bird king), he leaves behind his youthful fantasies as something silly―because now he has become wise, now he has an understanding of reality and knows what earnestness is―as it is quite usual for a 35-year-old Madame (mommy, household cook, and gossip) to leave behind her youthful fantasies as something silly―because now she has become wise, she has an understanding of reality and knows what earnestness and true love is: : similarly, the human race has now reached the age at which it is in the process of leaving behind Xnty’s lofty notions as something silly.

23

24

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 36–37

•

1854

That people nonetheless uphold the Sunday illusion that they are Christian is of course part and parcel of ordinary human cowardice, item: ordinary human indolence that wants to maintain its nice, steady pace, no matter what, and, finally, it is connected to the fact that there is a class in society (I mean the priests) that supports itself and its family by maintaining the illusion that Xnty exists. The fact that Christianity does not fit in with the world was known―indeed, the highly esteemed, enlightened 19th century knew Xnty very well (you can of course see this from the New Testament)―knew that it wanted to be a matter of life and death―but it has to come into the world. The situation at present is more or less as follows: in its refined superiority, the world boasts of the result, the ripe (not to mention, rotten) fruit of reasonableness and experience: that Xnty does not fit in with the world; the world boasts of this result, as if it were its own discovery, as if Xnty (eternity’s idea) were ein blutjunges Mädchen, who good-naturedly frolics about in life and now must endure having a very experienced woman of the world condescend to her, explaining that with a temperament of that sort, she does not fit in with the world. Thus the world now boasts self-importantly of this enormous result (which, however, when regarded as the result of 1800 years of strenuous effort, does seem rather unimpressive, almost like flatulence instead of childbirth, and as for news value, it is confronted with the embarrassing circumstance that Xnty itself said the same thing in year 1): that Xnty does not fit in with the world―but, in its self-important superiority, the world will permit it to remain, perhaps as a piece of old furniture, an antique. And when the priests, with the deferential suppleness characteristic of their profession, bow and scrape before this superior world: then the world will not be mean-spirited, but will even extend its protection to this old bit of junk.

A Suggestion for the Possible Synod. Wouldn’t it be more in keeping with the requirements of the times that from now on, Sundays came only every fourteenth day, or once a month?

3 item] Latin, as well as, furthermore. 17 ein blutjunges Mädchen] German, a very young maiden.

5

10

15

28

20

25

30

37

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 38–39 38

5

10

29

20

25

30

39

35

•

1854

Christianity―The State. Take this metaphor. If, for example, a common coachman sees a quite excellent, absolutely flawless 5-year-old horse, the very ideal of what it is to be a horse, snorting, and with a fiery temperament such as no horse has ever had, the coachman says, “Well, I cannot bid on that horse―I cannot afford it, and even if I could, it is in no way suitable for my purposes.” But when ten years have passed, when that excellent horse has now become spavined and worn out, etc., then the coachman says, [“]Now I can bid on it, now I can pay for it, and now I can profit sufficiently from it, from what remains of it, so that I can reasonably spend a bit on its care.[”] This is how it is with the state and Xnty. Given the superiority, the distinction, with which Xnty came into the world―well, any state would have to say: “That religion, I cannot buy that, and not only that, but I will say God, Father, save and preserve me from buying that religion―it would be my ruin.” But then, after some centuries, when Xnty had become spavined and lame and halting and damaged and confused, then the state said: [“]Look, now I can bid on it, and with my shrewdness I can see very well that I can make sufficient use of it and make a profit from it, so I can reasonably spend a bit on refurbishing it.[”] Just as long as Christianity, in gratitude for having been refurbished, does not play a trick on the state and become itself once again: “Ah, God, Father, save and preserve us―every state can see that this religion is my ruin.” The coachman rests assured, he made a shrewd purchase, he faces no risk that the twenty-yearold coachman’s nag will once again become that fiery 5-year-old with which, in the unanimous judgment of all coachmen, no coachman is well-served, any more than, any more than the state is well-served by―eternally young Christianity.

Christianity―Humanity. While in our day the human race, humanity, has gotten Christianity down among us, down under our feet, so that people rlly relate to it as a superior intellect relates to fantasy, we nevertheless have a bad conscience, an obscure sense that Christianity is, after all, still rlly sovereign.

25

26

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 39–41

•

1854

And that is in fact why people will not let go of it, just as people would employ every means in order to prevent Christianity from becoming Christianity once again. The world is shrewd enough to understand very well that this is how one best protects itself against this sovereign: having him down beneath us in this way. Get rid of him entirely[?]― the world is shrewd enough to understand that this could possibly lead to getting him back again in earnest. No, says the world, the way things are now is the best―now it has gotten the better of Xnty, insofar as this can be done, or rather insofar as this could be done.

Uniting Is, from a Christian Point of View, a Swindler’s Trick

1

5

[a]

In uniting, the genuine Christian collisions (suffering at the hands of hum. beings, which is what peop. fear most) naturally disappear; this is why one hears: [“]Let us join together―in Christian zeal and solidarity!!!―to work for Xnty.[”]

One always hears, [“]Let us unite―in order to work for Xnty.[”] And that is what people want to count as true Christian zeal. Christianity is of another opinion, it knows very well that this is a swindler’s trick, because uniting does not advance Xnty (to be specific, the greater the number, the less it is advanced), but weakens it. Christianity always has need of only one person, but it strains him to the utmost. This, you see, is what we hum. beings would like to be rid of. But in dishonest, swindling fashion we turn the matter around, as if it were true Christian zeal to join together―the more the better.

5

10

30

40

20

25

30

The Single Individual―The Crowd. The category of the spirit is: the single individual; the animal category is: the crowd. Christianity is spirit; thus it relates itself to the category of the single individual.

41

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 41–43

5

10

To work for Xnty with the help of, and in the direction of, the crowd is thus to transpose spirit into the animal category. And yet this is the tendency of all of Xndom’s efforts. What is abominable is the mendacity with which people pretend that this is Christian zeal, permitting themselves to be praised and lauded for Christian zeal the more they can get to unite so that, as they say, they can work for Xnty: whereas this activity tends precisely toward diluting and abolishing Xnty. The common man cannot see this, but these scoundrels, these hired, professional priests, they ought, after all, be able to see as much.

15

31

42

20

25

43

35

O, Socrates, You were and are, after all, the only thinker among those who are merely human. The so-called Christian philosophers, what confused heads! Take the celebrated Augustine! At one point he argues like this against the Donatists: Who do you―half a score of peop.―think you are when faced with the entire Christian Church―as if you half a score of peop. possessed the truth[?] Oh, Socrates, is this what can be called a thinker! He argues about truth by invoking numbers. And a Christian thinker! Whereas Christianity rests precisely upon the matter of the single individual.

Fear of People―Fear of God. The collision toward which Xnty continually aims is: to fear God more than peop.―that is, a collision with fearing peop. more than God. It is not about fasting, nor about the unmarried state, etc., etc.―no, if you fast out of fear of peop., this is simply not Xnty, and if people were to intimidate you into giving up fasting, it can be Xnty to fast.

•

1854

27

28

1

5

10

[a]

And this, in turn, is something a sophist can lecture upon and declaim with a profound bow before kings and emperors or, depending upon the times, before the public and the crowd: and thus we once again have the deception: an acknowledgment of how cunningly people have proclaimed Xnty in deceptive fashion― and alas, this acknowledgment is itself an even more subtle deception.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 43

•

1854

God is the only sovereign. He expresses this by sending as his envoy an utterly simple man―this is the highest distinction. And then he requires that this emissary and apostle of his express the truth, namely, that the great power he has the honor to represent is the only power. And he is to express this unconditionally to kings and emperors and the public and the pope whatever the devil they call all these human authorities that employ fear of peop. to intimidate peop. And, to complete the business, in order to express unconditionally the degree to which he is the only sovereign, God even participates in attacking his own emissary―albeit out of love, yes, out of love, you infinite Love. Only once has Christianity ever been proclaimed unconditionally in fear of God―by the God-Man. If it is proclaimed in fear of peop., it is no long Christianity. Herein lies the falsification by the whole of Christendom. As soon as Xnty is proclaimed unconditionally in fear of God, everyone abandons it. When it is proclaimed entirely in fear of peop., everyone becomes a Christian―obviously, this is to make a fool of God, and a reckoning will follow. The falsification is easily managed. Instead of proclaiming Xnty in fear of God, the millions who falsify behave as follows: for example, they transform what I am saying here into a thesis. For example, this thesis reads as follows: Only in fear of God can true Xnty be proclaimed―or, true Xnty cannot be proclaimed in fear of peop. Excellent! Thus it becomes a talk, a lecture, a sermon―and, if he lives in an age when power is held by kings, emperors, popes, and the like, who intimidate through fear of peop., then the speaker is very careful to bow and scrape before them and then to proclaim, with a profound bow, that true Xnty cannot be proclaimed in fear of peop. If the public, the crowd, is all-powerful and intimidates with fear of peop., then the speaker bows and scrapes before them, declaiming that true Xnty cannot be proclaimed in fear of peop. This is the sort of Xnty that flourishes in Christendom: Xnty proclaimed in fear of peop.―and

5

10

15

32

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 43–44 Xnty is precisely fear of God, as opposed to fear of peop.

44

10

15

33

20

25

30

35

Judas Iscariot. Indeed, it was Xt himself who pronounced these frightful words about him: [“]It would have been better if he had never been born.[”] But although everything in Christendom has been set in motion in order to blacken J[udas]’s name as much as possible, I could imagine him an entire quality worse. Thus, J[udas] I[scariot] would not be, as he probably was in actuality, a man in despair who in a moment’s rage sold his master for a paltry 30 shekels (there is something mitigating about this small sum itself, as also, in a certain sense, about his life’s frightful end). No, J[udas] would be an uncommonly cultured man, calm, with an uncommon understanding of life and of how to profit. So he goes to the high priests and says to them: [“]I’m willing to betray him, but now, listen to my terms. I’m not very interested in a lump-sum payment of money I could run through in a few years. No, I want a certain sum every year. I am a young man, healthy and strong, and the hum. probability is that I have a long life ahead of me―and I would like to live―married, with a family―a pleasant and enjoyable life. That is the price.[”] In my view, this is an entire quality more abominable―nor do I think that such an abomination could have occurred in antiquity: it has been reserved for our reasonable age. It can easily be seen that I have thought of J[udas] a bit in the manner of a professor, who, in calm and security, leads a life marked by good taste and enjoyment―assisted by the circumstance that Xt sweated blood in Gethsemane and cried [“]My God, my God, why have you forsaken me,[”] from the cross.

•

1854

29

30

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 44–46

•

1854

It is this peaceful, steady life in the utmost heterogeneity that makes the assistant professor so abominable. But, alas, in vain do you hope to influence the assistant professors. When I am dead, my work will be pressed into service―by the assistant professors. And these assistant professors will find continuing approval in the eyes of the world. Because, just as, in a grammar school, where those most looked up to are those whom their classmates regard as the cleverest at fooling the teacher, so does the world always admire this one thing: a more clever form of dishonesty. A police official in Berlin (Thiele, in his work on the Jewish “Gauner”) relates that one of them, Samuel Joel, was so highly regarded among the thieves that when one said to any of them, Do you know S. Joel?, a smile of admiration would come over the fellow’s face. In the same way, the world smiles in admiration every time one says the name of an assistant professor who has cleverly deceived the truth. The point toward which the world is heading before it assumes that history will end, is that the recently arisen and highly praised honesty will turn out to be a new swindler’s trick.

Get Thee behind Me, Satan―You Have a Sense Only for What Is of Man, Not for What Is of God.

5

10

15

34 20

45

25

Thus, so lofty is Xnty that even the most well-intentioned hum. undertaking (and, after all, Peter was surely well-intentioned) is not a misunderstanding, an error―no, it is “Satan’s.” Now, what is “Christendom” other than hum. good intentions that are not nearly as honest as were Peter’s[?] Thus, Christendom is an invention of Satan.

30

To Hate Oneself

46

that is the requirement of Xnty; only in hating oneself is there the passion that can carry the divine through.

35

12 Gauner] German, trickster, rascal, scoundrel.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 46–48

5

10

•

1854

In one way or another, human nature, even with the best of intentions, is always honest enough, if you will, to love itself. Thus human nature cannot carry Xnty; it always reverses the relationship, evades the requirement, evades what Xnty rlly is: to carry Xnty through the world―and it craftily reverses the relationship, so that it is Xnty that is to carry us through the world. This means that Xnty, which was situated in the divine egoity, has been deftly transposed into hum. egotism. This is done by even the most honest of the hum. race, not to mention the swindling, demoralized portion of hum. race.

35

47

15

20

25

30

48

35

From a Christian Point of View, the Meaning of Life is: to suffer. Yes, whether it pleases hum. beings or not, from a Christian point of view, the meaning of life is neither to make money not beget children nor to amount to anything, etc., but to suffer. This can also be easily seen from the following: only in suffering can the eternal collide with the temporal in temporality, only in suffering can spirit collide with worldliness in worldliness. The eternal element within a person―or whether there is anything eternal in him―is known from the desire or the willingness to suffer. As one can tell that an insect will become a butterfly when it begins to spin a cocoon, as a physician can tell that a woman is pregnant by the food and drink she asks for, so, too, can the existence and the extent of the eternal element in a person―or whether it has begun to awaken in him―be known from the willingness to suffer. Of course, the oratory of swindlers is merely yet another swindle―but how strange it is to want to delude oneself, and perhaps others, about something concerning the eternal, when there is indeed an eternity to regret having fooled oneself by not having earnestly made use of time.

A Distinguished Villainy. Some of the most advanced among my contemporaries are the very ones who are most able to see that the persecution and abuse I suffer at the hands of the mob is precisely my excellence, that not only am I right, but that this will also be the source of

31

32

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 48–50

•

1854

my fame. They are sufficiently advanced to be able to see this― and that is why they participate in the mockery and the nonsense and the beastliness. That which―in addition to something much higher― helps me is, among other things, the objective passion for police work that I am fortunate to possess, so that I can entirely forget that this is directed at myself if only I can do some psychological police detective work. An objective passion of this sort is an enormous help. If, for example, someone who was subjected to verbal abuse were to have an objective linguistic passion of this sort, so that what principally concerned him were the linguistic forms: what an enormous help.

First the Kingdom of God! Xndom interprets this―in learned fashion!―like this: first money, virtus post nummos. But it is Xnty all the same; indeed, people even regard it as unusual Christian earnestness if people get a bit of Sunday oratory for their money, post nummos. Finally, things will probably end with the disappearance of this post―and the proposition will become: first the money― ―and then they will cheat a person, so that one gets nothing whatever for the money. If this is achieved― ―I am convinced that (or, rather, this is inherent in the thing itself) it will be declared to be true Xnty, the objective, sound doctrine.

At First Hand―At Second Hand. For the senses, the thing itself is one thing, and whether one has it at first hand is something else, often a matter of complete indifference, and at most an inessential difference in distinction or favor. With the spirit, on the other hand, the thing is to have something at first hand―to have it at second hand is not to have it. To be spirit at second hand is to be devoid of spirit. To be a Christian at second hand is not to be a Xn. The most unchristian and bestial invention is to be a Xn by virtue of belonging to a Christian society. 17 virtus post nummos] Latin, virtue after money. (See also explanatory note.)

5

10

36

49

20

25

50

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 50–51

•

1854

In Xndom, however, people do not notice this: that when one speaks of being a Xn in this manner, what one is saying is utter nonsense, as if one were to speak of a yard of butter.

51

10

37

20

25

30

35

40

God and the Hum. Race. After having introduced Xnty into the world, God can only involve himself with the hum. race on one of two conditions: either that there are individuals willing to venture so far out in hating themselves that there can be talk of God being able to use them as apostles, or in such a way that a person honestly and unconditionally confess the true state of affairs. This latter position is my primitivity, which never occurs to anyone in Xndom, and I propose it in such a way that it is left to God to decide whether or not he will accept it. As for the former position: this is of course what is pointed out in the New Testament. But as for the obligation to venture out so far that there can be talk of becoming an apostle, the following must be noted: this is something so terrifying for a hum. being that one can be permitted to say: I do not dare do it. But, as noted, God can involve himself―and God can will to involve himself―with the hum. race only on one of these two conditions. But if it pleases the race to interpose dishonesty about Xnty between God and itself, then he cannot and will not involve himself. And this is what people have done. Xndom is the dishonesty that has framed the matter as follows: We are too humble to want to be apostles. This is dishonesty, and it is making a fool of God with respect to what he has had proclaimed in Xnty. In Xnty he puts forth the condition that every hum. being can become an apostle―God has not placed anything in the way. But it is clear that becoming an apostle is so terribly agonizing that a hum. being can be permitted to say: I dare not, I am not capable of it, etc. But there is one thing a hum. being is not permitted, he is not permitted to say: I am too humble to desire such a thing. It is this dishonesty (which is Xndom) that has made it impossible for God to involve himself with the human race. And when the race interposes dishonesty with respect to Xnty between God and itself, God is not some petty potentate who ris-

33

34

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 51–52

•

1854

es up and gives peop. a drubbing. Oh, no, he is too distinguished for that―his justice is too severe. He has eternity―here we will see one another again. So, in time, he makes use of the punishment that he himself understands is sufficiently frightful: ignoring. And in this respect he is truly majestic: he ignores centuries, millions upon trillions of copies. It is only we hum. beings who are deceived, as if these enormous masses were something in and of themselves. God ignores the race. And Xndom has long been forsaken by God. And that is how it will remain until it again interposes honesty concerning Xnty between itself and God: then we will either get apostles or will make the turn I propose, and this turn will find grace before God.

On Myself. If my contemporaries could understand how I suffer, how Governance, if I dare put it this way, mistreats me―I am certain that it would agitate them so deeply that hum. sympathy would make an attempt (as sometimes happens with a child who is mistreated by its parents) to free me from the grasp of Governance. That, however, would be a misunderstanding. Because I rest in the belief that it is out of love, yes, out of love, that you do this, infinite love! I know that, in love, you, infinite love, suffer as well, suffer more than I―even if you cannot be changed on that account. But my contemporaries could not understand this. Even if I were to speak, they would be unable to understand it―even if were to speak, although as a precautionary measure matters are surely arranged so that I rlly cannot speak, for I understand that matters are arranged such that those to whom I might speak could not understand it―a new cruelty, contemporaries might say, if they could understand it. As with those in the ox of Phalaris, whose screams sounded like music―even worse does God sequester those he uses. For their contemporaries understand all their suffering as pride, which means that the contemporaries take pleasure in heaping more suffering upon them―on account of their pride. But this is how infinite love must be! If such a pers. could make himself intelligible―and then, in a moment of weakness, forgot himself and told tales out of school: irreparable loss. Therefore, you keep watch, infinite love, to prevent such a thing from happening.

5

10

38

52

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 53–54

53

5

10

39

•

1854

On Myself. I was granted a gift, so much so that I can call it genius―this gift is the ability to converse, to be able to speak with any pers. This fortunate gift was granted me in order that I might thereby conceal the fact that I am absolutely the most silent person of these times. Silence that is concealed in silence is suspect; it awakens a suspicion, almost as if someone were betraying somethinga. But silence concealed in the most decided talent for conversation, that is―this is God’s own truth!―that is silence.

54

The Law of Existence, according to Xnty.

15

The law (which, in turn, is grace), that Xt, by having existed, has established for being a hum. being is: engage with God as an individual; whether you are clever or simple, highly gifted or scantily gifted, is a matter of complete indifference―engage (o, divine grace, to be willing to engage with a single hum. being, with every individual) with God as an individual; dare, as an individual, to engage with him: he will surely arrange everything in accordance with your abilities and possibilities. Therefore involve yourself first with God, not first with “the others.” But the fact is that existing and existence is a source of enormous anxiety for a poor hum. being. So he becomes afraid―he does not dare involve himself with God first; the animal within him is victorious, and he thinks: The shrewdest thing is to be just like the others. Every such existence whose first thought is [“]like the others[”] is a wasted existence, and because, from a Christian point of view, this is the consequence of an offense, it is a forfeited existence. These millions for whom the law of existence is [“]First, be like the others,[”] this mass of mimickers―to the senses, it appears as if they were something, something big, something

20

25

30

35

35

a

, at the very least, one betrays the fact that one is silent.

1

36

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 54–55

•

1854

enormously powerful. And to the senses this is indeed the case. But viewed ideally, this mass, these millions, are zero, less than zero, wasted, forfeited existences. A sparrow, a fly, a poisonous insect is an object of God’s concern, for it is not a wasted or forfeited existence. But the mass of mimickers are forfeited existences. Because God has shown so much mercy to hum. beings, has shown so much grace that he is willing to involve himself with every individual―and because grace consists precisely in this, he indeed must require this [involvement]―then, if hum. beings prefer to be like the others, that is lèse-majesté against God. The mass of mimickers are guilty of lèse-majesté. The punishment is: to be ignored by God. From the Christian point of view, every sort of lecturing is a wasted, forfeited existence. The lecturers can get increasingly clever in counterfeiting―it does no good, it is nonetheless a forfeited existence. To be like the others is the law for all earthly, temporal shrewdness. This is the shrewdness that, from a Christian point of view, is so shrewd that it fools itself out of eternity. *

1

Note because primitivity is the possibility of “spirit.”

5

10

15

20

40

25

*

alas, I write this in sorrow. Unhappy myself, I loved hum. beings, the mass of humanity, with melancholic sympathy. In order to endure their beastliness toward me, I had to involve myself more and more with God. So the result was that I have undeniably come to learn what Xnty is, but this truth causes me pain.

30

Primitivity.

55

a

Every hum. being is constituted with primitivitya―this is best known by God, who has done it.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 55

•

1854

37

Entry NB31:55, with marginal entries NB31:55.a and NB31:55.b. Kierkegaard has cancelled an indentation for a new paragraph after the sentence ending “killing one’s primitivity.”

38

1

5

[b]

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 55–56

By primitivity Xnty naturally does not have in mind all the frippery of intellectuality, of being a genius and the like. No, primitivity, spirit, is stake one’s life first, first, first on the kingdom of God. The more literally a pers. can take this, in action, the more primitivity.

•

1854

All earthly, temporal, worldly shrewdness relates to this: killing one’s primitivity. Xnty relates to this: following one’s primitivity. Kill your primitivity, and in all likelihood you will make your way well in the world, perhaps even be a success―but eternity will refuse to accept you. Follow your primitivity and you will be shipwrecked in temporality, but eternity will accept you.

5

10

Wanting to Be Just Like the Others could seem to be a sort of keeping faith with the others; naturally, it is proclaimed and praised as such in the world―it is, of course, the opposite, because inasmuch as, generally speaking, every hum. being is, spiritually, a swindler, and the race is a race of swindlers, then hum. language is, from beginning to end, a thieves’ cant that always twists everything hypocritically in the wrong direction. No, wanting to be just like the others is cowardly, comfortable dishonesty toward the others. Therefore the race has been subjected to the punishment of having these millions of people who, in the final analysis, all agree that the whole business is unreliable, because the one is always simply exactly like the others. You see, this is the source of their anxiety and confusion and suspicion when things go a bit wrong in life. On the other hand, every primitivity consists of honesty toward the others. Everyone who has carried through a primitivity has reliable knowledge of existence, is able-bodied, possesses something he dares vouch for. If a blushing youth (o, Socrates!) turns to such a person, he would not be evasive, nor will he offer him the mendacious reliability of: just like the others. At the present moment there is perhaps nothing in Christendom more reliable than this: just like the others. Of course, one does not say this―people speak in the loftiest manner as though they were ex-

56

15

42

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 56–58 tremely reliable―but then, when catastrophes arise, then it becomes apparent that the whole business is: just like the others.

57

10

15

20

25

43

Christendom. In Christ, God offered to involve himself with the hum. race. But what has the hum. race done? Instead of involving itself with God, it has transformed the matter into the story of how God in Xt involved himself with the apostles, or the story of how God in Xt involved himself with hum. beings. In brief, instead of involving itself with God, they have changed it into something historical, which they dilute and repeat from one generation to the next. And how has the race done it―has it treated God honestly and with hum. decency? No, no! The truth, in fact (and it cannot be denied) is that―for a hum. being, and speaking merely humanly―involving oneself in earnest with God is the most terrible of all torment. So “the hum. being” could thus have said to God, [“]We don’t dare do it, the grace you show us is so great that it makes us unhappy.[”] But that is not what the race has done. No, it has said, hypocritically: [“]We are too humble to want to be apostles.[”] Look, this is to make a fool of God. Look, this why Christendom is as godforsaken as it is bereft of ideas―a mass, a dark body. Because the law for the mass is that the single individual is just like the others. So the separateness of individuality, which provides transparency, falls away―everything becomes copies, a dark lump.

58

The Priest’s Oath.

35

Seek first the kingdom of God―that is Xnty. And it is the New Testament to which the priest is bound by an oath.

•

1854

39

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 58–59

•

1854

Now we all know how things happen in real life, that they haven’t in the faintest of faint ways the faintest of faint resemblance to this: first the kingdom of God. The student takes 4 years to get his theology degree. Then he becomes a theology graduate. Now he must wait 5 to 6 years before he has accrued the appropriate seniority. Then he seeks. And finally he gets an appointment and a living―this is: first the kingdom of God. Isn’t such an oath, after all, rlly perjury, and wouldn’t it in fact be much better to get rid of it entirely? Or is an oath that lacks the faintest trace of any meaning―is it something reliable, more reliable than no oath? In a certain sense, humanly speaking, one cannot call the priest’s oath perjury. Because the situation with this oath is like that with oaths in other circumstances. When, with respect to an oath in a given situation, it is generally agreed that we hum. beings have a mutual understanding that it doesn’t mean anything―then we don’t view it as perjury to take the oath even though one does not keep it. Such an oath is regarded as a formality. But can Xnty be served by this sort of thing? Wouldn’t it be far better if the oath were abolished entirely?

The Priest. And then, when the theology graduate has become a civil servant, perhaps his subsequent life becomes an effort directed toward this: First the kingdom of God―[“]an effort[”]: that is the construction people are so pleased to put on this business, because it is so difficult to check up on. Let’s see! “First the kingdom of God.” Now, isn’t the rule for whole of the priest’s activity much more this: First money―and then. Wherever he is involved, the refrain is: May I first ask for my money―and then. Furthermore, if there is to be any talk of the priest’s life being an effort directed toward the Xnty of the New Testament, then advancement within the clergy would have to proceed in reverse order. One would begin, for example, with 1200 rix-dollars a year, and when, e.g., one had served for 15 years, one would receive only 800, and so on. The greatest and most remunerative positions would go to the beginners.

5

10

15

20

59

25

30

44 35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 60 60

5

10

20

25

30

45

35

1854

Christendom. In the midst of actuality Xt steps forward, teaching, suffering― and saying: Imitate me; imitation is Xnty. Quite soon, this no longer pleases the race. Therefore people hit upon something new. They say: This way of imitating became altogether too earnest. Let us instead go out on the common and play at Xnty and call it Xnty. That is, people bring forth another actuality, an artificial actuality, or people place Xnty at an artistic remove―at the remove of imagination―from actuality, and in this medium hired and costumed civil servants and persons of rank play at Xnty. And this is supposed to be Troy―or what was it I wanted to say: This is supposed to be Xnty! *

15

•

*

Christendom is a sort of emanation, an ongoing dilution (which in self-congratulation people call the dissemination of Xnty), or Xndom is―as is said in a printshop, when a line of type is displaced―a displacement, a skewed deviation, and the law of this skewedness (skewed away from original Xnty) is: to adore rather than to imitate. Even the apostle altered Xt somewhat, to some extent turning the attention away from him as exemplar and from the unconditionality of the exemplar. But then we do have the apostle. True enough. But it doesn’t take long before people also put adoration in place of imitation with respect to the apostle. Then people do the same in relation to the martyr, the witness to the truth. Then Protestantism sees that this is confused―and P[rotestantism] resolves to abolish the whole of that part of Xnty that is inconvenient. But Xnty it is, and Xnty it remains: the livings continue to exist―something close to being the only (as well as the most peculiar) change Xndom has wrought. A teaching comes into the world concerning renunciation of this world, and after having existed for 1800 years, more or less the only result that has been achieved is that it has created 1000 or 100,000 livings. Xnty is truly perfectible.

41

42

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 61–62

•

1854

Christendom’s Wrong Turn. Indeed, if it were the case that true Xnty had been proclaimed yesterday and the wrong turn was being taken today, how infinitely easy it would be to point out where the error lies. But now a long, long time has passed. And for these many, many people the error has been transformed bona fide into this solemn business of clinging firmly to the faith of our fathers, which, in turn, is something the swindling priests know how to exploit. What a swindler Bishop M. was in knowing how to exploit this. And yet, from a Christian point of view, this business about the faith of our fathers is a misunderstanding, a perennial misunderstanding. From a Christian point of view, there can be no talk whatever of the faith of our fathers as something of decisive significance. From a Christian point of view the only question is that concerning the New Testament, with which every generation must begin. And the confusion that has produced “Christendom” and has led Xnty back to Judaism is precisely this: that in the course of time, each individual generation, instead of beginning with the New Testament, has begun with “the faith of our fathers,” begun with clinging firmly to the faith of our fathers. Always this swindling historical element and the category of the race instead of―the Christian one: ideality and the single individual.

Official Christianity’s Proclamation is every proclamation that is by virtue of and in the character of something other than what is personal, this purely personal thing: that it is the personal conviction of the person proclaiming it. Thus, when the person proclaiming it is a royal civil servant employed by the state, then we have official proclamation, we have this ambivalence as to whether this teaching he is presenting―and all that he has to say―is by virtue of and in his capacity of a civil servant, or whether it is his personal conviction, which he vouches for by offering his personality as the guarantee. And because Xnty is precisely this personal element, because it has come into the world in order to establish “personality,” in order to put an end to all the abstractions, ambiguities, mystifications, impersonalities in which, in Xnty’s view, evil has its bastion, it can easily be seen that the official proclamation of Xnty is the abolition of Christianity.

61

5

10

15

20

62

30

46 35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 62–64

5

10

15

63 20

25

•

1854

Every person shudders at becoming a personality, shudders at standing as a personality vis-à-vis others―he shudders at it because he knows very well that this makes it possible for the others to catch sight of him. The hum. being shudders at becoming manifest; thus he loves, if not pitch darkness, then at any rate twilight, mystification, impersonality. But Xnty, which knows what truth is, knows that it is: to be manifest. That is why Xnty is directed so decisively at this: to be a personality. And that, in turn, is why the abolition of Xnty is: impersonal proclamation. This is the abolition of Xnty, and of course this is most dangerous when it takes place under the name of the proclamation and dissemination of Xnty, just as Xnty’s retreat became most dangerous when people came up with the notion that Xnty was perfectible― and the retreat, the withdrawal, was covered by: [“]Things are going forward, Xnty is perfectible[”]―in a certain sense, it was so perfect a cover for a retreat that neither Xenophon’s or Moreau’s can stand comparison with it.

Change of Scene. (Xnty―Christendom). The Savior of the world, Jesus Christ, moves everything, everything in heaven and earth in order to make “actuality” the scene―and this he calls Xnty. Christendom marshals everything, everything, everything hum. beings can think of in order to prevent actuality from being the scene―it hits upon everything possible in order to change the scene, to put it at an artistic distance from actuality. The one is really and truly to introduce Xnty into the world; the other is to usher Xnty out of the world.

30

47

64

35

The Word of God. This word of God quite simply contains God’s will and his commands to us― ―and we evade it by acting as if everything were in order, that we have the Word of God, that we are a Christian people,

43

44

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 64–65

•

1854

etc.―and that the only things that really concern us are the artistic and scholarly aspects. This, however, is fundamentally unparalleled shamelessness. And yet this is how things are. While the priests compete over who can write in the loveliest prose, while the journals and periodicals review the linguistic artistry, the presentation, etc. with the greatest of seriousness―what is utterly forgotten is that we are in fact to act in accordance with it, that God did not rlly have his word proclaimed as an exercise in style in order to see who could present it most tastefully―this has been so totally forgotten that were someone to say this in earnest, people would rlly find it laughable. In earnest: that is, somewhere other than in a church or in a sermon, because by being said there it does not become something earnest, but is of course subjected to artistic critique concerning whether it has been presented tastefully.

5

10

15

20

Christendom in a Metaphor. Think of very long railroad train―though with the locomotive having long since run away from it. This is what Christendom is like. The ideal, the Exemplar, was the locomotive―indeed, no locomotive that human ingenuity has invented or ever will invent can be compared with this moving-fromplace-to-place that is the unrest of eternity. But, as noted, the locomotive has run away from the train. Nonetheless, people have gone on quite calmly, generation after generation, coupling the next generation’s enormous train to the one immediately preceding it, solemnly pronouncing: [“]We will cling firmly to the faith of our fathers.[”] In this way Christendom has become the precise opposite of what Xnty is. Christianity is unrest, the unrest of eternity: every comparison to it is feeble, sluggish―to such a degree is the unrest of eternity unrest. Christendom is calm reassurance―charming,

65

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 65–67

49 5

Christianity Is Unrest.

10

We all laugh when the comedy is performed: The family who set out in a 4-seater Holstein carriage in pursuit of the young girl who has fleet-footedly run off to Gurre and out into the wide world. And yet this is only a faint metaphor of how ridiculous Xndom is. The ideals, the exemplars―indeed, no fleet-footed young girl is as fast on her feet―they hasten out of this filthy world with the unrest of eternity and the passion and impatience of martyrdom― ― ― and Christendom! With respect to Christendom, to call it a four-seater Holstein carriage, presumably drawn by 2 horses, is to say too much―for at least the latter is in motion. No, if one were to describe Christendom’s pursuit of the ideal, one could (like the Jew who asked whether they didn’t have a carriage with 5 seats) imagine a Holstein carriage with 140 seats and one horsea up front, going uphill (i.e., coasting downhill), nonetheless claiming that this expedition had set off in pursuit of the ideal,[b]

20

25

45

Note Of course, the horse is an arrangement made for the sake of appearances, pursuant to negotiations with the clergy’s ballet master, in order that it might truthfully be said: Everything is all right, we are striving, we are striving, we’re rolling along―after all, we have a horse up front. Were there no horse at all up front, there would be a risk that the matter would get cleared up, but now everything is calmly reassuring and can be depended upon: there is a horse up front. Of course, a wooden horse could also be used, but there must be a horse up front lest the common man become concerned, have suspicions, and also so that the priest can say with a clear conscience: Things are moving forward, we’re rolling along, after all, there is a horse up front.

a

[b] an assertion, item that things are moving forward, is made by priests, of which there is one sitting on every seat.

30

67

1854

calm reassurance that one quite literally does not move from the spot. Xnty is a locomotive―in Christendom, Xnty is a locomotive that has the extremely strange property for a locomotive of not moving, i.e., it is not a locomotive, or, better, as noted, the locomotive has long since run away from Christendom.

66

15

•

Unrest―Calm Reassurance. Xnty puts the matter as follows: an eternity lies before you―your lot is decided in this life, by the

1

5

10

15

20

25

46

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 66

•

1854

The last portion of entry NB31:66 with marginal entries NB31:66.a and NB31:66.b.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 67–68

•

1854

10

use you make of it. You have before you perhaps 30 years, perhaps 10, perhaps 5, perhaps one, perhaps, perhaps only a month, a day: terrifying unrest! Xndom positions itself rather differently. Before you―the priest assures us (if you remember to assure him his salary, otherwise you will not get a word out of him)―there lies an eternity: millions, billions, trillions of years. It is an infinite striving! This life is only the beginning―what are 70 years compared to an eternity, not as much as 5 minutes―if you waste them, so what: Amen!

68

The Apostle.

50

15

20

25

30

35

To be an apostle must, after all, be such frightful, inhuman, superhuman torment and terror that I truly cannot blame us hum. beings for not daring to be one and for wishing ourselves exempted from it―but, as I have often said, what I do blame Christendom for is the mendacious turn the matter has been given: [“]We are too humble to desire to be apostles.[”] This lie is what has caused God to turn away from Xndom, which has long since been godforsaken. If God will deign to involve himself with us hum. beings as he has done in Xnty, then we at least ought to be honest with him. But here, as everywhere, the swindling nature of hum. beings has instinctively calculated as follows: [“]By being honest like that it may well end with our being unable to avoid becoming apostles and with God in fact gaining control and power over us and pressing us into his design. Therefore, we must protect ourselves by jamming the door locks, so that it even becomes a virtue for us not to desire to become apostles― then, by Satan, I know that it would be impossible for God to get hold of us.[”] Oh, hum. being, you do not need to be afraid: God disdains you. But in addition it is certain that being an apostle must be torment and terror beyond all torment and terror. Continually in danger, in distress, in need, in suffering―and continually denied even the least bit of probability. But for a hum. being the probable is what water is for a fish or air for a bird. To be denied all probability in this way is to be placed in extremis. Well, then at least give him, tired and exhausted as he is, permission to die―no, precisely at the absolutely uttermost in-

47

48 1

5

10

[a]

Infinitely more strenuous than living once and for all in the most extreme poverty and, thereafter, peace, and, with that, an end― what is infinitely more strenuous is then, in the absolutely uttermost instant to be helped with a miracle and then once again to be in the most extreme suffering, and then perhaps a miracle once again, for this is the most terrifying sort of blanket-toss.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 68

•

1854

stant he is terrified back to life― ― ―here, indeed, there is help from a miracle: great God, a miracle! Yes, right enough, but to be put through exercises in that way is a torture worse than being broken on the wheel or drawn and quartered. From the human point of view, so far was the miracle from being any help, that it was one more torment, also because the surrounding world will either treat him as a madman or will mock him, and when he is in distress regarding the most fundamental of necessities, it will say: [“]Oh well, he doesn’t need any help, because after all, he can perform miracles.[”] And yet his life is such that he can quite literally be in distress regarding the most fundamental of necessities, and then perhaps― well, or perhaps not―perhaps a miracle: frightful torture. Look, this is torture! When a hum. being is actually to be God’s instrument―that is, an instrument for that infinite will that is God―then God must first entirely deprive him of his own will. Fearful operation. And naturally, there is no one who knows how to examine with as much painful thoroughness as one who is omniscient and omnipotent. For even though it is true that there are usually physicians present during torture to ascertain how long the tortured person can hold out without dying, it can happen that they err and the person being tortured dies before their eyes―something of that sort never happens with one who is omniscient. And to be sure, there are means of resuscitation at hand in order to revive the person being tortured so that he can hold out still longer, though with each session, the tortured person’s strength is diminished and death draws closer―only an omnipotent being can unconditionally provide entirely new strength at every second. And that, too, is torment, of course. Because in fact, despite all sufferings, it is after all something indescribably great to be God’s instrument, so the apostle always has one additional strain: to be obliged to give thanks, to give thanks for this infinite benefaction.

51

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 68–69

5

52 10

Yet one thing is reserved to the apostle: to be able to love God in truth. Alas, for the way in which we others love God! We say that we, for having been created by God, must love God―and the only one who loves God in truth is the apostle, he who in order to become an instrument was absolutely, absolutely annihilated by God. To love God because he created you is to love yourself. No: if you want to love God in truth, this must be demonstrated by cheerfully, adoringly letting yourself be entirely annihilated by God in order that he might carry out his will unconditionally.

15

69

20

25

30

35

Duty toward God As noted earlier, this is also the swindler’s phrase though which Xnty has been abolished―by people putting the matter in this way: There are no duties toward God― ―whereas the New T. consists entirely of the duty to love God. But we teach (and we call it Xnty) that there are no duties toward God; if someone were more advanced than others in such a way that one could, if you will, speak of ideality in relation to God, this means (this is what we teach, and we call it Xnty) that he is to turn to the others and help them along, because God directs us away from himself: there is no duty toward God. Charming! The matter is quite simple: it is quite naturally in the interest of the hum. race to reformulate everything into mediocrity, because mediocrity is the conditio sine qua non for having things easy. Therefore it is important to the hum. race to reformulate everything down into the mass, into mediocrity. And to be quite certain of achieving this, people enlist God’s help: he is the one who directs us away from himself. What a swindle―and what a swindle to call it Xnty! In the New T. matters stand like this: what 32 conditio sine qua non] Latin, the necessary and indispensable condition.

•

1854

49

50

1

Note But it must continually be kept in mind that according to Xnty every single one of these millions could be the single one. a

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 69

•

1854

interests God is precisely the ideality, the intensive, the one person who is driven to what is highest― the masses are of no interest whatever to God. Let the dead bury their dead―that’s the slogan―just press onward. Yes, God in his majesty is so aristocratic that he lavishes millionsa on one person, and, according to the New T., God is so intent upon what is intensive that he squanders the extensive on a frightful scale. But that is precisely why it is so enormously strenuous to involve oneself with God―and naturally that is also precisely why hum. beings have, under the name of Xnty, turned Xnty into its precise opposite: lovable mediocrity instead of the most frightful strenuousness in the direction of the ideal. Look at the matter quite simply in order to see how infinitely high Xnty is situated. If there were a pers. who could truly be said to be farther along than all his contemporaries in Christian knowledge and insight and effort, what would be more natural than for this situation to present itself to him in such a way that he thinks that his task is now to look to helping the others, and that God would help him in this connection, and that the result would of course be that he would surely be honored, esteemed, respected by his contemporaries as their teacher. But this is not how New Testament Xnty looks at the matter. If it were true that a person were farther ahead in the manner described here, and that person turned to God, then God would probably say to him: “No, no, my friend. No, not like this . . . you are now so far along that I shall thrash you further with the purpose of helping you, so that your contemporaries, instead of taking you as an ally―in which case the whole business, both you and the others, turns into something wretched―will thrash you in order to drive you farther out.” Because ideality, the intensive, which is God’s interest, is what he squanders millions on―millions, who, be it noted, nonetheless consist of single persons, of whom every individual could be the single one.

5

53

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 69–70

5

10

54

15

20

25

See, this is what is frightful about having to do with God: the more you involve yourself with him, the wilder it gets, the more he thrashes you. Because intensity―indeed, intensity―concerns him just as infinitely as he is infinitely indifferent to trillions qua trillions. God is always the inverse of the hum. being: the hum. being believes that numbers mean something, for God numbers are precisely what are of absolutely, absolutely no importance whatever. It is certainly true that God, in turn, knows (if I may put it this way) how to state his case. To an individual of this sort he says: My little friend, I understand only all too well what you are suffering in a hum. way, that you also suffer from having to be heterogeneous with them, from having to let go of the peop. you hold dearest, or perhaps even having them turn against you in hostility―when instead, by backing off, you could get on very nicely with them―but, my little friend, believe me, I mean so infinitely well by you, as only infinite love can. Alas, indeed, as a girl has surely had to say any number of times concerning her seducer: It is vain to resist him, vain, vergebliche Mühe, he can speak for himself―this is even more true of God. He can speak for himself, and therefore, therefore― therefore he then thrashes away yet again: infinite love.

70

Suffering―and Suffering.

30

What is genrlly understood by suffering is one thing; the type of suffering that means that a pers. is involved with God is something else. And yet, the religious person must also put up with this humiliation: that the surrounding world will pity him because of his suffering without suspecting that this type of suffering is a distinction possessed neither by kings nor majesties. Indeed, o God, you can be severe with a poor hum. being! You capture him as no one can capture―but of course you are invisible: so every

35

40

23 vergebliche Mühe] German, wasted trouble. (See also explanatory note.)

•

1854

51 [b]

And therefore humanity has felt it to be an unspeakable relief when it got Xnty turned around in such a way that it got rid of God, so that Xnty came to be this: There is no duty toward God. Humanity believes it has things easiest of all when no God whatever exists―then humanity can play the Lord. Next after that is for God to become at most a fancy ornament, a luxury item―for there is no duty toward God.

1

5

10

52

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 70–72

•

1854

practical man readily understands that it is foolish to involve oneself with someone who is invisible, whom one cannot, if necessary, compel to appear in court, and from whom one has nothing in writing. But forget it, forget the testimony: your inner testimony easily counterbalances all that sort of thing. But, alas, you go further. You take a pers. as your prisoner―and then, then you fool him, actually: You take him to the point where everything makes it clear that you have fooled him, so that he is greeted with mockery for having been tricked by you: indeed, then he himself―the final humiliation!―must say: God has forsaken me. True, it is only a transition, infinite love, it is only a transition, you eternally faithful one, but indeed, it is nonetheless bitter and full of anxiety―who knows this better than you, infinite love, you who yourself, because of love, nonetheless suffer more from it than does the person who suffers―though this cannot change you.

5

10

15

20

55

Infinite Love! You capture a pers.―and then you deceive him: yes, but you do it out of love―that is, you do not in fact deceive him, infinite love. No, no, no, you will not get me to believe anything else concerning you, you―there it is again― you do not deceive me, you are infinite love! You want to deceive me, it is true. You want to test whether you can get me to believe that you are anything but love―which, however, were it to happen, would grieve you, infinite love, more than me―so you do not deceive me, infinite love!

God in Heaven. Indeed, there is no lover who knows how to conceal the identity of the beloved, the understanding

71

25

30

72

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 72–73

5

10

15

20

25

56

73

35

•

1854

53

with the beloved, their encounters and meetings― no one as does: God in Heaven! To all appearances it looks like this: this pers. is the most miserable, unhappy, and wretched of all; everything combines to torment and plague him, to mock and ridicule him; he even cries out: God has forsaken me―and this apparent reality conceals the fact that precisely he is the beloved―thus does God conceal the understanding with the beloved. No hum. being was ever so majestic, so dignified, so concerned in connection with his love, and had such concern for the understanding of everyone not involved in the matter; therefore it could never occur to any hum. being to conceal who the beloved was, to conceal it under the cover of the beloved becoming the most unhappy of all. And yet, only this God is the God of love! The love gods of the pagans went about among hum. beings, and if the identity of the beloved was not discovered immediately, it was certainly detected soon―because their favor was of course quite obvious, and in this way the gods, in turn, were of course drawn out of their concealment and became known. But the God of love, who is spirit, conceals his love better: the beloved becomes the misfortunate one―this is also required by the majesty of his personality, which must seek the most absolute concealment. But as the concealment is the most reliable, so, too, is the love: not for this life, no, but for eternity.

Spirit. One who has not suffered at the hands of human beastliness does not become spirit. This is indeed how a hum. being is constituted: this sort of suffering, as all suffering “at the hands of hum. beings,” is part of becoming spirit.

[a]

Every hum. being is a synthesis, is animal/spirit. Then, in order to get the animal beaten out of the person who is to become spirit, this suffering is required: to be treated bestially by hum. beings.

1

5

54

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 74–75

•

1854

The Extraordinary. To prevent the extraordinary from being conceited, arrogant, the truly extraordinary person is always dialectical so that, viewed from the one side he is a sufferer, and human villainy provides the repulsion that helps make him the extraordinary. No one is born as the truly extraordinary―he becomes it. And it happens like this. He is gradually able to notice that something extraordinary has been entrusted to him―although this is accompanied with such suffering that for a long time he notices almost nothing but the suffering, and the extraordinary does not tempt him. Then comes the time when he takes up his task. And here it is required that he love people very much and that he mean well by them. But what happens[?] He collides both with hum. misunderstanding and with hum. vileness. Thus he is thrust away from the peop.: it is not he who arrogantly despised peop., no, he loved them, but it is peop. who both misunderstand him and villainously rebuff him. They are unable to weaken him because he is of course destined to be an extraordinary, so treatment of that sort can only make him stronger―so that he becomes the extraordinary. The dialectical middle term is always the suffering person, the rejected, etc.

74

5

10

15

20

57

25

Curious Self-Contradiction. Naturally, hum. envy is directed against nothing so much as against the extraordinary. And yet, no one became the truly extraordinary except through abuse by hum. beings. Thus envy will abuse a person in order to prevent him from becoming the extraordinary, and no one becomes the extraordinary except as a result of hum. abuse―thus envy produces the extraordinary.

75

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 76–77 76

5

10

15

58

20

25

30

•

1854

God’s Majesty. It has occurred to me (something I will use here as illustration) that the best way of assessing someone’s personality would be if one could learn what words he used in proposing to his beloved. Precisely because the person in love is so infinitely concerned with being loved, at such moments he will be likely to lose control of himself, so that only a quite eminent and marked personality, which is always in control of itself, will be entirely self-possessed in its own notion of itself. So much for the introduction. Now let us see how God, so to speak, proposes to a hum. being―God, who to a Christian way of thinking must in no way be conceived of as lacking in pathos. No, he is, as it were, sheer passion and pathos, though he has only one pathos: to love, to be love, and, out of love, to want to be loved. Now let us see how he proposes to a hum. being, concerning which Xnty indeed enlightens us. He proposes like this: He says to a pers., [“]I love you, I who am love, so therefore be, in turn, my beloved― ― ―the consequence of this will be, I am telling you this right away, the consequence will be that you will be an unhappy, miserable, wretched hum. being, a byword among peoples, hated, cursed, persecuted by peop., finally deceived by me.[”] Truly, a proposal of this sort is either the talk of a madman (and, as such, indeed ranking in its originality far above all previously known idées fixes and madness) or it is majesty. If a hum. being dare speak of such things, I would say: There is something infinitely dizzying for a hum. being to think of such majesty, which, precisely at the moment when it is infinitely moved in love, nonetheless asserts itself majestically, is itself. But on the other hand, if this majesty is love itself, how he must suffer in love, because there is in fact this tragic misrelation between God and hum. beings, so that it must be so painful for the beloved (the hum. being) to love and to be the beloved!

35

77

40

. . . . . And some day, when I am dead, how busy all the assistant professors will be to get me and mine butchered and salted down, how much competition there will be to say the same things, if possible, in more elegant language―as if that were what mattered.

55

56

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 77–79

•

1854

Ah, but how ridiculous an assistant professor is! We all laugh when some mad Meier carries around a mass of fieldstone that he thinks is money―but the assistant professor goes about proudly, proud of his cleverness, and no one laughs. And yet it is just as laughable to be proud of the cleverness with which a pers. dupes himself eternally. Yes, you, the most loathsome of all loathsome, inhuman peop., you, you assistant professor, you may very well manage to say the same things that the religious person has said, perhaps in even more elegant language. With your cleverness, perhaps you can also manage to gain worldly advantage, indeed, gain the honor and esteem that the truly religious person never gained in this life: but you are duped eternally. I am not writing this as if it occurred to me to hope that I might convert an assistant professor. Truly, if Xt, when he speaks against the Pharisees and against lecturing, cannot frighten, how could I move him[?] Here, this is what applies: [“]They have Moses and the prophets―if they do not believe them, then neither will they believe, etc.”

5

10

15

20

Speaking in Tongues To have understood―and to continually have to experience the truth of this―that to be loved by God and to love God is sheer suffering and agony―and then to be able to hold oneself up in such a way that one can with full voice can say ex animi sententia: it is blessed, which it indeed is in the absolutely highest sense: indeed, this is to speak in tongues. This is how the apostle speaks. And what has confused everything is the fact that nonsense has taken these words in straightforward fashion, springing over the dialectical element: that it is sheer suffering and terror.

59

78

25

30

The Intensive―The Extensive.―Xnty.

79

God is love, and God wants to be loved, this is the Christianity of the New Testament.

35

25 ex animi sententia] Latin, as one’s honest belief.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 79–81

5

10

80

15

20

•

1854

Now, of course, everyone knows that to be loved is only dialectical in the sense of intensity, and that it is nonsense, indeed an affront if, instead of there being one person whom one loves unconditionally, one were to offer to love half a score of people, love them more or less, to a certain degree―as if it were possible to contribute 4 shillings to a fund for love. And yet this is the way in which people have construed Xnty in Christendom. What I am decrying in particular is the dishonesty of behaving as though this were the Xnty of the New T., or even an advance upon it.

Being Alone. The criterion for being a hum. being is: how long, and how far out can he endure being alone, without being understood by others. The pers. who could endure being alone for an entire life and in decisions involving eternity is at the greatest distance from the infant and from the social man, which is the animal definition of what it is to be human.

60

81

25

30

35

On Myself. Among the things that make my life so strenuous is that I quite literally have a special task, so that it has never occurred to me that anyone else would have the same task or that there was something I was to accomplish together with others. This can be regarded as an imperfection. And in one sense, it is. In another sense, it isn’t. The more a person has a task in common with others, the more he is merely a copy―the more his task is specific to himself, the greater the original individuality. But it is strenuous! But how blessed it is to be as close to the source, to the spring, as I am. If you, o God, are like a spring, then I am the man by the spring. No one can help me; no one understands me, and in a certain sense I don’t understand anyone either. But, then, I do have the spring so close, oh, so close!

57

58

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 82–83

•

1854 The Priests.

1

5

10

a

indeed, in such a way that his only complaint was that he did not regard himself as capable of replacing the leg with equal facility, because if that could be done, he was certain that every well-to-do person would at least once a day (as one nowadays takes a bath, etc.) permit himself the pleasure, the indulgence, of having a leg amputated or a tooth pulled.

[a]

This is how humankind has treated God.

If a comic poet had thought up what the priests, in all seriousness, regard as their task, we would all burst out laughing. That you, o God, are, of all things, the most bothersome, an enormous burden, so that no sooner do you show up than there is a storm, a ship in distress, suffering: this is something you yourself know well, you infinite love. That is why, in your love, you suffer so much with the religious person, without thereby being changed yourself. The task the priests have set for themselves is to position God in such a way that he makes life easy, so that having him along makes life easy and is a source of enjoyment, etc. But no one laughs. Though everyone would laugh if someone were to announce that he will amputate legs, pull teeth, in a way that not only did not cause pain, but was a true enjoymenta

82

5

10

15

61

20

The Error of Judgment That Is the Origin of Xndom.

With us hum. beings it is always like this. When we hear that someone is supposedly a loving person, that he is very much a loving person, to us this is a sign that we will certainly get what we want from him―for, after all, he is a loving person. But that is not how it is in the New Testament. In the New T. God is love, infinite love―indeed, this is certain, infinitely certain. He knows best of all what agony it is for a hum. being, for a person, to become spirit, for a pers. truly to love God. To this end, he is surely willing to suffer with the beloved in infinite love: he will hear your every sigh, will share your sorrow, weep with you, count your tears― ―but change him? that is something you cannot do. Be assured that he suffers much more than you― ―because he cannot change.

83

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 83–85

5

10

15

•

1854

59

The heart of the matter is that one can be love itself without that meaning that he can be changed in accordance with the will of the beloved. But God cannot be changed. If he could be changed―and you thought that you really wanted to love him (him, who was so loving): then, on other grounds, it would be impossible for you to love him―because if he could be changed in that manner, then he would not be God, but a phantom, something unreal. In this way, too, it can easily be seen that Christendom is a falling-away from Xnty, because Christendom is: God changed in accordance with the will of humankind. This is the well-known hum. posture: people think that they can order the loving one to do everything―after all, he is the loving one.

62

84

“Just like the Others.” [a]

20

As we say of a ship bound for China or for the West Indies, so can we say that “just like the others,” the ship is bound for temporality; people travel in it comfortably, pleasantly, safely― ―but it is not bound for eternity.

25

85

30

35

Two will be grinding at the mill; one will be taken and the other will be left, etc. Frightful separation and isolation! What a difference from paganism and Judaism, where the reverse is the case: the family, then the town, then the province, then the country take part (participate) in the individual, so that when, e.g., one distinguishes oneself, the family, the town, the province, the country, immediately participate in one’s fame! Xnty is the unconditional separation of the individual; paganism and Judaism are, conversely, the superior power of the category of the race and the generation.

And although in the external world we use small ships for short distances, and those who travel to distant lands do not dare do so without large ships, in matters of the spirit the reverse is the case. The ship in which one travels in temporality (“just like the others”) is an enormously large ship. For the journey to eternity, on the other hand, only some very small boats are used, boats for a single person, nutshells. But it is clear that there is an enormous distance before eternity is discovered and taken into possession, and that it is a frightful voyage, alone, on a sea larger than any of the oceans of this world, because it is not an ocean of this world, but one that separates two worlds; yet for the person for whom eternity came into existence it is in fact the shortest distance, so a nutshell is more than enough.

1

5

10

15

20

25

60

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 85–86

•

1854

But it is obvious that in Xndom everything takes place in pagan and Jewish fashion: in Christendom, one is a Christian by being a member of a family, however distantly, that has in it someone who is a Christian. Indeed, one is even a Christian at the remove of a long succession of family members who are descended from Christians, i.e., one is a Christian in a way in which it is impossible to be a Christian. The apostle says that faith comes from what is heard, but to be a Christian like this, von Hörensagen!

5

10

63

Another Side from Which Xnty Can Be Seen. Christianity is what God must suffer from us hum. beings. This can be understood as follows. A beloved naturally understands being loved to mean that the lover is changed in accordance with the beloved and the beloved’s will and views. A lover understands that to love is to be changed into likeness with the beloved, to become as the beloved could wish or will one to be. Now, if you will, in God there is a contradiction that is the source of all torment: He is love, and yet he is eternally unchanging. Thus, he cannot be changed―and yet he is love. Consequently, in one sense he must make the beloved unhappy―and yet he is love. To be love, and then to be unchanging in such a way that there can be no talk of sparing the beloved―no, to remain unchanged while seeing everything conspire against him, seeing him abandoned, hated, persecuted―without helping him, and yet to be love. When Christ cried, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”―it was frightful for Xt, and that is how it is generally portrayed. But I think it was even more frightful for God to hear it. To be unchanging in that way: frightful! Yet no, this is not what is frightful, but to be unchanging like that and then to be love: infinitely deep, unfathomable sorrow! Alas, what haven’t I, a poor hum. being, experienced in that respect, this contradiction of not being able to be changed and nonetheless to love, alas, what haven’t I experienced that helps me in a faint, faint way to form a weak notion of the suffering of divine love. 9 von Hörensagen] German, properly “vom Hörensagen,” through hearsay.

86

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 87–88

•

1854

64

87

5

10

88

15

20

25

30

35

“Close the Cover” That is what it says in the old hymn. Close the cover, that is, the coffin cover, close it well, very firmly, so that I―like a child who is so infinitely happy when it has been properly tucked in― can truly have peace, properly hidden away. Close the cover, close it very firmly―because I am not lying in the coffin, no, what is lying in the coffin is not me, but is what I so infinitely much want to be rid of: this body of sin, the prison vestments I have had to wear.

. . . . . It is only all too true, what people―the practical people―say about me: that I am not good for anything, that I am an utterly impractical pers., that I simply do not relate to the practical world. Alas, I am only good at one thing―and in this respect, however, I perhaps even possess an eminent genius―I am only good at: loving. Thus I am superfluous, a sheer luxury item in this practical world, indeed, even a luxury item that furthermore is in the way, so it will probably end with my getting kicked out of this world. But I am good at loving! You women, come to me―or, to say the same thing in a different way: don’t come to me, what good are you for loving, you maidens and madames of this miserable race. No, I am good at loving, and this was my only genius―it was raised to the second power―concealed in the incognito that I was the most self-loving of all. Yes, loving, that was the only thing I was good for. An object, simply an object! But as with the archer whose bow is strung unusually taut: when you present him with an object 10 feet away and ask him to shoot at it, he must say: [“]No, I cannot shoot at that distance, bring me something 400 or 600 feet away, that would work for me.[”] In order to love, I must place the object at a distance! That was my school in which I was perfected more and more in my only genius: loving. An object, then, an object! That was what I sought and searched for.

61

62

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 88–90

•

1854

Yes, and I found it! Because you, you, you eternal love, you infinitely rich man, naturally, as all rich men, you have no use for necessities, but on the contrary, as all rich men, you have use only for luxury goods. So you found use for me: I was indeed the officially recognized luxury good in this practical world; you found a use for me―and I found the object. So let the practical age in which I live busy itself with my trousers in asinine fashion; let ballyhooed posterity busy itself with my ideas and writings just about as asininely―I have found what I sought. I have found it. “But of course,” as they say, “on the mayor’s table,” by which one indicates that it is not quite true that one has “found” it. Oh, well, I admit it: You, o God, have helped me both to seek and to find.

65 5

10

15

. . . . . I am alone, I cannot expect to be understood: the young are too young, the old too weighty―or as the beloved poet of incomparable language has the girl incomparably describe her suitors: “The one is too young to break my garland, the other too heavy to dance my dance”―except that with me it does not end as it does with the girl, with me taking a third person―no, there was no third person.

89

Man―Woman

90

Woman was taken from man’s side―but from a Christian perspective isn’t man’s relation to woman comparable with what we call making an aside[?] Man was made for eternity; woman leads him into an aside. In this world, without woman, man is weaker: he has a weak side that woman protects, and together they are strong for this life. But from a Christian standpoint this weakness―which is that of the solitary―this weakness for this life is precisely part of being strong for eternity.

30

20

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 91–92 66

91

5

10

15

20

92

25

30

35

•

1854

“Let Me First Say Farewell,” etc. With all those scriptural passages in which Xt emphasizes the unconditional so unconditionally, it must nonetheless be borne in mind that the people involved stipulated a condition―that is, they did not unconditionally seek the kingdom of God first. Thus, matters would have been different if the person involved had said: “I stipulate no conditions, there is nothing I desire first, but you know how much I would like first to say farewell to my family and friends.” Or even if he hadn’t said this, but had had this thought on his mind, so that he did not in fact hesitate to choose the unconditional unconditionally―then it was of course possible that the one who knew all, including his thoughts, had said: [“]Very well, follow me, but first go and say farewell to your family and friends.[”] In other words, what concerns Xt is the sovereignty of the unconditional, that there must be no condition, nothing first; if it is to be “first,” absolutely nothing can be conceded. On the other hand, this cannot mean that Christ has no empathy for this hum. feeling of wanting to bury one’s father, to say farewell to family and friends―he who himself wept at Lazarus’s grave, he who himself entrusted the mother to a son’s care.

Socrates―Alcibiades. Why did A[lcibiades] weep when S[ocrates] spoke (“when he speaks, my heart beats violently, more violently than the Corybantes’, tears stream from my eyes”)[?] A[lcibiades], after all, was surely a man who knew how to express himself by choosing appropriate expressions. If A[lcibiades] had viewed S[ocrates] as an ironist who was incomparably capable of fooling people, then it would have been strange to speak of him like this, so Al[cibiades] might sooner have said, [“]One can laugh oneself silly by listening to S[ocrates].[”] So why did A[lcibiades] cry[?] It is easy to see that S[ocrates], as a true ironist, used irony to conceal the ideals. But sometimes he also revealed them. And that was when he moved A[lcibiades] so profoundly. A[lcibiades] wept, tears streamed out of his eyes, his heart beat violently―quite simply because S[ocrates] brought him into

63

64

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 92–94

•

1854

the agony into which an intellect that is frivolous and devoid of character can be brought by a pers. of character. A[lcibiades] had sufficient ideality and intellect to be capable of being grasped and captivated by the ethical ideal that S[ocrates] presented― ―but he could not vanquish the baser element within himself. Therefore it turned into tears, heartbeats―had it been transformed into ethical action, S[ocrates] would likely have said that the tears and the heartbeats would surely have stopped.

The Ideal―The Bearer. There are two scales of measurement with respect to bearing the ideals to hum. beings. The first is for those who bear the ideals to hum. beings in such a way that the bearers themselves are honored, esteemed, rewarded with all possible earthly goods. As one ascends this scale and the reward becomes greater, what is ideal becomes less recognizable, more dubious―the bearer rlly stands in its way, diverting attention from it, until finally, when he has attained to maximum of earthly reward, he completely obscures the ideal, annihilates it by obscuring it. The second group of bearers, the true bearers, consists of those who bear the ideals to hum. beings while they themselves are suffering. The more such a bearer suffers, the more unhappy, miserable his life―also owing to persecution and opposition from peop.―the more clearly the ideal is seen. The bearer does not stand in its way at all, he does not in any way obscure it with his corporeality or his finitude.

The Deceptive Thing about Socrates. The deceptive thing about S[ocrates] is that his irony is so witty, his intellect so eminent, that this tempts one to forget entirely that at the same time he is dealing with matters of life and death. One reads Plato’s Apology and one is enchanted: how infinitely witty he is, how pointed is every word he speaks, how a propos― ―alas, and we who have been spoiled by this damned

67 5

93

15

20

25

94

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 94

5

70

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

garbage that says that the greatest thing is to be a writer, we are tempted to read him as if he were a writer, a witty author who would perhaps even get an A+ from the journals― ―and then, Socrates is playing for life and death. On a smaller scale, my life demonstrates something similar, for my personal existence is worth much more and is far more strenuous than my writings, but this is not understood at all by this race of theater people, who are hollowed out in the back just like elf-girls, and who probably also trace their origins to theatrical marriages. But S[ocrates] is the only one of his kind! Such a developed intellect, so infinitely finely cultivated and pointed that one would think that such a pers. would require all the pampering, all the distance from the actual world, that a poet, an artist requires― and then, that he is the toughest fellow in Greece, who does not churn things out in his study, but who, in the most decisively actual situations, with everything at stake, with death before his eyes, brings to bear this fine intellect, so fine in every remark, so priceless in even the most insignificant turn of phrase. One could say of Socrates something my pseudonyms often say: His life is not a drama for hum. beings, but for gods―spectators of the sort he might require were just about as hard to find as a Socrates. That is how Socrates himself would understand it, for here can be seen how true and how Socratic this Socratic saying was: to understand, truly to understand, is to be. For us more ordinary hum. beings, this divides and becomes something double: to understand is one thing, to be is something else. Socrates is on such a high plane that he abolishes this difference―and therefore we cannot understand him, understand him in the deepest sense, in the Socratic sense. I can depict Socrates at a distance, but had I been his contemporary, I doubt that I could have endured him. Outside of Xnty, Socrates is the only pers. of whom it can be said, [“]He explodes existence,[”] which can be seen quite simply from the fact that he abolishes the separation between poetry and actuality. In the way we live, a poet presents the ideal―but, dammit, actuality is not like that. Socrates is an ideality higher than any poet can depict in poetry, and he is this in actuality, it is his actuality. Therefore it is as wrong as can be when Oehlenschläger wants to present Socrates poetically―O, Lord God, one is tempted to say with the character in the comedy, [“]Even a bricklayer wants to be poetic.[”] In relation to S[ocrates], “the poet” is an altogether superfluous person who can only be made

65

Part of entry NB31:94, with a deleted hash mark (#) in the opening sentence of the sixth paragraph. The passage reading “O, Lord God, one is tempted to say, with the person in the comedy, that even a bricklayer wants to be poetic” has also been deleted.

68

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 94–95

•

1854

a fool of or become ridiculous if he does not keep himself at a proper distance but even wants to portray him in poetry. What does it mean to portray something in poetry? It means: to add a bit of the ideal to it. The poet takes something actual that has alas lacked something of the ideal, and adds a bit of the ideal, and that is the poem. But, good God, Your Lordship, here there is no talk whatever of any need to add a bit of something―Socrates’ ideality is higher, and this precisely because it is actuality. When he wants to poetize, the poet is thus in the same situation as what Joh[annes] Climacus discusses in relation to an orator who at the climax of his argument mistakes his direction and ascends from the higher to the lower: the poet pulls S[ocrates] down―but I have enough of the Socratic in me to understand that I would not be able to get Ø. to understand this. Strange Socratic difficulty! In order to poetize a man, surely it is first necessary to understand him. But of course Socrates himself says, “to understand it is to be it.” Oh, dear poet, if you could understand this it would never occur to you to poetize it. Consequently, it can only be poetized when it is not understood, or to poetize S[ocrates] is eo ipso a misunderstanding, and to praise a poet for having poetized Socrates in a masterpiece is to make a fool of him. A man of great character who does not possess an intellect of equivalent magnitude can be depicted poetically by poetically attributing to him the equivalent intellect; or the reverse, by poetically attributing some character to an eminent intellect. But where intellect and character are equally eminent, there is nothing for the poet. And how ridiculous that a poet wants to take hold of S[ocrates]―S[ocrates] of course intended precisely to put an end to the poetic and to introduce the ethical, where the point is: that it is actuality.

Finitude―Infinitude, Reversed. This, too, has contributed to the demoralization that is Christendom: that we have represented the interests of the spirit, the idea, Xnty―but, be it noted, in a finite manner, consistent with finitude, so that what should participate in elevating society, or at least in pointing out that there something higher exists―this now helps to consolidate what is finite and finite efforts in their

5

71 10

15

20

25

30

95 35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 95–96

5

10

72

15

20

25

•

1854

finitude; indeed, it does so in such a way that even these representatives of the idea and of Xnty, behaving like swindlers, take advantage of the common man’s finite understanding in order to fight back in case something appears that is actually borne by and bears the idea and that is actually related to Xnty. Take finite situations. Assume there are 2 merchants. One of them buys and sells in such a way that he makes a great deal of money, the other in such a way that he loses money. Then finitude says: One of these two is a merchant, the other is not a merchant. People transfer this directly to the sphere of spirit and Xnty. Here are two philosophers. One of them makes a great deal of money, the other loses money―well, then finitude immediately concludes (and the swindling priests, and professors naturally confirm this) that the former is a philosopher and the latter is no philosopher. Here are two teachers of Xnty. One of them makes a lot of money and amounts to something, the other amounts to nothing and loses money. Yes: the former is a true teacher of Xnty, the latter is not. But finitude and infinitude relate inversely to one another. The true merchant is the one who makes money. Yes. But the true philosopher, not to mention the true teacher of Xnty, is precisely the one who does not make money―because to represent infinitude in such a way that it nonetheless remains finitude, is of course not infinitude. It is abominable to exploit the ignorance of the less enlightened, to urge them on to what is actually an infinite effort, while betraying it oneself under the appearance of attending to something higher.

30

96

35

The Substitute. To compensate for some nuts being hollow―one gets all the more of them. As compensation it is nonsense, and it is also a nuisance, because if there are going to be hollow nuts, it would be better if there were only 3 or 4 of them―what agony to have to crack open 1 million hollow nuts in order to ascertain that they are hollow nuts.

69

70

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 96–98

•

1854

The same thing with hum. beings: to compensate for the circumstance that they are copies, devoid of ideas―one gets all the more of them. And while no one wants to work in the direction of the idea, everyone is in service of the substitute, serving by multiplying and begetting children. The numerical is the most laughable parody of the idea: through addition people want to attain something in relation to which addition is subtraction. But obviously, in the bestial sense, the numerical has the power.

5

10

Sympathy. When the law is that the highest is attained only in the greatest suffering, then it is of course a misunderstanding to have sympathy for a person who suffers like that. For if the person showing sympathy is suffering less, then the person who is suffering more ought to have sympathy for him, who as someone who suffers less only attains something lesser.

The Extraordinary. That the extraordinary person must suffer in this world is, after all, entirely in order―indeed, it is not difficult to see that in a certain sense this is in fact ridiculous. The contradiction (in which the ridiculous consists) is: that someone is to be extraordinary, while nonetheless qua hum. being, etc., to outward appearances, to the senses, he looks just like the others. The contradiction inheres in the circumstance that such an enormous difference should be present within that likeness. When the extraordinary person is dead, people help themselves with illusions, people imagine that he had looked entirely different from other people, that what had been extraordinary about him had in fact been visible, accessible to the senses, all of which is nonsense. And because things are this way―because the truly extraordinary person is in a certain sense a person forsaken, ridiculed― therefore, whatever is a bit above average―without, however,

73

97

15

98

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 98–99

5

74

99

15

20

25

30

35

•

1854

being the truly extraordinary (which of course disdains such methods)―helps itself out by making use of some sort of difference from the ordinary, something that can be detected by the senses. This is helped with fancy uniforms, vestments, or other clerical costumes, stars, etc., etc.―for when the common man sees these, he thinks, Yes, such a man is something extraordinary, that is obvious, he doesn’t look like us others.

Time―Eternity Hum. beings were sent forth into the world with the task of satisfying eternity; subsequently, in Xnty, this order was enjoined unconditionally. But then this villainous falsification―that the task was one of satisfying the requirements of the times―was continued from generation to generation. The gifted, who ought to uphold the criterion, became cowardly and falsified it villainously, finding it most convenient to flatter their times. Then, finally, the notion that satisfying the times was true earnestness was preached with great bravura―or at any rate put into practice―by such scoundrels as Goethe, Hegel, and, among us, Mynster. In the end, this is what is meant by [“]the times[”]: the dregs, the mob of an age, because there are of course more of them, they are strongest numerically. This, you see, was what had to be changed, and Governance, which always acts in this manner, dialectically brings to bear the precise opposite in its most extreme form. Alas, but it is terrifying to be commanded to make the true law hold for such a demoralized generation. It would not occur in the faintest way to any hum. majesty to conduct itself in such a manner. When he notices that his sovereignty is under attack, he intervenes as soon as possible. But this enormous majesty, Divinity, amuses himself, if you will, by having it seem as though he is losing the game―so certain is he of his sovereignty. He lets century after century pass; the race becomes more and more conceited―and then, simply in

71

72

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 99–100

•

1854

order to demonstrate his majesty, he uses a nothing to stop the whole thing, to scrap these millions.

Christianity (Authority). This was how Xnty came into the world: it was based on authority, its divine authority―thus the authority was what was higher. Now, the relationship has long since been reversed: people seek to prove the authority, to substantiate it, on rational grounds. And yet this is supposed to be the same religion. This was the situation when Xnty came into the world: humanity had long since despaired of making sense of this existence, despaired of finding the truth―then came Xnty with divine authority. Therefore Augustine, to take him as an example, always puts the matter like this: that the perfect thing about Xnty is precisely the authority, that Xnty has the truth in its most perfect form, authority, that if one could possess the same truth without authority, it would be less perfect, because precisely the authority is what is the perfection―alas, for even Augustine had learned what it is a hum. being needs: authority, which the race, worn out by the doubts of the philosophers and the miseries of life, had learned precisely from Xnty’s entry into the world. Nowadays the situation has been turned this way: A so-called philosophical Xnty finds that authority is precisely an imperfection, is höchstens something for plebeians, that what is perfect would be to get rid of it―in order to get things to be as they were before Xnty came into the world. And theology seeks to ground Xnty’s authority, to ground it, i.e., to confess indirectly, worse than any attacker, that it is not authority. This is how the matter has stood for a long time, generation after generation―and everything goes wonderfully: students become theology graduates, graduates become priests or professors, get married, beget children in the name of Xnty, bread-and-butter brothers are securely cared for in the best fashion: oh, disgusting! What people nowadays call Xnty is actually nothing but making a fool of God. 27 höchstens] German, at most.

100 5

10

75 15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 100–102

•

1854

73

Ah, but then, once again, this is what I find so terrifying: whether eternity will actually scrap these generations and millions as eternally lost.

101

10

15

76 20

102

30

35

Christianity. Christianity was a task that was given to the hum. race, a lesson it was assigned, an examination that was to be taken. But finally, especially in Protestantism, especially in Denmark, it got to the point that had been a long, long time in preparation, it got to the point that the human race turned the matter like this: Let’s pretend, as it were, that it is a game, let us play Xnty. As when a teacher gives a student an assignment and says, [“]This is a difficult lesson, and learning it thoroughly will make for a hard day for you tomorrow[”]―that was how Xnty came into the world, more or less as if, in introducing Xnty, God said to the hum. race: [“]This is a difficult lesson, this temporal life will be a hard day for you.[”]― ―Nowadays we act as if God had said, [“]This life is a vacation day.[”] Then, being a Xn―indeed, even being a teacher of Xnty―became the most pleasant, enjoyable lifea―and there was no longer enough of a sense of shame remaining for it to at least occur to a person that this sort of Xnty was not the Xnty of the New Testament.

The Truth. It always seems natural to a person that the best thing is to make sure to recruit others to help, so that one strives for the truth in association with others; and the watchword is always: Let us join together in order to strive for the truth. No, no, no, it won’t work that way. Truly, the truth is anything but the result of a collective striving. Because the truth is precisely the fact that every one of us hum. beings is a swindler, so the only way in which there can be any talk of coming to the truth is for us―as each of the 70 translators were locked in their separate cells, as criminals nowadays are placed in solitary confinement―to become individuals―association is simply untruth. Becoming an individual, continuing to be an individual, is the way to the truth. And the longer a hum. being can hold out being

a

an extraordinarily entertaining and profitable game

1

74

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 102–103

•

1854

an individual, and the deeper the sense in which he is an individual (probably, in fact, so far is he from being in association with others that he is abused by them), the closer he is to the truth. But the animal category makes life pleasing, convenient, secure. You see, therefore: Let us join together. And in the course of time this has more and more gotten the upper hand, so that hum. beings have more and more become animal creatures.

The Difficulty of My Task. Everything, everything I see around me―but never mind it, things of this sort should not be of much importance to me―but everything, everything, everything about which I have read and heard (Socrates is the one exception, and in Christianity Jesus Xt, because the apostle does not constitute an exception) has always understood a task in this manner: A person has something called a cause, or a person has a cause in a great and lofty and profound sense. The task, then, the goal toward which one strives, is to interest people in something, to win them over to it, to gain their support, etc. To this end, if I dare put it like this, every sinew, every muscle is strained, every sail is hoisted. This, then, is the task. On the other hand, at the same time, the person who is striving in this way has nothing less than an equally powerful notion that there is something suspect about people’s interest, their support, etc., that it is the certain path to nonsense and twaddle and lack of character―that support from people does not augment or preserve ideality, no, it consumes it and makes it into something insignificant, into nonsense, etc. What happens is that a person who strives like this, who works with all his might to gain people’s support―10, 20, or, according to the scale of his intensity, 50, 100, 200 years later, history quite rightly points out the truth: that support from people is the way to get ideality destroyed, made into twaddle and gibberish. But when he began, the person who strove was not conscious of this. When they began, none, none, none of the peop. of whom I have read had this perspectival consciousness of what otherwise is only illuminated by history.

5

103

15

77 20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 103

5

10

15

20

•

1854

This means: in everything, everything, everything I have read concerning human beings (Socrates alone excepted), they have only had an immediate consciousness with respect to their task, not a reflected consciousness, only an immediate enthusiasm, not a reflected enthusiasm: they stood at the beginning.―Then history taught us the end of the story: Socrates knew the end of the story when he stood at the beginning―that is where he begins. But if that is the case (o, Socrates!) then the task is strenuous to the second power. A reflective consciousness of this sort would kill a person whose enthusiasm was immediate, so that he would decide to do nothing at all. Out of loving concern, the end is hidden from the eyes of the person of immediate enthusiasm―ah, if he could see the end, his enthusiasm would die. Frightful effort: even while the task is indeed to relate to peop., to work, as Socrates did, in the service of the gods―even while one does this, to also have to be wary of peop. because one knows―just as surely as history has ever illuminated things in connection with the efforts of any long since deceased enthusiast―that the support of peop. is the path to nonsense. Alas, and indeed this is how it is: just as, with each day he lives, a person comes one step closer to his death (for death is quite certain), so for every pers. whose support is won, does nonsense come one step closer―nonsense: that certainty which awaits every ideality.

78

* 25

30

35

40

*

But then, when I think of myself, I can sometimes become quite anxious and fearful for myself: how, after all, can a pers. become aware at an early age of something that would seem to take a long, long life to learn―if it can be attained in that way at all. “How did he come to begin[?]”―that is the question my pseudonyms continually explored in connection with the extraordinary figures in order to learn something from them. And now, for myself, how did I come to begin? Alas, how sorrowful (as I was so often compelled to say to myself in sorrow when I was younger), alas, I was never young; when I was a youth, I was a thousand years older than an old man! And thus I may also say to myself, in sorrow: I have in fact never rlly been a hum. being! I have never had a need for society and an immediate trust in people―and yet, (look, you can call this a contradiction!), yet I am an enthusiast, yes, truly an enthusiast. *

*

75

76

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 103–104

•

1854

If I were an immediate enthusiast, if I simply had a straightforward task, not a reflected one: how splendidly (if I dare say so) my cause would stand now: all the conditions for gaining support from peop. are as favorable as possible. Just look―the minister of culture looks upon me favorably. Martensen has become bishop; he very clearly senses that he has been favored, has been a protégé, that he is in a difficult position―all this means that he would be very likely to make everything as easy as possible for me. The popular mood is on my side, indeed, it is very much to my advantage; precisely because I have permitted myself to be ridiculed, etc., the tide has begun to turn, turning to my advantage: as always, when a people truly want to shower one with favor, they generally require first to be permitted to do him wrong. Furthermore, in this connection the appointment of Martensen is also favorable to me, because people are now more likely to let things go my way because I am nothing, I have done my work gratis, etc., i.e., I would be able to garner some pathos in this connection. Etc. Etc. But when the task is reduplicated, then all this merely constitutes an additional strain, inasmuch as it must be pushed aside. No, I have never rlly been a hum. being. And there is also something inhuman, if you will, in that: a young pers. who―and this thought goes back to my early years―has the idea: there are peop. whose destiny it is to be sacrificed for the others.

5

10

15

20

79

25

The Sacrifice. When a life has this formula: enthusiasm, though containing an equally powerful negative reflection―and nonetheless enthusiasm: this means that this individual is marked out to be a sacrifice; he is like a musical note that is sharp: his life is made sharper for him; he is the sacrifice, which of course has a significance that is entirely different from the thousands of spontaneous enthusiasts who have been sacrificed. It is curious that here, too, the lowest and the highest resemble one another. The lowest sort of character is what is womanish, Zerlina-esque: I want to and I don’t want to. And this resembles what is highest, the demonic pathos: I want to engage with my contemporaries, and I don’t want to and yet I do, i.e., I do not want to engage with them in straightforward fashion―I want to be sacrificed.

104

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 105–106

105

5

10

15

•

1854

The Scale of Existence is so great that it is as if it were calculated to deceive. The distances in the universe are so great that those enormous heavenly bodies appear to be dots―the child, nations in their childhood, actually believe this to be the case. The same holds in relation to numbers: centuries and millions upon millions of millions―it looks deceptively as if they were something, and yet the whole thing concerns a quite small number of individuals. Yet in connection with the numerical, hum. beings of course always remain children, and as with the stars (which are large bodies even though they appear to be dots), only a few individuals can understand things inversely: they look as if they were something, these trillions, and yet the whole thing concerns a quite limited number of very intensive points.

80

106 20

25

30

Luther has indeed given rise to great confusion. What rlly happened because of Luther? What happened was what very often happens. There is something that worldliness, politics, baseness wants to have done, but for one thing, these powers are not particularly courageous, but are merely shrewd cowards, and for another, they probably fear that what they want will be met with more opposition if it emanates or originates from them. So they lie in wait in order to see whether it might not occur to a religious figure (for religious reasons) to want, for religious reasons, what is apparently the same thing, and then take advantage of him. History is rife with examples of this sort of thing.

77

78

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 107–108

•

1854

To Enter a Monastery Is Cowardly, No, Remain in the World!

What the world indeed wanted, and wants, is to have Xnty abolished. But shrewd as the world is, it has instinctively understood that Xnty is most securely abolished when, precisely when, the appearance is maintained that we do, of course, have it. So the watchword became “To enter a monastery is cowardly―No, remain in the world.” For the world shrewdly understood that the sort of peop. who are capable of expressing Xnty’s heterogeneity right on the street, in the middle of actual life, are no longer to be found―the race has long since become too corrupt for that. So let us therefore prevent them from entering monasteries, then we will surely gain control over them and force them to express our views under the name of Xnty. And it succeeded. In Protestantism, especially in Denmark, they have managed to make every one of the terms that Xnty uses in connection with being Xn―terms that indicate heterogeneity with the world―to sound like a satire upon a Xnty that has become entirely homogeneous with the world.

107

5

10

15

20

Being a Christian: A Race. The first race is: with confidence in God, loving God, daring to be forsaken by hum. beings. Then, when a person has completed this race so that it finds grace and favor before God, the second race begins: Forsaken by hum. beings, also to be forsaken by God―of which hum. beings in turn take advantage with their mockery. But believe nonetheless, believe, believe that God, in love, suffers with such a pers. more than he does: Infinite love! The world has invented something new: to be a Xn is to live like these millions in the Christian countries. Laughable! that such an existence is to be a called a race, a race in which not only does one not move from the start line, but in which one merely sinks deeper into the mire! Even more laughable, that this is supposed to be being a Xn.

81

108

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 109–110 109

5

10

15

20

25

82

•

1854

To Love God Is to Hate What Is Human. The human is the relative, is mediocrity; only in mediocrity does a hum. being feel good; God is the unconditioned. Loving God is thus impossible without hating what is human. But truly, this hatred of the human to which Xnty refers is not something original in a pers.―no, hum. villainy and wretchedness tortures it out of the person who originally loved peop., and in a certain sense continues to love them, that is, in the idea, in accordance with the eternal, but not in the sense of permitting oneself to be conquered by mediocrity. True, we occasionally see that a person who feels very happy is inclined to something we call love of humanity. What is very rare―as in my own case―is when a pers. who feels unhappy and who understands that he must indeed come to terms with this unhappiness: that he then believes that he ought to do good for others. This was my case. But the wretchedness and meanness of peop., which repaid in villainous fashion the good that I, in my sympathetic melancholia, had intended to do for them: that taught me, compelled me to seek to come closer and closer to God, made it impossible for me to hold out without embracing the Christian principle of loving God rather than hum. beings. I can certainly see how Governance played a part in this. And that is something one must leave to Governance: it wants to have its ideas presented, and it knows how to govern. But this Christian hatred of what is human is anything but what is usually understood by hatred of humanity, wishing people ill, and the like; no, it is to love them in the idea, infinitely to wish them well.

30

110

35

“History.” This, too, is a part of hum. confusion, this belief that a young pers. is to be educated by history. Alas, good Lord, what is history! Let’s be honest and not give in to the hum. conceit that the hum. race is something so important and significant that its history is such a source of education, of cultivation. History is a process. Rarely, rarely, rarely is there produced a little drop of an idea. So the process is one of transforming this

79

80

1

5

a

and while this is taking place, it claims that it is perfecting this ideal undertaking.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 110–112

•

1854

into nonsense―in the course of which centuries and millions x trillions are sometimes used,a And it is by this that it is so important that the young person be educated, presumably so as to attain perfection in nonsense in timely fashion. And with every decade there are more and more new inventions so that, if possible, every grocer can be dragged along in history, just as the daguerreotype portrays everyone. No, Omar was right: Burn it all, because either it is in the Koran or it is a lie. From a godly point of view, what is infinitely important is to save primitivity, if possible, to preserve in the young person the impression of being the only person in the entire world. And historical education tends toward drowning the young person in a sea of nonsense. From a godly point of view, salvation inheres in “the single individual”―the race naturally believes that it inheres in―“the race.”

Maturity―Immaturity. There are certain thoughts, the highest of which is precisely something that every hum. being has an impression, a recollection, of having had as a youth―but then he becomes reasonable, and those thoughts are forgotten. In some cases there are exceptions, so some individuals did not get these youthful impressions. Their youth passes in dark melancholia, and only when they have reached the age of manhood―when, in addition, they are fully formed and developed― only then do these thoughts awaken, and they do so with the enthusiasm of youth.

5

10

15

83

111 20

25

30

Enthusiasts. At one point Lessing rightly remarks that the word enthusiast is formed from the word Schwarm and therefore designates something social, this urge to run together in a flock―and thus he cannot be called an enthusiast. 34 Schwarm] German, swarm. (See also explanatory note.)

112

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 112–113

5

10

84 15

20

•

1854

A solitary enthusiast is such a wonder, a phenomenon as rare as a meteorite, that there is indeed only one such: Socrates. A solitary enthusiast is as strange as combining fire and water, or as speaking of a chaste voluptuary, or of a solitary fellow who is the life of the party, or of keeping a liquid in a bottomless vessel! Wonderful Socrates! To keep the loftiest enthusiasm, to keep it in the most eminent reflection and intelligence―as wonderful as keeping a fluid in a bottomless vessel. For us others it would not succeed: if the vessel is bottomless, the fluid runs out―to the degree that our reflection and intelligence develop, something is subtracted from enthusiasm. Marvelous Socrates! You performed a feat, something quite different from the one with Columbus’s egg, from those in a certain sense plebeian feats. And thus your feat is unlike plebeian feats― and how I envy you the fact that it is not like them, that there is this justice that eternally secures you against the fraternization of the mob and the gang of professors―which present no difficulty to those who would perform them afterward. No, no, you splendid fellow, it remains just as difficult―and thus it is certain that, after you, no one has done what you have done, while it is surely the case that everyone in that rabble of professors and assistant professors thinks that he has gone much farther than you, that rabble of whom I assume you were speaking quite geheimt when, as Alc[ibiades] says, you continually spoke of pack-asses.

25

Socrates.

113

30

35

40

It is said that Sardanapalus had the following placed upon his grave: “I took all life’s pleasures with me,” to which someone, even in pagan times, replied: [“]How? You could not even hold fast to a single one of them while you were alive.[”] Thus, one cannot take everything along into the grave in that way; in that way, one succeeds only in letting everything pass through oneself, taking nothing whatever into the grave. No, Socrates, he is the only hum. being who solved the problem: He took everything, everything, everything with him into the grave. Marvelous Socrates, you performed a feat that forever remains equally difficult should anyone wish to imitate you: you left behind nothing, nothing, nothing, not the least shred of a result of which a professor could take hold―no, you took everything with you into the grave. Thus you preserved the highest 23 geheimt] German, secretly.

81

82

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 113–114

•

1854

enthusiasm, sealed it airtight in the most eminent reflection and intelligence, preserved it for eternity―you took everything with you. Therefore, nowadays it is said among the professors―o, Socrates!―nowadays the professors speak disparagingly of you: that you, after all, were only a personality, you did not even have a system.

The Human Race. No human beings are rlly being born; as one says in connection with a type of seed, or a certain type of fruit, that it certainly bears the same name, but is of an entirely different sort: hum. beings are not rlly being born any more. With respect to spirit, the peop. being born nowadays are just as unusable as sewing needles without eyes. Hum. beings are not being born, because they are without subjectivity. Subjectivity is what determines the relationship to spirit or is the possibility of spirit. Subjectivity, this I, which ceaselessly reminds and awakens the I that applies everything to itself, the I that, upon seeing what is glorious or upon hearing of it, immediately applies it to itself: [“]How does it stand with respect to yourself, do you strive in that manner, etc., etc.[?”] The I is the insomnia that is the condition of the ethical. But nowadays hum. beings are born without subjectivity, like knives without edges, like arrows without points. Millions live occupying themselves solely with the finite goals of this life. And those who ought to be a superior sort―yes, these are precisely the ones I have in mind when I say that nowadays hum. beings are just as unusable for spirit as sewing needles without eyes are unusable for sewing. The superior ones are namely―assistant professors, i.e., they are lacking in subjectivity, blunted, sluggish objectivities, copies. With respect to what is absolutely calculated to enflame subjectivity (if there is any) to its utmost, with respect to the divine that suffers for the sake of the sins of the race, crying [“]Imitate me[”]― ―there they remain, inhumanly―Yes, isn’t it as I say: they are not hum. beings!―they remain objective, they lecture on it. And that is also how it is in relation to everything else that is glorious, that has had to suffer, and that has cried out for imitation: They remain objective and lecture on it. Yes, and what is still worse, this tranquillity is not attained after a long struggle

5

114

10

85

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 114–115

5

10

15

86

115

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

with something better within themselves, a struggle with conscience―no, this tranquillity is original, there is nothing better in them that must be vanquished; on the contrary, they believe themselves to be glorious hum. beings who as such are capable of lecturing like this. Look, this is spiritlessness! Because just as committing a crime is not an outright lack of conscience, but committing it bona conscientia, brutally believing that one is doing something glorious, this is lack of conscience―so too, is it precisely lack of spirit to be devoid of spirit in such a manner that one believes that this is being spirit. Alas, as Chief of Military Commissary Neergaard constantly reiterates: the noble Frederiksborg breed of horses has died out― so indeed has the noble hum. race also long since died out, and those who are being born nowadays are no longer hum. beings.

The Duty toward God―Duties toward Oneself. At the same time that duty toward God disappeared, duty toward oneself arose. This is typical enough. Duty toward God is what intends to strain the hum. being in the direction of the unconditioned, undeniably what is most bothersome―so enough of that. In compensation there arose another sort of duties, the duties toward oneself, or there was advancement for everything base, the egotistical element in a hum. being; these advanced and became: duties toward oneself. Incidentally, it is strange that so much time passed before this discovery was made―after all, it lies so close at hand: after all, one is closest to oneself. Examples of duties toward oneself: Suppose someone falls in the water; someone else comes walking past―now, it has surely always been common for the latter person to lack the courage to want to save the former, but before the discovery of duties toward oneself, things went like this: the latter person slinked away and confessed to himself that he was a coward. Now, on the other hand, one does not slink away―no, one withdraws with dignity―it is a duty toward oneself.―Eating and drinking have surely always been normal activities, but after this discovery they have come to mean something else: they are duties toward oneself. Seeing to it that you scrape a bit of money together has surely always been quite usual, but now in addition it is some7 bona conscientia] Latin, in good conscience.

83

84

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 115–117

•

1854

thing meritorious―it is a duty toward oneself. In brief, dutiful peop. such as live nowadays have never been found before― their entire lives consist of nothing but the fulfillment of duties. Splendid invention: duties toward oneself! What until now moral systems have vainly sought to do by presenting duty and getting people to do it, we have now succeeded in doing: by making into duty what a pers. wants to do and will do anyway. My suggestion is that now that the duty toward God has disappeared, we also abolish duty toward one’s neighbor and treat the whole of ethics under the rubric: duties toward oneself.

God’s Word. “We of course have God’s word.” Yes, of course, namely in a manner such that between each individual and God’s word there are 1800 years’ worth of opinions concerning how God’s word is to be understood―and having it in that manner is more or less like have “having the reward”―“elsewhere.” “And of course we have teachers who are bound by an oath, each of whom individually has taken an oath upon the New T.” Yes, of course, but between each of these teachers’ oaths and the New T. there are 1800 years’ worth of opinions concerning how the New T. is to be understood, item this notion inserts itself: I am taking an oath just like the other priests of my day―in that way, it would be better to abolish the oath.

5

10

116

15

87 20

25

To Want to Be the First. However well trained a dog is, there are nevertheless always moments when something emerges in which one recognizes the animal, the animal nature. Thus, too, in relation with being a hum. being, one recognizes the animal nature in something that is even the subject of praise: “I do not want to be the first, I am not crazy enough to want to be the first.” You do not want to be the first. Thus, you feel the lack of something ahead of you―isn’t it true, you feel the lack of “the herd,” i.e., you want to be an animal.

117

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 117–118

5

10

15

20

88

•

1854

But God will not change the condition, which is the condition for grace in Xnty: First the kingdom of God, and only the one who comes first is saved―as at the pool of Bethesda. You do not want to be the first. Quite rightly, because you do not want to venture; if in fact one merely takes care to have others ahead of oneself―the more the better―one ventures that much less―or more correctly, in the end one does not venture at all. Or more correctly, one does the precise opposite of venturing. But God wants you, and every individual, to venture. God will not let himself be made a fool of. When, in infinite grace, he almost jests with his divine majesty and offers every individual what is infinitely highest: to be involved with God―then God will not let himself be mocked by the cowardly-clever monkeyshines of hum. beings, who prefer aping and animality, and yet they expect to receive the same. You do not want to be the first. But that is the condition. Nor can it be otherwise. For as God, in order to love, must love every individual (for one does not love en masse), so, too, in order to be loved does he also require that you, each one of you, become the first one. Everyone who has even the faintest notion of what it is to love must know that wanting to love someone just as the others do is shamelessness, is a mendacious modesty and humility that the object of love finds disgusting. Therefore, if you want to be disgusting to God, just run with the herd, over there where the journalists (who truly are not servants of God) are beckoning to you, and where the public guarantees you safety and certainty. *

*

Here, once again, I stand at the conclusion of the literary review of Two Ages, the picture of the future that was sketched. 30

118

35

The Great Catch of Fish. “You are to catch people.” In 1800 years there have now been caught: kingdoms, countries, peoples, etc., etc.,: a continent has become Christian and has been Christian through these many centuries―enormous catch, enormous catch, miraculous fulfillment of the Lord’s prophecy! Suppose a fisherman received orders to catch some pike or carp and he then caught a million sunfish: enormous catch, enor-

85

86

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 118–119

•

1854

mous catch. Or he received orders to catch whales and he then caught millions of herring: enormous catch, enormous catch. The method followed more and more over the course of the centuries is this: The criterion for being a Xn has been lowered, and thus all the more have been caught. Instead of whales, they caught herring, but countless millions. Instead of herring, they then caught stickleback, but countless millions―instead of whales. Indeed, how miraculously the Lord’s prophecies have been fulfilled: I wonder whether faith will be found on earth upon my return!

You Shall Be the First. Here it remains, God does not change the terms. Viewed from the other side: Oh thank him, thank him, because, tired of letting himself be mocked, he says: [“]If none of you wants to be the first, well then, you shall be first.[”] Just consider this: it was worst for those who were permitted to mock him in that way: that they deceived themselves frightfully! You shall be the first. By being the first one, what follows are quite simply the collisions and exertions prophesied in the New T. (and which have been totally removed from Xnty): You will perhaps be ridiculed by the others, persecuted, perhaps also put to death―but then comes the blessedness that is prophesied in the New T. That the apostles were sent out to catch herring is a perennial lie: they were sent out to catch whales. You of course know this: there had been a tragically frightful confusion in the legions of angels. God in Heaven desired to fill out their number. In Xnty, the terms were announced to humanity, to absolutely every, every, every hum. being―and would that I had a thousand voices to be able to shout it out to the world―every hum. being. Do you want to, do you not want to? But this much you yourself must easily be able to see: that millions of herring cannot be used to fill out the place of one angel. How villainously, indeed, Xnty has been falsified, and how disgusting that hum. beings not only have garnered all possible earthly profit by being teachers of Xnty, but in addition have permitted themselves almost to be worshipped―dreadful refinement―as if they were intermediaries.

5

10

119

15

20

89

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 120

120

5

10

15

20

25

90

30

35

40

•

1854

The Most Beautiful Sight If there were a hum. being who had attained perfection in the art of always being able to see the task, to see the task in everything and at every moment, never losing his composure, never without courage (Socrates was the hum. being who attained the highest). ―if there were such a hum. being, then to see him in relation to God, who knows at every instant, every second, how to assign a task in everything: that would be the most beautiful sight! And even this is beautiful: to see a hum. being who is in fact willing to learn this art from God. What stops, and delays, and torments, and plagues peop. is that they stop all the time without being able to turn what they encounter into a task. A person wishes that something or other might succeed―and it fails: well, then the task is to come to terms with oneself in this situation. Someone had been looking forward so much to a happy marriage―and he got an ill-tempered woman: well, then this is the task. Oh, Socrates! There were thousands who clamored and shouted and despaired and became ill-tempered men from indignation at the ill-tempered woman; thousands who collapsed under it; thousands who sighed quietly while putting up with it; some who bore it patiently―but there was only one who was so adroit that he immediately saw: this is the task; I am fortunate in marriage; precisely such a wife was what I needed for the sake of exercise. Always to see the task! Today you were prepared for an unhappy day―and look, it turned out to be a happy one: fine, so this is the task, perhaps just as difficult as the opposite one. At the very moment you have gotten it firmly established as the task, at that same moment there is a change of scene: something happens that is so unfortunate that you would not have wanted it at any price, and it is doubly painful precisely because this day had so unexpectedly become a happy one: well, then this is the task. To worship God is service at a royal court. How does a court official differ from an ordinary citizen? In this: that every day the ordinary citizen is himself in his own way; if he is a jolly, happy fellow, that is what he is; if he is a

87

88

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 120–122

•

1854

grumbler, that is how his life is. It is different with the court official. Every morning he begins absolutely all over again, so to speak, begins with nothing, but if possible (his perfection is in proportion to this) with the possibility of everything. First, he must see His Majesty, and then his art consists in this: without having the least thing firmly in place and nailed down, without any stiffness or tightness whatever in his joints, to be able properly to relate instantly, at every moment, to what His Majesty is. This is a feat that of course is empty and insignificant inasmuch as this Majesty is indeed neither more nor less than another hum. being. But in relation to God, this feat constitutes life’s deepest meaning.

Do You Want to Be a Significant Pers.? Yes, who wouldn’t like to be one[?] Well, then, involve yourself with God, but, first of all, without having millions between yourself and him―and you shall see that you are such a significant person that even the least infraction will be punished as if it were a crime that cries out to heaven. “How,” you say, “does this constitute being a significant pers.?” My friend, do you not grasp that this cannot possibly mean anything other than that you are an extremely important pers., because things are treated with such rigor.

5

10

121

20

25

To Be the First. To win the eternal without venturing is in fact impossible. But venturing is quite simply this: not to have others in front of oneself. O, Socrates, then, when a pers. becomes solitary in that way, then we are of course standing confronted by this: If! “To venture everything on an if,” you say. My friend, if you do not venture on an if, then you do not venture; if you take away the if, then you also take away venturing; you cannot truly have any objections to venturing on an if, for this is precisely what it is to venture; so if you have any objection, it must be to venturing. Take care that you do not deceive yourself by pretend-

91

122

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 122

5

10

15

20

25

30

92 35

40

•

1854

ing that you have nothing against venturing, by pretending that it is something you are certainly willing to do, only not on an if―which is just as though someone were to say: I have nothing against swimming, on the contrary, I would very much like to swim―only not in water. So a person shudders, then he clutches at the others―I must, he says, I must have certainty before I venture. Once again, it is backward to have certainty before one ventures, it is like wanting to put the front part at the back, or to have a mouth full of flour before one speaks. No, if you have a mouth full of flour, you must do the precise opposite of this: you must first get the flour out before you can begin to speak. And that is how it is with venturing. A pers. cannot venture in relation to something about which he is certain. If he is to venture, he must first get rid of the certainty, as if someone childishly had a certainty, or believed he had a certainty, and must now get rid of it in order to come to venture. Thus, first get rid of the certainty in order to venture― so far is it from there being truth in this [“]First, certainty, so that I can venture.[”] But a person trembles―first one must have certainty―one clutches at the others. The others! And then, when, after centuries, these others have indeed become millions, become the trillions x billions: yes, then people do think that they dare venture. Oh, my friend, nothing is more certain than that if you build upon this certainty, then, precisely then, you are deceived out of the eternal. Existence is, if you will, so cunning (but it would be impossible for “spirit” to be otherwise) that the greatest, the absolutely absolutely absolutely greatest hum. certainty is precisely what most certainly deceives us out of the eternal―and it is precisely in the least possible hum. certainty that the possibility of the eternal is to be found. Security, indolence, spiritlessness want to have certainty before they venture―and therefore secure, indolent, and spiritless priests have villainously cajoled and provided proofs upon proofs upon proofs and certainties. These scoundrels, who have murdered millions―spiritually―who with their mendacious Xnty, have expelled possibilities (as one speaks of repelling or expelling a fetus), possibilities of becoming spirit, which existed in every one of the countless millions whom the priests murdered by cajoling them and providing proofs. Xnty wants the opposite of what indolence and sensuality want: it wants to rouse up.

89

90

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 122–123

•

1854

If there is to be any talk of being a teacher in this situation, then it is especially important that the teacher is able to remain calm, that the teacher not permit himself to be disturbed by screams or shrieks or by the most cunning insinuations of immediacy, because he knows that all such things are a part of it. But, good Lord, in similar fashion a surgeon knows that the screams are a part of it―he does not stop the operation because the patient screams. And similarly, a swimming instructor knows that people are fearful when they have to go out into the current for the first time, and the corporal knows that the recruit is fearful, etc., etc. But in all these situations people have not deigned to change everything because of the screams. Only with respect to the one thing that is important, the eternal, Xnty, only there have people found it best to change everything in order to please the patient. That is what people have done―alas, that means that people have deceived themselves and millions of people out of the one thing that is important.

Examination by Existence The question that rlly constitutes existence’s examination of a hum. being is: Is there love in you[?] This is something we will now get to see, says Xnty, and it arranges everything to that end. If a hum. being can continue to love the one who makes him unhappy, and continue to believe that he, precisely he, is love, and that he is doing this out of love: Yes, then there is love in you. This is precisely God’s relation to us hum. beings in Xnty. Humanly speaking, he makes a pers. unhappy; he knows this very well, and indeed the New Testament says this clearly enough. [“]But believe nonetheless, oh believe, that I, precisely I, am love and that it is precisely out of love that I am making you, humanly speaking, unhappy―Then there is love in you.[”] After all, the love with which a pers. loves the one who makes him happy―well, this love cannot be called having love in oneself, because that love is of course constantly being replenished from without, and thus could also be self-love.

5

10

15

123

25

30

93

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 123–124

5

10

15

20

25

124 30

35

94

40

•

1854

But when the object becomes the one who is making you unhappy, then the love within you is of course denied any replenishment from without, and thus we will get to see whether there is love in you, which will be known by whether you continue to believe that the object is love and that it is precisely out of love for you that it is treating you this way. Granted, this is a frightful examination for a poor hum. being. At the same time, what cannot be approved of is that in consideration of this, Xndom has falsified the whole of Xnty and made it into something entirely different. What can truthfully be said is that God, in infinite love, is more concerned than is the poor hum. being whom he is examining out of love―infinite love. But this does not mean the syrupy drivel that God therefore changes himself. Yes, on this occasion he is infinitely concerned, far more concerned than the person being examined. But one could be tempted to say that Xndom has long since freed God from this sort of concern, for the sort of scamps and louts who are called Xns nowadays do not actually go out far enough for there to be any question of an examination―which, however, in another sense grieves him, infinite Love, who has offered the condition on equal terms to every hum. being. In my childhood I heard a great deal about there being great joy, sheer joy, in heaven; I believed it, too, and I thought of God as being blissful in sheer joy. Alas, the more I consider it, the more I come to imagine God sitting in sorrow, he who most of all knows what sorrow is.

On Myself. Alas, I have been granted the eminent intellectuality of genius; on the other hand, I am anything, anything, anything but what might be called a holy pers., and anything but one of those profound, original, religious natures. And existentially, an apostle is positioned an entire quality above me―but eternally one is ranked existentially. This is also why, when I compare myself with an apostle, or merely with a figure such as Socrates, I seem to myself like a child, and this despite the fact that I know very well what intellectuality I have at my disposal in comparison to an apostle, who does not exactly excel intellectually in any way whatever, though existentially he stands above Socrates.

91

92

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 124–125

•

1854

I feel myself to be like a child. And here again an expert would immediately recognize the sphere to which I belong, that I belong to the sphere of geniuses (which at most can be called second place, and indeed, strictly speaking, must be called 3rd place. Yet there is enough of the existential in me that it cannot be denied that I can nonetheless be said to have suffered for the idea.) This indeed is part of genius and is connected with, or contributes to, the melancholia, the unhappiness, that is inseparable from genius. Genius is a disproportionate composition. In that connection there is a striking metaphor about genius in what Goethe says of Hamlet: He is an acorn planted in a flowerpot. That is how it is with genius: an overabundance but without the power to bear it.

The Audit. An audit is what awaits―note well, not an audit of Xnty, no, many thanks, but an audit of Xndom and of all the almost insurmountable nonsense that the professors and priests have cooked up and called Xnty. First and foremost, this revision requires intellectuality; it requires an intellectuality corresponding to that of being an apostle. Naturally, this intellectuality comes long after the apostle, just as being an apostle is indeed an entire quality higher than this intellectuality, despite the fact that the apostle actually did not possess it. I know very well that this will be misunderstood, as if I had spoken condescendingly about being an apostle and conceitedly about intellectuality. But this is a misunderstanding, and the misunderstanding stems from the fact that people are not accustomed to having categories, but on the contrary have been spoiled by talking nonsense with one another about everything. No, “the apostle” is absolutely not situated in the intellectual sphere in the sense that intellectuality is his strength; and it is a general debasement of the hum. race for it to have constructed scientific scholarship upon a book such as the New Testament. And this is precisely why the audit must also clarify the spheres or clearly separate them from one another, for otherwise it is impossible to get rid of all the nonsense that has abolished Xnty under the name of Christian scholarship, specifically by confusing being an apostle with being a person who possesses intellectuality.

5

10

125

20

25

30

95

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 126 126

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

96 40

•

1854

Martyrdom In the New Testament, Xnty rests on the notion that martyrdom has value in and of itself, absolute value, as is also demonstrated by the Exemplar. Xnty wants to move existence at its deepest level, but as Archimedes so correctly said, such a movement requires: an external point. But the external point is solely and exclusively martyrdom, and, note well, martyrdom accompanied by the notion that m[artyrdom] absolutely has value in and of itself. Martyrdom and 1000 martyrs―but without the notion of martyrdom’s worth in and of itself, so that they certainly do suffer it, yet still seek to avoid it, or at any rate would prefer that it not be necessary―all such martyrdoms are only points for movement within the world, not the point outside the world. Therefore, to a certain extent they are carried out in homogeneity with the world, making use of human assistance and shrewdness, etc., and then, only when it cannot be avoided, then martyrdom. On the other hand, the martyrdom that is a point outside the world is carried out in the manner spoken of in the letter to the Hebrews: that a person will not let himself be helped, disdains assistance in avoiding it―this martyrdom indeed has value in and of itself. Martyrdom―note well, carried out in keeping with the view discussed here―is cardo rerum in Xnty. The history of Xndom is therefore also one of the successive changes in its understanding of Xnty’s relation to martyrdom. At first, the view of martyrdom is changed, but martyrs are still falling, in fact, by the thousands. But the very fact that the view of martyrdom has been changed constitutes an approach toward homogeneity with the world. Then the pace of martyrdom slackens―the Church believes it must not be too rigorous in what it requires of Xns―martyrdom disappears. Then it goes further, step by step, people think that they must not be too strict and scrupulous, there are more and more concessions. Finally, the entire perspective is reversed―not becoming a martyr comes to be wisdom itself. This is decked out in the most elegant attire under the name of pedagogical concern for those who are weaker, as humaneness, and also as the wisdom that, unlike that of the fanatic and the enthusiast, does not will more than what is possible at any moment. 24 cardo rerum] Latin, the heart of the matter.

93

94

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 126–127

•

1854

Good night! Xnty disappeared completely into homogeneity with the world. Not to will more than is possible at any moment is quite simply the formula for: politics, worldliness. But so far is that sort of thing from moving the world or being a point outside the world, that it actually belongs entirely, entirely, entirely to this world, lock, stock, and barrel. But Xnty is and remains this: the priests begetting children, bishops like Engelstoft getting triplets, and everything is right and proper. And yet such a transformation has taken place that language no longer suffices, no sensory depiction suffices to describe it.

Immortality One of our poets (Ingemann) supposedly holds the sentimental view that even every insect is immortal. One could be tempted to say that the man is right; for in fact if hum. beings such as are born nowadays en masse are immortal, then it does not seem unreasonable that insects, too, are immortal. This is truly lightweight chatter, hearty, moving, genuine priestly nonsense, which always excels in watering down all concepts so that they turn into nothing, indeed, almost into something disgusting! Immortality, which once was the lofty goal looked up to by the heroes of the human race, who humbly confessed that this reward was so excessive as to be utterly disproportionate to their most strenuous efforts―and now every louse is immortal. Truly, Ingemann―he ought to have been a priest, clad in velvet both front and back, and with a gold tassel on his shoulder! Despite the fact that I otherwise do not like it when people make fun of a man’s name, there really was something to it when Heiberg called him Ingenmand. Ah, it is abominable, and what is particularly abominable is the fact that there are thousands who believe that this sort of thing is a beautiful sort of sensitivity! Would that the swindling industry would also seize hold of this idea, and the swindling priests (“Gaudiebe”) would get “a Christian government,” which in Christian fashion also ought to do something for the insects, these immortal creatures―some spiritual counselors ought to be employed, or at any rate some livings established. 37 Gaudiebe] German, crook, swindler, rascal. (See also explanatory note.)

5

10

127

15

20

25

30

35

97 40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 128–129

128

5

10

15

129

25

30

•

1854

A Relationship to God at Second Hand is just as impossible and just as nonsensical as being in love at second hand. The foolishness of this notion of a relationship to God at second hand can also be seen in another way. Because God is in fact the one who is closest of all to a hum. being, closest to him at every moment, it can thus be seen how foolish it is to want to have a relationship to him at second hand, i.e., to put at a distance from oneself that which is closest to oneself, and to do so persuaded that in this way one comes closer to him. This is just as foolish as when Sexton Link leaves the student “in order to go over to a greengrocer’s and borrow a gazetteer to find out the address of the man he is supposed to talk to,” and then comes back and says: [“]Oh, that was odd―I was supposed to go right here.” Except the difference is that Sexton Link actually does come to the right place, whereas wanting to have a relationship to God at second hand like that does not lead down the right path.

Scholarly Research. They put on the appearance of Christian zeal, they praise Christian research that seeks to penetrate this accumulation of 1800 years of history―and thus they do not see that this is a hum. swindle that continually positions God at a distance of 1800 years from a person, that the truth is that we hum. beings are afraid of coming to know the degree to which God is the one who is closest of all to us. Look, this is why it can also be said of this scholarly research (as one says that an attorney is a poor attorney if he does not immediately create 10 new cases out of each case he finishes)―that for every problem it solves, it creates 10 new ones which make it necessary to have more professors, etc.

95

96

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 130–132

•

1854 98

God in Heaven. If speaking of such things were permitted, I would say that it is lucky for God that for him 1000 years are as one day; otherwise it would have to be frightful to endure these centuries upon centuries, this throng of millions, in which not a handsbreadth of progress is made, or there are giant steps backward.

The Human Being. The more I come to know hum. beings, the more I doubt that it is correct to call it an allegory when hum. beings are presented as animals (e.g., Reinecke Fuchs)―all in all, they are in fact essentially animal creatures. Everything in fact revolves around eating, drinking, procreating, having a good time, etc., etc. And those who are supposed to represent the spiritual aspect, the assistant professors and the like, are animal creatures in an even worse sense: they live off the sufferings of others, making sweets for themselves and their children out of the agonies of others who suffered for the sake of ideas and for the truth. Indeed, it is all nothing but devouring, and this can be seen best of all in situations of spirit: for one person who brings a bit of an idea into the world, there are immediately legions who want to devour it.

The Temporal―The Eternal

130

5

131 10

15

20

132

The temporal is the delaying that expands in time and space; the eternal is the intensity that hastens toward death.

99

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 133–135 133

5

10

15

134 20

135

30

35

100

•

1854

The North. That the North is the less favored part of the world can be seen, among other ways, from the following two things: the harsh climate, which renders impossible the carefree attitude concerning making a living that is found in the warm countries, where, for that reason, a philosophical ideality is also more easily attained, a philosophical ideality that does not divide a pers. so that he becomes a professor of philosophy and, with the help of philosophy, a tradesman. Secondly, it can be seen in the fact that only in the North is there this prosaic attitude that in so many ways warps women’s nature and poses problems that could never arise in the South: that a woman is a person who in addition is useful, profitable. This was not how things were originally. Originally things were arranged as follows: woman is a luxury, is for company, an ornament, for show, and the like. Only in the North must she also be useful, and therefore it is also in the North that this question of her emancipation must arise.

Worldliness―Christianity. Christianity is always the opposite of worldliness. In this world things are such that it is simplicity that is most often deceived; in Christianity it is cleverness that is most often deceived, or that deceives itself.

The Dishonesty That Is “Christendom” People have behaved like this: they have taken all the promises that the New T. makes to the Xn― ―and then have falsified the definition of what it is to be Christian. In this way Xnty has truly come into the wrong hands. But [“]the owner of the vineyard shall come and take the vineyard from them and lease it to others, who give him fruit in due season”―Xndom, too, especially in its forward march, has truly been a barren tree. The whole business resembles “the hum. being”: he is a swindler. If there were no police and no visible property owners, we would be able to see this in our everyday lives. Now, to steal

97

98

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 135–137

•

1854

from and cheat someone who is invisible―well, of course that must be extremely easy to do. Incidentally, it is foolish to want to deceive someone who is invisible―who reserves for himself the accounting of eternity. And the frightful thing is that this is surely why God has made himself invisible―in order to test people’s honesty, just as the schoolteacher or the parents conceal themselves when they want to assess a child’s moral character.

5

10

Play―Earnestness. This is how we hum. beings play. It is of course generally acknowledged that the lives of a countless number of hum. beings are a waste of time. But then there are some who supposedly express what is earnest, earnestness. They behave as follows: after having in every way made sure of their animal existence, and continuing to make sure of it, then, as is said, they occupy themselves with the eternal. Profound earnestness! which, from a Christian point of view, simply is = play, and which, from a Christian point of view, it is just as foolish to call earnestness as it is to call eating cake asceticism. No, earnestness is that you cannot truly involve yourself with the eternal without constantly becoming more and more embittered with the temporal, with your animal existence. “But surely, on those terms you will not get anyone who wants to become involved with the eternal.” My friend, you must not say this to me, I did not invent Xnty; if you have any objection to make, perhaps you ought to get in touch with His Majesty: God in Heaven.

The Common Man―The Assistant Professors. I love the common man―I find the assistant professors loathsome. It is precisely the assistant professors who have demoralized the race. If things were allowed to be as they truly are: the few

136

15

20

25

30

137

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 137–138

101 5

10

138

15

20

25

30

35

•

1854

who are truly in service of the idea, or, even better, in God’s service―and then the people: everything would be better. But the infamous situation is that under the appearance of also serving the idea, this group of scoundrels, this band of robbers, forces its way between those few and the people, betraying the idea and confusing the people, all for the sake of some miserable earthly advantage. Were there no hell, one would have to come into being in order to punish the assistant professors, whose crime is indeed precisely of the sort that cannot very well be punished in this world.

The Whole of What I Have Done. And what, then, is the whole of what I have done? Quite simply: I have introduced just a little bit of honesty. As though I were to find something on the road―I would not take it for myself, but would either let it lie there or make it publicly known: thus, with the New Testament in hand, I have said: No, there is something wrong with the way in which people are Christians nowadays. Therefore I want to report to you, o God! If it should actually be possible that what Xnty promises can be attained on the terms that are now being offered, no one would more willing to accept it with thanks than I. But I want to report to you, o God, and ask whether this is really how things are. But one will scarcely be permitted to do that in this―honest (Christian!) world. Dishonesty will cleverly (and I grant that in a certain sense it is clever) take the view that the safest thing to do is to act is if it were nothing. Well, yes, perhaps after having had things go well for you in the world, that is the safest way to be eternally discarded. But I grant that what dishonesty does, as it itself says, is the safest thing, “It is the safest thing. At all costs, let us not touch upon this point; well, this is the way it is, and for many generations there has been continuing success, brilliant success, in fooling God―to use an endearing expression, to lead him by the nose―so let us not be mad enough to disturb it.[”]

99

100

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 139

•

1854

A Good―That Causes Pain. In this way I could dialectically and accurately describe what Xnty is according to the New Testament, and from that it would also be easily seen how difficult it is, in a certain sense, for a hum. being to occupy himself with it, because that something good should be helpful―this is of course easily understood, and everyone will accept that. But that when something hurts, that this should be called a good, this is of course madness, it is impossible to accept it―it would of course be easier to accept if it were an evil, because then it would make sense for it to cause pain―but that it both causes pain and is supposed to be a good: that is too much. A human being is a synthesis, composed of a lower and a higher element, and from birth on, he is almost entirely in the power of the lower element. He is determined by what is pleasant and what is unpleasant―and that is more or less how matters remain for most people throughout their entire lives. Or, just to take this example, how many people are there, really, in each generation who are truly capable of approaching the desire for knowledge like this: [“]I will not be disturbed if this knowledge ends up making me happy or unhappy―I want only to have the knowledge[”]? How many people would there be who could continue to want to delve more and more deeply into knowledge, even as they began to comprehend that it would necessarily make them unhappy? No, the lower element in a person plays the master: The question is, [“]Is it pleasant or unpleasant[?”], and as soon as it becomes unpleasant, that is the signal to break off. With its divine knowledge of hum. nature, Christianity is indeed directed at the higher element in hum. nature, but in such a way that the lower element will be distressed because of this. From this it can immediately be seen that the differences that Christendom has introduced in connection with accepting Xnty― differences such as having great abilities, brilliant intellect, etc., or possessing merely quite modest talents―these differences have no place whatever here. Differences between one hum. being and another with respect to being able to accept Xnty lie elsewhere: the extent to which your life is subject to the power of what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, the extent to which you can compel yourself into something that is unpleasant―but of course this is something that the simple man, a serving maid, a common soldier, can do just as well as someone who is highly gifted.

139

102

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 139

5

103

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

Thus Christianity has addressed itself to the higher element in a hum. being, and then it announces itself as a great good, as the highest, the absolute good. At the very instant that “the human being” hears this proclaimed, the animal, the lower element in him―which is present and on the prowl when there is a question of getting hold of something good―at that very instant, it says: [“]Splendid, splendid![”] Xnty must reply to the lower element as follows: [“]No, my friend, you don’t rlly have anything to be thankful for―you will be distressed because of this.[”] Thus here we are confronted with a good―that causes pain. And what then? Then the call to retreat is sounded―the hum. being thinks as follows: [“]This is truly not something for me, it is a species of madness, and calling it a good rlly makes a fool of a rational creature and a serious man.[”] Originally things went as follows, and no amount of drivel and nonsense was of any help here: A number of individuals were ordered by divine authority―thus, if people would not enter into it voluntarily, the good that caused pain even went to the length of employing pain―and yet it was the good, the highest good. Then it stopped; Xnty was introduced. Now there was to be no more divine authority, now hum. beings were to experiment in helping themselves and one another to attain this highest good that causes pain. Divine authority would no longer be employed, God surely wanted to see how much honesty was present in “the hum. being.” Then, over the course of the centuries, a transformation took place within Xnty: it was abolished, or, to show that hum. beings, too, can be paradoxical, it was abolished in a manner such that it was said to persist and to flourish. As a paradox, Christendom ranks nearly as high as the expression [“]a good that causes pain[”], because Xndom is the paradox that Xnty abolished and nonetheless persists. So Xnty was abolished. In order truly to get human beings properly to embrace Xnty en masse and with real enthusiasm, the characteristic dialectical stamp (“that causes pain”) was removed, and Xnty was proclaimed as a good, a good pure and simple, without―as the late Bishop Mynster said―any funny business, which, after all, would surely have been unseemly in connection with so serious a matter as the highest good, and of course every serious person can easily see that to add the phrase “that causes pain” to “the highest good” is nothing other than a lack of seriousness. Thus did Xnty triumph! As fishers of men the apostles were incompetent bunglers in comparison to the fishermen who now

101

102

1

[a]

“it is,” as Anti-Climacus says, “not worth a pickled herring”―so revoltingly sweet is it.

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 139

•

1854

began to fish. Thus Xnty triumphed completely, i.e., it became utter nonsense. For the edification, contentment, and enjoyment of humanity, a mass of drivellers, clad in “long robes” (I mean priests and professors) proclaimed Xnty as the highest good, the absolute good. That is how the matter stands at present. Everyone is a Christian, Christianity is the highest good― ―now (if Bishop Mynster will permit it) some funny business is to be done, this should be introduced: “that causes pain.” Now, I am not entirely devoid of knowledge of human nature, and therefore, both on my own behalf and based on knowledge of hum. beings, I have considered that inasmuch as this is the way things are, it would perhaps be easiest to get them to involve themselves with Xnty by proclaiming it as an evil that causes pain―simply in order to introduce the phrase “that causes pain.” “Oh, God, Father, preserve us!,” I hear the priests howl. “Oh, God, Father, preserve us!―to proclaim Xnty as an evil, and then to think that you can get peop. to embrace it, embrace Xnty, as an evil, this lofty and priceless good as―” “Oh, would to God you would stop up your mouths and the whole of your proclamation of Xnty![”] The matter is quite simple. What matters now is to get the dialectical element, “that causes pain,” included, and inasmuch as the actual situation is that peop. have been muddled by, and into, this priest-nonsense about Xnty being the highest good in an entirely simple sense―then it is a relief to proclaim it as an evil. “An evil that causes pain”: this combination does not, in fact, burden the understanding with paradox. Then, once this has been thoroughly learned and we have actually included the dialectical element, the characteristic stamp of spirit: “that causes pain”―then we might see if it is possible to come to what is truly Xn: that it is nonetheless a good, but, but, that causes pain. Of course, this combination once again strains the poor hum. being―so lofty is Xnty.

5

10

104 15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 139–140

5

10

15

105

140

What has been presented here I could also express very well in more theological language, which, however, I would rather not do, in order that it not be immediately swallowed up by nonsense. “Grace” is taken in vain; helped by the proclamation of Xnty solely as grace, peop. have transformed Xnty into something meaningless. Now, given that hum. beings have been spoiled in this way and that the dialectical element “that causes pain” must be introduced, it is easiest for hum. beings to begin by proclaiming Xnty as an evil, that causes pain, i.e., as Law. Only after this has been thoroughly put into practice could there be any talk about what is infinitely lofty: a good that causes pain, a grace that causes pain.

The Honesty of Ideality or Either/Or.

20

25

30

35

What is required for honesty of ideality (which is like purity of spirit, or is spirit) is to be dialectical with respect to quality: constantly to look to quality―and then Either/Or. On the other hand, mediocrity, wretchedness, dishonesty, shabbiness, etc. are inherent in “also,” i.e., wanting to be taken along quantitatively, approximately, also-sort-of-a part-of-it, etc.―instead of honestly manifesting quality and giving it its due. Example. If there were a pers. who really played an instrument with a certain degree of mastery, then, when confronted with someone who is a virtuoso with this instrument, he will immediately manifest quality: [“]He is a virtuoso―Me? No, no, I am no virtuoso.[”] He would be revolted at abusing his own mastery in order to want also to be a virtuoso, or to want to fraternize with the virtuoso or weaken him in any way. On the contrary, he would come to use his own mastery, which grants him greater in-

•

1854

103

104

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 140

•

1854

sight than most people have, in order to direct people’s attention to the virtuoso and his virtuosity. This, you seen, is the honesty of ideality. What is dishonest, shabby, wretched―but commonly found―is: [“]also,[”] [“]if not entirely like that, then nonetheless sort-of also[”]: “the pair of us.” Were this honesty of ideality what is more usual in the world, how different everything would look! Because excellence has a need for an intermediate authority that has sufficient insight to be capable of pointing out excellence. But the unfortunate thing about the world is precisely the fact that this intermediate authority usually is dishonesty, which, instead of permitting itself, in seemly fashion, to be assigned its place by [“]Either/Or[”], that chief of protocol for ideality, and occupy it contentedly, mendaciously wants to wheedle its way into being excellent also―if not quite as excellent, then nonetheless [“]sort-of also.[”] This is how it is with everything. And, to take what is most important: this is also how it is in relation to Xnty. If the priests had this kind of honesty of ideality, things would be quite different with Xnty. But they are not at all honest in this way―no, it is disgusting, the way in which they have made everything shoddy because they “also” want to have experienced, to have suffered: true, not quite as did God’s great instruments, but nonetheless “also.” They take the life of an apostle―now of course they themselves have suffered as every hum. being can suffer, and then they talk as if they had suffered―well, not quite exactly as the apostle did, but nonetheless “also.” I oppose this behavior from the depths of my soul. No, despite the fact that, compared with peop. generally, I can surely be said to have suffered quite markedly, so far have I been from exploiting this fact in order to fraternize with the apostle or defraud him of his renown with my wretched “also,” that on the contrary I have immediately pointed out the quality, and I have actually made use of my acquaintance with suffering in order point to him―“because I am only a poet.” In Xndom, assisted by the despicable dishonesty of mediocrity, we have reached the point of having completely lost the exemplars. It was the exemplars who should be reintroduced, made recognizable, which can only be done by means of Either/Or: Either you have a quality in common, or you are of a different quality―but not this [“]also sort-of[”], [“]well, not entirely, but nevertheless also sort-of.[”] But in relation to that which is qualitatively different from oneself, what is important is that even if one were, if you will, the

5

10

15

106

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 140–142

5

141 10

15

107 20

25

30

142

35

•

1854

nearest approximation to it―what is important is that one have the honesty of ideality so that one is unwilling to listen to any talk of approximations, but insists solely upon qualities, so that one therefore finds one’s joy solely in pointing to that which is a qualitative level higher. This is what is discussed in Fear and Trembling in the presentation of the relation between the poet and the hero.

To Proclaim Xnty. What is required in order to proclaim Xnty is rlly a unity of being a person of character and an equally great dialectician. (Socrates, e.g., would be usable). However, it can hobble along with a dialectician, and walk quite tolerably with a person of character. But to entrust the proclamation of Xnty to orators is eo ipso to abolish Xnty; and the fact that in a given age the proclamation of Christianity is represented solely and exclusively by orators is sufficient proof that Xnty does not exist. An orator is to the proclamation of Xnty as a deaf-and-dumb person is to being a musician. At every point, the characteristic feature (the dialectical, the characteristic mark of the spirit) of Christianity is precisely what must be removed so that it can become an oratorical motif. But clearly, when what makes Xnty Xnty is taken away, things go swiftly, swimmingly, delightfully, convincingly―but it is not Xnty. We do not raise the objection that many of the Church’s great teachers have indeed been excellent speakers―no, we do not raise this objection, but we remember that in addition to that they were ascetics or persons of character or dialecticians. I am speaking of something quite different, the battalion of orators who nowadays represent the proclamation of Xnty.

God’s Compassion upon the Hum. Being in Xnty. This is how things stand in the New T.: The hum. being, in all his misery and need, continually plagued by fear of death (for this is how things stand in paganism and Judaism, unlike Christendom, where people have mendaciously appropriated the

105

106

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 142–145

•

1854

consolation of Xnty without including its obligations) moves God, so he takes mercy upon the hum. being: “I shall” (he may well be imagined to speak in this manner) “I shall show compassion toward you and make the thought of death into your most cherished thought―of course, the consequence will be that this life, in turn, will be more painful to you than ever.” Always, if you will, this misrelation between God and hum. beings, which, however, cannot be avoided: what God calls consolation becomes, in a different sense, a strenuous effort.

5

10

Fear of Death was taken away by Xnty, which then introduced fear of judgment. It is a sharpening, but also a step forward. And this cannot be sufficiently impressed upon a person, that whatever truly constitutes a step forward in the spiritual sense is always recognizable by the fact that it is a sharpening. Spiritually, there is in truth no progress that makes things easier―no, whatever makes things easier is eo ipso not progress, however much it is trumpeted as such.

143

15

108 20

A Lamentable Transformation in “the Hum. Being.” Once, this was the situation: he understood only a little, but that little moved him deeply. Nowadays he understands a great deal, but it does not move him, or at best only superficially, like making a face. Is this progress, then? Or is all this understanding that makes no impression on the pers. himself, that does not move him, isn’t it rather like a harlot: like a woman who, if you will, is tastefully turned out, is familiar with every shrewd and coquettish design aimed at pleasing a man―but is lacking in love?

“God created hum. beings straightforward, but they have devised many schemes.” This is truly an excellent saying from Ecclesiastes.

144

25

30

145

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 146

146

5

10

15

109

25

30

35

•

1854

Christ and His Apostles. There is certainly a difference between the teachings of the apostles and the teachings of Xt, or between the Xnty of the apostles and the Xnty of Xt, but nothing could be as erroneous as what the Wolfenbüttel Fragments have come up with: that Xt had only earthly aims, and that when his life’s sad fate and his death had taught the apostles that everything was lost, they revised him and then presented him as someone whose primary thought was to want to suffer. Thus, according to this, Xt had rlly been an optimist and the apostles were the “compulsory-voluntary” inventors of pessimism. But nothing could be further from the truth, and indeed, it is a poor sort of pessimism that one invents under compulsion. No, Xt had a better understanding of pessimism. And the difference between Xt and the apostle is this: that Xt unconditionally expresses the absolute pessimism that wants to have nothing whatever to do with this wretched, miserable, sinful world except to be put to death, sacrificed. The apostle, on the other hand, foreshadows the very first possibility, the seed, of a new optimism: thus the establishment of a congregation. Of course, it would never occur to me that the apostle should bear responsibility for what that congregation became over the course of the centuries, especially in Protestantism, especially in Denmark, where Xnty (sit venia verbo) does not possess the least vestige of any long-lost likeness to the Xnty of Xt, but on the contrary resembles a drinking song Jeppe of the Hill sings: So merrily, so merrily, round and round. As for the rest―that in the earlier part of his life, Christ almost seems to give the appearance that his idea was to establish an earthly kingdom―it must be borne in mind, as I have emphasized elsewhere, that this is simply a part of getting to pessimism in earnest. But what do hum. beings mean by pessimism, these wretched, creeping creatures who nowadays are called hum. beings, who are so overeager to get hold of a bit of happiness in the world that they naturally could never have an inkling of what pessimism is, that pessimism seeks to gain everything precisely in order to be able to throw it away? This is the passion of martyr26 sit venia verbo] Latin, excuse the word.

107

108

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 146–148

•

1854

dom, and imagine this intensified as it is in the God-Man―then one can gain a faint intimation of that pessimism. The sort of pessimism that is invented by hum. beings is not pessimism but is a species of optimism, an attempt to emerge from circumstances as best one can. And people imagine that they can compare this sort of pessimism to the passion of martyrdom in the God-Man! No, true pessimism always requires that one has had the earthly in one’s power.

What Indirect Mockery of the World!

5

147

The attack on the Savior of the world is made―anonymously. Honored be the hum. race!

On Myself. At one time, this was how things were with me. This was what I had to bear: the agony that I can call my thorn in the flesh; sorrow, spiritual sorrow in connection with my late father; heartache in connection with the beloved girl and matters related to that. Thus I believed that, compared with most peop., I might even be said to be rather heavily laden. In my work, however, I found so much spiritual and intellectual delight that, even with the burden of sorrow over sin, I could not call the life I led one of suffering. Now, in addition to all the previous burdens, I have to bear concerns related to making a living as well as abuse from the rabble. Without falsifying or sullying the concept, I may say that my life is a sort of martyrdom, though of a new model. What I am suffering as a public person can best be described as the slow death of being trampled to death by geese or as the excruciating method of killing a person bit by bit, which is in fact practiced in faraway lands, by being thrown to insects―to this end, the offender is first coated with honey in order to give the insects a proper appetite―and thus my fame is of course the honey that gives the insects a proper appetite. So you can just come, history, with your audit: everything is in order, nor have I neglected to expose myself to it voluntarily―it is not something that has simply happened to me.

148 15

110 20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 149–150

149

5

10

15

111

150

20

25

30

35

•

1854

Species―Individual With every animal species it is like this: the species is what is higher, is the ideal; the copy or specimen is what continually arises and disappears; the species is higher, the copy is lower. Owing to Xnty, it is only in the human species that things are ordered such that the individual is higher than the species. But to be an individual in this way is of course very strenuous, so everything human tends to reorder this relation such that the species becomes higher than the individual, i.e., that the individual becomes a copy, i.e., we are animals. But it is clearly easier to be an animal―then one is freed of the sort of efforts that nowadays surely appear to hum. beings as incredible madness: such as relating oneself personally to God, or that there can be any notion of God testing a person.

The Crowd―The Single Individual. Never has the category of the race been so overwhelming, never have the crowd, the numerical, the abstractions been so overwhelming as right now, in our times; and never has the single individual been emphasized as strongly as by me, for Socrates, after all, had disciples. The two things correspond to one another and are related to the majesty of the divine. God indeed is not a majesty who backs down in view of the fact that opposition has grown stronger―no, then he raises the stakes. Here is a metaphor: if someone were standing with a stout staff in order to thrash 10 peop., and these 10 peop. received reinforcements, so that there were now 20, what is majestic is to lay aside the stout staff and take up a very thin rod with which to thrash the 20―so far is true majesty from giving way. Precisely because the rebellion is so aggravated and so powerful, for that very reason―how majestic!―it makes use of means that are as close as possible to being nothing at all. But alas, in a certain sense it is frightful for the poor hum. being who is to be used in this manner, who is constantly to be kept as close as possible to being nothing at all―in every sense of the term―in order that the majestic can be properly seen, in or-

109

110

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 150–154

•

1854

der that, as the opposition grows stronger, majesty truly demonstrates the superiority of its infinite power―if I dare put it this way―playfully. In a certain sense it is frightful for the poor hum. being―though it is indeed love, you infinite love. 5

I―Third Person To be “spirit” is to be “I.” God wants to have “I’s,” for God wants to be loved. The interest of the hum. race is to introduce objectivities everywhere, this is the interest of the category of the race. “Christendom” is a society of millions―all in the 3rd person, no I.

To Believe―Nicodemus

151

10

112

152

If believing were a hidden inwardness, then Xt would have to have approved of Nicodemus―that was hidden inwardness, of course.

Xnty―Diffusion. Xnty is inversely related to diffusion. Xnty rests upon there being an opposition between God and hum. beings. So when Xnty has become humanity’s cause, which is what “Xndom” is aiming at, then eo ipso it is not God’s cause. God wants to have individuals, but the individual―either out of good-natured sympathy or out of a swindler’s cunning―always wants to have the herd with him. But God wants individuals.

Judaism―Xnty. In Judaism, God relates to a “people.” Progress consists of relating to the individual; Xt is of course the Exemplar. Therefore the Jews were offended, but it can also

153

25

154 30

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 154–158

•

1854

be seen that Xnty is inversely related to the numerical and that, in general, progress is made in the direction away from the numerical.

155

Everything―Nothing. God creates everything out of nothing―and everything God is to use he first turns into nothing.

156 10

113

157

20

158 25

30

The Exemplar―The Atoner. It is as though “the Exemplar” kills everyone, because no one attains it. “The Atoner” wants to save everyone. Yet Xt is both, and this swindle that takes the atonement and grace in vain is not Xnty.

The Apostle―Diffusion The reason that the apostles could push so hard in diffusing [Christianity] and without any Christian risk was that they were so few and the world had such enormously superior power that suffering for the teaching (which, in fact, is part of Xnty) could not be avoided. “Xndom” is nonsense. The method must be changed, the offense, the repulsion must be brought to bear unceasingly.

Prudence.―Xnty. Xnty has come to a stop and is stuck in “prudence.” We must get through it. Xnty has arranged things in the following fashion: suffering is a part of being a Xn―eternity will judge. In its prudence, the hum. race has found out that we might be able to teach Xnty objectively, to possess Xnty, to be a Xn―and in addition prudently avoid suffering. And hum. beings are not a

111

112

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 158–160

•

1854

little proud of this prudence, of the enormous step forward that has been taken. And that is where things remain―until hum. beings learn that inasmuch as eternity has arranged things in such a way that suffering is part of being a Xn and is a condition of salvation―then what will be most prudent will surely be that one comes to suffer. Oh, shortsighted hum. prudence―which eternally deceives itself. No, when God has arranged something, the only prudent thing is to do as he wills.

5

10

The Calculation. Xnty supposes that there is an antithesis between God and hum. beings, like the antithesis between life and death. Now do the calculation! If there are 1000 Xns, does it not already seem as if there is a possibility that the antithesis will disappear? This increases with every 100,000, with every million― and finally, when the whole world has become Xn, well, then the antithesis between God and hum. beings has disappeared―Xnty no longer exists. Thus, one of two things: either things are in order with these millions of Xns―and in that case God has miscalculated, applied the wrong scale, or―yes, or the whole business with these millions of Xns and a Xn world is a swindle. No, to be a Xn is to suffer in this world―and then eternity. On the other hand, God does not want to know anything of these swindles with the whole world calling itself Xn in order to abolish suffering. Xnty is not a promise for this life (that is Judaism), it is a promise for eternity―but in this life, suffering.

159

114 15

20

25

30

Judaism―Xnty.

160

All suffering for which help arrives already in this life, so that the suffering ceases: is Judaism. Xnty remains in suffering until the end―then eternity. 35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 161 161

5

10

115

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

On Myself. If I could sound an alarm, found a party, etc., get hold of large numbers―I would be regarded as a power. Well, good night! But I would still not be understood. My life is really one of the most profound satires upon this generation: an absolutely solitary pers., so frail in appearance as to be almost nonexistent―and then an initiation into the secrets of existence such as is rarely found, and then, only after a long period of time has passed, will I rlly be understood, though in my view without peop. necessarily having become any better or any different than they are now. But the satire consists precisely in the fact that such a little dot has been included, a dot whose activity will cause a later age to recast my life in fantasy, to rewrite it, in order to explain its effect, for the world never gets any wiser. What is intensive always relates ironically to what is extensive―more or less like the proverb [“]der Eine hat den Beutel und der Andre hat das Geld.[”] The extensive is an enormous machine―and the intensity?― well, the smaller the extensity into which it can be compressed, the greater the irony. The extensive expands itself with great self-satisfaction, it would like to expand so much that the intensive could not even be permitted to slip in with even so much as a tiny little dot―the situation would become all the more ironic. Thus it would of course also be quite ironic to imagine a huge gathering of people that was so enormous that―the speaker could not get in the door and was completely unable to address them. During every moment of actuality the extensive is an enormous machine―it does not notice, does not suspect, that it has rlly had its day, that a little dot can be seen―a little dot, yes, highly esteemed public, a little dot can be seen. But if it is ridiculous when actors continue their play after the curtain has fallen, then the given actuality is ridiculous every time such a little dot becomes visible; for when the curtain falls it means that the comedy is over, and that the dot is seen means that now this actuality is finished. But, as noted, the smaller, the more pointlike the dot, can be―if possible, so that it could be visible only with a microscope―the more ironic. The irony consists in the heterogeneity between the extensive and the intensive. To conquer an actuality while at the head of battalions has nothing ironic about it, it is sensate power against sensate power, and thus it is homogeneity, proportionality―but a little dot! To hit a horse on the forehead 16 der Eine . . . das Geld] German, the one has the money, the other has the purse. (See also explanatory note.)

113

114

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 161–162

•

1854

with a club and kill it has nothing ironic about it, the scale of the sensate power corresponds to the horse’s large body. But to kill it by sticking or pricking it at a specific point with a sewing needle has something ironic about it. To do away with an actuality in such a way that it is immediately seen to be finished has nothing ironic about it―for of course what has happened can be seen. But do away with an actuality so that it hasn’t an inkling that it’s all over: that is ironic―because what has happened is not seen. No, highly esteemed public, what has happened is not seen; on the contrary, what is seen is that the given actuality continues, completely unchanged: the entire machinery is running at top speed, all the players in their customary activities. And nonetheless something has happened, but it is not seen, and this is what has happened: a little dot is seen. It is seen: that is, actuality does not see it, but it can be seen.

The Measure of Spirit. This is how we talk: A man says with pride, I am not a single man, but a man with family―perhaps with a large family: and from the point of view of spirit a single man is more. This is how we talk to God: Someone steps forward and says, We are not a few individual persons, we are a people―from the point of view of spirit an individual is more before God; precisely this is Xnty, and the fact that every person can be this individual. How ironic that every hum. being is intended to be an Atlas who bears a world―and then to see what we hum. beings are; alas, and how sad that we ourselves are to blame for what we are.

5

10

15

116

162

20

25

JOURNAL NB32

JOURNAL NB32 Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse Edited by Joel D. S. Rasmussen

Text source Journal NB32 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Finn Gredal Jensen, Klaus Nielsen, and Steen Tullberg

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 1

119

1

•

1854

NB32. October 11th 1854.

117

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 2–3

•

1854

121

2

The Point―The Mass The Intensive―The Extensive

5

15

A metaphor. The center is of course a point, the target is a large body, and yet only hitting the center is a hit, to hit the target is not to hit: thus, only the intensive rlly lives, the being of the extensive is being that is not rlly being. The extensive is an inauthentic being; its being consists only in consuming the intensive. Only the intensive has being in itself, the extensive lives off―by devouring, by sucking the blood―of the intensive (as the shades of the underworld do with the living). Just as writing in sand or in the sea leaves no trace, so is all existence that does not become spirit something that disappears, something that leaves no trace.

3

Two Aesthetic Remarks That I Will Nonetheless Write Down.

10

20

25

30

35

122

I Hamlet and Ophelia. Hamlet cannot rlly be viewed as being in love with Ophelia. It may not be understood in that way, even though, psychologically, it is quite true that it is precisely the person who goes about brooding strenuously upon a great plan who needs moments when he can rest and is apt to use a love affair for that purpose. But nonetheless I do not think that Hamlet is to be understood in that way. No, what is indefensible about H[amlet] is that, master of intrigue that he is, he makes use of a relationship to Ophelia to deflect attention from what he is actlly concealing. His treatment of Ophelia is abuse. This is how it is to be understood, and then one may certainly add that precisely because he is under strain, there are moments when he almost goes so far as actually to be in love. II Don Quixote. It is a mistake for D[on] Q[uixote] to end with him dying and for him to die as a rational man. D Q ought to have no ending. On the contrary, D Q ought to end with the indication of a new idée fixe in which he will now play a role as, e.g., a shepherd. D Q is endless fantasy. And thus it is really prosaic to let the story end with him dying after having become rational. It is an attempt to transform D Q into a sort of moral tale instead of letting this work belong to the genre of romantic comedy.

119

120

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 4–6

•

1854

Politics―Christianity P[olitics] consists in this: never venturing more than what is possible at any moment, never beyond human probability. Xnty is: Where there is no venturing beyond the probable, God is absolutely not included, though it does not follow from this that he is present wherever there is venturing beyond the probable.

Ridiculous! A person’s entire life is worldliness, all of his comings and goings, from morning to evening, his waking and his dreaming. ―in addition, he is naturally a Christian―after all, he lives in [“]Christendom” and in his character as a Xn, he is “a stranger and an alien in this world.” This is just as ridiculous as if savages were to deck themselves out with a single item of a European uniform, e.g., the savage who came onboard stark naked except for general’s epaulets on his shoulders.

Idealities for Preaching Xnty. One ideality is this: The ideal of the preaching is that all become Xns. A second ideality is this (this is the reflection): The ideal of the preaching is to gain one Xn.

4

5

5

15

20

6

25

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 7–9 123

•

1854

7

The Beginning―The End―The Beginning.

5

The beginning was: there were no Christians at all. Then all became Xns―and for that reason, there are once again no Christians at all. That was the end; now we stand once again at the beginning.

8

The Significance of Cholera

10

is that it tends to drill into hum. beings the fact that they are individuals, which neither war nor any other calamity accomplishes, but rather herds them into flocks; but plagues disperse them into individuals, teaching them―corporeally―that they are individuals.

9

Philosophers on the Throne

15

is what Plato wanted. Our times teach us that it is a dubious matter to have a dramatist on the throne. I mean Louis Napoleon. As a poet, he understands that it would have an incomparable effect at the military review in Boulogne if a courier arrived in haste with news of the capture of Sebastopol. Well, then, it is arranged! The consequence, naturally, is that the next day the whole of France has a hangover, just like that following a drinking spree. But N[apoleon] is a master at prostituting the generation. This generation of windbags deserves as emperor a windbag en gros. And how excellent as well, that all the great discoveries (railroads, telegraph, etc.) of the hum. race tend toward developing and supporting the windbaggishness. But perhaps this is how people will turn back from it again.

20

25

24 en gros] French, on a large scale.

121

122

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 10–13

•

1854

Wisdom’s Discourse [What is] admired by the times as wisdom’s discourse, take care, it turns into nonsense, no hum. being was ever such a giant. Therefore the truth (which, dialectically, always has need of the tension of opposition) arranges things such that wisdom’s discourse is regarded by its times as madness―wisdom’s discourse is not vouchsafed to a hum. being on any other terms, which is something at which he himself must rejoice, if, in fact, becoming nonsense is what he fears most. Then, afterward, in the generations that follow, this discourse of wisdom is admired―but then it has been transformed, is no longer the discourse of wisdom, but is a species of nonsense.

124

10

5

10

. . . . . . Alas, that was how I understood it: I thought I should have your help, o God, in loving people. You understood it differently: You used peop. against me in order to help me to love you.

11

. . . . alas, no matter how old I am, sometimes, when ideas present themselves to me, I am almost like a child who wants to take so much of the fruit he has been permitted to pick in the garden that he almost transforms joy into worry and difficulty.

12

Martyrdom’s lofty thoughts, and all such lofty things, all things lofty that relate to a polemical and pessimistic view of life, have as if entirely vanished from the generation, and, in a larger sense, considered in relation to what it is to be a hum. being, this generation is like chaff in comparison to seed corn. Everything ends in this miserable longing for success in this world and then divides into two classes: those who are lucky enough to succeed, and those who fail to succeed.

13

30

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 13 1854 •

125 5

10

15

20

25

30

35

I am returning to this because in these days I have been reminded of Lessing and The Fragments. He puts the matter as follows: At various points in the gospel there are hints that Xt had really wanted earthly things, to be a king, etc.―but that he had not succeeded. No, no, but precisely in order to amplify the repulsion of this all the more―precisely in order to demonstrate even more passionately that this was not what he wanted―precisely for that reason, he makes a move as if that were what he wanted―in order then to reject it so that one might see what is truly spiritual―which is precisely what relates to voluntary repulsion. Nonetheless, it is and remains true that, in judging, a person makes manifest what dwells within him. And because neither in the people of our times nor in Lessing is there passion of the more ideal sort, the situation presents itself to them in such sorry fashion. It could not occur to one single person living in our times to believe that someone could want to acquire, to seek, renown, for example―with pessimistic intentions, i.e., simply in order to throw such rubbish away and, polemically, to wound all the more deeply. No, no one believes in such things―and then people want to understand or involve themselves with interpreting Xt. “Spirit” has disappeared entirely from the generation; ideal passions, which possess―and this is precisely what is ideal―a potency, a looming prospect, so that, in ideal passion, such a pers. continually relates inversely to the world: this simply does not happen anymore. And this is also why Xnty has been dragged down into the most wretched, trivial sort of mediocrity. Nowadays one could truthfully say: Xt cannot really admit to being the founder of this sort of Xnty. But, consistently, hum. beings turn the matter―new swindlers’ tricks―in such a way that they rewrite Xt so that he fits in with what we call Xnty. And in our times this is the loftiest thing we have: Someone who longed for the world, was unsuccessful, and now―this is the only possibility remaining to him of at least some small bit of profit―reinterprets his life and aspires to the sort of renown and admiration that comes with suffering. And the exemplar of this then becomes―Jesus Xt!

123

124

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 14

•

1854

The Reliability of Numbers

1

5

10

Note. And just as, when a pers. really begins to blabber away and spew a frightful mass of nonsense, one suspects that there is scarcely likely to be any thought in it―so, too, precisely when there are millions x millions, ought one become extremely suspicious that these enormous numbers simply indicate that it doesn’t add up.

a

[b]

15

Nor, in relation to everything finite and temporal, in relation to eating, drinking, and the like, in relation to all worldly activities and to business in this world, is there a

is of course a deception, something unreliable; and yet this is what is offered to the world, calculating that you will then be deceived and become a part of the number. There live millions of Mohammedans―but take a closer look, and you will see that they are Mohammedans of this type: [“]Yes, I am just like the others[”]―and Mohammedans in the sense that if they had been born in Xndom, they would have been Xns. There live millions of Xns―how reliably! Yes, this is so reliable that if the same peop. had been born in those countries, they would have been Mohammedans. If there is a certain truth in that saying that hum. beings have been granted speech in order to conceal their thoughts, or, as I say, in order to conceal the fact that they have no thoughts―if there is a certain truth in this, namely the truth that this is not why they have been granted it, but is what they use it for―then one can truthfully say something similar about the numerical: the numerical is used in order to conceal how empty the whole of existence is,a the numerical displaces a pers. into an exalted state just as opium does―and then he is tranquilized, tranquilized by this enormous reliability of millions. And yet, in truth millions are equally unreliable, absolutely equally unreliable as one person. But one person does not have a stupefying effect―that is something the millions have: and thus it is quite clear that he is absolutely unreliable. That means that “millions” displace a pers. into a state of stupefaction, he swoons under the power of numbers, he expires qua spirit, he goes along with it, but it is not expressed in this manner, no, he believes that he possesses the most complete certainty and reliability―so greatly is he deceived. This is connected with the synthesis that is the hum. being. He is an animal creature and is the possibility of spirit. But the animal creature has no need of any greater certainty than that of numbers. To feel a need for another sort of certainty than the

14

5

10

126

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 14–15

5

15

10

127 15

20

25

30

35

40

numerical is in proportion to spirit. This is also why Governance has arranged things so that this need for spirit (for the sake of the truth) immediately receives its fortifying opposite, because the numerical naturally takes that sort of thing ungraciously and calls it arrogance.

What a Swindling Disguise! Nowadays the situation is such that to want to be Christian―in a sense other than as the meaningless adjective that is in general circulation―is viewed as something so poor and insipid that people cannot understand why anyone would want to be one. And if someone once again clarified what Xnty understands by being a Xn, the world will rage against such a person and accuse him of the most dreadful arrogance. For Christianity actlly expresses the situation like this: The difference between being a Christian and being a hum. being is as great as the difference between being a hum. being and being an animal. But it is clear that being a Xn is in fact such a terror and a torment that people gradually managed, in very cunning fashion, to free themselves from being a Christian that way. Thus people abolished ideality, and thus they turned it into the way we live nowadays, in which being a Xn is something so poor and insipid, something that everyone so automatically is, that there is nothing more to be said about it, and it is ridiculous to want to talk about the fact one is a Xn, or to want to be one cum emphasi, because of course one is a Xn―just as when one does not find it ridiculous that a person wants to be a councillor of state cum emphasi, but one certainly does find it ridiculous if he wants to be a hum. being cum emphasi, because Good Lord, that is of course something all of us are, and just as one does not find it ridiculous that a person makes a pithy remark cum emphasi, but, surely, on a beautiful summer day, when someone says cum emphasi, 32 cum emphasi] Latin, with emphasis. (See also explanatory note.)

•

1854

125

need for any greater reliability than that of numbers, because in a certain sense numbers are the power in this world, where the idea must put up with seeming as impotent as numbers actually are in the world of the idea. By the very nature of the matter, there is no eternal certainty in relation to the temporal, the sensory, the finite― thus the reliability of numbers is completely sufficient, indeed, is the only thing possible, except that thereby one is deceived―out of the eternal, the infinite, the ideal.

1

5

10

15

126

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 15–16

•

1854

[“]Fine weather today,[”] it is ridiculous, because what is emphasized has no relation to the nothing he says or the meaninglessness of his remark: and thus neither, presumably, does emphasis have any relation to the nothingness of being a Xn, something we of course are, etc.

The Divine―The Human according to the teachings of Xnty, relate to one another as polemically as possible. When Peter, as well-meaningly as possible, wanted to restrain Xt for human reasons, Xt said, as categorically as possible, [“]You sense only what is human, it is the impulse of Satan, get thee behind me, Satan.[”] On the other hand, when Xt speaks to the Jews of God and of himself (e.g., in Jn 8), the Jews cry out: [“]He has Satan, the devil, he is a Samaritan.[”] And Xt says that the Jews are the devil’s children. The human, as such, is the relative, the mediocre, is this pleasing [“]to a certain degree.[”] Viewed from this vantage point, the unconditioned is thus the devil, for the unconditioned is of course truly a plague for this hum. mediocrity that egotistically wants sensate enjoyment and does not want to hear any talk about the unconditioned―the unconditioned is of course sheer unrest and strain and torment. That the unconditioned should be the divine, that what causes such torment and trouble should be the divine, is something a hum. being cannot comprehend before he has surrendered to it and learned from the unconditioned itself that it is the divine. If a hum. being remains in the merely hum. way of seeing, then the unconditioned is the devil, or God is the evil, as they say in the latest French philosophy: God is the evil, i.e., he is to blame for all hum. unhappiness; if only we could get rid of the unconditioned, knock all the ideals out of our heads, then

5

16

10

15

128 20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 16

5

10

15

20

129 25

30

35

40

things would surely go well―but God makes us unhappy, he is the evil. On the other hand, from God’s point of view, it is precisely this mediocrity of wanting to enjoy life in sensate fashion that is possession by the devil, that is of the devil. Indeed, from God’s point of view, what we hum. beings say―mostly in connection with the wildest sins―is perhaps even more true with respect to the sensory enjoyments of mediocrity: that they are of the devil, because viewed ideally, this mediocrity is even farther from higher things than are the greatest sins. Where there is unrest―and that is where there are great sins―there is at least a possibility of something higher; but this tranquillity is indeed at the greatest remove from “spirit.” Mediocrity is the principle that forms the compact mass of the hum. race. And what the unconditioned―and thus God as well―may require as the first condition for coming into relation to hum. beings is to get them split apart. This in turn is why great crimes make the relation more possible than does mediocrity, because great crimes isolate. Instinctively (just as the octopus knows how to muddle things, and the skunk knows how to spread an odor, and the hedgehog knows how to raise its quills), the “hum. being” has a tactic against “spirit”: [“]Let us form a mass[”]―that is the hum. being’s tactic, his mode of protecting himself. Just as a person puts on many coats to keep out the cold, so does “mass” keep idea and spirit away. Just as the ostrich sticks its head in the ground and believes that it cannot be seen, so does the hum. being form a mass and then think that he cannot be seen. People speak of not being able to see the forest for the trees―with his tactic the hum. being believes that the trees cannot be seen for the forest. Like a person who says he is not home, thus does the hum. being deny that he is home: by becoming a third person―i.e., in the mass―instead of being I. As mass, then, a hum. being is a sensate power, behaves en masse as an animal creature, and is extremely happy and satisfied to be protected as a

•

1854

[a]

127

It is done cunningly, in the following manner: Let us unite, form a mass, in order to work for the ideals―because to form masses is precisely to get rid of the ideals.

1

5

128

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 16–17

•

1854

mass against God, the unconditioned, the idea, spirit, the ideals. Lamentable happiness, for whatever is mass is always what is wasted in every generation, and through its own fault.

5

Xnty―Christendom. God―Hum. Being.

This is how matters stand, and I can very well repeat it yet again. According to Xnty, salvation consists precisely in becoming spirit, being saved out of the race. But to become spirit is to become the single individual; isolation is the conditio sine qua non, an inescapable condition. Then, scarcely is this word heard concerning a salvation, a salvation for hum. beings, before the race (if I may speak for it) replies, “Splendid, let us now unite” (You see, there we have it!) “in order that, united, (abracadabra!) we might seek this lofty good.” But, as has been shown elsewhere, it is precisely through uniting that we defend ourselves against God, the unconditioned, ideality―and thus also against “salvation.” So a numberless mass of people unite―and then people are completely protected against Xnty. And this is “Christendom.” Because there is a qualitative difference between God and hum. beings, it is of course difficult for them to come to an understanding with one another, even with the best of will on the part of hum. beings. And the problem is rooted in the circumstance that hum. beings always show up accompanied by numbers. If (to speak almost jokingly of something that has cost me plenty of suffering―which, however, I do not regret), if God in Heaven opened up his window and said: [“]I have use for a hum. being, get me a hum. being―the race would answer, [‘]I will immediately take the necessary steps, get a couple of hundred thousand men and women together, so you can get just as many hum. beings as you want.[’ ”] But God asked for one single hum. being, and this is something that “humanity” cannot get into its head: that one single hum. being is more than millions, that by getting millions, one gets fewer. 12 conditio sine qua non] Latin, the necessary and indispensable condition.

17

10

15

130 20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 17–18

5

10

15

20

•

1854

This is extremely difficult to root out of a person, this faith in millions, because it is connected to the animal category. Everyone in whom the animal category predominates believes wholly and firmly that millions are more than one. And spirit is precisely the opposite: that one is more than millions, but that everyone can be that one. The person in whom the animal category is the dominant element always has this belief of being more when he is with his family―and what the family is on a small scale, on a larger scale, family is constituted by the millions. But now one can easily see this for oneself on a smaller scale: when, for example, there is talk of working for an idea, the one who says the most is not the one who says: [“]Yes, I am willing, and not only me, but my family.[”] No, the one who says the most is the one who says: [“]I am at your service, I am only a single hum. being.[”] For in relation to an idea, a single hum. being is more than a man with a family. But it is embedded in us, indeed, in the language we speak, this predominance of the category of the race. This is why, of those two men, the one who says the least is the one who says―[“]Not only me, but also my family[”]―he says “not only,” so one expects that what follows will be something greater, and yet it is less, for the family subtracts. And the one who said the most says: [“]I am only a single hum. being[”]: “only,” and yet it would have been less if he had been with his family.

25

131

18

30

35

That This World Is a Vale of Tears. This is how people live in “Christendom”: Everyone certainly feels in his own way that this world has more than a bit of trouble and suffering―but people think that the task is to take care to make one’s life as full of enjoyment and as happy as possible― and this is supposed to be Xnty. According to Xnty, on the other hand, the task is precisely to discover that this world is a vale of tears, to venture forth in such a way that it becomes one, to understand that the fact that it is this vale of tears is our punishment―but that it avails us but little in the eternal sense, this swindler’s trick of acting as though we cannot see what God wants us to see, or of actually being unable see it because we have made life easy―by making it insignificant, devoid of spirit, bereft of ideas, bestial for hum. beings.

129

130

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 18–19

•

1854

So far is Xnty from wanting to make life easy for us that, on the contrary, it wants to make it enormously burdensome―for the sake of eternal life. But understanding this is already spirit, and it is just as difficult to get this into hum. beings as the principle that, spiritually, one does not strengthen oneself, but rather weakens oneself by allying oneself with others and by joining in groups, that the million are less than one, which indeed is true, just as surely as the law of “spirit” is the precise opposite of the law of the sensate and finite. But in “Xndom” people take the natural hum. being’s natural notions and they edit Xnty in accordance with them. That is also why in Xndom the public worship of God is neither more nor less than blasphemy, than making a fool of God.

5

10

15

Xnty―Xndom. Sometimes a teacher talks to a pupil by using a lower sort of expression by which something higher is understood, and does this in such a way that the pupil understands it. He says, for example, [“]Tomorrow will be a day for fun,[”] and by this he means precisely that it will be a rigorous day, with much to do, which in a higher sense can indeed be called fun. Now suppose the pupil took the liberty of pretending that he did not understand this, suppose that he spent the whole day wasting time, and when the teacher pointed this out to him, he said, [“]You did say, after all, that tomorrow would be a day for fun.[”] A teacher usually uses elevated language about being diligent and working hard; making a real effort is something he calls joy and fun, which in a higher sense it is. But I wonder if he will put up with it when the boy takes the liberty of exploiting his use of these lofty expressions of joy and fun in order to loaf? The same with Xndom. In his majestic language, God has let a great joy be proclaimed to us hum. beings―a great joy. Yes, God cannot speak otherwise about the lofty goal he establishes in Xnty. And what is Xndom? Xndom is a swindler of a boy who pretends he does not understand what God meant, but believes that because it is a great joy, the task must of course be that of properly enjoying life. Christendom is sheer lèse-majesté against Xnty, impudent shamelessness, and that is what public worship is in this country.

19

20

25

132

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 20–21

20

5

10

15

•

1854

Willing the Good in Truth. It will never be otherwise in this world: willing the good in truth is in fact regarded as a sort of narrow-mindedness, as stupidity. Willing earthly things without success is not regarded as anywhere near so stupid. And there is nothing that people like to pity as much as willing the good in truth, for there is nothing that people fear as much as being moved by, or coming into the least sort of relation to, willing the good in truth, and people believe that they have the best and most secure protection against it by pitying it―because confessing that the task is to will the good in truth, but that one is unable to bring oneself to do it: this is not as safe, and it might perhaps end with a person getting involved with the good, with making a start at doing so―no, but when you pity willing the good in truth, then, for your part, you are completely safe and secure.

21

Christianity―The Human Being.

20

Does it ever occur to a child that it needs to be brought up? Or if you took two children and had them live together, grow up together, would it occur to them that they needed upbringing? Would anything occur to them other than that they were very nice and splendid? But the higher view, the parents’ view, recognizes that they are in need of upbringing, so a criterion for the child is established The same with the hum. being. Naturally, it does not occur to any hum. being, nor to any society of hum. beings, that they are profoundly corrupted. It is quite simply an impossibility, for one cannot be profoundly corrupted if one can―at the same time and on one’s own, without outside help―see that one is profoundly corrupted. But something higher (Xnty) takes it upon itself to proclaim to the hum. being that he is profoundly corrupted and then lays down the criterion for him. But nowadays Xnty is not proclaimed in this way. People take the natural hum. being’s natural notions about life; his striving

25

133

30

35

131

132

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 21–23

•

1854

for enjoyment is regarded as the truth. Then people take some of Xnty’s promises and mix them up in such a way that they fit in with this business about enjoying life.

Promises without Obligations are sweets, confections. And in “Xndom” Xnty has been made into sweets. But the promises cannot be separated from the obligations. Peop. have wanted to treat Xnty as, for example, a person treats a medicine that the doctor has flavored with a bit of raspberry juice: one gets the idea of taking the raspberry juice by itself and calling it the medicine―thus peop. have wanted to separate the promises from the obligations, taking the promises as sweets and turning their backs on the obligations. But this cannot be done: the relation of Xnty’s promises to the obligations is different from the relation of the raspberry juice to the medicine. If one separates the promises from the obligations, one gets the promises only as sweets, i.e., as an illusion, i.e., precisely in such a way as to cheat oneself out of the promises. But in a way, to get the raspberry juice as a sweet is not to be cheated, because raspberry juice is in fact a sweet (although one is indeed definitely cheated if one needed the medicine and took only the raspberry juice), but to get the promises of eternity as sweets is to be cheated out of them. One is not cheated by raspberry juice that one gets as sweets, but one is eo ipso cheated out of promises of eternity that one gets as sweets.

The Life of the Spirit. To live so strenuously that despite the fact that one’s life is not merely beyond reproach, but, in hum. terms, is extremely rigorous and chaste, and yet to speak of one’s body as a “body of sin” (thus, Paul): This, you see, is spirit. As it is said that whatever is not of faith is sin, so, too, in this case: As soon as the body does not conform to the will of the spirit on every point, even the 25 eo ipso] Latin, by that very fact.

22

10

15

20

25

134

23 30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 23–24

5

10

15

20

•

1854

least, at every instant, even the briefest―wherever it does not do as the spirit wills, it is the body of sin. But such things are not even suspected in our times, when all of life is mediocrity, and living in harmony with the flesh is called Xnty. And of course, precisely the fact that the spirit is involved makes the body, in turn, more rebellious. In its own way, the body, too, is, if you will, a decent sort of fellow. When it is permitted to continue along in its regular routine, i.e., in steady mediocrity, it doesn’t cause much trouble. And people view the favorable outcome resulting from this procedure as proof that this is the right method―or as they say, the truly Christian one. Yes, in one sense what the freethinkers claim (which the orthodox also do, indirectly) is true: Xnty is a myth. Yes, it is a myth, a fable, that there once lived hum. beings who led lives on such a scale―it is a myth, inasmuch as the “nation of boys” that now calls itself Christian is what is truly human, indeed the highest humanity, for this is of course the latest stage of perfectibility in the growth of the hum. race. If we did not have the bones of mammoths, people would of course maintain that the historical account of such animals was a fable, a myth―at least, that is what all the animals that belong to that animal species would claim.

135

24

30

35

The Sign by Which It Can Be Seen That a Given State of Affairs Is Ripe for a Fall

Suppose someone has an insight that is truer than what is regarded as true by the times―it does not by any means follow from this that he is to lash out against the given state of affairs. No: if the situation is such that the times bona fide regard what they call the truth to be true, then he must proceed more gently, because he must of course first convey to the age the knowledge that is needed. But when the situation of the times is such that almost everyone knows privately that the whole business is wrong, is untrue, while no one will say so officially, when the tactic employed by those in charge is [“]Let us simply stall, pretend it is nothing,

133

134

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 24–25

•

1854

make no response to any attack, because we know all too well that the whole situation is rotten, that we are acting in bad faith[”]: Well, in that case, such a state of affairs is eo ipso condemned―it must fall. Just as people say that a person has been marked by death, so, too, is this state of affairs the symptom that invites a total onslaught. In this case there cannot be any talk of something that is truer confronting something that nonetheless honestly believes itself to be true. No―here the battle is against a lie. But fundamentally this is the state of affairs in Xndom, especially in Protestantism, especially in Denmark.

Tactical Caution.

1

5

[a]

the heterogeneity of the unconditioned would very soon, or immediately, be rendered unrecognizable in the homogeneity of characterlessness.

When something unconditioned is to be introduced―and when the age, devoid of character, excels to a frightful degree in agreeing with everything, everything, to a certain degree: then caution dictates not doing what one would prefer doing in other circumstances―both for one’s own sake and for the sake of others―before one launches a decisive attack: approaching those in charge and informing them in order to see whether, if possible, this might cause them to yield a bit. No, one dare not do this, because―well, the problem is that one can be certain that however emphatically one expressed oneself, they would agree with it to a certain degree― ―and then, of course, one would indeed have failed in one’s mission to introduce the unconditioned. No, especially when confronted with this characterless [“]to a certain degree,[”] the unconditioned must be brought to bear upon it as the leap of a beast of prey, as the stoop of a raptor. This is what has long been overlooked in Xndom. Xnty is something unconditioned―for generation after generation, millions of people have been induced to accept this, but they have not noticed that they have accepted it only to a certain degree, so that in the course of time we have come to the point that what people nowadays call Xnty is only the uncon-

5

10

25

20

136

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 25–28

•

1854

135

ditioned in one sense, namely, it is unconditionally the opposite of what Xnty is in the New T.

26 5

Socrates. Indeed, it is related that the oracle enjoined his father: [“]Do not constrain the child.[”] How brilliant! For Socrates is of course precisely the subjectivity that was to overthrow Greek objectivity―an ideal heterogeneity.

10

27

15

137

28

25

30

To Live―To Die. There are only two views of life, corresponding to the duality that is a hum. being: animal creature and spirit. According to the one, the task is: to live, to enjoy life, and to direct everything at this. The other view is: the meaning of life is to die.

[a]

Christendom is a disguise. All the business with these priests and professors―it gives the appearance of being work for the infinite, but is finitude, quite simply as with all the other tradesmen. It is the same as when Morten Fredriksen presents himself as a Russian officer, mixes in fine society (without, however, renouncing his thieving nature)―but suddenly a police officer notices him and says, [“]Oh, of course, it is Morten Fredriksen.[”] This is how it is with priests and professors disguised as the servants of the infinite and of the idea―the police recognize them immediately and know that they are butchers and barkeepers in disguise.

And, just as there is a police regulation that forbids men from going about in women’s clothing, and vice versa, ah, would that a prohibition might also be maintained against butchers and other shopkeepers going about disguised as servants of the idea. Alas, but what certainty is there rlly in this world! Indeed, if someone wanted to decorate himself with the Order of the Elephant, it would quickly be thwarted. But it is permitted to deck oneself out as a servant of the idea―indeed, it is rlly something official. Nonetheless, things are for the best this way: Long live the uncertainty and the swindlers’ tricks, these are precisely what make true service to the idea all the more true.

1

5

10

15

20

136

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 29–30

•

1854 A Wonderful Motto.

As a motto for his Numbered Tracts, Peter Hiort has chosen the following words of Bishop Mynster: [“]Entirely and without Reservations[”]. An extremely peculiar combination, for the point of Bishop Mynster’s life was: [“]Always with Reservations, Always to a Certain Degree.[”] Thus the motto is just as peculiar as if I were to imagine this: [“]Honesty and Trustworthiness,[”] signed Morten Fredriksen. Mynster’s motto might be very good, but the name has an unsettling effect.

God’s Word Must Be Proclaimed to the People. The Medium (The Clergy).

29

5

10

30

15

“The people” is always the good health that can give birth to something good. What has amounted to something in the world and what stems from what has amounted to something is usually already weakened or probably even corrupted, because everything human is frail and generations are quickly corrupted. For this reason―and for many other reasons― God’s Word must be proclaimed to the people. But of course there must be some peop. to proclaim it. These people, then, constitute the medium through which God’s Word sounds to the people. This medium is the clergy. Now, it is easy to see that if this medium were without any selfishness, it would be perfect, for in that case God’s Word would reach the people almost unmediated, because the medium would be devoid of anything disturbing. But this medium is where the misfortune has always been lodged, and is lodged. Catholicism saw rightly that it would be a good thing if this medium belonged to this world as

138

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 30–31

5

10

15

20

31

139 30

35

•

1854

137

little as possible. Thus the unmarried state, poverty, asceticism, etc. This is completely correct, calculated to eradicate selfishness from the medium. But what happens?―then Satan enters this clergy and, in spiritual arrogance, they come up with the idea of being something other than a medium: an intermediate authority between God and hum. beings, in order thus to be repaid for what they have renounced in the temporal world. Then Protestantism sees this error. So in order to prevent this spiritual arrogance it came up with the idea that the clergy is to be just like everybody else. So we get a clergy that has become entirely worldly: civil servants, persons of rank, men with wives and families, trapped more than anyone in the nonsense of temporality. And this is supposed to be the medium through which God’s Word is to sound! Well, if this medium is calculated to transmit sound―then mattresses are suitable as well! No, a clergy of this sort, a medium of this sort, bars the way for God’s Word, or when God’s Word sounds through it, it becomes something entirely different.

The I In general, a great deal is said about every pers. being an egotist, willing his I, asserting it, etc. And this is indeed true, especially in relation to everything beneath him, where he believes he can dominate. But this is not the case in the upward direction― there, no one wants to be an I. When confronted with power, the I retracts its antennae and becomes third person. Confronted with one’s times, no one wants to be an I, but retracts his antennae and becomes third person, the public, [“]one.[”] And then, to have to be I, confronted with existence itself, bearing all that pressure: No, thank you―that is something no one wants to do.

[a]

or as when a sharp instrument is blunted when it strikes a hard object, so with an I that becomes third person

1

138

1

b

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 31–32

, because of the distance at which God has in fact placed himself from a pers., though in another sense is what is closest to him

•

1854

Yet it is impossible to be involved with God except by continuing to endure being Ib under the weight of that pressure; and after all, it is surely also impossible to be a Xn without being involved with God. But the thousands who go on living like that, without having become I, or living as truncated, blunted I’s, truncated into the third person―they fill out their lives with all sorts of things, imagining that they are actually involved with God, flattering themselves that if they have not ventured farther out, it is because of humility. What foggy confusion! The first precondition for properly coming forth is seeing that the business about humility is nonsense, that a person holds back because of weakness, hypersensitivity, cowardliness. It is untrue, nor was any hum. being ever, in truth, too humble to desire what is highest, especially the highest that God commands under penalty of eternal punishment. No, my friend, it is self-deception. But you want to be free of the dangers, and thus it is precisely the type of people who hold back because of such so-called humility who are the sort of people who―if they can get hold of a person who ventured all the way out― are so greedy to get hold of his ideas, impressions, expressions, etc.―though without the dangers.

Wasn’t the Whole Business of Xndom Caused by a Confusion?

5

10

15

20

25

32

30

Xnty came into the world when Emperor Augustus decreed that all the world was to be taxed―one could be tempted to believe that Xndom has misunderstood things and has confused these two simultaneous events, believing that Xnty had come into the world in order to tax everyone.

140

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 33–34

33

5

Laughable Seriousness. As I have learned, the tax levied on persons of rank is not collected annually or semiannually, no― it is collected every day! Profound earnestness: only now do I understand how infinitely significant every day is!

34

Numbers―The Idea.

10

The idea always relates to one; one pers. is enough, and, for Christianity, every person can be that one. Eternity does not count; it is quality, and thus is not number despite being a number. When two people relate to an idea together, numbers begin, because two count. Finally, when they become millions, numbers take on such superior power―that the idea has disappeared and can be advertised in the newspaper as missing. That is how the matter stands. In any case what must be stopped and changed is this swindling language: to unite in order to be better able to serve the idea, the truth, or in order to be better able to be spirit. No: with respect to the idea, with respect to spirit, numbers subtract. But people unite because a person cannot endure being the one. Yes, Das ist Was anders! But let us say it as it is, let us get some truth into the situation and not weaken it by jamming the lock against the idea, making it impossible even merely to relate oneself to spirit. Sociality is a part of the animal definition of being a hum. being, and it is the cunning (in every case, the instinctively cunning) way in which people have positioned uniting, joining together, in relation to spirit―it is this that has made Xndom spiritless

15

20

25

30

35

28 Das ist Was anders] German, That is something else.

•

1854

139

140

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 34–35

•

1854

or abandoned by spirit, so much so that it has jammed the lock, for in confessing that it is out of weakness that they join together, people do at least relate themselves to spirit. 141

Arthur Schopenhauer. That he is a significant writer, a very significant writer, is indisputable. The whole of his life and its history are a deep wound inflicted on professor-philosophy: this is acknowledged with joy and gratitude. But to my way of thinking, he is a sign of something disquieting. For, strictly speaking, he is not what he believes himself to be, which, if he were, would undeniably be extremely beneficial: He is neither a thoroughgoing pessimist, nor is he himself entirely free from being a Sophist. He is not a thoroughgoing pessimist. Truly, a genuine pessimist who was entirely in character is what our times, which are both soft and devoid of character, needed. But take a closer look. S. is not a pers. who has had it in his power to be a success, to win recognition―and who then cast these things aside. No, he has, perhaps against his will, been compelled to do without temporal and earthly recognition. But in that case to choose pessimism can easily be a sort of optimism―in the temporal sense, it is the shrewdest thing one can do.―So he takes it upon himself to assign asceticism and that sort of thing a place in the system. Now, here it can be seen that he is a disquieting sign of the times. He says, not without great self-satisfaction, that he is the first person to have assigned asceticism a place in the system. Alas, this is nothing but professor-speak: [“]I am the first to have assigned it a place in the system.[”] And now, furthermore, the fact that asceticism has found its place in the system: Isn’t this an indirect indication that its time is past[?] There was a time when a person was an ascetic in character. Then there came a time when the whole matter of asceticism was forgotten. Nowadays someone brags about having been the first person to assign it a place in the system. But precisely concerning oneself with asceticism in this way of course demonstrates that it does not truly exist for him, more or less as Judaism is no longer a religion for the many people in our day who depict old-fashioned orthodox Jewish life aesthetically in novels.―So far is S. from really being a pessimist,

35

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 35–36

•

1854

25

that he höchstens represents: the interesting―in a way, he makes asceticism interesting―which is the most dangerous thing for a hedonistic age that would indeed be most seriously damaged by distilling pleasure even out of―asceticism, namely by observing asceticism in a way utterly devoid of character, by assigning it a place in the system. Nor is S. entirely free from being a Sophist. He flogs away at the tradesmen, the professors, and lucrative professor-philosophy with all the coarseness one could desire. Very good. But how, in fact, does S. differ from “the professor”? In the final analysis, only in that S. has money. But just ask Socrates what he understands by a Sophist, and you will see that he replies that the fact that a man makes a profit from philosophy is certainly sufficient to stamp him decisively as a Sophist, but it does not follow from this that his not profiting from it is sufficient for deciding that he is not a Sophist. No, the sophistry is to be found in the distance between what one understands and what one is: The person who is not in the character of what he understands is a Sophist. But this is the case with Schopenhauer. True, he says so himself, and to that extent it is praiseworthy, but it does not suffice. And despite the fact that he says it himself, this seems as if forgotten when he hammers away at professor-philosophy, despite the fact that here, too, he ought to bear this in mind―if in other respects he is supposed to be in the character of his confession, made elsewhere, regarding himself.

36

Do You Want to Be a Power?

5

142 10

15

20

30

35

Of course, this is something everyone wants to be, but listen to what the truly powerful one might say. “If someone were to ask me what absolute power I possessed, I would reply: [‘]Power of the only true sort.[’] Because the power of command, even though it were at the head of 500,000 men and 1,000 cannon, is only relative power. Suppose someone came with 600,000 men and 1,500 cannon. No, my absolute power is the only true sort―and when I reflect on it like this, it seems to me so easy to attain that I find it inexplicable that every hum. being isn’t what he would so infinitely much like to be. For this is my power: If people want to ridicule me―I am ready! If people want 1 höchstens] German, at most.

141

142

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 36–37

•

1854

to imprison me: I am at their service! If people want to put me to death: I am ready, so much so that I will be happy to free the state of the expense of a trial, because hum. justice is a bothersome waste of time, and as an author has said, the business with a prosecutor and a defense attorney is like that of Harlequin and Pierrot. Thus, just a word, a gesture, from the powers that be, and I will board a coach, fetch the executioner, and then the two of us will set out― no priest is needed. Neither guards nor watchmen are needed―but if it is required that it take place at a location where many people can gather, then I will make no objection, but I will merely point out to the authorities that if a public execution is intended to have a deterrent effect, it would surely be best if mine took place as privately as possible, in order that it not have the opposite effect.[”] You see, that is what it is to be a power―do you want it, or why do you not want it? Alas, nowadays we live such wretched lives that all of us have been pampered by reading and hearing things of this sort, and perhaps we admire it as poetic speech―but it does not in the faintest way occur to us to do likewise. And that is why it is in fact even dangerous for a person of character to possess this poetic capacity, because it can so easily happen that people take hold of his poetic side and turn their backs on the part about character. The combination of the poetic part and the part about character is dangerous, just as in logic, for example, it is a risky business to illustrate the laws of reasoning with interesting examples―in so doing, it is easy to forget what is important.

1

5

[a]

And as a ship capsizes when it no longer responds to the rudder, so does the race degenerate when it does not respond to the idea― alas, and this is what people call its perfectibility, as if one were to call a child’s disobedience its perfectibility and try to develop it further.

Our Times. Nowadays, individuals, hum. beings whose lives are lived in obedience to the idea, are no longer being born. No, the men are not men, the women are not women. Instead of the ideality, people have come up with the idea of making prudence into a sort of ideality.

143 5

10

15

20

25

30

37 35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 38

144

38

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

•

1854

143

The Extraordinary Person. It is one thing to be the so-called extraordinary person in straightforward recognizability (i.e., the false extraordinary)―on good terms with all the relativities that participate in it―as something that is merely the maximum of their range, and which thus understand the behavior of the extraordinary as the extraordinary. It is something else to be the truly extraordinary person, who relates inversely, who explodes the relativities, which therefore protect themselves at all costs against the truly extraordinary person who explodes existence, so that in this case the e[xtraordinary person] is inversely recognizable by being the one who is ridiculed, pushed aside, etc., and the life of the extraordinary person is sheer misery and suffering. If this is the case, it would rlly be a relief to be permitted to be simply the most miserable, suffering person, exempted from being the extraordinary: for, under such circumstances, having to maintain being the e[xtraordinary person] is merely a new intensification of the suffering―because, it would of course have to make an impression on him if, for an instant, he actually permitted himself to be affected by his surroundings as though he were some sort of braggart: thus, for that reason he could wish to suppress the fact that he was the extraordinary. Furthermore, this absolutely contributes to his being declared a madman. Take what is highest, take Xt! To stand as he did―and then to say: [“]Nonetheless, I am a king![”] Indeed, these are the proudest words ever spoken, and it is precisely the situation that makes them so. But on the other hand, I think that it takes a sort of mastery of things to say this―that it would have been easier to remain silent, reposing in one’s own consciousness of oneself. Therefore I understand it

[a]

Thus, with respect to being in the most extreme poverty, it is of course also an intensification to possess in addition some very valuable securities, which, however, no one in that city recognizes, which are literally worthless―it is an intensification because it is easier to be simply in the most extreme poverty and free from possessing such securities, free from this torment of being―in a sort of crazy sense―also enormously wealthy.

1

5

10

144

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 38–40

•

1854

as having been said out of obligation to the idea. But one easily overlooks how repugnant it must be for a person to say: [“]Nonetheless, I am a king,[”] when all appearances (the phenomenon) are opposed to a person in this way. But the idea requires it. But what child’s play are the hum. misery and suffering one reads about elsewhere in comparison to these dreadfully combined, intense agonies that are a part of having to be the extraordinary!

. . . . . . To want to get someone to help me would be just as ridiculous as if, in connection with the finest embroidery―for which the sharpest English needles were too blunt―a darning needle or a sewing awl were to be of help: willing enough, perhaps, but not sharp enough.

5

145

39

15

A World-Transformation ―and for this a single pers. is used, one single pers.! My friend, were this not the case there would be no world transformation. The calamity lies in the social aspect―two people, and it will only become a change to a certain degree, within the old order. Governance is too good a dialectician not to see this. But in a certain sense, what suffering it is for someone, who in a certain sense is a poor hum. being, to be used like this, always kept in the infinite weakness of nothing―o, infinite, infinite love! Though no more about this. But how wonderful, o God: As you create everything out of nothing, so do you, as the pious say, hang everything upon nothing―something hum. beings only mendaciously imagine themselves capable of doing (the system).!

40

20

25

30

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 41–42 146

41

5

10

15

42

25

30

35

•

1854

Christianity. This is how things are: for God, seen from his point of view, there is a world that lieth in wickedness: lost, every one of these individuals eternally lost. [“]So in my grace I will show mercy,[”] he says: [“]Surely, I will have salvation proclaimed, eternal salvation.[”] [“]But,[”] he says, [“]in turn, the consequence of this will be that this life of yours in temporality will be a time of suffering.[”] And the person who is capable of grasping God’s notion of how brief those 70 years are, and how frightful eternal perdition is― he will understand that it can not occur to God that there might be any hesitation on the part of the hum. being, as if this condition were too rigorous. In Xndom, Xnty has become nonsense, a continuing attempt to make it into a nice world instead of it remaining clear that this world lieth in wickedness, that your life is lost, that eternal salvation is possible only on the condition that your life thus become a time of suffering.

Infant Baptism. It is easy to see that this is truly connected with the swindler’s cunning with which the race has tried to fool God out of Xnty and turn it into Epicureanism. Take away the hallucination of infant baptism, and immediately we have the genuine Christian collisions: the father and mother, themselves Christians, hoping for eternal blessedness, but compelled to leave it up the child to decide, when the time comes, whether it wants this for itself. You see, this effort, this strenuous effort, which would both make peop. less eager to marry and make marriage a more earnest business―this effort is something that Xnty specifically does not want to abolish: this is something that hum. beings want to abolish with all their might. So people invented infant baptism, and then they as good as breed little baby Christians: the matter of eternity is quickly put right―people can truly take enjoyment in the idyllic enjoyment of the pleasantness and delights of family life.

145

146

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 42–44

•

1854

Ah, how abominable: people have falsified Xnty so villainously! Lately it has been turned in such a way that its purpose seems to be to give peop. the desire to beget children.

147

5

Immortality At one time, i[mmortality] was the lofty goal of the greatest possible effort, related to a total reformation of character in this life: nowadays, as soon as man and a woman couple―instantly, the result is an immortal creature and, with a splash of water on its head, a Xn, with the expectation of eternal salvation. Isn’t this in fact an altogether too cheap way of producing immortal works[?] In Xndom, Xnty, which is spirit, is transformed into a sort of brutality, a sort of bestiality. And this is how it goes. No one has any misgivings, everybody thinks this here business is splendid.

A Protestant Priest.

1

a

―yes, as a chest of drawers, a very respectable piece of furniture, I’m truly not speaking disparagingly about a chest of drawers, but

That a figure of this sort is supposed to be a teacher of Xnty is precisely as ludicrous as seeing a chest of drawers dance: the chest of drawersa is lacking in precisely those attributes that are required for dancing. This is also exactly the situation with the Protestant priest as a teacher of Xnty: he lacks precisely every one of the attributes and possesses the opposite ones: husband, father, civil servant, person of rank, knight, dressed in long robes, etc.―very respectable and estimable as a chest of drawers, but a chest of drawers is not suited for dancing, and he is not suited to be a teacher of Xnty.

43

10

15

20

44

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 45–46 148

45

5

10

15

20

25

46 30

35

Hypocrisy―Nonsense Things were probably dangerous and dubious enough when the accusation that might be lodged against teachers was that they were hypocrites: oh, but the problem lies much deeper when the charge must be that they are propagators of nonsense. Hypocrites are not at so great a distance from what Xnty is, from spirit, as are people who, in all gemütlig mediocrity, blandly lead lives enmeshed in nonsense, believing it to be Xnty. What I have remarked elsewhere is true, that being transformed into a hearty muddlehead must be regarded as one of the most dangerous sorts of demonic possession. Among other things, the danger of course lies precisely in the fact that it is not as easily discovered as, for example, when the transformation consists of being turned into a werewolf. But the evil in the world is entirely and exactly proportionate to the good. When Xnty came into the world as spirit, and for as long as it remained spirit, Satan had to exert himself, and he created hypocrites or major, grandiose errors. Now that it has been a long time since Xnty has existed as spirit, Satan amuses himself with the sort of sorcery that makes hearty muddleheads―he knows full well that he has never been as victorious as he is right now.

The Exemplar. Protestantism has come to the point at which it regards wanting to imitate the Exemplar simply as presumption. How can this be explained? Probably like this. People think of the life of the Exemplar as rlly meaning the result of his life―and then there is indeed truth in it if someone were to say: [“]I don’t desire anything like that.[”] 9 gemütlig] Danicized German, hearty, cozy.

•

1854

147

148

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 46–47

•

1854

But truly, the life of the Exemplar was not the result of his life―no, as it says in scripture, his life was to be a worm, not a hum. being, and that is in fact how he himself describes it―as continual wretchedness and suffering. In the face of that, then, how villainous it is to say: [“]I am too humble to desire anything like that.[”] But this human language falsifies things from start to finish. Let God proclaim “Joy,” and language immediately comes and takes the word joy and gets it broadcast in such a way that Xnty is: Enjoy life. And that is also how it is with the Exemplar. The Exemplar presents what is highest. But wait a bit―what does the highest show itself to be[?]: sheer suffering, affliction, being a worm―behold the man. But what does a hum. being do, assisted by his swindling language[?]: He takes the words “the highest” and then he says, [“]I am too humble to desire what is highest or to want to be what is highest.[”] And this is Christendom, a society of Christians―which does not fit the apostle’s description of paganism (Rom 1–3), inasmuch as, nowadays, bestial, wild debauchery, has been replaced by an even more villainous mendacity. In a certain sense I could be tempted to say that a person using the New Testament cannot attack the depravity of Christendom, simply because the New Testament is concerned with the demoralization of Judaism and paganism, but of course is not concerned with what has been produced by the misuse of Xnty. And yet it is easy to see that this must be the most frightful, because the stronger the medicine, the more dangerous the consequences of its misuse.

5

149

15

20

25

The Specific Character of Christendom’s Demoralization

47

When Xnty came into the world, its most immediate struggle was against the depravity that involved the lusts and desires of the flesh, wild, unbridled passions―that is, the bestial element in a hum. being. Then Xnty came into the world, Xnty was the truth. The demoralization―Christendom’s demoralization―that can arise in the aftermath of this includes the various varieties of lying. This is an escalation corresponding proportionately to the fact that the depravity associated with this demoralization is much greater than what had taken hold before Xnty came into the

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 47

5

150

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

world. Thus the ensuing demoralization is always proportionate to what has been introduced. For example, asceticism exists in order to keep the flesh and the desires in check, and the demoralization that follows upon asceticism does not consist of the lusts of the flesh: no, it consists of unnatural desire. But lying is the specific characteristic of the demoralization of Christendom, and as a rural police officer shudders when he arrives in the big city and sees the scale on which crime exists, so would a pagan ethicist tremble at the grandiosity of the lie that is Christendom―indeed, a pagan ethicist would lack instruments for measuring the depth of this lie that is Christendom. And the lie is habitual to such a degree that the lie is the way things are, that thousands upon thousands are therefore thoughtlessly, bona fide, lost in the lie. Everything is a lie, and to such a degree that the only way people try to counteract it is by being mutually aware of the fact that it is a lie―that is how official the lie is. And now, what had been intended as a blessing, but which hum. beings have themselves transformed into a curse upon themselves―Xnty―rlly and truly makes them into liars. This frightful lie in which each calls himself a Xn, inducing himself and his neighbor to imagine that they both are. How well-deserved, then, is this mockery upon the hum. race―this disgusting, almost daily telegraph-lie: take pride in your discovery, it is appropriate to the times, designed for lying on the grandest scale. As, with the Romans, a calumniator was branded with the letter C, so is the electrical telegraph a brand upon the hum. race: you liar. Yes, the lie is the specific feature of the demoralization of Christendom. Just as, when Christianity arrived, the prevailing corruption that it confronted, with its raw lusts and passions, was not considered sin, but on the contrary was regarded as something splendid, nowadays, in Christendom, this is how it is with lying: it does not occur to anyone that lying is something evil―on the contrary, people assume that it is just as impossible to live in this world without lying as it is to live without air―and of course there is truth in this inasmuch as the element of this Christian world is precisely: the lie. Lying is regarded as indispensable, and people admire lying on a grand scale just as the crude pagan admired violence and rapine on a grand scale and unbridled lusts on a colossal scale.

149

150

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 48

•

1854

Christendom. Instead of the shameless nonsense that―after having first (ah, what lèse-majesté!) degraded Xnty into being a historical phenomenon in the simple sense of the term, then came up with notion that Xnty is perfectible: ah, just as if, when a drop of attar of roses falls into the ocean, the ocean were to insist that this constituted its perfection―that things are going forward (impudent effrontery: no, as with the ocean in relation to that drop, so, too is the world, in relation to Xnty, only capable of consuming it, corrupting it[)]: the truth, unlike all this shameless nonsense, is this: Christendom is a falling-away from Xnty. What is deceptive is that people think of falling-away as a solemn, honest renunciation of Xnty. Ah, dear friend, the world is not that honest and good; no, its element is the lie, and therefore the falling-away takes the form of a lie―falling-away is the lie of apparently being something. In what I have written above I have pointed out that every demoralization is related to something that had been healthy―that inasmuch as Xnty is the truth, demoralization tends in the direction of a lie. In the wake of asceticism one does not have simple lusts of the flesh, but unnatural desires―and after Christianity, which has been introduced as truth, one does not get simple paganism, no, one gets the lie of being a Xn, one gets paganism refined in Epicurean fashion by dishonestly appropriating one aspect of Christianity, taking advantage of it for this life, mendaciously tarting it up into being Christianity. Christendom is the falling-away from Christianity―and the fall is so profound that it would indeed have been far more preferable for it to have taken place through a straightforward, honest renunciation of Xnty. And what is deceptive is precisely the fact that this falling-away is so profound, just as with the most dangerous crimes, which in swindling fashion can indeed appear to be virtues, so that what must be done first is to make it clear that it is a crime. Christendom is the falling-away from Christianity. Far from improving the situation, the small number of better Christians who are a part of it instead cause harm, because they have neither the energy nor the character to make apparent the true state of affairs and venture their lives. Therefore, they do not improve matters―

48

5

151 10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 48–50

5

10

•

1854

no, they are included in the count along with the others, more or less as if, confronted with a mob of 10,000 peop., there were ten police officers who showed their badges: it does no good; strictly speaking they are simply counted along with the others, so if the size of the mob were to be reported precisely, one would have to say that there were 10,010. But this is the difference: the police officers are of course incapable of resisting, but every Christian is capable of stepping away from the mendacity of Xndom, emphasizing it to the uttermost, and if he does not do this, then it is proper that he be counted as part of the mass of corruption.

152

49

15

20

25

50 30

An Actual Relation to God. As said elsewhere: an actual relation to God is of such infinite value that even though it were only for an instant, even though at the very next instant a person were to be kicked, booted, hurled, thrown far away, forgotten (which, however, is impossible, both because God is love, and because this relation is remembered eternally, so that it must nonetheless end with a person getting hold of God again): this is nonetheless of infinitely greater worth than everything that the world and humanity can offer. But an actual relation to God is also something entirely different from becoming a professor of, marrying on the basis of, living off―that is, with a family (off, in, with, on) living off―the fact that another person has had an actual relation to God, and in the only way that it can be had, in frightful torment and suffering.

To Deceive in Relation to the Temporal, in Relation to the Eternal.

The former can be understood in a certain sense, i.e., it does make sense. Both because worldly goods are such that if the deception succeeds, one actually does come into possession of

151

152

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 50

•

1854

them, and because it is of course possible that the deception can succeed. The latter is utterly meaningless because it is impossible to come into possession of the eternal through deception. The eternal―which, it is true, does not have police and watchmen to protect it―is quite a bit better protected: the question of who possesses it is not a matter of indifference to it―no, the eternal can only be present with, can only be possessed by―the proper possessor. Here, therefore, to deceive is absolutely only to deceive oneself. And furthermore, here, all cheating will be discovered in eternity―that is, precisely at the point at which a person was supposed to profit (if it were in fact possible to do so) from the deception. Thus, to deceive in relation to the eternal is impossible: the deception cannot really be brought about, and if it could be brought about, it would be discovered at precisely the decisive instant. Though what is so strange is that we hum. beings have so little understanding of the eternal, are so spiritlessly ignorant of what spirit is, that most peop. probably believe that it is easier to cheat in relation to the eternal than in relation to the temporal―alas, because the eternal is so infinitely lofty that it does not sound the alarm or run after the police and the like, but in infinitely subtle fashion punishes so frightfully that the person punished―oh, frightful punishment!―does not even notice that judgment has been pronounced upon him. The relation of an intellectually superior pers. to thick-skinned boors could furnish a very weak analogy to the mode of punishment that the eternal employs in time. The former’s method of killing, his irony, would be so subtle that these thick-skinned fellows would notice nothing whatever―indeed, they would even be tempted to regard him as a weak pers. who was easily fooled. No, this is the law: the nobler and more dignified the person, the easier it is to fool him―because how he punishes consists essentially in the fact that he knows very well that the others are fooled by wanting to fool him. It is this, his certainty of himself, that makes it look as if he were easily fooled. The person who possesses no superiority is immediately zealous in insisting upon his rights―and therefore people believe that it is difficult to fool him. Therefore, instead of doing as the priests do in their fulminations, when they turn the matter around by shouting that it is impossible to fool God, one should for once, and for the sake of awakening, turn the matter the other way around and say: [“]Oh,

5

10

15

153

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 50–51

5

10

15

154

51

•

1854

dear friend, pay very careful attention, watch and fight and struggle and pray and cry out to God―because it is so infinitely easy to fool him. Precisely because he is indeed so infinitely lofty, it is so easy to get him―to ignore you. Consider this, and you shall see that you will shudder at the thought of wanting to fool him, you will come to understand that even though, at every instant of your entire life, you prayed to him and beseeched him, it would nonetheless be an indescribable mercy if, for an instant, he were to be aware that you exist. But who has any understanding of how to talk about God’s majesty―who, in these times! These scoundrels of priests demoralize peop. more and more, because they themselves haven’t a clue of the significance of God’s majesty, and therefore foist people upon him, constantly turning the matter in such a way that it almost ends up with God, like one or another earthly king, needing hum. beings.

Thought Experiment: Imagine That a King Had Come to Christ and Wanted to Be a Disciple.

20

25

30

35

From the moment that the divinely appointed teachers stopped and Xnty was entrusted to hum. beings in order to see how honest they would be―from that moment, everything was transposed into the purely hum. notion of dissemination, dissemination. To get a king, an emperor, to want to become a Xn: this, then, was something that was regarded as being of utmost importance, entirely forgetting the fact that Xt’s kingdom is not of this world, serving Xnty entirely as if Christ’s kingdom were a kingdom in this world and of this world. People did not stop to consider whether in doing so they were not in the process of turning the entire relationship around by making a king into a Xn―no, they went at it ravenously, with great―Christian!―eagerness and zeal―yes, or with Jewish eagerness and zeal. Let us now think of a contemporary situation involving Xt; this is the true answer to all questions. As Nicodemus came at night, that is how a king comes to Xt, at night, wanting to be a disciple. I wonder what Xt might say to him. [“]If you want to continue being what you are―a king―then have no fear of me,

153

154

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 51–52

•

1854

my kingdom is not of this world. I will be your subject more than anyone else, I will bear toward you all the humility of a subject, and I will teach my disciples to do the same. But if you want to be a disciple―o, human being, in that case I am the king: therefore, lay aside your crown, give everything away, and follow me in poverty.[”] You see, this is―indeed, one doesn’t need to say it―this is proclaiming Xnty: the imperturbability of divine majesty, which thus does not―oh, hum. nonsense!―make a mistake and become giddy when a king wants to be a disciple. But the fact is that with the proclamation of Christianity, as soon as it is served in merely hum. fashion―in accordance with hum. shrewdness, not in hatred of oneself―the entire situation is reversed. Then Xnty becomes a doctrine, and the person who proclaims it is not so strong in the character of being a Christian that he expresses through his personal existence that the kingdom of Xt is not of this world. Then the entire relationship gets reversed: we get kings and emperors as Xns, Xn states and countries, a Xn world―that is, everything goes back into the old rut and Xnty is pushed aside― this: [“]My kingdom is not of this world[”] becomes a meaningless platitude―except in another sense it is a very meaningful expression, because inasmuch as Xnty simply does not exist, Xndom truly does express the fact that Xt’s kingdom is not of this world.

5

10

15

20

25

155

The Sacraments. It is rlly by means of the place to which people have assigned the sacraments and the use people have made of them that Xnty has been led back into Judaism―and what Pascal says is entirely true, the truest words that have been spoken about Xndom, that it is a society of hum. beings who, with the help of some sacraments, free themselves from the obligation to love God. Through baptism people become―objectively―the people of God, and, in the bargain, by infant baptism― ―precisely as people become the people of God through circumcision. So people have completely abolished imitation of Xt. The sacrament is something objective, and every earnest person must

52

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 52–53

•

1854

15

feel the need of something objective―well, thanks, but no thanks. And, helped by this objectivity, the whole business about eternity has been decided once and for all in the easiest and least expensive way in the world―and now we have our entire lives in which to be happy and joyful and amuse ourselves and enjoy this life―and after that, an eternity, so the amusement can continue without end. Thus the sacrament of the Eucharist is used just as sacrificial offerings were used in Judaism―everything is calculated to provide rapid and objective reassurance with respect to the question of eternity and, thereafter, to have life before us for the enjoyment of existence, multiplying, and filling the earth. This is Xnty. And the fact that it is the Xnty of New Testament is proven by―Xt having been present at the wedding in Cana. All honor to Christendom!

53

To Treat Xnty as a Science

5

10

20

156 25

30

35

is to transform it into something past, or it is to express that it is no longer something present. Science, theory always comes last. Take another situation. The grammar of a living language can never truly be turned into a science―this can only be done with a dead language, because the immediate, present-tense existence of the living language makes science difficult. In the days when Xnty was indeed present as a religion, a faith―even though then, too, people made an attempt at a science, it didn’t truly succeed―and this was precisely because Xnty still existed, thus it was not owing to an imperfection. Only for our times has it been reserved to get a philosophy that boasts of getting Xnty entirely embodied in a science, i.e., Xnty no longer exists. But inverted as the language of swindlers always is, we do not tell the truth: that Xnty no longer exists; no, we say: [“]Enormous progress, now Xnty has entirely become a science.[”]

155

156

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 54–55

•

1854

To Be Spirit. Flesh and blood―or the sensate―and spirit are opposites. Thus it can easily be seen what it means to be spirit, that being spirit is freely to will what flesh and blood most shrink from― because spirit is as opposite to flesh and blood as, to use the proverbial expression, the end of the sack. Now, what is it that flesh and blood most shrink from? From dying. Therefore spirit is: to will to die, to die away. Incidentally, it can easily be seen that to die away is a whole power higher than to die, because to die is merely to suffer―to die away is freely to compel oneself into that same suffering. Furthermore, dying is, after all, a rather brief suffering―dying away lasts for an entire life. From this it can also be seen why so many people become what are called deathbed Christians. This is a suspect matter. Xnty is pessimism, but on the deathbed, when everything for this life is lost anyway―at that point, to choose Xnty becomes something close to a sort of optimism, is rather like the sort of generosity that can appear when a person is threatened by someone with a loaded pistol and told to hand over his money: he prefers to put a different construction on the matter and generously donates it. Xnty wants to get rid of flesh and blood’s attachment to life. It wants the hum. being to be spirit, and this is expressed by dying away. But when a person is lying on his deathbed―to grasp at Xnty at that point is almost a sort of final ploy on the part of flesh and blood. There is absolutely no certainty that a transformation, the transformation of becoming spirit, has actually taken place. For what provides the certainty that the transformation has taken place is precisely that it is clear, from the situation, that he is indeed alive and well. But with a dying person the situation is different, or rather, there is not rlly any situation in the sense in which situation is a part of the expression of spirit. Therefore there are indeed cases in which a person seizes hold of Xnty on his deathbed―and then, if he does not die, he turns back to his old ways, so that it becomes clear that no transformation had taken place.

The Freethinkers’ Illumination of What Xnty Is. It is surely the case, as noted elsewhere, that Xnty’s cause has long been such that people in the so-called Christian Church

54

5

10

15

20

25

157

35

55

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 55–57

5

10

56 15

20

25

158

57

30

35

•

1854

(especially Protestantism, especially in Denmark) cannot find out what Xnty is, but must seek the answer from the freethinker. This, however, also has its dubious side, for the freethinker, precisely because he himself wants to escape from Xnty, sometimes takes wicked pleasure in exaggerating, out of bitterness, the strange aspects of Xnty. The so-called Church falsifies Xnty by softening it―because, of course, people do want to be Xns. The freethinker falsifies it with bitterness―out of malice toward the Xns, while he is of course situated outside. But what is certain is that, of the two, the freethinker’s view is truer than that of the socalled Church, especially Protestantism, especially in D[enmark].

. . . . I of course simply cannot reasonably demand help from hum. beings, for I understand very well that the view of Xnty I represent is not exactly welcome to us hum. beings―on the contrary, it is what we protect ourselves against at all costs. But thus it is of course unreasonable to demand that they should help me. And however much I could wish to be in harmony with peop., I would have to have anxiety in connection with such help―I would have to have anxiety because it would signify that my cause was losing. On the other hand, God cannot help me in any straightforward way, for then the cause would lose ground; he must help me by attacking me―yet nonetheless out of love, yes, out of love: would only that I were worthy of it.

Theme: “Show Me Quite Clearly My Misery and Moil.” i.e., show me how insignificant and empty is everything I call my misery and moil. and show me what is truly my misery and moil. But here it is again: it shows us that Xnty is not straightforwardly suited for us hum. beings. For we imagine (and in Xndom, this is Xnty) that we in fact know what our misery and moil is―and that Xnty is then supposed to help us. Xnty’s view is that we must first learn from Xnty what our misery and moil is. And then, when Xnty begins its discourse to the effect that poverty, sickness, lack of appreciation by one’s fellows, etc.―that

157

158

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 57–59

•

1854

these are absolutely not genuine misery and moil, that on the contrary, they are even a help: well, then we hum. beings are not helped very much in the merely hum. sense. But all this misfortune and confusion stems from the entire scaffolding of highly distinguished and highly paid priests and civil servants, for of course they must preach Xnty as something other than it is, because if being a Xn is suffering, then it does not appear likely that preaching it can become a fat living.

The Situation Decides the Outcome. When Xt says to the leper or to the two blind men (Mt 9:28): [“]Do you believe that I can help you[?”], and they were then healed by virtue of their faith― ―then, nowadays, if we were to say, [“]I believe that Christ can help me,[”] this is not at all the equivalent of that. Nowadays, Xt is of course no longer in the form of a lowly servant and in his incognito, which was the repellent factor that was required in order that faith could become faith. And yet we in Xndom act as if nothing had happened, we speak of having faith as if it were the same thing to have faith that God can help us and to have faith that this individual hum. being―in the form of a lowly servant, the sign of offense―with whom I am standing and talking: that he can help.

Confessing Christ in Christendom is indeed impossible. What Xt understands by confessing is indeed abundantly clear (Mt 10:32–33). There is always a situation of opposition, of confessing Xt in opposition to hum. beings―and this is also inherent in the matter itself: it has to be like this if there is to be any question of confessing someone. But in “Xndom” confessing Xt has become: repeating what all the others are saying―and this is what people call confessing Xt.

5

58

15

20

59

159 30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 60–61 60

5

10

15

•

1854

Progress in Being Christian It begins with the consciousness of sin. That is what teaches a pers. to take refuge in God. And then Xnty proclaims the atonement, and Xnty is then sheer mildness and consolation. Then, when this has been practiced and consolidated, then things go further and proceed to this: to suffering for the teaching, to the fact that, in a very different sense, to be a Xn is to be unhappy for this life. This is of infinite concern to God, for now it is a matter of being loved. Naturally, he does this out of love, but nonetheless it can be very painful for a hum. being. If there is difficulty here, if the hum. being puts up altogether too much resistance against God, then the previous stage, consciousness of sin, is used for compulsion. As I have discussed elsewhere, it is in fact easier to suffer for one’s sins than to suffer because of one’s relation to God. If for a moment I cannot endure this suffering because God, in his love, is making me unhappy, then God will let go of me for an instant, and I will come to suffer for the sake of my sins, which is a sort of consolation as well as a form of discipline until I can begin again.

20

61

25

30

160

35

Joy in Living. Hum. beings do everything, everything in order to maintain their joy in living. And if a pers. is truly to be involved with God, to be loved and to love, to become spirit, the joy in living must first and foremost be banished, longing for death. God knows best how painful this can be for a hum. being, and therefore he is willing to commiserate with him, but he will not change it. But you see, in Christendom people have gotten Xnty turned in such a way that Xnty serves precisely to animate and stir up joy in living (Judaism or paganism). And that is why I am so worried about getting involved with one single hum. being, because I am not yet very strong: I very much feel the pain of dying away and would like to return to taking joy in living―and I know that every hum. being would help me in that respect, i.e., that they would corrupt my cause.

159

160

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 62

•

1854

The World.

1

5

a

; or when echo waits in the silent night to see whether anything will interrupt the silence, so that it can find enjoyment in providing an echo

. . . . “But, after all, the world is so beautiful,” you say. Well, it certainly is beautiful. Beautiful― who could invent or imagine anything more beautiful―beautiful when, after long, quiet preparation, everything stands ready, all at once, for the surprise, clothed in summer’s garment. Beautiful―indescribably beautiful―when, in the bright, moon-clear winter night, everything is as wonderful as in a fairy tale, a poem; or in the dark night, when the stars blink from the immense vaulta! Beautiful―enchantingly beautiful, who could refrain from abandoning himself to it―beautiful to look out over the sea, far, far into the distance, this distance that, constantly, captivatingly, remains distant, and constantly appears to beckon, so close that it invites you to let your gaze follow it―into the distance. Yes, viewed in this way, the world is certainly beautiful. But is this Christianity, is this the Christian way of looking at the world[?] And look at the world, the human world―isn’t it so―isn’t it a beautiful world, a nice world[?] A nice world, where hum. beings, created in God’s image, essentially live in order to eat, drink, heap up money, in short, busy themselves with what makes them forget that they are created in God’s image. A nice world in which all is dishonesty, so much so that it is praised as honesty when a person limits himself only to being a thief in his own profession; a nice world in which all trust is broken, so much so that it is praised as trustworthiness when a person is a trustworthy supporter of one group in its untrustworthy behavior toward all the others; a nice world in which a man, a real man, is a marvel who not only is not seen, but who is not even missed; and where, in big cities, every eighth woman is a whore, and the rest are more or less corrupted by social life, so that feminine virtue is a wonder that not only is

62

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

161

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 62–63

30

not seen, but is not even missed, and which indeed, would occasion the greatest inconvenience were it to show itself; a nice world in which despite the police prohibition against disguises, everything, including the police, is disguised, is something other than what it pretends to be; in which envy, in swindling fashion, disguises itself as sympathy, compassion, namely compassion for what has collapsed, for what has fallen; where schadenfreude, disguised as concern, arrives and looks solicitously at the sufferer; where malicious gossip puts a finger to its lips, as though signaling silence, and with that gesture perhaps gets said precisely what it wanted to say; where one must be most wary of what is manifest, which conceals the finest sort of hiddenness; where the person who wants to deceive you comes to warn you against being deceived; where the person who will betray you comes in the guise of pointing out to you that snares have been set for you; where the person upon whom you can depend least of all is the person who assures you that you can depend on him―and even less when he says that he knows well that other people, precisely when they want to deceive, have the custom of giving assurances that you can depend on them―yes, a nice world where the only true things that are heard either concern the most inconsequential matters, such as there being good weather today, or are true in a way in which something―for example, politeness―is a lie, which everyone knows is a lie. etc. etc. .

63

Making Distinctions.

5

10

15

20

25

35

164

Fundamentally, all upbringing concerns this: making distinctions; it is learning how to make distinctions. What is continually impressed upon the child is: you must make distinctions. What is beaten into the peasant lad who becomes a soldier is this: you must make distinctions. The man from the provinces continually causes offense in the capital because

•

1854

[b]

161

where one never gets to know the truth as long as it is important, but only when it has become a matter of indifference, that is, only when it has become entirely clear and certain that it actually is not worth the least bit of inconvenience to lie.

1

5

End of entry NB32:62 and beginning of entry NB32:63; marginal entry NB32:62.b is on the right-hand page.

164

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 63

•

1854

he doesn’t know how to make distinctions. A stupid prank by a youth is brushed aside as nothing, but if it is an older man, people say, [“]He should know how to make distinctions.[”] Now, from this standpoint, take a look at Christendom, especially Protestantism, but especially in Denmark, and you will see that it can quite simply be understood as lack of upbringing, a boorishness toward the divine. Wanting to have eternal salvation and―in addition―there is a lack of upbringing in this [“]in addition.[”] It is certainly clear that a person who speaks like this has not been brought up, that he lacks upbringing, has not learned to make distinctions. For there are many things in connection with which it is appropriate, and very appropriate, to say that one wants to have them and―in addition. Yes, in reality this holds for everything―with one exception, the unconditioned, but precisely the unconditioned is Xnty. It is as if a peasant bumpkin, just arrived from Jutland on the cattle steamer, were to go to a general who was standing in the barracks in full uniform, and say to him: [“]Listen, good fellow,[”]―that is what it is like to want to have eternal salvation and―in addition. But the corporal will surely teach him something else, teach him to make distinctions. Xndom has taken away from Xnty the expression of respect, the expression of respect that relates to divine majesty―Xndom needs upbringing. The time of the prophets, both the major and minor prophets, is long past; nor do our times believe in prophets any longer, so there is only one kind of prophet left: the cudgel prophets, who also know how to make sure that they are believed, for even the greatest unbeliever, after all, never has any doubts about the drubbing he receives. Christendom lacks a proper upbringing. It does little good that we have built God a splendid house, that we wrap both his Word and his priests in velvet―this is of no interest to God; but this “in addition” must go. God has in fact his own language to be used in addressing him: it is action, the reformation of the spirit, what one’s life expresses; it is of no help if we bow and scrape before him with words and modes of address and actions such as building churches and binding the Bible in velvet. How epigrammatic: If there is any man who has pretensions of being―and who has to a very great degree been satisfied with himself in this consciousness of being―a cultivated person, then it is Bishop Mynster―And yet I maintain that, understood from a Christian standpoint, he was as much of an ill-brought-up boor as any peasant bumpkin from the countryside.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 64–65

•

1854

165

64

5

10

Hypochondria. The proverb says, When honor is shown to what is low, / No one knows where it will go. The hypochondriac must experience the truth of this. When the hypochondriac busies himself with minor details, e.g., about whether the candle was properly extinguished in the evening, about the fire in the stove, whether the door was properly closed, whether one’s long underwear is properly buttoned across the abdomen, and the like―it is unbelievable how shameless such junk can be when it notices that it is being shown the honor of being noticed―no tyrant is more despotic than such bagatelles.

65

Symptom.

15

When something is in the process of departing or has departed from life, this can be seen from the fact that it attracts a different sort of interest, e.g., interest of a speculative, aesthetic, artistic sort. Thus what is characteristic of our time is that a theme we are now beginning to see more frequently in novels is the depiction of the struggle of genius with actuality (so it is with us, even Goldschmidt). This means that it no longer occurs to anyone to want to realize such things in actuality (e.g., Goethe, who clearly falsified his genius into talent). But we must have it, so the novel provides it. Shortsighted people then see things erroneously and think that well, after all, it is good that it is introduced in this way, and they even think that in this way such things come closer to us or that we come closer to them―alas, they err: it means that it is becoming more distant. So the more artistically perfect the novel becomes, the less it enters into life, and the more does it merely pamper and spoil peop. by enjoyably occupying itself with this sort of thing in the realm of imagination. To believe that art helps us into actuality is just as wrong as to believe that the more artistically perfect a sermon becomes, the greater the transformative effect it must have in life―alas, no, it will come to have a greater aesthetic effect, away from the existential.

20

25

30

35

165

166

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 66–67

•

1854

Mt 12:34: How can you speak good things, when you are evil. In a certain sense, one might of course say that precisely this is a form of evil, this pretense that prevents what Christ adds: that the mouth speaks out of the abundance of the heart. Neither, therefore, ought the passage probably be understood as though Xt said that they did not do it. Or it may be understood negatively, that they had not in fact spoken good things, that precisely this pretense was the abundance of the heart out of which their mouths spoke evil (in good words).

Law and Gospel.

1

[a]

Luther’s sermon on the gospel for the third Sunday in Advent can be taken as an example.

The manner in which even Luther speaks of the Law and the Gospel is not in fact Xt’s teaching. Thus L. separates two things: the Law and the Gospel. First the Law and then the Gospel, which is sheer leniency, etc. In this way, however, it ends up with Xnty becoming optimism, with the intention being that everything should go well for us in this world. In other words, Xnty then in fact becomes Judaism. The Law comes to correspond to what, e.g., being tempted and tested by God was in the Old Testament; but then comes the Gospel, just as in the Old Testament the trial came to an end and everything became joy and jubilation. But as I have often said: every existence in which life’s tension is resolved within this life is: Judaism. Xnty is: this life, sheer suffering―eternity. It does not help if we hum. beings become furious ten times over and say: [“]No hum. being can endure it.[”] It does not help, God does not permit himself to be impressed, and the error in Luther’s message is present in the very fact that it bears the

166

66

5

10

67

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 67

5

167

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

imprint of this concern for us poor hum. beings, which proves that he does not keep Xnty at the pinnacle of being what it is in the New Testament, specifically in the gospel: the unconditioned. No, God does not permit himself to be impressed, he changes nothing. But nonetheless believe this: that it is out of love that he wills as he does. In love, he himself suffers infinitely with this, but he does not change. Indeed, in love he suffers more than you do, but he does not change. He sets everything in motion in order to bring a hum. being to this, which is surely the greatest possible torment for a hum. being: to hate oneself (for to hate oneself and the world, etc. is the condition for loving God). He sets everything in motion, enticing, moving, persuading, sometimes almost as if he were begging on his own behalf, as if he were the one in need―at other times, frightfully, he lets go of you for an instant, so that an instant’s relapse into sin might teach you both to make a renewed effort and not to take his love in vain or simultaneously to approach him and shrink from him: in doing this, he suffers infinitely in love, more than you do, doing so even when you grieve him with renewed sin―but he does not change: infinite love! But it is easy to see that in his preaching of Xnty, Luther changes Xnty’s view of life and of the world. He has one-sidedly taken hold of “the apostle,” and then, as he often does, he goes so far as to use this criterion (in reverse) to overrule the gospels, and when he does not find the teachings of the apostle in the gospel, he concludes: ergo this is no gospel. Luther seems entirely blind to the fact that the apostle has already reduced the price in relation to the gospels. And this wrong turn that Luther took has been continued in Protestantism, where people have made L[uther] into the absolute, and when they found the apostle to be stricter than Luther (which he indeed is), they concluded: [“]Here the apostle is wrong, this isn’t a proper gospel[.”] In this way, systematically, step by step, they have fooled God out of the gospel, have reversed the entire relationship.

•

1854

167

168

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 68

•

1854

The Atonement. This is how Protestantism, especially in Denmark, has turned Xnty around: Xt has suffered, is dead, his suffering and death make satisfaction for our sins and earn eternal salvation―now we should, and we can, properly enjoy life, at most thanking him once in a while, and even that isn’t really necessary. But what peop. are taught under the name of Xnty is in fact genuine cannibalism, an inhuman atrocity. Under ordinary circumstances, where it is only a matter of dying, not of eternal perdition, if it were the case that a person’s offense was such that he deserved to be put to death and an innocent person was to suffer death on his behalf―then any pers. of the more decent sort would surely have to say: [“]No, that is in fact a more severe punishment, it would indeed be more lenient if I, who deserve it, suffer the death penalty than that an innocent person should suffer it for me, whereby I of course get yet another murder on my conscience, because it is of course my guilt that is murdering him.[”] However willing another person might be to suffer death for him makes no difference whatever. Now, the situation is certainly different where it is a matter of being saved from eternal perdition by another person suffering death in my stead. But, now suppose that Xt had not required imitation, how, then―if it were impressed upon me that another person has suffered the most painful death for the sake of my salvation, has suffered for my sins―how could it occur to a person of the more decent sort―given all this, how could it occur to him to want to take delight in this life! Or must not a person who had experienced such things say: [“]My life is essentially consecrated to sorrow[”]? Has not salvation been purchased at such a high price that, if it were possible to purchase it with one’s own suffering, that would be leniency?

168

68

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 69–72 69

5

•

1854

Sorrow over Sin. True sorrow over sin is: reform. One can forget the sin or attempt to forget it, perhaps in new sins, so that the one is displaced by the other; or in diversions―in vain. True sorrow and true forgetting is: reform.

169

70

Relapse―Progress

10

True consolation for a relapse is―that, with God’s help, it becomes progress, so that you might say that without that relapse I would not have come so much farther.

71

Individual Differences

15

72

20

25

30

One person needs to be helped to the decisive triumph through the encouragement of minor victories; another person is strengthened by defeat.

To Hate Father and Mother, etc. This collision is so obvious when it is simply regarded like this: If a person’s life is destined for eternity―that enormous goal―how much, then, must he not be alienated from that which binds a person to the relationships of finitude[?] And of course this alienation itself is like hating the relationships that are precisely what are most important to a pers. when he is entirely absorbed in this life. For these relationships are such that if he does not belong to them entirely (and that he cannot do if his life is to be an effort directed at eternity), it is like hating them. But peop. live with the foolish conviction that one simply continues for all eternity the life that one leads here on earth, that one takes along the city in which one lives, everything, everything, right into eternity. This is why peop. who would shudder at the change and isolation of emigrating to another part of the world― nonetheless believe that they are going to live for eternity.

169

170

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 73–74

•

1854

O, God! Indeed, o God, you have in fact nothing but trouble from us hum. beings! Alas, when I think of all your benefactions toward me and I want to collect my thoughts in order truly to give thanks to you―alas, I then find myself so distracted, the most varied thoughts cross my mind, and it ends with me having to ask you to help me thank you―but a benefactor could at least require that a person did not bother him yet again by demanding even that he help him in giving thanks! Ah, and when for a moment sin gains power over me in the form of new sin―then, when my soul feels disconsolate, then, finally, I know nothing but to say to you: [“]You must help me, you must console me, come up with something in which I truly find consolation, so that even my sin is transfigured into helping me to come farther than I would otherwise have come.[”] What shamelessness―it is, after all, you against whom I have sinned, and then to demand that you should console me for it. And yet, infinite Love, I know that this does not displease you, because in one sense it is a sign of progress! If sin has a pers. entirely in its power, he simply does not dare think of you―he fights against it, but not with all his might, so that he at most dares only to accuse himself before you and beg for your forgiveness. But if he fights honestly, with all his might―only then could it occur to him that you are with him or on his side, that it is you who must console him, because, instead of merely accusing himself before you, he dares to complain, almost as though it were something that had befallen him.

170

73

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Religious Suffering. If a brewery horse or a farm horse were merely to see the instruments of torture that are used on a

74

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 74–76

171

5

10

15

20

dressage horse, it would tremble. And that is how the natural hum. being would tremble at seeing the instruments of torture used for religious suffering, which is in fact a part of coming to blessedness. Thus, of course, it is undeniably disgusting, abominable, this mendacious business with this gang of merry professors and priests who live off― of presenting it: this is then regarded as religiousness, indeed, unusually profound religiousness, because the religiousness of the congregation of course consists of listening to them present this every now and then. Charming religiousness, just as genuine as tea boiled with a piece of paper that had once lain in a drawer together with another piece of paper, that had once been wrapped around some dried tea leaves that had already, on three previous occasions, been used to brew tea. But it isn’t really right to complain about this, for when it is a matter of eternity―these assistant professors are not in fact lying their way into eternity, so it seems reasonable to require that they have things all the better in this world.

75

The Two Ways.

25

30

One is to suffer; another is to become a professor of someone else having suffered. The former is “the way”; the latter is to go roundabout (thus the preposition that serves as the motto for all lecturing and lecture-prating: about), and perhaps it ends with going downabout.

76

The Numerical

35

is like an envelope: one receives an enormous package and thinks that it is something―but look, it is envelopes: so it is with these thousands upon thousands, who in turn confuse having power in the sensate world with relating oneself to the idea.

•

1854

171

[a]

Note But if someone were to take note of this, the difference is that with the tea, peop. would say, [“]Thank you, and if you have anything stronger, we would be grateful to have it.[”] But with Xnty, peop. have an interest precisely in getting it as diluted as possible, and they do not offer thanks for getting it stronger, but protect themselves against it.

1

5

10

172

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 77–79

•

1854 172

Eternity―Temporality. Look, this is why the truly great religious figures, whose lives were sheer torment and suffering, even though they could see the villainy of this lecturing and falsification of what it is to be spirit as well as I can see it and of course better―this is why they don’t complain about it and why they present their lives as blessed: because they firmly believe that it concerns eternity. Then, when I find it so difficult to refrain from anger at these assistant professors, let no one misunderstand this, as though it implied perfection on my part, as though I saw something that those glorious ones did not see, or at any rate as though I saw it more clearly. No, no, the reason is that I am not nearly as certain that it concerns eternity.

Presumed Prescriptive Right. As soon as sects and the like arise, it is quite amusing to see the shamelessness with which the official clergy always know how to point out that what rlly is at stake is money. And the congregations regard this as quite in order―because, after all, the official clergy have a prescriptive right to make a profit. But if profit is reprehensible in relation to religion, then the official clergy are of course far worse than the sectarians, inasmuch as the official clergy have their profit secured far better, and in addition have the profit of honor and respect.

Christianity―Judaism―Christendom. Even in the Old Testament (which, however hasn’t an inkling of what the New T. demands: mortification, etc.), the situation,

77

5

10

15

78

20

25

173

79

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 79–80

5

10

15

20

25

30

174

80 35

40

•

1854

after all, is such that Sirach says: [“]If you would serve the Lord, then prepare yourself for temptation.[”] Thus, wanting to serve the Lord is not quite straightforward optimism―it brings inclement weather, even if it pales in comparison to when Xt went onboard, which is perhaps the source of the mariners’ saying (which sounds rather satirical when used in connection with the Christendom and the priests of our time, in whose company one can surely be quite secure): [“]There is always a storm when one has a priest onboard.[”] But the saying itself is true and is a good description of what Christianity is: unrest. Compared with Judaism, then, Xnty is utter pessimism, a rigorousness with which Judaism is utterly unacquainted. But I hear someone say: [“]Then how in all the world has this come to be called grace, the Gospel, as opposed to the Law?[”] I can reply very satisfactorily to this, but I must explain something I have never seen set forth. It is called grace because Xt introduces and promises the blessing called: immortality. Please take note of this. Judaism knew nothing of immortality. Immortality was proclaimed in Xt―that is, if you want to become a Xn―and then the requirement of the Law is intensified to the maximum, though it cannot be said that this has any relation to a blessing such as immortality. This is how things are in Xnty. Now, how it has been possible for Xndom to get optimism out of Xnty is indeed a sort of mystery―yes, or it is easily explained: it is a swindle. Incidentally, this swindle provides an indirect proof that Xnty is the truth and the power, for precisely because it is, Xnty has been corrupted in such a manner that people dare not cast it aside or put a new religion in its place. No, Xnty flourishes all over the country―but it is certainly the exact opposite of what Xnty is. I doubt that anyone can point to an analogy to this, that any other religion has been corrupted in this way.

The Exemplar. Bishop Mynster, in his day, found it so peculiar that the Exemplar must be situated both ahead and behind, as Anti-Climacus says―he couldn’t get it into his head that the Exemplar should be behind. However, as I in fact understood at the time, this is not so difficult to grasp. Thus, when he trains his recruits, a corporal, too, will sometimes walk backward―in order to

173

174

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 80–82

•

1854

make sure that he has them all with him. Otherwise he could easily end up like the castellan Pedro in Pretiosa, who marched in front of his guards, and when he turned around, the guards had gone down a different road. And this is the game that has actlly been played by Xndom, especially in Protestantism, especially in D[enmark], and not least by Bishop M.: letting the Exemplar walk up front by himself. You see, Your Reverence, that is why the Exemplar is also situated behind.

Christendom one could regard as a simple misunderstanding, a wrong turn, which has introduced the historical rather than the primitive element; and this historical element has now become an enormously long rhyme, for just as with certain fairy tales, with each new line, all the previous lines are rattled off as well. This is what I have so often pointed out: people shrink from the effort of being the primitive I―and thus one becomes a third person and then gets tranquillized in something historical and leaves behind an imprint that is historical. But is it also possible to become immortal in the third person, or by virtue of the history that tells of others having become immortal[?]

Illusion. Christ is the Exemplar; his life is eternity’s examination. Of course this examination has not changed in the least simply because it has been 1800 years since he lived. Of course it has not changed simply because perhaps no one has subjected himself to it in a very long time.

5

10

81

15

20

25

175

82 30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 82–83

5

83

15

20

25

30

176

35

•

1854

175

But we are Christians in such a way that we have quite literally no notion of the examination, of its requirement―that is how far we are from subjecting ourselves to it. But what an illusion: that because “the age,” with its cunning, is able to deceive us―that it therefore should also be capable of deceiving eternity!

God’s Majesty. I have shown elsewhere how God’s M[ajesty] is secured against what in other circumstances spells the ruin of majesty: the numerical―that God in fact relates inversely to the numerical: the larger the number, the less one comes into relation to God. Now I will also show his majesty from another side, namely that unlike other majesties, he has no need of police and guards to punish offenses against him. No, he is protected better than that, because matters are arranged such that to sin against God is to punish oneself―so certain is God that his enemies will be punished. Someone might perhaps think that this turns all punishments into natural punishments, and thus abolishes positive punishment and is therefore empty talk. Look around. In situations involving hum. beings, if the crime is not its own punishment, what makes people think that the sinner could escape if the law does not catch him in time, is that a man lives only for a limited time and thus that he could die and avoid punishment. But of course God has eternity before him. And thus it is the case that to sin is to punish oneself: when there is an eternity lying ahead, one does not get away. Therefore, to sin against God is to punish oneself; this is how God’s majesty is secured. And not only that, one must, in addition, repent the punishment one suffers (one’s sin) if one wants to come to an understanding with God: what an immense majestic distance. The maximum that

[a]

The greater the number, the greater the distance from God―the single individual is one closest to him; and in his majesty God is in turn secured against this closest one: the closer the individual comes to him, the more he feels his distance.

1

5

176

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 83–86

•

1854

hum. beings could think of would be to give thanks for a gracious punishment, but that the sinner must―repent the punishment, suffer the punishment, and then ask to be forgiven for it: how majestic. 5

Backward Progress. In an article by a Prof. Jacobi (on the Irvingites, 1854), I see that the Mormons believe that God is not omnipresent, but that he moves with great speed from one star to another. Excellent! In other cases, after all, progress usually means that compared with more childlike eras, people adopt more spiritual notions, thus if a more childlike era had imagined God moving from place to place very quickly―and nowadays, more mature times would understand that God is omnipresent. But here the movement is the reverse! It is quite indicative, and I am probably not mistaken when I assume that this is the influence of railroads and the discovery of the telegraph. Presumably, theology is now on the verge of a new development in which all these modern discoveries will be used to determine the idea of God.

84

10

15

20

Apexes. What Socrates says in the Phaedo―that the pleasant and the unpleasant are positioned together as apexes―is the law for everything Christian. The hum. being is a synthesis, but when “spirit” is introduced, it splits the components of the synthesis and places them together as apexes. This is why the more spirit there is, the more strongly flesh and blood react, and here indeed comes what the apostle is talking about: what cannot enter into a harmonious synthesis.

85

25

30

177

. . . . . In an age when there is much searching after originality, suddenly an originality emerges that is so qualitative that to be this originality must be suffering.

86

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 86–87

5

10

•

1854

This is the case with me. But I’m not complaining about the times, because the same thing would happen to me in any age. Merely quantitative originality is straightforwardly recognizable and understandable by something given or by the given situation (and the poorer and lesser the originality, the quicker and more certain this is). Qualitative originality must rlly require faith. But peop. never want to make this effort. Then, at a future time, when that once-qualitative originality rests upon its results―yes, then it is celebrated, but by then faith is no longer required. Thus, qualitative originality must always suffer to a greater or lesser degree, for it is of course impossible for it to begin with its result―and hum. beings are never capable of anything beyond believing in virtue of the result, i.e., they are incapable of faith, they are only capable of―and long for―being deceived!

15

87

20

25

30

178 35

Offense. Perhaps mediocrity will find consolation in the circumstance that if one does not take Xnty too seriously (which, undeniably, mediocrity does not do), one at least has the advantage of not producing offense. No, thanks. If exaltation is guilty of having occasioned offense by taking Xnty too seriously, mediocrity is always guilty. Mediocrity must simply bear in mind what Xt said to Peter: [“]Thou art an offense unto me[”] (which, by the way, mediocrity dare not attempt to turn to its own advantage, because Peter, after all, was as different as possible from mediocrity). And how often, in lesser circumstances and situations, has not someone who truly willed the truth had occasion to say to the damnable, wretched, hearty, swindling mediocrity that wanted to restrain him: [“]Thou art an offense unto me[”?] You see, o mediocrity, that you are perhaps anything but free of that guilt from which you had absolutely believed yourself protected: that of being a source of offense. Couldn’t this be of help, couldn’t this rouse you up and prod you out of your routine[?]

177

178

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 88–89

•

1854

The Unconditioned―The Relative. The law for introducing something relative is: Look out, look out. The law for introducing something unconditioned is: Close your eyes, have blind faith, for God’s sake do not look out―as the raven lost the cheese because it listened to what was said, so will you lose the unconditioned itself if you look out, regardless of whether looking out means looking out because of anxiety concerning yourself or because of so-called sympathetic concern. You see, this is why Xnty has completely disappeared, because the bit of Xnty that has been introduced has always followed the law: look out. But the world is in fact so wretched―it lies, as Xnty teaches, in wickedness―so if you want to look out, you will always have to say: [“]It would, after all, even be a great thing if hum. beings were to lead their lives a bit more decently than they do[”]―and so you reduce the price, fail to introduce the unconditioned. Or it would even be a great thing if one induced a few to embrace a sort-of, more-or-less, watered-down version of Christianity―and so you reduce the price and fail to introduce the unconditioned.

88

5

10

15

20

25

To Forgive Sins. is not merely divine in the sense that no one but God can do it, but it is also divine in the sense that one must say that no one can do it without God. Human beings (if they actually were able to forgive sins) are not capable of it, no: their forgiveness is so poor, so grudging, so reluctant, with so many reservations, that the sinner must say: [“]No, thank you, I must, rather, ask to be chastised and suffer my punishment, spared of your wretched, miserable forgiveness which even―if perhaps I were to be properly rescued and become someone eminent― would emerge again as envy, and your forgiveness would be reckoned as a debt against my account.[”]

89

30

179

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 89–91

10

How different the divine and the human are! The hum. tendency is actlly to uncover sin, to find out something bad about a pers.―so that we know that he is no different from the rest of us. The only kind of forgiveness that is observed, more or less, is the mutual settling of accounts. The Deity rejoices in forgiving sin: as God is omnipotent in creating out of nothing, so is he omnipotent in―annihilating, because to forget, to forget omnipotently, is of course to annihilate.

90

Hum. Justice.

5

15

91

25

30

180

35

The most profound satire upon the hum. race is precisely its concept of law and its justice. Thus, the fact that theft is regarded as practically the only crime―ah, how you unmask yourself, o world, for what you are: avarice, etc.

Spiritual Sins. How far the world is from being spirit can also be seen from the fact that precisely those sins that Xnty regards as the most frightful are not regarded as sins by the world, but are almost admired: e.g., cunning, treachery, subtlety, etc. What the world regards as sin and makes a big fuss about is either theft (and everything related to security of property) or the sins of the flesh, which indeed are surely those that Xnty regards as most pardonable. A man who lives day after day by means of stealth and deception, but who is in other respects an extremely cultivated man, a member of cultivated society―if one day he were to have the misfortune to get drunk: Oh, good grief, it’s an irreparable loss, and he judges himself so harshly that, as they say, he may perhaps never forgive

•

1854

179

[a] Abraham of St. Clara says somewhere that he has often pondered who was guiltier―the person who utters slanderous words, or the person who listens to them. Similarly, one could be tempted to ask: Who is the greater sinner―the thief, or the person who literally regards theft as the only kind of sin[?]

1

5

180

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 91–92

•

1854

himself, while it probably never even occurs to him that he has need of forgiveness in connection with all the stealth and deception and dishonesty and all the spiritually loathsome passions that dwell in him and constitute his life.

The World’s Conscience. In Plato’s Republic (bk. III) a line by Phocylides is cited to the effect that after a person has reached the point when he has enough to live on, he ought to practice virtue (δει ζητειν βιοτην, αρετην δ’ οταν ᾑ βιος ηδη see Heise, notes). With this I am reminded again of a line I read in Schopenhauer to the effect that an Englishman supposedly said that having a conscience was such an expensive way of life that his circumstances did not permit him to do so―and the English are of course well-known as practical people, and so the view of the Englishman must surely be regarded as decisive for what practical people must understand by―conscience. And this in turn reminds me of a story Father related. In the old days, when district officials and local judges were formerly the coachmen or servants of their gracious rulers, they were customarily subjected to a sort of an examination in which the provincial governor did the examining―and the whole business went straight to “bribery.” During one of these examinations, the examiner said to the candidate: [“]What do people mean by [‘]conscience[’ ”]? In a subdued voice, the candidate replied, [“]I have a quarter-barrel of butter in the wagon.[”] “Good enough,” the examiner replied, “quite right, but nonetheless not exhaustive.” “I have ― ― ― ―.” “Very good, very good, but still not entirely exhaustive.” “I have 10 rix-dollars in cash.” “Extremely good.” This is how it is with the conscience of truly practical peop. And if one were to search through 12 δει ζητειν . . . βιος ηδη]: Greek, One must first seek the necessities of life, and only when they are found, virtue. (See also explanatory note.)

5

92

10

15

20

25

30

35

181 40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 92–93

15

the conscience of the numberless mass, one would feel like someone rooting around in an old chest in which there are all sorts of odds and ends, as in the chest in Kjerlighed uden Strømper―thus in a certain sense one would have to say that if the conscience is to be a storehouse for things of this sort and not for anything else, one might just as well not have a conscience. Naturally, such peop. are far, far better than those practical people, but it is sadly true that in a deeper sense they are, in fact, rlly like someone who owns an instrument designed to be used for a specific purpose but which he uses for something completely different and rlly does not know what it is to be used for―and thus it is only in an unreal sense that he can be said to possess this instrument.

93

God Is Love.

5

10

20

25

30

35

182 40

This is what, transformed into a motto and prepared like childish nonsense, has utterly confused Xnty and made Xndom into gibberish. The law of loving is quite simply the well-known: To love is to be transformed into likeness with the beloved. Aber, aber, aber, this law only holds for the ascending scale, and not in reverse, for the descending scale. Example: If someone is superior in reason and wisdom, then the law for his love in relation to someone who is subordinate in reason and wisdom is, of course, certainly not that he should be changed into likeness with the latter. To love in that way is nonsense, and if he is truly the superior one, it will not in fact happen. No, the law is to want to do everything to draw the beloved up to himself, and if the beloved is willing, then the law for his lover is to be changed into likeness with the beloved. This law is applicable and is to be respected in all possible circumstances. Only with respect to one person has Xndom made an exception: God in Heaven. According to the childish nonsensical understanding, he is sup24 Aber] German, but.

•

1854

[a]

181

Note. Naturally, it must be kept in mind that in the relation between one pers. and another, the superiority in question can only be an imperfect analogy to the difference between being God and being a hum. being. And because, fine and pious as we are, we think of the equality of all peop., it is proper for us to make our opposite number our equal, so that the law for both parties is: being transformed into likeness with the beloved.

1

5

10

182

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 93

•

1854

posed to be pure love―i.e., sheer nonsense. Here, it is insisted that we view as valid the complaint that it is egotism and deception if the superior being does not become changed into likeness with the less rational being. Here, this complaint about it being egotism and deception is supposed to be valid―that is, here people think that here this [i.e., the inferior being changed into likeness with the superior] does not happen, for God, indeed, is pure love―i.e., sheer nonsense. This is how, for the benefit of children and “childlike souls,” people in Xndom have transformed God into such a fabulous monster that everything that antiquity has to offer by way of monstrous compound creatures and everything dreamed up in the most decadent arabesque fantasies, are bagatelles in comparison to this mixed composite: to be omnipotent, omniscient, all-wise, etc., all this combined with being love―note well, love in the sense of being nonsense, so that even the most frivolous woman―e.g., in the manner in which a mother loves her children―is nonetheless a little less nonsensical, a bit less of that pure love. No, that God is love of course means that he will do everything to help you to love him, i.e., to be changed into likeness with him. As I have often said, he knows well how infinitely painful this transformation is for a hum. being; he is willing to suffer along with you―indeed, in love he suffers more than you do, suffers from all the heartache of misunderstanding―but he is not changed. But as an adult, in relation to a child whose love he wishes to win, begins by becoming lovable to the child on the child’s terms, and to that end is happy to bring the child cookies and that sort of thing, so, too, does Xnty introduce something attractive. This attraction is the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins. For every hum. being who does not have enough of a sense of himself to sorrow over his sins, to notice that this is where the misfortune is truly lodged, for every hum. being who does not have that much of the eternal in himself―for every such hum. being, the fact is that he cannot come to love God, God cannot involve himself with him, God cannot, if I dare put it this way, get hold of him. So the forgiveness of sins is proclaimed and, if I dare say so, with a splendor that is beyond compare. Now Xnty rlly begins. For this is the point at which the transition to loving God, or to reformation into likeness with God, must take place. And thus begins what I describe in this way:

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 93–94

5

183

•

1854

humanly speaking, God must make you unhappy if he is to love you and you are to love him. Now, Christendom―like the child who eats the cookies and rebuffs the donor― has presumably performed the feat of taking hold of the divine splendor― ―and then making use of it as a piquant ingredient in living enjoyably―after its fashion―in this life. This is the swindle, naturally the most foolish possible swindle, because of course the most foolish of all things is to want to fool God.

10

The Idea of Being Sacrificed 94 15

20

25

30

35

does not form the basis for association. I would also like to see if anyone can show me an example of any people who have ever joined together with the intention of being sacrificed―please note, with the idea that being sacrificed has worth in and of itself. The greatest example one could name would probably be the apostles. But I maintain that the apostles were not an association formed with the intention of being sacrificed; they were an association of those willing to be sacrificed if things could not be otherwise, but in other respects an association formed in order, if possible, to prevent that from becoming necessary. What unites people is in one or another way something finite, but the intention of being sacrificed is fatal to all that is finite. If someone were to say that in fact in the Orient there are examples of peop. who are associated and are sacrificed, sacrificed by jumping off mountaintops or throwing themselves under the temple cart of the god, and so forth―I would reply that this is probably so, but that in this case what causes them to join together like this is in a way devoid of ideas―that there is no concrete idea being served with their self-sacrifice. No, the idea of being sacrificed, the intention of being sacrificed, is the most unsocial of all, and quite naturally for the simple reason that an association could of course result in people gaining at any rate a bit of power in the sensate world, which is precisely contrary to the idea of being sacrificed.

183

184

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 95

•

1854

. . . . My life is enormously strenuous; I feel so alien, so different, from what occupies most people. Day in and day out, in the most various ways and in almost every contact, I notice my heterogeneity. Constantly surrounded by curiosity, always as an outsider, now envied, now ridiculed, now admired, now stared at in bestial fashion, everything, everything is done to prevent me, if possible, from being myself and, if possible, to prevent every person from being himself in my presence. In every situation I am not actually treated as a person, but, with varying interpretations, as a sort of interesting object, something people can talk about. Were I to say to a shoemaker, [“]I have a weakness in this foot, couldn’t you remedy it by altering the shape of the boot[?”], I run the risk that as soon as he gets home to his family, what rlly concerns him is to tell them: [“]Magister K. has a weakness in one foot.[”] This could perhaps find its way further, perhaps into the press, perhaps I could get to read it in Swedish (something I could read where I take my stroll), get to read about it (like my clothing, which, by the way, is of course subject to public discussion), and then I will have every passerby looking at my feet (as I have now endured for years with respect to my legs and my trousers), forgetting to step aside, even though I have the right of way, simply because people have to look at my foot― ― ―this is what I can get: on the other hand, I did not get my boots the way I want them. To be sure, this is infinitely comical, but it is also an expression of how strenuous my life is. As noted, among the sources of this strain is the circumstance that I am altogether different from people. They either live solely for finite goals―and this is the class of people I like most, with whom I would also have gotten on very well, had not the press of the rabble disturbed things―or they pretend that they live for something loftier, but this is just mystification. In any case, living for an idea, as I live, is just as different from the lives of peop. around here as speaking Hebrew is from speaking Danish―not only do we not share a common effort, but in a certain sense neither do we share a

95

5

184 10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 95–96

5

10

185

15

20

language, inasmuch as they in fact use language fraudulently. Imagine a criminal―his life is different from that of other people. But on the other hand, there generally are more than a few criminals, and they then form an association, a world for themselves. But imagine being the only criminal: wouldn’t that be enormously strenuous[?] Conversely, take what is highest, take the GodMan: to live in that way, to know that he has come to light a fire―and this is not about setting fire to a house or two, no, but setting fire to the human race―you see, to be a hum. being and to live among hum. beings and yet be differentiated like this from being a hum. being: I cannot do more than form a faint notion of that dreadful strain. Furthermore, from this I can see what nonsense it is with these millions of Xns and thousands of priests, because merely in order to be able to form a faint notion of Xt’s suffering, a pers. must be subjected to strains such as I have been―what, then, can it be that is being preached by the priests, as those who are ahead of the rest, and what can it be that the congregations believe[?]

25

96

30

35

40

. . . . I will never be understood, nor will the strenuousness of my life be understood. To carry the burden of great notoriety, as I do, is a great strain; to have to put up with being recognized by every child, to have nursemaids, when they walk the children, send them over, one after the other, to ask me what time it is, something that is also shouted after me in the street (God knows what this is really about or who has thought it up). In the evening, to have to put up with being accosted by prostitutes, and then there is the perpetual nonsense about my clothing, which occupies people incessantly and in which, finally, the tailors have come to play a role, etc., etc. Those who envy me pretend that they don’t understand that this life is enormously strenuous,

•

1854

185

186

1

5

[a]

Abuse by the rabble does not constitute a conspicuous event such as, e.g., being prosecuted by the government, getting arrested, convicted, etc.

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 96–97

•

1854

or probably they want to find me to be the author of it and regard it as vanity on my part for having come up with it myself. Those who mean well by me do not notice that the little bit that each person contributes is, indeed, small, but that taken together, all of these little bits amount to a great deal for the person who has to bear it all. And then, if there were someone who wanted to understand this and were capable of doing so, I cannot get any more out of him than this: that I can travel abroad or withdraw from public sight. That is, he misunderstands me most profoundly. This is how I live. It of course does not occur to me to speak with anyone about such things, and I truly do not have any help within myself, so good night[!] And up to now I have borne it all as lightly as a dancer, which, incidentally, helps ensure that the problems I solve are unseen. Among the finite matters that most weigh upon me in this connection are financial concerns, which are coming closer and closer. Although I can certainly become embittered at abuse by the rabble, which is in turn exploited by the envy of the elite, I could bear it as if it were nothing, or at any rate, as something very slight, but one needs the counterweight of not having economic worries.

5

10

15

186

20

25

Isolation.

97

The fact that Xnty is unconditionally related to isolation (the single individual) can also be seen in the circumstance that Christianity’s presupposition is always: the consciousness of sin, that it begins by proclaiming the forgiveness of sins. But the consciousness of sin is what isolates unconditionally. Even the most primitive originality is not as isolating, is indeed only an anticipation in relation to other people; it does not involve the deepest essence of the personality. Even the most individual and unique hum. misfortune and suffer-

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 97–99

5

10

98

20

ing are not as isolating―insofar as they are hum., other people do, after all, participate in them, and of course such things end with death and do not concern the deepest essence of the personality. Only sin isolates unconditionally. My sin does not concern one single hum. being other than myself, and it concerns my personality at the deepest level. Thus one sees what nonsense it is with peoples and states and countries and abstractions that are Xn, item with little children who are Xns. People have made being a Xn into something in which there cannot be any notion of Xnty’s requirement, its sine qua non: isolation, the single individual.

The Savior of the World When one considers the insipid, cloying, syrup-sweet concept of the Savior of the World that Xndom worships and offers for sale―a strange effect is then produced by reading his words: “I have come to bring fire to the earth,” come to sow division that can burst the holiest of bonds, bonds that God himself has blessed: bonds between father, son, wife and husband, parents and children, etc.

187

99

30

35

Praising Xnty in Such a Way That in One Sense, One Is Warning against It. This is the formula of my proclamation, which has certainly caused offense enough. But take a different situation. Would anyone deny that Epictetus was a Stoic or that he knew how to praise Stoicism, or that he did so in grand style[?] Yet he also continually warns against it, against becoming involved with it unless one wants to do so wholeheartedly. But let a silk-clad tradesman-priest get hired to proclaim Stoicism, and you will see that he will 10 item] Latin, as well as, furthermore.

•

1854

187

188

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 99–102

•

1854

simply utter praise―not himself a Stoic, he will simply utter praise―entirely like a shopkeeper. Naturally, a shopkeeper will say that warning people against his wares is indeed madness: [“]I of course run the risk of not getting any customers or of chasing customers away from a place where there had been plenty of business, chasing them away instead of keeping them in the shop.[”] How disgusting a priest of that sort is, and this is called Christian earnestness!

5

10

Impotence―Strength. According to the thinking of our times, I am the most impotent of all, not merely not a large party, not a little party, indeed, not so many as two. And yet in these times I am absolutely the only person who is strength―for, in the idea, the numerical is impotence, the greater the number, the greater the impotence.

A Qualitative Originality, that relates itself to faith may put up with this repellent business of being, as it were, an unknown ware concerning which the merchants cannot agree among themselves whether it is worth anything, whether it is worth a lot or only a little, or whether it perhaps is of the greatest worth. Therefore, they look upon it with both shrewdness and suspicion. The price of quantitative originality is immediately determined.

100

15

101

25

188

A Very Special Sort of Proclamation is what has indeed been entrusted to me, and how strenuous to the nth degree! Wherever I look, until now, the law for proclamation has always been this: that if people are willing to embrace the pro-

102 30

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 102

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

189

•

1854

claimer’s message and say to him: [“]What is it, then, that you want us to do? Do you want us to do exactly as you do?[”]―the answer has always been: [“]Yes.[”] It is different with me―if all the millions of people alive came to me, united and with the greatest willingness, and said: [“]What do you want us to do? Should we do as you do?[”]―I would have to reply: [“]No, there is not one pers. alive who has the same task as I.[”] And again― in my view―among the millions there is not one single person who has a task in common with another― ―and this is precisely what I must proclaim. It is like the difference between gathering and dispersing. Usually, all proclaiming tends toward gathering peop. together, mine tends toward dispersing them, making them single individuals. This much, then, is easy to see: the person who replies Yes, to that question (Shall we do as you do?) may perhaps be himself an individuality, but on the other hand his proclamation is not the proclamation of individuality. He obviously has a doctrine, and his proclamation does not rlly makes peop. individualities, but copies. My proclamation is the proclamation of reduplicated individuality. But could I be the least bit understood in an age in which all tactics tend toward gathering peop. together and in which, of course, no one has an inkling of the tactics that tend toward dispersing them, or how such tactics are an entire qualitative level more strenuous than the other approach? Nonetheless, this is the path the hum. race must take. And this is my task: While being an individuality myself and preserving myself in being one (which God in Heaven also watches over in infinite love), to proclaim what infinite reality every hum. being has within himself if he wills to become himself before God. But for that reason I have not a shred of doctrine―and doctrine is what people want. Because doctrine is easy imitation for the student, and doctrine is the path to palpable power for the teacher, because doctrine gathers peop. together. The proclamation of individuality is blessedly its own reward―to be sacrificed to peop. My proclamation is in the strictest sense: service of the spirit. Everything proclaimed that tends toward gathering peop. together is in one way or another related to the animal category. That is why it goes so easily. Because when the whole business is nothing but instructions, when one is dealing not with individualities but with copies, one can soon get thousands―alas, in a certain

189

190

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 102

•

1854

sense there are enough of them. But proclaiming individuality is so slow that a single one is already a great thing, and one must be able to be satisfied with none at all―which, indeed, in another sense the true individuality can indeed be, for he is himself. With my proclamation, it is as if someone were to proclaim, [“]What a lovely sight is the starry nighttime sky.[”] Then, if there were thousands who were willing to accept his proclamation, and said to him: [“]What do you want us to do―do you want us to learn your words by heart?[”]―must he not then reply: [“]No, no, no―I want each one to look up at the starry nighttime sky, and each in his own way―this is possible for him―to be uplifted by this sight.[”?] Alas, but hum. beings are, after all, animal creatures, and the lazy desire for copying others is, as it were, their second nature. That is why it is so easy to gather them together into a herd; that proclaimer will get thousands who will learn his words by rote, perhaps becoming professors of them―but out of ten thousand, there is perhaps not one who himself looked up at the starry nighttime sky. But it is all too frequently the case that it is the proclaimers themselves who are to blame for the whole business becoming copying, imitation, because it earns them earthly and temporal profit. Be, as it were, dishonest toward the starry nighttime sky, make it look as if it is not the starry nighttime sky that is glorious, but your conception of it. Get some trumpeting knights of business on your staff―and you will quickly have a crowd who will pay you sky-high prices for your splendid instruction. Ah, but if you are honest toward the starry nighttime sky, you will tell the truth: that the starry nighttime sky is what is glorious, and that every hum. being is able to see this glory in his own way, and that his way is worth infinitely more to him than yours is to him or his to you: Yes, then there is rlly [no] occasion for financial speculation, nor for crowding together into a herd like animals. There is surely no pers. in the Kingdom of D[enmark] who has the sense for individuality that I have. On the other hand there are enough half-clever heads who indeed look conceitedly down upon the mass of peop. as lower beings. This is certainly not the case with me. For me, a serving maid, a watchman, a coachman, etc., unconditionally every pers., has been of infinite worth. I also understood (as did no one in D[enmark]) how to speak with absolutely every pers., how to idealize them in the conversation. This was the (inhumanity?) that I practiced―and that was why I was abandoned to abuse by the rabble, or that was why abuse

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 102–103

190

5

10

15

20

25

103

35

40

•

1854

by the rabble took on a special significance in connection with me, because I thought that I ought to expose myself to it. What distresses me is that now I can no longer come into relation with these many peop. whom I love, but who now either believe that they ought to make a fool of me or are afraid that I am making a fool of them. How sad it is with these thousands upon thousands―every single one could grasp what is highest, could take hold of the infinite worth that is his, but everything goes to waste, and everything is also done by politicians, etc. to turn them into copies. Think of how a housewife shudders, think of her sorrow at seeing healthful, nourishing food thrown into the gutter―this is only a weak illustration of the shudder and the sadness that must fill the breast of a person who, himself an individuality, sees in every single pers. something that is absolutely equally significant, something of infinite worth, an individuality―and then sees them being wasted by the millions as copies! Take action as an individuality yourself, hire half a score Corybants, trumpeters, and drummers to proclaim that through the relation to you, a person becomes an individuality―that can be done splendidly, it will soon become a brilliantly successful business. Proclaim the truth, that every pers., unconditionally every pers., is an individuality, becomes one through the relation to God, who has in no way deputized you to collect his debts: and you shall see―it turns into a business concerning which people (like that woman in Barselstuen who says with tears in her eyes that the meat, which after all cost ――― per pound) can say: there is not a speck of fat on it.

[“]The Right of the Stronger Prevails[”] Is Now Called: [“]The Right of Shrewder Prevails[”]. (A. Schopenhauer). This is very well put by S[chopenhauer], and I am convinced that there is more in it than he thinks. This is what I have continually shouted, that Xnty has gotten an entirely different aspect of life against which to do battle than previously, and the confusion arises because people are still preachifying in the old way. What wild sensuality, item violence and savagery, etc.―to which Xnty was vehemently opposed―once were, has now

191

192

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 103–104

•

1854

been taken over by shrewdness. In order for Xnty to return―or through its return―we will learn to abhor shrewdness just as we have trained humanity to abhor violence. (In one of the older manuscripts I have also written on this, with respect to shrewdness as the specific evil.)

5

191

An Apostle―My Lowliness. An apostle’s task is: to spread Christianity, to win people for it. My task is: to deprive people of the illusion that they are Christians―yet I am serving Christianity. Christianity has now existed for 1800 years―let someone show me that this idea has ever been put forward before in Christendom. My life is entirely like everything else in the sphere in which I belong and for which I work, the sphere of the paradox: the positive is recognizable by a negative. Alas, my life is indeed sheer sadness, like night (hence those words in the Diapsalmata in Either/Or are entirely fitting: Du bist vollbracht Nachtwache meines Daseins); to be sure, my life is suffering and torment, and, lovingly and out of love, God tortures me where it pains me most of all: yet this negative is the mark of the positive, a primitivity that relates itself not to the present time, but to generations, and has a significance that is so correctly expressed in my being superfluous to these times. Fundamentally, these times are absolutely right in pretending to be ignorant of me as anything other than a caricature known from the street; the times are especially right in refraining from getting involved in judging me. For in these times there is of course not one single person who has the least clue of my task, much less of the tactics for carrying out this task. But therefore the most ridiculous thing anyone could demand would be that my work (toward depriving peop. of the illusion that they are Christians) be judged by the current criterion: the universal, trivial, spiritless, shopworn notion of spreading Xnty. This would be a sort of analogy: If a military officer who knew nothing other than strategy for offense (and perhaps not even very much of that) were to use this criterion in judging the operations of a military officer who was undertaking a defensive maneuver: he would have no clue of what the other officer’s task was, even less 18 Du bist . . . Daseins] German, You are fulfilled, nightwatch of my life. (See also explanatory note.)

104

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 104

5

192

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

would he have any notion of which tactics might be employed. Or this might be an analogy: if someone who could play [“]first off the board[”] in checkers were to see someone playing [“]last off the board,[”] then wanted to judge that player’s move according to his own tactics. It is of no help that those who are working nowadays in order, as they say, to spread Xnty, are poor players―this does not bring them any closer to understanding my task and my tactics. It would be better if they were excellent at what they do. Because genuine proficiency in proclaiming Xnty― and then a consideration of the depth of confusion inherent in the concept “Christendom”―might well bring them into my project, or closer to it. Now, this is how people have been working time out of mind: the more significant, capable people who have emerged have left open the question of whether Xnty exists, have left open the question of Christian states and countries and peoples―and in so doing they believed they were helping a bit with what was lacking in the individual and, if possible, were introducing a bit of new life― ―before they took care to look out where they were going; the consequence of their work was that they gave sustenance to the misunderstanding, gave sustenance to the sickness, which understood with infinite speed how to ingest that altogether-too-weak medication and transform it into nourishment for itself. No, no, the matter must be dealt with at its root, the ground must be cleared, it must be made completely clear that Xnty does not exist. Take a metaphor. Think of a crowd in the street of some 20,000 people who are making noise and tumult. Then the police come. The chief says to his officers, [“]If we can just get them to keep calm, walk quietly, refrain from violence, things will be all right.[”] Then the police personnel attempt to do this by mixing among them and talking sense to them. Let us assume that it succeeds. Now let a real policeman come and offer his judgment. He will say: [“] No, this doesn’t help. Fundamentally it makes things worse, it makes the popular movement more important precisely because it remains quiet and well-behaved. No, whether the crowd makes noise or is quiet does not decide the matter―20,000 people in the street, even though they are as quiet as a mouse, is and remains mutiny, rebellion―the ground must be cleared.[”] That is the way it is with letting all the illusions persist and then to want to bring some new life―yes, why? Of course, it is to the illusions that one is bringing new life. No, the illusions are what must

193

194

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 104–105

•

1854

go, the ground must be cleared, and the illusions are not to be given new life, but what little bit of life there might be in the illusions must be starved out―then we will be able to see that Xnty simply does not exist. You silk and velvet priests―and you in many ways honorable and worthy cloth priests―believe me, you are going to have a busy time holding on to Xnty, i.e., to the illusions. I am not blaming you― the instinct of self-preservation is powerful―and when we take a careful look at the illusions, it will be clear that from a Christian point of view a silk priest, too, is an illusion.

5

10

193

Indignation. I am absolutely serious in demanding that everyone who wants to be involved with me must commit to paying twice as much money to the priest as before. Nothing weakens the impression of moral pathos more than when money is involved. Thus, if someone wanted to express indignation by refusing to pay the priest his due―the whole business could be explained by saying that he wanted to save the money. No: twice as much priest money―but you stop attending church. The punishment I would like for the priests to endure would be: to give each of them an income 10 times greater than what they have at present―but not one person in church. But it is quite clear that this―like, in fact, all my views―is, in Bishop Mynster’s words, “much too high.” I fear that neither the world nor the priests would understand this punishment. It is, however, what is truest and is entirely in keeping with the idea. If someone―let us perform a thought experiment―if someone could prove (not in the sense in which I say that Xnty simply does not exist), no, if someone could prove that Xt never existed at all,

105

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 105–106

5

10

15

194

106

20

25

30

35

•

1854

195

nor did the apostles, that the whole business was made up―if there was no action taken by the state and the congregations, no move toward revoking all these livings: I would like to see how many priests would resign their posts. If the matter were not so serious, it would be infinitely ridiculous when the priests and their families quite calmly continued living off Xnty. Indeed, in the final analysis, perhaps what keeps our times clinging to Xnty is not even shrewdness on the part of the government and so forth, but fear of the enormous economic dislocation. And it is also quite certain that not even if 10 Rotschilds went bankrupt would the disruption be as great as if Christianity were to go out of business.

Twaddle―Abusive Ridicule―Persecution by the Public.

If I had the time, I think I would write a book about this as guidance for future Christian officials, because evil lies on the path we are to travel, and it is well that an official should have in advance as concrete a notion as possible of the suffering and the danger. What makes such abuse so shabby and thus so wearing is that it has absolutely no basis in fact, has nothing to get hold of, but always has the cover― of being nothing. This, in turn, has the result that many people who otherwise would control themselves, here feel that they can participate in it, or at least that they can crow over the fact that this sort of thing is happening to someone. And the person to whom it happens can scarcely speak about the way he is being mistreated, because it is precisely calculated to deprive him of his sense of himself. And yet this abuse is so vile that it bears analogy to the gladiatorial animal combat of pagan times, except that it is taking place in a setting of culture

[a]

Note And it may be noted that one can certainly endure persecution by the public if one is willing to protect oneself with high office and thus by possessing power, or if one is a rich Englishman. But in neither of these cases is there a true Xn official. No, to be nothing, and then to bear what a cabinet minister must bear: you see, that is the Christian situation, making sure that the official is not a politician who makes Xnty into politics.

1

5

10

196

1

5

b

The most disgusting of all types of tyranny: that of the louse; and the most disgusting of all bootlickers of tyrants, you, the time-server of tyrants and lice: “The Journalist!”

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 106

•

1854

and cultivation or polish, and is covered―and thus is even more villainous―by the hypocritical appearance of being nothing at all. But it is just like being thrown to wild animals, being compelled to fight them, except that in this case hum. beings take upon themselves the role of beasts and, in addition, hypocritically conceal the villainy under the cover of it being: nothing. What has weakened and continues to weaken governments and make them powerless is that they are capable only of using large-scale means. But first of all, large-scale means place responsibility on those who make use of them, and next, they provide pathos, recognizability, for those against whom they are used. But as the world grows older and thus more and more demoralized, the villainy, too, becomes greater. So the public, the one who hypocritically conceals himself under the cover of being no one, became the tyrant―and then comes the murderous element. The murderous element whereby one evades responsibility (for of course it is nothing), and the murderous element whereby one deprives the persecuted person of pathos, the pathos of recognizability. Small means, but many to use them; minor, but incessant; something not worth talking about, but that nonetheless everyone talks about, saying that it is not worth talking about; something insignificant, but continuous―you see, this is what is used. And in the most villainous way, the public is power, power like bedbugs or a stench, power that always has the advantage of denying pathos to the one abused. A disgusting bloodthirstiness, to thirst after human blood not like a lion or a tiger― no, like a louse or a legion of lice!b All honor to humanity, it is making progress in cultivation! Naturally, the public only wants to be geheimt knowledgeable that this is how things are―for if it were known, it would of course be an attempt at depriving the public of its power. So the public preserves the idea that: it is nothing. But in other respects the public of course knows very well what is going on. Thus, the public knows very well, 37 geheimt] German, secretly, covertly.

5

10

15

20

195

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 106–107

5

10

15

20

25

196 30

107

35

e.g., that 4 shillings is a very small sum, but that a nationwide subscription of 4 shillings is a very large sum. Thus, the p[ublic] also knows very well that one of these ordinary peop. is so viel wie Nichts, but that 10,000 such ditto ditto is a kind of power. And so it is in many situations. Except in matters involving slander, envious ridicule, twaddle, and the like, the public does not want to be knowledgeable, both in order that there cannot be any question of responsibility, and in order, as mentioned, that it not lose its power. For my part, I am not complaining. For one thing, in the course of time the whole matter has come to mean something different to me, has become for me a welcome occasion for a loving understanding with God. Gifts from God ought of course to be the most valuable thing a pers. has; and then if he by chance si placet has si placet the peculiarity that his gifts are in the form of torment: may it not be the same thing[?]―they come, after all, from him. But even if this were not so, I am still not complaining―as a psychologist, I am satisfied. A physician would be an odd duck if he complained that the illness he was treating was malignant. No: I have wanted to learn about hum. beings, and it would have been impossible for me to have been better situated for learning about humanity―this has been of infinite value to me, even while it is in fact teaching me that peop. are of very little value.

Baptism. If Christ had gone along with viewing baptism as it is viewed nowadays by Xndom, as an analogue to circumcision, an opus operatum: he would scarcely have used the word baptism figuratively as, e.g., when he speaks of being baptized with a baptism: “Are you able to be baptized with the baptism that 4 so viel wie Nichts] German, as much as nothing. 18 si placet] Latin, if you please. 36 opus operatum] Latin, work wrought. (See also explanatory note.)

•

1854

197

198

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 107–109

•

1854

I am to be baptized with,” where he is of course speaking of his suffering.

The Public is of course what is most devoid of ideas; indeed, it is the precise opposite of the idea. For the public is numbers. This is also the source of what is made clear by our times and of what Poul Møller had already noticed, though without explaining it―that Jews are especially suited to be publicists. Generally speaking, the Jew is devoid of fantasy and is also gemütlos, but he does have abstract understanding―and numbers are his element. For the publicist, the battles of public opinion are neither more nor less than stock exchange business. Just as with bond prices, the only thing that concerns him is the matter of which opinion has the numbers on its side. He believes that the number is the idea―this is precisely the highest degree of idea-lessness.

The Ordinary Preaching of Xnty. If the matter were not so serious, one might say that this preaching is among the most ridiculous things one could imagine. What is ridiculous is this: that expressions and concepts that belong to an entirely different sphere are applied to our lives. Because Christianity, the solemnity of Christian expressions, fits us just as well as for “a tailor’s child to be baptized Caesar, Alexander, Hanibal, Napoleon.” If the priest were a joker who spoke in highflown language for amusement’s sake, then it would have a humorous effect, as if one used an expression that had a generally accepted official meaning and association in an entirely different context that had 12 gemütlos] German, without feeling.

108 5

10

15

20

197

109

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 109

5

10

15

20

25

198 30

35

nothing whatever to do with officialdom, as if, e.g., a man announced his wife’s death and ended as follows: The interment will take place from Peter’s Church “notice of which is herewith given.” This latter phrase is from the official language proclamations. But just as the official formality of proclamations is inappropriate for the ordinary affairs of everyday life, so is the lofty terminology of Christianity inappropriate for our lives, even while we pass ourselves off as Xn. There is not one single one of the terms for a Christian in the Holy Scripture that, when applied to us―we, who of course are Xns― does not appear ludicrous. Try it, take any expression whatever, take this: [“] to be God’s co-worker, [”] that is, to have a task in which one relates to God in such a way that one can be called his co-worker― and then apply it to us Xns! In the way we live, our work ordinarily has nothing to do with having God as a co-worker; indeed, when we go about our work, we might sooner pray to God that he would go into another room (just like children, who when they really want to play, ask their parents if they would go into another room―or whether they themselves might go into another room―because the parents’ presence makes things too serious). People really notice this when they again and again read this expression in the morning hymns included in the Evangelical Hymnal: “I hurry now to my task,” “I hasten now to my work,” I hurry and hasten, and hasten and I hurry―but let us see whether the task is of the sort that relates to being God’s co-worker. It is, after all, so characteristic of Xnty in Christendom that it is: Sunday service. On Sunday we put on our nice clothes, and in a much deeper sense we disguise ourselves, we put on all the Christian terminology; the priest, especially, is remarkably well disguised―and in that quiet hour it looks as if the Christian terminology more or less fits―the disguise.

•

1854

199

[a]

Note This, then, is so far from it, that not even being a priest, in the manner that is usual in Protestantism, can be called a task in which there can be any talk of being God’s co-worker.

1

5

200

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 110–111

•

1854

Unrest. As the fisherman, once he has set his net, disturbs the water in order to chase the fish in that direction and catch more; as the hunter encircles the whole terrain with a band of beaters in order to scare the game together into groups, toward the place where they are to be shot: this is how, with the help of unrest, God, who wants to be loved, catches hum. beings. Xnty is the most intensive, the strongest, the greatest possible unrest, than which nothing greater can be thought; it wants (this was indeed the effect of Xt’s life) to awaken unrest in the greatest depths of hum. existence, explode everything, break everything. Thus God makes use of unrest, he makes use of unrest in order to catch hum. beings who want to love him. But the difference from the fisherman and the hunter is that God does not make use of unrest in order to catch more, not for the sake of numbers, but for the sake of intensity―that is, when the greatest possible unrest has been produced within a hum. being, then, in the tension, there can develop the intensity that is truly able to love God. But hum. beings love rest, security. Yet it is certain that no one can become a Xn in rest and security, and it is no less certain that no Xn can remain in rest and security. If someone is to become a Xn, there must be unrest, and where someone has become a Xn, there will be unrest.

110

5

10

15

20

25

Thoughts That Try the Spirit. Quite simply, this is the tactic: Remain absolutely indifferent, victory consists precisely in the most absolute indifference toward them. What thoughts of this sort want to do is make you anxious, they want to make you anxious to the point of pusillanimity, make you imagine that you are responsible for having them; they want to make you anxious, foist themselves upon you, making you listen to them, dwell upon them, etc., and all this amid the torment that you are responsible for it. If they get you to imagine this, well, then Satan is loose. Therefore, be absolutely indifferent! Be as indifferent toward them as you are toward rumbling in your stomach and the like. Or get angry, as angry as you get when, at an inconvenient hour, someone is standing there ringing

199

111

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 111–112

5

10

15

112 20

200

25

30

35

40

•

1854

your doorbell, and you rush out and say: [“]What’s all this noise, etc.[!”]; that is, get angry so that you do not become afraid, because becoming afraid is precisely what must be avoided. In fighting against temptation, the right thing for you to do is flee, avoid it. This is indeed of no help against thoughts that try the spirit, because they will pursue you. Here the tactic is: do not become afraid, remain entirely calm, absolutely indifferent. Nowadays, thoughts that try the spirit (which indeed are entirely in order when a pers. is to be placed under a strain, as it is strenuous to want to be a Xn, strenuous also with respect to the imagination) never arise among Xns, especially Protestants, especially in D[enmark]. In fact, people probably even regard this as progress. Ah, yes, it is retrograde progress, progress of the same sort as the recovery of which the doctor speaks in Barselstuen―the patient died, but the fever entirely left him―in similar fashion, thoughts that try the spirit have disappeared, but, clearly, so has Xnty.

A View of Christianity that to my knowledge has never been put forward is: Xnty is an invention of Satan, calculated, with the help of the imagination, to make hum. beings unhappy. As the worm and the bird seek out the finest fruit, so, too, has Satan taken aim at precisely those who are superior, those with great imagination and feeling, in order to lure them astray in imagination, getting them to make themselves unhappy―and, if possible, others as well. This view, after all, deserves a hearing. It is also true that after one has ascended to the level at which there can really begin to be any talk of becoming Xn, then every step becomes such a strain, so life-threatening, that it is constantly like “Black or Red,” either it’s God or it’s Satan. To be Xn, merely to approach being a Xn, is such ideality that it is always: either God or Satan. But how in all the world has this become possible, this mess with Xndom, these millions of Xns! Consider a harmless, grunting, well-to-do bourgeois philistine―provided he pays the priest well: this, then, is the earnest Xn, the typical example―in truth, just as ludicrous as if the Round Tower wanted to pass itself off as a young ballerina, age 18. How, indeed, has it been possible for this confusion to have arisen! Yes, naturally the problem is lodged principally in “the

201

202

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 112–113

•

1854

priest,” in the fact that it is in his pecuniary interest that there be as many Xns as possible. Imagine that a recruiting officer had been sent out to recruit, and that he was promised a certain sum for each person he recruited―and there was no monitoring of whom he recruited: what then? Then I think it would end with him recruiting cripples, bedridden people, old crones, in short, those who would be of no use in war, but whom he could get at the cheapest price―whereupon he turned in his lists and received payment for each of them. It is the same thing with Xndom. The fact that there will not be an accounting until eternity has more or less the effect of there being none at all―and now the priest (not himself a Xn, of course) goes all out to acquire― paying souls. Everyone who can pay is a Xn, as long as he can pay, that is―otherwise, he is a pagan. If he can pay well, he is an earnest Xn. If household pets could pay their way―I’m sure that “the priest” would also make Xns of them. Oh, revolting nonsense and villainy! Alas, but I do indeed feel that in a certain sense Bishop Mynster could be right in saying that my views are much too high, that I’m not really fit to have anything to do with hum. beings. What one of my pseudonyms expresses with a dash of paganism―I dance to the honor of the god―which I have occasionally said to Prof. Nielsen: My life is service at a royal court―is indeed true. This is how I have lived among people. Among living Danish writers, there is not one who can rise as high, even in productions that remain in their imaginations, as what I have carried out in actuality. And thus a number of peop., those who are a bit more advanced, seem to believe that it might be very amusing to have a look at me, to converse a little with me, perhaps flattering themselves that they are shrewder, because my views, after all, are an exaggeration― ―but there was no one, no one, who was able to, or who wanted to, venture out. And the minute I begin to retreat a bit from peop., so that I do not indulge even this nonchalant view of theirs, but evince earnestness, however faintly: they get offended.

“A Better Posterity” It is, after all, naive, undialectical, to permit oneself to get enthusiastic over the idea of a better posterity, a posterity in

5

10

15

20

201 25

30

35

113

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 113–114

5

10

15

20

25

•

1854

which one will be better understood―as if things were not in fact always essentially equally bad or, if there is any change, then it is for the worse. Better understood, a better posterity means a posterity in which admiring professor-scoundrels and the priestly rabble will turn the life and work of the deceased into profit for themselves and for their families. Is this a better posterity, is this to become better understood[?] Take what is highest: Which is the greater misunderstanding, which would be more repulsive to Xt: that of the Jews, who put him to death, or that of Xndom, which turned him into profit? absolutely the latter, of course―indeed, only the latter is truly disgusting. And yet, with all the struggling hum. beings I have read about (Socrates alone excepted) things are always this way: they are enthusiastic about a better posterity when they will be better understood. This thought does not make me at all enthusiastic, and I think that to need an inspiriting thought (illusion) such as this is an indirect proof that one does not repose within oneself and for oneself, in one’s own enthusiasm. In any case, this thought does not make me enthusiastic; on the contrary, what can provoke me most is the thought of that scoundrelly posterity. Misunderstanding by the present does not embitter a person nearly as much, nor is it, if you will, as hopeless―no, everything is only hopelessly lost, one’s life smothered in misunderstanding, only when the misunderstanding is: unthinking admiration, devoid of character.

202

114

35

Thoughts That Try the Spirit relate, as noted, to the imagination―peop. who live only in the understanding are unacquainted with things of this sort. Such thoughts are best compared to wind (flatulence). Similarly, such thoughts are nothing, but as long as they last they can certainly be a source of discomfort. And, to remain with the metaphor, just as those who suffer from bowel complaints must see to it that they have a good evacuation every day, so is a good evacuation in the form of

203

204

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 114–115

•

1854

acting in character the best medicine against such thoughts. It is rlly during the time before one is to take action, when one cannot properly come to inner certainty or to clarity about what one must do―it is then that such plaguing spirits make their appearance, as the twilight of dawn and dusk is the time of ghosts. They are: possibility, products of possibility―the best medicine against them is: actuality.

. . . . What I am rlly troubled by, in fact, are financial matters. Give me a fortune and I will transform all this nonsense and mockery and the wretched envy of the elite, etc. into a jest; not only will I bear it lightly, but I will take pleasure in it, for I am, after all, a born polemical nature, and, surrounded by the insignificance and narrow-mindedness of peop. and by wretched envy, I am, in a sense, rlly in my element. That is how things are. Then, of course, there is what is most strenuous for me: Xnty. Truly, the New Testament is a frightful book with which to be alone. The matter of hating oneself, of dying away, etc.―can certainly be strenuous. What I have often had to say to myself is true: If 4 or 5 years ago I had owned nothing at all, it would in human terms have been a help to me. For at that time I still had enough temporal and worldly lust for life to do something on the financial front, and the matter would not have been difficult. But then things have gone on, year after year. As long as I have a red cent, I cannot decide to do anything on the financial front; it seems to me that that would constitute a break with God and with the idea. If Xnty is hating oneself, dying away, then it is, after all, wrong to do anything before the uttermost point is reached. Year by year, however, the lust for life wanes―Governance is a great arithmetician. Infinite love: to be sure, you are love, but―isn’t it so?―this is indeed strenuous for a poor hum. being. Sometimes one hears of a man who had a bit of money, but then he fell into the hands of a woman: she could help him; or of a gambler: he could help him. But God in Heaven can do it just as well―and neither a woman nor a gambler can do it as systematically. Surely, seldom, seldom has it been seen: a pers. conscious of himself, with clarity about what he is doing, diligently and strenuously―working himself into poverty.

5

115

15

20

25

203

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 115–116

5

116

15

20

25

204 30

35

40

•

1854

Infinite Love, it is of course not your fault that such a long time has passed; if there is any fault here, it must of course be mine for not having more quickly ventured to the utmost. But on the other hand, you of course know very well that I have not had clarity about what it is that I should do. Only this much have I understood: that I must endure and then come to see how, when things are at their uttermost, you will help me understand myself, or how you want me to understand myself.

Talking Nonsense. This can serve as an example of all this solemnity with which people in Xndom speak of stillness, profound stillness, festive stillness, still festiveness, etc. as the condition of true religiousness. This is completely ridiculous, precisely as ridiculous as if a bird-catcher wanted to go forth with kettle drums and trumpets, and then, when he had set his trap, start making music as noisily as possible: the more energetically he made noise, in the hope of catching more birds, the more ridiculous. And similarly, the more aesthetically correct and dramatically perfect both the setting and His Reverence are, the more everything expresses the aesthetic stillness that His Reverence sets forth as the condition of true religiousness, the more ridiculous. Yes, with respect to the religiousness that consists of enjoyment, it is true that what matters is stillness. But for Christianity, religiousness is suffering, and therefore what matters is that unrest be introduced, the greater, the more profound the unrest, the more that religiousness is possible. Therefore the place for Christianity is not in theatrical churches where theater priests declaim―but in actuality and in the unrest of actuality. But as with everything, so, too, with this: hum. beings are höchstens so advanced that they have a bit of understanding of the aesthetic― and inasmuch as all of us, of course, are naturally Xns, the priests thus make use of this fact to transpose Xnty into the aesthetic sphere―and with great pretensions. So the situation becomes this: that what is aesthetic is regarded as something higher than what is simply Xn. For if this had not been done, the swindle would not have been properly secured. Remaining within the aesthetic sphere, but with the admission that it was something much lower than the Christian sphere, was insufficiently secure,

205

206

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 116–117

•

1854

and perhaps things would end with Christianity getting hold of a person. But when one remains in the aesthetic sphere in such a way that it is the higher sphere―yes, then one is completely secured against Xnty. 5

Christian Audit. What money is in the world of finitude, concepts are in the intellectual-spiritual sphere. All transactions take place using these. Now, when, generation after generation, each person takes over the concepts as he received them from the previous generation―and then uses them in the enjoyment of life, in striving for finite goals, etc. in his own day and age―it can altogether too easily cause the concepts gradually to get distorted, to become something quite different from what they were originally, cause them to come to signify something quite different, to become like counterfeit money―while throughout all of this, transactions nonetheless continue quite calmly taking place using them―this however, does not touch upon people’s egotistical self-interest as when counterfeit money comes into circulation, especially because the counterfeiting of concepts fits in quite nicely with hum. egotism, so that the one actlly fooled by it is, if I dare put it this way, the party of the second part in the matter of Xnty: God in Heaven. But to the matter at hand: no one has the desire to perform an audit on the concepts. Everyone understands more or less clearly that to be put to this task in this way is more or less the same thing as to be sacrificed, that it would mean that one’s life has been confiscated, that one cannot come to do what a hum. being has the natural desire to do: occupy oneself with finite ends. No: to deal with the concepts as fleetingly as possible, and then, the sooner the better, to plunge into the concrete aspects of life, or at any rate to be not overly exacting in dealing with the concepts, no more exacting than what would permit a person to plunge at full speed into the concrete aspects of life: that is the hum. thing to do. Nonetheless an audit is needed, and more and more so with each passing decade. So Governance must commandeer an individual who is to be used for this purpose.

117

10

15

20

25

30

205

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 117

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

206 40

•

1854

Naturally, an auditor of this sort is something quite different from the entire nonsense-babbling company of priests and professors―yet neither is he an apostle, rather just the opposite. What the auditor needs is precisely what the apostle rlly has no need of: intellect, an eminent intellect, and, in addition, an enormous familiarity with all possible swindles and counterfeits, almost as though he himself were the craftiest of all swindlers― his task is precisely that of “knowing” counterfeits. Inasmuch as this knowledge is of such a highly equivocal character that it could of course give rise to the greatest possible confusion, the auditor is not treated as an apostle. Alas, no―the apostle is a trusted man; the auditor is subjected to the strictest oversight. I always have only one metaphor for this, but it is very apt. Suppose that the bank in London noticed that counterfeit currency was in circulation―and that the banknotes were made so expertly that the bank despaired at being able to recognize them with certainty and at being able to protect itself against counterfeiting in the future. Despite the talented personnel of the bank and of the police, there was in fact only one person who was absolutely talented in this respect, but he was a convict, a criminal. So he was the one to be used, but could not be used as someone who was trusted. He was subjected to the most stringent oversight: he had to sit there and handle all these banknotes with a death sentence hanging over his head, he was searched every time, etc., etc. This is how it is with the Christian auditor. The apostle has the task of proclaiming the truth; the auditor has the task of discovering the counterfeits, making them identifiable and thus impossible. If the apostle’s personal characteristic is pure, noble simplicity (which is the precondition for being an instrument of the Holy Spirit), that of the auditor is equivocal, ambiguous knowledge. If in one sense―and only in a good sense―the apostle is entirely in the power of Governance, the auditor is entirely in the power of Governance in an ambiguous sense. If, despite all his efforts and labors, the apostle has no merit before God, the auditor has even less, and (even if it were otherwise possible) it would be impossible for him to have any merit, because he has a negative balance to work off, so he is essentially a penitent. But both of them are sacrificed, and both have been chosen, in grace, by Governance, because it is not in disgrace that one is chosen to be an auditor. And, as things began with the apostle, so does the auditor naturally arrive toward the end, because his presupposition is dissemination. And if the apostle has his name because he was sent out

207

208

1

a

and even were there no other hindrance

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 117–118

•

1854

by God, the task of the inspector is to penetrate the counterfeits, to lead back to God. The apostle can never come again, for in that case Xt might also be able to come again, in a sense different from that of the second coming. Xt’s life on earth is Xnty. The meaning of the apostle is: Now Xnty has been introduced, from now on you hum. beings must take it over yourselves, but subject to responsibility. So humanity took it over. And if it is an eternal lie that Xnty is perfectible, it is certain that humanity has developed an increasing perfectibility―in falsifying Xnty. Confronted with this falsification, even if God wanted toa, he could not use an apostle because, with its counterfeiting, Xndom has placed itself at such a distance from God that there cannot be any talk of (if I dare put it this way) a trusting approach to hum. beings. No, as Xndom is falsification, and as sin nowadays is primarily shrewdness, then, in turn, from the side of Governance― from whom the hum. race distanced itself through its counterfeiting―everything is suspicion: no happy messengers come forth from God any more than we greet police as messengers of that sort; no, only experts in dishonesty come, and even these (because they in fact are essentially a part of the general dishonesty) are treated by Governance as ambivalent, equivocal figures. Nowadays, Christendom is happy and satisfied. Not so infrequently we see the situation presented like this: Now a new epoch will begin, new apostles will come―because Christendom, yes, naturally it has done its job splendidly, it has now practiced and appropriated so completely what the apostles brought that now we must go further. The truth is this: that Christendom has done such a rotten job, and done it in as swindling a manner as possible, that to expect new apostles (if there were any truth in that idea) is the most outrageous impudence.

“Speaking in Tongues.” Consistent as Xnty naturally is (so consistent that I am still probably far from having grasped how consistent it is―so it couldn’t occur to me to speak of it in the way that people do nowadays, when just about anyone who speaks as a critic of any-

5

10

15

20

25

30

207

118

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 118–119

5

10

15

20

25

30

208

119 35

40

•

1854

thing does so with something like condescension), it also admits to having its own language: speaking in tongues is the Christian language, entirely different―not in the way in which one language differs from another―different from all hum. language, a qualitative difference rooted in a conceptual difference. The more I look into this matter, the more I see that the confusion is to be found not merely in Denmark and not only in Protestantism, but that it is rooted in hum. nature and thereby in the thieves’ cant we hum. beings speak. The Christian language uses the same words that we hum. beings speak―it does not want to make any change in that respect―but it uses them in a way that is qualitatively different from how we use them. It uses the words inversely, because Xnty points to an additional sphere, or a higher sphere, than the one in which we hum. beings naturally live, and in that sphere hum. language is reflected inversely. An example: Xnty says that to be deprived of, to lose, what is earthly is a gain, to possess it is a loss. We use the words loss and gain as well, but we do not include the sphere of the spirit at all, and therefore we understand loss and gain in a sense that is precisely the opposite of what Xnty understands by them. And so we let Xnty prattle on―afterward, we preachify in our own language and call it Xnty. As in music, where people speak of transposing a part so that it can be sung by a voice different from that for which it was originally written, so is the Christian language utterly and qualitatively different from our language on every single point, despite the fact that we use the same words―and the feat that Xndom has performed is to transpose the Christian language back into the old wretchedness―and this is how we have all become Xns. And so we await new apostles because now humanity has surely completed and perfected the lesson assigned by the apostles: How shameless!

That There Supposedly Are Epochs in Xndom. When people had turned the Xnty of the New Testament into simple historical fact, and next, when people came to imagine that Xnty is perfectible, it then followed entirely of itself that people also came up with the notion that there were various epochs. The epoch of the Son was the Xnty of the New T., and what now lies ahead is―the epoch of the Spirit.

209

210

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 119–120

•

1854

No, no, no! Xnty in the New Testament is: Xnty. And Xnty is: life’s examination. God wants to be loved, that is the examination. But summa summarum will certainly be that Xndom is to be regarded in corpore as having failed. On the other hand, Xndom has been inexhaustible in inventing gibberish and swindles. An epoch of the Spirit! If talk about this is to make any sense, it would have to begin with the apostles. But to have it begin later, during the advance of Xndom―yes, there we have it, the advance of Xndom―from a Christian point of view, it makes no sense to speak of any progress from one generation to the next. Every generation begins all over again, the examination remains the same. And then, when the generation is dead and buried, eternity keeps track of how many in it took the divinely instituted examination. And then the next generation can begin. But the hum. swindle is always based on introducing the numerical factor in order to conceal oneself in numbers. The single individual conceals himself by fleeing into the mass of his contemporaries, the contemporary generation. And in order to conceal itself even better, an individual generation conceals itself in the sequence of generations. And then, when one is concealed, then―a coward as always―then the person, when he believes himself to be securely concealed, he becomes impudent, bold, shameless enough to speak of Christendom’s progress, of a new epoch―the epoch of the Spirit. True, it does in fact look as if this resembled spirit: the most cowardly crowding together into a shoal of herring or a herd of animals, impersonality from start to finish. If this period, our time, is supposed to be the age of the Spirit, then it must take its name (ad modum lucus a non lucendo) from the fact that it is totally devoid of spirit, so that the age of the Spirit is that which distinguishes itself by being utterly spiritless. There is not a single person among these millions of members-of-the-public who has the courage to engage with God in solitary fashion, and scarcely very many who even have a notion of such a thing―and this gathering is supposed to be the age of the Spirit.

The Hidden Attack on Xnty A great deal of damage has been done to Xnty’s cause because, for a long time, owing to the hard-won respect it had once enjoyed, attacks against it were carried out cunningly. 3 summa summarum] Latin, sum of sums, sum total. 4 in corpore] Latin, as a body. 29 ad modum . . . lucendo] Latin, in the same way that lucus [“grove”] is called lucus because there is no light [luceo] in a grove. (See also explanatory note.)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

209

120

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 120

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

210 40

•

1854

I will give an example, and I choose the example of Lessing, who cannot be acquitted of guilt in this connection. In a recently published book by Prof. Schwarz, Lessing als Theologe, it is once again emphasized, particularly in connection with Nathan d[er] W[eise], that L[essing] abominated everything he considered to be fanaticism. On the other hand, he was of course no enemy of Xnty. Look, here is the example. Someone puts forward the concept of fanaticism―he rails against it, and peop. think this is splendid. But as for Xnty, it is treated fairly. Wait a moment. When the concept of fanaticism is defined, we learn that what rlly constitutes fanaticism is: exclusivity, that there is one specific condition for salvation, one single one, exclusively, that there is no salvation outside of this condition. In addition, we are informed that fanaticism is recognized by its zeal for wanting to save others and its condemnation of others. But if this is the case, then Xt, after all, is in fact actually the greatest of all fanatics. Then why not attack like this: Xnty is fanaticism. Xt is a fanatic. This has done incalculable damage. People have bowed deeply, asserting a meaningless respect for Xnty[,] which, however, has been deprived of all its distinctive characteristics, which have been stamped as errors and a source of corruption. This in turn has caused defenders of Xnty to step out of character and alter Xnty. If the attack had been made directly on Xnty, the matter would have been clear, and the defenders would have been compelled to step into character. What happened was that those who attacked Xnty bowed before it in deep respect, and those who defended it actually attacked it. Lessing attacks fanaticism― but Christianity, oh, God forbid, no―he has respect for it. The defenders of Xnty then provide further proof that things are as Lessing says, that Xnty is not fanaticism. And if you take a closer look you will see that the result is that Christianity is no longer Christianity, that gradually, under the name of Xnty, something entirely different has been substituted for the Xnty of the New Testament. The fact is that the way the defenders should have addressed the matter, what they should have said, was: [“]Many thanks, but no―Xnty is fanaticism.[”] That is what a Tertullian would have done. But nowadays this seems altogether too lofty and daring; when the attacker is so polite as to express respect for Xnty, then, in response, to reject this respect and compel him to join the attack―this sort of thing does not occur to the Xndom

211

212

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 120–122

•

1854

of our times, where all of the many people who have a pecuniary interest in Xnty thank God that people refrain from attacking it.

. . . . When I have so frequently compared myself to a spy, a condemned person who is unusually knowledgeable about all sorts of counterfeits, but who is himself placed under the strictest surveillance, this is entirely true and entirely fitting. But viewed from another angle, I am anything but a swindler. On the contrary, what I represent is: a hum. honesty that has been unwilling to make use of or participate in the circumstance that Christendom, in a manner pleasing to flesh and blood, has extracted from Xnty something utterly different from what is in the New Testament. My suggestion, indeed, is always this: Let us be honest and say straightforwardly where we are, but not falsify Xnty. And understood in this way, God then helps me by preventing me from slipping into any illusion. My comparing myself to a condemned person is not just owing to my relationship to Xnty, no, it is owing to my personal life and to what I might personally have on my conscience. And my honesty with respect to Xnty is connected with this inasmuch as I very much wanted, if possible, to do something well-pleasing to God, precisely because I may have a great deal for which to reproach myself.

121

“I Came to Cast Fire upon the Earth.”

122

How frightfully true are the expressions of Christianity. To cast fire upon the earth. Indeed, for what is a Xn? A Xn is a pers. who has caught fire. This comes up again with Pentecost―the Spirit is fire; flames rested upon them. Spirit is fire. Thus it is also in linguistic usage. An example from an entirely different world, which for that very reason illuminates ordinary usage. In Kruse’s adaptation of D[on] Juan, D. J. says of Elvira: “in her eyes there burns a fire as if from another world,” and that is why “his heart thumps at the sight of her.”

10

15

20

30

211 35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 122–123

5

10

15

20

123

25

30

35

212

40

•

1854

Spirit is fire. Hence the expression [“]to burn out to spirit[”] (in Baggesen: “burnt out to spirit[”]). Alas, but in the fire that Xnty wants to ignite, not everyone burns out to spirit―some burn out to ashes, i.e., in fire they do not become: spirit. Spirit is fire. Xnty lights fires. And this wildfire naturally makes a pers. shudder more than does any other fire. For even if a person gets burned by fire ten times, as long as the lust for life in him does not die out, he can perhaps become a prosperous man and come to enjoy life. But the fire Xnty wants to ignite is not calculated to burn up a few houses, but precisely to burn away: the lust for life―burn it out to spirit. Spirit is fire. This is the source of the common saying: as gold is refined in the fire, so is the Xn refined. By [“]fire[”] one must not think only of the fire of “tribulations,” i.e., of that which comes from without. No, a fire is ignited within the Xn, and through this, or in this incineration, is the refining. Thus the diabolical cleverness of the most terrible, atrocious cruelty that was practiced upon some of the first Christians: having them burn as torches along the road. One can almost hear the jeering of these inhuman emperors as they said: [“]Xt, after all, wanted to cast fire upon the earth, so let the Xns serve as torches.[”]

Christianity―Xndom. Think of a medication that is known to work quite specifically in one particular way, e.g., a laxative. There is a physician who knows all about such matters. Then he arrives in another country and here―imagine his surprise―here all the physicians use this medicine against diarrhea; every pharmacist knows about it, and every physician prescribes it for this. The physician says: [“]But how can this be possible? And of course, if the patient in fact gets this medicine, people will quickly discover that it has precisely the opposite effect.[”] To this is replied: [“]The patient in fact gets a large dose of it, and it counteracts diarrhea―and we have been using it this way from time immemorial.[”] Then the physician says: [“]Might I see it[?”] and they bring it to him. He takes a look at it―[“]Yes, das ist was anders, this is of course not at all what I am talking about, but is in fact a very well-known medicine that has an anti-diarrheal effect. But how in the world has arrowroot come to be called Epsom salt[?”]

213

214

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 123–124

•

1854

This is how it is with Christianity in Xndom. In the New Testament, Xnty is the most intense possible unrest―God in Heaven was unable to come up with anything more intense. And in Xndom, Xnty is used―as a tranquilizer. “But how is this possible,” the physician must say, “how is it possible: Even if someone ingests just a little dose of the Xnty of the New T., he will immediately notice that it does not have a tranquilizing effect.” “Yes, to this we can only answer truthfully, that this is how we all use it here in Xndom, and we all detect the same effect: it is tranquilizing.” “Might I hear in a bit more detail what it is that you understand by Xnty?” He is told of this. “Aha,” he replies, “yes, now the mystery is solved: I do not deny that such medicine has a tranquilizing effect, but I certainly deny that it is Xnty.”

5

10

15

The Son of Man Shall Come as a Thief in the Night.

In the little article on the Irvingites written by Prof. Jacobi, I see that they explain this passage as meaning that Xt will come so stealthily that no one notices it, no one notices that he has been there. This is not lacking in perspicacity―of course, a thief does not come in such a manner as to make a lot of noise. And from another point of view, there is something of majesty in the severity of letting judgment fall upon hum. beings in such a way that they go on living merrily and never notice that the whole matter is decided. As I have pointed out elsewhere, one cannot warn people too much against this. Hum. beings have such a tendency toward having a plebeian, almost comradely notion of divine majesty, as if God must make a great deal of fuss to get what is his (as if it were between comrades), and therefore he arrives accompanied by much commotion. No, the divine is so infinitely elevated that precisely for that very reason the most vigilant attention is needed in order that God not leave us hum. beings to ourselves. People continually forget that it is we hum. beings who need God, not God who needs us; people forget that in his majesty God does not at all like our earthly and temporal busyness. That

124

20

25

30

35

213

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 124–126

5

125

15

20

•

1854

is why this very false, almost bestial consolation is so widespread in Xndom: people think that if God does not intervene punitively, they are basking in his favor. People forget that divine majesty possesses a punishment that he himself naturally regards as the most frightful: to ignore, majestically to ignore, to leave hum. beings to themselves. This in connection with the Irvingites’ interpretation, which in other respects I will leave as is.

. . . . When, somewhere in these journals, it says with respect to myself that I have never felt a need for society, this is certainly quite true, but it must nonetheless be understood in a special way. In one sense, there are perhaps few natures that are as social as I was. But alas, the excruciating misery that was my lot from my earliest years caused me to prefer to be unsocial, to distance myself from everyone, to conceal my pain―and I found great consolation in being able to do so. In that sense it is true that I have not felt a need for society. In order truly to engage with Xnty, most peop. must probably first be thrust into sufferings of which they in fact have scarcely any notion. My life was suffering from an early age. That which corresponds to what people usually call the lust for life was―my lust for life was―to be able to conceal this.

25

126

30

35

To Proclaim True Xnty, the Xnty of the New Testament is in one sense, indeed, beyond a hum. being’s power; divine authority, or rather, a divine lostness in the unconditioned, is required for it. Let me take myself. That I am actually attentive to what Xnty is: nothing is more certain. That in order to become attentive I had to become, humanly speaking, unhappy in the most profound way: nothing is more certain. But now, when I am to turn toward hum. beings to proclaim Xnty to them, the matter is quite different: my hum. sympathy immediately thwarts me―for this stands firm: that to become a Christian is to become, humanly speaking, unhappy.

215

216

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 126–127

•

1854

Here it comes: Can I find it in my heart to make peop., humanly speaking, unhappy? The fact that I must become so of course concerns only me. But others―and that I must do it[!] Then the entire matter becomes reversed, and it is practically the case that when I am to proclaim Xnty, I want to say: [“]Forgive me, o, forgive me, for making you, humanly speaking, unhappy.[”] In another fashion, I say something similar when I say: “You yourselves are to blame for the fact that the price of being a Xn must be pushed up so far,” because here I am speaking as if what I spoke of were not something good, but almost an evil, which in turn is connected to the fact that true Xnty must make a pers., humanly speaking, unhappy. With the apostle it is otherwise. He is unconditionally lost in the unconditioned, blind to everything else; in a certain sense he simply does not at all see what he is doing in the merely human sense: that he is in fact making peop., humanly speaking, unhappy. Incidentally, here again we see the identifying mark of this sphere: the positive is recognizable by the negative―that Xt is the Savior of the world (the positive) is recognizable by the negative, that humanly speaking, he, precisely he, is making us hum. beings unhappy. This, as can easily be seen, belongs in the sphere of the paradox, and is naturally something entirely different from the gibberish about the Savior of the world in which Xndom excels.

214

One Must Take the World as It Is,

127

this, or: The world is what you take it for, though, please note, understood in this way: One must take the world as it is―this is the substance of the lives and doings of these millions, the copy-people. They find everything given: concepts, notions, thoughts, as well as customary behavior―in short, everything is given―the copy-person brings nothing with him. So, everything is given―and then they rush off,

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 127

5

215

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

busily, each one to his own affairs, to make money, amount to something, get married, etc. etc. Existence does not rlly notice that these millions are there, they have no contact with it, the whole of their lives is too insignificant to make contact with existence, which is structured and designed for lives of a different sort―so, in relation to existence, copy-people are like sticklebacks in relation to a net that has been set for larger fish. The net is certainly a net (as in similar fashion, existence is also a net) that has been set to catch fish―but sticklebacks can pass through it freely. The fact that copy-people become large groups does no good―they do not weigh any more on that account: one copy-person and 1 million of them make equally little contact with existence, which like a horn of plenty gushes out people of this sort. On the other hand, as soon as there comes a pers. who brings with himself a primitivity, so that he therefore cannot be said to take the world as it is (the license to pass through it like a stickleback), but says, [“]However the world may be, I relate to something original that I do not intend to change in accordance with the whims of the world.[”] The moment these words are heard, it is as if the whole of existence were transformed. As in the fairy tale: when the word is spoken, the castle that had been under a spell for a hundred years opens up and everything comes alive―thus does existence become transformed into sheer attentiveness. The angels get busy and pay curious attention to where all this is heading, because it concerns them. On the other side, dark, sinister demons who had long been sitting and gnawing their fingernails―they jump up, stretching their arms and legs―because, they say, [“]Here there is something for us,[”] and they have been waiting for it a long time, because the copy-people do not give them anything to do, any more than copy-people give the angels anything to do. This is what the apostle is speaking of when he says that the Xn does not battle merely with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers. That

•

1854

217

218

1

[a]

And, as I have pointed out elsewhere, ethical primitivity is to stake everything, to venture everything, first the kingdom of God.

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 127

•

1854

is, the life of a Xn runs so deep that it makes contact with existence, thereby gaining the infinite ideality to set both heaven and earth in motion. A Xn’s life makes contact with existence. He probably cannot be said to bring with himself a primitivity in the sense of genius, but he takes up, in primal fashion, Xnty’s requirement regarding what it is to be a Xn, and thus in no way does he obey that wretchedness: [“]One Must Take the World as It Is,[”] but adheres to what Xnty wants the world to be, Xnty, which is not a kingdom of this world precisely for the reason that it will never respect this [“]One Must Take the World as It Is.[”]

5

10

216

*

*

How sad I am, in a certain sense, when I write this sort of thing, because I have certainly never been one of those haughty spirits who look down upon other peop. and who are capable of taking pleasure in thinking such thoughts. Alas, no, with a sympathetic melancholia, I have loved peop., all of these many peop. I have seen―the serving maid and the manservant and the watchman and the coachman, etc.―I found such great pleasure in speaking with them, in greeting them on the street, etc. In one sense, however, I must say: Oh, why was Bishop Mynster such a spineless wretch! If only there had been something to him, I would not have been brought as far out as I am. I would have turned back, in sympathetic melancholia, right at the point that I came to represent what could be called Xnty in the interest of humanity. But perhaps precisely for this reason (because it was not for egotistical reasons that I wanted to represent Xnty in the interest of humanity), perhaps it was precisely for this reason that Governance has taken notice of me, has permitted me to be led farther and farther out, so that it will probably end with me being forced to proclaim Xnty in God’s interest. And what a different view of the matter one then gets, compared with the view one otherwise has! I

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 127

5

10

15

20

25

217 30

35

40

could be tempted (in sympathetic melancholia) to shout out to peop.: [“]You talk of a Savior of the world, but be wary precisely of him. It is true that he wants to save, that eternally truly, truly, eternally truly, he wants to save all, all―but beware, this [‘]all[’] is his majestic language,―and at the same time, he establishes a criterion of the sort that perhaps not one person in centuries can fulfill. All― yes, to be sure, all―but beware, consider the enormous number that the Divine squanders as if they were nothing. And you, on the other hand, when you hear talk of saving all, then you think of a couple of peop. here in Copenhagen, believing that when an individual is lost it is something exceptional.―You talk of ‘the apostle,’ but be very wary of ‘the apostle’! The apostle is unconditionally lost in the unconditioned; he does not see at all that he makes us hum. beings, humanly speaking, unhappy. No, being himself absolutely in the grip of the unconditioned, he speaks of blessedness and joy―but be very wary, keep a close eye on things: he speaks a godly language; what he calls joy and happiness is something beneath which a hum. being would writhe and groan. Beware―you believe that the apostle is sacrificed for you: No, he is sacrificed for God―it is God who tramples the apostle down― humanly speaking, kills him―which the apostle, in worship, understands as the highest blessedness and erupts in gratitude: [‘]Infinite love, infinite love![’ ”] And yet, this is the situation―yes, God be praised that this is the situation―that Xnty does not relate to the single individual as genius does, but that it is possible for every individual hum. being to become a Xn. It is frightful to contemplate the scale on which existences are wasted; but it is, after all, a consolation to think that not one single one is wasted without guilt. That is why I have always shuddered at this arrogance of genius, because the arrogance of genius believes that thousands upon thousands are wasted―but without guilt. Were that the case, it would be frightful: then there would be no kinship between a genius and other peop. Revolting! No, I will not let go of the idea of human

•

1854

219

220

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 127–128

•

1854

equality― ―I could never become that inhuman: I do, after all, find consolation in the fact that that no one is wasted except through his own guilt. But what I do see as necessary is for Xnty to at any rate approach its ideality once again. The infinitely trivial business of this nonsense about millions of Xns has quite literally made being a Xn into the greatest nullity. And yet when one additional person becomes a Xn, it is the greatest of all events, much greater than a European war that perhaps involves thousands upon thousands of people, all of whom, however, obey the law that one must take the world as it is―that is, as copy-people in whom there is nothing eternal. No: when one additional person becomes a Christian, it is an event. A Christian, that is, a person who relates unconditionally to the New Testament; who in primal fashion seeks first the kingdom of God; who, with the New Testament in his hand, ventures everything and is willing to suffer everything, saying: [“]No, my good world, I do not intend to take you as you are―no, here are the instructions for how you are to be.[”] This, you see, is an event, an event that moves existence, that existence takes note of―a deliberate change in the world, something that a European war can only be said to be in a very superficial sense, namely as a change on the map, not a change in the world such that existence itself takes note, such that hosts of angels and legions of demons are set in motion. Only when Xnty is introduced in such a way that it specifically does not obey this: [“]You must take the world as it is[”]―only then is the Xnty of the New Testament, only then is Xnty, introduced―in actuality. The swindles of Christendom are maneuvers on the common instead of on the battleground; Xnty is introduced in such a way that people obey this [“]You must take the world as it is[”], that is, it is introduced in such a way that people play at Xnty as people play at being soldiers.

5

10

15

20

25

30

218

Sanguis martyrum est semen ecclesiae. If this is an attempt to say that for everyone who is a blood witness, there will come more and more―who will not abandon their lives―then, from a Christian point of view, the statement is of course rlly untrue. It is precisely the martyrs who constitute the true Church―the others simply become the wrappings. But then what in fact grows is not the Church, but the wrappings. 34 Sanguis . . . ecclesiae] Latin, The blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church. (See also explanatory note.)

128 35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 128–129

5

10

129 15

20

25

219

35

•

1854

Already in these words, expansion is really the overly dominant idea. It indeed looks as if Xnty were a hum. cause related to expansion instead of being a divine cause related to intensity. But how infinitely easily a hum. being goes running off, so that he does not insist that being sacrificed has value in and of itself, but defines it teleologically: that it has value in preventing others from being sacrificed, so that more and more may come, and in the end, probably even that instead of being sacrificed, people receive money for becoming Xns―then Xnty is entirely transposed into the merely hum. sphere, and is precisely the opposite of the N.T.

. . . But then there is an eternity, where there is no cold of winter, nor heat of summer, nor violent storms, nor the thousand bothers of a thousand insect bites; nor what perhaps torments me just as much, people’s envy and narrow-mindedness and twaddle; nor what perhaps torments even more: well-meaning misunderstanding―no: there, what you did out of love does not look like cruelty―no: there it is understood, clearly, that it was love―blessed peace. There, what you did in humility does not look like pride, no: there it is understood, clearly, that it was humility―God be praised. There, what you did in self-denial does not look like crime and is not punished as crime, no: there it is understood, decisively, clearly, that it was self-denial―blessed reward: I require nothing more. Yes, that is how it is: but if anyone should come to read this, ask yourself: Aren’t these two completely different things: to be inflamed by the poetic beauty of such language, and to be warmed by the idea itself[?] As I have often said, there is something dangerous in the poetic gift, both for the pers. himself and for others―lest what ought to be transformation of character become an aesthetic flash. And yet the situation in Xndom is that people would view it as exceeding every requirement if every priest in the country were as eloquent as this―and if that were the case, it would not by any means follow that there was one single Christian.

221

222

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 130–131

•

1854

To Be a Christian is something ideal, indeed, it is the highest. Now, isn’t it madness for people to have come up with the notion that all hum. beings, by the millions, are supposed to be Xns[?] Take a much lower idea, that of being a poet―what would people think if the generally held view in the world was that everyone was a poet[?] And yet, what has happened in connection with Xnty could perhaps be done in similar fashion. Let the state hire 1000 civil servants whose way of making a living is to get peop. to imagine, to say, to proclaim, that they are poets, saying to them: [“]Just believe it, then you are one; just believe it, don’t go about trying to find out if you are―for example, by wanting to produce some poetry―no, no, just believe it, i.e., imagine, that you are one, and be very careful to refrain from any attempt to prove that you are―such ideas are temptations that will disturb faith.[“] And this, of course, is how Xnty is proclaimed. Just believe that you are a Xn―fill up your life with earthly busyness, never attempt anything from which you could find out whether you really believe; no, no, abandon, abominate such thoughts, they are temptations; just believe, i.e., imagine that you are a Xn―and make every effort to lodge yourself firmly in that imagined notion and it in you. This is how the lofty notion: to believe―in the Christian sense, to believe―has become imagining something―and this is how we have all become Xns.

Falsification. At various times people have raised a hue and cry about the falsification of doctrine, on some points, on many, on as good as all points. Quite possible. But Christendom’s forgery is far more dangerous, is lodged much deeper: they have falsified the concept: Xn. This is what the New Testament understands by a Xn: a swimmer who leaps out into the deep water in order to express the divine requirement that has been proclaimed to him, i.e., he steps right into the middle of actuality in order, first, to discover whether he has faith and, then, by practicing it, to learn to be a Xn. This, you see, is what God wants. As soon as someone does

130

5

10

15

20

25

220

131

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 131–132

5

10

15

20

25

30

•

1854

this, God in Heaven says: [“]Good, that is indeed what I have been waiting for, and just believe me, I shall not let you go.[”] But in Xndom, generation after generation, in these constantly increasing millions, this is what it is to be a Xn: an old ninny of a swimmer, a swimmer of the sort who does not want to go into the water, a society of such swimmers who let one another imagine―on dry land―that they are swimmers, but that leaping out into the water would be horrid presumption, would be to tempt God―something the priests drum into them, which is natural, as it is of course important to their business that no one leap out into the depths. And meanwhile God has been sitting in Heaven, waiting; he neither can nor will get involved with anyone who does not leap out into the depths, he does not get involved with anyone who, with the greatest of earnestness―plays at Xnty. Xnty’s guilt is rlly that of making a fool of God, of treating him as a fool, of letting him sit and wait in Heaven and then playing Xnty on the common or in theatrical buildings constructed for this purpose, which they call houses of God, and quite appropriately―if they mean it in the same sense as when one calls a house designed to protect one from a storm a [“]storm house.[”] No, God has no need of a house―the world of actuality is where he wants to be, the world of actuality where, in defiance of the New Testament, the law still is: One must take the world as it is. You see, of all falsifications, this is the most profound, far more dangerous than any falsification of doctrine. And this in turn is why no one wants to touch it, because people would rather get involved with matters involving falsification by the teacher because in that case the conflict is still about something objective. And indeed, the objective, the objective always conceals something subjective. No, the falsification is lodged in the subjective.

221

132 35

40

Spirit―Appearance (Phenomenon) God’s Nearness―God’s Remoteness.

God is spirit. As spirit, God relates paradoxically to appearance (phenomenon), but paradoxically, he can, in turn, come so close to actuality that he stands right in the midst of it, in the middle of the street in Jerusalem.

223

224

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 132

•

1854

Direct recognizability is an impossibility for God. His majesty is so great that the absolutely, utterly most daring imagination’s most daring invention for an expression of majesty as direct recognizability would not, after all, be suitable for God, whose majesty is a quality higher, and therefore only paradoxical; indeed, if he were directly recognizable, he would rlly be ludicrous.―If I were a German professor, at this point I would exclaim that I was the first person to draw attention to the fact that God can become ludicrous, item that paganism is rlly ludicrous insofar as in relation to God as directly recognizable one must say: [“]Either what I am seeing is not God or, if it is God, it is ludicrous.[”]―What is human has of course no analogy to the majesty whose elevation consists precisely in the fact that nothing that is directly recognizable can express it, but that it can only be recognized paradoxically. Were I to suggest a weak analogy, I would say: At certain times in hum. history, just at the point when everything is confusion, rulers have arisen who have ruled, if I dare put it this way, in shirtsleeves. This is a far more elevated majesty than an emperor’s direct recognizability; there is something paradoxical here: that the ruler is recognized by the fact that he goes about in shirtsleeves. From this can also be seen―to remain with this analogy―that if one thought of such a ruler subsequently setting himself up as an emperor who was directly recognizable, one would have to laugh (the comical aspect of direct recognizability) if he thought he had become something more, for he would have become something less. Thus God can relate to appearance only paradoxically, but he can also come so close to it that he can stand in the middle of actuality, right in front of our noses. Thus the law of God’s nearness and remoteness is this: The more the phenomenon, the appearance, expresses that it would be impossible for God to be present, the closer at hand he is; conversely, the more the phenomenon, the appearance, expresses that God is very near, the farther away he is. The more the phenomenon, the appearance, expresses that it would be impossible for God to be present, the closer at hand he is. That is how it is with Xt. And precisely at the moment when the appearance expressed not only that this hum. being could not possibly be the God-Man―no, when appearances expressed this, the peop. even denied that he could be a hum. being (behold the man!): then God was the closest to actuality that he had ever been. This, then, is the law of God’s remoteness (and this history is thus the history of Xndom): Everything that strengthens appearances

5

10

15

20

25

30

222

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 132

5

10

15

20

25

223

30

35

40

•

1854

places God at a distance. When there were no churches, but the few Xns gathered as refugees and as persecuted people in catacombs, God was closer to actuality. Then came churches, so many churches, such large, splendid churches: to that same degree, God became distant. For God’s nearness is inversely related to the phenomenon, and this increase (churches, many churches, splendid churches) is an increase in appearance.―When Xnty was not doctrine, when it was a couple of simple affirmations, but these were expressed by people in their lives: then God was closer to actuality than when Xnty became doctrine. And for every increment and embellishment, etc. etc. to the doctrine, God was distanced more and more. For doctrine and its dissemination is an increase with respect to appearance, and God relates inversely.―When there were no priests, but the Xns were all brothers, God was closer to actuality than when there were priests, many priests, a mighty priesthood. For priests are in an increase with respect to appearance, and God relates inversely to phenomenon. And thus, gradually, the point has been reached at which Xndom is indeed at almost the greatest possible distance from God, all the while maintaining that Xnty is perfectible, that it is moving forward. And this is the history of Xndom: distancing itself from God by strengthening appearance, or (as people say in certain situations: getting someone quietly, tactfully removed) the history of Xndom is: getting God quietly, tactfully removed by building churches and splendid structures, with a gigantic, monstrous doctrinal structure, with an immeasurable host of priests. Thus Xndom is probably more or less the greatest distance from God. And if I were now to say this to someone, I know that there is not one among those who do seem to concern themselves about such things (for those who don’t care about such things won’t have anything to do with me) who would not say to me: [“]Something must be done about it, then. There are definitely not enough priests in proportion to the population; let us get another thousand priests (excellent, in order to get farther away from God!) and some more churches (excellent, in order to get farther away from God!) and make the doctrine even more precise with the help of a permanent committee of priests and professors[”]― excellent, in order to get farther away from God. No, no, no: if you are actually serious about having God closer, then say death and the devil to the entire lying pack of priests and professors, who en masse produce an excellent commentary on the Bible passage: [“]Seek first God’s kingdom[”]―venture

225

226

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 132

•

1854

right into the midst of actuality, venture―at that very second, God is right there, oh, believe it, be assured that far more certain than that a doctor will arise from bed when he is called in the middle of night, far more certain is it that, at the very second someone ventures for God’s sake, he is there, right there, immediately―he, infinite love. So willing is he, infinite love, so willing is he to get involved with a hum. being, that he has written us love letters in his Word and has proposed to us and said, [“]Come, come.[”] And now he is sitting, watching to see whether there might not be at least one single person who will venture. And absolutely every hum. being can venture, and God is willing to become involved with absolutely every hum. being who ventures. But it is clear, that he, infinite love, he is also majesty, and he is―a connoisseur. He can see with frightful acuity whether a person wants to make a profit from him or whether a person ventures. Therefore, when a velvet-clad coward wants to deceive him with the fat flesh of solemn phrases about loving God, then of course God indeed sees with frightful clarity that such a man understands that passage about seeking first the kingdom of God in a very special way. But where is there someone who actually wants to venture―whereas there are hundreds of thousands of priests and professors who want to profit and who höchstens will venture a little bit if the profit could be counted on to be somewhat greater. But this is not venturing in Christian fashion. But where is there a person who will actually venture, who will venture with confidence in God and by virtue of the fact that God relates inversely to appearance―something that Christendom, as noted, does not seem to accept: it seems to assume that God relates directly to appearance, that where the appearance is greatest, God is nearest. Therefore, spiritual Xndom builds large, spacious churches for God, presumably so that he can have plenty of room. But from a Christian point of view the fact is that there is more than enough room for God even in the smallest space, to such a degree does he

5

10

15

20

25

226

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 132–134

5

10

15

133

20

25

227

30

134

relate paradoxically, inversely to space and location. One single, poor, abandoned, simple hum. being, who with confidence in God will venture unconditionally: there God is present, makes him, humanly speaking, even more unhappy, which God must do in order to be there―to such a degree does God relate negatively to phenomenon― ―and then people build enormous buildings for him, and people summon hundreds, indeed thousands, of priests and bishops, deans and professors to an enormous church council, certain that when such a gigantic body is assembled and sits there, costing the government unbelievable sums of money―that God is present, that he is there, closest at hand, his cause is advanced: and God relates inversely to phenomenon.

God―Appearance. To assume that God relates directly to appearance (if this were not at odds with God being spirit as well as with the entire outlook of Xnty) would also lead us into the difficulty of having to assume that this world is a nice world. The sensate hum. being who believes that this world is a nice world therefore also thinks that God’s nearness relates directly to appearance: the more phenomenon, the closer is God. But Xnty teaches that this world lieth in wickedness, and thus it makes sense that God relates paradoxically to appearance, only tangentially, as if to something one can only touch, though nonetheless intervene in it decisively, yet not in continuity with it.

God’s Majesty. It is what I have often said: The entire confusion in Xndom is rooted in our having lost the notion of

•

1854 [a]

227

The least possible of places or of phenomena: an unfortunate, solitary, impoverished, abandoned hum. being―that is the place for God, that is the degree to which he relates negatively to phenomenon; and if he is to be present in him, God must make this hum. being, humanly speaking, even more unhappy― ― that is the degree to which he relates negatively to phenomenon; he must have the least possible phenomenon, and then, in addition, he must negate that.

1

5

10

Conclusion of entry NB32:132 and NB32:133; marginal addition NB32:132.a can be seen on the left-hand page, and a lengthy deletion can be seen at the bottom of the right-hand page.

230

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 134

•

1854

God’s majesty, of what majesty of spirit is. Thus Xndom’s guilt is lèse-majesté: we have actually degraded the God of Xnty into having what amounts to a human cause, or a cause in the human sense, whereby he in turn is in fact merely a superlative of hum. majesty, whereby, again, the worship that he can require and wish to have becomes something different, something more convenient for hum. beings: busyness in finite matters, a struggle―in a finite sense―for his kingdom, though only as a kingdom of this world―instead of the worship that relates to the unconditioned, which undeniably is what is most strenuous for flesh and blood. God is pure subjectivity, sheer, unadulterated subjectivity―intrinsically has nothing at all of the objective, for everything that has such objectivity thereby indeed comes within the relativities. People have completely forgotten this. This is thus the source of the usual way of thinking in Xndom (which is rather close to the old pagan view), that minor things are of no concern to God, but that on the other hand, there are also things so important that in and of themselves, on their own, they must be of concern to God, attract his attention, interest him, if you will, whether he wants it or not. Both notions are equally unchristian. But I especially dwell upon the latter of the two, inasmuch as it constitutes lèse-majesté―the other one will be elucidated and illuminated in passing. The pagan believed that trifles are too small to be of concern to God; an individual hum. being is of no concern to God, but a people, for example, a people’s affairs, and the like: these are things which, owing to their significance, must concern God―this instead of the Christian view, that God is such infinite majesty that nothing can be of concern to him in and of itself, but only to the extent that it pleases his majesty. From this, in turn, it follows that the most insignificant matter can be of concern to him just as much as what we hum. beings would call the absolutely most significant matter, because what concerns him does not lie in the object, but in his pleasure―he is infinite subjectivity. The fact that, from a Christian point of view, the lower conception of God’s majesty is lèse-majesté, can easily be seen by looking at hum. majesty. Take the mightiest emperor who ever lived. It is entirely true that for him there are a great many things of which one might say that they could not concern him as such, in and for themselves―no, whether they are of concern to him depends on whether it pleases his majesty. But inasmuch as even the mightiest emperor is not pure subjectivity, but has objectivity in his world, he is subject to the law that situations, events, and

5

10

15

20

228

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 134

5

10

15

20

229 25

30

35

40

•

1854

the like could emerge so decisively and with such importance that they would have to be of concern to his majesty, whether he wanted it or not. You see, here lies the limit to his majesty, and you see, here it is lèse-majesté to apply this to God. And yet there are peop. in Xndom who are entirely of this view. The single individual despairs utterly over existing for God―but let us unite, form a group, an entire people, a gigantic undertaking― ―then, yes, then, in and of itself this does not concern God the least bit more than the most forsaken, impoverished, stupid hum. being―if it does concern God, it is only because it so pleases him. “In that case,” one might say, “couldn’t you hum. beings just as well spare yourselves the inconvenience of these great undertakings calculated to interest God―because God is interested only in what pleases him: he, pure subjectivity, sheer subjectivity, has absolutely no other interest except: what pleases him.[”] If a war broke out, not merely a European war, but if Europe were in a war with Asia, and then Africa, America, and Australia found themselves obliged to join in: in and of itself, by itself, this is of absolutely no concern to God―but that a poor hum. being sighs to him, this would concern him, because it so pleased his majesty, and this would move him subjectively. But now assume that all the emperors and kings of Europe issued an edict commanding all the thousands of ordained hirelings (I mean the priests) to pray officially for Heaven’s assistance; assume an enormous, united worship service were arranged, with 100,000 musicians, 50,000 bellows treaders, and a million ordained hirelings to pray officially for Heaven’s assistance: this is of absolutely no concern to the heavenly majesty― but if a poor hum. being, while walking down Kjøbmagergade, sighed to God from the depths of his heart: this concerns him indescribably, infinitely, because it so pleased his majesty, and this would move him subjectively. And why didn’t the other concern him, the enormous official noise that could be heard many miles away and that of course must have been capable of forcing its way up to Heaven―why was this of absolutely no concern to him, why? My friend, whatever notion you have of God in other respects, you surely do not doubt that he is what one could call a “connoisseur,” a fine connoisseur―he who is sheer subjectivity, and being subjectivity is precisely what is related to being a connoisseur. That, of course, is why people generally regard women (who, in comparison with men, are superior in subjectivity) as fine connoisseurs, connois-

231

232

1

a

with an edict drafted by the minister of state,

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 134–135

•

1854

seurs who have an immediate knowledge of how to differentiate between what is official and what is personal, who know that what is official is actlly shamelessness, a solemn way of making a fool of someone. Thus, what an infinite distance from God: an emperor whoa commands 10,000 hirelings to yell officially to God, what an infinite distance in comparison to a poor hum. being who sighs to God from the depths of his heart. But this true Christian concept of God does not at all suit the taste of the world, which, shameless as it is, wants, in addition to all other pleasures, to have worldliness stand in direct proportion to God―it does not want to hear said what Xnty wants said: that the relation to worldliness is inverse, that the only way to interest the majesty of Heaven is to be a poor individual hum. being. But only God knows how long the earthly emperor can stand that deathly silence, he who is perhaps accustomed to believing that the official yelling of 10,000 ordained hirelings has an entirely different significance, a belief that they naturally reinforce in him, inasmuch as it is of course the manner in which they make their living. For this, then, is how Xnty has been proclaimed in Xndom― and it is linked to the degradation of God’s majesty. Money, power, and the like are what decide outcomes in the world. Art and scholarship and those higher sorts of things must agree to bow before money; if someone has plenty of money, if he will make a contribution, then people bow before him, he is celebrated as a connoisseur of art, as a patron of poets, even though he has no understanding of either one. But one might, after all, think that the omnipotence of money would run aground on one thing: on Xnty, which was of course proclaimed in poverty, which praised poverty as blessed, and which taught that it is very difficult for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Yes, that was how it was originally; but when the ordained hirelings and the oath-bound tradesmen, the money-changers of Xnty, got hold of it, Xnty was improved in practical ways and it spread triumphantly over kingdoms and countries―and God’s majesty was degraded.

God’s Majesty―God’s Cause. As noted, Christendom’s guilt is lèse-majesté; we have degraded God into being a superlative of hum. majesty; this has been done by the manner in which we have served Xnty.

5

10

15

20

230

30

35

135

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 135

5

10

15

20

231

30

35

40

•

1854

Or: how is Xnty served in Christendom? Isn’t it served simply as politics? Prudent use of hum. methods, that’s how it’s served―ergo God is degraded: merely a hum. majesty. But where―when it is served like this―where is there the least thing that resembles Christ’s injunction in the Sermon on the Mount! Is there any thought here of it being blessed to be persecuted―blessed? No, suffering is precisely what people avoid by every means, and this is praised as Christian wisdom. People avoid suffering by every means―what they are avoiding, rather, is Xnty’s cause, or they are altering it in order to avoid suffering. Is this the commentary on [“]It is blessed to suffer[”]? For it is not written [“]You must put up with suffering,[”] no, it says [“]Rejoice and be glad[”]―it is blessed.―Where is there the least thing that recalls Xt’s injunction: [“]If he takes your coat, give your cloak as well[?”] Or isn’t Xndom’s commentary on the passage rather: [“]When you have taken someone’s coat, then take his cloak as well[”]?―Where is the least thing that recalls Xt’s injunction to be as utterly indifferent about the morrow as the lily and bird[?] Or isn’t Xndom’s commentary: [“]Studying theology is the surest way to bread![”] No, we have served Xnty precisely as if God were some hum. majesty who aspired to expand and become the mightiest: entirely in that fashion―that is, as politics. But God in the New Testament, the God of Xnty, is infinite majesty, he has not the least shred of a cause in the hum. sense of the term. Look, this is why he demands to be served in a different way, namely: by scorning the use of hum. means, by disdaining hum. cleverness, by being unwilling to accept hum. help. Naturally, the worldly understanding cannot grasp this sort of thing: this is a sublimity of which it has not a clue, a sublimity, an infinite sublimity that does not have a cause in the hum. sense. But precisely because God is infinite majesty in this way, does not have a cause in the hum. sense, he has no use whatever for the gang of politicians in velvet and silk, who have generously wanted to serve Xnty and serve God by serving themselves. No, God has no use for politicians, only worshipers can serve him. Worshipers―yes, and worshiping is precisely this: to disdain hum. cleverness because it is blessed to suffer for God. When Xnty is served in that way it also becomes something qualitatively other than what it has become in Xndom, where it has become a flat, trivial, ordinary cause, just like all other politics.

233

234

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 135

•

1854

From the manner in which Christianity was served in its earliest days, people understood that Xnty was something so infinitely elevated that the whole of existence―angels, devils, etc.―are interested in this event. On the other hand, a cause that is served by human means―in which one ventures no farther out than politicians venture―naturally sinks to the level of a bagatelle ad modum a European war and the like: some nonsense we hum. beings have among ourselves. The superhuman aspect emerges only when a cause is served with disdain for hum. means and hum. cleverness. But this service is in turn an expression of the fact that the cause one is serving is not a cause in the hum. sense. No, God has absolutely no cause in the hum. sense of the term, save yourself the trouble, God is not in a jam (so that it would be important that you work cleverly for him and his kingdom)―he does not aspire to expand his power[,] because it cannot be expanded. No, God wants to be worshiped. And to worship means simply to cultivate him in such a way that you look only upon him, disdaining hum. means. To worship him means simply that you refrain from the use of hum. help to avoid suffering― no, you look only to him and you find it blessed to suffer. But this sublime thing that is the Xnty of the New Testament: It was not convenient for us hum. beings, and, you see, this is why we have dragged God down into the muck, have built splendid churches for him, have countries and kingdoms full of Xns, which is to drag him down into the muck, for he is so infinitely more sublime, so sublime that only a disdain for hum. means corresponds to his sublimity―disdain for hum. means, which is the same as being willing to be sacrificed. Christendom, on the other hand, not only does not disdain hum. means, no, it imputes the same view to God: that he believes that these hum. means are what are to be used―Xndom, itself a spineless wretch, has made God into an ordinary, human, spineless wretch of a majesty. 8 ad modum] Latin, in the manner of.

5

10

15

20

25

30

232

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 135–136

5

10

15

20

25

136 30

233 35

Humanly speaking, God has no cause whatever. Eternally unchanging, he sits and looks out upon existence, looking to see if there is anyone who wants to worship him. To worship him is to relate oneself to him unconditionally. But everything that wants to relate unconditionally must eo ipso collide with this world―collide, because this world is precisely the world of the conditioned. Thus to worship eo ipso becomes to suffer―and to find this blessed is to serve God. On the other hand, the person who does not want to worship, does not want to suffer, does not want to serve God―he comes up with the notion that God has a cause in the hum. sense, so it is therefore important to get this to fit into the world of relativities, for which cleverness and hum. means are used―and this is called serving God. With this, people have degraded God and in addition make Christ into a dreamer, because he disdained the use of hum. means, the use of hum. cleverness, to avoid suffering (suffering is namely inseparable from the unconditioned and from serving God unconditionally―therefore hum. cleverness avoids suffering by transforming the unconditioned into something conditioned), and he was dreamer enough to enjoin his disciples to the same.

The Nourishing―The Consuming. When a witness to the truth proclaims Xnty, then this is consuming―of the illusions; on the other hand, taking away some of those illusions is nourishing, nourishment of the spirit. When one of the instruments of illusion proclaims Xnty, this is consuming―of what Xnty had previously been, and nourishment of the illusions. There are witnesses to the truth who are so intensive that entire legions of professors and priests, along with their families, could live by consuming

•

1854

[a]

235

Note This is an axiom: In relation to something unconditioned, or in unconditionally serving the unconditioned, suffering is unavoidable in this world, which is the world of the conditioned. One must surely insist upon this. Cleverness would like to make it appear that the cause is the same, except that cleverness knows how to avoid suffering. But this is a lie, the cause is not the same, it is not the unconditioned, because no cleverness can invent a way in which suffering can be avoided if one actually is to relate oneself unconditionally to the unconditioned.

1

5

10

15

236

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 136–137

•

1854

them. At the same time, among the instruments of illusion there are some who could very well eat up half a score of witnesses to the truth, to such a degree are they virtuosos of consumption, virtuosos in transforming spirit into illusion, suffering into enjoyment, etc. The late Bishop M. was not bad at this.

“Those Who Rent out Opinions, the Journalists.” (A. Schopenhauer) 1

5

10

[a]

Note In one respect I find having begun to read Schopenhauer almost unpleasant. I have such an indescribably scrupulous anxiety about making use of someone else’s turns of phrase and so forth without acknowledgment. But sometimes his expressions are so akin to my own that in my exaggerated anxiety I perhaps end up attributing to him things that are actually my own.

This expression by S[chopenhauer] is really valuable, and he himself has also understood its worth. He demonstrates that although, with respect to outward things, most people would refrain from wearing a hat, coat, and so forth, that someone else had cast off, this is not at all the case in matters of the mind. In this case, just about everyone goes about with cast-off clothes. The great mass of people naturally has no opinion but―here it comes!―this deficiency is remedied by the journalists who make their living by renting out opinions. Naturally, as he correctly adds, what they get in this connection is of the same quality as the clothing usually rented out by those who rent out masquerade costumes. Incidentally, this is quite natural. Gradually, as more and more people are wrenched free of the condition of innocence in which they were by no means obliged to have an opinion and are being forced into the “condition of responsibility” (it is every man’s responsibility, the journalist says) to have an opinion, what can the unfortunate people do! An opinion becomes a necessary item for every member of the enormous public, so the journalist offers his assistance by―renting out opinions. He works in twofold fashion: first, with all his might he drills in the notion that it is necessary for every pers. to have an opinion―and then, then he recommends his assortment.

5

137 10

15

20

25

30

234 35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 137–138

5

The journalist makes people ridiculous in dual fashion. First, by making them imagine that it is necessary to have an opinion―and this is perhaps the most ridiculous aspect of the matter: such an unhappy bourgeois fellow, who could have things so easy and whom the journalist induces to imagine that it is necessary to have an opinion. And then, to rent him an opinion that despite its insubstantial quality is nonetheless put on and worn as―a necessity.

10

138

15

20

25

30

35

The Unconditioned Beginning. Surely, what is most strenuous for a poor hum. being is to begin unconditionally as does everything relating to the unconditioned; but in turn there is the consolation that only the unconditioned beginning possesses: that one can begin at every moment. That which bothers peop., that with which they plague or extenuate themselves, both pusillanimously and probably also with a swindler’s cunning, is that they say: [“]Yes, a year ago, or a month ago, or if one thing or another hadn’t happened, I could have begun, but now I can’t.[”] And there is some truth in this when the beginning involves conditions. But as the ostrich can digest iron and stone, so does the unconditioned have this power to assimilate everything to itself―and then begin. Whatever it is that you think may block you―begin unconditionally: then that thing is a part of the beginning, it is no longer that which can block you but is that with which you begin. The unconditioned does not bat an eye, neither does it see anything erroneously, but if you unconditionally want to begin, it turns whatever it sees into the beginning. In connection with beginning unconditionally, what is important is what I have pointed out elsewhere: always to see the task. The person who practices this art can see that what blocks the way is precisely the task. And it is also certain that the

•

1854

237

238

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 138–140

•

1854

block and the task are one and the same, just viewed from different sides.

. . . . . If someone who had learned to write as we do, from left to right and, never having heard talk of anything else, saw someone else write from right to left, how could he get it into his head? Alas, and that is how my life relates to the lives of most people: Entirely wrong according to the generally held view― how, then, should I expect to be understood[?]

235

139 5

10

Spiritual Power―Sensate Power. To become and to be spiritual power is very difficult, plus it is dangerous. So people prefer what is easier and more profitable: to become sensate power by means of simple addition. This art is now being practiced more and more commonly, and it inflicts damage that will make it more and more difficult for spiritual power to prevail in the future. If in earlier times peop. lived out their lives, looking after themselves in a naive routine, it was easier for the power of the spirit to get hold of them. But nowadays everything is factions, numbers, sensate power. As the invention of gunpowder transformed the conduct of war, so, too, if it were possible, will this transformation―in which people everywhere are involved with sensate power―change the struggle of the spirit. But that cannot be done, for if spirit changes and becomes like its opponents, it is no longer spirit. Thus the consequence can only be that it becomes more difficult for spirit to prevail, for, as noted, gunpowder transformed war and abolished personal bravery, and so, too, does the hum. race tend toward wanting to abolish personality in matters of spirit, i.e., abolish spirit and make personality impossible, i.e., make spirit impossible. In sensate affairs the transformation was irresistible. If one nation conducts war with cannons, there is no help for it, so the other nation must also get hold of cannons or lose. People are counting on the same thing being the case in the world of spirit. If so, it will mean that spirit no longer exists.

140

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 141–142 236

141

5

10

15

20

•

1854

To Relate Oneself to the Concepts. Plato teaches that only the ideas have true being. Similarly, one can also, and more truly, say that only that hum. life that relates itself to the concepts―by appropriating them in primal fashion, by modifying them, by bringing forth new ones―only that life is of interest to existence. All other hum. lives are merely copy-lives, a rooting-around in the world of finitude, which disappears without a trace and which has never been of interest to existence. This holds just as much for the life of a bourgeois philistine as for, e.g., a European war, if it is not placed in relation to concepts―in which case the actual life is something belonging only to the individual to whom it is happening. But although that which relates itself to the concepts is thereby of interest to existence, such a life is of course also a struggle with demons and powers that do not otherwise disclose the fact that they exist. This was how being Xn was originally understood, but nowadays it has become something quite different, and being a Xn has of course gained the ease and relaxed manner and indolence reserved for everything insignificant, which this insignificance in turn regards as progress, without suspecting that spiritual scruples, and struggles with demons and the opposition of the whole of existence constitute an indirect admission―because existence is too old and shrewd to go to that trouble for no reason.

25

142

30

35

The Intensive―The Extensive. Rather than persevering, oneself, to the uttermost in intensively becoming a Xn (and becoming a Xn is related to what is intensive; the intensive is what God wants), people busy themselves with what is called influencing the others. And that is what people call love, despite the fact that, as has often been shown, it is self-love, namely in order to spare oneself. And people call it Christian earnestness despite the fact that it is―distraction, a distraction by means of which a person seeks to forget that he has himself deserted intensively, a distraction by means of which a person seeks to get God to forget that he has deserted intensively, a surrogate with which one helps oneself and with which one wants to render God blind.

239

240

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 143–144

•

1854 237

Double Meaning. Everything Christian has a double meaning, is a redoubling. And this is what is so strenuous as well as what makes having an understanding with others so difficult. To be happy or to suffer in the simple, unambiguous sense― how straightforward, how easy it is, to be understood by others. But that suffering means blessedness: here is something with a double meaning. One cannot of course complain about suffering if it in fact means blessedness―and one cannot be understood, neither when one speaks of blessedness nor of suffering, because the one is always implied in the other, and only that which has a single meaning can be understood straightforwardly. Incidentally, from this it can be seen that Christianity is designed for asociality, designed for blocking off the individual in relation to God.

The God-Relationship. The Sophists of course teach that being involved with God is sheer blessedness. The fact is that the world believes that for safety’s sake it is, after all, best that, after its fashion, it also include God―for he is of course a great power, and it could be dangerous simply to ignore him. But that including God should mean suffering (concerning which, incidentally, the Sophists had secret intimations, which is why they always have a bad conscience about their syrupy lies concerning God) is something the world does not want to know about―after all, a person can have troubles enough, so one would be crazy if one happened to get involved with God. The most sublime discourse concerning the relationship to God is that of the apostle. So perfect is he that he proclaims that to involve oneself with God is to be blessed―this despite the fact that the life of the apostle is sheer suffering. A truthful discourse on the relationship to God is one that proclaims it to be suffering.

143

5

10

15

144 20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 144–146

238 5

•

1854

The Sophists cook up syrupy nonsense for peop., concerning sheer blessedness upon sheer blessedness, getting paid handsomely―of course, the whole business is lies and swindles. But the screams from the torture chamber (the operating room) where the religious person suffers, dying away from the world― this is something the world does not want to hear; the world curses a religious person of that sort. Then the Sophist turns it into sheer sweets, and this is especially pleasing to the world.

10

145

15

20

25

146

35

The True Christian Collision happens quite simply like this: by no means does the world want to abolish Xnty―no, the world is not that honest, nor does it have that much character (and understood this way, in comparison with official Xnty, the freethinker is a dangerous man); no, it wants to have it preached falsely, proclaimed as Epicureanism, tending toward refined Epicureanism, proclaimed in order, with the assistance of eternity, to properly whet the appetite for enjoyment of this life. Of course, the truly religious person would not dare do this at any price. He must himself first learn that Xnty is suffering, agony, death-struggle. And then he is ordered to proclaim this―at which the world becomes as furious as if he were the greatest of criminals. Thus he is forced into this double situation: God, who compels or moves him―and the world, which mistreats him because he is obedient to God.

A Church Father in the 4th Cent. (most likely Basil or one of the Gregorys―in any case, the passage is marked in my copy of Böhringer) says: [“]and a martyrdom is impossible―because the enemies also bear the name of Xns.[”] Yes, quite so. There we have it. The problem lies in the untrue sort of dissemination. Even at that time, people with half an eye

241

242

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 146–147

•

1854

of course could not avoid seeing: We are no longer salt, we are the mass. Now, as for the Christian courage to turn the relationship around and to see that what matters is to demonstrate martyrdom by falling at the hands of Xndom―people did not have the open-hearted bravery for that. So it went, further and further, and with every century things become more and more wretched, more and more meaningless, with the nonsensical dissemination of Xndom. But no one wants to see where the problem lies. No, thank you, says shrewd worldliness, which has now really acquired a desire for Xnty and a taste for it, inasmuch as it has become the exact opposite of what it is in the New T: [“]No, thanks―we are certainly not crazy: this is indeed splendid, almost divine.[”] And the few who see honestly how things are―they are dispirited, they despair at daring to venture such a decisive step and turn―against Xndom, against that which, from a Christian point of view, is infinitely more dangerous to Christianity than the whole of paganism. But from a Christian point of view, the order is of course to turn toward where the danger is.

Divine Police Precaution There are peop. who (it is true, this is most often connected with their insignificance) have a fortunate gift of getting on splendidly with everyone; they have no sharp edges that could offend anyone, etc. God never makes use of such peop. If he is to use someone of this sort, he first frustrates his life so that he has nothing but misunderstandings with peop. For having been bitten by peop. is of service to a person if he is to be involved with God. God is no friend of the gemütlig gang of humanity―no, the sort of person he is to use is quickly blocked off. Generally, with respect to someone who has original significance in himself, God has no need of intervening later on in order to block him off from the others, because in his original situation, a person of significance is usually so differentiated from the common run that he is as if destined to encounter misunderstanding from people. This is a police precaution, but it is also love, indeed, almost like falling in love―this is indeed what happens in a love affair

5

239 10

15

20

147

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 147–149

5

240 10

148 15

20

149

30

35

•

1854

when a superior man falls in love with a girl who has the happy gift of living on very good terms with a great mass of cousins upon cousins, etc.―then he immediately disturbs and disrupts her situation, sows misunderstanding in order that the beloved not become nonsense. In my own case, I almost have to believe that the stroke of separation whereby a pers. is isolated occurred at birth―for me, isolation is as it were innate, and I myself have instinctively behaved in this manner, so my isolation is not something that God had to arrange for a pers. after he had become older―no, my isolation was assumed early on and is in one sense my own doing.

Man and Woman in Relation to the Religious In a certain sense, w[oman] is naturally better suited for genuine religious service, because a w[oman]’s nature is to give herself entirely.―But on the other hand, she does not explain anything.―An eminently male intellect, served in womanly subjection: this is the truly religious.―W[oman]’s devotedness essentially relates to interjections, and it is unfeminine if it becomes more. But on the other hand, an eminently male intellect is directly related to selfishness, which must be mortified through submission.

Service in Character―The Usual Preaching The former is the true service, but naturally is also the one full of danger―therefore it has been entirely abolished. Indeed, it sets its sights directly upon the peop. among whom we live, it sets its sights upon the world in which people live, addressing itself directly to them, attacking them. The latter sort of preaching transforms itself into a talking-about. See the difference: sit and have a private conversation with a man, and talk about how wretched the world and peop. are―he forms an extremely pleasant impression of you, because he naturally excludes himself from this and is therefore very happy to hear you talk about. But stand up, direct the accusation at him, and you shall see that it

243

244

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 149–150

•

1854

turns into something different.―The swindle in Xndom is thus, that, e.g., here in Denmark the state has engaged 1000 costumed hirelings, each of whom addresses his separate congregation by talking about―perhaps about all the other congregations, but not about his own―and this how it is all over the country.―Strictly speaking, this sort of preaching is really the formula for slander: speak ill of those who are not present. What wonder, then, that this sort of preaching Xnty is such a success. In the event that a preacher gets involved in combating something, one may always be sure that it is not present. What wonder, therefore, that he is a pleasant man to listen to.

The Transformation That Has Taken Place in Xnty with Xndom; to Enjoy―to Suffer.

5

241

150 15

A metaphor. At one time, learning to read was supposed to be a serious matter for a child; things were very strict. But gradually people came up with the notion that everything ought to be done voluntarily. So the practice of eating cookies after each quarter-hour of reading was introduced and ABC primers were supplied with pictures, and so forth. Finally, the quarter-hour itself was also abolished, and the ABC primer became simply a picture book. Nonetheless, people continued talking about learning to read―this despite the fact that the child did not learn to read at all, but understood learning to mean eating cookies and looking at pictures, which was all the more pleasant precisely because it was called: learning to read. This is how it is with the transformation of Xnty in Xndom, except that here, unlike the metaphor, “the teacher” also has an interest in this transformation, which he finds extremely convenient. People have transposed Xnty from suffering into enjoyment― and they refine this very enjoyment with―having it supposedly be Xnty, owing to the touch of holiness and earnestness this enjoyment takes on. People have transposed Xnty into the aesthetic sphere―into aesthetic enjoyment for the listener. And “the teacher” has transformed the preaching into a work of art (in artistic buildings― theaters, i.e., churches) and into profit.

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 32 : 150–151

5

151

242 15

20

•

1854

But, in suffering, to think of God―that this can be to love God, this is clear. But, in enjoyment, to think of God: that this is supposed to be to love God―is rlly to make a fool of him. To enjoy is to think of oneself, is to dwell upon oneself, is selfishness―and to do it while claiming that it is done to the glory of God, is either to degrade God into a hum. being who must be propitiated with fancy banquets, or―if one assumes that he is spirit―is to make a fool of God.

To See the Task. How different understanding is from taking action can perhaps best be seen from the circumstance that it is precisely at the instant a hum. being resolves that from now on he will see the task in everything, he will not permit himself to be disturbed by anything―that what he then fears most is that at that very instant something might happen that would give him the opportunity to act on his resolution. The resolution, the thought of willing something from now on, is like a very large denomination bond―a person is extremely hesitant to cash it in, especially because he is secretly troubled by a suspicion that the whole thing will collapse for him and that the great wealth of the resolution will dissolve into less than nothing.

245

JOURNAL NB33

JOURNAL NB33 Translated by David D. Possen Edited by Bruce H. Kirmmse

Text source Journal NB33 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Niels W. Bruun, Stine Holst Petersen, Rasmus Sevelsted

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 1

245

1

•

1854

NB33. Novbr. 9th 1854.

249

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 2–3

•

1854

247

2

5

10

15

20

The Price of Eternity (Buying and Selling). . . . . Of course, “Studenstrup” is entirely right that the city hall and courthouse is a very fine building, and indeed, at the pittance for which these upstanding men wanted to sell it, it would be nearly the most brilliant business deal possible. The only thing that “St.” has overlooked is whether these upstanding men are actually so situated with respect to the city hall and courthouse that they are entitled to sell it―for otherwise, even at a price of only 10 rix-dollars, it would be much too expensive. So it is with Xnty and with eternal blessedness. After all, that an eternal blessedness is an indescribable, priceless good is indeed certain―and as for the price at which the priest wishes to dispose of it: yes, there can be no doubt that this is an even more brilliant business deal than St.’s would have been. What gives me misgivings, however, is whether “the priest” is actually so situated with respect to eternal blessedness that he is entitled to dispose of it, or whether his relation to it is, in this sense, just like that of the two swindlers to the city hall and courthouse―for then even ten rix-dollars would be much too much. Probably it would be better, then, not to let oneself be fooled by the priest’s sale price, but instead to turn to the One who truly has ownership and control of the blessedness of eternity―but who by no means sells at a discount.

25

3

30

Temporality―Eternity. T. is the delaying, expansive element, hence relates essentially to chatter; eternity is nothing but haste, the intensive, relates essentially to action, character-transformation.

In the world of temporality it rlly comes down to being able to chat, to having a devil of a way with words.―This applies to the

251

252

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 3–4

•

1854

whole series, from the shopkeeper plugging his wares, the one bantering with womenfolk, and the agitator making repartee with the crowd, all the way up to being a poet, a speaker, someone learned―for that, too, is chattering, is not character-transformation. But eternity looks at action, at character-transformation. Every change involving chatter is of no help whatever in entering eternity. If a person who used to engage in passionate chatter now carries on holy chatter, it is of no help, makes no essential difference. But in temporality’s view, the trouble with action is precisely that it is so short―there is nothing whatever to chat about, no delaying. This, you see, is why temporality loves the poetical, for it is the lingering element, which does not become action, and erudition, which helps a person to shirk action. If eternity were to rule, there would be no verbosity, which is precisely what temporality loves―it loves appearances, and delaying, and chatter.

Hypocrisy―The Hearty Nonsense. In a former time, when Xnty was a horreur to hum. beings, the forgeries tended toward hypocrisy. One would give the appearance of fulfilling the Christian demand―but it was hypocrisy. Now that Xnty, in the view of hum. beings, has been reduced to anything but a horreur, now that it has become such a wellknown, good-natured, agreeable, decent fellow―now the fraudulences tend toward the hearty nonsense whereby one deals with the Christian requirement as something quite cozy, bungling it down into being more or less the life of a bourgeois philistine. Naturally, this forgery is the most dangerous of all―I wonder whether any of those Church Fathers who battled for the faith against heretics, or any of those who passed judgment on heretics, ever even suspected that such a thing could become orthodoxy.

5

248

10

15

4

25

30

35

21 horreur] French, horror.

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 5–6 5

5

249

10

15

•

1854

Bishop Mynster That M. can be said to have been as unfortunate a figure for me as possible was due not to the fact that he was not what I needed, but to the fact that he conjured an appearance of being what I needed. What I needed was a person of character in the seat of the bishop of Zealand―the misfortune for me was not that M. was not that, for that means little, no, the misfortune was that―by refining all his other pleasures―he cunningly managed to pass as a pers. of character, a leader in the government, even though he was only a Sunday orator and, what is more, a worldly-wise eudaemonist. As long as he lived, it was thus made impossible for me to attack him. For my accusation was simply this: he does not govern, it is a hallucination; he is as much of a journalist, a slave of the public, as anyone is. But to whom should I have addressed this charge? And on the other hand―I was of course fighting on the government’s side, so I couldn’t very well have weakened him. Privately I told him this; but what did he care about what was private? He was only afraid of the public, for he was cowardly.

20

6

25

30

35

Christendom. Assuming it was correct that we all are Xns, that the first person who passes by when I walk on the street is a Christian, in short, that everyone is: then the New Testament is the most laughable of all books, and God in Heaven is as impractical as can possibly be. For can anything more laughable be imagined than to invoke such motives as the punishment of eternity and the blessedness of heaven for the sake of producing this effect[?] Can anything more laughable be imagined than wishing to use a house jack to hoist up a pin―and similarly to use eternal damnation to lead peop. to the half-demoralized, half-agreeable fussbudgetry that is, more or less, simply what it is to be a human being? And that this can proceed in such a way that no one takes notice of it, that no one raises an outcry: yes, that is yet another proof of how insignificant hum. beings’ lives are.

253

254

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 7–8

•

1854

Christianity Is a Kingdom Not of This World. Yet it wants to have a place in this world―this is precisely where the paradox and the collision lie: it wants to have a place, but, again, not as a kingdom of this world. Thus it is in the New Testament. Of course, Christendom has not been able to assent to this, it was altogether too taxing; so people have either turned it into a kingdom of this world (Catholicism) such that the Christian collisions disappear and the direct recognizability that pleases peop. becomes the law; or they have transferred Xnty into hidden inwardness―an adequate form, if you will, for not being a kingdom of this world, but still not the Christian form, not the paradoxical―and they again escape the Christian collisions. It is easy enough to see that what corresponds to a kingdom not of this world, as a more or less adequate form, is hidden inwardness, for hidden inwardness is a negativity just like that “not of this world.” But then one once again perceives the paradox in Christianity, namely, that a kingdom that is not of this world still wishes to have a place―a visible, knowable place―that is, it paradoxically wishes to have a place in this world, all while constantly alert to ensure that it remains paradoxical, that it not be transformed into a kingdom of this world. Here one also finds an example of how this fits together with all of Xndom’s so-called progress. For all of this about hidden inwardness as the true form of existence for true Christianity, all of this that has indeed been proclaimed to be higher and truer than early Xnty, is quite simply something lower. Xnty, as it is in the New T., doubtless has hidden inwardness more than there ever was in Protestantism, but it will not content itself with that: it wants to have paradoxical recognizability, through which all the Christian collisions emerge.

Christianity―Rebirth. Xnty’s view is that what is pivotal is a qualitative transformation, a total character-transformation (just as qualitative as the change from not being to being, which is birth) in time. Every-

7

250

10

15

20

25

30

8 35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 8–9

5

251

10

15

20

25

•

1854

thing that is merely an unfolding of what the hum. being originally was: is not Christian existing. Christendom, whose interest is continually in eliminating the paradox (for this is the paradox: to be born when one is older) and, with it, the strenuous exertions. To that end, people have transposed the scene for becoming a Xn into the earliest stage of infancy. In itself, that is indeed laughable if the goal is to avoid the paradox; for once a child has been born, even if it has only lived for five minutes, a second birth―for a person who has been born to be born a second time―becomes just as paradoxical as for a man of forty years to be born a second time. But what Xndom has intended, and accomplished, is to eliminate strenuous exertions. People push the rebirth so far back in time that just as one might say of his birth, [“]I don’t know how it happened,[”] the same holds of rebirth―one doesn’t know how it happened. And with that a person is happy and is fortunately and well rid of all of the qualitative strenuous exertions of Xnty. It goes without saying that one is thereby also rid of all of Xnty’s promises; and yet Xnty rlly does teach that rebirth is eternal life, is immortality. By displacing the paradox, the result is that Xndom is quite simply the old paganism―decked out in Christian expressions and catchphrases. Confirmation helps only a little; for the age at which one is confirmed is still merely a phase of childhood, and it is almost laughable, on such days, to hear the priests dubbing the boys [“]little Christians.[”] My proposal is to introduce the custom of having the boys wear false beards and mustaches at confirmation―so that they look like men.

30

9

35

40

Hum. Empathy. A sufferer will perhaps have the thought: my sufferings and tribulations are so horrific that if hum. beings found out about them, everything would be empathy. O my friend, beware of hum. beings. If it is true that your sufferings and tribulations are of this kind, then beware of letting hum. beings find out about them; for given your situation, they would become so anxious and afraid of you that, instead of empathizing, they would defend themselves against you cruelly, cruelly seek by every means to rid themselves of you, so as not to be made anxious by such

255

256

1

a

, bearing;

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 9–11

•

1854

things, cruelly make your sufferings into your fault, so that it was perhaps even a “duty” to be harsh with you. Yes, Anti-Climacus is right in what he says about hum. empathy! Hum. empathy! Subtract hum. empathy from this rubric, subtract everything that perhaps is not rlly empathy but egotism, an empathy with what one has an egotistical interest in or one is egotistically interested in ameliorating, preventing, restoringa; subtract from this rubric everything that perhaps is not empathy but disguised envy; place an enormous NB by this rubric to mark that it is precisely in the most painful and excruciating cases that empathy even transforms itself into cruelty: and see for yourself how much empathy there is in the world.

Mk 12:34: You Are Not Far from the Kingdom of God. It was after the scribe had explained about the commandment of love that Xt spoke thus. From this we see that to love God is to relate oneself to the kingdom of God. This can serve as a counterweight to the swindling doctrine of faith that is heard in Xndom nowadays.

“Teach Them to Obey Everything That I Have Commanded You.” With these words Xt departs from the earth. Now if this were what one learned in Protestantism, particularly in D[enmark], then it would seem remarkable that Xt speaks of obeying everything he has commanded―it does not quite resemble our talk of [“]faith alone.[”] From this we see that Christ must associate having faith with a thought that is entirely different from the one that Xndom has hit upon.

5

252 10

10

20

11

25

30

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 12 12

5

10

253

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

The State of Affairs in the Established Order. Precisely this is what shows how fundamentally corrupt everything is: that everyone knows more or less clearly―but no one will say it―that all of them, guilty as they are to varying degrees, support one another like conspirators, keeping it from being said how untrue the established order is. From this it again follows that one single hum. being is enough; only one is needed―who says it entirely straightforwardly. This is the nemesis that looms over such dishonesty, the fact that one is enough―as long as it is said and heard, then everything is changed, then fire is set in the Philistines’ camp. But for this reason it can naturally be quite perilous to have to be the one who says this; indeed, precisely for this reason, the peril might be greatest of all. When battle is joined between clearer insight and insight that is less clear, albeit honest―the battle is rarely so very fierce. No; but if one knows oneself that things are going poorly, and if one does everything to hide it and prevent its being said―then it perhaps becomes the most frightful crime of all to say it. Take an analogy. Go to a merchant who believes he is doing well―although you know that he is bankrupt; tell him so . . . now, to be sure, it is not pleasant to hear that sort of thing, but he will surely concede the point. But go to a merchant who has himself long known that he is bankrupt, who has himself long done everything in every way, stealthily and cunningly, to conceal the fact that he is bankrupt―and show him that he is bankrupt: it will surely become a matter of life and death. The fact is that when knowledge is what is missing, then the truth does not, after all, become a charge against one’s character; but when knowledge is there, then the truth becomes criminal. The dangerous collisions in the world have never emerged where knowledge alone was missing, but always where those who were truly involved knew full well that they were supporting something untrue; and these collisions would become most dangerous of all when those who were truly involved carry a mass of hum. beings along with them―who, however, are to some extent lacking in knowledge, and accordingly are not entirely dishonest. My own life has already contributed to illustrating this. When in my day I took on The Corsair, was there one single person in the kingdom who had not said more than once, and said repeatedly in private conversation, “It is outrageous, the situation with

257

258

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 12–13

•

1854

that paper; something ought to be done!”? But―this could not be said in public. And behold, here is a study that focuses on the swindling aspect of human demoralization. Hypocritically, a person will say “It is outrageous” in private conversation, albeit precisely when it is ensured that, publicly, envy retains its victorious organ―and then a person becomes infuriated when someone else goes and says it publicly. On the other hand, in every generation there are men who are obligated―by their position, by what they count as in society―to witness against demoralization. But look, they have abrogated their duty―and so it became a crime, madness, that I said it publicly. But wherever it isn’t knowledge that is lacking, but where the problem is conspiracy (in which the most various people could be have an interest in various ways), there it holds that one person is enough: one person, that is, who says it. But this is also the most dangerous sort of business.

Will―Knowledge (Christendom).

5

10

254 15

13

20

Χnty, as it is in the N.T., is directed toward a hum. being’s will; everything turns on this, on changing the will; every expression (renounce the world, deny oneself, die away, etc., etc., item, to hate oneself, to love God, etc.)―everything relates to this basic thought of Xnty, the thought by virtue of which it is what it is: transformation of the will. In Christendom people have transposed all of Xnty into intellectuality: it then becomes doctrine, and all its concerns are directed toward intellectual matters. If this is not a swindler’s trick, then I don’t know what is! Anyone who has merely the least bit of human knowledge, item self-knowledge, knows full well that what puts a hum. being in a bind is transforming the will. And this is where Xnty aims its deadly attack. But Xndom deftly evades the blow―and transposes everything into intellectuality. But what an abomination! And imagine this performed by millions; imagine that children are being raised this way, so that a father in Xndom deceives his child about what is highest and holiest. 23 item] Latin, as well as, also.

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 13

5

10

255

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

It is frightful! When a person who is not a doctor is to be present at the dissection of a body, he is nauseated, just as is the [medical] student the first time he is to perform the dissection himself―but such a thing does not happen to the seasoned anatomist: and yet it can happen at times that a corpse is so repugnant that he, too, feels nausea. If a man of the sort most often found among people were to gain the knowledge a police agent has of a crime, he would be discomfited―but the old police agent knows no discomfiture on account of criminality; and yet it can sometimes happen that a case is so frightful, and so dreadfully all-consuming, that he, too, feels discomfiture.―I can truly say that I have an inborn genius with respect to criminality; I am also, after all, aged, hardened; but in truth, this matter of Xndom overwhelms me with its horror. That corruption in Russia, where every official was bribed―is only a faint analogy of this frightfulness in which every possible relationship has this lie mixed into it, the lie that we are Xns, that we have Xnty, all while we mendaciously call Xnty that which is the opposite of the N.T. How abominable that it must happen like this!―that if a hum. being in Xndom is actually to become Xn, he must first suffer the blow, that for a time it will almost seem to him as though God in Heaven were the most abominable deceiver―because ever since childhood, people have indeed coached him into a lie about what Xnty is. This is how the child is sent out into life: God in Heaven will surely help you; however things go, God will surely help you. And behold, in the N.T., the matter stands as follows: what God wills is that you shall love him, and this means that, humanly speaking, you will come to suffer frightfully―precisely because you have involved yourself with God. For what is the N.T.? A handbook for those who were to be sacrificed. What villainy, then, to bring up a child in this Xnty that is the norm in Xndom, and thereby to lead the child either to fool his life away in the same nonsense, or at some point to have to endure the horror of God appearing as a seducer who, at the decisive moment―just when a hum. being needs him most―transforms himself and becomes the very opposite of what people had mendaciously been presented to him as a child. But as stated, I am sickened―so much so that the impression overwhelms me―at the fact that, in the most binding relationships, those between teachers bound by oath and the community; in the most intimate relationships, those between parents and children; everywhere, everywhere this lie is there. Here, then, it is not a matter of a few scurrilous priests―no, no, it is a matter

259

260

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 13–14

•

1854

of those whom I both will and must call upright and earnest parents: they are involved, bound up in this criminal story: they cannot be wholly without guilt for this mendacity, this kind of Xnty in which the child is trained; for the true fact of the matter is that a person who truly became aware of the Xnty of the New T. would almost certainly refrain from marrying. In many ways, therefore, the false concept of Xnty is bound up with the fact that we hum. beings have wanted to get this world back, in the Jewish sense. But if the kind of Xnty in which children are raised were that of the N.T., the N.T. would have to say: that Xt primarily spoke of his death as a sacrifice, sparing others, and only spoke of imitation very infrequently and cautiously. But on the contrary, the situation is precisely the reverse: Xt speaks of his death as a sacrifice only in [one] quite isolated instance, and even then only in a qualified way; but what he actlly teaches is: imitation.

5

10

15

256

The Situation for Me in Xndom. That the entire proclamation of Christianity, particularly in Protestantism, particularly in D[enmark], is mad as a hatter, as my late father would have said―I see that well. But what I have continually attempted to do is to have this problem exposed, if I may put it that way, before God and hum. beings: Can one be a Xn without being a disciple[?] This is the problem that I would like put forward, so that God, if it would please him, could come to intervene, so that we could get a bit of truth into the matter. In one sense, then, I am in fact quite in agreement with the ordinary proclamation of Xnty: I hold that this sort of religion was thoroughly desirable for us hum. beings. But, but, but, I say―and here my plea begins―but, I say: to acquire it as is done nowadays, so that one changes the Xnty of the N.T. in order to make it a better fit for us hum. beings: No, that I do not want. In this, however, I will not be understood, and even this, my― to my way of thinking―so reasonable and modest suggestion can perhaps turn out to cost me quite dearly. For hum. beings think as follows: God is such a great power that in relation to him, the only sure thing is to see if one can fool him dexterously and then

14

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 14–15

5

10

15

257

•

1854

stand firm and act as it nothing has happened; to engage with God sincerely, honestly, straightforwardly, unreservedly is eo ipso the same as having lost, for he is almighty to such a degree that even giving one’s little finger is enough. And there can be something entirely true in this. But I will keep to my points. If God will not consent to the sincere, honest, and unreserved proclamation of an approximation to Xnty that acknowledges that it differs from the Xnty of the N.T. by an entire qualitative level, and that does not mendaciously represent itself as a striving toward the Xnty of the N.T. (for both of these constitute the lie in Xndom: that people call Xnty what is not Xnty, and call a striving toward it [i.e., N.T. Xnty] something that is qualitatively different from it and thus will never in all eternity reach it, because its striving is directed elsewhere)―if God does not want this, if I can understand that God does not want it, then only one of two options is possible: to abandon Xnty, or to do exactly what God wants.

15

To Live Comparatively.

20

The numerical’s law of existence is: they live comparatively. From this one also sees that the numerical is the sophistical, an expansive element that, when examined more closely, dissolves into nothingness. To have things just as good as the others do―that is called being happy. Whether this life of everyone is wretched misery or actually is a valuable existence―that is of absolutely no concern to the numerical―no, as long as one simply has things just like the others. To behave just like the others―that is the right thing to do. Even if that is as wrong as can be, it is irrelevant to the numerical, as long as it is just like the others, then it’s right.―To have the same religion as the others is to have the true religion, etc., etc., always this [“]like the others.[”] “Like the others.” This phrase also includes the two characteristic traits of being hum. in general: 1) the social element, the animal creature that relates to the flock: [“]like the others[”]; 2) the envy―which, however, the animals do not have. This envy is entirely characteristic. The animal has no envy because every animal is merely a specimen. The hum. being, by

25

30

35

2 eo ipso] Latin, by that very fact.

261

262

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 15–16

•

1854

contrast, is the only animal species for which every specimen is (ϰατα δυναμιν) more than the species, is individuality, destined for spirit. Naturally, numerus does not become spirit, but nonetheless retains this mark of its distinction from other animal creatures: envy. If the hum. being were a mere specimen, he would not have envy. But even the hum. being who degrades himself most deeply with the aim of reaching― particularly with the assistance of the daily press―the lofty goal toward which the race is striving, namely, the goal of becoming a specimen―even he would still contain enough difference from the others that, in comparison with the animal, he would distinguish himself by― envy. I say that the daily press, in particular, works with the aim of degrading hum. beings into specimens, and nothing is more certain. As rags in the paper factory are worked together into a mass, so does the daily press tend to scour off all the differences of individuality, all spirit (for spirit is differentiation both in itself and, of course, from others), in order to make them happy qua Numerus with this way of life, which is that of the numerical: just like the others in everything; here, in the flock, the animal creature finds peace and rest, and here the envy finds itself allayed. If the daily press achieved its lofty goal, it would be a question whether the numerical would not suddenly feel a need for there nonetheless to be some who were not entirely like the others―so that envy could at least have a bit to live on. In a certain sense, I could wish this punishment on the hum. beings: that the daily press achieved its goal and made everyone into specimens―a frightful punishment: a million hum. beings, each of whom was just like the others. One could present this in a cautionary tale and call it [“]Envy Punished.[”] The punishment, naturally, would turn out to be the most excruciating boredom.

5

10

15

20

258 25

30

35

Christian Courage

16

is (and this, after all, also corresponds to the fact the truth was in one hum. being, in Xt, in contradistinction to the whole race) the tendency alone, as an individual, to withstand the resistance 2 ϰατα δυναμιν] Greek, according to its potential. number.

3 numerus] Latin,

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 16

5

10

15

20

25

259 30

35

40

•

1854

of the numerical; it is conceptual heterogeneity or heterogeneity of character vis-à-vis the numerical, and its rank is higher in proportion to the greater magnitude of the Numerus, to the greater period of time during which it is withstood, and to the greater intensity with which it relates to a person. This moral courage in the realm of concepts, of truth or spirit, differs qualitatively from all other courage. To charge alone into certain danger, etc., as a brave fighter, whether it were against a thousand men, or against cannons―all such courage contains no conceptual collision at all. Christian courage begins only where concepts take part in battle. For this reason, paganism did not rlly know such courage. Paganism, like what is merely human, rests on the principle that the numerical constitutes the concept. (Socrates is an exception, the only one who understood that the task was: the individual against Numerus.) Χnty introduced the concept of spirit, and with that the collision was posited: the individual against Numerus, that truth can be in one single individual, one single individual unconditionally opposed to, in opposition to―all, unconditionally all. This collision is the most intensive possible. It also follows from this that everywhere this collision is found, there existence itself has an interest; for a concept, after all, is a spaciousness that can in fact contain within itself millions, indeed all. Hence the one who does battle in the realm of concepts, who wants to change the concepts: he does battle with the possibility of millions. And this collision is so frightfully strenuous: that these innumerable and in many respects lovable hum. beings should all, all, be in untruth. Alas, how hum. it is to prefer to give in and oneself become the one who is in untruth. But here lies the Christian battle, the Christian courage, with respect to impulses both of fear and of empathy. If I dared speak in pagan fashion, I would say that existence is like an enormous giant who lies perfectly still and finds amusement in hum. beings, much as we hum. beings can amuse ourselves by looking at birds or household animals―thus he lies perfectly still and amuses himself by watching the hum. beings play their games, that Ludvig and Maria catch sight of each other, fall in love, marry, become parents to a sizable flock, all fine and pleasant: existence keeps perfectly still. Yes, even if someone were so much more advanced that it pleased him to want to play

263

264

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 16–17

•

1854

the game of being regarded by others as the one who actually had to do with concepts (much as Bishop Mynster, e.g., played Xnty), existence keeps perfectly still; for it is not rlly affected, it is just a game. But at the very second one seriously touches the concepts― then existence asserts itself. And in order to defend itself, item to examine this hum. being, there is a collision: the collision as an individual with the numerical. And among all those who have actually involved themselves with existence and truly touched the concepts, there is no one, not even the most courageous, who has not shivered for a moment at this tete a tete with existence itself, and at this collision with the numerical in the battle of concepts.

5

10

15

The Arithmetic Problem. 100,000 millions, of whom each is: “like the others” are = one. Only when someone comes along who is different from these millions, or from this one, only then are there: two. In the world of numbers, what counts is: oneness; in the world of spirit, there is no counting, or rather, what counts is: difference, i.e., there is no counting. But this must be learned through practice, just as a horse learns to be steady under cannon fire. And this training is especially important for the cadet officers of Xnty. One must learn not to be frightened of the numerical, learn that it is nothing, just as the child learns not to be frightened of ghosts: behold, my child, it is nothing to be afraid of, it is nothing, there is no one there; or it is nothing, it is only the night fog―in this way one must learn not to be frightened of the numerical, learn this method of inverted group calculation, by which one can count the entire group, together, as neither more nor less than one, a trick like the one in which the tall thin man in Schlemihl takes the whole tent and stuffs it in his pocket. In “spirit” everything is inverted. In the sensate sphere one adds things together and it then becomes a large number; in the sphere of the spirit one adds things together and the large number dwindles away, like a mystification. For number is a mystification, the mystification that there is more than one. This 12 tete a tete] French, properly “tête à tête,” a private conversation between two persons.

17

20

25

260

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 17–18

•

1854

is a sort of mystification that one rarely thinks about: to mystify by disguising oneself as many.

18 5

10

15

20

25

261 30

35

Humility―Insignificance. Because Xnty continually lays claim to humility, relates everything to humility and humility’s tasks, mediocre insignificance immediately thinks: [“]This is something for me,[”] without considering that Christian humility, like all that is Xn, has a dialectical element in it, so that its humility has as its presupposition a pride that holds its head higher than proud humanity, but that then humbles itself again. Examples. “Do not seek after the high things, but hold yourselves to the low.” [“]Splendid![”] says mediocrity, [“]that’s something for me: I do not desire to become king, I am content with becoming councillor of the chancery, or a well-to-do bourgeois, a true Xn, who does not seek after the high things.[”] Oh, good night! Take a closer look at what Xnty understands by “the low,” and you will see that such seeking will, when one undertakes it in all seriousness, be condemned by hum. beings in another sense as the most monstrous pride, as arrogance, as a seeking after something that is higher than being either king or emperor.―“Do not take a seat at the head of the table.” [“]Splendid![”] says mediocrity, “I don’t long for such things, I am content with sitting more or less at the middle of the table or, indeed, closer to the foot―I am a true Xn who does not take a seat at the head of the table.[”] Wrong again. If a hum. being truly deals seriously with the humility that humbles itself unconditionally, then you will see that it will be condemned as the most monstrous arrogance, much worse than wanting to sit at the head at the table. As, in the fairy tale, where the stupid Gottlieb always makes mistakes, so, in all eternity, will mediocrity also misidentify Xnty. But it must continually be kept in mind that Xnty does not in fact relate in any way to the differences between hum. being and hum. being, differences of talent. No, no, no, it offers itself to every hum. being unconditionally. But it demands of him the passion of venturing all. “You just do it!” says God, and “I will do the rest.” This is why the Apostle James says: If any of you is lacking in wisdom, he will ask for it. And this is why Xt used quite simple hum. beings as apostles, precisely in order to avoid

265

266

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 18–19

•

1854

giving rise to the confusion that Xnty is essentially concerned with genius and talent. But “the hum. being” who is a trained swindler, or who has an inborn instinct for swindler’s tricks, he has naturally pretended not to understand this business of Xnty’s equality for all, because the part about changing the will, or the will’s change, that does not please him at all. So Xnty’s equality for all has once again been transformed into: insignificance. No, thank you! Certainly Xnty is equal for all in the sense that here, genius and talent are mere foolish tricks―and yet so far is it from being the equality of mediocrity and insignificance for all, that what Xnty demands (and what every hum. being is capable of if he wishes―and herein lies the equality) is so great and absolutely so rarely achieved that among scores of talented people not a single Christian is to be found, even though all have the opportunity to be capable of being true Xns.

The Numerical. Let me speak figuratively. Suppose that in the Latin language there were―and let us not skimp on the number―100,000 words that were declined like mensa; suppose that these words had the idea of commissioning a monstrously long roll of paper on which they were written, one beneath the other― all in order to impress a grammarian: Would that impress him in the slightest? No, not even in the slightest. Mensa, he would say, is the declension; the others and their number are entirely irrelevant; indeed it would be a waste of time for me to acquaint myself with this entire list―we reach the second declension only with dominus; but dominus is not declined like mensa either. In a dictionary, he would say, there can be a point in having this list of 100,000 words as vocabulary; but grammatically, no, not at all.―Or if (to give the analogy a slightly different turn) mensa had the idea of standing at the 26 mensa] Latin, table. 35 dominus] Latin, lord, master.

5

10

15

20

19

25

30

35

262

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 19–20

5

10

15

20

25

30

20

head of these 100,000 words―in order to impress a grammarian: would that impress him? Not in the least. [“]My good mensa,[”] he would say, [“]my concern is the declension, and you misunderstand yourself and your significance by imagining that you become more significant at the head of 100,000 vocabulary words that are declined like you. Indeed you are crazy, my dear mensa, if you imagine that one can stand at the head of something that is nothing; for grammatically the 100,000 are = 0. Hence you are not at the head of anything; that is just something you yourself make yourself and the 100,000 imagine, or they you.[“] So it is with the numerical. Except what is missing in the metaphor―and to that extent the metaphor does not work―is that in the world of vocabulary it is a matter of chance which word, which among these 100,001 words, becomes the paradigm. In the world of spirit it is not a matter of chance who stands for the declension; but those that follow this declension, the imitations, mean nothing at all. Yes, so it is. And yet alas, how sad that I should be the one who must say such things, I who, in melancholia, loved the multitude of hum. beings so highly, and alas, that it is the same multitude who have forced me, under the influence of Governance, into this indeclinability. But certainly, if justice is to be maintained, it depends on an eye for the qualities, an eye for who defines the declension, and complete indifference to the Numerus of the words, the perhaps monstrous number that follow that declension.

Laughable Erudition. Peer Degn says …. “and when it is bound in leather, it is called Aurora and is declined like mensa.” This [“]and is declined like mensa,[“] this is schol-

•

1854

[a]

267

After all, to claim to stand at the head of what is nothing is entirely the same sort of madness as when mad Meier walked around with a pocket full of stones and claimed they were gold pieces, boasting of his great quantity of money―that is, proud of owning what was nothing.

1

5

268

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 20–22

•

1854

arship―and it is entirely out of place, merely in order to display learned erudition. And yet, if one took a pencil and went through the books of even so capable a man as Dr. Rudelbach, how constantly one would run across erudition of this sort: [“]and is declined like mensa.[”] Yes, from a Christian point of view, the whole of learned theology is rlly a counterpart to this: [“]and is declined like mensa.[”]

Mk 15:39. The centurion says: “Truly this man was God’s son!” He has plainly misheard, just like all the bystanders, and believed that Xt called upon Elijah. And yet Xt is in fact saying something completely different. But is it not wondrous, gripping, that precisely Xt’s most suffering words, to which the bystanders, had they heard them correctly, would have had to respond: [“]Look there: he gave himself up[”]―that these words were misheard by the bystanders? The bystanders hear the words in such a manner that they regard them precisely as proving that he was God’s son. There is a deep, enigmatic coherence in this: for the very fact that he has endured in his suffering until its utmost point was the expression, before God, that he was God’s son. But what is miraculous is that those surrounding him mishear―and yet, in a far deeper sense, hear rightly. It is as though God spoke through them―by means of letting them mishear.

The Divine Punishment: To Ignore. That according to God’s conception (he who indeed is pure, infinite subjectivity), this is the utmost punishment, the most frightful punishment, I have shown elsewhere―item, that not

263 5

21

15

20

25

22 30

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 22

5

264

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

being aware of this fact leads one to the nonsense that when something succeeds, then God is not against it, which is why, for example, one could argue that all of Xndom (which is in fact the falling-away from Xnty) is well-pleasing to God―“for otherwise he would no doubt intervene with punishment.” People have no inkling of God’s majesty, and (although Xn) are entirely unacquainted with the fundamental Christian thought that he only punishes those he loves, that only his beloved ones become unhappy in this world, etc. But I have said enough about this elsewhere. What I wish to illuminate here is something miraculous―if I dare to put it this way―about God. One could in fact say: he is an omnipresent being―how is it possible for him to ignore anything, even the least thing[?] But consider, here, how it fits in with the fact that God is pure subjectivity. Even in relations between one hum. being and another, it is easily seen that it is no great art to ignore someone whom one does not see. By contrast, when the task is to ignore someone who is standing right before one, then indeed, only exceptional hum. subjectivities could execute such a masterstroke. And nothing is quite so fatal as when, despite being in its presence, one must endure and put up with being ignored by the superior subjectivity. So it is also with God. Even though he is omnipresent, he still holds power over himself to such an extent that he can relate by ignoring as though he were infinitely far away. But just as a superior hum. subjectivity who punitively ignores someone who is present―just as he can nonetheless be said to need, to the very same degree, the self-satisfaction of showing that he can indeed ignore―God, on the other hand, is such infinite subjectivity that when he punitively ignores, he does it so radically that the one so punished does not even truly come to notice it, which, in turn, from God’s point of view, is the worst punishment, indeed, even more severe than if the sinner had come to notice it. For according to God’s conception (and this one really cannot blame him for), everything, everything, everything revolves around being so happy to exist for him. The most frightful punishment, therefore, is when even the fact that he is being punished is hidden from the sinner. O, but what wretched misery Xndom has dragged your majesticness into, you sole Majesty! Nearly always it seems as though you are the one who needs us hum. beings, or at any rate that you, as sovereign, need us hum. beings―and thus is forgotten the

269

270

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 22–23

•

1854

degree to which you do not need us hum. beings, nor again how infinite your love is when you become involved with hum. beings.

265

To Relate Objectively to One’s Own Subjectivity. 1

5

[a]

Like Münchhausen’s dog, a greyhound that wore its legs down and became a dachshund.

Most hum. beings are whittled-down I’s; what was arranged by nature as a potentiality for being sharpened into an I is quickly whittled down into a third person. What is entirely different is to relate objectively to one’s own subjectivity. Take Socrates! He is not a third person in the sense that he avoids―as one who is a third person, and not an I, would avoid―wading into dangers, exposing himself, or risking his life. In no way. But when in danger, he relates objectively to his own personality: at the moment when he himself is sentenced to die, he talks about his sentence entirely as a third person. He is subjectivity to the second degree: he relates with objectivity, just as a true poet would relate to his poetic production―and with this objectivity he relates to his own subjectivity. Behold, this is a masterstroke. Normally one obtains one of two: either something objective, a piece of objective furniture that is supposed to be a hum. being, or a hodgepodge of random, arbitrary things. But to relate objectively to one’s own subjectivity, that is the task. Thus the maximum of what has ever been reached by any hum. being in this respect can serve as an infinitely weak analogy for intuiting how God is infinite subjectivity. He does not have an objective element in his being, as I have shown elsewhere, for that would limit him and place him down among the relativities; but he relates objectively to his own subjectivity, though this, too, is just a redoubling of his subjectivity, for in his being subjective there is of course nothing incomplete that needs to be taken away, nor anything missing that needs to be added, which is the case in hum. subjectivity, which is why relating objectively to one’s own subjectivity is also a corrective. God is infinite redoubling, which naturally no hum. being can be―he [the human being] can neither transcend himself so fully that he relates completely objectively to himself; nor can he become so subjective that he can bring to fruition that which, in transcending himself objectively, he has understood about himself. He cannot see himself unconditionally, completely objective-

23 5

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 23–24

•

1854

ly; and if he could do so, he would not be able to reproduce that view of himself unconditionally subjectively. 266

24

10

15

20

25

30

35

A Point of View for the History of the Hum. Race. If I were to express myself about this―even though I normally do not occupy myself with such things and consider it unethical to busy oneself with the history of the race instead of with one’s own existing―I would articulate the following point of view. God has only one passion: to love and to be loved. Accordingly, what has pleased him is to go through―existentially, with hum. beings―all of the various ways in which one can love or be loved: to go through loving. Naturally, he himself participates in this and arranges everything accordingly. At one point he wishes to be loved as a father is by his child; then as a friend by a friend; then as the one who only brings good gifts; and then again as the one who tempts and tests the beloved. And in Xnty, if I dare say so, the idea is to wish to be loved as a bridegroom by his bride, and so it becomes sheer trial. Then he transforms himself almost into equality with the hum. being, in accommodation, in order to be loved in that way; then the idea is to be loved by a hum. being as spirit―the most strenuous task. Etc., etc. Here are my thoughts: God is like a poet. From this it can also be explained why he puts up with evil and all the nonsense, the misery of insignificance and mediocrity, etc. For that is also how a poet in fact relates to his poetic production (which is also called his creation): he permits it to come forth. But much as it is a serious mistake to believe that what an individual personage says or does within a poem is the personal opinion of the poet, so, too, is it of course a mistake to assume that what happens, by virtue of the fact that it happens, has God’s consent. Oh no, he has his own opinion; but poetically, he permits everything possible to come forth, while he himself is present everywhere, watching, continuing to compose his poetry: in one sense poetically impersonal, equally aware of everything, and in another sense personal, establishing the most frightful distinctions, such

271

272

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 24–25

•

1854

as that between good and evil, between willing as he wills and not willing as he wills. Etc., etc. Hence the Hegelian claptrap according to which the actual is the true is entirely like the confusion of forcing upon a poet the words and actions of the poet’s dramatic personages as if they were his own personal words and actions. Still, it must be insisted that what makes God―if I dare put it thus―want to compose poetry in this way is not, as paganism believed, to while away the time, no, no, the earnestness lies precisely in this, that loving and wanting to be loved is God’s passion, yes, almost as if―infinite love!―he himself were bound up in this passion, in the power of this passion, so that he cannot cease loving, almost as if it were a weakness, whereas it is in fact his strength, his almighty love: that is how much his love is not subject to change.

267

10

15

God Is Love. This is Christianity’s thesis. There is a doubleness in it: God loves―and God wants to be loved. In equilibrium, this yields true Xnty: equally as much promise as obligation, always just as much obligation as promise. If a person were to maintain, on the grandest possible scale, that God is love in the sense that God loves him―and then, all of a sudden, came to see the other side: that God wants to be loved―then he would no doubt become anxious and fearful. Just as it can surely be grand for a girl of low station to be the object of an all-powerful man’s love, a man who loves her with all his soul―but nonetheless, in another sense, there is a monstrous discrimen when she realizes the seriousness of his passion in wanting to be loved: so it is for the Christian. In one sense, nothing is more blessed than this certainty that God loves him, as well as the degree to which God is love, that this is his essence―in another sense, nothing is more horrific than being drawn into this highest level of existence, where in one sense it is so frightfully earnest that God wants to be loved. Xndom, naturally and most comfortably, has wanted to play the game of hoodwinking God: God is love, in the sense that he loves me―Amen! 29 discrimen] Latin, difference, separation; decisive test, criterion.

25

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 26–27

268

26

5

10

15

20

27 25

30

35

•

1854

Christendom. So far is Christendom from being a society of Xns that, as I have shown elsewhere, it is in fact a falling-away from Xnty. And, if one observes it closely, Xndom will reveal itself to be such a state of demoralization that all the other religions manage to put forth a better appearance. Yet this is not so inexplicable, for Xndom is demoralized by means of leniency, grace, the promise, God is love, etc. The other religions do not have this leniency in themselves; they have more of the rigor of the Law, and thus the demoralization never runs so deep. No: demoralization by means of leniency, that is the deepest. Let me make a comparison. If one becomes fat and gross by eating overmuch food―now, that is basically an unhealthy obesity. But if one gets fat from cake and sweets―pasty fat―that is frightful. So it goes with Xndom’s demoralization. Even within hypocrisy, there are differences. To be hypocritical in the face of the Law’s rigor―that is hypocrisy; but to be a hypocrite in the face of grace: that is infinitely more detestable. To be defiant toward what is hard on me, that is surely sin; but to make a mockery of love, that is detestable.

Playing at Xnty. As I see from the newspapers, the widow of the now-deceased Russian General-Adjutant of Marines has been inducted by the Tsarina into the Ladies of the Order of the Great Martyr Catharine, Second Class. Hold on a moment! First of all, Catherine has apparently been promoted to being a great martyr. Great martyr: what does that mean? It is nonsense―though, naturally, the intention is to broaden the rubric of martyr to the point that everyone can fall under it. Then an actual martyr is promoted and called Great Martyr; perhaps there is an even higher class: Privy, General, or ober hof Great Martyresses. 35 ober hof] German, upper court; normally Oberhof-, used as a prefix in the titles assigned to high officials in the royal court, e.g., Oberhofprediger, High Court Preacher.

273

274

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 27–28

•

1854

Second: that an order is founded, an order for noble ladies― who, note well, do not themselves become martyrs, quite the opposite―who decorate themselves with a certain kind of ribbon or the like, and thereby can make an even more pompous appearance in the most exclusive salons. Third: of the “Second Class.” So there are multiple classes! See here: this is an example of playing at Xnty (as if all Xndom were anything other than that). What keeps hum. beings busy is continually broadening the concepts to such a degree that they become childishness, quite the opposite of earnestness: hair-splitting fussiness. O, how frightfully true, what Xt says, that those who build tombs for the prophets are just as guilty as those who killed them―to me, they seem worse; to me, there seems more hum. feeling in the rage that rises up and kills than in this bestial aping that comes up with the idea of decking oneself out on the occasion of a martyr’s death, and then, so bedecked, is celebrated and distinguished in society. The shriek of the martyr in the moment of death―that must sound terrifying to his murderer; but to me it seems that it must sound even more terrifying amid this vile childish nonsense that so shamefully turns him to account.

Playing at Xnty. The more I examine it, the clearer it becomes to me that Xndom’s guilt is actually the following: that instead of what the N.T. understands by Xnty, it has come up with―playing at Xnty, and of course, as with the hum. imagination: it can be daring, inexhaustible. All playing at Xnty is recognizable by its splitting things up so that in practical life, in the actual world, it lets them go as they are wont to go―and then one is a Xn. What God wished with Xnty was a transformation of the world, though surely a transformation of the actual, practical world. To that end, he let his will be proclaimed, and he said something like this: Now begin―I am sitting and waiting, willing to involve myself with you. Now, everyone who is such a Xn that he says: [“]In hidden inwardness, or on Sundays in church, there I summon forth these

5

269

10

15

20

28

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 28–29

5

270 10

•

1854

lofty conceptions; but in practical life―this I know very well― there, things do not go that way, and so in practical life I act just as the practical world does[”]: He is playing at Xnty, and is making a fool of God. For to make a fool of God is to let him sit and wait, willing to intervene―when, note well, the Xn actually ventures forth. O, when at times it is said of a child that he keeps on playing for too long―then, at most, we are talking about a year or two, and the child is, after all, just one person; but that this can go on like this to the point that, for centuries, Xnty is being played at by millions: this is frightful. The proportions of existence are so frightful that one becomes dizzy―fortunately, therefore, with respect to Christianity, the individual has only to do this: to look after himself.

15

29

20

25

30

35

Playing at Xnty. What is decisive for being Christian is the medium in which you are one. To be a Christian in the medium of imagination (hidden inwardness―the artistic Sunday ceremoniousness, etc.) is:―playing at Xnty. Being it [a Christian] in the world, which Xnty calls the evil, sinful world, this actual world: this is to be Xn in the N.T.’s sense. The N. Testament of course predicts what the result of this will be: suffering. But on the other hand: according to the N.T., God is also willing to intervene, to help, albeit in accordance with the grand criterion he always uses and that makes it so demanding for us hum. beings. But God will not be played for a fool; least of all does he wish that playing him for a fool should be called Xnty. God, who himself is actuality, wishes that the scene for being Xn be this actual world. An analogy: when a swimming teacher himself leaps out into the deep water, and then says to the learner that he will surely help him, that he should not be afraid, then the teacher expects one thing: that the learner will leap out into the deep water. If he

275

276

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 29–32

•

1854

instead comes up with the idea of walking out into the shallow water and playing at swimming―that is to make a fool of the swimming teacher, who is lying and waiting out in the deep water. 5

To Dare. People imagine that refraining from daring is modesty, that it must be pleasing to God as humility. No, no: not to dare is to make a mockery of God―for he is waiting simply for this: that you should dare. It is this, after all, that he has proclaimed to you in Christianity―that he is waiting.

30

10

271

God Is Love. When I have said that there is a doubling: that he loves a hum. being, and that he wants to be loved―with regard to the latter it must certainly be remembered that it, too, is a part of the definition of his love for a hum. being, inasmuch as God knows that coming to love God properly is the highest blessedness for a hum. being. Naturally, no such thing obtains in a love relationship between hum. being and hum. being, which explains the egotistical element in wanting to be loved: for of course it is not the case that, for the other party, coming to love this hum. being constitutes the greatest happiness and benefaction.

31

15

20

25

The Medium for Being a Christian The Situation

Ventriloquism is, after all, speaking in such a way that it cannot be determined who the speaker is, so that the speaking is indeed heard, but as if it did not come from anywhere, as if there were no speaker.

32

30

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 32

5

10

15

272

25

30

35

40

•

1854

But in a far deeper sense, all speaking with the mouth is also―a kind of ventriloquism, something indeterminate. What can deceive a person is that there is in fact a definite visible figure using his mouth. But be quite careful: language is an abstraction. In order for speaking actually to become hum. speech in a deeper sense, or speech in the sense of the spirit, there must be something else in relation to being the speaker; two points must be determined. The one is the speech, the words; the other is: the situation. The situation is thus decisive in determining whether or not the speaker is in character with what he says, or the situation decides whether the speaking is aimless babbling, a speaking that does not come from anywhere, which, in deeper sense, characterizes all speaking is that is situationless. And yet, precisely this situationlessness is what negatively characterizes all Xndom and makes all its Christian confession into something imaginary, ventriloquism, so that actually one could just as well use a machine. But this is the shirking that is so common among hum. beings: to say what needs to be said― ―but to flee from the situation. I once knew a man who participated in public life, was a member of popular assemblies, but who almost never spoke. He got by with telling his neighbor what should be said at the assembly. That is lack of character owing to lack of situation. And so it is with Xndom. According to Christianity, to confess Xt is to do so in the situation that Xnty assigns to it: the actual world. To confess Xt is not to say it on Sunday in a quiet hour, or in private conversation in the safety of the living room, etc., etc. And what makes things no better is the barefaced pretension that one is of course merely stating objectively what Christianity is. To say it objectively―this is another attempt at ventriloquism, for it is to speak in such a way that it becomes unrecognizable who the speaker is, [it] is to mystify one’s I beneath the disguise of being a third person or an abstract I. An illustration. There is a particular word―to say it to the tyrant is deadly dangerous. What does one do, then? One plays the game―saying the word, yes, indeed―but not to the tyrant. That is how children play―and that is also how these profound men of seriousness, such as Bishop M., etc., are Christians.

277

278

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 33

•

1854 Ventriloquism

1

[a]

“Personality” is derived from sound (personare); in another sense, one could call personality transparency.

2 personare] Latin, lit. “to sound through.” (See also explanatory note.)

It occurs to me that if humankind brought it to the point that everyone was a virtuoso at ventriloquism: how pleasing that invention would be to a person―wouldn’t that anonymity satisfy him! It is indeed the case that the inventions that truly please humanity are either along the lines of the race’s rebelliousness against God (the Tower of Babel, railroads, the mass aspect), or, insofar as the invention relates to the individual, are the inventions that satisfy boyishness. Boyishness. Yes, there are schoolboys who take great amusement in being able to get something said in a manner that makes it impossible for the teacher to discover who the speaker is. The boyish element relates to the impersonal. And the impersonal is what pleases humanity, that is, being personally impersonal, being a person but without any danger or responsibility, perhaps being a testy, malicious person, venting all one’s spleen―but anonymously, or by means of ventriloquism. And, for a hum. being, salvation consists precisely in becoming a person. Yes, one could certainly establish as a rule that the one who becomes a personality, the one who succeeds in getting that far, he is ordinarily saved. And why? Because he is so illuminated that he is unable to hide from himself, indeed the illumination is such that it is as if he were transparent. After all, in civic life people are in fact of the opinion that gas lighting at night helps prevent a great deal of evil, because light, brightness, frightens away evil: and now imagine the illumination of being a personality, light everywhere. But humanity naturally loves the twilight, the impersonal. When it becomes all too bright, matters easily become all too serious for him, particularly if the light is not vacillating but constant, not with some light hours followed by twilight and darkness, but uninterrupted light and with the highest degree of clarity.

33

5

10

273 15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 34

34

5

10

274 15

20

25

30

35

40

The State That in a Christian sense it should be as was taught by Hegel―that the state has moral significance, that true virtue can make its appearance only in the state (which I also childishly mimicked in my dissertation), that the goal of the state is the ennoblement of humankind, etc.―this, naturally, is nonsense. The state is more an evil than a good: more a necessary evil, and in a certain sense a profitable and expedient evil, than a good. The state is hum. egotism on a grand scale: that is how far Plato was from being right in holding that we can become aware of the virtues by studying them within the state. The state is hum. egotism on a grand scale, marshaled quite effectively and shrewdly, so that the egotisms of individuals intersect and correct each other. In that sense, the state is certainly a bulwark against egotism―by exhibiting a higher egotism that overpowers all the individual egotisms, so that, egotistically, they are compelled to understand that, egotistically speaking, the most prudent thing is to live in the state. Just as one speaks of the calculus of infinitesimals, so, too, the state is the calculus of egotisms, but always in such a way that, egotistically, it turns out to be shrewdest to enter into, and to be in, this higher egotism. But this is of course anything but the moral renunciation of egotism. And the state extends no farther than this. Therefore, being improved by means of living in the state is just as dubious as being reformed in a reformatory. In the state, one may perhaps become much much shrewder with respect to one’s egotism, one’s enlightened egotism, i.e., one’s egotism in relation to other egotisms; but one does not become less egotistical, and what is worse, one develops the bad habit of regarding this official, civic, authorized egotism as―virtue. This is how demoralizing life in the state

•

1854

279

280

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 34

•

1854

is, because it makes one feel comfortable in being a shrewd egotist. Higher than this the state does not reach. And when regarded as moral upbringing and development, one must really call it very dubious. And thus the state is continually subjected to the same sophistry with which the Greek Sophists were also so occupied: that injustice on a grand scale is justice, that in a quite curious manner, the concepts reverse themselves or turn over, that what really matters is doing things on a grand scale. Furthermore, the state is continually subject to the skeptical notion that the numerical determines the concept, that the greatest number is the truth. And then the state was supposed to be calculated to develop hum. beings morally, to be the proper medium for virtue, the place in which one can properly become virtuous! In truth, it is just as dubious a place for that purpose as if one were to claim that the best place for a watchmaker or for someone who is to engrave something, is aboard a ship in heavy seas. Christianity is, accordingly, not of the view that the Christian should remain in civil society in order to be morally ennobled―no, on the contrary: it prophesies to him that it means that he will come to suffer. But in the language of swindlers, of course, it is said that the state is morally ennobling―and thus we are completely secured against anyone suspecting that the authorized egotism is not in fact virtue. On the whole, it can never be sufficiently emphasized that the immediate, the uncultivated, the rash, etc., is never as corrupted as is what is shrewd. An uninhibited rake who conducts himself with ungoverned wantonness is perhaps not nearly as corrupted as one who is lecherous while observing― decorum. A sinner who, as the expression goes, fleeces another hum. being, is perhaps not nearly as corrupted as one who knows exactly how much one dares to cheat another while still preserving the respect and esteem befitting a highly respectable man.

5

10

15

20

25

275 30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 35–36

35

5

36

15

20

The Numerical. Much as the hum. being cannot endure uninterrupted labor, but has a need for diversion: thus the numerical is diversion, a relief. What is backward is that people have made― diversion into seriousness.

The Problem I could be tempted to pose the problem as follows: Is it at all possible for a hum. being, without failing in one way or another to endure the act of separation that is the condition for becoming a Xn in the N. Testament’s sense; is it possible, without failing in one way or another, for a hum. being to be separated even more forcefully than death separates, to be separated by having to die away and then to live; is it possible to endure being before God at every moment? And then we have Xns by the millions!

•

1854

281

282

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 37

•

1854

State. State Church.

1

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

[a]

Note. So it was established by the state as a kind of eternal basic principle that every child is more or less born a Christian. Much as the state undertook, on behalf of the Christians, (si placet) to take care of the matter of eternal blessedness, so, too, in order to complete the whole business, it also undertook to produce: Xns. And just as machines make it possible to work on a larger scale, not to mention more accurately, than by hand, so, too, the state has delivered, generation after generation, an assortment of Xns, all with the state’s factory label, where each Christian is so entirely like all the others―so alike that the heart of every factory owner must leap at the sight of the matchless heights of accuracy to which the art has been pushed. In Xnty, the point is that the hum. being is spirit, and spirit is difference in itself; Xnty’s infinitely lofty thought is that every Christian becomes Xn in different ways and fashions―always difference, which is precisely what God wants, he who (a despiser of all mimicry, which is spiritlessness) is inexhaustible in differentiating. So the state took control of Xnty, and the point of being a Xn became: the greatest possible uniformity

6 si placet] Latin, lit. “if it pleases,” if you will.

Given that the state, as noted, is the higher egotism or, rather, the individual egotism’s calculus and reflection in egotism, it can easily be seen that when Xnty was overtaken by the state, it fell into good hands. And how comical that this―whose point is numbers―has taken it upon itself to look after that whose point is single individuals. Inasmuch as the higher egotism has overtaken Xnty, it has surely regarded the matter as follows: If within society there are individuals who stubbornly claim to be the true Xns, in contrast to others, it has to be viewed as punishable egotism, which it is my―the state’s―task to persecute, for I am a despiser of all egotism and strive to root it out (with the aid of a higher egotism). To want to be a Xn in that way is a lack of civic spirit and civic virtue, for the good citizen does not wish to have anything for himself, but everything in common. Naturally, such hum. beings are to be regarded as criminals. Now, because their guilt does not touch upon the highest good in society―money and the security of property―the utmost degree of severity is thus not required. But they ought to be punished nonetheless. In general, the fact that individuals would prefer to occupy themselves with specific personal affairs is in itself a crime and is and remains a source of disorder and misbehavior in the state. The state assumes control of Xnty and then requires (in its subjects’ true best interests, which the state always protects), also for the sake of order, that all be equally Xns―a requirement it emphatically intends to uphold. So much for the state. But the egotisms that found repose in the state’s takeover of Xnty and entirely assented to it, surely reasoned as follows. To want to be a Xn under contentious conditions―i.e., under the condition of having to suffer for the doctrine―is misunderstood egotism. To be sure, this egotism can take satisfaction in the fact that of course the others will thus be damned, but nonetheless it is a misunderstood egotism. One can

276

37

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 37

•

1854

Journal NB33, entry NB33:37 with marginal note NB33:37.a.

283

Journal NB33, continuation of entry NB33:37 and marginal note NB33:37.a.

286 1

5

10

15

of the factory product. Strangely enough, by the way, Xnty’s God and the state do have one thought in common: both wish to retain oversight―which of course is the ruler’s task. But the fact is that God, as the infinite concretion, maintains oversight with infinite ease: when he permits difference, he is not afraid of losing oversight―no, he expresses his majestic security precisely by being able to maintain oversight while wanting to have difference everywhere. The state, which is not entirely secure, wishes to have the greatest possible uniformity―for the sake of oversight.

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 37

•

1854

also pay too dear a price for gold. No, by a reasonable estimate of the relation between egotisms, it can be seen that the shrewdest egotism for us all is: We are all Xns. And so it is that, in order to prevent all further bickering, the only correct course of action is for the state to assume control of Xnty. That, after all, is why we have the state. When it assumes control, there is an end to the bickering―and what is more, everything will be better provided for. One can in fact see this in every possible situation. Suppose the streets are to be illuminated at night―now each individual householder, or by pairs in concert, could certainly have a lamp and provide for it themselves: but that system would go badly; no, let the state take it over, and then we will pay a set fee. In the same way, it is also proper for the state to take over Xnty, take over the matter of eternal blessedness, and then we will pay a set fee. What is more, this provides a measure of safety and thus has a calming effect. Eternity, after all, is like a different part of the world; and to have to make one’s way there as an individual person, to involve oneself with a world―no, that’s not a task for an individual person. We can also see this in other situations: Suppose a man here in Den[mark] were so unlucky as to have a court case in Italy: that is more or less the same thing as losing it, for it is one individual man against an entire country. It would be different if he were to be lucky enough to get Denmark to take an interest in the case through diplomatic channels; then it would work out, and why?―because then it would be country against country. And similarly with eternal blessedness: the matter is too serious to be taken care of by an individual (Xnty’s view is certainly that its seriousness is precisely that it shall be taken care of by the individual, as the matter is too serious to be taken care of by an abstraction). No, let the state take over the matter; let it vouch for our being Xns and guarantee that blessedness is surely ours: this is indeed a reassurance. The alternative is so horrific: to imagine that an individual hum. being, a man here in town, an individual―and then, this monstrosity: another world―it would be

280 5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 37–39 impossible to prevail. But the state: that is something, that is a power; if it provides a guarantee, we will surely find a way.

281

38

10

15

39

20

25

30

To See God Is to Die. (To Die Away).

What paganism and also Judaism spoke of, that to see God is to die, or at any rate to become blind, mute, and the like: Xnty expresses this ethically as a task: to die away is the condition for seeing God. In both situations, the expression of majesty is that one cannot see God in the same sense as everything else, one cannot live out one’s life and see Peter and Paul―and God as well. No, to see God (immediately) is to be placed in pausa. And ethically the task is to die away in order to see God.

To Believe in God. That to believe in God is impossible without relinquishing one’s understanding can easily be seen. For understanding relates to the dialectic of finitude. If I can understand that a thing is good for me, then I think I can certainly believe―but: yes, here it comes. No, to believe in God is essentially to be equally joyful always, essentially equally joyful. For the joy of faith is that God is love, which―if only I relinquish my understanding―he is just as much when I encounter what according to my conceptions is joyful as when it is something sorrowful. Everything, everything, everything is love.

15 in pausa] Latin, lit. “in a pause.” (See also explanatory note.)

•

1854

287

288

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 40–41

•

1854

Life’s Worth. Only when a hum. being has become so unhappy, or has grasped the misery of this existence so deeply, that he may say in truth: For me, life has no worth― ―only then can he bid on Xnty. And then life can gain worth to the highest degree.

40

5

282

The Human Race’s Battle against God. According to the New T., there is a quarrel between God and humanity; and the way in which one is Christian in Christendom can scarcely have changed the situation―indeed, people have made the quarrel even worse, for there [is] in “Christendom”―or “Christendom” itself is―a far more serious battle against God than humanity’s battle against God ever was in paganism. Now, the disproportionate element in this struggle is not simply that the hum. being is only a minor power compared with the infinite power of God. No, the misrelation is much greater, something entirely different, and to that extent there is something very comical in this battle. For in fact what “the hum. being” always does to strengthen himself, his tactic, is always with an eye to―becoming a mass, more and more and even more, etc. But for God, mass detracts: the greater the mass, the less significance for God. Therefore, the hum. race’s tactic is just as odd as if someone who was to run a race wanted to strengthen himself for that battle by chopping off one of his legs, and then, despairing over not yet having become strong enough, chopped off the other leg, too. That is how disproportionate this battle is; so certain is God in his majesticness. In a way, the battle has no objective reality at all for God, and this was the source of paganism’s and Judaism’s minimization of God’s majesty: they thought that this battle was an object in the objective sense and that God had a sort of a cause in the human sense of the term. No, what makes this battle of interest to God, and what is also the highest, is something subjective―God is sheer subjectivity―is that it pleases God in love to have concern for humanity. This makes this the matter of interest to God, yes, in the highest degree; for what else would be able to make something of infinite

41

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 41–42

5

•

1854

interest to God other than his own subjectivity, or the determination of his own subjectivity[?] Paganism and Judaism either trivialized God, as if he had a cause vis-à-vis humanity, or they elevated God in abstract majesticness, so that everything about hum. beings had absolutely no interest for him. Xnty raises God in infinite majesticness over everything objective, over every definition of having a cause; but then, in turn, it interests him with infinite pathos―because he himself, in love, has willed it so.

283 10

42

15

20

25

30

35

Theory―Practice, Doctrine―Existing

So far is it from being the case that theory, busying oneself with theory, bears a supportive relation to practice in the ethical realm (i.e., the realm where the task is directed toward self-denial, toward constraining flesh and blood, etc.―for medical practice, for example, and similar practices that do not relate to the reformation of character, are something else), as if busying oneself with theory helped one to practice it that much better―so far is this from being the case that theory here [in the ethical realm] is―a swindler’s trick. What Talleyrand said about speech, that it was given to hum. beings in order to conceal their thoughts, can be said far more truthfully about the relation between theory and practice in the ethical realm. Theory, doctrine, exists―in order to conceal the fact that practice is lacking. Make the ethical as terse as possible―then attention will immediately come to focus decisively on this: whether one is doing it or not doing it; if one does not do it, one is exposed in all one’s nakedness. But theory, doctrine, brings about an illusion, as if one had a relation to the ethical―by speaking about it. Theory, doctrine, is―the fig leaf, and helped by this fig leaf, a professor or priest then comes to appear so solemn that it is terrifying. And much as it is also said of the Pharisees, that not only do they themselves fail to enter into the kingdom of heaven, but they even hinder others from doing so―thus, too, does the prof. hold the unlearned person back by saddling him with the notion that it depends upon doctrine and that he must also do his own small

289

290

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 42–43

•

1854

part by following along. Naturally, this is in the professor’s own interest: for the more important doctrine becomes, the more important the professor becomes, too, and the more brilliant his profession and the greater his reputation become. The prof.’s and priest’s cure of souls is thus usually a mystification, because it is calculated to―hinder people from entering into the kingdom of heaven. Much as in the natural sciences and other sciences, in which the apparatus plays such a large role and it is so difficult to get into dialectical matters because one’s attention is continually distracted by intrinsically interesting facts about details, so, too, with introducing doctrine: in this way they seek to make it difficult for the ethical to penetrate so that it can see and judge whether a person is doing it or not doing it. A falling-away from the ethical takes place every time it becomes doctrine; having been introduced into personal existence by a personality, it is generally taken over by a Schüler who turns it into doctrine. Once this falling-away has taken place, it does not take long before the falling-away is promoted so that it bears the title of “progress,” which is generally done by Schülerens Schüler. From that moment on it proceeds merrily―as sheer progress. Ultimately, even the true men of progress, the journalists, adopt the doctrine―and now it is incredible with what leaps and bounds things progress. This talk of making progress is curious. Much as nature has lovingly concealed from the crippled and deformed the fact that they are crippled and deformed, so that they regard themselves as beauties, so, too, talk of the progress of a cause first truly emerges when it is clearly in retreat―and then becomes ever more puffed-up and loud-mouthed to the same degree that the ever more vulgar hum. riff-raff get hold of it.

God’s Majesticness. No stronger expression can be thought of than the following for how elevated God is in his majesty, for the degree to which he has no cause, humanly speaking: that he makes those who would stay by his side, his beloved ones, precisely them―unhap21 Schülerens Schüler] German, the schoolboy’s schoolboy.

5

10

284 15

20

25

30

43

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 43

5

10

15

285

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

py, and they become so to the same degree that they more and more genuinely and inwardly devote themselves to him. Infinite majesty! But here, once again, the sphere of the paradox leaves its mark―the telltale sign of inversion. In a certain sense it would be superhuman for a hum. being to endure this. It must be recalled, however, that God is indeed love, infinitely is love, and suffers with the beloved―indeed suffers more than the beloved―without undergoing change. No, he is not like an earthly majesty who has it in his power, if you will, to dispense with protocol and majesticness for the sake of the beloved―he has it in his power, that is, this is precisely his weakness, for he has it in his power because here his nobility and majesticness (and consequently the protocol associated with this) is a foolish frippery, not a quality of his essence; for earthly majesty, of course, is only drapery, just a costume put on a wretched hum. being who is just like the rest of us. But what majesticness: even pointing it out is something to be anxious and fearful about! Ah, when I consider how, from my earliest days, I have been set apart in special torment reserved for the extraordinary, when I consider how I later had to suffer, how my life had to be embittered, when I consider how hard, in a certain sense, I was taken hold of (for it was of course love that took hold of me in this hard grip), how hard I was taken hold of― ― ―and that it was only then that I first became aware of Xnty and God’s majesty: When I consider this, and then consider this nonsense about the millions upon millions, and the centuries upon centuries with Xns by the millions! Yes, hum. beings really do understand how to corrupt everything! That is how loftily high God’s majesticness is situated. And surely, in the final analysis, this is precisely what must be drilled into Christendom above all else: what is understood by God’s majesty, what it means. It is clear enough that the unceasing talk of God being love has, in the officialdom of nonsense, dragged God so far down into the nonsense that, to put it mildly, the notion of God that is the genrlly held in Christendom is entirely scandalous. One does not know whether to laugh or cry when, in a cursory look at paganism, one sees what laughable, odd, and baroque notions hum. beings can form of God― ―but― ―Xndom almost, pessimistically, takes the prize for inventiveness. For after all, there is always some salt in the gods of paganism; but anything less salty, more insipid, more vapid, can scarcely be thought of

291

292

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 43–46

•

1854

than to make God (for just as the hum. being is, so is his God, “he creates God in his image[”]) into a hearty bit of nonsense, into a fussbudget about whom every priest can babble something. With this concept of God, one becomes so insipid that I do not know how to express it better than to say: it is so insipid as to be indecent. To transform God into such insipidity is much worse than to transform him into a bull, etc., as paganism did to its God. To transform God into such insipidity that one almost becomes ashamed on his behalf is, of course, infinitely much worse than all mockery of religion.

The Freethinker (It Reverses Itself) It is not far from being the case that, in our time, the freethinker can be said to suffer persecution by the government―because he proclaims Xnty. Where it comes to pass that this goal is reached, that everything is turned about. The orthodox Church does not proclaim Xnty but allows itself to counterfeit it into Epicureanism. Then the freethinker undertakes―indeed out of chicanery, it is true―to proclaim Xnty or what Xnty is―and is accordingly punished by the government.

A Martyrdom Suppose that the Church Father who said, in the third or 4th century: Martyrdom is impossible, for the enemies are called Xns―suppose he was martyred by pagans, fell at the hands of the pagans: I hold that he would have failed at the task, that his martyrdom should receive an NB: for already at that time his martyrdom ought to have been in relation to Xndom in order to counteract its spiritless dissemination. For he himself says: The enemies are called Christians. But then the martyrdom surely ought also be where the enemies are.

. . . . . . I have an innate genius for two things: to be a police agent, and to be a courtier. Verily, those we call courtiers have no

5

10

44

15

286

20

45

25

30

46 35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 46–47

5

10

47

15

287 20

25

30

•

1854

conception of what it is to express majesty in the highest sense, what it is to bow before true Majesty; all their pomp is only on the direct scale. As for the scale that is called the inverted scale: to move on that scale, to express oneself on it, that is something completely different.―Nevertheless, those whom we call the police live under the limitation that a large number invalidates or alters the concept, that a large number makes one reluctant to prosecute a case, indeed, that a large number makes wrong into right. But in the police force in which I serve, the number itself is regarded as a crime, and there can be criminal cases in which centuries are guilty.

Difference between One Hum. Being and Another. There are many differences―yes, indeed, eternity rlly can abolish all other differences. But there is one difference between hum. being and hum. being that eternity cannot abolish: the difference of eternity―Did you live in such a way that truth was in you, that something higher existed for which you actually suffered? Or did you live in such a way that profit was in fact the focal point? That you perhaps did well at it only makes the matter worse. This difference eternity cannot and will not abolish, it will not contradict itself; two such hum. beings could never in eternity come to an understanding with each other. All other differences, of abilities, circumstances, fates, sexes, ages, etc., eternity must be capable of abolishing and of producing understanding and equality between what is so different in the temporal sphere―but not that other difference. What a satire it is, then, when someone whose life was indeed profit, a priest or the like, speaks with fanatical expressions about being gathered up with Xt and the saints, indeed almost fancies that he anticipates this union with longing: what a satire it is, for having to live in such company would in fact be, for him, the harshest punishment.

293

294

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 48–49

•

1854

Temporality―Eternity (inverted).

In a noble sense, to become nothing in this world is the condition for becoming something in the other world. Thus do they relate inversely to one another. But the ideals are then entirely eliminated―especially in Protestantism, especially in Denmark. From a Christian standpoint, however, Catholicism is somewhat less devoid of ideas and spirit than is Protestantism. Catholicism, after all, has the concept and notion of the Christian ideal: of becoming nothing in this world. Protestantism is finitude from start to finish, with everything revolving around finite goals within a finite horizon, and Christianity is introduced at most as a mood, and indeed a mood that, so as not to exaggerate, one has only on Sundays, or, so as not to exaggerate, perhaps only every other Sunday. There is nothing that Protestantism, especially in D[enmark], is more afraid of than exaggeration. Nor can one even say it is guilty of that―unless it were of an exaggerated fear of exaggerations.

48

5

10

15

20

288

Sense for the Majestic. Strictly speaking, one can say that no hum. being will achieve greatness if he lacks an inborn, decisive sense for the majestic. But these individualities so equipped, of whom it holds that they are erectioris ingenii (for as humanity’s upright gait is its superiority over the animal, so, too, is a sense for the majestic an uprightness that distinguishes such a person from ordinary people just as much as the upright gait does from the animal), divide themselves further into two classes. The one class craves, wants to be, the majestic itself. Here, however―even if the proudest maximum were to be reached― this can only come to a limited majesticness, as the individual himself has to supply it. Such a craving, however, is regarded by the comm. peop. as entirely impractical (in the ordinary hum. understanding, the law for the impractical is always: to stake everything on one thing). Only in the rare instance that it succeeds 26 erectioris ingenii] Latin, with an upright spirit, i.e., capable of higher thinking.

49

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 49–50

5

10

15

20

•

1854

is it admired as a sort of higher practicality that people cannot quite figure out. The other class is suffering, wanting in its suffering merely to point out the majestic, wanting, in admiration, or―because here the highest becomes possible―in blessed worship, to point out the majestic, the divine majesty. Here it can remain the truly majestic, for such an individuality of course does not wish to hinder the majestic by himself wanting to be it, no, he wants to suffer merely in order to point it out, or he wills the majestic simply and solely, forgetting entirely about himself. Such an existence is declared, unconditionally and at all times by all Practici, to be impractical; for however one turns the matter, and whether or not the individual succeeds in what he wants, it continually becomes apparent that no profit comes of it, nothing finite― ―and the being in-and-for-itself is and remains, according to the unanimous testimony of all practical people, “unconditionally impractical.” “So there is after all something unconditional―that’s good, I was worried that practicality would abolish the unconditional entirely―by also involving itself in it to a certain degree.” The entire practical world with all its millions and its praxis resides in interest; how, then, could it have any notion of, or respect for, disinterest, impartiality, let alone―going up the scale― that disinterest even be expressed positively (and not merely negatively, by not wanting to make a profit) by willing to suffer.

289 25

50

30

35

The Single Individual (What It Is to Be Christian) ―Race.

To differ qualitatively from the species to which one belongs insofar as one belongs to a species at all, and yet to have to remain within that species: this is the formula for the most intensive torment, as well as for the most agonizing collision, both autopathetic and sympathetic―and what is more: it is the formula for being Xn. Allow me to illustrate this somewhat more exactly, and link a number of observations to it. Take a race of animals. For a given specimen, belonging to the species is the consolation, the relief, the satisfaction. If one 11 practici] Latin, plural of practicus, practical people.

295

296

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 50

•

1854

had any wish to compare existing as an individual―whether as an individual animal or qua hum. being as an individual―with experiencing a certain pressure (and indeed, living things do experience a certain atmospheric pressure), then one could say that the species is what helps to bear the pressure, or that the fact that one is not literally individual, but is subsumed under an abstraction, mitigates the pressure. Let me put it like this: there are of course animal creatures that are so revolting and repulsive that the sight of them disgusts not only hum. beings, but nearly every living thing. Now imagine that such a creature said to the Creator: “Why did I become such a revolting being? Having this effect, arousing sheer repulsion, is indeed a frightful torment.” The answer to this would then presumably have to be that it came to exist because its existence, too, had its place. But perhaps something else must be added to this: that when you belong to a family of the same species, your situation is alleviated. Yes, there is no doubt that everything that belongs to a species is satisfied by virtue of being homogeneous with it: the satisfaction lies in being homogeneous with one’s species; the individual cannot have a conception of anything beyond this or that it should be anything other than grand to be like the species to which it belongs. What is more, the individual is further satisfied by the sight of the many others who belong to the same species. The situation would already become different and even more difficult if such an animal were entirely unique, if it were―if such a thing existed―both specimen and race in uno. Nonetheless, it would always have had the inner composure of being homogeneous with its species, and it would not have had to suffer anything from others of the same species. But look, this is where the collisions begin: when a difference in quality is manifested within one and the same species, without it becoming a new species, but being compelled to remain within the species, which then of course mortally hates and despises this bastard. A bastard! In the animal world, indeed, it is in fact the case that the species from which bastards emerge despises the bastard. But then it comes full circle: the bastard then becomes a species of its own, and then has, in its turn, the satisfaction of being homogeneous with its species. Now being Christian (this is how the matter stands in the N.T.) involves a difference in quality from being hum., albeit within the category of being hum. And this is the most intensive torment and most painful collision. In being Christian (according to the N.T.), the divine is so 26 in uno] Latin, in one.

5

10

15

20

25

290

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 50

5

10

15

20

25

30

291

35

40

•

1854

conjoined with being hum. that a conjunction of this kind differs in quality from being hum.―and yet he is hum. and is to live among hum. beings. As is well known, Christendom has resolved the collision in the following, utterly simple fashion: it makes being Xn into a qualification of the species, and then all collisions fall away. This of course is nonsense, or swindler’s tricks. In the N.T., the point of being Xn is precisely this: a qualitative heterogeneity from being hum., and nonetheless―to be among hum. beings, and to be a hum. being insofar as the Christian belongs to a species at all. It is easily seen that this is the most torment-filled suffering. Nor is it so difficult to see that this is also the most painful collision, both autopathetically and sympathetically; but here I will dwell only upon the latter. In all that I have read about conversions, about transitions to becoming Xn, even in the most famous and historically renowned cases, I have never seen depicted―not in any of them―that pain, that hesitation, associated with becoming Christian, which I consider to be the most legitimate of all: that of sympathy. Is it not inhuman to break with one’s species in that manner, to become blessed in such a way that others, all others, perhaps become unblessed! For the optical illusion that is conjured up by making realms, countries, and states Christian is of course meaningless. No, becoming Xn in the sense assigned to it by the N.T. actually means to be separated eternally from what, humanly speaking, is called humanity, and thereby from hum. beings. In the New T. (no secret is made of this) Xnty is enmity toward humanity―and this is also how the paganism and Judaism of the day regarded it. There is a life-and-death conflict between being God and being hum. And as when two nations wage war on one another, and the one captures some citizens of the other in order to use them against it, so, too, the Xn (as the New T. puts it) is taken by God―and is used against hum. beings and humanity. True, God does this out of love― ―but one must still remember that this view of the matter does not help the person who does not understand it in this way, the person who is not Xn, which is why the other hum. beings, in accordance with their way of looking at it, must see in the Xn their mortal enemy, an un-human being, a person who is qualitatively different from the species and yet wishes to be with the species. In order to be loved by hum. beings, it is required that your life express a “to a certain degree,[”] or that your life express a

297

298

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 50

•

1854

[“]just like the others.[”] The hum. element lies in relativity. If you wish to be more egotistical than the others, you are declared to be an egotist. But, but, and note this well: if you do not wish to be just as egotistical as the others, that in turn then becomes another sort of egotism, for you will come to intrude vexingly on all the hum. existence that surrounds you. And this is how hum. beings rlly live with each other. We make a mutual confession, there is a tacit understanding―which we accordingly do not speak of any further, but which we mutually understand very well: that we are all egotists. But let us be reasonable; let everyone restrict his egotism out of a certain consideration for the others; and then we could all in fact live a more or less happy life here on earth. But egotists we cannot tolerate, egotists who wish to be more egotistical than more or less all of us―and egotists who want to be lesser egotists than we all are. And now a Xn with his ideality, which is (as the N.T. also teaches) hatred of the world, hatred of oneself, hatred of hum. beings, hatred of all that within which hum. beings have their lives: How are they supposed to be able to tolerate him! Yet this is not what I am speaking about here. I am speaking about the hesitation with respect to becoming Xn, the hesitation that is connected to sympathy, or rather, that concerns whether it would not be inhuman to break with one’s species. I have hunted in vain for enlightenment concerning this, or even for a hum. being who has previously taken note of this. In our time, of course, it is futile to search for such a person, for everywhere there is this throng of millions of Xns who naturally are Xns, who are naturally just like all the others, and who are breeding more Xns at a rapid clip. Among these there truly is no enlightenment to be had. As a response to my inquiry, their existence is just as meaningless as if one who was occupied with auditing “the bank’s cash reserves” was instead sent―for enlightenment―paper money en masse and from every quarter. What I seek is a primitivity: I call out into the world, as it were, and from the present day down through the centuries, asking where is the primitivity that primitively vouches for the whole affair, where is the primitivity that has so primitively experienced and lived through becoming Xn, as primitively as I can depict it. If such [a primitivity] can be found, then I must also be able to find this hesitation, this collision, depicted somewhere, and thereby find an answer to what I am asking about. But I do not find it, and I nearly lose hope! Even famous Church Fathers―when one inspects them closely―truly look as

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

292

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 50

5

10

15

20

25

293 30

35

40

•

1854

though they, too, were not wholly free of hum. braggadocio, of talking about their experiences in grander terms than what is literally true. Part of true primitivity (and without this, it is impossible to become Xn) is that it is literally true that one is alone, alone with God. Only when one is in that situation can the collision of sympathy properly emerge; for only in this way does one properly get the hum. race on one’s conscience. But if you look more closely, look even at the most famous conversions to Xnty, you will see that this matter of being alone before God is not taken quite so strictly. As one would speak in ordinary life about a girl in love, saying that she is in love [“]to a high degree,[”] or that at most she has a sister or a friend with whom she talks of her love― ―meaning that she lacks inwardness in the deepest sense: it is the same, too, with the transition to becoming Xn. A pagan converts to Xnty―but he takes his mother with him, perhaps his wife, his children. A pagan converts to Xnty, but has friends with whom he speaks about the most innermost definition of his inwardness. The collision cannot rlly emerge in this way. For one thing, if, in his inwardness with God, a person has confidants, one single one, then his inwardness is 50% too lax. For another: the person who takes his loved ones with him when converting to Xnty does indeed make it easier for himself to let go of the other hum. beings. But Socrates (o, Socrates, you alone!), is it not true that the one who rlly occupies himself with an idea fears most of all to be in error? Accordingly, such a person by no means tries to arrange his affairs so that he can avoid the collisions; no, no, he perhaps applies the greatest degree of zeal to make sure that the collisions can arise. The person who occupies himself with an idea not only permits himself to be examined by existence, but also examines it. His examining consists in not wanting to buy at the cheapest possible price, for he understands that, when viewed in light of the idea, all this talk of a cheaper price is gibberish; when viewed in light of the idea, there is only one price: the highest. For that price, you attain the idea, or it all falls through; but for a cheaper price, you fool yourself. The person who said to himself, when he wanted to be a Xn, [“]I cannot make this transition if I cannot take the beloved with me,[”] and then was so lucky as to persuade her to become Xn: He avoided the true Christian collision―and managed to become Xn after that fashion. The transition to becoming Xn does not take place in accordance with the true Christian proportions, and thus one can see

299

300

1

5

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 50

Note Viewed from another side, the one who is grasped by God will do the same, though out of love for God, in order not to encroach too closely upon God―if I dare put it this way―by wishing to have some other hum. being with him, as if that were the condition. a

•

1854

why I have not found the truest hesitations concerning becoming Xn made manifest: namely, whether I do not, humanly speaking, commit an injustice toward hum. beings not only by making them guilty of hating me, of persecuting me, perhaps even of putting me to death, which may accompany or be the direct result of becoming Xn in the N.T. sense (this point has been emphasized particularly by H. H., in the Two Ethical-Religious Essays; and later I also saw this suggested in a passage by Clement of Alexandria; I believe I made a note of this in my copy of Böhringer), but also by separating myself for eternity from them, from their concepts, from their entire being, for eternity, so that eternal blessedness awaits me and eternal damnation them. The person who behaves in such a way that he can say: [“]In order for me to make the transition to being Xn more easily, I need to have the beloved with me[”]―he is rlly an egotist who is opposed to what it is to be a hum. being. The one who magnanimously loves humanity says―[“]Also for the sake of the idea―no, precisely in order to verify it―I will keep the beloved apart from me, suspended, so that when I let the others go, let go of peop., I let go of her as well, so that I do not purchase too cheaply what ought to be the most difficult thing.[”]a The person who takes the beloved and the mother and father and the children and some friends and one thing and another along with him in the transition to becoming Xn: he errs so, so easily, and takes no notice of the fact that the transition to being Xn consists in letting go of the hum. He takes with him what, for him, more or less amounts to the race. This is to say that such a person neither poses nor responds to the problem―and the latter surely comes if the former merely occurs.

5

10

15

20

25

30

294

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 51 51

5

10

15

20

25

30

295

40

The Hum. Race’s Deepest Fall is in fact reserved for more recent times. There is a discovery that “the hum. being” has made and is happy in his discovery: the way to make life easy is to make it insignificant. Become, existentially, with respect to character, a spineless wretch―or, rather, a clever animal creature who indeed lives for finite ends―and then become important and interesting to yourself and others by virtue of interesting knowledge about what is highest, by being able to depict it, present it, sing its praises, declaim it, systematize it, etc. Thus if, in this context, martyrdom for being a Xn reappears one day, it will tend toward laughter. In one sense, there was something better in those bloody persecutions of old, for there was, after all, a certain kind of power in them, and there was passion. But the power of ridicule is the wretched power, or cowardice, of vileness. Another result of this is that in recent years the tactic that is used against everyone of character is to have the man declared mad. This is the situation: to hold an opinion vis-à-vis character is itself to be forced into necessity of having character. So insignificance and cowardice―the refuse of the race as it is in recent generations―have come up with the tactic of declaring everything of the sort to be madness, for a person who is opposed to madness or insanity has no need of stepping into character, of holding a conviction himself. The race’s deep fall is that there are no longer individuals, but that in a certain miserable sense, everyone has become two. As when a book becomes old and worn, the binding becomes loose, and the pages separate and fall out, so, too, are today’s hum. beings disintegrated―their understanding, their imagination, does not obligate them to have character: no, thanks. No, existentially, one is a spineless wretch who flirts learnedly, rhetorically, poetically, systematically, etc., with what is highest. But of course, to such beings this elevated talk, which one indeed used to hear, this lofty talk of

•

1854

301

302

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 51–52

•

1854

how having to do with God is in one sense pure torment, the most intensive torment: this lofty talk, or rather, the fact that someone wants to have to do with God―this sort of thing must appear to such people as the most laughable madness. And as far as this mass of otherwise entirely decent and even fine hum. beings―I mean the mass of hum. beings―is concerned, it is of course led by the priests to imagine that they are Xns―which of course is in the priest’s interest, for the sake of his numbers. If one were to tell them that they are not Xns, they would become furious; even with their best good will, they would not be able to think of it as anything other than an insult and thus become indignant and shameless. But the mass of hum. beings is not rlly like this: they do not become indignant because someone tells them that they are not poets. No: but the priest has led them to imagine that they are Xns―item he has so obscenely reduced what is to be understood by being Xn―that in a certain meaningless sense it can be true that they are Xns. This, you see, is why they become indignant. And then this large group of good-natured hum. beings is encouraged to attack the Xn. They thus become guilty―and yet are guiltless in a certain sense, namely, insofar as they are acting in accordance with their best conviction; but the misfortune is that this best conviction of theirs is a lie that has been impressed upon them and foisted upon them by the priests.

5

10

15

20

25

30

Flesh and Blood―Language. Now, it is spoken about frequently enough, nowadays, that it is in flesh and blood that the hum. being has its enemy―I am becoming more and more inclined to assume that every hum. being has an even more dangerous enemy, or one just as dangerous, in language: in being able to speak. After all, there was something very true in that ancient view that character-formation begins with silence (Pythagoras).

296

52

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 52

5

10

15

20

25

30

297 35

40

It is so seductive for a hum. being―perhaps even more seductive, or at any rate just as seductive as the sudden urges of flesh and blood―to be able to use the highest expressions, to puff them up and thereby give the appearance that one is oneself a person of that sort, or at any rate that one’s own life is related to theirs. In this regard, if I compare, e.g., Luther with Pythagoras, the comparison is not flattering to Luther with his claim that what matters is that the doctrine be proclaimed without adulteration, namely, objectively. No, abuse of language―ah, and when the matter is examined very carefully in this connection, perhaps the most famous historical figures cannot be declared innocent of this, though Socrates, as always, is an exception―the abuse of language so as to seem more than one actually is, so as not to be overly concerned about whether one is using words that are too lofty: abuse of language, this sin is still as widespread―if possible even more so, encompassing all hum. beings―as the sins of flesh and blood. The police frisk the bodies of suspicious persons; if these masses of orators, teachers, professors, etc., etc., were to be frisked in the same way, it would doubtless become a very complicated criminal case. To frisk them―indeed, to strip them of the attire, the costume, the disguise of language: to frisk them by commanding them to be silent, saying, [“]Hold your tongue, and let us see what your life expresses―let that, for once, be the speaker who tells us who you are.[”] People cite poisoning the wells of a country or a city as an example of a vile crime―but this sin of using language fraudulently is just as dangerous; alas, the difference is only this, that in this case one pers. is not supposed to say much about it to the other. Behold, this is why the race has sunk, is sinking, more and more into dishonesty―and even world-famous historical figures who are cited specifically for their service to the truth, when one examines them

•

1854

303

[a] People shout in protest about relocating a crossroads―but the person who uses language fraudulently in fact falsifies the road signs.

1

304

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 52–53

•

1854

entirely accurately, one also finds that they did not exercise great care in how they used language. And this is where the whole nonsense with Xndom comes from. Had people taken the New Testament literally, this confusion would have been impossible. For what is Xndom? It is this indulgence, continued from generation to generation, in which what it takes to call oneself Xn is initially discounted by a bit, and then the next generation discounts a bit more on top of the original discount; and then again, the next one discounts a bit more on top of the discount already given, etc.―all through the misuse of language, while people continue to use the most elevated and decisive expressions, meaning less and less by them, continually obligating themselves less and less to what the words say.

God’s Majesty. One Aspect of Lutheran Doctrine.

1

5

10

15

[a]

It is this sort of Xnty (refined Judaism) that is especially popular as “childlike Xnty”; for while it is self-evident that a child cannot assimilate pessimism, you certainly can fill it up with optimism, and even participate in licking it up yourself―and then be responsible for the fact that, when the child is grown, he either makes a fool of himself by imagining that he is Xn or falls into despair when he is to understand correctly what Xnty is, despairing precisely because people filled him up with this Xnty as a child.

Luther explains all sufferings, spiritual trials, all tribulations and persecutions, etc. as coming from the devil: were it not for him, being a Xn would be a life of milk and honey. This view is not the true Christian one, and in part this is connected to the fact that L. rlly does assume that Xnty is optimism, that adversities and sufferings are only accidentally related to being Xn and hence in fact derive from an external power, so that if that power did not exist, then being Xn would be pure joy and gladness, inasmuch as in itself, in and by itself, being Xn has no relation at all to suffering; In part it is connected to the fact that L. does not elevate the divine majesty to a sufficiently high level of majesticness. If the situation is that God is a majesty vis-à-vis a majesty such as that of Satan, who is so powerful in relation to God that, even with his

5

10

15

53 20

25

30

298

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 53

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

299

best will, God still cannot ward off suffering from his believers: then the summa summarum is that God in fact has a cause, in the human sense of the term, and thus God is degraded. But that God should have a cause is something that hum. beings are eager to imagine, for with that the human busyness begins―and thus people count on the price of being Xn to be discounted substantially. If someone, be he ever so elevated a majesty, has a cause in the human sense of the term, what then? Then he must make use of hum. beings. He must make use of hum. beings. Here are some analogies. If someone must buy on the stock market, the broker understands immediately that there is a profit to be made, for the man must buy; if one must sell to the book dealer, then the dealer understands immediately that there is a profit to be made, for the man must sell. And so it is when one must make use of hum. beings. Yet this is the reasoning that Xndom, especially Protestantism, has pursued, and in this way God has been changed from being the infinite majesty who has no cause, in the hum. sense of the term, into a majesty who must make use of hum. beings. And finally, those who have procured hum. beings for him have more or less followed Vespasian’s principle regarding money: one must not sniff at it. Xnty entered into the world, admirably, with the aim of raising hum. beings to the highest ideality; but humanity managed to get the matter turned the other way―the requirement for being Xn was discounted to such a degree that it became approximately zero, for God must make use of hum. beings. To this compare Xt’s response to those who wanted to be disciples. This, you see, expresses that God has no cause in the hum. sense of the term. Cloaked in the figure of a lowly servant, without a place to lay his head, aware of what monstrous machinery had been set in motion against him――one should think that such a man would have need of hum. beings, would need to make use of hum. beings, and particularly when they offer as much as do the ones in this discourse. But no, Xt keeps the price of the 2 summa summarum] Latin, lit. “the sum of sums,” the final result, the upshot.

•

1854

305

306

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 53

•

1854

unconditioned unchanged. When he says directly to Pilate and the mob of people, [“]I am nevertheless a king,[”] his answer has the same majesticness as if he had said: [“]My friend, I am a majesty who does not have to make use of hum. beings.[”] Oh, even a miracle is not nearly as majestic as such a reply in character. *

*

Later Protestantism has entirely abandoned the devil in the sense of a participating power. This eliminated the dose of pessimism that was nonetheless present in Luther’s Xnty, and Xnty became, purely and simply, sweet syrupy candy, an idyll of begetting children, etc. The degraded element in all of later Protestantism is that it allows an entire aspect―which was so decisive for Luther―to fall away without giving thought to inserting another explanation in its place, an explanation of what Luther nonetheless did retain in accordance with scripture: namely, the principle that being Xn is bound up with suffering―to allow an entire aspect to fall away like that, to act as though it were nothing and nonetheless remain, as they claim, the Lutheran account. But a Protestant priest in our days, particularly in Denmark, is thus more or less a private individual who receives payment for declaiming, each Sunday, approximately whatever he himself can come up with. *

5

10

15

20

*

That the Xn must suffer does not come from the devil. And right here begin the greatest spiritual exertions in relation to Christianity: for the suffering comes from God. If a hum. being is to think of a being who is pure love, then it is the most frightful exertion for his mind and for his soul that, in one sense, this love should be like cruelty. Humanity, you see, has been unable to endure this doubleness, and so has split the matter up as follows: God is love―from him come all good things, and only good; all the evil things, all troubles, etc., come from the devil. Otherwise people would be unable to maintain that God is love― at most, that punishment for one’s sins does in fact come from him. But this contradiction, that love makes the beloved, humanly speaking, unhappy―albeit out of love, but still, humanly speaking, unhappy―this thought is deadly for the hum. view of

25

30

300 35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 53

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

301 40

•

1854

things. And thus people helped themselves by appealing to the devil, much as, in similar fashion, people help a child by speaking of a wicked man who does what they do not want to tell the child that God has done, because people want to nurture in the child the idea of associating God only with the notion of goodness and joy. And yet the suffering comes from God. Nor does it stand in an accidental relation to being Xn. No, it is inseparable from it. The suffering―that it must be so―is connected to God’s majesticness. His majesticness is so infinite that only the paradox can depict it or serve as the expression for it, and the paradox is: to be so majestic as to have to make the beloved unhappy. Infinite majesty! Yet it is never forgotten that this majesty is love. The suffering is connected to the fact that God and the hum. being are qualitatively different, and that the collision, within temporality, of temporality and eternity must give rise to suffering. The suffering is connected to the fact that God is the examiner. But if the examination is to be serious, the examiner must let matters come to the uttermost point. And so God, who examines a hum. being in his faith and in whether he loves him, must (himself suffering more, in love, than the one being examined) let matters come to the uttermost point. What a hum. being wants so very much is that it become plainly evident that he is loved by God. Only rarely, very rarely, is there someone who has so much inwardness that he does not wish this. But in truth, the relationship may not and cannot be thus, if God is spirit. Rather, it must examinando go straight to the other extreme, that it is indeed the beloved who appears to be the one who has been forsaken by God. This is the examination in which there can be variation of degree, but that is nonetheless essentially uniform. God is the examiner. This is a very telling term. In truth, however, an examiner has not the slightest thing in common with a person who, in the human sense of the term, has a cause. Yet it is self-evident that in our age of babble all concepts are reversed, and finally we have come to lack a word to designate the sublime. In our day, a schoolmaster means someone who needs the children; a doctor someone who needs the sick; an author someone who needs readers; a teacher someone who needs learners― so, too, indeed, an examiner is surely someone who needs those who submit to the examination.

28 examinando] Latin, by examining.

307

[b]

Lesser majesties are recognized by their making the beloved happy (straightforwardness).

1

5

308

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 54

•

1854

Thoughts That Try the Spirit. When I say that the explanation that suffering in relation to being Xn comes from the devil is not the true Christian explanation, but that the suffering comes from the God-relationship itself, this must naturally be understood with the codicil that in one sense the suffering does come from the individual himself, namely, from the inability of his subjectivity to devote itself immediately and wholly to God. In the older, weightier edifying literature, one reads much about thoughts that try the spirit, thoughts under which the individual can suffer, which are then depicted as burning arrows and are ascribed to the devil. But this explanation is not the truly Christian one; one must say that such thoughts come from the individual, albeit innocently. The matter is as follows. If God is to love a hum. being, and a hum. being is to be loved by God, then this hum. being, qua selfish will, must be annihilated entirely. This is dying away, the most intensive torment. But even if, in accordance with the better will within him, the religious person is willing enough to do this, he cannot either immediately or entirely subjugate his will, his subjectivity, to this better will; and so, after having first put up the most desperate resistance, his subjectivity now constantly lies in wait for a chance to disrupt the entire revolution by which it was dethroned. No religious person, not even the purest, is such pristine, purified subjectivity or pure transparency in willing solely what God wills, so that there is no residue of his original subjectivity― something that has not yet been fully penetrated, not yet conquered, perhaps not even truly discovered―in his soul’s depths: this is where the reactions come from. But as the old edifying literature properly teaches, the individual is entirely guiltless in this; so far is it from being the case that these thoughts that try the spirit are to be counted against him, that they are in fact proof that he has engaged the matter thoroughly. The police are entirely guiltless when by seriously investigating a case they uncover more and more crime; rather, the police are guilty when, by acting ineffectually, they promote the impression that there is no crime. Accordingly, security in a sensual sense―mediocrity―knows nothing of thoughts that try

54

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

302 40

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 54–55

5

55

10

15

20

25

30

35

303

•

1854

the spirit―indeed, that is precisely its fault and guilt, its new crime, proof that it has never had any idea at all of what the task is from the Christian standpoint, for to die away, to kill one’s will, is truly among the sort of operations that cannot pass off unnoticed, as if they were nothing.

God―And the Devil. When in a number of places I have raised objections to the view that introduces the devil everywhere as the one responsible for the fact that the Xn must suffer, it is not my intention to explain that power away. After all, the New Testament itself represents the matter thus, that Xt was tempted by the devil. No, my intention is to ward off the thought that is so easily smuggled in here, namely, that God indeed has a cause, in the human sense of them―and at that very instant, the standard for being a Xn is so easily lowered. If it were the case that God, in any way whatsoever, wants to have Xns because, in any way whatsoever, he has need of Xns, has something he is to use them for: then the ideality of being Xn would instantly be threatened, disturbed, just as God’s majesty would also be degraded. If it is the case that God is a majesty bound in battle with the devil, another majesty, and wants to have Xns in order to use them in that battle, then it would be impossible to preserve ideality with respect to the category of being Xn. In the New T., the ideality of being a Xn is set so high that even if God did not obtain one single Xn, not a jot or tittle is to be taken away from the requirement. This, you see, is ideality, and this is infinite majesticness. The revolt from below, on the other hand, is ever on the prowl, testing whether it is not possible to establish that the Majesty is in some way in the position of needing Xns, perhaps must make use of Xns. But at the very same second that this is discovered, at that same second, finitude rlly has deprived the infinite Majesty of power―and now the bargaining begins. Take a metaphor that illustrates what it should, provided you forget that in God there is nothing arbitrary (the ideality he has attached to being a Xn is not something arbitrary, not a whimsy).

309

310

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 55

•

1854

Suppose a king got the idea that he only wanted to have soldiers of a certain height, a certain build, and with a certain color of hair and eyes― ―if His Majesty is in the predicament of needing to wage war against another majesty and―needs to use soldiers: What then? Then finitude, that humpbacked little peddler-Jew, says: [“]Yes, Your Majesty really ought to refrain from insisting too much on this particular demand, for it is impossible to find even the bare minimum number of soldiers that live up to these requirements[”]―and “Yourrr Majesty does indeed need soldiers.” And look, this is the reason why finitude wants so infinitely much to claim that God has a cause, in the human sense, to make him busy, indeed even to make him be like someone who is in a bind―for then God has to make a concession, roll back his requirement for being a Xn, since “He does indeed need Xns.” The unconditioned, the being in-and-for-itself, is so frightfully strenuous for a hum. being, which is why one is so eager to be rid of it, to insist that God has an end in mind―and at that very instant becomes dependent upon finitude; for the one who has an end must also will the means, and if he must will the means, then he must adapt himself― ―and then we have the same situation: then God cannot preserve the ideality of being Xn, must yield a little―for “otherwise he won’t get anyone at all”― ― ― and, of course, he has a definite end in mind for which he wants to have Xns: ergo the requirement is reduced. And look, this is why I say repeatedly that God is pure subjectivity, has nothing of objective being within himself―which could imply that he has, or must have, ends. Whatever is not pure, transparent subjectivity has, at one point or another, in objective being, a relation to a surrounding world, a relation to an other, and thus must have a purpose, an end. Only that which, infinitely subjectively, has its subjectivity infinitely within its power as subjectivity―only that has no purpose, no end. But the unconditioned, the being in-and-for-itself, is thus fatal for a hum. being. Think of the unconditioned requirement, and then suppose that a hum. being were nonetheless permitted to raise the question [“]Why, why shall I give everything up unconditionally in this way?[”]―and then suppose that the answer to this were: [“]Because God wants to use you as a tool to affect other hum. beings[”]: then this would be a relief; the unconditioned would be somewhat mitigated, somewhat less fatal, because this [“]Why,[”]―and thus a purpose―would have been inserted between the unconditioned and this hum. being. But look quite carefully, and you will see that the unconditioned, the in-and-for-

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

304

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 55–56

5

10

15

20

25

•

1854

itself, is no longer unconditioned; and before you know it, you will see that there is something lying in wait here, something that bit by bit turns the whole relation on its head, and summa summarum it ends with God being a majesty who has a cause, in the human sense, and who therefore cannot stand unconditionally firm upon the unconditioned. For this reason, I also have a suspicion about the way in which people use the expression [“]serving God.[”] For one cannot serve God as one serves some other majesty, one who, humanly speaking, has a cause, has ends, intentions. No, the only expression befitting God’s majesty is to worship him. In general, people prefer to draw the distinction as follows: when one worships God, one thinks especially of one’s own feelings, moods, and the verbal expressions of these; in serving him, one thinks about one’s actions. No, your action is precisely true worship, and it is that when it is released from all busyness, as though God had an end, an intention. To renounce everything worshipfully, that is, not because God needs to use you as a tool, no, by no means, but to renounce everything unconditionally in such a way that the renunciation has the character of something absolutely superfluous, a luxury: that is what worship is. When this is the case, then it is certain that you are “worshiping”; and then it is also certain that God’s majesty is not degraded. Such is this infinite majesty, which nonetheless is love itself, is love suffering, as I have often said, suffering in love with the beloved, though without altering his majesticness. But one must not do as Christendom has done in order to maintain the notion of God as love: discount the majesticness.

56

Christendom.

35

A metaphor. Imagine a country―where there live happy, contented subjects; the one says to the other: [“]In our country we have the great and priceless benefit that, if anyone suffers injustice in any way whatsoever, or has something else on his mind, he may approach the king personally; we are all fully aware that absolutely everyone has open access to His Majesty.[”] This is how they live. But look, when all is said and done, each of them thought as follows: [“]Probably, though, it is smartest not to approach His Majesty directly; it is a very difficult business,

311

312

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 56–57

•

1854

after all, to stand before a majesty, and furthermore, one exposes oneself to all manner of difficulties with officials and many others afterward.[”] In short, summa summarum, no one approached His Majesty personally. Similarly, Xndom is more or less a society of peop. who are happy with each other in the conviction that unconditionally and at every moment, every individual, purely personally and entirely as an individual, can approach the Majesty of Heaven― ―but the smartest thing. . . . . .

305

5

10

Christendom. As an individual, quite literally as a single individual, to relate to, to turn to, God personally―that is the formula for being Xn. Χndom exists, then: these millions of hum. beings who, as stated, each say separately and to one another: [“]How wonderful that each of us, absolutely every one of us, and at any time whatsoever, etc., can address ourselves personally to the Heavenly Majesty.[”] That is what they say, and that is what is preached there. But when all is said and done, each says separately: [“]Still, the most prudent thing is not to get involved quite literally as an individual with this infinite Majesty[”]; and in the end, summa summarum, no one at all does it. To all appearances, of course, it looks as though this is something everyone does. We are all Xns, after all, all these millions; and everyone can do it; and it is a blessing, we say, that everyone can do it and at every time of day, etc. To all appearances, therefore, it seems as though for a hum. being as an individual to address himself to God personally were such a perpetual and constantly occurring event, every everlasting day, that it was almost as insignificant as stopping by the grocery store next door to buy a few shillings’ worth. The truth is rather different. The truth of all that nonsense about how blessed it is that everyone is able to address himself, etc.―the truth of this is: that no one did it. And the truth of the notion that, because a person addressing himself personally, qua individual, to God, is something that occurs all the time, it is supposedly a meaningless event―the truth of that notion is this: that even if it were only to happen once, it would be an entirely un-

57

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 57

306 5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

paralleled event, more important than a European war or a war of all the corners of the earth, a catastrophe that shakes existence in its deepest foundations. Nothing is more certain. Approaching God produces catastrophe; to address oneself to God quite literally qua an individual produces the most intensive catastrophe of existence. Even a small but significant approach (that is, a small number―for numbers subtract) already leads to a relative catastrophe. Nothing is more certain. As surely as a scientist knows that a drop of this or that essence in a glass of water will make it bubble―as surely as he, when someone brings him a glass of water, puts a drop from a bottle into the water, but no bubbling ensues―as surely as the scientist says, “Well, then, that wasn’t the essence”: just so certain is it that approaching God leads to catastrophe. Yes, God be praised, so it is. But even without being a knower of hearts, one can nonetheless keep watch on that vile lie by those repulsive, disgusting, hypocritical speakers who give assurances upon assurances. Anyone whose life does not lead to a relative catastrophe has not―not even approximately―addressed himself to God as an individual; as noted, this is just as impossible as it is to touch an electric generator without getting a shock. In this way, the entire matter of Xndom dissolves into nonsense―in a certain sense, one could have expected it. Just as the police, whenever they see one of their practiced thieves in a crowd, say immediately: If he is here, then something has probably been stolen―so can one can say: wherever “the hum. being” is, there, too, is nonsense. But in one sense, or viewed from one side, how infinitely beautiful that the Heavenly Majesty was not the one to withdraw, has not refused to involve himself with hum. beings―no, he (infinite love!) he stands by his word, unchanged, sits and waits, in love―but then it still does not happen, but it is the hum. being himself who prevents it, it is the hum. being who, instead of taking it seriously, transforms it into mutual nonsense, communal nonsense, or into playing that one is doing it: how characteristic this is―is it not! In truth, it is a frightful act of daring to address oneself to God as an individual, or even just approximately as an individual; or even, as an individual, to approximate addressing oneself to God. What an act of daring it is to do this, quite literally as an individual, is shown by the life of the God-Man. For that life, it became pure misery and torment, even to the point―and this is part of it―of being abandoned by God, who, unchanged nonetheless, is love and who, in love, suffers together with the beloved.

313

314

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 57–59

•

1854

I have never denied this. But why, then, has not Xndom long ago posed the matter truthfully and made the admission: We are not capable of being Xns. This is the point that I am continually aiming at. In Xndom, people have either pretended, in swindling fashion, that there is no problem, have remained calm, and confidently insisted on being Xns (even though a person’s entire existence had not the slightest similarity to what the New T. calls being Xn, but was precisely the opposite), or people have explained, in swindling fashion, that they are too humble to desire something so lofty as being a disciple, an apostle (words that Xt himself always used synonymously), which was a lie, for it was not humility that was the obstacle: humility is precisely the path to becoming an apostle, and not a hindrance to it. This is and remains Xndom’s guilt and crime: it has placed dishonesty between God and itself, so that God has been unable to involve himself with hum. beings.

Suffering. To imitate―that is to have the true impression that the truth had to suffer. To be able to represent this, or to hear or read this presented, is so far from being the true impression of it that it is the very opposite: Epicureanism. Lucretius, in the oft-cited passage, says quite rightly that it is a pleasure to see another undergoing sufferings from which one is oneself free.

307 5

10

15

58

20

25

Christendom. If there were a drink that was the most repulsive of all, a sight that was the most disgusting of all―that would be only a weak analogy for this repulsiveness of Xndom. That it has continued in this manner, year after year, with these millions upon millions of Xns, each of whom says that it is a blessed thing, the highest blessedness, to address oneself to God―while each of them nonetheless, when all is said and done, finds it shrewdest not to get involved with such blessedness, but instead to take care to help himself in another way! And “the

59

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 59–60

308 5

10

15

20

25

30

•

1854

priest,” moved, declaims: [“]What blessedness, what priceless blessedness[”]―but he himself would rather be free of this blessedness; on the contrary, he holds that it is his duty to ingratiate Xnty with hum. beings, item that it must be well-pleasing to God that he is spoken of in such glorifying fashion―as if it were not well-pleasing to God for someone to become earnestly involved with him. But “the priest,” moved, declaims that it is blessed; and the congregation, moved, weeps for this blessedness―although as individuals, each of them would prefer to decline such blessedness. And the father, moved, says to his child: it is blessed to address oneself to God―for it is so moving, this blessedness; it is so moving, but then he counts on the likelihood that when the time comes, the child will develop enough common sense to decline this blessedness; but then, again moved, he says to his child: it is blessed. Proof that every hum. being is adulterous, proof that every hum. being is a thief, proof that every hum. being has scabies, proof that unconditionally every man and every woman are infected with venereal disease: you cannot find a more odious expression of humanity than by examining this issue involving Xndom, the truth of which is only all too easy to prove. Had there been truth, honesty, earnestness in hum. beings, then the proclamation of Xnty would long since have had an entirely different form: at any rate, it would at least have been as I propose, demonstrating that it has a special sort of relation to this blessedness. But the proclamation of Xnty as it has existed for a long, long time, is as different from this as the square from the circle. The law for the proclamation of official Xnty is as follows: the more grandiloquent the talk can become about how blessed and blessed, the sweeter and sweeter the blather about this blessedness can be, the better―whether anyone actually involves himself with God is a matter of complete indifference. And it is these millions of Xns who, after death, are to populate the stars and serve as angels!

35

60

Xndom’s Dishonesty.

40

And how do I explain the dishonesty of all these millions― how do I explain it? As hypocrisy, and in that sense evil? No, no. I explain it as a lack of hum. openhearted courage and as mediocrity.

315

316

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 61

•

1854

The final page of Journal NB33, with the conclusion of entry NB33:61 and the marginal addition NB33:61.a.

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 60–61

5

10

310

15

20

61

30

35

310

40

Consider a metaphor: a powerful prince, as princes were in the times when it meant something to be a king or an emperor―and you will see that hum. beings will find that the most prudent thing is to conduct oneself as follows: to say nothing but good about him―but then, in addition, not to get involved with him. This is the prudent life-wisdom of mediocrity. And this is the pattern in accordance with which the entire proclamation of official Xnty is fabricated: to speak well of God, sweetly and with trumpets and bassoons, the more the better: but prudently to avoid getting involved with him. There is nothing mediocrity fears so much as what is actually lofty, the infinite―but it is not daft enough to say so outright―no, no, mediocrity is prudent: it speaks of it in the most wonderful terms―but involve myself? No thanks. To say outright that I am afraid of this loftiness: Mediocrity would say that that is imprudent, for it is, after all, involving oneself with it. No, pure, pure, pure praise―and then prudently avoid getting involved with it.

“The Hum. Being” All of the extraordinary ones, scattered sparsely over the course of the ages, who have ever lived, have each no doubt pronounced their judgment on “the hum. being.” The verdict of one has been: the hum. being is an animal; that of another: he is a hypocrite; he is a liar, etc. Perhaps, then, I am not farthest off the mark when I say: the hum. being is nonsense―and he is that with the assistance of language. With the assistance of language, every hum. being participates in what is highest―but to participate in the highest with the assistance of language, in the sense of chatting about it, is just as ironical as being a spectator, from the gallery, of the royal dinner table.

•

1854

317

318

1

5

[a]

From a Christian point of view, it is of course out of love that God has bestowed language upon hum. beings, and thereby made it possible for everyone actually to grasp what is highest―alas, God must look upon the result with sorrow.

J O U R N A L NB 33 : 61

•

1854

If I were a pagan, I would say that an ironical deity had bestowed the gift of speech on hum. beings in order to amuse himself by observing this self-deception. By speech, the hum. being distinguishes himself from the animal, the dumb creature―but perhaps the dumb creature has the advantage: at least it is not―deceived, or does not deceive itself, out of what is highest.

5

10

JOURNAL NB34

JOURNAL NB34 Translated by Alastair Hannay Edited by Bruce H. Kirmmse

Text source Journal NB34 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Niels W. Bruun, Klaus Nielsen, and Stine Holst Petersen

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 1

313

1

•

1854

NB34. Novbr. 24th 1854.

321

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 2–3

•

1854

323

315

2

5

10

15

20

The God-Relationship (Silence). Even in human situations if a girl who is, as we hum. beings so cruelly put it, otherwise insignificant, has the characteristic of being unconditionally silent in her relation to the beloved, speaks to no other pers. of their relationship: nonetheless this gives her a worth, makes her appealing in the eyes of the beloved. And God loves silence similarly. He wants none of this driveling with other peop. about one’s God-relationship. Doing that is perhaps vanity―and this displeases God. Or else it is done out of cowardice and lack of faith because one does not quite trust, because one is afraid in case one should come, if I dare say it, at an inconvenient time―this all displeases God. If someone were to say that when one pers. is further along than another, then it really is so good-hearted to let the other participate in his God-relationship―here, again, God is opposed to it because it is conceit. [“]What conceit,[”] says God, [“]have I not let it be preached that every pers., unconditionally every pers., can turn to me―so this other pers. can very well do the same.[”]

25

3

30

35

Divine Distinction. How affecting, how indescribably affecting: the most exalted person is always precisely the one to whom one can appeal most daringly, without red tape and difficulties― ―as, too, when language has exhausted itself in every possible gradation of titles―in coming to God, the relationship turns around and we say to him “Thou” with no further ado. How ironical, on the other hand, then, that it is the hum. being himself who creates all the difficul-

[a]

Silence concerning the relationship to God is strength; the unconditionally silent person would be like a jackscrew, or like the point outside the world of which Archimedes speaks. Talking about one’s relationship to God is an emptying that debilitates.

1

5

324

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 3–4

•

1854

ties and makes his access to God so hard, because―because, yes, the hum. being is petty. God’s distinction is curiously inverted. Straightforward distinction shields itself by every means against a straightforward approach. God, on the contrary, says: Come, dear hum. being, come entirely without ceremony― ―but look, the hum. being himself produces the ceremonies, and God is placed at distinction’s infinite distance from the hum. being. With God’s distinction it is like taking hold of a nettle. Grasp it briskly, that’s how it’s done. But when it comes to the point, the hum. being finds it wisest not to grasp it too briskly, discretion is the greater part of valor etc.―and gets stung. This is what the God of love says: “Appeal directly to me”―yes, thus says God, he, the infinite love. But the hum. being thinks that discretion is the greater part of valor, that the wisest thing would be to be able to catch the interest of one of God’s valets and, if possible, in that way come into conversation with His Majesty. The result would then be that God becomes in the straightforward sense the most distinguished of all.

316 5

10

15

20

Christendom. In a certain sense―although in another sense it is of course an indirect attack―it can be said in defense of the average run of peop. in regard to this dishonesty in calling themselves Christians (and then to be as different from it as possible), that the truth is rlly this: that insofar as being Xn means practically nothing in Xndom, the mass of peop. are perfectly justified in calling themselves Xns. If someone came to a country where all the inhabitants imagined they were, and professed to be, princes―then it would in a sense alter the matter considerably if he found out that it didn’t mean anything to be a prince. As for the priests who swear an oath upon the N.T., that is indeed another matter. But with the mass of peop. one has to proceed a little cautiously; in particular one must avoid taking issue with them on words, for the whole trouble is that they all too often attach a false notion to words. Now, this [false notion] is something one can take from them, but not so easily the word. If I were to offer

4

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 4 –5

317 5

10

•

1854

a presentation of what it is to be Xna―and then remonstrate with the mass of peop., saying, [“]So, are you that[?”]―I would easily get them to admit that this is not what they are. As soon as I say to them, [“]So, you are not Xn,[”] then everything changes. Well, this is something “the priest” has preached firmly into them, is how he makes a living; just as with someone who lives by sheep-breeding, the important thing for him is that the flock be plentiful. That is why it is vital to him that everyone call himself Xn―the fact that he understands this to mean nothing, or that what he understands by this is that it is more or less nothing, something that everyone is as a matter of course: this makes no difference to the priest.

5

The Popular.

15

Whatever is to become popular must orient itself toward the extensive, the diverse; the intensive will never be popular. The intensive is only for peop. of character, and these are even less common than geniuses and talented people, except that also the most simple-minded pers. can be a pers. of character. So if I were to make an attack on the present state of affairs among us in Christendom and say: [“]The Xnty we teach is a different sort of Xnty from the Xnty of the N.T.,[”] this attack could become popular―and why? Because covertly mixed in with it is a dose of gibberish, as if there were talk of several kinds of Xnty. Then it can become popular; peop. can get something of this sort into their heads: [“]There are several kinds of Xnty[”]―just as there is extra-refined manor-house butter, and there is good butter, and plain butter, and lard that is almost as good as butter. This is the law for the popular, there always has to be a certain dose of nonsense put in. Tightening up in the direction of either/or, on the other hand― this will never be popular. The diverse, the extensive, the expansive, and, from another angle, the numerical: this is what can become popular. If, e.g., I stand at the head of a number of supporters, a group sufficiently large in proportion to the size of the country: I could then carry my point, this could become popular and I could be acclaimed as being right―but that I, as a single pers., should be in the right is something that can never be popular. Were I to get myself a suitable number of merely nominal adherents, so that it looked as

20

25

30

35

40

325 yet suppressing the name Christian

a

1

326

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 5–7

•

1854

if I were many―this would already constitute an accommodation on my part.

Language

318

6

is an ideality that every pers. has free of charge. What an ideality: that God can use it to express his thoughts so that the hum. being thus has fellowship with God through language. But in the realm of spirit nothing is ever straightforwardly a gift in the way sensory things can be; no, in the realm of spirit the gift is always also a judge―and through language, or through what this ideality becomes in his mouth, the hum. being judges himself. And, in the realm of spirit, irony is also always present. How ironic that it is precisely by means of language that the hum. being can degrade himself to a level below those without speech― for a jabberer is indeed a lower category than a being without speech.

5

“The Priest”

7

As so much in Peer Degn is typical, so too this line: “If you want fine sand, it costs so and so much; if you want coarse sand, it costs so and so much.” This is basically the explanation of everything in the official priesthood’s existence. In vain does God let it be preached that he is love, that everyone, unconditionally everyone, can appeal to him without further ado, that it is so infinitely dear to God that one will do so―in vain. In vain. This is too lofty for the hum. being; he cannot get it into his head, doesn’t dare believe in it. Then “the priest” comes to his aid and sets things to rights, satisfies hum. beings’ deep need to be fooled―it was of this that Peer Degn was a practitioner. “The priest” summons forth intermediate authorities and gradations, the whole complex machinery of a government chancery―and everywhere there is money to pay. And just look, this is something a hum. being can get into his head. Now his soul finds rest and gratification, his thoughts find peace, only now is he quite certain that he has a God―and the certainty is

20

10

15

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 7–8

5

319 10

15

20

8 25

30

35

•

1854

in proportion to how much he pays for the priest. That this is how it should be, that the Majesty of Heaven should, if I may say so, sit and wait in heaven even if no one wants to turn to him, almost saddened that no one wants to understand his love: this is something the average run of peop. never get into their heads. “No,” says Morten Frandsen “no, it is a figment of the imagination, things cannot be like that. Merely getting to speak with the councillor of chancery is hard enough, and he is, after all, only a hum. being―and then, to be able so easily to come into conversation with God!―no, no, that kind of thing is just a figment of the imagination.” When “the priest,” on the other hand, explains that it costs a person 100 rix-dollars plus 10 rix-dollars for the priest, then Morten Frandsen says: “Look, one can understand that, there’s sense in that. True, it’s a lot of money, but one also has an assurance that it is God one is dealing with when one has given 100 rix-dollars for it.” What the hum. being brings forth is exactly what God wants to be rid of, and in this respect it is “the priest” who satisfies the hum. being’s deepest need. To be sure, God in Heaven can truly say of the hum. world: mundus vult decipi.

Hum. Existence. There are two poles in being a hum. being: the animal category―the spiritual category. The animal category relates to propagation of the race― ―and this is a way in which all are in fact willing to be hum. The result of this (and this is the misfortune for existence) is that the numerical mass grows entirely disproportionately to the number of individuals who really relate to spirit. This, however, still does not present the misfortune in a precise way. No, the disproportion between the numerical mass and the few individuals who should form a counterbalance is so great that, between these few individuals and the mass of peop. an entire intermediate authority is inserted, a medium: the priests, the teachers, and the like, who live from playing up to peop., who make a living by converting what is more true into what is more untrue. 21 mundus vult decipi] Latin, the world wants to be deceived.

327

328

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 8–9

•

1854

If only those few individuals who really relate to spirit could come to influence the common man, much would be won. But it is precisely this intermediate authority that constitutes the misfortune of human existence. And so it is a glaring lie when this intermediate authority gives the appearance of helping peop. to come gradually nearer and nearer the truth. No, the intermediate authority is and will continue to be a half-measure, and it helps the mass of peop. into half-measures.

5

320 10

The Propagation of the Race. Christianity Wants to Bar the Way.

This is surely how Xnty would have to speak to a pers. who wants to marry: In what capacity is it that you want to propagate the race, is it qua animal creature―or qua spiritual hum. being? In the first capacity the matter is only all too simple. But if it is in the latter capacity, then stay a while. Don’t you think that being a father requires that you have reached the maturity of really possessing a life-view that you dare vouch for, so that you would dare pass it on to your child when the latter―with the justification inherent in being a child who owes its life to you―asked you about the meaning of life? Or if it were something that nature takes care of―that the woman’s task is to make sure there was milk in the breast, and the like―would it not be detestable to want to be the mother, to want to gratify the desire, but not have in readiness what is needful for the child? But from a father the child has the right to demand: a life-view― to demand that the father actually does have one. Yet if a pers. is to attain this maturity, a long time will pass before he marries, the years will pass, precisely those years when desire is greatest. If he then finally attains maturity and his life-view becomes Xnty, then it might well never occur to him to want to bring a child into existence. To bring a child into existence. The child is, after all, brought forth in iniquity, having been conceived in sin, and this existence is a vale of tears― ―is this what you will say to the child, is it this that will make you openhearted toward the child who owes its existence to you?” Oh, my God, the more I look at it, the more I see how Protestantism has fundamentally confused Xnty.

9

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 9–10

5

10

321

15

20

25

•

1854

The hum. being naturally centers existence on the propagation of the race; here lies all his egotism qua animal creature, or it is here that it culminates. Xnty would like to decentralize this relationship―and what a fight it has cost[!] Merely in this regard, how terribly true it is when Xt says to the apostles: [“]I send you forth as sheep among ravening wolves,[”]―yes, ravening wolves, that is what peop. become once someone tampers in earnest with that point, seriously wanting to wrest from them what for them is life’s everything. And Protestantism then comes and positions Xnty―precisely in relation to marriage: marriage becomes exactly what is pleasing to God. How detestable this mendacious Xnty that lies to peop., both because the most convenient thing is to play up to peop., and because in the capacity of studmaster and breeder, “the priest” is of course egotistically interested in increasing the flock, interested that the breeding of children be conducted as grossartig as possible. The error in Catholicism is not that the priest is unmarried― no, the error is that a qualitative distinction has been introduced between lay and priest, which is directly opposed to the N.T. and is a concession to a weakness for numbers. No, the error is not that the priest is unmarried―a Xn ought to be unmarried. “But upholding this would mean you getting no Xns at all”― if so, absolutely of no consequence! “If, on the other hand, you make marriage into Xnty, then you get millions of Xns”―absolutely of no consequence!

10

Xnty Bars the Way to Propagation of the Race.

30

A metaphor. When the fire chief comes to the site of the fire― the first thing he does, if not already done, is to say to the police: Bar the way, close off the neighboring streets, we have crowds of peop. enough. Xnty fastens its gaze on [human] existence in the same way and sees straightaway: The evil is rooted in, and involves, the numbers, the preponderance of the animal category over the spiritual category―accordingly then: bar the way. That is, it of course goes without saying that no Xn marries―the misfortune is indeed precisely that there are frightfully far too many peop., and all are busily engaged in providing new deliveries of millions.

35

40

17 grossartig] German, grandly.

329

330

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 10

•

1854

A Xn is salt―that is: it of course goes without saying that no Xn marries. The mass is to be salted, the mass―yes, good Lord, it is a fearful body [of peop.], and all are busily engaged in producing masses. Salt is needed there, salt: it goes without saying that a Xn is unmarried. Yes, this is the root of it. These fine peop. who have got it into their heads to marry, and then―by bringing up a child in Xnty from childhood, to populate the earth with such exceptionally fine Xns, proper, thoroughly proper Xns: these fine peop. are masses who chatter nonsense, or are swindlers. Xndom truly achieves a glorious population of Xns with the help of these fine peop. who have so generously wanted to teach God in Heaven how to make Xns, which is best done when they are bred and then brought up from childhood in Xnty. Excellent! Xnty is precisely the divine’s qualitative break with the human in the breakthrough that constitutes becoming a Xn, becoming salt―and then peop. want to bring up Xns from infancy, i.e., they want to avoid the breach with this existence, the breach with this world. No thanks, you fine peop.! This discovery is not one made by Xnty, but by―veterinarians! Here it does not help at all to give assurances that one means well―and honestly and solemnly― by Xnty, and that one prizes it; no, no! Recall the metaphor of the fire chief! With every outbreak of fire, a crowd of peop. also comes storming―fine, good-hearted peop., who want to help put out the fire, some with a pail, others with a glass of water, others with a squirt gun―in short, fine, sincere, good-hearted peop. But what does the fire chief say? He says: Get those peop. away, if they won’t go of their own volition, then beat them. That is, when fire breaks out the matter is so serious that this heartfelt chatter will not be given a heartfelt welcome, no, the heartfelt chatter is treated as a kind of crime; there will be no trial, no, the police deal with it all by beating the heartfelt nonsense home to where it really belongs. But, that Xnty is supposed to be so insignificant a matter as not even to have the seriousness of an outbreak of fire: Xnty is supposedly something so insignificant that, here, the heartfelt nonsense, the well-intended twaddle, is bid heartily welcome, taken seriously. Truly, truly, what has long since destroyed humankind in Xndom is the lack of an authority that manages and dares to transform heartfelt nonsense and well-intentioned twaddle into― guilt, into street disorder and the like.

5

10

322 15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 11–12

11

5

10

323

15

20

25

•

1854

The Greatest Danger to Christianity is―this is my contention―not heresies, false doctrines, not freethinkers, not profane worldliness, no, but the kind of orthodoxy that is: hearty nonsense, mediocrity sweetly prepared. There is nothing, nothing so terribly opposed to the nature of Xnty as this, in which it not so much perishes as goes to ruin. Precisely this sort of orthodoxy is lèse-majesté against Xnty; for in spite of all its heartiness and decency and good intentions, at root it lacks the imprint of respect for majesty. Nothing is so insidious as this heartiness in taking away majesty. Always good-heartedly, gradually, ever so gradually, coaxing, picking away, and again coaxing― ―the result is that majesty is cheated just a little bit. A little bit―exactly that is the danger; for majesty relates much more to violent attack than to being just a little bit degraded―in heartiness. This kind of orthodoxy has to do with the hearty nonsense of family life, has in essence its stronghold in the heartiness of family life. And this again is Xnty’s greatest danger―Xnty is not as opposed to wild desires and debauchery and dreadful passions and the like, as it is to this plain, ordinary mediocrity, this nauseating miasma, this familiarity with one another, where, to be sure, no great crimes, powerful delusions, can arise―but where it is also all the more difficult for majesty to find what it must require: subjection to the expression of majesty; there is no greater distance from obeying either/or than this common, hearty, family nonsense.

12

One More Reason for Marrying!

30

Xnty says: refrain from marrying; this pleases God and is a quite natural consequence, if you rlly are a Xn. To this the hum. race replies: But if we all do that, then the species must surely die out. And the race naturally regards the extinction of the race as the greatest misfortune. The consequence of this is that not only does a person not refrain from marrying, no, but that a person acquires one more reason for marrying―in order to prevent this horror (which indeed

35

331

332

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 12–13

•

1854

is so imminent!), this horror (which practically all are engaged in preventing!), this horror, that the race should die out. This is one more reason for marrying!

Single State. Creating is reserved for God; and this, if one dare speak of such things, is the loftiest self-generated gratification. Giving life is a weak analogy to this, is granted to the hum. being―and in it lies the culmination of hum. egotism. As the nerve fibers lie under the nail―so is hum. egotism concentrated in this matter of the sexual relation: propagation of the race, giving life. According to the teachings of Xnty, God wants just one thing of us hum. beings, he wants to be loved. But in order for the hum. being to love God, he must abandon all egotism, first and foremost that intensified egotism: propagation of the race, giving life. Naturally, that this matter of the sexual is the center of hum. egotism is something God knows all too well, and that is why it was targeted. And the slightest observation can also easily convince a person that this is where human egotism is to be found in its entirety. So God required―that this egotism be abandoned―and then God pointed to immortality. For, as I have discussed often in these journals, the propagation of the race was (as indeed both Plato and Aristotle stated explicitly) of course paganism’s surrogate for immortality, and Judaism’s as well. The sexual, that is the height of hum. egotism. Therefore, viewed in a purely hum. way, not only the woman but also the man feels as though his life is lost, has failed, unless he gets married. Only a married person is a proper citizen in this world; the single pers. a stranger (which is indeed exactly what Xnty wants the Xn to be―and what God wants the Xn to be in order to love him). Therefore among the Jews (who really knew all about propagating the race) being barren was regarded as a disgrace for a woman. Therefore, perhaps no misfortune touches a pers. as painfully as that regarding the propagation of the species―everything else (being blind, deaf, lame, and the like) does not dishonor him, it does not involve his egotism’s sore point. Self-respect qua animal creature relates to propagating the race, giving life. It

13

324

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 13

5

10

15

325

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

is therefore of concern to peop. who, through natural or unnatural excesses, have lost their propagating capacity―it concerns them exceedingly to regain that capacity in order to regain their self-respect etc., etc., etc. Consequently, God wants the single state, because God wants to be loved. But the hum. being says something like this: [“]I cannot bring you this sacrifice―but let me get married, then with your help I will get 10 others to love you.” Excellent. But take a closer look; these 10, if this child-breeder and purveyor of hum. beings now indeed delivers 10, these 10―do these, then, become single peop. who renounce intensified egotism? No, these 10 behave in exactly the same way and each perhaps produces another 10, all the while under the formula that, instead of one, God shall have 10―while the truth is that God gets none at all, but is ceaselessly swindled. In Protestantism all circumlocution has been set aside in this respect; here we teach “sens phrase” that marriage is precisely what is well-pleasing to God―and I anticipate that learned theology will one day discover that the God of the Xns is called neither Jehovah nor Adonai, is not even neutrius genus, but is a female, and is named Kirsten Marriage-Maker. What has Xnty not become in the course of the centuries! In the old adaptation of D[on] Juan, Elvira’s servant says to D. J., with reference to Elvira: [“]In a remote corner, in a man’s half worn-out clothes, I met my late lord’s daughter: What a terrible reunion.[”] Likewise with Xnty! This sole sovereign, the majesty of divinity―nowadays must provide music for weddings and christenings. Single state! says Xnty. No, replies the hum. being, but I will order a wedding ceremony at your place. Charming, it is ad modum: Refrain from murder! No, but I will have the dagger consecrated with you. Single state! says Xnty. No, says Protestantism, marriage is precisely what is pleasing to God―he jumps for joy the more people he can manage to get married. Have we then not reached the point where Xnty has become the direct opposite of what it is in the New Testament? It has been “reached”―because it has been worked on for a long time; for what are Xndom’s 1800 years other than the history of the continual striving, on the part of the numerical, to re-direct Xnty―and are also the history of how Christianity has been served ever more weakly, of how more and more concessions 18 sens phrase] French, properly “sans phrase,” in so many words. 21 neutrius genus] Latin, of neuter gender. 31 ad modum] Latin, in the manner of.

333

334

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 13–14

•

1854

have continually been made to the numerical, lowering the price, until everything has been turned around. This is the 1800 years’ history―in which the student is thoroughly taught so as not to be mistaken about―what is true Xnty. In the New Testament’s Xnty, the matter stands like this: God wants to be loved and therefore wants the hum. being to renounce the egotism of giving life. The Fall is the gratification of this egotism―and here is the real beginning of the history of temporality, which is the constant repetition of the same guilt, constantly countering or obstructing what God intends, which is to put an end to this wrong move― by means of the single state. Every time, out of love of God, the single state makes its appearance, it is in order to comply with God’s intention. But I almost shudder when I think of how far I had traveled along that path, and how wonderfully I was stopped and directed back to the single state, and how I―understanding myself, of course, but understanding myself as an exception―have known how to hide from my contemporaries what I knew, until at long last I see how Governance has once again been with me here and has wanted to have something quite definite brought into the open. You, infinite majesty, even if you were not love, even if in this infinite majesty you were cold, I still could not refrain from loving you. I have a need of something majestic to love. What others have spoken of―that they did not find love in this world, and therefore felt a need to love you because you are love (with which I agree entirely)―this is something I will also say with regard to the majestic. There was, and is, in my soul a need for the majestic, a majesty that I cannot weary of, cannot be bored of worshiping. In the world, I found nothing, no, I found scarcely anything worth taking up from a gutter, and as for the majestic, I found no more of that than of a beard on a young girl’s cheek, or even less, for I found it ridiculous.

5

10

15

326

25

30

35

Christendom.

14

Rlly it is these two elements that have cooperated in producing this nonsense with Xndom: On the one hand, in the course of time, an increase in the numbers of those who want to be Xns, sort of Xns―but who naturally do not want to be it in the New

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 14

•

1854

Kierkegaard has deleted almost three lines near the end of entry NB34:13.

335

336

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 14–16

•

1854

T.’s sense (an eagerness to be Xn like the Jew here who was so eager to get the Norwegian Constitution introduced―the constitution that expels the Jews―“damn it, I didn’t know that”)― ―and this numerical made such an impression with its numbers, that ground was yielded to it and the concept of Xn was increasingly counterfeited. On the other hand, an egotistical priesthood’s egotism that rightly saw that profit of course goes together with the numerical.

The Religious―The Xnty of the Millions.

1

5

a

The apportioning is nevertheless by no means unreasonable; for inasmuch as these millions only have the illusion of having to do with God, and are thus fooled, it seems reasonable that they should find it charming, and nothing but charming, item that the priests who are in the same situation live well off it.

8 item] Latin, as well as, also.

The life of the religious pers. is the most intensive agony―the scream of the woman giving birth, the scream from the hospital’s operating theater, neither is as horrifying―such is the intensive agony of really having to do with God. It cannot be otherwise, despite the fact that God is love remains unchanged―while, e.g., to take what is highest―the life of the Exemplar―this shows to the most frightful degree what it means to have dealings with God, to be faithful to him. So it is with the religious person. There are only few of these to be found, sparsely distributed. Meanwhile, ever more millions, stage, uninterrupted, the religious divertissement that having to do with God is sheer bliss, sweet and charming and delightful, something that thousands of priests live well off by declaiming it. And both of these are Xnty!a

5

10

15

15

328

25

30

Father―Son―The New Testament.

16

This is how a father speaks to his son in Xndom: Go serenely out into the world, there is a God, he

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 16

5

10

15

20

25

329

30

35

40

will surely look after you, merely put your trust in him, he will surely help you, he always has a way out, always has assistance and every good gift― ―and, there, I am giving you a book, the New Testament, in which you can read more about how blessed it is to have to do with God. As a rare exception―naturally it is a rare exception, perhaps not one time in a million―as a rare exception, it does happen that a son actually reads in the New Testament. To tell the truth, my pen is incapable of expressing this transformation, this something quite different, that the son comes to know. He comes to know, regarding himself, that he is conceived in sin, brought forth in iniquity―that his existence is thus―a crime, that it is very far, as far as possible, from being the case that in bestowing life on him, his father has done something pleasing to God. So there is not exactly anything advantageous in his coming to know about the father, who, presumably with the help of―the New Testament !!!!!!―has fortified himself in his conviction that breeding children is not something one does from desire, no, it is the greatest good deed one can perform. Then the son learns that death awaits him―as punishment, as punishment because his coming into being is guilt and transgression. He learns that this life is to be a vale of tears, a penal institution, that the world lieth in wickedness, that God wants him to hate himself, and that if he does not do as God wills, eternal punishment awaits him. Etc., etc., etc. Is there anything more detestable, can anything more detestable be thought of than the quite simple consequence of this lie of Xndom― ―if a son actually chances to read in the New Testament[?] That the chance of this happening is rare I do not deny; indeed there are possibly millions of Xns, thousands of priests and professors, to whom this did not happen.

•

1854

337

338

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 17–18

•

1854

Ludicrous. It’s ludicrous, after all―I think anyone must see it just by its being said―this seriousness and self-importance about breeding children, as though it were the meaning of life. Yet I am sure there are peop. so engrossed with the seriousness of it that they reckon the ability to breed children to be among the hum. being’s advantages over the animals! No, the old pagan notion still haunts most people’s minds: They believe in immortality one fine day perhaps―but cling to the surrogate: the propagation of the species, and are therefore so besotted―in genuinely Jewish fashion!―with family trees and family histories about how many times someone was married, and how many children in each marriage, whether he had triplets or was special in having only boys―and the priest plays the studmaster.

17

5

10

15

330

Immediate Enthusiasm with Regard to Preaching Xnty; Reflection; the Hum. Being’s Instinctive Slyness.

18

20

Immediate enthusiasm with regard to preaching Xnty has to do with winning everyone, if possible. Peop. praise this as commendable, this eagerness, they extol winning everyone in this way as love. Very good: but take care that the instinctive slyness that is in the hum. being is not mischievously (though only unconsciously) party to this praise. For perhaps they grasp instinctively that if only one can get an ideality properly out into the numerical, then one will no doubt gain power with it―and one becomes a Xn at a cheaper price. The numerical is ideality’s mortal danger. Maybe the preacher comes to be captivated, as it were, by the sight of his winning so many Xns―this is dangerous for his ideality. Or the impression made by the numerical overwhelms him and he thinks: [“]What will become of it, this mass, so far from relating itself to Xnty[?] I must reduce the price a little, so as to win even more.[”] And then the ideality is lost.

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 18–20

5

19

10

•

1854

O, Socrates, you saw rightly. In reflection the task will become that of standing right in the peop.’s midst and then expressing: It is a matter of my becoming a Xn myself. Here, the numerical cannot deceive; and this also expresses properly the fact that God is not a busy majesty who must have followers, but that God is the unconditioned.

The Wedding in Cana. Xndom’s perpetual and never-ending emphasis on Xt’s presence at the wedding and on his providing wine―proves indirectly that peop. themselves suspect that Xnty opposes marriage, and this is the reason this story is so important for them, as their argumentation from it is ludicrous.

331 15

20

20

25

30

35

Martyrdom―Asceticism. I have shown elsewhere that Luther has disfigured Xnty by changing the notion of martyrdom, as though it had no inherent value in itself. Then at another point, I have called the asceticism of the Middle Ages situationless. On this, it must be noted: It is quite true, the Middle Ages’ asceticism is situationless, and the Xn is to go out into the world to be sacrificed. But then, from another point of view, the idea of being sacrificed can easily be made sophistical, as though it had to be entrusted to a hum. being’s intelligence to see where a sacrifice was needed. No, the Christian view is actlly that sacrifices are always needed, and asceticism is actlly the life-view that corresponds to God’s being the unconditioned and that for God this world lieth in wickedness, that it is not a playground for pleasure but a penal institution: God’s view, which asceticism strives to express voluntarily. What made the asceticism of the Middle Ages situationless was rlly the introduction of straightforward recognizability, that

339

340

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 20–22

•

1854

people wanted to honor and to be honored in relation to their asceticism. Ja, das ist was anders! You see, this was how what otherwise seems impossible to bring together in thought could be excellently united: an ascetic who is afraid of being put to death, afraid of martyrdom. That is to say, his asceticism was not pessimistic, but a sly invention: to attain distinction among peop. in that way, to live admired, practically worshiped. The ascetic, therefore, was so far from having a hostile attitude (in love of God), a hostile attitude toward hum. beings, that he related to them as just another traveling entertainer to his audience; and although he was an ascetic, he perhaps clung to this life as much as any street performer, he loved peop.’s admiration with a passion as strong as that of any actor on the stage.

5

10

15

Protestantism is altogether untenable. It is a revolution brought about by proclaiming “the Apostle” (Paul) at the Master’s (Xt’s) expense. As a corrective at a particular time and place, this can have its importance. If there is to be any further talk of retaining Protestantism beyond that, this is how it must be done: We confess that this teaching is a mitigation of Xnty that we hum. beings have permitted ourselves, appealing to God to put up with it. And instead, Protestantism is trumpeted as an advance in Xnty! No, it is perhaps the most pronounced concession that has been made to the numerical, this numerical, which is the hereditary foe of Xnty, which wants to be Xn but wants to be rid of the ideality or have it abolished or downgraded, and defiantly boasts of being so many.

Christianity Transformed into Optimism. If it is not the most complete thoughtlessness or a plain knavish trick to transform Xnty into optimism, the thought must be something like this. 2 Ja, das ist was anders!] German, Yes, that is something else.

332

21

20

25

30

22

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 22

5

10

15

333 20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

For God, sure enough, this world lieth in wickedness―that is what Xnty teaches―after all, we do admit that this was the situation in paganism and Judaism. But if we Xns will now behave well, be fine peop., then indeed it could after all become a fine world, and we are delighted with this life: indeed, through his suffering, Xt has atoned for original sin. What constantly occupies “the hum. being” is to get this world made into a fine world, to get away from God’s criminalist view that it lieth in wickedness, that for him it is a felonious existence. Now, I shall not dwell on whether Xndom can really be said to have in any way at all achieved anything by way of behaving well and being fine peop., or whether, ethically, the situation in Xndom is not rather the same as that in paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism. But if this is not the case, then the requirement is still quite unchanged: that in order to further Xnty’s cause, the Xn―if there be any such in this fine Xndom!!!―became a sacrifice, fell as a sacrifice. Yet I shall not dwell on this. No, what causes God not to change his view of this whole existence is that, for him, time has no significance; for him, what is long past is constantly present, so too with that long bygone―the Fall. This whole of hum. existence, which dates from the Fall and about which we hum. beings are so conceited as a devil of a piece of work―this whole existence is something in opposition to him, is nothing but the result of a false step that―owing to the immensity of its consequences―we conveniently forget, which God does not. This whole of hum. existence is against God, is a defection from him, a false step away from him, and now he will show it compassion (for, after all, he is love), though he also wants to do away with it. To this end Xnty―which therefore immediately bars the way to propagation. That Xnty bars the way to propagation means: Stop now, I have put up with this world-historical process long enough; I will certainly show mercy, but I will have no more consequences of that false step. So even if someone became Xn and died unmarried, he is still a criminal, for his existence through propagation was a crime. This world can never be a fine world for God in that way, for either there is a given generation―but in that case its existence is through propagation, or― ―well, then the question of whether or not it is a fine world indeed ceases to apply. Take an illustration. Suppose there were a family whose progenitor had sinned against the king in the land―if this were then

341

342

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 22

•

1854

continued from generation to generation by the respective successors to the throne, this family would never be forgiven―there would be much to object to in this. For one thing, kings, after all, are only hum. beings, and thus time is significant here. Furthermore, in the second, in the seventh, etc. generation these are no longer the same persons, any more than the king in question is the same; perhaps the members of that family now alive are really excellent peop., anything but enemies of the king. Take, on the other hand, God’s relation to the race. For one thing, time has no power to change God: for God, this matter of the progenitor’s fall essentially happened “today.” And yet he wants to forget―but still, of course, on condition that culpa will not be repeated. In the illustration, the transgression was not that this family’s later generations descended from the progenitor through propagation. But when culpa inheres precisely in that [propagation], then it is, after all, really asking too much to require forgiveness―with permission to repeat culpa. And yet it is this re-editing of Xnty that flourishes especially in Protestantism. It is as though Xndom has said to God: just let us have our way, you will see, we will give you satisfaction, you shall see what fine children we would bring up, true Xns, for this must be done in a timely manner (Xnty, it is true, is of the opinion that because becoming a Xn is a breach, it is important that the breach not be made so early that it is nonsense to talk of making a break with the world, as if one were saying that in baptism, the infant breaks with the world―in that way the breach is avoided: i.e., becoming a Xn is avoided, i.e., it becomes an illusion, a bit of sentimentality and a bit of children’s games). No, Christianity stands firm upon the single state―it has no need of empirical proof, but Xndom’s grand achievement in procuring Christian children, real Christians from childhood on, the result of this grand achievement, has adequately demonstrated what this leads to: starting over with the help of a deft turn of that old [“]It is a fine world,[”] and it would be a glaring sin to stop this influx of legions of fine peop. by barring the way to propagation. No, Christianity stands firm upon the single state―and I shall not, like Luther (I took good care not to do that!), I shall not, like him, when it seems as if Paul does not agree with Xt, I shall not then say: Xt must step aside, Paul is the man. No, should it be the case that Paul disagrees with Xt, then I will say: Yes, then Paul will have to excuse me. God’s kingdom is not of this world; the Xn shall be a stranger and a foreigner in this world, in this world that, for God, lieth in 12 culpa] Latin, fault, crime, guilt.

5

10

15

334

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 22–23

•

1854

30

wickedness, the consequence of a guilt, which, for God, is indeed committed today. But cardo rerum in this world is precisely: the propagation of the race, only with this does one (the person who takes it upon himself to propagate the race) become truly incorporated in this world. No matter all the conclusions and assurances and good intentions, and all possible measures and precautions, the result will still be that Xnty becomes homogeneous with this world. Get a man a wife and children (this is something this world knows very well), then we shall soon rework him so that he becomes so homogeneous with this world that it is a joy―for this world to behold. Xnty knows this, too, and therefore straightaway imposes the barrier. If I had 10 stenographers and could dictate something different to each, and kept on dictating uninterruptedly for 10 years, I doubt if I could describe all the gibberish and nonsense, all the mass of illusions and lies and dishonesty and well-meaning and knavish fabrications that are concealed in this one word: Xndom. But this I vouch for: it is all connected, in one way or another, with people having overlooked, rendered null and void, the fact that being a Xn―not solely that of being a priest―is the single state: that distinction is un-Christian―no, to be a Xn is to be single. This world, the selfishness of this entire existence, is concentrated and culminates in the propagation of the race, a selfishness that (as I have shown elsewhere), if it cannot create (which is the right reserved to God’s majesty), then at least wants to: give life. God does not want this selfishness; he wants it stopped―therefore Xnty immediately bars the way; God’s kingdom is not of this world; the Xn is a stranger and foreigner.

23

Let the Little Children Come to Me

5

10

15

335 20

25

35

Yes, quite right―Xt is indeed the world’s Savior, and, indeed, by its existence, the infant, too, belongs to the lost race. But to interpret this passage in the way that a million × trillions have put it: [“]Let us produce little children―for Xt says: Let the little children come to me.[”] This is either brutishly stupid or shameless insolence. 3 cardo rerum] Latin, the heart of the matter.

343

344

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 23–24

•

1854

In Xndom peop. have made Xt into a goodfellow, someone who provides wine at banquets, almost as though Xt had not come to the world to save a lost race but to be a godfather to all the world’s children. The matter is nevertheless so simple: saving the race, that means that the race is lost―we’ve had only altogether too much of it―what matters is getting saved out of the race, and of course that must begin with blocking off the race. Christ has not come in order to become progenitor of a new race descending from him. Yet this is what Xndom rlly wants to re-edit Xnty into; instead of letting the matter stand as in the New Testament: The race is lost―Xt wants to save; not: Xt wants to be the starting point for a new race.

5

10

15

Single State (Christendom.)

Thus Xnty demands the single state. This seems so easy to see if one wants to; when it is seen, it is so obvious that one then might well ask: But how can this enormous nonsense with Xndom’s millions possibly have come about? The explanation is in fact not so difficult; it inheres in the fact that peop. have been unable, or for egotistical reasons have been unwilling, to hold their ground against the numerical. The Christian demand is God’s demand, it places the matter as high as God wants it, and, of course, it is not exactly congenial to flesh and blood. But when this talk of heaven’s blessedness had penetrated to some extent, then the numbers of those who rushed in and wanted to become Xns constantly became greater and greater. But the Christian demand was not really congenial to them, it was too lofty for them. Then it happened that the preachers―perhaps guided by a hum. good nature that wanted to make a mess of it rather than obey it―thought that we might relax things a bit―and then things went at full gallop. What happened after that was that, between the divine requirement and the hum. crowd that wanted to be Christians at a

336

24

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 24–25

5

10

15

337

•

1854

slightly lower price, an intermediate authority―some Gaudiebe (see the story about Studenstrup at the town hall and courthouse) who took it on themselves to reduce the requirement a little (as if they had heaven’s blessedness at their disposal)―forced its way in and then things went at full gallop, just as they generally do in the world of trade, with one underbidding the other. But Xnty sticks to its own: the single state. Xnty wants heterogeneity with this world―and as for the pers. who remained unmarried for religious reasons, he is (as they say in the language of the military) radically out of step with this world. Yes, even absent the deeper reason for the single state that I have earlier pointed out, God would have to demand the single state simply to have peop. available and capable of obeying every order. Being a Xn is, and shall be, a strenuous way of existence, but (as indeed life so commonly demonstrates) every such person is usually single. Truly, it has done incalculable harm, this hypocritical cover, that the people, that priests, give assurances that they would be willing to do everything―if only they had no wife and children. Thus, first of all, people falsify Xnty and get wife and children, and then, when Xnty beckons and wants to treat them a little roughly, or wants to make use of them (because breeding children and gobbling up a livelihood can scarcely be called a use that Xnty makes of them), then the answer is: Yes, if only we didn’t have wife and children.

25

25

30

35

God’s Majesty. Just as Draconian laws lead to no one at all being punished, so, too, can one also elevate God into a majesty of a sort, which, by means of a swindle, gets people altogether rid of him. This is the sort of majesty into which Xndom has removed God. This is also why it is so needful to stress that God is sheer subjectivity in the sense that, if it so pleases him, the most insignificant trifle can attract his attention. It is, of course, another matter that, as I have often discussed, in his majesty he punishes by ignoring peop. and all their striving; but this is indeed not because he is so far distant in his majesty that he is, as it were, unable to catch sight of them. But neither, naturally, is he subjectivity in the sense that anything should―if I dare put it this way―have it in 1 Gaudiebe] German, swindlers. (See also explanatory note.)

345

346

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 25–26

•

1854

its power to affect him; no, the greatest thing is no more capable of this than the least―but, as mentioned, the least trifle can attract his attention when it pleases him. When it pleases him. That is what it depends on. For he sees everything, knows everything, the greatest thing and the greatest or the least trifle. Therefore, no one should deceive himself. If a pers. heaps transgression upon transgression and it goes unpunished, if, indeed, his life is sheer good fortune and triumph, he should not deceive himself; God sees it; God is very close at hand, but he overlooks him; he punishes with the most fearful of all punishments: being ignored by God. If the religious pers. thinks that one or another trifle could be so trivial as to go unnoticed by God, he should not deceive himself, for God sees everything and, if it pleases him, he can take note of it. The textbook category: God is in heaven and does everything as it pleases him, is quite right if understood as I have presented it here: God is sheer subjectivity―if it so pleases him, everything is nothing for him, and nothing is everything if it so pleases him. But this middle term, [“]if it pleases him,[”] is the infinite distance that God has―God, who nevertheless in another sense is what is infinitely nearest. Everywhere, at every moment, he is infinitely nearest, but infinitely secured against all familiarity; for, whether or not he wants to make it known how near he is, or whether or not he wants to be subjectively near, depends on this alone: whether it pleases him.

The Numerical. The numerical―which, as the numerical grows in importance, has more and more become the law of hum. existence―also has a demoralizing effect in this way: that the sight of these thousands upon thousands makes peop. live in merely comparative fashion, that the whole of hum. existence dissolves into this comparative nonsense, the numerical mire, which then, under the name of history and politics, is always tarted up as something, where the point (the mark of spiritlessness) is always that what gives it any significance is that a large number participated in it, so that the number imparts significance, almost as if the idea were like a teller in the bank, someone who contemplates numbers. Ah, in antiquity it was still the case that there were peop. who thought primally about what it is to be a hum. being, about what

5

10

15

338

25

26

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 26

5

10

15

20

339

25

30

35

•

1854

meaning there is at all to being hum., about what inherent significance this has in itself and in the whole of existence. It does not occur to anyone to think about such things, lost as everyone now is from the youngest age in this hum. nonsense of the numerical. Whence also comes the fact that there no doubt is not a hum. being alive who even suspects the dimensions on which Xnty is established, that Xnty is established by God and has the dimensions or proportions of the whole of existence, the universe’s proportions. That Xnty is an event that literally concerns heaven and earth, as indeed Xt always presents it, see, e.g., his discourses in Luke 21 about his return[.] But here again the drivel with “Xndom”―these millions × trillions of Christians―has babbled Xnty down into a wretched state, so that being a Xn is reckoned as nothing, as something we all are―so as then to begin mutually driveling with each other, where the point again becomes, how large a number have been set in motion―always the numbers. But how ironical, the law is this: Whatever requires numbers in order to be significant is eo ipso something insignificant, and the greater the number required, the more insignificant it is; everything that can be achieved, arranged, be brought to fulfillment, with the help of a large number, which then takes peop. aback in admiration, as though that were what was important―precisely this is what is unimportant. What is truly important relates inversely, its fulfillment requires a progressively smaller and smaller number, and for the most important thing of all, for that which sets heaven and earth in motion, only one pers. is required; if it requires more, it is diminished. Sure enough, European wars and revolutions and art exhibitions and giant newspapers etc. cannot be arranged by one pers. Peop. then think that such things are important, instead of it being precisely their unimportance that makes it necessary for there to be many, their lack of importance that makes their importance dependent upon the number giving them importance. But the most important thing of all, that which interests angels and demons―that a pers. really gets involved with God: for that, one pers. is enough. And shudder, then, when you consider how we live―and that the truth is that every pers. could be that one pers.

18 eo ipso] Latin, by that very fact.

347

348

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 27–29

•

1854

Giant Undertakings. Alas, what a change! At one time it was true that to think of a giant undertaking was to think that it was one, one pers.―a giant. Nowadays we boast of giant undertakings, and these giant undertakings are rlly dwarf-undertakings―a few million dwarfs united, the point is simply the number.

That Christianity Simply Does Not Exist. Light can be thrown on this, my sole thesis, from the following point of view. Precisely because Xnty is what is unconditionally important, it is the case that in accordance with the law of importance, one pers. is enough. Nowadays, on the other hand, Xnty has now been conveyed into the world of unimportance, where the law is: importance is given by the amount, the number. In order for Xnty to amount to anything nowadays, there must be people, states, millions of hum. beings or, as they call themselves, Xns. In our day, a person would probably, bona fide, break out in guffaws were it to be said that, in Christian terms, one pers. is enough. From Xnty’s point of view, Christian kingdoms and states, a Christian world, are just as ludicrous (if, that is, if Xnty employed the category of the ludicrous). What the hum. being always seeks in the numerical is what Adam sought among the trees: concealment. Secretly, though, one perhaps shudders at the truth that one is oneself not Xn, that Xnty simply does not exist―and then one conceals oneself in “Christian states, nations, kingdoms,” fleeing from the truth: that Xnty simply does not exist.

27

5

28

15

20

340

25

30

Divine Governance.

29

He who governs is, indeed, he who is omnipresent, thus in one sense closest-at-hand to everything. But in another sense he is in-

35

21 bona fide] Latin, in good faith.

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 29–30

•

1854

35

finitely remote. That means: intervening with might is something he will not do, he omnipotently constrains his own omnipotence, because it has indeed pleased him to want to see what the whole of this existence can become. He is, in a certain sense, like a naturalist with regard to his experiment: he may of course have it easily in his power to achieve the result another way; he wants to see if it can be produced by the particular procedure of the experiment; but he constrains himself in order to observe the experiment, waits patiently―though still infinitely interested.―Or, in relation to the learner, God is like a practitioner of maieutics. He of course has it in his power to tell the learner the right answer straightaway, but instead he holds back, puts up with the learner, who spends years, perhaps, in exhausting himself in gibberish and inventing new gibberish. But just as the experimenter, the maieuticist, is anything but a disinterested man, so is God infinitely interested. Yet, that which, seen from this point of view, makes existence so terribly overwhelming for a poor hum. being is: that God has, and makes use of, such huge proportions, which, here again, is precisely the majestic (just as, in a weak analogy, an experimenter, a maieuticist, is ranked according to how long he can hold out, and according to the scale on which he can arrange the experiment). God makes use of centuries or permits centuries to dither about in gibberish and delusions: the proportions here are so immense for a poor hum. being. That is, in a certain sense one can say that there simply is no governance, just as, indeed, it is also as if there were no experimenter, or as if the experimenter were no one, because he does not, after all, intervene, but simply permits the complex forces to unfold on their own. And yet the experimenter is sheer attentiveness and incessantly follows along, which is only a weak metaphor for God’s way of being-with, while in another sense he constrains himself entirely from intervening omnipotently. Only once has Governance intervened omnipotently: in Xt.

30

Relating Oneself to God.

5

10

15

20

25

30

341

God is at once infinitely close to, and infinitely remote from, the hum. being.

349

350

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 30–31

•

1854

To come to relate oneself to God is a voyage of discovery that can be to some extent compared with a North Pole expedition― so seldom has a pers. ever really pressed on in that direction, to the discovery. But imagined doing it[?]―Yes, all the centuries, and almost everyone, have done that. Yet this voyage for the discovery of God is an interior journey; the point of it is precisely to preserve oneself in singularity, and then, internally, simply to put aside, to get rid of, the obstacles. Here is the boundary of hum. bustle and conceit. If an emperor were to open his purse strings and give 2 mill. specie dollars a year to pay 10,000 fat priests in order―to discover God: this is naturally ludicrous, even more foolish than throwing the money away. If the whole of Xndom initiated a 4-shilling subscription in order to pay 10,000 priests with the intention of getting hold of God, it is nonsense. Yes, God be praised, money is not capable of everything, nor are associations.

Xnty as Doctrine. Were it really God’s intention that Xnty be merely teaching, some tenets: then the N.T. is a ludicrous book―to set everything in motion in this way, to let Xt suffer in this way, in order to introduce some theses. Humankind would have to say: [“]Why, good grief, is there nothing else you want, can this be of such concern to you[?] We should gladly espouse anything, we will do it just as readily as if you wanted us to go around in three-cornered hats instead of round ones.[”] In truth, if, according to God’s idea of it, Xnty is to be nothing but a doctrine, then the entire machinery of the New T., the life of Xt, reveals that qua judge of hum. beings, God is, to put it plainly, a total bungler. No, but God―who knows this swindler, “the hum. being”―he aims for something else: transformation of character. And that is why God aims first and foremost at the cardinal point: the single state. Heterogeneity is what God wants, heterogeneity with this world. Dying to the world instead of lust for life: the single state instead of weddings and births. There was a time when the Xn decorated his home with only a skull. Now one sees a Venus in every house: Nowadays it is (Christian?) cultivation to be able to make a genteel allusion to

5

10

15

31

20

25

30

342 35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 31–33

5

32

15

•

1854

sexuality in connection with everything, and a woman’s cultivation consists of genteel coquetry. Yes, either a Venus as the emblem, or the Jewish business about child-breeding being a blessing for this life: one of these two is the point in Xndom’s life, or of life in Xndom. Marvelous result of―making Xnty into doctrine: in “Christendom” the earnestness of life is: the relation to the opposite sex― and this is Xnty, the Xnty of the N.T.

Paganism―“Xndom” Paganism always has one advantage over Xnty by not having consumed so frightfully many lies. Just think of the lie of the priests, who thus, zealous in their job, year in and year out preach―lies; for it is a lie that what they preach is the Xnty of the N.T. Maybe in paganism, too, every pers. was a liar; in Xndom, in addition to being a liar in the same sense as in paganism, he is also a liar by calling himself a Xn, a general lie that makes every hour he lives a mendacity that cries out to heaven.

20

33

25

343

30

35

“Christendom” a Conspiracy “Christendom” is a conspiracy against New Testament Xnty. In this connection, what matters is to see it: for it is not so easy to see, even though, once it has been said, it is so exceedingly easy to see. But its not being so easy to see is because it doesn’t occur to anyone to imagine a conspiracy in that format. But it is a conspiracy nevertheless, and, as has been shown elsewhere, it is also in a sense an expression of respect for Xnty that people have not dared make open rebellion, but have cunningly conspired to falsify the concept of [“]Xn,[”] to make the world Christian (the world with which, according to the New T., one should be at odds). “Christendom” is a conspiracy against New T. Xnty. Yes, I know very well that Christendom would have us imagine that they are excellent Xns, that, on the other hand, the freethinkers, the sect makers, etc.―that it is these who are the conspirators. No, no, this is an old ruse, that, e.g., a thief who is being pursued

351

352

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 33–34

•

1854

hits upon shouting “Stop, thief!” in order to direct attention away from himself. And likewise “Christendom” is busily engaged in protecting orthodoxy from sects and freethinkers, etc., but one is not taken in by that; Xndom is itself the conspiracy against N.T. Xnty and far more dangerous than all freethinkers and sects. Christendom is conspiracy against New T. Xnty. And what was Catiline’s, and what was any conspiracy known to history, and what were all of them together, compared to this conspiracy? But now, the next point―which is to be used against this monstrous conspiracy: where is there a large enough body of men to raise this matter with these masses? Yes, this next point―which will particularly outrage the public and moral personages of that sort: this next point is that the single individual, a single individual, is to be used. Frightful! And yet it is the only true, the only consistent thing. For if an association of two is used, the conspiracy is not radically exploded; if an association of two is used, what is used against the conspiracy contains the germ of a new conspiracy against New T. Xnty; for where there are two, there are also ten, and then hundreds, etc.―and then when there are a million, we have the conspiracy. Rlly it is the numerical that is the conspiracy, because the numerical insidiously strangles the point in Xnty. Under a show of zeal for Xnty, the numerical suffocates Xnty; just as, under a show of solicitude for a child, a mother smothers it to death―so does the numerical smother Xnty to death. The numerical is the conspiracy. As in the state, when a mass of peop. gathers on the street―without further ado the police charge in, regardless of whether or not a crime has been committed, because this gathering of peop. is itself a crime; so too, and with a quite another kind of right, wherever millions of Xns appear, the higher police launch an attack without further ado― the greater the number, the more certain that it is a lie, the more certain it is that there is a falsification here. This can be taken as the opposite principle to what has delighted the priests for so long: spreading Xnty.

A Personal God. This is what professors and priests jabber about―they try to prove that God is personal, and it is in this that the congregation delights.

5

10

15

20

25

344

35

34

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 34

5

10

15

20

25

30

345

35

40

•

1854

I will not talk about it being ludicrous to want to prove this, inasmuch as it cannot be “proven”―it must be believed. But what I will actlly talk about is that here as everywhere peop. waste their time and their lives on solving problems that they have themselves created. Yes, God indeed always makes fools of the wise. Suppose that someone, a professor, employed his whole life to proving, in learned and scientific fashion, the personality of God―suppose that he finally succeeded, what then? He will then, at the end of his life, have managed to stand at the beginning, or to stand at the end of the introduction to the beginning. And this whole introduction is something the hum. being has itself foolishly created―difficulties that the hum. being has come up with on its own. But, as mentioned, this is how it is in all things religious, all things Christian: peop. invent a kind of difficulty at the beginning, the introduction, to the matter itself: they waste their time and energy and life on this, and then they die, and thus never come to start on the matter itself. No, God is personal, that matter is certain enough. But with this you have, up to now, not come any further. Here again lies a hum. delusion: people fancy that now, when the professor has finally proven that God is personality, then this is what God is for all of us as a matter of course. This may also be why we would rather transport the matter into a sphere other than faith, into that of the proofs, in order, once and for all, to be quickly and surely quit of this, or to have certainty. No, God sure enough is personal, but from this it still does not follow that he is that for you as a matter of course. Take a hum. situation: a superior personality is, of course, surely personality, but it is not in his power to be personality in relation to someone inferior to himself or to relate to him objectively, even though it nonetheless remains true that the superior is and remains personality. Likewise with God. He is, to be sure, personality, but whether he will be that with regard to the individual depends on whether it so pleases God. It is God’s grace that he will be personality in relation to you; and if you forfeit his grace, he punishes you by relating to you objectively. And in that sense one may say that the world (despite all proofs!) does not have a personal God, for the world does not please God, and his punishment is to relate to it objectively while he nevertheless remains, as fully as ever, personality. But while professors and priests jabber to millions about proofs of God’s personality, the truth is that for a long time no peop. have lived who were able to bear the pressure and weight of having a

353

354

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 34–35

•

1854

personal God. There is something touching and gripping in the truth with which a patriarch or an apostle speaks about dying wearied of life; for truly to have had to do with a personal God― that can indeed make a pers. tired. Metaphorically, a farm horse, even if it has worked hard in front of the plow―has not even a glimmer of what it means to be as tired as a dressage horse that the riding master has ridden.―Ah, but even if my life had had no torments and sufferings in other respects, this alone would be enough, this disgust that comes over me every time I think of the nonsense on which peop. waste time and life. It would indeed be disgusting to imagine peop. not eating food but living off filth, eating vermin and the like―but it is just as disgusting to imagine peop. paying exorbitant prices to priests and professors, buying, and happily living on―jabber.

5

10

15

Marriage. That the propagation of the race is linked to hum. egotism―or, rather, is it―can be seen in countless ways: here are just a couple of features. Most peop. do not have sufficient self-esteem to live as individuals; so their egotism demands that they draw a [geometrical] construction line―which makes it clear that their self-esteem takes its strength from the fact that there are people who owe their lives to them. Now they apparently think that their lives have meaning after all. And in addition (as frequently noted) this is for them a surrogate for immortality. Most peop. lack the self-esteem to be capable of holding their own when confronting other peop., so their self-esteem requires that they have some people who must obey them unconditionally, some people whom they have completely in their power, so that a person at any rate feels that he is master. These, then, are the children. God have mercy on the crudeness and egotism that family life conceals in this connection, because, alas, it is only altogether too certain that as often as not, the parents are more in need of upbringing than are the children.

35

20

25

346 30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 36 36

5

10

15

20

25

347

30

35

40

•

1854

Human Cultivation. Governance has endowed every pers. with uniqueness. The meaning of life should then be to implement this uniqueness, to be strengthened and matured in the collisions it necessarily generates with the surrounding world. Hum. cultivation, on the contrary, is demoralizing and is calculated to teach a person the trick of not altering his expression, not saying a word, not undertaking the least thing without the guarantee that many others before him have conducted themselves in the same manner. In this way, people believe that they have managed to avoid all changes, all collisions, all the effort associated with uniqueness. As journals in the world of opinion demoralize peop. by weaning them from having their own opinions and from developing themselves by implementing their opinions in opposition to those of others, they wean and habituate them instead to every opinion they [these journals] have, accustoming them to having the guarantee (which the journals’ circulation provides) that a considerable number of peop. are of the same opinion: this is how so-called hum. cultivation demoralizes. A man of this refined taste is really a consumptive. Whereas every unique character (which indeed every person originally is) that is then implemented in life is a real enrichment, a plus, that enters the world, a cultivated person of the former sort is a consumptive imitation. And this sort of cultivated person, a consumptive imitator of this sort, no doubt also thinks that he is immortal―by having the guarantee that he conducts himself exactly in the way in which he knows many others have conducted themselves. For a hum. being, all salvation lies in becoming personality―but there is no greater distance from personality than a person who is cultivated in this way. It is true that, as a rule, he is spared all that can befall uniqueness: coming to stand alone, being severely tested in primitivity, perhaps finding himself in serious conflicts in life, perhaps being ridiculed, perhaps being persecuted, perhaps put to death―but deep down he is demoralized, a non-pers., a freak; he has in a way ceased to be a creature of God and has become a creature who―how loathsome!―has as his creator the hum. race. Only God, in creating, can give uniqueness; when a hum. being tries to emulate God’s trick, it consists of taking away uniqueness. A cultivated pers. of this sort is then transformed into a hum. creation who also bears his creator’s (the hum. being’s)―no, not his

355

356 1

5

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 36–37

[a]

This sheer wretchedness of being like the others occurs only in the hum. world, is not an original something, but a later something―a demoralization―the Creator endowed no living being so stingily.

•

1854

image, but his stamp―that he is just like the others, the most pitiful of all being: indeed, the poorest animal’s being has more worth than being such as this, which of course is not owing to God but, through guilt, is the hum. being’s own work.

The Common Man―The Cultivated.

[a]

10

15

20

25

Is it not with all hum. life in the world as it is with the princess in 1001 Nights, who survives by telling stories[?] Is not the reason that―under the pretext of drawing near to God, every effort is made to keep God away―is not the reason for this that a person secretly knows, as children know that their mischief and games come to an end when the parents come home, that in like manner, the impression of God’s actual proximity would put a stop to all this commotion, a commotion that only comes about through peop. cunningly supporting one another in the notion that God is remote, removing him under a show of laboring to approach him[?]

As the common man gets God out of the way, or himself produces the misgivings and difficulties that take God away because the common man will not allow himself to be uplifted but would rather stick to his view that God is so infinitely elevated that it can’t really be true that a person can appeal to him simply and straightforwardly, without further ado― so, too, does the cultivated person invent similar difficulties that likewise get God out of the way. The cultivated person says (and rlly it is even more stupid than the common man’s talk): [“]One cannot draw near to God without further ado; no, when trying to push one’s way toward God, one must proceed in scientific, scholarly fashion.[”] And alas, all the while, the God of love sits in heaven and waits for someone to become involved with him―while in various ways hum. beings are busily engaged in getting God out of their way and, note well, claiming that what they are doing is being done precisely in order to approach God. That is, while claiming to draw near to God, they are distancing God from themselves. But, when all is said and done, is this not rlly what, in their instinctive cunning, people want? Is not the true situation rlly this, that the hum. being is just like the child who would prefer to be free of the parents’ gaze; is this not what hum. beings want: to be free of God’s gaze[?] And to this end their instinctive cunning has come up with the idea that it is safest to do this with a show of making great exertions to draw near to God, whereas it is precisely these exertions that place God at a distance from a person. This is unquestionably true of the cultivated in particular.

5

37

10

15

20

348

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 37

•

1854

357

Journal NB34, with the conclusion of entry NB34:37. The deleted hash mark near the top of the page shows that Kierkegaard had at first wanted to end the entry at that point.

358

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 38

•

1854

Christianity. What makes it so infinitely difficult for us hum. beings even merely to attend to what Xnty is, is that, naturally, we have altogether the opposite way of looking at things from that in the New Testament, exactly the opposite kind of eyes, if you will. The New Testament’s point of view is solely and exclusively: eternity. This is the topic, this is what it concerns itself with―and then it says it as it is: If there is talk of an eternal damnation, then whatever you might suffer in these few temporal years is nothing, yes, sheer grace, even if you got off with suffering the most possible in these few years and then were eternally blessed. That is, the N.T. is so lost in the eternal that it treats this life entirely as a bagatelle. Conversely with us hum. beings: we are so preoccupied with this life, with having a good time in this life, with being spared suffering in this life―that we would rlly rather leave this matter of eternity in abeyance, or we wish to obtain, in the easiest way, a certainty that we can busy ourselves entirely with enjoying this life. Thus for Xnty the eternal life is of sole importance―for us, more or less entirely the present life. From this point of view, I can again throw light on my thesis: Xnty simply does not exist. That is, if Xnty truly exists, then this means that the eternal is so important for a hum. being that for him this life is a bagatelle, this life with every possible suffering [is] still but a bagatelle compared with escaping eternal perdition. Ergo when, conversely, the temporal has become what is important, yes, when even the eternal is cited in support of the temporal, when it must serve it by giving―zest to enjoy this life!―then Xnty is falsified in such a way that it simply does not exist. In the New Testament, Xnty gives the matter the following turn: for God, hum. existence is culpable in a way that there can be no question of altogether escaping punishment. So choose, choose to suffer in this life―become Xn in the New Testament’s sense and then hope for an eternal blessedness, the offer of which is nonetheless sheer grace. In Christendom the matter has been turned such that the Xn exploits eternal bliss as refinement in the enjoyment of this life.

38

5

10

350 15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 39 39

5

10

351 15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

Grace. (Paradox). In order, if possible, to impede the drivel about grace, which has falsified Xnty in “Xndom” and has demoralized peop., let me outline the situation in just a few words. The matter is exceedingly simple if only one remembers that “grace,” like everything Christian, lies in the sphere of paradox. The falsification of grace is therefore, like the falsification of all else that is Christian, owing to its having been demoted to the sphere of the straightforward. Grace paradoxical: what does that mean? It means grace that is recognizable negatively as suffering, so that grace is recognized negatively, precisely through its giving suffering. So elevated is the Christian concept of grace, because the majesty of the divine does not at all reflect upon this life, but only upon the eternal, so that if this [the eternal] is now brought to bear on this life, everything appears inverted. Thus grace. Grace is to be saved from eternal perdition―in God’s view, an infinite grace. But, for the hum. being, at every weak moment the situation comes to look quite otherwise. What do we mean by a weak moment? It is a moment when the eternal is not present to him. And when the eternal is not present to him, the temporal then becomes important to him― ―and now, in temporality, when it seems, as indeed the N.T. teaches, that to be Xn is to suffer in this life, suffering one could escape if one were not a Xn: then the whole situation is turned around and grace becomes what brings suffering, agony― ―so far is “grace” from being anything straightforward. Have God’s conception of eternity, of the hum. being’s guilt, and of eternal perdition, and then Xnty is sheer grace; this matter of suffering in this life’s few years is infinite, infinite grace. Have your conception of this life―and grace is anything but grace, is torment, the greatest torment, because being a Xn is the most intensive suffering in this life. Blessed the person who is not offended! Look, this is how it hangs together: precisely because everything Christian is in the sphere of paradox, for that very reason the possibility of offense lies so infinitely near. This majesty―that in a lower sense, grace is sheer suffering, torment―how infinitely near offense lies: that is, if one does not prefer Xndom’s escape, the expedient of transforming everything Christian into outright drivel, whereby offense is in a certain sense indeed avoided, even though, in

359

360

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 39–40

•

1854

another sense, I think it must emerge when one considers that such drivel is supposed to be―the divine. This means that in a deeper sense one must be said to notice the absence of the characteristic mark, “the possibility of offense,” so that one would have to say, regarding this drivel-Christianity: [“]It cannot possibly be the divine, there is of course nothing here by which to be offended.[”]

5

10

Christianity (Irony) Were someone to say: “Xnty is of course God’s irony toward us hum. beings,” I would reply: [“]No, my good man, but we hum. beings have it in our power to transform Xnty into an irony, a biting irony.[”] The matter is quite simple. God in his majesty adopts such a solemn tone that, if a hum. being will not let go of his finite common sense, not give up everyday, self-indulgent mediocrity―then what God calls help, salvation, grace, etc. is the most biting irony, so that in a way one cannot blame the finite understanding for saying: [“]No, thanks, I would in fact prefer to have none of this help, salvation, grace.[”] On the other hand, as soon as a pers. wants what God wants and will let himself be taught by God about the relation between temporality and eternity, as soon as he is willing to see, to appropriate, God’s conception of eternity, is willing to believe God― then, naturally, God is sheer, sheer, sheer love and compassion. But Xndom’s expedient of letting God be a muddlehead who drivels something about a salvation, grace, etc. in such a manner that all worldliness finds that there is indeed good sense in this talk― this expedient is lèse majesté. As I have remarked elsewhere, no pagan nation has cultivated so ridiculous and abominable a divinity as has “Xndom,” which cultivates and worships―a muddlehead. Even the crudest pagan took

352

40

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 40–41

5

10

353 15

20

The World Is What You Take It For (The Numerical)

25

Elsewhere I have pointed out how this manner of speaking should rlly be understood; but I would also like to say that it can be given another explanation, or at any rate be put in relation to a different point of view. The world is what you take it for, i.e., however you are, you will always find a number of your own sort; you will never come to stand alone, always fellowship, always the world; therefore, which world you will have depends upon you yourself. The fact is that just this is part of the concept of the world (which Governance therefore watches over, just as a bath house attendant watches over the proper mix of water): that at every moment all possible variations and nuances are represented, and represented numerically; this is a part of what

35

40

1854

361

better care that his God loomed somewhat above being a hum. being, stood a little higher, whereas Xndom has excelled in making God entirely human. Perhaps this will be called an exaggeration. But that is not so; on the contrary, the situation can be explained by the fact that Xnty, in its truth, has the highest conception of God: God is spirit, love’s majesty―but then the demoralization of the highest is also precisely what will provide the lowest of all conceptions of God. To charge “Xndom” with lying, hypocrisy and the like is therefore still rlly too high-flown, is making it out to be more than it is. No, the most suitable charge is: the whole thing is an impropriety. It is an impropriety for a grown man to ride a hobbyhorse―and similarly it is really also an impropriety to call something one declaims under the name of Xnty, to call it Xnty, when all the characteristic features of divine majesty have long ago been erased and where all concepts have long since been re-cast as hum. drivel.

41

30

•

[a]

Note When I say that Governance takes care of this, it must of course not be overlooked that it is nonetheless also a hum. being’s own fault that at every moment all possible gradations of delusion, depravity etc. are represented numerically.

1

5

362

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 41–42

•

1854

makes the world able to serve as a means of examination. Everywhere you look, everywhere, all possible variations of delusions and wrong turns, etc., in all possible nuances, and always numerically represented. It is made so infinitely easy to go astray in the world, and yet in such a way that being like the others affords cover. Only willing the good is never numerically represented. This in turn has to do with the examination; for truly to will the good involves precisely the strenuousness of being alone. On the other hand, inversely, being numerically represented belongs precisely to delusion, going astray, depravity, and the like, precisely in order to be able to beguile with the help of the numbers.

5

10

354

The Enlightened 19th Century.

42

Fundamentally, this is, after all, awfully pitiful: For most peop. Xnty is rlly mythology, fable, poetry, they don’t consider it to be anything else―and then, in addition, it is their religion! That is to say that they don’t in fact have the courage to renounce it, that with respect to the most important matter, they don’t have enough energy to break with it in order either to go without religion altogether or to look for another. This is the state of affairs in the enlightened nineteenth century―because the number of those who are in one sense honest, the declared freethinkers, is in no way greater in our time than in an earlier period. The enlightened nineteenth century―well, yes, gas lighting is in fact also an invention of our time, and it is doubtless from this that the century gets its name. For this business with Xnty is really the most pitiful possible. Not the grossest superstition, if it at least fulfills these people’s lives and is what they believe, not the most obdurate unbelief, if it at least has character, is anything in comparison to this pitifulness: that something a person himself regards as fable is also that person’s religion. They have their children baptized, instructed in Xnty, confirmed; when they themselves are to die they have the priest called, want to be buried as Xns―and, in addition to this, they regard Xnty, fundamentally, as fable. In a sense, one can say that being so pitiful is a frightful punishment upon them. One feels sorry for a man who finds himself cuckolded, who goes on living, knowing it, but lacks the courage or energy to change the situation―so he

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 42–43

5

•

1854

continues to live with his wife, knowing in addition that he is continually being cuckolded: but it is infinitely more wretched and pitiful and disgusting to go on living and to have as one’s religion what one nonetheless considers to be fable; this is in the truest sense to make an utter fool of oneself, to despise oneself.

355

43

Children and Women; the Man; Xnty Earnestness.

10

Christianity is earnestness. Naturally, therefore, the criterion is indeed applied to: the man. The Christian requirement is related to the man, indeed to God’s idea of what it means: that the man is the hum. being. But everyone with the slightest experience in life, the workaday life, knows that whenever someone tries to sneak out of something, the tactic employed is to bring in women and children. And here we have a new explanation of this same thing, of how, by means of an inversion―which it pleases hum. beings to call perfectibility―Xnty has become precisely the opposite of what it originally was. Xnty, so it goes, is of course for hum. beings; of course, a child is also a hum. being―ergo the child is the criterion for what Xnty is. Now, this is such a lie that it is in fact downright unscrupulous to bring up a child in Xnty; for the child cannot possibly appropriate what Xnty rlly is (or can, indeed, a child have any idea of original sin―a child who, after all, is brought up to see the father and mother as its benefactors, to thank them for the great benefit of having come into existence, etc.?). Therefore one must either make Xnty into something other than it is so that the child can appropriate it―and does one really have license to put notions into a child’s head in the name of educating it? Or the child itself alters Xnty because it cannot do otherwise―but has one license to cause a child to become stuck in illusions, and has one license to do it in the name of educating and instructing[?] No, but the whole matter of the child in relation to Xnty is a swindle. Just as in business affairs, when, for example, the authorities come and ask for the man, he then takes care to sneak

15

20

25

30

35

363

364

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 43

•

1854

Entry 34:43 is concluded in the marginal column of the journal’s final page.

J O U R N A L NB 34 : 43

5

10

357

15

off and fetch the women and children, who are to take care of moving and mollifying [the authorities], so, too, in Xndom’s recent history is there this swindle in which the man has sneaked away, has gotten Xnty turned into something for children and women. And then, when this succeeds and religion has become sweets for children, then the man comes home, this truant Tom, then he licks the sweets along with them and talks sentimentally of religion, of Xnty, as being especially for children and women. What shamelessness and what a base lie, that religion is something for children and women, presumably because its task is too easy for the strong person: the man. Thanks, but no thanks―especially for such menfolk as those living nowadays. No, religion, Xnty, is an ideality, a task, under which the greatest ideality[a]

•

1854

[a]

365

of being a man almost must faint. This is what Xnty was originally. It comes from the East. And what was the situation there? There it was the man who was the hum. being, women and children practically a sort of domestic animals. But just as the whole world-historical process is the tour de force of botching God’s entire plan and turning it into its exact opposite, so, too, is it reserved to Romantic Protestant Xndom to make children and women into “the hum. being” and the man into a zero. I anticipate perfectibility reaching this point: polyandry in contrast to the polygamy with which it began. But this transformation, with children and women becoming “the hum. being,” has in turn transformed Xnty into the exact opposite of the original: it has become sheer gift― it was sheer task.

1

5

10

15

20

JOURNAL NB35

JOURNAL NB35 Translated by Vanessa Rumble Edited by Bruce H. Kirmmse

Text source Journal NB35 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Niels W. Bruun, Klaus Nielsen, and Stine Holst Petersen

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 1

361

1

•

1854

NB35. Dec 3rd 1854.

369

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 2 1854 •

363

2

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Irony. The whole of my existence is rlly the most profound irony. To travel to South America, to descend into subterranean caves to unearth the remnants of extinct animal species, of petrified antediluvian life―in this there is no irony, for the animals found there are not assumed to be of the same species [as those now inhabiting the earth]. But in the midst of “Christendom,” to unearth formations of Christian existence that relate to present-day Xns more or less as the bones of prehistoric animals relate to ones now living―this involves the keenest irony. The irony consists in the assumption that Christianity can exist in the presence of 1000 velvet, silk, and cloth priests and millions of Xns who breed Xns, etc. In what did Socratic irony consist? In felicitous turns of phrase and the like? No. Such virtuosity at ironic banter and verbal niceties does not constitute a Socrates. No, the whole of his existence was irony. While every womanizer and businessman, etc. of his time―in short, these thousands―were fully assured of their humanity, and were sure that they knew what it is to be a human being, Socrates lagged behind (ironically) and busied himself with the problem of what it is to be a human being. In this way, he expressed the fact that all the Treiben of these thousands is rlly an illusion, a joke, commotion, noise and bustle, which, seen in the light of the idea, = 0 or less than nothing, for these people could have used their lives to consider the ideal. In its relation to Christendom, irony contains one element that exceeds the Socratic, inasmuch as hum. beings in Xndom do not in fact merely imagine themselves to be hum. (the Socratic, naturally, culminates in this), but in addition imagine themselves to be something historically concrete: to be Christian. Socrates doubted that a person is human at birth―one does not slip into being hum. or gain knowledge of what it is to be hum. so easily; for of course what concerned Socrates―what he sought―was the ideality of being human. What, indeed, would Socrates have thought if he were to hear that hum. beings have long since become so perfectible, have made such progress in nonsense, that it now makes sense to claim that a child is more or less born Christian, yes, “even of a quite specific confession.”

23 Treiben] German, striving.

371

372

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 3–4

•

1854 364

Charity (Christianity) Paul says: if I give all my possessions to the poor, but have not love, how would it profit me[?] This “me” is characteristic of Christianity. We prefer to think that it is of course the others who are to profit from a person’s charity, ergo everything turns upon the charity itself. Alas, no, Christianity is not that busy. Xnty is not, like the world, in need of money, so that everything simply depends upon getting money, and charity becomes, in and of itself, a virtue. No, Christianity has no such use for money at all. For this reason, the apostle asks, “how would it profit me[?]” Here, incidentally, we have an example of irony’s constant proximity to Xnty, so that it is in fact sensual passion alone that renders us deaf to irony. The apostle speaks with eternity’s concern: how would it profit me[?] Socrates would teasingly be able to say the exact same: how would it profit me―would I become better, would I become wiser, were I, without love, to give everything to the poor[?]

3

5

10

15

20

Knowledge of Christianity. This is surely much talked about in Christendom―and boasted of, and worked for: that there be knowledge of Christianity throughout the country. I will avoid pointing out that it is in fact most likely the case that the kind of knowledge about Xnty people have is actually not―about Xnty, but rather about something hum. beings themselves have invented, so that boasting about the presence of Christian knowledge is just as dubious as if a city were to boast of a water supply that provided an adequate amount of water for the city, but drew it from the gutter, etc. But this I will not speak about, except to say that having knowledge of Christianity is, from a Christian standpoint, of ambiguous import. Even if a country could lay claim to true, extensive knowledge of Christianity, this would only serve to increase culpability if life there corresponded so little to what Christianity teaches.

4

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 4–5

365 5

10

5

•

1854

But from such talk of Christian knowledge we see once again that people in fact rlly treat Xnty as if it were a matter of knowledge, as if knowledge of Christianity were valuable in the same sense as, e.g., mathematics, history, or similar branches of learning that do not concern themselves with the kind of life one lives, with character, which, as noted, is what Christian knowledge does. Thus, to the degree that it becomes ever more vast without improving life, Christian knowledge, as noted, makes matters worse; and one cannot even recommend it as praiseworthy―no, quite the opposite, it means that one has still fewer excuses for oneself and less of which to boast.

Man; Woman; Child. Xnty.

15

20

25

30

35

40

Ultimately, it is indeed dreadful but nonetheless true and expresses the appalling extent to which it is true that Christianity simply does not exist. This is the actual situation in Xndom, especially in Protestantism. Men―even such miserable wretches and spittle as we today call men, compared with the ideality associated with manhood in the East―men turn away from religion with a certain pride and self-satisfaction and say: Religion (Xnty) is something for women and children. And look at the truth: the truth is that Xnty, as it is presented in the New Testament, is of such magnitude that it, strictly speaking, cannot serve as a religion for women, or can at most do so at second hand, and it is impossible for children. This is my testimony as a psychologist: no woman can bear a dialectical redoubling, and all that is Christian has within itself a dialectical element. It takes a man to relate to the Christian task; a man’s toughness is required simply to bear the pressure of the task. A good that is recognizable by the fact that it gives pain; salvation that is recognizable by the fact that it makes me unhappy; grace that is recognizable by suffering, etc., etc.―everything of this sort (and this is the way it is with everything Xn) cannot be borne by any woman―she would lose her mind if she were bound to such an effort.

373

374

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 5

•

1854

As far as the child is concerned, it is of course utter nonsense that it is supposedly Xn. A woman, and above all a child, relate themselves to, and breathe, straightforwardness. If something is good, it must be recognizable by making someone feel good: this is of no help― to want to force a woman (a child I won’t even mention) into a good that is painful is to destroy her. Merely observe: what else can account for the fact that no woman can countenance irony, that irony in relation to her passion will kill her[?] Is this not because she is unable to bear the dialectical? In this respect, I have indeed taken the major philosophical examination. Try this: make a girl unhappy, and then say to her: Yes, but I did it out of love. You will destroy her; her understanding will burst asunder. Accommodate yourself to her and say: I am a careless rascal―then she can bear it, and she will lovingly forgive you. But in this way she also escapes the dialectical redoubling. And so it is with all things Christian. Only men have received from the hand of Governance the toughness needed to bear the dialectic. To bear this dialectical relation is the most intense agony, is the most intense agony, possible. A child, that little master of mischief, is completely safeguarded against it; he cannot come close enough to it to threaten his good sense and sanity, even if you were to pour it into him with the greatest possible force. A woman can come close enough to collapse under it, or for the understanding to tiptoe away in order to save her; i.e., she loses her mind. To have to bear this dialectical relation entails the most intense possible agony. It is thus easy to see that the suffering involved in becoming unhappy is exceeded by the pain of becoming unhappy and that this, in addition, is precisely to be what constitutes a person’s happiness―and likewise on every point. Thus, anyone who has an understanding of such things (if indeed there are any capable of understanding such things), when he thinks of this figure―a dialectical redoubling―will (just as one who at the sight of the instruments of torture involuntarily hears the cry of the tortured), will, when he thinks of a woman’s relationship to it, involuntarily hear the cry: Oh save me, save my sanity. The truth regarding Xndom is thus as follows: that this sublimity that is Xnty, this sublimity, that no man―not even a man who lived in the time when being a man entailed a certain ideality,

366 5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 5

367

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

not even the one among those who had the greatest ideality― took it up or lifted it without being brought to his knees: this sublimity, under which (I will use the strongest expression) even the Savior of the world collapsed: that God, who is love, could nonetheless abandon him and do so out of love―in Xndom this sublimity has been steadily and merrily chattered down into the street grime that makes up the thoughts of the average hum. being, with the result that this sublimity has now become too easy and too unimportant for even the sort of costumes that today go by the name of men, and has been handed over to the women and children for whom religion rlly exists. In the New Testament the situation was this: the requirement was directed to men; religion addressed itself to men; women participated in religion secondarily, by way of the man. She herself is unable to bear a dialectic, but by witnessing how the man shoulders the task, she receives an impression of something beyond pure immediacy. The child looks after itself until its time comes. To attempt to pour Xnty into a child (if this were in fact possible, if the child’s nature did not make it impossible for him to appropriate it) is just as bestial as wanting to pour hard liquor into a child (which is done often enough) because the parents themselves drink hard liquor and the sweet kiddie ought to have things just as good as the parents. To want, in the name of Christianity, to pour something into a child that is not Xnty is, after all, indefensible. But, as stated, Xndom has managed to translate everything into what is straightforward―and for this reason “the child” has quite definitely become the measure of what it is to be a Xn! Excellent! Christendom seems in no way to have noticed that, precisely in the figure of “the child,” it has stumbled upon an ironic problem, a problem that has been addressed so lovingly, namely, the problem of what we are to do with the child, of whether the child can become a Xn―a problem concerning which the New T. contains no solution, since it was assumed that the Xn―did not marry. The irony of Peer Degn’s remark regarding Saxo Grammaticus, namely, that he enriched the Latin language with a host of expressions, finds its parallel in the irony with which Xndom has enriched Xnty: With regard to all these very learned and profound pronouncements about the child, the child’s Xnty, the child’s baptism, faith, etc. If only you will relate to a child solely as a third party, you will see that everything is ordered as the New T. presents it. But ever since the nice Xns hit upon the agreeable idea of beginning anew in a manner that Xnty has

375

376

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 5–6

•

1854

blocked off, the child has been given a new meaning. And with “the child”―yes, so it is―Christianity was totally overturned, became precisely the opposite of what the New T. set forth: candy for children, so men, as they are today, were right to turn away from this, seeing it as something only for women and children, as something that disgusts a man, just like chatter and silliness and the temperature in the lying-in room. No, let things be as they once were, let it [Xnty] bring to his knees the man who takes on and bears its demand, and let the woman who sees the weight of it tremble―and the child? Yes, let it be as it once was, let us get free from the child-breeding of Xns: it is possible that Xnty would be seen once again. But otherwise it is impossible, and I for my part cannot conceive how it is possible that anyone with an impression of Xt’s life and of what the evangelists understand by being Xn, that anyone with the impression of Xt’s command for imitation, could come up with the idea of―marrying.

5

368

15

Woman.

6

To say that a woman must relate to Christianity in the same way that a man does, simply because Xnty establishes equality between men and women, is unjustified. Xnty does indeed posit equality between a man and a woman, but it does not alter natural attributes; otherwise one might similarly conclude that Xnty must make it possible for the woman to become just as tall and muscular as the man, or even that Xnty (were Xnty concerned with such things) will bring it to pass that in Xndom child-bearing occurs at random among both men and women. To say that a woman has a more vital relation to Christianity than a man is a swindle aimed at redirecting Xnty to the realm of immediacy. No, in the register of the immediate and straightforward, a woman has, without doubt, the advantage both in subtlety, depth and inwardness; but as soon as the dialectical appears, a woman is in the same situation as the inhabitants of southern nations when forced to pronounce a word of Slavic origin that has 5 or 6 consonants preceding a single vowel.

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 7–8 7

5

369

15

20

8

25

30

35

•

1854

The Unconditioned; Luther Luther’s contribution, the idea that Christianity must first and foremost console, is in fact really the language of revolution, even if cloaked in language of the greatest possible submission. When Christianity’s requirement forces the issue to the most extreme point, then, what is merely human reacts: [“]We cannot! This is sheer mortal dread.―Xnty must first and foremost console.[”] Through such talk, the unconditioned gradually becomes associated with the making of concessions. And as soon as the unconditioned makes a concession, or as soon as it is assumed that anything is capable of positioning itself in relation to the unconditioned in such a way that the unconditioned would have to take it into account, the unconditioned no longer exists. The basis for the Lutheran position is rlly this: that in the final analysis what is decisive for what Xnty is, is whether or not human beings find themselves comfortable with it; but in that case Xnty is not the unconditioned, and God’s majesty is only a relative majesty. The law that governs revolutions is revealed in Luther.

Frailty. A genuinely religious ideality that, precisely because it continually exists before God, can be as distressed by something we human beings regard as insignificant as by the greatest crime: this is something people like to regard as frailty. Excellent, so it’s frailty; in the same way, the darning needle will also find it to be frailty when the finest English sewing needle cannot, impassively, endure the same sort of work that the darning needle can; the table knife, too, regards is as a sign of frailty that the most finely sharpened surgical knife “can’t endure the least thing” without it having an effect on it. No, this frailty is health, a more profound health. It is frailty only when it becomes nothing but nonsense. Surely the microscope’s ability to see, so to speak, the smallest, most insignificant speck cannot be called frailty. No, being able to see the insignificant is only regarded as frailty when it means seeing imprecisely; but so long as one sees clearly, then surely the ability to see even

377

378

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 8–10

•

1854

that which is most insignificant is a sign of health―an advantage. Nor is it a form of frailty that a clock shows both minutes and seconds, even though the hall clock might think this a kind of cowardice, a sickly unrest. No, when the clock tells both the minute and the second with complete accuracy, it is of course an advantage.

Christianity relates to existence. The phrase, “the truth is naked,” is to be understood in this light. In order truly to relate to the truth, all the veils and coverings of sensible illusion must fall away, so that you are brought so near the truth that this truth itself becomes your own existential [truth]. In Xndom, however, all this business about millions of Christians is nothing other than the veils and coverings of sensible illusion, distance; then Xnty is at most a doctrine, while their existence is in quite other categories. It is the numerical that deceives us. We hum. beings have great difficulty understanding that, in relation to the idea, the numerical is of no importance whatsoever. We have difficulty understanding this because in the temporal and sensible world the numerical is all-powerful. One million or 10 million peop. who are not Xn believe that the numerical should be capable of effecting what it does indeed effect in this world of the numerical: that the concept [“]the Christian[”] should be changed and that these millions are what it is to be Xn. And peop. are strengthened more and more in this faith in the power of the numerical. Everything confirms them in this conviction, because of course politics is everything.

Swindles. That Xndom is in its entirety a swindle can be seen in the fact that its proclamation, its official proclamation, relates to life as follows: On Sunday it is taught that Xt is the Exemplar everyone is to follow―and if someone on Monday wanted to talk about

5

9

10

370

15

20

25

30

10

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 10–11

5

•

1854

Xt as his Exemplar, they say that this is a provocation, frightful arrogance, etc. So the proclamation of Xnty is Sunday-jargon. In the same way, the chief functionary of the royal court wears his finery when he comes galloping in on festival days―but in daily life it would be laughable to be dressed in that finery! This is supposed to be Troy! And this is supposed to be Christianity!

371

11

15

20

25

30

35

The Human Race Today is so spiritless that peop. are no longer conscious of themselves as “spirit”; the only self-awareness they possess is more or less that of an animal creature. Think of those Xn leaders of times past who believed that to call people hypocrites, ungodly, and such was to crush them.― Such talk would in no way give offense to hum. beings of our times. Nor would calling people “fornicators,” metaphorically, as the scriptures do, cause offense either, because fornicators in fact have self-esteem qua animal creatures. No, there must be a change of language. Elsewhere I hinted at a formulation that can provoke, that can show that, spiritually understood, they [Christians in Christendom] are cuckolds―for what corresponds precisely to the situation of the cuckold, who lives with his wife in the state of marriage though he knows that he is continually being cuckolded―what corresponds precisely to this is to have a religion that one regards as a fable, but to be so pitifully lacking in courage that one does nothing about it. This kind of observation teases and provokes, and it has in addition the advantage of prostituting them in the eyes of women, which is something they are quite worried about, because, as noted, their self-esteem qua animal creature is the only thing they possess, as the relation to the opposite sex has in fact been transformed into the meaning of life, its earnestness, and into true Xnty.

379

380

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 12

•

1854 Life’s Entrance and Exit.

1

5

10

[a]

Note The cry of birth―The cry of death. It is the mother who cries, but the question is whether the child does not have greater reason to do so, it of course has a longer life ahead of it.a But if the child does not cry immediately, that cry will surely come―for the cry of death is of course the cry over having been born. a

15

The mother of course exists, her pain is thus but one of the pains of existence; the child, however, comes into existence, comes simultaneously into existence, into the pain of existence.

Hear the cry of one giving birth, in the hour of delivery―see a dying person battle against death at the very end: and then tell me whether what begins and ends in this way is supposed to be enjoyment. It’s true that we hum. beings do everything to distance ourselves from these two points as quickly as possible. We hasten as much as possible to forget the cries of birth and thus recast them as the joy of having given life to another being. And when someone dies, people immediately say, [“]He had a gentle and peaceful death; death is a sleep, a quiet sleep.[”] We say all this not for the sake of the deceased, for our talk cannot help him, but for our own sake, so as not to lose any of our lust for life, in order to transform everything so as to increase the lust for life in the interval between the cry of birth and the cry of death, between the mother’s cry and the child’s repetition of it when the child one day dies. Suppose somewhere an enormous, magnificent ballroom were to be found, where everything had been done to bring about unmixed joy and delight―but the stairway to this hall was a squalid, disgusting plankway that it was impossible to climb without becoming filthy, and the price of admission was paid by prostituting oneself, and when the day dawned, the amusement stopped and it all ended with one’s being kicked out again―but throughout the night everything was done to maintain and fan the fires of pleasure and joy! What is reflection? Surely just the consideration of these two questions: How did I get myself into this or that, and how can I extract myself again, how will it end. What is thoughtlessness? To do everything in order to drown in forgetfulness the business of coming hither and going hence, to do everything to reinterpret and explain away our entrance and our exit, lost solely in the interlude between the cry of birth and the repetition of this cry, when the one born expires in the battle with death.

12

5

10

372

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 12

•

1854

Entry NB35:12 with marginal note NB35:12.a and additional note NB35:12.a.a.

381

382

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 13

•

1854

The Human Race. Yes, such is the situation, and this is how I understand the whole business with this nonsense that is Christendom and the fact that Xnty has become the precise opposite of what it originally was. Xnty is God’s thoughts. For God, being a human being is an ideality of an order that we now can scarcely conceive. The guilt of the Fall occasioned a degradation, the painfulness of which can only be felt if one has an impression of the ideality that preceded it. All this is lost more and more with the succession of generations. Gradually, people became accustomed to the state of misery in which we live and came to see this as our natural condition; each generation has begun with the misery of the one immediately preceding, and in this way has made things still more miserable, and so the new generation begins. In this way, Xnty must become meaninglessness, and in a certain sense the only way to preserve a sort of meaning is to transform it into the opposite of what it is. It is as though the ideality that was lost, and that has caused the degradation into animal creatures to be so painful―it is as though it never existed. For a long, long time, for generations out of mind, the race has been―and in its ongoing decline continues to be―utterly satisfied to be: animal creatures, finding life’s meaning and joy and earnestness therein, and, finally, it has to view as utterly ludicrous anyone who would consider returning to the Christian concepts and their necessary presuppositions. Imagine a princely clan that, as punishment for a crime, was demoted to serfdom. Imagine the 10th generation of this family, so that for 8 or 9 generations prior to the present generation, they had lived as serfs, each son like his father. The result will presumably be that those in the 10th generation are well pleased with the conditions under which they live and feel themselves at ease in their situation in life, into which they were born, as were their fathers and grandfathers before them, etc.―and if someone came and wanted to explain to the members of this 10th generation that they were of princely blood, he would soon become a laughingstock and would discover that the people concerned were those least eager to learn this, that they would even complain bitterly that someone was disturbing them in the routine in which they had long lived satisfied lives, the son as the father and the father as the grandfather, etc.

13

5

10

374

15

20

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 13–14

5

10

15

375

20

25

30

•

1854

That is how it is with Xnty. With eternity’s unwavering resolve, immovable as the North Star, Xnty takes the Fall as its reference point and presupposition. The Fall, however, owing to the consequences of its repetition, has swollen into such an appalling loquacity that it is like a monstrous parenthesis that no hum. being is capable of viewing it in its entirety and see that it is a parenthesis. And within this parenthesis, life hums along cheerfully, the degeneration continues its steady growth from generation to generation, with each generation becoming more insignificant than the preceding one (with whose insignificance it began) while also becoming more numerous. In this way two great powers are united: insignificance and numbers unite to reduce humankind to such a triviality that, when brought into relation to it, the Xnty of the New T. can only appear as nonsense. Next came the idea―what a monstrous reduction!―that Christianity does not relate to the hum. being, to the individual, but to―the race. “It does not go well with us hum. beings,” has likely been the reasoning, “we admit it, and it is nonsense to bring Xnty into relation to one of us, but 100,000 million of us―added together―must be able to relate appropriately to Xnty.” It does not help: even if this change of substituting the race for the individual did not constitute a radical confusion of Xnty, it still would not help, for the race has so degenerated that it is not suitable for the Christianity of the New T. It does not have the concepts that are presupposed by Christianity. But God’s memory reaches far enough to encompass all parentheses. Hum. beings, on the other hand, have long, long, long since totally forgotten that we have entered into a parenthesis and that Xnty was introduced precisely to be the divine [“]Claudatur.[”] No, we live merrily within the parentheses, propagate the species, and make world history―and the whole thing is a parenthesis. Question: Can a parenthesis-person be immortal?

35

14

The Propagation of the Race To give life is surely, as indeed is said, the greatest good deed in relation to a child. To give life is surely also to enrich existence; it is an enrichment. 30 Claudatur] Latin, refers to the expression claudatur parenthesis, i.e., “close the parenthesis.”

383

384

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 14

•

1854

Let us see whether Christianity is not rather of the opposite opinion, namely, that the propagation of the species is consumptive. Even if Christianity did not otherwise object to the propagation of the species, one of the teachers of ancient Church pronounces: Refrain from propagating the species, control your urges and desires― for, consider that, every time this urge is satisfied, Governance must contribute an immortal soul to the animal creature that is the fruit, so that you thus drag one more immortal soul down into this misery, down into the monstrous danger from which he may possibly be saved by Xnty but in which he also may be eternally lost. This, you see, was a somewhat different explanation than the brisk, cheerful, and complacent one about child-breeding as an enrichment of existence. It consumes, corrodes, drawing more and more souls into existence. Viewed in the light of what lies ahead, propagation looks as if it were an enrichment; after all, more and more do indeed come into being. But viewed in the light of what lies behind it, there is the minus that more and more are drawn down into corruption. A lie is concentrated at precisely this point concerning the propagation of the race; if sin came into the world in this way, a lie was also set vigorously in motion on the same occasion. Merely satisfying the most intense lust that more or less constitutes life for most people, merely to get its satisfaction tarted up so that it becomes, in addition, the greatest good deed, a good deed for the child, for society, an enrichment of existence, in short, so that it is as excellent, lofty, moral, and highly commendable an act as is indeed possible―this alone shows what sort of a swindler, or what sort of a fellow, a pers. is. Yes, oh please, [“]Double courage![”] as they say―it is sweet soup, filled with jam and with jam on the side. Soon it will become a crime that cries out unto heaven, an unforgivable crime, if a pers. does not wholly sacrifice himself to the task of day in and day out doing nothing other than begetting children, which is of course the greatest good deed

5

10

15

20

376

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 14–15

5

10

15

20

for the child, for society, for humanity, for existence and even perhaps―for God, who says, “The more, the better.” Yes, here the lie has its headquarters. It is because of this lie that the child is filled full of all this: that it’s a wonderful world, that the purpose of life is to be happy, to enjoy, etc. etc., which of course the child is indeed naturally disposed to believe (Schopenhauer is thus correct in saying that each person is born with the illusion that the aim of this life is to be happy), but which is also connected to the fact that the parents―were they to explain that the world is evil, that the purpose of life is to suffer, item that a child’s life has its origin in the satisfaction of lust, etc.―would of course face embarrassment if it occurred to the child to ask, [“]Why then, do I exist?[”] Sexuality possesses not only two senses but a hundred senses that can be construed in the most varied ways, and always with the inclusion of a bit of a lie. It is something hidden and precisely therefore is so colossally dangerous, entirely based on lies, and the woman’s element is of course also the lie.

377

25

15

30

35

World History. A Question.

We hum. beings flatter ourselves with the thought that world history is of colossal importance and therefore must be of utmost interest to God. The question―and I do not take it upon myself to answer it but merely toss it out, and only in view of the fact that Christianity teaches that the propagation of the race is an error, but, of course, the cast of history―these millions―are produced in that way―the question: does the whole discussion of world history, of the 4 monarchies, Hegel, Grundt14 item] Latin, as well as, furthermore.

•

1854

385

386 1

Note Of course, he also posits 4 monarchies.

a

b

5

10

is it not a “mistake” that some seers believe themselves able, with the greatest of effort, to glimpse that God is―item, how he is―engaged in all this history, and is it not an even greater error when they believe that someday, in the hereafter, they will be able to discern with total clarity the role God has played in all the historical― commotion?

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 15

•

1854

vig, Geert Westphaler,a railroads and telegraphs― does all this concern God or please him any more than the noise and commotion that children could stir up in the playroom instead of sitting still and reading their lessons, as their parents would prefer? Isn’t this belief in the infinite importance of history one of the hum. pretenses aimed at sustaining and animating the lust for life―the desire to join in the commotion, inflamed by stories about the uproar and pandemonium made by various kings and emperors while they lived? When Richard III’s mother was about to curse him, he turned to the drummers in order not to hear her words, and said, [“]Beat the drums![”] Do we not all rlly behave in this way? There is something in us we do not wish to hear, and for this reason we seek out a commotion, and world history is just such a commotion. Can the idea that this should interest God be anything other than a pleasing illusion? Does this not foist one of our misunderstandings upon him?b And does not humanity itself tend to show more and more that this whole concern with history means nothing at all―that it is but the clamor and commotion and hubbub of adults? For as long there was a certain separation, as long as history preserved only what was of greater distinction and significance, while the mass of insignificant details sank into oblivion―as long as this was the case, it could at least seem as though this might have been the object of God’s attention, however much he usually is a friend of silence; but now, in this regard as well, everything proceeds in the direction of equality, everything is preserved in history, and enormous heaps of insignificant details are dragged along, so that what once inspired people to want to be of somewhat greater significance can no longer inspire them, which further mitigates against anyone becoming more significant, whereby the very concept of history is simply abolished, because the mass of reports concerning the most insignificant details about what a mass of insignificant people have undertaken with respect to a mass of insignif-

5

10

15

20

378 25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 15–16 icant things does not yield: history, much less: history that is capable of attracting God’s attention.

16 5

10

15

20

25

30

379

35

40

The Christian. Here, a definition, somewhat modernized. The Christian is: the page of absolute majesty. The only art that they practice is also absolutely the only art: to worship absolutely―not in words and nonsense, in intricate prose or sonorous verse, but in acts of absolute obedience. Just as a tightrope walker’s child develops, from the very beginning, a suppleness in his back and all his muscles, so that after daily exercise he is sheer suppleness and is able to make every movement, absolutely every single one, even the positions a person finds most back-breaking, easily and with a smile―this is what it is to worship absolute majesty, to worship him absolutely, with no thought of any reason or any why, to worship him absolutely in everything, always joyful, grateful, smiling. Now we understand what the ancient Church spoke of: that after death the Christian is taken up among the angels―this is indeed a kind of school exercise in preparation for that. But the fact is that the concept of the absolute and the image of absolute majesty have long since disappeared from Xndom. People have degraded God, drawn him down into the relativities and the wretchedness of finite teleology, foisted upon him the notion that, humanly speaking, he had a cause, needed human beings, would have to be happy that someone wanted to serve him―foisted upon him the idea that world history is a matter of import for him, so that he really must involve himself in the job of attending to and staying on top of the task, and to that end must keep his wits about him, as they say. No, heavenly majesty is not a majesty of that sort. And from this it follows that the existence of a single Xn, if one does exist, concerns God more than all 4

•

1854

387

388

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 16–17

•

1854

world-historical monarchies and more than all the noise that we hum. beings have come up with and to which we have contrived to attribute importance. Just as one who is a “thinker” in an eminent sense attends exclusively to categories of thought and calmly sets aside piles of notebooks, however interesting might be the information they contain, saying, [“]Ultimately, I learn nothing from all this,[”] and just as “the mathematician” imperturbably says of the poet’s tragedy, “What does this prove, then[?]” so, too, God attends unwaveringly to a single thing, to absolute worship. And of the 4 monarchies, and the face of the disapproval of professors and of lecturers who by speaking of the former seek to make themselves worthy of note, seeking, with the help of history, to become history themselves, he says, [“]What does this prove, then?[”]

5

10

15

Christendom. (Protestantism). Without God.

17

One must say one or the other: either Xndom, in worshiping God, worships a muddlehead, or Xndom has no God whatever, despite all its preachifying. The fact is this: With the passing of generations, the race has degenerated more and more, has become more and more insignificant, consoling itself more and more by substituting the extensive, the numerical, for what has been lost of the intensive. In a certain sense, this is the case for animal species as well, but because animals are not individuals but mere specimens, the extensive has some significance; in a certain sense an animal species may be said to become more significant by virtue of its greater numerical dissemination. But the point of the hum. race is precisely the fact that the individual is higher than the race―so it can be seen how despairing it is to want to replace the intensive with the extensive. With the passing of generations, the race has become more and more insignificant. This is linked to the fact that, in a different sense, it may be said to have progressed. Its progress has namely been in terms of the understanding, finite understanding. But in a deeper sense this progress is ambiguous and is thus both a retro-

20

25

30

380

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 17

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

gression, a retreat from the unconditioned, from the impression, the representation, of the unconditioned, and at the same time progress in the sense of having more and more understanding of what is relative, of mediocrity, of what is to a certain degree. Thus it can easily be seen that this progress is a falling away from the eternal, for the life of this world lies under the category of [“]to a certain degree, everything to a certain degree.[”] Once one has arrived at the idea that everything exists only to a certain degree, then this world has managed to liberate itself wholly from all connection to the eternal, which is what this world naturally tends to do and which happens in the midst of great celebration on the part of hum. beings, who are full of admiration for themselves, for the race, and for the incomparable progress that is being made. The unconditioned, being-in-and-for itself―do tell me if I am mistaken, but I doubt that there lives one single person who has in the remotest way any impression of such a being or could possibly hit upon the idea of trying to relate himself to such a being, which of course, one can only do so by submitting unconditionally, by allowing oneself to be annihilated, if you will, for the unconditioned is of course fatal to relative being, and only through this fatality does it bring to life. But when the unconditioned does not exist for peop., what difference does it make that one has something one calls God, since of course this is only a name, while God is indeed unconditioned being. Therefore, one of two things: either Xndom is without God―or it has a muddlehead for a God. The latter is most likely the case[.] Take the New T., there is no, absolutely no definition of Christianity that does not bear the mark of the unconditioned. Compare this to the standard proclamation of Christianity today, or more precisely the existential proclamation (for a little impassioned rhetoric decides nothing, and in any case it is not exactly the mark of the unconditioned), and you will see that everything is “to a certain degree,” or, what amounts to the same thing, that everywhere there are reasons, and everywhere there is a Why that is answered, i.e., the unconditioned is not present. Just one example, which I have often mentioned: take the idea of martyrdom. Then imagine that someone has decided to become a martyr (a thought that, incidentally, is altogether too generous to be applied to the average person in Xndom)―you will see that this person does not rest in the unconditional notion

389

390

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 17–18

•

1854

of the unconditional validity of martyrdom: No, he has reasons― in short, he is in the final analysis in fact a politician, and thus, in the final analysis, he is wholly homogeneous with this world of relativities.

381

5

The Problem. Xndom’s distance (or, especially in Denmark, Protestantism’s distance) from New T. Xnty is so great that I must continually underscore that I do not call myself a Christian. My task is to pose the problem, something that must be done in order for it to be possible, once again, to speak about Xnty. It was an act of arson (Xt himself indeed describes his mission thus), it was a setting aflame, setting hum. beings on fire by introducing a passion that made them heterogeneous with the whole of what is naturally understood as being a human being, heterogeneous with the whole of this existence, an act of arson that would sow discord between father and son and between daughter and mother, sow discord at the core of the most precious relationships; the lighting of a flame calculated to tear the “race” apart in order to create “individuals,” which is what God desires; therefore, too, the passion that was introduced was to love God, together with its negative expression, to hate oneself. It was an act of arson. But in order to put out a fire, one does not always use water. However, if you will, I can very well continue the metaphor and say that Xndom is the water that has extinguished the fire. But as stated, one does not always use water but sometimes uses bedclothes, mattresses and such in order to―put out the fire. And therefore I say that Xndom is the mass that smothered the fire that once had been lit, and now has it so far down beneath itself, beneath the monstrous layer of the numerical, that, in the interest of security and peace, people have made Xnty into the exact opposite of what it was in the New T. Wherever you may find yourself―if it is your intention, your idea, to do what you can do to further stifle the flame, then play your part energetically in large-scale dissemination, doing it in the name of serving Xnty, and you will do the most damage it is possible for you to do. If, on the other hand, you wish to summon Xnty, the fire, forth again, then do everything you can to get

18

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 18–19

382 5

10

15

20

25

30

•

1854

rid of the comforters, bedclothes, and mattresses, get rid of the mass―and the fire will surely be there. Here, the orders are: away, away with all the abstractions: state churches, people’s churches, Christian nations―these are the comforters and bedclothes, and all efforts of this sort are treason against the fire, which one thereby contributes to smothering even more. On the other hand, efforts aimed at splitting apart, aimed at “the single Individual”―that is the watchword. It was an act of arson. But forget this, and forget that this was Xt’s own understanding of Xnty. Then take Protestantism, especially in Denmark, and tell me, from what you see here that this is supposed to be Xnty―tell me whether it would ever occur to you in the least way that this religion’s founder came into the world in order to start a fire[?] Would you not everywhere and in everything get the impression that he must have come into the world in order to extinguish the fire[?] It was an act of arson―and now Christianity consists in pacification, pacification as concerns eternity, so that we might all the better enjoy ourselves by savoring this life. A stench can make a person ill, we know, and there are also various sickening emanations that hum. beings cannot tolerate and by which they are made ill― ah, but one can also become ill from nonsense. And just as, in times of plague and cholera, doctors chew on something in order to prevent inhalation, in the same way one may very well need, spiritually speaking, something in one’s mouth when one must continually combat nonsense. The difference, however, is that for the doctor the inhalation actually has the potential to be dangerous, while for the other practitioner it is not harmful―but rather is beneficial. For while the hum. being is naturally attracted to what can make life pleasurable, the religious officer needs, by contrast, an appropriate dose of disgust at life in order to be fit for his work; disgust at life, properly ingested (for the context is decisive), definitely protects against participating in―the nonsense oneself.

35

19

383

The Problem. The significance of my life has been to pose the problem, and thus my life’s suffering relates to it. But it is not so difficult to understand that such effort and such suffering have been needed for such a long time when one

391

392

1

5

[a]

and managed to so stifle it so much with their preachifying and preachifying and lecturing, that it is no more heard than what is said when someone with weak lungs in the midst of a storm, during cannon fire, speaks into the wind.

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 19

•

1854

considers the monstrous effort that has been mounted, in the course of time―in the name of orthodoxy and zeal for Xnty―to conceal thoughtlessly, or in swindling fashion, what Xnty is, to explain away or to reinterpret what in and of itself is entirely simple. Truly, long-windedness does not come from Xnty, but from people who have contrived to get Xnty so convoluted in illusion that they have skillfully managed to smuggle it away. Look, this is why I must remain in this colossal tension, remain in a merely tangential relation to existence, touching temporality only with the tips of my toes, and in such a condition of sensitivity that the least contact with the idea affects me with the force of Judgment Day. I must be kept in that tension so that the trembling wards off the deceptions of the sensible realm. Yes, when one takes into account the illusions of the sensible realm in which they live, takes into account their lives in this world, which they call the above-ground world, if peop. knew that they actlly live in a subterranean world― if they knew this: yes, then they would be helped; yes, if they only wanted to know it, they would have been helped. But this floating, always with just the tips of the tips of one’s toes on earth, is an enormous effort. One speaks of the terror of Damocles, with a sword suspended over his head, hanging by a horsehair― but, then, to be the sword hanging by a horse hair. A sword of course always has a certain weight― and then to hang by a horse hair. In the same way, every hum. being also has a certain weight―and to hang, swaying, by a horse hair, in mortal danger at every moment. What is required in order to clear away the illusions, to become aware of them, and to overpower them, is not violence or a show of force but concentrated attention, tautness, heightened wakefulness, which keeps one hovering.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 20 384

20

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

The Relationship to God Is Sheer Joy The Apostle, the Christians of the Most Advanced Class

When the apostle and those whom I call the Christians of the most advanced class speak of the relationship to God, or relating to God, as sheer joy, this surely has its ground, as has often been noted, in the fact that they were masters in the art of transforming suffering into blessedness, masters at turning away from suffering so as to see the blessedness in the fact that it is the relationship to God, etc.; but perhaps it has an additional reason. Perhaps what moved them to speak in that way was also a cautious concern for hum. beings; perhaps they feared that, in speaking of the relationship to God as one of suffering, they would scare peop. away. But now I ask, has not the history of Xndom sufficiently shown the consequences of such an accommodation[?] No, when the relationship to God is proclaimed to be one of suffering, then it is easier for peop. to become aware of how things stand with them. And on the other hand, “sheer joy” becomes all too easily a phrase declaimed by millions of liars, not a single one of whom relates himself to God. No, proclaim that Christianity is suffering―if anyone arrives at the point at which he really and truly perceives that it is sheer joy: well, then, he has nothing to complain about. But proclaim that Xnty is suffering―and do not forget that the apostles numbered only 12, so hum. beings do not seem particularly suited to being apostles (messengers), while on the other hand they are quite good at coming up with some verbal bluster to run with, a little nonsense, a phrase. That [“]Xnty is suffering[”] can of course also become a cliché, but not as easily as [“]sheer joy,[”] which with its sublime arc is so eminently well suited to the forgeries of the phrasemongers, and if it [“Christianity is suffering”] becomes an adage, it is not nearly so dangerous; failing to engage with Xnty in the midst of constant talk of

•

1854

393

394

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 20–22

•

1854

Xnty as suffering is not nearly as dangerous as failing to do so in the midst of constant talk of Xnty as sheer joy and blessedness: the former does, after all, lie closer to a true beginning than the latter, which is separated by a double distance from actually coming to begin.

“Christendom” is the greatest shamelessness, the most shameless insolence toward God. Or is it not the case that all of us hum. beings, the whole human race, are subject to a single condition, equally bound in obedience to the divine command? What boundless shamelessness then, to apportion things in this way: to set up shop and become a professor in the subject of what others have suffered in order to obey God’s command. Such a professor-scoundrel teaches, for example, how witnesses to the truth lived and acted. [“]Here,[”] the professor says, [“]here it is strange to see how long he remained in the most terrible struggle with himself before he decided to venture forth[”]. Or [“]Here,[”] he says, [“]here we cannot approve of his behavior; there was something weak about it, or somehow over-eager, or rather vehement, etc.[”] Such professor-nonsense is supposed to be spirit-filled. Such an ass fails to notice that instead of standing and spouting nonsense at a podium criticizing, item―begetting children paid for from the account [of the martyr]―he himself is in turn obligated to obey God’s command.

5

385

21

10

15

20

25

The Tame Goose An Observation for Awakening.

22

Imagine geese were able to speak― they would likely arrange things so as to have their own religious worship and their own prayers. Every Sunday, then, they would gather together and a gander would preach. The main content of the sermon was: what a high calling had been bestowed upon the goose and to what a lofty goal the creator―and every time this word was voiced, all the geese knelt

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 22

5

10

386 15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

and the gander bowed his head―had called the goose. With the help of its wings, it could fly away to distant regions, blessed regions, where it rlly had its home, for here it lived only as a foreigner. And so it went every Sunday. And afterward the gathering would disperse, each waddling home to his own. And then off again, the next Sunday, to the worship service and then home again―so it went, they flourished and fattened, became plump and delicate―and dined together on St. Martin’s Eve―and that was that. That was that. For although the speech reached such lofty heights on Sunday, the geese had the habit of telling one another on Monday what had happened once to a goose who, with the help of the wings the creator had given it, had seriously wanted to live up to the lofty goal that had been set for it―what had happened to it, the terrors it had had to endure. The geese were all in agreement about this. But of course to talk about it on Sunday would have been in poor taste for, they said, [“]It would then have become plain that our worship actlly makes a fool of God and of ourselves.[”] Also to be found among the geese were some few who seemed to be suffering and who became thin. Of these, the geese would say, [“]Here we see what happens if one takes this wanting to fly in earnest. Because they go around nurturing in their inner selves the thought of wanting to fly, they become thin, do not thrive and do not have God’s grace, as we do, which is why we become plump, fat, and delicate, because the grace of God makes one plump, fat, and delicate.[”] And the next Sunday, they went again to the worship service, and the old gander preached about the lofty goal the creator (here, all the geese knelt and the gander bowed his head) had bestowed upon the goose, for which its wings were intended. It is the same with worship in Xndom. For hum. beings, too, have wings: they have imagination, which is bestowed upon them in order that, with its help, they might raise themselves up―but we play, we allow the imagination to amuse itself in a quiet hour in the midst of Sunday’s fantasies, and in other respects we remain where we are, and on Mondays we regard being plump, fat, and delicate, becoming pudgy, i.e., heaping up money, becoming a person of importance in the world, begetting many children, and being successful, etc.―we regard these as proof of God’s grace. And we say of those who truly engage with

395

396

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 22–23

•

1854

God and who therefore come to suffer―it cannot be otherwise, nor is it, according to the New T.―of those who look worried, who have troubles and struggles and are riven by grief and regret―of them we say that this shows that they do not have God’s grace. *

5

*

And when someone reads this, he will say, [“]This is beautiful[”]―and he will stop at that, and then waddle home to his own, and he will remain, or strive with all his power to become, plump, delicate, and fat―but then on Sunday the priest preaches and he listens―exactly like the geese.

10

387

God―“Hum. Being”

23

“Just like the others,” this is the overriding concern of “the hum. being,” it is the animal category. Everything that is not just like the others is madness or arrogance. Whether this be fear and trembling before God, shuddering before the accounting of eternity and the punishment of hell; whether it is the most fearful self-interrogation or the most courageous self-sacrifice―as soon as it is not just like the others, it is either madness or arrogance. This is the rule of our age. By contrast, God stands, not only equally firmly, but even more firmly, on his: Not just like the others. No: “First the kingdom of God.” With this, God has protected himself in a remarkable way. Namely, this “First the kingdom of God” can be understood in concreto by each individual concerned in his own concrete way, and the concretion of existence is so great that it is sufficient for countless individuals. Thus, each in his own way. On the other hand, it is certain that no one who is truly earnest about first seeking God’s kingdom can become “just like the others”―it is eternally impossible. In a certain sense it resembles a sweepstakes or a lottery, only here the number of tickets is much greater: everyone can draw his own number, or everyone is shown how he, for his part, is to understand, in concreto and before God, “First the kingdom of God,” but it can never happen,

15

35 in concreto] Latin, in the concrete sense.

20

25

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 23–24

5

24

•

1854

for example, that two people draw no. 99, i.e., it can never happen that two draw the same number. Therefore: “Not just like the others,” and by this Xnty does not understand some sentimental nonsense about including a little variation in shades of color―no, Xnty understands it to mean: the necessity of suffering at the hands of the others, of having to suffer because one is not like the others.

The Reversal of the Concept Is the Mark of the New Quality.

10

15

388

20

25

30

35

Wherever a new quality appears, the concepts are also reversed. Take, for example, the quality of the divine. Hum. beings of course busy themselves with reflection about the divine. All such human thought, however, leads no further than to the conclusion that the divine is the superlative’s most superlative superlative of the human. This is easy to see. Quantifying―the quality of the divine is thus not to be found here. Xnty introduces the quality of the divine, and look, the mark appears immediately: all concepts are reversed―the divine and the relationship to it become the precise opposite of what they were in immediacy. Instead of the pagan belief, which straightforwardly believes that having to do with God involves being his favorite and means sheer happiness―instead, in Christianity, it is sheer suffering; instead of the straightforward understanding of the enjoyment of life, it means to die away; straightforwardly, believing that the person loved by God becomes the powerful person; in Christianity he is degraded, etc., etc. I have of course demonstrated this in the most varied ways. Here one sees that Christianity is the paradoxical, and that precisely the paradoxical is the very form of the quality of the divine. Xndom’s great service to Xnty (which, according to the professor, is of course perfectible) is to babble Christianity back into the categories of straightforwardness, to slacken the paradox back into the utterly empty [“]most superlative superlative[”] of straightforwardness, though with the assurance that the qualitative change has taken place.

397

398

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 25–26

•

1854

Christianity’s Coat of Arms. As everything Christian is the diametrical opposite of what is straightforwardly human, the same is true here. In the straightforward manner, what is preserved in a coat of arms is the memory of one’s accomplishments; in the Christian manner, it is the memory of one’s guilt―thus, in a way, the cock became Peter’s symbol― ―zum Andenken.

25

5

10

The Numerical

1

5

10

[a]

Christendom is therefore a mutiny against Xnty; but a quite singular sort of policeman’s gaze is required in order to recognize that it is mutiny. For of course the mutiny does not consist in everyone refusing to call themselves Xn―no, the mutiny consists precisely in the fact that everyone calls themselves Christian―and thus makes use of “the number” to transform the concept: Xn.

This lurks in everything hum.: the number alters the concepts. It is the law for mutiny: the numbers change a capital crime to one punished more leniently. And this law runs through many gradations, until the number (in a revolution) changes injustice to justice, changes what is criminal to a great virtue that is rewarded with all earthly goods. The same goes for “Xndom.” The numerical has changed the definition of being a Xn from meaning that to suffer and to be sacrificed is to be a true Xn, into meaning that to be a Xn is to have the most refined enjoyment of this life, to enjoy all goods, and then in addition to be idolized and worshiped as truly pious. Everything hum. is thus fundamentally nonsense or sophistry. It looks as if it were something―and it can go along in this way for a long time, but at the basis of the whole thing lies: the numbers change the concept. Only true Xnty holds the concept fixed; the concept is so firmly fixed that one becomes―a martyr for it.

389

26

15

20

25

30

35

9 zum Andenken] German, in memory.

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 27–28 27

5

10

15

390

20

Just as in culinary arts one knows, e.g., that a powerful essence will be most revolting if used alone or in large quantities, while a drop of it will produce the most delightful taste―in the same way, in the contemporary age a truly religious person is too strong; he must first be killed―and then be butchered and preserved by the assistant professors, who will prepare the most delicate and costly dishes by making use of him and his properties one drop at a time. This is of course the most disgusting thing of all. That such a person should live blessedly together with―the assistant professors―no, it is simply too repulsive. Think of being dead as a result of having been eaten by cannibals―and then to have to live blessedly together with the people who―ate you. This is ghastly. And yet this other sort of cannibalism is even more disgusting, especially because of its hypocritical pretense. I still maintain that those who kill a witness to the truth are less repulsive than the assistant professors who turn his suffering into profit.

Significant―Insignificant

25

The more significant a personality someone is, the more it is the case that nothing is insignificant in his eyes. The reason for this is that the impress of his personality is present to him in everything. To make a mistake with regard to something unimportant means nothing to an insignificant personality―while a significant personality recognizes immediately that he is of course also capable of erring in something important, just as, e.g., a barkeeper does not take a slight numerical error seriously, while an eminent astronomer immediately realizes that he might then also err in the most important undertaking, and he can thus be deeply affected by a slight error because he discovers in all things an impress of himself.

35

1854

399

The Truly Religious.

28

30

•

[a]

Note And if an assistant professor happens to read this, he wraps it right into his lecture.

1

400

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 28–29

•

1854

Rightly understood, this is very significant with respect to the concept of God: nothing is insignificant for God.

“The Assistant Professor.”

1

5

a

insofar as he, in understanding, intellectuality and such, is infinitely superior to the animal―which, excusably, lacks all such attributes, nor is it guilty of refinement― perhaps he is thus best called a non-thing.

What I speak about unceasingly, that Xnty simply does not exist and that what is called Xnty is precisely the opposite of what Xnty is, is also apparent in the fact that “the assistant professor” has now become the representative of Xnty, is now Xnty’s teacher and officer. For the professor is precisely the opposite of what the New Testament understands by being Christian. “The assistant professor” is in reality a nonhuman; I could almost be tempted to call him a non-animal.a No passion whatsoever is capable of making an impression on “the assistant professor” such that he might say: [“]Now I am willing to suffer like that, I want to suffer.[”] No, the assistant professor is unconditionally immune to this (just as one who is stone deaf is immune to hearing), protected from that at which Xt aims, from what he required: imitation. No, suffering makes no impression on “the assistant professor.” He is, however, very busily engaged in studying the sufferings of others, in familiarizing himself with them―for this, of course, is the basis on which he makes a living, fattening himself up with wife and child and family, all tastefully enjoying life with the help of―the sufferings of others, which he knows how to prepare in such a way that the state and a highly esteemed public willingly pay a very high price for it. And “the assistant professor” not only lives off the sufferings of the glorious ones―disgusting!― but he steals from them their lives’ earnestness. For much is gained if those who make up the mass of humanity can receive an immediate impression of the sufferings of a witness to the truth. But this effect is, after all, the lawful possession of the de-

29

10

15

391

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 29–32

5

ceased and is stolen from the latter by the assistant professor. The assistant professor insinuates himself between the glorious ones and the mass of humanity, whom he demoralizes by pampering them and by having the sufferings of others served up as interesting knowledge that is for sale like any other delicacy.

30

Nonsense.

10

15

When a child is born, people exclaim [“]What a joy it is that a new citizen of the world has come into being, etc.[”] And when a man dies, people say: [“]All is well with him; he has escaped from this world.[”] It is, as Prof. M. Nielsen said, stuff and nonsense.

31

Beware of People.

25

Speaking in purely human terms, it is said, “Seek help from people.” From a Christian standpoint, it is said, “Beware of people.” Christianity was of course a fire lit by Christ and that must be guarded; but in the realm of the senses water extinguishes fire, and in the spiritual realm, the mass of hum. beings extinguish fire―beware of people!

32

Christianity Is a Flame.

20

392

30

And, as was the case with the flame guarded by the virgins―so also with the lighting of the flame that Christ accomplished: the Christian is―single.

•

1854

401

402

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 33

•

1854

If Only Hum. Beings Were Unable to Speak! In the lives of animals, everything is so easy to understand, so simple―because compared to hum. beings the animal has the advantage of being unable to speak. The only thing that speaks in an animal’s existence is its life, its actions. When, for example, I see a stag in rut, I see what this means, namely, that it is in the grip of the drive’s intense power and there is nothing further to say about it. If it could speak, one would likely hear nonsense about the feelings of duty by which it is governed, about its desire, out of a sense of duty toward society and the species, to preserve the race, as well as its being the greatest beneficence, etc. When I see the spider spin its fine web, a true work of art, I see―for the spider has this advantage over the hum. being, the advantage of being unable to speak―I see what it means, that it seeks to make a living. If the spider could speak, I would likely hear, as it sat hungrily in its web, keeping watch in hopes a fly would come, a long speech to the effect that it was because of its enthusiasm for art that it produced this fine web, which is a genuine work of art. And this is true of animal life in general. Make hum. beings mute―you will see that hum. existence would not in fact be very difficult to explain. But what confuses everything is that humans possess this advantage over the animal―of being able to speak. Thus, while a person’s life expresses what is lowest, one’s mouth speaks nonsense about what is highest, giving assurances that this is what is decisive for him. Language, the gift of speech, cloaks the hum. race in a cloud of twaddle and swindling that is and spells its ruin. Only God knows how many are to be found in each generation for whom speech did not spell ruin, making him a fool or a hypocrite. Only humanity’s most significant personalities can bear the advantage of being able to speak. So dubious is the human being’s advantage over the animal, an advantage that most often comes to mean, ironically, that he is what an animal is not: a fool and a hypocrite.

33

5

10

15

20

25

30

393

35

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 34–35 34

5

10

15

20

25

30

•

1854

This World Is a Prison. But, as I have said elsewhere, as in a prison, people find it both shrewdest, and also take satisfaction in the impudence: to give the impression that they are doing fine―and if, in such an institution, there are some individuals who prefer to humble themselves under the authorities’ view of the matter and admit that [“]this is not exactly a good place to be, nor should it be, seeing that we are here as punishment,[”] they will be ill-regarded and ridiculed by the other prisoners: this is how it is with the whole world. Xnty’s view is that this world is a prison. But what occupies the world―both because it is the shrewdest thing to do and because it satisfies the desire for defiance―is of course to do everything to give the impression that this is a lovely world. If there are some individuals (that is, the Xns) who humble themselves under God’s thoughts and say, [“]This is not a good place to be, and this is as it should be, since this is a punishment,[”] they will be hated and despised by the world. According to the teachings of Xnty, all peop. have been judged and found guilty. But the heavenly authorities do not yet intervene but rather, in a way, leave us to our own devices. Those who freely offer to suffer their punishment―these are the Xns. Grace is thus: to suffer one’s punishment in this life and to be eternally saved. But grace does not mean that this life is to be one of Epicureanism. Thus, when a person who was sentenced to life in prison is offered clemency and only 5 years imprisonment, this is indeed grace, but grace in no way means that he is immediately set free. This is the Christian understanding of this life―try it, then, and see whether begetting children is compatible with this. To transform Xnty into the enjoyment of this life is bestial.

394

35

To Thank God for Pleasant Days.

35

It is what we in Christendom have come to call Xnty, and what we, by having been taught Xnty since childhood, have been induced and pampered into calling Xnty: thanking God for the pleasant days and for the joy and the enjoyment of life.

403

404

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 35–37

•

1854

But now, just measure the distance between this and true Xnty. The matter of whether thanking for the pleasant days is true Xnty depends on whether, from a Christian standpoint, this [Xnty] is truly compatible with the pleasant days and the enjoyment of this life, for which we are offering thanks. But if Xnty’s thought is that this existence is a penal institution, that God’s thought is that this life is the suffering of punishment, which he has proclaimed―if, then, we humans take advantage of the fact that God does not compel us (on the contrary, he of course wants to see whether we will voluntarily comply with his thought), and we set everything in motion in order to glean joy and enjoyment from this life―then to thank God for this is so far from piety that it is actually making a fool of him. Imagine a prison in which it was to some degree within the power of the prisoners to arrange their lives as they themselves want―but they know that the authorities’ idea is that their lives should be the suffering of punishment: if they then do everything to make their lives enjoyable and comfortable and pleasant―and then were willing to thank the authorities for the good days they enjoyed: this would be making a fool of the authorities, for of course it was the exact opposite of the authorities’ idea.

5

10

15

20

The Half Is More Than the Whole.

36

This saying of Hesiod surely corresponds more or less to what Asaph said: Spare me riches. To want the whole is dangerous; what is safest is: the half. Spiritually understood, the opposite holds true: to have the half is to lose the whole. But in the realm of the senses, it is preferable to have the half, and all finite prudence concerns itself with halfness.

25

The Blessedness of Heaven

37

Once, it was understood in this way: it was a task, an effort, of which we can now scarcely form any conception whatever.

35

395

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 37–39

•

1854

20

Then the matter was turned in this way: No, it is sheer grace and no amount of striving can seize hold of it; it is sheer grace― and in consequence one’s life is sheer gratitude on a scale that we can scarcely imagine. And now the truly profound expression for grace has been reached: It is grace of such magnitude, such magnitude―that it is not worth thinking about. There was a time when one would sell everything in order to buy the blessedness of heaven from the heavenly majesty. Nowadays one receives it as a bonus, just as one receives a fine little box or decorative packet free with a purchase at a shop. And not only this, but it has become lèse-majesté to want to do the least thing, even merely to give a thought to one’s blessedness―that, of course, constitutes lèse-majesté, if the majesty wants to give it gratis, just as it is an insult to the grocer if one wanted to pay for what he gives away at no cost. God wants grace to be freely given, and so much so that he does not even want to be thanked. No, as I said, the blessedness of heaven is not even received as an extra, a bonus, but rather as that little packet in which the sugar or coffee comes.

38

The Truth Is Naked.

5

10

15

25

In order to swim, one strips naked. In order to pursue the truth, one has to venture out in a far more inward sense and take off the far more intimate clothing of thoughts, representations, selfishness and such before one has become sufficiently naked.

398

39

30

Talent―Spirit If a pers. who has talent is actually to become spirit, he must first acquire a distaste for all the satisfactions talent provides― just as a boy who becomes a pastry chef’s apprentice is given permission to eat, right away, as many cakes as he would like― so as to lose his taste for cakes.

405

Journal NB35 with entry NB35:35.

408

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 40

•

1854

The Church. The Falsification.

Christianity is constituted to address the individual. Precisely here lies the vast ideality but also the challenge of being Xn, of relating oneself as an individual to God, not concealed behind some form of abstraction that, if I may put it this way, would cushion the blow, or, if you want to put it this way, would soften, like colored glass, the fire of the sun’s rays. But everything human tends toward getting free of God. This is the common factor. The method is a dual one (ad modum as when one speaks of refined and crude suicide). The one is to rebel against God or to deny that a God exists. This I do not discuss. The other, the finer one, manages―precisely under the pretext of zeal for God and God’s cause―to position an abstraction between God and oneself. “The Church” is such an abstraction. So people have come up with the idea of speaking of it [the Church] as a person, of its birth, its course of life, etc., finally becoming accustomed to thinking of the Church as the Xn―there are no Xns in any other sense. Behind this abstraction, the Xn is on vacation. The Church is spoken of with solemnity, profundity, and deep spirituality―but there are no individual Christians, or, if you will, there are more than enough of them, millions, so that a million Christians more or less can mean no more than a sausage in the butchering season. Surely, as Sleiermacher remarks somewhere, the idea behind the invention of the lightning rod was surely not that people could then sit securely behind it and laugh at God, who thunders and lightnings, and similarly, neither is it people’s idea to mock God through this discovery of the Church that, just like Peer Mikkelsen, substitutes a straw man for his person: but nonetheless it does in fact make a fool of God and Xnty. The Church, that abstraction, is the barrier behind which the Xn avoids the real effort of being a Xn. 14 ad modum] Latin, in the manner of.

40

5

10

15

20

25

30

399

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 41–42

41

5

•

1854

409

Thought-Experiment. Imagine that Socrates had been ordered to become an apostle―and imagine, then, that one of the apostles came to him and said, “Today we caught 3000 souls in an hour”: I wonder if Socrates would not have become skeptical as to whether this was possible―whether, when it involved something as ideal as being a Christian, 3000 could be caught in an hour.

10

42

15

20

400 25

30

35

Christianity―Christendom. In the New T. the matter stands as follows: if someone reads the Gospels with the least bit of primitivity, he will come to the conclusion that even if from a Xn point of view there was nothing standing in the way of marriage, the Xn would have no time to marry; a Xn is obligated to God to such a degree that the delay involved in marrying is out of the question. This is how things stand in Xndom: just when a theology graduate has reached the point of coming to terms with what Xnty is, it turns out that he does not have time for it―for he is engaged and must turn his attention to marrying as soon as possible; thus he does not have time to come to terms with what Christianity is―because he must marry. And it is at Xnty’s expense that he marries, and he and his family are to make their living from it!!!! So he marriesa, brings along some books to the countryside and then breeds some children―and then, rest assured, people may learn, from him and his wife, what Xnty is. And this is the way Xnty is spread, as the late Mynster would have said, “all around in the nations”! Oh, would that one were dealing with hypocrites, impudent liars, and brazen fellows! But this pitiable

a

becomes a priest―don’t forget this, it can happen so easily, and of course it doesn’t mean anything― is bound by oath to the N.T., an oath he surely understands in this manner: that he swears just as the others do.

1

5

410

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 42–43

•

1854

situation―all nonsense, meaninglessness, and even a certain good-natured willingness, which, please note, is just as useless as if a sewing needle without an eye wished to make up for the lack of the eye with willingness―it should be noted, however, that the needle can lack an eye without guilt, but this meaningless, good-natured willingness is sin, is lack of character owing to never having properly willed―and people imagine this to be Xnty. Everywhere, this swarm of good-natured insignificance that shows itself as impudent only when in a crowd, but otherwise is willing enough. If your idea is to clothe hum. beings in a new costume―such a reformation can be effected easily enough―there is sufficient willingness. But look carefully, because such a reformation is an illusion, for it can become the same old nonsense, or the same nonsense in a new costume.

The Quality of a Hum. Being was what Xnty wanted to change. Hum. beings always make use of a substitute: a change in the pattern―the quality remains the same. This is the way in which humanity has accepted Xnty, but to do so is to make a fool of Xnty and of oneself. Of course, the longer Xnty has existed within Xndom, the larger the selection of various patterns that has arisen, together with learned knowledge concerning all these many patterns and their mutual relations. It all serves to draw attention away from what Xnty is, that it is: a change of quality. Xndom does everything possible to direct attention to the pattern―Xnty focuses everything on: the quality. For this reason, Xndom has in the course of centuries produced millions x millions of Xns in all possible patterns, and thousands of men and women remain in the business of breeding little Christians of various patterns―Xndom is best regarded as a

5

10

15

43

25

401

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 43–44

5

10

15

20

44

402

35

40

•

1854

411

huge factory. In the midst of all this excess, Eternity, which asks only about quality, hangs it head in embarrassment (if it were possible for Eternity to be embarrassed). Xnty’s aim was a change in quality. The result of Xndom turns out to be that in Xndom the quality of humanity has become even poorer than it was before Xnty came into the world―this, however, is concealed by the swindling importance that the patterns have taken on. It is indeed easy to see that nothing protects so well against the examination of the quality of a thing as having one’s attention diverted to the variety of patterns, and here true Xnty was zealous to discover what is going on, to get engaged in struggle and battle, and not one simply against flesh and blood (which Xnty suggests, when it aims at a change in quality), but against opinions and against supposedly scientific scholarship, which is why the religious disputes in Xndom are precisely what best show that, as far as the quality of hum. beings is concerned, everything remains at the level of the old position, the pagan, the Jewish position― or what is probably even worse.

Enlightened or Artificial Stupidity. Just as one can speak of artificial heat, lighting, artificial nature (in contrast to natural warmth, daylight, flowers, beauty, etc.), one can also discover an artificially produced stupidity. No one, not even the stupidest person, is as ignorant of Xnty as “the professor.” His stupidity is a stupidity that is the product of effort and much study. In order to be preserved in this stupidity, what is needed is, on the one hand, the continued, ongoing study of other professors’ writings and, on the other hand, a strong opiate, in this case, the hallucination that Christianity is perfectible. Anyone fortunate enough to have his eyes opened to this wisdom is well on his way to becoming a professor.

[a]

Note: In saying this I do not mean to imply that the prof. will in any essential way be benefited by reading the writings of others; he will instead transform everything into his own stupidity.

1

5

412

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 45–46

•

1854

Xnty―Xndom Christianity is the contact between the divine and the human. And it is this [contact between human and divine] that has become history, which, note well, has happened in such a way that each successive generation―with the distance steadily increasing―has become the history of the fact that the preceding [generation] was the history of the fact that the preceding [generation], etc., backwards. This is the perfectibility of Xnty! People have turned Xnty into―the history of Xnty, without noticing that to do so is precisely to situate oneself outside Christianity, and, of course, increasingly so with each generation. When one receives a package, one unwraps it in order to get to the contents. Xnty was a gift from God; but instead of receiving the gift, Xndom has taken it upon itself to package it, with each generation adding fresh packaging on top of the others―and this is the way in which people have thought they were drawing closer and closer to Xnty. Christianity has become history. Yes, were it not for the difficulty that the very first generations adhered to the unmarried state, I am sure that, in Xndom, where religion is supposedly the religion of spirit, it would long since have become orthodoxy that what mattered most was not merely the apostolic succession but rather―the veterinary point of view―genuine pedigree through breeding. The greatest difference that exists between one pers. and another is this: to feel God so close to oneself that it is as if he stood right beside one, present at every moment―and to lead one’s life blissfully in the thought that God is far away, at a distance of 1800 years of history, and that the question of God’s nearness is a historical one.

Christendom.―Spiritlessness.

45

5

10

15

20

25

403 30

46 35

Xnty, or becoming a Xn, is to subject oneself to an examination―ordained by God―of one’s existence.

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 46–48

5

47

10

•

1854

Christendom is a society of hum. beings who call themselves Xns because they occupy themselves with learning about how other people, long ago, subjected themselves to this examination, and also learning about what happened to these others during their time of examination―spiritlessly forgetting that they themselves are of course under examination.

Verbosities. We have a certain turn of phrase―we say of a man or a woman, [“]That’s one verbose person,[”] intending by this something bad. In this sense one can say that with Xndom long-windedness came to Xnty―which is true and concise. It is unbelievable what Xndom has accomplished in the way of: verbosities.

15

404

48

20

25

30

The Demoralization of the Hum. Race advances with increasing speed. Individuals (sit venia verbo) become less and less significant. On the other hand, they become ever more proficient in becoming tangible power by forming a mass, becoming cheeky and defiant in the bargain, thereby making their possible salvation increasingly impossible. Meanwhile, Professor Snivel and the priests declare that hum. beings are immortal, and they prove it. Ah, yes―but prove then, too, that the creatures who now go by the name of hum. beings are hum. beings. Immortality! What possible significance can this rlly hold for peop. who, in relation to everything, even the most insignificant matters, have become accustomed to being part of a group, a flock, and for whom being part of a group or a flock is―everything.

19 sit venia verbo] Latin, excuse the word. (See also explanatory note.)

413

414

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 49

•

1854

Unmarried State. All these sublime pronouncements to the effect―that sexuality truly does not constitute the hum. race’s superiority, that hum. ideality is to be found anterior to it, that sexuality was a degradation, and that, if ideality is to be attained, the task is precisely to renounce sex and to play the melody backward, as one does in reversing magic spells: all this has been lost in Xndom, and especially in Protestantism, and lost so profoundly that it is as if it had never existed. For centuries Protestantism in particular has sailed full speed into these depths, downward: that marriage is the meaning of life, that the relationship to the other sex is life’s earnestness, etc., so that in Protestantism one is most inclined to regard a single person as laughable in more or less the same way as a single boot, that is, as something that has failed to achieve its true destiny, something that does not rlly exist when there aren’t two. *

5

10

15

*

Luther maintained that it is impossible to live chastely outside of marriage―the ancient Church maintained that it is impossible to live chastely in marriage, which thus became “tolerated fornication.” *

49

20

*

We are all Xns, however, and Xnty flourishes “all around in the nations.” *

*

Did Luther believe that, because human beings have become as lecherous and passionate as they are, it is now impossible to live chastely outside marriage[?] Perhaps. But then the Reformation becomes a peculiar business, especially when it is constantly trumpeted as a great advance for Christianity. It is, rather, much more a concession made to lechery or to the sensual.

405 25

30

J O U R N A L NB 35 : 50 50

5

10

15

•

1854

Two Wills in the World cannot be tolerated. God is the only one. Now God has surely bestowed on hum. beings and on the hum. world the power to have a will. But the world that wants to will its own will in this way must accept, as its punishment, that it does not rlly exist for God, that he relinquishes it. On the other hand, as soon as a will wills to involve itself with God, that will must go. This is the meaning of dying away from the world. That a will wills to involve itself with God is precisely what he [God] wills, but if God and this will are to be joined together, what comes next follows as a matter of course. The God-forsaken world seems to be free in a sense wholly distinct from the way in which the Christian is free―this is because the God-forsaken world has been relinquished by God; it is free from God.

415

JOURNAL NB36

JOURNAL NB36 Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse Edited by Joel D. S. Rasmussen

Text source Journal NB36 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter Text established by Niels W. Bruun, Klaus Nielsen, and Stine Holst Petersen

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 1

409

1

•

1854

NB36. Decemb. 13th 1854.

419

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 2 1854 •

411

2

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

“The Child.” As with the white spot in a corn and with the black spot on a target―so it is with this point in Xndom: in one way or another, this is where the whole business is to be found. Where in all the world did Christendom get “the child”[?]―for of course it is easy enough to see that Christ’s view was absolutely that being a Xn naturally means the unmarried state. But then they got hold of the child. And now it begins. At first it is said that it would be cruel, unendurable for parents to believe themselves to be saved and not to know that their child is saved. Therefore (despite of the fact that the New Testament does not in any way resolve such collisions by giving way, for Xnty in fact heightens the collision into that of hating father and mother and spouse and children) they had to come up with something to pacify the parents. So they came up with infant baptism―that when the child got some water on its head, everything was decided: the child was a Xn, eternally saved. Then the child was to be brought up in Xnty. For this purpose, Xnty had to be made into the precise opposite of what it is in the New T., because it is completely impossible for a child to grasp the punctum saliens in Xnty: original sin, and were the child capable of understanding it, the parents would appear in an extremely strange light. So Xnty was thus turned into optimism: Enjoy Life―Judaism, with the addition of falsified Christian ingredients. ― ―And thus, from a Christian point of the view, the family is in turn demoralized with the assistance of the child. It began with giving in to the parents and embarking upon playing that the child is a Xn. But soon the parents found that this was in fact true and certain: that simply by having been baptized, the child had been eternally saved―so that actually this was absolutely the most pleasant way in which to be a Xn: to be one as a child. And this was made into a sentimental article of faith: the child is the true Xn. Xndom got a child to lie to and exploited this in order also to lie to itself: and thus Xnty became precisely the opposite of what it is in the New T. 24 punctum saliens] Latin, salient point.

421

422

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 2–3

•

1854

We see how necessary it is to insist upon the unmarried state. As soon as we get a child from Christian parents, the whole of Xnty is turned upside down―and then it comes gushing forth from professors and priests, women and menfolk, as from a cornucopia―profound gobbledygook and sentimental, speculative nonsense come gushing forth. And this fundamental confusion of Xnty, this boundless heap of theological questions and problems and disputes and charges of heresy: all this rests upon these two―points of support (if one can call them that): that Christ was present at a wedding (ergo the Xn must marry, marriage constitutes the meaning of life, true Xnty is impossible in the absence of marriage) and that when the apostles tried to restrain them, Xt said en passant to some women, [“]Let the little children come unto me[”] (ergo the significance of Xt’s coming to the world was to establish marriages in order to get little children). Xt had come to the world in order to light a fire; that was why virginity was also required of the Xn: to preserve the fire. Xndom became a stud farm in which―in Jewish or heathen fashion―the breeding of children became: true Xnty.

Original Sin―Xnty. Precisely at the age when a pers. has come to the point that there could be any talk of having attained the maturity that is able to take note of the Xn idea of original sin―that propagation of the race is a sin, and that, for the spirit, existence as an animal creature is an equivocal good, etc.: precisely at that point, or a few years earlier, he is himself, in his capacity of father, fully engaged in drilling into his children what a blessing it is that he has bestowed life upon them; or he is fully immersed in his happiness over the child’s delight in existing―which Xnty has of course never denied, for the child is merely an animal creature, and Xnty understands that, for spirit, existence as an animal creature constitutes suffering, which is why Xndom has very shrewdly abolished the category of spirit in connection with being a hum. being and thus has made life easy and made marriage into the earnestness and meaning of life (which propagation is for animal creatures)―and yet nonetheless continues to call itself Xn. As in folk tales, when the sprites of the woods withdraw and instead spout a lot of nonsense to those who wish to learn about

412

5

10

15

20

3

25

30

35

40

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 3–4

413 5

10

15

20

•

1854

them: so, too, does existence withdraw, deceiving hum. beings by fooling them into propagation of the race, by which their lives are placed in a parenthesis, and this parenthesis broadens to encompass millions of people, and this parenthetical state is continued from generation to generation while existence continues just as little transfigured, and Xnty is shoved entirely aside. Of course, all talk to the effect that Xt has made satisfaction for original sin provides no proof that Xnty wants the propagation of the race. For, after all, all atonement and satisfaction is of course always retrospective and not prospective. As in the case of the specific sins that an individual commits: if a person’s sin was theft, the atonement makes up for what had gone before, but it certainly does not mean that he is now permitted to steal as much as he wants in the future. And that is how it is with satisfaction for original sin: it does not mean that a person is now permitted to lead his future life as merrily as he wants with respect to propagating the race. No: Xnty blocks the way with the unmarried state. It says that satisfaction has been made for your father’s transgression through which you came into existence― but now, stop: the satisfaction does not mean that you are to go off and do just as he had done, the satisfaction does not mean that you are to have license for all foolery of that sort.

4

The Numerical―The Proclamation of Xnty.

25

The true proclamation of Xnty requires this: Close your eyes to the numerical, whether there be millions, 10’s of millions, it must mean only one pers. But surely Xnty is not to be changed for the sake of 1 pers.― and from a Christian point of view, millions are of the same quality as one single pers. Thus, if a Franz Knivsmed or whoever it may be in the collegium politicum―if, in connection with the punishment contemplated for women (his abstention from contact with them), he declares that he cannot abstain―Xnty is not to be changed on that account and the unmarried state abolished. No, Xnty does not change for the sake of one Franz Knivsmed. Rather, from a Christian point of view, 10 million Franz Knivsmeds are only one. Every proclamation of Xnty that grants the least bit to numerical considerations forgets what majesty the Xn has the honor of

30

35

31 collegium politicum] Latin, political club. (See also explanatory note.)

423

424

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 4–6

•

1854

serving, item, the degree to which this majesty is a hater of―precisely the numerical. And therefore, my good Luther, you were not quite sober, but a bit befogged, or your brain was clouded by the numerical, by the business of millions of Franz Knivsmeds, when you altered Xnty and declared it impossible to live chastely outside of marriage. That sort of thing is of no consequence whatever to Xnty, which is too lofty to allow itself to be impressed in this fashion by one or by millions of Knivsmeds. And in any case, dear Luther, you ought at least to have made it clear that here there was no talk of Christian progress, but of reducing the price.

. . . . How far Xnty is from existing can best be seen from me. For even with the clarity I possess―I am nonetheless not a Xn. Yet it still looks to me that despite the depth of nonsense in which we are mired, we will nonetheless all be saved. This is the result of having ingested a diametrically opposed so-called Xnty as a child. But, indeed, my position is certainly difficult enough. I am not like a pagan to whom an apostle preaches Xnty in succinct, pithy fashion―no, I am the one who must, so to speak, discover Xnty, work it out of the bewitched state into which it has been brought.

5

414

5 15

20

25

The Witness to the Truth And when a witness to the truth dies, he says to God: [“]Thank you, thank you, infinite love, for all sufferings.[”] And God then responds: [“]Thank you, my friend––thank you for the use I have made of you.[”]

1 item] Latin, as well as, furthermore.

6

30

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 7 7

5

10

415

15

20

25

30

35

40

•

1854

Irony in Relation to Spirit and to What Is of the Spirit.

There is no category of spirit that does not also include an element of irony. The sensate view will thus hold that what must move a pers. to want to think about life is that the more he thinks about it, the easier life becomes for him. Spirit means that the more a pers. thinks about life, the more burdensome and the more strenuous it becomes for him. “For in much wisdom is much grief”―yes, and the strenuousness of existing. “But then this business about spirit is of course madness.” Yes, quite so. But precisely this is the negative hallmark of spirit: that spiritlessness is the way of making life easy―so aristocratic is spirit. Money, worldly power, and the like: these are what the sensate hum. being understands; he desires them because he thinks―and indeed, to some extent correctly―that possessing them will make life easier for him. If amassing money indubitably meant more suffering and difficulty for every thousand: yes, then the sensate hum. being would surely refrain from doing so―which he therefore in fact does do with respect to spirit, happy with the path that has been trodden more and more over the course of centuries, the only true and recommended path: becoming merely a more or a less animal creature is the way to make life absolutely easiest for oneself. Spirit conjoined with existence as an animal creature produces suffering: the more spirit, the more suffering. Xndom (assisted by its perfectibility!) has therefore taken it upon itself to improve Xnty. It lets the category “spirit” disappear completely (it was to introduce this [i.e., spirit] that Xt came to the world), and thus we are Xns; Xnty flourishes all around in the nations; there are at least 1000 livings for teachers (but according to Xnty, being a teacher is precisely what must not be a living), marriages are entered into before the altar (but Xnty is precisely the unmarried state), children are begotten in Xnty and brought up in Xnty and baptized as Xns, etc. etc., Xnty everywhere―i.e., everywhere there is precisely that to which Xnty is diametrically opposed. But easier―yes, this is conceded―life has really become easier: Xndom’s, especially Protestantism’s, scenery is: an idyll, begetting children, fat livings, busyness in this world, politics.

425

426

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 8–10

•

1854

The True Extraordinaries, Those of the First Class. they do not feel happy enough in this world to want to settle down in it. No, they are travelers, on a mission, hurry away again, home, as soon as possible. Then, when they notice that the end approaches, when―having brought about the greatest possible effect in the shortest possible time―they have just about completed their mission: then they push a little button that only they know about―then their lives have a catastrophic effect, and in that way they are thrust out of the world. Here, from beginning to end, everything is heterogeneity: to exit this world catastrophically is the greatest heterogeneity in comparison with a steady, calm life and a quiet death.

8

5

10

416

15

I Thank God for Three Things 1) That no living being owes its existence to me. 2) That He kept me from thoughtlessly becoming a priest in the sense in which people are priests around here nowadays, which makes a mockery of Xnty. 3) That I voluntarily exposed myself to abuse by The Corsair.

Falsification of Xnty What has been falsified is the concept of being a Xn. And what has been falsified is not so much the doctrine as the proclamation of Xnty, as what it is to be a teacher of Xnty. It is as if water were not contaminated in the reservoir, but became contaminated, infected, by passing through pipes that were contaminated―as if someone were to lead a person up to the reservoir and say: [“]The water is not in fact contaminated.” [“]Yes, but it is contaminated by the medium through which it is delivered to people.” In every situation in which something can only be obtained through a medium, the condition of the medium is more

9

20

10

25

30

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 10–12

•

1854

427

or less as important as that which is being delivered through the medium. From this can be seen how dubious is this talk about the objectively true proclamation of Xnty.

11

10

417 15

20

12

25

30

35

My Task: To Make Room. I am not an apostle who brings something from God and does so with authority. No, I am serving God, but without authority. My task is: to make room so that God can come. From this it can easily be seen why I must quite literally be a single hum. being, item kept in great weakness and frailty. For if the one who was to make room arrived, for example, at the head of a couple of battalions―yes, from a hum. point of view that would seem a splendid way to make room, the surest way of doing so. But then, of course, the one who was to make room could take up the space himself, could take up so much space that God could not properly come. My task is to make room―and I am the police, if you will. But as things are in this world, the police come and use force to arrest the others―the higher police come, suffering, demanding instead to be arrested.

Mynster and I are the collision between the old and the new. Genrlly, what is new comes with its selfishness and wants to put the old to death, to overthrow it―the sooner the better. I came in resignation and was even willing to play into Mynster’s hands, giving him what was new, so that he could end on that note―concealing myself and all my suffering and sacrifice (indeed, in the deepest, most laughable incognito) for the sake of the cause, while the entire contemporary age―with myself at the head―bowed to Mynster as the man. Governance passed judgment: that was something Mynster never deserved. And of course I, too, have seen this; but being incognito is my life, my element; I am certainly willing to suffer, to make sacrifices, etc., but incognito is my passion.

[a]

My task is not: to make room by giving orders, but to make room by suffering.

1

5

428

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 13–14

•

1854

Ludicrous. To bury a man―who, even by proclaiming Xnty has attained and enjoyed all possible earthly goods and advantages on the grandest scale―to bury him as a witness to the truth is just as ludicrous as burying a virgin who in fact left 3 children and was pregnant with the fourth. People find such virgins ludicrous, and it does not help at all―it only increases the laughter―if, (perhaps in return for money because “fine sand” has been ordered) the priest adds emphatically: the genuine virgins, the true virgins. But the fact is that everything concerning the animal category―as, for example, what it means to be a virgin and so forth― these are things about which the people of the world are very well informed. But people do not know what a witness to the truth is, simply because, among other reasons, they have gotten Xnty and the world to mean the same thing, whereas “the witness to the truth” relates precisely to the heterogeneity of Xnty with this world, and thus always suffers, forsakes, fails to obtain what is of this world. Fundamentally, Martensen has made Mynster ludicrous, but his contemporaries lack the Christian presuppositions for seeing that he has been made ludicrous.

13

5

10

418 15

20

25

My Contemporaneity with Bishop Mynster.

The significance of it is rlly this, the question: [“]Wasn’t it possible that I, who certainly am naturally disposed for what is catastrophic―wasn’t it possible that instead of attacking, I could have been the last defense of the established order[?”] I had to have time to ponder this question deeply. And therefore Governance arranged it such that the head of the established order in these times was a man for whose sake I was infinitely willing to make allowances of every sort.

14

30

35

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 14–16

5

15

10

•

1854

How much―for so many reasons―I should have been happy to have been: the last defense. But rlly it is Mynster who―by what I have endured from him and by how I have seen where his position leads―has changed me, or rather, has contributed to making me come to greater clarity regarding myself.

Mynster and I. I have rescued M. from what he feared more than the most superstitious pers. fears walking across a graveyard at midnight: religious movement. And I have helped him attain something he was more eager to do than the vainest young woman is bent on outshining everyone at the King’s Club: to die undiminished.

419 15

16

20

25

30

35

Jesuitism. There has never lived an eminently primitive person who was not accused of Jesuitism by his contemporaries. The matter is easily explained. The fact that he bears the future within himself gives his actions the heterogeneity that they call Jesuitism. He acts by virtue of the future, while his contemporaries continue to conduct their business in the time-honored fashion. His relationship to God inheres in this tension. And again, from one point of view, a heterogeneous person of this sort looks a bit comical, or his enormous pathos is cloaked in something comical. For there is nothing comical when someone who holds the rank of cabinet minister, etc. conducts himself as such, but of course what is in a sense comical is when someone, in virtue of the fact that he bears the future within himself, acts more energetically than any cabinet minister; the fact that someone acts energetically in virtue of the fact that he is acclaimed by millions is of course not comical, but the fact that someone acts energetically in virtue of the fact that he bears within himself the

429

430

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 16–18

•

1854

future’s millions―there is something comical about this. Where the millions are seen, there is nothing comical in it, but what is comical is to have the millions within oneself.

5

Mynster was, after all, an egotist―even in this matter: I remain rather convinced that (with respect to the possibility that Martensen might one day be his successor) he did not drop a hint that I actlly was a pers. whose significance was quite different from what was generally believed. Martensen could certainly have used such a hint. But on the other hand, Mynster really could not provide it without exposing himself a bit. Therefore I am of the opinion that here, yet again, he was sufficiently egotistical to refrain from doing it. But this is only an opinion.

17

10

15

420

Mynster―Martensen. Mynster’s prudence consisted simply in refraining absolutely from passing judgment on me, for he surely noticed all the traps that lay in wait here. In addition, my veneration of him also motivated me to try to help him along in every way. Martensen of course barges along: to say that he guides the Church is just as odd as to say that a man who continually rams his head against the parlor door is guiding, although this does, in fact, involve a certain amount of guiding.

18

25

30

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 19–20 19

5

10

15

20

421 25

30

•

1854

The Interesting―The Decision of Action. Were I to dare accompany my actions with commentary explaining the cunning purposefulness behind the entire project, I would enjoy great success― ―but fail completely in my task. Then people would utterly fail to get the impression, the sting, of decision in the action, but would be enchanted by the interesting aspect of the reflection that underlies the action. Nonetheless, it is an act of resignation for a pers. to undertake an action in such a way that―precisely as calculated―it must appear to be a sort of madness (for without this we do not get the passions set in motion, the fires lit), whereas if he were to accompany it with detailed explanations he would be admired by everyone for his cleverness and would avoid all dangers and inconveniences, for now the action would not itself accomplish anything, but would serve as a motif for the interesting. If I wanted to show (this is something I understand even better at the moment than I did at the beginning) how cunningly the attack on Martensen―or on Mynster per Martensen―is related to my entire operation and how it brings about precisely what it is supposed to bring about: I think that all that interesting business would cause people to forget to become embittered at me. But that of course rlly would mean that the whole business would cease being action and cease having the decisiveness of action. On the other hand, precisely the abrupt, unreflective way in which the impetus of character has been imparted is calculated to produce passion and has indeed succeeded in doing so. From this people then want to prove that I must have done something wrong, but what I see in it is precisely the fact that it is right― without, however, pointing this out to peop., for in that case we would once again slip into the interesting. But working like this requires resignation―or, more correctly, no hum. resignation is able to work in so resigned a fashion: a person must be compelled by a higher power, by fair means and by foul.

35

20

Providentia specialissima. To be a Xn is to believe in a provid. spec., not in abstracto but in concreto. Only the person who has this faith in concreto is an individuality―every other person rlly degrades himself into 36 providentia specialissima] Latin, most specific and personal form of Providence. (See also explanatory note.) 37 in abstracto] Latin, abstractly, generally. 38 in concreto] Latin, concretely.

431

432

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 20–23

•

1854

being a specimen in relation to the species, lacks courage and humility, is not tormented and helped sufficiently to be an individuality.

Conscience. When all is said and done, for hum. beings, having a conscience extends no further than having conscience (co-knowledge) with: hum. beings. Thus, even in connection with taking an oath―look a bit closer and you will see that what is tacitly understood is [“]Yes, I swear as―in the same sense as―all others do.[”] How many hum. beings rlly have conscience with God?

The Truth, Christianity, Will Make You Free! But the fact is that hum. beings would prefer to be free of the sort of freedom that God and Xnty have in mind―indeed, they protect themselves against it at all costs. It is as if one were to say to a molar: [“]I will make you free, loosen the gum, cut the nerve, etc.[”] The molar would have to reply: [“]No, thank you. I’m happy as I am.[”] And this is how things are with the sensate hum. being in relation to the liberation of which Xnty speaks.― God and hum. beings do not understand one another or speak the same language.

“After All, We Can’t All Be Martyrs.” 1

[a]

for the objection is rlly an impudent bit of cleverness.

To this, God might likely reply: “Leave that to me.” But hum. beings deceive themselves with the help of the numerical. In this life it is quite true that the shrewdest thing is, if possible, always to be like the others. But eternity disperses people and therefore requires something that, quite truly, is in a certain sense impossible for all to become.

21

10

22

15

422 20

23 25

30

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 24

24

5

10

15

20

25

423

30

35

40

•

1854

Catastrophe. How is a c[atastrophe] produced in the realm of the spirit? Quite simply by omitting several intermediate steps, by setting forth a conclusion without providing the premises, by drawing a consequence without first indicating what it is a consequence of, and so forth―then the collision between the person who acts in this manner and his contemporaries can become a catastrophe. For example, let the person who truly bears whatever is the idea of the age―let him work in silence for some years. During that entire period he will develop more and more, and thereby he will become increasingly alienated from his contemporaries. Then let him take the absolutely final stage, begin with it, in the most concentrated brevity: then it can become a catastrophe. On the other hand, it would not have become a catastrophe if he had communicated the earlier stages, step by step, nor, probably, would it become a c[atastrophe] if he begins with his earliest position. It has of course frequently happened that an individual has collided with his age and a c[atastrophe] has resulted. But then that was something immed[iate]. The individual involved rlly had no notion of the degree to which his contemporaries were incapable of understanding him, the degree to which they lacked intermediate links, premises. That is the catastrophic collision of the genius. It is completely different with the conscious arranging of a c[atastrophe], when one has such clarity that one can gauge with one’s eye that the distance must now be so great that the collision must result in a c[atastrophe]―setting up the entire matter consciously. Yet it is only with this consciousness that Christianity―the genuine Christian concept of being sacrificed, a voluntary sacrifice―is present. But here I am once again tempted to ask whether a hum. being has the right to do this? Isn’t this being harsh toward the others? In Christendom a person seeks in vain for enlightenment. And as for the New T., there it is of course the God-Man, and the God-Man is of course qualitatively different from every hum. being. On the other hand, without catastrophe it is impossible to put an end to the lack of character, the sophistry, the nonsense of

433

434

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 24–25

•

1854

reflection. Catastrophe is the genuine μεταβασις εις αλλο γενος; catastrophe is to reflection what the sign of the cross is to the devil. But to begin with the conclusion, omitting all the premises or things of that sort―and then to say that this is what one is doing in order to bring about a catastrophe: this is once again to prevent c[atastrophe], because within the explanation thus provided there lies, once again, an approach that reduces the distance from one’s contemporaries, so the collision does not become catastrophic.

Ideals―The Requirements of Civil Law. What the requirements of civil law are to the criminal world, the ideals are to the world that observes the requirements of civil law. What occupies the criminal world is to get free of the requirements of civil law, whether by rebelling against them or by stealth; this is exactly what occupies the world of the peop. who in fact abide by the requirements of civil law: to get free of the ideals by rebelling against them in straightforward fashion, or by stealth, or by the hypocritical appearance of honoring them, etc., etc. Eternity obligates one to uphold the ideals in entirely the same manner that this world obligates one to observe the requirements of the civil law. Therefore, from a Christian point of view, a person who by preaching Xnty manages to make 20,000 a year, who dresses in velvet, bespangled with stars, etc.: he is a thief in entirely the same sense as a person who steals in this world is a thief, because all those thousands and the velvet and everything acquired by proclaiming Xnty have been: stolen and thus can only be acquired by preaching, under the name of Xnty, something that is not Xnty. But the fact is that in this sinful world it is indeed regarded as something great if one can carry through―this egotism: abiding by the requirements of the civil law. And then people let observing the requirements of the civil law count as Christian virtue: and thus we are all Xns.

1 μεταβασις εις αλλο γενος] Greek, transition to another conceptual sphere. (See also explanatory note.)

5

10

25

15

20

25

30

424

35

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 26

26

5

10

15

20

25

30

425

35

40

•

1854

To Bring About a Catastrophe. However afraid people would be of me if they found out, however strange it would seem to them: it is certain that what has occupied me in recent times has been whether God in fact wants me to stake everything on bringing about a catastrophe, on getting arrested, convicted―if possible, executed. And in my soul I am concerned that if I refrained from doing so I would regret it eternally, a concern I know no other way of opposing except with the thought in which I continually entrust myself to God: that he will watch over me so that I do not come to neglect anything that I would eternally regret having omitted. If catastrophic action is to be taken, I had considered―in an entirely unexpected fashion and after the most complete silence― uttering “The Cry” to the effect that the public worship of God is mockery of God, that participating in it is a crime. But before I was really ready for this, I in fact came to do something else, namely to publish the article on Mynster against Martensen. This itself already weakened the catastrophic approach. Furthermore, when I look at that article, “The Cry,” I see that my intention has always been that it be accompanied by several sets of supplementary remarks, but these supplementary remarks would in turn weaken the catastrophic tendency. Then I have great misgivings concerning myself, about whether I am in fact capable―if it comes to that―of going to prison, of possibly being executed, about whether all this sort of fighting would have a disturbing effect on me, so that I could not subject myself to it. But in any case I must leave this to God. But there is an entirely different misgiving in connection with working catastrophically. It really cannot be done in the way I had imagined it. The established order is so demoralized that one could spit right in its eye and it would prefer to slink away and take shelter rather than bring a legal case or anything of that sort. This is something I have in fact experienced, because I have rlly already acted in catastrophic fashion, so if there had been the least notion on the part of the established order of taking legal action, my most recent article against Martensen was of course as decisive as surely is possible.

435

436

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 26

•

1854

When the situation is such that the established order is so sunken into wretchedness, is so demoralized, is so aware of itself as a lie, that it refrains at all costs from proceeding in this manner: bringing charges, arresting, execution―then it is infinitely dangerous to have indicated that this is the direction one intends to take: even if one’s opponent is a glob of snot, one easily renders impossible all of one’s own future maneuvers. Yes, and it is almost a sin against the congregation, for it is, after all, frightful to imagine that what will happen (something that, incidentally, is happening now) is that after what I told them, with emphasis, about making a fool of God―everything on Sundays remains as usual. Martensen’s silence is an abominable prostitution, indeed, it is actually blasphemy, and the congregation must rlly say to Martensen what Countess Orsini said to Marinelli: [“]Take pity, after all, and tell a little lie―it is at any rate better than this sort of silence.[”] So if catastrophic action is to be taken, the matter must be approached in a manner entirely different from what I have understood until now. The approach must be in the following style. One would begin by demonstrating that the matter is so serious that all learned disputes are childishness. The established order would therefore be required, required in the name of Xnty, to defend itself by using the means at its disposal. One must thus oneself demand that legal action be taken, one must oneself demand to be arrested, oneself insist that the matter be followed through with the greatest rigor, as a matter of life and death. The accusation lodged against the established order must then be that the whole of it is a lie, that the worship of God is mockery of God, that participating in it is a crime; but in addition the accusation must be made graver by demonstrating that the established order itself knows that it is a lie, and that this is why it has refrained from taking legal action. And even in this manner I still do not believe that it would be possible actually to get arrested, much less executed. Ah, but it is dreadful to consider the depths to which the established order has sunk―what a depth of wretchedness and philistinism and mediocrity and mendacity[!] But this is precisely why, in the course of time, this incomparable epigram will come to shine over the established order: that Bishop Mynster should be buried as one of the witnesses to the truth, one of the real witnesses to the truth.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

426 40

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 27–28

27

5

10

•

1854

Luther―The Reformation. L[uther] is the precise opposite of “the apostle.” “The apostle” expresses Xnty in God’s interest, comes with authority from God and in his interest. L. expresses Xnty in humanity’s interest, is rlly the hum. reaction against Xnty in God’s interest. Hence, too, L.’s formula: [“]I cannot do otherwise,[”] which absolutely is not that of the apostle. Look just at this: what confusion when one makes L. into an apostle. Generally, what Xndom has always lacked: a diagnostician of the disease and a dialectician.

15

28

20

25

427 30

35

On Whether the Race Has Not Degenerated to the Point That Individuals Capable of Bearing Xnty Are No Longer Being Born? It cannot be denied that in a certain sense the “freethinker” is very beneficial to Christendom. He in fact insists upon the part of Xnty that causes offense. And this is where I confront what I believe to be the degeneration of the race. Everything Xn presupposes a dialectical element or is constituted such that the individual must be able to endure a reduplication within himself. To be capable of seeing clearly and distinctly that Xnty is the scandal of offense, to be capable of seeing that Xnty makes me, humanly speaking, unhappy: and then nonetheless to embrace Xnty: this is hum. stature of a sort that I doubt is found any more. Nowadays everything must be made entirely straightforward if hum. beings are to accept it; one must be able to see quite straightforwardly that something is advantageous, one must provide finite sorts of reasons, etc.: in brief, hum. beings have sunk down into sheer insignificance that has no relation to the ideality that is Christianity.

437

438

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 28–29

•

1854

And, corresponding to this insignificance of individuals, people have also remade Xnty into some sort of god-awful syrupy-sweet stuff that, like other sweets, is sold by pastry mongers (priests in silk and velvet) and that further corrupts a hum. being.

Christianity―Hatred of Humanity Xnty in Xndom.

1

5

10

[a]

By having 11 copies of the shield made, the Romans believed that they could guarantee themselves secure in their possession of the 12th, the one fallen from heaven: with millions of copies of Xns, Xndom has not guaranteed itself secure in having one true Xn―the definition of what it is to be a Xn has been made unrecognizable.

The New Testament clearly rests on the view: to love God is to hate oneself, and love of God is hostility toward humanity. Thus, indeed, the entirely accurate view of Xnty held by the paganism of the times, that it is hostility toward humanity; loving God involves a tightening of an oppositional relationship, and it is impossible to love God in that nonsense of hearty solidarity with an entire people, etc. Thus, in the early years of Xnty, the opposition was represented by the paganism and Judaism of the surrounding world, and love of God was hostility toward humanity. But as more and more people became Xns, so, apparently, did this decisive factor undergo a change, and the notion of loving God in hostility to humanity was replaced by the notion of loving God in loving solidarity―and then Xnty was changed, totally, fundamentally―abolished. Therefore, in “Xndom” the Xn himself must be careful to express hostility to humanity, to remain on guard against the relationship of solidarity. Here, again, one sees that actually being a Xn in Xndom is an escalation in relation to what it originally was to be a Xn, for in Xndom the Xn must himself bring about the hostility of humanity. The true Xn, I mean, because at the moment, Xnty simply does not exist, but has perished in this nonsense about millions of Xns.

5

29

10

15

20

25

30

428

35

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 30–31 30

5

10

15

31

20

25

30

429

35

Christianity’s Earnestness. It is absolutely impossible to prevent―at the very instant that more stringent notions of the characteristics of Xnty are introduced―to prevent, at that very instant, the assistant professors, the swindlers, the nonsense from taking hold of them and lecturing on them. It is impossible to prevent it; and that is how it should be. If it were possible to define Xnty in such a way that falsification by the assistant professors was impossible, Xnty would be something other than it is. No, counterfeiting is a constant possibility. Earnestness is to be found elsewhere: eternity, and the assistant professors cannot fool eternity. Undeniably, lecturing is what pays best in time, but one does not lecture one’s way into eternity.

The Ideal. The ideal is hostility toward humanity.―What the hum. being naturally loves is: finitude. Introducing the ideal causes him the most appalling agony. True, when it is introduced in extremely poetic fashion as an imaginary vision―yes, then he accepts it―as yet another pleasure. But it is the most appalling agony for a hum. being when the ideal is introduced as the ethicalreligious requirement; in the most agonizing way, it kills in him everything in which he truly has his life; in the most agonizing way, it shows him his own wretchedness; in the most painful way, it keeps him in sleepless unrest, whereas finitude lulls him into enjoyment This, you see, is why Xnty was called, and is, hostility toward humanity. *

*

This is how hum. beings relate to the ideal. When she hears of it, the young girl blushes with enthu-

•

1854

439

440

1

5

10

15

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 31–32

[a]

All who have truly learned about the ideals have therefore also praised the unmarried state. To marry is to make the relation to the ideal so difficult that it is ordinarily synonymous with abandoning the ideal. (To be married in the way Socrates was married is different from what is generally understood by marriage: what S[ocrates] saw in marriage was in fact a hindrance, and that was―why he married; that was why he was happy with Xanthippe or counted himself fortunate―namely, on account of the difficulty.)

•

1854

siasm; the young man’s heart beats ardently; the unmarried man respects it; the married man does not indeed turn away from it altogether; but the greatest distance from the ideal is: Mommy, madam. The real rage against the ideal emanates from family life, from the lioness, or to express it in different fashion―which sometimes is also the truth―from the brood sow. *

5

*

Anyone who believes that he has introduced the ideals―if he has not been hated, abominated by people, he has introduced the ideal in deceitful fashion, so that it ended up merely as a delight to the imagination, something like when Heiberg fought “the public” and at the same time catered to “a cultivated public,” which is shamming.

A Special Relation to God in Immediacy and in Reflection.

10

15

32 20

[a]

20

25

With respect to a special relation to God in reflection, in one sense it is the case that it can only be known in retrospect; it is not something to which such a pers. can appeal in direct fashion, for at every instant there is a venturing, that is, at every instant there is the possible danger of neglecting to venture or of venturing wrongly.

In Holy Scripture it is always the case that God, in immediate fashion, tells the person with whom he has a special relationship what he is to do. I don’t understand this; that is, it does not admit of being thought, it is an immediacy that is inaccessible to thought, but for all that, it can of course be just as real. In any case, it is impossible for this relation to arise in reflection. In reflection the relation becomes dialectical. God must leave it up to the person who is to have such a special relation to him whether to venture to take it. Indirectly, God can provoke him a multitude of ways so that he does in fact venture; but indeed, the immediate relation cannot be had in reflection. Thus, in the final analysis it depends on the person daring specifically to involve himself with God, a daring in which there is always the

25

30

432 35

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 32–33

5

10

possibility that he could have misunderstood all the indirect influences. But on the other hand, all the indirect influences decide nothing―one must venture, and once one has ventured, there is an entire qualitative transformation. The person who has an immed., special relation to God thus has only the danger that can result from obeying what God, in immediacy, commands him to do. In reflection there is an additional qualitative danger: the possibility of having neglected to venture as well as the possibility of having ventured wrongly.

33

One Person.

15

With respect to “spirit,” one pers. is more than 10, 10 are more than 100, and so on. Numbers subtract; one pers. is the highest power. From this can be seen how stupid is all the nonsense which believes that in matters of the spirit one becomes stronger by becoming more numerous―which is to weaken oneself, and only in sensate fashion does it strengthen one. But perhaps this is what people rlly want, and in any event they want to spare themselves the effort of becoming a single one―and this, in turn, people want to conceal by letting their joining together into groups look as if it were being done in order to strengthen themselves. At every instant, one pers. is enough. But the fact is that centuries may pass before such a one-pers. arrives. And then, when he is dead, then, in turn, only one pers. is needed in order to take up the cause where he left off. But it doesn’t happen. So what has been produced and set forth must be learned by heart. And then begins this nonsense with the assistant professors who live by outlining, lecturing, presenting, etc. And then centuries pass with this nonsense―and all the while, only one single pers. is needed.

20

25

30

35

•

1854

441

The conclusion of entry NB36:31 with marginal addition NB36:31.a and the beginning of entry NB36:32.

444

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 34–35

•

1854 433

Living, with One’s Family, off the Fact That Xt Was Crucified is not merely bestial, but―insofar as this is spiritlessness that (worse than the brutality of the Jews who put him [Christ] to death) supports itself and its offspring, securely and comfortably, from the circumstance that another person was tortured―it is also bestial because the appearance of Xt was directed specifically at putting a stop to the race, at saving that which had once been lost, and at barring the way―and then people believe that Xnty has now become this: supporting oneself and one’s family from Xt’s life and death.

34

5

10

My Possible Fame.

35

Even my bitterest enemy would scarcely deny that I shall acquire a certain fame. But now I am beginning to wonder whether I might not gain fame in an entirely different genre from the one in which I had imagined until now: whether I might not actlly become famous as a naturalist, inasmuch as I have discovered―or at least have made a very significant contribution to―the natural history of parasites; the parasites I have in mind are priests and professors, those greedy and prolific parasites who even have the brazenness (which, indeed, other parasites do not possess) to want to be counted as the true friends and adherents of those whose sufferings they live off.

15

20

25

J O U R N A L NB 36 : 36–37

•

1854

436

36

Mediocrity.

10

In their mutual relations with one another, mediocre individuals are surely not immodest, are not guilty of any brazenness; they indeed mutually respect each other’s mediocrity. But the entirety of this mediocrity, the entire mass of mediocrity, or medioc[rity] en masse, is brazenness in relation to God because it wants to set itself up as what is highest, wants to vomit up the ideal. Just as people mutually insure one another against fire, mediocrity wants to provide total assurance to mediocre individuals that m[ediocrity] is the truth.

37

How Did It Come About That Xt Was Put to Death?

5

15

20

25

30

I can answer this by at the same time showing what Xnty is. What is “spirit”? (and Xt, of course, is spirit, his religion is that of the spirit) Spirit is: to live as though dead (to die away from the world). Now, this mode of existence is so distant from the natural hum. being that for him it is quite literally worse than dying pure and simple. The natural hum. being can stand it for an hour’s time if it is carefully presented at the remove of the imagination―indeed, he even finds it pleasant. But if it is to be pushed closer to him, so close that it is presented to him, in all seriousness, as a requirement for him: then his natural life, with its instinct of self-preservation, rears up to the point that a veritable furor sets in, just as with strong drink or when one speaks of a furor uterinus. And in this condition, in which he is beside himself, he demands the death of the person of spirit, or he rushes at him in order to kill him.

27 furor uterinus] Latin, madness in the uterus; an early term for nymphomania; also (in a woman) madness to marry a man, moral laxity, hypersexuality.

445

Journal NB36. The series of journal entries ends with entry NB36:37.

Notes for JOURNAL NB31 Critical Account of the Text of Journal NB31 451

Explanatory Notes for Journal NB31 461

NOTES FOR JOURNAL NB31

Critical Account of the Text by Joakim Garff and Klaus Nielsen Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse Edited by Joel D. S. Rasmussen

Explanatory Notes by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse Edited by Joel D. S. Rasmussen

451

Critical Account of the Text I. Description of the Manuscript Journal NB31 is a bound journal in quarto format. On its front cover Kierkegaard pasted a scallop-edged label marked “NB.31.” and bearing the date “Aug. 16th 1854.” (see illustration 1). The manuscript of Journal NB31 is preserved in the Kierkegaard Archive (KA) at the Royal Library in Copenhagen. The pages have been folded vertically such that the outer column constitutes about one-third of the page. The inner column contains the principal text of the entries, while the outer column has additions and marginal notes. The journal is written in Kierkegaard’s gothic hand with occasional instances of his latin hand. Kierkegaard’s latin hand is seen in the text used on the label and was also used for Latin and French words and quotations and sometimes calligraphically for proper names and headings. Marginal addition NB31:66.a was written around the earlier marginal addition NB31:66.b; lines have been drawn to separate the two marginal additions from one another (see illustration on p. 46 of the present volume). Marginal addition NB31:84.a extends across two pages. Most of the entry headings in the journal are completely or partially underlined. At various points in the entries, individual words have also been underlined. Horizontal lines separate the headings from the rest of the text in entries NB31:4, 5, 6, 20, 22, 23, 29, 45, 79, 83, 84, 107, and 140. Kierkegaard’s handwriting varies somewhat in size throughout the journal. Journal entries are separated from one another with a hash mark (#). When an entry began on a new page of Kierkegaard’s journal, he generally placed two hash marks (# #) at the top of the page. Entries NB31:30, 54, 60, 103, and 117 have internal divisions marked by two asterisks. The journal has a number of minor corrections, with deletions, erasures, and additions. At some points, arrows or brackets indicate minor interlinear additions in the main text. A sizable deletion can be seen in entry NB31:94 (see illustration on pp. 66-67 of the present volume). Kierkegaard cancelled indentations for a new paragraph in entries NB31:55 (see illustration on p. 37 of the present volume) and NB31:140. Deleted hash marks, indicating that an entry has been continued after having initially been concluded, are found in entries NB31:15, 31:91, and twice in entry NB31:94.

452

J O U R N A L NB 31

II. Dating and Chronology According to the label affixed to its front cover, Journal NB31 was begun on August 16, 1854, and must have been concluded no later than October 11, 1854, which is the beginning date of the next journal, Journal NB32. Of the journal’s 162 entries, only NB31:1 is dated. Several other entries, however, do contain references that make possible an approximate dating. In NB31:15, which has the heading “Chance Witticism,” Kierkegaard mentions a shopkeeper who advertised in Adresseavisen on September 5 and 6, 1854, offering to rent various items, including “wheels of fortune, and bedpans.”1 In NB31:26, which has the heading “The Exchange Rate or Market Price of Hum. Beings,” Kierkegaard mentions “the National Pension Fund,” which had been discussed in Fædrelandet [The Fatherland] and Dagbladet [The Daily News] in early September.2 Lastly, in his discussion of “Chief of Military Commissary Neergaard” in NB31:114, Kierkegaard is presumably referring to a review of J. V. Neergaard’s book, Historisk-faktisk Oplysning om vor Stutteriherrers sælsomme Commerce paa Hestenes Gebeet [Historical and Factual Information concerning the Strange Dealings of Those Who Manage the Breeding of Our Military Horses] (Copenhagen, 1854), which had appeared in Berlingske Tidende [Berling’s Times] on September 27 and 29, 1854.3

III. Contents “Can an eternal blessedness be decided in a moment of time, or can something eternal be decided in time?” (NB31:2; see NB31:67). Kierkegaard poses this question in the first real entry of the jour) The advertisement appears with identical wording in Adresse-

1

avisen, supplement 1 to no. 206, September 5, and supplement 1 to no. 207, September 6, 1854. See also the explanatory note for NB31:15 in the present volume. 2 ) See, e.g., Fædrelandet, no. 201, August 30; no. 205, September 4; and no. 208, September 7, 1854. See also Dagbladet, no. 203, September 1; no. 204, September 2; and no. 209, September 8, 1854. See also the explanatory note for NB31:26 in the present volume. 3 ) See Berlingske Tidende, no. 225, September 27, and no. 227, September 29, 1854. See also the explanatory note for NB31:114 in the present volume.

Critical Account of the Text

1. Outside front cover of Journal NB31.

453

454

J O U R N A L NB 31 nal and is thus repeating the question he had Johannes Climacus pose ten years earlier on the title page of Philosophical Fragments (1844). In the years since then, Kierkegaard’s interest in that question appears to have shifted from a mainly philosophical point of view to one that had a more Christian perspective that takes into account the reluctance with which a person approaches a definitive decision: “For an eternal decision in time is the most intensive intensity, the most intensive leap” (NB31:2). Quite a few entries in Journal NB31 are marked by a radical and uncompromising relation to God that is characterized by extreme passions that are utterly alien to enlightened humanism’s ideal of a harmonious life and a reasonable deity―thus these entries reflect a fundamental disagreement with the world. Kierkegaard asserts that “[t]his is the atmosphere Xnty breathes: there is hatred between God and hum. beings” (NB31:22; see also NB31:12 and NB31:142), and he depicts God as a heavenly sovereign who does not hesitate to use his unlimited powers―who, indeed, can in fact regard himself as obliged to employ “torture” (NB31:68), even “attacking his own emissary” (NB31:43) in order to develop in him a “hatred of what is human” (NB31:109), so that he can extirpate his “egotism” (NB31:46; see also NB31:68) and thereby be separated from the “mass of mimickers” (NB31:54). In its original form, true Christianity was infinitely distant from “the sort of scamps and louts who are called Xns nowadays” (NB31:123), who simply want “to reformulate everything into mediocrity” (NB31:69; see also NB31.109), “eating and drinking and begetting children and clinking glasses, etc.” (NB31:29): No, the New T’s Christianity . . . rests upon the idea that there is strife between life and death, between God and hum. beings: God hates hum. beings, just as hum. beings hate God. So if you want to be loved by God and to love God (and this is what it is to be a Christian), you must be hated, abominated, cursed, etc. (see the New Testament). And God hates this entire existence, a sinful falling away from him and a rebellion against him―being a Christian therefore means that you are to be tormented in every way. (NB31:29) A number of entries are marked by a clear dualism: “Xnty is not a promise for this life (that is Judaism), it is a promise for eternity―but in this life, suffering” (NB31:159; see also NB31:47 and NB31:51). Alternatively, other entries can make use of metaphor and depict the human being’s split between the temptations

Critical Account of the Text of temporality and the reward of eternity as an “examination” (NB31:31). Metaphorical language of this sort serves as support for Kierkegaard’s oft-cited description of Christianity as a “pessimism” (NB31:32) that is without parallel in history. Thus, Christ “unconditionally expresses the absolute pessimism that wants to have nothing whatever to do with this wretched, miserable, sinful world except to be put to death, sacrificed” (NB31:146). Kierkegaard makes no secret of the fact that his own relation to God has brought him inexpressible suffering. In an entry bearing the heading “On Myself,” he writes: If my contemporaries could understand how I suffer, how Governance, if I dare put it this way, mistreats me―I am certain that it would agitate them so deeply that hum. sympathy would make an attempt (as sometimes happens with a child who is mistreated by its parents) to free me from the grasp of Governance. (NB31:52) Kierkegaard adds that upon further consideration, putting the matter this way seems to him to be a “misunderstanding,” because he is quite certain not only that what has been visited upon him emanates from God, but that he has God as a fellow-sufferer: “I know that, in love, you, infinite love, suffer as well, suffer more than I” (NB31:52). Kierkegaard emphasizes this shared suffering as a fundamental characteristic of God’s love, which eternally continues to love, but which, owing to its unchangingness, cannot spare the beloved―something attested to in the most frightful fashion by Christ’s last words from the cross, which elicit this comment from Kierkegaard: “Alas, what haven’t I, a poor hum. being, experienced in that respect, this contradiction of not being able to be changed and nonetheless to love, alas, what haven’t I experienced that helps me in a faint, faint way to form a weak notion of the suffering of divine love” (NB31:86). Kierkegaard’s allusions to his own experiences with Regine are characteristic of the eroticization of the relation to God that can be found in a number of the journal’s entries, in which God is presented as a seducer who toys with a more or less gullible human being: “Indeed, o God, you can be severe with a poor hum. being! You capture him as no one can capture . . . and then, then you fool him, actually: You take him to the point where everything makes it clear that you have fooled him” (NB31:70; see also NB31:25 and NB31:71). At other points God is depicted in terms borrowed from the eroticism characteristic of clandestine assignations: “Indeed, there is no lover who knows how to conceal

455

456

J O U R N A L NB 31 the identity of the beloved, the understanding with the beloved, their encounters and meetings―no one as does: God in Heaven!” (N31:72). But Kierkegaard certainly does not suppress the fact that such an assignation between God and a human being involves a great deal more than is generally the case with their worldly equivalents, because when God “proposes to a hum. being,” he at the same time tells the beloved what their future life together will be like: “the consequence of this will be, I am telling you this right away, the consequence will be that you will be an unhappy, miserable, wretched hum. being, . . . hated, cursed, persecuted by peop., finally deceived by me” (NB31:76). If one is able to accept God’s declaration of love on these terms, one is on the way to becoming “spirit,” and thus of becoming one of the “I’s” (NB31:151) who position themselves apart from the anonymity of the millions: “God wants to have individuals, but the individual―either out of good-natured sympathy or out of a swindler’s cunning―always wants to have the herd with him” (NB51:153). The cunning with which a person tries to involve himself with God―but at the same time escape suffering―provokes Kierkegaard into depicting the following situation: If I were a pagan and spoke Greek, I might say that God has arranged the entire business this way in order to amuse himself: he amuses himself just as a hum. being can amuse himself by putting a bit of pork in a mousetrap and then watch all the tricks the mice employ to get hold of the pork without getting caught― ―this is how God amuses himself over all the leaping, pivoting, twisting, etc. of all these millions of hum. beings in order to get hold of the truth without coming to suffer. (NB31:25) In this context, one can scarcely be surprised that Journal NB31 contains violent attacks on “this swarm of professors, priests, etc.” (NB31:10), who have forgotten “that to be a Christian is essentially to be a missionary” (NB31:17; see also NB31:18). Kierkegaard explains that “ordinary human indolence . . . wants to maintain its nice, steady pace, no matter what,” and thus “there is a class in society (I mean the priests) that supports itself and its family by maintaining the illusion that Xnty exists” (NB31:36). No less harsh is the judgment passed on “the assistant professors,” who fill Kierkegaard with disgust, all the more so because one day they will loot his remains: “And some day, when I am dead, how busy all the assistant professors will be to get me and mine butchered and salted down, how much competition there will be to say the

Critical Account of the Text same things, if possible, in more elegant language―as if that were what mattered” (NB31:77; see also NB31:44). Kierkegaard finds the assistant professors so “loathsome” that if there weren’t a hell, one would have to come into existence in order to punish in particular this group of tradesmen, “whose crime is indeed precisely of the sort that cannot very well be punished in this world” (NB31:137). Harsh criticism is also directed at “the System” of philosophy, which―unlike the far more demanding effort to take hold of oneself and actualize oneself as “personality”―is a “plebeian invention: with the help of the System (that omnibus), everyone comes along” (NB31:13). Kierkegaard pronounces similar judgment on Protestantism, which he calls “the crudest and most brutal plebeianism” (NB31:30; see also NB31:100). The journal is also marked by Kierkegaard’s critique of the growing intellectualization and historicization that typifies the modern era. “Xnty is absolutely not situated in the sphere of intellectuality” (NB31:11), Kierkegaard insists, pointing out that Christianity has been become “stuck in ‘prudence’ ” (NB31:158). Nor is he any less critical in his remarks on the research aimed at navigating “this accumulation of 1800 years of history”―which in reality only “positions God at a distance of 1800 years” (NB31:129). Thus Kierkegaard must also object to the erroneous notion “that a young pers. is to be educated by history”: Alas, good Lord, what is history! Let’s be honest and not give in to the hum. conceit that the hum. race is something so important and significant that its history is such a source of education, of cultivation. History is a process. Rarely, rarely, rarely is there produced a little drop of an idea. So the process is one of transforming this into nonsense―in the course of which centuries and millions x trillions are sometimes used. (NB31:110; see also NB31:103 and NB31:111). To his view of history as “an ongoing dilution” (NB31:60) of what had been concentrated and intense, Kierkegaard adds a critique of the idea that Christianity has become increasingly clarified over the course of history, thereby supposedly attesting to Christianity’s perfectibility (NB31:60; see also NB31:62). One can only become a Christian by virtue of a condition granted by God, and this explains why no one can become a Christian at second hand: “To be spirit at second hand is to be devoid of spirit. To be a Christian at second hand is not to be a Xn. The most unchristian and bestial invention is to be a Xn by virtue of belonging to a Christian

457

458

J O U R N A L NB 31 society” (NB31:50). What is decisive is never “the faith of our fathers,” but is always and only the question of “the New Testament, with which every generation must begin” (NB31:61). Therefore, by its very principle, profane history constitutes a threat to Christianity, because, as a conglomeration of “1800 years’ worth of opinions,” it positions itself as a disturbing filter “between each individual and God’s word” (NB31:116). In his critique of the culture of “cultivation,” Kierkegaard ironizes about the fact that owing to our temporal remove from “Adam’s fall,” we now view ourselves as “nice peop.” (NB31:34). This critique takes on special piquancy when Kierkegaard describes Judas as a “cultured man” who has an “understanding of life” as well as of “profit” (NB31:44). When it comes to the Christian truth, which stands in an asymmetrical relation to the requirements and expectations of this world, the exponents of the culture of cultivation are in principle no less consistent than Judas: Then, finally, the notion that satisfying the times was true earnestness was preached with great bravura―or at any rate put into practice―by such scoundrels as Goethe, Hegel, and, among us, Mynster. In the end, this is what is meant by [“]the times[”]: the dregs, the mob of an age, because there are of course more of them, they are strongest numerically. (NB31:99) Goethe, Hegel, and Mynster refrained from doing anything to rectify the tendencies toward anonymity that characterized their times, and thus they were accessories in dismantling the possibilities for a modern person to become himself in the intensified Christian sense: “With respect to spirit, the peop. being born nowadays are just as unusable as sewing needles without eyes. Hum. beings are not being born, because they are without subjectivity” (NB31:114). A recurrent theme in the journal is precisely the widespread fear of “standing as a personality vis-à-vis others” (NB31:62), which has its positive counterpart in the courage required for “being alone, without being understood by others” (NB31:80). This is something that Christianity presupposes in every individual human being: “How ironic that every hum. being is intended to be an Atlas who bears a world―and then to see what we hum. beings are” (NB31:162). Kierkegaard’s remarks about “these wretched, creeping creatures who nowadays are called hum. beings” (NB31:146) emerge from his worries about the animalization that continually gains ground when no one takes it

Critical Account of the Text upon himself to represent Christian authority. As herd animals, human beings naturally fear “being aside from the crowd . . . [b]ecause the hum. being is an animal who can become spirit, something that, qua animal, he is by nature more afraid of than of dying” (NB31:24; see also NB31:35, 41, 136, 149, 150). The notion of “the bestial aspect of a hum. being” (NB31:29) appears in more than a few entries―alternating with “bestial” (NB31:30, NB30:96), “the bestial” (NB30:35), and “beastliness” (NB31:54, NB30:73)― and it designates the instincts and attributes in human beings that not only reveal their kinship with animals, but at times make human beings even more bestial. Journal NB31 includes a significant number of autobiographical entries. Kierkegaard sketches quite matter-of-factly how in his younger years he had been “rather heavily laden” with “sorrow, spiritual sorrow in connection with my late father; heartache in connection with the beloved girl,” but that, on the other hand, “[i]n my work . . . I found so much spiritual and intellectual delight that . . . I could not call the life I led one of suffering” (NB31:148). Nonetheless, he could shudder when he reflected on himself as a young man― how, after all, can a pers. become aware at an early age of something that would seem to take a long, long life to learn― . . . Alas, how sorrowful . . . , I was never young; when I was a youth, I was a thousand years older than an old man! And thus I may also say to myself, in sorrow: I have in fact never rlly been a hum. being! (NB31:103) Kierkegaard also concedes to his critics that he is an utterly impractical man who has failed to understand how to advance his own cause, and to that extent has simply been unsuited to this world―with one exception: “Alas, I am only good at one thing― and in this respect, however, I perhaps even possess an eminent genius―I am only good at: loving. Thus I am superfluous, a sheer luxury item in this practical world” (NB31:88). In one of his entries on Socrates, Kierkegaard reflects on the involuntary irony that accompanies Socratic irony and can obscure the fact “that at the same time he is dealing with matters of life and death” (NB31:94). Life and thought, existence and insight do not admit of separation, but presuppose and determine one another―also in Kierkegaard’s own case: “On a smaller scale, my life demonstrates something similar, for my personal existence is worth much more and is far more strenuous than my writings” (NB31:94). With this, Kierkegaard has given posterity the best

459

460

J O U R N A L NB 31 possible autobiographical argument for concerning itself with his person and for taking an interest in his biography, but he has in addition emphasized the lack of natural proportions―characteristic of true genius―that makes him unhappy and, at root, incomprehensible: I feel myself to be like a child . . . This indeed is part of genius and is connected with, or contributes to, the melancholia, the unhappiness, that is inseparable from genius. Genius is a disproportionate composition. In that connection there is a striking metaphor about genius in what Goethe says of Hamlet: He is an acorn planted in a flowerpot. That is how it is with genius: an overabundance but without the power to bear it. (NB31:124)

Explanatory Notes 3

1

NB.31. . . . 1854.] Variant: label affixed to the front cover of the journal.

5

2

the Sophistical] That which can be used in sophistical fashion, i.e., erroneous conclusions, designed to mislead, etc. Also an allusion to the Sophists of Greece in the 5th century b.c., namely, a group of teachers who traveled throughout the country and offered instruction in philosophy, rhetoric, and statecraft on a professional basis. They are particularly known as Socrates’ (→ 17,20) opponents in Plato’s (→ 64,34) dialogues, where they are criticized for taking money for their instruction (unlike Socrates). Can an eternal blessedness be decided . . . in time?] See the question posed at the beginning of Philosophical Fragments (1844): “Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?” (PF, 1; SKS 4, 213). See also JJ:342, from May or June 1845, in KJN 2, 232. Xnty of course declares itself to be against the understanding] See, e.g., 1 Cor 1:19–24. mythological views of Xnty―that it is mythology] Presumably, a reference to Left Hegelian critics of religion such as David Friedrich Strauß (1808–1874), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), and Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), widely read in the 1840s, who maintained that Christianity was poetry and mythology. 70 years] The traditional notion that seventy years is the duration of a human life goes back to Ps 90:10. the words Abraham spoke to the rich man . . . someone rose from the dead] See Lk 16:19–31.

3

7 10

22

6

22

6

38

The hum. being is “a social animal,”] Refers to the definition of the human being as a ζῷον πολιτιϰόν (Greek, [zōon politikón], “a political

animal”), i.e., a living being who resides in a city (or, more broadly, a political entity), a view advanced by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (see below) in his Politics, bk. 1, chap. 2 (1253a 2–3); see Die Politik des Aristoteles [Ariststotle’s Politics], trans. C. Garve, ed. G. G. Fülleborn, 2 vols. (Breslau 1799–1802; ASKB 1088–1089), vol. 1, p. 9: “that civil society, which in its first and simplest form consists of a city, is among the works of nature, and the human being is a creature destined and established for a civil and social life.” Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 b.c.), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and naturalist, a pupil of Plato (→ 64,34), and later tutor to Alexander the Great. God is infinite love] Allusion both to 1 Jn 4:8 and 4:16. that they will] Variant: first written, instead of “will”, “become too dangerous for God”. metaphor of a true] Variant: “true” has been added. shot by elves] i.e., obsessed, under enchantment, and (deathly) ill. See the folk song “Elveskud” [Elfshot], in Udvalgte Danske Viser fra Middelalderen [Selected Danish Songs from the Middle Ages], ed. W.H.F. Abrahamson, K. Nyerup, and K. L. Rahbek, 5 vols. (Copenhagen 1812–1814; ASKB 1477–1481), vol. 1, pp. 237–240. ― elves: According to popular legends and beliefs, elves were natural beings who lived in forests, marshes, or underground, and were generally thought of as possessing intent to harm human beings or as wanting to lure them to themselves, see, e.g., Irische Elfen-märchen [Irish Elf Tales], trans. J. and W. Grimm (Leipzig,1826; ASKB 1423). 1000 priests] Alludes to the number of priests in Danish churches. According to the lists in the Geistlig-statistisk Calender for Aaret 1854 [Ecclesiastical Yearbook for 1854], ed. Th. Hertz (Copenhagen, 1854 [went to press December 24, 1853]; cf. ASKB 378, an edition from 1848), there

13

7

23

29 31

35

7

462

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 4–12

were about 987 principal parishes in the kingdom of Denmark (i.e., without the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg), which employed about 916 priests, including bishops and deans; in addition to this there were about 123 personal chaplains. 8

8

1

10

13

Freethinker] According to C. Molbech, Dansk Ordbog [Danish Dictionary], 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1833; ASKB 1032), vol. 1, p. 319, col. 2: “a person who thinks freely (especially of a person who does not accept the teachings of the Church).” Father Forgive Them, for They Know Not What They Do] See Lk 23:34, where these are Jesus’ first words from the cross. the Socratic view that sin is ignorance] Alludes to Socrates’ principle that “virtue is knowledge,” which is developed in several of Plato’s dialogues, e.g., Protagoras (351e–357e). Here Socrates asserts that the person who has true knowledge cannot let it be displaced by the passions and the like, and that the person who chooses the wrong course of action merely expresses his ignorance. See Udvalgte Dialoger af Platon [Selected Dialogues of Plato], trans. C. J. Heise, 6 vols. in 3 tomes (Copenhagen, 1830–1838; ASKB 1164–1166), vol. 2 (1831), pp. 195–209. (The Heise edition of Plato was subsequently expanded to 8 volumes. In 1851, the three volumes constituting Plato’s Republic were published as vols. 4–6, which appear collectively as ASKB 1167 in the auction catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library; these three volumes also bore their own volume numbers [1–3]. In 1855, Plato’s Timaeus was added as vol. 7 and appears in Kierkegaard’s library catalogue as ASKB 1168. An eighth volume was published in 1859, after Kierkegaard’s death, and thus does not appear in his library catalogue.) Kierkegaard also owned a Greek edition of Plato (→ 64,34). Kierkegaard expressed in numerous places his understanding that this Socratic view meant that “sin is ignorance”; see The Concept of Irony (CI, 211; SKS 1, 255); Philosophical Fragments (PF, 50n; SKS 4, 254n); Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CUP 1, 339; SKS 7, 310); and especially the chapter titled “The Socratic Definition of Sin” in the second

•

1854

part of The Sickness unto Death, which begins as follows: “Sin is ignorance. This, as is well known, is the Socratic definition, which, like everything Socratic, is an authority meriting attention” (SUD, 87–96; SKS 11, 201–208). Christ . . . says that a person must do what he says] Presumably, an allusion to Jn 7:16–17; see also 15:9–17, 14:15, 14:24.

32

9

intelligere ut credam . . . credere, ut intelligam] The latter of these two statements, in the form “credo, ut intelligam,” stems from an oft-quoted saying of Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) in his Proslogion [Discourse], chap. 1: “Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam, sed credo, ut intelligam” (“For I never seek to understand, in order that I might believe, but I believe, in order that I might understand”); see W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie [History of Philosophy], 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819; ASKB 815–826), vol. 1 (1810), p. 120 n. 71. H. L. Martensen often stressed the importance of this sentence; see, e.g., Den christelige Dogmatik [Christian Dogmatics] (Copenhagen, 1849, ASKB 653), pp. 72, 73, 81, and Dogmatiske Oplysninger. Et Leilighedsskrift [Information on Dogmatics: An Occasional Piece] (Copenhagen, 1850; ASKB 654), pp. 45–46, 55, 73–74, where Martensen, in his polemic against Rasmus Nielsen, writes that the dogmatist “does not want to create a path through knowledge to faith, but only wants to create a path to knowledge through faith, saying only Credo ut intelligam, whereas Prof. Nielsen’s standpoint conceals an ‘Intelligo ut credam’ [I understand in order that I might believe], an Intelligo [I understand] that is surely not in the positive, but in the negative sense, the sense of philosophical not-knowing.” Obey Xt’s requirements and commands] → 9,32. do the will of the Father] Reference to Mt 7:21; see also Jn 9:31.

8

10

according to Xnty, to love God is to hate the world] Presumably, an allusion to Mt 6:24. according to Xnty, there is enmity between God and hum. beings] Reference to Jas 4:4; see also Rom 8:7–8 and Lk 14:26.

21

9 9

22

10

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 13–15 10

24

26

11

1 5

The System] Refers to Kierkegaard’s previous polemics, not only those directed specifically against the philosophical system developed by the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (→ 71,22) in works such as Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften [Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences], but also directed more generally against Hegelianism including, in particular, the attempts by Danish philosophers J. L. Heiberg and Rasmus Nielsen to construct an all-encompassing logical system (see, e.g., The Concept of Anxiety [1844] [CA, 51, SKS 4, 356], and Prefaces [1844] [P, 14, 65; SKS 4, 478, 525], with respective explanatory notes). By the term “system” or “the System” Kierkegaard thus seems to refer generally to a philosophical attempt to understand and explain the world as a whole with the help of abstract logical categories or discursive thinking; at times the term seems to be used as a synonym for objective knowledge. Kierkegaard sets forth his most comprehensive polemic against “the System” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (see, e.g., CUP 1, 13–17, 106–125; SKS 7, 22–26, 103–120). omnibus] Omnibus is a Latin term meaning “for all,” but by Kierkegaard’s time, it was a common designation for a large, enclosed coach used for public transport and following a regular route. In Copenhagen the first horse-drawn omnibusses appeared ca. 1842; the first route went from Amagertorv (see map 2, BC2) to the nearby suburb of Frederiksberg, but soon there were also omnibus routes to more distant destinations, such as Lyngby, Charlottenlund, and the Jægersborg Deer Park. Steam-driven omnibuses made their appearance in England and France ca. 1830, but they were not introduced in Denmark. The Journalists.] Variant: first written “The Moment’s”, followed by a line break. “night carriers, the guild of night carriers.” . . . those to whom it is applied―the people who cart away sewage] In a police ordinance of April 29, 1771, the term “night carriers” (also called “night men”) was applied to nocturnal carters of sewage from septic tanks, setting forth rules governing how the “night carrier” or his “driver”

•

1854

463

was to cart away the contents. That Copenhagen had a “guild of night carriers” can be seen from J. R. Hübertz, Beretning om Cholera-Epidemien i Kjøbenhavn. 12 Juni–1 October 1853, udarbeidet og udgiven for Den overordentlige Sundhedscommission for Kjøbenhavn [Report on the Cholera Epidemic in Copenhagen, June 12–October 1, 1853, Written and Published for Copenhagen’s Extraordinary Commission on Public Health ] (Copenhagen, 1855), p. 69. I have always believed and said that chance . . . is wittier than all witty authors] It has not been possible to identify what Kierkegaard is referring to. ― always: Variant: first written “often”. Farve-Gaden] or Farvegade (see map 2, AB2), today, Farvergade; see the next note. advertises every day in Adresse-Avisen . . . [“]wheels of fortune, and bedpans.[”]] Refers to the following advertisement “New and Used Bed Linens, Furniture, Wheels of Fortune, and Bedpans are rented out by Sørensen at Holger Danske, 139 Farvergaden”; identically worded advertisements appeared in Adresseavisen (abbreviated form of Kjøbenhavns kongelig alene privilegerede Adressecomptoirs Efterretninger [Information from Copenhagen’s Only Royally Licensed Advertising Office]) under the rubric “Diverse Announcements” in supplement 1 to no. 206, September 5, 1854, and supplement 1 to no. 207, September 6, 1854. ― advertises every day: Under ”Diverse Announcements” in Adresseavisen, no. 175, July 31, 1854; no. 176, August 1, 1854; no. 177, August 2, 1854; no. 178, August 3, 1854; no. 194, August 22, 1854; no. 195, August 23, 1854; and no. 196, August 24, 1854; supplement 1 to no. 209, September 8, 1854; and no. 210, September 9, 1854, the following, identically worded advertisement appears: “New and used bed linens, furniture, and wheels of fortune are rented out by Sørensen, 139 Farvergaden.” ― Adresse-Avisen: Adresseavisen was established in 1759 and published until 1909 (the spelling of the name underwent minor changes in the course of the newspaper’s history) and was the most important organ in Copenhagen for advertising because, with the exception of Berlingske Tidende [Berling’s Times],

15

23 23

11

464

28

11

33

35

J O U R N A L NB 31 : 15–19

it was the only newspaper in Copenhagen that had the right to accept paid advertising. Starting in 1800, Adresseavisen was published six days a week; in the 1840s, the average press run was seven thousand copies. ― wheels of fortune: i.e., roulette wheels. The age of heroes] Variant: first written a hash mark (#), apparently indicating the end of the entry. Priest Who Is Bound by an Oath] A priest who has taken the prescribed oath of office; see the next note. priest, who is bound by an oath on the N.T.] Refers to the oath taken by a priest: “Juramentum, qvod in timore Domini præstabunt, qvi muneri Ecclesiastico initiabuntur” (“The oath which, in fear of the Lord, is to be sworn by those who are to be dedicated to an ecclesiastical office”), in Dannemarkes og Norges Kirke-Ritual [Ecclesiastical Rites for Denmark and Norway] (Copenhagen, 1762 [1685]; abbreviated hereafter Kirke-Ritualet), pp. 379–380: “I, N.N., do swear and testify in holy awe before the countenance of God . . . I promise that I will, with the greatest care, see to it that the divine teachings that are contained in the prophetic and apostolic writings and in the symbolic books of the Danish Church will be preached to the congregation pure and unsullied; that the sacraments will be administered properly and devoutly, in accordance with the manner prescribed by Christ; that the Church’s admonition will be carefully pronounced and catechetical instruction constantly maintained; that universally accepted rituals of the Church will be observed; and that nothing that conflicts with Church regulations will be permitted.” The term “apostolic writings” refers to the New Testament.

12

9

impossible[”]:] Variant: first written “impossible[”].”, with the period apparently indicating the end of the sentence.

12