Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959 1498508138, 9781498508131

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Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959

The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Series Editor: Mark Kramer, Harvard University Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948 Edited by Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak Triggering Communism’s Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland’s Transition Marjorie Castle The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism Bradley F. Abrams Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany 1945–1955 Gary Bruce At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946 Jamil Hasanli The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? Edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953 Hua-yu Li The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War Edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conflict, 1939–1953 Gerhard Wettig Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953–1960 Steven Brady The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Edited by Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present Edited by Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-yu Li Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969 Edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982 Edited by Idesbald Goddeeris Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953 Jamil Hasanli Securing the Communist State: The Reconstruction of Coercive Institutions in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Romania, 1944–1948 Liesbeth van de Grift Solidarity: The Great Workers Strike of 1980 Michael Szporer Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 Edited by Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana The Vienna Summit and its Importance in International History Edited by Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx The Legacy of the Cold War: Perspectives on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict Edited by Vojtech Mastny and Zhu Liqun Displaced Terror: History and Perception of Soviet Camps in Germany Bettina Greiner Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959 Jamil Hasanli

Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959 Jamil Hasanli

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26–34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hasanli, Jamil. Khrushchev’s thaw and national identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959/Jamil Hasanli. pages cm—(The Harvard Cold War studies book series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4985-0813-1 (cloth : alkaline paper)—ISBN 978-1-4985-0814-8 (electronic) 1. Azerbaijan—Politics and government—20th century. 2. Nationalism—Azerbaijan—History—20th century. 3. Communism—Azerbaijan—History—20th century. 4. Social change—Azerbaijan—History—20th century. 5. Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894–1971. 6. Azerbaijan— Relations—Soviet Union. 7. Soviet Union—Relations—Azerbaijan. 8. Azerbaijan—Social policy. 9. Azerbaijan—Economic policy. I. Title. DK697.3.H3747 2014 947.5408’52—dc23 2014036925 ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

For my grandchildren Ayan, Emily, Sabina, Aytan, Sami, and Ibrahim.

Contents

Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

In a Tangle of Old Problems: First Steps of New Leaders of Azerbaijan The 20th Congress of the CPSU and Soviet Republics of South Caucasus Enactment of the Law on State Language of Azerbaijan Deepening Political Crisis in the Leadership of Azerbaijan 1957: Growth of Contradictions between Soviet Leaders and Azerbaijan Transformation of the National Policy into Key Vector of Society’s Development Attempts of Party Bodies to Strengthen Control in Ideology Summer 1959: Moscow’s Interference and Change of Leadership in Azerbaijan

Conclusion Bibliography Index About the Author

Introduction

The years 1954–1959 were of no great importance in the seventy-year history of Soviet Azerbaijan. However, this brief period saw major developments in the life of the nation that left their imprint in the annals of history and hearts of citizens. What changes took place in Azerbaijan in 1954–1959? For some people the developments of the reviewed period remained inexplicable and suspicious; for others—delightful reminiscence that gave birth to national pride and bitter disappointment. However, principal questions remained unanswered: what happened in the Republic from early 1954 to mid-1959? What events led to the dissatisfaction of Moscow politicians and resultant tough measures? Why did these events affect reappraisal of spiritual milestones and reanimation of political life and processes of national rebirth? What were causes of Republican leaders’ great interest in the destinies of their country and people? Was it a genuine growth of the national idea and self-consciousness? What novelties were brought into the literature, historical science, and culture? Why, under the pressures of the Kremlin, Party, and state apparatus, were statesmen and senior officials of Azerbaijan removed from their posts? This book makes an attempt to answer these and other questions that mattered most not only for the history of the USSR but for the subsequent destinies of the Azerbaijani people as well. Following the death of Joseph Stalin, the political life of the USSR was marked by certain changes. First of all came the so-called “case of physicians,” those allegedly attempting upon Stalin’s life and charged with close links to international Zionism. All those repressed in this case were rehabilitated. The same is true of the case of the “Mingrel nationalistic group” that brought great misfortunes to the Georgian people; in April 1953 illegally deported citizens were allowed to return home. Against a background of relaxation of Soviet totalitarianism there was a touch of liberalism in the national policy. Thus, the rights of Union Republics in planning their own economies and running their cultural life were, to an extent, expanded. Beginning in the mid-1950s the rural population was provided with passports. The Soviet “servitude” came to an end, and the inflow of citizens into towns intensified. In the 20th Congress, crimes of the Stalin period were made public; the rehabilitation process started; and victims of Stalin deportations returned to ordinary living conditions, although with certain restrictions. This process became known as the “Khrushchev thaw.” Despite gradual weakening of the Stalin totalitarianism of the 1930–1940s, the “Khrushchev spring” in the mid1950s failed to put an end to it once and for all. The reforms of Nikita Khrushchev were indeterminate and failed to affect the foundations of the Soviet system. For instance, some repressed peoples were allowed to come back and restore their autonomy, while the rights of Crimean Tatars, Meskheti Turks, and Povolzhye Germans were still infringed.

It was the “Khrushchev thaw” that revived the political life of Azerbaijan. A new leadership of the Republic was formed in the beginning of 1954. Imam Mustafayev was elected the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan at its 20th Congress; Sadykh Rahimov headed the Council of Ministers; Mirza Ibrahimov was elected the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. This triumvirate assumed the responsibility for the Party and economic and cultural life of the Republic. Note that the new leaders of the country took no part in the Stalin repressions and were interested in deepening the political processes going on in the Soviet Union. They managed to make these processes comply with the interests of Azerbaijan and even contrived to hold out against pressures from the “non-native” population of the Republic, representatives of the so-called Baku Party organization who claimed themselves to be “victims of Bagirov’s terror,” which is how the era of Stalinism began to be referred to after the arrest of Mir Jafar Bagirov, who was then the Party leader of Azerbaijan. An article on enforcing the Azerbaijani language’s status as a state language was added to the constitution of the country in August 1956. It was the wide and universal application of the Azerbaijani language in state institutions that gave impetus to the development of a national self-consciousness. The Republic saw the growth of national sentiments. However, outliers manifested themselves as well. Productive conferences in Baku to discuss language issues sometimes turned into heated debates and even brawls. Sensing the government’s support, the native population gradually expanded its legal rights and restored its positions in politics and economics. The burden of staffing policy fell on the shoulders of Azerbaijanis. The driving factor in the development of science, literature, and culture was to comply with national values. All these fostered spiritual principles, in-depth study of the historical past, and a full transfer of culture into the national track. Fifty years have passed since then, and today’s readers may take the progress for granted. However, account has to be taken of the fact that in the reviewed period other national Republics faced problems of this sort as well. Except for Georgia and Armenia—which managed to add articles on the state status of their national languages to their constitutions in 1937—all the other Republics, particularly Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, raised the question of their language status as they marked their national rebirth. In 1953, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Leonid Melnikov, Russian by nationality, was replaced by Ukrainian Aleksey Kirichenko. However, neither Ukraine nor the Baltic Republics succeeded in adopting a law on state language. Azerbaijan was the single Republic that made this step without the permission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) in 1956 and thus equalized itself in rights with its neighbors. In spite of the fact that the rights of the Union Republics were expanded, and they were provided with certain economic independence in the 1950s, hidden confrontation arose between the Center and the provinces. Dissatisfaction of the Union Republics came from the growing chauvinism of Moscow officials that was in fact predicted by Lenin toward the end of his life. It was the consolidation of the Party apparatus in the course of Khrushchev’s reforms that imparted the increasingly ugly nature of this process. Testifying to this was an undisguised

animosity between the heads of the Republics and CC CPSU apparatus officials. The matter was that Muscovites looked down their noses at national minorities and treated them like a lower order of creation. Travelers from Moscow behaved arrogantly in the Republics. Much documentation referring to Azerbaijan, including numerous statements made by Party bureaucrats, debriefings on inspections, and reports on Baku developments, was of a biased, ill-intentioned nature. An eloquent testimony to this fact is a report made by a CC CPSU special group who carried out inspections in Azerbaijan in the spring 1959. Results of the work done were submitted to a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Strained relations between Mustafayev and the central authorities came as a result of low-grade apparatus intrigues carried out by senior executives from the CC CPSU, and their overrated selfappraisal was manifest in their relations with representatives of national regions. An attempt was made in 1955 to remove Mustafayev. Thus, in April 1955, Moscow was going to approve the candidacy of the First Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, but in the course of interlocution, Evgeniy Gromov, head of the department for Party organizations of the Union Republics, made uncomplimentary comments about Mustafayev. In August 1955, CC CPSU senior executives passed a decision on removing Mustafayev from his post, and they eventually succeeded, although not in 1955 but in 1959. On the one hand, Khrushchev’s reforms gave national Republics certain rights to solve local problems, but on the other hand, beginning in the mid-1950s nearly all Second Secretaries of the CPSCs from national Republics were sent from Moscow with the goal of strengthening control over the Republics. As a rule, they were Russians by ethnicity, and they were meant to fulfill the function of Moscow’s “eyes and ears” in the Republics. Vladimir Semichastny, who would later lead the Soviet KGB for long years, was sent to Azerbaijan with precisely this mission in 1959. In his memoir, he touched on the period of time when he served as the Second Secretary of the Azerbaijan Party CC: “It probably merits explanation why the Second Secretary of the CCs of the republics had to be Russian. The Second Secretaries almost everywhere were sent from the Center, and as a rule, they were Russians . . . and this system justified itself. I consider that this was what maintained a sustainable equilibrium in the national republics.”1 A former KGB chief described the mission of the Second Secretaries of the Republics as follows: “the person chosen as the Second needed to be not only a soldier, but a leader who had authority, strength and management ability; he needed to be able to solve the most complicated problems, be a good organizer and influence both the management of the republic and the masses. . . . I set up this kind of system: no single decision of the Party CC [of Azerbaijan—J. H.] was made without my approval.”2 It was no secret that the USSR saw national contradictions and dissatisfaction of national minorities with their status. Proceeding from a bitter experience of the Soviet society, local leaders were deathly afraid of any accusations of nationalism, so they had to handle the national question with utmost care. The bitter lot of Nariman Narimanov, one of the First Chairmen of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, may be cited as an example. As far back as in the 1920s he was accused of nationalism. Attempts to dismiss charges of this sort from his name were crowned with no success, even in the transitional 1950s or the stagnant

1970s. However, it should be noted that the Center, in turn, showed prudence in the national question, appraising it as a form of anti-Sovietism. In so doing, the Center tried to avoid flaunting the facts of national manifestations. Posing itself as a state of national harmony, the Soviet Union was, nevertheless, in the thick of inter-ethnic conflicts. The role of Azerbaijani science, literature, and art in turning the national idea into the guiding star of the 1950s is incontestable. It has to be kept in mind that the national themes manifested themselves in cultural life as a factor of national consciousness and played a crucial part in shaping the worldviews of students and youth. The analysis of the reviewed period illustrates that a new generation of young people rose up in the Republic. These people showed interest in their past, took an active part in political life, and fostered the national mentality. They discovered fine points in the history and culture of the country. Led by prominent scholar Yusif Mamedaliyev, Azerbaijan State University and institutes of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences turned into centers of gravity for the national idea. In autumn 1957, a meeting was held at ASU with the great Turkish poet, Nazim Hikmet, to demonstrate the national spirit of the Azerbaijani youth. It was a manifestation not only of respect to the Communist poet and political émigré but also of heartfelt love toward the Turkish poet from the youth, who showed a sincere interest in the foreign lives of congenial people. Patriotism manifested itself in the 1950s when the topic of South Azerbaijan was brought up in Azerbaijani literature. The Azerbaijani intellectuals who participated in the revolutionary events of 1945–1946 in South Azerbaijan still felt the bitter defeat of the national liberation movement of Iranian Azerbaijanis. This topic was reflected in the works of Samed Vurghun (Burnt Books), Suleyman Rustam (Two River Banks), Mirza Ibrahimov (The Day Will Come), and Rasul Rza (“Fortress Ark” from the series Tabriz Is a Wonderful Town). The majority of Party, Soviet, and economic leaders of Azerbaijan as well as the Azerbaijani Soviet intelligentsia that took an active part in the development of national ideas of the 1950s were schooled in patriotism in South Azerbaijan, where they were engaged in creating the Azerbaijani state structures and cultural institutions during the occupation of North Iran by the USSR during the course of World War II. Over the past few years numerous collected documents, research works, and political essays on the 1950s’ developments have been issued in Russia. They focus on political processes in the post-Stalin period and analyze the start of rehabilitation of victims of political repressions; innovations in the national policy; intra-power intrigues; origins of Party dictatorship; and Khrushchev’s triumph over his political opponents and the beginning of voluntarism in his political activity. The collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the unveiling of secret archives which made it possible to reconstitute the political life of the reviewed period. It is essential to note that the publication of priceless collected documents throwing light on social and political processes of the epoch has made a great contribution to the development of source studies of the topic in question.3 Following the disintegration of the USSR, many researchers and publicists started studying the political processes of the 1950s. Deserving consideration among numerous publications are works by William Taubman, Vladislav Zubok, Rudolf Pikhoya, Elena Zubkova, and

Alexondr Pyzhikov, which stand out for their scholarly innovation, theoretical insights, and use of abundant archival sources to study the general concept of processes going on in the USSR in the 1950s.4 Research works, monographs, and memoirs depicted a political portrait of Khrushchev, the incomplete nature of his reforms, the place of the 20th Congress in the history of the country, national-ethnic relations of the reviewed period and the confrontation between the anti-Soviet, nationalistic power, and the multi-national, deceived Soviet people. When identifying all-Union processes, domestic policy of the Soviet Union, relations between the Center and outskirts, and some aspects of national policy, we have relied on the latest achievements of Russian and foreign historiography.5 Regretfully, the scientific picture of the 1950s as described by Azerbaijani historians is scanty and faded. Not long ago the National Academy of Sciences issued a many-volume set, The History of Azerbaijan, of which the seventh volume deals with some historical aspects; however, there are few materials on true facts.6 An exception is two valuable monographs by Professor Eldar Ismailov that broke the silence on that point.7 Chronologically supplementing each other, these monographs reconstruct the situation in Azerbaijan from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. They are notable for rich facts, dramatic scenes, clear depiction of conflicting processes, and in-depth academic generalizations. When editing the research, the author availed himself of materials from the Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Azerbaijan Republic, State Archives, Archive of Literature and Art named after Salman Mumtaz, and Archives of the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic. The author analyzed secret materials, information, and reports kept in the Russian State Archive of Social-Political History and Russian State Modern History Archives which retraced social and political processes in the Republic, activity of the country’s Party organization, and the top leaders of Azerbaijan. In addition, the author utilized materials of the US National Archives and Records Administration and National Security Archives under George Washington University and newly discovered materials of the US CIA archives; he looked through copies of secret correspondence about processes going on in the USSR, including annual reports of the KGB under the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR. The author expresses his thanks to the heads and officials of the abovementioned archives for their assistance. The author believes that he failed to thoroughly study the role of the national idea in Azerbaijan in shaping the public conscience; the impact of the law on state language on further historical processes; and some uncertainties in the relations between the Republic and the Center. It is also essential to identify the impact of the above on various spheres of the political life of the country. The matter is that some archives, especially those of state security bodies, are still classified. Therefore, some assessments may seem to remain debatable in the eyes of readers. This notwithstanding, the author has attempted to formulate some insights in this book using the available documents. It is left to up the reader to determine to what extent this attempt was successful. NOTES

1. Vladimir Semichastny. Bespokoynoe serdtse (Vladimir Semichastny. Restless Heart). Moscow, 2002, p. 117. 2. Ibid., p. 126. 3. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T.1 Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammi (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand). Editor in chief A. A. Fursenko. Moscow, 2004. Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964. T. II. Postanovleniya 1954–1958 (Presidium of CC CPSU, Vol. 2, Ordinance 1954–1958). Editor in chief A. A. Fursenko. Moscow, 2006; Prezidium TsK KPSS 1959–1964. T. III. Postanovleniya 1954–1958 (Presidium of CC CPSU, Vol. 3, Ordinance 1959–1964). Editor in chief A. A. Fursenko. Moscow, 2008; Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TsK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), Moscow, 1998; Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva o kulte lichnosti Stalina na XX syezde KPSS: Dokumenti. (N. S. Krushchev’s report about Stalin’s personality cult on his XX trip to CPSU: Documents), Moscow, 2002; Lavrentiy Beriya. 1953 g.: Stenogramma iyulskogo Plenuma TsK KPSS I drugiye dokumenti. (Lavrentiy Beriya. 1953: Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), Moscow, 1999; Georgiy Zhukov. Stenogramma oktyabrskogo (1957 g.) Plenuma TsK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti (Georgiy Zhukov. Verbatim report of October (1957) Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), Moscow, 2001; Stalinskiye deportatsii. 1928–1953. M., 2005; Stalin i kosmopolitizm. 1945–1953. Dokumenti Agitropa TsK. Sost. D. G. Nadjafov, Z. S. Belousov. (Stalin Deportations. 1928–1953. Moscow, 2005; Stalin and Cosmopolitanism. 1945–1953. Documents of Agitrope CC. Ed. D. G. Nadjafov, Z. S. Belousov), Moscow, 2005; Politbyuro I delo Beriya. Sbornik dokumentov. Pod obshey red. O. B. Mozoxina. (Politburo and the Beria Case. Collection of documents. Under the general editorship of O. B. Mozoxin), Moscow, 2012; Apparat TsK KPSS i kultura. 1953–1957. Dokumenty. (The Central Committee Apparatus of the CPSU and Culture. 1953–1957. Documents). Moscow, 2001; Apparat TsK KPSS i kultura. 1958–1964. Dokumenty. (The Apparatus Central Committee of the CPSU and culture. 1958–1964. Documents). Moscow, 2005; Regionalnaya politika N. S. Khrushcheva. TsK KPSS I mestnye partiynye komitety. 1953–1964 gg. (Regional policy N. S. Khrushcheva. CC CPSU and local party committees). Moscow, 2009. 4. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008; Vladislav Zubok. Neudavshayasya Imeriya: Sovetskiy Soyuz v kholodnoy voyne ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev). Moscow, 2011; Pikhoya Rudolf. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voyni, 1945–1985. (Pikhoya Rudolf. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), Moscow, 2007; Zubkova Elena. Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998; Zubkova Elena. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsii v SSSR. 1953–1985 godi//“Otechestvennaya istoriya” #4, (Zubkova Elena. Power and the Development of the Ethnic Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985.//“History of the Fatherland” #4,) 2004; Pyzhikov Aleksandr. Khrutshevskaya “ottepel”: 1953–1964 gody (Pyzhikov Alexandr. The Krushchev “Thaw”: 1953–1964). Moscow, 2002. 5. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer). Moscow: Vremya, 2010; Khrushchev Sergey. Rozhdeniye sverxderjavi. Kniga ob otse (Khrushchev Sergey. The Birth of a Superpower: A Book About My Father). Moscow, 2002; Medvedev Roy. N. S. Khrutshev: Politicheskaya biografiya. (Roy Medvedev, N. S. Khrushchev: Political Biography). Moscow, 1995; Burlatskiy Fedor. N. Khrushchev i ego sovetniki —krasniye, cherniye, beliye. M., 2002 (Burlatskiy Fedor. N. Khrushchev and his Advisors—Red, Black, White). Moscow, 2002; Kozlov Vladimir. Neizvestniy SSSR. Protivostoyaniye naroda i vlasti 1953–1985 gg. (Kozlov Vladimir, Unknown SSSR. Opposition of the People and Power 1953–1985), Moscow, 2006; Danilov Aleksandr, Pyzhikov Aleksandr. Rojdeniye sverxderjavi; SSSR v perviye poslevoyenniye godi. (Danilov Alexandr, Pyzhikov Alexandr. The Birth of a Superpower; the USSR and Its First Post-War Years). Moscow, 2001; Kramola; inakomisliye v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve. 1952–1982 gg. Pod red. Kozlova Vladimir I Mironenko Sergey. M., 2005 (Kramola; Dissent and the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. 1952–1982. Ed. Kozlov Vladimir and Mironenkko Sergey). Moscow, 2005; Aksyutin Yuriy. Khrushchevskaya “ottepel” i obshestvenniye nastroyeniya v SSSR v 1953–1964 gg. (Aksyutin Yuriy. The Khrushchev “Thaw” and the Public Mood in the USSR in 1953–1964. Moscow 2004; Leybovich Oleg. Reforma i modernizatsiya v 1953–1964 gg. (Leybovich Oleg. Reform and Modernization in 1953–1964.) Perm, 1993; Khrushchev Nikita. Vospominaniya. Vremya, lyudi, vlast. (Khrushchev Nikita. Memory. Time, People, Power.) Vol. 1–4, Moscow, 1999; Shepilov Dmitriy. Ne primknuvshiy. (Shepilov Dmitriy. Unjoined.) Moscow, 2001; Beriya Sergo. Moy otsets Beriya. V koridorah stalinskoy vlasti. (Beria Sergo. My Father Beria: In the Corridors of Stalin’s Power) Moscow, 2002; Zelenin Ilya. Agraranaya politika N. S. Khrutsheva I selskoe khozyaystvo. (Ilya Zelenin. Agricultural policy of N. S. Khrushchev and Agriculture). Moscow, 2001; William Taubman. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York-London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2003; Taubman W., Khrushchev S., Gleason A., eds. Nikita Khrushchev. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000; Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007; Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009; Zubok, Vladislav and Constantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev. Harvard University Press, 1996. Aleksandr Fursenko and

Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006; Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011; Crankshaw Edward. Khrushchev: A Career. NY.: Viking, 1966; McCauley Martin, ed. Krushchev and Khrushchevizm. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987; Tompson William. Khrushchev: A Political Life. NY: St. Martin’s, 1995; The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume 3, The Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press, 2006; Roberts, Geoffrey. Molotov: Stalin’s Cold Warrior. Potomac, 2011. Swietochowski Tadeusz. Russia and Azerbaijan. A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995; Alstadt Audrey. The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, 1992. 6. The History of Azerbaijan (in Azeri). In 7 volumes. Vol. VII. Baku, 2003. 7. Ismailov Eldar. Vlast I narod. Poslevoyenniy stalinizm v Azerbaydjane. 1945–1953. (Ismayilov Eldar. Power and the People: Postwar Stalinism in Azerbaijan. 1945–1956), Baku, 2003; Ismailov Eldar. Azerbaydjan: 1953–1956. Perviye godi “ottepeli.” (Ismayilov Eldar. Azerbaijan: 1953–1956: The First Years of the “Thaw.”). Baku, 2006.

Chapter 1

In a Tangle of Old Problems First Steps of New Leaders of Azerbaijan

Political processes in the USSR and a change of leaders after Stalin’s death had an effect on the destiny of Azerbaijan. In the debates that broke out after Georgiy Malenkov made a large report on the criminal activity of Lavrentiy Beria at the July 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU, M. J. Bagirov’s name came up as well. Shortly thereafter, a joint Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the Baku Party Committee was held on July 12–13, 1953 which not only kept Bagirov out of the Republic’s leadership but even drove him away from the country. As a consequence, he was arrested on March 29, 1954. Members of the socalled “Bagirov’s guard” Mir Teymur Yagubov and Teymur Quliyev, were entrusted with guiding the Republic on a temporary basis. In 1954, the country’s leadership was renewed by persons remotely connected with Bagirov, including Imam Mustafayev—First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan; Mirza Ibrahimov—Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic; and Sadykh Rahimov—Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria’s shooting and Bagirov’s removal from power stirred up great public interest not only within the USSR but outside the country as well. Thus, on August 19, 1953, the US CIA prepared a two-page reference on Bagirov which said that he spoke Russian with an accent and made grammatical mistakes. It also added that Bagirov’s elementary education was very poor, so he had to study in Moscow and continued his education as a Marxism expert. The document divided Bagirov’s activity into several periods, the first of which started in 1918 after the occupation of Azerbaijan by the British army. The CIA stressed Bagirov’s activity in the municipal police department. Authors of the reference reported that in 1917 he joined the Bolshevik Party, yet his political views of the reviewed period were rather vague. The second period of his activity fell in 1920 when Bolsheviks longed to capture Azerbaijan. The reference noted that when acting in the underground, Beria met Bagirov and married his sister. In all probability, this CIA information runs contrary to reality, for biographical data of Bagirov and Beria provide no oral or written evidence of this sort. Then the reference added that following the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Bagirov headed the so-called All-Russian Special Commission (ARSC) with Beria as his assistant. The document erroneously explained this as being due to the fact that Beria descended from Georgia, while Bagirov was an Azerbaijani Turk. The CIA reference noted that the third period of Bagirov’s political activity was in 1928– 1929 when Moscow expressed its dissatisfaction with the work of “national communists.”

This notwithstanding, Bagirov contrived to seize control of the Republic. The fourth period started in 1933. Then the document described the developments of the 1930s, Beria’s departure for Moscow, the strengthening of Bagirov’s position, and so on. The reference said that “Bagirov drank, smoked, and socialized with people easily. He was a practical person and an organizer, not a theorist. Thanks to Beria, Bagirov was well aware of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Fond of Stalin and Beria, Bagirov brilliantly represented the Eastern intrigue. He was well-versed in the Near and Middle East as well as the history and psychology of Eastern peoples. Also, Bagirov organized subversive activity in Iran/Turkic Azerbaijan [meaning South Azerbaijan—J. H.] and Arab states of the Near East. The Soviet intelligence service was in close contact with him in the region.” Finally, the CIA reference provides information about Bagirov’s nomination to the Presidium of the CC in 1953, about his dismissal from the post of the First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and appointment to the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. Former Internal Minister M. Yagubov took up Bagirov’s post. The CIA failed to establish reasons of Bagirov’s failure in Azerbaijan to become the second man in the Table of Ranks.1 By all appearances, the CIA failed to take into account that after Stalin’s death it was the Council of Ministers that seized the reigns of government in the country. On August 17, 1954, the CIA prepared a new document titled “The Resignation of L. P. Beria” consisting of ten chapters, one of which dealt with Azerbaijan. The document described Bagirov’s removal from power and his arrest, dismissals of Yagubov and Quliyev in 1954, and so on. It pointed out that after Stalin’s death Bagirov remained loyal to Malenkov rather than to Beria. However, Bagirov’s discharge from power in Azerbaijan was directly attributable Beria’s arrest. The CIA document is of particular interest and use for the study of 1950s political processes.2 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was held in February 1954 and characterized by heated debates. Bagirov’s support sustained a shattering defeat due to Moscow’s opposition. Immediately after the Congress on February 17, the first Plenum of the new composition of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was held to elect I. Mustafayev as the First Secretary of the Republican Party organization. It has to be kept in mind that the issue of Mustafayev had been resolved long before the Congress, in January 1954 in Moscow. Indeed, after the departure of Bagirov from Azerbaijan, Yagubov was entrusted to lead the Republican Party organization. However, it was an unsuccessful venture to appoint a former Internal Ministry senior official to lead such an important organization. It was no mere coincidence that visiting the Republic in January 1954, CC CPSU senior executives G. Shubin, D. Yakovlev, and N. Borisov in their memorandum to Khrushchev characterized the work of the First Secretary of the CC of the Communist of Azerbaijan (CC CA) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Quliyev as unsatisfactory and, in some cases, as “worthless.” Members of this commission recommended Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CC CPSU, to immediately dismiss Yagubov.3 E. Gromov, head of the CC CPSU for Party organizations of the Union Republics, agreed with the content of the reference on the leadership of Azerbaijan, backed a proposal of January 24

about the dismissal of Yagubov from the post of the First Secretary of the CC CPA, and in his report to Khrushchev recommended Mustafayev, Secretary of the CC CPA, to take the position of Yagubov. Mustafayev was characterized as an energetic person with great authority in the Party organization and an expert in agriculture. Of course, Mustafayev’s candidacy was favored by Khrushchev. Note that Mustafayev was not a member of Bagirov’s entourage; he was far from power structures, a Candidate of Sciences, and a specialist in agriculture, which was an important factor following the September 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU that called for the development of agriculture. Thus, the head of the state agreed with Gromov’s arguments and on January 25 gave his consent to the election of Mustafayev as the First Secretary of the Party organization of Azerbaijan.4 Not long after, Shubin and Yakovlev prepared a new reference, so the nomination of Mustafayev to the post of the First Secretary of the CC CPA ended.5 By this time Mustafayev was forty-four. He was born on February 25, 1910 in the Qakh region of Azerbaijan to a poor peasant family. His parents died when he was young. According to personal data, Mustafayev had a brother who was a collective farmer. He was educated at the Zakatala Agricultural College and Kirovabad Agricultural Institute. In one form he filled out, he wrote “Turk” in the “nationality” column.6 In 1937, Mustafayev was sent by the National Land Committee of Azerbaijan to the Leningrad Institute of Physics to defend a thesis. His knowledge and proficiency was found to be unsatisfactory in Leningrad, perhaps due to poor knowledge of Russian. Even worse, the acting head of the Higher School Department Alexandrov reported to the National Land Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic that “Owing to a substantial gap in his [Mustafayev’s—J. H.] education, the Institute is in no position to prepare him over a short period of time for the defense of a thesis. The suggestion has been made to take Mustafayev on as a ‘final course student of Leningrad State University’ as an alternative; ‘Mustafayev is to pass post-graduate courses pursuant to a special plan.’”7 This notwithstanding, with the interference and assistance of the republican bodies, Mustafayev successfully defended his candidate thesis in 1938 at the Moscow Agricultural Academy named after Timiryazev and received a scientific degree. The repressions of 1937 cast suspicion on Mustafayev. The secretary of the Party committee of the Azerbaijan Agricultural Institute S. Rahimov sent a report to the investigation commission on October 22, 1937 that Mustafayev was “a member of the counter-revolutionary organization of teachers in Nukha (Sheki) or Agdash in 1928.” Mustafayev did not deny the existence of such an organization, yet he disagreed with claims of his participation in it. Rahimov writes: “I doubt this statement, so I ask you to investigate him.”8 Investigations were unavailing, and Mustafayev survived 1937 and joined the Communist Party in 1940. The same year he was appointed Head of Higher Educational and Technical Institutions and Scientific Structures under the National Land Committee of Azerbaijan, and in 1942 he became a first deputy commissar of this organization. In autumn of 1944, Mustafayev was sent to Iran along with other senior officials to develop the agriculture in South Azerbaijan. Upon his initiative, fifteen tractors and other agricultural machinery were sent from Soviet Azerbaijan to Iran, to the first agro-technical stations.9 In 1947 Mustafayev was appointed Minister of Agriculture; in 1950 he was elected a member of

the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. In 1952 he took up the position of the First Secretary of the Ganja regional Party committee; in 1953—secretary of the CC CPA; and in 1954 he was appointed the First Secretary of CC CPA. Dramatic events were awaiting him in the near future. Together with Yagubov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic Quliyev was also replaced by Sadykh Hadjiyarali oglu Rahimov. Note that Rahimov was born on September 27, 1914 in the settlement of Balakhany, not far from Baku. Having graduated from the oil college, Rahimov worked at the S. M. Kirov mechanical plant; in 1932–1937 he obtained his higher education at the Azerbaijan Industrial Institute. In November 1939, Rahimov went to Moscow to attend the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. In July 1941, upon completion of his education, he voluntarily went to the front and took part in the defense of Moscow. He was wounded and demobilized; in 1942–1947 he worked as Deputy Minister of the Clothing Industry, fulfilling the duties of Minister of the Clothing Industry. Following the merging of the Ministries of Clothing and Light Industries, he headed the Ministry of Light Industry of the Azerbaijan SSR. In April 1953, Rahimov was appointed Minister of Civil Engineering and Communal Economy of the Republic and led this structure till his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.10 After Rahimov’s appointment as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, compromising information about him was spread in order to discredit Rahimov. On August 12, 1954 he addressed an explanatory memorandum to Mustafayev that dealt with his aunt and her husband’s visit to Iran in 1938, as well as his father’s pilgrimage to Mecca prior to 1900.11 On February 17, 1954, the Plenum of the CC CPA dealt with the question of candidature to the post of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. The Plenum advised the Supreme Soviet to remove Nazar Heydarov from the post of the Chairman of the Presidium and elect the famous writer Mirza Ibrahimov, with his great authority in Azerbaijani society, to this post. At the same Plenum, Ibrahimov was elected a member of the CC CPA Bureau. To approve this decision, an inquiry was made to the CC CPSU.12 In a short while, an acknowledgment came from Moscow. On March 9, 1954 Mirza Ajdar oglu Ibrahimov was elected the Chairman of the Presidium at the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, and on March 13, 1954 the CC CPA Bureau reaffirmed this decision. In the period under review, Ibrahimov had a great deal of life experience. He was born in 1911 in the village of Eva in the Sarab province of Iranian Azerbaijan. He obtained higher education in the Azerbaijan Republic, finished postgraduate courses under the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of philological sciences in Leningrad. Starting in 1932, Ibrahimov worked in various positions in culture, arts, and education. In 1938, he held the position of the head of the Art Department under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR, and in 1942 he was Education Commissar. Before his appointment as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1948, he chaired the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan. Ibrahimov achieved fame after he wrote the play Hayat (Life) in 1935. Next came the plays Madrid (1939) and Mahabbat (Love, 1941). When the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR was set up in

1945, Ibrahimov was among the first members of this structure. In 1948, he wrote a novel The Day Will Come that left a profound imprint not only in Azerbaijani literature but in the destinies of all Azerbaijanis worldwide. In 1950, he received the Stalin Prize for this novel, which was adapted from the experience of the national liberation movement in South Azerbaijan. Ibrahimov not only played a crucial role in this movement but also proved to be a definitive figure in the period of interest.13 When the Soviet troops invaded Iran in 1941, Mirza Ibrahimov was one of the first intellectuals of the country to arrive in South Azerbaijan. In 1941–1942, he was the first editor of the For Motherland newspaper issued in Tabriz. On September 20, 1945, Ibrahimov went to Tabriz on a business trip as head of the group of political workers ARCP from Soviet Azerbaijan. On July 6, 1945, the CC ARCP Political Bureau passed a decision “On Measures to Organize Separatist Movement in South Azerbaijan and other provinces of North Iran.” Ibrahimov’s mission was, jointly with Bagirov, to ensure the election of separatist representatives of South Azerbaijan to the fifteenth convocation of the Iranian Majlis.14 On October 8, 1945, CC ARCP again began discussing developments in South Azerbaijan, and under a secret decision Ibrahimov was appointed head of the group of Soviet political workers to be sent to South Azerbaijan. He was instructed to maintain permanent contacts with leaders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party and render them any necessary aid.15 Thus, the new leadership of Azerbaijan that came to power in February–March 1954 distributed its functions as follows: Mustafayev was responsible for agriculture; Rahimov for industry; and Ibrahimov for culture. The leaders of the Republic faced important tasks against the background of serious changes in the USSR. In the first place, the Azerbaijani society, depressed by the burden of totalitarianism, expected radical changes in the democratization of society; resolution of some key problems of Azerbaijani language, history, and culture; expansion of the local population’s participation in public affairs and leading Party and government bodies; removal of artificial restrictions on residence of the Azerbaijani population in large towns, and so on. In addition, a large group of citizens had been repressed in the 1930s to 1940s, and their relatives hoped for restoration of their violated rights by the new authorities. In turn, Moscow nurtured plans to regain control over Soviet Azerbaijan, which had demonstrated “superfluous self-dependency” in the reign of Bagirov. Piggybacking on Bagirov’s arrest, representatives of non-native nationalities residing in large towns of Azerbaijan, particularly in Baku, proclaimed themselves victims of repression and overloaded the Center with thousands of complaints in an attempt to have their previous privileges granted back to them by the supreme power. An anonymous letter addressed to Khrushchev in November 1954 alleged that the Lenin-Stalin national policy was falsified in international Baku. It would be appropriate to cite the letter in full: Here in Baku all nations are not equal; instead, there are privileged nations in this city: first of all, Azerbaijanis, and then Moslems in the second place. All the leading and best positions both in Baku and the Republic as a whole are held by Azerbaijanis. . . . There are a lot of young, talented people in Baku who excel beyond Azerbaijanis in everything; however, all of them are kept down and ignored by the leadership of the Republic. Former workers of art and science, literature, and culture who contributed to the formation and development of science and art in Baku and the Republic are currently

suppressed by composer U. Hajibeyov, who seized the power in culture after 1938, and now by his nephews—conductor Niyazi and Chingiz Hajibeyov—and other nationalists.16

Letters and appeals of non-Azerbaijanis from different regions of the Republic tried whip up ballyhoo and persuade the CC CPSU senior executives of the Turko-philism of the Azerbaijani leaders. On August 28, 1954, a resident of the Khanlar region, A. K. Parsegov, appealed to Yudin, head of a CC CPSU department, saying that when joining the Communist Party in 1931 he erroneously indicated the village Aidzor, Van vilayet of Turkey, as his birthplace. Parsegov considered it to be more appropriate to indicate the village Aidzor in the Van region of West Armenia. In his statement he complained that the Khanlar regional Party committee of Azerbaijan did not allow him to correct this “mistake.”17 During the first months of the new Azerbaijani leadership, or on April 19, to be exact, a report came from the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR that Azerbaijanis from Armenia, who had been forcibly resettled on the Kura-Arax lowland by a decision of the Soviet Council of Ministers dated December 23, 1947, were returning home on a mass scale. A letter of the head of the Chief Migration Department of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR S. Cheryomyshkin to Rahimov and Mustafayev said that more than a thousand Azerbaijani families returned to Armenia. The main reasons for their unauthorized repatriation were poor conditions, a devil-may-care attitude toward them from local Soviet and Party bodies and organizations, and insufficient clarification work. The leaders of the Republic were kindly asked to improve the economic conditions of migrants and render them necessary assistance.18 As a result, Mustafayev instructed ministries and respective departments to investigate the social, material, and economic conditions of Azerbaijani migrants from the Armenian SSR. On October 14, 1954, the Ministry of Agriculture of the Azerbaijan SSR submitted a detailed reference to the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Republic. It said that from 1948 to 1953 about 11,914 farms (53,000 persons) moved from the Armenian SSR to the Kura-Arax lowland. All restrictions notwithstanding, a small part of migrants failed to withstand hardships and had to return.19 On December 13, 1954, Mustafayev sent a reference to the Agricultural Department of the CC CPSU which noted that over the years 1948 to 1953, approximately 12,552 farms were resettled to Azerbaijan. Mustafayev singled out mistakes, including Azerbaijan’s unpreparedness to accept migrants: as of July 1954, 1,124 farms had yet to be provided with homes, and 580 farms did not have personal plots. The active efforts of the Azerbaijani leaders caused the CC CPSU and the Soviet Council of Ministers to pass a special resolution dated July 31, 1954, about additional benefits for migrants in the Kura-Arax lowland.20 Moscow’s concern and the additional benefits came as a reaction to the return of migrants to Armenia after Stalin’s death. Fearing that the return of migrants would assume an irreversible nature, the Armenian leaders became panic-stricken and bombarded the Kremlin with desperate letters. If the deportation of Azerbaijanis from the Armenian SSR in 1947 was explained as being due to the repatriation of foreign Armenians, in 1954 it was motivated by the fact that Armenian families who had been deported by the decision of the Political Bureau in 1949 as anti-Soviet propagandist Dashnaks were returning “home.”

On April 4, 1949, the Political Bureau passed a resolution “On Deportation of Dashnaks Residing in the Territory of the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR.” On May 11 of the same year, another resolution was adopted by the Political Bureau titled “On Deportation of Dashnaks Residing on the Territory of the Georgian SSR.” Under these Resolutions, 3,620 families (13,000 Armenians) were resettled to the Altai region. One more resolution was adopted on April 4 titled “On Eviction of Turkish Citizens, Stateless Turks and Former Turkish Citizens who were Granted Soviet Citizenship Residing on the Black Sea-coast and in Transcaucasia,” under which 1,500 families (5,400 Turks) were resettled to the Tomsk region. Thus, the deportation of Turks from the European part of the USSR came to an end. It started in November 1944 when 91,095 Meskheti Turks were resettled from Georgia to Central Asia. On May 17, 1949 the Political Bureau passed a decision on the eviction of 27,000 Greeks from Transcaucasia and the Black Sea coast to the Jambul region and South Kazakhstan. Judging by the order of the Soviet Ministry of National Security of May 28, 1949, a total of 873 families (3,164 persons) of Greeks, former Dashnaks, Turks, and Aysors were evicted from Azerbaijan.21 The death of Stalin was followed by numerous appeals to Moscow asking for return. However, neither Turks nor Greeks were allowed into Transcaucasia. In the meanwhile, the CC CPSU allowed Armenians to come back in September 1954. A commission was set up including the KGB Chairman, Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, and Procurator of the Armenian SSR to carry out appropriate organizational measures. Shortly thereafter, the commission reaffirmed the illegality of Dashnaks’ resettlement in 1949 and decreed that all of them would return.22 It was Moscow’s patronage and criticism of the “Bagirov regime” that gave hope to Baku, Mountainous Garabagh, and foreign Armenians. The Armenian organizations abroad, which had been laying territorial claims to Azerbaijan since the end of World War II, had been under the control of Soviet special services and the CC CPSU since the 1950s. It should be noted that a certain Vahan Grigoryan headed the CC CPSU department for foreign Communist Parties, which played a role in Armenian foreign organizations’ being controlled by the CPSU. Even as early as January 15, 1952, on the initiative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and foreign policy commission, the CC CPSU Political Bureau passed a secret decision to transfer approximately 40,600 rubles to the French Armenian Cultural Union in 1952 for the issue of the Lusartsakh newspaper. This sum was transferred to the Soviet Embassy’s account in Paris, and then transferred on for its intended use. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, his Deputy Andrey Gromyko, Chairman of the foreign policy commission of the CC CPSU Grigoryan, and Soviet Finance Minister A. Zverev were entrusted with implementing this decision.23 Without a doubt, the CC CPSU leadership was well aware of Lusartsakh’s orientation, including the tendency of the newspaper to falsify the history of Garabagh and the region as a whole. Sensing a fatherly type of care, local Armenians took heart. They sent numerous letters to Moscow demanding the opening of the Armenian theater in Baku, which had been closed since as early as 1949, to found an artistic magazine in Armenian. The theater was allegedly closed due to intrigues of Bagirov, who was already arrested. In reality, the theater was closed due to its

unprofitability, and the Stepanakert state the Armenian drama theater named after M. Gorkiy was active instead. During hard times in the Republic, Bagirov opined that two Armenian theaters, especially subsidized ones, were an unallowable luxury for Azerbaijan, so he sent the collective body of the Baku Armenian theater to perform on the Mountainous Garabagh stage. Two actors of the Baku Armenian Theater, Zhasmen Grigoryan and Tavrizyan, appealed in March 1954 to the CC CPA with a request to restore the Armenian state theater in the city of Baku. The Bureau of the CC CPA discussed this question on March 16 and instructed Rahimov and Ibrahimov to prepare their proposals within a month. A question of resumption of the theater was again put on the agenda of the Bureau of the CC CPA. To ease tensions, the Bureau decided to confer some workers of the Stepanakert (Khankendi) state theater with honorary titles and award them with diplomas of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, as well as entrusting Ibrahimov, Pasha Arushanov, Akima Sultanova, and Abdullo Bayramov with reconsidering the question and giving final recommendations.24 On April 15, 1954, the 2nd Congress of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan opened. In connection with the fact that Ibrahimov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, Suleyman Rahimov was elected as Chairman of the Writer’s Union at its Union Plenum on March 16, 1954, and Rahimov also made a report to the Congress. His report covered a twenty-year period since the 1st Congress of Azerbaijani Writers in 1934. Rahimov pointed out that in the same period, the Azerbaijani Soviet Literature harshly criticized pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, cosmopolitanism, nihilism, formalism, and other harmful and alien ideologies. He assessed this period as a revival of Azerbaijani classic literature and its availability to the broader public. Touching upon Azerbaijani poetry, Rahimov focused primarily on the creative work of S. Vurghun. He noted that “The poetry of Samed Vurghun, rich in classical traditions, is reminiscent of a strong spring welling out of the depths of mountains. In between the two congresses this poetry established itself, conquered the hearts of readers and overstepped our borders. Vurghun’s poetry is a beating heart of not only Azerbaijani Soviet poetry but of Azerbaijani literature and art as a whole.” Then Rahimov touched upon some deficiencies in Vurghun’s work: This great poet has his own deficiencies. In propagandizing “revolutionary romanticism,” he sometimes violates principles of socialist realism, separating himself from the laws of reality. For instance, the protagonist of his work “Insan” (“Man”), Shahbaz, is not a philosopher-Marxist, but an idealist. This philosopher turns out to be deficient in heroism, absorbed in his idealistic philosophy, and dies in flame. This occurs because Samed Vurghun sometimes alienates himself from life and plunges into groundless romanticism.

Rahimov figuratively stated that no aircraft can fly unless it strikes its chest against the ground and gathers fresh energy from it. Moving on to discuss the creative work of S. Rustam, the speaker highly evaluated his series “Southern Verses”: The collection of verses Two Coasts, worthy of the Stalin Prize, is devoted to the heroic struggle of 5 million people of South Azerbaijan dreaming of the national independence and sovereignty of their motherland. It seems to me that Suleyman Rustam feels crowded within the framework of his creativity. His drama Gachag Nabi is an eloquent testimony to the fact that he is skilled in writing great poems and describing real conflicts.

As for Mamed Rahim, who was awarded to the Stalin Prize for his poem “In the Sky of

Leningrad,” Rahimov noted the talent of the poet but criticized him for an infatuation with the beauty of forms and the search for superficial effects. The speaker pointed out that Rahim spends his time at literary/artistic evenings and meetings with readers; he revels in applause, fails to control himself, follows the momentary whims of groups of readers and indulges them, and is stuck in the realm of old Oriental poetry and forgets about the grit of real life. In his report, Rahimov criticized Rasul Rza, Stalin Prize winner. His poem “Lenin” and other verses were highly evaluated; however, the speaker added, “in recent times the creative work of Rza has been analyzed and criticized in our press to give grounds for creative disputes. I personally think that the main deficiency of his creative work is a shortage of human emotions and passions, of feelings and heartbeats. It seems to me that in the poetry of Rasul Rza, reason and thinking prevail over heart and feelings. When reading his verses, you feel some coldness and indifference. Even worse, Rasul Rza is indifferent to folk creativity. I don’t think that Rasul Rza opposes folk creativity intentionally. Yet, he considers it to be ‘primitive’; he mistrusts it and looks down on it.” In his report, Rahimov also mentioned Azerbaijani authors, including O. Saryvelli, Z. Khalil, A. Jamil, A. Abbasov, M. Dilbazi, and N. Rafibeyli, as well as young and talented B. Vahabzadeh, N. Babayev (Nabi Khazri), H. Huseynzadeh, A. Kyurchayli, A. Kerim, A. Babayev, I. Humbatov, and Ali Soltan. As for Azerbaijani Soviet prose, Rahimov said the following: I’d like to note the author of “The Day Will Come,” Mirza Ibrahimov; the author of the novel Morning which came out after Absheron, Mehdi Huseyn, who has already found favor with readers; and I would also like to name Mir Jalal, who wrote A Young Man’s Manifesto and A Revived Man, Abulhasan who wrote Rises and The World Explodes, and Ali Veliyev for his Gulshen and Chichekli. I’d also like to recall writers who wrote short stories, including Avaz Sadykh, Enver Mamedkhanov, Ilyas Efendiyev, Manaf Suleymanov, Yusif Azimzadeh, and so forth. On the eve of the Congress our young authors Imran Gasymov and Hasan Seyidbeyli published their narrative “On remote coasts.” Also worthy of notice are young writers, including Ahmed Rahimov, author of the novel My Family, Salam Gadirzadeh, author of the novel Youth, Isa Huseynov, author of Our Girls, and others.

The speaker also touched upon works by Ismail Shikhly, such as his novel Mountains Are Singing, and works by H. Abbaszadeh. In stressing positive and negative aspects of Azerbaijani prose, Rahimov noted that nihilist critics J. Jafarov and M. Rafili would exaggerate deficiencies: “Nihilists are libeling the Azerbaijani Soviet literature, especially its prose. They go too far in saying that there is no prose and in doing so they want to disarm us. Dear comrades, this nihilism is not dead yet. It does live, it does oppose us. Suffice it to recall the words of Jafar Jafarov, who cried several years ago: ‘There is not anything; there is nothing!’ These nihilists dare to teach us and deliver lectures on culture. After Michael Rafili failed to deal with all genres of literature, he decided to command us, saying ‘give up writing’!” During the 2nd Congress of Writers, Rahimov placed emphasis on the development of Azerbaijani drama. He noted that after the death of Jafar Jabbarly, an emptiness arose which is currently being filled by Ibrahimov, Vurghun, and Rustam, so they should be thanked. Further, the speaker concentrated on the creative work of I. Efendiyev and S. Rahman. Rahimov’s report was followed by reports of Mehdi Huseyn about Azerbaijani prose, S. Rustam about Azerbaijani Soviet poetry, I. Efenfiyev about Azerbaijani Soviet drama, G. Musayev about Azerbaijani children’s literature, M. Arif about literature translation, and M. J.

Jafarov about the problems of Azerbaijani Soviet criticism. In his report, Mehdi Huseyn dwelled on the creative work of Rahimov. He pointed out that Rahimov’s prose might be considered a serious success of Azerbaijani literature. In his opinion, Rahimov’s works are notable for realism, demonstrating great skill in describing folk life and with their plot lines based on significant real-life conflicts. On the other hand, there are elements of naturalism, repetitions, and prolixity. Huseyn referred to the novel Sachly as an example. Debates were held after the reports were made. Attending the debates were N. Akhundov, N. Babayev, G. Ibrahimov, A. Abbasov, A. Sharif, editor in chief of the Zvezda magazine V. Druzin, secretary of the CC Communist Youth Union N. Gadjiyev, P. Khalilov, B. Vahabzadeh, B. Azeroglu, S. Antonov, R. Rza, A. Sadig, M. Rafili, I. Dagestanly, J. Jafarov, M. Alizadeh, S. Rahman, K. Simonov, Ibrahimov, and others. The decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Soviet writers of Azerbaijan were published in the newspaper Edebiyyet ve indjesenet (Literature and Art) on May 8, 1954. The newspaper harshly criticized J. Jafarov, M. Guluzadeh, and M. Rafili. In particular, it pointed out that: Among literary critics there are apologists of bourgeois aestheticism (M. Rafili), vulgar sociology and intentional negation of creative quests in literature (M. Guluzadeh), and of cosmopolitanism and nihilism (J. Jafarov). For several years J. Jafarov has been negating main positive qualities of our literature under the slogan of struggle against pseudo-populism and has thus opened the front of struggle against national manifestations in our literature. All these suppressed creative potentialities of Azerbaijani poets, writers and dramatists have negatively affected the development of all Azerbaijani literature.

The Congress formed a delegation to attend the USSR Congress of Writers. It included Ibrahimov, Vurghun, Rza, Rahimov, Rustam, Huseyn, Veliyev, Mir Jalal, Saryvelli, Efendiyev, Rahman, Sharif, Arif, Vahabzadeh, Rahim, Abulhasan, Jafarov, and more. The 2nd Congress of Writers of Azerbaijan, as well as Republic-level gatherings of other creative associations, clearly demonstrated that in the mid-1950s the center of gravity of the creative elite of the Republic fully rested on shoulders of Azerbaijanis. The Congress was immediately followed by a meeting of the Board of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan with the active participation of V. Ivanov, head of the literature sector of the science and art department of the CC CPSU, and K. Simonov, secretary of the Board of the USSR Union of Writers. Among other issues, Rahimov raised the question of the necessity of resuming the publication of a literary magazine in the Armenian language in Baku. It should be noted that the literary magazine, Khorkhdain grog, was issued in Baku in the Armenian language; however, in 1942 its printing was suspended. S. Grigoryan, head of the Armenian section of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan, spoke at the meeting and demanded that the magazine be resumed as soon as possible. Then Simonov stressed that it would be very difficult to resume the Armenian literary magazine in Baku, so he suggested the creation of a type of library under the Communist newspaper in the Armenian language. In addition, Simonov recommended agreeing with the Writers’ Union of Armenia that a portion of the circulation of the literary magazine in Yerevan be spread in Baku. V. Ivanov did not support Grigoryan’s proposal and considered it expedient to start with a literary anthology which might be issued within a year in several copies. He added that it would possible to make an agreement with the Communist newspaper on the regular issue of literary pages. Thus, the meeting of the Board of April 20, 1954 failed to solve the problem

positively.25 However, the Armenians started long-term correspondence with Moscow, and in 1957 they succeeded in issuing Grakan Adrbedjan (Literary Azerbaijan). A meeting was held on June 21, 1954 at the science and culture department of the CC CPA to renew the Armenian Drama Theater in Baku. Attending the meeting, besides the theater workers, were A. Sarkisov, secretary of the Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee; Gagem Antelepyan, editor of the Communist newspaper in the Armenian language; Armik Karamyan, secretary of the Baku Committee of CPA; Armenian writers Grigoryan and M. Davtyan; Deputy Minister of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR Petrosyan; member of the CC CPA Bureau P. Arushanov; Minister of Culture of the Azerbaijan SSR M. Alekberov; and others. The Armenians alleged that the closing of the Armenian theater in 1949 was a great political mistake. They tried to persuade everyone that the restoration of the Armenian theater in Baku would have no negative effect on the Stepanakert theater and that just one or two actors would come to work in Baku. Many people indicated that the closing of the theater came as a result of a collective body who worked indifferently, without any initiative, making no attempts to attract spectators. The meeting minutes state: “Of interest was a speech of Comrade A. Sarkisov, secretary of the Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee. Like the XX Congress of the CPA, Comrade Sarkisov pointed to the particular neglect of cultural development in Mountainous Garabagh. Comrade Sarkisov stressed that the new leaders of Azerbaijan kept on mistreating the Armenian part of the republic’s population.” P. Arushanov, A. Sultanova, Alekperov, and Bayramov gave their explanations on issues concerned. The meeting came to the conclusion that it was necessary to renew the Armenian theater in Baku.26 It should be noted that debates over this issue at the science and culture department of the CC CPA and even a positive decision did not contribute to the resolution of the problem. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Rahimov wrote to Mustafayev on June 29, 1954 that “there is no place for the theater now,” “there is no practical opportunity,” and that the problem might be resolved only after the completion of the construction of a new building for the Azerbaijan state drama theater.27 On August 4, head of the science and culture department of the CC CPA A. Bayramov, proceeding from Rahimov’s letter, sent a reference to Mustafayev saying that it would be inexpedient to open the Armenian theater.28 Despite negative views of Rahimov and A. Bayramov, the CC CPA bureau considered it possible on August 10, 1954 to open the Armenian Theater in Baku and even entrusted Mustafayev and Rahimov with petitioning the CC CPSU and the Soviet Ministry of Culture.29 It must kept in mind that the former Armenian theater building, previously under the Palace of Culture named after twenty-six Baku Commissars, had now been subordinated to the trade workers’ union. For this reason the leaders of the Republic appealed to N. Shvernik, chairman of the USSR Trade Union; however, he categorically refused to return the building. In addition, various Union bodies refused to open the theater until a proper building was found. Thus the question remained unsolved and even lost its importance. However, the Armenians’ voices of protest did not remain quiet for long. A group of Armenians regularly informed the Soviet leaders about the policy of nationalism pursued in Azerbaijan. For instance, a certain

Karapetyan filed a complained to Moscow saying that the Azerbaijani senior executives treated Armenians like outcasts. As a result, the CC CPSU demanded Azerbaijani leaders to give explanations; however, it became evident that Karapetyan’s letter was false. Letters and complaints of that sort arose from day to day. One of the main ideologists stirring up the conflict between nations was A. Sarkisov, secretary of the Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee for ideological work. Sarkisov’s question had twice been raised at the CC CPA bureau. In February 1954 at the 20th Congress of the CPA and on June 21 at a meeting of the science and culture department of the CC CPA, Sarkisov accused the new leaders of Azerbaijan of fostering the policy of nationalism. However, in his explanatory notes he put the blame on a stenographer, shifted uncomfortably, and suddenly declared that the new leaders were persecuting him for his criticism. On October 22, 1954 the CC CPA Bureau began examining Sarkisov’s appeals and explanations. Mamed Iskenderov, secretary of the CC, reported that Sarkisov did not recognize his mistakes and was trying to lay the blame on a stenographer, saying that “I admitted some unscrupulousness in expressions.” Addressing Sarkisov, Iskenderov said: “You are secretary of the regional Party Committee. If you are showing such unscrupulousness, how can we demand them to act scrupulously?” Bayramov, head of the science and culture department, entered into the debate saying that Sarkisov’s speech was heard by not only by the stenographer but other people as well, including two heads of CC departments who witnessed his nationalistic attacks. In his speech Bayramov said: “You are alleging that a devil-may-care attitude is shown toward the Armenian population and its cultural needs. What are your facts? On what basis? There are no facts of this sort, except for the fact that the Armenian theater is closed. The comrades stressed that the theater was unprofitable. The government made it public that some theaters had not been financed, so the ones incapable of financing themselves were closed, including a whole number of Azerbaijani theaters in the countryside . . . over ten theaters were closed.”30 Then P. Arushanov, Armenian by nationality and head of the heavy industry department of the CC CPA, took the floor, saying that Sarkisov had made mistakes but had shown no courage to acknowledge his guilt. He touched upon reduction of radio broadcast hours, closing of the pedagogical institute, and so on. To avoid responsibility, he wrote an explanatory note to Mustafayev saying that the first secretary of the regional Party committee Grigoryan and other functionaries agreed with him. It should be noted that Arushanov was well aware of the situation in Mountainous Garabagh. In May 1953, he was elected chairman of the regional executive committee. In March 1954 he was appointed head of the oil industry, and for a long span of time Arushanov headed this department. Note that in 1946–1952, he had been the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Young Communist League (Komsomol); in 1952–1953, he worked as deputy head of the transport department of the CC CPA and head of the transport department of the Ganja regional Party committee.31 Prior to the Bureau meeting, Sarkisov was received by the CC CPA Secretary Vitaliy Samedov and told him that Arushanov and Grigoryan were similar to himself, in that they said one thing while thinking another. In an effort to defend himself, Sarkisov dug himself a deeper hole. For example, he said that when he was talking about the use of the Armenian theater for

the Armenian portion of the population, he meant not only a part of the Republic’s population but the Armenians of the Krasnodar region (Russian Federation) as well. However, when Mustafayev could not stand it any longer, he cried out, “This is a blunder! Why should Baku serve the whole Armenian population of the Soviet Union? There is an Armenian Soviet Republic. Have you forgotten about it? It may cope with this task much better than anybody else.” Then Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, noted: “Sarkisov is seeking to prove his worth as a hero of the Mountainous Garabagh people, and in particular, the Armenian people. As a result of your ungifted activities, Comrade Sarkisov, the Stepanakert theater was found to be in sorry shape, and we have had to provide it with finances at the expense of the Opera Theater. Problems of winter and summer pastures have been resolved without your participation; a Madagiz-Stepanakert electric transmission line is being constructed without your participation; a library and a printing house in Stepanakert were repaired without your participation. You are preparing to enroll in post-graduate or doctoral courses, to be a scholar, but a scholar has no right to stir up national questions.” Rahimov demanded that Sarkisov be severely punished. Iskenderov added that Sarkisov’s claims about Armenians having been mistreated under Bagirov were fabrications, and it was political and nationalistic blunder: “we could cite many examples by comparing with other Republics. Suffice it to look at the CC Apparatus staff, Council of Ministers Apparatus and other organizations. I am not talking about of Mountainous Garabagh. This is a blossoming land.” To sum up the Bureau meeting, Mustafayev addressed Sarkisov, saying: “In your first letter you demanded special privileges for Mountainous Garabagh and 1,800 million rubles. But you are well aware of the fact that the Republic does not have that kind of money. I want you to go to Nakhchivan and see what kind of state it is in; see what has been done in the Soviet period. There are no water pipelines, no electricity, theaters, new buildings, hotels, or schools. I visited Nakhchivan recently, and then went to Yerevan. . . . In the meanwhile, Bagirov did his utmost for Mountainous Garabagh to please the local Armenian population. You have visited many regions. The Barda region is one of the largest in the Republic, and what has been built there? But Stepanakert has been provided with all services and amenities. I dream of having five or six cities of this sort. Some kind of construction is in process there every year. It is a calumny to allege that minorities are discriminated against; Party and Soviet organizations of the Republic never estrange Mountainous Garabagh or Stepanakert from other towns of the Republic. . . . As for the theater, Moscow phoned Rahimov and refused his request. The same is true of the Nakhchivan theater (300,000 rubles were allocated to the Stepanakert theater). At present, we must apply efforts to consolidate our friendship. When you visit a village with a mixed population of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, you feel nothing but ranks of one and the same people; they eat, work, and rejoice together. However, the situation is different in towns where a national question is regularly raised; letters, anonymous or signed, stress that in Azerbaijan nobody but Azerbaijanis can enjoy privileges. Is it fair to accuse the Azerbaijanis of such improper actions? Provocative statements are made to allege that if you’re not an Azerbaijani, you’re doomed to unemployment. I’m unaware of facts of discrimination, of preferences given to Azerbaijanis to the prejudice of other nationalities. . . . We have no right to misinterpret the

national policy; instead, we must gain understanding in everything and give no footholds to our enemies.”32 At the end of the meeting, Chairman of the Republican KGB Anatoliy Guskov; editor of the Communist newspaper in Armenian, G. Antelepyan; and others joined Rahimov’s proposal to punish Sarkisov. The Bureau advised the Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee to discuss the Sarkisov question. The advent of new leaders to power raised the hopes of Republican intellectuals that the cases of once unjustly repressed Azerbaijani scientists and political figures would be revised. Tens of thousands of families closely watched the developments in the Soviet Union. In the years 1930–1934, according to the KGB, 3,778,234 people were persecuted, of whom 786,098 were shot, and the rest were sent to camps. In 1937–1938, 1,344,923 people were arrested for state crimes, of whom 681,231 were sentenced to death.33 It was not surprising that among the first ones to be rehabilitated was Heydar Huseynov, head of a sub-department of Azerbaijan State University, member of the Academy of Sciences, and Stalin Prize Winner who committed suicide in 1950 following unfair accusations and oppression. Collaborators of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR Musa Aliyev, Alexandr Makovelskiy, Aliovsat Quliyev, and Addin Shakirzadeh highly appraised the scientific importance of Huseynov’s works and appealed to the CC CPA with a request to restore his scientific heritage. There was a decision of the CC CPA dated December 9, 1953 about withdrawal of Huseynov’s works from libraries and the book trade. A special CC commission considered the appeal of the scientists, found their arguments erroneous, and noted that Huseynov was loyal to Bagirov to the very end. The commission composed of Samedov, Iskenderov, Bayramov, and Sultanova decided not to recognize Huseynov as a victim of the Bagirov regime and restore his scientific heritage.34 This decision was the subject of heated argument at the CC CPA Bureau of September 7, 1954, where Ibrahimov categorically disagreed with the negative decision of the commission. He declared: “I cannot put my signature to this. Heydar Huseynov did very much to develop Azerbaijani science and train cadre. I consider that it would be wrong to charge him with cringing before Bagirov; it’d be height of injustice. There are valuable works of his. Thus, his works have been published implicitly. His quotations of Beria and Bagirov are found in the works of everyone, so they may be deleted. I’m confident that we cannot commit such unfairness to Huseynov.” Then he added: “There was a poet in Armenia, Charents by name, a nationalist. He was arrested in 1937, and he died. At present, a literary newspaper published an article about injustices against him.” Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, backed Ibrahimov. He said: “Huseynov was not alien to us; he was a scholar, philosopher. In my view, we lost much after he died. So I think that this decision must be cancelled.” On the decision of the CC CPA Bureau of October 21, 1955, it was decided to avail of the scientific heritage of Huseynov. An offer was made to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR to consider the question of reissuing a monograph by Huseynov titled “On the History of Social and Philosophical Thought in Azerbaijan, nineteenth century.”35 On January 13, 1955, a commission was set up by the CC CPA Bureau to consider applications of those having returned from prison and exile. The commission included Iskenderov, CC CPA Secretary; Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet;

Rahimov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Babayev, Procurator-General of the Republic; Guskov, KGB Chairman; I. Gulmamedov, Minister of Justice; A. Abdulrahimov, Chairman of Baku City Executive Committee; and Y. Javadov, Deputy Home Minister. The commission faced enormously difficult tasks: to provide rehabilitated persons with jobs and housing, and to render them material aid, medical treatment, and personal pensions.36 Over a short span of time, many applications came to the commission; approximately 200 applications per month were considered on average. In August 1955, over 900 people were on a waiting list. On August 10, Mustafayev appealed to the CC CPSU asking them to provide an established post for a commission instructor.37 Many complaints sent to Moscow stated that non-Azerbaijanis were being prosecuted for not knowing the Azerbaijani language. One such letter was authored by Dmitriy Minkevich, head of the science and culture department of the CC CPA. The problem was that Minkevich was responsible for literature and art. However, without knowledge of the Azerbaijani language, he was in no position to read works of art in the original. Samed Vurghun spoke at the 20th Congress of the CPA and harshly criticized Bagirov’s neglect of the Azerbaijani language, citing the case of Minkevich as an example. On the eve of the same Congress, Minkevich was sharply criticized at some regional Party conferences, the Baku film studio and the Opera Theater. On December 31, 1954, the CC Bureau discussed the question of his dismissal and transfer to another post. A. Bayramov, head of the department, raised the question of Minkevich’s dismissal and reported that the latter declined from alternative posts. Ibrahimov reported that Minkevich realized the complexity of the situation. He suggested putting off the debates over his issue, finding him a new job, and writing the reason in his new work orders as “owing to a transfer to another position.” If “owing to inexpediency” were written, it could raise some doubts about whether his transfer was political or business-related. Ibrahimov added that Minkevich was an educated person, a professional, and had a great deal of experience working in the Republic; he might be of benefit to the Republic and it was necessary to find a suitable position for him. During the debates Minkevich tried to create an impression among the Bureau members that he was dismissed due to Mustafayev’s personal enmity. For this reason, CC Secretary V. Samedov considered it necessary to inform the audience about the issue. He pointed out that the Congress rightly criticized the unsatisfactory work of Party bodies with literature and art institutions. Therefore Samedov recommended Minkevich to realize that he would no longer deal with literature and art in the CC Apparatus and that he would be engaged in other positions. Samedov noted: “We addressed our creative organizations, leaders of the Writers’ Union, and asked them to recommend comrades for the position. In so doing, we sought to avoid reproaches that, for example, geologist Bayramov is responsible for literature and art. However, no recommendations of this sort were given.” Samedov asked to appoint Minkevich as editor of Vyshka newspaper. In reply, Mustafayev noted that “today we are discussing Minkevich’s dismissal from the post of deputy head of the department, so this problem has to be addressed.” Rahimov joined the discussions by stressing that the Minkevich question was raised by

leading writers and poets and that Minkevich was not an authority for Samed Vurghun, Suleyman Rahimov, Mirza Ibrahimov, and Mehdi Huseyn. He said: “I can say with certainty that I took part in the talks with Comrade Mustafayev when the leaders of the Writers’ Union insisted that Minkevich was in no position to work in this field; that he does not know Azerbaijani literature and art. . . . You’re wrong; it is not Imam Mustafayev who initiated this action.” Then Guskov, KGB chairman, took the floor: “I agree that Comrade Minkevich is not equal to the task at hand; he can hardly understand works of Azerbaijani writers and poets in the original; yet, it’d be inappropriate to dismiss him with such a formulation. If so, he would sully his name to make his way up. I believe the problem has to be solved adequately; an appropriate job should be selected for him with the formulation ‘owing to a transfer to another position.’ Member of the Bureau Arushanov also agreed with Guskov’s proposal, but added that a Party worker cannot be higher than Samed Vurghun. “At any rate, no person can be found who exceeds Samed Vurghun or Mirza Ibrahimov.” Having heard reports of the speakers, Mustafayev summed up the results of the discussions. First of all, it was necessary to dismiss Minkevich from his post. But it was also necessary to shed light on some aspects of Minkevich’s statement: I can treat all deputy heads of the CC Departments equally without any discrimination, but he wanted to be dealt with in a special manner. In other words, Comrade Bayramov has no right to sign a document without Minkevich, so the signature should be “Bayramov, Minkevich.” Why is it so? A conference of painters of Transcaucasia was held, which I attended from the first to the last day; I also spoke at the conference. After my statement Comrade Minkevich expressed his protest. He said that I was speaking unilaterally and without using any of their materials. Comrade Minkevich, I’m not among those who need your assistance, and I’m very happy that I have not used your materials; otherwise, you’d say that I’m in a position to speak on the basis of your materials only. We in the CC selected writers, and he also prepared a speech for me; however, if I had spoken on the basis of his materials, the composers would have mocked me. I cannot use materials of this sort, and I did not trust you because you meant to plunge the CC leadership into a bog that would be very difficult to get out of. You submitted a draft resolution on Jafar Jafarov. In the first item of the draft Minkevich insisted that cliques reigned in Azerbaijani literature, and he wanted to show who was leading what; in so doing, he meant to prove with political documents that there was a problem with cliques among writers. But neither I nor anybody else can agree with that. . . . You are responsible for all these disgraceful practices in the literature field, because you were entrusted with all the authority to run it. That’s why I think we should not focus on the question of Minkevich’s dismissal. We should not report back to anybody and we cannot provide dismissal formulations. Before dismissing Comrade Minkevich, I’d like to ask Comrade Bayramov where Minkevich intended to work. However, the latter declined from all posts he was offered to take, saying that he would have to appeal to proper authority and insist that he was dismissed improperly.38

After long discussions Minkevich was dismissed from his post. Unfortunately we cannot cite the shorthand record in full, with its thirty-plus pages of interesting material. Yet one fragment is worthy of particular attention. Mustafayev lost all his patience and said, “We have dismissed many deputy heads from their posts; why should we demonstrate a particular attitude to Minkevich?” Indeed, the shorthand record goes on to show that the Bureau members were indignant; however, in their final speech, as in Sarkisov’s case, they tried to alleviate the guilt of the person in question and to look for extenuating circumstances. What was the result of Sarkisov’s case? The Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee was entrusted to make a decision! What was the result of Minkevich’s case? This schemer shifted from one post to another. This displays not infringement on non-native citizens—but rather the opposite—a careful attitude

toward non-Azerbaijanis to avoid the interference of supreme central bodies. This was vividly echoed in the report of experienced, diplomatic Mirza Ibrahimov who in every possible way tried to avoid an international scandal. On January 15, 1955, the CC bureau returned to the debates over providing Minkevich with an appropriate job. As a result, he was appointed director of the Baku Theater of Russian Drama. However, Minkevich was dissatisfied with this decision and lodged a complaint to the CC CPSU. Head of the Party Bodies Department Yakovlev demanded shorthand records of the meetings of the bureau of the CC CPA dated December 31, 1954 and January 15, 1955.39 Moscow cleared up the situation and did not restore Minkevich to his post; however, the very fact of the complaint aroused doubts, suspicions, and enmity toward Mustafayev in the CC CPSU Apparatus. When a slur campaign against Mustafayev started in Moscow in mid-1955, the very fact of the banishment of a leading official of Russian nationality from the Republican CC decided Mustafayev’s fate. It should be noted that the processes in the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s were manifest in the establishment of creative associations, debates, and discussions. Mikhail Sholokhov’s speech at the Congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union (December, 1954) caused great concern among Soviet leaders. On January 21, 1955, a senior executive of the Science and Culture Department of the CC CPSU Kozlov phoned the CC CPA and asked how writers of the republic received Sholokhov’s speech. Kozlov recommended organizing meetings of Azerbaijani writers with workers, peasants, and intellectuals to discuss the results and decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Soviet writers. Such meetings would be intended to focus on the appeal of the CC CPSU to the 2nd Congress of writers. If anyone asked about Sholokhov’s speech, it would be appropriate to answer that he was right in raising a question of improving the professionalism and responsibility of writers, but that the congress expected much from him.40 In all probability, the Party leaders did not risk openly confronting the world-famous writer; however, they tried to decrease the public opinion of his speech. Sholokhov, albeit moderately, criticized the literary process in the Soviet Union in his speech at the congress. His speech was published with minor abridgements in Literaturnaya Gazeta on December 26, 1954. Sholokhov conceded that achievements of the multi-national Soviet literature over the past twenty years (meaning in the period since the first congress of writers in 1934—J. H.) were indisputable: “These achievements notwithstanding, there is enough of a flow of insipid, vapid literature on the pages of magazines to overload the book market. The time is ripe to put an end to this flow, to create a strong dam; otherwise we may lose the respect of our leaders that has been gained throughout many years.” In Sholokhov’s view, one of the main reasons of this failure was “depreciation of appraisal criteria” between writers and critics. The lack of protest against the penetration of reading matter into the press breeds a nasty taste among readers. “These furious Vissarions (a hint at Vissarion Belinskiy, famous literary critic of the first half of the nineteenth century—J. H.) unexpectedly transformed into fair maidens. . . . Indeed, has there been a critical article published in our press to criticize a writer for his unsuccessful work? No, there has not. And what a pity. There cannot and should not be both true works of literature and writers enjoying the right to immunity.” Sholokhov argued that the level of literature was not accounted for by the quantity of writers. At the same

time, Sholokhov criticized an exaggerated number of prestigious prizes in the time period, including the Stalin Prize. Giving out first, second, and third prizes for artistic productions was equal to labeling them as first-, second-, and third-rate. And then how can books that haven’t been given prizes be assessed? Are these books designed for mass consumption? The leaders of the country were very anxious about the issues raised by Sholokhov. The 2nd Congress of Writers of Azerbaijan was followed by debatable developments against the background of changes in society. To analyze the decisions of the All-Union Congress of Writers, a Plenum of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan was convened; it was held for four days with the participation of Mustafayev and Ibrahimov. The debates revealed serious differences in views among writers. Heated debates broke out around the figure of talented critic Jafar Jafarov. His persecutions by leaders of the Writers’ Union caused concealed protest in the Azerbaijani society. Jafarov was born in 1914; in 1937 he graduated from the School of Literature of the Moscow Pedagogical Institute and headed the department of criticism for Literaturnaya Gazeta. In 1940–1947, he served in the Soviet army. After demobilization he was nominated to hold the post of Head of the Art Sector of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC CPA; in 1949–1951 he worked at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic; in February–November 1951 he was a correspondent of Pravda newspaper. During the period under review, Jafarov published two interesting books in Russian—Dramaturgy of M. F. Akhundov and The Azizbeyov Theater—as well as a number of theoretical articles that caused him to be attacked in the mid-1950s. In November 1951, Jafarov was appointed Deputy Head of the Literature and Art Department of the CC CPA; on July 5, 1952 he was appointed the head of this department. In 1953 Jafarov was the first deputy minister of culture of Azerbaijan; in 1954 he was dismissed from his post and banished from the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan for serious shortcomings in his work.41 In the mid-1950s, the passions in the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan were so heated that A. Rumyantsev, head of the Science and Culture Department, and V. Ivanov, senior executive, had to arrange a two-day meeting in the CC with the participation of Mustafayev. Prior to the meeting, on March 10, a harshly critical article about the situation surrounding the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan was published in Literaturnaya Gazeta under the title “A Letter from the Writers Organization.” The article was authored by special correspondent of the newspaper, V. Ponedelnik, who called his article “To Rally all Creative Forces.” The article considered the situation in the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan after the 2nd Congress. It seriously criticized the leadership of the Union, saying that they estranged themselves from the writers’ body. Neither a plenum to deal with creative matters nor any work in genre sections and national literature departments had been held in over a year that had passed after the Congress. Even worse, press bodies of the Writers’ Union issued poor, sometimes politically harmful publications. The author of the article asked: “Is it possible the Writers’ Union of the Republic is headed by people incapable of coping with their tasks? No, the writers have elected prominent men of letters who enjoy great authority in the organization with rich creative, lives and organizational experience to head the Union. The problem is that members of the Presidium and its heads

(Rahimov and Huseyn) do not rely on a broader consensus of writers, and they do not strive for each writer to become an active member of the organization.” Ponedelnik noted shortcomings in the work of literary criticism. According to his thinking, critical articles did not always objectively reflect reality, and some of them violated the truth or distorted facts, exaggerating them. As an example, the correspondent cited an article by A. Veliyev about poetical distinctions of the creative work of O. Sarivelly and a research work of B. Vahabzadeh devoted to the poetry of Vurghun. He wrote: We encounter a peculiar “criticism” when reading Vahabzadeh’s poem “Simple People.” Expressed in verse, the author opines about the poetry of the outstanding Soviet poet Vurghun. He has the right to be delighted by the works of this great master. However, his delight becomes depreciated when Vahabzadeh begins “executing” those who disagree with him: “He who has not fallen in love with the poetry of Vurghun, neither shall he love his native land,” Vahabzadeh categorically insists.42

By all appearances, the two-day meeting of the CC CPA to discuss the situation of the Writers’ Union of the Republic in May 1955 was attributable to the anxiety caused by this article. The first day of the meeting was held with the participation of a small group of CC members, heads of departments, and leaders of the Writers’ Union. In his introductory speech, Mustafayev reported that the meeting aimed to exchange views regarding the activity of the Writers’ Union. He noted that several applications had recently been received, the behavior of some writers discussed, and individual works debated. “A proper situation has not yet been set up in order for writers to focus on their creative works, end their inappropriate relationships with one another once and for all, and stop getting on one another’s nerves.” Mustafayev suggested hearing out Rahimov’s report first and then starting the debates. Rahimov devoted his report to cosmopolitanism and the struggle against its manifestations. He declared that this trend was headed by Jafar Jafarov. In the speaker’s view, Bagirov patronized cosmopolitanism, which penetrated into the literature and art of Azerbaijan and damaged them greatly. At the 2nd Congress of Writers of Azerbaijan, Jafarov was harshly criticized, after which he recognized his mistakes and wrote a letter to the CC. The congress pointed out Jafarov’s blunders in its resolution. After the Congress, Jafarov wrote a second letter which was discussed at meetings of the Presidium of the Writers’ Union. Note that his letters were discussed twice, but both discussions failed to satisfy the Presidium. An enlarged plenum was held before these events during which some people insisted that several mistakes be corrected. However, the Presidium of the Writers’ Union unanimously expelled Jafarov from the Writers’ Union. Rahimov noted: “Some comrades, and comrade Rasul Rza in particular, have been on friendly terms with him for fifteen years. I understand this friendship as one of a personal nature, for he has not fought against the mistakes of Jafarov and Michael Rafili, nor supported those who opposed these facts, sympathized with them or expressed his consent to Jafarov’s expulsion, though I raised this question at the plenum.”43 Vurghun spoke at the meeting, saying that Jafarov had caused great damage to Azerbaijani literature and art as the instigator of cosmopolitanism. “Once we had creative differences which later grew into an ideological political struggle. I openly declared this at the 19th Party Congress. I said that the head of the CPA department denies the Azerbaijani culture, people,

achievements of the Azerbaijani Soviet literature, our music, and so on. Then Bagirov asked me to cease dancing to Jafarov’s piping.” Vurghun further noted that the point was cosmopolitanism, not Jafarov’s personality: “This trend negated all the folk literature and called all the people shepherds. It seems to me that our Party public, the Central Committee, has not spoken its opinion on the subject. A CC organ, the newspaper Communist, published Jafarov’s article about Schiller the other day. . . . It turns out that the Writers’ Union passes one decision, and the person in question, Jafarov, cares not a bit.” Then Samed Vurghun explained: “In saying ‘a group of cosmopolitans,’ I meant the group of Jafarov, Professor Rafili, and Rasul Rza, who was a close friend of Jafarov. I don’t want to say that Rasul Rza negated our classical heritage, but when Jafarov attacked people who created a true contemporary literature, in that sense they drew closer together . . . for example, out of all composers, Jafar Jafarov only made friends with Qara Qarayev.”44 Truly, if the jubilee of Jafar Jafarov were celebrated today, trumpeting the criticism of the great poet would sound like the best compliment to the hero of the day. In the meanwhile, Avaz Sadykh spoke at the meeting to protest against Jafarov’s expulsion from the Writers’ Union: “It is up to the Board of the Union to decide on the expulsion. You’re saying that the Presidium is the Board, but that is wrong. The Board consists of twenty-eight people, the Plenum of only nine. For this reason Jafarov’s expulsion is legally contrary to the Union’s charter.” Avaz Sadykh also protested against an item of the Plenum’s decision which said that the Plenum approved the Presidium’s resolution regarding Jafarov’s expulsion from the Writers’ Union. The second item stated as follows: “The Plenum demands that Rasul Rza change his attitude toward Jafarov.”45 Ibrahimov took the floor, saying that he was against pressuring Jafarov and making him admit his mistakes. He suggested providing Jafarov with an opportunity to correct his mistakes. A. Rumyantsev made a circumstantial report at the meeting. He emphasized that “it would be wrong to raise a question as follows: we’re opposing Jafarov, they’re advocating Jafarov. Who are we and who are they? To be frank, they are the CC leadership; we are the leadership of the Writers’ Union. It turns out that we are opposing Bagirov’s line, while the Party-invested leaders are advocating Bagirov’s line. Is the Party advocating Bagirov’s line? Even during Bagirov’s office the Party did not back this line, for it was an anti-Party line, perfidious Beria’s line, that attempted to lead it away from the tasks of the Revolution. At present, we cannot say with certainty that the Revolution is over. We are in the crucible of the Revolution, we are advancing toward communism, and these are not mere words. We are moving toward communism.” Rumyantsev suggested not to make haste in Jafarov’s matter and to address the issue collectively. He cited several examples from the work of the Moscow writer’s organization: “For example, Mikhail Bubennov, author of White Birch, was to be expelled from the Party for anti-Semitism. Kovalevskiy spoke at the meeting saying that he wrote an anti-Party work, so he was severely reprimanded. Tvardovskiy wrote a very bad poem —“Terkin in the Next World”—however, he was not expelled. . . . So let’s help this man on the basis of the Party Charter, remembering that he is an ordinary Party member to us.”46 CC CPSU senior executive Ivanov raised question, confessing that he intended “to say a distressing thing: rumors are afloat across the Republics that writers in Azerbaijan, leaders of

the Writers’ Union, are opposing the Central Committee. Things have gone so far that the USSR Writers’ Union is asking writers of the Union Republic what is going on in Azerbaijan. Writers at war with the Central Committee? That won’t do at all! The situation here is bandied about everywhere. Through the Writers’ Union the Party administers writers and pursues Party policy in the sphere of literature via the Writers’ Union. How can you set yourselves off against the Central Committee? You are a direct and immediate bearer of the Party line. Together with the CC, under its direct leadership and assistance, you are to carry out ideological breeding of writers. You’ll fail to attain this goal if you keep on standing on this position of cliquishness. Things have gone so far that the CC Secretary Vitaliy Samedov declined from supervising the Writers’ Union.”47 Ivanov’s speech was followed by Suleyman Rahimov’s remark: “I was sent on a mission to the region and I agreed to work here. There were a lot of differences in the Union, therefore I hinted to Comrade Ibrahimov that the bonfire is put out. We, members of the Central Committee, should assist the Central Committee in addressing the problems. Why are other Republics talking about opposition to the Central Committee? Georgia asked: why did the Second Secretary of the Central Committee decline from the ideological work? I don’t know. Comrades from Moscow come and ask: why? I repeat that I don’t know the reasons; I told Comrade Ivanov about it, and I again repeat that Comrade Samedov, Second Secretary, has not decided on his attitude to the Writers’ Union. You have characterized Jafarov’s literary position today. But he has said nothing about it. I think criticism is leveled both at the Central Committee member and the Secretary. I say frankly that I disapprove of Comrade Samedov, for as the Second Secretary he was to have remedied the situation. . . . I mean to say that the Azerbaijani Party organization is mature; that this organization was exposed by Bagirov and is in a position to correct all its mistakes. I was among those who took a positive view of Comrade Mustafayev’s appointment, but that doesn’t mean that Comrade Mustafayev as the First Secretary has the right to ignore us, as Central Committee members. Instead, he must consider our opinion.” In the meanwhile, Rahimov turned the conflict between the CC and the Writers’ Union into a problem of Jafarov only. He said that Rumyantsev ought to know that there is no clannishness in the Writers’ Union. If a Chairman of the Writers’ Union takes responsibility for his group only, he cannot lead the Writers’ Union. At this moment, Mustafayev interrupted Rahimov, asking whether there had ever been a situation in which Rahimov had appealed to him, and he, Mustafayev, had not responded. “We were not considering the issue of Jafarov, and at one time I even told you that Comrade Jafarov wrote us a statement, so we should get together in a small group and discuss the situation. Didn’t I tell you about that?” Rahimov replied that yes, he had. “But in the spirit of self-criticism, why did you get together to discuss Ali Veliyev’s article and fail to do so in respect to that of Jafarov?”48 On May 31, Mustafayev summed up the meeting with some other issues. Addressing Rahimov, he asked, “I instructed you to delete references to Rasul Rza, since they inflamed passions, but you again touched upon them and thus caused a scandal. I did ask you to avoid this.” Then Mustafayev noted, “Our body of writers is one of the most advanced, famed not

only in the USSR but far beyond its boundaries. That’s why the CC CPSU and the CC CPA demand this body to work more effectively. Everyone knows that the lack of consensus implies bad results. . . . I’d like to remind Comrade Rahimov of some facts. When we came to the CC leadership, we pursued our objective and discussed candidatures, because Comrade Ibrahimov had been elected President of the Republic. Everyone voted for you as a prominent writer and former Party worker with great authority, qualification, and experience capable of closing ranks. The point was about the Union’s Secretaries at the Writers’ Congress. You asked to leave Ali Veliyev in his position and thus help him with funds. In the course of the Congress and after its termination I note that we cannot leave him as he is, for his managerial abilities and his level of culture cannot ensure further success. When electing the Board and Presidium of the Writers’ Union, we reasoned everything out. You mistakenly believe that if we pressure any of you, you’re lost. Beyond any doubt, we cannot behave in that manner. Annihilation is not a policy of our Party. It’d be the worst of all. The point is about Jafarov. You have not raised a question of Jafarov, neither orally nor in a written form. You have just shown interest in why no views are shaped regarding Jafarov. To whom should the Central Committee express its opinion? You behaved incorrectly. Before expelling him from the Writers’ Union, you should have come to see me, Comrade Ibrahimov, or Comrade Bayramov to get advice. We would give his behavior a political appraisal to teach him a good lesson. But you merely expelled him, placed information about it in newspapers and started a campaign to expel him from the Party. Did it help to solve the problem? Jafarov gave his own explanation of the facts in approximately twenty pages, where he denied most accusations and admitted a small minority of them. It was necessary to reason this matter out jointly, but you hastened, and now you insist that the Central Committee back us. It’s a wrong position.” Mustafayev’s speech was followed by Vurghun’s remark that he opposed administrative measures against people for their relationships with others, saying that he had personally committed mistakes in respect to others. He emphasized, “The point is not about annihilating somebody; the point is that our fifteen-year struggle proved to be fair.” After eight hours of debates, a decision was made to continue the meeting at 10:00 a.m. the next day in a larger group. Also, it was decided to avoid focusing on Jafarov’s issue only.49 A meeting of writers of the Republic was held on June 1, 10:00 a.m. at the CC CPA building. The agenda included debates over the results of work of the Writers’ Union after the 2nd Congress of Azerbaijani Writers. However, participants of the meetings were more anxious about the fate of Jafarov; even yesterday’s recommendation to hold the meeting at the CC CPA failed to draw participants’ attention away from the issue. The meeting was opened by Mustafayev, who asked speakers to display impartiality and expose shortcomings. Then the floor was given to Rahimov. His speech was devoted to the situation in the Writers’ Union, art developments, and the question of Jafarov and was full of specific facts. However, in the course of the debates, the issue of Jafarov came to the foreground, and subsequent speakers Vurghun, Huseyn, and Veliyev voiced their solidarity with Rahimov. Rza, M. Rahim, S. Rahman, and E. Mamedkhanly were also seriously criticized. They were accused of passivity in the fight against cosmopolitanism and nihilism, and of aspirations to keep silent. Things

went so far that Ivanov took the floor and expressed his disagreement with such a formulation. He said: “It turns out that if somebody subjects Jafarov to criticism, the Writers’ Union thinks high of him; if another person says nothing of Jafarov, he is bad and worthy of criticism.” Iskenderov, CC CPA Secretary, and Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, also disagreed with such a formulation. Ibrahimov noted: “In my view, the main reason for unhealthy relations in the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan is that there are writers among us who misunderstand the great role of their profession. The writer bears responsibility to his people. To rehabilitate the literary environment, one most contain oneself and check the correctness of one’s thoughts. Let’s talk seriously about literature, respect other people’s opinions, and refrain from demands for obedience. Samed Vurghun said that all these had been instigated for twenty years. But now the situation has changed. Let’s cease creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.”50 Jafar Jafarov made a long speech at the meeting, acknowledging a portion of his mistakes linked to the assessment of Azerbaijani classical literature. He alleged that in the time of Jalil Mamedquluzadeh and Abdurrahim bey Haqverdiyev the Azerbaijani people was at its lowest level of development and could not even put forward prototypes worthy of fiction. At the same time, Jafarov was an excellent expert in Russian and western literatures and tried to apply the same criteria to Azerbaijani literature. Of course, not all works of literature met the standards used. This was apparent from speeches of writers that criticized each other both at the Congress and at the meeting in question. Besides, some poets and writers who had once been pressured by Bagirov now attributed their misfortunes to Jafarov, thinking of him as Bagirov’s chief literature advisor. In all probability, that was the main reason for the writers’ attacks on Jafarov. Acknowledging some criticism against him as just, Jafarov tried to prove the falsity of lies directed toward defaming him. He also stressed that he was the author of an article directed against Vurghun published in Moscow in 1950, and that it was an editor’s distortion. This question was discussed by the commission for criticism of the Writers’ Union, and Comrade Kedrina spoke at the meeting saying that the article was not authored by Jafarov. The latter’s mistake was that he had not protested against this provocation in a written form and opportunely. It turned out that Jafarov allegedly defamed Vurghun before the public. Rumyantsev interrupted the speaker, saying: “You should be ashamed to be a Communist! Your Party card must be burning a hole into your chest.”51 Finally, the meeting decided to submit all materials about Jafarov to the CC CPA Bureau for an appropriate decision. On June 24, 1955, Bayramov read out a reference drawn up by the CC. He noted that during a meeting at the CC, Jafarov acknowledged his mistakes, and considering this, the Science and Culture Department suggested adopting a decision titled “On Theoretical Mistakes of Literary Critic, Comrade Jafarov” with which to condemn Jafarov’s theoretical mistakes in literature and during his work at the CC CPA. It was also suggested that Jafarov should be demanded to learn lessons from his mistakes and write for the press, as well as to instruct the Writers’ Union to assist Jafarov in correcting his mistakes by creating normal working conditions. Jafarov agreed with such a formulation, while CC members Vurghun and Rahimov opposed it. In particular, Samed Vurghun stated: “I’m categorically against this proposal; it appears that the Writers’ Union and

its leadership level unjust accusations at Jafarov. As a member of the Writers’ Union leadership and that of the CC, I suggest indicating specifically that the Writers’ Union is absolutely right in some aspects of the matter. Second, the point is not only Jafarov’s ideological and theoretical mistakes but also the fact that for several years he had been an instrument in the hands of Bagirov and denied all our achievements. . . . Jafar Jafarov prejudiced the theater; however, Comrade Bayramov says he did not. If that’s how it will be written, I disagree.” Suleyman Rahimov added that “the question of Jafarov relates not only to Jafarov proper. It is a matter of ideological work on our ideological literary front. He was to have disarmed himself completely, because a half-way policy will never help him gain support of our writers’ body. So I ask you to make a decision with which to identify all the mistakes admitted by Jafarov. Samed is right in holding that Bayramov’s speech misinterpreted Jafarov’s expulsion from the Writers’ Union.” At this moment Bayramov interfered, saying that the “Writers’ Union has not yet expelled Jafarov and that any member of the Union may be expelled by the decision of the Board, while Jafarov has been expelled by the decision of the Presidium. When I protested, comrades wanted to approve the decision of the Presidium without Jafarov’s participation. I said that they cannot do it. If you consider it necessary, approve your decision but with the participation of Jafarov.” Ibrahimov interfered in the debates in an attempt to ease tensions, so Mustafayev, Ibrahimov, and Bayramov were instructed to word the text of the draft resolution.52 On July 20, 1955, the CC CPA Bureau passed a resolution titled “On Serious Mistakes of CPSU Member Comrade Jafarov J.,” which said that Jafarov as a literary critic admitted some serious mistakes in assessing the history, conditions, and prospects of Azerbaijani literature. Along with theoretical mistakes, the critic also admitted serious mistakes in his practical work as head of the Literature and Art Department of the CC CPA. Hence, the CC Bureau resolved: 1. To condemn serious mistakes of Comrade Jafarov admitted by him in his literary activity and practical work. To demand from Comrade Jafarov to write for the press with principal criticism of his mistakes, draw necessary conclusions and prove his worth in the practical work. To assist the Board of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan in correcting Jafarov’s mistakes. 2. To oblige the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan to cover and develop the urgent questions of the history and further development of Azerbaijani Soviet literature in the pages of its press organs.53 In 1955 when Rahimov again raised the question of Jafarov at the Plenum of the Writers’ Union and referred to the names of Rza, Mamedkhanly, and Rahman, he faced a harsh rebuke from Rasul Rza: “I don’t know why Suleyman Rahimov is raising this question again and with what purpose. If he wants to make me bow down before him, it’s all idle talk.”54 Yet Rahimov succeeded in including the names of Rza, Mamedkhanly, and Rahman in the decision of the Plenum. The decision said as follows: “The Plenum warms Rza, Mamedkhanly, and Rahman that their support for cliquishness to please their personal interests is greatly damaging the

correct development of our literature, preventing the unification of all creative forces, and may lead to the complete estrangement of these writers from the writers’ body.”55 Thus in 1955, the conflict that had lasted nearly one year not only in the Azerbaijani literary environment but also in political life came to an end. These angry and passionate speeches of the post-Bagirov period demonstrated the level of intensity of writers and creative intellectuals in the Republic. Following the decision of the CC CPA Bureau, Jafarov engaged seriously in his creative work. Beginning from the end of 1954, he taught at Azerbaijan State University. In 1955, he defended his candidate’s thesis and took the position of associate professor at the philological faculty. Starting in 1959, he headed the theater and cinema department of the Institute of the Architecture and Art. In 1961, he defended his doctoral thesis on art criticism; a year later he was elected a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, and in 1963 he was conferred the title of professor. In August 1967 Jafarov, as presented by Akhundov, was elected the Secretary of the CC CPA for ideological questions. He worked in this post till 1971.56 Another reason for the tensions between the Writers’ Union and the CC in the mid-1950s was the publication of the materials of the 2nd Congress of the Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan. Owing to the adoption of the decision of the CC Bureau “On the 2nd Congress of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan and Publication of its materials,” the materials above were given to the Azerneshr publishing house. Chairman of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan Rahimov appealed several times to the CC; however, the Department of Sciences and Culture of the CC discussed these materials and on June 4, 1955 came to the conclusion that their publication would be inexpedient. In so doing, the department was guided by the following reasons: 1. All reports made at the Congress were published in periodicals. 2. When preparing materials for their publications, no principled remarks made at the CC meeting dated April 14, 1954 were taken into account. 3. The thematic plan of Azerneshr for 1955 did not provide for publication of Congress materials, so their publication in 1956, that is, in two years after the Congress, was inexpedient. On June 10, the CC CPA discussed proposals of the same department and agreed with them. Despite the lack of necessity for the publication, Rahimov appealed to the CC CPA. On December 1, 1955, Bayramov forwarded an official reference to Mustafayev that explained the position of the CC department. On December 13, the CC CPA Bureau put these questions for consideration and entrusted Ibrahimov, Bayramov, Sultanova, Rahimov, and Kurbanov with submitting their proposals on the possibility of publishing the collected materials of the 2nd Congress.57 In reality, the CC’s unwillingness to publish materials was not attributable to the thematic plan of the publishing house. The 2nd Congress proved to be the first event since the arrest of Bagirov; therefore, there was a confrontation between the victims and offenders in the reports and Congress materials. Despite tensions between the Writers’ Union and the CC, the CPA Bureau passed a resolution

on September 30, 1955 on celebrations in May 1956 for the fiftieth anniversary of Samed Vurghun, well-known poet not only in Azerbaijan but in the USSR and abroad. The 2nd AllUnion Congress of Soviet Writers in 1954 entrusted Samed Vurghun with making the main report “On Soviet Poetry” which attested to the recognition of his talent and celebrity on a Soviet scale. The poet had received the Stalin Prize for two years running—in 1941 for the drama Vagif, and in 1942 for the drama Farhad and Shirin. On October 19, 1955, Mustafayev made a request to the CC CPSU to celebrate the poet’s jubilee and award him with the Order of Lenin in consideration of his particular contribution to the development of Soviet literature.58 This contribution was acknowledged by the Soviet writers’ community. Suffice it to note that along with Vurghun’s report, speakers included such prominent figures of literature as A. Surikov (“Conditions and Tasks of Soviet Literature”), K. Simonov (“On Soviet Fiction”), A. Korneychuk (“On Soviet Dramaturgy”), B. Polevoy (“On Children’s and Youth Literature”), P. Antokolskiy, M. Auezov, M. Rylskiy, and N. Tikhonov (“On World Literature”). Vurghun’s mention among these leaders and his erudition were subject to no doubts in the mid-1950s. In addition, a meeting of the 2nd All-Union Congress of Writers on December 18 was led by Ibrahimov, and Rahimov and Huseyn spoke at the Congress, both of which testified to the considerable authority of the Azerbaijani writers’ organization. On May 30, 1955, a meeting was held at the CC CPA to discuss ideological political work in the higher education institutions of the republic. Attending the meeting was Rumyantsev, head of the CC CPSU Department of Science and Culture. The meeting was chaired by Ali Kerimov, head of the school department, who identified the purpose of the meeting as revealing shortcomings in the ideological-political work of higher education institutions and draw up a plan of further actions. Bayramov, head of the Science and Culture Department, submitted a detailed report on the matter. His speech was followed by Rumyantsev, who noted major areas of ideological/political work with youth and stressed the necessity of strengthening the role of Party organizations in higher education institutions. He noted that “weakening of the party work at Moscow State University lead to the formation of undesirable free thinking. The party organization’s estrangement from the life of the university resulted in some comrades’ free interpretation of Marxism as “just one point of view.” In other words, non-Marxist views have the right to exist. There is no need to explain here what awaits us in the future. There are people who try to avail themselves of the situation to let inimical ideological views and harmful idealistic concepts into our world outlook. There are few of them, but it is sufficient to stymie our great cause of creating a true personality. Rumyantsev referred to an incident at MSU. A certain Pomerantsev wrote an article about sincerity in literature, and students gathered together to discuss this article. A member of the Party bureau of the University learned about it and forbid them from holding the meeting. She said that she had not read the article and considered the meeting dismissed. The students held a meeting in the street and passed a resolution that they supported Pomerantsev. “In the meanwhile, it was necessary to explain to these inexperienced youth the harm of Pomerantsev’s article and the political background of this article.”59 It was no mere coincidence that Ryumantsev referred to these

examples, since there was an increased flow of complaints from non-Azerbaijanis who informed Moscow that nationalism was cultivated in higher educational institutions, creative associations, and scientific structures. To prevent free-thinking and nationalistic sentiments, the CC CPSU adopted a decision on March 12, 1954 to entrust the KGB under the Soviet Council of Ministers to strengthen the struggle against nationalistic associations and secret anti-Soviet groups. On June 25, 1955, N. S. Khrushchev spoke at the All-Union meeting of workers of prosecutor’s and investigation bodies and clearly indicated the political purposes of law-enforcement bodies and state security organs. He pointed out the following: “The class struggle existed and does exist. Enemies have infiltrated and will infiltrate our country. That’s why, dear comrades, we cannot lose our vigilance, nor make it easier for our enemies to exert influence on our citizens. We must remember that should we fail to do that, much harm will be done.”60 After the advent of new leaders to power in the Republic, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB (which had separated from the former in May 1954) were strengthened by new cadre from Moscow. As far back as in September 1953, Stepan Yemelyanov was substituted for A. M. Guskov, who headed the Republican KGB since May 1954. The post of Internal Minister was held by A. Bulyga, who came from Moscow. The Moscow hirelings were to supervise the new leaders of Azerbaijan and communicate reliable information to Moscow about the current situation in the Republic. This notwithstanding, the leaders of the Republic contrived to appoint Azerbaijanis only as members of the KGB board. Rahimov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, sent a letter on January 17, 1955 to Mustafayev which suggested approving the KGB board as follows: Guskov A. M.—Chairman, Alizadeh Mamed Ali oglu, Zamanov Abbas Mamed-Tagi oglu, Samedov Hajibaba Aydamir oglu—Deputy Chairmen, Aliyev Heydar Alirza oglu—head of the second department, and Mamedov Gambay Aleskerovich—head of the investigation department.61 However, Guskov made certain changes: he rejected the candidature of H. A. Aliyev, and he included heads of departments in the board including Mamedov Ayvaz Abdurahmanovich and Efendiyev Sami Soltan Abdul Bagi oglu.62 On August 26, 1955, the CC CPA Bureau approved the KGB board under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR to comply with the list presented by Guskov.63 In the mid-1950s, the KGB did its best to combat foreign influence on the national awakening in Azerbaijan. On March 31, 1955, Guskov wrote to Mustafayev that foreign anti-Soviet organizations were using balloons to drop anti-Soviet leaflets on the territories of the USSR and countries of people’s democracy. In 1954, special services discovered about 500 such balloons on the territory of the USSR. Having indicated their dimensions and technical specifications, Guskov asked Party and Soviet bodies to carry out a campaign among the populace to opportunely inform KGB bodies about anti-Soviet materials. Attached to the letter were three photographs that depicted leaflets being dropped by balloon mechanisms.64 In March 1955, Guskov signed and sent to Moscow a reference titled “On Sentiments among Some Part of the Population of Baku” which said that for some time past, owing to some difficulties in food supplies as well as reduction of cadre, the information came that unhealthy talk and rumors were afloat among workers, engineers and other persons. Informers reported

that the people were dissatisfied with reductions at plants and enterprises, decline in wage rates, lack of foodstuffs, and even worse, the jobless plundered shops to feed their families. National contradictions intensified against this background.65 That same year, Guskov sent one more detailed report to the USSR KGB based on information related to “Islamists.” The report discussed possible relations between religious figures of the Republic from border regions and the Iranian special services. Guskov wrote: “Materials regarding Mir Mamed Kazymov gave no grounds to suspect him of his participation in the Iranian intelligence services. In this respect, the case of ‘Islamists’ was terminated in August 1955 and consigned to oblivion, while Kazymov remained within the intelligence service.” The same information was true of Molla Huseyn Teymurov, who maintained relations with the Iranian intelligence service until 1950. The “acts of sabotage” Guskov described were none other than the secret transfer of religious literature and cult objects. Guskov’s report emphasized a resident of Shamakha region Javad Kurban oglu Javadov and his anti-Soviet activity. He authored leaflets that called to overthrow the Soviet structure, liquidate collective farms, restore private property, and withdraw Transcaucasia from the USSR. He was arrested in February 1955 and proven guilty. Guskov’s report also referred to a certain Aydin Mirzazadeh, a musician from the “Veten” movie theater, who propagandized the American way of life. An agent under the code name Alexandrov reaffirmed the anti-Soviet nature of Mirzazadeh’s activity.66 On July 28, 1955, Guskov informed Mustafayev about the spread in Baku of an anonymous verse in the Azerbaijani language titled “Unforgettable Letter.” A line from this verse in word-for-word translation sounded like this: Dear Lenin presented us with his inheritance: A Party of workers and peasants. This Party teaches us how to live, However, in our life we gain no knowledge as the Party teaches us. We need no such freedom, Because our life is worse than dogs’ lives.

The KGB discovered and a graphology examination confirmed that “the letter” was authored by Aliyev Fazil Baba oglu, resident of Baku, born in 1926.67 Mustafayev was anxious about KGB messages sent to Moscow. He realized that intelligence information on the rise of nationalism in the country would not remain unrequited. For this reason, Mustafayev treated Guskov’s fervor distrustfully. Though the leadership of the Republic was renewed in the mid1950s, Bagirov’s heavy hand still held sway over Azerbaijan. All the CC CPSU Plenums and Party-governmental meetings mechanically criticized the leadership of Azerbaijan. A group of people who worked at the Internal Ministry and state security bodies was arrested together with Bagirov. The arrests were made on the basis of nationality but with elements of the beloved “internationalism.” Suffice it to say that among the detainees there were Azerbaijanis, Russians, Armenians, Georgians, and Jews. This representation was no mere chance. In so doing, the Soviet leaders meant to demonstrate that the Bagirov trial was not directed against the Azerbaijani people. A letter was sent to the CC CPSU after the 20th Congress of the CPA which said that Quliyev, who had long headed the Republican government, and M. T. Yagubov,

who had for many years led the internal bodies and later the Republican Party organization, were expelled from the Central Auditing Committee and the CC. Note that all the CC CPA Bureau members voted for this decision, except for Ibrahimov. Following a long correspondence, the CC CPSU Plenum expelled Quliyev from the CC and Yagubov from the Central Auditing Committee in March 1954. The cause was non-Party behavior and insincerity before the Party.68 Indeed, the situation in Azerbaijan was not as deplorable as the central leadership insisted. This was done for the discredit of Bagirov and justification of his arrest. Nevertheless, the new leaders of the Republic intended to make appreciable changes and thus win the Center’s favor. This was vividly echoed in the fact that since 1954 the traditional Azerbaijani crop, grain, had been replaced by cotton. In November 1954, Mustafayev spoke at the All-Union Meeting in Tashkent and promised Khrushchev to raise cotton up to 600,000 tons in two to three years. The Republican leaders intended to raise livestock population in collective farms and increase oil extraction in the oil industry. Note that the oil production situation was rather difficult due to merciless extraction during the war. At the same time, social processes in Azerbaijan and the Republican Party organization were under the permanent control of the Center. Retired Colonel-General Ivan Shikin, deputy head of the department of the Union Republics, reported back to his bosses about the situation in the Republic. Further aggravating the case was repeated anonymous slander against Mustafayev and other leaders. Mustafayev opined that this slander was authored by Guskov and his deputy M. Alizadeh. As a consequence, in early1955 Mustafayev raised a question before the CC CPSU about the withdrawal of Guskov from Azerbaijan. However, the CC CPSU considered Guskov’s work to be fruitful and allowed him to remain. Mustafayev felt insulted and launched a struggle against the Republican KGB. A letter filed by M. Alizadeh, deputy head of the Republican KGB, personally to Khrushchev (July, 1955) makes it clear that following this incident, Mustafayev changed his attitude to Alizadeh and even began persecuting him.69 A commission of CC CPSU members Yakovlev, Vadim Tikunov and P. Grigoryev arrived in Baku to check the facts shown in Alizadeh’s letter. The facts were confirmed.70 As head of the sector under the CC CPSU department for Union Republics, Yakovlev made reports in March 1955 and later in June about the situation in Azerbaijan.71 On the basis of these reports, the head of the Party Central Committee of the union republics Gromov made recommendations to the Party leadership on July 25. The recommendations noted that there were serious mistakes in the work of the CC CPA Bureau and Mustafayev personally. They concluded that it would be appropriate to invite the CC CPA Bureau to the CC CPSU and openly discuss the situation.72 As for the situation in the Bureau proper, Yakovlev believed that the situation here was not normal; there was no unity between the Bureau members and decisions were not adopted unanimously. Some Bureau members complained about Mustafayev’s improper actions. For instance, Secretary of the CC Iskenderov maintained that Mustafayev mistrusted him, so it was impossible to collaborate with him; he claimed, “we are afraid of visiting the CC CPSU Apparatus. While Rahimov and I were in Moscow with to attend a meeting of industry workers, he suggested, ‘Let’s go to Shikin. If I go alone,

Mustafayev might think that I’m going to complain about him.’” Rahimov said that Mustafayev was intolerable of criticism. It’s inexplicable why he waged war on Guskov. Secretary of the CC Samedov stated: “We are spoiled by cruelty, rancor and shortsightedness.” As viewed by Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, “Mustafayev tolerates no criticism, and if no measures are taken, he’ll be lost as a worker.”73 On the CC CPSU recommendation dated August 18–20, 1955, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the question “On Methods of the Work of Mustafayev and Shortcomings in the work of the CC CPA Bureau.” Attending the meeting were members of the Bureau I. K. Abdullayev, A. M. Guskov, M. A. Ibrahimov, M. A. Iskenderov, S. G. Rahimov, V. Y. Samedov, and Hajibaba Efendiyev. The meeting was chaired by Mustafayev. Moscow guests also took part in the meeting. These were Gromov, head of the CC CPSU department for Union Republics; G. T. Drozdov, deputy head of the administrative department; Yakovlev, head of the sector under the CC CPSU department for Union Republics; and P. I. Grigoryev, deputy chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Attending the meeting was Alizadeh, who, following the conflict with Mustafayev, was displaced from his post and appointed chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Nakhchivan Autonomous SSR. After two days of debates, a resolution was passed titled “On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPA Bureau” which read as follows: “Over the period that lapsed after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, the Party of Azerbaijan, the Party organization of the Republic, guided by the decisions of the CC CPSU, has achieved certain positive results in economic and cultural building, as well as some improvement in the Party organizational and political work. However, the results above could have been more remarkable if no serious shortcomings had taken place in the work of the CC CPA Bureau.” Further, the resolution added: “The CC CPA Bureau violates the principle of collective leadership and declines from joint discussions when solving challenging problems. Business-like, principled criticism of shortcomings and free exchange of opinions are deficient in the work of the Bureau. In some cases, First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev has applied incorrect methods of leadership, ignored views and remarks of the Bureau members, declined from joint discussion over issues in question, persisted in his delusions, opinions, and conclusions, and showed irritability. Comrade Mustafayev arbitrarily mistrusts individual top officials and at the same time is uncritical of the improper reports of some persons. Abnormal relations are maintained between Comrade Mustafayev and Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, Comrade Guskov. Mustafayev misbehaved when he arbitrarily raised a question before the CC CPSU about the dismissal of Comrade Guskov from his post without the knowledge of the CC Bureau. The resolution seriously criticized the Second Secretary of the CC V. Y. Samedov for lack of control over Party organizations and mistakes in the personnel work. Secretaries of the CC Iskenderov and Efendiyev, as well as some Bureau members, were criticized for shutting their eyes to Mustafayev’s Party discipline violations. The Bureau found that the CC CPA Secretariat’s work was unsatisfactory. It said that “in terms of the CC CPSU decisions, it is essential to radically reconsider the work, change improper styles and methods of management, comply with a principle of collective leadership, breed a

normal situation in the Bureau work, ensure broader criticism and self-criticism, develop activity and initiative, and opportunely respond to shortcomings and mistakes of some Bureau members. It is also necessary to take into consideration Mustafayev’s statement that he found criticism of mistakes as correct, demand him to radically change methods of leadership and strictly comply with the principle of collective leadership, and create conditions for free and business-like criticism in the Bureau.” This decision was distributed among the city and regional Party committees of Azerbaijan.74 However, the situation was far from completion. On October 1, 1955, the CC CPSU Secretariat, guided by the decisions of the CC CPA Bureau and a memorandum of the Gromov/Drozdov/Yakovlev commission, passed a resolution titled “On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPA Bureau.” In connection to this, a meeting of the CC CPA Bureau was held on October 19, 1955 where Mustafayev, Samedov, Efendiyev, Abdullayev, Arushanov, and Guskov spoke. The Bureau took into account that the resolution of the CC CPSU Secretariat was distributed among regional and district Party committees and CC Communist Parties of the Union Republics. It adopted a decision to take into consideration all remarks, conclusions, and proposals made by the CC CPSU commission in a memorandum.75 The strangeness of this situation is that it reflected the half-hearted manner of all reforms carried out by the central leadership on an All-Union scale. As a matter of fact Khrushchev, later charged with voluntarism, behaved in Moscow as Mustafayev had in Baku. At the summit conference, Mustafayev dared to disagree with criticism addressed to him, which Khrushchev did not appreciate. It was no secret that the October 1955 decision was initiated by Khrushchev. In other words, Mustafayev was defamed across the country for other leaders’ edification. It was no mere chance that Mustafayev told the Secretariat that “this decision of the CC CPSU completely discouraged him.” Following a meeting on cotton-growing in Tashkent, Mustafayev brought up a question before Khrushchev about the construction of cotton-cleaning and processing enterprises. In this case Azerbaijan could have gained additional benefits from cotton processing. However, Khrushchev reacted to Mustafayev’s proposal with hostility: “Why, Comrade Mustafayev? While the Russian peasant lives from hand to mouth, you want Azerbaijanis to eat honey and butter.”76 The abovementioned meeting of the CC CPA Bureau of August 18–20, the memorandum of the Moscow commission, and the decision of the CC CPSU decisions of October 1 all made their marks. On October 19, 1955, the Second Secretary of the CC CPA Samedov was dismissed from his post. The official version of his dismissal spoke of Samedov’s serious illness; however, that was not the truth in full. The decision of the CC CPA Bureau about Samedov’s dismissal was promptly approved by the CC CPSU Secretariat on October 1955.77 On November 4, upon Moscow’s instructions, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the question of appointing a Second Secretary and decided to ask Moscow to fill the post with Yakovlev, repeated participant of various CC CPSU commissions for Azerbaijan.78 To strengthen control over the situation in the Republic, the CC CPSU Secretariat sent Dmitriy Nikolayevich Yakovlev to Azerbaijan to take office in November 12, 1955.79 Thus, Moscow protégés began finding their niches in the uneasy Soviet Republics. At the same time, Pavel Kovanov was

appointed Second Secretary in Georgia. NOTES 1. Purge of Lavrentiy Beria. 1953.//National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 82, pp. 1–2. 2. Ibid, pp. 28–30. 3. Shubin, Yakovlev, and Borisov to Khrushchev. January 1954.//Russian Newest History State Archive (further referred to as RNHSA), f.5, r.15, v.492, pp. 3–6. 4. From Evgeniy Gromov to Nikita Khrushchev. 23.01.1954.//RNHSA, f.5, r.15, v.492. p. 2. 5. From Shubin and Yakovlev to Khrushchev. January, 1954.//RNHSA, f.5, r.15, v.492. p. 2; For more details see: Ismaylov E. Azerbaijan; 1953–1956. Perviye godi “ottepeli.” (Azerbaijan: 1953–1956. The First Years of the “Thaw.”) pp. 94–124. 6. Notes from the meeting of administrative, staff and faculty members of Azerbaijan Agricultural Institute in 1936.//Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan (further referred to as APDPARA), f.1, r.122, v.402, p. 2. 7. About the manager of administration of higher education institutions of Narkompros RSFSR—in Narkomzem of the Azerbaijan SSR. 25.07.1937.//APDPARA, f.1, r.122, v.402, p. 4. 8. From Rahimov to the Commission for Investigation of Azerbaijan Agricultural Institute. 22.10.1937.//APDPARA, f.1, r.122, v.402, p. 1. 9. Hasanli Jamil. At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet—American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. 2006, pp. 32–33. 10. APDPARA, f.1, r.87, v.1350, p. 15–24. 11. Ibid., p. 31. 12. On the Candidacy of the Presidium of Upper Soviet Azerbaijan SSR. 17.02.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.87, v.808, p. 61. 13. For more details about the activity of Mirza Ibrahimov in South Azerbaijan see: Hasanli J. At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet—American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946. 14. Decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), CC AUCP (B) “On Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in South Azerbaijan and other provinces of North Iran.” 06.07.1945.//Russian State Archive of Social-Political History, (further RSASPH), f.17, r.162, v.37, pp. 147–148. 15. Decision of the CC AUCP (B) “on Southern Azerbaijan and Northern Kurdistan.” 08.10.1945.//RSASPH, f.17, r.162, v.37, pp. 152–153. 16. To Nikita Khrushev, Secretary of CC CPSU. 20.11.1954.//RNHSA, f.5, r.15, v.492, pp. 7–8. 17. From Parsegov to Yudin. 28.08.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.160, p. 376. 18. From Cheremushkin to Rahimov and Mustafayev, 19.04.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.167, p. 18. 19. APDPARA, f.1, r.245, v.2, p. 10; r.241, v.3, pp. 239–242. 20. From Imam Mustafayev to the Selkhoz division of CC CPSU. 13.12.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.160, pp. 328–330. 21. From Fedor Kopilov to Hajibaba Efendiyev. 12.04.1957.//From materials Archive of the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic (further AMNS AR); Stalinskiye deportatsii. (Stalin Deportations) 1928–1953. p. 671. 22. Resolution of CC CPSU “on investigating the 1949 exile of Dashnaks and members of their families from Armenian SSR.” September 1954.//State Archive of the Russian Federation, ( further SARF), f.9401, r.2, v.451, p. 168. 23. Decision of the CC AUCP (B) “on the provision of financial assistance for the publication of the Lusartsakh newspaper. 15.01.1952.//RSASPH, f.17, r.162, v.48, p. 17. 24. Note from shorthand records of TsK KP Azerbaijan Bureau session from March 16 and May 28, 1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.110, pp. 549–550. 25. About the discussion of issues regarding the reestablishment of an Armenian literary journal at a meeting of the Soviet Writer’s Union of Azerbaijan. 20.04.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.525 “a”, pp. 124–125. 26. About the discussions in the department of science and culture of the CCCP on questions of the reestablishment of the Armenian drama theater in Baku. 21.06.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.110, pp. 551–553. 27. From Sadyg Rahimov to Imam Mustafayev. About the question of organization of an Armenian drama theater in Baku. 29.06.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, p.548. 28. From Abdulla Bayramov to Imam Mustafayev. 04.08.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.528 “a”, p. 68. 29. Decision of the CC CPA Bureau of Azerbaijan “on restoration of the Azerbaijani State Armenian Drama Theater in Baku.” 10.08.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.110, p. 544. 30. CC CPA Bureau of Azerbaijan. “Explanation of Comrade Sarkisov about the merits of his argument.” 22.10.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.127, pp. 297–300. 31. APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.185, pp. 10–11.

32. APDPARA, f.1, r.40, v.127, pp. 301–314. 33. See: Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), p. 281. 34. From Vitali Samedov, Mamed Iskenderov, Abdulla Bayramov, and Akima Sultanova to Imam Mustafayev.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, pp. 255–226. 35. Decision of the CC CPA Bureau of Azerbaijan “On the possibility of further usage of the scientific works of Huseynov” 07.09.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.101, pp. 215–230. 36. For more details about the beginning of the rehabilitation process in the mid-1950s in Azerbaijan, see: A. Ismayilov. Azerbaijan: 1953–1956. The First Years of the “Thaw,” pp. 254–256. 37. From Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 10.08.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.133, pp. 289–290. 38. Shorthand from the CC CPSU Azerbaijan Bureau meeting. 31.12.1954.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.135, pp. 140–157. 39. From Vitali Samedov to CC CPSU. 02.02.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.135, p. 139. 40. APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.545, p. 13. 41. Akhundov Veli. Characterization of Comrade Jafar Jafarov, member of the CPSU. 22.08.1967.//APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.490, pp. 7–11. 42. Ponedelnik. Splotit vse tvorcheskiye sily (Ponedelnik. “All creative forces are being ruined”).//“Literaturnaya gazeta,” 1955, 10 March. 43. Meeting with the secretary of the CC CPA of Azerbaijan, Mustafayev, about the question of the Soviet Writers’ Union of the Republic, with the participation of Rumyanets and Ivanov. 31.05.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.392, pp. 20–22. 44. Ibid., pp. 44–54. 45. Ibid., pp. 91–92. 46. Ibid., pp. 127–137. 47. Ibid., pp. 138–148. 48. Ibid., pp. 150–151. 49. Ibid., pp. 151–172. 50. Meeting of active writers of the republic, held at the CC CPA, about the question of the work of Soviet Writers’ Union after the 2nd Congress of Writers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 01.06.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.239, pp. 120–126. 51. Ibid., p. 105. 52. Shorthand from meeting of Bureau of CC CPSU of Azerbaijan. 24.06.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.77, pp. 305–314. 53. Decision of the CC CP Bureau of Azerbaijan “On Serious Mistakes of CPSU Member Comrade Jafarov Jafar.” 24.06.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.83, pp. 3–4. 54. State Archive of Literature and Art of the Azerbaijan Republic named after Salman Mumtaz (further referred to as SALAAR), f.340, r.1, v.453, p. 54. 55. Decision of the Plenum of the leadership of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan. 1955.//SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.453, p. 17. 56. Akhundov Veli. Characterization of member of the CPSS, Comrade Jafar Jafarov. 22.08.1967.//APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.490, pp. 7–9. 57. Meeting of the CC CP Bureau of Azerbaijan “On the 2nd Congress of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan and Publication of its materials.” 13.12.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.108, pp. 199–204. 58. From Imam Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 19.10.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.135, pp. 16–17. 59. Meeting of the CC CPA on the question of the situation of ideological/political work in higher education institutions of the republic. 30.05.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.258, pp. 91–99. 60. Presentation of Comrade Nikita Khrushev at the All-Union meeting of procurators and investigative workers. 25.06.1955.//Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (further AP RF), f.52, r.1, v.312, pp. 18–19. 61. From Rahimov to Mustafayev. 17.01.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.90, p. 203. 62. From Aanatoliy Guskov to Imam Mustafayev. 24.03.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.90, p. 204. 63. About the composition of the KBG regarding Soviet Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 26.08.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.90, p. 199. 64. From Guskov to Mustafayev. 31.03.1955.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 65. Anatoliy Guskov. Information about the attitudes among several sections of the population of Baku. March 1955.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 66. Reports about operative agencies and investigative work presented to the KGB Council of Ministers in 1956.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 67. From Guskov to Mustafayev. 28.07.1955.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 68. Purge of Lavrentiy Beria.//National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 91, p. 29; RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 2.

69. RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 20. 70. RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 36. 71. From Dmitriy Yakovlev to CC CPSU. 25.07.1955.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 42. 72. From Gromov to CC CPSU. 25.07.1955.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 39. 73. From Yakovlev to CC CPSU. 25.07.1955.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.25, p. 42. 74. Minutes from the meeting of the Azerbaijan CC CPA Bureau. 18.20.08.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, fol.89, v.100, p. 329. 75. Decision of the CC CPSU Secretariat. 01.10.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, fol.89, v.100, p. 329. 76. History of Azerbaijan, (in Azeri). Vol. 7, p. 153. 77. APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.100, pp. 333–342. 78. APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3142, pp. 4–7. 79. Decision of the CC CPSU Secretariat from 12 November 1955 “on Comrade Dmitriy Yakovlev.” 12.11.1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.106, p. 21.

Chapter 2

The 20th Congress of the CPSU and Soviet Republics of South Caucasus

The year 1956 proved to be critical from the standpoint of unmasking Stalinism and the criminal nature of the thirty-year-long Soviet system. Stalin’s death was followed by easing of the political regime, cautious debates over social-ideological problems, and a hidden struggle between the country’s leaders that raised many questions. All those related to political processes going on in the country, particularly Party bureaucrats, expected the 20th Congress of the CPSU to offer answers to the questions of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR that came to light after Stalin’s death. It was Khrushchev who first raised the question of the 20th Congress. As far back as April 7, 1955 he sent his recommendations to the CC CPSU Presidium members which provided a basis for debates over the necessity of this Congress. Participants of the debates considered it possible to convene the Congress in late 1955 or early 1956. Khrushchev suggested holding the Congress in February 1956. He offered an agenda as follows: reports of the CC CPSU and central check-up committee, directives of the sixth five-year plan, amendments to the program and charter, and elections to the central Party bodies.1 On the next day, April 8, a meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium passed a decision to convene the 20th Congress on February 14, 1956. Khrushchev offered to approve the agenda. The Presidium decided that every delegate would be representing 5,000 Communists of the country. To elect delegates, they planned to hold a congress of regional and district Party committees in December 1955 and the first half of January 1956. The day of December 21 fell on Stalin’s birthday, which had for many years been a traditional Soviet holiday. This time the date caused heated disputes among Soviet leaders. On November 5, 1955 the CC Presidium was discussing the question “On December 21” in the context of calls to criticize Stalin personality cult. Some Presidium members declined from Khrushchev’s offer not to celebrate the date of December 21. Klement Voroshilov opined that if no grand meeting had been held, this might be misunderstood by people. So he maintained that Stalin’s birthday was to be celebrated as usual. In turn, Lazar Kaganovich backed the CC course for non-adoption of the personality cult. He noted that there were mistakes on this track and that he agreed with Khrushchev. He was not inclined to think that Stalin excelled Lenin. Khrushchev declared that Stalin exterminated the cadre, particularly the military. Koroshilov added that all the statements made were true, but there was the flip side of the same coin: for

instance, Stalin had driven him away, but he had forgiven Stalin. After brief debates, the CC CPSU Presidium passed a decision “On Measures Arising from Stalin’s Birthday on December 21.” It was decided not to hold a grand meeting but make publications in press and radio broadcasts.2 As the date of the Congress approached, Khrushchev was engaged in collecting secret information about Stalin’s repressions and bloody crimes. On December 31, 1955, with a view of stepping up the rehabilitation of the 1930s–1940s repressions, a special commission was set up headed by the CC CPSU Secretary P. Pospelov. It included A. Aristov, N. Shvernik, P. Komarov, R. Rudenko, and I. Serov.3 Serious differences came up among the CC CPSU Presidium members a fortnight before the 20th Congress about how to position Stalin in the report. Khrushchev stood up for tight formulation and rehabilitation of top military and political figures; Molotov stressed the necessity of Stalin’s canonization as a leader of genius. As viewed by Molotov, the report was to stress that Stalin was a great continuer of Lenin’s cause. M. Saburov objected to Molotov, saying that if these facts were true, could it be called “Communism?” These crimes cannot be forgiven. N. Bulganin disagreed with Molotov; still, he did not like that placards and works of Stalin were withdrawn. To Voroshilov’s thinking, the Party should have known the truth. He reaffirmed Khrushchev’s correctness: there were scores of ugliness, and one could not endure these any longer. Secretary of the CC CPSU M. Suslov interfered, adding that for some time past he learned terrible news: for example, Stalin told Dvinskiy that 10–15 people would suffice, while the remaining could be exterminated. Molotov again joined the debates and backed Voroshilov: the truth was that under the guidance of Stalin socialism was built. Khrushchev conceded Stalin’s loyalty to the cause of socialism but made a reservation: he committed crimes to attain this goal, annihilated the most distinguished Party members, and was far from Marxism, so it’d be appropriate to unmask “Stalin’s personality cult.”4 Though meetings of the CC CPSU Presidium had been held behind closed doors, no secrecy was kept about the discussions. Leaders of the Republican Party organizations heard from a distance about changes to come. Pospelov’s commission demanded information about repressions from leaders of the Union Republics and law enforcement bodies, and this fact led to some conjectures. But, as a whole, these leaders, prior to the CC Plenums held on the eve of the 20th Congress, remained in the dark about the future course of events. Active preparations were underway in January 1956 to hold the 21st Congress of the CPA. The CC Plenum discussed a report to the 21st Congress. A variant of the report as submitted by the Secretariat was not approved unanimously. Rahimov, Chairman of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan, who had been at war with Mustafayev as far back as in 1954–1955, was discontent with the fact that the report mentioned no mistakes of the CC CPA Bureau, nor did it criticize those of Mustafayev. Therefore Rahimov suggested that that Mustafayev construe his report in the spirit of self-criticism. When Mustafayev declined from his proposal, Rahimov reminded him that a decision of the CC CPA Bureau was adopted in between the Congresses on the instructions of the CC CPSU, and that decision was to be reflected in the report.5 Proceeding from political processes going on in the USSR, Chairman of the Council of

Ministers Rahimov offered to lay a special emphasis on Narimanov’s role in the history of Azerbaijan. In turn, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet M. Ibrahimov suggested mentioning names of workers of literature, art, and science who fell prey to repressions. Mustafayev considered it possible to include the names of Bolsheviks Narimanov and Samed Agamalyoglu. As for other people repressed, he suggested collecting documents about their rehabilitation.6 The 21st Congress of the CPA started its work on January 25, 1956. As of January 1, 1956, there were 112,945 Party members in the CPA with 651 delegates representing them. Of them, 432 were Azerbaijanis, 107 Russians, 71 Armenians, and 41 other nationalities.7 Mustafayev made a summary report to the Congress. An introductory part of the report consisted of general phrases about domestic and foreign political lines of the Soviet state. The first section of the report was devoted to industry, transport, and construction. The indices were satisfactory; however, the report demonstrated that the Soviet leaders were anxious about backlogs in the oil industry. Mustafayev declared: “At the July 1955 Plenum of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade Bulganin correctly and fairly criticized the work of the CC CPA and the Baku City Party Committee for poor leadership over the oil industry of the Republic.”8 The report said that the CC and the leadership of the Republic drew appropriate conclusions from criticism, made specific steps to improve the work of oil processing and mechanical engineering enterprises, and raise indices of exploration operations and oil extraction. The second part of the report dealt with achievements in agriculture. In examining the situation in agriculture after the September 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU, Mustafayev noted that 390 peace-makers became Heroes of Socialist Labor and twenty-three collective farmers became Stalin Prize winners. The report said that no progress in cotton growing had been reached and that the plan had only been 85 percent implemented. Also, cotton-growers failed to crop above six quintals of cotton per hectare. Mustafayev, visiting Tashkent in 1954, had promised Khrushchev to raise the cotton harvest in Azerbaijan up to 600,000 tons. The report also touched upon an ideological work being done by Party organizations of the Republic. It said that there were 3,616 schools with 35,000 teachers and 600,000 schoolchildren in the mid-1950s in Azerbaijan. In the reviewed period, 35,000 students were educated in fourteen higher educational institutions of the Republic, and 2,088 scholars taught them. Mustafayev noted that one of the most serious shortcomings in the work of higher and secondary special schools was the lack of manuals and textbooks in Azeri.9 Construction of an academic campus in 1954 was presented as a great achievement. One good example was the research work of the Institute of Party History that translated classic works of MarxismLeninism into Azeri. One remaining problem was failure to comply with a decision of the 20th Congress of the CPA on preparation of essays on the history of the CPA. Mustafayev noted that in 1956 the Institute faced a challenging problem: to complete a work on the history of the Azerbaijani Party organization. This part of the report paid great attention to the development of literature and art in the Soviet period. It said that “widely known not only in the Republic but also beyond the bounds

of the Soviet Union are works of our poets and writers Samed Vurghun, Mirza Ibrahimov, Suleyman Rahimov, Mehdi Huseyn, Rasul Rza, Suleyman Rustam; composers Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Muslim Magomayev, Qara Qarayev, Fikret Amirov, Seyid Rustamov; sculptors and painters F. Abdurahmanov, J. Karyagdy, M. Abdullayev, A. Kerimov, and many others.” But along with this, some criticism remained. In his report Mustafayev noted: “Over the past two years congresses of writers and painters, as well as meetings arranged by the CC CPA have been held to expose serious shortcomings in the work of our creative organizations. Not infrequently, our writers, composers, and painters faced failures in their creative work for lack of exactingness. . . . Heads of the Writers Unions Suleyman Rahimov, Mehdi Huseyn, and some members of the Presidium kept aloof from fostering writers in the spirit of correct attitude to criticism.” A section titled “Questions of Party-Organization Work” proved to be the most interesting part of the summary report. Of interest is the fact that disputes around the personalities of Bagirov, Narimanov, and old repressed Bolsheviks, and their rehabilitation was not published in the press.10 Leaders of the Republic were cautious of making Bagirov’s materials public before the legal proceedings started, while the Central Apparatus was to voice its stand on the rehabilitation of Narimanov and repressed Bolsheviks. In his summary report, Mustafayev confined himself to brief information about judicial investigation on the matter of Bagirov and his henchmen. He pointed out that “the investigation revealed that Bagirov, fearing he would be unmasked, especially in connection with his past anti-Soviet, hostile activity, resorted to various provocations–blackmail, lies, calumny, intrigues, falsification of evidence, and other dirty, brutal actions–and slaughtered prominent revolutionaries, active participants of the struggle for the establishment of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan. Overemphasizing his personality, Bagirov tried to erase from the history of the revolutionary movement of Azerbaijan names of true sons of the Party, outstanding Party and political figures and organizers of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan, including Nariman Narimanov.” In support, Mustafayev cited words of Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Mikhail Kalinin during Narimanov’s funeral. He added that Bagirov even forbade using works by Narimanov, “withdrew them out of library stocks, and even annihilated some manuscripts of Narimanov.” Even worse, Bagirov abolished the name of Narimanov as it had been given to regions, collective farms, and enterprises in Azerbaijan. In the meanwhile, collective farms and enterprises in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Kuybyshev region, and other places kept on being named after Narimanov. Mustafayev preferred to restore the glorious name of Narimanov.11 Along with Narimanov, Mustafayev cited names and posts of persons repressed in the 1930s, including R. Akhundov, A. Qarayev, G. Musabekov, S. M. Efendiyev, Huseyn and Hasan Rahmanov, H. Sultanov, M. Narimanov, M. Khalilov, N. Rizayev, M. Juvarly, A. Buniyatzadeh, and others, saying that they and their families had been fully rehabilitated. He declared that approximately 200 persons rehabilitated had already returned home, and of them 122 had been reinstated as Party members and accepted material aid, personal pensions, and medical treatment. Then Mustafayev added that the CC CPA considered the question of Heydar Huseynov and decided to restore his scientific heritage. The Academy of Sciences was instructed to re-publish his fundamental works.12 Mustafayev told Congress participants that

the USSR Procurator’s Office completed an examination of Bagirov’s case and his henchmen and that an open trial would be held in March in Baku. In his summary report, Mustafayev also touched upon an August 1955 resolution “On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPA Bureau.” He discussed critical remarks as set forth in the resolution. At the same time, he emphasized that following the adoption of this resolution, many shortcomings had been removed. Contributing to the preparation and conduct of the Bureau meetings were active work, collectivism, and the high degree of organization of Bureau members.13 The 21st Congress showed great interest in the speech of M. Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. He enumerated the intellectuals repressed in the 1930s, including M. Mushvig, H. Javid, Abbas Mirza, Ulvi Rajab, and M. Kazim Alakbarli. “Everybody remembers what a hard, unbearable situation arose around Heydar Huseynov. The purpose of scientific and art institutions of the Republic is to cherish the immaculate names and fond memories of these comrades, widely publish and propagate their best works, and create works to analyze their heritage.” Ibrahimov noted that “our scholars are faced with serious tasks: to write works on the history of the Azerbaijani people, the Azerbaijani Party organization, and Azerbaijani literature. The young generation ought to know the glorious history of their own people and party organization; they ought to study the long journey of the development of our literature and art. However, there are disagreements on how to evaluate the role of certain historical personalities.” For instance, in 1947 Bakikhanov was declared to be a progressive democratic writer. But when Huseynov made the same claim in his book and then attitudes toward him changed, the official stance on Bakikhanov also changed. In 1949, Bakikhanov was termed monarchist and fanatic, and Huseynov as a bourgeois nationalist who idealized the past. Ibrahimov noted: “We are not going to lay blame fully on scientific institutions and researchers. In my view, the CC CPA Bureau has not always conducted ideological work clearly and promptly. Sometimes it hesitates, showed sluggishness in obvious matters. For example, it took months to decide whether works by Heydar Huseynov were worth being published. After long debates, the CC CPA Bureau finally solved the issue positively. However, the stain put on the reputation of Heydar Huseynov by the bloody hand of Bagirov has not been fully erased.”14 In his speech, Procurator of the Republic A. Babayev dwelt upon the necessity of reconsidering cases of those repressed in 1937–1938. He pointed out that “so far 1031 out of 1209 cases have been considered and these persons are still jailed on charges of counterrevolution activity. In Azerbaijan, 1107 persons are totally rehabilitated. Babayev singled out the names of Professors Atayev and Ismailzadeh, poet-dramatists renowned in the Orient Huseyn Javid and Ahmed Javad, former Chairman of the Writers’ Union Alimamedov, and talented actors Abbas Mirza Sharifzadeh and Ulvi Rajab. When Babayev informed the audience about atrocities committed by KGB officers against innocent people, especially mentioning the work of the former prison doctor, Belenkiy, everybody shuddered with horror. When prisoners appealed to him for help, asking him to alleviate their suffering, he would reply: “Testify what is required, and I’ll give you the necessary medicine.” Babayev also provided an interesting story about bureaucracy in evicting Turks from the Black Sea littoral

and from Transcaucasia in 1949: “In 1872, an Azerbaijani family by the name of Yusufzadeh left for Istanbul, where a son Ismail was born to them. In 1919, the family returned to Azerbaijan and continued to reside there. Ismail had already grown old when he was evicted to the Tomsk region as a Turk in 1949, despite the fact that his father came from Qutkashen and mother from Wartashen and that the family had never had a Turkish citizenship.”15 Chairman of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan Rahimov spoke at the 21st Congress. He gave a briefing about Azerbaijani literature and stressed that the poetry of S. Vurghun, S. Rustam, R. Rza, M. Rahim, and O. Saryvelli was already recognized by readers from the whole Soviet Union. He laid a special emphasis on the glory of Vurghun. Two days before the Congress, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan instituted the honorary title “People’s Poet,” and the same day, on January 23, this title was conferred upon Vurghun. In stressing that Vurghun was truly a people’s poet, Rahimov declared: “In August 1955, we invited Samed Vurghun to attend Isti-Su. ‘Samed,’ we told him, ‘you’re held in respect. Construction operations in Isti-Su are slow. That’s why you must put up in a good word and speed up the completion of the construction of this world’s second spa.’ While at Isti-Su, we witnessed people receive him so cordially, sincerely, like a native brother. Men, women, old people, the whole population of Kelbadjar and public organizations warmly welcomed the poet. Folk ashugs attended a meeting with Samed Vurghun, including fellow villagers of ashug Alesker. I witnessed how happy Samed was. Of particular interest was Vurghun’s meeting with Shamshir, a Party member and the oldest ashug from the distant village of Agdaban in the Kelbadjar region who was a talented disciple of ashug Alesker.” As for present-day Azerbaijani prose, Rahimov placed emphasis on novels including The Day Will Come by Ibrahimov and Absheron by M. Huseyn as well as works by Mir Jalal, Abulhasan, and A. Veliyev. Testifying to the breakthrough in Azerbaijani drama were the plays The Atayev Family by I. Efendiyev, Oculist by I. Safarli, Ildrym by J. Majnunbeyov, and more. Then Rahimov started into criticism, saying that Azerbaijani writers “do not use industrial themes or write about Sumgait, Mingechevir, or Dashkesan; instead, they are engaged with the gossip of the Writers’ Union.”16 The 21st Congress of the CPA decided on the list of delegates from the Azerbaijani Party organization to attend the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Materials from the Congress showed that the Azerbaijani leaders took a wait-and-see position in respect to changes going on in the USSR in the mid-1950s. Closed debates over Azerbaijani history, culture, and social thought, as well as visible differences between the summary report of the Congress and a text published in the press, especially regarding the national question, reaffirmed the lack of determination of the country’s leaders to take a specific stand on the subject owing to uncertainties about the results of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. A Moscow–pressured decision of the CC Bureau (August 1955) and subsequent return to the same issue (October 1955) added prudence to the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities. Following the 21st Congress, the CPA leaders maintained their positions. Mustafayev remained the First Secretary of the CC CPA; Yakovlev was elected Second Secretary; other Secretaries were M. Iskenderov, H. Efendiyev, and A. Bayramov. The CC Bureau included I. Abdullayev, Tofiq Allahverdiyev, P. Arushanov, Bayramov, A. Guskov, Ibrahimov,

Mustafayev, Rahimov, and Efendiyev. Despite being busy with preparations for the 20th Congress, Moscow closely watched the course of the 21st Congress of the CPA. Following the August 1955 decision of the Bureau, Moscow’s attitude toward the Baku leadership changed for the worse. Judging by information of S. Kislin and I. Ignatov, heads of sectors of the CC CPSU, the situation in the Republican leadership did not change after summer 1955. With reference to a conversation that took place in January 1956 between Rahimov, Iskenderov, Yakovkev, and Guskov, CC CPSU observers reported that Mustafayev pretended to reconcile with the conclusions of the commission of Gromov, Yakovlev, and Drozdov to comply with the August decision of the Presidium of the CC. In their opinion, Mustafayev was about to neutralize his opponents. After the Bureau’s decision his relations with Rahimov grew appreciably more complicated. P. Arushanov said that Mustafayev behaved arrogantly and ignored the views of the CC CPA Bureau members. On January 28, 1956, Mustafayev told the Bureau members that membership of Guskov in the CC CPA Bureau would be impossible. To corroborate his words, Mustafayev cited a time when Guskov spoke at the city Party conference and read out a text of the August Bureau decision about serious shortcomings. Commenting on Mustafayev’s words, Guskov emphasized that he expected nothing good from him. In their speeches, Bureau members Yakovlev, Arushanov, Iskenderov, and Efendiyev substantiated the necessity of Guskov’s participation in the CC CPA Bureau meetings, while Ibrahimov, Abdullayev, and Rahimov stood up for friendly relations in the work. Ibrahimov suggested electing Guskov as member of the Bureau, provided he would leave Azerbaijan after the plenum. Following the Congress, Rahimov, Iskenderov, and Yakovlev voiced their firm confidence that the situation in Azerbaijan could not be changed for the better without the interference of the CC CPSU. In their reference dated February 6, 1956 Kislin and Ignatov also joined this opinion.17 Thus the Azerbaijani Party Organization approached the 20th Congress of the CC CPSU in strained conditions. Following the example of Bagirov, former powerful Republican leader, Mustafayev made an attempt to become the sole leader; however, he faced strong opposition from his Republican colleagues. Chairman of the Committee of State Planning N. Baybakov, who took part in the 21st Congress of the CPA, also spoke less than complimentarily of Mustafayev upon his return to Moscow. On the basis of Kislin and Ignatov’s reference, as well as Baybakov’s information, Gromov prepared a report for Mikhail Suslov, CC CPSU Secretary, which said that Mustafayev was a direct culprit of the current negative situation in the CC CPA Bureau and that he made no changes after his mistakes were criticized by the Bureau.18 The 20th Congress of the CC CPSU was held on February 14, 1956 to mark a new era in the life of the country. Khrushchev’s report titled “On Personality Cult and Its Consequences” was absent from the written agenda of the Congress. The report itself and its inclusion in the agenda were kept secret. On the opening day of the Congress, in the morning and evening Khrushchev made a report of the CC CPSU to the Congress. The first section of the report covered the international situation; it dealt with economic development of the USSR and countries of people’s democracy, increasing contradictions in the capitalist countries, policy of “instigating

a cold war by imperialism,” the crisis of the colonial system, the USSR struggle for peace, and strengthening international security, raising some principled questions of contemporary international processes. Khrushchev said that adversaries of peace were trying to assert that the Soviet Union meant to overthrow capitalism in other countries by means of “exporting the revolution”: “it is clear that there are no supporters of capitalism among us communists. But that does not mean that we interfere or intend to interfere with the domestic affairs of states with capitalist systems. Romain Rolland was right in saying that “freedom cannot be imported from abroad like Bourbons in vans.”19 After these words of Khrushchev the whole audience began to move, including main adherents of “exporting the revolution”–leaders of fifty-five communist and working parties. In his report, Khrushchev pointed out that the CC pays a great deal of attention to the observance of legality. If no social legality is observed, enemies of the Soviet state will immediately avail themselves of the situation to attain their base, destabilizing purposes. The unveiled party of Beria behaved exactly in that manner: they tried to put state security bodies above Party and Soviet bodies to breed an atmosphere of illegality and lack of control. After Beria’s arrest and shooting, this approach was accompanied by belittling the role of state security bodies. In 1954, even regional KGB departments were closed and their employees reduced. Khrushchev was greatly interested in re-orientating state security bodies which, thought previously aimed at searching for domestic enemies under Stalin, would now be directed toward strengthening intelligence services outside the country. In his report to the 20th Congress Khrushchev noted that “revision and cancellation of some operations undermined confidence in state security employees. That was incorrect and even harmful, for one cannot forget that enemies are poised always to stymie the building of communism. The capitalist encirclement must have sent scores of spies and saboteurs into our country. It would be naïve to think that the enemies have ceased trying to harm our system.”20 In his third section of the summary report titled “Party,” Khrushchev dwelt on the post-Stalin period, noting that the enemies of socialism expected muddle and doubts to reign in the domestic and external policy of the party. However, the enemies failed to attain their purposes. Khrushchev associated this with the fact that imperialists placed their bets on Beria, who pushed his way into the party and state leadership. Khrushchev praised the victory over Beria as a triumph of the idea of collective leadership of the party. In fact, Khrushchev’s words at the 20th Congress about the unity of Party ranks were far from reality. In the mid-1950s, serious differences arose in the CPSU leadership and the Soviet bodies regarding numerous questions of communist reality. Heated debates broke out among the CC CPSU Presidium members when assessing the consequences of the Stalin personality cult and developing further directions of domestic and foreign policy of the country. In the meantime, the 20th Congress did not clarify the situation; instead, it aggravated the current contradictions. A plenum of the CC CPSU was held a year later (June 1957) to identify the roots of all contradictions. Touching upon the ideological work, Khrushchev casually spoke of Stalin’s “Brief Course” which had been used for the last seventeen years and did delve into its analysis. He confined

himself to stressing that there was a need for a good scholarly textbook on the history of the Marxist party based on historical facts to substantiate the struggle of the Party for communism based on world historical experience with comments to cover the present-day situation. The most interesting part of the Khrushchev report was “Some Questions of National Policy.” It should be noted that the most successful reform of the 1950s was the consolidation of the role of national Republics in running some branches of economy and culture. The summary report noted that some Union Republics were led by poor cadre potential and industrial facilities were few, which is why all enterprises were headed by Union Ministries. Now the situation had changed. The development of industry in the Union Republics was accompanied by competent cadre against the background of a totally enhanced cultural level of Soviet peoples. The time was now ripe to radically change obsolete managerial methods. The rights of the Republican Ministries were appreciably expanded, for Union Ministries had still been subordinated to the Center in identifying planned targets, control over implementation of plans, provision with equipment and capital investments. Khrushchev cited as an example the formation of new ministries in the Republics, including the Ministry of Oil Industry of Azerbaijan and re-subordination of all enterprises thereto. Directives of the sixth five-year plan for 1956–1960 aimed at developing the national economy of the USSR, and a report of Nikolay Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, concentrated on the Union Republics. This was a witness to the developing roles of the periphery. However, the strengthening of the roles of the Union Republics held a declarative nature. Hinting at the system of patronage that had long existed in the USSR, Khrushchev noted that it would be wrong to foster mean-spirited patronage over Union Republics. They were to independently cure their specific problems within the framework of the All-Union plan for development of national economy. Such an approach would contribute to strengthening the sovereignty of each republic and mutual confidence among them to intensify the use of local resources. In so doing, Khrushchev rejected nit-picking in the national question and endeavored to theoretically ground a concept that the law of the Motherland was not contrary to the principle of loyalty to internationalism. Delegates speaking on behalf of Azerbaijan at the 20th Congress of the CC CPSU were Mustafayev and Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. Mustafayev’s report was based on Khrushchev’s summary report, while Rahimov’s report was based on directives of the five-year plan of N. Bulganin. Both speeches had the character of reports back to Moscow; however, Mustafayev’s report revealed processes going on in the Republic. With reference to Khrushchev’s report, Mustafayev spoke of the personality cult, saying that such admiration transforms a political figure into a magic hero, which accordingly humiliates the role of the Party and popular masses, reducing their initiative and creative activity to zero. As an example of the personality cult in Azerbaijan, he cited Bagirov. He added that for long years Bagirov had been engaged in glorifying his personality, surrounding himself with bootlickers and flatterers, committing illicit crimes and petty tyranny. He persecuted and punished honest men, loyal to the cause of the Party and the Soviet State, Old Bolsheviks and activists of the revolutionary movements, and builders of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan. Among his victims

were Narimanov, Agamalyoglu, A. Qarayev, G. Musabekov, and others. Delegates of the Congress did not know that Mustafayev was on the list of persons promoted by Bagirov; however, leaders of the country that chaired the Presidium were well aware of this fact. On February 25, a closed meeting of the 20th Congress was held but no guests or delegations from communist and working parties were allowed to attend the meeting. Khrushchev made a large report “On the Personality Cult and its Consequences.” Documents available show that this report, together with an accompanying letter of Khrushchev with “Top Secret” security classification, was distributed among members and candidates to the Presidium of the CC CPSU membership. Note that a manuscript of this report filled eighty-eight pages.21 When discussing the personality cult, Khrushchev spoke with the reservation that he did not mean to asses the life and activity of Stalin. Many books, brochures, and various research works had been written about Stalin’s contributions to the development of the country in his lifetime. The public was aware of Stalin’s role in the preparation and implementation of the socialist revolution, about his contribution to the civil war, and the construction of socialism in the country. Now the point was about the provenance of Stalin’s personality cult, an issue of great importance for present-day life of the Party and its prospects. First of all, Khrushchev reminded the Congress of severe criticism made by classics of Marxism/Leninism with respect to the personality cult manifestation, and he enumerated some facts of Stalin’s crude behavior even during Lenin’s lifetime. Khrushchev recognized Stalin’s key role in the struggle against Trotskyists, Rightists, and bourgeoisie and in the ideological defeat of enemies of Leninism. However, he attributed the personality cult to the materials of repressions, saying that it was Stalin who put into circulation the definition “enemy of the people.” This definition enabled the authorities to repress anybody disagreeing with Stalin and excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or expression of one’s view on any issues. Khrushchev declared that there were no serious reasons for physical annihilation of party members who opposed the Party line. Hence, “enemy of the people” was introduced to excuse the physical annihilation of repressed persons. The problem is that many people collaborated with Lenin and made mistakes during his lifetime; however, Lenin exploited their contribution, corrected them, and ran their activities. In his report, Khrushchev frequently and naturally referred to Lenin and cited examples from his life. To prove the collapse of Stalinism, he relied on Leninism as his basis in order to neutralize the resistance of Stalinists and their possible attacks. That was the correct tactic for the mid-1950s, when Stalin died, but the ideas of Stalinism still held sway over the Soviet society. Khrushchev reported that outrage against the Party and its CC was started by Stalin in 1934 right after the 17th Congress of the CPSU. No Congresses were convened for thirteen years between the 18th and 19th Congresses, nor were CC Plenums held during the Patriotic War. That came as a direct consequence of Stalin’s despotism. Then Khrushchev acquainted delegates with the results of the work of the Pospelov, Aristov, Shvernik, and Komarov commission, providing the following information: Party, Soviet, and economic senior officials charged as “enemies of the people,” and annihilated by the KGB, were not in fact enemies and saboteurs. They were slandered, and in some cases did not withstand brutal torture and

pleaded their guilt in unprecedented crimes. Of 139 members and candidates to membership of the CC elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98 had been arrested; of 1966 delegates to the Congress, 1,108 were arrested in 1937–1938. Then Khrushchev gave details about the association of S. M. Kirov.22 He cited fact after fact, one more terrible than another.23 In 1937, Nikolay Yezhov, people’s commissar of internal affairs, prepared a reference “On Intelligence Activity against Anti-Soviet Turkic-Tatar nationalistic organizations.” This reference goes to show an unprecedented scope of repressions in 1937–1938. It cites examples of how people were falsely charged, tortured mercilessly, and forced to slander themselves and other people. The reference said that secret anti-Soviet activity of local nationalists had stepped up lately in the eastern national Republics and regions (Azerbaijan, Crimea, Tatarstan, and others). Of particular importance was the activity of “Musavat” in Azerbaijan and “Milli Firka” in the Crimea. The principal political objective of these organizations was to withdraw from the USSR and create a “unified state of Turan,” uniting with Turkey. To substantiate his thesis, Yezhov cited the words of arrested Prof. Bekir Chobanzadeh: “I consider it necessary to get out of the USSR and create a unified Turkic-Turan state. Also, I’m a supporter of the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic state. In considering that the international situation makes it impossible to withdraw from the USSR and create an independent state, I consider it possible to establish a Turkic-Tatar state after the example of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Such a unified Turkic-Tatar state could be a member of the USSR on the basis of a treaty, but this seems to be possible in case of the change of Soviet leadership and its policy. In the end, I’m standing up for the establishment of the unified state of Turan.” According to Yezhov, these nationalistic organizations maintained ties with the Crimean “Milli Firka” via Chobanzadeh, with “Musavat” via Kiyasbekov and Mamedhasan Baharly, with Daghestan nationalists headed by Uzeyir Hajibeyov via Prof. Aziz Gubaydulin, as well as with Tatar nationalists via Sultan Galiyev. Judging by Yezhov’s reference, in its anti-Soviet activity this organization relied on the Turkish Party “Unity and Progress” represented in the person of Ismail Hikmet and the Turkish consul to Baku, Ferid bey. It was alleged that in 1934 this organization sided with a Trotskyist organization headed by Sefin, Secretary of the Baku Committee of the CPA. Under an agreement, one of the terms of unification was an obligation of nationalists to assist Trotskyists in destroying the USSR, while Trotskyists undertook to breed conditions for Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the USSR. Yezhov wrote that this organization was active among students in Baku, Ashgabat, Tashkent, and other towns and that this organization’s propaganda tended toward the side of fascist Germany. For instance, when arrested Baharly declared: I make no differences between fascism, including the German fascism, and the “Musavat” movement; they are identical and allied. Hence, “Musavat” displays a reliance on fascism, for sooner or later the Germans will defeat communism and overthrow the Soviet power. We believe that the German fascism will wage war against the USSR, so “Musavat” will avail itself of chaos in the country to seize power.” Then Yezhov noted that the investigation proved connections between this organization and foreign centers in Iran and Warsaw.24 In his report “On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences” Khrushchev underscored that

political repressions of 1937 were carried out under the slogan of the struggle against Trotskyism which, in fact, posed no threat for the country: Trotskyism as political phenomenon was destroyed as far back as in 1927. The start of a struggle against Trotskyism as declared by Stalin at the February–March plenum of 1937 was explained by Khrushchev as being due to an attempt to lay a theoretical basis under mass repressions and justify an erroneous thesis that the resistance of enemies would allegedly be intensified as the victory of socialism became nearer. In so doing, Stalin referred to the lessons of history and Lenin’s teaching. To prove that neither history nor Lenin adhered to the above, Khrushchev cited numerous facts from the experience of Lenin’s leadership over the Soviet power. Khrushchev made the audience shudder with horror when he informed the participants about brutal tortures of prominent Party and state figures, reading out fragments from investigations. To corroborate his words, he dwelt on the destinies of candidates to the Political Bureau membership Eiche and Rudzutak. Using these examples, Khrushchev went on to show that “anti-Soviet centers” and “blocks,” “provocations,” and “sabotages” allegedly unmasked by internal bodies were artificially fabricated. He announced that from 1954 to the present, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court had rehabilitated 7,679 people, many of them posthumously. Appreciating Stalin’s role in the repressions of the 1930s, Khrushchev summarized as follows: “He was chief prosecutor in these matters. Not only did he give his permission for arrests but also initiated them. The delegates of this Congress should have a clear idea of all these crimes to give an appropriate assessment and make adequate conclusions.”25 Then Khrushchev started examining Stalin’s activity during the patriotic war: “Many Soviet novels, films, and historical studies describe the role of Stalin in the patriotic war quite improbably. The most typical scheme is as follows: Stalin knew and predicted everything.” For the first time in the Soviet history Khrushchev publicized Stalin’s concealing of the exact date of Germany’s aggression against the USSR. He stressed that these valuable intelligence data and information of foreign state figures were ignored by Stalin. As a whole, he questioned the image of a great strategist and commander as it was firmly established in the public opinion. From the podium, Khrushchev said, “much more was written. Time and time again he departed from the text.”26 One of the most interesting parts of Khrushchev’s report dealt with the national policy of the Party. He condemned the migration of separate peoples from native lands to other places and proved that there was no military necessity for this migration. Among innocent peoples that suffered as a result of migrations, Khrushchev enumerated Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, and Balkars.27 However, the report did not mention Crimean Tatars, Turks, and Greeks from the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea seacoast. In his report, Khrushchev dealt with the “Mingrelian case,” under which the CC CPSU Political Bureau had already passed a decision in 1951–1952. He said: “We know that in Georgia, like some other Republics, there were manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism. A question arises: when the decisions above were adopted, did nationalistic tendencies threaten Georgia’s withdrawal from the Soviet Union and its transfer into the Turkish State? That’s nonsense. One can hardly imagine that such suppositions could even arise. In considering the situation in Georgia with the hard living conditions of workers in Turkey, was

it possible for Georgians to dream of joining Turkey? In 1955 steel production per capita in Turkey fell to eighteen times less than that of Georgia. Also, electric energy generated in Georgia per capita was nine times greater than in Turkey. According to the census of 1950, 65 percent of the Turkish population was illiterate, including 80 percent of the female population. There were nineteen higher educational institutions in Georgia with about 39,000 students, which was eight times greater than in Turkey, whose population was six times that of Georgia’s. . . . In fact no nationalistic organization has ever functioned in Georgia. Thousands of innocent Soviet people fell prey to the despotism and illegality. All these were done under the “genial” leadership of Stalin, “Great Son” of the Georgian people, “as Georgians liked to call their compatriot.”28 In his report Khrushchev examined in detail the harm caused by the personality cult to the country’s foreign policy. As an example, he referred to the case of Yugoslavia. At the end of his speech, Khrushchev touched upon a question of Beria, saying: “It’s established now that this villain made his career through scores of dead bodies. The CC knew that Beria collaborated with the Musavat’s intelligence service; however, Stalin attached no importance to this fact.” To conclude, Khrushchev emphasized that the personality cult had to be approached very seriously, saying “we have no right to make this question public outside the Congress or mass media. That’s why this question is being discussed in a closed meeting.”29 Sergey Khrushchev writes that the “secret” report literally shook the country, but it remained a secret no more than a couple of weeks.30 Despite Khrushchev’s efforts, the report “On Personality Cult and Its Consequences” became known to the broader public. On February 27, a text of the report was handed over to the heads of thirteen Communist and working parties, including leaders of eleven Socialist countries and Communist parties of France and Italy. It was agreed that they would return the texts of the report to the CC CPSU before leaving the USSR. Other foreign delegates were provided with ten to fifteen minutes of information on the subject several hours before their departure. On March 1, 1956, all the CC CPSU Presidium members acknowledged their consent in a written form with an edited variant of Khrushchev’s report of February 25. With the security classification “Not for Press,” the report was printed in fifty copies and distributed on March 5 among Communist parties of the Union Republics, district, and regional committees. It was instructed to return the document to the CC CPSU within three months. A little later, another 150 copies of the report were sent to the Soviet embassies abroad and Central committees of foreign communist parties. In June–July 1956, Khrushchev’s secret document was published not only in developed countries but even in Iran, Indonesia, and Chile. In a short while, the whole world, except for the Soviet people, was aware of the full text of the report. The mass media of some countries obtained this text via black markets. After the report was distributed among Party organizations, local committees began discussing this document. Note that the report faced different responses: discontent arose in some parts of the country, while some Party organizations raised the question of Stalin lickspittles who still held leading positions. For example, at a Party meeting of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, some people accused CC CPSU

Presidium members for the hard conditions in the country and suggested calling them to account for dereliction of duty. The meeting participants compared the current speeches of those persons with the speeches they made at the XIX Congress, and charged top Party functionaries with hypocrisy. Other Party meetings suggested convening an extraordinary 21st Party Congress and criticized Khrushchev, Molotov, Mokiyan, and Malenkov.31 Thus, a Party meeting of the State Security Committee of the Latvian SSR officials Kukushkin and Lobanov alleged that the question of a personality cult had insufficiently been covered in Khrushchev’s report. Vodolazova, teacher of the Tashkent secondary school #36, said the following: “As for the personality cult, it was Stalin’s entourage who contributed to this cult. I cannot forget Molotov’s statement that ‘our great happiness is that Stalin was side by side with us during the Great Patriotic War.’ Now there is an identical tendency. Some CPSU members are presently engaged in creating Khrushchev’s personality cult.” Communist Schulz from Estonia told a Party meeting at the Pyarnu beer-lemonade factory that the 20th Congress was closed, without criticism or self-criticism, and that Congress materials were not published in full. Further he added that in Stalin’s lifetime everyone, including Khrushchev, praised him to the skies, but now they all held a different opinion. Party meetings in the Ukraine strongly opposed the Party’s new line. Pototskiy, head of the Marxism-Leninism Department of the Stanislav Pedagogical Institute, Ukrainian SSR, alleged that “without the personality cult we couldn’t have implemented five-year plans and gained a victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War.”32 Following the Congress resolutions Anna Pankratova, editor in chief of the Questions of History journal, delivered lectures in Leningrad on March 20–23 with the theme “The 20th Party Congress and Tasks of Historical Science.” Her memorandum to the CC CPSU Presidium said that approximately 6,000 intellectuals attended the lectures. More than 800 notes were submitted on political issues, including the personality cult. Pankratova in turn submitted the text of these notes to the CC CPSU Presidium. The notes showed a lack of consensus among the Leningrad public’s views on Khrushchev’s struggle against the personality cult. For instance, “many notes raised the question of not only denouncing Stalin’s cult but also unmasking those advocating this cult.” Another portion of the notes considered it “inexpedient to revise the role of ‘dead Stalin’ and, instead, expressed their displeasure with ‘exposing Stalin’s name to public dishonor.’” Also, the notes revealed that “Leningrad residents were strongly indignant about ‘taking down and annihilating Stalin’s portraits, withdrawing his works from libraries and bookshops, memorial plaques, and so on.” Pankratova selected the bluntest of the notes, for example, “Khrushchev’s report to the closed meeting of the congress on the personality cult gave an absolutely unpersuasive answer to the question: “Where were the Presidium members?”; “Was there any opportunity to oppose the personality cult till 1953 and who missed this opportunity?”; “What did our country have from 1934 to 1956: dictatorship of the class, Party, Central Committee, or military dictatorship of a separate person? If the latter, why was the Party silent and what was the Party’s role in this dictatorship?”; and “Do not the one-party system and nearly complete merging of bodies of power and Party organs further the personality cult?” Scores of questions touched upon the

Party line in the national question. Some scientific workers voiced their concern about manifestations of nationalism in the activities of Georgian scholars. They recommended Georgian scholars to provide their scientific works with resumes in Russian, so that broader circles of Soviet researchers could avail themselves of these works. Some notes dealt with anti-Semitism and the struggle against its manifestations. Questions arose: “Why is antiSemitism still extant in our country? Why aren’t official orders on dismissing Jews withdrawn from safes? Why aren’t Jews admitted to certain departments in higher education institutions?”.33 The same is true of debates over the personality cult at Party meetings in military units. Reports said that Communists welcomed resolutions of the 20th Congress, although in some places individual officers protested them. Thus, Stekolshikov, major of a special infantry division, told a Party meeting that “Stalin committed some mistakes but this became possible because members of the CC CPSU Presidium favored the creation of a personality cult and did not set Stalin straight in time.” In turn, Morozov, captain of the third rank of the Anapa training detachment, said that “the Party ought not to oppose the cult of Stalin, for ‘this enables our enemies to fight against us, and leads to negative consequences.’” A party meeting of the 32nd border detachment of the South-Western district was engaged in the same debates. Kakhiani, an officer of the 10th border detachment, after having looked through Khrushchev’s report, spoke of separate Party leaders in an insulting tone and set rumors afloat that political demonstrations took place in Moscow, Leningrad, and Georgia.34 Although a report of the Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs, Dudorov, defined the actions of the officers as provocation, Georgia ended up in a crisis situation on March 5–the day of Stalin’s death. The Transcaucasian Republics each discussed Khrushchev’s report uniquely. Whereas the debates in Georgia were accompanied by street demonstrations and meetings, on the eve of Bagirov’s trial people in Azerbaijan preferred to show prudence and avoid being absorbed in the problem. In Armenia, protesters tried to link all Armenian misfortunes and territorial claims to Mountainous Garabagh, Nakhchivan, and Javakhetia with Stalin’s personality cult. It should be noted that Stalin’s death and Beria’s arrest had a very negative impact on the situation in Georgia. In some parts of his report Khrushchev stressed “the Georgian origin” of Stalin and Beria, and this insulted and caused moral damage to Georgians. Even the CIA documents paid attention to this fact. When summing up texts of anonymous articles in Pravda of July 4 and in Izvestiya of July 7, American Ambassador Charles Bohlen reported to Washington that Beria was charged with spoiling friendly relations between the Soviet Republics, fomenting hostile sentiments, and conniving bourgeois nationalistic elements. In examining this information, CIA experts wrote: “This accusation raises scores of questions. It is incredible that Beria as Minister could have ever dared to oppose the great Russian power chauvinism. Perhaps with his de-Russification policy Beria tried to enlist support of other Republics, so he positioned himself as a liberal and humanist, not a composed policeman”. Proceeding from the then Soviet practice, a CIA Beria personality reference said: “It has to be kept in mind that when eliminating disagreeable top officials the Soviet authorities imputed them to grave crimes.” The CIA reference added that Vladimir Dekanozov, Soviet Ambassador

to Germany on the eve of the war, was appointed a deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs to seek a separate peace treaty with Germany, according to the Soviet special services. Allegedly, Beria and other top officials of Georgian origin showed initiative in clearing up Hitler’s stand on the possibility of the establishment of an independent Georgian state.35 After Beria’s arrest, a joint 13–14 July 1953 Plenum of the CC CPG and Tbilisi city Party Committee considered a cadre question: Akakiy Mgeladze, First Secretary of the CC CPG who succeeded Kandid Charkviani, was dismissed and replaced by Alexandr Mirtskhulava, and Valerian Bakradze appointed a chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Plenum criticized Charkviani’s activity as head of the Georgian CP organization; Nikolay Ruhadze as State Security Minister in 1948–1952, as well as Mgeladze. In autumn 1953, the agenda of Georgia included the question of the Republic’s new leadership. A September Plenum of the CC CPG put on the agenda a question of putting decisions of the July 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU into practice. Attending the Plenum was Nikolay Shatalin, Secretary of the CC CPSU. Under Moscow’s “recommendation,” the Plenum aimed to purge the Republic from Beria’s cadres. As a result, A. Mirtskhulava was dismissed from his post of the First Secretary and Vasiliy Mzhavandze succeeded to him as the First Secretary. Khrushchev knew him very well as a former member of the military council of the Kharkov, Kiev, and Prikarpatye military districts in 1947–1953, as well as a member of the organizing bureau of the Khrushchev-led CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Note that G. Javakhishvili, the head of the Tbilisi executive committee in 1945–1952 and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia since 1953, replaced V. Bakradze, and M. Chubinidze was recommended to assume the post of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR. In February 1954, a great number of top officials of the Republic, including the Second Secretary of the CC CPG D. Romelashvili and the Third Secretary V. Chkhivadze, were relieved from their posts due to close relations with Beria. It should be noted that Khrushchev’s report on the personality cult and its broader discussions put the Georgian leadership at a disadvantage. As has been noted above, some aspects of Khrushchev’s report touched on sore spots of Georgians’ national feelings. Particularly untimely was the coincidence of personality cult debates with Stalin’s death. On March 4, a group of Tbilisi residents gathered at the Stalin monument and behaved aggressively. A member of the CPSU, fifty-year-old N. I. Parastishvili, “climbed to a pedestal of the monument and swore like a trooper. He took a mouthful from a wine bottle and smashed it down, saying: ‘Let all the enemies of Stalin be ruined like this bottle’.”36 A student of the Georgian Polytechnic Insitute, E. Devraziani, demanded that an unknown major of the Soviet Army stand guard of honor of Stalin’s monument. When the latter refused, the student tried to stab the officer but was detained by militiamen. A large crowd, numbering approximately 300, beat off security forces and freed the detainee. Note that this spontaneous meeting lasted till midnight.37 On March 5 at daybreak, approximately 120–150 students took to the streets of Tbilisi. They had portraits of Stalin their hands and made their way to the monument. The students, “angry at Khrushchev’s denunciation of a native son, organized demonstrations to prevent the removal of a monument to Stalin.”38 Passers-by joined them as they moved in this direction. The protesters

demanded car drivers to signal incessantly, and the city was alarmed. The protesters laid a wreath on Stalin’s monument and paid their respects to his memory. The same picture was typical for all the towns of Georgia. In the first days of March, the Khrushchev report was not permitted to be discussed in Sukhumi. On March 5, students of Sukhumi’s technical and secondary schools as well as students of the pedagogical institute, Georgians and Mingrelians, and workers of enterprises and various organizations gathered together with wreaths and flags in their hands at Stalin’s monument on the central square. A guard of honor was arranged, and meeting began which lasted until March 10. The number of meeting participants reached 12,000–15,000.39 Owing to the current situation, a meeting was held on March 6 at the CC CPG with the participation of about seventy–eighty heads of ministries, newspapers, and magazines. After giving a briefing on the situation V. Mzhavanadze read a closed letter of the CC CPSU “On the Personality Cult.” Rumors were afloat around the city. Despite efforts of the country’s leadership, the situation in the city and regions spun out of control. On March 7, students of I. V. Stalin State University took to the streets. A little later they were joined by students of other educational institutions as well. Rustaveli Avenue was overcrowded, and slogans could be heard such as “Long live great Stalin!”40 By the end of the day the number of protesters reached 70,000. Attempts of militiamen to disperse the meeting yielded no results. On March 8, studies at educational institutions stopped, offices and enterprises ceased to work, and Tbilisi plunged into chaos. By 3:00 p.m. Lenin square and an area of the Stalin monument were captured by the protesters. In the meanwhile, Moscow neglected to take the Georgian developments seriously, as evidenced by correspondence between law enforcement bodies and the CC CPSU. The protesters demanded that First Secretary Mzhavanadze and Deputy Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Marshal Zhu De, address the meeting. On March 8 at 12:00 p.m. Mzhavanadze spoke before the protesters, saying that he would not allow injustices in respect of Stalin.41 By the evening, the protesters made their way toward Zhu De’s residence. At the request of the Georgian leadership, the guest had twice appeared to greet the protesters; however, he declined the suggestion of going to Stalin’s monument. In the protesters’ view, one of the Chinese leaders ought to speak and reaffirm the international importance of Stalin’s personality. In the end, a representative of the Chinese delegation spoke at the meeting. He was followed by poets K. Kaladze, I. Noneyshvili, I. Abashidze, and K. Bobokhidze, who recited verses about Stalin. On March 9, the authorities tried to take the initiative and bring mourning ceremonies into the official framework. Mourning meetings were planned to take place at plants, factories, offices, and institutions. In so doing, the authorities endeavored to drive the protestors away from streets and squares. However, they made a mistake. The same day the Tbilisi meeting assumed a political nature. Mzhavanadze and other Georgian leaders spoke in the squares and gave various promises; however, the crowd called for the change of the government, intending to “capture the post, telegraph, and editorial offices even if blood must be shed to attain the goal.” In addition, the protesters called for help and support for all the Republics. A certain R. Kupiani read out a petition which demanded the recall of the closed letter to the CC CPSU; relieve Anastas Mikoyan, Bulganin, and

Khrushchev from their posts; renovate the government; release the former First Secretary of the CC CPA Bagirov; nominate Mgeladze and Mzhavanadze for the Presidium of the CC CPSU; introduce Stalin’s son Vasiliy into the CC; and announce general amnesty. The meetings also called for beating Armenians and the banishment of Russians from Georgia. Finally, Moscow lost all patience. On March 9, commander of the Transcaucasian military district I. Fedyuninskiy was ordered to set the army against the protesters; patrols appeared in Tbilisi at 12:00 a.m.; and every fifteen–twenty minutes the authorities addressed communists, young communist activists, workers, and employees in Russian and Georgian. Tanks and troops entered the city, and bloody skirmishes broke out.42 Fifteen people were killed, including two women; fifty-four were wounded at Stalin’s monument, and the Georgian Internal Ministry said seven who were wounded died later; about 300 protesters were arrested. On March 10, processions were staged in various parts of the city; however, the army dispersed them immediately. Around 7:00 p.m. the message was received that rioters were heading toward the Armenian quarter Avlabar; however, this information later proved false. Events of the same sort took place in Gori on March 5–9 as well. The number of protesters on Stalin square reached 70,000 on March 9. However, as in Sukhumi, these actions were quelled on March 10.43 Note that the Georgian developments were echoed across the world. A letter to Khrushchev from R. Gulia in Sukhumi dated March 23 likened the 5–9 March events to the Menshevist counter-revolution of 1926. The letter said that these actions led by nationalists and chauvinists were directed against Russians, Abkhazians, and Armenians. Gulia suggested making Abkhazia a part of the Russian Federation and thus resolving the problem once and for all.44 Russian residents of Georgia, in turn, were very anxious about developments in Tbilisi and other towns. As far back as in Stalin’s lifetime, anonymous letters had come from Tbilisi to Moscow in Russian which complained that Russian history had been Georgianized. For example, in September 1947 an anonymous letter was sent to the magazine Partiynaya zhizn that asked to bring the contents of this letter to the CC CPSU’s notice. A deputy editor in chief of the magazine sent it to the secretary of the CC CPSU Andrey Zhdanov. The letter said that a Tbilisi newspaper Zarya Vostoka published an article, “Georgians in Moscow,” which stated that “were it not for Georgians, Moscow would not exist at all, nor celebrate its 800th anniversary.” It alleged that Georgians created cannons and artillery in Russia; built a Donskoy cloister in Moscow; were associates and commanders of Peter the Great; and that Aleksey Tolstoy’s book Peter the First ran contrary to the truth. It claimed that it was not Alexander Menshikov who was an associate to Peter, but Alexander, the son of a Georgian king. Apparently Tolstoy dug through historical archives and wrote his remarkable book Peter the First in vain. The same article “Georgians in Moscow” negates the entirety of Russian history, and it is simply a disgrace that the Party organizations overlooked such a menshevist article, especially on the eve of Moscow’s 800th anniversary. Before that, the film David Guramishvili was released, in which Russian Queen Anna Ioannovna, Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, and her court speak Georgian. No Russian history mentions this fact, so why did the film producers Georgianize the Russian empresses? This article gives rise to chauvinism in the

minds of youth. During a meeting several Party functionaries asked their Georgian counterparts to briefly translate the article; in reply they were told: if you do not speak Georgian, you should just go back to your Russia.45 The number of letters of this sort visibly increased in the 1950s. The March Georgian events stirred up Moscow. CPSU functionaries hurriedly arrived in Tbilisi, Gori, and Sukhumi. A Party meeting in Sukhumi, March 21, was attended by Alexandr Shelepin, First Secretary at the All-Union Komsomol organization; a meeting in Gori was attended by I. Shikin and F. Dolgikh. In both cases, nationalistic actions were harshly criticized, while activities of towns’ Party organizations were declared extremely unsatisfactory. Right after the Georgian developments, on March 26, 1956, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the suggestion of the CC CPSU, passed a decision on measures to urgently liquidate consequences of criminal actions of Beria and his associates. The said decision relied on an identical resolution of the CC CPSU dated March 12. The document said that much work had been done to undo grave consequences of the actions of Beria’s gang, yet a great number of innocent people charged with counter-revolutionary activity were still jailed. Also, the document considered it necessary to set up a commission for examination of cases connected with political accusations and economic crimes. All these proceeded in terms criticism of Beria, who had abandoned the political arena as far back as in 1953. On July 30, 1956, the CC CPSU passed a resolution titled “On Mistakes and Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPG.” The resolution focused on the March 5–9 events and stressed the revival of nationalism, shortcomings in the national policy, and confrontation of Georgians with Abkhazians, Armenians, and Ossetians. All these were attributed to the hostile nationalistic policy of Beria. The Georgian Communist Party was criticized for failure to fight against manifestations of bourgeois-nationalistic ideology; to properly pressure creative organizations, scientific, and educational institutions; and failure to organize educational work inside intellectual environment. It was pointed out that works of science and art showed signs of bourgeois nationalism and decadence. Historical works paid no attention to the role of popular masses, idealized activities of Georgian Kings, falsified historical roots of friendship between the Georgian and Russian peoples, and belittled the role and progressive significance of Georgia’s joining Russian. As for the Stalin’s personality cult, the document treated the subject carefully: it emphasized Stalin’s theoretical and organizational abilities, his services in preparing and implementing the socialist revolution, his contribution to the victory in the civil war, and the triumph of building socialism. On the other hand, the document noted that the CC CPSU could not pass over Stalin’s blunders in silence; his delusions had greatly damaged the country, including the Georgian CP and the entire Georgian people. The CC CPSU considered it necessary to implement all ten items of the decision by December 1, 1956 and report back to Moscow.46 On July 18, 1956, E. Gromov, head of the CC CPSU department for party organs of Union Republics, on the order of the Soviet leadership, phoned Second Secretary of the CC CPA Yakovlev and instructed him to acquaint the Bureau members and the First Secretary of the

regional Party committee with the CC CPSU decision “On Mistakes and Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPG.” Note that CC senior executives and secretaries of town, district and regional Party committees had already been notified about this decision.47 Debates over the decision of the 20th Congress of the CPSU started in Azerbaijan on March 13. Mustafayev made a report at a Party meeting titled “Results of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Tasks of the Party Organization.” The report was devoted to retelling Khrushchev’s speech at the Congress. He declared that the personality cult in Azerbaijan was associated with the name of Bagirov. In fact, Mustafayev repeated much of what had been said about Bagirov at the 21st Congress of the CPA and the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Speeches of other speakers voiced support to Khrushchev’s line. In so doing, the speakers tried in every possible way to avoid mentioning the personality cult in Azerbaijan. According to the KGB, on the eve of the Bagirov trial the situation in Azerbaijan was unstable, for the Georgian developments had a negative effect on the situation in Azerbaijan. On J. Jabbarly Street in Baku were discovered leaflets, the first item of which said: “It’s our mission to set Bagirov free.” The second item said: “Let’s rally closely round Georgians; down with Russians and Armenians.” The third item said: “It’s necessary to introduce the Moslem alphabet and decline from the Russian alphabet.” Further, the text added: “We Moslems have been under the yoke of Russians and Armenians for thirty-six years. They are plundering us, misappropriating our riches. Should Baku remain in our country, we would become millionaires. Russians are taking away our oil, wool, cotton, tea, rice, butter, milk, eggs. Don’t be afraid. Long live soldiers and officers of Turkey.”48 A leaflet with the following text was spread in Sumgait: “We inform Caucasian Moslems that at present we must oust Russians from any parts of the Caucasus, drive Armenians back into Armenia. Oh, Moslems, oh, Azerbaijanis, every nation takes care of its own needs, except for Azerbaijanis. Georgians beat Russians and drive them out. Russians arrive here and take our bread away. We must unite closely with Georgians and oust Russians from our land. Let’s liberate Mir Jafar Bagirov. Georgia and Armenia have their native written language, while we, Azerbaijanis, have to use the Russian written language. We ought not to be scared of aliens, for Georgia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India are behind us.” Translations of both leaflets were attested by Captain Markarov, senior commissioner of the 2nd sector of the 4th department of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.49 Also, Guskov reported to the CC CPA that in the morning of May 18 an anti-Soviet, nationalistic leaflet was discovered in Sumgait on Pushkin street. A leaflet of the same sort was discovered in Baku on Lenin street. An anti-Soviet, nationalistic leaflet arrived the same day in the CC CPA. The author of these leaflets demanded readers to release Bagirov, banish Russians and Armenians from Azerbaijan, and rely on Turkey and other capitalist countries. An examination of these leaflets revealed that they were authored by Rzayev Kamil Khalil oglu, b.1930, native of the village Saatly, Azerbaijan SSR, carpenter of the trust “Grazhdanstroy” in Sumgait. All K. Rzayev’s family members were taken under KGB control, and he was arrested and sentenced to six years of imprisonment.50 Another letter from Guskov to the CC CPA dated February 13, 1956 said that the KGB

established an author of an anonymous anti-Soviet letter addressed to the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR from Baku. It was Hasanov Huseyn Aga Nusret oglu, native of the village Abasabad, Yardymly region. It also turned out that in 1955 he had already sent anonymous letters to the CC CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. According to the criminal nature of Hasanov’s letters, he was sentenced to five years of imprisonment.51 A report on the KGB’s activity in 1956 provided information about the anti-Soviet activity of some Azerbaijani citizens. For instance, Rahimli Rasul Haji Kerim oglu, native of the village Lagidj, sent anti-Soviet, nationalistic letters to various state bodies that criticized Russians and the domestic affairs of the country. For anti-Soviet propaganda and propinquity to Musavatists, Rahimli was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment but was released ahead of schedule in 1942. However, he kept on writing anti-Soviet and nationalistic letters, so in December 1956 he was re-condemned for another seven years. In addition, student of Azerbaijan State University Tatliyev Sabir Ali oglu wrote anonymous letters to various organizations which expressed dissatisfaction with the CPSU and Soviet government’s national policy and demanded the release of Bagirov. Born in 1938 in the village of Dagkesaman, Akstafa region, Tatliyev was sentenced to two years in 1956. The director of the cognac factory in the town of Geokchay, Yusubov Mazair Kerim oglu, educated as an agronomer, sent anti-Soviet, nationalistic letters to the Party and Soviet system. In the letters he sharply criticized the situation in the country and heads of the communist Party and the Soviet state, as well as advocating for Bagirov. M. Yusubov noted that if Bagirov was executed, 3 million Azerbaijani people and 1.5 million Iranian democrats would rise and demand to join Iran. The KGB arrested Yusubov, and he was condemned. In January 1956, the KGB arrested Hajiyev Yusif Ismail oglu, b.1917, charged with sending four anonymous anti-Soviet, nationalistic letters to various organizations. His letters criticized grievous material and social conditions of the Soviet, Party and state leaders, after which he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. In 1956 a student of the Azerbaijan Industrial Institute Babayev Khanahmad Isa oglu, b.1937 in the village of Miyanku, Masally region, sent anonymous anti-Soviet, nationalistic letters to the CC CPSU, CC CPA, and editors of Zarya Vostoka newspaper. In his letters he criticized leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state. In April 1956, three anonymous letters arrived in the CC CPA which harshly criticized one of the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state. Though a KGB report did not mention the name of the leader, it was evident that letter pointed to Khrushchev. In summarizing the letters of protest, KGB bodies avoided naming Khrushchev by introducing the term “one of the leaders of the Party and the Soviet state.” Per the instructions of the CC CPA, the Republican KGB established that the letters were authored by Ganiyev Tofik Ibrahim oglu, b.1926, native of Baku. It revealed that a leaflet with nationalistic calls was attached by Ganiyev to a lamp post on A. Aslanov Street. The leaflet called on Azerbaijan to withdraw from the USSR.52 In August 1956, Chairman of the KGB Guskov sent a letter to the CC CPA which informed them about anti-Soviet, nationalistic letters of a certain Jafarov Bahman Kazim oglu, a teacher, who sent six anonymous letters since February 1955 to different organizations

about disfranchised conditions of Azerbaijanis and their life under the yoke.53 The KGB established that B. Jafarov worked as assistant to a prison chief in 1919 in Ganja and joined the Communist Party in 1920, according to the State Archives of the October Revolution. However, the fact of his collaboration with the Musavat police became public, and in 1928 he was expelled from the Party. KGB materials revealed that Jafarov wrote anonymous letters to the CC CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Azerbaijani leaders.54 In April 1956, on the instruction of the CC CPA, a check-up was carried out in the national security bodies. A document says that a certain Bahshaliyev Jabar Shahmamed oglu, b.1931, a resident of the village Aliabad, Lerik region, sent anonymous letters to various organizations which alleged that leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state were pursuing a policy inconsistent with interests of the Azerbaijani people and proved the necessity of Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the USSR. On the Soviet KGB instruction, the national security bodies had been engaged since June 1956 in detecting the so-called “Organization of Young Nationalists.” One of the Moscow-addressed letters was signed “Secretary of the Organization of Young Nationalists A. Mamedov.” The author of the letter called on the Azerbaijani people to start an active war against the Soviet power, proving the necessity of Azerbaijan’s joining Turkey, saying that in this case only Azerbaijan would gain national sovereignty and independence. Security bodies revealed the author of the letter – it proved to be a tenth grader of the Baku school #190 Mamedbeyli Agalar Rzagulu oglu. Considering the seriousness of the political calls of the letter, A. Mamedbeyli was put under surveillance.55 It should be noted that secret societies and movements and nationalistic tendencies in the Soviet society intensified after Stalin’s death and Beria’s arrest. To discontinue this tendency, in March 1954, the CC CPSU passed a secret decision under which the KGB undertook “to unmask hostile activities of bourgeois nationalists” and “suppress subversive actions of foreign emigrant centers; detect authors of anti-Soviet anonymous documents.” To attain this goal, the Republican KGB intensified agential work among intellectuals and students, as well as speeding up actions against emigrant organizations. Specially recruited agents collaborated with the population. Particularly valuable were agents from intelligentsia. For instance, in February 1956, a head of the photo laboratory of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, under a pseudonym Ildrym, with higher education and a good reputation among intellectuals of Baku, took an active role in supervising a certain T. Aslanov and K. Abdullayev, suspects of anti-Sovietism. Acting under the pseudonym “Samvel” was a student of Baku State University who collected information about trends in students’ environment and re-emigrants. To judge by his personal qualities, Samvel was reputed to be a promising agent. However, security bodies were discontent with some older agents who, in an attempt to remain afloat, provided false information and reports. For example, agents Vasiliyev and Nizami reported on the establishment of an anti-Soviet organization of Murids in Zangelan, Gubadly, and Jabrayil. However, this report was not confirmed, and a further check revealed that these agents acted as misinformants and provocateurs.56 In his report for 1956, Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic Fedor Kopylov wrote that nineteen operatives maintained relations with agents at twenty-eight safe houses. Note that eleven to

twelve agents were assigned to each operative. He complained that intelligence work was not satisfactory among 25,000 Baku students. According to him, the intelligence apparatus in charge of higher educational institutions consisted of fifty-nine persons. He reported: “Testifying to the poor work with agents by higher educational institutions is the fact that we obtain untimely signals about anti-Soviet manifestations in Baku institutions. This is also explained by the small number of agents among intellectuals and youth. Large educational institutions, such as Azerbaijan Industrial Institute, Azerbaijan Medical Institute and Azerbaijan State University, are monitored by five to six agents each, while the National Economy Institute has only three agents.”57 Along with actions aimed at suppressing anti-Soviet and nationalistic sentiments among Azerbaijanis, the security bodies established strict control over the Jewish population of Baku. A case of Baku resident, Abraham Mostov, says that in 1956 he had repeatedly visited Moscow, where he tried to establish contacts with an Israeli Ambassador but failed. At the same time he had a meeting with an Israeli attaché, Eliahu Hazan. The Soviet KGB found out that Hazan was an agent of the political intelligence apparatus of Israel, and during his stay in Moscow had established close ties with Jews, providing them with Zionist materials and nationalistic literature. The fact that Mostov received an invitation to go to Israel but declined it stirred up KGB suspicions. Skilled agents Samoylov and Ilyin were instructed to establish Mostov’s possible participation in the Israeli intelligence. In July 1955, Israeli Ambassador to the USSR Avidar visited the Baku synagogue under the KGB control. The same year, American journalist Schwarz also visited the synagogue, following which a letter came from chief rabbi of Israel in April 1956 to the synagogue that suggested measures to meet urgent needs of the Jewish community. To prevent an outflow of the Jewish population of the USSR to Israel, the KGB was actively involved in the correspondence process and sent false information and letters. At the same time, the security bodies took advantage of the repatriation process and thereby tried to implant their agents into various strata of Israeli society. According to agents Pochtovik and Kasymov, a third-year student of the philological faculty of the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute Kurbanov Musa Gulam oglu disseminated anti-Soviet, nationalistic sentiments among his classmates, telling them that there were groups of youth dissatisfied by the policy and practical steps of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Of greater interest is the information provided by the agent under the pseudonym Geroy, who described a certain A. Tartarashvili who worked in bakery №3 and resided in Baku. In a conversation with Geroy, Tartarashvili said that Georgians were plotting a conspiracy to take place in early 1957, and they were not alone. Working in association with them were Azerbaijanis striving for independence. He said that they aimed to get out of the USSR in collaboration with Turkey and the United States of America. It has to be kept in mind that one major task of special services was to organize agents’ networks in the religious environment and seize control over holy places in Azerbaijan. For this reason, agents were actively implanted among Adventists, Pentecostalists, and other sectarians. In his report, Colonel Kopylov expressed his anxiety about the fact that believers

stepped up their activity in the course of Moslem mourning “Moharram.” According to him, on the day of the “Ashura” religious feast in 1956, approximately 3,000 believers gathered together in the mosque “Teze pir.” He emphasized that Communists and young communist league members also took part in this ceremony. At the same time, the colonel stressed that the Transcaucasian Moslems Department was under vigilant surveillance of the KGB. To judge by information available, no ant-Soviet actions were conducted during rites of worship or visits to holy places. Nevertheless, KGB agents were even implanted into small groups of pilgrims visiting Mecca and Mashhad. It should be noted that even participants of Olympic Games were on an intelligence mission. Thus, one of the Azerbaijani sportsmen acted as an agent under the pseudonym Kulikov. He was reputed to be a promising counter-intelligence agent and even visited Melbourne to take part in the sixteenth Olympic Games. In this capacity he collaborated with agents of the first KGB Department under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The same year in the Spartakiad athletics festival of Soviet Nations, not only did agents participate as members of the Azerbaijan delegation but also KGB operatives participated as sportsmen proper.58 On the other hand, operatives suffered major set-backs as well. As of January 1, 1956, the fourth department agent had to investigate 467 anti-Soviet leaflets scattered in the outskirts of Baku on October 19, 1955, in the region of an Armenian cemetery, and 273 anti-Soviet leaflets discovered in the outskirts of Kirovabad. Despite all efforts, the authors of these leaflets were not discovered. The majority of these leaflets bore nationalistic nature. In addition to the leaflets, there were seventy anonymous letters of fifty-four authors circulated about various Union and Republican, Party and administrative bodies. Of them, forty-four letters were of anti-Soviet, nationalistic nature.59 According to the Soviet KGB, foreign intelligence services showed great interest in Bagirov’s trial. Lieutenant-general Zheleznyakov, chief of KGB special department for the Transcaucasian military district, wrote to the Georgian CC secretary P. Kovanov that a Turkish agent “B” was instructed to worm out the population’s sentiments in connection with the struggle against the personality cult and the trial over Bagirov.60 Immediately after the 20th congress of the CPSU, on March 2, 1956, Procurator General Roman Rudenko announced a state accusation against Bagirov, A. I. Atakishiyev, K. I. Grigoryan, R. A. Markaryan, T. Borshev, and S. F. Yemelyanov. A case against Y. D. Sumbatov-Topuridze was suspended due to his illness. The accusation said that Bagirov, in close collaboration with Beria and others, accused and condemned innocent people, physically tortured them, forced suspects to make statements, and executed thousands of innocent. Many victims were sent to Gulag camps. At first, Bagirov was charged with staging a car accident, following which Seyid Jafar Pishevari died in 1947. However, this episode remained unproven. When Bagirov replied that it’d be better to appeal to Moscow on this matter, judges preferred to keep silent. Thus, the death of Pishevari was a sealed book to the public. In the meanwhile, former chief of the Yevlakh regional KGB department Salayev Latif Samed oglu declared as follows: “I believe that the car accident was coordinated to kill Pishevari.” Salayev’s evidence made it clear that attempts had been made to seek the instigators of the car accident abroad. The blame for this crime was laid on Karmik Melikhyan, driver of

Pishevari’s car. Salayev said that “after Pishevari’s death, chief of the Shamkhor regional KGB department Sarkisov Ruben Mirzayevich told me that before the accident he had been aware of the fact that driver Melikhyan was a son of Dashaks’ leader, his wife was a Pole, and his daughter worked at the British Embassy to Iran.”61 Beyond any doubts, Melikyan was directly involved in this provocation. However, by spreading muddled rumors and associating this crime with Iranian Dashnaks, the true perpetrators of the crime tried to divert suspicions away from Moscow. As soon as Pishevary died in the Yevlakh regional hospital, the regional KGB department was instructed to keep his death secret. Pishevari was buried late at night, secretly without a tombstone, indicating that executors fulfilled Moscow’s order. During the course Bagirov’s trial, April 12–26, 1956 in Baku, he was charged with violating many articles of the criminal code. A great number of “documents” were available to confirm the anti-Soviet nature of his activity since 1918, as evidenced by numerous “witnesses.” Investigation materials reflected “traditions” of that time period: the bill of particulars was more reminiscent of a Party resolution with political background than a legal document. It said that Bagirov and his nearest associates, Sumbatov–Topuridze, Atakishiyev, Markaryan, Grigoryan, Borshev, and Yemelyanov, applied methods of a terroristic structure characteristic of Beria. One acquainted with the investigation materials and the accusatory act may observe that Bagirov’s trial in Azerbaijan copied his trial in Moscow in 1953. Of interest is the fact that the number of the accused also coincided. Following two-week legal proceedings, the Military Board of the Supreme Court announced its sentence on April 26, 1956, under which Bagirov, Borshev, Markaryan, and Grigoryan were sentenced to death, and Atakishiyev and Yemelyanov to twenty-five years of imprisonment. The sentence was final without the right of appeal. A week later acting Procurator General of the USSR P. Baranov and Chairman of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR A. Cheptsov submitted secret information to the Presidium of the CC CPSU about open legal proceedings in Baku. It was reported that “from April 12 to 26 in Baku the open legal proceedings of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Comrade Cheptsov, with the participation of public prosecutor in the person of Procurator General of the USSR Comrade Rudenko, and legal defense considered the cases of Bagirov, Borshev, Markaryan, Grigoryan, Atakishiyev, and Yemelyanov. Attending the trial were upward of 700 people, including Party activists, workers of Baku enterprises, seamen, collective farmers, and intellectuals. Evidence of witnesses that unmasked the criminals, a speech of the public prosecutor, and a sentence were unanimously welcomed by the attendees.” The memorandum above, together with a copy of the sentence, was distributed among the Presidium of the CC CPSU members, candidates to the Presidium Members and the CC CPSU Secretaries. Note that Bagirov appealed to the leaders of the country with a request for pardon; however, the Supreme Court of the USSR rejected this appeal. On May 7, 1956, the Presidium of the CC CPSU approved the sentence of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR on the case of Bagirov and his associates. It was decided to publish a report on the legal proceedings and the sentence in local mass media.62 Some publications and rumors said that Bagirov had not been executed by shooting and that he was kept at a Russian prison and was

even sending letters from the prison. But these were only rumors. At a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU dated May 7, 1956 the sentence was approved and ordered to be executed. Bagirov and the other accused were shot.63 It should be noted that Bagirov’s trial slightly postponed a propaganda campaign on the implementation of Party documents criticizing the personality cult of Stalin. That’s why a resolution of the CC CPSU, dated June 30, 1956 “On Removal of the Personality Cult and Its Consequences” across the country, and Azerbaijan in particular, gave a new impetus to this process. To cover the population with this propaganda campaign, the CC CPA passed a decision dated July 3, 1956, under which meetings of propagandists were organized in Baku, Kirovabad, Nakhchivan, Stepanakert, Sumgait, and Nukha. The following Bureau members were sent as chief speakers: to Baku–T. Allahverdiyev; to Kirovobad–Yakovlev; to Nakhchivan–K. Mamedov; to Stepanakert–Y. Grigoryan; to Sumgait–Iskenderov; to Mingechevir and Nukha–A. Bayramov. Under a decision of the Bureau, all district, town and regional Party Committees undertook to arrange wide discussions of the said resolution of the CC CPSU on removing consequences of the personality cult. Also, the Republican, regional, town, and district newspapers were instructed to regularly elucidate the course of this propaganda campaign.64 However, meetings arranged in July aimed at criticizing the personality cult were not all smooth sailing. G. Pisman, deputy head of the Party organs department of the CC CPA, reported on August 2, 1956 that some Party organizations had cast doubts on the political line of the Party and the government. For instance, on July 10, a Party meeting of a closed enterprise (mailbox #2) said a worker’s wages render him incapable of hosting his friends, while parties and festive meals are regularly organized in the Kremlin. Some speakers openly opposed the general line of the Party. Communist Malova openly declared: “The government is busy with breakfast and lunch, perfectly indifferent to the needs of youth; it has turned Russia into a revolving door.” That was also a reflection of the ordinary people’s view on the development of friendly relations with the “third world” countries. Several members of GRES, a primary Party organization of the Krasin, noted the following: “When Comrade Khrushchev arrives somewhere, crowds of people greet him with flowers, and this is also a personality cult. Comrade Khrushchev gives presents out to other countries, for instance, tractors to Yugoslavia, as if these tractors are owned by him.” Communist Yermolayev stated: “I’m listening to London, and they are quite different about the personality cult. I think that Malenkov has wrongly been dismissed, because he’s a true Leninist. Also, Molotov and Kaganovich are pushed into the background, but they’re old Party figures.” Communist Kharitonov asked a rhetorical question: “Shall we ever live well?” and answered: “Never, I think!” Communist M. M. Salmanov spoke at a meeting of the primary Party organization of the oilfield #1 “Azizbeyovneft,” stressing the impossibility of peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems and the inadmissibility of making costly and expensive presents to heads of other states on behalf of the Soviet government. He said: “My family consists of seven members; we receive 2 kg of bread per person. So we have to queue up for bread several times, which is absolutely wrong.” Pisman points out that these anti-Party, apolitical and

harmful speeches met no adequate rebuff nor were they condemned by communist participants of these meetings. Hence, he recommended the Baku town Party Committee to seriously analyze these speeches and take necessary measures.65 On August 24, the CC CPA Bureau passed a decision “On Facts of Anti-Party Speeches at Some Party Organizations of Baku” during debates over a CC CPSU resolution “On Removal of the Personality Cult and Its Consequences.” It said that weakening educational work in some Party organizations resulted in speeches of Communists directed against the political line of the Party and the Soviet government. The CC CPA Bureau considered it inadmissible that demagogic and anti-Party speeches of some CPSU members met no adequate repulse from meetings of communists. The Baku City Party Committee was instructed to take practical measures aimed at strengthening Party work at Baku Party organizations with a special emphasis on ideological aspects. Yakovlev, Iskenderov, and Allahverdiyev were commissioned with holding meetings at enterprises which voiced their displeasure with recent developments in the country, and also with discussing the CC CPA Bureau decision of August 24.66 In view of the fact that a campaign against the personality cult concurred in Azerbaijan with the Bagirov trial, appropriate discussions were noted for their cautious nature. Nevertheless, the 20th Congress decisions stirred up social-political processes in the Republic, leading to the depending and awakening of national and cultural enlightenment. Developments arising from the death of Stalin, arrest of Beria and innovations of the 20th Congress concerned the Armenian SSR as well. The CIA’s report of August 1954 on Beria’s elimination said that “Armenia is the third Republic which sympathized with Beria’s removal. The ‘purging’ process here lasted rather long.”67 Gr. Arutinov, who had headed the Armenian Communist Party since 1937, was reputed to be Beria’s protégé. He was born in 1900 in the town of Telavi, province of Tiflis. In 1927, he graduated from the Moscow Institute of National Economy named after K. Marx and had long been engaged in the Party work of Georgia. In 1931–34, Arutinov headed an organizational department of the CC CP of Georgia; in 1934– 1937, he was Second and First Secretary of the Tbilisi Party Committee. In 1936, Agasi Khandjan was shot due to Beria’s intrigues. In 1936–1937, it was Amatuni Amatuni who held the office of the First Secretary of the Armenian Party organization; beginning in 1937, on the recommendation of Beria, the then First Secretary of the Tbilisi Committee, Grigoriy Arutinov, held the position of First Secretary of the CC CP of Armenia till the end of 1953.68 To promote Arutinov, the authorities made use of the 1937 suicide of S. M. Ter-Gabrielyan, former Chairman of the Armenian Council of People’s Commissars. In this case, Stalin and Molotov appealed to the CC CP of Armenia in September 1937 with a letter, and Malenkov, together with a special group of investigators headed by M. Litvin, chief of the fourth Soviet KGB department, arrived in Yerevan. The group was instructed to unmask and liquidate a secret counter-revolutionary organization in Armenia. Following one month of work, the investigators arrested 1,183 people, of which 505 were later shot. On September 1937, a CC Plenum took place in Yerevan, during which A. Mikoyan, in agreement with Beria, promoted the candidacy of Arutinov to assume the post of First Secretary of the CP of Armenia.69

Before Beria’s trial, which took place on December 18–23, 1953, a Plenum of the CC CP of Armenia was held on December 4 with the participation of P. Pospelov, Secretary of the CC CPSU. Officially, it was devoted to discussing decisions of the July 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU on agriculture. However, a special emphasis was laid on Arutinov. Foreign observers associated Arutinov’s December dismissal with the fact that in 1951 Arutinov, jointly with Bagirov, opposed Khrushchev’s program “Agrogorod.” However, the conflict went back to 1949 when Khrushchev was elected the CC CPSU Secretary but continued heading the Moscow city and regional Party organizations. In the early1950s he put forward the concept of “Agrogorod.” Although Stalin did not oppose this idea, the Beria-controlled Party press of the Transcaucasian Republics criticized the concept. In fact, the Republican press hardly dared to oppose Khrushchev’s project without Stalin’s consent. After the Soviet leader’s death, Arutinov, in common with Bagirov, tended to support Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, not Khrushchev. CIA experts noted: “When dismissing Arutinov, the Armenian CC Plenum referred to the decisions of the July 1953 Plenum of the CC CPSU, which revealed a connection of his case with Beria’s case. Arutinov and Bagirov’s criticism of Khrushchev’s ‘Agrogorod’ project added fuel to Arutinov’s dismissal.”70 However, Soviet official bodies tried not to link this matter with Beria’s case. Other sins were brought into the foreground: violation of the collectivism principle in the administration; narrowing down the Secretariat and Bureau’s role; preference of dictatorship methods; bureaucratic attitudes toward agriculture and production; and so on. Beria’s arrest was followed by Khoren Grigoryan’s dismissal and his subsequent arrest. Note that Grigoryan had once worked in Azerbaijan; later on he held a position as the Armenian Internal Minister, 1949–March 1953; till January 1954 he headed a department of the same ministry. From early 1937, Grigoryan headed a department of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan. He exhibited particular brutality toward victims of the 1937– 1938 repressions. After his arrest in 1954, Fedor Goryayev testified as follows: “Every department applied special ‘arms’ to make prisoners slander both themselves and others. For instance, head of department Grigoryan had a special belt, 50–60 cm long and two fingers thick. They also used a ruler, a thin vine, and even aircraft rope. . . . All executions occurred at nighttime. Grigoryan ordered us to beat prisoners at night only. . . . He instructed investigators as follows: each of them had to work prisoners into such a condition that People’s Commissar Sumbatov and then Rayev could reckon a specific prisoner in the ‘first category,’ and the Military Board of the Supreme Soviet or a military tribunal could sentence him to be shot.”71 As Beria’s protégé, Grigoryan was sentenced to be shot at the public trial in Baku. Another of Beria’s henchmen, Ruben Markaryan, was relieved from his post as Internal Minister of the Daghestan ASSR and later arrested. In 1936–1939, as head of the department and later as Deputy Internal Commissar of the Azerbaijan SSR, he was personally involved in arresting and beating prisoners and falsifying criminal cases. Since 1943, as People’s Commissar of Daghestan for Internal Affairs, Markaryan was personally in charge of the deportation of Chechens and Ingushes. Having familiarized himself with evidence from the Grigoryan, Markaryan, Borshev, and Sumbatov-Topuridze cases, Bagirov declared: “I

believed them, entrusted them with bodies of the Internal Commissariat. My guilt before the nation is so great that I deserve not only shooting, hanging; no, I deserve quartering, to be broken into pieces.”72 In April 1956, Markaryan was also given a death penalty. In 1954, yet another of Beria’s henchmen, Vagan Grigoryan, was relieved from his post. In 1933–1946, he was a senior executive of the Tbilisi-headquartered newspaper Zarya Vostoka. In 1946, Beria took him to Moscow and entrusted him with heading a department of central newspapers under the Propaganda and Agitation Board of the CC CPSU. In 1947–1949, he worked as deputy editor of the newspaper For Lasting Peace and People’s Democracy; and in 1949–1953–chairman of the foreign political commission under the CC CPSU and head of the CC commission for foreign Communist Parties, including various Armenian societies. After dissolution of the said commission in 1953–1954, Grigoryan headed a department on foreign Communist Parties; beginning in May 1954 he headed the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was a member of the Foreign Affairs Board. In September 1954, owing to Beria’s case, Grigoryan was dismissed on charges of “insincerity to the Party.” CIA experts noted: “Grigoryan’s dismissal was attributable to Beria’s case. In the 1930s, Grigoryan collaborated with Beria in Georgia and, through mediation of the latter, he moved to Moscow, the CC CPSU, and on September 9, 1954, he was replaced by Leonid Ilichev.”73 As is seen, problems arising from Beria’s case dealt with Armenians, both in the Republic and on a national basis. However, foreign experts failed to explain the immunity of Mikoyan, who had for long years collaborated with Beria in 1919–1920 during their joint activity in Transcaucasia. The CIA report pointed out that charges against Beria could have easily been applied to other Soviet leaders as well. For example, Mikoyan’s career in 1919–1920 was closely related to Beria. The two of them were arrested and held in a Georgian prison.74 It should be noted that the change of leaders in Armenia started from the appointment of Suren Tovmasyan as the First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party in December 1953. Tovmasyan was born in 1910 in the Zangezur district of Elizovetpol province. After graduating from Yerevan State University he was long engaged with Party work. In 1948–1953, he was the Secretary of the Yerevan city and district committees of the Armenian Communist Party. In December 1953, he was appointed the First Secretary of the CC of the Armenian Communist Party to work in this capacity till 1961. In 1954, a new Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR was appointed. Shmavon Arushanyan was born in 1903, Minkend village, Zangezur district of Elizavetpol province. He led the office till 1963. Since 1937, Arushanyan had held leading Party and state positions in Armenia.75 A little earlier, in 1952, Anton Kochinyan, who had held the posts of First Secretary of the CC of the Armenian Communist Party and First Secretary of the Yerevan city Party Committee in 1946–52, was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Armenia. He contrived to escape “purges” in Transcaucasia and stayed in office till 1966. When the Soviet government laid territorial claims to Turkey in 1945, a question of the transfer of Kars and Ardagan to the Armenian SSR was so realistic that regional Kars and Ardagan committees had been set up under the Armenian Communist Party. In 1946, as an experienced Komsomol and Party figure, he was appointed secretary of the Kars

regional Party committee.76 In February 1954, the 20th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party was held to criticize old leaders. In his report to the Congress Tovmasyan accused Arutinov of infringing principles of collectivism, dictatorship, and other faults. In 1954, Bureau meetings even charged Arutinov with deporting Azerbaijanis from the Armenian SSR. However, further developments showed that this was only a propaganda trick. The death of Stalin, Beria’s trial, and charges in the Armenian leadership gave Azerbaijanis who had been deported in 1948–1953 from Armenia the hope of returning home. By April 1954, 1,154 Azerbaijani farms returned to the Armenian SSR. Fearing that this process would assume mass character, the Armenian leaders appealed to Moscow. Pressured by the Center, Azerbaijani leaders had to take measures aimed at preventing deported Azerbaijanis’ return to Armenia. In April 1954, a large delegation of Azerbaijani specialists, headed by Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Azerbaijan SSR Mohsun Poladov, made their way to Armenia to establish the causes of deportation and conduct explanatory work. However, some people managed to return home. For example, a protracted litigation between the village of Lambali and the leadership of Armenia reached Moscow. Under instructions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers G. Malenkov, a commission of the Ministry of Agriculture arrived in the Armenian SSR which reaffirmed the legality of the demands of Lambadi villagers. As a result, the Armenian Communist Party Bureau ordered that homes be returned to their former owners and that Azerbaijanis be hired to work at a newly created state farm for subtropical plants. But that was the exception to the rule. For a long span of time, Lambali villagers, according to instructions of the Council of Ministers, were not allowed into their native village and were compelled to settle in the Basarkechar region.77 To shake Azerbaijanis’ morale, Armenia’s single pedagogical institute in Azeri and its 200 students were transferred to the Khanlar region of the Azerbaijan SSR. Even worse, an Azerbaijani branch of the Yerevan pedagogical institute was transferred to Baku and attached to the Azerbaijani state pedagogical institute. As a whole, the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia lasted till 1956. Note that another 5,876 (1,316 farms) were deported from Armenia to Azerbaijan in 1954–1956. Under the pretext of struggle against the personality cult in the mid-1950s, Armenians tried to return “lost” territories. The 20th Congress was followed by demands to separate Mountainous Garabagh and Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan, Javakhetiya from Georgia, and eastern vilayets from Turkey. Discussions about decisions of the 20th Congress were focused on Stalin and Beria; however, the discussions quickly shifted to concentrate on nationalistic themes and to manifest themselves in the form of territorial claims. In his report to the CC CPSU on March 23, 1956, Tovmasyan emphasized that meetings of residents of Yerevan criticized Stalin’s personality cult and noted great damage incurred by Beria to the Party, state, and people. Workers insisted that Stalin, this murderer of thousands of people, was not worthy of being placed close to Lenin in the mausoleum. Speakers voiced their discontent with contents of the “Brief History of the CPSU” which ignored activities of progressive revolutionaries of Transcaucasia–Shaumyan, Japaridze, and other Party figures–and laid an emphasis on Stalin

only. Tovmasyan reported to Moscow that meeting participants asked quite a few questions about the ideological heritage of Stalin and his attitude to his portraits and monuments. Why didn’t members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU raise the question of the personality cult at the 19th Congress of the CPSU or during Stalin’s lifetime? Why was the Yugoslavian delegation absent at the 20th Congress of the CPSU?78 Three weeks later, on April 12, Tovmasyan sent a new report to Moscow which, together with other speeches, marked out a speech of lecturer of the Yerevan State University R. Arutyunyan, who suggested making Mountainous Garabagh a part of Armenia. Tovmasyan openly confessed that other Party meetings were making calls of this sort and that Armenian Communists did not criticize such “anti-Party fabrications.”79 A Party meeting of the Writers’ Union of Armenia that lasted five days running was noted for territorial claims to neighboring Republics and Turkey. Writer B. Ovsepyan charged the Turkish government with pursuing anti-Armenian, anti-Jewish, and anti-Greek policy: “For many years we’ve been crying that Armenia has its own statehood and independent government. Enemies of the Armenian people are saying the opposite. Headed by American multimillionaires, they are alleging that it is not true. At present, when Israel and Greece are raising their voices against the Turkish tyranny, the government of Armenia is silent, so enemies of the Armenian people are encouraged and eager to prove that they’re right and that there is no government at all in Armenia.” At this moment the cue was given in the room that the French government was standing up in defense of Armenians, while the Soviet government kept silent. Another writer, S. Arzumanyan, spoke at the meeting and raised the question of Garabagh, Nakhchivan, and Javakhetiya. He said that these regions had historically been integral parts of Armenia and demanded that they be joined to the Armenian SSR. The speaker said these territories were economically backward, had no educational structures, plants or factories, and peasants in Javakhetiya worked as farm hands. Touching upon the “cluttering up” of the Armenian language, he noted: “During the latest election of the Catholicos (in 1955) I happened to hear a radio report by Gnel, a priest of the Armenian church in Cilicia. True, that was a church ceremony, but what language, purity, pronunciation, patriotic warmth! My heart overflowed with delight! Armenians residing in Cilicia, Syria, Bulgaria, and France have succeeded in preserving the Armenian image, language and spirit more than Armenians from Moscow, Baku, Odessa, Leningrad, Tashkent, and so forth.” Arzumanyan cited an anecdote about Don Quixote and paraphrasing his words, said: “If Don Quixote unexpectedly came to life and saw the reality I have referred to, he would have cried out: ‘Listen, Sancho, either this is not Socialism, or I’m a Turk’.” Very similar demagogic, anti-Party, and anti-Soviet statements were made at a Party meeting in Yerevan State University, March 29–31. Vice President of YSU Agayan declared that “for several years we have faced infringement of the national dignity” of Armenians; scores of national policy questions remain open and have still to be addressed, in particular the question of Armenian lands in Turkey. He noted: “When the Soviet government declared that it had no territorial claims to Turkey, had it appealed to the government of the Republic? That question

concerns us; had it asked the Armenian people about this decision? And finally, had it asked the 1.5 million Armenians about it? It is their territory.” In support of Agayan, postgraduate Pogosyan pointed out that people acquainted with pogroms of Armenians, Jews, and Greeks in Turkey have to know that the Soviet government did not take the side of Armenians persecuted in Turkey: “The Soviet Union advocated not only peoples consisting a part of the USSR but also the interests of other countries, yet, it declined to protect Armenians. . . . It turned out that the French government which took the responsibility for advocating the interests of Armenians is more humane than our government.” A detailed reference was made by F. Yakovlev, deputy head of the Party Organs Department under the CC CPSU, and V. Gorin, head of the Organization and Party Information Sector, to inform M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the CC CPSU, about departures of Party members from CPSU standards in Armenia and other Union Republics.80 The reference was signed by head of the department E. I. Gromov. After the 20th Congress, the Armenian church intensified its activity to lay territorial claims to Turkey and neighboring Republics. On May 12, 1956, head of the Armenian church Catholicos Vazgen I sent two messages to N. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The first message described the role of the church in the history of the Armenian people, and reported that dreams of the Armenian people came true under the Soviet power. Among others, the message asked to take into account privileges granted to the Armenian church during Stalin’s rule and help them be realized. In particular, it said that “thanks to a decree of the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. I. V. Stalin, dated April 19, 1945, Echmiadzin was granted certain privileges that have not been realized through either the fault of clerics or government bodies.” In addition, Vazgen I raised the question of opening churches for Armenians residing in other regions of the USSR. It added that “we kindly ask you to open new churches in the regions of the Soviet Union where large numbers of Armenians reside. That’s a problem of great importance. On the territory of Azerbaijan there reside upwards of a half million Armenians [under the 1959 census, 442,000—J. Hasanli]. However, there are just two churches–in Baku and Kirovobad. In the autonomous region of Mountainous Garabagh with its 200,000 Armenians [under the 1959 census, there were a total of 130,400, including 110,100 Armenians—J. H.], there is just one church, not in the regional center but in a remote village. There are not churches in the areas with Armenian populations in the Nakhchivan region. There are not churches in the Central Asian Republics where the Armenian population reaches 100,000. There are just four churches in Georgia with its 400,000 Armenians: two in Tbilisi and two in the remote regions. There are not churches in the large towns with great Armenian populations, including Batumi and Sukhumi. All these facts are widely known to the foreign clergy and prominent public figures, so this gives rise to an unfavorable opinion of the church conditions in our country.”81 In a second message on the same date, Vazgen I touched upon more challenging issues. He demanded the joining of Mountainous Garabagh, Nakhchivan, and the Akhalkalaki region of Georgia to Armenia, alleging that foreign Armenians had initiated these views. He wrote: “The eyes of more than 1 million Armenians abroad are turned to Echmiadzin, the Motherland– Soviet Armenia. They believe that the Armenian question will justly be resolved, that

Armenians will return home. . . . While abroad, we are asked about the necessity of resolving questions of Mountainous Garabagh, Nakhchivan ASSR and the Akhalkalaki region, which are largely populated by Armenians who are still staying outside the borders of Soviet Armenia. Thus, foreign Armenians are hopeful that the Soviet government will create necessary conditions for Armenians abroad, including territorial, economic and housing conditions, to return home and reunite with their native brothers. I’d like to add that the stronger the Armenian land and Armenia, the safer the southern borders of our Great Motherland will be.”82 The Armenian church leader’s last phrase provides ideological substantiation for “just resolution” of the Armenian question. Note that the concept of territorial claims gripped Armenians living both in the USSR and abroad. This posed a threat to the territorial integrity of the South Caucasian Republics, primarily Azerbaijan. In August 1957, upon the invitation of the Soviet government, leader of the Party “Ramvakar Azatakan” Parunak Tovmasyan arrived in the USSR secretly on a false passport. While in Moscow, he met with Danil Solod, deputy head of the Near and Middle East department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and asked him to transfer the Mountainous Garabagh autonomous region of the Azerbaijan SSR to Armenia. This idea was suggested to Tovmasyan in Yerevan, which he had visited before going to Moscow. It should be noted that P. Tovmasyan was received by all the leaders of Armenia, including (twice) Suren Tovmasyan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party. Their views coincided on many issues. Following the results of these meetings, S. Tovmasyan sent a thirteen-page report to the CC CPSU.83 These meetings saw a rather “interesting” appeal to the leaders of Azerbaijan published on October 18, 1960 in the Armenian newspaper Baykar (“Struggle”), issued in Boston (United States of America). On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet power in Armenia, the newspaper called on the government of Azerbaijan to give Armenia “the greatest present,” Mountainous Garabagh and Nakhchivan. This bore a strong resemblance to the calls of the Communist leaders of Armenia whose territory made up 9,800 km2 on the date of the establishment of the Soviet power. Later on, the territory of Armenia reached 29,000 km2 thanks to the patronage and favor of the central authorities. Having looked through the contents of the “call,” V. Akhundov, First Secretary of the CC CPA, instructed CC Secretary N. Hadjiyev to prepare an appropriate answer in collaboration with scientists and lawyers of the Azerbaijan Republic. This document played a crucial role in safeguarding interests of the Republic before the central Moscow authorities. In September 1958, Moscow residents M. L. Episkoposov and G. L. Episkoposova submitted an appeal to the CC CPSU titled “On Some Violations of Rights of National Minorities, Principles of Equality of Nations and Languages in Separate Transcaucasian Republics.” In April 1959, Episkoposov applied personally to E. A. Furtseva with a message “On Violation of Rights of Nationalities in Azerbaijan.” The message told about infringement of the rights of Armenians, Avars, Lezghins, Kurds, Talyshes, Tats, Aysors, Georgians, and other peoples, as well as Russians and Ukrainians who lived together in the Republic for more than a century. The Episkoposovs informed CPSU leaders about rules of admission to higher educational

institutions of Azerbaijan; examinations in Azeri for the Russian sector; privileges for university entrants of the Azerbaijani sector; gradual closing of the Russian sectors; admission of Azerbaijanis only to the Conservatory, Theater Institute and musical colleges; and the closing of Armenian theaters in Baku and Kirovabad. Then they shifted to the main topic and wrote about continuing disputes around Nakhchivan and Mountainous Garabagh. They complained that Mountainous Garabagh was not granted to Armenia and that Nakhchivan had the status of autonomous republic but Mountainous Garabagh did not. The Episkoposovs tried to prove that Nakhchivan as a part of Azerbaijan failed to justify its status of an autonomous republic and had no common border with Azerbaijan. They expressed the opinion that if Nakhchivan were given to Armenia, it could really become an autonomous republic. The letter finished by saying that it would be “fair” to give Nakhchivan to Armenia. The CC CPSU treated the letter seriously. On December 31, 1958, deputy head of the Party Organs department for Union Republics I. Shikin and instructor of the same department K. Lebedev prepared a memorandum for the CC CPSU which said as follows: “For some time past, some reduction both of Russian and Azerbaijani sectors occurred in higher educational institutions of the Republic. Thus, as compared with 1954, the number of entrants dropped from 7,500 to 3,900. Russian sectors are active in ten universities; they are absent in three universities only: Institute of Foreign Languages, Theater Institute, and Kirovabad Pedagogical Institute, which is explained by these establishments’ specificity.” As for the Armenian theater, the authors of the memorandum noted: “It is inexpedient to reopen an Armenian theater in the town of Kirovabad, for the population of this town is served by the Yerevan and Stepanakert Armenian theaters. Besides, theaters and separate performers from the Armenian SSR regularly arrive in Azerbaijan to give concerts both in towns and rural regions.”84 The documents show that changes following the 20th Congress and especially the personality cult campaign in the mid-1950s gave rise to the revival of not only nationalism but old recurrences of territorial claims to neighbors, and primarily Turkey.85 The appetites of the Armenian figures grew after Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 at the height of celebrations devoted to the 300th anniversary of integration of Ukraine and Russia. Thus, the Soviet Republics of the South Caucasus received the decisions of the 20th Congress differently. The Congress led to mass demonstrations in support of Stalin and Beria in Georgia; to the struggle for national language and national values in Azerbaijan; and to territorial claims to neighboring Republics and Turkey in Armenia. NOTES 1. Notes of Nikita Khrushchev, member of the CC CPSU Presidium, on the XX congress of the CPSU. 07.04.1955.//RNHSA, f.1, r.2, v.1, p. 7. 2. Working minutes on the meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium. 05.11.1955.//RNHSA, f.3, r.8, v.388, pp. 61–63. 3. A Khrushchev’s report on Stalin’s personality cult to the 20th Congress of the CPSU: Documents. p. 172. 4. From the working protocol notes on the meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium. 01.02.1956.//RNHSA, f.3, r.8, v.384, pp. 52– 54. 5. Materials from the IX Plenum of the CC CP of Azerbaijan), January 1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.40, p. 62. 6. Ibid., pp. 59–70. 7. From shorthand notes of the XXI meeting of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 25–27.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43,

v.2, pp. 341–344. 8. “Communist” (in Azeri); 1956; 27 January. 9. “Communist” (in Azeri), 1956, 27 January. 10. “Communist” (in Azeri), 1956, 27 January. 11. From a shorthand report on the XXI meeting of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 25–27.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.2, pp. 142–143. 12. From a shorthand report on the XXI meeting of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 25–27.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.2, pp. 144–146. 13. “Communist” (in Azeri), 1956, 27 January. 14. From a shorthand report of the XXI session of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 25–27.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.2, pp. 271–274. 15. From a shorthand report of the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan), 25–27.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.2, pp. 348–354. 16. Ibid., pp. 396–399. 17. From Kislin and Ignatyev to CC CPSU. About the XXI Congress of the CPA. 06.02.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.609, p. 59. 18. From Gromov to Suslov. February 1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.1, p. 5. 19. “Communist” (in Azeri), 1956, 15 February. 20. “Communist” (in Azeri), 1956, 17 February. 21. “On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences,” report of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU. 25.02.1956.//RNHSA, f.1, r.1, v.17, p. 1–88. 22. Doklad Nikita Khrushcheva o kulte lichnosti Stalina na XX syezde KPSS: Dokumenti (Report of Nikita Khrushchev about the personality cult of Stalin at the XX Congress of the CPSU: Documents). pp. 51–70. 23. See: Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.). p. 276. 24. From materials of the AMNS AR. 25. Doklad Nikita Khrushcheva o kulte lichnosti Stalina na XX syezde KPSS: Dokumenti (Report of Nikita Khrushchev about the personality cult of Stalin at the XX Congress of the CPSU: Documents). pp. 81. 26. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.). p. 275. 27. Doklad Nikita Khrushcheva o kulte lichnosti Stalina na XX syezde KPSS: Dokumenti (Report of Nikita Khrushchev about the personality cult of Stalin at the XX Congress of the CPSU: Documents). p. 94. 28. Ibid, pp. 96–97. 29. Ibid, p. 116–177. 30. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.). p. 277 31. From notes of the department of Party Organs of the CC CPSU of RSFSR about “antiparty speeches” at a meeting of the Party organization at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 16.04.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.32m v.46, pp. 82–83. 32. F. Yakovlev, V. Gorin. Statement about the facts of incorrect, demagogic and anti-Party speeches that were made at Party meetings in Union republics during the XX Congress of the CPSU. 17.06.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.54, pp. 14–19. 33. From Anna Pankratova to the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Memorandum. 03.08.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.32, v.32, v.46, pp. 212–213. 34. From Nikolay Dudorov to CC CPSU. 24.05.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.54, pp. 121–125. 35. Purge of Lavrentiy Beria//National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 91, pp. 1–17. 36. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), p. 282. 37. Kozlov Vladimir. Neizvestniy SSSR. Protivostoyaniye naroda I vlasti (Kozlov Vladimir. Uncertain USSR. Oppostion of People and Power) 1953–1985 Moscow, 2006, p. 235–236. 38. Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 425. 39. Gulia. Memorandum about events in the city of Sukhumi and other Abkhazian regions of the ASSR from 5 to 9 March 1956. 23.03.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.30, v.138, pp. 81–82. 40. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), p. 282.

41. Ibid., pp. 283–284. 42. See: Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 425. 43. Kozlov. Neizvestniy SSSR. Protivostoyaniye naroda I vlasti, (Kozlov. Uncertain USSR. Oppostion of People and Power) 1953–1985. pp. 237–258; Zakritoye pismo korrespondenta gazety Trud po Gruzinskoy SSR S. Statkova glavnomu redaktoru B.Burkovu o sobitiyakh v Tbilisi, 5–11 marta 1956 (Closed letter of correspondent S. Statkova on the Georgian SSR to the main editor of Trud newspaper, B. Burkov, about events in Tbilisi of 5–11 March 1956). 12.03.1956//RNHSA, f.5. r.30, v.140, pp. 53–66 44. RNHSA, f.5, r.30, v.138, pp. 85–87. 45. From Leybzon to Zhdanov. Copy to the editor in chief of the magazine Party Life.//RSASPH, f.17, r.125, v.508, pp. 1–3. 46. CC CPSU decision “On Mistakes and Shortcomings in the Work of the CC CPG”. 10.07.1956.//RNHSA, f.3, r.14, v.41, pp. 25–53. 47. APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.90, p. 46–48a. 48. Translation of a leaflet discovered on Jabbarly Street. 12.06.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, p. 40. 49. Ibid, p. 41. 50. From Guskov to the CC CPA. 18.06.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, pp. 43–44. 51. From Guskov to the CC CPA. 13.02.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, pp. 28–29. 52. From Kopylov to Mustafayev. Report on events of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijani SSR in investigations of authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and about arrests carried out from January 1956 to April 1957). May, 1957.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 53. Ibid. 54. From Guskov to the CC CPA. 25.08.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, p. 54–61. 55. From materials of the AMNS AR. 56. Fedor Kopylov. Report on the work of the fourth department of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR for 1956.//From materials of the AMNS AR. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Archive of the President of Georgia. f.14, r.31, v.297, p. 44. 61. Court case of Mir Jafar Bagirov (in Azeri). Baku, 1993, p. 99. 62. Ibid, p. 99. 63. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T.II. Postanovleniya 1954–1958. (CC CPSU Presidium. 1954–1964 Vol. I. Ordinance 1954–1958) p. 279–280. 64. About the organization to explain and discuss the decision of the CC CPSU “On Removal of the Personality Cult and Its Consequences. 03.07.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.84, p. 35. 65. From Pisman to the Secretariat of the CC CP of Azerbaijan. 02.08.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.93, p. 150–152. 66. Decision of the CC CP Bureau of Azerbaijan “On facts of anti-Party actions in several party organizations in Baku during discussions of the decision of the CC CPSU “On the Removal of the Personality Cult and Its Consequences”. 24.08.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.93, pp. 110–112. 67. Purge of Lavrentiy Beria.//National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 91, p. 30. 68. Tsentralniy Komitet KPSS, VKP (b), RSDRP (b): historic-biograficheskiy spravochnik. (Central Committee of the CPSU (Bolshevik), RSDRP (b): Historical/Biographical Directory.) Moscow, 2005. p. 133. 69. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957, p. 763 70. National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 91, p. 30. 71. Court case of Mir Jafar Bagirov (in Azeri). p. 104. 72. Ibid., p. 115. 73. National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 91. p. 25. 74. Ibid., p. 13. 75. Central Committee CPSU (Bolshevik), RSDRP (Bolshevik): Historical biographical directory, p. 133. 76. Brutents Karen. Nesbyvsheesya. Neravnodushniye zametki o perestroyke (Subjective notes about Perestroika). Moscow, 2005, p. 336. 77. Pashayev Atakhan. Po sledam zakrytykh stranits (in Azeri). (Pashayev Atakhan. In the footsteps of the closed pages). Baku, 2001. pp. 202–204. 78. From Suren Tovmasyan to CC CPSU. 20.03.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.52, pp. 40–43. 79. S.Tovmasyan. From information of the CCP of Armenia. 12.04.1956.// RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.52, p. 46.

80. Yakovlev, Gorin. Information about incorrect facts, demagogic, and anti-party speeches at party meetings in the Union republics following the XX CPSU Congress. 17.06.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.54. 81. From Catholicos of all Armenia Vazgen I to Nikolay Bulganin. 12.05.1956.// Central State History Archive of the Republic of Armenia (further CSHARA), f.409, r.1, v.5787, p.4. 82. From Catholicos of all Armenia Vazgen I to Nikolay Bulganin. 12.05.1956// CSHARA, f.409, r.1, v.5787, pp. 6–7. 83. Melkonyan E. Mezhdu dvumya mirami. Puti politicheskoys adaptatsii armyanskoy diaspory (E. Melkonyan, Between two Worlds: The Journey of Political Adaptation of the Armenian Diaspora).//“Vertikali istorii”, #5, 2003, p. 83. 84. Episkoposov M. L., Episkoposova G. L. On Some Violations of Rights of National Minorities, Principles of Equality of Nations and Languages in Separate Transcaucasian Republics. 1958.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.101, pp. 42–43. 85. For more details of these claims see: J. Hasanli. Stalin and Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953. Lexington Books, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK. 2011, pp. 123–174.

Chapter 3

Enactment of the Law on State Language of Azerbaijan

In February 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU discussed challenging questions and, in particular, a report of Nikita Khrushchev, “On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences.” Thus, the Soviet society endeavored to get out of the ideological and political noose of Stalin totalitarianism and take in fresh air. The 20th Congress materials, “Main Directions of the Development of National Economy of the USSR,” included a section devoted to the economic development of the Union Republics. On March 16, 1957, a resolution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on economic and cultural development of the peoples of the North was published. The process of rehabilitation of citizens repressed in the 1930–1940s and the release of innocently convicted persons from prisons appreciably intensified after Stalin’s death. Apprehensive of the growth of nationalistic sentiments in the Union Republics, the Soviet leaders recommended special services to avoid loosening appropriate control mechanisms. In 1956–1957, peoples repressed in the war years were rehabilitated; however, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Povolzheye Germans were not allowed to return home even despite the start of 1956–1957 rehabilitation processes in the USSR. All these came as a result of the half-baked nature of Khrushchev’s reforms. Further developments went to show that the Soviet leaders, despite dethroning the personality cult, were not ready to accept the consequences of this step. This was vividly echoed in 1956– 1959 with respect to developments in Azerbaijan. New trends in the Soviet society contributed to the growth of national self-consciousness in the national republics. At the same time, there was an increase in superpower chauvinism among soldiers and officers of the Transcaucasian military command stationed in Azerbaijan. Special services were engaged in collecting materials about chauvinist attitudes toward the Azerbaijani population of Russian officers who made up the majority of the Soviet Army. Right after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, protests broke out across Georgia that were suppressed by the Transcaucasian military command which, in turn, strongly aggravated relations between the civilian population and the military. Things went so far that the Ministry of Defense of the USSR issued an order that prohibited training and use of Azerbaijani officers in the Transcaucasian military command. Active interference of the Republican leadership forced the Presidium of the CC CPSU to issue a decree dated November 12, 1957 which canceled improper orders of the abovementioned Ministry of the Defense regarding the Transcaucasian military command. However, despite this

decree, the Soviet Ministry of Defense rejected the candidacies of two Azerbaijani officers to attend the Higher Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov.1 As for the civilian population, in the mid-1950s Azerbaijanis suffered from chauvinism of non-Azerbaijanis engaged in state bodies, ministries, and law-enforcement bodies. The institutions above did not respond to letters and complaints from Azerbaijan’s remote regions. Facts of this sort were typical for the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, as well. For instance, the accountant of one institution threw away an Azerbaijani worker’s written request for leave, saying: “I do not understand your French [Azerbaijani] language!”2 Every day, the government had to face facts of this sort. In early 1955, an anonymous letter addressed to Mustafayev, First Secretary of the CC CPA; Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, said the following: “You are representatives and great leaders of the Azerbaijani people. The revolution gave us the right to freely live, write and speak our native language at our institutions and enterprises. Thirty-five years have passed, but there is not a single enterprise or office running business in Azeri. This goes to show that we are an oppressed, suppressed, disfranchised, unprotected, crushed, and unfortunate nation. For example, our people with secondary and higher education are employed as skilled workers, stablemen, and at low posts because they are asked everywhere ‘do you know Russian or not?’ With diplomas in Azeri higher education they can only get hired as workers. If Georgia and Armenia did not run business in their native languages, the oppressed sons of Azerbaijan would go there to work. Dear respected Comrade Imam, three days ago, a very old Azerbaijani woman was waiting at the reception desk of the Council of the Chairman of Baku. She approached a female secretary, saying that she had an application to be submitted to the Chairman. This miserable woman was sent to the general department. A little later, weeping was heard in the corridor. The old woman raised her head to the skies and, inconsolably sobbing, called to God for help: ‘Oh, Allah, the Azerbaijani people is crushed, humiliated, dying with hunger. Oh, top leaders, you ought to be ashamed of my gray hair. My application is not accepted in my native language.’ It turned out that her application written in Azeri was not accepted and she was asked to re-write it in Russian.” The author of the anonymous letter alleged that there were many such examples, so the leaders ought to pay attention. The letter ended with a request to run office work in all institutions and enterprises in native Azeri language till the end of the elections (meaning the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR elections of March 6, 1955—J. H.). “Our people, a talented nation residing in the East, kindly ask you to make all institutions and enterprises work in our native language. We’re waiting for this.”3 Upon the instruction of the CC CPA, the KGB started searching for the letter’s author. The search lasted for a year. It was learned that the letter was authored by Bahman Kazym oglu Jafarov, b.1895, native of Shamakha, former teacher, now pensioner residing in Baku. Starting from March 1955, Jafarov had been sending letters of this sort to the CC CPSU, Council of Ministers, and other organizations. Guskov informed the CC CPA that Jafarov would be investigated to hold him accountable for his activity. Guskov’s report, together with Jafarov’s letter, came to the CC CPA on June 11, 1956, and the CC Secretary Yakovlev endorsed an

application suggesting that Bureau members familiarize themselves with the letter.4 Note that the first steps had already been made to adopt Azeri as the state language. It should be noted that the first attempts to announce Azeri as the state language were made as far back as in Bagirov’s time, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. With that end in view, a meeting of teachers of Azeri language and literature was held under Ibrahimov’s chairmanship. The meeting decided to set up a fifteen-strong commission to transfer all institutions and enterprises of the Republic into Azeri. Made up of Ibrahimov, Vurghun, C. Aslanova, and others, the commission got down to preparatory work; however, the case came to a standstill after Bagirov’s arrest.5 In the early 1950s, the Russian orthography of the names of towns, regions, and settlements was tailored to their Azerbaijani pronunciation. On February 2, 1953, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR N. Heydarov wrote to A. Gorkin, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that there was a need to match the Russian spelling of the names of eight towns, six regional centers and twelve urban settlements with their original Azerbaijani pronunciation. These included the towns of Göychay, Zakatala, Karyagin, Qusar, Salyan, Tovuz, Shamakhy, and Nakhchivan; regional centers Aghsu, Belokan, Vartashen, Kutkashen, Norashen, Davachi; and urban settlements Neftchala, Kyzyl-burun, Buzovna, Shuvelan, Korgöz, Mashtagha, Mardakan, Lokbatan, Amirjan, Balakhany, Ramana, and Nasosny. Heydarov reported that “at present there is a great difference in spelling these populated localities in Russian and Azeri.” To remove this obvious discrepancy, a transcription commission was told to revise the Russian orthography of the populated localities above to adjust them to Azeri. That would be fair both historically and phonetically.6 The secretariat of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resent this letter to the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, and a reply came on March 6. Signed by Acad. V. Vinogradov, director of the Institute, the reply said that after consultations with Turkologists it was decided to accept, with a few exceptions, proposals from Azerbaijan. The linguists suggested spelling the names as follows: Shamakhy, Nakhchivan, Belekan, Norashen, Gutkashen, Vartashen, and Gyzylburun. These proposals were submitted to the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, March 23. A scientific-transcription commission under the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted the Moscow amendments, except for the name of Belekan, which they decided to spell Balaken.7 On July 8, 1953, P. Tumanov, head of the Information/Statistics Department, prepared a large report for K. E. Voroshilov titled “On Changes in Spelling Names of Some Towns, Regional Centers, and Urban Settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR.” The report noted that populated localities had been renamed before. For example, under a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of August 17, 1936, the city of Erivan was renamed Yerevan, Tiflis as Tbilisi, and so forth. However, Tumanov pointed out that the town of Nakhchivan was the capital of the Nakhchivan ASSR and, hence, renaming the town would lead to renaming the autonomous republic, whose name was specified in Article 24 of the USSR Constitution.

Owing to the fact that renaming the regional centers would result in renaming regional and town Party committees, Tumanov suggested settling this question with the CC CPSU through the mediation of the CC CPA.8 In September 1953, Heydarov approached the CC CPA with a request to settle the matter with the CC CPSU. A list of populated localities was supplemented with names of the regional centers Zhdanov, Astrakhanbazar, Dastafur, Zengilan, Zardab, Gasym-Ismailov, Pushkin, Ujar, Khyzy, Khylly, and Shaumyan. He informed M. T. Yagubov, Secretary of the CC CPA, that the question of correct transcription of names of towns, regional centers, and urban settlements had been agreed on with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. However, the Presidium recommended that he settle this question with the CC CPSU through the mediation of the CC CPA, since renaming populated localities as regional centers would result in renaming regions and regional Party committees. Heydarov asked Yagubov to come to an agreement on these changes with the CC CPSU.9 Having discussed Heydarov’s letter, the CC CPA Bureau entrusted V. Samedov, Heydarov, and H. Hasanov to once again consider this question and submit their opinions. A meeting of the Science and Culture Department of the CC CPA on October 22 came to the conclusion that it would be expedient to change the Russian names of four regional centers only: KasymIsmailov, Qakhi, Qusary, and Tauz. On October 28, the CC CPA secretariat entrusted Samedov with settling this question with the CC CPA apparatus, for planned changes might involve changes in a great quantity of documents, and, hence, require much expenditure.10 It was evident that post-Bagirov leaders of the Party organization of the Republic, in an attempt not to irritate Moscow by renaming populated localities, tried not to raise this question before the CC CPSU. In the mid-1955s, debates broke out around a monograph The Orthography of the Azerbaijani Language. Issued in 1954 on the decision of the Council of Ministers, The Orthography of the Azerbaijani Language, with the language updated and some deficiencies removed, still contained serious orthographic shortcomings. This caused protests in schools, mass media, and among intellectuals. In relation to this, in June 1955 the Institute of Literature and Language named after Nizami of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR put forward a draft which provided for changes in the orthography and alphabet of the Azerbaijani language. The new draft considered it wrong to remove the apostrophe from the alphabet as set forth in Orthography . . . of 1954. The draft stressed that, while the Azerbaijani language has no words that require an apostrophe, nevertheless there is a group of words whose meanings remain vague without an apostrophe. A new wording of the draft provided for reforming the orthography of the Azerbaijani language. Thus, Article 14 of Orthography . . . of 1954 said the following: “if a word has ‘o’ which is read as ‘a,’ this word should be spelled with ‘a.’ The 1955 scientific discussions noted that serious errors would arise when spelling some names, nouns, and separate words. The draft above also suggested reforming the Azerbaijani alphabet: after the transition into Cyrillic in 1940 the Russian letters “я,” “ю,” and “е” appeared, which ran counter to the rules of Azerbaijani grammar. The document pointed out that new letters were vividly introduced in 1940 to denote sounds inherent to the Azerbaijani language. When adopting the Russian script, a blunder was committed: the introduction of letters with double

phonation into the Azerbaijani alphabet. It would be natural both scientifically and methodically to exclude the letters “я,” “ю” and “е” from the Azerbaijani alphabet.11 Note that the debates over the draft reform of the Azerbaijani orthography grew into public discussions about general problems of the Azerbaijani language. Step-by-step an idea arose to enforce a status of state language to the Azerbaijani language. It has to be kept in mind that Russian, Armenian, and Georgian schools operated in Azerbaijan, so the status of the Azerbaijani language faced great difficulties in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the study and use of mother tongue and its transformation into the means of communication of the local population were of principled importance for enforcing the status of the state language. In the period under review, the teaching of local languages in the Russian-language and other schools of the former USSR caused serious disputes. To remedy the situation, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Bulganin issued a special decree on May 9, 1955, which stipulated “to exempt pupils of primary, seven-year and secondary schools of the Union Republics (except for the RSFSR) from compulsory study of the language of an indigenous nationality of the Union Republic, provided this language is not native for them and the school disciplines are not taught in the language specific to that Union Republic.” But those willing to study a language of an indigenous nationality were entitled be properly educated in an established order.12 Such a statement of the question gave rise to serious problems in teaching the Azerbaijani language in Russian, Armenian, and Georgian schools. To execute the order of the higher authority, the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted a resolution on May 31, 1955, under which non-Azerbaijani pupils of all Russianlanguage schools of the Republic were fully exempt from studying the Azerbaijani language. Under the existing curriculum, the Azerbaijani language was taught in the Russian-language schools beginning in the fifth grade. Prior to the 1953–1954 school year, Azerbaijani language lessons were withdrawn from the curriculum of the third and fourth grades in the Russianlanguage schools; however, hours spent on this discipline did not increase in the higher grades. In relation to this, Minister of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR Mirza Mamedov wrote to Mustafayev on March 23, 1956: “Teaching of the Azerbaijani language in the Russian schools starting in the fifth grade makes it impossible to ensure all-encompassing knowledge of the mother tongue by Azerbaijani schoolchildren. In addition, in the fifth grade they begin studying a foreign language. Simultaneous study of the two languages makes it difficult for pupils to learn both native and foreign languages. Hence, to ensure sound knowledge of the Azerbaijani language with due regard for age qualification of pupils, the Ministry of Education considers it expedient that the Azerbaijani language should be studied by Azerbaijanis in the Russianlanguage schools beginning in the third grade, including two hours a week in the third and fourth grades.”13 The Minister’s letter was discussed at the CC Secretariat on April 5. The Ministry of Education and the CC school department were commissioned to discuss the matter with all the parties concerned and then submit their proposals to the CC CPA Bureau. To clarify the situation, a meeting of teachers of the Azerbaijani language in the Russian schools of Baku

under the School Department of the said ministry was held on April 20, 1956 to solve the problem of teaching the Azerbaijani language in these schools starting with the third and fourth grades. A. Javadov, a teacher of School #138 in the October district of Baku, said, “At present, the teacher of the Azerbaijan language in the Russian schools is faced with the difficulty that the teaching of the Azerbaijani language starts with the fifth grade and just two hours a week. We urgently ask you to start teaching the Azerbaijani language with the third grade. Our next request is to ensure that the hours allotted per week are increased to three hours, so that we are able to teach pupils the main rules of orthography and stylistics of the language. The most challenging issue is the prospects of teaching the Azerbaijani language in the Russian schools for Azerbaijanis only. It would be rather difficult to fit the Azerbaijani language lessons into the time-table. We would only be able to conduct these lessons at 18.00–19.00 in half-empty classrooms, thus turning the classes into ordinary conversations. In many cases the lessons are foiled: pupils run away from lessons that then fall apart; pupils skip their lessons or show up very tired. As a teacher, I insist that the Azerbaijani language in Russian schools should be compulsory for children of other nationalities. This already occurs in Ukraine, Georgia, and some other Republics where the national language is taught as the principal one.” Javadov was backed by Shevket Mamedova, a teacher of the Baku Russian School #8: “The teaching of the Azerbaijani language in the fifth grade leads to great difficulties. Specific letters in the Azerbaijani alphabet make it possible to teach correct pronunciation of sounds only up to the tenth grade. It is urgently necessary to start teaching the language in the third grade. On the other hand, how can pupils learn the Azerbaijani language within two hours a week? It should plainly be stated that the compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language for Azerbaijanis only will yield no desirable effect. This language has to be taught for the whole class as the basic one.” Advocating his colleagues, teacher of the Baku School #171 S. Aliyev pointed out: “The Azerbaijani language is the national language of our Republic. It is needed for teaching Azerbaijanis. To get knowledge in the Azerbaijan language, a pupil must study it as a compulsory discipline. It is not possible to learn a language in after-school hours as an optional subject.” As viewed by the head-master of School #171 K. Samedov, the level of the Azerbaijani language teaching dropped after it became compulsory for Azerbaijanis only. He noted: “First of all, we must assign six or even seven hours to study the Azerbaijani language. There is no other way out. As a rule, we unite several grades for the sixth or seventh lessons, and it is very difficult to gain the required result. The time-table is violated, and teachers are faced with physical difficulties to conduct the last lessons. This results in lessons falling apart and remaining unfruitful.” Other speakers stuck to the same point of view. Summing up the meeting, methodologist in the Azerbaijani language as taught in the Russian language schools M. Yusifzadeh indicated that he had personally visited 80 percent of the Russian language schools of Baku to conclude that the teaching level of the Azerbaijani language was bad everywhere. The reason was that this language had compulsorily been taught to Azerbaijanis only. Yusifzadeh noted: “Can children learn a language when they are tired and want to go home?” In a number of schools there were only one, two, three, or four pupils. It’s necessary to create groups of pupils from three to four classes, for it’s difficult to teach tired children.

Given ten Azerbaijanis from grades three to five or grade six, just three of them attend lessons. Even worse, methodological principles of teaching are violated. Rather than forty-five minutes, a lesson lasts twenty to twenty-five minutes. Facts of this sort injure the prestige of the Azerbaijan language. Curriculum material is taught improperly, and no written tests are conducted. There are Azerbaijani pupils who cannot put together more than a few words in Azeri and cannot express their thoughts. In some Russian-language schools where there is a considerable number of Azerbaijani pupils, the teaching of the Azerbaijani language is satisfactory. However, the level of teaching leaves much to be desired in schools with a small number of Azerbaijanis.” Yusifzadeh added that in the schools for working youth, the Azerbaijani language teaching was even more deplorable. At the meeting, a decision was made to recommend teaching the Azerbaijani language starting in the third grade; for lessons to be conducted three hours a week in the day-schools and two hours a week in the evening-schools; and the introduction of compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language in all the schools beginning in the 1956–1957 academic year, as it was in Ukraine, Georgia, and other Union Republics.14 On April 20, a meeting under the School Department of the Azerbaijan SSR was held to discuss the teaching of the Azerbaijani language in the Russian-language schools of the Republic starting in the third grade. Y. P. Kyrdyumov, the director of School #160, spoke at the meeting, saying: “This academic year, the teaching of the Azerbaijani language proved to be much worse than before the resolution. First, lessons of the Azerbaijani language for Azerbaijani pupils fall to the last (sixth or seventh) lessons. Second, the absence of their classmates has a negative effect on the psyche of the remaining Azerbaijanis, who seek to avoid the lessons in their mother tongue. These pupils are dissatisfied by the fact that they have to study a subject their other classmates are exempt from. They show no interest in the study of their mother tongue and refuse to do their homework. It would be expedient to start studying the mother tongue in the third grade, for younger children are more receptive to learning languages. . . . Also, it would better to start teaching the Azerbaijani language to all pupils of the Russianlanguage schools, not only to Azerbaijani pupils. The problem is that most school graduates stay in the Republic and have to be proficient in the Azerbaijani language.” N. S. Cherednik, the director of School #8, backed Kurdyumov to raise another problem: “This academic year the teachers of the Azerbaijani language worked under very strained conditions, because their weekly teaching load is four to twelve lessons. The small number of Azerbaijani pupils in classes and their irresponsible attitude to the subject result in worsening the quality of the Azerbaijani language teaching.” A. P. Sedova, the director of School #134, declared that “pupils must learn to speak the literary language, so it would be appropriate to introduce teaching the Azerbaijani language in second, not third grade.” Shahramanyan, the director of School #164, said: “This academic year the situation went from bad to worse due to neglect of pupils to the lessons of the Azerbaijani language. Sometimes parents personally voice their displeasure with the fact that their children have to study one more subject than their classmates.” As viewed by Shahramanyan, it would be more appropriate to make the

Azerbaijani language mandatory for all pupils. In the meanwhile, lessons of the Azerbaijani language are conducted, even by experienced teachers, at a low methodological level.15 Per the results of the two meetings, acting Minister of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR Ahmed Rahimli sent a letter to the CC CPA which stressed that directors of schools and teachers of the Azerbaijani language consider it expedient to teach the Azerbaijani language beginning in the third grade, and it should be compulsory for pupils of all nationalities. “The Azerbaijani language is taught during the sixth or seventh lesson, which disparages its authority and lessens the discipline of Azerbaijani pupils,” wrote Rahimli. The Ministry of Education backed the proposal of school directors (with the exception of its application to children of servicemen hailing from other Republics).16 Reporting back to Mustafayev about the results of the meetings of April 20 and 29, the head of the Science and Schools Department of the CC CPA, A. Kerimov, stated that it would be appropriate to teach the Azerbaijani language not only in Russian but in Armenian and Georgian schools as well, starting from third grade.17 On June 29, this question was discussed by the CC CPA Bureau, and a positive decision was adopted and sent to the Council of Ministers. On July 12, Rahimli submitted a reference to the Council of Ministers which substantiated program and finance changes due to the transition of Russian, Armenian, and Georgian schools to the teaching of the Azerbaijani language starting in third grade. On July 30, Minister of Education M. Mamedov sent a detailed letter to the Council of Ministers, saying: “Prior to the 1952–1953 academic year the Azerbaijani language in non-Azerbaijanilanguage schools had been taught from the third to the tenth grades–three hours a week in the Russian-language schools; two hours a week in the Armenian- and Georgian-language schools. . . . In the 1954–1955 academic year the Azerbaijani language was studied in the Russianlanguage schools from the fourth to the tenth grades only, two hours a week; the Azerbaijani language was withdrawn from the curriculum in the Armenian- and Georgian-language schools due to the study of three languages–native, Russian, and foreign ones. Under a decree of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR dated May 31, 1955, the Azerbaijani language was taught only to Azerbaijani pupils in the Russian-language schools from the fifth to the tenth grades, two hours a week. Owing to the introduction of the Azerbaijani language in the Russian-, Armenian-, and Georgian-language schools, its study beginning in the fifth grade will not make it possible to develop an adequate knowledge of the language. The Board of the Ministry of Education discussed this issue with directors of schools and found it expedient to study the Azerbaijani language beginning in the third grade, two hours a week, as had been before.” The Minister added that the study of the Armenian language in the Russian- and Azerbaijani-language schools of the Armenian SSR takes place in the third to the tenth grades; and in the Russian-language schools of the Ukrainian SSR from the second to the tenth grades, two to three hours a week.18 On August 9, 1956, following a long correspondence, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR Rahimov reported that in the commission from the Bureau of the CC CPA dated June 29, 1956 he had discussed the question of Azerbaijani language teaching in non-Azerbaijani schools beginning in the third grade and decided to allocate 4.9 million rubles

a year to change the curriculum. Part of this amount was to be covered by the Republic’s budget for raising teachers’ salaries.19 Finally, on August 14, 1956, the Bureau of the CC CPA passed a decision “On Teaching the Azerbaijani Language in Schools of the Azerbaijan SSR with Russian, Armenian, and Georgian Languages of Teaching” for the 1956–1957 academic year.20 Adoption of this decision ran counter to the decree of Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and marked an important stage in adopting the law on the state status of the Azerbaijani language. Greatly contributing to the state status of the Azerbaijani language in the 1940s were the development of scientific principles of the language, works of literature and science in Azeri, and translations of the best pieces of foreign literature. The 2nd Congress of the Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan in 1954 and the post-Congress period showed that the Azerbaijani Soviet literature and the culture as a whole were experiencing unprecedented growth. Azerbaijani writers and poets created a number of brilliant works in the 1950s that vividly echoed the history, destiny, and life of the nation and added a brilliant page into the treasury of Azerbaijani literature. The people’s poet, Samed Vurghun, died on May 27, 1956, three months before state status was given to the Azerbaijani language. He contributed to the renovation of the Azerbaijani language, its being made poetic, and the inimitable literary style of reproduction of folk thinking. Samed Vurghun played an exclusive part in the development of the twentieth century Azerbaijani literature and enrichment of the Azerbaijani language. N. Tikhonov published a eulogy titled “The People’s Poet” in Literaturnaya gazeta. The young poet Rasul Hamzatov quipped figuratively: “A white-headed eagle of Azerbaijani poetry, father and son of the Azerbaijani Soviet literature left us.” Of interest is the fact that neither the official obituary nor any of the numerous articles and farewell speeches published ever mentioned the poet’s philosophical drama Man or his poem “Aygun.” Making contributions to the development of the Azerbaijani language were writers Abdullah Shaig, Mirza Ibrahimov, Suleyman Rahimov, Mehdi Huseyn, Ali Veliyev, Mir Jalal, Ilyas Efendiyev, Abulhasan, Sabit Rahman, Anvar Mamedkhanly, Talat Eyubov, Avaz Sadyg, Jabbar Mejnunbeyov, Aziz Sharif, Gylman Musayev; and poets Rasul Rza, Suleyman Rustam, Osman Sarivelli, Zahid Khalil, Mamed Rahim, Ahmad Jamil, Aliagha Vahid, Mirvarid Dilbazi, Nigar Rafibeyli, Mirmehdi Seidzadeh, Islam Safarly, and Huseyn Huseynzadeh. In the 1950s, young writers and poets infused a fresh spirit into the Azerbaijani literature, including Bakhtiyar Vahabzadeh, Ismail Shikhly, Isa Huseynov, Imran Gasymov, Hasan Seyidbeyli, Aliagha Kurchayly, Vidadi Shikhly, Nabi Babayev, Sabir Ahmedov, Salam Gadirzadeh, Bayram Bayramov, Adil Babayev, Gasym Gasymzadeh, Chingiz Huseynov, Ibrahim Kebirly, and Gabil Imamverdiyev. The state status of the Azerbaijani language was adopted in the mid-1950s, which gave a strong impetus to the development of literary criticism, linguistics, and social sciences as a whole. Contributing to great successes in social sciences were scholars and researchers Hamid Arasly, Mammad Arif, Mamed Jafar Jafarov, Jafar Jafarov, Ali Sultanly, Hidayet Efendiyev, Mikail Rafili, Abdulazal Demirchizadeh, Mamedagha Shiraliyev, Mirzagha Gulizadeh, Mamedhuseyn Tahmasib, Feyzulla Gasymzadeh, Mamed Akber, Kamal Talybzadeh,

Aziz Mirahmedov, Abbas Zamanov, Mohbaly Gasymov, Ismail Huseynov, Alovsat Quliyev, Alisohbat Sumbatzadeh, Zulfali Ibrahimov, Abdulkerim Alizadeh, Aslan Aslanov, and others. Works such as Mirza Ibrahimov’s The Day Will Come and Great Stronghold, Mehdi Huseyn’s Black Stones, Suleyman Rahimov’s In the Mountains of Aqbulag, Mir Jalal’s Where Roads Lead To, Suleyman Rustam’s Two Banks, Rasul Rza’s Oh, If There Were Not Roses, Anvar Mamedkhanly’s In the Fire, Ilyas Efendiyev’s The Atayev Family, Ismail Shikhly’s Parting Ways, Bakhtiyar Vahabzadeh’s Ordinary People and Shabi-Hijran, and Isa Huseynov’s Flaming Heart gave a powerful spur to the development of social and national thinking. It should be noted that the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Azerbaijan State University were the principal academic centers in charge of humanitarian studies. The Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences was headed by Academic Musa Aliyev, and the State University of Azerbaijan–by Academic Yusif Mamedaliyev. It should be noted that the mid-1950s saw appreciable progress in other spheres of culture as well, including music, art, and painting. In November 1954, a VII plenum of the Union of Composers of Azerbaijan was held where Chairman of the Union Qara Qarayev made a long report. He highly appraised Fikret Amirov’s opera Sevil, based on a similar drama by Jafar Jabbarly as a grand event in the cultural life of Azerbaijan. Qarayev noted that the composer’s musical language is closely associated with folk music and mugham.21 In addition, the speaker carried out a detailed analysis of symphonies, operas, and suites by Rauf Hajiyev, Jovdat Hajiyev, Soltan Hajibeyov, Suleyman Aleskerov, Nazim Rzayev, Jahangir Jahangirov, Afrasiyab Badalbeyli, Said Rustamov, and Niyazi. He highly appraised the symphony Babek by young composer Hasan Rzayev. Having served as the head of the Union of Composers since 1953, Qarayev, despite his young age (thirty-five), was well-known not only in Azerbaijan but across the Soviet expanse as well. Qarayev received his first Stalin Prize at the age of twenty-eight and his second Prize at the age of thirty. His ballet Seven Beauties (1952) expanded the horizons of worldwide exposure to Azerbaijani music. When composing the music to this ballet based on a poem by Nizami Ganjevi, Qarayev was skillful in exploiting national folk motives. It was the path passed from the first Azerbaijani ballet Maiden’s Tower by A. Badalbeyli (1940) to the ballet Seven Beauties, and the path from the symphonic picture “Caravan” by S. Hajibeyov to the symphonic mugham “Rast” by Niyazi that vividly demonstrated the high development of musical art in Azerbaijan. The symphonic poem “Leyli and Mejnun” and the ballet Seven Beauties by Qarayev, symphonic mughams “Shur” and “Kurd ovshari,” the opera Sevil by F. Amirov, symphonic poem “Beyond Arax” by J. Jahangirov, songs by S. Rustamov, the ballet Gulshan by S. Hajibeyov, and the symphonic mugham “Rast” begun by U. Hajibeyov and completed by Niyazi, initiated the introduction of national ideas into Azerbaijani music. On January 18, 1956, Afrasiab Badalbeyli made a detailed report on Azerbaijani music to the V Plenum of Transcaucasian composers in Tbilisi. On December 1, 1955, a summary of this report was discussed at a meeting of the Union of Composers of Azerbaijan. In doing so, Niyazi touched upon some interesting aspects; in particular, he noted concerning the history of Azerbaijani music that the report refers to “Iranian influence” and that this aspect offended

Niyazi: “I want you to understand me correctly; the other day I happened to see a brochure which perhaps many of you have ignored. When working over some material, I had to refer to this source. Perhaps this will help Afrasiab to clarify, in the Party manner, some slippery ‘theoretical provisions’ which we have not made clear so far. I am referring to the brochure ‘Shahsenem’ issued in Moscow in 1929 by T. Efendiyev. He emphasizes that the artistic life of the Turkic people was influenced by Turks, Persians and partly Russians. . . . Melodies of Iranian origin proved allegedly to be the main artistic-aesthetic, musical influence over Turkic, that is, Azerbaijani, people. I’d like to dethrone this false historical reference which has nothing to do with the history of our music.” Further, Niyazi added: “Touching upon scales, I’d like to prove that these scales do not pertain to Iran and that these scales are much older than the musical culture of Persia. As an example it can also be shown that Azerbaijan is famed for its collective dances which are deficient in Iran, specifically ‘Yally.’ Without a doubt, these dances had existed long before the appearance of Islam. Under the Islamic religion, a woman cannot be present in a room with an unfamiliar man, while ‘Yally’ is typical for our belligerent people. It should be noted that our people succeeded in preserving its language throughout centuries. According to the practice of the Iranian state, it prohibits Azerbaijanis to propagate their native culture or to sing and speak in Azeri; nevertheless, the people of South Azerbaijan do speak and sing in their native language. Such a nation is in position to keep its own musical culture alive throughout centuries.” As for mughams, Niyazi pointed out that “Our mughams have nothing in common with Iranian mughams. Mughams appeared in Azerbaijan with their own history, absolutely different from Iranian mughams. It is for the first time that we appear on the Union arena, so it would be appropriate to tell the history of our mughams. We must demonstrate the national grade of our music. We have no modern themes in our music at all, except ‘For Peace’ and ‘Vatan’; however, that time is past. Modern themes are not measured by numbers and dates such as 1954 but by their concepts only. Koroghlu is modern in its very concept.” To conclude, Niyazi repeated that the Azerbaijani mugham cannot be defined as Iranian mugham and is not affected by the latter: “True, mughams of Iran, Azerbaijan and even China have much in common, but it would be incorrect to allege that mugham came from Iran. Suffice it to say that our language is Turkic and is spoken by Turkmens, Uzbeks, and Azerbaijanis, but one cannot say that the Azerbaijani language is the Uzbek language.”22 A note on Badalbeyli’s speech in Tbilisi says that his report on the Azerbaijani music and especially its folk roots was highly appreciated. Debates showed that there was not a fundamental work on Azerbaijani folk music so far, except for the famous work by U. Hajibeyov. Speaking at the V Plenum of Transcaucasian composers together with Badalbeyli were Ashraf Abbasov, Boris Zeydman, and Danil Danilov. Abbasov’s report on mugham was highly appreciated by all Plenum participants. On January 18, the Board of the Union of Composers of Azerbaijan discussed the question of publication of the musical heritage of Hajibeyov and Muslim Magomayev. It turned out that besides Koroghlu and The Cloth Peddler none of Hajibeyov’s works had ever published in the republic. It was decided to issue the complete works of Hajibeyov, as well as his “Essays on the History of the Azerbaijani Music of the Soviet Period.”23

The 1st Congress of the Union of Composers of Azerbaijan was held on March 21, 1956. Attending the Congress were prominent musical figures, including Dmitri Shestakovich, Otar Taktakishvili, and A. Darkevich. In his report, Qarayev told about the great successes of Azerbaijani music over the period starting from 1948, the date of the 1st Congress of Soviet Composers. Qarayev pointed out that Hajibeyov’s operas Leyli and Mejnun and Koroghlu, as well as Magomayev’s Shah Ismail and Nargiz, take a particular place in the cultural history of Azerbaijani national music. However, the art of Azerbaijani opera was in stagnation after the above works, except for the opera Sevil by Amirov. Qarayev enumerated opera works by Niyazi, Khosrov and Shirin; by Badalbeyli and B. Zeydman, People’s Anger; by Zeydman, Masquerade and Woe from Wit; by Qarayev and J. Hajiyev, Motherland; and by Badalbeyli Nizami. Qarayev noted: “The fact that the above works are ignored in the repertoire of the opera theater is rather concerning, so it is essential to reveal the causes of this phenomenon.”24 Speaking at the Congress, Niyazi, taking advantage of the presence of guests from Moscow in the audience, criticized the Union of Composers of the USSR. He said: “We do not have our own musical body, and we all rely on the magazine Soviet Music. Why do musicologists from Baku have to write about the creative work of our composers Qarayev, R. Hajiyev, F. Amirov, J. Jahangirov, and S. Hajibeyov? Why does the magazine not care to invite prominent masters of the arts to come here, study our scores, hear the works of our composers, and write good articles about their creative activity? We are also shocked by the rules of admission to the Union. In this time when all our Republics have unlimited rights according to the Constitution, why does the Union of Composers of the USSR restrict us in the admission to its membership? Even our Communist Party has no such restrictions. Very often a nominee from our organizations is declined by Moscow under the pretext of his incompetence. It seems to me that the Union of Composers of Azerbaijan is an authoritative organization capable of solving questions of this sort. Further aggravating the case is the lack of a choir, putting restrictions on our composers in creating large-scale symphonic works. Another question is the restoration of the symphonic orchestra under the state radio, thus propagandizing the musical culture into two foreign countries.”25 Participating at the debates was Badalbeyli, who dwelt on the question of the national language in music: “The question of the national language is vague for many of us. . . . When listening to a symphonic work, you sense that there is an Azerbaijani theme, and then it is followed by the main party theme. When everything gets reworked, it gets lost, and you wonder what language the author was speaking. Nobody understands anything and therefore it is not received by broader masses. Main parties and side parties work in the national language, and the development of themes is in the universal language, Esperanto. Why? Because we have never dealt with the national language closely. . . . So, we have a gap between the instrumental music of the same composer and the vocal music. When the point is about the vocal music, one senses that it is authored by an Azerbaijani. If the question is about the instrumental music, one feels that it is quite another language and style.” Then Badalbeyli got down to the question of musical terminology. He dwelt on Harmony, a manual of N. A. Rimskiy-Korsakov, edited by Qarayev and translated into Azeri by S. Rustamov. He noted that there used to be an institute

headed by Hajibeyov under the Academy. There was also an institute headed by Bul-Bul (Murtuza Mamedov), but now these institutes did not exist. The Conservatory is not engaged in studying languages. If an article about music is written in Azeri, it poses a problem for persons proficient in Russian only.26 After a congratulatory telegram from Vurghun on the occasion of his fiftieth anniversary was read out, the great composer Dmitriy Shostakovich took the floor. He shared his views on the report to the Congress and then expressed his attitude to the concert at the Congress. Having highly appraised works of conservatory students and a choir headed by J. Jahangirov, Shostakovich singled out young composers, including Arif Melikov with his suite for violin and piano; Zakir Bagirov; Khayyam Mirzazade with the first part of a quartet; Vasif Adigezalov with his suite for piano; and Oktay Zulfugarov with a trio for piano. He predicted they would have great futures and brilliant prospects.27 Attending the Congress as a guest was well-known Georgian composer of the mid-1950s O. Taktakishvili. Note that a year after the Congress he was elected Secretary of the Union of Composers of the USSR. The Georgian guest was amazed by the growth of the Azerbaijani classical and national music that took place over such a short period of time. Speaking about the creative activity of Qarayev, he emphasized: “Comrades, in the person of Qara Qarayev we have a wonderful, talented composer who is well aware of folk principles, putting the folk heritage into practice in his music, a composer with his own style, proficient in all modern means of musical expressiveness. On behalf of my delegation I’d like to express general delight at his ballet Seven Beauties. We are surprised that such a splendid, outstanding piece has not yet been staged in the Bolshoi Theater of the USSR.” At this moment the First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev retorted: “He flew to Leningrad via Moscow,” which caused laughter in the hall. Taktakishvili went on: “I will venture to say with all responsibility that ballets are presently staged in the Bolshoi Theater of the USSR which are musically inferior to the ballet Seven Beauties.”28 First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev made a report at the Congress which reviewed the situation in the Azerbaijani musical culture after 1920, laying a special emphasis on the contribution of the brilliant composers Hajibeyov and M. Magomayev. Speaking about the influence of the Azerbaijani music on neighboring countries, Mustafayev noted: “It should be noted that our music is recognized not only by our friends, it is even liked by our ideological opponents. A parliamentary delegation from Iran visited our country the other day. It included people unfriendly to us, yet they told us ‘we often listen to your wonderful music.’ We are glad that they recognize our achievements. . . . As compared to Azerbaijan, Iran is much greater both by population and territory, like Turkey; however, there is not planned musical development, native opera, and ballet, you have to lend an ear to monotonous whining music at tea-houses or entertainment places. That’s why peoples of these countries listen to the Azerbaijani music with great pleasure, so we’d like to thank musicians and composers for their good pieces of music.”29 It has to be kept in mind that chairpersons spoke either in Azeri or Russian but largely in Russian. This “tradition” had first been violated by Rasul Rza at the First Congress of Composers, March 28, when J. Hajibeyov was chairing: “Comrades, I remember 1938 when

we were preparing for the first decade in Moscow, and Uzeyir Hajibeyov was still alive. There were just a few young intellectuals – Qarayev, Jevdet, and some others. At present, Azerbaijani composers are famed not only in the Soviet Union but also far outside the country. Our composers joined the vanguard of All-Union workers of music.” At the same time Rza dwelt on a negative event widely spread among composers. He said: “I believe that the Azerbaijani composers should be proficient in the Azerbaijani language. True, there are composers who know their native Azerbaijani language. Before me spoke Afrasiyab Badalbeyli, who knows the Azerbaijani language well. But touching upon the Azerbaijan language, I’d like our composers to know the Azerbaijani literature at the level of our literary critics and writers, for the Azerbaijani language is a source of taste and inspiration for our composers. We must follow the example of our great Uzeyir bey, because he was proficient in all nuances of the Azerbaijani people, its life and traditions. It seems to me that, along with his talent as a composer, Uzeyir Hajibeyov won people’s hearts because he sincerely loved the Azerbaijani literature and language, and his music was to people’s liking. Why should we tolerate improperly sung songs? For example, the song ‘Sureya.’ I can say with certainty that in 90 percent of our songs the Azerbaijani language is misemployed. Some singers perform national songs in an unintelligible language.” Rza’s speech was met with loud and prolonged applause. Rza added that he decided to specify what “a song” meant from a scientific point of view. A reference book said that a “song” is a universal definition for poetical images, a vocal image. “Hence, musical images originated in the combination of poetical images. The distortion of words is half the trouble. In some of our songs the text lives its own life, the music–its own life. We see no integral unity. The song ‘Kendimiz’ (Our Village), with music by Ganbar Huseynli and words by Zeynal Khalil, may be cited as an example. I like this song. However, the text narrates a merry event while the music is sorrowful. The song is about a man separated from his homeland for years. When you enjoy the words of the song, the music is out of place, and vice versa. Frequently, the music is not implied by the text.” In connection with the language problem, Rza referred to Hajibeyov’s life: “I’d like to raise a question before my colleagues and composers: the question of taste. What text did the late Hajibeyov make use of when composing his opera Leyli and Mejnun? You know that there are many poets besides Mahammad Fizuli who were skilful in writing ghazals. Bahar Shirvani, for example. Despite this, an emphasis has been laid on Fizuli’s ghazals. This is because in his verses, the words, and content are in integral unity. The language of Fizuli is musical. It has a melody to pave the way to the listener’s soul. There are great poets in our musical culture–Samed Vurghun, Suleyman Rustam, Mamed Rahim, and others, but very often songs are composed based on the words of amateurs. I repeat that no emphasis is given to educated people in our musical culture.” Touching upon the use of the Azerbaijani language, Rza noted: “Comrades, I’m happy that our friends here speak Russian very well. This is our achievement. But this does not mean that we must drag the Azerbaijani language to the background or speak it at our whim. That would be wrong. The question of the Azerbaijani language in our musical schools has not been solved properly. No poetry evenings to celebrate Azerbaijani poetry have been held at our conservatory for years. In the meanwhile, poetry evenings are held at technical colleges,

libraries, plants, and factories. There is a thirst for Azerbaijani poetry and literature everywhere. Why is the Azerbaijani language not heard here? The reason is that our attitude to the native language is far from perfection. The time is ripe to solve this problem. You know very well that even a few years ago, both the speaker and his family would have been in trouble for saying that.” Rza further stressed the problem of mughams: “I’d like to share my view on one more problem–folk mughams and opera. Based on folk mughams, our national opera makes up an integral part of our classical heritage. We must cherish these brilliant examples as the apple of our eye, and if a composer estranges himself from the classical, centuries-old cultural heritage of our people, he is unlikely to create something worthwhile or a good thing. But one cannot go too far. When protecting our past, we cannot mark time, but we must push pieces of our music ahead. Comrades, I cannot agree with the speech of musicologist Danilov. He spoke Russian, so please allow me to quote him in Russian. Danilov recommends that symphonic music should not be built on the basis of mugham, for, in his view, ‘mugham has no intrinsic development, just outward, candybox beauty.’” To Danil Danilov’s thinking, Fikret Amirov and Niyazi were carried away with mugham; however, Rza disagreed with him. To sum up, he noted: “I’m calling our composers, especially graduates from the Conservatory and musical colleges, to be closer to the Azerbaijani people. I’m calling you to visit out-of-theway places where songs are composed on the basis of ancient traditions, to hear the voice of the folk, voices of mothers, to study folk melodies. You must go there, so that the folk music grades the basis of composition and feeds it. That’s the way to behave.”30 Rza’s timely speech made in Azeri caused a storm of applause, and when Rza sat down, Afrasiyab Badalbeyli came up to him and demonstratively shook his hand. The poet’s speech went far beyond the country. Thus, a certain R. Bagdasarov, a second-year student of the Hajibeyov Conservatory, sent a diffuse letter to Khrushchev which charged the Azerbaijani intellectuals with stirring up nationalism. He referred to Rza’s speech as an example: “While attending the Congress of Azerbaijani Composers, an Azerbaijani intellectual disregarded the fact that Dmitriy Shostakovich from Moscow and O. Taktakishvili were sitting in the Presidium and understood no Azeri. He made a speech in Azeri, whereas he could have made it well in Russian.”31 It should be noted that painting and applied art processes were also accompanied by strengthening of national factors in their development. An exhibition of Transcaucasian painters was held in Baku on May 25 to June 1, 1956, where the works of Azerbaijani painters attracted visitors’ attention with their national content. A “Shusha” carpet, woven according to a sketch by painter Latif Kerimov, Stalin Prize winner of 1950, was chosen to be the best exhibit. In 1954, the newspaper Sovetskaya kultura announced a contest for a vacancy of corresponding members and full members of the USSR Academy of Fine Arts. On the suggestion of Mamedagha Tarlanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Painters’ Union, well-known painters of Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union Latif Kerimov and Mikail Abdullayev were nominated for the vacancy. This question was agreed upon with the CC CPA science and culture department. Note that Abdullayev’s works were exhibited in Budapest in 1949 and in Peking in 1950, and were a great success. True, Abdullayev became a member only in 1958,

yet his and Kerimov’s nominations demonstrated the great successes achieved by the Azerbaijani painting and applied art.32 Another exhibition of Azerbaijani painters opened in November 1954 and was a success. On November 22, the Azerbaijan Painters’ Union discussed the works exhibited. A report on painting was made by E. Mamedov; on sculpture, by Omar Eldarov; and on drawing by A. Mamedov. The exhibition lasted fourteen days and was visited by 8,324 People. Visitors focused their attention on the following pieces: “Girls” by Salam Salamzadeh; “A Portrait of Kerimov” and “A Road” by Kerimov; “Birth of the Sea” and “My Mother” by Abdullayev; “A Portrait of Leyla Badalbeyli” by Vajiha Samedova, and “Oil Rocks,” “A Green Carpet,” “A Valley of Shahdag,” “Autumn,” and “In the Middle of Gardens” by Sattar Bahlulzadeh. Debates over works in the exhibition stressed that the nature painted on Bahlulzadeh’s canvas was peculiar and inimitable. The same appraisals were given to works by Abdullayev “On Banks of Kura” and “Birth of the Sea” from the Mingechevir series.33 Also noteworthy were sculptures “A Bust of Mirza Fatali Akhundov” and “Natavan” by Eldarov, who graduated from I. Repin Leningrad Institute of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in 1951; a fretwork “Nizami Ganjevi” and a marblework “Guerilla Michaylo” by Tokay Mamedov; “A Bust of Khurshud Banu Natavan” by Jalal Karyagdy, and other monumental and decorative pieces of work. Of interest was the historical and national content of the pieces exhibited. In the mid-1950s, pieces of Azerbaijani painters and sculptors were noted for their thematic variety and broad use of national colors. The creative works of some painters overstepped the bounds of not only Azerbaijan but, in some cases, the USSR. Works by Abdullayev, “Builders of Happiness”; S. Bahlulzadeh, “A Bank of Gudialchay”; E. Mamedov, “A Portrait of Herdsman”; B. Mirzazadeh, “In a Cotton Field”; T. Tagiyev, “A Portrait of a Student”; Samedova, “A Portrait of Leyla Badirbeyli”; T. Mamedov, “Guerilla Mehti Huseynzadeh”; A. Mirkasimov, “A Portrait of a Girl” and others were exhibited in Czechoslovakia and the People’s Republic of China. Works by talented painters Tahir Salakhov–“To the Watch”; Asef Jafarov–“Bread for Pakistan”; Nadir Abdulrahmanov–“On the Pasture”; and Omar Eldarov–“Happiness” were exhibited at an exhibition of the VI World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow; graphic works of Maral Rahmanzadeh were exhibited in London, and those of Mikail Abdullayev in Italy, Austria, and India. Personal exhibitions of Bahlulzadeh were held in Baku and Tbilisi, and those of Rahmanzadeh in Moscow. The artistic public showed great interest in the historical and cultural heritage of the nation. Painters and sculptors worked hard at images of Molla Panah Vagif, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Samed Vurghun, Mirza Alakber Sabir, Abbas Sahat, Khurshud Banu Natavan, Mammad Said Ordubadi, and other prominent figures of Azerbaijani art and literature.34 On December 14–16, 1955, the II Congress of Azerbaijani Painters was held. In his report to the Congress, Chairman of the Painters’ Union M. Tarlanov retraced the creative activity of painters over fifteen years after the I Congress. His report touched upon qualitative changes in applied arts, painting, sculpture, graphics, theatrical decoration, and so on. The Congress noted works by Fuad Abdurahmanov, Pyotr Sabsay, Jalal Karyagdy, Eyyub Mamedov, Mikail Abdullayev, Sattar Bahlulzadeh, Letif Kerimov, Khafiz Mamedov, Tahir Salakhov, Oktay

Sadygzadeh, Letif Feyzullayev, Ismet Akhundov, Najafgulu Ismailov, Davud Kazimov, Boyukagha Mirzazadeh, Tokay Mamadov, Abdulkhalyg Akhundov, and others. Speakers analyzed paintings “Kirpi” by N. Abdurahmanov; “Concert-riddle” by D. Kazimov; “Favorite Pictures” by Elbey Rzaquliyev; “Oil Suite” by Gazanfar Khalygov; “A Derrick in the Sea” and “A Drilling” by Maral Rahmanzadeh, and so on. Attending the Congress were Imam Mustafayev, Mirza Ibrahimov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Akima Sultanova, Minister of Culture Mamed Kurbanov, CC CPSU instructor L. M. Osipov, and other senior officials.35 Serious measures were taken to assess and purchase the best works of Azerbaijani painters and sculptors by the Republican Art Fund. A resolution of the Council of Ministers and the CC CPA was made titled “On Storing Gifts Presented to Enterprises and Organizations of the Azerbaijan SSR from Fraternal Republics and Countries of People’s Democracy at the Museum of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Museum leadership was instructed to exhibit gifts in the open exposition.36 In April 1956, the Azerbaijan State Theater of Musical Comedy was restored. According to the decision of the CC CPA Bureau, Shamsi Badalbeyli, director of the Azerbaijan Philharmonic Society since 1949, was appointed director of the Theater.37 Badalbeyli was born in Shusha in 1911, finished secondary school in Baku, and graduated from the Azerbaijan State Conservatory, class of Hajibeyov. He took special producers’ courses in Moscow, earned stage manager qualification in 1938, and put several plays on the stage of the Azerbaijani theater. In 1941, he went to South Azerbaijan to work as secretary of an army newspaper till spring 1942. In 1949–1956, he was director of the Azerbaijan Philharmonic Society and art director of governmental concerts. In 1956, he was appointed director of the musical theater, created a company of actors staged a play Azeri.38 Like culture and art, Azerbaijani science made great progress within the borders of the USSR. For example, Khudu Mamedov defended a thesis in Moscow in 1955. His work was highly appreciated by Soviet and foreign scholars. In 1956, Mamedov published another work which was of great theoretical and practical importance. Mamedov’s works were published ahead those of British and German scholars, making a great contribution to the study of silicates.39 In 1957, A. Mirzajanzadeh, later to become a recognized scientist, defended a doctoral thesis on oil-bearing strata. In 1955–1956, jointly with Midhat Abasov, later a member of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Azad Mirzajanzadeh published articles that mattered most for the development of oil science in the Republic. Azerbaijan made a significant progress in literature, culture, science, and art in the mid-1950s. Thus, the main burden of social processes fell on Azerbaijanis, and this had a serious influence on the formation of social thought. As the process of national self-knowledge intensified, the struggle for the status of Azeri as national language became the pivot of all political developments of the mid-1950s. In the early 1956, intellectuals of Azerbaijan were dissatisfied with the situation regarding the language. A researcher of the Institute of Literature and Language of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Ramzi Yuzbashov, sent a letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai

Bulganin, and Anastas Mikoyan. This letter dated March 13, 1956 is strongly indicative of the state of that period. It said: “Two or three years ago I wouldn’t have dared to write such a letter, for letters from the people did not reach our leaders, and if they were critical, the author was punished. From now on the situation has visibly changed. Wives and husbands can freely talk about high prices at the market or tell others their news about the return of a relative from exile. In sending this letter I’m not pursuing the aim of seeing all shortcomings removed immediately. It’s my civic duty to write this letter. I hope this letter will reach the leaders of the country, and they will not call me an ‘enemy of the people.’ My question is about the national policy of the Communist Party. As far back as twenty-five to thirty years ago when Sergei Kirov led Azerbaijan, our institutions started their activity with the help of a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals who spoke their mother tongue. However, during the reign of Bagirov, the Azerbaijani language began losing its importance. Within twenty-five years he refused to speak Azeri with his native Azerbaijani people, nor did he write in this language. He was surrounded by bootlickers who imitated all his initiatives and looked askance at their native language. Suffice it to say that the official work is nowhere conducted in our mother tongue. Even worse, the number of schools in Azeri decreases from year to year. Persons speaking Azeri are treated like ignoramuses, Philistines. This is reminiscent of the times of German occupation when fascists wrote the names of streets on walls in Kherson first in German above and in Russian below, and the population was very dissatisfied and anxious about it. In the meantime, no street names in Baku are presented in Azeri. Dear leaders of the country, I’d like to state that Mir Jafar Bagirov exterminated not only our revolutionaries, Communists, and our prominent statesmen, poets and writers, but he ruined our native language as well. Today, a school graduate from the countryside is unlikely to find a job in Baku institutions; he way work either as a skilled laborer or try to continue his education somewhere else. Is it consistent with Lenin’s national policy? It’s my civic duty to write this letter, and it’s up to you to decide.”40 Shortly after, Yuzbashov’s letter was sent back from Moscow to the CC CPA. They decided to examine just one question raised in the letter: the reduction of purely Azerbaijani schools in Baku. Head of the Science and Education Department under the Central Committee, Ali Kerimov, was instructed to investigate the matter. On June 28, Kerimov forwarded a reference to Yakovlev, CPSU Secretary. In his cover letter, Kerimov noted that the number of schools and schoolchildren appreciably dropped, which was explained as being due to the considerable fall in birthrate during the war years.41 In turn, Secretary of the CC CPA Abdulla Bayramov sent another reference to K. Lebedev, head of the Party Organs Department under the CC CPSU, which noted that data on the number of schools and schoolchildren in the Azerbaijan SSR and Baku over 1945–1955 had been examined. Indeed, the number of schoolchildren of the first through fourth grades studying in Azeri dropped by 4,100. Bayramov explained this by the fall in birthrate and rise in the number of Azerbaijani schoolchildren attending Russian schools.42 On August 1, 1956, a letter was addressed to Sadyg Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. It said: “Comrade Rahimov, principles of Communism and the Lenin road call for the restoration of the Lenin national policy of people’s languages. This

question is a thousand times more important than the construction of the Mingechevir power station. Neither Khrushchev nor Bulganin will oppose it. There is a small number of those resisting this approach for fear of losing their cushy jobs. However, the Party of Lenin, workers of Azerbaijan and the progressive mankind will greet this cordially. The present-day situation makes it necessary to solve the problem in favor of people’s interests, or else it will be too late and become impossible. Interests of the Party, not personal ones, are important here. Justice, the Party and the nation are with you!” The letter was signed in a unique manner: “Nizami Ganjevi, Mahammad Fizuli, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Nariman Narimanov, and the whole Azerbaijani people.” Attached to the letter was a draft resolution in four items: 1. Every person employed in governmental offices of Baku should know the Azerbaijani and Russian languages. 2. Every person employed in governmental offices of Mountainous Garabagh should know the Armenian and Azerbaijani languages. 3. Every person employed in other places of Azerbaijan should know the Azerbaijani language. 4. Office work in governmental establishments of Republican importance should be run in the Azerbaijani language.43 As a result of search operations, the KGB detected the letter’s author. It proved to be Yuzbashov. He owned up to authorship of the draft resolution, saying he had signed the names of great Azerbaijanis to emphasize the letter’s significance. Yuzbashov added that he had earlier sent letters to Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Anastas Mikoyan, Imam Mustafayev and Mirza Ibrahimov which raised the question of state status being granted to the Azerbaijani language.44 Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR Fedor Kopylov sent a secret report to the CC CPA, saying: “It was established that the letter was authored by Yuzbashov Ramzi Movsum oglu, b.1906, native of Shamakhy, non-Party, higher education, junior researcher at the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. In his letter the author, from a nationalistic point of view, interprets the Lenin principle of national question. Asked about why he signed his letter on behalf of Nizami, Fizuli, Akhundov, and the whole Azerbaijani people, Yuzbashov replied that he did it to enhance the letter’s effect.”45 A KGB report for 1956 clearly demonstrates that Yuzbashov sent six letters to leaders of the USSR and Azerbaijan. Mustafayev instructed Bayramov to discuss the question at the CC Secretariat with the participation of Yuzbashov and the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR. Speaking at the Secretariat were Mustafayev, Bayramov, Yuzbashov, Aliyev, Gulizadeh, and B. K. Zeynalov. It was decided to discuss the question at the Secretariat only and entrust the President of the Academy of Sciences Aliyev and Party leader Zeynalov to hold the Institute of Literature and Language accountable for the thoughtless actions of Yuzbashov. Also, the low level of Party/political and educational work at the Academy of Sciences was emphasized.46 Kopylov’s letter to Mustafayev demonstrates the increasing number of signed and anonymous

demands about granting state status to the Azerbaijani language. Taking this into consideration, in spring 1956 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR Ibrahimov suggested interpreting this question from a legal standpoint. In June 1956, he discussed the question with Mustafayev. The latter agreed with such a formulation of the question and considered it necessary to discuss the problem in the CC Bureau. Ibrahimov offered to make an official inquiry to the CC; however, Mustafayev assured him that an oral appeal would be enough. In early July 1956 a draft supplement to the Constitution on state language was discussed at the CC CPA Bureau and unanimously approved. Ibrahimov was instructed to discuss this question with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Ibrahimov left for Moscow, and on July 17 he settled the issue with Chairman of the Presidium Kliment Voroshilov. However, it should be noted that the state language question had not been resolved with the CC CPSU. Leaders of Azerbaijan were confident of a favorable reply, especially because central Party organs were engaged in criticizing errors of the Stalin period in the national policy, neglect of national languages in official institutions, legal proceedings, selection of local cadre, and other spheres. Account must be taken of the fact that Republics bordering on Azerbaijan (Georgia and Armenia) had announced their national languages as the state languages on the Constitutional level. Thus, Article 156 of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR said that the Georgian language was the state language of the Republic. Also, all national minorities of Georgia had the right to use their mother tongue in the territory of the Republic. The same was true of the Constitution of the Armenian SSR. Upon return from Moscow on July 20, 1956, Ibrahimov sent a letter to the CC CPA which read as follows: “Throughout centuries, foreign oppressors subjugated the Azerbaijani people in an attempt to destroy its national sovereignty, statehood and culture. They caused the greatest damage to the national culture and formation of language. It is the Soviet power that gave impetus to the development of the national culture and language. At present, the Azerbaijani language is universally developed, used in all spheres of science and thinking. “Our writers and scholars create works of world-wide fame in this language. Also, the masterpieces of world literature are translated into our language. These include works by Shakespeare, Pushkin, Maupassant, Gorkiy, and others. The best philosophical works – Capital, Anti-Dühring, Materialism and Empiriocriticism, and so forth–are translated into the Azerbaijani language. One of the Soviet period achievements is the Azerbaijani language’s rise to the state level. It is no mere coincidence that the Azerbaijani language is issued as the state language at the level of rural, regional, town, Party and Soviet Republican organizations. Beyond any doubts, this process will intensify and develop henceforward. This situation is to find its parallel in the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Azerbaijan SSR. Therefore I consider it necessary to include a new article in Chapter XIII of the Constitution that the Azerbaijani language is the state language of the Azerbaijan SSR, and the national minorities reserve the right to use their mother tongues in their own offices. While in Moscow I had consultations in Moscow, July 17, with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Voroshilov, who reaffirmed the necessity of this supplement to the Constitution. Here’s a draft resolution of the CC CPA Bureau on the state language of the

Republic. I advice discussing this supplement at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to be convened on August 15.”47 On July 24, the CC CPA Bureau discussed Ibrahimov’s letter and decided to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet on August 20. Health Minister of the Republic Veli Akhundov was to make a report on the first item of the agenda, titled “On Conditions and Measures to Improve Medical-Sanitary Servicing of the Population in Rural Regions of the Republic.” The second item of the agenda was a question titled “On Changes and Supplements to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR,” and the third item was “On Approval of Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR.”A meeting of the CC Bureau of July 24 approved a draft law on the interesting article “On State Language of the Azerbaijan Republic” as suggested by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR into the Constitution. The CC Bureau entrusted the Presidium to submit the draft for discussion in the oncoming third session.48 On August 20, a meeting of the commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR for lawmaking was held under the guidance of Mamed Iskenderov, CC CPA Secretary. On the submission of Jafarov, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, members of the commission D. Agayeva, A. Babayev, B. Babazadeh, S. Gordiyev, O. Davidyan, A. Popov, and S. Rustamzadeh unanimously recommended submitting for discussion a draft law “On Supplement to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR and Article on State Language of the Azerbaijan SSR.” At 10:00 a.m. the third session of the Supreme Soviet began its work. Attending the session were 236 deputies, chaired by deputy B. Bagirova. The session listened to a report by M. Mamedov, member of the mandate commission, who stated that Yakovlev, Second Secretary of the CC CPA, was elected as a deputy on April 15, 1956 by constituency #22 in the name of F. Engels. The first meeting of the third session included a report by the Health Minister Akhundov “On Conditions and Measures to Improve Medical-Sanitary Servicing of the Population in Rural Regions of the Republic.” The Minister spoke in the Azerbaijani language. Rza, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet and Stalin Prize winner, spoke at the debates. Along with health problems typical for urban regions, Rza singled out cultural values: “As for cultural aspects, I’d like to say a few words about the language, about Azerbaijani language, which played a major role in the development of our people and proved to be a major factor in its cultural rise and progress. The Azerbaijani language that our great grandfathers spoke passed through centuries, enriched itself and turned into a wonderful means of communication. Immortal Fizuli wrote verses in this language; great Mirza Fatali created his works in the same language. In the Soviet period the Azerbaijani language kept on developing and getting renewed. Millions of political, scientific and artistic works were published in this language. However, our duty is to multiply our care for the Azerbaijani language. Some offices and enterprises have no proper respect for this language. It is essential to enhance the importance of the Azerbaijani language via its state significance. However, there are people who do not realize the importance of the basic language of our republic and its importance in the struggle for communism building. Today, we are witnessing

serious errors in studying, using and teaching the mother tongue. Here in the audience is the Minister of Education, respected Comrade Mirza Mamedov. Without a doubt, he is well aware of the fact that the number of pupils attending the Azerbaijani sectors drops from year to year. Behind this figure, there is the destiny of our science, literature, art, that is, the destiny of our nation. It’s a great concern for us. The native Azerbaijani language must take its own place in our life and our job. Our language has to be protected against foreign influences. We must pay greater attention to our native language in our practical everyday lives, create all necessary conditions for its use on a broader scale.”49 Rza’s speech received applause, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR Ibrahimov supported a subject raised by Rza: “Comrade deputies, Comrade Rza touched upon the destiny of the Azerbaijani language. It should be noted that some measures are being taken in our republic to remove nihilism and cosmopolitism and thus implement Lenin’s national policy. Our session is discussing the question of a supplement to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, including a special article on the state language. When we discussed the question of the state language with Comrade Voroshilov, he was very positive about this proposal. Such an important supplement to the Constitution urges the state offices and Party organizations to use the Azerbaijani language on a broader scale and remove distortions of its use. We cannot admit neglect of the Azerbaijani language in separate institutions. Unfortunately, cases of the sort are still found in some structures. For example, all the reports in Azerneshr (a publishing house) had for twenty-five years been run in the Azerbaijani language. However, an accountant changed, and the Azerbaijani language was put in the background. The Ministry of Culture is responsible for this mistake. Republican organizations took necessary measures and put an end to such a practice. All of us should be proficient in our native language; it’s shameful not to know the mother tongue.”50 As a result of these debates, the deputies adopted a law on the supplement to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Azerbaijan Republic, an article on the state language. Article 151 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR says: “The Azerbaijani language is the state language of the Azerbaijan SSR. National minorities residing on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR have the right to freely develop and use mother tongues in both their cultural and state institutions.” 51 The same day, Article 128 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR was approved with a new wording: “Citizens of the Azerbaijan republic have the right to education. This right is ensured by compulsory seven-year education, broad development of secondary education, a free education system, both secondary and higher, a system of state scholarship, teaching in the native language in schools, and so on.”52 Thus, in August 1956 not only did the Azerbaijani language receive the status of state language but also constitutional principles of education in the native language were strengthened. Also, the legal basis of school teaching in the Azerbaijani language was consolidated. A little later, on October 26, 1956, an article by Mirza Ibrahimov titled “The Azerbaijani Language in State Establishments” was published in the newspaper Kommunist. This article caused a storm of discussions in society. The article criticized the colonization policy of Russian tsarism and revealed the anti-humanistic nature of the national oppression. Ibrahimov wrote: “Any pressure from the ruling nation, the so called ‘great nation,’ causes

hatred and compels the oppressed people to wait for revenge.” Touching upon the policy of Russification, the article stressed that “tsarism suppressed non-Russian peoples through the most brutal gendarmerie methods, categorically rejected the national culture and national languages, and resorted to provocations and national massacre. With the purpose of oppressing and exterminating peoples and dissolving them inside the Empire, tsarism sought to fill outskirts of the country with Russian migrants. Pursuing such a wild policy, tsarism defamed the great Russian people and birthed hatred among oppressed peoples against the Empire.” It was evident that the two quotations above, pertaining to the tsarist regime notwithstanding, raised the question of national policy of the Soviet political regime. It was the political concept of the author that later led to unprecedented badgering against Ibrahimov. In his article, Ibrahimov pointed out that within the first decade of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan, an emphasis was laid on the use of the Azerbaijani language by state establishments. Later on, the author noted, serious distortions were admitted in some offices; some individuals developed defiant attitudes toward the Azerbaijani language, to say nothing of the fact that requests made in the Azerbaijani language were frequently ignored and remained unanswered. The author of the article summed up: “People engaged in state, Party, and public organizations admit neglect and indifference to the Azerbaijani language and thus commit grave errors. The use of the Azerbaijani language in state institutions and public organizations of the republic is a legal action, since every people is willing to run official work in its native language.”53 The proclamation of the Azerbaijani language as the state language was met with great enthusiasm of Azerbaijani intellectuals and ordinary citizens. Note that this law played a crucial role in shaping national self-consciousness in the Republic. Following the adoption of the law of the state language, it was suggested that non-Azerbaijanis engaged in state establishments learn the Azerbaijani language within six months. At the same time, all establishments and enterprises were instructed to avoid dismissing personnel speaking other languages. Senior officials of state establishments were entrusted with responding to complaints of the Russian-speaking population in their native language, that is, Russian. Twenty days after the adoption of the law on state language, on September 10, 1956, a group of workers of the plants and factories named after Schmidt, Pyotr Montin, Vano Sturua, Mikhail Kalinin, and Vatslav Volodarskiy, largely Russians and Armenians, sent a letter to Khrushchev, Voroshilov and chairman of the Soviet Trade Unions Viktor Grishin which protested the Law on Language, believing it incorrect to adopt such a law in Baku where 50 percent of the population are Russians, Armenians and Jews. They stressed that all non-Azerbaijanis were forcibly, against their will and desire, taught the Tatar, that is, Azerbaijani language. Panic reigned among the non-Azerbaijani population of Baku. Meanwhile, Azerbaijanis became impudent and ran office work in the Azerbaijani language. They warned that it was impossible to behave in such a manner in Baku, otherwise the situation could get out of control. Some Tatars insisted that foreigners go home–to Russian, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and so forth.54 The same day, on September 10, A. M. Petrosov, head of socialist building department of the Communist newspaper, which was issued in Baku in the Armenian language, appealed to Khrushchev, saying that the national question was being falsified in Azerbaijan. On behalf of

the country, Petrosov declared that the people welcomed decisions of the 20th Congress of the USSR and that “further expansion of the rights of Union Republics in managing economic and cultural building will contribute to the creative initiative of the public as well as further development of economy and culture of the Soviet nations; however, achievements of the national policy of our Party cannot hush up the current shortcomings in this field.” Petrosov believed that some aspects of international relations hampered the communist building in Transcaucasia: “The facts go to show that spiritual needs of national minorities are ignored, and artificial obstacles to their political activity are created. Enemies of the Soviet power Lavrentiy Beria, Mir Jafar Bagirov, and other persons avail themselves of the situation. When announcing Azerbaijanis as the native population of Azerbaijan, Armenians as the native population of Armenia, and Georgians the native population of Georgia, these figures distorted the Lenin national policy and did their best to create privileges for native nationalities in these republics. In the Azerbaijan SSR, the national culture of the Azerbaijani people is developing, while the cultures of national minorities are ignored. Even worse, the rights of national minorities are infringed.” Petrosov explained his concern as being due to the fact that such a practice of the national policy could seriously damage the communist education of people, since “such a practice corrupts intellectuals and leading cadre from the native population by granting them privileges in the first turn; infringement of rights of national minorities disables their initiative and political activity and leads to their artificial separation.” Petrosov tried to associate nationalism in Azerbaijan with the name of Bagirov. He wrote: “When leading the republic, this criminal Bagirov was engaged in separating nationalities for many years. He put forward a slogan of cadre promotion, primarily of Azerbaijani cadres, and thus set native nationalities against non-native. In every possible way he dismissed non-native cadres, first and foremost Armenians residing in Azerbaijan, from senior positions in industry, Party and Soviet apparatus. He tolerated the Russian cadre and at the same time prosecuted the Armenian cadre, although from time to time he backed some mercenary Armenians. For example, one of his accomplices, former State Security Minister S. Yemelyanov, told the CC Bureau in 1954 that Bagirov pursued anti-Soviet and particularly anti-Armenian policy, though he backed some Armenians he needed. An eloquent testimony to this is found in materials of Bagirov’s trial and actions of his accomplices Khoren Grigoryan and Ruben Markaryan. To attain his villainous goals, Bagirov backed corrupt Armenians, for instance, writer Markar Davtyan who was a puppet in the hands of Bagirov. In 1948 Marietta Shaginyan arrived in Baku to attend Nizami’s 800th anniversary celebrations, and Bagirov decided to discredit her. Davtyan was a villain who tried to publish a prevocational article against Shaginyan. On Bagirov’s suggestion, Davtyan was nominated as deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. It was Bagirov’s political line that made it possible to start an open campaign against Armenian cultural institutions. Suffice it to note the closing of the Baku Theater of Armenian Drama named after Yeremyan, Kirovobad Armenian Theater, the Armenian literary magazine Sovetakan grokh, a Kirovabad Armenian newspaper, and the withdrawal of Shaumyan, Khanlar and other mountainous regions from Armenian kolkhozes.” Then Petrosov complained that the number of Armenian schools in the Republic was in

decline. “This is explained as being due to the fact that higher educational institutions, special, and technical colleges, expect for the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute, have no Armenian branches, and Armenians from secondary schools face difficulties in entering an institute. Anxious about the prospects of their children, many parents have to place them in Russian schools. In the meanwhile, there are lots of Armenian villages, thousands of Armenian workers engaged in industrial centers who want to study and teach their children in the native Armenian language. Petrosov believed that Bagirov’s arrest would be followed by distribution of lands between Armenian collective farmers, opening of Armenian theaters, issue and publication of Armenian literary magazines, opening of technical or agricultural colleges in the Armenian language, and so on; however, the Republic’s leaders were silent. He was puzzled: “There is no law to stipulate that the Armenian culture should develop in Armenia only. Why not help or promote the development of national minority cultures where appropriate? After Bagirov’s unmasking, new leaders of the Republic are doing not enough to end the consequences of the counter-revolutionary actions of Bagirov and publicly acknowledge their guilt in these issues.” Petrosov believed that responsibility for unsatisfactory work with national minorities should rest with the First Secretary of the CC CPA.55 Subsequently, Petrosyan’s letter was re-sent to Baku for verification. Upon instructions of A. Bayramov, CC Secretary, a commission was set up to include M. Okulov, T. Aliyev, and B. Vekilov. The commission made a reference which said that all charges against Republican bodies and establishments of infringing rights of national minorities, particularly Armenians, were groundless. Petrosyan alleged that the promotion of the Armenian cadre was deliberately restrained by Republican bodies. However, facts of this sort were not on record. Thus, seventy-four out of 310 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR were representatives of other nationalities (24%), including Armenians–twenty-four deputies (7%) and Russians–thirty-five deputies (11%). Also, thirty-one out of 137 members of the CC and Auditing Commission of the CPA were representatives of other nationalities, including nine Armenians. Note that twenty-five out of 110 senior officials of the CC CPA Apparatus were Russians and fourteen were Armenians. Also, five Armenians were secretaries of the Baku City Party Committee and district Party organizations. Over thirty Armenians worked as top officials in the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR and Republican Ministries. As for the closing of the Armenian drama theaters, the reference revealed the reason for this fact: a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated February 6, 1949 about the transfer of theatrical organizations to a self-supporting basis. Suffice it to say that twenty-two out of thirty municipal and regional theaters were closed as unprofitable. Also closed in Baku were the Azerbaijan State Theater of Musical Comedy, Puppet Show, Jewish Drama Theater, Azerbaijan State Choir, Azerbaijan Variety Orchestra, Azerbaijan Saz Ensemble, and the Kirovobad (Ganja) branch of the Azerbaijan State Philharmonic Society. Note that the Russian and Armenian Drama Theaters were also closed. As for the closing of the Armenian State Drama Theater, the reference said that it was integrated into the Armenian Drama Theater in Stepanakert (Khankendi). In his letter to Khrushchev, Petrosov raised the question of opening literary magazines in the

Armenian language. The reference said that before the Great Patriotic War two literary magazines in the Armenian language were issued in Azerbaijan: Sovetakan grokh (Soviet writer) and Kaits (Spark). During the War these magazines were suspended. Starting in 1954, the CC CPA put forward proposals to the CC CPSU’s Science and Culture Department about resumption of a literary magazine in the Armenian language to be issued in Baku. However, the problem was not solved. The CC CPA passed a decision to issue such a magazine in Kirovobad. However, the CC CPSU propaganda department did not support this decision. Members of the said commission considered it inexpedient to issue an Armenian newspaper in Kirovobad, since even in Baku the Communist newspaper in the Armenian language was not fully selling. Also, in addition to the said Kommunist, one provincial and four regional newspapers in the Armenian language were issued in the country. In addition, radio broadcasts in the same language were transmitted two times a day. The reference stressed the demagogical nature of Petrosov’s complaints, saying: “To provide the Armenian population of Azerbaijan with political, scientific literature, and belles-lettres in the Armenian language, an agreement has been reached with the Republican bodies of the Armenian SSR, under which publishing houses and book-selling organizations were to regularly send the abovementioned literature.” In addition, the Armenian literature in the Armenian and Russian languages was published in Baku as well. In 1954–1956, the publishing house “Azerneshr” issued seventy-six titles of Armenian books with a total circulation of 170,004 copies. Baku residents of older and medium generations remember it very well that newsstands and book shops were full of literature in the Armenian language, but no Armenians dreamt of reading them. Why? That’s a question for the Armenian readers! Petrosov’s letter paid a great deal of attention to the study of children in the Armenian language. The author tried to prove that the number of those studying in Armenian steadily dropped. The reference noted that this fact was typical for the first post-war years and explained it as being due to the reduction in birth rate. The last three years saw a steady rise in the number of students, including those studying in the Armenian language. For instance, in the 1954–1955 academic year the number of Armenian pupils made up 37,552; in 1956–1957 – 43,277. The reference said that two Armenian schools operated in Baku and that six schools had Armenian sectors (note that the number of these schools in Azerbaijan was 317). It also noted that at parents’ requests most Armenian children studied in the Russian-language schools. As for higher education in the Armenian language, this depended upon the demand in specialists. Thus, there were Armenian sectors in the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute and the distance-learning pedagogical institute. The facts went to show that no rights of Armenian schoolchildren were infringed, as Petrosov alleged. It transpired that he was either misinformed or deliberately perverted facts to damage the Azerbaijani reality. Also, a final question was raised in Petrosov’s letter. Mountainous collective farms of the Shaumyan and Khanlar regions were known to have utilized lands of the state reserve in low-lying areas. However, the lands were cultivated poorly, and the harvest was low. The reference inferred that Petrosov was guided by “outdated sentiments of thoughtless people.” Thus, the commission replied to all of Petrosov’s questions and considered it necessary to discuss the

letter in the CC CPA with the participation of the author.56 Having familiarized himself with the reference, Petrosov disagreed with the commission’s conclusions. He wrote another letter to the First Secretary of the CC CPA, Comrade Mustafayev, which complained of the commission’s biased approach to his questions. As viewed by Petrosov, his ideas were misinterpreted, and the sabotage activities of Beria and Bagirov were improperly analyzed. Petrosov was particularly displeased with the fact that the commission explained the infringement of interests of the Armenian minority with objective circumstances, not with Bagirov’s policy. He tried to persuade Mustafayev that the letter’s charges were directed against Bagirov only. He complained that the Decade of the Azerbaijani Culture program in Moscow paid no attention to national minorities, including Armenian creative associations. Petrosov declared that it was not the Azerbaijani decade, but the Decade of the Azerbaijan SSR. And, finally, Petrosov unmasked the real motivation of his demarche: the adoption of the Azerbaijani language as the state one and teaching of this language in the Armenian schools. In particular, he complained that the Armenian schoolchildren would face difficulties in learning four languages at once.57 Despite Petrosov’s sixteen-page explanatory note, the CC CPA Bureau approved the reference made by Aliyev, Vekilov, and Okulov, declaring Petrosov’s letter to Khrushchev as “ungrounded and politically harmful” and resolving the following: “To condemn the behavior of CPSU member Comrade Petrosov and explain to him that due to his political backwardness he misunderstands the national policy of the Party.”58 The day after Petrosov sent a letter to Khrushchev, on September 11, 1956, psychiatrist from Yerevan named V. Badalyan lodged a complaint to the Secretary General of the CC CPSU protesting the national policy of Azerbaijan. He spent his leave in Mountainous Garabagh to infer: “My late father, an old Bolshevik, one of the first chairmen of revolutionary committees of Armenia, told me about the ruins of Shusha ten to twelve years ago. But I did not believe him. One day I was passing by 5,000 destroyed homes, and my oldest son, Samuel, then in third grade, asked: ‘Daddy, did fascists destroy the town? Why is another part of the town intact?’ I found no adequate answer and had to tell a lie, the first ever in my life: ‘Yes, fascists did.’ But I failed to answer my son’s next question: ‘Why hasn’t the town been restored?’ It should be noted that ancient Shusha had two parts: the Azerbaijani and Armenian one. Owing to the tsarist power that stirred up national discord and roused national massacre, Azerbaijanis exterminated a part of the Armenian population of Shusha and set the town of fire. The rest was completed in 1920.”59 As it is known, V. Badalyan intentionally falsified the history and ethnic composition of the town’s population. First, there had never been 5,000 Armenian homes; second, at the date of Badalyan’s letter Shusha was a rapidly developing cultural center of Azerbaijan. Projecting his own thoughts onto his under-age son, the psychiatrist sought to arouse Khrushchev’s anger. In the meanwhile, a second-year student of the Azerbaijan State Conservatory named R. Bagdasarov told Khrushchev that “a disgusting tradition” was underway in Azerbaijan: Azerbaijanis are in high demand to take leading positions in all the branches of the national economy and culture. Nationalism is prospering in the Republic; even Party committees are

made up of Azerbaijanis only. The champions of nationalism are intellectuals. R. Bagdasarov warned that the proclamation of Azerbaijani as the state language would give impetus to dangerous consequences for non-Azerbaijanis. In all probability, this would lead to the growth of negative tendencies in the country.60 Another Armenian “well-wisher,” chairman of the Frunze collective farm from Mountainous Garabagh Ashot Mikhaelyan, reported in August 1956 to Khrushchev that his collective farms were engaged in protecting their crops against “our Azerbaijani neighbors who assault our gardens, harvests, and threshing floors to plunder properties owned by our collective farmers.” He added that Azerbaijanis from the village Shelli, Agdam region, were making a fortune on their personal plots to the detriment of the collective farm. Even better, he stressed that situations of this sort was typical for the entirety of Azerbaijan, while regional and Republican leaders were not lifting a finger to remedy the situation. Mikhaelyan noted that leaders of Mountainous Garabagh were well aware of these facts but, for fear of being charged with nationalism, wary of putting this question on the agenda of central bodies.61 This letter was resent to Baku where CC CPA Secretary Efendiyev was instructed, jointly with CC agricultural department executives, to investigate the situation in Mountainous Garabagh. Involved in the investigation were first secretary of the regional Party committee E. Grigoryan, first secretary of the Agdam region Party committee, Mustafayev, and Minister of Culture of Azerbaijan M. Kurbanov. Talks with the population of Mountainous Garabagh, residents of villages Nakhchivanik and Shelli, and with Mikhaelyan personally, made it possible to infer that the latter dreamt the whole thing up. As the facts turned out to be incorrect, Michaelyan was told that his conduct was unbecoming for a member of the Communist Party.62 It should be noted that the transition to the compulsory study of the Azerbaijani language in the Russian-language schools was given a hostile reception by the non-Azerbaijani population of Baku, especially by Armenians. Scores of anonymous letters went to Moscow protesting against the nationalism of Republican leaders. Things went so far that even an eighth-grade girl wrote to Khrushchev asking: “Why is there so much sensation around the Azerbaijani language? Why do the Azerbaijanis not understand the true mission of Russians in Azerbaijan? Why should the Azerbaijani language be taught not only in the Russian-language schools but the Azerbaijani schools as well? Why should anybody need to speak the Azerbaijani language at all? We ask you to take necessary measures.”63 The number of complaints being sent to Moscow increasingly rose after the adoption of the decision of the CC CPA Bureau dated August 14, 1956 about teaching of the Azerbaijani language in Russian, Armenian, and Georgian schools beginning from the third grade. In September 1956, a member of the CC CPA G. Antepelyan submitted a reference to Mustafayev titled “On Curriculum of the Armenian Schools of the Republic for the 1956–1957 Academic Year.” He noted: “Pupils of the Armenian schools start learning their native language from the first grade; the Russian language from the second grade; the Azerbaijani language from the third grade and a foreign language from the fifth grade. Thus, the pupils of the Armenian schools compulsorily study four languages at the age of twelve. Introduction of the Azerbaijani language from the third grade makes essential changes in the current curriculum to create

excessive burden for schoolchildren. A certain discord arises between academic plans devised by the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR and academic programs and methodic instructions drawn up by the Ministry of Education of the Armenian SSR, compulsory for the Armenian schools of our Republic. The abovementioned reduction of hours for the mother tongue and literature gives rise to additional difficulties for those finishing the Armenian schools in Azerbaijan and planning to enter higher educational institutions in the Armenian SSR.” In connection to this, Antelepyan suggested studying the Azerbaijani language in the Armenian schools from the fifth grade or even on an optional basis.64 Making adjustments for these proposals, and even more so for pressures from Moscow, the CC CPA Bureau adopted a decision on October 16, 1956 to make amendments to the resolution of August 154, specifically: “owing to the overloaded curriculum, to cancel the CC CPA Bureau Resolution dated August 14, 1956 ‘On Teaching of the Azerbaijani Language in the Schools of the Azerbaijan SSR with the Russian, Armenian and Georgian Languages of Teaching’ regarding the teaching of the Azerbaijani language in accordance with the desire of the pupils and their parents, and to entrust the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR with making necessary amendments in the curricula of schools teaching in the Armenian and Georgian languages.”65 Enactment of the law “On State Language” in Azerbaijan faced a frosty reception in Moscow. Head of the CPSU Department for Party Organs E. Gromov and instructor of the same department K. Lebedev made a detailed reference on November 16, 1956 which reviewed the debates at the III session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, speeches of Ibrahimov and Rza, articles of Ibrahimov in the Communist newspaper, and adoption of the law on state language and its impact on the social-political life of the Republic. They wrote that the authorities instructed official structures of Azerbaijan to run official work in the Azerbaijani language. Before this decision, neither the Republic Communist Party nor the Supreme Soviet of the Republic asked for advice from the CC CPSU. The Department for Party Organs of Union Republics opined that there was no need to enact such a law. The very adoption of this law goes to show the rise of nationalism in the Republic. From that point on, meetings in the country were held in the Azerbaijani language, and some people speaking another language were dismissed. Letters arrived at the CC CPSU and CPA protesting the new law and Ibrahimov’s article. Many senior officials disagreed with this article’s concept. As viewed by Rahimov, Ibrahimov’s article gave rise to the growth of nationalistic elements, demagogues, and authors of anonymous letters. In Bayramov’s opinion, Ibrahimov’s article was inopportune and undesirable. Mustafayev, Rahimov and Bayramov believed that it would be appropriate to seek counsel from Bureau members before writing for the press on such an important subject. E. Gromov and K. Lebedev wrote that the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR sent a text of the stated law to all Union Republics. After that, some Republics, especially the Baltic ones, tended to enact the same law. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia K. Ozolin, with reference to the Azerbaijani experience, spoke at the Secretariat of the Latvian Communist Party and raised the question of an appropriate clause to be added in the Country’s Constitution. However, during the CC CPL Bureau debates, the draft

was turned down. Gromov and Lebedev stressed that the CPA and the Supreme Soviet had committed a mistake by failing to consult with the CC CPSU. They suggested that the issue be discussed in the CC CPSU with the participation of Mustafayev, Rahimov, and Ibrahimov. Note that Ibrahimov’s speech about the state language at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR was translated into Russian, attached to the article and forwarded to M. Suslov, Secretary of the CC CPSU.66 For reasons mentioned above, the enactment of the new law at ministries, offices, and enterprises received serious resistance from people speaking other languages. For instance, the Ministry of Finance alleged that it was very difficult to use the Azerbaijani language within the framework of this structure. Serious debates arose around the language’s usage at meetings and in various discussions. A chairperson at the meeting of an instrumental ensemble made his opening speech in Russian. Azerbaijani musicians demanded that the meeting be conducted in the Azerbaijani language; a squabble broke out and grew into a brawl. At another institute, an Armenian was demanded to either speak in the Azerbaijani language or to step down from the podium. Other ministries tried to postpone the application of the law on various pretexts. Note that the enactment of the law on the state language urged the population to write requests to state institutions in the mother tongue and thus intensified the public activity of citizens. It was the CC CPA, running its office work in the Russian language, that immediately felt the weight of the situation: written requests from ordinary citizens in the Azerbaijani language assumed a mass character. Guided by this principle were not only ordinary citizens but heads of Party and Soviet bodies. In autumn 1956, reports, references, and documents in the Azerbaijani language arrived in the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers from various organizations of Baku and especially regions of the Republic. A meeting of the primary Party organization was held on October 25, 1956 at the CC CPA. The minutes of this meeting testify that the Party leadership of the Republic did not expect things to have taken such a turn. A report of member of the primary Party organization D. Rzayev conceded that CC departments were technically in no position to process appeals and applications, answer them in the Azerbaijani language, and submit resolutions of the CC CPSU to local organizations. CC member H. Aliyev noted that many Republican and Party organizations were discontent that the CC ran correspondence in the Russian language. He suggested employing one typist and one stenographer well versed in the Azerbaijani language. In turn, CC Secretary M. Iskenderov declared that most CC Apparatus members were proficient in the Azerbaijani language, so “it would be appropriate to discontinue translating letters into the Russian language.”67 In his report to the CC CPA on the results of the meeting M. Okulov, Secretary of the CC Apparatus Party Bureau, said that a typist was needed to type materials in the Azerbaijani language. The absence of such a typist made it difficult to be in correspondence with regional Party organizations.68 Aliyev, Kuzovenkov, and Okulov forwarded a document to Mustafayev which said as follows: “In connection to the law ‘On Supplement to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR,’ articles on the state language of the Azerbaijan SSR as adopted in August 1956 at the III Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, for some time there has been a rise in the quantity of incoming and outgoing correspondence of the CC CPA in the

Azerbaijani language. Now communists more frequently speak the Azerbaijani language at the meetings of the Bureau, Plenums, and sessions held by the CC CPA. However, there were just two stenographers and five typists who could hardly cope with their work in the Russian language while additional employees were required to run the work in the Azerbaijani language.” It was suggested to take on five additional typists, one stenographer, and one translator at the expense of staff reduction, including two instructors at the Nukha town committee, one statistician at the Kirovabad town committee, one instructor, and one technical secretary at the Baku city committee. “Thanks to the five vacant posts it is suggested to take on a translator in charge of translating texts of key decisions from Russian into Azerbaijani, including those adopted at the Bureau and Secretariat of the CC, and other CPA directives; a stenographer-translator in charge of not only taking down in short-hand speeches in the Azerbaijani language but also translating decisions of the CC CPA Bureau and Secretariat, as well as two typists who know the Azerbaijani language.” Regarding the fifth vacant post, it was suggested to take on a chief receptionist of the CC CPA.69 In considering these proposals, the CC CPA Secretariat passed a decision “On Measures to Increase the Quantity of Correspondence in the Azerbaijani Language Incoming and Outgoing from the CC CPA.”70 However, to put this decision into practice, the permission of the CC CPSU was required. With that end in view, on March 23, 1957, Mustafayev appealed to Moscow. He wrote: “Owing to the enactment of the law on State Language of the Azerbaijan SSR, the member of incoming and outgoing information of the CC CPA has essentially increased, so there is a growing need to translate all the decisions of the CC Bureau and other Party documents into the Azerbaijani language. Also, the number of Communists speaking at meetings at the Bureau, Plenums, and sessions in the Azerbaijani language has risen as well. The lack of translators, stenographers, and typists to translate and type materials in the Azerbaijani language at the CC CPA Apparatus creates difficulties for the normal work of the Apparatus.” Mustafayev asked Moscow to allow the CC CPA to increase the staff by five posts: three instructors of the special sector, one stenographer, and one typist. It was noted that the supposed increase in the staff would be compensated by appropriate reduction of instructors and technical workers at the Baku city Party committees.71 The introduction of an additional article in the Constitution was accompanied by growth of natural interest in the greatest specimen of the Turkic language, the epic Kitabi Dede Korkud. In the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, relations between the USSR and Turkey were utterly strained, which resulted in the negation of the Turkic roots of all historical/cultural monuments and prohibition of all Turkism-related ideological trends. In 1951, the epic Kitabi Dede Korkud (The Book of my Grandfather Korkud) was banned as an example of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism propagandizing nationalistic ideas. In the meantime, pan-Islamism emerged as an ideological trend in the end of the nineteenth century, and panTurkism on the eve of the First World War. The strangest thing was that this work of literature was declared absolutely alien to the Azerbaijani people. Following the enactment of the law of language, scholars and writers spoke at the Azerbaijan State University, Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Writers Union and other

organizations and called to return this work to the Azerbaijani people. With that end in view, the CC CPA propaganda department entrusted Professors H. Arasly, A. Demirchizadeh, M. Shiraliyev, and associate professors M. Qulizadeh and M. Tahmasib with stating their views on the epic Kitabi Dede Korkud in written form.72 In November 1956, this group of intellectuals prepared a detailed eighteen-page reference. They noted that the copy of the epic had first been discovered in the early nineteenth century in the royal library of Dresden. A cataloguer named Fleischer dated it back to the sixteenth century. In 1815, orientalist Friedrich Ditz recopied the manuscript and brought it to the Berlin library. He published it together with the Chapter “Tepegöz” (Cyclops) which was translated into German. Azerbaijani researchers noted in their reference that in connection with this publication, Ditz wrote an article in which “Tepegöz” was compared to Homer’s Odyssey. In stating that the battle of “Tepegöz” was used in composing the Odyssey, Ditz thus attributed the epic to antiquity. In their report, the Azerbaijani researchers pointed out that the epic had first been studied by orientalist Heldek, then by well-known Russian orientalist Vasili Barthold. In 1984, Barthold provided general information about this epic and the Russian translation of the battle of “Doha Godja oglu Deli Domrul.” The reference noted that Barthold’s initiative caused great interest among Russian orientalists. Later issues of the almanac published serious studies of Tumanskiy, Divayev, Inostrantsev and other scholars about the epic. Subsequently, Barthold published several chapters of the epic in the Russian translation, and after his death this translation was discovered in his archives. In 1950, the Academic Barthold’s work was published by the Nizami Institute of Literature and Language. The report said that Turkish researchers analyzed the historical work. In 1916, the epic was first published in the Arabic script by teacher Ryfat Kilisli on the basis of the Berlin copy. In 1938, Turkish scholar Orhan Şaik Gökay published the epic in the new Turkish script. Of interest is the fact that in the same year H. Arasly published Kitabi Dede Korkud in the Latin script. The reference of the Azerbaijani researchers noted that Italian orientalist Rossi had recently discovered another variant of the epic’s manuscript and published it in the Vatican in 1952, with an opening address attached. With a special emphasis on Barthold, the Azerbaijani researchers wrote that “in his opening address attached to the Russian translation, Barthold insisted that this epic could have been born in the Caucasus only, nowhere else.” The researchers stressed the following: “The epic’s stories are known to take place in Azerbaijan. Suffice it to mention the names of Ganja, Barda, Derbent, Sharur, Alinja-chay, the fortresses Alinja and Darsham, the Göyche Lake, and other toponyms. The main developments happened in these localities. Relations between Kitabi Dede Korkud and Azerbaijan are integral and inalienable, as referred to by various scholars and travelers visiting Azerbaijan. As far back as in 1638, Adam Olearius wrote that while in Derbent he heard separate episodes of the epic from Azerbaijanis. He reported that graves of Qazan-khan, his wife Burla-khatun, and Dede Korkud proper were located here. In the mid-seventeenth century, traveler Evliya Chelebi visited Shamakhy and wrote in his diary that the grave of Dede Korkud was located in Derbent and that Shirvan residents revered and even worshipped it. Citing various examples from the epic, the authors of the reference proved that Kitabi Dede Korkud is undoubtedly owned by the

Azerbaijani people. As for the language of the epic, the authors reject views of the 1950s that it was not the Azerbaijani language. They maintain: “The language of the epic is partly intelligible for peoples speaking Turkic languages. However, in its vocabulary, phraseological turns of speech, and grammatical structure, it is closest to the Azerbaijani language. Words are sometimes found in the epic which seem to be ‘foreign’ for people unfamiliar to the history of our language. Availing themselves of the fact that no words of this sort are used in the modern language, these people put forward unscientific, thoughtless opinions. In the meanwhile, these words are widely used both in the works of our classics and the living language”. At last, the authors of the reference came to the conclusion that Kitabi Dede Korkud is the best, oldest source for the study of the history of the Azerbaijani language. The epic presents the most valuable concentration of rich materials for the study of everyday life, ethnography, language, folklore, literature and the history of the Azerbaijani people.73 In connection to this, T. Aliyev, senior executive of the CC CPA, sent a note dated November 19, 1956 to A. Bayramov, CC Secretary, which suggested publishing a scientifically substantiated article of a group of prominent scholars and writers about the epos Kitabi Dede Korkud in the Communist newspaper. In addition, Aliyev asked the Institute of Literature and Language of the Academy of Sciences to issue the epos in 1957 and supply it with a preface, commentaries, and a vocabulary of incomprehensible words.74 A meeting of the CC CPA Bureau was held on January 29, 1957 which resolved as follows: (1) to regard the prohibition of Kitabi Dede Korkud as incorrect; (2) to entrust the Institute of Literature and Language of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR with organizing in a two-month period broad debates over the epos Kitabi Dede Korkud and to issue the epos in 1957 with a circulation of 10,000 copies, supplied with a detailed preface, commentaries and a vocabulary of incomprehensible words; (3) to publish as soon as possible a scientifically substantiated article of prominent scholars and writers about the epos Kitabi Dede Korkud.75 After the Second World War and up to the death of Stalin, no one in Azerbaijan could even breathe a word of the Turkish language or Turkey as a whole. However, in summer of 1956, Deputy Minister of Education A. Rahimli sent a letter to Mustafayev and Rahimov which stressed the necessity of teaching the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages instead of western languages at some schools of Baku and other towns for training of entrants and those willing to join the faculty of oriental studies of the Azerbaijan State University. The letter focused on the necessity of studying the history, culture, and economy of eastern countries to thus meeting interests of the Azerbaijani youth in the oriental languages. Rahimli added that there were personnel available to teach these languages.76 A report of the deputy head of Science and Schools Department of the CC CPA, B. Vekilov, noted that the West European languages might be replaced by Arabic, Persian, and Turkish in the 1956–1957 academic year in some schools of Baku, Kirovabad, Lenkaran, Nukha, Nakhchivan, and Salyan. He added that this question had been settled by D. Kukin, deputy head of Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools of the CC CPSU.77 After preparatory work, the CC CPA Bureau passed a resolution on November 2, 1956 titled “On Teaching the Arabic, Turkish, and Persian Languages in Three Schools of Baku instead of the Western

European Languages.” The resolution said: “Owing to the development of international relations and the propinquity of the Azerbaijani language to the languages of the Near Eastern peoples, to ask for permission of the CC CPSU to introduce, beginning with the 1957–1958 academic year, in three Azerbaijani schools of Baku (#31, 44, 204), the teaching of the Arabic, Turkish, and Persian languages instead of the West European languages, starting in the fifth grade.” In connection with this, the Bureau instructed the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR with drawing up and approving academic plans and curriculums for schools teaching the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages, as well as with supplying the said schools with skilled teachers. At the same time, the State Publishing House was entrusted with preparing and issuing programs and manuals of the Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages in the beginning of the 1957–1958 academic year.78 The adoption of the Law on State Languages was accompanied by the strengthening of the national idea and concern for the cultural heritage of the Azerbaijani people. For instance, Secretary of the Union of Soviet Composers of the Azerbaijan SSR, F. D. Aliyev, sent a letter to the Secretary of Mountainous Garabagh regional Party committee E. P. Grigoryan on September 8, 1956 which stated as follows: “Under a decision of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan dated February 9, 1949 on perpetuating the memory of composer Hajibeyov, a memorial museum was to be created in his native land–in the town of Shusha, where he spent his childhood and youth. Inspection of the museum site showed that local organizations had not complied with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic.” Amirov and director of the Republican branch of the Soviet museum fund, R. Khalilov, demanded local authorities to carry out repair operations in the museum. In turn, the museum fund undertook to provide stands with photographs, musical materials, and manuscripts.79 On October 8, 1956 Amirov and Khalilov sent a letter to the Ministry of Culture of the Azerbaijan SSR which suggested perpetuating the memories of the late composers of Azerbaijan. Attached therewith was a plan of measures to perpetuate the memories of Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Muslim Magomayev, Asaf Zeynally, and Zulfugar Hajibeyov. With respect to Uzeyir Hajibeyov, it was decided to erect a monument in Baku, install a monument at his burial place, put up a bust at his homeland in Shusha, issue collected works and texts of his musical comedies and libretti in the Azerbaijani and Russian languages, create memorial museums in Shusha and Baku together with appropriate personnel, and install memorial plagues in Gori, the Leningrad Conservatory, and so forth. To perpetuate the memory of Magomayev, the authorities suggested installing his bust in a public garden in front of the philharmonic society building, putting a memorial plaque on his home, issuing piano scores of the operas Shah Ismail and Narghiz, and naming schools in Lenkaran and Baku after him. The same recommendations were given regarding A. Zeynally and Hajibeyov.80 In October 1956, a preparatory work was under way to open a museum of J. Mamedquluzadeh. The son of Hamida Mamedquluzadeh, M. Davatdarov, wrote in a letter to Suleyman Rahimov: “After my mother H. Mamedquluzadeh’s death, you and the late Samed Vurghun raised the question of establishing a museum to Jalil Mamedquluzadeh. Vurghun called me and suggested that the Nizami museum employees survey our apartment for an estimate of

repair needed and adequate equipment. He told me that the Baku city council had been instructed to provide me with a flat of equal worth. After Vurghun’s death, the question of the museum was suspended. At present, rumors are afloat about measures to deduct large amounts of money for extra floor-space. Under such circumstances I’ll be in no position to retain the flat for a museum, so I’ll have to grant the flat on a lease to new tenants. This will create difficulties in the future, not only for me, but also for the new tenants who will have to be provided with a flat.” M. Davlatdarov asked to accelerate the opening of J. Mamedquluzadeh’s museum.81 After the adoption of the law on state language, the population’s demand for spiritual nourishment rose. To meet the cultural needs of readers, the Union of Writers raised the question of increasing the volume of the magazines Azerbaijan and Literary Azerbaijan. The question was resolved by the CC CPA Bureau in December 1956, though as far back as in December 1955 this question was raised by Rahimov, the Chairman of the Writers’ Union. On December 31, 1955, CC Secretaries M. Iskenderov and A. Bayramov sent a reference to Mustafayev which stressed the expediency of meeting the writers’ proposal. A letter from Ibrahimov and Bayramov sent to the CC CPA on October 25, 1956 said as follows: “For many years the volume of Azerbaijan has been ten printer sheets. Writers compose new works of literature; however, the magazine cannot publish them. Some large works are published in three to four issues for lack of space. We recommend increasing the magazine’s volume to fourteen printer sheets. All the issues are sold well.” In corroboration with their words, the authors of the letter attached a scheme which showed the general circulation, number of subscribers, and the magazine’s sales over the ten months of 1956. For instance, in January 1956, the magazine Azerbaijan had 5,250 copies, of which 5,207 were sent to subscribers and forty-three copies were left for free sale. The second issue of the magazine had 5,400 copies, of which 5,340 were sent to subscribers and sixty copies were put up for sale.82 Ibrahimov and Bayramov submitted a draft decision to the CC CPA Bureau on December 1 about increasing the volume of Azerbaijan by four printer sheets, and that of Literary Azerbaijan by two printer sheets. On December 4, 1956, the CC CPA Bureau passed a decision to increase, as of January 1957, the volume of the magazine Azerbaijan up to fourteen printer sheets and that of Literary Azerbaijan by four printer sheets.83 The same day, December 4, 1956, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Ibrahimov appealed to the CC CPA with a request to provide him with a three-month leave. Having discussed this question, the CC Bureau provided Ibrahimov with the leave from January 1 to March 1 to work on a novel about oil workers’ lives. On December 29, 1956, before going on leave, Ibrahimov raised the question before the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR “On the Use of the Azerbaijani Language in Some Ministries of the Republic.” Note that as far back as November, under a decision of the Presidium, commissions arrived in the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and Culture to review the situation. In the first half of December, the commissions finished their work and submitted reports to Ibrahimov. A reviewer of the Presidium, M. Abdullayev, and executive secretary of the newspaper Youth of Azerbaijan, Jamil Alibeyov, said in their report that after the inclusion

of an article about the Azerbaijani language in the Constitution of the country, some positive changes took place in the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, correspondence and office work in the department of forestry were run in the Azerbaijani language. However, the transition into the native language was not complete here. Sometimes letters in Russian were submitted to central bodies of the Republics in some regions, especially in MTS. Abdullayev and Alibeyov noted that materials for the Ministry Board were prepared in Russian, and the accounting in all departments and branches was run in Russian. The managers explained this as being due to the fact that accountants did not know the Azerbaijani language. The commission stressed the disastrous situation in the MTS headquarters, saying: “There are forty-two engineers in this department, and just nine of them know the Azerbaijani language. The rest do their work in the Russian language. The department of material and technological supply is made of thirty-six employees, of whom only six persons know the Azerbaijani language.” The report stressed that the law on the state language was not observed in the cattle-breeding inspection, where correspondence was done in Russian. The situation is especially deplorable in the agricultural propaganda department. Z. Efendiyev told us that his department covered five institutes and one silkworm breeding station, with a total of 982 employees, of which 352 were researchers. Most of them could not write in the Azerbaijani language. That’s why all lectures, scientific work, and office work were run in the Russian language. Note that the leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture, both the minister and his deputies, did nothing to remedy the situation. The report of the commission said: “All the incoming and outgoing correspondence is in Russian. Office workers do not know the Azerbaijani language, so all the letters and projects are in Russian. The enactment of the law on state language was followed by four meetings of the Board, and all of them were held in Russian. Decisions and orders adopted by the Board were distributed about the regions of the Republic in Russian. It should be noted that a great majority of the Board members, except for two, know the Azerbaijani language very well and could easily deal with documents in the Azerbaijani language. But for some reason, no changes for the better have been observed in this area.”84 The Ministry of Finance was evaluated by a commission made of deputy S. Aliyev and head of a department of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR K. Aliyeva. They reported that 156 employees were engaged in the Ministry, of which seventy-eight did not know the Azerbaijani language; seven employees out of twenty-two heads of departments and their deputies did not know their mother tongue; and as a whole, 78.4 percent of employees from financial institutions did not know the Azerbaijani language. Members of the commission noted that some changes for the better had happened: fifteen new employees were taken on, all of them proficient in the Azerbaijani language; language circles were organized to study the Azerbaijani language; the Russian-language typist was replaced by an Azerbaijani-language one; and a greater portion of the correspondence was run in the local language. Still, the commission noted that before the check-up at the Ministry of Finance, due attention was not paid to the use of the Azerbaijani language, so the correspondence, accountability, auditing protocols, and even the correspondence with the province were run in Russian. To conclude, Aliyev and Aliyeva noted that after the III session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan

SSR, the correspondence in the Ministry was partly run in the Azerbaijani language; over the fifteen days that passed between the first and the second evaluation, correspondence with local organizations had already begun to be run in this language. It was also established that a full transition to the Azerbaijani language at the Ministry of Finance was feasible.85 A commission consisting of A. Kazymov and Z. Gasymov submitted a detailed report to Ibrahimov on December 14 titled “How the Law on State Language of Azerbaijan Is Executed at the Ministry of Culture.” The report said that no positive changes had taken place at the Ministry of Culture after the enactment of the new law. This was vividly echoed by the fact that the leadership of the Ministry discussed the question of the adoption of the state language together with senior executives of the apparatus just three months later, that is, several days before the commission’s arrival. The office work at the Ministry is another testimony of employees’ indifference to the Azerbaijani language. Practically all the correspondence of the central apparatus and local departments was run in Russian. For example, from October 1 to November 12 the Ministry issued 102 orders, of which just three were written in the Azerbaijani language. The commission asked a rhetorical question: was not it possible to issue an order of dismissal of the head of Akstafa branch and his replacement by another employee who used the Azerbaijani language? Kazymov and Gasymov pointed out that instructions of the Ministry of Culture to all offices of Baku were written in Russian only. An eloquent testimony to this fact is the construction department (head A. Rasulov) and the financial-planning department (head G. Grigoryan). They did not write in the state language, nor reply to letters written in this language. The same situation is typical for cinema and radio institutions. The commission considered it necessary to adjust the work of technical staff and thus meet the requirements of the law. There were very few staff members in the system of the Ministry of Culture meeting the requirements. For instance, just one typist out of five typists could write in the Azerbaijani language. The situation was deplorable in practically all departments. The problem was to be solved as soon as possible through the efforts of the Ministry of Education and the Industrial Board of Azerbaijan.86 Having familiarized himself with this information, Ibrahimov decided to hold a meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on December 29. Though the date of the meeting had been fixed beforehand, Mustafayev did not attend the debates. Upon Ibrahimov’s request, Secretary of the Presidium Salman Jafarov contacted Mustafayev and informed him that all meeting participants were waiting for him to come. However, Mustafayev refused to attend the meeting, saying that he was ill, and asked that the debates be conducted without him.87 In six months, check-up commissions that Ibrahimov had initiated arrived in the Ministries of Culture, Finance, and Agriculture to verify how the new law was executed. The results of their work were unsettling. In reality Mustafayev was not ill, and the reason for his failure to appear was much more serious. From December 20 to 24 he had visited Moscow to attend the Plenum of the CC CPSU, where he had disagreeable tasks with Ivan Shikin, first deputy head of the department for Party organs of Union Republics. Shikin informed him about numerous complaints to the CPSU regarding the newly adopted law on state language, and especially methods of this language’s application. Shikin instructed Mustafayev to urgently discuss the new law at the CC

CPA Bureau.88 Though Shikin mentioned a huge member of complaints from Azerbaijan, he did not show Mustafayev any of them except for several libelous letters. That is the reason Mustafayev did not take part in the Presidium debates, nor did he raise this question in the Bureau. The First Secretary dragged this problem out till March 16, 1957.89 Despite Mustafayev’s absence, the question of the use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic was discussed. Secretary of the Presidium S. Jafarov informed the audience about the results of evaluations, stressing the unsatisfactory situation in this area: most apparatus staff was committing sabotage against the new law. Evaluation results went to show that additional efforts were required to focus central organizations’ attention on the issue.90 The Ministry’s staff was invited to take part in the debates. Minister of Agriculture M. Seidov took the floor, saying: “The application of the Azerbaijani language in our institutions is a matter of great political importance. After the enactment of the law we have done some work. Most instructions being sent to the regions of the Republic are written in the Azerbaijani language. Most meetings of the Board are held in this language, and we are applying efforts to increase the number of Azerbaijanis employed in the Apparatus. However, it is not an easy thing to do. Suffice it to say that just 125 apparatus personnel are Azerbaijanis. It is rather difficult to teach such a great quantity of people a new language. It would be appropriate to arrange training groups for representatives of other nationalities and employ experienced teachers in this process. We cannot provide these people with new jobs.”91 After deputy Aliyev spoke about the Ministry of Finance evaluation, the floor was given to Ministry of Culture M. Kurbanov. He noted: “The evaluation revealed that our ministry pays little attention to the Azerbaijani language. However, the situation changed after the evaluation. A month and half has passed. Things have settled into a certain order. But we must be careful, for everything depends on people, just as Comrade Seidov said. Representatives of other nationalities have traditionally been engaged in office work. We are doing our best to observe the law and not leave room for unfavorable criticism. For this to happen, the Presidium and the Council of Ministers should take some organizational measures, and thus all institutions will be able to work in harmony.” It should be noted that the debates were stormy and unpleasant. When Minister Kurbanov complained that some employees tried to derail meetings and interrupted Russian speakers, Ibrahimov broke him off, saying: “If you don’t like it, you are free to go away.”92 One of the meeting participants, Minister of Finance Rza Sadykhov, gave his opinion as follows: “This is a rather complex and important question, so we have to think of it very carefully and solve it in practice, not formally. Last year we received 26,000 requests, of which 1,300 were responded to in Russian, though they could have been written in the Azerbaijani language as well. The difficulties have to be discussed, and we must reach complete consensus and avoid differences.” Addressing Ibrahimov, Sadykhov noted: “After your article in the Communist newspaper, the Azerbaijani comrades stated that if Russian comrades and representatives of other nationalities would run office work in the Azerbaijani language, they would be sure to retain their posts. Otherwise, they would be dismissed. It is natural that they won’t be able to learn the language over three to six months. Therefore we’ll

face great problems which cannot be solved in a day or two. We have 156 employees, of which seventy-eight are Azerbaijanis. We mustn’t offend people or infringe on their rights.” However, K. Aliyeva, head of a Presidium department and member of the evaluation commission, disagreed with Sadykhov, saying: “In my view, the Ministry of Finance has every chance to start using the Azerbaijani language as the office language. Why can Azerbaijanis not receive official letters and requests in the Azerbaijani language? National minorities could master the Azerbaijani language more easily if they would do their office work in this language.”93 Then Ibrahimov gave the floor to Teymur Buniyatov, deputy Minister of the Interior, who agreed that his Ministry should use the Azerbaijani language: “I’m ill at ease. Other ministries have done some work on this track, while my ministry has done nothing. There is only one person in the Republican militia who can write in the Azerbaijani language. In the meanwhile, office work and legal proceedings in the regions of the country are run in the mother tongue. When I worked there, no letters from the Ministry to the region were written in the Azerbaijani language. What should we do to create the necessary conditions for the study of our native language? We are faced with great difficulties. The problem is that senior officials currently attending this meeting do not know the Azerbaijani language properly. I think it is so good that this meeting is being held in the Azerbaijani language. Sometimes five senior officials take part in a meeting but they do not know the Azerbaijani language, so the meeting is held in the Russian language.” Buniyatov suggested teaching the language from the top, from the Council of Ministers, and to the bottom, to the local Soviet institutions. He noted that there were great difficulties in this endeavor: “Some people complain that their offices receive letters in the Azerbaijani language and even files are filled in this language. I had talks with Minister A. Kerimov about what to do. We cannot have translators in every department. Also, we cannot send letters to Moscow in the Azerbaijani language. On the other hand, there are highly qualified persons, non-Azerbaijanis, who do not know this language. Who to do with them? In short, clear, and strict instructions are required.” Another difficulty, as Buniyatov saw it, was the lack of typists writing in the Azerbaijani language: “We are told to take on typists; however, two months have passed and we cannot find them. Hence, it is urgent and essential to train typists and stenographers at the earliest possible date.” Then he touched upon an interesting topic: “Various delegations arrive in Azerbaijan from the Near East. Our respected leaders greet them in Russian. Of course, this is undesirable. For instance, they say ‘Dobro pozhalovat’ (Welcome) in Russian.” At this moment in Buniyatov’s speech, Ibrahimov interfered, adding: ‘Then they go home and spread rumors that there is no difference between Azerbaijan of the tsarist times and contemporary Azerbaijan.” In his speech, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhchivan ASSR H. Mamedov touched upon the autonomous republic’s attitude to the law on state language, saying: “The comrades here spoke of natural difficulties arising from the execution of the law in some institutions of Baku. These difficulties stem from aspirations to belittle the Azerbaijani language. In many offices there are announcements in Latin script, sometimes in Arabic script. This is none other than disregard of the Azerbaijani language, and we shall have to fight this tendency. For example, we are

neighbors with Armenians; we exchange visits and correspondence. They have qualified typists. Irrespective of the type of institution, large or small, they use their native Armenian language. The same is true of Georgia. Some comrades consider it to be a novelty, while it was necessary to transfer to the Azerbaijani language as far back as in the beginning of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan. The question is not new. We preferred to close our eyes to the subject.” Having substantiated the necessity of transitioning to the Azerbaijani language, Mamedov said that rumors were afloat that after the enactment of the law on state language that Russians and Armenians would have to leave Azerbaijan. That’s a misinterpretation of the law. Explanatory work must be carried out to avoid misunderstanding.94 To sum up, Ibrahimov addressed the audience, saying: “In principle, nobody, as I see it, objects to the law on state language. Some people say that the question gives rise to complaints and discontent. Without a doubt, the question is rather complicated. We have made no steps to run contrary to the decisions of Party organs. In particular, we raised the question at the CC Bureau and were told as follows: there are no objections, but it has to be agreed with Moscow. While at the session in Moscow, I spoke to Voroshilov. He stated the fact that the question was raised in a timely way, but also asked, why haven’t you done anything so far? We came here; I was asked to write to the CC Apparatus; I did, and added that the question had been agreed with Voroshilov. The evaluations were agreed with the CC CPA Secretary. Comrade Mustafayev is sick, but we agreed on everything with him, and he said: hold a meeting. As I see it, there is nothing bad in this. Now we’re faced with only one question: how can we put this law into practice? For instance, Comrade Samedov cited several facts. If we’re going to succeed, we must analyze this question. Thus, you say that a health certificate is written in the Azerbaijani language. How could it be that an Azerbaijani did not have this certificate in Russian? That’s wrong; he’s a human being, he had nowhere to go. Why is he so disadvantaged? At a hospital, two nurses are speaking in the Azerbaijani language, and a doctor says: “stop speaking your crow’s language.” Then Ibrahimov focused on objective difficulties, saying: “Some people believe that this problem is twenty to twenty-five years old, so we are in no position to solve it within a year or two. We must be patient, behave wisely and cautiously. We must wean some people from disregarding the Azerbaijani language. We’re responsible before our nation.” Ibrahimov stated that if “graduates who got their education in the Azerbaijani language fail to get employed, this might cause serious social problems. Thus, hundreds and thousands of young people are engaged in profiteering and hooliganism in Kirovobad. Is criminality a national feature of Azerbaijanis? Their single fault is that they were educated in the Azerbaijani language. This problem has to be solved. If you are true communists and internationalists, you should not forget that you are residing in a national republic and that you must seek its advancement toward progress. The communist society cannot reconcile with the fact that a part of the community has gained success while another part is delayed in progressing. How could it happen that just twenty-three Azerbaijanis are employed in the ‘AzerEnergy’ system? A correlation between the indigenous and nonindigenous must be observed. We cannot close our eyes to the facts. The Azerbaijani population makes up a majority, while we’re at the tail-end of the pensioners. Twenty to

twenty-five years of service are required to earn pension.” Touching upon the application of the Azerbaijani language, Ibrahimov noted: “It’s a great pleasure to read the glorious Azerbaijani literature in the original. Does this belittle the importance of the Russian language? No, we must know Russian and other languages to perfection. As for practical issues– personnel and translators–all these are within the competence of the Council of Ministers and possibly the Central Committee. Materials to Moscow must be forwarded in Russian. But it’s our own responsibility to address internal affairs and relations with citizens. Reservations have to be made when giving employment to new persons: ‘If you don’t know the language, you’re not hired. Learn the language.’ Comrade Sadykhov says that some departments are directly connected with Moscow. Account must be taken of this fact and certain rules observed. But there are spheres where terms have to be compiled with. This has to be done to make people respect the language.” When Ibrahimov finished his speech, a question was asked: what language is to be used when writing a letter to Mountainous Garabagh? He replied that Russian was to be used. Letters to the Azerbaijani villages were to be written in the Azerbaijani language; but to the Armenian and Russian villages–in Russian. Next asking for the floor was Deputy Health Minister B. Agayev. He noted that a draft resolution should focus on some aspects of the problem, primarily the reform of the Azerbaijani language. A great quantity of words were borrowed from other languages. No language reform had been carried out since 1939. Also, it was essential to become free from the influence of Arabic and other languages. There are words of Russian or international origin which might as well be replaced with appropriate Azerbaijani equivalents. Secondly, the matter of orthography must be addressed. Many people were dissatisfied with the new orthography and considered it necessary to reform and regulate it. For example, an elderly employee wrote a letter in the Azerbaijani language. This was a mixture of Turkish, Persian, and Arabic words. In Agayev’s view, it was time to elaborate a perfect orthography of the Azerbaijani language. Then courses of the Azerbaijani language for Azerbaijanis would be organized. But only after the elaboration of the perfect orthography.95 Finally, the debate was over. Ministers Seidov and Kurbanov, as well as Jafarov, were entrusted with looking through the final text of the draft resolution. The same day, the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR “On the Use of the Azerbaijani Language in Some Ministers of the Republic” was signed by Ibrahimov and made public. The resolution said: “The Presidium notes that many works have been done in some ministries and institutions of the Republic aimed at improving the use of the Azerbaijani language. At the same time, the evaluations showed that there were essential shortcomings on this track in the Ministries of Agriculture, Culture, Finance and subordinated branches and offices. The proper initiatives to ensure the use of the Azerbaijani language in office work and business correspondence are lacking. Some Ministries and related departments receive letters in the Azerbaijani language but reply in the Russian language, which is absolutely inadmissible. Apparatus staff of these Ministries includes no technical employees capable of writing in the Azerbaijani language properly. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR resolves:

1. To instruct heads of the ministries and departments of the Azerbaijan SSR and subordinate organizations and enterprises to remove existing shortcomings impeding wider use of the Azerbaijani language; 2. To pay particular attention to timely consideration of complaints and application of employees regarding the proper use of the language; 3. To organize appropriate courses for those in the ministries, their departments, and offices, willing to study the Azerbaijani language; 4. To entrust the Minister of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR, Comrade M. Mamedov, with improving the courses of typists and stenographers, providing them with necessary material/technical supplies with a special emphasis on training of specialists in the Azerbaijani language. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR is hopeful that the wider use of the Azerbaijani language in state and public organizations of the Republic will contribute to the strengthening of their relations with working people and the eradication of procrastination.”96 Note that this resolution would later be applied against Ibrahimov. This resolution was of particular importance for the development of the Azerbaijani language and its wider use in ministries and organizations. Despite strong pressures from Moscow, harsh criticism and inconsistency of the Republican leaders in the matter of state language, the use of the Azerbaijani language in the Republic became irreversible and played a major role in the development of the national idea. Thus, the historical decision of December 29, 1956 marked the wider application of the law on state language across the Republic. However, the year 1957 was before the nation, which would be a time of severe trials and hard ordeals for the Azerbaijani leadership. NOTES 1. Resolution of the Presidium Central Committee of the CPSU “Abolition of properly issued orders of the USSR Ministry of Defense of the Transcaucasian Military District and the change of attitude towards the use of officers from among the Azeris.” 12.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.158, p. 253. 2. Transcript of the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 16.06.1959.//APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, p. 109. 3. Appeal to Imam Mustafaev, Sadyg Rahimov and Mirza Ibrahimov. March, 1955.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, pp. 51–53. 4. From Guskov to CC CP Azerbaijan. 11.06.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, p. 54. 5. APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.228, p. 52. 6. From Nazar Heydarov to Alexandr Gorkin. 02.02.1953.// APDPARA, f.1, r.39, v.162, pp. 97–100. 7. From p. Tumanov to Heydarov. 27.03.1953; From Heydarov to p. Tumanov. 16.05.1953.//APDPARA, f.1, r.39, v.162, pp. 102–104. 8. From Tumanov to Kliment Voroshilov. 08.07.1953.// APDPARA, f.1, r.39, v.162, pp. 105–108. 9. From Nazar Heydarov to Mir Teymur Yagubov. 17.09.1953. //APDPARA, f.1, r.39, v.162, pp. 109–110. 10. Note by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR Comrade N. Heydarov “On the change of names and areas of the district centers of the country. Reference to change the names of regions and transcription of the district centers of the country. Reference Comrade Hasanov “On changing the names and transcriptions of areas and regional centers of the republics.”// APDPARA, f.1, r.39, v.162, pp. 109–110. 11. “Edebiyat ve indjesenet” (“Literature and Art”), 1955, 25 June. 12. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of USSR on May 9, 1955, # 3947.//APDPARA, f.1, r.41, v.545, p. 161. 13. From Mirza Mamedov to Imam Mustafayev, 23.03.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, pp. 151–152.

14. Ibid, pp. 157–159. 15. Meeting with the Office of Schools of the Ministry of Education of Azerbaijan SSR “On the teaching of Azerbaijani language in Russian schools in the country in the third grade.” 29.04.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, pp. 153–156. 16. From Rahimli to Department of Science and Schools of the CC CP Azerbaijan. 05.06.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, p. 149. 17. From Ali Kerimov to Imam Mustafayev. 26.06.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, p. 146. 18. From Mirza Mamedov to Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. 30.07.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, pp. 41–142. 19. From Rahimov to the Bureau of the CC CP of the Azerbaijan. 09.08.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, p. 138. 20. The solution of the Bureau of the CC Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR “On teaching Azerbaijani language in schools of the Azerbaijan SSR with the Russian, Armenian, and Georgian languages of training.” 14.08.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.91, p. 135. 21. Report of the Chairman of the Union of Soviet Composers of Azerbaijan Q. Qarayev to the VII Plenum of the Board of the Union of Soviet Composers of Azerbaijan. 20.11.1954.// SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.42, p. 2. 22. Meeting of the Union of Composers Azerbaijan to discuss the reports concerning Afrasiyab Badalbeyli. 01.12.1955.//SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.56, pp. 10–28. 23. Ibid., pp. 1–2. 24. Report on the I Congress of the composer Azerbaijan Chairman of the Union of Soviet Composers Qara Qaraev. 21.03.1956. //SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.71, pp. 1–10. 25. Ibid., pp. 105–108. 26. SALAAR, f.254, r.2m, v.71, pp. 77–81. 27. SALAAR, f.254, r.2m, v.71, pp. 91–94. 28. Ibid., pp. 259–261. 29. SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.71, pp. 278–279. 30. SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.71, pp. 297–303. 31. From Bagdasarov to Khrushchev. 28.12.1956.// RNHSA, f.5, r.30, v.141, p. 93. 32. From Tarlanov to Bayramov. November 1954.//SALAAR, f.344, r.3, v.152, p. 64. 33. Talk of the Republican Art Exhibition 1954. 22.11.1954.//SALAAR, f.344, r.3, v.158, pp. 2–13. 34. A Report of Activities of the Painters’ Union of the Azerbaijan SSR for January 1956 to November 1957.//SALAAR, f.344, r.3, v.189, pp. 1–4. 35. The II Congress of the Union of Azerbaijani Painters. 14–16.12.1955// SALAAR, f.344, r.3, v.179, pp. 13–18. 36. A resolution of the Council of Ministers and the CC CPA “On Storing Gifts Presented to Enterprises and Organizations of the Azerbaijan SSR from fraternal republics and countries of People’s Democracy at the Museum of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. 25.02.1955//SALAAR, f.344, r.3, v.164, p. 15. 37. CC CPA Bureau. Questions of the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan. 20.04.1956//APDPARA, f.1, r.81, v.377, p. 37. 38. CC CPA Bureau. Questions of the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan. 20.04.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.81, v.377, p. 9. 39. From Aliyev to CC CPA. 26.02.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 251. 40. From Yuzbashov to Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan. 13.03.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 221–222. 41. From Kerimov to Yakovlev. 28.06.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 217. 42. From Bayramov to CC CPSU, Department of the Party, Comrade Lebedev. Information about the request of Comrade Ramzi Yuzbashov. 27.07.1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 216. 43. Ibid., pp. 214–215. 44. Yuzbashov. Explanation in the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 02.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 213. 45. From Kopylov to CC CP Azerbaijan. 02.03.1957.//APDPARA f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 211–212. 46. A meeting of the CC CPA Secretariat. Kopylov’s note about the author of an anonymous letter. 22.03.1957.// APDPARA f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 206. 47. From Ibrahimov to Azerbaijan CC CP. 20.07.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.87, p. 116. 48. Meeting of the Bureau of Communist Party of Azerbaijan. On the addition of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR article on the state language of Azerbaijan SSR. 24.07.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.87, p. 113. 49. Communist (in Azeri), 1956, 21 August. 50. From Gromov and Lebedev to CC CPSU. Speech of M. Ibrahimov at the III session of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan SSR. 21.08.1956 //RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.60, p. 13. 51. Azerbaijan SSR. Supreme Council. IV Congress, III Session. Shorthand report. Baku, 1956. p. 154.

52. Ibid., p. 143. 53. Mirza Ibrahimov. Azerbaijani language in public institutions. 26.01.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.25, pp. 181–182. 54. RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.60, pp. 10–14. 55. From Petrosov to CC CPSU, Comrade Nikita Khrushchev. 10.09.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, pp. 121–127. 56. Aliyev, Vekilov. and Okulov. A reference due to a letter of A. M. Petrosov, head of department of Communist newspaper, addressed to N. Khrushchev. 06.12.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, pp. 114–120. 57. From Petrosov to Mustafayev. 06.01.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, pp. 128–144. 58. Decision of the CC CPA Bureau “On the Letter of Comrade A.Petrosov, head of department of Communist (in Armenian) newspaper, addressed to the CC CPSU.” 29.01.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 105. 59. From Badalyan to Khrushchev. 11.09.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.229, pp. 46–47. 60. From Bagdasarov to Khrushchev. 28.12.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.30, v.141, pp. 91–93. 61. From Mikhaelyan to Khrushchev. 10.08.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 236–239. 62. From Bayramov to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CP Azerbaijan. 21.02.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 229–231. 63. APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, p. 205. 64. From Antepelyan to I. Mustafayev. 03.09.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, vd.107, pp. 258–259. 65. A decision of the CC CPA Bureau “On Withdrawal of Teaching of the Azerbaijani Language in the Schools of the Azerbaijan SSR with the Armenian and Georgian Languages of Instruction.” 16.10.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.107, p. 253. 66. From Gromov and Lebdev to CC CPSU. 16.11.1956.//RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.60, pp. 10–13. 67. Minutes of the general meeting of primary Party organization of the CC CPA Apparatus. 25.10.1956. //APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 95. 68. Frpm Okulov to the Secretariat of the CC CP Azerbaijan. 15.11.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 85–86. 69. From Aliyev, Kuzovenkov and Okulov to Mustafayev. 09.03.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, pp. 85–86. 70. The Decision of the CC CPA Secretariat “On Measures to Increase the Quantity of Correspondence in the Azerbaijani Language Incoming and Outgoing from the CC CPA.” 22.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 79. 71. From I. Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 23.03.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.103, p. 81. 72. From Teymur Aliyev to Abdulla Bayramov. 19.11.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 148. 73. Hamid Arasly, Abdulezel Demirchizadeh, Mamedagha Shiraliyev, Mirzagha Qulizadeh, Mamedhuseyn Tahmasib. On the Epic Kitabi Dede Korkud. November, 1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, pp. 149–166. 74. From Aliyev to Bayramov. 19.11.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 148. 75. A decision of the CC CPA Bureau “On the Epos” Kitabi Dede Korkud. 29.01.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 145. 76. From Rahimli to Mustafayev and S. Rahimov. 18.06.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 208. 77. Vekilov. A Reference. 10.08.1956// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.39, p. 206. 78. A decision of the Bureau of the CC CP Azerbaijan “On Teaching of the Arabic, Turkish and Persian Languages instead of the West European Languages. 02.11.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.112, p. 198. 79. From Fikret Amirov and Ramazan Khalilov to Grigoryan. 08.09.1956.// SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.78, p. 62. 80. From Fikret Amirov and Ramazan Khalilov to the Ministry of Culture of Azerbaijan SSR. 08.10.1956.// SALAAR, f.254, r.2, v.78, p. 65. 81. From Davlatdarov to Rahimov. 25.10.1956.//SALAAR, f.340, op. 1, d.524, p. 16. 82. From Ibrahimov and Bayramov to CC CP Azerbaijan. 25.10.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.118, p. 62. 83. A decision of the Bureau of the CC CP Azerbaijan. 04.12.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.118, p. 58. 84. A report on the execution of the Law “On State Language” of the Azerbaijan SSR dated August 21, 1956 of the Ministry of Agriculture. December, 1956.//State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (SA AR), f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 18–20. 85. A report on the execution of the Law “On State Language” of the Azerbaijan SSR. 01.12.1956//SA AR, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 22–25. 86. A report on the execution of the Law “On State Language” of the Azerbaijan SSR by the Ministry of Culture. 14.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 26–30. 87. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 30–32. 88. APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, p. 87. 89. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 34–36. 90. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 36–37. 91. Ibid., pp. 37–39.

92. A verbatim report of the VIII Plenum of the CC CPA. 16.06.1959.//APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, p. 128. 93. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 39–42. 94. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956.//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 43–48. 95. A meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR to discuss “The use of the Azerbaijani language in some Ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 49–56. 96. A resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR “On the use of the Azerbaijani language in some ministries of the Republic.” 29.12.1956//AR SA, f.2941, r.7, v.990, pp. 11–13.

Chapter 4

Deepening Political Crisis in the Leadership of Azerbaijan

The year 1957 was hard and momentous. The Hungarian developments in October 1956 stirred up the world socialist system. Leaders of the Soviet Union were given a good lesson. The socialist countries and national republics of the USSR saw processes of renovation and national awakening. That was not appreciated by Moscow. In their words, everyone advocated the decisions of the 20th Congress, but, in fact, special services advised the Soviet leadership “to tighten up the noose.” It was natural that “recommendations” of this sort were given as “top secret.” During November/December 1956, Party and Soviet leaders repeatedly discussed the Hungarian events.1 The whole world, except for the Soviet people, was aware of those events. On December 8, 1956 the Presidium of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a decision on granting social privileges to the families of those lost during the counter-revolutionary mutiny in Hungary and to workers and servicemen of the Soviet military units deployed in this country. To execute clause 6 of this decision, appropriate bodies were instructed to provide ex-servicemen (wounded or contused), as well as families of those lost in Hungary, with dwelling space out of turn. In addition, children of officers, servicemen, workers, and staff who lost their lives in Hungary were admitted into boarding schools. The same privileges were provided for wives of the lost in Hungary when providing them with jobs. Finally, families of the lost or invalids were conferred the same status as those of the first and second groups of the Great Patriotic War invalids. On January 3, 1957 Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov sent a letter to the First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev, asking him to assist in executing the decision of December 8.2 Attached to this letter was a list of soldiers and officers from Azerbaijan who lost their lives in Hungary. The list was compiled as far back as in November 1956 by Major-General V. Loboda, head of the fourth department of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Listed below are soldiers and officers from Azerbaijan who lost their lives in Hungary when upholding interests of the Soviet state in this country: Sergeant Kerimaga Bedirkhanov (Gusar region), Junior Sergeant Mamedali Akberov (Lenkaran region), Junior Sergeant Mirzabek Balabekov (Gusar region), Corporal Magomed Ramazanov (Zakatala region), Private Ismikhan Quliyev (Zangelan region), Private Suleyman Rezakov (Baku), Private Jalal Jalalov (Ismailly region), Private Iltifat Ahmedov (Masally region), Private Ibadulla Akhundov (Neftchala region), Private Vladimir Kasymov (Baku), Private Michael Ignatov (Baku), and Private Boris Khosrovyan (Baku).3 It should be noted that prior to

Zhukov’s letter, the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR took prompt action to render material aid to the families of servicemen lost in Hungary. A resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR “On Incentives and Privileges for Servicemen, Workers and Employees of the Soviet Army Stationed in Hungary, and for Families of the Lost during the Counter-Revolutionary Mutiny in Hungary” included all six clauses of the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated December 8, 1956.4 On February 5, 1957, the CC CPA Bureau discussed Zhukov’s letter and tasked H. Aliyev, military commissar of the Republic, with preparing an individual list of the lost, wounded, and contused citizens of Azerbaijan involved in the Hungarian events, identifying their needs, and reporting back to the CC CPA by March 1, 1957 about measures that had been taken to comply with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.5 It was the Hungarian events that aggravated contradictions in the Soviet leadership. Differences typical for the Kremlin found their parallels in the leadership of Azerbaijan. At first, the process was latent, but in spring 1957 it became apparent. The enactment of the law on state language in 1956 raised a surge of nationalism in Azerbaijan, but Moscow’s response was rather restrained. However, the Hungarian events of 1956 stirred up Gromov and Lebedev, who reported back to Suslov about the current situation. As a result, the CC CPSU tried to find ways to prevent undesirable processes in Azerbaijan. One of the first steps on this track was a decision of the CC CPSU Secretariat of December 26, 1956 to issue a literaryartistic magazine in the Armenian language. It was true that since 1954, the Union of Azerbaijani Writers had been submitting proposals of this sort under pressure by Armenian writers and poets; however, Moscow declined to adopt these proposals, pleading it had no money and paper. In the end of 1956, the CC CPSU Secretariat suddenly remembered about these proposals and allowed the issue in Armenian of the magazine Sovetakan Adrbedjan, consisting of eight printer’s sheets, six issues a year, with a circulation of 2,000. On Moscow’s instructions, in January and February 1957 the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers completed preparatory work to issue the magazine Sovetakan Adrbedjan. According to the decision of the CC CPA Bureau dated February 5, Samvel Grigoryan was appointed editor in chief of the magazine. The editorial board included Armenian writers residing in Azerbaijan Markar Davtyan, Bagrat Ulubabyan, Gurgen Antonyan, and Kostik Karakozyan, as well as a graduate from the Yerevan State University, candidate of philological sciences, and expert in the Armenian language, Mirali Seidov. The initial draft of the editorial board provided for the candidature of Farkhad Farkhadov, candidate of philological sciences; however, he was replaced by Aram Balyan. Under a decision of the Bureau, Minister of Finance R. Sadykhov was instructed to defray expenses for issuing the magazine from the state budget. Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR A. Ibrahimov was instructed to allocate necessary funds for equipping the editorial office and paper stock. Of interest is the fact that the decision of the CC Bureau on establishing the magazine Sovetakan Adrbedjan was, for some reason, signed by the Second Secretary Yakovlev.6 On February 19, upon the suggestion of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, the CC Bureau restarted discussions over the issue. The magazine was renamed Grakan Adrbedjan (Literary Azerbaijan).7 In

March 1957, the first copy of the magazine was issued. But very soon the confrontation arose in the editorial board between its Armenian members and Mirali Seidov. Armenian writer Gevork Petrosyan who lived in Baku, complained to the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan that S. Grigoryan and M. Davtyan insulted him and declined from reading his work. To clear up the conflict, a meeting of the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan was held in September 1957. Attendees were Huseyn, A. Veliyev, Mir Jalal, M. Arif, S. Rustam, B. Vahabzadeh, and I. Efendiyev, as well as Armenian literary man Karen Brutents from the Azerbaijani branch of the Soviet Literary Fund. Armenian poet Atanes Senal joined Petrosyan to advocate his complaint. He stressed that Grigoryan and Davtyan were committing excesses and that the Armenian branch was doing nothing because of the lack of organizational talent of Grigoryan. A. Senal asked in a demagogic manner: “Have you checked how much money M. Davtyan received? He became a millionaire, publishes one and the same story or novel several times. When we try to criticize M. Davtyan or Grigoryan, they call us hooligans, run to the telephone, and send for militia.” Other Armenian writers did not back the complainers, though they criticized each other of all manner of faults. Finally, the floor was given to Seidov: “As a member of the editorial board, I have read little of those works published in the magazine Grakan Adrbedjan. I asked the authors to give me their works to familiarize myself with them; however, they delayed, gave me materials already in print, or denied. Three months ago I tried to get an article about the language of M. Davtyan’s works. After long arguments I received this material yesterday. M. Davtyan’s memoirs about Egishe Charents were not given to me. Memoirs about Samed Vurghun in the Armenian language are given with abridgements. I wonder who abridged the text. The story about Samed Vurghun is very poor. The author disgraced Samed. M. Davtyan translated a novel of M. Ibrahimov, The Day Will Come. The translation is very good. However, his subsequent translations, particularly Commissar by M. Huseyn, are hideous, with great distortions. As a member of the editorial board, I’m isolated. The cause is that I submitted an article with which Balyan disagreed, and he pressured Grigoryan and Davtyan. Three of them made malicious attacks on me. As a result, I ceased attending the editorial office. If such a situation continues, I ask you to remove me from the editorial board.” V. Karakozyan reaffirmed that Seidov had asked him to provide incoming materials; however, he was refused manuscripts under various pretexts. In turn, Davtyan disagreed with all claims as staged by G. Petrosyan, whose artistically poor works Davtyan declined to publish. He declared: “Petrosyan insulted me, and he has to bear responsibility for his actions. Petrosyan’s father is Armenian; his mother is Russian. He does not speak Armenian but speaks Russian very well.” Then he turned to Petrosyan, saying: “You know neither Azerbaijani nor Armenian. You’ve been living in Azerbaijan for twenty-five years but haven’t learnt this language. You’re criticizing us that we publish works of the Azerbaijani writers.” Next Grigoryan took the floor and suggested excluding Petrosyan from the Writers’ Union. It became evident that Grigoryan meant to hold Davtyan’s position. In the meanwhile, Veliyev joined the discussions, saying that he disagreed with the speeches of Petrosyan, A. Senal, and B. Ulubabyan. It was obvious, he stressed, that the editors of “Grakan Adrbedjan” were not striving for the quality of literature, and ignored challenging tasks facing

the literature. Veliyev suggested reprimanding Petrosyan severely and placing information about it in the newspaper Edebiyyat ve indjesenet (Literature and Art). However, Petrosyan should acknowledge his guilt and promise that he would never admit such a mistake. After long debates it was decided to declare his attitude toward his comrades erroneous and harmful. “Account has to be taken of the fact that Petrosyan has agreed with criticism of his comrades and promised to morally reform himself.” Thus, Petrosyan was severely reprimanded and warned, and the newspaper Edebiyyat ve indjesenet published an announcement about it.8 It should be noted that disputes and debates around the magazine Grakan Adrbedjan and among Armenian writers residing in Azerbaijan continued for a long period of time. In early 1957, disputes arose within the leadership of Azerbaijan. The case of M. Alizadeh, former Deputy Chairman of KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, turned into a headache for Mustafayev. Under a decision of the CC CPA Bureau, he was transferred in August 1955 to the post of Chairman of KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Nakhchivan ASSR. Alizadeh’s case was raised at the CC Bureau meeting of January 15, 1957. Former Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR Guskov availed himself of Alizadeh’s case and tried, by every possible means, to return him to Baku to the KGB central apparatus. Prior to his departure from Azerbaijan on June 16, 1956, Guskov submitted a positive testimonial about Alizadeh. It noted that during Alizadeh’s office in Nakhchivan the activity of state security bodies had substantially improved, the level of operative work rose, and measures were taken to unveil and liquidate hostile forces. Guskov asked the Bureau to consider the possibility of Alizadeh’s reinstatement as Deputy Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.9 Mustafayev re-addressed Guskov’s testimonial to H. Efendiyev, CC Secretary for cadres. On July 9, 1956 H. Efendiyev submitted a document to Mustafayev titled “On Comrade Alizadeh’s Work,” which suggested considering Guskov’s proposal at the Bureau.10 However, Mustafayev did not want to raise this question at the Bureau until Guskov left Azerbaijan. While in Moscow, Mustafayev informed Khrushchev that Guskov set the KGB apparatus against the CC CPA and disturbed its work. Khrushchev backed Mustafayev, and on November 21, 1956, Guskov had to abandon the country. On September 19, 1956, the CC CPA Secretariat considered the issue of Alizadeh’s return to Baku and made a negative decision. The new Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, F. Kopylov, was approved in November 1956, and in January 1957 the CC CPA Bureau considered it expedient for Alizadeh to continue his activity in Nakhchivan.11 In early 1957, relations between the CC CPA Bureau members were far from perfect, and confrontation between the Republican Party organization and the Council of Ministers was increasingly aggravated. Things went so far that when some Ministers or top officials attended the CC CPA, their colleagues from the Council of Ministers tried to find out, “why do you visit the CC so often and attend the Council of Ministers so rarely?” Scores of senior officials found themselves in a sticky position. Confidential relations between Mustafayev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Rahimov were sharply reduced. The same was true of the relations between Rahimov and Ibrahimov. Mustafayev’s protégé I. Abdullayev, once Minister of

Agriculture and a prominent scholar, was nominated to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, Rahimov told CC Secretary Bayramov that he had always maintained good relations with Mustafayev, but Mustafayev meddled, began acting as Mustafayev’s informer, and thus spoiled relations between him and the First Secretary. In turn, Bayramov informed Mustafayev about his conversation with Rahimov; Mustafayev denied everything, saying that Abdullayev rarely visited the CC or him personally.12 Relations between Ibrahimov and Rahimov grew cold over practically nothing. President of Indonesia Sukarno arrived in Baku, and Moscow ordered that he be received at the highest possible level. When a business manager of the Supreme Soviet, on the instructions of Ibrahimov, asked the Council of Ministers for cars for the guests, he was refused the request. The occasion was an excuse for Rahimov to put a wrench in Ibrahimov’s wheel. In fact, Rahimov felt hurt that Moscow entrusted Ibrahimov with receiving Sukarno, not him, and he interpreted it as distrust in him. In autumn of 1956 and in early 1957, owing to the enactment of the law of state language, nonAzerbaijanis living in Baku showered Moscow with complaints. In mid-March, the CC CPSU leadership sent I. Ignatov, head of Party bodies of the Union Republics sector, and Lebedev, instructor of the same sector, on an official journey to Baku. The leaders of Azerbaijan felt alarmed about the arrival of the two CC CPSU senior officials in Baku. Rumors were set afloat that they arrived to relieve Mustafayev from his post. The leaders of the Republic remembered that in January 1956, on the eve of the XXI Congress of the CC CPA, Mustafayev urgently left for Moscow for alleged dismissal. In the reviewed period CC Secretary Bayramov, head of Party organs department G. Jafarly, and Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers, A. Sultanova, met in Kirovabad to prepare for the Congress. Sultanova told the head of the department, and he in turn told the CC Secretary, that, except for Abdullayev, no one in the Council of Ministers was going to pave the way for Mustafayev to hold the post of First Secretary. She added that the leaders of the Council of Ministers and the CC Secretary M. Iskenderov had allegedly agreed on the matter. Sultanova hinted that “Moscow had given its consent and that Rahimov flew into a temper.” Rumors were afloat in the Republic that Rahimov would allegedly be appointed the Secretary, and Mustafayev would be transferred to the Academy of Sciences and Vezirov to the Council of Ministers.13 But they were only rumors. On Sunday, March 10, 1957, right after the elections of the local Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR, Mustafayev was called to Tbilisi to attend the council of war of the Transcaucasian military district. That was the eve of the 145th anniversary of M. F. Akhundov, who lived the greater part of his life in Tbilisi. On the eve of this jubilee, the leaders of the Republic were informed that the grave of the great thinker was in a sorry plight. Mustafayev laid the blame on the Georgian leadership, which demonstrated negligence to the memory of Akhundov. To clear up the situation, Ibrahimov made a business trip to Tbilisi and made certain that the grave was in a sad state. It was decided to take the philosopher’s ashes from Tbilisi to Baku. Before leaving for Tbilisi to attend a meeting of the council of war of the Transcaucasian military district, Mustafayev entrusted the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR

Rahimov to prepare transport facilities and a special carriage for honorable re-burial of the great thinker and philosopher.14 Sculptor I. Zeynalov was instructed to create a bust of Akhundov for installation on his grave in Baku. However, the Georgian leaders decided to restore the grave and thus redress a wrong. Upon completion of the meeting, Mustafayev, accompanied by G. Gavakhishvili, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia, and P. Kovanov, Second Secretary of the CC CPG, visited the grave of Akhundov and made sure of the restoration’s completion. Then Mustafayev made his way to a workshop of the Georgian Union of Painters and examined a monument for Akhundov’s grave. After that, Mustafayev declined from re-burying the ashes of the thinker but asked the Georgians to give him the old tombstone from Akhundov’s grave to be kept at the museum. The Georgian leaders complied with this request. In the meantime, a bust created by Zeynalov was installed in Nukha where Akhundov was born. Right after elections to the local Soviets on March 10, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Rahimov called T. Allahverdiyev, First Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, to exchange views on the challenging matter. M. Iskenderov also attended the meeting. Rahimov touched upon the elections and shortcomings in the election law. Note that Allahverdiyev was born in Baku in 1917. He graduated from the Azerbaijan industrial institute. He was a participant of the Great Patriotic War, on the Kerch front line. He was demobilized in 1942 following an injury; in 1944 he finished the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He worked at the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry and in November 1945 was secretary of the Soviet vice consulate in Maku (Iran). In 1947, Allahverdiyev was recalled from Maku; he held top positions in the CC CPA and the trade union organization of the Republic. In the first half of the 1950s he studied at the Soviet Academy of Oil Industry and the Higher Party School under the CC CPSU. The XXXI Party Conference of the Baku City Party of April 1955 elected Allahverdiyev the First Secretary of the Baku Party organization.15 The personality of the head of the Baku Party organization seemed to be very important for those dissatisfied with Mustafayev. In addition, Allahverdiyev maintained good relations with Moscow functionaries, including Lebedev, which is why Rahimov indulged in confidences with Allahverdiyev to set the latter against Mustafayev. On March 10, Rahimov told Allahverdiyev that Mustafayev and Gafarly had allegedly taken possession of materials that compromised Allahverdiyev, so should the City Party Conference be held this year, he would fail to be elected to the Baku City Party Committee. Even worse, the compromising materials were likely to be discussed at the CC Bureau. Rahimov went on, alleging that Mustafayev was unfair rather frequently. For instance, he provided persons with comfortable housing conditions while they had already possessed decent apartments. In doing so, Mustafayev allegedly acted in defiance of the Bureau decision. For example, Mustafayev provided Abdullayev, with a family of only five members, with a dwelling of 175 sq.m. Also, he intended to offer Rashid Behbudov a floor space of 160 sq.m. Then he added that the Bureau acted unfairly when it dismissed, without any grounds, Colonel A. Mamedov, former head of the reformatory schools under the Internal Ministry. Of all the Bureau members, Rahimov proved to be the only one to oppose this decision. The Bureau meeting looked like a funeral ceremony. “You must

understand that Mustafayev will eat us all, so your silence will affect you too. Why aren’t you responding to this situation? Why don’t you assist CC CPSU comrades, especially Comrade Lebedev? It’d do you good; in a day or two comrades Ignatov and Lebedev will arrive, and you could help them unmask Mustafayev.”16 Allahverdiyev very well knew that CC CPSU functionaries had no special liking for Mustafayev, yet he preferred to be cautious. In April 1955 when Allahverdiyev was approved to the post of First Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, he had talks with Gromov, head of the department for Party organs of Union Republics. When asked about his relations with the Republican leadership, Allahverdiyev described Rahimov as “careerist and powerloving person.” Gromov replied that this was more appropriate for Mustafayev, not Rahimov. Upon his return from Moscow, Allahverdiyev shared this view with Mustafayev, who advised him to “avoid getting involved in nonsense of this sort.”17 In fact, it was CC CPSU functionaries that largely spoiled relations between Mustafayev and Rahimov. On March 12, Mustafayev returned from Tbilisi. The same day, after a meeting of the CC Bureau, Allahverdiyev tried to talk with Mustafayev, but the latter claimed to be busy and put off the talk until the next morning. On March 13 at 9:30 a.m., Mustafayev listened to Allahverdiyev’s report on the elections and activity of the Baku City Party organization. In particular, Allahverdiyev reported that some voters wrote nationalistic and anti-Soviet phrases on ballot papers. At the end of this information, he detailed his conversation of March 10 with Rahimov and M. Iskenderov. In turn, Mustafayev familiarized Ignatov and Lebedev with this fact. They invited Allahverdiyev, who reaffirmed his story. Owing to the fact that a session of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR was to take place on March 15–16, it was decided to consider this question upon completion of the session. On March 1, prior to the session, Chairman of the Supreme Council Ibrahimov got down to his work after a two-month leave. On March 11, he sent an agenda of the oncoming session to the CC CPA. The agenda included amendments and changes to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR due to the transfer of some powers and authorities to the Republic, and approval of some decrees of the Supreme Soviet. On March 14, the CC CPA Bureau approved Ibrahimov’s proposals on the agenda of the session. On March 15-16, the session of the Supreme Soviet enacted the law of the inclusion of Article 13-a (transfer of rights to trials and legal proceedings) in the Constitution of the Republic; enactment of civil and criminal codes; management of inland water transport, motor transport and communication; and changes to Article 19. The same Article 13-a noted that the Azerbaijan SSR was entitled to independently determine its own administrative-territorial structure.18 The session approved decrees of the Supreme Soviet, including the decree “On Election Standards to the Council of Deputies of the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Region and the Baku City Council of Deputies” dated December 29, 1956 and the decree “On Reorganization of the Internal Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR under the Executive Committee of the Council of Deputies of the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Region into the Department of Internal Affairs of the Executive Committee of the Council of Deputies of the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Region and Departments, Sectors of Militia in Towns and Regions under the

Control of Militia of Executive Committees of Town and Regional Council of Deputies” dated March 6, 1957.19 Right after the session, Ibrahimov sent a letter to the CC CPA that said: “Not pending the adoption of All-Union Principles of Legislation in Judicature and Judicial Procedure previously submitted to the Union Republics, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR intends to start regulating codes of the laws of the ASSR. Currently existing codes apply some antiquated provisions. Changes have been made over the last thirty years, yet failed to be reflected in the codes. A special commission should be set up to revise the codes. Commissions of this sort have already been set up in some Union Republics, and the work is underway.”20 By a decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, Secretary of the Presidium S. Jafarov was appointed as chairman of the commission; the composition of the commission was as follows: G. I. Kasimov, head of the administrative, trade-financial, and planning department of the CC CPA; I. M. Gulmamedov, Minister of Justice of the Azerbaijan SSR; A. S. Babayev, prosecutor of the Azerbaijan SSR; S. G. Musayev, chairman of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan SSR; A. G. Kerimov, Minister of the Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR; F. I. Kopylov, chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR; M. Kasumov, head of the legal department under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR; Z. Ts. Klyachkin, head of the legal group under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. The commission was allowed to draw research and practical works in order to prepare and submit to the CC CPA specific proposals to regulate codes of law of the Azerbaijan SSR and a draft law on judicature of the ASSR by the end of 1957.21 The work of the Supreme Soviet attended by Moscow emissaries was held in a calm atmosphere unlike the second day, on March 16, when a session of the Bureau of the CC CPA was held. The agenda included debates over the adoption and application of the law on state language. Note that the law was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the ASSR in August 1956 with the participation of Ignatov and Lebedev. In fact, it was Moscow that initiated this question to be discussed at the CC Bureau. Responding to complaints from Azerbaijan due to the new law on state language, I. Shikin, first deputy head of Party organizations of Union Republics department, recommended that Mustafayev discuss the law at the CC Bureau, so that all Bureau members would plainly voice their views. On March 16, all Bureau members gathered together; these included I. D. Mustafayev, S. G. Rahimov, D. N. Yakovlev, M. A. Iskenderov, H. Efendiyev, A. S. Bayramov, T. A. Allahverdiyev, M. A. Ibrahimov, I. K. Abdullayev, P. A. Arushanov, and G. M. Jafarly. Mustafayev opened the meeting, saying: “We are here today to exchange views on the law as adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. As you know, right after the enforcement of this law there were certain misunderstandings. These citizens feared that they would be in no position to work in Azerbaijan without the knowledge of Azeri. Another misunderstanding was that this law would compel all nationalities of Azerbaijan to forcibly speak Azeri on the whole territory of the country.” Primarily addressing the guests from Moscow, Mustafayev explained that the application of the law was accompanied by distortions, and that things sometimes went so far

that Azeri was not used in any ministry or institution, while Russian was used even in kolkhozes, which made it difficult for the rural population to understand instructions, orders, and so forth.22 In fact, language-related displeasure arose as early as the 1920s and 1930s. In the reviewed period, non-Azerbaijanis held top positions in the state institutions, so Azeri had gradually been forced out of common use. In 1934 while he was still in the first years of his office, Bagirov received an anonymous letter which said: “The Party demanded oil from us, and all other problems, except for oil, have been ignored. In the meanwhile, there are cultural problems in the country to be solved. Azerbaijan is an unfortunate country. Until recently, our northern neighbors have enjoyed the fruits of our country. Now you have welcomed Melkumyan (Commissariat of Economic Management), Pantskhava (Commissariat of Healthcare), Chubar, and so on. What does this mean? That means that an Armenian holds a post even in the Soviet of People’s Commissars. No matter of this sort has ever been encountered. Even Turkophobe Musabekov did not dare to act in that manner. The country does not have its native language: it’s been forgotten; now anyone who takes the trouble may head any business. But you’re the chief, you’re responsible for the nation; you must think of its culture.”23 Note that there were thousands of letters of this sort that expressed anxiety about the withdrawal of Azeri from state institutions, and Mustafayev hinted at them in his speech. It was Ibrahimov who first took the floor at the Bureau meeting. In his opinion, wider use of Azeri in state institutions and its proclamation as the state language of the Republic was of the greatest political importance. The Azerbaijan SSR was located on the southern borders of the USSR, in the vicinity of Iran where national oppression reigned; minor peoples were oppressed, their national sentiments insulted and languages victimized. Thus, the proclamation of Azeri as the state language is of particular political and practical significance. “The whole nation, workers and intellectuals, are heartened that we are holding this event. True, there are spiteful critics. Regretfully, you can’t help that; there have always been critics of this sort, and there always will be. The people welcome this; the people support it, but there are those who, psychologically and intellectually, are bearers of alien sentiments. They gave a hostile reception to this event, but it seems to me that today the Party organizations of the Republic have done much work to explain the situation.” To corroborate his cause, Ibrahimov cited examples from works of Lenin. In substantiating the necessity of the law on state language, Ibrahimov said, “I’d like to provide you with striking, intolerable facts unacceptable for our Soviet reality. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture received a letter from the countryside to inform them about abuses in a kolkhoz. A head of the department, unversed in Azerbaijani language, adopted a resolution “To check it.” Responsible organizations checked and confirmed the abuse and suggested measures to be taken. And again the same head appended a resolution “To check it.” It is ridiculous and terrible. It is terrible because such an attitude insults people and alienates officials from ordinary people.” At this moment, Mustafayev gave the cue saying that “such a situation begets bureaucracy.” Ibrahimov went on: “I checked this comrade; he is a good fellow, and we must help him study Azeri. In general, everybody must study both Azeri and Russian. The knowledge of one language does not prevent one from

studying another. Why is it rumored that interest in the Russian language is reduced? That’s all talk of those disapproving the study of Azeri, and slanderous figments of people seeking to discredit the decision. Hence, in my view, there is nothing harmful in translating office work into Azeri.”24 Thus, calmly and clearly, Ibrahimov expressed his position in the presence of members of the CC CPSU whom many people feared. Ibrahimov was followed by Bayramov, CC Secretary for ideological questions. He said: “From the very outset when I confronted this problem, I faced two aspects of the matter: first, its essence, and second, its form. Under the first aspect I mean the fact that many people are gradually forgetting their mother tongue while others have no opportunity to apply their knowledge and ability properly even though they know the mother tongue very well. That proved to be a cause of circumstances that have made a certain part of the population forget the language, especially in the city of Baku. In this respect, I consider it timely and correct to carry out measures aimed at improving the situation of the mother tongue. I believe that if we delay those measures, the capital of the Republic would, in ten to fifteen or even fifty years, be fully separated from the other parts of the Republic. In other words, people in Baku would speak one language, and the rest of the Republic in another. It is no secret that I can go to the countryside and speak there in the native language of the local population while my son or daughter would fail to do the same. True, it’s my own fault, not theirs. The reason is that they study in the Russian-language school. We know that an overwhelming majority of Baku intellectuals, followed by workers, seek to make their children study in Russian schools, hence, the number of schools in Azeri is reduced from year to year. In other words, after some time, no people proficient in their native language will be available in the capital, so the town will be separated from the village. To my thinking, this is a very alarming circumstance, so the CC Bureau has to deal with this problem. This is to say nothing of the fact that when an Azerbaijani tries to send a telegram in Kelbajar in Azeri it is not accepted. This is none other that perversion of the national policy. We must apply efforts to make Azeri the language of the indigenous population of the Republic and thus take its deserved place in the state, political and cultural life of the country.” To sum up, Bayramov underlined that he was backing an idea of measures aimed at restoring the rights of Azeri and applying it widely in the state institutions of Azerbaijan. As for the means of implementation of this project, Bayramov considered them to be insufficiently well thought-out: “I came to this conclusion on the basis of misinterpretation and misunderstanding on the part of separate citizens of the Republic, both Azerbaijanis and non-Azerbaijanis.” Bayramov cited two typical examples: during a Komsomol meeting at the pedagogical institute a man trying to speak from a rostrum in Russian was banished from the dais; an eighth-grade boy wrote a letter to the CC CPA and Khrushchev which insisted that there was a need to study Azeri properly not only by Russians but also even Azerbaijanis. There were dozens of examples of this sort, though none of the facts above had been available earlier, Bayramov said. There was lull following this law enforcement, but the situation changed for the worse after publication of Ibrahimov’s article in the Communist newspaper. Bayramov stressed that from a political point of view he had no claims on the article. However, Ibrahimov was to seek advice from his colleagues regarding the expediency

of such an article. “If Comrade Ibrahimov had asked me about the article, I would have advised him not to publish it. The fact is that some unwholesome sentiments arose in society after this article. At least, these facts were manifest among the politically immature strata of intellectuals.” Then Bayramov put forward his proposals to remedy the situation: “Suppose we cancel this decree. It seems to me that in this case our thirty-eight-year-long work on international education of workers would sustain great damage. We must think of ways to cope with our tasks properly. We, Azerbaijanis, must do our best to speak equally well both to the Russian and the Azerbaijani audiences to comply with practical necessity. For instance, Comrade Magomayev made a very good report, but when he tried to answer questions it became obvious that he did not know Azeri. Magomayev may be forgiven; he is Russianspeaking. But there are many such people among Party workers, ministers, and their deputies.” At this moment, Ibrahimov gave the cue: “He has held this post for ten years and must know the language.” Bayramov agreed with Ibrahimov, saying that “all necessary conditions are to be created for our functionaries who are Russians, Armenians, Georgians, and others to master the local language and read workers’ requests; they must at least speak in broken language to explain things to a comrade not conversant in Russian. Say this comrade goes to a kolkhoz, and there is no interpreter with him, while a collective farmer wants to talk with the Center’s representatives and work out a certain matter. We must think of this question. On the other hand, measures have to be taken to improve teaching of Azeri in schools and educational institutions along with other subjects. We must explain to Azerbaijanis and non-Azerbaijanis all the aspects of the issue in radio, mass media, official and unofficial meetings. Why am I focusing on this question? The other day I attended a party meeting at the Academy of Sciences. I’ve been on the books of the Academy’s Party organization for eight years and know the situation very well. All the Party meetings have been held in Russian until recently. The President of the Academy was the last to speak in Russian, and nobody said a word. I spoke after him, in Russian as well, for I knew that 15–20 percent of those present did not know Azeri. But someone gave the cue: ‘Speak in Azeri, not Russian,’ while no cue was given to the President of the Academy who had spoken in Russian. I replied in Azeri that each speaker was entitled to speak a language he considers it to be appropriate; moreover, if you want to test my Azeri knowledge, I’m ready to compete with everyone; finally, I speak Russian because I know all those present, some of whom are not versed in Azeri and there is nothing wrong. So I went on speaking in Russian.” In his speech, Bayramov stressed the necessity of refusing administrative methods of work with intelligentsia to focus on patient explanatory work. “This form of debate at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is not the best way to solve the problem, irrespective of ministers’ adoption of Azeri as official language.” The speaker meant the abovementioned meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated December 29, 1956. In reply, Ibrahimov responded immediately: “The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet enjoys its sovereign right to raise a question of the use of Azeri in some ministries of the Republic, and there cannot by any obliging, administrative impediments on this track.” Bayramov noted that he did not encroach upon sovereign rights of the Presidium and that he was addressing the CC Bureau, which heads the Presidium’s work. “When, for example, a Minister is told that he

failed to run official work fully in Azeri, and it is regarded as negative fact, what should the Minister do under these circumstances? Those capable of running official work in Azeri may stay at their posts; those incapable of doing so must go. Some provocative points open up if such an approach is used. As a whole, the national question is a very delicate point; it is far from building a plant or a factory. One can build a plant today or tomorrow, there is no particular trouble, but the national question is very serious. Maximum patience and prudence has to be displayed on this track; appropriate efforts are required to explain the current situation.”25 Bayramov was followed by Allahverdiyev, First Secretary of the Baku City Party organization, who cited V. I. Lenin’s works on state language and national languages: “First of all, the national language is mentioned in three Constitutions of the Union Republics: Georgian SSR, Article 156; Armenian SSR, Article 119, and now the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR. No references to the state language are found in the Constitutions of other Union Republics.” Then he started quoting theses from Lenin’s works of different periods and under different conditions. In so doing, he referred to these quotations at his own discretion. Allahverdiyev bothered everyone with his quotations to conclude that an Article of the State Language should not have been included in the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, since Lenin considered the national language to be an essential attribute of each sovereign republic. Another conclusion of Allahverdiyev was that the Azerbaijani language, that is, Azeri, could be used equally with Russian in state institutions and enterprises of Azerbaijan, for it did not run counter to Lenin’s standards. Then Allahverdiyev started analyzing the situation that was established in the Republic after the adoption of the law on state language. He noted as follows: “First of all, there is a certain response on the part of the population, and there are two aspects of the problem. First is the response of the urban population, that is, that of Baku; second is the response of non-Azerbaijanis residing in Baku. The rural population does not care a bit about this law, because the current official work in most regions of the Republic has always been carried out in Azeri. True, there have been some irregularities in the correspondence work between regional and Republican offices. . . . Thus, the regions have shown no particular interest in the law.” As for Baku, the working people had, at first, been absolutely indifferent to this law on language as set forth in the Constitution. However, humanitarian intellectuals, a part of the student body and an insignificant part of the backward population wanted to present this as a new April revolution of 1920 that followed in 1956. And what was the response of the non-Azerbaijani population of Baku? As viewed by Allahverdiyev, “in the first days that followed, the people feared that they could lose their jobs as a result of this law’s implementation. Provocative rumors were afloat; however, after Comrade Mustafayev, other CC Secretaries and Council of Ministers functionaries spoke in Russian at various official meetings, organizations, and institutions, and this type of apprehension passed.” When analyzing the leadership’s dereliction, Allahverdiyev noted excessive attention to the subject in some unofficial circles. By “unofficial circles” Allahverdiyev meant ordinary people: “every person explained the amendment of the state language in his own manner, but failed to say anything persuasive about what was wrong and

what was right; people whispered secrets, and nothing more.” When the abovementioned article by Ibrahimov appeared, Allahverdiyev paid attention to the last indention and a signature. Ibrahimov, as Allahverdiyev put it, ought to come out as official functionary, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. However, he signed as “Mirza Ibrahimov” and thus presented himself as an ordinary writer, for not everybody thinks as he does. Also, the article was to have been sanctioned by the CC Bureau. “Ibrahimov was to speak as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR and a member of the CC Bureau and thus provide appropriate bodies with his directives; if he spoke as a writer, he was not entitled to give directives to Party, Soviet, and trade unions about the transition to Azeri. It seems to me that we must finalize our view on the state language. My standpoint is as follows: there is no question of canceling the decree on the state language, and all the attempts to make amendments to the Constitution at the next session have to be rejected.” Lenin’s directions and instructions have to be followed in the language question. For instance, “in Ukraine, Lenin directly instructed public servants to speak in Ukrainian as well. . . . We must insist that servants from state, Party, and other organizations be proficient in Azeri. It is essential to explain to teachers and students of pedagogical institutions and the state university, as well as writers and scholars of the Academy of Sciences, what the state language is. In so doing, we shall avoid misinterpreting this term.”26 Then Ibrahimov took the floor saying that he disagreed with some of Allahverdiyev’s statements, especially those quoting Lenin. He noted that some of Lenin’s phrases were cited out of context, and other phrases going back to the Tzarist period were linked to the present reality. Then Ibrahimov gave his explanation on the subject: “Following a preliminary exchange of opinions at the CC CPA Bureau and on its instruction, I agreed that an article on the state language should be included in the Constitution of the Republic with Comrade Voroshilov during my stay in Moscow. This question was discussed and approved at the CC Bureau and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. In connection with this question I wrote a letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.” Ibrahimov read out the text of this letter saying that fifteen to twenty years ago, an article on the state language was included in the constitutions of Armenian and the Georgian SSR and that this article had never run contrary to Leninism. At this point Ignatov exclaimed: “We dispose of no Bureau decision of this sort!” Ibrahimov responded abruptly: “I’m citing documents which I dispose of.” Then he applied to Allahverdiyev and got into argument with him regarding the term “national culture,” saying that Lenin’s citation about the reactionary character of the slogan “national culture” was written under specific historical conditions: “Dear Comrade Allahverdiyev, the term ‘national culture’ was not invented by me. All documents of our Party, including those going back to, for example, Checheno-Ingushes, testify to ‘all-around development of national culture of the USSR peoples.’ The term ‘national culture’ in terms of bourgeoisie is a reactionary term but not under Soviet conditions. A slogan of national culture in Soviet terms is an exclusively progressive slogan. As for my article in the Communist newspaper, I must admit that I’m a writer and, hence, write scores of editorial materials. . . . No directives are found in my article. I hope that you, Comrade Allahverdiyev, will agree with

me that it is not nice to groundlessly run a person down. For example, I categorically disagree with you that the Azerbaijani people, the rural and urban population, specifically in Baku, remain indifferent to the language question, as you insist, except for fifty intellectuals. On the contrary, collective farmers and workers enthusiastically welcome this decree. I can show you letters from workers of Baku enterprises who approve this law. As for spiteful critics, you may find them everywhere. We should take measures aimed at wider use of Azeri in the Republican institutions.” Involved in the debates was Yakovlev, CC Second Secretary: “Regretfully, we ought to have discussed the issue on July 24, with appropriate reference to Lenin and the Congress resolution, and adopt an appropriate decision. However, I failed to attend the Bureau meeting, and I’m unaware of the course of the debates.” Rahimov added that no broad debates had been held. Sensing that every attendee was eager to avoid responsibility before CC CPSU top officials, Ibrahimov felt insulted: “At that moment none of you wanted to speak, and a decision was adopted; now I don’t understand why you’re stammering.”27 The situation became heated after these words. To protect himself, Yakovlev said, “It is not worth flying into a passion. The decision has been adopted, and an appropriate article included in the Constitution. That’s the reality. Unfortunately, I did not take part in the Bureau meeting of July 1956 when the question of state language was discussed. It’s too late now to express one’s negative view on the subject. However, I’d like to emphasize that there are two aspects of the problem: first, the question of the state language as set forth in the Constitution; and, second, the question of native language, which is to be widely spread and applied with all rights and duties it has never enjoyed here in Baku. Today’s speakers have pointed out that the national question is a very delicate, painful problem. Note that some CPSU Congresses dealt with this problem, for example, the decisions of the X and XII Congresses, which considered questions of language and the national culture. Following these decisions, Party and Soviet bodies have taken specific measures. So it’d be wrong to opine that comrades have ignored these serious questions and taken no steps to develop the mother tongue. Our Party has always cared for these questions, so it is no mere coincidence that there are schools, higher educational institutions, and creative organizations operating in the native language.” Yakovlev pointed out that many Party meetings, plenums, congresses, and works by Lenin dealt with these questions and backed the development of natural culture and native language, but there were neither resolutions nor works by Lenin to propagandize the national language. Suffice it to look at the collected laws titled “Constitution of the USSR and fifteen Union Republics” issued in 1956. The point is about Constitutions of the two Union Republics-Georgia and Armenia-with their state languages. Now Azerbaijan has joined them. Nowhere in the USSR, except for the three Republics above, is there an article on State Language, though it is Ukraine, Baltic Republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and so forth. So it’d be a pity if tomorrow the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, and other Union Republics would enforce a law on the state language. I’d say that it were contrary to Leninism if the Russian Federation would declare the Russian language as the state one. At the same time, one cannot say that such an approach would be correct in respect to the RSFSR and incorrect in respect to other Union Republics. To my thinking, it equally applies to all Union Republics. My point of view is that those

constitutions are closer to the spirit of Communism where no state language is declared; but where it is, there is a certain discrepancy with the Lenin national policy. It should be noted that Lenin had always opposed the state language, saying that the declaration of the state language was contrary to the genuine democracy. Beyond any doubt, most honest-minded Soviet people and every Party organization will understand us properly; they are unlikely to tend toward elimination of Russian, Armenian, and other languages, once an article on language has already been adopted. However, we must take into account that there is a group of citizens who admit throwing down from a rostrum the people speaking in Russian or Armenian. In so doing, they refer to the fact that the state language is Azeri. These persons interpret the law on the state language, as Lenin saw it, as a measure of coercion, and these persons are going to benefit from this. I’m confident that no article on the state language would ever be included in the constitutions of the other twelve Union Republics, to say nothing of the RSFSR or Ukraine where scores of nationalities reside. I lived in Ukraine and voluntarily studied the Ukrainian language even despite the lack of the law on the state language. In general, it’d be appropriate for every person to study a language of the Republic where he works, but this article alone cannot make a conscious person study a language. Even despite this article, there are comrades, natives of this Republic, and even Azerbaijanis who do not know their native language. When we adopted this law, we hoped that they would be conscience-stricken and start studying their native language.” To support his words, Yakovlev cited a speech of Sergo Ordzhonikidze at the 1st Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in 1922: “Georgians in Georgia are Velikorusses in Russia. This is a nation holding supreme power; it cannot say it’s being oppressed, for it’s a dominating nation in Georgia.” Yakovlev placed a special emphasis on Ordzhonikidze’s phrase: “Manifestation of great-power chauvinism in the language question is intolerable.” To sum up, Yakovlev advised the audience to avoid the situation where an Ossetian or Armenian has to speak the state language only. If he attended the CC Bureau meeting in July, he would categorically oppose the adoption of such an article. At this moment Ibrahimov reminded the group that Yakovlev did not attend the Bureau, though he did take part in a preliminary exchange of views. However, Yakovlev went on denying not only his personal but also the Bureau’s participation in the debates as a whole. In so doing, he tried to lay the blame on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet: “I don’t know whether the CC Bureau of July 24 has adopted this decision, but in the time that followed it stood aloof from these questions. It was Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov who monopolized raising these questions. It’s wrong because it’s the Bureau’s mission to dominate on this track to control, lead, and correct each of us. If a Bureau member is going to appear in print and provide principled directives, other Bureau members should know about it, talk out the material, and approve it. In the meanwhile, Mirza Ibrahimov published an article in the Communist newspaper without consulting with the CC Bureau, and then began giving directives to Party and Soviet bodies of the Republic. There are petty tyrants among us who, under the cover of the law on the state language, are seeking to create an atmosphere of intolerance to other languages. That was at a meeting of orchestra musicians; at a university meeting where a student failed to speak in Armenian. It is rumored that an accountant of the Academy of Sciences, being well aware that applicants did not know

Azeri, wrote resolutions in Azeri only. The same was true of ‘Azenergo’ system when an engineer on duty made records in Azeri while an engineer that replaced him did not know Azeri. Facts of this sort are typical for the oil industry system when making well repair and maintenance documents in Azeri. It has to be kept in mind that no facts of this sort had been found before the enactment of the law on the state language. Everyone in the Republic spoke a language intelligible to the majority. Until recently, the language has not fostered any misunderstanding among various nationalities, in the first turn, among workers and collective farmers.” Then Yakovlev decided to ease tensions: “In my view, our task is to assist people in studying Azeri without any coercion. People unwilling to study this language, especially Communists, have to be pulled up and corrected. Also, it is essential to call those to order who intentionally distort the language question and thus cause discontent. So we have to draw up a unified stand on the subject. We cannot admit any case where a zealous administrator says that if you don’t study the language within three months you’ll be dismissed.” Yakovlev tried to bring up a story at a power plant; however, Mustafayev interfered, saying that at one time he was also accused of this attempt. The problem is that there is no need for language proficiency when shifting the watch; figures are important only, not language. At this moment Yakovlev started blackmailing Mustafayev, saying that when raising this question at the CC Bureau in July 1956 he scorned the CC CPSU view on the subject, and suggested a new article to be included in the Constitution. In reply, Mustafayev stated that Ibrahimov sought advice from Comrade Voroshilov. Yakovlev asked ironically if he had talks with Voroshilov in passing, somewhere in a corridor? Ibrahimov replied it was in a Voroshilov’s study. It seems to us that Azerbaijani leaders should have talked not in Voroshilov’s study but at the CC CPSU, and not with Voroshilov, but with Khrushchev, as the law on the state language ought to have been enacted with the consent of the Party leader. All archival documents on the state language asked Azerbaijani leaders, “why did not you seek counsel from the CC CPSU?” In reply, they repeated over and over again that they asked Voroshilov’s advice. It should be noted that K. E. Voroshilov and S. Budenniy survived in the 1930s owing to the fact that they tirelessly reaffirmed the “heroic deeds” of Stalin on the Tsaritsyn front. Having sustained a defeat in the first war period, Voroshilov was not shot, like D. Pavlov, and instead was put on the periphery of Stalin’s entourage until his death. Mechanically, he went on sitting solemnly in his study but had no real power. Tamed by Stalin and accustomed to humbleness, Voroshilov would never dare to defend anyone to the detriment of his prosperity. As a matter of fact, Voroshilov’s game was over. It was no mere coincidence that Azerbaijani leaders faced difficulties after Ibrahimov met with Voroshilov. To spoil Yakovlev’s game, Mustafayev also referred to the Party’s authority: “If this article is regarded as anti-Lenin, wrong, then the CS CPSU would put Georgia and Armenia right, for this article has been set forth in the Constitution since 1936.”28 It should be noted that Yakovlev’s behavior at the Bureau was not accidental. He realized that Moscow representatives Lebedev and Ignatov, his former fellow employees, could lay part of the blame on him when reporting back to the CC CPSU on Azerbaijan’s developments. With many positive traits, Yakovlev was not a chauvinist. He worked long in the CC CPSU

apparatus and knew in the systems of this institution well. In 1943–1945, Yakovlev attended the Higher Party School under the CC CPSU and, before going to Azerbaijan in 1955, he held top Party positions on “Old Square.” For some time in the past he worked in a department which supervised Party bodies of Union Republics and thus came to know the particulars of his work.29 For this reason he decided to estrange himself from any problems. Also, he was well aware of the mission he had to carry out in Azerbaijan. Yakovlev realized that Khrushchev’s reforms of the mid-1950s did weaken one of the USSR state system pillars-the state security bodies that had traditionally strengthened the Party apparatus. A new powerholding center sprang up to consolidate all levers in political struggle. Yakovlev’s assignment to deal with restless Azerbaijan and the very practice of appointment of top Russian functionaries as second secretaries of the CC of Union Republics displayed the strengthening of the Party’s positions in the country. It became obvious that the Party turned into a key factor of social-political life of society. Note that CC CPA Bureau members clearly realized this fact, especially in light of Yakovlev’s speech at the Bureau meeting. Yakovlev was followed by P. Arushanov, a member of the CC Bureau since January 1956 and a head of the oil industry department, who criticized Ibrahimov guardedly, acting circumspectly with an emphasis on some interesting aspects of the issue: “First, we are too late to discuss this question, and prompted by the CC CPSU only. We are all aware of the fact that some circles of the population misinterpreted the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on the State Language and thus attached political coloring to the issue, so I’m prone to think that the Bureau should have discussed the question much earlier to form a certain view on the subject. Should we have done it in a timely manner, no idle talk would have ever been set afloat. So, when questions of this sort arise, they have to be discussed and settled without any further delay. As far as I remember, a couple of months ago we discussed a question of the use of Azeri in state institutions together with Comrade Yakovlev. These debates broke out after an appropriate Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. It was decided that no such resolution could be published in mass media, for it would inevitably cause false rumors. Some Bureau members opined that all of them should gather together and discuss the question of state language. However, we have dragged out this matter.” Then he turned to the national question as set forth in Marxism-Leninism, saying: “even under Communism with a single language, when regional languages will first be shaped and then a single one formed for the whole society, this may be achieved through the all-around development of national languages.” Arushanov assured meeting participants that from the very outset the Soviet power did its utmost to develop national languages. For instance, there was only one school in Russian in the village of Kasapet, Mardakert region of Mountainous Garabagh, prior to the establishment of the Soviet power. An Armenian peasant who could not converse in the Russian language learned Russian in this school. After the establishment of Soviet power, a broad network of Azerbaijani and Armenian schools and educational institutions was created to teach pupils and students in their native languages. As a result, highly qualified specialists of Azerbaijani, Armenian, and other nationalities were trained. As viewed by Arushanov, “it was the well thought-out Lenin national policy that

played a crucial role in the development of the Azerbaijan SSR, its economy, science, and culture. However, as time passed, a greater portion of top officials and technical intelligentsia ceased studying Azeri and speaking their mother tongue. There are lots of Party and Soviet senior executives of Azerbaijani nationality who are practically ignorant of Azeri. Abnormality of the situation is apparent in the regions of the Republic, and as a result, some comrades avoid speaking to collective farmers and even meeting them, to say nothing of Russian comrades and Armenians who work in the Republic and must be proficient, to an extent, in Azeri and thus avoid talking with workers or collective farmers through an interpreter. It is absurd when a senior executive, Azerbaijani by nationality, arrives in a village and cannot talk with collective farmers in his native language.” As for the law in question, Arushanov stressed that the point was moot: in terms of Tzarist Russia, the dictate of Russian as the state language is none other than the policy of oppression of other peoples, as Lenin maintained. As for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, the situation is different. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Republic cannot be compared with the Republics of Transcaucasia: “I admit that Ukraine is a national Republic as well; however, non-Ukrainian nationalities form a substantial part of Ukraine’s population. . . . I think that no mistake or departure from Leninism has been made, as some comrades allege, when we included the Article of the State Language in the Constitution of the Republic. I agree with comrades who oppose the abrogation of the law now, since it may provoke meaningless talks. But I think that no departure from Leninism has been made and that there is no need to cancel the law, especially as the status of the state language was set forth in the Constitutions of the two Republics since 1936.” Regarding Ibrahimov’s article in the Communist newspaper, Arushanov declared that he had not read the article but was aware that the use of Azeri in state institutions had been discussed in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and that a decision was adopted. “I’m not aware of the decision, I have not read it, and I think that a reprimand against the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and personally Comrade Ibrahimov was correct. We frequently discuss draft decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan about closing of village councils. You consider it necessary to agree on projects of this sort with the CC Bureau, while such a crucial question as the state language was not agreed on with the CC Bureau. It was Comrade Yakovlev who first raised this decision, and I believe, Comrade Ibrahimov, you have made a mistake in this matter. It is rumored that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet indicated that all the office work in state institutions should be translated into Azeri. It is impossible because half of the employees are of non-Azerbaijani nationality, and even some Azerbaijanis themselves are not proficient in Azeri.” Ibrahimov interrupted the speaker, shouting: “It’s slander. It was not even mentioned.” Arushanov took him up saying that if the problem had been discussed before, no aspersions would have been cast. To sum up, Arushanov criticized himself for knowing his native language very poorly.30 In fact, Arushanov was cunning: his father was a native of the village Mohartkala, the Mardakert region of Mountainous Garabagh, while he was born in Baku in 1916 and finished secondary school at the M. Azizbeyov industrial institute. Like most Garabagh Armenians of his generation, Arushanov was equally skillful both in native Armenian and Azeri, which distinguished him from other non-

Azerbaijanis and top officials.31 Arushanov was followed by the Secretary of the CC CPSU M. Iskenderov, who considered it necessary to study Azeri. He stressed that no decree on the state language was required: “Inclusion of the article on the state language in the country’s Constitution is a matter of paramount importance. The question has not been thoroughly thrashed out; however, we neither discussed it nor asked advice from anyone. I mean higher Party organs. It’d be wrong to adopt the law on the state language only because a law of this sort is set forth in the constitutions of Armenia and Georgia. If the CC sanctioned these actions, all the constitutions of the Union Republics would provide for the state language, that is, the one spoken by the majority of the population. However, no sanction of this sort has so far been imposed. In other words, could the CC ever have raised the question of removing this article from the constitutions of Armenia and Georgia? I think that it’d be inconvenient for the CC to formulate the matter in such a manner. To be frank, there is no need for the state language today when the national cadres are trained. If it were the 1920s, maybe, but not today. The problem is different: what measures are required to develop the Azerbaijani language? I think, Mirza Ajdarovich, that inclusion of this article in the Constitution is a formal aspect of the issue. As a matter of fact, we’ve done nothing on this track. In August, when the article was included in the Constitution, the Party organs kept silence. I mean the Bureau in its current composition. After that the Presidium passed a decision, which was distributed among all institutions and enterprises, and again the Party organs kept silence. I did not read this decision but I’m aware that the cadres should be selected to comply with national identity. I believe it’s wrong. I don’t mean that it’s your fault, Mirza Ajdarovich, but the decision said, “the cadres should be selected to comply with national identity.” Arushanov added: “I said that people proficient in the Azerbaijani language should be selected.” Iskenderov objected: “It seems to me that Comrade Muhitdinov was right in saying recently at a Party activists’ meeting: cadres should be selected according to the Leninist principle. We have excellent personnel in our multinational Republic. It’s not the 1920s. I opine that we must devise measures to develop the Russian language in parallel with the development of the Azerbaijani language. One cannot separate one from another and run into extremes.” Iskenderov cited an example of a Lenin district where Party activists insisted that all Azerbaijanis should attend schools with the Azerbaijani language of instruction. In so doing, the activists insisted that all Azerbaijanis should attend Azerbaijani schools only, because the Azerbaijani groups numbered thirty pupils while the figure stood at sixty to sixtyfive pupils in the international groups. Iskenderov summed up: “I believe that people must study in Azeri as well. Everyone has the right to study a language at one’s own discretion; however, the study of Azeri cannot be separated from the study of the Russian language.” Then the debaters exchanged heated words. Rahimov declared that Azerbaijani children should attend schools with Azerbaijani language of instruction from the first grade. Iskenderov objected that no administrative measures were required to remedy the situation: “I think that our CC Bureau was wrong when it entrusted Comrade Ibrahimov and the Supreme Council with solving this problem.” Then Iskenderov turned to the article by Ibrahimov saying: “I think that articles of this type should not be published in a newspaper. If I were to decide, I would

not publish this article. As writer, you, Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov, have no right to give any instructions, but as Chairman of the Presidium and CC Bureau member you may. All these led to unfortunate results when some immature comrades misunderstood our initiative. For example, a doctor came to see me one day saying that her polyclinic’s personnel came to the conclusion that from now on case histories would be written in Azeri.” In reply, Ibrahimov asked, “What do you think of the fact that case histories in Kelbajar are submitted in Russian?” Iskenderov replied, “I think that documents cannot be written in Russian for kolkhozes. The case history is not delivered to the patient, it is reflected in documents to give information about a patient’s disease.” Secretary of the CC Efendiyev explained this as being due to the fact that “they cannot write in Azeri. To sum up, Iskenderov pointed out that measures to study Azeri were of paramount importance.” However, a preliminary work needed to be done. Administration by mere injunction would not do at all. He suggested selecting a group of comrades for drafting measures aimed at developing the language and culture, national in form and social in content.32 It should be noted that the Secretary of the CC CPA Iskenderov was born in 1915 in Gubadly region of Azerbaijan. In 1929 he finished a village school; in 1933-M. A. Sabir Pedagogical College; and in 1940-Azerbaijan Industrial Institute, as an engineer/geologist by specialty. He worked in various oil organizations, holding posts from engineer/geologist to head of a department. In 1946, he defended a candidate thesis on geology-mineralogy. In 1953, he was elected the first secretary of the Baku City Communist Party; in February 1954-Secretary of the CC CPA. Contributing to Iskenderov’s career, especially his appointment as the first secretary of the Baku City Communist Party, was Bagirov. Note that Iskenderov was responsible for oil industry and other related questions in the CC Secretariat.33 Also of interest is a speech made by Rahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, at this meeting: “I don’t remember; perhaps I was not at preliminary debates over inclusion of the new article on state language in the Constitution. I attended a Bureau meeting, but there were no discussions. Comrade Ibrahimov announced that this question had been agreed upon with Comrade Voroshilov and that the law on the state language had been included in Constitutions of other Republics, so we must do the same. We, as Bureau members, agreed and voted for this law, but I did not expect that this law could arouse a double reaction, positive and negative. I accepted that after the law had been adopted, a group of competent comrades, well conversant with the national question of our Party, would be entrusted to develop measures for law implementation. And it would have been appropriate, because over the forty years of Soviet power we lived our lives differently and our attitudes to the national language varied, therefore measures were to be taken step-by-step to gain a breakthrough in the subject; however, things went wrong. We failed to take these measures, and hence, attained none of the goals we strove for.” In the course of discussions Rahimov touched upon a key question: it turned out that not all Azerbaijanis taught their children in Azerbaijani schools. A question arose: How could this happen? Were conditions in Azerbaijani schools worse than those in Russian schools where teachers were more competent?” I think that our children have to attend Russian schools for the simple reason that upon graduation from an educational

institution it’s easier for them to get a job than for those finishing an Azerbaijani school. I know about it from experience. I have four children; three of them attend an Azerbaijani school and one, a Russian school. The problem is that when going to work at a state institution a competitor is tested first of all for knowledge of Russian. If he is found incompetent in Russian, he is sent to work in an outlying district.” In believing that the language is one of the key factors of national definition, since every nation has the right to use its own language, Rahimov disagreed with some of Iskenderov’s postulates. He turned to Ibrahimov and declared that “we have enough schools and, if necessary, we may open additional classes. For whom are Azerbaijani schools created? They are created not for Russians, not for Armenians, not for Jews. They are designed for Azerbaijanis. Our mission is to respect our mother tongue. This may be achieved not by setting one nation against another. We want to preserve our language, respect our language, so we may, on various pretexts, dissuade parents from sending children to Russian schools. Hence, the study of the Azerbaijani language has to start with Azerbaijanis themselves.” Further, Rahimov dealt with a sticky question: preparation of reports of senior officials in Azeri. He confessed honestly that he would be delivering reports independently, without interpreters, but not now. Rahimov put all the blame on writers and linguists who often changed the alphabet and orthography: “Officials of our age and slightly older studied seven grades in the Arabic alphabet, then turned to Latin, further to Russian, then some amendments were made in the Russian alphabet, so people like me face difficulty when writing in Azeri.” Another reason for Russian preference is that not all subordinates know Azeri equally. A head of an organization takes up materials in two languages. “At any rate,” Rahimov emphasized, “Azerbaijanis should start studying Azeri themselves, in schools and higher educational institutions.” He added: “In order to study Azeri in educational institutions in a more effective way, it is essential to have literature; however, no appropriate literature in Azeri is available; no vocabulary on special terms is available. We must translate all technical literature, and publish materials on technical and humanitarian sciences. What about the situation in higher educational institutions? Lectures on special branches in the Azerbaijani sector are delivered in Russian; scientific literature on these branches is in Russian only; students do not understand anything. It is crucial to translate all this literature into Azeri. So, it’d be appropriate for the CC to take the lead and avoid false rumors. Following the Decree of the Supreme Soviet, the Health Minister Veli Akhundov instructed all physicians to write case histories in Azeri. Yesterday, I phoned the Minister of Culture, Comrade Kurbanov. A concert was televised by a request program of voters. An announcer speaks Azeri and conveys the orders of Russian comrades. I told Kurbanov about it. It is necessary to call the director of the studio E. Alibeyli to order.” Ibrahimov asked what should be done, and whether this order came from Azerbaijani and Russian comrades. Rahimov replied that both languages were to be used. Then the attendees turned to another unclear question: how will organizations operate, if they are led by persons not conversant in Azeri? For example, Minister of the State Control Zimenkov, CC Secretary Yakovlev, deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers N. Saakov should sign orders in Russian, then translate them into Azeri, and send them around with a “certified true copy” postscript. Rahimov pointed out that he did not understand the current situation: “It’d be

expedient to single out a group of competent comrades whose responsibility will be to draw up appropriate measures, without particular ballyhoo and publicity. If you call all linguists, writers, and others together, you’ll stir up idle talk.” As for Ibrahimov’s article, Rahimov characterized it as inopportune: “When we, Bureau members, speak or publish our articles, all these are made with consent of the Bureau. This applies to all of us. As a writer you may write whatever you want, but when you publish a keynote article, you must agree on it in appropriate instances. We are over-diligent in this direction and have thus done something very stupid. From this time onward, I suggest settling all principal questions with the consent of the Bureau members.”34 It has to be kept in mind that in comparison with our speakers, Rahimov stuck to a sincere and impartial position, though he followed the “Party line” as regards Ibrahimov’s article in the Communist newspaper. Also, Secretary of the CC H. Efendiyev joined the debates to appraise speeches of previous speakers as follows: “Debates over the issue are illustrative that Bureau members are not unanimous about the question on the agenda. It is obvious that when adopting the law on the state language we had no idea of how it would work. The question was obscure for all of us, myself included. I agree with comrades that such an important political question had to be approached cautiously. We ignored the probable consequences of this law. Perhaps, I’m mistaken, but I told Comrade Ibrahimov at the session that it’d be wrong to make a statement on the issue. For some reason or another, I apprehended this step. Maybe I was not right. Comrades prompted us to approach issues of this sort with due regard for specific historical circumstances. The fact was ignored that our Republic was multinational, so the issue had not been studied thoroughly. When the law on the state language was adopted, I insisted that there was no need for such a law.” Then Efendiyev pointed out that for some time past the Azerbaijani language has not been developed properly; instead, it was disregarded: “We are to blame for this. The development of the Azerbaijani language in not in the enactment of such an administrative decree. We must explore ways of how to develop our language. As for schools, why do children of top officials go to Russian schools not only in towns but in regions as well (a certain group)? Comrade Rahimov maintains that we must compulsorily send all children who are Azerbaijani by nationality to Azerbaijani schools. It’s wrong beyond any doubt. Why should we restrict them? It’d be much more effective to study the Russian language in Azerbaijani schools at the highest possible level, so that a son of an Azerbaijani will be proficient in Russian after finishing a secondary Azerbaijani school. A tenth-grade boy from Baku is versed in Russia, while the situation is much worse in rural schools. Village school graduates arrive in Baku to enter the institute; however, they fail to do it because they do not know Russian. A failure to enter the institute because of poor knowledge of Russian is the second blunder. It is unacceptable to demand all Azerbaijanis to study and write in Russian through the use of administrative levers.” Further, Efendiyev turned to the practical implementation of the law: “Let’s turn to the Academy of Sciences. Thus, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences sends a letter to Comrade Kopylov in Azeri, while the latter has recently arrived in Azerbaijan, so he is not in position to read or write in Azeri.” Ibrahimov interrupted him again: “The staff of Comrade Kopylov must speak Azeri, for his

mission is to know everything and everywhere.” However, Efendiyev insisted that “today we cannot demand Kopylov to know Azeri.” Another example is the case of Comrade Polyanskiy. A prosecutor draws up reports in Azeri, and he signs these documents unmindful of anything, for he is not proficient in Azeri. As for Ibrahimov’s article and debates over the use of Azeri at Ministries, Efendiyev considered it useless and premature: “To my thinking, it was needless to allege that such-and-such a Ministry does not show initiative in using Azeri. Perhaps other methods were to be used. Why can a Party organ not find another way out of the impasse? Why do such-and-such departments keep on sending documents to kolkhozes in Russian while nobody understands them? The idea is good, but one should think of how to shun idle talk.”35 Efendiyev was followed by first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Abdullayev who stressed that the whole problem was in the improper approach of the postwar state offices, ministries, and organizations toward the use of Azeri: all the clerical work was run in Russian. He stated: “Documents from regions of the country come in Azeri, replies to regions are in Russian; reports and speeches at meetings, especially those discussing agricultural questions and attended by 99 percent comrades from regions and the countryside, are made in Russian; senior officials speak Russian as well. A question arose; it was essential to remedy the situation, which caused legitimate discontent of local officials. That’s why I think that there is nothing bad about the fact that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR took the initiative to raise this question, and that our political line is consistent with the Lenin national policy to use the Azerbaijani language in our state institutions.” Abdullayev cited an interesting incident that occurred during his business trip to Iran as a member of the Parliamentary delegation: “I happened to talk with scores of Azerbaijanis, MPs, professors, and so on. When I said that the clerical work and teaching in our schools, institutes, and state offices were not run in the Azerbaijani language, the public was impressed. The problem is that the Azerbaijani language was forbidden in all spheres. In the meanwhile, the Azerbaijani population numbers above five million.” Abdullayev stressed the necessity of thorough debates over issues of this sort. He admitted that some mistakes were made but considered them to be remediable.36 The floor was given to G. Jafarly, head of CC department for Party organs, who recollected that “the CC Bureau entrusted Comrade Ibrahimov with agreeing on the issue with Moscow. In a while, he informed CC Bureau members that inclusion of the Article on the State Language in the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR had been agreed on with Comrade Voroshilov who gave his principal consent. After Ibrahimov’s report, none of the CC Bureau members objected to this proposal. In all probability, CC Bureau members did not foreknow the possible false talks due to this law. It became evident that we did not think through the issue. It’s all of our fault.” Jafarly pointed out that the inclusion of Article on Language in the Constitution was not at variance with Marxism, especially as the second paragraph of this Article made a reservation that comrades from the non-Azerbaijani population residing on the territory of Azerbaijan have the right to speak, write, explain, and answer letters and complaints in their native languages. “Generally speaking, it is essential to rehabilitate the Azerbaijani language; however, we did not think of how to start up this Article-either through its inclusion in the Constitution or

otherwise. We did not discuss this question, showed negligence, and did not seek advice from the CC CPSU. It seems to me that the restoration of the Azerbaijani language is necessitated by vital interests. This process is not and cannot be directed to weakening the positions of the Russian language. The enactment of this Article was followed by idle talk and false rumors; in particular, rumors were afloat that persons of non-Azerbaijani nationality would allegedly be dismissed from their jobs, evicted from the country, and so on. However, it was malicious slander having no grounds in reality. I personally am not aware of any cases of this sort.” Further, Jafarly noted that “some comrades insist that the cadres will be selected along national identity lines. There are no facts of this kind. On the other hand, it’d be ridiculous if we appointed a Russian or an Armenian not versed in Azeri to work as a Secretary of the Kelbajar regional Party Committee.” Jafarly joined in, saying that “measures aimed at restoring Azeri were correct and timely.” Touching upon Ibrahimov’s article, Jafarly voiced his opinion as follows: “I’ve read this article from cover to cover. At first, I was prone to think that it was ill-timed. Note that Comrade Ibrahimov is famed not only as a writer but also as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and a CC Bureau member. To my thinking, such an important political issue ought to have been discussed by the CC Bureau. At the same time, I discovered no political misinterpretations in his article. Comrade Ibrahimov makes appropriate reservations regarding complaints and appeals of people not proficient in Azeri. He says that letters should be written in the language in which the appeal was first made. In may view, there is no mistake in raising such a question. True, the Azerbaijani language could have been rehabilitated even without being included in the Constitution. But it’s too late.”37 At the end of the meeting the floor was given to CC CPSU representative Ignatov, who first of all talked about the history of the question. He said, “After the law was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR and the article by Comrade Ibrahimov appeared in the newspaper, the party CC received a lot of letters, which were also delivered to the Supreme Soviet, CC departments, and so forth. On the whole, the general content of these letters is that there were some facts of misinterpretation of the law of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR.” In classifying the complaints, Ignatov grouped them as follows. First, there were complaints claiming meetings and gatherings were held in Azeri only, without taking into account the composition of those present, and with no interpreter. Second, there were complaints that if those not proficient in Azeri did not become proficient in the language within an appropriate period they would be “seen off.” Different periods of studying the language were mentioned: three, five, or six months. Third, there was a demand to hold all written correspondence in the Republic in Azeri only and send it within the Republic in Azeri only, with no addressees’ needs taken into consideration. Fourth, the complaints said in some institutions all official work was forced to be done in Azeri only, disregarding the fact that there are many institutions with a considerable number of persons who do not converse in Azeri. That was the summary of the content of letters indicating abnormalities in the Republic after the law and the article commenting on it appeared. The CC Bureau officially did not discuss the matter of how this law was implemented, nor did it consider all the abnormalities reported. However, CC CPSU members knew that complaints had been submitted not only to

the CC CPSU but also to members of the CC CPA Bureau, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. Thus, the CC CPA Bureau held no discussion of this matter. How should various statements of abnormalities be reacted to? For this reason, the CC CPSU department for Party organs decided to recommend that the CC CPA Bureau discuss this question at its meeting with due regard for the fact that abnormalities were reported; the law was interpreted in a perverted manner by some individuals; certain persons attempted to distort the essence of the law, and in so doing to enable the CC Bureau, as the leading body responsible for the whole political and economic life of the Republic, to clarify all these matters. Ignatov noted, “today’s discussion of the question was of exceptionally business-like, principal character. I can easily imagine that after the discussion of the measures the Bureau will take is over, it will be clearly defined what should further be done. I have some personal remarks in connection with this question. As you know, now the CC CPSU and the Union Government are taking measures to give Union Republics more independence in settling economic and other matters, which, in turn, requires enhancement of the leadership level. Granting more rights requires more duties. This requires, as I understand it, a more thorough, serious approach to all the issues of the Republic’s life; these demands will become even greater, because the issue of independence of Union Republics will be of greater importance after the decision of the CC CPSU February plenum. But regretfully, before the law was adopted (it is not an insignificant but an extremely serious matter), the most elementary thing was not done: the question did not undergo thorough, deep discussion at the CC Bureau. Formally, the CC Bureau made the decision and approved the draft law so the session, in accordance with the decision of the CC CPA Bureau, adopted it but failed to conduct a discussion of the essence of the matter. Formally it appears that none of Bureau members considered it necessary, as it becomes evident now, to discuss this matter and, hence, the Bureau unanimously approved the law. However, the task of leaders, including the leader of CC Bureau of an appropriate Republic, is to foresee everything that may result from realization of a certain issue, on which there is a decision by such an important organ as the Party CC Bureau. Thus, it seems to me (it’s my personal opinion) that even if Bureau members did not suggest broadly examining this question, some comrades stated here that they did not attach importance to the matter, and others did not explain at all why it happened. I think that you, Comrade Mustafayev, should have pushed Bureau members to such a discussion on such a serious political question of the Republic’s life. Regretfully, this did not happen. In my view, this should teach us a lesson about further discussion of significant questions, which, of course, the republic will face and which we cannot foresee. Second, since the decree was adopted and started being implemented, the role of such a political organ as the CC Bureau has been to react quickly to all the political developments in the republic’s life. The law-related developments do occur in a way they should not. There are separate facts, abnormalities, minor or major factors; but these are not single facts, at least proceeding from the number of complaints we in the CC have received.” At this moment, Mustafayev interjected that no single official complaint had been delivered in the republic and that he was unaware of any complaints, except for anonymous ones, delivered to the CC CPSU. Ignatov replied, “To be frank, a proposal to discuss the situation in connection with this question at the CC Bureau was

made not ten days or half a month ago but much earlier—the advice was personally made to you, Comrade Mustafayev, to discuss the question at the Bureau. That was several months ago.” Mustafayev recalled that this had happened at the December 1956 Plenum of the CC CPSU. In response, Ignatov noted that it was already March 1957; however, Mustafayev stated that the Bureau, in its full composition, had gathered together only now. Perhaps he meant that the main instigator of this issue—Ibrahimov—had been on a two-month leave prior to March 1. Ignatov went on, saying, “It would have been much more useful for the CC Bureau to interfere earlier, clarify the situation, give instructions to avoid the situation when one CC secretary interprets the law in his own manner and another one does this in another manner; along with that, everybody thinks for himself, not taking on the Bureau’s viewpoint as a collective leader. As for the publication of the article of Comrade Ibrahimov, generally speaking, such things very seldom happen in our practice. I’m unaware of a case when the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic publishes an article in a printed organ of the Party CC (the article is quite official) and at the same time does not sign it officially as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It has to be kept in mind that this article instructs about specific things to be done; this is not an oral speech but a statement in the media. As practiced by the Party, in such a case any Party CC Bureau member should seek advice from the Party committee prior to publishing an article containing principal instructions. This is to proceed from the Party’s leading role. It seems to me that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic had no contact of this sort with the CC Bureau under the settling of all matters relating to the enactment of the law on the state language, and that the Presidium tried to act in its own manner, which, naturally, was wrong. To sum up his speech, Ignatov said it was time to find out details about incoming reports on separate misinterpretations, conjectures, and not to bypass them. “We need to react specifically, proceeding from fact. For instance, these are talks in a number of institutions, especially the Ministry of Finance; there are rumors during meetings, that you should either study Azeri or be dismissed. These facts should be discussed specifically, collectively; attitudes to persons who misunderstand this law should be clarified. Not only should the CC deal with this matter, but also the Baku City Party Committee, regional Party committees, and primary Party organizations.” Ignatov suggested not making a comprehensive decision at this meeting. A group of Bureau comrades should be instructed to develop measures to implement the law and submit measures for consideration to the CC CPA Bureau.38 For the simple reason that the meeting of the CC CPA Bureau was targeted mainly at Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Ibrahimov who was politically accused in Ignatov’s speech, at the end of the meeting Ibrahimov again took the floor to clarify some matters. The most important thing was that Ibrahimov did not change his opinion and again said that admitting the Azerbaijani language as the state one was quite a fair demand. He said, “The question of language is very important; circumstances that could hardly be foreseen inevitably might have occurred in this issue. I say so because some Bureau members allege that this question was not discussed as broadly at the time. None of you wanted to discuss it broadly then, because we thought it was a natural, correct measure; none of us could imagine that such a

reaction to this question could ever occur; nevertheless, I maintain the opinion that this measure in our common work benefited us, contributed to our national policy. I’m convinced that this measure is being taken as part of the steps the CC CPSU and Union Government undertakes to expand the rights of Union Republics.” Ibrahimov noted that a braver, more decisive approach is needed for the solution of series of matters; for example, he mentioned a struggle with the personality cult initiated at the 20th CPSU Congress. “That was a great step; the CC CPSU foresaw that enemies could take use of this. In foreseeing this, the CC CPSU bravely took this step because it only benefited our Motherland, made millions of people glad, restored the rights of unfairly offended nations, and returned them from exile to native places. As a patriot, I was forced to raise the difficult question of use of the Azerbaijani language. I used to be in frequent contact with people, intelligentsia, so my duty prompted to me to take measures to eliminate the abnormal situation that causes displeasure in people’s hearts; I express my opinion. Comrade Rahimov has just now submitted a statement to me. Let’s consider what they write. Can we, Comrade Ignatov, pay attention to some statements and anonymous letters and ignore others? We receive information about any kinds of infringements in the city of Baku; I cannot help noticing that 60 to 70 percent of those are committed by youth. I’m alarmed by this. I wonder why the youth under Soviet conditions commit acts of hooliganism and robbery; the majority of them are unemployed. They must be given jobs, measures should be taken to remove abnormalities.” Turning to Ignatov, Ibrahimov began insisting that “in reality, the encroachment upon the Azerbaijani language leads to a morbid atmosphere and morbid sentiments. Removal of the morbid sentiments requires removal of morbid practice, so we are waiting for your assistance in this respect.” Ignatov replied that there was a CC CPSU decision on Georgia illustrative of similar shortcomings; it was also related to the republic neighboring Georgia and was instructive on what needed to be done [here he meant the resolution of the CC CPSU of June 30, 1956]. Ibrahimov responded that people could be consolidated and interconnected by kindred links only through eliminating vital shortcomings. We need to think of practical things, he said. “I have worked at the Ministry of Education so I know that this is a very delicate question. For instance, the first grade consists of sixty children, including twenty Russians and forty Armenians and Azerbaijanis; however, some of the Armenian and Azerbaijani children are fluent in Russian because they had attended a kindergarten in Russia, had spoken Russian in their families; and some other children are not proficient in Russian. So each of these children requires an individual approach.” At this moment, Rahimov interjected: “If you want to preserve the language, let the children attend kindergarten in Azeri.” Ibrahimov replied that “on such issues it is extremely difficult to give an immediate recommendation; as I found out, the majority of infringers of discipline in Russian schools are boys who learn poorly. They started attending school without knowledge of the Russian language. A nearby child understands everything well, but he does not. It must be explained to such parents that their child cannot speak even a couple of words in Russian. So it would be better for him to study in a school in the national language. But it’d be wrong to deny everyone’s access to a school in Russian. It seems to me that we will have to think through these issues thoroughly.”39 Ibrahimov was followed by Yakovlev once again:

“Comrade Ibrahimov regards discussion of this issue as if an attack is set against him and that he is the only culprit here. It seems to me that we all are guilty in that hurriedness or thoughtlessness that was committed. But what I disagree with Comrade Ibrahimov and what I will argue till the end is his theoretical substantiation that adoption of the law on the national language proceeds from Lenin’s phrases or the Lenin national policy. I categorically disagree with this.”40 He was followed by Bayramov again. Taking advantage of the presence of CC CPSU employees, he claimed that the Party’s central apparatus disrespected the needs and the opinion of the Republic’s leadership: “I’d like to raise one question in the form of a request to the CC CPSU. I connect this with the practical implementation of those measures we intend to think of and outline. Practical implementation of this and some other similar matters requires a specific approach, taking into account the specific conditions of the Republic, which, regrettably, are not always clear to comrades who work together with us and help us in many cases, not because they don’t want to assist us but because of their incomplete coverage of the republic’s specificity as they think the questions we raise are abundant. Suppose we say that we should write here in Azeri but to Moscow in Russian. Or that we have to speak Russian in one place and speak Azeri in another. In connection to this, Comrade Mustafayev, while in Moscow, suggested increasing the staff by four units, two translators and two typists, but we were denied the request.” Mustafayev specified: “They told us: make a proposal at the price of dismissing others.” Bayramov continued his speech: “I could have cited lots of other examples, but I will only tell you how they in the CC regarded our proposal pertaining to the magazine Azerbaijan Gadyny [Azerbaijani Woman]. I told the head of the sector of CC propaganda Comrade Bogolyubov: “Don’t you think you are more competent in settling the matter on the magazine “Azerbaijan Gadyny” than the CC CPA Bureau?” Comrade Ignatov! I ask you and your department and other departments, if possible, to sensibly treat proposals from CC Bureaus of not only Azerbaijan but also other Republics. Over the past years the Party has taken a series of measures to expand the rights of Union Republics. These are excellent undertakings, but we should enjoy expansion of these rights in practice. Sometimes we face questions whose solutions need to be agreed with Moscow, so we discuss them and come to a certain opinion, but a comrade who has never studied these questions before tell us that “we consider your decision inexpedient.” Ignatov tried to reply jokingly that the world was large enough for Bogolyubov. There are heads of departments and CC Secretaries, he said. Bayramov replied: “I do not know who Comrade Mustafayev spoke with, but if a CC Secretary asked for two typists I would not have objected. For some reason, they think that it is possible to authorize us to create or liquidate districts and regions, but when the question is about two typists, they tell us: discuss the matter with Comrade Krupin. . . . Anyway, the opinion of the CC Bureau or, as you called it, the political leader of the Republic, must be taken into consideration.” At the end of his speech, Bayramov urged Moscow to have a more sensible attitude to the decisions of the CC CPA Bureau because these decisions are based upon the full consideration of the republic’s specific conditions.41 That’s how the March 16, 1957 meeting of the CC CPA Bureau ended. No decision was

made. The historical decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on recognition of the Azerbaijani language as the state one was strongly criticized; however, this law had already carried out its key mission: the national idea became the main vector of the development of society. The CC CPSU officials, who continued to stay in Azerbaijan to identify what the real situation was, were also convinced of this. They were seeking ways out of the situation. Khrushchev’s liberal reforms, especially the issue of passports to rural residents since 1955, together with the adoption of the law on the state language and methods of its application in Azerbaijan in the mid-1950s, initiated the process of return to Central Russia of Russians and sectarian Christians who had been resettled to Azerbaijan at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the twentieth century in line with the Tzarist colonial policy. The culmination of the process was that the deserted villages in Mugan, in regions bordering Iran, started to be resettled by those whose ancestors had been the owners of this land since time immemorial. Some of the returning Russians settled in Baku, but the majority of them preferred to move toward central Russia. Beyond any doubt, such a situation was not beyond the perspective of Soviet leadership and security bodies. Sending two CC CPSU officials on a mission to Azerbaijan and a broad discussion of the law on the state language were constituent parts of the plan of prevention of an undesirable settlement process. However, that yielded a contrary result: as the Soviet society started liberalizing and passports started being issued, manifestations of nationalism strengthened in Azerbaijan; Azerbaijani peasants began resettling to Baku and other industrial towns. As the process intensified, Baku no longer remained an exemplary international city of the USSR and became the capital of a national Republic. Starting from the mid-1950s, the main population of the republic became the determinative factor and key strength in Baku’s political, economic, cultural, scientific, and spiritual life. That was a historic event of exceptional significance in the life of the republic and in the fate of Azerbaijanis. Hot debates at the CC Bureau on March 16, as well as the selection of Ibrahimov as a target to be criticized, were caused by the fact that the law that had given an impetus to the development of nationalism in Azerbaijan was defended on a high official level. In reality, Yakovlev’s words “Comrade Ibrahimov regards the discussion of this question as if an attack is set against him” represented the start-up of Moscow’s operation to extinguish the fire of nationalism, which was covering all of Azerbaijan. The discussions demonstrated that Ibrahimov was only the first target. Upon their return to Moscow from a long trip to Azerbaijan, Ignatov and Lebedev would provide all the necessary information to the leadership. Anxiety expressed on March 16, 1957 by Bureau members over an article “The Azerbaijani Language in State Institutions” published by the Communist newspaper; attempts to link the growth of nationalistic sentiments exactly to this article; and, at last, the attention Ignatov paid to Ibrahimov’s article at the Bureau meeting were illustrative of the opinion Moscow was forming on Ibrahimov. The publication of Ibrahimov’s article caused the obvious alarm of members of the CC CPA Bureau. Nevertheless, the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan in 1957 included the

“dangerous” article in an almanac of Ibrahimov’s articles titled The Azerbaijani Language. The book started with an article “On Means of Development of Our Language” written in 1943. The almanac also included articles Ibrahimov had written when he worked in Southern Azerbaijan in 1944-1946. The almanac The Azerbaijani Language prepared for publication by the Nizami Institute of Literature and Language of the Republic’s Academy of Sciences made Ibrahimov famous. The book was distributed immediately and enjoyed particular success among intellectuals and students. The Institute’s director M. Guluzadeh, the anonymous author of the book’s foreword, was also blasted with criticism and dismissed. Discussions at the CC Bureau showed that relations among persons in the political leadership of Azerbaijan were far from ideal. It was evident that some of them, in attacking Ibrahimov, only served Moscow’s emissaries and extremely feared getting involved in nationalism, which was so carefully monitored by the Moscow leadership. Even after a meeting in Mustafayev’s study, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Rahimov, in the presence of Efendiyev and Jafarly, stated: “I should have pulled Ibrahimov’s trousers off, but I did not want that, so I let Ibrahimov understand this.”42 Ten days after such a heavy discussion at the CC CPA Bureau and accusations of the republic’s leadership of nationalism, the CC Bureau approved a telling appointment: First Secretary of the Voroshilov Party committee Shihali Kurbanov was appointed as head of propaganda department of the CC CPA on March 26, 1957; this appointment would have played an important role in further development of the national idea in Azerbaijan.43 Kurbanov was born in 1925. He attended secondary schools 9 and 150. Upon graduation from the nineth grade, he entered the Akhundov two-year pedagogical college. In 1942 he went to a front line as a volunteer and participated in the Great Patriotic War. In 1946 he was demobilized from the Army and further worked at various posts. In 1947 he entered the philological faculty of the V. I. Lenin Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute. As a Party member since 1946, while he was still a student, Kurbanov was the secretary of a faculty’s Party organization. Upon graduation from the institute, for a short time he headed a department of the magazine Azerbaijan mektebi (Azerbaijani School). In 1952 Kurbanov became a candidate for the Azerbaijani literature chair of the V. I. Lenin Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute. Yet as a candidate, he was elected a member of the Party regional committee plenum and then a Second Secretary of the Party regional committee.44 In September 1954 Kurbanov was approved as head of the propaganda department of the Baku City Party Committee, but did not work there long. In January 1956 Kurbanov was appointed as First Secretary of the Voroshilov regional Party committee.45 He worked in this capacity until he was appointed as head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA. Almost immediately after Kurbanov was appointed to this post, Ruhulla Orujev, who already had experience working in the CC apparatus, became his deputy in the propaganda department. The strengthening of this department in the Party central apparatus made an essential contribution to further development of the national idea and the feeling of national self-conscience. Upon completion of the session of the Supreme Soviet and discussions at the CC Bureau on March 15–16, Mustafayev returned to Allahverdiyev’s statement about the actions of Rahimov

and Iskenderov. He decided to discuss this in the presence of Ignatov and Lebedev, who insisted the incident had to be reported to the CC CPSU. Following their advice, Mustafayev phoned I. Shikin, first deputy head of CC CPSU department for work with Party organs of Union Republics. Shikin advised to him first to talk with Iskenderov, then with Rahimov, and finally arrange a discussion at the CC Secretariat with Secretaries in attendance. In the presence of the Moscow guests, Mustafayev talked first with Iskenderov, then with Rahimov. On March 18 the question was raised to the CC Secretariat with the attendance of Mustafayev, Rahimov, Iskenderov, Yakovlev, Bayramov, Efendiyev, Ignatov, and Lebedev. The Secretariat decided to submit the question for consideration to the CC CPA Bureau. After the Secretariat meeting, Mustafayev phoned Shikin again. But Shikin advised to him not to hurry but to start discussing the question when possible. Mustafayev objected, saying that the Secretariat had decided to discuss the question at the CC Bureau.46 Thus, on April 5, 1957, with the participation of Ignatov and Lebedev, the second strained meeting of the past twenty days of the CC Bureau was held, and was attended by I. K. Abdullayev, T. A. Allahverdiyev, P. A. Arushanov, A. S. Bayramov, G. M. Jafarly, M. A. Ibrahimov, M. A. Iskenderov, I. D. Mustafayev, S. G. Rahimov, H. Efendiyev, and D. M. Yakovlev. The meeting started with Allahverdiyev reading his March 19 statement addressing Mustafayev. In the statement he described in detail the conversation held in Rahimov’s study on March 10. At the end of his statement, Allahverdiyev asked to inform all Bureau members of what had happened, believing that Rahimov’s sayings could lead to grave consequences, affecting the practical work of the Party organization.47 Apart from Allahverdiyev’s statement, there was also a statement by Mustafayev about the March 13 conversation. This second document reflected aspects not covered by Allahverdiyev’s statement. Mustafayev had been doing his best to get a broad discussion at the CC Bureau, and he got it. At the April 5 meeting, Rahimov gave a broad explanation that on March 10 he had talked with many senior executives, including Allahverdiyev, whom he called to discuss the course of elections to the local Soviets. Upon the completion of all the discussions, Rahimov hinted to Allahverdiyev that there were rumors about the latter’s suspicious connections. Declining to name names, Rahimov said that Mustafayev, Yakovlev, and Jafarly were aware of that, so he ought to be cautious. Rahimov went on saying, “Let’s talk about the second question. As I’ve said, the satirical article about the issue of my dwelling was discussed several times. They at the Bureau stated one thing, but the draft decision contained another thing: no one senior official should have his living standards improved. I told them that it was their mistake to write such a point; in the satirical article I was made a subject of discussion, my question was discussed several times, and now they have written such a point, but why? Such a discussion really took place.” As for chief of the Department of Correctional Colonies A. Mamedov, he himself told Rahimov that Allahverdiyev knew him very well and would back him at the Bureau as one of the most valuable officials. “I also considered Mamedov a good employee and thus I asked the Bureau not to dismiss but free him to allow him to work as a lower-rank official for the Internal Ministry. And as for that the Bureau meeting was held like a funeral ceremony; the following

conversation took place: I said that when Mamedov’s question had been under discussion everyone kept silent, including Allahverdiyev. And Allahverdiyev alleges that I told him to keep in contact with Moscow CC CPSU officials; any of us may keep in contact with them. I think that Allahverdiyev does not need my recommendation, as he understands everything pretty well. Comrade Iskenderov went away right after this talk. Then, I, Comrade Allahverdiyev and Comrade Mamedov sat for two more hours discussing the city economy’s issues. I had studied and worked in the komsomol together with Allahverdiyev, so I wanted to warn him as a fellow that he had to remember how severely he had been punished in 1952 when he was downgraded to the head of an enterprise.”48 He was followed by Iskenderov, who noted that on March 9 Yakovlev had phoned him and told him that he had to be on duty at the CC on the day of elections, March 10. “I came here at 7:30 a.m. and I spoke to you, Comrade Mustafayev. You ordered me to phone to Shamkhor several hours later to find out how the elections went. At approximately a quarter to midday, Comrade Rahimov phoned and asked me what was new. I told him. He then said: come see me and tell me again. I went to see him. Though Comrade Allahverdiyev objects, I still opine that I came there after Comrade Allahverdiyev did. I know that I went straight to Comrade Rahimov at a quarter to noon and that he asked me how things went and what the percents were. I talked twice with Comrade Ignatov by telephone; he wondered what was new, how the voting went, what was good and what was bad. I stood up to go away but at this time I saw that Rahimov appealed to Allahverdiyev, saying that the latter behaved badly. Allahverdiyev asked him what the matter was. Then Rahimov told him: well, you continue to behave this way, but remember that you got bogged down in 1952 and may get bogged down again. This talk was held in my presence. When Allahverdiyev asked Rahimov where all this came from, the latter replied that Comrades Mustafayev and Yakovlev knew that question. I remember well that Comrade Mustafayev personally told me that Comrade Babayev’s bad behavior was rumored, but I never heard the same about Allahverdiyev. When I was going to leave, I thought that undue familiarities in a talk with apparatus officials could be misunderstood, so we have to give up such a familiarity. As I said last time and I now tell CC Secretaries, Bureau members, and CC CPSU representatives, then and now I’ve seen nothing suspicious in this question. I supposed that Rahimov was addressing his Comrade with a remark. Was that necessary? I think not he alone, but CC Secretaries also should have done this. Frankly, Rahimov also told that you went down for the same deeds in 1952 and could go down again if there is a Party conference. After the Secretariat meeting, I personally thought very much; I worried a great deal on this occasion. I am a very hot-tempered person (I think this is my main shortcoming) but this is caused by certain reasons, and many know about this. I think I have enough strength of will to overcome these shortcomings, but other comrades should also make conclusions for themselves.”49 To clarify the situation, Abdullayev asked why Rahimov’s words did not coincide with what Allahverdiyev wrote, and what was the truth? Allahverdiyev replied, saying, “First of all, I understand what I said and what I wrote, so I’m fully responsible for this. I understand that Comrade Rahimov is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a member of the CC CPA Bureau and a member of the CC CPSU, so if I found it necessary to report this talk to Comrade

Mustafayev and notify CC Bureau members of it. I pursued the only goal: interrelations among our CC Bureau members should be appropriate.” Ibrahimov specified: “Pure.” Allahverdiyev continued to say, “I’m the secretary of the City Party Committee and whether I should stay at this post or not depends strongly on how the CC Bureau will settle my personal matter. Even if a single member of the Bureau objects by saying that such a person cannot work as the Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, the issue of my career will be settled at once. I perfectly realize this. In notifying the Bureau members of this conversation, I confirm and insist that it had exactly the form as I described in the statement. I mean that we will have to settle a lot of matters; and in the situation when some of us do not trust fully or are not sure that we can speak one to another freely, bad consequences may arise.” Asked by Ignatov whether Iskenderov had taken part in the conversation under discussion, Allahverdiyev confirmed that Iskenderov had participated in this conversation.50 In his speech, Secretary of the CC CPA Bayramov touched upon many problems. He said, “If the conversation was like Allahverdiyev describes it, that was a bad conversation. I would have described it as dissent of our Bureau composition. But if the conversation had the manner Rahimov mentions, it seems that there was no dissent; nevertheless, even the form of the conversation is undesirable, because it does not contribute to consolidation of our Bureau, nor does it create friendly business relations among us. If there were nothing else except for the case informed about by comrades Allahverdiyev and Rahimov, there would have been no grounds to worry or think we will have difficulty in settling complex tasks in such conditions; and there would have been no grounds to believe that there is no mutual respect and trust between some Bureau members. On the contrary, there is the aspiration of some Bureau members to undermine the authority of others. I mean relations between Rahimov and Mustafayev, and I think that the lack of appropriate interrelations between these two first persons may affect the whole work in the Republic. I mean bad relations between Rahimov and Ibrahimov, and between Rahimov and Abdullayev. A question arises: why are the bad interrelations exactly between these comrades, and why has the question of this been raised only now? I talked with Mustafayev on this occasion about two months ago. In informing Mustafayev of my opinion about the existence of bad interrelations among Bureau members, I alleged that this could affect the work. I do not know, in particular, what relations between Rahimov and Ibrahimov were before Sukarno arrived here. The relations are spoiled because of nothing. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic asks the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to provide a car, or more specifically, a car designed for guests. He is told: we can give you a car with our driver only. He replies: I have my own driver. They in the Council of Ministers then reply: no, we will not give you a car. That was how things turned to mutual accusations.” At this moment Bayramov recalled a secret talk in Kirovabad, on the eve of the XXI congress of the CPA, among him, Sultanova, and Jafarly. Ignatov noted that the story with Sultanova was unclear to him. CC CPSU representatives visited Azerbaijan prior to and during the congress. But why didn’t Bayramov inform them? The question was about the First Secretary of the CC. Bayramov replied that he, indeed, had told nothing to Mustafayev but talked separately with Iskenderov and Rahimov. He said,

“Several months later when I visited Rahimov in the evening, we talked about relations between him and Mustafayev, as well as about retorts between Rahimov and Mustafayev at Bureau meetings; I told him that things went so far that he was ascribed to a certain group. Maybe this takes place, maybe not; I don’t know. I said that only with the aim to persuade him that this was not good and that any grounds for such talks should be eliminated. At this moment Ignatov interrupted him, asking: “Didn’t you then think it was necessary to share with us about that conversation?” Bayramov definitely replied he had not thought so at the time. He kept his opinion that such intolerable relations among Bureau senior members strongly troubled Bureau members.51 One of those new members was Bayramov himself. He began to work for the Party after he left the Academy of Sciences. He was born in 1912 in the village of Safikurd near Ganja. In 1927, upon graduation from a seven-year school in Ganja, he entered the Baku Pedagogical College; in 1939 he graduated with honors from the geological-prospecting faculty of the AzII. He worked for a short period of time in the system of Narkomat of Internal Affairs and joined the CC apparatus in December 1939. In 1941-1946 Bayramov was a participant of the Great Patriotic War. Having demobilized from the Army, he began his labor activity as a junior research officer of the Institute of Geology of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and continued to study at the postgraduate school he had entered back in 1939. In 1950 Bayramov became a candidate of geological-mineralogy science. On October of that year he was appointed as director of the Institute of Geology. Following the new leadership’s rise to power in the Republic, in March 1954 Bayramov was nominated for the post of head of science and culture department of the CC CPA, and in 1956 became a CC secretary responsible for propaganda issues and at the same time was elected a CC Bureau member.52 When, in his speech above, he applied to the elder generation of CC Bureau members, he meant those elected in 1954, that is, the leadership of the Republic. He was followed by head of the department for work with Party organs, Jafarly, who reported every detail of his Kirovabad conversation with Sultanova, who assured him that Mustafayev would be dismissed and substituted by Rahimov. Jafarly said, “I told Comrade Bayramov as an older fellow: isn’t it possible to stop these gossips and bring them to order, and is it possible for Bureau members to gather together once to put an end to such talks and reservations? True, I had such a talk with Comrade Bayramov in Kirovabad.” Speaking at the Bureau, Ibrahimov clarified the conflict situation: “I must say that abnormalities in our interrelations have become evident, especially in the past year. We should not make a secret of this. These abnormalities make those comrades who work together with us nervous, disturb them from mobilizing attention, thoughts, strength, and ardency toward one and the same direction. In my observations, Comrade Rahimov, I must tell you to your face that in ninetynine cases out of 100 I personally remained convinced that you were not right but wrong. Comrade Rahimov, if you don’t eliminate the shortcomings of your nature you will find it difficult to work at the post you’re keeping. You’re a power-hungry man, Comrade Rahimov, and the power makes you drunk. This is terrible, awful when a person is hungry for power and forgets about his responsibilities and duty before the nation. Huge financial resources go

through you. Comrade Rahimov, you’re like a plate with honey surrounded by flies in summer heat: that is how toadies and lackeys may surround you. There are people who come up to you, smile in your face, tell you sweet words, something like: we would have died if it weren’t for you; it’s so good that God created you. And they get what they want, receive apartments or something else, and then go away. You gave an apartment to a teacher or an actress who had just begun to sing, while an actress with a fifty-year career lives nearby in an apartment looking toward the pavement. Every step is under people’s control, so people talk about these things. Thus, you’d better think of the burden laid on us, the burden and responsibility of leading the republic.” Then Ibrahimov turned to the question raised by Bayramov about a car to meet Sukarno. “I had no abnormal interrelations. I had very serious disputes over separate questions, but I think I was the least guilty of all in these disputes. I never told you about the car. Sukarno arrived here. They from Moscow telephoned and told us to receive him well. I instructed the business manager of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Comrade Kropachev to appeal to the Council of Ministers’ business management department to agree about the car. I consider it beyond my dignity to deal with a car issue or instruct the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to do the same. Kropachev reported to me that he had agreed with the Council of Ministers’ business management department on the car. Anyway, we have either car ZIS or cabriolet ZIS. Before Sukarno arrived, I asked my driver, Comrade Zadorniy: ‘did you receive the car?’ He replied, ‘no.’ He said he had gone to a Council of Ministers’ garage where a certain Novruz told him to go away and that nothing would be given. I wondered how that could happen, given that Kropachev had agreed with the Council of Ministers’ businessmanagement department. I said, ‘well, if they don’t give us a cabriolet, we don’t need anything, and we will drive our own car.’ Comrade Mustafayev phoned me and told me that we had to take a cabriolet. I replied that I’d do it with pleasure but they wouldn’t give us the car. He responded that no matter what they do, let our driver go and get a car there. However, again the car was not given. I did not phone Comrade Rahimov because the denial was motivated by his instruction. I did not phone because I considered it humiliating to speak on this occasion, if the Chairman of the Council of Ministers does not give the Supreme Soviet a car to meet a foreign guest.” Here Ibrahimov turned to the conflict pertaining to the reception of Sukarno. He said the following: “When Sukarno arrived, we met him, brought him to the city, and put him at the Guesthouse. You were also at the Guesthouse. People stood at the reception, and Sukarno was moved upstairs to have a rest there while Comrade Gorkin and the others remained. I think that Comrade Gorkin is an honorable guest (I personally respect him very much), so when I saw him standing there tired, I called Tariverdiyev, a business manager of the Council of Ministers, and instructed him to accommodate Comrade Gorkin. When Tariverdiyev went toward me, Comrade Rahimov told him: ‘come here.’ So Tariverdiyev turned toward him, but I told him again to come to me, but Rahimov called him over. Then I said, ‘Sadykh Hadjiyevich, allow us to work; we’ve been instructed to receive the guest.’ Rahimov answered me (in Azeri): ’You are so arrogant.’ I replied: ’You’re arrogant yourself.’ I’m a man of another nature; I dislike putting myself above others, I like to respect people and have a friendly attitude toward them. But if I feel that you insult me I will not make a bow to you. Respect should be mutual. People

must respect each other in common human relations. It seems to me that if Sadykh Hadjiyevich eliminates these shortcomings, talks like the one you had with Comrade Allahverdiyev will never take place. This smells fishy; this smells like the creation of clannishness.”53 Yakovlev, who followed him, backed Ibrahimov on many positions. He supported the opinion that serious shortcomings should be reported face-to-face and that Rahimov had serious shortcomings. “Last time we spoke about the line of interrelations of Rahimov-Mustafayev, but today three lines of interrelations have already been mentioned: Rahimov-Mustafayev, Rahimov-Ibrahimov, and Rahimov-Abdullayev. As I suppose if I have bad, non Party-style relations with Jafarly, Bayramov, or Mustafayev, of course, one would have guessed that Yakovlev is wrong, or he has crossed over the boundaries of appropriate behavior.” He again reproached Rahimov of an extreme suspicion and mistrust: “All this negatively affects his interrelations with the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the CC, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It appears that this suspicion and mistrust leads him away from the correct solution of the matter, from establishing the correct business interrelations. Last time Comrade Mustafayev said that Comrade Rahimov apparently sometimes thinks that if there is no call from Mustafayev, this means Mustafayev does not want to work with him, treats him badly, and so forth. Because of Comrade Rahimov’s mistrust, it seems to him that Mustafayev looks at him or tells him something inappropriately. But isn’t it clear that sometimes not only work but also a certain kind of “sore spot” disallows one from having a jolly mood? Such mistrust can bring nothing but harm, and I think that Rahimov can overcome it if he understands his responsibility. I believe that today’s discussion will be very useful and help us correct our interrelations, strengthen the necessary trust in each other, and further avoid making mistakes like the one made by Comrade Rahimov in respect to Comrade Mustafayev.54 Further the floor was given to first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Abdullayev. He said, “Of all comrades present here, I encounter Comrade Rahimov most of all, so I’m aware of his nature best of all. Maybe other comrades would think that I, as his first deputy, mean something or have some specific thoughts when I say this. I think Dmitry Nikolayevitch remembers that when I was nominated for the post of first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I asked them not to do this, I told them that I was ill; however, comrades told me that I had to work at this post for the reasons of business. Comrade Ignatov, perhaps, remembers that I, while at a conversation at the CC CPSU, urgently requested to be freed from this work, meaning to create a healthy atmosphere in the Council of Ministers. I had no other aims. I knew that this negatively affected our common work. Why did I come to such a conclusion; why did I raise the question before CC CPSU comrades? Because I got in a position at the Council of Ministers when (I want to report this frankly at the Bureau meeting here) many Ministers fear to have my advice on many issues; they are probably afraid that Rahimov will dislike this, and all this creates a bad atmosphere in the work of Ministers and the Council of Ministers’ apparatus. Though the situation became a bit better after the conversation with the CC CPSU comrades, I think it currently negatively affects the work of the Council of Ministers.” Strongly denying rumors that Mustafayev controls the work of the Council of Ministers through

Abdullayev and that, when Rahimov is absent on a trip, Abdullayev settles matters inappropriately or misses the questions Rahimov rejects, Abdullayev replied, “When I substitute Comrade Rahimov, I settle matters from a state, Party point of view. I’m responsible for these documents. But I’m not a person to let you make me a pawn, that is, decide nothing when Comrade Rahimov is absent. In my view, in discussing this question at the Bureau today, we must put an end to such a situation and take measures to avoid its reappearance.”55 Joining the discussion, CC Secretary Efendiyev noted that this composition of the Bureau had worked in a more or less friendly way only in 1954 and that morbid interrelations had become particularly evident over the past year. “I claim with all responsibility that Party, Soviet, and lower-rank activists are well aware of unhealthy interrelations between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Rahimov and Secretary of the CC Mustafayev, and have a very bad attitude toward this. Each Minister or Secretary of Party regional committee or Chairman of regional executive committee, when he needs to appeal on a certain issue to the CC or the Council of Ministers, thinks very hard about which of the two instances to choose, proceeding from how his appeal to the CC CP of Azerbaijan will further be regarded by Rahimov. From Rahimov’s side, this affects every step, so we should not turn a blind eye to a serious shortcoming in our work, to Rahimov’s behavior.” Further, Efendiyev analyzed the unsubstantiated stubbornness of Rahimov in protecting unworthy persons, for instance, chief of the Department of correctional colonies A. Mamedov. “I shared my thoughts on Mamedov with Yakovlev. Not I alone but also deputy head of the department Mamedov and Minister Kerimov had great difficulty in preparing the case of Mamedov, as they saw, we faced a lot of barriers and hardships. But why should this Mamedov have become such a problem when his inward nature and his activity is wholly clear to everyone present here? He deserved absolutely no trust; he should have been dismissed long ago, beyond any doubt. There were great hardships during that check-up. Rahimov often asked me, deputy head of the CC administrative department Mamedov, and Internal Minister Kerimov: ‘What do you want from Mamedov? Do you want to dismiss Mamedov?’ I told Comrade Rahimov that it was needless to raise this question. Let the comrades check him, and we will further report this to the CC Bureau. If necessary, we will dismiss him or leave him. None of us is personally against Mamedov. Why does Comrade Rahimov want to protect this Mamedov? Even now I disagree that during the Bureau meeting Rahimov corrected the CC Bureau’s resolution’s draft through writing, ‘instead of dismiss Mamedov, free Mamedov’; he ought to be not freed but dismissed. As viewed by Rahimov, with such a formulation Mamedov could continue to perform a lower-rank work. However, Mamedov came to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers with a complaint that he was a colonel and that Rahimov had thus humiliated him with such a formulation. Why should Mamedov have such access to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to come up to him and ask him: ‘why did you say that?’ Rahimov permanently put Council of Ministers’ departments in opposition to CC departments. Rahimov thought that the two sides should enjoy equal rights. Council of Ministers’ incentives initially did not go to the CC Bureau but passed expertise at an appropriate department of the CC. The department, having studied the matter, submitted its conclusion to the Bureau no matter whose resolution or signature was on the document.

Rahimov supposed that a CC department should never object a Council of Ministers’ proposal. Efendiyev said that such statement of the question is quite incorrect. A department has the right to express its own opinion. In addition, Efendiyev reported Rahimov’s uncomplimentary expressions of March 16 addressing Ibrahimov.56 Efendiyev was followed by Bureau member Arushanov. He assured everyone that he trusted Allahverdiyev’s words but began his speech in a roundabout way: “It’s a pity that I did not attend the Bureau in summer 1955 when the question of CC Bureau work was discussed. It seems to me that this meeting of the CC Bureau focused its criticism on CC First Secretary Mustafayev. Upon my return from holiday, I was acquainted with the CC Bureau decision. I agreed with remarks criticizing the work of the Bureau and Comrade Mustafayev, and I thought that the decision was right, especially because Comrade Mustafayev had been CC First Secretary for a short period of time and because anti-Party methods of leadership had been planted in the CC CPA for long years. However, it should be considered a shortcoming of the discussion at the Bureau that there were no critical remarks addressing other members of the Bureau. In addition, this was not indicated in the Bureau’s resolution. I think shortcomings of other members of the Bureau, especially the shortcomings of Comrade Rahimov we were aware of then, should have been pointed out at the time. If shortcomings of other comrades were pointed out at that Bureau, Comrade Rahimov and other members of the Bureau would have made appropriate conclusions, so we would not have to discuss this matter today. As a result of this, Comrade Rahimov apparently opines that he is impeccable and has no shortcomings. Also, Comrade Rahimov probably thought that Comrade Mustafayev would avenge upon him as a response for the criticism at the Bureau. Once, when we discussed who of the Ministers should be nominated as delegates to the XX Congress, Comrade Rahimov told Comrade Mustafayev: ‘You don’t want Comrade Seyidmamedova and some other Ministers to be nominated delegates of the Congress because you fear that they will criticize you.’ At the time I had an impression that Rahimov feared that the majority of the congress participants would be supporters of Comrade Mustafayev and that the latter would try to do something against him. Comrade Rahimov very painfully and suspiciously reacts to the actions of Comrade Mustafayev. I remember that Mustafayev and Rahimov worked as friends in Kirovabad. I do not remember any reproaches, unneeded disputes, or mutual insults between them at the time. I remember that Comrade Shikin, before the CC Plenum, after the XX Congress, sought advice from some members of the Congress Presidium on who could be recommended for the post of CC First Secretary. Many of the voters then voted against Comrade Mustafayev. We told Comrade Shikin that this campaign was organized by Yakubov, that at the congress there were lots of the latter’s supporters who know that one of the active unmaskers of Yakubov was Comrade Mustafayev, so they canceled Comrade Mustafayev, feeling that he was the most probable candidature for the post of First Secretary of the CC. And we told Comrade Shikin that the most appropriate candidature for the post of First Secretary of the CC was Comrade Mustafayev. We also talked about who could be appointed as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. I, for instance, stated at once that Comrade Rahimov should be nominated for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and stressed that Rahimov and

Mustafayev had worked together in the Ganja region and complemented each other well. Comrade Mustafayev has a good knowledge of agriculture while Rahimov has worked in industry for long years, so this would be an excellent combination. To be frank, we were aware of some of Rahimov’s shortcomings: Comrade Magomayev and others told the CC Plenum that he had elements of roughness. Comrades well remember the case when Comrade Rahimov tactlessly told me: ‘why do you come out with remarks at the Bureau every time?’ and was extremely irritated that I had made a proposal differing a bit from his. I was then forced to tell him that ‘I’m equal to you as a member of the Bureau.’ All this very much offended me at the time, but I’m not a rancorous man, so I quickly forgot this.” Further, Arushanov started criticizing Rahimov for holding grudges forever: “In this case, I’d like to tell about your attitude to Comrade Kerimov. Don’t think that I’m telling about this because I have friendly relations with him. No, I treat a comrade well when I know that he is an honest, scrupulous communist, but if I find out that a comrade misbehaves I won’t be his friend. I worked with Comrade Kerimov at the Komsomol CC for five years, and I knew him back when he studied at the institute. In the institute he was a member of the Komsomol committee, a Stalin grant holder, and since then we’ve known him as a capable, promising employee. When there were discussions about appointing him as a CC secretary, Comrade Rahimov categorically objected to the candidature of Kerimov; but I know that Rahimov had not treated Kerimov badly earlier; that he used to have quite a different opinion of him. But something happened, so Comrade Rahimov started hating him. Under discussion of a satirical article in the newspaper Izvestiya, Rahimov directly stated that he disliked Kerimov but nevertheless provided him with an apartment. I cannot understand why Rahimov should dislike Kerimov. If he is a bad employee or misbehaves, then tell this so that we are also aware of this. The man was appointed as the Internal Minister while he had not worked a single day as a law enforcer, but look how he works. Last time, he reported about the work of correctional colonies to the Bureau in such a manner that many asked him when he had time to study this work. But at the same time, Comrade Rahimov treats him badly.” Arushanov then redirected the fire of his criticism toward Mustafayev: “I think that today we should not criticize one comrade only. So I’d like to say some words about Comrade Mustafayev as well. After that CC Bureau meeting he made conclusions for himself and changed considerably, but some elements of persistence, or to be frank, stubbornness of Comrade Mustafayev still remain. That was particularly displayed in the issue of whether Comrade Guskov should be nominated a CC Bureau member or not. Knowing that all the members of the CC Bureau backed his nomination, he stubbornly insisted that he was not to be elected and even wanted to submit the dispute to the CC Plenum.” Arushanov also criticized Iskenderov: “I respect Comrade Iskenderov; he is a very energetic, business-like comrade, full of desire to work, but has shortcomings, particularly a lack of self-control. When discussing the issue of establishment of the Oilfield Institute, you stood up and told Comrade Mustafayev, ‘You know agriculture, and I know oil.’ It appeared that only Comrade Mustafayev was authorized in the sphere of agriculture and only you were authorized in the sphere of oil. That did not sound modest, so you displayed a lack of self-control.” At the end of his speech, Arushanov stressed that they also had many positive

qualities and that “if they give up negative features of their nature—this especially concerns Rahimov—they will work well, in a friendly way.”57 Jafarly took the floor again to confirm Efendiyev’s words that even lower-rank Party and Soviet organs were aware of the mutual hostility of the Republic’s leaders. He said, “I was in a hospital when Comrade Jafarov, the Secretary of the Udjar Party committee, was brought there. I did not ask him about anything, but he entered my ward and told me, apart from other things, ‘Do you think we don’t understand what the interrelations among our leaders are like? We all left this Bureau (where the question of violation of gradations of raw cotton while delivered to stores was under discussion—J. H.) in a bad mood.’” Jafarly added that he felt offended for the Republic. He was also offended that unpleasant talks about the work of the CC Bureau or Bureau members recurred from year to year. “Last year they spoke about Mustafayev, this year about Rahimov. It seems to me that only because we neglect our talks and display familiarities when addressing each other, there are appear various unhealthy attitudes that go down to the very regional Party organizations.”58 Rahimov took the floor at the end of the discussion to clarify his attitude to the questions under discussion. In particular, he detailed some nuances of his talk with Allahverdiyev: “As for appealing to Muscovites, the talk was in the presence of Iskenderov; there is nothing bad about it. We all should maintain contact, they should assist us, so I did not pursue any other goal here. And I don’t think that we could have pursued any other goal through being in touch with Lebedev or Ignatov. I understand that I should not have had this conversation with Allahverdiyev. I made a mistake. In the initial period of my work at the Council of Ministers I really was a bit rough. I try to improve this as every day passes and to know my own place.” Rahimov promised to take comrades’ remarks into consideration, but asked them to understand his situation as well. There are constant talks that he’ll be dismissed and that various candidatures are nominated, he said. And this makes his nervous. “The talk between Sultanova and Jafarly is an unhealthy discussion. Comrades Jafarly and Bayramov ought to have raised this question before the congress, call her and ask her what her aim was.” As for his relations with Mustafayev, Rahimov noted, “True, Comrade Mustafayev and I had worked well together in Kirovabad for more than a year, so things were not bad in the first year. Then in summer 1955 at the CC Bureau, in the presence of Comrades Gromov and Yakovlev, there was a discussion about the work of the CPA Bureau and the question of the KGB Chairman, Comrade Guskov, and his departure from here. Relations between me and Comrade Mustafayev started gradually worsening, especially after the Bureau. I visited Comrade Mustafayev several times, asking him to tell what he was displeased with; I even appealed to him in Moscow where I asked him to talk about my shortcomings. At the last Bureau, Mustafayev forwarded too many accusations against me; today comrades also talk about this. We have very many shortcomings. I discussed my shortcomings with my deputies in the Council of Ministers and told about them to Comrade Mustafayev in separate cases.” Rahimov had four deputies who had profile Ministers under subordination. However, Rahimov refused to contact the Ministers, instructing them through his deputies only. “If you find it necessary to establish such an order, I will do this, but if, for instance, the Agriculture Minister will phone me and I will tell him: go to the

deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers as I’m not responsible for your issues, or come to me together with the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I’d think this is wrong and that it is inadmissible to isolate me from the Ministers. Otherwise, I will have only the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance under subordination.” As for his relations with Abdullayev, Rahimov admitted that Abdullayev was even eager to be dismissed from work several years ago: “Comrade Gromov called us. Abdullayev raised the question that he would leave for the Academy. I told Abdullayev to stop this talk; that we must work.” Finally, Rahimov promised, “Whether I will stay at this work or not, I will try to improve relations with Comrade Mustafayev and to be friendly. I will work and try to make the Republic develop successfully.”59 First Secretary of the CC CPA, Mustafayev, summed up the results of the discussion. In his speech, he clarified some aspects in connection with Allahverdiyev’s oral and written statements. He notified Bureau members of the essence of his telephone conversations with CC CPSU officials sent on a mission to Azerbaijan, particularly with Shikin, first deputy head of CC CPSU department on work with Party organs of Union Republics. Since Guskov’s name had been mentioned several times in the speeches of previous speakers, Mustafayev considered it necessary to return to this question: “When we discussed the question of Comrade Guskov with Comrade Shubin, the latter noted that Guskov had told him that Rahimov had once asked him: ‘what does Mustafayev want from you, and why doesn’t he leave you alone?’ When I reminded Rahimov about that, he said that Shubin was a provocateur and declined to give a direct answer. I don’t want to repeat now what happened to Guskov, but he behaved in a manner unsuitable to the Party. I reported this to Comrade Khrushchev in Rahimov’s presence; he wanted to raise the whole KGB apparatus against the CC CPA, and now he is considered a hero because he struggled with the First Secretary of the CC CPA and was immediately assigned the rank of general. If this case were treated in a Party manner there would have been no such heroes. But there’s no point in returning to this now. Guskov lost a top-secret document; this matter was hidden from us and no appropriate measures have so far been taken, but I don’t know why you wanted to use Guskov. Once in your speech at the Bureau where many people were present, you made a very heavy impression. When we were leaving, I said, ‘Comrade Rahimov, you cannot act this way.’ You replied, ‘What do you want from me? If you dislike this, then write an appeal to dismiss me.’ You sometimes behave as if I am your subordinate, should act as you dictate all the time and should agree with whatever you say. But that’s not possible. If this work is entrusted to me, you should take this into account. You can’t pretend that you’re the only one and that no one else matters. Such careerism spoils interrelations between us. You must understand, Comrade Rahimov, that many Ministers and comrades are right in saying that they fear going to the CC because tomorrow you’ll be reproaching them: why did you go to the CC? You cannot behave like this or raise the question this way. The CC is an organ leading the Republic, and the Council of Ministers is also a leading organ, but you can’t prevent a Minister from going to the CC. You’ve never heard and will never hear that Mustafayev tells anyone: why did you go to the Council of Ministers? I told Gromov that it is not possible to make the CC a needless organ, and that I will not let

anyone do this, and neither will our Party organization. Matters should be settled collectively; decisions of the Party and Government should be implemented together. I think that each of us should make a conclusion on these questions. We should not forget about one peculiarity: as a result of very many complex events that happened in our Republic, there are still a lot of unsettled matters causing different opinions of people. We cannot yield to these opinions. If we work like we do now, we will achieve nothing.”60 The discussions were stormy, but finally, Mustafayev disallowed severely punishing Rahimov and Iskenderov. He noted that if there were no objections it would be sufficient to discuss this question at the CC Bureau. In its April 5, 1957 decision the Bureau said, “Given that comrades Rahimov S. and Iskenderov M., at a meeting of the CC Bureau, admitted their mistakes and condemned their wrong actions, it’d be appropriate to discuss this question at a meeting of the CC CPA Bureau.”61 That’s how the leadership of Azerbaijan temporarily managed to escape the crisis situation established in March–April 1957. Their further road was studded with thorns and hardships. NOTES 1. For more detail on the relationship of the Soviet leadership to Hungarian events, see: William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, pp. 318–332. 2. To First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPA, Comr. I.D. Mustafaev from G. Zhukov. 03.01.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.40, pp. 97–98. 3. List of lost Soviet servicemen whose families reside in the Azerbaijan SSR. November 1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.40, p. 99. 4. Ibid. 5. Letter of the Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov dated January 3, 1957. 05.02.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.40, p. 86. 6. Excerpt from the minutes N 74 of the CC CPA Bureau meeting. 05.02.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.42, p. 239. 7. Ibid. 8. Minutes N11 of the meeting of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan. 21–22.09.1957. // SALAAR , f.340, r.1, v.528, pp. 86– 96. 9. From Guskov to Bureau of the CC CPA.16.06.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, d. 37, pp. 129–130. 10. From Efendiyev to Mustafayev “On the work of Comrade Alizadeh.” 09.07.1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, d. 37, p. 128. 11. Reference of Comrade Mamedov “On the work of Comrade Alizadeh.” 15.01. 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.37, p. 121. 12. A meeting of the CC CPA Bureau. 05.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, pp. 342–343. 13. A meeting of the CC CPA Bureau. 0 5.04. 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, p. 34. 14. APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.87, p. 64. 15. Autobiography and reference of Comrade Allahverdiyev. April 1955. // APDPARA, f.1, r.80, v.128, pp. 7–16. 16. From Allahverdiyev to Mustafayev. 19.03.1957. // APDPARA, f. 1, r.44, v.58, pp. 424–428. 17. From Mustafayev to the Bureau CC CPA. March 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, pp. 428–429. 18. Stenographic report from the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. 15–16.03.1957. // SA AR, f.2941, r.9, v.65, pp. 1–319. 19. Stenographic report from the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. 15–16.03.1957. // SA AR, f.2941, r.9, v.65, pp. 1–235. 20. From Ibrahimov to CC CPA. 09.04. 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, p. 192. 21. On Measures to Regulate Codes and Laws of Azerbaijan SSR. 23.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 193–194. 22. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated March 16, 1957 // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, pp. 1–2. 23. Letter N1 to Bagirov from Zabrat Balakhany. 1934. APDPARA, f.1, r.88, v.81, pp. 115–116. 24. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated March 16, 1957 // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, pp. 3–7. 25. Ibid., pp. 8–17. 26. Ibid., pp. 18–31. 27. Ibid., pp. 31–36.

28. Ibid., pp. 37–44. 29. Autobiography of Dmitriy Yakovlev. 31.03.1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3142, pp. 4–5. 30. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated March 16, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, pp. 45–51. 31. Autobiography of Arushanov Pasha Atsaturovich. 15.08.1955 // APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.185, p. 5. 32. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated March 16, 1957 // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, pp. 54–61. 33. APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.577, pp. l1–14. 34. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated March 16, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.50, pp. 62–69. 35. Ibid., pp. 70–73. 36. Ibid., pp. 75–76. 37. Ibid., pp. 78–82. 38. Ibid., pp. 83–89. 39. Ibid., pp. 90–94. 40. Ibid., p. 95. 41. Ibid., pp. 98–100. 42. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated April 5, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, p. 370. 43. Decision of the Bureau CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.” 26.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3240, p. 34. 44. The autobiography of Shykhali Kurbanov. 04.10. 1954. // APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3240, pp. 7–8. 45. Decision of the Bureau CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 11.09.1954; Decision of the Bureau Baku City Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 11.09.1956 // APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3240, pp. 29–33. 46. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated April 5, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, p. 401. 47. Ibid., pp. 324–326. 48. Ibid., pp. 331–334. 49. Ibid., pp. 335–336. 50. Ibid., pp. 337–339. 51. Ibid., pp. 340–347. 52. Autobiography of Bayramov. 05.01.1951; Characteristics of the CPSU member, Comrade A. S. Bayramov. 05.11.1965. // APDPARA, f.1, r.77, v.272, pp. 8–14. 53. Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated April 5, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, pp. 349–355. 54. Ibid., pp. 356–361. 55. Ibid., pp. 361–366. 56. Ibid., pp. 366–370. 57. Ibid., pp. 373–381. 58. Ibid., pp. 388–389. 59. Ibid., pp. 391–398. 60. Ibid., pp. 399–408. 61. Protocol # 85 Meeting of the CC CPA Bureau dated April 5, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, pp. 330.

Chapter 5

1957 Growth of Contradictions between Soviet Leaders and Azerbaijan

The events of the fall of 1956 and of the spring of 1957, particularly the 20th Congress of the Party, greatly influenced the situation in the USSR and Socialist countries. Over the short period that followed the Congress, it became clear that the Soviet leadership’s struggle with Stalinism appeared to be a new one only in terms of its content. It was carried out by Stalin-era men, who themselves were not prepared for the radical breakup of the society. The split nature of the 20th Congress’s decisions and even the results of implementation of these split decisions turned to be unexpected for the country’s leadership. They sought answers to post-Stalin reality-related questions in Lenin’s works, but his teaching had apparently become obsolete in the conditions of the renovated country and the world. Contradictions between the Lenin dogma and the real demands of social development explain, to a significant extent, the reasons of nervousness and intolerance displayed in Soviet leaders’ attitudes to the practical results of the 20th Congress’s decisions. Upon the completion of the 20th Congress, particularly at the end of 1956, Soviet state security bodies reported that anti-Sovietism was getting stronger in the Russian Federation’s biggest cities—Moscow and Leningrad—and so was the nationalism in the Union republics. The scale of this phenomenon became so threatening that on November 29, 1956 the Presidium of the CC CPSU created a special commission led by Leonid Brezhnev instructed to prepare a letter to be submitted to all party organizations of the country. The draft letter, titled “On Strengthening of Political Work of Party Organizations in Masses and of Prevention of Onslaughts of Anti-Soviet, Hostile Elements” was discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on December 6. During discussions, Malenkov linked the established situation to the weakening of the party discipline, and Molotov—to the weakening of the propagandistic work; meanwhile Khrushchev thought the root of all evil was that unworthy persons had been released from prisons and camps. Here, they also examined the matter of strengthening of discipline and potentials of the Interior Ministry and the KGB. They also thought it was essential to include Malenkov and Averkiy Aristov in the commission. At a repeated examination of the letter on December 19, the Presidium decided to approve the document and send it to all the Union republics as well as to the Party’s regional committees, city committees, and district committees for discussion by all the primary party organizations.1 The

letter expressed the CC CPSU’s serious concern that the anti-Soviet elements either inside or outside the country, “in connection with a certain deterioration of the international situation, have lately intensified their hostile actions against the Communist Party and the Soviet State.” The letter admitted that the Hungarian events had directly affected the situation in the country and even in the Party: “Influenced by the international reaction, poor remainders of anti-Soviet elements in our country, keeping hostile attitudes to the Socialist system, try to take use of the remaining hardships for their filthy reasons.” As stressed, the activation of the enemy is caused not by its strength in numbers but by connivance of the authorities: “They skillfully use the political carelessness and kindness of some Communists and leaders of Party organizations.” As noted in the letter, the youth, students, and creative and scientific intelligentsia were subject to anti-Soviet ideas most of all. The letter also noted the influence of a new factor: the influence on the public conscience held by the opinion of amnestied and rehabilitated people, among whom there were persons “holding malice against the Soviet power, especially those of the number of former Trotskyists, and rightwing and bourgeois nationalists” speaking against the party’s political line. The letter directly instructed Communists working for state security agencies “to safeguard the interests of our Socialist state, be vigilant to intrigues of hostile elements, and efficiently prevent criminal actions in accordance with the Soviet power laws.” That was the third consecutive closed letter the CC CPSU sent to country’s party organizations that year.2 However, as American historian Professor Taubman correctly noted, this letter itself raised even more noise and disturbance in political circles.3 The Soviet leadership was gravely concerned over the appearance of anti-Soviet organizations and groups in humanitarian colleges of the country’s universities and in scientific institutions considered to be the main ideological pillar of the Party. Historian V. Zubok wrote, “during the fall semester, students at many universities in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere produced posters, bulletins, and journals unauthorized by the authorities. . . . Anti-Stalinist socialist radicalism was centered in Moscow and Leningrad, at universities and in educated circles.”4 In line with the directive of the same letter of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, in summer 1957 the KGB of the USSR disclosed an anti-Soviet group consisting of teachers and students of the M. V. Lomonosov State University of Moscow (SUM) and its former graduates working for various scientific institutions in Moscow.5 The investigation revealed that a group consisting of N. Obushenkov, candidate of history and assistant to the New History Chair of SUM; N. Pokrovsky, candidate of history and assistant to the Source Study Chair of SUM; L. Krasnopevtsev, a postgraduate of SUM and Marxism-Leninism Chair; V. Menshikov, a scientific officer of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences; L. Rendel, history teacher of the All-Union Light Industry Correspondence School; and V. Kozovoy, a fourth-year student of SUM Faculty of History, had initiated their anti-Soviet actions as early as the fall of 1956. The KGB identified that this group, acting in various districts of Moscow in June 1957, had distributed 300 leaflets calling for an overthrow of the existing state system. P. Ivashutin, KGB Deputy Chairman, reported the following to the CC CPSU: “During a search, the following material evidences were found on almost all the detained persons: anti-Soviet leaflets, two copies of an essay titled ‘Key Moments of

Development of the Russian Revolutionary Movement in 1861–1905’ with authorship ascribed to L. Krasnopevtsev, and other anti-Soviet written records, as well as a typewriter and photomaterials used for the typing of leaflets and other documents. For the reasons of intensification of organized anti-Soviet actions, Krasnopevtsev wrote the aforesaid essay in which he grossly distorted the role of the CPSU and Lenin in the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia. After all the above-mentioned persons were acquainted with the essay, they formalized an illegal group at a gathering in Izmaylov Park in May 1957.” In addition, the investigation revealed that the group’s actions had gone beyond the boundaries of the USSR. In April 1957, Krasnopevtsev, who stayed in Poland as a member of a youth delegation, entered into contact with the former editor of the Polish paper Poprostu, MP Lyasota, with whom he agreed to undertake joint actions against the state system of the USSR and the Poland People’s Republic. P. Ivashutin notified the CC CPSU that Krasnopevtsev and Lyasota, having exchanged slanderous information on the internal situation in the USSR and in Poland, agreed to be in further illegal contact through Skalsky, a Pole who studied at SUM. Later on, Krasnopevtsev sent an anti-Soviet essay to Lyasota through Skalsky. During a search of the detained Menshikov, there a letter was found addressing Poland, in which he had asked to send literature and printing type. It appears from the document that the dissidents chose Menshikov, Rendel, and Obushenkov as the leading trio.6 Despite the advance actions of the Soviet leadership, similar anti-Soviet groups in the USSR grew like mushrooms after a rain. In accordance with the CC CPSU’s closed letter, the struggle with anti-Soviet hostile elements was intensified in Azerbaijan as well. Making use of trusted personnel, the leadership of the KGB in the republic’s Council of Ministers and of the Interior Ministry became stronger. The increase of the number of anti-Soviet groups, especially in big cities such as Baku and Kirovabad (Ganja), resulted in the removal of Gen.-Major Andrey Buliga, who had been heading the republic’s Interior Ministry since April 1954, from his post in August 1956 “for health reasons.” After his resignation, the General, who had served for the Soviet Army, frontier troops, and the interior ministry system for thirty-three years, voiced the desire to leave for Kiev for family circumstances. However, the report he had submitted to the USSR Interior Ministry was ignored for a long period of time. In May 1957, Yakovlev, Second Secretary of the CC CPA, even had to appeal to the CC CPSU in connection to this.7 The main reasons for Buliga’s dismissal were the unsatisfactory work of Azerbaijan’s law enforcement agencies, as it was believed in Moscow; the number of infringements of the law; reduction of the level of public security; and the impunity of criminal elements terrorizing the population. T. Bulokhova, an engineer of Giprosovkhozstroy, was killed in Kirovabad in July 1956 after she was sent there on a mission from Moscow. The case received a broad response. As instructed by the Presidium of the CC of CPSU, a group of investigators was sent to Kirovabad consisting of Pankov, Instructor of the Administrative Bodies Department of the CC CPSU; Kamochkin, Deputy Chief of the Investigative Division of the USSR Prosecutor’s Office; Svetozarov, Division’s Prosecutor; and Ovchinnikov, Deputy Head of the Main Division of the USSR Interior Ministry. Apart from being involved in the case of Bulokhova, they made a detailed report to the USSR Interior Ministry and to the CC CPSU Administrative

Bodies Department on the situation with the struggle with criminality in Azerbaijan. Proceeding from these materials and results of their own mission to Azerbaijan, Nikolay Dudorov, Interior Minister, and A. Elichev, Head of Sector of the CC CPSU Administrative Bodies Department, in a detailed report to the Presidium of the CC CPSU on October 1, 1956, stated that “the current situation in Kirovabad does not make us feel the presence of Soviet power in the city. The population lives in fear. The city’s biggest enterprise, a textile factory employing more than 4,000 female workers, mostly Russians, loses about 1,000 female workers annually as a result of the impunity of hooligans and other criminals. They are afraid to leave their homes in the evenings, so they hardly ever go to the cinemas, parks, and other cultural sites of the city; some Russian mothers are forced to walk their daughters to school daily because of their fear of rapists. Officers of the Kirovabad garrison said that military servicemen and their family members seldom walk in the city’s streets at night as a result of the situation in the city. In addition, the CC CPSU was told that Party, Soviet, and law enforcement agencies do not try to restrain criminals and that nationality-related crimes remained, as a rule, undisclosed. For example, the document read that seventeen murder cases, of which six remained undisclosed, had been observed in Kirovabad in 1955 and in the first eight months of 1956. The investigation revealed that criminality was spread widely among the unemployed and the youth. In particular, 70 percent of the persons detained in 1955–1956 were unemployed. As of the end of 1956, more than 900 unemployed persons were registered, these largely consisting of able-bodied youth in the city. As noted in the document, 278 cases of murders were registered in the republic in 1955 and in the first half of 1956. It was also stressed that there was no real public order in the city of Baku. In their report note, Dudorov and Elichev wrote, “The working people of the Armenia and Russian population, in appealing to us with various complaints, pointed out the fact that the attitudes of some local employees toward them were wrong in a number of cases. They said it was impossible to find a job in a city enterprise without paying a bribe. Servicemen in reserve cannot find jobs for a long time. In conversations with us, residents of the Armenian part of the city of Kirovabad told us that the part of the city they inhabited was in worse conditions than the part inhabited by Azerbaijanis. Visiting the Armenian part of the city confirms these statements to a certain extent. Party and Soviet bodies of the city of Kirovabad stand aside the in struggle with criminal offences and other harmful phenomena, neglect the inactivity of militia and prosecutor’s bodies, and do not counteract the criminal practice in their work. Republican organizations also do not undertake appropriate measures to strengthen public order or struggle with criminal offences. The former interior minister Buliga, prosecutor Babayev, and republic’s justice minister Gulmamedov, being aware of tyranny and lawlessness in subordinate bodies in the cities of Kirovabad and Baku and in other regions, displayed incomprehensible indifference and inactivity. The CC of CPA and the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, as it seems to us, should know about the criminal situation in the republic and about the facts of brutal violence against Russian women and women of other nationalities. These facts did not receive the appropriate political assessment in the republic, which did not contribute to the elimination of the nationalism still typical for some Azerbaijanis. For

example, the following fact can be mentioned: the Letters Division of the USSR Council of Ministers prepared a note about the unfavorable situation with murders and other crimes in the Azerbaijan Republic. Comrade N. A. Bulganin sent the note on May 30 to comrades Mustafayev and Rahimov; however, the CC CPA and Council of Ministers have not examined the matter so far.”8 On September 24, with Dudorov and Elichev in attendance, Baku hosted a republican meeting of militia, prosecutor’s office, and court officials with the attendance of Secretaries of the CC CPA, Chairman of the republic’s Council of Ministers, and city’s party and Soviet employees. The participants of the meeting discussed the issue of the state, strengthening of public order, and the struggle with criminal offenses in the republic. Based upon the information provided by Dudorov and Elichev, the Presidium of the CC CPSU adopted a strictly secret resolution on October 4, 1956 on the case of the killing of T. M. Bulokhova. The resolution was prepared and presented by A. I. Mikoyan, M. A. Suslov, L. M. Kaganovitch, V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, M. G. Pervukhin, and N. P. Dudorov. The resolution prescribed “sending Dudorov and Elichev’s note to the CC CPA for examination and adoption of necessary measures.” It “obliged the CC CPA to arrange an open trial over the killers of engineer T. M. Bulokhova to sentence them to severe punishment.” In addition, the resolution obliged “to send CC CPSU member and USSR Interior Minister, comrade Dudorov, together with a group of employees of the Office of the CC CPSU, and USSR Interior Ministry and Prosecutor’s Office, on a mission to Azerbaijan to help the CC CPA establish public order in the republic.”9 Three weeks after the decision, on October 25, the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers decided to undertake measures to eliminate serious shortcomings in the work of the USSR Interior Ministry. The work of the Ministry’s Correctional Colonies Division was criticized most of all. Precisely this decision led to the dismissal of A. Mamedov, Head of the Correctional Colonies Division of the Interior Ministry of Azerbaijan, causing serious collisions within the republic’s leadership. Proceeding from the results of examinations and instructions from above, Ali Kerimov, who had been appointed as the Interior Minister in August 1956, had A. Mamedov dismissed, despite resistance of the Council of Ministers Chairman, S. Rahimov. Kerimov had not spent a single day of his life working in law enforcement. That he was appointed as the Interior Minister in August 1956 was a manifestation of the strengthening of party control over the interior affairs system. Earlier, Kerimov had led the schools division of the CC CPA. The strengthening of the personnel of the Interior Ministry and law enforcement agencies by experienced party apparatus employees was typical not only for Azerbaijan. That was a constituent part of Khrushchev’s policy of strengthening of the party apparatus and the party’s role in governing the country. In appointing his supporters—party apparatus employees —as key officials, he took over the heights of the country’s government. In a struggle for power in the Soviet Union that had started in mid-1957, Khrushchev’s victory over his rivals was ensured by the key factor that the CC apparatus was becoming the determinative political force. Thus, appointing a nonprofessional party member as a key official was a reflection of

countrywide policy. In particular, Nikolai Dudorov, who was appointed as the Interior Minister of the USSR in January 1956, had no experience in law enforcement and had headed the Construction Division of the CC CPSU in 1954–1956.10 At the same time as Kerimov, another high-ranking official of the CC CPA (Chief of Division of the Administrative, Trade and Financial, and Planning Bodies, Khalil Mamedov) was appointed as his deputy responsible for heading the militia. In 1939–1946 Mamedov had served in the Soviet Army, earning the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union, and in 1946– 1957 he kept various leading posts in the CC CPA. Mustafayev was quite satisfied with his personnel, and in letters addressing Minister Dudorov and the Administrative Division of the CC CPSU in July 1957, he even asked that Kerimov be assigned the rank of Major Gen. and that Mamedov be given the rank of third-rank militia commissar. He wrote to Dudorov: “As you know, the CC CPA recently undertook a whole number of measures to improve the work of the Interior Ministry’s bodies. In particular, the CC CPA appointed Comrade Kerimov Ali Habib oglu, who has worked as a Komsomol and party leader for fifteen consecutive years, as the republic’s Interior Minister. Comrade Mamedov Khalil Mamed oglu, who has been head of a department of the CC CPA, was appointed as Comrade Kerimov’s deputy responsible for working with militia. By your order, Comrade Kerimov is assigned the special rank of colonel and Comrade Mamedov with the rank of militia colonel. We believe that both Comrades Kerimov and Mamedov, in terms of either their party position or personal qualities, deserve to be assigned ranks higher than that of colonel, which would considerably increase their authority and the authority bodies they lead. Therefore, we ask you to assign Comrade Kerimov the special rank of Major Gen. and Comrade Mamedov with rank of third-rank militia commissar; furthermore, their predecessors had such ranks.”11 To prevent a growing wave of anti-Sovietism and nationalism in the Soviet society, awareness work was developed among citizens who had returned from abroad to the USSR for permanent residence. On October 26, 1956, the Presidium of the CC CPSU adopted a Resolution “On Measures of Improvement of Work among Soviet Citizens Who Returned from Abroad to USSR for Residence.” Having discussed the resolution on November 23, the CC Bureau of the CPA worked out a plan of measures. Initial examinations revealed that thirty-two repatriate and re-emigrant families totaling sixty-four people lived in Azerbaijan, including twenty-one families in Baku. Mustafayev sent a report on January 7, 1957 on the work among repatriates, including issues of their provision with living areas and jobs, solutions of their life problems, strengthening of political-educational work among them, and so on to the CC CPSU. In addition, Mustafayev reported that thirteen people out of the number of repatriates and reemigrants expressed displeasure with their living standards and thus planned to go back. In accordance with the October 26, 1956 Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, Comrade A. I. Sultanova, Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, comrade Ordukhanov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Nakhchivan ASSR, and chairmen of district, city and regional executive committees of the Council of deputies of working people were made responsible for the timely solution of all issues relating to repatriates. 12

The conditions for the return of citizens to the Soviet Union who had not gone back immediately after the war for various reasons were softened to some extent. Information was spread about some Soviet citizens who had taken an active part in the opposition movement in the territories of European countries. Repatriates were given the opportunity to tell the media about events they had witnessed to thus clarify and unveil unknown pages of World War history. On May 31, 1956, proceeding from memories of former guerilla V. Sokolov, the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda published an article titled “Courage of a Guerilla.” The article was wholly devoted to the heroic deeds of Mehti Huseinzadeh, who under the pseudonym of Mikhailo had displayed heroism in Yugoslavia and Italy. Searches by historians and journalists turned the legends into reality. In October 1956, former guerilla G. A. Zhilyayev wrote the thirty-nine-page “Recollections of Mehti Huseinzadeh (Mikhailo)” and gave them to the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. The materials collected by the Institute also include a photocopy of the list of Soviet guerillas awarded with Yugoslavia’s Bravery Sign Medal, and a report by the Russian Shock Brigade to the Yugoslavian Army’s Ninth Corps Headquarters confirming the feats of Mehti Huseinzadeh. Basing upon a huge number of materials on this hero’s deeds in the years of World War II, Mustafayev addressed the CC CPSU on November 12, 1956 for the first time with a secret letter. In accordance with instructions from the CC CPA, the Committee of State Security under the Council of Ministers carried out a secret investigation that confirmed the heroic deeds of M. Huseinzadeh in the territories of Yugoslavia and Italy against German fascist occupiers. An according nine-page certificate was submitted to Mustafayev. Kopylov wrote to the CC CPA: “The USSR Embassy to Yugoslavia asked Yugoslavian competent bodies to additionally examine and document Huseinzadeh’s activity in the Yugoslavian guerilla movement.”13 The investigation revealed that M. Huseinzadeh, a graduate of the Art School of Azerbaijan who later studied at the Foreign Languages Institute in Leningrad and the Lenin Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute, was called up for the Soviet Army in 1941. In 1942, he graduated from the Tbilisi infantry school and fought in Stalingrad battles later the same year. He was heavily wounded and taken as a prisoner of war in a battle near the town Kalach in August 1942. He also stayed in prisoner of war camps in the Ukraine, Poland, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Having escaped captivity in 1944, Huseinzadeh joined Yugoslavian guerillas and took an active part in war operations in the north of Italy and in Yugoslavia. He led an operation in Italy’s Udinese in the fall of 1944 which led to the release of 700 prisoners of war, including 147 Soviet soldiers and officers. On January 15, 1957, Mustafayev again appealed to the CC CPSU,14 this time citing a KGB reference and new documents. At last, his attempts were successful. After additional documents were delivered from Yugoslavia on April 11, 1957, Huseinzadeh was assigned the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. Republican Komsomol leader Nazim Hadjiyev instructed writers I. Gasymov and H. Seidbayli to write an artistic work devoted to the heroguerilla. Their novel On Distant Shores attained great success among readers and was screened by the film studio Azerbaijanfilm in 1958. The mass demobilization of officers from the Soviet Army in the middle of the 1950s created an urgent need for jobs. In Moscow particularly, the USSR Defense Ministry was displeased

with the sluggishness of the Azerbaijani leadership. In a resolution on September 1, 1955, the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers directly instructed the leaders of Union republics to provide officers, who had been demobilized from the Army and Fleet, with jobs and homes. Defense Minister G. Zhukov, in a letter to Mustafayev, the First Secretary of the CC CPA on December 28, 1956, noted that the majority of officers in Azerbaijan had not been supplied with living areas. As the letter said, there were 260 unemployed officers and 527 homeless officers. Zhukov explained the sad situation by the inappropriate work of city and regional executive committees’ permanent commissions, which did not seek employment opportunities. In addition, in some cases leaders of enterprises and facilities did not undertake measures to employ officers with respect to their experience and training obtained in the Army and Fleet, and instead, offered them the positions of loaders, guards, or stokers, although they could have been used more expediently. In his letter, Zhukov recalled Resolution #2436 of the USSR People’s Commissars Council of September 21, 1945, which read that 10 percent of local Soviets’ housing should be given solely to the demobilized people, families of servicemen, invalids of war, and families of the warriors who had been killed. Zhukov reported, “According to available data, out of 951.3 square meters of living area as 10 percent of the housing stock in July–September this year, 407 square meters, or 42 percent of the total, were provided by the executive committee of the Baku City Council inappropriately.” At the end of the letter, the Minister asked to examine the matter again and undertake measures to fulfill CC CPSU and the USSR Government’s appropriate resolutions.15 On January 15, 1957, the CC CPA Bureau examined the matters raised by Zhukov and made an appropriate decision. The Bureau said, “The Party’s district committees, city committees, and regional committees, the Council of Ministers of the Nakhchivan ASSR, the district executive committee of the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Province, and regional Councils of deputies of working people have recently decreased their work to employ reserve officers while the number of homeless people continuously increases. The number of homeless officers increased from 279 on January 1, 1956 to 598 on January 1, 1957.” As of January 10, 1957, 797 square meters of living area, as 10 percent of the total in Baku, not been given out, the Bureau said. The Baku City Executive Committee, ministries, enterprises and organizations, republic’s military registration and enlistment office, and party bodies were given one month to give retired officers jobs and homes without obstacles or bureaucracy.16 This efficiency demonstrated by the republican leadership and CC CPA Bureau resulted not only from Zhukov’s letter to Mustafayev. The majority of officers transferred to the reserve consisted of Russian officers whose complaints were accepted very sensitively by the Defense Ministry and governmental circles. With these complaints in mind, Moscow accused the Azerbaijani leadership of nationalism. There’s no smoke without fire, so Kopylov, Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, reported in his secret report for 1957 to Chairman of the USSR KGB, Army General I. Serov, that not everything was going well in this area. In the document, it appears that the USSR KGB demanded from the republican security bodies primarily that they combat manifestations of anti-Sovietism and nationalism. For these

reasons, Kopylov reported, particular attention was paid to organizations for intelligence and investigative work, clearing the intelligence network from suspicious persons, and so on. To counteract the spread of anti-Sovietism and nationalism, in 1955 the USSR KGB issued secret instructions that envisioned secret registration of all those released from prisons and exile, along with mechanisms of control over their behavior. Regarding implementation of this instruction, Kopylov wrote to Serov that “examination of more than 200 investigations of cases of persons who returned from prisons and exile and had been convicted for anti-Soviet crimes, as well as intelligence and other sources, specified this contingent-related data more exactly and identified new persons.” According to Kopylov, in 1957 anti-Soviet-nationalistic materials were detected, including 133 anonymous letters: 100 anti-Soviet letters, 32 nationalistic letters, and as a matter of fact, 1 terrorist letter. The search and investigative measures revealed thirty-three authors of anti-Soviet anonymous letters, of which seven persons were arrested and twenty-six were interrogated by intelligence. Also, in the same period the KGB received ninety-four anonymous documents written by eighty-four authors; nine leaflets; and fourteen anti-Soviet proclamations by nine authors. It seems from the report note that on May 15, 1957 the Center made a decision to create a special card file of these types documents and their authors. In connection to this, they collected specimens of handwriting of suspects and specimens of anonymous anti-Soviet letters that had been detected earlier. In June 1957, a republican meeting of officers of provincial security bodies was held to discuss measures to accelerate the process of identification of the authors of anonymous letters in the republic’s territory. Issues of exploration of search methods and graphical expertise bases were examined. Investigators paid attention to the search for the most important documents. In his report note, Kopylov paid much attention to the organization of counterintelligence work in the republic’s industrial enterprises and most important facilities. Attention was also paid to the prevention of penetration of foreign intelligence agents and hostile elements to these facilities, and to the maintenance of state secrets. As reported, the KGB’s 5th division operatively served ninety-seven industrial facilities, including fifty-three in Baku. They were largely oil, chemical, power engineering, machine-building, metallurgic, and ore-mining enterprises controlled by skilled agents. Kopylov writes, “In accordance with Resolution #161 (top secret) of the Union KGB, persons who had been released after they served their sentence for anti-Soviet actions were identified and registered at the facilities where they served and, in addition, a number of intelligence and operative measures were carried out concerning this category of persons.” It seems from Kopylov’s report that the number of KGB agents increased as the anti-Soviet/nationalistic movement in Azerbaijan grew beginning in 1957. As of January 1, 1958, the KGB network encountered 286 agents and twelve residents, up fifty-four agents from 1956. Simultaneously, inappropriate agents were dismissed from the KGB. In 1957, Azerbaijan’s security bodies brought thirty-three actions against thirty-eight persons, including nineteen persons charged with anti-Soviet propaganda, two persons charged with high treason, thirteen persons charged with trespassing of a frontier, and four persons—with the making of anti-Soviet anonymous letters and leaflets.17 For example, on April 26, 1957 in

Kirovabad, near to the bridge across River Ganjachay, unidentified persons tacked anti-Soviet leaflets written in Azeri to the trees. In a report, the 4th Division of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR noted that the author of the leaflet slanders the Soviet reality, expresses dissatisfaction with the existing order, announces a large number of unemployed people, and urges the working people to unite to fight the authorities.18 In the 1957 report, Kopylov expresses his concern over the growth of antiSoviet/nationalistic moods among democrats who resettled from Southern Azerbaijan to Northern Azerbaijan. The former education minister in the national government of Azerbaijan, Mahammad Biriya, who had been arrested repeatedly for anti-Soviet actions, was put on parole in September 1956 but did not stay free for long. After the USSR MGB secretly moved M. Biriya to the USSR, he became a real headache for security agencies. On February 21, 1957, the republic’s prosecutor A. Babayev and KGB Chairman Kopylov sent a joint letter about poet M. Biriya’s career and creative development to the CC CPA. As noted, Biriya entered the party school after he arrived in Baku, but in December 1947 he expressed his desire to return to Iran to be reunited with his family. Despite warnings, on December 27 he came up to the Iranian Consul in Baku and wrote an official letter requesting to be issued an Iranian passport and visa. In connection to this, he was detained by Azerbaijan SSR KGB officers, put under observation, and in August 1948 was arrested on espionage charges. The espionage charge was that in 1942 he informed the Iranian Consul to Baku of the content of the subscription to secret cooperation he had given to the NKVD of the Azerbaijan SSR when he was the Azerbaijani Government’s Education Minister to Iran, that he had two meetings with American Consuls to Iran, and that in 1947 he visited the Iranian Consul in Baku and told him that he wanted to leave for Iran. Babayev and Kopylov admitted, “The investigation revealed no materials confirming Bagirzadeh (Biriya)’s relation to espionage in favor of foreign intelligence. Nevertheless, at its special meeting on November 27, 1948, the USSR MGB sentenced him to ten years in a correctional camp.” When at the Stepnoy camp, Biriya was thrice convicted for anti-Soviet propaganda and hooliganism so he had to serve his sentence till August 1961. But following the protest by the Prosecutor of the Azerbaijan SSR, the espionage case was reviewed by the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR and subsequently dismissed in the absence of a criminal act. On September 14, 1956, Biriya was given parole to leave for the place of residence he had chosen and, as far as he expressed his desire to move to Iran, he stayed at the Potma gathering station where he had to receive permission to go abroad. “Having learnt that Bagirzadeh (Biriya) will be released, the CC ADP asked the CC CPA to undertake measures to prevent Bagirzadeh’s departure for Iran through establishing necessary conditions for his normal life and creative development.” Biriya arrived in Baku on November 1, 1956. The republic’s leading Soviet Party employees held the necessary conversations with him and gave him advice. However, Biriya wanted only to live in Iran and thus rejected all arguments that such a step was undesirable. On November 12, 1956 he willfully left for Moscow in an attempt to visit the Iranian Embassy to receive permission to leave for Iran. As a result of the measures the KGB undertook, his visit to the embassy was prevented and then he, accompanied by a KGB officer, was sent back to Baku where he settled in the apartment

allotted for him. From Baku, he continued to send letters to the Iranian Embassy to Moscow, and on December 6, 1956 he even managed to get through to Ambassador Masud Ansari. Biriya not only declared his wish to leave for Iran but also urged other political emigrants residing in Baku to do the same. In conversations with persons whom he knew, he afforded making anti-Soviet statements and read anti-Soviet/nationalistic verses. Babayev and Kopylov reported, “On January 18, 1957, Bagirzadeh sent a strongly anti-Soviet, nationalistic letter to the CC CPA, Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR. In the letter, Bagirzadeh asks, in particular, to close Marxism-Leninism schools, remove the Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin memorials, oust Armenians from Azerbaijan, open borders, and create all the conditions for the freedom of religion through special newspapers and journals, and so on.” Materials against Bagirzadeh were reported to the CC CPSU Division on links with foreign communist parties led by B. Ponomarev, to the leadership of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, and to the USSR Prosecutor’s Office. On February 8, 1957, the 2nd Main Division of the USSR KGB gave an instruction to document Bagirzadeh’s anti-Soviet statements, find anti-Soviet poems that he possessed, and arrest him. Following the order, security agents detained Biriya in the city as a person having no documents. In the search, they found several anti-Soviet, nationalistic verses on him. In one of the verses, Bagirzadeh expresses his strongly negative attitude toward Marxism-Leninism, Armenians, and Khrushchev. Before he was arrested, Biriya submitted a provision of sixteen points demanding closure of the Marxism-Leninism schools and full freedom of religion, to the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR. Babayev and Kopylov concluded that Biriya’s further freedom was inexpedient.19 This resolution was fully formal because the instruction on Biriya’s arrest had come from the Moscow-based USSR KGB. Biriya was sentenced to seven years in a correctional camp. Another Tabriz native, Abdullah Mizani, told his friends that he was ready to join any force struggling against the Soviet power. Upon an informer’s denunciation, Mizani was arrested in June 1957 and sentenced to 7 years in a correctional camp. The fate of Iranian democrat Fatali Fathi was equally unhappy. Expelled from the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the University of Baku in 1954, Fathi was evicted from the city to a remote area. However, he continued to claim there that the Soviet Azerbaijan was subject to exploitation. In 1957, Fathi was also sentenced to seven years in camps.20 Despite serious measures by party and Soviet institutions and security bodies, disputes and talks over the state language did not stop. Numerous complaints from non-Azerbaijanis were submitted to state security bodies from elsewhere. For example, Captain Avakov, an authorized person of the 1st department of the Baku oil refinery, reported in June 1957 to the KGB Chairman Kopylov: “On June 13, 1957, I was approached by pass bureau employee V. Vinogradova with the following statement: Having come to the pass bureau, Sharifov Kamil Ali oglu, a teacher of the Kirov State University of Azerbaijan and candidate of technical sciences, passed a letter from the university asking the refinery’s director to permit students earning their field experience to enter the refinery. Vinogradova, having detected the absence of the refinery’s director’s resolution on the letter, proposed that Sharifov appeal to the

refinery’s management to receive permission. However, the latter began to argue with her, saying no permission was necessary because everything was written clearly in the letter. Vinogradova said the letter was written in Azeri, which she did not understand, so she needed the refinery director or his deputy’s resolution. However, Sharifov started swearing and using obscene words, and finally said, ‘Scum! If you do not understand Azeri, get out of Azerbaijan; no one asked you to come here. . . .’ The conversation was witnessed by Z. Egorova, a pass bureau employee, and G. Popova, a student of Azerbaijan State University, so a statement was drawn up about Sharifov’s behavior. Vinogradova was asked to write an explanatory note on the fact and submit it, together with the statement, to the KGB of the Azerbaijan SSR.”21 Changes that occurred after the 20th Congress and the strengthening of anti-Soviet feelings reduced interest in the CPSU. This is quite clearly illustrated by the discussion of the issue “Of Composition and Movement of Republic’s Party Organization in 1956” at a meeting of the CC CPA Bureau on April 23, 1957. According to the statistics, the republic’s party organization had encountered, as of January 1, 1957, 125,895 communists, including 118,629 CPSU members and 7,266 CPSU candidates. In the decision, the Bureau noted, “The situation in which the share of workers of key industries in separate regional party organizations has decreased in the reported period cannot be considered normal. Particularly, the number of communist workers at Lenin district’s oilfields decreased by eighty-nine, at Orjonikidze district’s—by forty, and at Stalin district’s—by thirty-four.” The document reads that the work with CPSU candidates is quite neglected. Overdue candidacy length is 100 percent in Zangelan’s regional party organization, 82.8 percent in Astrakhan-Bazar’s, 71.4 percent in Shamkhor’s, 71 percent in Agsu’s, and 57.4 percent in Agdam’s. As of January 1, 1957, there were 2,598 CPSU candidates, or 35.7 percent of the total number of candidates in the republic, with overdue candidacy length. Only 214 of them were permitted by the party committee to prolong their candidacy length and, concerning the others, the party charter was violated. “One of the substantial shortcomings is that some party committees are inattentive to the study of personal qualities of those joining the CPSU; as a consequence, unworthy people penetrate the party.” The Baku City party committee was asked to examine the matter of reasons of decrease of the number of communists working for oil enterprises and undertake steps to improve the process of advanced oil workers’ joining the party.22 Gradual liberalization of the Soviet society after the 20th Congress also reflected on the rehabilitation of books, which had been banned or contained as state secrets. However, further developments illustrated that the Soviet leadership was not prepared for that either. On April 3, 1957, the CC CPSU Secretariat adopted a resolution “On Work of Glavlit” (Glavlit is USSR Council of Ministers’ division responsible for protection of state and military secrets in printed editions—J. H.). Though the decision envisioned replacement of the old list of banned books by a new one, the lists hardly differed one from another. USSR Glavlit was prescribed to define a circle of censor restrictions jointly with concerned ministries at least once a year. In addition, the CC CPSU demanded the creation of such a list of state and military secrets that would not have allowed any variant readings or erroneous comments. To get its demands realized, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the work of republican Glavlit on May 17, 1957 and

decided: “The shortcomings in the work of USSR Council of Ministers’ division responsible for protection of state and military secrets in the press revealed by the CC CPSU Secretariat also take place in the operation of Glavlit of the Azerbaijan SSR. . . . There are censors who treat their duties formally, wrongly present the role and importance of the Soviet censorship in modern conditions, believe that it is currently possible to weaken control of the observation of demands for protection of military and state secrets in the press, and do not undertake measures to prevent mistakes in newspapers, magazines, and books. It is censors’ fault that in early 1957, Socialist Sumgait newspaper publicized data on the production capacities of some enterprises representing state secrets.” The CC Bureau unsatisfactorily assessed the work of republican Glavlit, especially because of insufficient control of scientific and technical literature. As indicated, the reason for these shortcomings was poor discipline among the censor personnel. The decision read, “Glavlit’s primary party organization insufficiently deals with the education of censors and increase of their ideological-political level.” The CC CPA Bureau resolved to consider the CC CPSU Secretariat’s April 3, 1957 Resolution on the work of USSR Glavlit: “To oblige Glavlit of the Azerbaijan SSR to eliminate shortcomings in its work as soon as possible, and increase every censor’s responsibility for the protection of military and state secrets in the press. To organize the work of censors in a way that rules out any possibility of disclosure of information representing military and state secrets”23 was the steadfast guideline. Liberalization of the society on the one hand and the process of rehabilitation of the repressed creative intelligentsia on the other complicated the work of Glavlit in the mid-1950s. For example, A. Musayev, Deputy Head of Glavlit under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, sent a secret letter on April 16, 1957 to S. Kurbanov, Head of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPA, as a consequence of which the CC CPA Bureau on May 14, 1957 lifted a ban on more than 100 books whose authors had been repressed. These books were rehabilitated following their authors. In the list of rehabilitated books, the following works are noteworthy: New Turkic Alphabet, a book by Agazadeh, Akhundzadeh, and Mamedzadeh, issued in Baku in 1924; Genealogy of Sheki Khans and Their Descendants, a book by Haji Sayeed Abdul Hamid, translated by S. Verdikhanov and issued in 1930; and The Azizbeyov Dramatic Theater, a book by J. Jafarov issued in 1951 (as noted, the USSR Glavlit prohibited canceling an identical book issued by publishing house Iskusstvo in 1951). A book titled Mirza Alekber Sabir Tairzadeh. Biography. Literary-Critical Essay (Baku, 1936) was banned because its pages 17–31 contained an article by the repressed S. Shamilov; Reader for Literature for Sixth Form of Secondary Schools by G. Samedzadeh and V. Musazadeh, issued in 1933, was later banned as it contained articles by Nazarli, Kantemir, and Tagi Shahbazi; Almanac by Talybzadeh Abdullah Shaig, issued in 1923, was later banned as it contained articles by M. Quliyev and T. Shahbazi; “For Full Preservation and Raising of Young Cattle,” a brochure by Suleiman Sultanov issued in 1932, as well as his other brochures devoted to cattle-raising, were confiscated as Sultanov was arrested. There were many such books.24 On April 5, 1957, the CC CPA Bureau resolved to lift a ban on the books of authors rehabilitated by court, such as V. Khuluflu, B. Hasanbeyov, J. Ahundzadeh, M. Aghayev, J. Aliyev, B.

Bagirov, M. Huseynov, S. Belenkiy, A. Bukshpan, I. Dubinsky, M. Mamedov, A. Musayev, A. Rayevsky, and Y. Ratgauzer.25 On February 19, on the basis of a letter by A. Huseynov, the Head of Glavlit under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, the works by Seyid Huseyn, Qafur Efendiyev, A. Heydarli, M. Quliyev, Salman Mumtaz, G. Nazarli, Tagi Shahbazi Simurg, A. Mamedov, and so on were rehabilitated.26 Apart from the rise of anti-Sovietism and nationalism after the 20th Congress, the tension of political intrigues within the Soviet leadership peaked in spring and especially summer of 1957. The unity of successors of the Stalin state power did not last long. Discords between Malenkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and CC CPSU First Secretary Khrushchev, who had taken over party management, over important issues of internal and foreign policy had started emerging as early as March 1954. Malenkov announced in March 1954 that he backed the process of lessening of international tension, spoke against cold war policy, and forecasted that wars waged using modern technical means would result in the death of civilization. However, a group of persons in the Soviet leadership did not share his view of a post-nuclear war world. Strongly criticizing him, V. Molotov said, “How can you assert that atomic war will result in the death of civilization? Why should then we build socialism and care about tomorrow? Then we’d better provide ourselves with coffins. Do you see where such theory can lead?” Malenkov was also criticized by Khrushchev who, speaking in budget debates at the USSR Supreme Council on April 20, 1954, said, “If imperialists try to unleash a new war it will inevitably culminate in the collapse of the whole capitalistic system.”27 Such criticism cost Malenkov an expensive price: he lost the right to chair meetings of the CC CPSU Presidium. That was a right he had held since spring 1953. However, that was not the only way his colleagues in the Presidium punished him. After the January 1955 plenum of the CC CPSU, a session of the USSR Supreme Council in February dismissed Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He was replaced by N. Bulganin, who had a reputation among Soviet leaders as an inert, irresolute man.28 Relations among Soviet leaders deteriorated starting from early 1957. The rules of the game, which had been formed in the CC CPSU Presidium and CC Secretariat for long years, were crudely violated by Khrushchev. Thus talks were initiated to find ways to “restrain” him. The Soviet leader’s speech at a meeting of members of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR and famous writers at the CC CPSU on May 13, 1957 frankly reflected the elements of disgust among leaders. In his speech, Khrushchev spoke about changes which had occurred in the country, in the party, and in the international arena since Stalin’s death. Emphasizing the party’s sincerity and fairness in the condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult at the CPSU 20th Congress, Khrushchev said, “But, comrades, either me as a reporter or my friends cried like children when we stood at Stalin’s coffin. Thus, we have to keep this in mind. Were the tears insincere when we cried, when Stalin died, or did we start spitting on Stalin’s dead body when he was taken out and put into the mausoleum? No comrades, we were sincere then, and so we are now.” In assessing the situation after the 20th Congress, Khrushchev reported that enemies through Poland had taken over the text of a report made at a closed meeting of the Congress, and they very much hoped that the CC, having condemned Stalin, had thus condemned the

system and hence, events would now start developing and would be beyond the control of those who wanted to correct the mistakes Stalin had made, and that they would follow their way. Poland is a confirmation to such interpretation of the report and so is Hungary. It may be concluded from bourgeois papers that intelligentsia that has now grown, will not tolerate the party’s control, and will struggle to rid of it. Returning to Malenkov’s old thesis, Khrushchev said, “We have enemies. In one word, they are foreign agents. I want to say we do not have to think everything is over or that we have survived the Stalin epoch or that we have to make, say, razors of weapons. No, enemies do exist, so we must keep weapons ready, keep our powder dry, and first of all, keep our main weapons—ideological weapons—in order.” Later on, Khrushchev touched upon the realization of the slogan “Overtake and Surpass America” in terms of meat, milk, and eggs per capita. He noted that the 20th Congress had tasked to overtake America on the production of foods per capita. “Calculation is underway, and we currently want to settle the following task: to overtake the United States on production of meat, milk and eggs per capita. But the simple task of overtaking is not all. We can overtake them, but I’m afraid I will be dead by that time. Thus, we’ve tasked to overtake America within this five-year plan and, concerning butter, we probably will overtake America next year. In 1913, Russia had 31.1 kilograms of meat per capita, and the United States, 86.4 kilograms.* In 1940, the Soviet Union had 24.5 kilograms, that is, down from 1913. The United States had 85.6 kilograms that year. In 1952, the Soviet Union had 27.5 kilograms, the United States—92.9 kilograms; in 1955—they had 32 kilograms and 99.4 kilograms, respectively, and in 1956—32.3 kilograms and 102.3 kilograms, respectively. This is more than a triple gap. So how can we take on such a commitment? I say we need more than a triple increase, and we will overtake them, maybe one year earlier than we’ve planned.”29 When N. Khrushchev came up with the slogan “Overtake and Surpass America” in 1957, he “genuinely thought the Soviet Union could catch up with and surpass the United States in the fields of science, technology, consumer goods, and overall living standards.”30 The slogan “Overtake and Surpass America” as officially proclaimed by Khrushchev at a meeting of agricultural workers of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’s regions was examined at a May 22, 1957 meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium, recognized to be unreal and thus criticized. On May 19, a week after the aforesaid meeting with writers at the CC CPSU Office, Khrushchev received a large group of writers, artists, sculptors, and composers. In his speech to the creative intelligentsia, he openly stated the existing contradictions in the CC Presidium and personal discords between him and Molotov. On May 20, Kaganovitch, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, and Pervukhin began to discuss how to get rid of Khrushchev. They were later joined by K. Voroshilov. The majority of the Presidium’s members backed cancellation of the post of first secretary of the party. In a conversation with Maksim Saburov, Malenkov fairly stated, “If we don’t remove them now then they will remove us.”31 However, opinions in the CC Presidium over the future form of the country’s government varied. In Malenkov’s opinion, Presidium meetings should be chaired by the head of government because this corresponded, as he thought, to the old party traditions Lenin and Stalin had laid. Saburov and Pervukhin held

more radical views, believing that all Presidium members should chair its meetings in turn. In discussions, they suggested making Khrushchev the minister of agriculture; his ardent supporter Suslov the minister of culture; and substituting USSR KGB Chairman Serov with Bulganin or Patolichev. On this occasion, Molotov consulted with Defense Minister Zhukov, who also suggested abolishing the post of first secretary and replacing it with the post of secretary for general issues. Later that May, Khrushchev gave an interview to the foreign media without preliminary accordance of the text of speech with his colleagues. That was a crude violation of party discipline. On May 28, 1957, CBS aired the interview in the United States of America, causing worldwide mockery of the Soviet leadership. Even American journalists said it was economically unreal for the USSR to overtake the United States in terms of cattle-breeding production per capita. They openly jeered at Khrushchev. For example, a journalist asked him the following question: “I’ve heard that specialists say no one country has yet managed to increase meat production by 3.5 times in four years. But perhaps you, the communists, know how to make a twin of every cow?” Khrushchev replied, “It is possible in nature. It happens in nature that cows give birth to not only twins but also triplets. But naturally, we are not making our calculations on this basis. Our calculation is thus that in our meat economy, we will prioritize pork, because swine rapidly increases its weight and breeds, so we have large opportunities to increase meat production.”32 On the exact date of a planned meeting with Hungarian journalists—June 18—the opposition consisting of party and state leaders demanded a meeting of the CC Presidium. The formal cause was the need of confirmation of the text of a speech for the celebration of Leningrad’s 250th anniversary. Eight members and three candidates to the Presidium gathered at the meeting. Zhukov was late. However, Malenkov had talked to him a day before in order to receive the army’s support. Presidium members Kirichenko, Suslov, Saburov; candidates Shvernik, Muhitdinov, Kozlov; and CC secretaries Aristov, Belyayev, and Pospelov did not attend the meeting. Thus, the initiative was wholly in the hands of Khrushchev’s rivals. Malenkov, who spoke first, proposed that Council of Ministers Chairman Bulganin lead the meeting. Then he strongly criticized Khrushchev’s activity. At this moment, a proposal was made to gather the next day so that all the Presidium members could attend. Famous Russian historian R. Pikhoya notes that this was a principal matter. At the June 18 meeting, the majority of participants were Khrushchev’s opponents and, as Kaganovitch noted, they had the necessary quorum. All decisions could have been made within two hours. However, the oppositionists had no luck with the meeting chairman offered to them, Bulganin. Always hesitant and irresolute, he agreed to postpone the meeting until June 19. Khrushchev’s supporters were given a chance which they did not waste. The June 19 meeting started with discussion of who should chair it. Molotov, Kaganovitch, Malenkov, Saburov, Pervukhin, and Voroshilov nominated Bulganin again. Malenkov accused Khrushchev of disconnecting Presidium members from one another, identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party, misunderstanding interrelations of the party and the state, and forming a personality cult. Malenkov strongly criticized Khrushchev’s slogan about overtaking and surpassing America in meat and milk production per capita in the near

years. Kaganovitch, Molotov, Saburov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Shepilov, and Pervukhin backed Malenkov’s theses. In his speech, Kaganovitch also criticized the slogan “Overtake and Surpass America,” accused Khrushchev of “rushing about the country,” and suggested abolishing the post of CC first secretary. Later speakers charged Khrushchev with the breach of the principle of collegiality in leadership as well as roughness and intolerance toward some Presidium members; in addition, he was accused of killing the initiative and of misappropriation of the economic functions with party organs. Speaking in Khrushchev’s defense were Kirichenko, Mikoyan, Suslov, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Kozlov, Muhitdinov, Brezhnev, Aristov, Belyayev, and Pospelov, that is, candidates for Presidium membership, and CC secretaries. In the very Presidium, Khrushchev remained in a minority. The meeting lasted until June 21, and party apparatus skillfully used that time to defend Khrushchev. First of all, CC military members were mobilized who demanded to be let into the Presidium’s meeting hall. They were followed by CC secretaries, key ministers, and the “second echelon” of the party apparatus who demanded be given votes for settlement of the matter in the Presidium. They urged to call up a Plenum of the CC. At a moment when the majority of Presidium members managed to narrow the frames of Khrushchev’s power, CC members’ appearance on the scene changed the situation. According to Zubok, the plotters forgot that “Khrushchev had all the muscle of state power in his hands. Most members of the Secretariat, all Khrushchev protégés, supported him against the Presidium potentates. The defense minister, Marshal Zhukov, and the chairman of the KGB, Ivan Serov, proved to be crucial allies throughout the crisis.”33 As the discussion in the Presidium went on, CC secretaries involved party apparatus employees, and, under the pretense of discussion of agricultural issues, called up a CC Plenum in Moscow. With the help of USSR KGB Chairman Serov, CC members devoted to Khrushchev were moved to the capital by military helicopters. In these stormy days, the party apparatus that had once, under Stalin, lost its presentable appearance seemed to be an efficient political force.34 The CC Plenum was opened on June 22, and twelve of its meetings were held before June 29. The first meeting was chaired by Khrushchev, and all the rest were chaired by Suslov. The chairmanship of Khrushchev, as the first secretary, at the first meeting ended all discussions on this occasion. First, the floor was taken by Marshal Zhukov, who spoke in Khrushchev’s defense. He stated directly and openly that action aimed to oust Khrushchev from power was under preparation, and that it was unclear who would replace him and what would happen, so the Army would be subordinated to not the Presidium but to the CC. Zhukov declassified some details of the latent struggle in the Presidium and stressed that Khrushchev’s business was right. He reported that Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovitch, Shepilov, Saburov, and others had long disagreed with Khrushchev’s opinion. For example, he pointed out the discussions of issues on Yugoslavia, Austria, virgin lands, and industry and construction management. To add to his accusations against Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch, Zhukov again raised the question of the 1937–1938 repressions with the said opposition trio taking an active part in it. At the end of his speech, Zhukov proposed the following: let Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch enter the rostrum and tell the public how they used power in their own favor and

about their dissenting plans.35 After Zhukov, the floor was given to USSR Interior Minister N. Dudorov to make sensational disclosures of Malenkov. Dudorov reported that a certain D. Sukhanov, head of Malenkov’s secretariat, had been arrested in May 1956, and documents of state importance had been taken from Sukhanov’s safe. They were hand-written documents envisioning the creation of a special prison for political prisoners in Moscow; summaries of questions and answers of expected interrogations of future political prisoners set up beforehand; a project assuming formation of the composition of the Soviet government dating back to March 4, 1953; and information by KGB agent Klimkin against prominent military leaders Voroshilov, Zhukov, Budenny, and others.36 Undoubtedly, these statements were designated to reduce the authority of Malenkov chosen as the key target at the Plenum. Then Khrushchev, chairing the meeting, passed the floor to Malenkov. However, a storm of insulting remarks did not give Malenkov a chance to build his defense. All he could think of was to sarcastically say to Khrushchev: “You are absolutely pure, Comrade Khrushchev.” L. Kaganovitch, in an attempt to find an excuse, tried to counterattack Khrushchev by reminding him about the shootings in the Ukraine. Malenkov stated that Khrushchev’s slogan “Overtake and Surpass America” on meat and milk production had led to factious opinions in the Presidium and outside it, and that the Presidium aimed not to oust Khrushchev but discuss the matter of abolishment of the post of first secretary. These words of Malenkov seriously troubled the first secretaries of Union republics, and secretaries of party district committees and regional committees who formed the backbone of the CC. They knew full well that if there were no first secretary in the center, there would be no such thing in regions either. Though Malenkov assured them that the proposal did not concern districts and regions, this did not calm the first secretaries. The fact that the proposal was voiced only worsened the positions of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch.37 The June 1957 plenum was carried out using Stalin’s methods; however, forces that were new in terms of age and length in power had the upper hand over “the old guards.” That was a victory not of Khrushchev but rather of the first secretaries of communist parties of Union republics and of party district and regional committees. Two CC CPSU members from Azerbaijan, Mustafayev and S. Rahimov, as well as Central Revision Commission member M. Ibrahimov, were on the side of the new forces. As members of different commissions, they fought alongside Khrushchev’s supporters during the Plenum. CC CPA First Secretary Mustafayev made a speech at the Plenum’s seventh meeting on June 26. That evening, three strong speeches were delivered prior to his speech: State Planning Committee Deputy Chairman Aleksey Kosygin, Sverdlovsk Party District Committee First Secretary A. Kirilenko, and Party Control Committee Chairman N. Shvernik had created a background where Mustafayev’s speech was distinguished for its party pathos. Having begun to speak about intraparty issues, Mustafayev stated, “These comrades, acting as a group under the cover of the slogan of strengthening of collegiality in the Presidium’s work and criticizing the work of CC CPSU First Secretary, Comrade Khrushchev, wanted to change party policy by establishing an anti-party faction and doing appalling things. They thought they would achieve their goal, since

the group in the Presidium arithmetically made up the majority; however, this simple arithmetic turned to be ineffectual. They also had other plans. They thought that if they would not manage to oust Comrade Khrushchev from the post of first secretary, they had to at least compromise him. But they failed because the majority of CC members and all the party organizations know how Comrade Khrushchev works, how the initiative of popular masses and party organizations has widened since Comrade Khrushchev became the first secretary, and that life has been in full swing in the country. This is felt in all the republics, regions, and districts. This is also felt in all the cities and villages of our country. People now step forward with greater confidence and competence. This is helped and contributed substantially by the activity of Comrade Khrushchev, who knows the country and people’s lives well.” In analyzing relations between Khrushchev and his opponents Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch, Mustafayev told a small parable from Azerbaijan’s history: “There were two neighbors living in one town. One of them was a shoemaker and the other one was a gardener. The gardener came out every day with fruits in his hands, ate them, and then threw the pits at the shoemaker. The shoemaker gathered the stones all the time and put them on scales: when the stones equaled a one-pound weight, he hit the gardener’s head with the one-pound weight. When he was under trial, he said, ‘I answered him exactly as he had done: I only gathered everything at once and hit him.’ Here, the situation is the same. As Khrushchev criticized them little by little and spoke of their disadvantages a bit, they collected everything as their personal offence and wanted to hit his head with a big stone. However, one blow is not enough to hit or disable someone in our party.” At this moment, approving voices were audible from the hall: “Well said.” Mustafayev further noted that some comrades in the CC Presidium performed the function of challengers. One thinks of business, but others challenge him every time. “Does the Presidium need the functions of challengers? When Comrade Khrushchev makes a vitally important suggestion, some others say this is unreal, fantastic, unfounded, and so on but do not think that this issue is so necessary for the party, people and for our policy and economy. If you now think the slogan of overtaking America in terms of meat production per capita is wrong, this only proves your isolation from life, from places: Is it bad to think of overtaking America? Right after this slogan was voiced by Comrade Khrushchev in Leningrad, in his speech at the opening of an agricultural exhibition, and then in his conversation with American radio and television reporters, the whole nation caught onto the slogan and started making additional commitments toward an increase in cattle production. People started assessing opportunities more and more exactly. Over a short period of time, kolkhozes in Azerbaijan created more than 300 pig farms, in a place where no one wanted to see a pig. It was difficult to hold discussions about this, but we explained to farmers the economic profitability. Farmers say they do not eat pork, so they will give the pigs to the state to help ensure the rapid increase of meat production and of the preservation of sheep and cattle.” CC CPSU Secretary Belyayev disliked this expression. He asked, “Why were you involved in this ‘rightwing trend?’” Mustafayev replied that everything was done for the reasons of public economy and the state. He noted that Khrushchev had told the September 1953 Plenum that Azerbaijan was the republic with the lowest yield of milk. But in 1955–1956, the milk yield was increased by 416 kilograms per cow. According to

Mustafayev, milk delivery to the state in Azerbaijan increased from 16,000 tons in 1940 to 90,000 tons in 1956. He added, “As you can see, the figures are incomparable but real. This indicates real opportunities and further spread of all kinds of agricultural and cattle-raising production. It seems to me that these comrades do not understand one thing: we are building communism in the country. But, comrades, we will not build communism in the city only. We need to build communism in villages as well. Villages lag behind the city so we need to have economic or material bases to allow a village to reach a city’s level. We cannot improve or build a village at the price of the state. To achieve this, we must increase outputs of all agricultural branches. You don’t need to feed us with a teaspoon like an ill person because our country is not ill. We are a healthy organism and thus we need healthy, strong and confident steps and paces to raise our village’s culture and economy as quickly as possible. If so, our village will no longer be backward. But you object the slogan of overtaking America.” At the end of his speech, Mustafayev accused the anti-party group of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch of being isolated from life and underestimating the party and country’s trust in them. “They were so backward that we, sitting here, were surprised at their speeches and thought how persons who had forgotten it was neither 1920 nor 1940 nor even 1950 could come to power, as it was quite a different year with different requirements. Now, people cannot be distracted by dogmas, they should prove themselves at work.” Mustafayev denied all the accusations addressing republican party organizations from the side of anti-party group members who claimed that someone from the republics was working against them through the Presidium or CC Secretaries. Mustafayev stated, “I’m the secretary of the CC CPA, but no one has even talked to me about that nor appealed to our republic’s organization to check anyone. Let them accuse themselves and no one else. We reject the slander they’re addressing to us.” In conclusion, Mustafayev backed previous speakers’ proposals for the removal of the anti-party group of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch from not only leading posts in the party but also the CPSU.38 The June Plenum resulted in the full defeat of the “old guards.” Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch were led out of the CC Presidium and CC CPSU. It was taken into account that Shepilov, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and Pospelov repeatedly voiced regret about what they had done. Though some of them lost their posts and regalia, they continued to lead the party and the country for a while. The CC Presidium comprised Khrushchev’s supporters: A. Aristov. N. Belyayev, L. Brezhnev, N. Ignatov, F. Kozlov, O. Kusinen, A. Mikoyan, Suslov, Y. Furtseva, N. Shvernik, and Zhukov. The Plenum made a decision titled “On the Anti-Party Group of Malenkov G. M., Kaganovitch L. M., and Molotov V. M.” and appealed to party organizations and all CPSU members and candidates with a closed letter. During the preparation of the letter, it was forbidden to publish information about Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovitch’s relations to the acts of mass repressions.39 The June 1957 Plenum affirmed the party’s leading role in the Soviet society and party apparatus’s leading role in governing the country. The CC CPSU and its republican, regional, district, and even provincial organizations became the main force determining the country’s policy. The struggle for power that had been conducted since Stalin’s death resulted in the

establishment of party apparatus dictatorship, and the process continued until the USSR breakdown. Ronald Suny wrote, “Khrushchev reasserted the authority of the Central Committee and the Secretariat over the major government ministers, defense and internal affairs, as well as the new Committee for State Security (KGB). Khrushchev undermined the power of the old Stalinist guard.”40 Over this period, someone’s entering the party or removal from it was the sole responsibility of the party apparatus. The party apparatus that had defended Khrushchev so ardently in 1957 just as easily removed him from all posts in 1964. The strained struggle of 1957 did not recur. Assessing the results of the June Plenum of the Central Committee figuratively, Taubman wrote: “At the June 1957 Plenum, Stalin’s henchmen were close to retribution. However, the new ‘Nuremberg trials’ did not take place primarily because the prosecutors and judges were themselves guilty.”41 According to Suny, Khrushchev “dominated through his personal authority, though occasionally he was forced to retreat from his preferred positions. The events of June 1957 indicated once again that in the post-Stalin Soviet Union the ultimate sanction for power in the USSR was the Central Committee.”42 The opposition which had lost was removed from the capital after the June plenum. In 1957, Malenkov was appointed as director of Ust-Kamenogorsk hydropower plant, and in 1961 he was dismissed from the party and retired. In 1957–1960, Molotov served as the ambassador to Mongolia, and in 1960–1962 he led the USSR’s representation to the IAEA. In 1962, he was dismissed from the party and retired. After a long struggle, Molotov was restored in the party’s ranks in 1984. Kaganovitch led a potassium plant in the Urals in 1957 and worked there till 1961 when he was excluded from the party and retired. He died in July 1991, so he was a witness to the processes of CPSU decline and USSR breakdown. D. Shepilov, who had joined the anti-party group, was freed from the post of foreign minister and sent to Central Asia where in 1957–1960 he led the Institute of Economy of the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz SSR. In 1960–1982 he worked as senior research officer of the Main Archive Division under the USSR Council of Ministers. Shepilov, who had been excluded from the CPSU in 1962, was restored to its ranks in 1976. He died in 1995 so, after the USSR broke down, he even wrote memoirs paying attention to June 1957 events. M. Pervukhin, who had been first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and a member of the CC CPSU Presidium, also suffered. He was downgraded to chairman of the foreign economic relations committee under the USSR Council of Ministers and in 1958 appointed as ambassador to the GDR. Another first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, M. Saburov, became Pervukhin’s deputy in the foreign economic relations committee in 1957, but in 1958 was sent to Syzran as a plant director. The fate of Marshal Zhukov, who had collaborated with Molotov and Malenkov, and then firmly took the side of Khrushchev, was far from happy. In October 1957 he was dismissed from the post of defense minister, and in 1958 he retired. K. E. Voroshilov, who had displayed interest in the anti-party group, continued to be chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, for certain reasons, till 1960. But as a member of the CC CPSU Presidium he enjoyed none of his previous authority in political decision-making. After a defeat in June 1957, Bulganin kept the post of chairman of the USSR Council of

Ministers for a short time. In March 1958, at its first session of the fifth convocation, the USSR Supreme Council did not suggest his candidature anew. In a decision on his candidature, the CC CPSU Presidium said he had displayed political illiteracy concerning the anti-party group and that the June 1957 Plenum had severely reprimanded and warned him. With this in mind, it was recognized inexpedient for Bulganin to keep such an important state post. Accordingly, the CC Presidium recommended Khrushchev to the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with preservation of the post of CC CPSU First Secretary. The March 1958 session approved the recommendation. Thus, a large group of men who had long played an important role in country’s government was removed from the political arena. The new group replacing them had much less government experience, but only slightly differed from the “old guards” in terms of views and world outlooks. The newcomers, like the “old men,” were products of the Stalin era. Field discussions of June Plenum decisions were held immediately. On July 1, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the results of the CC CPSU Plenum. Mustafayev detailed the events in Moscow. In its decision, the Bureau condemned the factious actions of the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovitch, and wholly supported the decisions of the CC CPSU Plenum. The Bureau ordered a Plenum of the CC CPA to be held jointly with the republic’s party activists on July 2. CC First Secretary Mustafayev, who had just arrived from Moscow, was named the key reporter. By its decision, the Bureau invited members and candidates to membership of the CC CPA, members of the revision commission, first secretaries of regional, city, and provincial party committees, senior executives of the CC and Baku City Party Committee, secretaries of primary party organizations of large enterprises, heads of ministries and bodies, leaders of Komsomol and trade union organizations, commanders of military units deployed in Azerbaijan, and political workers to attend the Plenum. At the same time, regional, city, and provincial party committees were instructed to hold meetings of party activists on July 3–4 to discuss the June Plenum decisions, and large enterprises were told to hold closeddoor party meetings. A CC CPA Special Division was instructed to print 100 copies of the CC CPSU Plenum’s decisions and pass them on to regional, city, and provincial party committees. In line with the Bureau’s decision, a closed letter titled “On the Anti-Party Group of Malenkov, L. Kaganovitch, and Molotov” was translated into Azeri and distributed in 2,000 copies across the country.43 The 5th Plenum of the CC CPA was opened on July 2. One issue—“Results of the July Plenum of the CC CPSU”—was on the agenda. Opening the plenum, Mustafayev stated the number of those present and immediately suggested ending the Plenum’s work the same day, since meetings of party activists in Baku and in other regions, as well as party meetings at large industrial enterprises, were scheduled for the next day. Next, Yakovlev gave the floor to Mustafayev. He started his report by stating that a Plenum of the CC CPSU devoted to examination of an intra-party matter had been held on July 22–29. As instructed by the CC CPSU Presidium, reporting to the Plenum was CPSU CC Secretary, Comrade Suslov, who said that an extraordinary meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium called up upon insistent demand of comrades Malenkov, Kaganovitch, and Molotov was held without interruption for four

consecutive days. The CC CPSU Presidium had had no previously set agenda. These comrades explained the need for an emergency meeting of the Presidium by agreeing upon the schedule of tours for the celebrations of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad. However, from the start of the meeting, Malenkov and Kaganovitch made demands to dismiss Comrade Khrushchev from the post of CC Presidium chairman, explaining that the discussion of the issue of CC CPSU first secretary was urgent. By making use of “arithmetic majority” in the Presidium, this group achieved Comrade Khrushchev’s dismissal from chairing the Presidium and, per their suggestion, he was replaced by comrade Bulganin. Simultaneously, this group suggested abolishing the posts of first secretaries of the CC of Union republics and first secretaries of the party’s regional and provincial committees. When the offer was categorically rejected as an attempt to weaken unity and discipline within the party, they made another proposal: no permanent chairman of the CC CPSU Presidium should exist at all, whereas the CC CPSU Secretariat should consist only of a secretary for general issues. All the proposals aimed to dismiss Comrade Khrushchev from the post of CC CPSU First Secretary at any price, and, later on, from the post of CC Presidium Chairman. The offer assuming abolishment of the posts of first secretaries of Union republics and regional and provincial party organizations was not made by the anti-party group. Speaking at the first meeting of the June Plenum, Malenkov said their proposal did not concern republican, regional and provincial party organizations. As for a single-secretary post in the Secretariat for general issues, this idea was proposed by Zhukov in a conversation with Molotov on June 18, on the eve of the Presidium’s meeting. Zhukov later paid an expensive price for the proposal. Mustafayev detailed all the accusations forwarded against Khrushchev during the four days of the Presidium meeting. “Malenkov, Kaganovitch, and Molotov wanted to discredit achievements in agriculture, saying they are exaggerated. They misinterpreted statistical data on cattle-raising and agriculture outputs in some recent years, and claimed Comrade Khrushchev’s proposal of overtaking the United States in terms of milk, meat, and butter production per capita was wrong. Comrade Khrushchev’s statement in an interview with a US radio and television company reporter that further lessening of international tension depends primarily on improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was also regarded by this group as something wrong, allegedly impeding sovereign rights of other countries.” Next, Mustafayev detailed everything that had happened at the CC CPSU Plenum: “The Plenum demanded from Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovitch, Molotov, and others to explain why they had grouped together behind the Presidium’s back, plotted on a number of important issues, wanted to appoint Comrade Khrushchev as agriculture minister and comrade Suslov as culture minister, wanted to dismiss KGB Chairman, Comrade Serov, and get Molotov, Kaganovitch, and others included into the group of CC CPSU Secretaries, and denied Presidium membership requests by other CC members. Mustafayev analyzed some aspects of Malenkov and Kaganovitch’s speeches at the Plenum, mentioning that he appreciated the speeches of Saburov and Pervukhin, who had repented of their actions and disclosed the antiparty group. Mustafayev strongly criticized Molotov’s accusations addressing Khrushchev: “Molotov went as far as to say he regarded Comrade Khrushchev’s speech at the reception of

writers, which had contributed to the rise of the ideological level figures of literature and art, as a mistake.” Having briefly described key aspects characterizing the progress in foreign policy, internal development, industry, and agriculture in the second half of the 1950s, Mustafayev confirmed that the Soviet people backed this policy. He said, “The Soviet country is on a great political and economic rise. Only those who have lost their link to the people, those who are politically blind, or enemies of socialism can deny our party and our people’s successes. Also, this group opposed extension of Union republics’ rights in the sphere of economic and cultural development, in the sphere of lawmaking, and in the strengthening of the role of local Soviets in the solution of these tasks.” Mustafayev noted that in Azerbaijan the Oil Industry Ministry had been established as an example of extension of republican bodies’ rights and that new rich oil and gas deposits had been discovered. Over a short period of time, average daily production increased to 1,970 tons of oil and 5,568,000 cubic meters of gas. “This year we will produce 1,946 million cubic meters of gas: a double increase since 1954. We increased average daily production of petroleum products by 7.2 percent, light oils by 16.1 percent, and lubricants by 15.1 percent.”44 Indeed, the establishment of the Oil Industry Ministry in 1954 and especially Mustafayev’s invitation of Suleiman Vezirov to lead the ministry contributed greatly to oil industry development. Vezirov had enjoyed great authority among oil workers in the USSR. He had a legendary capacity for work. In 1949–1953 he led Turkmenneft and was considered the creator of Turkmenistan’s oil industry. Vezirov had close links with Nikolay Baybakov, who had long led the USSR oil industry and State Planning Committee. In 1957, he was appointed as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. After state government reform, Vezirov was appointed as Chairman of the republic’s Economic Council. Albania, which at the time had been considered an ally of the USSR, started producing oil at the end of 1950s. Thus, on his visit to Tirana in 1958, Khrushchev took Vezirov with him. Personal acquaintance with Vezirov made Khrushchev form a positive opinion of him as a specialist. When political crisis was in full swing in Azerbaijan in the second half of the 1950s, it was rumored that Vezirov would occupy the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers.45 Mustafayev reported that the issues of personality cult and repression had been widely discussed again at the June Plenum of the CC CPSU. He said, “The elimination of the aftermath of the personality cult and the restoration of socialistic lawfulness in the country resulted in the identification of a huge number of honest Soviet citizens who had been unlawfully arrested, shot, or repressed, including numerous party, Soviet, Komsomol, and leading military personnel. Note that 232,000 people were fully rehabilitated over several recent years. The number of those restored in the party is 4,634, including 1,791 persons with pre-Revolution length of service, of whom the majority were shot.” Mustafayev claimed that Molotov, Kaganovitch, and Malenkov were personally responsible for the mass repressions in 1937– 1938 when they not only failed to oppose but also in some cases contributed to such tyranny and lawlessness. The foreign policy of the USSR and the criticism of Molotov’s activity were separate topics in Mustafayev’s report. He stressed that it was Molotov who prevented the improvement of

relations with Yugoslavia, the signing of an agreement with Austria, and normalization of relations with Japan. Mustafayev continued to say that the USSR’s relations with Iran and Turkey had also deteriorated because of Molotov.46 Khrushchev very skillfully used the Soviet Union’s policy on Iran and Turkey against Molotov. With Stalin as the architect of this policy, Molotov, as foreign chief, contributed greatly to an increase of pressure against Iran and Turkey. Speaking at the 11th meeting of the June Plenum, Khrushchev stated, “What did you do in Iran? You deployed troops and started drilling oil wells. Stalin led the campaign and instigated Bagirov, but when there was the smell of gunpowder in the air, and we had to fight or to leave, Stalin ordered us to leave before it was too late, and we did so. We soured the Persians’ moods. Once they had a Shah. He used to say he could not forget what we had desired to do. But who led the Foreign Ministry then? I do not remember, but anyway, Molotov was one of Stalin’s key advisers on international policy.” A. Gromyko backed him: “Molotov was in the ministry at the time.” At this moment, Molotov replied, “But that was not my proposal.” Khrushchev objected him: “But you fully agreed with that.”47 As for USSR’s postwar territorial claims against Turkey with the aim of getting access to the Turkish Straits, Khrushchev attacked Molotov, saying, “Look what sad results this policy brought. It led to the breakup of friendly relations with Turkey and Iran. This is foolishness. We helped Kemal Pasha. Turks treated Voroshilov as a brother and thus named a town square after him. For example, Comrade Voroshilov was an honorary citizen of Izmir. Turks have not yet renounced his citizenship though they have had all grounds to do that. We defeated Germany, and the success got to our heads. The Turks are our friends. Do you think we can write a note, and they will immediately give us the Dardanelles? Not on your life! The Dardanelles is not Turkey; it’s the pivot of the nation. In fact, we spat upon Turks. And they say we harbored a grudge against them. It was Georgians headed by Beria and some others who stirred up this provocation. There are 300,000 Ukrainians in Canada, but that’s not to say that Canada belongs to the Soviet Union. It’s stupid. At any rate, we’ve lost friendly Turkey, and now there are American bases in the south that are targeted against our south. Comrade Molotov was Foreign Minister, and it is interesting how he argued his claims when he handed his notes to Turkey. I wonder, what reasons did he have when he prepared the note?”48 Also, Khrushchev pointed out the sad consequences of this policy because the mistakes had very much helped American imperialism: “By our short-sighted policy, we made the United States and England embrace Turkey and Iran, and we pushed them toward the Baghdad Pact.”49 Khrushchev blamed Molotov for the breakdown of relations with Turkey; however, these accusations were in line with the political campaign against the anti-party group. In fact, upon the completion of the June Plenum, Moscow, acting in line with the USSR KGB’s plan, initiated the Kurdish question in September 1957 and thus interfered with the territorial dispute between Syria and Turkey. Thus, tension between Moscow and Ankara increased again. Exactly as Khrushchev ordered, a threatening note was handed over to Turkey while Soviet troops started being deployed in Southern Caucasus republics along the Turkish borders. By its decision, the CC CPSU Presidium appointed USSR deputy defense minister, Marshal K. Rokossovsky, as Commander of the Transcaucasian military district. The situation was so

critical that it was rumored war against Turkey would begin in days. Transcaucasian district troops were put on alert. Preparatory measures for war were constantly underway. The population was very troubled. Only in October 1957, following the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov from the post of Defense Minister, Khrushchev said that there would be no war on Turkey and that the entire incident was the fault of Zhukov, who had misinformed the leadership about the situation.50 Tension in USSR-Turkey relations did not lead to war in the fall of 1957; however, Soviet leaders, in a secret letter to Turkey’s top government officials, did not fail to remind them that three to four Soviet missiles would be enough to wipe Turkey off the map.51 After passions calmed down and Zhukov was made responsible for everything in 1958, Rokossovsky returned to Moscow to serve as deputy defense minister again. In continuing his speech at the Plenum, Mustafayev noted that if the CC CPSU Presidium had listened to Molotov’s advice over a number of international problems, the country would have gotten into very big trouble. For example, during the days of the Hungarian events, Molotov objected to the appointment of Janos Kadar as chairman of the provisional revolutionary workers and peasants’ government of Hungary but supported the return of former premier Mathias Rakoshi and former head of Hungary’s Workers Party, Erno Gero, to Hungary. “If we returned these men to Hungary, Janos Kadar would have thought we conspired against him, first advancing them and then replacing them with old leaders; hence, we would have lost our authority. We could not follow the way Molotov had recommended. The CC CPSU Presidium decided to remove Rakoshi even from Moscow to prevent him disturbing the new Hungarian leadership’s policy.” Mustafayev considered it necessary to explain the party’s position about Council of Ministers Chairman Bulganin, who had displayed political unscrupulousness and supported, at a certain stage, the anti-party group. At the CC Plenum, Bulganin admitted his mistakes, told the Plenum about the factious actions of the anti-party group, and blamed it. At the end of his speech, Mustafayev reported personnel changes of the country’s government and, on behalf of Azerbaijan’s party organization, suggested approving the decisions of the June Plenum of the CC CPSU.52 Speaking after Mustafayev was another participant of the CC CPSU Plenum, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, S. Rahimov. It is interesting that he fired criticism primarily against Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Bulganin. Rahimov reported that Bulganin had also taken the responsibilities of KGB chairman, meaning that Serov was dismissed from that post. “It seems that this group really aimed to restore the previous orders in the KGB system and repeat the violations of the revolutionary lawfulness in the country. Bulganin played a negative role in the appearance of this group by making use of his position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, masterminding the group and involving Presidium members Pervukhin and Saburov in it. Bulganin also made a lot of mistakes in his practical work. The work of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was inappropriate; meetings of Presidium and of the very Council of Ministers of the USSR were formal; and many matters were settled too late or thoughtlessly. We in the Union republics also felt that the work in the Council of Ministers was unsatisfactory. Comrade Bulganin, over the whole period of our work, was never interested in the work of the republic’s Council of

Ministers and never telephoned us. In his tours abroad, Comrade Bulganin also made gross mistakes. For example, in his speech in Calcutta, India, he said the Soviet people had Lenin and the Indian people had Ghandi. Thus, Bulganin identified Lenin with Ghandi. Bulganin was forced to correct his mistake only after he was severely warned by Comrade Khrushchev.” Many knew from a closed letter of the CC CPSU that Bulganin had once called Josip Broz Tito a true follower of Lenin. Instead of refusing to join the anti-party group and struggling with it, Bulganin chose the path of frustrating the authority of the party’s leadership. Thus, as Khrushchev used to say, instead of driving the devil away, Bulganin found himself in the position of a man driven by the devil. When Rahimov announced the descriptions of conspirators Khrushchev had given, the audience came to life. Khrushchev called Molotov the ideological leader of the group, Malenkov its organizational leader, and Shepilov the group’s theorist. Kaganovitch was the group’s instigator and ringleader.53 Such sharp attacks against Bulganin illustrate that the Councils of Ministers of Union republics had already known that Bulganin’s fate had been predetermined and, in order to avoid sharing his destiny, the heads of national governments tried to keep their distance from him. Starting from July 3, 1957, regional, city, and provincial party committees, as well as party committees of large enterprises, initiated broad discussions of the June Plenum’s decisions. Mustafayev felt inspired by Khrushchev’s victory in struggling for power. He assessed this victory as his own. He assessed it as the establishment of the party’s commandment of state government processes and as the strengthening of his own position in the republic. In his recent struggle against KGB Chairman Guskov, Khrushchev took the side of Mustafayev, and, thanks to this support, Guskov was ousted from Azerbaijan. Even earlier, Mustafayev, who had then just become the leader of the republic, took on excessive commitments at an all-Union meeting of cotton-growers in Tashkent in November 1954 and won Khrushchev’s favor to the extent that the latter appointed Mustafayev toastmaster for the next banquet. Khrushchev explained his favor, half in jest, by the fact that Mustafayev was the only man among the republics’ leaders with a moustache. Having completed the propaganda of the June Plenum’s decisions, Mustafayev, in a letter on October 4, 1957, asked the CC CPSU Presidium to send Khrushchev and A. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on a mission to Azerbaijan. He wrote, “Over past years, members of the CC CPSU Presidium toured nearly all Union republics, districts, and regions, where they visited industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, and scientific and cultural institutions. . . . But none of the Presidium members visited Azerbaijan over the period. Those in party organizations and at meetings of workers thus often ask themselves why party and government leaders do not come to visit us. They are unsatisfied with our answers that the leaders are busy. The CC CPA asks the CC CPSU Presidium to send Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and A. I. Mikoyan on an official trip to the Azerbaijan SSR after the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialistic Revolution to familiarize them with the situation in the republic and assist party and Soviet bodies in their work.”54

Following Khrushchev’s victory at the June Plenum of the CC CPSU, Mustafayev started paying greater attention to the idea of competition with America in terms of meat, milk and butter production per capita. A Plenum of the CC CPA on November 26, 1957 was entirely devoted to cattle-raising issues. Right after the Plenum, on November 29, the republic’s leadership took excessive socialistic commitments in the sphere of cattle-raising for 1957– 1960. In an appeal to the CC CPSU, it said, “The CPSU task of overtaking the United States of America in meat, milk, and butter production per capita in the following years, as well as CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers’ letter on further development of sheep-breeding and increase of wool production, are met by agricultural workers of the Azerbaijan SSR with great enthusiasm.” The republic took the obligation to produce 155,000 tons of meat in carcass weight in 1960, up 1.6 times from 1956. Also, it planned to produce 525,000 tons of milk in 1960, up 1.5 times from 1956. It endeavored to shear 11,000 tons of sheep wool in 1960, up 1.4 times from 1956. The final part of the socialistic commitment read: “Kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers and agricultural specialists of Azerbaijan assure the CC CPSU that they will do their best to fulfill the CPSU historic task: to overtake the United States on per capita meat, milk, and butter production in the coming years.” Signing the commitments were Mustafayev, Rahimov, Azerbaijan’s Komsomol CC Secretary Abdurrahman Vezirov, Agriculture Minister M. G. Seyidov, Secretary of Nakhchivan Party Committee of the CPA H. Mamedov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Nakhchivan ASSR R. Rahimov, Secretary of Mountainous Garabagh Committee of CPA E. Grigoryan, district executive committee chairman R. Shahramanyan, Secretary of Baku City Committee of CPA T. Allahverdiyev, chairman of Baku Executive Committee A. Ahmedov, and leaders of cattle-breeding regions and kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In a letter to the CC CPSU later the same day, Mustafayev reported the socialistic commitments taken by agricultural workers of the Azerbaijan SSR.55 In the fall of 1957, the leadership of Azerbaijan was so carried away with competition with America over meat, milk, and butter that it did not notice that the republic’s grain reserve was only enough for seven to eight days. In this dangerous situation, Mustafayev addressed L. R. Korniets—the Minister of Grain Products of the USSR—with the following letter: “Grain import to the republic has considerably worsened lately. From July 1 to November 14, 1957 we got only 107,000 tons of grains out of the planned 293,000 tons. As of November 14, the republic’s grain reserve is only 39,000 tons, including 28,000 tons at sales points and 11,000 tons at mills. Thus, under the republic’s daily demand for 1,500 tons of grain, there is only a seven to eight-day reserve, though, as you know, a special provision says the grain reserve should be equivalent to at least three months. This threatens the nonstop supply of the republic’s population with grain products and timely delivery of flour to the country’s other regions. With this in consideration, and as we are on the brink of wintertime, we ask you to undertake immediate measures.”56 Following the crush of the anti-party group, the new leadership scheduled the next election of the USSR Supreme Council for March 1958. On this occasion, K. Lebedev, instructor of the CC CPSU division for work with republic’s party organizations, telephoned M. Iskenderov, CC CPA Secretary, on August 22. Lebedev informed him that it had been recommended to hold

party Congresses in Union republics no later than in January 1958. Thus, the party bodies division should determine dates of party conferences in districts, cities, and regions. Lebedev asked him to tell G. Jafarly, head of division for work with party organizations, to make his proposals at the Bureau’s next meeting.57 In line with this task, preparatory actions for the CPA’s 22nd Congress were initiated in summer of 1957. The June Plenum raised the importance of party bodies, and particularly field party organizations, so highly that law enforcers even feared to bring actions against party persons. In some republics, district, and regional party organizations, having examined actions of communist infringers of the law, imposed a punishment upon them. The CC CPSU started accumulating complaints that leading party workers defended their protégés. In connection to this, I. Shikin, first deputy head of CC CPSU division on work with party bodies of Union republics, and V. Zolotukhin, first deputy head of division on work with administrative bodies, drafted a letter to the CC CPSU Secretariat. They recommended providing comprehensive assistance to court bodies.58 But this process was not tolerated, so law enforcement bodies themselves fell under the party’s control. From now on, senior party executives could be brought to responsibility only with permission from the party’s top tiers. Anti-party group members Molotov, Kaganovitch, and Malenkov had been in leading posts since the 1930s, so numerous economic institutions, settlements, enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, schools, palaces of culture, and so forth were named after them. There were so many such facilities that it was no possible to rename them all in a short period of time. Thus, on August 28, 1957, the CC CPSU made a decision titled “On Streamlining of the Process of Naming Districts, Regions, Provinces, as well as Cities and other Settlements, Enterprises, Kolkhozes, Institutions, and Organizations after State and Public Figures.” The CC CPA Bureau discussed the decision on September 10. M. Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, I. Abdullayev, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Agriculture Minister M. H. Seyidov, and Interior Minister A. Kerimov were told to submit their proposals to the CC CPA Bureau.59 The names of Molotov, Kaganovitch, and Malenkov, together with Stalin’s name—the names that had long been synonymous with the buildup of socialism—were thus wiped off cities, organizations, and facilities within a short period of time in the fall of 1957. The situation in Moscow became strained again in the fall of 1957. This time, the political intrigues focused on world-famous Marshal Zhukov, the one who had collaborated with Malenkov and Molotov on the eve of the June Plenum and had been the first to have expressed the seditious thought that the first secretary could be done without and that a secretary for general issues was enough. Such a man, who had continued to lead the country’s Armed Forces, was a serious threat to Khrushchev and party apparatus. Everyone knew well the courage Zhukov had displayed in 1953 under the arrest of L. Beria, and his role in the destruction of putsch at the CC Presidium in June 1957. Marshal Zhukov played the roles of either Defense Minister or Military Prosecutor at the June Plenum, often interrupting those speaking, asking threatening questions, and making insulting remarks addressing the anti-party group. Khrushchev particularly remembered Saburov’s frank statement at the Plenum. In a

conversation with Zhukov, Saburov voiced his fears connected with KGB Chairman Serov, but Zhukov replied, “Let him only try, and I will smash him and Lubyanka at once.” Thus, in Khrushchev’s eyes Zhukov gradually turned into a mighty, uncontrollable monster.60 Zhukov’s determinative role in the overcoming of two serious crises in the country’s leadership in the post-Stalin era was interpreted in quite a definite way. Marshal Zhukov and General Eisenhower were the two heroes of World War II. One of them, as president of the United States, dictated his will to the world during the 1950s. Thus, the natural question arose: if an American General managed to become the US president, why should a Soviet marshal not lead the USSR?61 When Stalin launched a campaign in 1946 to discredit Zhukov, one of the compromising materials was an article in the Chicago Tribune reporting that Zhukov and Molotov fought for dictator Stalin’s place.62 Since the fall of 1957, Khrushchev started displaying a strong interest in this information and similar reports kept at CC CPSU Presidium’s secret archives. Zhukov was the last barrier on the path toward the party’s dictatorship, so search of ways to eliminate the barrier was initiated. According to a plan for a secret operation designed to dismiss the marshal from the post of Defense Minister, in October 1957 Zhukov was sent on a long-term official mission to Yugoslavia and Albania. While central and republican newspapers printed reports on Zhukov’s successful activity in the Balkans, the CC CPSU Presidium gathered on October 19, 1957 to decide the destiny of the defense minister. For his mistakes made in the sphere of party and political work in the Army, Zhukov was excluded from the number of members of the CC CPSU Presidium and CC and at the same time dismissed from the post of defense minister. The Presidium adopted a resolution “On Improvement of Party/Political Work in the Soviet Army and Fleet.” However, the document was not submitted to Army units, since it was secret. Nevertheless, appropriate conversations were held with high-ranking officers of the Soviet Army, and preparatory work was done. First secretaries of Union republics were warned about the upcoming CC Plenum so they were ready to act against Marshal Zhukov; in addition, they collected all the facts compromising the minister and sent them to Khrushchev personally. In line with this instruction, Mustafayev, in a secret letter to Khrushchev on October 26, wrote: “The CC CPA considers it necessary to inform you that the Defense Ministry of the USSR and the commandment of the Transcaucasian military district have recently issued some directives and undertaken certain measures in fact contradicting Lenin’s national party policy, countering the guidelines of the CPSU 20th Congress, and actually damaging the further strengthening of friendship among peoples of the Soviet Union.” As proof, he referred to a May 23, 1957 directive of the Chief Commander of Land Troops of the USSR Defense Ministry and a June 8, 1957 directive of the Commander of Transcaucasian military district stating the following: Only conscripts of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nationalities should be called to serve as land and parachute troops; Only conscripts of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nationalities should be called to serve as troops deployed abroad; No conscripts of Caucasian nationalities should be called for service in Transcaucasian

military district troops. Mustafayev wrote, “Such instructions infringe upon civic rights of other nationalities of our country, contradict the USSR Constitution, and create unhealthy moods among small nations. We cannot understand how the USSR Defense Ministry can consider all the nations but three of the USSR defective and thus distrust them. At the same time, we’d like to note that the 34th infantry division consisting largely of Azerbaijanis was reformed in Baku in July 1956. Under this measure, the commandment of the Transcaucasian military district and 4th Army committed a number of rough perversions and displayed a biased approach to Azerbaijani officers’ further service. As a result, more than 400 out of 600 Azerbaijani officers were dismissed from the Soviet Army. An overwhelming majority of the dismissed officers had sufficient general and military training and were young, so they could have continued to serve and build their careers in the Soviet Army; in terms of their business and political skills, they did correspond to their positions in the division.” Out of the division’s twenty-four senior Azerbaijani officers with higher military education (they graduated from the Military Academy in 1950–1957), nineteen were sent to work at military enlistment and registration offices and as civil higher schools’ military chairs. They were: Col. K. Aliyev, born in 1921, a CPSU member, graduated from the military academy in 1950; Col. M. Quliyev, born in 1919, a CPSU member, graduated from the military academy in 1951; Lieut.-Col. K. Kerimov, born in 1924, a CPSU member, graduated from the military academy in 1954; the Hero of the Soviet Union Major F. Safarov, born in 1920, a CPSU member, graduated from the military academy in 1954; Major M. Kasimov, born in 1923, a CPSU member, graduated from the military academy in 1954. It is typical that the TMD commandment dismissed the only Azerbaijani General G. Zeynalov, who had graduated from two military academies. Gen. Zeynalov spent several months jobless and, only upon insistence by the CC CPA and interference of the CC CPSU, was appointed as head of the Baku Infantry School. The commanders of the TMD and 4th Army, having overseen the mass dismissal of Azerbaijani officers to the reserves, did not care about their further employment and appropriate use but, on contrary, in many cases prevented and continued to prevent this. For example, Mustafayev referred to the training of national military personnel. According to him, out of seventy officers of the Baku Infantry School, there were only five Azerbaijanis: the very head of the school, three platoon commanders, and one physician. And there were only thirteen Azerbaijanis out of school’s 325 students. It would become impossible for any further Azerbaijanis to enter the Baku Infantry School, since the school’s students will consist of servicemen of the TMD troops where Azerbaijanis are forbidden to serve. “This may lead to such a situation in which there are no Azerbaijanis among Soviet Army officers in several years. This may bring about the recurrence of hardships that had been observed in the years of the Great Patriotic War due to the absence of trained national officers.” At the end of the letter, Mustafayev asked that the incorrect orders of the USSR Defense Ministry be cancelled and that they change their attitude toward the training and use of Azerbaijani officers.63 When Marshal Zhukov returned from his official trip, the CC CPSU Plenum began its work on

October 28. Opening the Plenum, Khrushchev reported that the CC CPSU Presidium had recommended discussing only one issue: “On Improvement of Party/Political Work in the Soviet Army and Fleet.” CC Secretary Suslov, who had hardened through the 1950s’ political intrigues, was named the key reporter on the issue. He said, “It is known that the CC CPSU Presidium adopted a special resolution on this issue on October 19. The CC Presidium raised the question of party/political work in the Soviet Army to this Plenum not only because this matter is of huge importance for the Soviet Army but also because serious shortcomings and perversions in this work have been disclosed. These shortcomings and perversions, as now identified by facts, were caused by rough violation of party principles and of Lenin’s principles of Defense Ministry and the Soviet Army’s leadership by Comrade Zhukov.” Suslov substantiated concerns about the Soviet Army’s efficiency in the struggle of two global systems, and in the face of new provocations and military endeavors against the USSR and socialist countries. Suslov referred to Lenin, who had taught him to be always on the alert and build the work of the defense authority on the basis of directives issued by the CC and under the party’s control. “These party principles and Lenin’s principles were roughly violated by Defense Minister, Comrade Zhukov, who strove toward the Armed Forces’ separation from the party, weakening of party organizations, and actual cancellation of political bodies in the Soviet Army. . . . Here we deal with not separate mistakes but a system of mistakes, his tendency to regard the Soviet Armed Forces as his own domain, a policy that leads to dangerous separation of the Armed Forces from the party, and the CC’s exclusion from the settlement of most important matters relating to the life of the Army and Fleet. We have the Defense Board and, as its part, the Military Council consisting of Presidium members and all the district commanders, as well as fleet commanders. Comrade Zhukov did not consider it necessary to call up the Military Council even once. Furthermore, three months ago the Defense Minister proposed to the CC to abolish the Military Council. Perhaps Comrade Zhukov does not want the CC to be more familiar with the life of the Army and the activities of the Minister and commanders. Naturally, the CC Presidium rejected this politically incorrect proposal of the Defense Minister. . . . Also, it did not bother Comrade Zhukov that members of military councils of districts were also secretaries of the party’s district and provincial committees and central committees of communist parties of Union republics. He seems to have been quite satisfied that secretaries of party’s district committees, regional committees, and the CC had no full vote in Military councils.” Zhukov’s attitude to political workers in the Army was reported by Suslov with particular pathos. Zhukov told political workers at a meeting that they had grown used to idle talk for forty years and lost their sense of smell like old cats. Another report said Zhukov had made the following comment about political workers: if you glue yellow beards onto them and give them daggers, they will slaughter commanders. In addition, the October Plenum accused Zhukov of having created the central intelligence school, the so-called “school of subversives,” without agreement with the CC. According to Khrushchev, it is unclear why subversives were gathered without CC permission and why Zhukov did not tell the CC about that. It is unclear why only Zhukov and Shtemenko were aware of this school.64 Zhukov initially denied the accusations and trumped them with his role

at the June Plenum; however, well-prepared CC members, marshals, and generals who had fought under his leadership in the years of Great Patriotic War, forced him to retreat. At the second meeting on October 28, following a flaming speech by Soviet Army Headquarters Commander V. Sokolovsky, the chairperson L. Brezhnev gave the floor to Mustafayev, who was the first among republican first secretaries to speak. He said, “The issue discussed at the Plenum today is of huge political significance for not only the Army but also all our party and other cadres. In its October 19 decision, the CC CPSU gave a brilliant appraisal of our army. This appraisal gladdens our Soviet Army warriors and the whole Soviet people, as our army fulfilled its task with honor in the Patriotic War period and always stands ready to defend the motherland. As far as there is a sufficient number of districts and units in our republic, and republican party organization is very closely linked to them, I’d like to speak of some issues relating to our work with them.” Mustafayev further built his speech upon facts he had indicated in a secret letter to Khrushchev two days before charging Zhukov with national separatism and distrusting officers and conscripts from Transcaucasia, especially Azerbaijanis. Mustafayev added new facts to Suslov’s critical remarks addressing the Baku anti-aircraft defense district and the whole Transcaucasian military district. He drew listeners’ attention to the violations that had been committed under the disbandment of the 34th infantry division, and said that due to the fault of the Defense Ministry’s leadership, Azerbaijanis were banned from entering military academies, and conscripts from Transcaucasia were banned from serving in a number of military units, including those abroad. He stressed that the commanders of military garrisons in the republic ignored the republic’s party leadership and that party/political work in the army was in awful state.65 Khrushchev delivered a long speech at the October 29 evening meeting. In the beginning, he said that first deputy defense minister I. Konev objected assessment of his relations with Zhukov as a “particular” friendship. Konev sent an official letter regarding this to the CC Presidium. One of the speakers at the Plenum asked why A. Zheltov, Commander of the Political Department of the Soviet Army and Fleet, had not been elected a CC member at the 20th Congress. Khrushchev said Zhukov had prevented that. Khrushchev’s entire speech was designed to stir up high-ranking military officials against Zhukov. In his speech, Khrushchev masterfully turned the words Zhukov had stated at the June Plenum against him. Having reminded Zhukov of his own words: “If necessary, I will appeal to the Army and nation, and they will support me!” Khrushchev said, “He said he would once be able to appeal to the Army and nation, without the party CC, without government. And when we told comrade Zhukov about that, he replied, ‘Indeed, I spoke that way at meetings. But what is wrong with that? I spoke correctly; I fought the anti-party group!’ But is it right, Comrade Zhukov? You can even appeal to the Army and nation now to tell them that the anti-party group is blaming you. But is it appropriate for a party leader to appeal to the Army and nation, bypassing the CC? He, Zhukov, used to say that all he said was the truth. But what truth is this? Any tyranny could be reported as Comrade Zhukov’s truth. But this is a horrific thing, comrades.” Khrushchev continued to say, “Comrade Zhukov likes to say military communists will support the party CC in any affair. No one doubts that military communists will support

the party CC, but if they support the party CC only upon calls and orders by the defense minister, then the party CC will be in bad situation. If the party CC only allowed communists to support the CC upon orders of the minister or his deputies, this would mean the death of party leadership.”66 In his speech at the Plenum, Khrushchev talked much about revision of Zhukov’s activity in the years of war. To refute Zhukov’s assertions that he knew no defeats in the war years, Khrushchev referred to a number of war communiqué examples. The aim was the same: to depreciate Zhukov’s role and strengthen the significance of other officers. Summing up the result, Khrushchev stressed, “Comrade Zhukov, you can’t act like this; you can’t depreciate the role of other marshals and generals, the party, and our army. You can’t create a new personality cult. In connection to this, I’d like to speak about preparation of the history of the Patriotic War. We examined this matter at a meeting of the CC Presidium. I asked the CC Commission to write the history of the war because if this is done by the Defense Ministry, mistakes may be made. You know, it is very hard for a hungry person to walk around porridge and not eat it.”67 At the end of his speech, Khrushchev stated, “I think we should undertake decisive measures on Comrade Zhukov. Our decision must be a warning to everyone who wants to put himself above the party. Anyone who ignores our party’s interests will not be spared by the party despite his merits or name.”68 Khrushchev detailed so much at the October Plenum that CC Secretary Suslov refrained from making a closing speech. Thus, in October 1957, “the collective leadership and periodic rounds of Kremlin infighting were now history. Khrushchev, increasingly surrounded by yes-men, quickly found himself a decision maker in a vacuum.”69 According to Suny, “now he [Khrushchev—J. H.] headed both party and state, backed by a loyal Central Committee and a subordinate police and army.”70 The October CC CPSU Plenum approved the Presidium’s decision made ten days earlier. The Plenum unanimously decided to dismiss Zhukov from the post of Defense Minister and from the composition of the Presidium and CC CPSU. Marshal Zhukov resigned in 1958. Prof. R. Pikhoya fairly writes, “Reading the Plenum’s materials, it is hard to shake off the impression that the reprisal over Zhukov went according to Stalin’s prescriptions, as the Plenum actually ‘dubbed’ Stalin’s 1946 secret order that envisioned Zhukov’s dismissal from the post of Chief Commander of land troops. The only difference is that in 1946, Zhukov, then forty-nine, was authorized to command a district and that now, in 1957, at sixty, he is to share the destiny of a disgraced pensioner.”71 Indeed, in the middle of 1940s Marshal Zhukov held the whole burden of Stalin’s nature on his shoulders. While in March 1946 he was recalled from Berlin to Moscow and appointed as Chief Commander of land troops and deputy minister of the Armed Forces, he was freed from all the posts and authorized to command the Odessa military district in June of the same year. But that was not all. A search at his Moscow apartment and dacha in January 1948 resulted in the confiscation of many jewels. In an explanatory note to A. Zhdanov, Zhukov indicated that his house and dacha with all the properties were owned by the KGB and that he had paid more than 60,000 rubles for the confiscated goods. The explanation did not save him. To check his activity, a commission was established consisting of Zhdanov, Bulganin, Kuznetsov, Suslov, and chairman of the party investigation commission under the

UCP (b) CC M. Shkiryatov. The commission reported the results of the investigation to the CC Political Bureau on January 20, 1948. In its decision, the Political Bureau said, “Comrade Zhukov, as Chief Commander of the Group of Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany, committed actions dishonoring the high rank of UCP (b) member and the honor of Soviet Army commander. Fully provided with all he needed by the state, Comrade Zhukov, abusing his post, chose the path of marauding through misappropriating a lot of jewels in Germany and exporting them from there for his own needs. For these reasons, and aspiring to money-grubbing without restraint, Comrade Zhukov exploited his subordinates who, in order to do him favors, committed evident crimes, stole pictures and other valuable items from palaces and villas, forced a safe in Lodz jewelry store and stole jewels from it, and so on.” Further, in its decision, the Political Bureau indicates a long list of stolen jewels and notes that Zhukov was insincere at the commission’s meeting as he tried to make every effort to hide and cover the facts of his anti-party behavior. With the aforesaid in mind, the UCP (b) CC resolved: 1. Recognizing that Comrade Zhukov is to be excluded from the party’s ranks and brought to court for his deeds, Comrade Zhukov is subject to a final warning and is given his last opportunity to reeducate himself to become an honest member of the party. 2. To dismiss Comrade Zhukov from the post of Commander of Odessa military district and appoint him as Commander of a smaller district. 3. To oblige Comrade Zhukov to hand over all jewels and items he misappropriated to the State Fund immediately.72 In line with the decision, in February 1948 Zhukov was sent to the Urals military district, where he served till March 1953, that is, until Stalin’s death. Upon the completion of the October 1957 Plenum of the CC CPSU, the CC CPSU Presidium’s October 19 resolution titled “On Improvement of Party/Political Work in the Soviet Army and Fleet” and the Plenum’s materials were discussed on various sites, especially at military units’ closed-door party meetings. Thus, at its October 29 meeting chaired by Yakovlev (Mustafayev still was in Moscow), the CC CPA Bureau urgently discussed the aforesaid documents. In its resolution, the Bureau noted that the commanders and chiefs of political bodies of units deployed in the republic’s territory were acquainted with the resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium and that the text of the resolution, in Russian and in Azeri, was sent to all the city committees and regional committees of the CPA to make CPSU members familiar with it. A meeting of the republic’s party activists was scheduled for November 1, for the reasons of discussing the October 19 decisions of the CC CPSU Presidium and of the CC CPSU October Plenum. Mustafayev was appointed as reporter. Commanders and political workers of military units deployed in the republic’s territory were invited to the meeting. Also, the Bureau decided to hold district, city, and regional meetings of party activists on November 2 to discuss the results of the CC CPSU October Plenum. Simultaneously, it was decided to instruct divisions of party bodies and administrative, trade/financial, and planning bodies of the CC CPA to submit reports on acquaintance with and discussion of the aforesaid documents to the CC CPSU.73

In a long speech at a meeting of the republic’s party activists on November 1, Mustafayev reported the results of the October Plenum, accentuating the report by Suslov and the speech by Khrushchev. Attending the meeting were the commanders of the Baku anti-aircraft defense district and high-ranking officers, so Mustafayev accentuated Suslov’s critical remarks addressing the command of the district. Gen.-Colonel V. Ivanov, District Commander, admitted the criticism expressed in either Moscow or Baku. Most serious mistakes were made in the organization of party/political work and in the activity of political bodies. Also, the meeting discussed the mistakes made under the use of national cadres in the Soviet Army. A meeting of party activists of the Baku anti-aircraft defense district took place on November 2. Mustafayev made a report titled “On Results of the October Plenum of the CC CPSU on Improvement of Party/Political Work in the Soviet Army and Fleet, and Tasks of District Party Activists and Party Organizations.” He built his speech upon analysis of the Presidium decision and materials of the October Plenum, adding a number of facts on the Baku antiaircraft defense district about which he had reported at the Plenum. Though mistakes made at the Baku district had been included in Suslov’s report, this time Mustafayev did not delve deeply into the problem and only criticized the retired I. Fedyuninsky, who had commanded the Transcaucasian military district in 1953–1957. In their speeches concerning theses of the report, high-ranking officers voiced their agreement with the party’s line on Marshal Zhukov. Aviation Gen.-Lieutenant M. Machin noted that the CC CPSU had discussed the question of improvement of party/political work in the Soviet Army in a timely manner and dismissed Zhukov from the post of defense minister as a person who had violated the Lenin principles of army buildup. He said, “a significant number of commanders of forty-two VIA units in 1956 and in early 1957 were subject to rough repressions. As a result, some officers rejected posts of commanders because they feared that otherwise they would be subject to severe repressions.” Machin voiced his disagreement with the abolishment of political bodies. He asked Mustafayev “to report to the CC CPSU that the Army’s crew, having eliminated the disadvantages, will perform its duties with honor.” Aviation Gen.-Major Beregovsky, who reported next, strongly criticized the activity of the former defense minister: “We felt that our party’s line in the Armed Forces was perverted, but we kept silent, as we were afraid of being beaten and ousted from the Army and party. The will of communists was depreciated through repressions, and we displayed cowardice. . . . But if I feared to inform the CC CPSU of this because persons like me and lower-ranking communists in the Army were ignored, let me ask: where were the higher-ranking communists, members of district and Army’s Military Councils? When he was in Baku, Gen. Fokin (deputy commander of anti-aircraft defense district—J. H.) made a speech to the commanders of our units and notified them of Soviet Union Marshal Biryuzov’s demand that initiative in work is foolishness, so it means nothing to display initiative because there are orders and directives that should be followed. I am saying this at the party activists’ meeting to make CC CPSU member Comrade Mustafayev notify the CC of comrade Biryuzov’s incorrect demand.74 Aviation Gen.-Major and Chief of the fortytwo VIA headquarters Reznichenko, in returning to the criticism of Baku anti-aircraft defense district for cadre battering contained in Suslov’s report, said, ‘We are displeased at such

reproach’. Nearly all commanders of regiments, bases, divisions and corps, headquarters commanders and many political workers were punished in 1956–1957. I have not seen such a situation over thirty years of serving in the Army. At a meeting of republic’s party activists yesterday, many communists talked about national cadres in the army. They fairly spoke about incorrect use of them. For example: in 1956, unit commander Lieut.-Colonel Mahmudov was on his way home. On the way, his driver, who stopped to add some water to the radiator, had his soldier’s blouse unbuttoned. Lieut.-Colonel Mahmudov was thus arrested for ten days and transferred to the reserve upon the commandment’s report. He came up to us, cried and asked for an explanation of why he was dismissed.”75 In his speech, Col. V. Molodtsov, commander of the district’s Political division, detailed the party’s role in the Armed Forces and explained the theoretical and practical role of political workers in the Army in light of the decisions of the October 1957 Plenum of the CC CPSU. As to improvement of relations with the local population, he stated the following: “Relations should be improved not only between the leaders of district committees and political bodies but also between servicemen and the population. We should do away with the cases of outrage against local population.”76 At the end of the meeting Gen.-Colonel V. Ivanov, district troops commander, took the floor. He had attended the Plenum and thus was perfectly aware of the essence of events. He began to praise the role of the party in the Soviet Army, voicing regret that some, for example, Comrade Zhukov, did not understand this. “He tried to isolate the army from the party, depreciate the role of political bodies, curtail the party’s work, and stand above the party.” Ivanov said Zhukov’s main faults were the attempt to abolish the Main Military Council and ban criticism in party organizations, allegedly with the aim of strengthening unity of command. Ivanov admitted that the criticism of the Defense Ministry expressed in Moscow also concerned the Baku anti-aircraft defense district. He said, “At the moment, our activists are a good school. For the first time in many years, people can say all they want or tell how they understand certain issues. . . . Here, many comrades have criticized me. They were right. Every person can make mistakes. And I have also made them. I admit this. But I have never been and will never be a scarecrow. I punished many commanders but I never beat them. On the contrary, I recommended many commanders for promotion. While there were no generals among the commanders of our divisions in the past, there are now six generals. In his speech, Comrade Reznichenko depicted Lieut.-Colonel Mahmudov as a kind of martyr dismissed from the army allegedly for the unbuttoned blouse of his driver. This is not so, comrades. He was dismissed for health reasons. Criticism is a good, useful thing, but we should also know its limits. Who authorized the political division’s deputy commander, Comrade Guskov, to call me, the communist, a gendarme? This comrade is present here, so I ask party activists to clarify the matter.”77 In closing speech, Mustafayev answered a number of political and administrative questions. Some of the questions were as follows: What is Comrade Zhukov’s adventurism? How did Zhukov behave at the CC CPSU Plenum and react to the criticism? Why are commanders of our district so often replaced? Why was Baku’s only street named after the Soviet Army—

Krasnoarmeyskaya—renamed Samed Vurghun Street?78 Having listened to and discussed Mustafayev’s report, the meeting of party activists of Baku anti-aircraft defense district unanimously approved the CC CPSU Plenum’s resolution and accepted it as a steadfast guideline. The party activists adopted a resolution of nine points supportive of the actions of the Presidium and CC CPSU. On November 3, S. Rahimov, member of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, made a speech at a party meeting of the Baku Garrison of the 4th Army. In his report, Gen.-Lieutenant S. Bobruk and other officers unanimously approved the CC CPSU Plenum’s resolution on the improvement of party/political work in the Soviet Army and Fleet and on the removal of Zhukov from the Presidium and CC CPSU. The Main Political Department and its head A. Zheltov were strongly criticized for not having informed the CC CPSU that Zhukov had depreciated the work of political bodies, and underestimated the party/political work, and that the Main Political Department had poor links to troops.79 In the immediate aftermath of the plenum, deputy commander of the 4th Army’s political department, Col. Karpov, and political commander head and Military Council’s member, Col. Kravchenko, reported, on November 1 and November 10, respectively, the political measures undertaken at military units to Mustafayev. As reported, everyone welcomed the decisions of the October Plenum, and no morbid interpretations of the CC CPSU resolution among the commanders were identified. However, the following questions were asked: Why was Marshal Zhukov dismissed when he was not in Moscow? Why was Marshal Zhukov upgraded in June from candidate to member of CC Presidium, given the fourth Gold Star, and sent to Yugoslavia but then dismissed at once? Why do such events happen too often in our country? Col. Karpov noted, “These moods and statements of some categories of officers illustrate that it is essential to do urgent, everyday explanatory work on the significance of CC CPSU decisions in the strengthening of the efficiency and fighting capacity of our country’s Armed Forces, mostly among officers.”80 The whole world watched the October 1957 crisis events, which were invisible to the naked eye and were not as smooth as they appeared, proceeding from solemn speeches at meetings. In reality, Marshal Zhukov’s dismissal from all the posts echoed through the Army in different ways. Security agents who were embedded among soldiers and officers made rather alarming reports. On November 5 Col. Monastirsky, head of the KGB’s department responsible for the 4th Army, reported quite secretly to Mustafayev: Positive reactions are combined with other sayings; for example, Lieut.-Colonel V. Gazenko, commander of the 95th communications regiment, stated on October 31, 1957, “Khrushchev is clearing his way. He removed the old men—Molotov and others—so young men will obey him. Now they will say Zhukov is so-andso like they talked about Stalin earlier. He was not alone but where was the CC?” Major P. Krasnoshekov of the same regiment said, “Well, Zhukov made mistakes, but it was the CC that had to stop him. They have made too many mistakes lately. Everyone cries of party work but does nothing.” Captain R. Ashikhin said, “Zhukov will share the fate of Suvorov. When necessary, he will be asked something, but now the situation does not require this so they dismissed him from the post of defense minister. Zhukov is a good tactician but perhaps could

not get along with the government.” E. Zuyevsky, a student of the Baku Military School, reported, “I do not know whom I should believe. There have been such changes in the government over a short period of time. They removed Molotov, Kaganovitch, Malenkov and now Zhukov, so I cannot understand what is going on.” I. P. Ponomarev, Chief Commander of the tank battalion headquarters, stated, “The CC CPSU decision on Zhukov is right but made to the detriment of Soviet leaders’ prestige. It may happen so that when other Soviet ministers are abroad they will be thought about in the following way: you are here as a Soviet leader, but is it worth settling important matters with you, given that it was probably already decided to dismiss you?” Lieutenant N. Gulyayev of the same regiment voiced a more interesting thought: “All we have to do is to appoint E. A. Furtseva as defense minister of the USSR, and the matter will be settled.” As viewed by mechanized division commander, Major M. Napakh, “When Stalin was in power and held all the leadership in his hands, everyone worked honestly because of fear of Stalin. Since Stalin died, everyone wants to come to power, not to mention to take over the highest post and thus make history.” Unit commander of the 75th infantry division, Senior Sergeant Rodionov, said, “Perhaps someone in the government resembles Beria so he is creating intrigues against good men. Molotov, Kaganovitch, and Malenkov were removed first, and then Zhukov. I simply do not believe that Zhukov did anything wrong.” All such seditious thoughts caused anxiety, so the political bodies of the 4th Army were ordered to strengthen their explanatory work among the crew.81 Monastirsky’s second report to Mustafayev on November 19 primarily covered Baku Military School’s officers and students’ reactions to the decision of the October Plenum of the CC CPSU. For example, in the presence of several men, Senior Sergeant A. Zhitkov stated, “Zhukov was right that he disliked political workers because they were lazy. Zhukov was dismissed when he was absent, and then sent to Yugoslavia and Albania; perhaps they were afraid, so they decided to send him there to dismiss him later.” Another participant of the conversation, a student named Kolotilov, was tougher: “We need to bomb the government and then elect a new government.” During the conversation among students, A. Shelegenda displayed the gift of political foresight in accusing Khrushchev of isolating Molotov, Kaganovitch, and others: “He will finish badly; he will be removed as time comes. Making use of his power as the secretary, he removes everyone he dislikes. In particular, he declared Molotov, who gave his whole life to the struggle for socialism, the enemy of the nation.”82 On November 18, Colonel V. Molodtsov, Commander of the Political Department of the Baku Anti-Aircraft Defense District, sent a broad report on the course of examination of the CC CPSU resolution and on practical proposals over an increase of the role of political bodies in troops to Mustafayev. According to the report, the political department’s officers and commanders of political departments of all units personally read the text of Suslov’s speech at the October Plenum, condemned the wrong, harmful line of the former defense minister, Comrade Zhukov, and held party-style conversation about disadvantages in the district’s units and divisions’ party/political work and about the necessity of elimination of these problems as soon as possible. The report said the communists strongly criticized Gen.-Colonel Ivanov, commander of district troops, who maintains strict discipline through threats and violence.

Marshal Biryuzov and General Kalashnik not only knew about this, but they were also supportive of Ivanov. Instead of training his subordinates to a high level of understanding, Ivanov broadly applied the so-called triplet: displace, downgrade, and dismiss. I. Fedyuninsky, the former commander of the Transcaucasian military district, was also criticized strongly. It also appears from Molodtsov’s report that some communists misunderstood a series of new provisions and made erroneous statements due to insufficient political maturity. Anonymous notes of seditious content were handed over to the Presidium even at meetings. Security agents identified these dissidents and took them under control.83 On December 6, 1957, Mustafayev submitted a document titled “Information of Critical Remarks and Proposals Expressed by Communists under the Examination of CC CPSU Resolution ‘On Improvement of Party/Political Work in Soviet Army and Fleet’ in Military Units and Divisions Deployed in the Territory of the Azerbaijan SSR” to the CC CPSU. The document read: “The resolutions of the CC CPSU of October 19, 1957 and the resolutions of the October Plenum of the CC CPSU ‘On Improvement of Party/Political Work in Soviet Army and Fleet’ are accepted by commanders, political workers, and the whole crew of the Soviet Army and Fleet’s units and divisions deployed in the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR with great satisfaction. Members of CC CPA, as well as heads of political bodies and commanders of units, made reports at meetings of party activists to discuss the results of the October Plenum of the CC CPSU. Noting the timeliness and correctness of CC CPSU decisions ‘On Improvement of Party/Political Work in Soviet Army and Fleet’ and blaming the wrong, harmful line of the former defense minister, Comrade Zhukov, communists, in the spirit of the party, spoke bravely of disadvantages in the party/political work of units and divisions, and strongly criticized the wrongdoings of some commanders and political workers. Many critical remarks were addressed to the former commander of the Transcaucasian military district, Comrade Fedyuninsky, the commander of the Baku Anti-Aircraft Defense District troops, Comrade Ivanov, the chief commandment of country’s Anti-Aircraft Defense District, and the main political division of the Soviet Army. Comrade Fedyuninsky was criticized for roughness, bad administration, bad examination and choice of cadre, and for his inappropriate attitude toward the crew of officers under the disbandment of the former 34th infantry division where the majority of officers had been Azerbaijanis. As noted at meetings of party activists in units of the Baku Anti-Aircraft Defense District, the harmful line of battering and scaring the crew pursued by Comrade Zhukov found its application in the troops of the Baku Anti-Aircraft Defense District, particularly, in the forty-two VIA district, which was mentioned in fairness at the October 1957 Plenum of the CC CPSU. Claims were filed against the Main Political Department (MPD) of the Soviet Army because of its isolation from troops. District party activists of the Baku Anti-Aircraft Defense District wrote in their decisions that the MPD, despite receiving numerous signals from sites that the party/political work in troops was bad, turned to be unscrupulous, displayed tolerance to the perversions and disadvantages, and did not raise this question before the CC CPSU. In closing part of the “Information” section, Mustafayev made proposals, many of which coincided with Molodtsov’s. These proposals were designed to strengthen the role of the party in the Army, strengthen the political work,

improve living standards of officers and sergeants, increase the level of cultural work, soften Zhukov-era repressive discipline, and so forth.84 Mustafayev was eager to subdue high-ranking army officials in Transcaucasia, including Azerbaijan, because they had long ignored the republic’s party organization and looked down upon local leadership; crews of units consisting of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians were arrogant toward the local population. Compared to the leaders of the other Caucasian republics, Mustafayev took a more active role in the October 1957 events. This was primarily because Zhukov, as defense minister, prevented Azerbaijanis from training and caused problems for conscripts who had been called to the Army from Azerbaijan. As a result of the October 1957 Plenum, the party CC took over the last center of power that had been beyond its strict, direct control. This process developed in several stages. In summer of 1953, the party established direct control of interior bodies, in summer of 1957—of the government, and in the fall of that year—of the Army. Taubman wrote that the victory over Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich in June 1957, a few months after the resignation of Zhukov, gave Khrushchev the sole power in the country.85 As a result, Zhukov, one of the greatest strategists of World War II who had become the symbol of Soviet people’s victory in 1945, simply became an honored veteran much earlier than he should have. Thus, it became clear that the Khrushchev liberalism, as a matter of fact, differed very little from the Stalin totalitarianism. NOTES 1. Prezidium TSK KPSS. 1954–1964. T.1 Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammi. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 212–213, 985. 2. Rudolf Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast, Sorok Let Posle Voyni, 1945–1985, (Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 331–334. 3. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 333. 4. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, pp. 168–170. 5. For more information see: Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, pp. 66–70. 6. From Vice-Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR Council of Ministers p. Ivashutin to Central Committee CPSU. 07.09.1957.// RNHSA, f.5, r.50, v.43, pp. 72–75. 7. From Yakovlev to Central Committee CPSU. 13.05.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 63. 8. Prezidium TSK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. II. Postanovleniya 1954–1958. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. II. Decree 1954–1958), pp. 434–442. 9. Ibid., pp. 433–434. 10. Nizhnik, Salnikov, Mushket. Ministri vnutrennih del Rossiyskogo gosudarstva (1802–2002). SPb., 2002. (Nizhnik, Salnikov, Mushket. Ministers of the Interior of the Russian State 1802–2002), pp. 449–450. 11. From Mustafayev to Minister of the Interior of the USSR Dudorov. 01.07.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, pp. 100–101. 12. From Mustafayev to Central Committee CPSU. 01.07.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 7–9. 13. From Kopylov to Mustafayev. 15.01.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, p. 10. 14. From Mustafayev to Central Committee CPSU. 15.01.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, p. 11. 15. From Zhukov to Mustafayev. 28.12.1956.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.37, pp. 68–69. 16. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the employment and housing of retired officers.” 15.01.1957. //APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.37, pp. 62–63. 17. From Fedor Kopylov to Ivan Serov. Memorandum of agent and operational work of the hereditary KGB at the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR in 1957. January, 1958.// From materials of the AMNS AR. 18. Information about preventive measures undertaken KGB at the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. 07.01.1960.//

From materials of the AMNS AR. 19. From Kopylov and Babayev to Central Committee of the CPA. 21. 02. 1957.// From materials of the AMNS AR. 20. From Kopylov to Serov. Memorandum of agent and operational work of the hereditary KGB at the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR in 1957. January, 1958.// From materials of the AMNS AR. 21. From Avakov to Kopylov. Report. June 1957.// From materials of the AMNS AR. 22. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On the composition and movement of the Party organization of the Republic for 1956.” 23.04.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 161–163. 23. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On work of Glavlit” 17.05.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.70, pp. 111–113. 24. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On exclusion of books and pamphlets from the data of the previous orders of Glavlit Azerbaijan SSR on seizure of literature.” 14.05.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.69, pp. 107–116,//; From Musayev to Qurbanov. 16.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.69, p. 129. 25. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On exclusion from the list of all the products which are on the orders of the head of Glavlit of the Azerbaijani SSR on seizure of literature. 05.04.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.58, pp. 256–257. 26. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On exclusion from the list of persons of all the products which are on the orders of the chief of the Glavlit of Azerbaijan SSR on seizure of literature.” 19.02.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.42, p. 280. 27. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), p. 186. 28. Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voyni. 1945–1985, (R. Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 289–292. 29. See: Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at the meeting of Writers in the Central Committee of CPSU. 13.05.1957.// President Archive of the Russian Federation (PARF), f.52, r.1 v. 255, pp. 47–86; For more information see: Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), pp. 422–425. 30. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 175. 31. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), p. 14. 32. Communist (in Azeri), 1957, 5 June. 33. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 119. 34. Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voyni. 1945–1985. (Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 350–354; Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), pp. 14–27. 35. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), pp. 33–41. 36. Ibid., pp. 42–43. 37. Ibid., pp. 46–68. 38. Ibid., pp. 300–303. 39. Ibid., pp. 563–580. 40. Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 418. 41. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 355. 42. Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 429. 43. Decision of the Bureau of the CC CPA “On the results of the June Plenum of the CC CPSU.” 01–02.07.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.79, pp. 91–92. 44. Plenary Session V Communist Party of Azerbaijan together with the Republican Party activists. 02.07. 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.19, pp. 1–18. 45. Nadezhda Ismailova. Suleiman Vezirov-portret na fone veka. Baku, 2006. (N. Ismailova. Suleiman Vezirov- Portrait on the Background of a Century), pp. 68–82. 46. Plenary Session V Communist Party of Azerbaijan together with the Republican Party activists. 02.07. 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.19, pp. 18–24. 47. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), p. 532. 48. Speech of Nikita Khrushchev at the 11th meeting of the June (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Shorthand June record (1957) of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 28.06.1957. // RNHSA, f. 2, r. 1, v. 161, pp. 223–224. 49. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), p. 473–474. 50. Koptevsky Rossiya-Turtsiya: etapi torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva. M., 2003. (Koptevsky. RussiaTurkey: Stages of trade-economic collaboration. Moscow, 2003), p. 120. 51. PARF. f.52, r. 1, v. 498, p. 63. 52. Plenary Session V Communist Party of Azerbaijan together with the Republican Party activists. 02.07.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.19, pp. 25–40. 53. Ibid., pp. 41–47. 54. From Mustafayev to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 04.10.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 143. 55. From Mustafayev to the Central Committee of the CPSU. 29.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, pp. 217–221. 56. From Imam Mustafayev to the Minister of Grain Products of the USSR Leonid Korniets. 14.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, pp. 175 57. From Iskenderov to Mustafayev. 22.08.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 179. 58. APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 179. 59. Resolution of the Central Committee CPSU of August 28, 1957 “On Streamlining of Process of Naming Districts, Regions, Provinces, as well as Cities and other Settlements, Enterprises, Kolkhozes, Institutions, and Organizations after State and Public Figures.” 28.08.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.90, p. 44. 60. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch. 1957. Stenogramma iyunskogo Plenuma TSK KPSS i drugiye dokumenti. (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Verbatim report of June Plenum of CC CPSU and other documents), p. 85. 61. Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voyni. 1945–1985. (Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 362–363. 62. Danilov, Pyzhikov. Rojdeniye sverhderjavy: SSSR v perviye poslevoyenniye gody. Moscow, 2001. (Danilov, Pyzhikov. Rebirth of superpower: USSR in the first postwar years. Moscow, 2001), p. 200. 63. From Mustafayev to Khrushchev. 26.10.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 277–281. 64. Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU. October, 1957. Verbatim Report. // RNHSA, f. 2, r. 1, v. 268, pp. 4–15. 65. Ibid., pp. 34–35. 66. Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU. October, 1957. Verbatim Report. // RNHSA, f. 2, r. 1, v. 269, pp. 72–73. 67. Ibid., p. 82. 68. Ibid., p. 86. 69. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 121. 70. Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 428. 71. Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voyni. 1945–1985. (Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), p. 367. 72. Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Comrade G. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union.” 20.01.1948.// RSASPH , f.17, r.3, v.1068, pp. 28–29. 73. Meeting of Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU of 19 October 1957. “On Improvement of Party-Political Work at Soviet Army and Fleet.” 29.10.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.96, p. 99. 74. From Head of Political Department of the Baku Anti-Aircfaft Defense District Colonel V.Molodtsov to Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 06.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 382–386. 75. Ibid., p. 373. 76. Ibid., p. 356. 77. Ibid., pp. 351–354. 78. Ibid., p. 349. 79. From head of the Political Department of the 4th Army Colonel Kravchenko to I. Mustafayev. 11.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 301–304. 80. From deputy commander of 4th Army’s political department, Colonel Karpov to Mustafayev. Information on the work done in the military units of the 4th Army to bring the organization and performance of the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 19.10.1957 “On Improvement of Party-Political Work at Soviet Army and Fleet.” 01.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 316–321.

81. From head of KGB’s department responsible for the 4th Army Colonel Monastirsky to Mustafayev. Information note “on the response of military personnel 4th Army to address the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.” 05.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 305–309. 82. From head of KGB’s department responsible for the 4th Army Colonel Monastirsky to Mustafayev. Information Note “on the response of individual officers and students of the Baku military school to decision the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 310–315. 83. From Head of Political Department of the Baku Anti Air Defense District Colonel V. Molodtsov to I. Mustafayev. 18.11.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 322–336. 84. Information of Critical Remarks and Proposals Expressed by Communists under the Examination of CC CPSU Resolution “On Improvement of Party-Political Work at Soviet Army and Fleet” in Military Units and Divisions Deployed in the Territory of the Azerbaijan SSR.” 06.12.1957.//APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.119, pp. 292–296. 85. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 399.

Chapter 6

Transformation of the National Policy into Key Vector of Society’s Development

Preparations for an all-USSR Census began in February 1957. The CC CPSU Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on February 2 titled “On Conducting allUSSR Census.” It was decided to carry out the Census in January 1959. The necessity of this important state project was accounted for by the fact that the previous Census had been held in 1939, so it was essential to collect exact information on changes in the country over the past twenty years. The huge human losses the country suffered in the years of the Great Patriotic War, the deportation of a number of nations from places of permanent residence, and the halved process of rehabilitation of those convicted innocently, no doubt, negatively affected population’s size as well as its location and employment. Khrushchev’s thoughtless experiments—the unsuccessful change of benchmarks in industry and agriculture—in the middle of the 1950s led to the growth of unemployment among youth. In Azerbaijan, the unemployment problem was worse than that of the country’s other regions. On March 12, 1957, the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR discussed central bodies’ decision titled “On Conducting all-USSR Census.” Upon the completion of the discussion, an appropriate document was adopted obliging the State Statistics Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Nakhchivan ASSR, the Mountainous Garabagh’s Executive Committee, and district and city executive committees of Councils of working deputies to regard the February 2, 1957 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR as a guideline. The Statistics Department was made responsible for conducting the Census in the Azerbaijan SSR and making preparations for it. For this purpose, executive bodies were given time till January 1, 1958 to “specify borders of cities and urban settlements; streamline the numeration of houses and blocks in all the cities and urban settlements, as well as the names of streets, squares, blind alleys, and side streets; hang street signs indicating the names of streets and numbers of houses; hang indicators of apartments and tenants; and draw up district maps indicating all the settlements, railway stations, booths, forest warden’s huts, pastures and other places of residence.” It was essential not to make any changes in the administrative-territorial division of regions, cities, urban settlements, and villages, or rename administrative units or separate settlements after January 1, 1958. The Interior Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR was given time till January 1, 1958 to supply all the cities and urban settlements with registers of tenants and undertake measures to streamline them, to register all

tenants, including children of all ages, and cancel the registration of those who had left.1 On March 19, 1957 the CC CPA Bureau adopted the CC CPSU Presidium’s resolution “On Conducting All-USSR Census” as a guideline. CC CPA district, city, and regional party committees were told to discuss the resolution “On Conducting All-USSR Census” that the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR had passed on March 12, 1957, and to undertake measures to implement the resolution. The Bureau instructed the Statistics Department of the Azerbaijan SSR to inform the CC CPA of the preparatory works.2 The 1959 Census was the fourth one in the USSR after the censuses carried out in 1926, 1937, and 1939. The January 1937 Census was surprising for the Soviet leadership on a number of indicators. Thus, on September 26, 1937, the USSR Council of People’s Deputies declared the Census erroneous and cancelled the data. For example, Stalin told the 17th Congress of the UCP (b) in 1934 that the population, as of the end of 1933, was 168 million. The 1937 Census illustrated that the population had not increased but decreased to 162 million over the previous four years. Moreover, that happened at a time when the USSR State Planning Committee predicted an increase of the population up to 180 million in 1937 and 183 million in 1939.3 The analysis of the 1937 Census revealed the awful truth that more than 40 million people had died in the country over the past decade. The mortality rate was double the average European one.4 In addition, the 1937 Census displayed interesting data concerning the national composition of the population; for example, 2,134,250 Azerbaijani Turks, 2,008,939 Georgians, and 1,968,721 Armenians lived in the country. Apart from Azerbaijanis, 10,285 more people wrote “Turk” in the section “nationality.” As for the national composition of population in republics, the population of Azerbaijan totaled 3,056,449, including 1,778,798 Turks, 479,008 Russians, 370,164 Armenians, 104,290 Lezghins, 99,145 Talyshes, 56,933 Tats, 12,854 Avars, 10,899 Mountainous Jews, 10,878 Kurds, 1,498 Iranians, and 131,982 representatives of other nationalities. The population of the Georgian SSR totaled 3,378,064, including 1,991,962 Georgians, 395,796 Armenians, 275,892 Russians, 178,038 Azerbaijani Turks, 143,604 Ossetians, 88,217 Adzharians, 87,385 Greeks, 55,409 Abkhazians, 40,855 Ukrainians, 29,721 Jews, 12,601 Kurds, 9,387 Turks, 1,430 Germans, 440 Iranians, and 67,327 representatives of other nationalities. The population of the Armenian SSR totaled 1,209,456, including 1,009,004 Armenians, 124,434 Azerbaijani Turks, 40,472 Russians, 22,313 Kurds, 3,803 Greeks, 3,164 Aysors, 28 Iranians, 27 Turks, and 3,345 representatives of other nationalities. The 1937 Census data shows that the number of Kurds residing in Armenia was double the number in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, Meskhetian Turks, who were deported from Georgia in 1944, had not been registered during the 1937 Census at all. They were all most likely registered as Adzharians. 9,387 people registered in Georgia as Turks were former citizens of Turkey, naturalized citizens of Turkey or persons without citizenship. The 1937 Census had registered 206,045 Crimean Tatars, who were deported in 1944. The third largest number of Azerbaijani Turks, after Georgia and Armenia, was registered in the Dagestan ASSR at 37,861.5 After the 1937 Census was declared invalid and its organizers were repressed, the new 1939 Census contained no matters troubling the Soviet leadership. This was particularly displayed in change of the methodology of determination of people’s

education level as a result of “cultural revolution.” Preparations for the Census that began in 1957 and the discussion of the problems of repressions and unlawful deportation of nations at the June Plenum led to specific results. After the exiled nations were rehabilitated, many people were permitted to return to their native places. However, an April 28, 1956 resolution by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks did not authorize them to return to their places of residence. New facts were also disclosed. According to a decision by the State Defense Committee of July 31, 1944, apart from Meskhetian Turks, 24,000 Azerbaijanis were deported from Georgia although none of the state acts had called for that. Of the number of exiled Azerbaijanis, 11,000 were accommodated in Uzbekistan, some 10,000 in Kazakhstan, and around 3,000 in Kyrgyzstan.6 That was a consequence of the fact that Azerbaijanis in either Azerbaijan or other republics prior to 1936 had officially been called Turks, so Azerbaijanis who had lived near Meskhetian Turks were also repressed. After the April 28, 1956 resolution appeared, they asked the government of Azerbaijan for help. Meskhetian Turks joined the request. The idea of deportation of the Turkish population residing in Georgia along the Turkish borders had emerged back in the spring of 1944. However, the question at the time was about resettlement of some 77,500 Turks to Eastern Georgia, that is, to areas where the Azerbaijani population resided compactly. The appropriate operation started with Tbilisi. On March 25, 1944, as a result of measures led by Georgian Interior Commissar G. Karanadze, 3,240 Azerbaijanis and Kurds (a total of 608 families) were deported from the capital of Georgia.7 A wide-scale deportation of Turks began a bit later. Beria proposed to Stalin a deportation of 16,700 families of Turks, Kurds, and Hemshils (Armenian Muslims) from areas bordering Turkey. On July 31, 1944, the State Defense Committee decided to resettle 86,000 people (16,700 families) from Georgia’s districts of Adygen, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Aspindza, Bogdanovsky, and the Adzharian autonomous republic to Central Asian republics. Of those resettled, 76,021 were Turks, 8,694 were Kurds, and 1,385 were Hemshils. Another 3,181 Turks joined them later.8 The resettlement began on November 15, 1944. Over three days, 92,307 Meskhetian Turks were deported, including 53,133 to Uzbekistan, 28,598 to Southern Kazakhstan, and 10,546 to Kyrgyzstan. Upon the completion of the operation on November 28, Beria sent the following inquiry to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov: “A significant part of this population with relationship ties to residents of regions bordering Turkey has been engaged in smuggling, displayed a desire to emigrate, and has been used by Turkish intelligence for reasons of recruitment of espionage elements and spread of gangs.”9 When Turks were cleared out of the aforesaid territories, the State Defense Committee of the USSR let Georgia’s Council of People’s Deputies resettle 32,000 people (7,000 families) from Georgia’s land-poor regions to the freed lands.10 They were largely Armenians. The Soviet leadership returned to the problem in 1949. On April 4, 1949, the Political Bureau passed a resolution titled “On Deportation of Turkish Citizens, Turks without Citizenship, and Former Turkish Citizens Who Took Soviet Citizenship Residing on the Black Sea Coastline and in Transcaucasia,” under which everyone who had escaped during the previous cleansing was deported. Thus, 1949 marked the end of clearing the Black Sea

coastline and Southern Caucasus from Turks, a process that had begun in 1944. Their deportation was recognized as unlawful in the middle of the 1950s. However, unlike other nations, they were not allowed to return to their homeland. Armenians who had been deported to the Altay district, in turn, were allowed to return home in the middle of the 1950s. With this in mind, Mustafayev instructed the republic’s bodies to collect necessary information on Azerbaijanis who had been deported from Georgia. Having received the needed information, on August 12, 1957 he appealed to the CC CPSU with the following statement: “In 1944, in line with State Defense Committee instruction #6279 of July 31, 1944, the families of Turks, Kurds, and Hemshils were resettled from the Georgian SSR to special settlements in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek SSR. Many Azerbaijanis, who had officially been called Turks before 1936, were among those resettled as if they were Turks. According to information the CC CPA is aware of, more than 17,000 Azerbaijanis who had been deported from the Georgian SSR in 1944 currently reside in the special settlements. According to an April 28, 1956 Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR titled ‘On Lifting Restrictions over Special Settlement of Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Turks-USSR Citizens, Kurds, Hemshils and Members of their Families Deported in the Period of the Great Patriotic War,’ Turks, Kurds, Hemshils, and members of their families are no longer registered as special settlement inhabitants but are not authorized to return to their places of previous residence. The Union and republic’s party and Soviet bodies have recently received numerous appeals from Azerbaijanis residing in special settlements asking them to eliminate the provision that bans them to return to their previous places of residence. In addition, many of them ask to be permitted and assisted to resettle to the Azerbaijan SSR because they find great difficulties in raising and educating their children in the native language at the special settlements. The CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR consider it possible to employ Azerbaijanis who currently reside in special settlements in the republic’s kolkhozes and sovkhozes in accordance with the plan. The CC CPA asks the CC CPSU: 1. To explore the opportunity of authorizing Azerbaijanis, who in 1944 were resettled from the Georgian SSR to special settlements in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek SSR, to return to the places of their previous residence and resettle to the Azerbaijan SSR. 2. To permit sending representatives of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR on official trips to the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek SSR to identify a list of those desiring to resettle to the Azerbaijan SSR and organize their resettlement. 3. To provide Azerbaijanis under resettlement with the privileges the Government established for Chechens, Balkars, and others returning to the places of previous residence.”11 The CC CPSU discussed the matter and created a commission to examine the questions Mustafayev had raised. The commission asked the leadership of Georgia to express its opinion. Georgians spoke against Meskhetian Turks’ return to native places. P. Kovanov, Secretary of the CC CPG, wrote to the CC CPSU in September 1957: “The CC CPG is against

return of persons who were deported from republic’s border regions to places of previous residence because lands in these regions have already been occupied and explored by new settlers. Previous residents’ return will only cause a disruptive situation at the border, not to mention that many of those resettled in 1944 have relationship ties to residents of Turkey. We thus think it is essential to keep the April 8, 1956 Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR in force.”12 Considering the Georgian government’s denial as a basis, the CC CPSU Presidium Commission concluded that no restrictions over Azerbaijanis expelled from Georgia could be lifted and that Azerbaijanis should not be allowed to return to their homeland. In addition, the Commission did not allow CC CPA representatives touring Central Asian republics to familiarize themselves with the lives of the deported Azerbaijanis.13 But Mustafayev disagreed with the statement of the question. On October 2, 1957, he wrote a new letter to the CC CPSU Presidium indicating the number of the repatriated Azerbaijanis (28,000) and asking to let them return freely to the previous places of residence and “to other Union republics if they desire.” Mustafayev insisted that the Commission’s decision not to lift the 1940s’ restrictions on Azerbaijanis and not let them return to the previous places of residence “would mean adding another injustice to the injustice once committed against these citizens.”14 Mustafayev’s letter was tough. Thus, the CC Presidium on October 19, 1957 reexamined the matter and partially satisfied the request, that is, they let the deported Azerbaijanis leave Central Asia, not for Georgia but for Azerbaijan. Proceeding from the CC CPSU Presidium’s decision, on October 19, 1957 the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR issued an order titled “On Lifting Restrictions over USSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality Resettled from the Georgian SSR in 1944.” On October 31, 1957 it issued an order titled “On Resettlement of USSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality from the Uzbek SSR, Kyrgyz SSR, and Kazakh SSR to the Azerbaijan SSR in 1958–1960.” Moscow instructed the party leadership of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to explain the orders to citizens of Azerbaijani nationality. The Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR was permitted to provide privileges to Azerbaijanis who had expressed their desire to resettle to Azerbaijan for permanent residence. On November 13 the CC CPA Bureau discussed the aforesaid Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium and the Orders of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, specifying measures to implement these decisions. A commission was established led by Rahimov and consisting of I. K. Abdullayev, A. S. Bayramov, N. M. Hajiyev, Q. M. Jafarly, M. A. Iskenderov, M. T. Mamedov, S. A. Orujov, and H. A. Seyidov. The commission was instructed to examine all materials relating to the Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium and Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On Lifting Restrictions over USSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality Resettled from the Georgian SSR in 1944,” and to submit proposals for consideration to the CC Bureau and Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.15 On March 6, 1958, the commission submitted its proposals to the CC Bureau. 2,150 families were expected to arrive from the Uzbek SSR. They had to be distributed over the republic’s regional kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the following way: 100 families in Ali-Bayramli, 500

families in Saatly, 200 families in Aghjabedi, 200 families in Udjar, 200 families in Zardab, 100 families in Kurdamir, 200 families in Barda, 100 families in Mir-Bashir, 200 families in Zhdanov, 50 families in Lenkoran, 150 families in Khudat, and 100 families in Shamakhy. Thus, 1,650 families were distributed over kolkhozes, 200 families over the Agriculture Ministry’s sovkhozes, and 300 families over the Economic Council’s sovkhozes. For the reasons of calculation of the number of families of Azerbaijanis in Uzbekistan and organization of their resettlement to Azerbaijan, a commission was established consisting of H. Suleimanov, Deputy Agriculture Minister; S. Alekberov, Deputy Head of the CC CPA Agriculture Division; M. Jafarov, head of the Agriculture Ministry’s Organizational Kolkhoz Division; A. Askerov, employee of the Council of Ministers; and Q. Novruzov, an employee of Agriculture Ministry’s Resettlement Division. They were sent on a mission to Tashkent. At the same time, the Planning Committee, the Agriculture Ministry, and the Economic Council of the republic were given one month to submit their proposals on creation of new kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other institutions where families of Azerbaijanis arriving from Central Asian republics could be settled for consideration to the CC CPA. Given that the majority of 924 houses built earlier for re-settlers from Armenia were unsuitable for living, it was decided to oblige regional party and Soviet organizations to temporarily accommodate those under resettlement from Uzbekistan in the houses of kolkhoz workers, at sovkhozes and other organizations; to allocate the necessary funds to families under resettlement; and to provide them with building materials to let them build homes and economic premises within three to four months. On March 18, 1958, the CC CPA Bureau approved the proposals and instructed the commission to start implementing them.16 Based upon the proposals of the republic’s Council of Ministers, on June 17, 1958 the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued an instruction titled “On Resettlement of USSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality from the Uzbekistan SSR, Kyrgyzstan SSR, and Kazakhstan SSR to the Azerbaijan SSR in 1958–1960.” The instruction envisioned issuing Agricultural Bank’s credits to the re-settlers. It included a 10,000-ruble credit per family for construction of houses with outhouses, with a ten-year period of depreciation and three-year grace period; a 3,000-ruble credit for the repair of houses and outhouses, with a three-year period of depreciation; and a 1,500-ruble credit per family for the purchase of cows and longhorn cattle. The Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR was authorized to issue one-time monetary assistance in the amount of up to 1,000 rubles to families with the most need. In addition, the republic’s budget was made responsible for resettlement-related costs. On June 24, 1958, the CC CPA and republic’s Council of Ministers adopted a resolution consisting of nineteen points. M. Mamedov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was authorized to coordinate all the work. Attaching great political and economic significance to resettlement of the repressed Azerbaijanis, the republic’s leadership demanded that the Economic Council, ministries, bodies, and party and Soviet bodies provide the necessary systematic assistance in the resettlement process.17 That is how the process of return of displaced persons began in mid-1958. The first group of re-settlers from Uzbekistan consisted of 2,000 families. The measures helped increase the number of re-settlers from Central Asian republics up to

13,010.18 Apart from the issue of re-settlers, the republic’s leadership settled another matter at the end of 1957. Azerbaijanis who had been deported from Armenia in 1948–1952 accumulated debts to the Agriculture Bank of the USSR. Following insistent requests by the CC CPA and republic’s Council of Ministers, on October 26, 1957 the Council of Ministers of the USSR ordered to write off the debts of Azerbaijani re-settlers from the Armenian SSR in the amount of 13.5 million rubles. To implement the order, the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR developed a plan of measures approved by A. Sultanova, Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers, on December 18.19 The republic’s leadership had to deal with not only Azerbaijanis deported from Armenia but also the aftermath of the damage the neighboring republic had done to Azerbaijan’s ecology. Crude industrial sewage started being dumped into the waters of the Okhchu-Chay River, the region’s only water source, since the Kajaran copper-molybdenum enterprise was put into operation in Armenia in the early 1950s. Starting from 1953, the leadership of Azerbaijan raised the question of building sewage treatment plants until the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy provided money for that purpose. Nevertheless, sewage treatment works were delayed, so contaminated water did damage to either agriculture or human health. A. Ibrahimov, head of the CC CPA industry and transport division, sent an inquiry to CC Secretary Iskenderov illustrating that the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR had assigned 18 million rubles for construction of the Zangezur ore enterprise’s sewage treatment plants, of which only 8 million rubles, as of January 1, 1957, had been exploited. Four million were assigned for use in 1957. The treatment plant had to be completed in 1958.20 Concerned over the pace of the work, Mustafayev appealed to the CC CPSU heavy industry division. He wrote, “The Zangelan region of the Azerbaijan SSR is located in the valley of the Okhchu-Chay River, which is the only water source in the region. Over the years Okhchu-Chay has been contaminated with a considerable volume of crude industrial sewage produced by the USSR Non-Ferrous Metallurgy Ministry’s enterprises located in the territory of the Armenian SSR, which seriously damages the agricultural production and extremely negatively affects the health of people consuming the river’s water. Since 1953 we have been asking to build sewage treatment plants at the Kajaran copper-molybdenum enterprise and at the Zangezur ore and mining enterprise of the Union’s Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. But given that the work at the Zangezur enterprise has been delayed and not completed so far, Okhchu-Chay still gets contaminated by the sewage. Given that the matter is important, we’d like to ask you to interfere to speed up the construction of the sewage treatment plants.”21 Unemployment spread widely among youth beginning in the middle of the 1950s. Thousands of young people could not find jobs after they left schools. In a move to reduce the problem, the government declared calls to virgin lands and to grandiose construction sites in the USSR’s north and east. In 1956 alone, owing to the propaganda by the party and Komsomol, it became possible to employ more than 200,000 young people in the country’s northern and eastern regions and at Donbass construction sites. The CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a joint resolution on June 14, 1957 titled “On 1957 Social Call for Youth to Work at Most Important Construction Sites in USSR Eastern and Northern Regions and at Donbass.”

The resolution assumed mobilization of 60,000 young people under the slogan of patriotic initiative. Azerbaijan’s share in the movement was 1,300 people. Thus, on July 9, 1957 the CC CPA and republic’s Council of Ministers obliged party, Komsomol, Soviet, and trade union bodies to join the call, widely disseminate propaganda before September, and mobilize 1,300 young workers to build a Jezkazgan copper-smelting plant in the Karaganda district of the Kazakh SSR. Industrial workers who had been dismissed and youth who had started working after school were to be called up for this reason. Young workers, who needed to be recruited to serve in the Soviet Army, could not be sent to the construction sites. Of the total number of 1,300 people, Baku covered 830, Kirovabad 150, Sumgait 100, Mingechaur 50, Stepanakert 40, Nakhchivan 30, Guba 25, Nukha (Sheki) 30, Lenkaran 25, and Aghdam 20.22 On September 12, 1957, before the recruitment plan was over, local authorities got another resolution from the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR, titled “On Involvement of Youth Who Have Graduated from Secondary Schools in Industrial and Agricultural Production.” Not everything was accepted smoothly in Azerbaijan on this occasion. Institutions and enterprises were not eager to employ unskilled young people. In addition, men under eighteen were authorized to work shorter hours, which caused additional problems under the conditions of “socialistic competition.” It was planned to employ a total of 4,303 people in the republic’s production facilities in 1956 and in the first quarter of 1957, but the real number reached only 3,130. Falling short of the target were a number of enterprises of the republic’s Economic Council, Agriculture Ministry, Azerbaijani Industrial Council, and others, which refused to employ graduates of secondary schools under various pretenses.23 The denial had either objective or subjective reasons. The biggest subjective factor was that the absolute majority of youth up for employment were Azerbaijanis, and this was regarded with jealousy by old non-Azerbaijani workers of “proletarian” dynasties. On October 29, 1957, the CC CPA Bureau arranged a broad discussion of the September 12 resolution of the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR. In a report on the matter, CC Secretary Bayramov disclosed the reasons for the republic’s lagging behind in the fulfillment of the CC resolution. Bureau member T. Allahverdiyev made proposals on the creation of real conditions for youth to work. He said, “Each enterprise has had strict wages and labor plans, so it has no free resources to employ people from the outside. This can be eliminated if we give the enterprises appropriate labor and wage limits or instruct the Finance Ministry not to register appropriate violations at enterprises.” Pasha Arushanov, head of the CC industry division, noted, “Labor productivity at enterprises permanently increases. If the plan of production is increased, the workforce next year will decrease as production norms get tighter. We not only will have no opportunity to employ school graduates, but we will also have to dismiss people. . . . We will employ a certain group of people at enterprises but the issue is that we need additional funds.” Bayramov took the floor again. He agreed with the previous speeches but added that some enterprises were not eager to employ school graduates even at vacant positions: “Firstly, the youth must work two hours shorter, and secondly, professional training must be organized, but they do not want to do that. Thus, of no lesser importance is our enterprises’ incorrect attitude to the process and party committees and regional executive

committees’ insufficient attention. We do not even know exactly how many youth are unemployed. These data are collected haphazardly and thus do not fully reflect reality.”24 After long, comprehensive discussions, the CC CPA and Council of Ministers adopted a nine-point resolution instructing appropriate organizations to provide graduates of secondary schools with professional training and to decisively prevent the actions of some leaders who refused to employ youth under 18. Under the development of the 1958 economic plan, the State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, together with the Workforce Division, was obliged to establish a plan for the employment and training of youth. In addition, the State Planning Committee and the Workforce Division were instructed to make quarterly reports in 1958 to the Council of Ministers about the course of implementation of the resolution.25 Referring to the extension of rights of local bodies, the republic’s leadership undertook several measures in the sphere of education with respect to local conditions. First of all, they considered it expedient, due to Azerbaijan’s climatic peculiarities, to start school lessons not on September 1, like the rest of the country, but on September 15. For this reason, Akima Sultanova, Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers, Mohsun Poladov, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Mirza Mamedov, Education Minister, and Veli Akhundov, Health Minister, were instructed to submit proposals on the starting date of school lessons for the next year. Proposals on the expediency of starting lessons in primary, seven-year and secondary schools on September 15 were examined in April 1957. However, Rahimov did not dare to bear the whole responsibility for this. Reporting the Council of Ministers’ initiative to Mustafayev on April 18, he reminded him that “the starting date of lessons in the Soviet Union’s schools was affirmed by the resolution of the USSR Council of People’s Deputies and CC UCP (b) of September 3, 1935,” so the change of the starting date of lessons in schools in the Azerbaijan SSR should be agreed upon with the CC CPSU.26 Mustafayev and Rahimov, in a joint letter to the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR on April 22, 1957, said with this provision in mind, “According to the existing education plan, lessons in schools in Azerbaijan begin on September 1 and end on May 25. The schools’ experience, materials of inspections by the republic’s Education Ministry, and observations by school physicians illustrate that in the first half of September where it is hot in the majority of the republic, school lessons are minimally efficient as pupils quickly get tired. Upon permission by the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR, the starting date of lessons in the republic’s schools was put off for September 15. The decision was justified given that weather conditions at the end of May or the beginning of June are more favorable for lessons than in early September. Thus, leaders of people’s education divisions, schoolteachers, and the community of parents in the republic unanimously support postponing the starting date of school lessons in the Azerbaijan SSR from September 1 to September 15, with a respective prolongation of the ending date of lessons. In connection to this, the CC CPA and Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR request to put off the beginning of the educational year in the Azerbaijan SSR from September 1 to September 15 and correspondingly prolong the ending date of lessons.”27 A serious decision was made in 1957 in connection with the transition to an overall

secondary education. On May 14, 1957, the CC CPA and republic’s Council of Ministers issued a joint resolution entitled “On Schools’ Preparation for the 1957/1958 Academic Year in the Azerbaijan SSR.” The resolution urged all concerned organizations to register all the children aged seven to fifteen during August 1–5, attract all the children of school age to schools through mass explanatory work, and end repair and accommodation of school buildings before August 15. In addition, the resolution recommended acting more boldly in appointing women teachers to leading posts in schools.28 The most serious matter the republic had to settle in 1957 was the transition to an overall secondary education. Yet on October 31, 1956, the Ministry of Education prepared an inquiry indicating that there 3,571 schools in the republic, including 1,330 primary schools, 1,489 seven-year schools, 748 secondary schools, and four boarding schools. A total of 576,400 people studied at those schools. This number included 301,200 people in the first through fourth grades, 137,300 in fifth through seventh grades, and 107,900 in eighth through tenth grades. The eighth grade (i.e., secondary school) included 38,100 people or 75 percent of the seventh grade’s graduates, including 94.3 percent in urban localities and 64.8 percent in rural localities. Of those who graduated from the seventh grade, 1,793 pupils, entered vocational schools. Thus, the secondary education included 78.6 percent of the seventh grade’s graduates. The Education Ministry thought it was possible to increase the figure up to 91 percent in 1960. For this reason, they planned to build forty-eight new schools, including thirty-three in cities and 15 in villages. The aim was to increase the number of secondary schools in cities from 242 in 1956 to 275 in 1960 and in rural localities from 506 to 510 at the expense of reorganization of seven-year schools. In the inquiry, the Education Ministry also revealed the reasons for school attrition. The number of those studying in fifth through tenth grades decreased by 24,000 in the 1955/56 academic year. While half of those who left school had objective reasons, the second half left school due to economic and household reasons, such as parents’ resettlement together with their children to mountainous regions; children’s and teenagers’ involvement in work at enterprises and in sovkhozes; girls’ early marriage; some parents’ unwillingness or inability to afford to let their children enter boarding schools; some pupils’ being neglected, and so forth. On the brink of transition to an overall education, the number of school teachers reached 33,916 of whom only 9,456 had completed higher education. In its inquiry, the Education Ministry pointed out a number of shortcomings, as a result of which a large number of pupils could not learn the Azerbaijani language, the Russian language, or mathematics well.29 On July 9, 1957, the CC CPA and Council of Ministers issued a resolution titled “On Measures of Realization of Overall Secondary Education in the Azerbaijan SSR” pointing out, apart from achievements, serious disadvantages in the sphere of education. The number of school entrants, by the early 1956/57 educational year, was down 9,614 from the plan. The percentage of repeaters, especially among girls, was very high in a number of schools. According to the document, only 77.1 percent of fifth form pupils had reached the seventh form and only 60 percent of eighth form pupils had reached the tenth form over the past three years. That was one of the serious disadvantages. The construction and quality of schools left much to

be desired. Of eight schools that should have been put into operation in 1956, only two were completed, and the same was observed in 1957. As the schedule of construction of schools was not observed and the newly built schools were of poor quality, 8,054 pupils in sixty-two schools in Baku alone attended school during a third shift. The resolution obliged all leaders of the republic’s party, Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations to undertake decisive measures to eliminate shortcomings. Particular attention needed to be paid to Azerbaijani girls to enable them to learn in schools before they had reached the end of the curriculum. In attaching great significance to the successful implementation of measures over the transition to an overall secondary education, it was considered expedient to submit the matter for discussion to the next session of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR.30 To develop and propagate education, the CC CPA Bureau made a decision later in that same year, 1957, to establish a House of Teachers in Baku. Such a facility had been created in Baku back in 1922 under the name House of Education Workers which was then renamed the House of Teachers in 1926. However, the House was rebuilt into a hospital in 1942. Though the question of the House of Teachers had been raised repeatedly, nothing was done. In a letter to Mustafayev, N. Hajiyev, Head of the CC CPA Science and Schools Division, reported that the matter of establishment of the House of Teachers in Baku had been examined upon instruction of the CC CPA Secretariat and that the idea had been approved. Thus, Hajiyev proposed: (1) to place the House of Teachers in the building currently occupied by the Republican Society of Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge; (2) to instruct the Baku Executive Committee to find another premise for the Society. The matter was settled positively after a short delay. The CC Bureau took Hajiyev’s proposal into account and approved the decision.31 Following the resolution “On Measures of Realization of Overall Secondary Education in the Azerbaijan SSR,” the CC CPSU Secretariat made a decision on August 23 titled “On the Unsatisfactory State of Children’s Compulsory Education” reading that the disadvantages noted in the Bureau’s July 9 resolution were typical not only for Azerbaijan but also for the whole USSR. The CC CPA Bureau discussed the CC CPSU Secretariat’s decision on September 17. Nazim Hajiyev and Education Minister Mirza Mamedov were instructed to control the course of implementation of the CC CPA decision “On Measures of Realization of Overall Secondary Education in the Azerbaijan SSR.” The Bureau gave the Education Ministry (Mirza Mamedov), the republic’s Komsomol CC (Abdurrahman Vezirov), and the Military Registration and Enlistment Office of the Azerbaijan SSR (G. Aliyev) ten days to set up a list of measures to liquidate illiteracy among the population, especially conscripts, and submit it to the CC CPA. In its September 17 decision, the Bureau said it was essential to examine the matter at a session of the Supreme Council.32 What occurred in Azerbaijan in the middle of the 1950s stirred up natural interest in the study of historical and cultural heritage and the restoration and protection of such properties. Yet on July 26, 1955, the Architecture Division under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR asked the Council of Ministers to help settle matters pertaining to restoration and protection of monuments dating back to different historical periods. On July 9, 1956 E. A. Ismailov, Deputy Chairman of the State Construction and Architecture Committee, noted that out of 435

monuments, over 100 were of utmost value and thus required immediate restoration.33 In 1956, Mustafayev instructed M. A. Useynov, Director of the Architecture and Art Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and Full Member of the USSR Academy of Architecture, who was well known outside the republic, to make an inquiry of the situation concerning the protection, study, and restoration of monuments in Azerbaijan. On July 17, 1956, Useynov submitted a very valuable eight-page inquiry to Mustafayev. As Useynov reported, the research work done over some recent years helped identify the general development of Azerbaijan’s architecture; a number of almanacs and separate research works were publicized, and the work on Volume I of the History of Architecture of Azerbaijan was nearing completion. Useynov wrote, “These works had begun only in 1952, following the creation of a special scientific-restoration art studio in the system of the State Construction and Architecture Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Since the middle of the 1950s the studio was involved in restoration works at eight monuments, including mausoleums of Momine-Khatun and Jusuf ibn Kuseyr in Nakhchivan, the Shirvanshahs’ Palace and Baku Fortress Walls, two castles in Mardakan, the Barda mausoleum, and the Sheki Khans’ Palace in Nukha. He also reported that some of the works were under development and that some others were nearing completion. “A specialist/technologist recommended by the Scientific-Methodical Council for the Protection of Monuments under the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been invited from Moscow to make a final approval of the measures of restoration of buildings and work out a method to carry out the works. In some cases, the paces and the quality of restoration work are unsatisfactory. The quality of restoration works is better at stone monuments in Baku and Absheron and worse at brick constructions.” Useynov thought the main reason for this was the workshop’s lack of skilled personnel and a production base. He wrote, “If the workshop were organized and equipped appropriately, it would have supported the restoration of fifty to sixty of the most valuable architectural monuments and the reinforcement of dozens of others over the next decade, thus saving the monuments from destruction. A little over 1 million rubles was assigned for restoration of monuments for 1956. To implement the suggested measures, the workshop will need about 3 million rubles in 1957, with the sum to be subsequently increased up to 3.5–4 million rubles per annum over the several next years.” In addition, Useynov thought it was essential to study and popularize ancient monuments. In his opinion, not only the public but also intelligentsia were insufficiently aware of architectural monuments. The primary reason was that the appropriate departments of the state university (of history, philology, and Oriental studies) and of the pedagogical institute did not offer any courses devoted to monuments of Azerbaijani architecture, and there was no course offered in the history of Azerbaijani art. However, in 1957–1958, the Architecture and Art Institute could develop a brief course of the history of Azerbaijan’s architecture in Azeri. This book would be used as a guideline for higher educational institutions. In order to popularize architectural monuments and safeguard them, it is essential to turn the most outstanding constructions into architectural museums, each to be served by a small staff of three to four persons. First of all, the complex of the Shirvanshahs’ Palace in Baku and the Sheki Khans’ Palace in Nukha should be made into

museums. As viewed by Useynov, the absence of a good printing industry and up-to-date photo equipment in the republic was a negative factor. He believed that the efficiency of measures of protection of monuments required appropriate governmental decisions on local Soviets’ responsibility for the safety of architectural monuments by setting punishment measures for those responsible for monuments’ destruction and decline.34 Useynov’s letter illustrates that the institute he led was seriously involved in the study of monuments of culture and attracted talented youth to the work. One of them was S. Fatullayev, who started his work at the institute in 1953. Years later, he became an outstanding specialist in the sphere of study of architectural monuments and was recognized not only in Azerbaijan but also throughout the Middle East and Central Asia; he used to make the pearls of Azerbaijani architecture the world’s heritage and he contributed greatly to the history of city planning and architecture. In the 1950s, Fatullayev was established as a talented scientist and architect, the worthy successor of the school of widely-known Useynov, S. Dadashev, A. Salamzadeh, and G. Alizadeh. M. Qaziyev, Director of the Museum of History of Azerbaijan, sent an inquiry on September 11, 1956 on the state of preservation of monuments of culture to the CC CPA Science and Schools Division. He wrote that despite partial measures, “the state of registration, study, preservation, and restoration of monuments of culture and history is apparently unsatisfactory: monuments, especially those in the regions, are poorly preserved, not restored, and are destructed and plundered.” In Qaziyev’s opinion, the unsatisfactory state of work with monuments resulted primarily from the absence of a single scientific-administrative center that could have led the work. The second negative factor is “quite insufficient financing of this work, and the poor logistics base of the restoration workshop.”35 Having comprehensively examined these inquiries and other similar proposals, the CC CPA and Council Ministers issued a joint resolution on April 23, 1957 titled “On the State and Measures of Improvement of Preservation, Study, and Restoration of Monuments of Culture of Azerbaijan” noting that “the work on identification, study, restoration and popularization of cultural monuments in Azerbaijan is in a neglected condition.” The document said the leaders of the State Construction and Architecture Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Culture of the Azerbaijan SSR had not ensured implementation of a number of appropriate decisions by the USSR Council of Ministers, CC CPA, and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. The work of setting up a list of all kinds of historic monuments subject to state preservation was not completed. The organizations had only approved a list of architectural monuments registered for state preservation in the Azerbaijan SSR. Local Soviets’ irresponsible attitude to the preservation of culture monuments in these places led to pitiable cases of destruction of these monuments. For example, a caravansary in Khoja-Hasan village in the Kirov region, a mausoleum in Haldan village, and a mausoleum in Agbil village in the Guba region were destroyed. Unique monuments such as the Khanega complex of constructions at the Pirsagat River and the DiriBaba tomb in Marazy village were subject to gradual destruction. Those responsible for destruction of the monuments remained, as a rule, unpunished. Out of 435 monuments of architecture subject to state preservation, only ten were restored at a time when more than 100

valuable monuments required immediate repair and reconstruction. The resolution noted that the quality of restoration works had been low, that the Architecture and Art Institute had studied a limited collection of monuments, and that the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR had not completed the complex study of the Bailov Stones nor had it publicized summaries of the results of a multi-year work on Gobustan rock paintings by a Mingechaur team of archeologists. The work of identification and study of historical monuments was weakened in the Academy of Science’s institutions. Popularization of cultural monuments through lectures was unsatisfactory. Students of appropriate faculties of the republic’s higher education institutions were not even given introductory courses on the monuments of the Azerbaijani nation. As explained in the document, serious disadvantages in the preservation, restoration, and popularization of monuments resulted from the absence of a single appropriate body. With this in mind, the CC CPA and Council of Ministers passed a sixteen-point resolution. The State Construction and Architecture Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Ministry of Culture, and the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR took one month to finish composing a list of monuments of architecture, habitation, art, archeology, revolutionary events, and graves of art figures subject to state preservation and submit it to the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR for approval. These organizations, upon agreement with the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance, were given one month to submit a plan of measures for 1958–1960 on restoration, rehabilitation, and improvement of the monuments of culture of Azerbaijan to the Council of Ministers for approval. As resolved by the third point, the Shirvanshahs’ Palace in Baku, the Sheki Khans’ Palace in Nukha, and a necropolis with museums near Khazra village in the Kutkashen region had to be declared as reserves. The Ministry of Culture, jointly with the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and the republic’s Unions of Writers, Architects, Composers, and Artists, was given one month to develop measures for erecting monuments and affixing memorial plaques at the burial places of outstanding figures of culture and submit them for consideration to the Council of Ministers. The State Planning Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR was instructed to provide the appropriate equipment for a special art restoration studio in 1957. It had to keep in consideration a statement by Sadykhov, Minister of Finance of the Azerbaijan SSR, that the State Construction and Architecture Committee had been assigned 1.2 million rubles in 1957. The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR was instructed to provide the issue, in 1957–1959, of volume I of the History of Architecture of Azerbaijan, a monograph on carpet-weaving art, an album of ornaments of Absheron burial monuments, a summary of the results of work by the Mingechaur expedition, and the first part of a monograph on Gobustan rock paintings. In addition, the State University of Azerbaijan, the Polytechnic Institute, and the Pedagogical Institute were instructed to include a course on cultural monuments of Azerbaijan into the education plans of appropriate departments, strengthen explanatory work among the republic’s workers and youth about the significance of cultural monuments, make reports on popularization of cultural monuments in newspapers and on the radio, provide supervision for excavation and construction works, and ensure the transition of items of historical/cultural significance to

museums.36 The decision made in April 1957 clearly illustrated the strengthening of state concern about the registration of historical-architectural and cultural monuments of Azerbaijan, and their preservation, restoration, popularization, and study. Once such an important decision was made, organizational matters were examined. The State Construction and Architecture Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR was abolished; it was replaced by the Architecture and Construction Control Division. However, this agency did not justify itself. Thus, the matter reappeared on the agenda in November 1957. Rahimov made a proposal to the CC Bureau to make a single state body subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR responsible for the issues of architecture, construction, and preservation of monuments. Having agreed with the proposal, the CC CPA Bureau made a decision on November 19, 1957 on establishment of the Architecture Division under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.37 Strict decisions pertaining to the restoration and preservation of historical monuments of architecture were caused by the extremely poor conditions of these monuments. Poet R. Rza, upon his return from Nakhchivan in May 1958, wrote of the condition of Momine-Hatun’s mausoleum: “Aren’t the republic’s organizations designed to preserve monuments of old and the leaders of these organizations ashamed of watching the slow destruction of this rare creation of architecture? I wonder why millions of rubles assigned by the Soviet State for culture, for preservation, restoration and protection of historical monuments are not spent appropriately, rationally, for the sake of preservation of monuments like this rare pearl of Nakhchivan. Who is to be responsible for such unforgivable neglect? Will the nation forgive officials who treat the monuments of its history so carelessly?” Almost simultaneously with this issue, the examination of another matter—“On Transcription of Names of Settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR”—began. On November 20, 1957 Mirza Ibrahimov wrote to the CC CPA: “A Transcription Commission has been established under the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR to identify the exact transcription of the names of settlements of the republic. However, the Presidium lacks appropriate scientific officers, so there are no results. In other republics, it is the responsibility of the Academy of Sciences to deal with transcription matters, so Presidiums of the Supreme Council approve new transcriptions of names upon their presentations. We’d like to ask you to adopt a draft resolution on the matter.”38 Proceeding from this letter, the CC CPA Bureau made a decision on December 31, 1957 titled “On Transcription of Names of Settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR” indicating the following: (1) to make the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR responsible for work on specification of transcription of names of the republic’s settlements; (2) to give the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR two months to revise the list of administrative centers of regions, settlements and rural Soviets in the designed transcription in Azeri and in Russian, and submit it to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR for approval; (3) to instruct the Presidium of the SC of the Azerbaijan SSR to consider and further approve, upon presentation by the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, the transcription of names of all the remaining settlements which are not administrative centers.39 To popularize the Azerbaijani culture and language, the Council of Ministers of the

Azerbaijan SSR resolved to strengthen the leadership of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Committee. Upon presentation by Rahimov on September 10, the CC Bureau approved the Committee’s new composition: Teymur Aliyev as chairman, Nasrullah Imanquliyev as first deputy chairman, Enver Alibayli as deputy chairman, and Muhtar Hajiyev as deputy head of the foreign radio broadcasting division. S. Qurbanov, head of the CC CPA division, was also approved as a member of the Committee.40 At the same time, the editorial staff of the Communist of Azerbaijan journal was strengthened; the staff included A. Vezirov, A. Huseynov, M. S. Iskenderov, N. Imanquliyev, S. Qurbanov, M. Gasymov, A. Gasymov, I. Gasymov, G. Mamedov, A. Sumbatzadeh, A. Farajov, and N. Muraki. In November 1957, a decision was made to start publishing Goyarchin (Dove), a magazine for children. M. Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, had written to the CC CPA on September 17, 1957: “I’d like to ask you to examine the issue of publishing a magazine in Azeri for children of preschool age. The magazine should contain colored pictures like Murzilka. In cities and especially in rural localities, there is an urgent need for a magazine that could essentially contribute to the process of children’s education. I think it expedient to issue a twelve to sixteen-page magazine monthly.”41 On November 19, 1957, proceeding from Ibrahimov’s letter, the CC CPA Bureau resolved to permit the CC of Azerbaijan’s Komsomol to issue, starting from January 1, 1958, the children’s magazine Goyarchin in a format identical to Murzilka’s, in 40,000 copies monthly. The authors’ royalties of 8,000 rubles and the wage fund of 9,300 rubles per eleven staff members were approved. The necessary stock of offset paper was provided. The Baku Executive Committee was given one month to provide a premise to the magazine’s editorial staff.42 At the same time a decision was made, with the consideration of economic and cultural growth of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialistic Republic and an increased demand for the Sharg Gapysy newspaper (the Gates of the Orient)—the organ of the Nakhchivan regional party committee—to increase the newspaper’s periodicity from three times to five times a week and the number of copies from 5,000 to 10,000. The price for one copy of the newspaper was to be decreased from twenty kopecks to fifteen kopecks. All appropriate ministries were instructed to settle financial, technical, and personnel matters.43 In its turn, the Mountainous Garabagh regional party committee also asked the CC CPA to decrease the price for the Sovetakan Karabakh newspaper from twenty kopecks to fifteen kopecks per copy and donate 127,400 rubles to the newspaper. Under examination of the matter, it was found out that the Sovetakan Karabakh newspaper had been allocated 729,600 rubles (except for the sums assigned for purchase of equipment) and that the amount should be increased up to 857,000 rubles. A decrease of the price for the newspaper with no increase in the number of copies, as well as an increase of the state allocation, was economically unprofitable, but the CC Bureau agreed with the request and allocated 104,000 rubles to the newspaper.44 Later the same day, November 19, the CC Bureau discussed the matter of conducting the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the M. F. Akhundov State Opera and Ballet Theater of Azerbaijan, which had been awarded the Lenin Order. Jubilee celebrations were planned for February 1958. Upon the proposal of the theater director, Fikret Amirov, a

decision was made to invite twenty-five guests from Moscow, Leningrad, and other Union republics to the jubilee. It was also decided to ask the CC CPSU for permission to invite another twenty-five guests from Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Egypt, Finland, and popular democratic countries. To carry out top-level celebrations, a decision was made to establish a governmental commission consisting of A. S. Bayramov (chairman), A. I. Sultanova, S. K. Qurbanov, M. K. Qurbanov, F. Amirov, Q. Qarayev, M. Davudova, Bul-Bul Mamedov, and Shovkat Mamedova.45 Mehti Huseyn, responsible secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan, asked republic’s Council of Ministers on November 5, 1957 to create Poetess Natavan House-Museum in Shusha.46 The Dagestan Kumyk State Dramatic Theater named after A. P. Salavatov, a famous propagandist of Azerbaijani culture in the Caucasus, was on a tour to Baku on December 11– 25, 1957. The theater repeatedly staged the plays Sevil and Yashar by Jafar Jabbarly; Ignorance and Nadir Shah by Nariman Narimanov; The Cloth Peddler and If not that one, then this one by Uzeyir Hajibeyov; and Red Banner by Suleyman Sani Akhundov. A series of Azerbaijani stage directors had headed the Kumyk theater’s creative team for long years. On the last day of the theater’s tour, Ibrahimov awarded the leading actors of the Kumyk Theater with letters of commendation of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR. Those awarded included the poet/playwright Suleimanov Abdul Vagab, translator of works by Nizami, S. Vurghun, and S. Rustam into Kumyk.47 The process of political rehabilitation of those repressed innocently started spreading in the middle of the 1950s. After the CPSU 20th congress and especially after the June 1957 Plenum of the CC, the Bureau examined the numerous cases of intelligentsia and former party and Soviet employees at its every meeting. In fact, the political rehabilitation in Azerbaijan began after an unofficial ban of Nariman Narimanov’s personality was lifted. His works had not been officially banned; however, Narimanov had been considered the key ideologist of nationalists, which was nearly a direct accusation against anti-Soviets and dissidents in the USSR. Narimanov’s works had thus been banned. Speaking at the 21st Congress of the CPA in January 1956, Mustafayev mentioned Narimanov in a report with particular pathos; this triggered the celebrations of the eighty-fifth anniversary of Narimanov’s birthday in April of the same year. Later his works were publicized in Baku, and the monographs Prominent Revolutionary and Writer Nariman Narimanov by Mikail Rafili and Nariman Narimanov by Mamed Qaziyev appeared. The Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Party History Institute under the CC CPA, and the State University of Azerbaijan held a joint scientific session on April 11, 1956 in honor of eighty-fifth anniversary of Narimanov’s birth. M. Aliyev, President of the Academy of Sciences, opened the session. Making reports were H. Shahgeldiyev, Director of the Party History Institute, on “Narimanov as Prominent Party Figure and Statesman”; and Prof. M. J. Pashayev, Doctor of Philology, on “Narimanov’s Literary-Editorial Activity.” The Communist newspaper, in its April 15 issue, devoted a whole page to M. J. Pashayev’s article titled “Prominent Writer-Realist” where he wrote the following: “One teacher worked in a newly opened school in one of Azerbaijan’s southern regions, in the Nakhchivan village of Nehram, while another teacher worked in Gyzyl Hajili village in the Tiflis province. One of

them was Mirza Jalil, the pride of Azerbaijani culture and literature, and the other one was Nariman Narimanov, at the time a young writer who later became a high-ranking public and political figure of our motherland. Fate and history made these two young enlighteners fighters for people’s wealth and public progress.” Having analyzed Narimanov’s works Nadanlyg (Ignorance), Woe Is Language, Nadir Shah, Bahadur & Sona, and the novel One Village’s Adventures publicized by Achyg Soz newspaper, edited by Mamed Emin Rasulzadeh in 1915, Pashayev touched upon an interesting aspect. Several months before the law on state language was passed, he wrote, “Because of Narimanov’s proposal, the teachers decided at their congress in Baku in 1906 to increase the number of native language lessons at secondary schools. With his art works, articles, and statements, he actively struggled for the development, progress, purity, and freshness of the Azerbaijani language. He openly hated the intellectuals who looked askew at the native language, who humiliated it in front of foreign languages, and who were alien to the nation. Narimanov always thought the greatest achievement of the Socialistic Revolution was the opportunity for all nations to create their culture in their native language.” The article was illustrated by a 1920 picture captioned “Narimanov among Pupils in the Town of Shusha” that stressed the national, artistic and political sense of what was written.48 It is no coincidence that the names of Mirza Jalil and Narimanov stood next one to another in Pashayev’s article. Pashayev, who in his doctoral dissertation analyzed the artistic/creative trends of Azerbaijani literature of the early twentieth century in his novel Where Are We Going? (1957), not only described the life of great poet Mirza Alekber Sabir but also devoted many pages to the life of intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. In all, the political processes in the middle of the 1950s aroused the society’s great interest in the early twentieth century’s national movement. Talented youth joined the processes together with the older generation. B. Vagabzadeh appealed to the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan on December 6, 1957 with the following letter: “I have long been engaged in preparatory work, and I am collecting materials for a tragic play about the life of great Azerbaijani poet Mahammed Hadi. It is now essential to visit Shemakha and Kurdamir, places of residence of people who closely knew Hadi, and write down their memoirs. Thus I ask you to give me one-month creative leave to tour Shamakhy and Kurdamir.”49 Entering the Azerbaijani literature in the middle of the 1950s was talented philologist Aziz Mirahmedov who attained great success in the study of the early twentieth century’s romanticism, realism and satire in the creativity of Mirza Alekber Sabir, Jalil Mamedquluzadeh, Mahammad Hadi, and Abdulla Shaig. 1957 was a remarkable year from the point of view of creation of the full political portrait of Narimanov and commemoration of his name. That year, Veli Mamedov, distinguished for his original writing about Narimanov, issued a book titled Nariman Narimanov. At the same time, young historian Jamil Quliyev publicized an article titled “Nariman Narimanov as Prominent Party Figure and Statesman” in an almanac by the Azerbaijani branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CC CPSU. The article illustrated that the study of Narimanov had already been grounded scientifically, though the author was criticized strongly in The Communist journal, the organ of the CC CPSU, upon instruction by Khrushchev. On April 21, 1957, the

newspaper Edebiyyat ve Injesenet (Literature & Art) published an article “Lenin and the East” that Narimanov had written back in 1925. All of Narimanov’s articles about Lenin were issued in a single book in Baku in 1957. The publication of this book actually gave the green light to the publication of all Narimanov’s works. As his political rehabilitation progressed, the geography of study of his political and literary activity rapidly widened. For example, in 1958, Mehti Huseyn, First Secretary of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, asked I. Abashidze, First Secretary of the Union of Writers of Georgia, to help writer Ismail Gezalov in his archive research because he was working on a novel about Narimanov’s life which was “closely linked to the land of Georgia.” In another letter, M. Huseyn addressed the Union of Writers of Ukraine, M. Bajan, with the following request: “According to a decision by the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, comrade Ismail Gezalov will be sent on a mission to the Ukrainian SSR to study archive materials and a series of important historic events linked to the life of prominent party figure and statesman, the favorite of the Azerbaijani people, Narimanov. As is known, Narimanov, as a student of the Odessa (Novorossiysk) University, was involved in great revolutionary activity among the youth and workers in 1902–1908, for which he was twice expelled from the university. In addition, Narimanov visited Kiev and Kharkov, and kindly spoke of Ukrainian people’s history and ancient culture. We’d like to ask you to provide any possible assistance to writer I. Gezalov in search of the necessary materials.”50 Generally speaking, Narimanov-related processes that had begun in the middle of the 1950s continued to grow despite Moscow’s strong opposition, and were expressed in works by academician F. Kocharli, a prominent Azerbaijani scientist; T. Ahmedov, doctor of philology; and H. Hasanov, candidate of history. Ibrahimov’s long years of research and thoughts on the life and activity of Narimanov culminated in the creation of the epic novel Pervane (Butterfly). C. Huseynov, a prominent writer and famous scholar, wrote and then published in Moscow his original novels Dr. N and Endless Letter that changed the perspective on Narimanov studies with their editorial and political content. Settlements, enterprises, and educational institutions started being named after Narimanov in 1957. The process was pioneered by workers and employees of the Sari fish factory in the Lenkoran region. At a general meeting, they unanimously decided to name the Sari fish factory and settlement after Narimanov. The decision, together with the Fishing Industry Ministry’s letter, was submitted to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR. Having positively reacted to the initiative, the Presidium sent draft decision to the CC CPA on January 7, 1957. The settlement of Sari Island was to be renamed Narimanabad. The CC CPA Bureau on February 12, 1957 decided to satisfy the request of the general meeting of workers and employees to name the Sari fish factory after Narimanov, and further name the settlement Narimanabad.51 On April 2, 1957, the republic’s Health Minister V. Akhundov asked Mustafayev to confer the name of Narimanov to the State Medical Institute of Azerbaijan upon request by the Ministry’s Board Akhundov led: “The merits of Narimanov, as a physician by education, in not only development of the state system but also in the buildup of popular healthcare in Azerbaijan are generally known. Naturally, a series of the republic’s medical institutions should be named

after Doctor Narimanov, the glorious son of the Azerbaijani nation and prominent statesman. But none of the medical institutions in the republic are currently named after him, and the ones named after him earlier were later renamed or stopped being named after him. The Health Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR believes that it is time to correct the situation and thus suggests conferring the name of Narimanov to the State Medical Institute of Azerbaijan.” To analyze the initiative and submit it to the Bureau, Mustafayev sent the letter to H. Efendiyev. On April 23, the CC CPA Bureau honored the request of the State Medical Institute’s team and decided to confer the name of Narimanov to the Institute. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR approved a draft decree signed on April 27, 1957.52 By its later decrees, the Presidium of the Supreme Council conferred the name of Narimanov to the Baku children’s clinical hospital in June 1957 and to Baku’s Keshla district in July.53 Azerbaijan’s region that had been named after Narimanov was renamed the Khanlar region back in 1938. Thus, the conferment of the name of Narimanov on one of Baku’s districts in 1957 signified the commemoration of his name. After a long silence, these were the early manifestations of a love for Dr. Narimanov that was deeply rooted in the hearts of Azerbaijani intellectuals and political elite. The national processes in Azerbaijan in the middle of the 1950s revived Turkism that had long been banned and sometimes persecuted but solicitously kept in hearts. Great Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet visited Baku in the fall of 1957. He was met with cordial trepidation and a stormy manifestation of national feelings. Hikmet was met in Baku in mid-October 1957 pompously and ceremoniously. On October 18, accompanied by Mirza Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, and Suleyman Rustam, a prominent poet, Hikmet visited one of the centers of Azerbaijan’s national revival: the State University. This meeting indelibly impressed Hikmet himself, all the participants, and even security agents who served the guest. The University’s big assembly hall was full of people. University Rector, academician Yusif Mamedaliyev, opened the meeting by addressing the guest. He welcomed Hikmet and assessed his visit as a significant event in the republic’s history. Prof. Ali Sultanli, the Dean of the Philology Faculty, gave a report on the Turkish poet’s creative methods. He said, “Hikmet, who has constantly been engaged in creative work for forty years, has come to us not as a guest. He is dear to us as our creator, our native poet. His heart beats for the name of Turkey’s brilliant future. Hikmet is the true Prometheus of Turkic poetry.” The hall applauded loudly after Ali Sultanli’s words. Everyone stood up. Two Turkish students, Ibrahim Berulov and Halima Mustafayeva, who had arrived from Bulgaria to study at the Azerbaijan State University, read Hikmet’s verses “Invitation” and “Running Man” in Turkish. The verses, masterfully read, caused an unusual emotional rise among those present. Having heard his native speech, Hikmet could not hide his tears. He embraced both Bulgarian students and kissed them many times. Later the University’s student poets Teyub Gurban and Hekuma Aliyeva spoke with verses they had dedicated to Hikmet. Fifth-year student S. Salmanov read the guest’s poem “I’m Coming from the East.” When young poet Aghajavad Alizadeh read a series of Hikmet’s verses titled “Letter from Istanbul,” “Fifteen Wounds,” “My Soul,” and “If I Am Not Burnt,” the guest could hardly restrain his emotions. In a storm of applause, he came

up to the rostrum and said, “I think this is the happiest day in my life. I have not seen Baku for thirty years. It is impossible to recognize it now. Last time I did not see a series of marine oil derricks. There was no flourishing Sumgait at the time. Then it was a gray desert. But now . . . you have gone so far ahead. Comrades, you are lucky. I want my native Turkey to be such.” To support his words, Ibrahimov exclaimed: “This day will come. You will see your son Mehmet as happy as these students are.”54 Of course, the issue of language discussed stormily inside and outside the republic was not put aside. One of the students of the philology faculty asked Hikmet: “How do you assess an intellectual who does not know Azeri or knows it but does not speak it?” Hikmet, feeling that he was a foreigner in the USSR traced by security bodies, preferred not to give an answer. Ibrahimov spoke at the end of the meeting. Having highly appraised Hikmet’s creativity and thanking him for the visit, Ibrahimov returned to the unanswered question. He repeated the question loudly and then answered that the intellectual who does not know Azeri or does not speak it is a traitor.55 His words were applauded thunderously. All this was reported to Moscow in detail. Later, these words became the basis for political accusations against Ibrahimov; the words were pronounced in the CC CPSU and CC Presidium and became the determinative reason to remove him from the political arena. Hikmet met with Azerbaijani writers on October 23. Huseyn, the responsible secretary of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, spoke about directions of development of Azerbaijani Soviet literature and introduced the guest to the writers and poets present. Medine Gulgun, Nigar Rafibayli, Ismayil Soltan, Hokuma Billury, and Huseyn Huseynzadeh read their verses; Talat Eyubov read sonnets of Shakespeare that he had translated. In his turn, Hikmet spoke very warmly of the traditions of Azerbaijani literature, drew examples of Soviet literature’s influence upon his creativity, and then read his verses. On the brink of Hikmet’s visit to Baku, Akber Babayev, an Azerbaijani author and candidate of philology, issued a book titled Hikmet in Russian in Moscow. The book reflected Hikmet’s life story and creativity, stressing the great Turkish poet Yahya Kemal’s influence upon young Hikmet. Babayev realistically described the situation at the end of World War I, Turkey’s defeat, and Istanbul’s occupation by the Entente troops. Hikmet’s verse titled “Captive of Forty Robbers” was being passed around at the time. The political verse reflected the author’s positive attitude to the Anatolia national movement. In addition, in his book, Babayev noted that Hikmet had studied in Moscow in 1921–1924 and that the education he had received considerably influenced his creativity. He also analyzed the poet’s creativity in the 1920s. He noted that the first book of Hikmet’s verses, titled Songs of Those Drinking the Sun, was issued in Baku in 1928. The fourth chapter of A. Babayev’s book was devoted to the years Hikmet spent in prison (1938–1950) whereas the fifth chapter covered the period of his emigration to the Soviet Union. That was the first large study of Hikmet’s life and creativity publicized in the USSR. In the middle of the 1950s, Hikmet was very much loved in Azerbaijan for not being a Communist emigrant but rather for being a Turk. At a time when any manifestation of Turkic national identity was banned, communist Hikmet became the only unbanned symbol of the Turkic world in Azerbaijan. In expressing their open love for him, Azerbaijanis displayed their sympathies for Turkey they held deep in their hearts. This is evidenced by a great deal of secret

information reported by secret agents to the Center. The Soviet leadership masterfully used Hikmet for reasons of anti-Turkish propaganda, but did not trust him fully. During all the years the poet spent in the Soviet Union and even on tours abroad, he remained under KGB observation. Various Soviet institutions accumulated numerous controversial documents on Hikmet, starting from 1920. His dossier is kept at the Communistic International Fund. Documents contained in the then newly opened Molotov Fund, written correspondence among KGB officials, and letters and reports by the CC CPSU Secretariat and Foreign Political Commission also form a huge dossier on Hikmet. In addition, inquiries on him written for Stalin personally contain very interesting, illustrative episodes of the emigrant poet’s life. Hikmet was born into the family of an official in Thessaloniki on January 20, 1902. In 1918 when he continued to study at the Istanbul Naval School, Turkey was defeated and left World War I. The young man began to write satiric verses unmasking the occupants and the losers. After being persecuted in Istanbul, Hikmet left for Anatolia and initially partook in the national liberation movement. In 1921 he arrived in Batum where he worked for the organizational bureau of the Communist Party of Turkey, and he later became a member of the editorial staff of the party newspaper New World. In 1922–1924, Hikmet studied at the Moscow Communist University of Workers of the Orient. In 1924 he was sent to Izmir, where he spread underground activity. When the Turkish Communist Party was destroyed in 1925, Hikmet was sentenced in his absence to fifteen years of penal servitude but managed to flee to Moscow. There he worked as a research officer of the Communist University of Workers of the Orient till 1928.56 In 1924–1925, Hikmet became known to Turkish readers as a poet, so Communist International rested great hopes upon him. Petrov, head of Communist International’s executive committee’s eastern division, received a letter on February 5, 1925 containing information on Hikmet from Turkey by diplomatic channels, and passed a copy of the letter to Vasil Kolarov, member of the Presidium of Communist International’s executive committee. The letter read, “Displaying particular activity of those who have arrived are Comrade Nazim and Comrade Ahmed Javad. Comrade Nazim is the greatest rising star in Turkish literature. He is much loved at workers’ meetings. The bourgeois media speak of him as a talent. I’ve heard of him from diplomatic circles having contact with the Turkish cultural world. Nazim promises much.”57 Hikmet returned to Turkey again in 1928 and was arrested several times for his propagandistic verses by 1933. A conference of the Communist Party of Turkey was held in Moscow in 1934. Hikmet was excluded from the party’s ranks for his participation in the Trotsky opposition but restored to it one year later. In 1937, he was arrested again for his communist activity, and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison but served his term in prison until 1950. I. Bakulin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry’s Middle East and Asia division, sent the following letter to A. A. Smirnov, an official of the CC UCP (b) and the former ambassador to Iran on October 15, 1949: “Turkish reactionaries in 1938 arrested famous Turkish poet-revolutionary Hikmet based on information by German fascist agents in Turkey and sentenced him to twenty-eight year penal servitude for communistic activity. As reported by Turkish newspapers recently, Hikmet has taken ill with tuberculosis. French writer Louis

Aragon, in a recent speech at a meeting of the ten-day Tajik festival in Moscow, mentioned Hikmet, who remains in Turkish prison. On this August 19, Turkish journalist Yalman, in an article published by the newspaper Vatan, asked the Turkish Justice Ministry “to correct the greatest injustice” against Hikmet. Yalman’s article was reprinted by other Turkish papers, particularly Akhsham [the Russian version of the article is attached to the letter—J. H.]. Don’t you think it is possible to use this appeal as a cause to release Hikmet from prison through progressive organizations abroad, for example, through articles in popular democracies’ newspapers? It’d be expedient to publicize such articles in October, as Turkey’s national holiday — Proclamation of the Republic — is October 29.” As we’ve already mentioned, the translation of Yalman’s article “Tevfik Fikret and Hikmet” publicized by newspapers Vatan and Akhsham was attached to the letter. Yalman wrote the following about Hikmet: “As a pupil of the recent generations, he is one of the greatest Turkish poets, and very few people have a better knowledge of Turkish than he, but he has been tormented in prisons for long years. One day history will regard this as a stain that spread over the whole epoch. As a citizen of my country, I urge the Justice Ministry to fulfill its duty. Correction of the greatest injustice is not only an urgent necessity with respect to Hikmet and Turkish culture and literature but also a debt to history.” However, the UCP (b) CC did not consider it possible to publicize corresponding articles in popular democratic countries. On November 22, 1949, Aleksey Kuznetsov, CC Secretary, wrote to Yakov Lomakin, Deputy Chairman of the UCP (b) CC Foreign Political Commission: “As far as Turkish journalist Humbarji raised the question of Hikmet’s release to the UN, I think it’d be expedient to abstain from publicizing articles in popular democratic countries until the needed information is obtained. However, upon instruction by Vahan Grigoryan, Chairman of the UCP (b) CC Foreign Political Commission, an article titled “Turkish Reaction’s Crime” was written and further publicized by the magazine Novoye Vremya (Vol. 4, 1950).58 Hikmet gradually became a headache for the Turkish government on the international arena. The ruling circles deemed it right and proper to release him in July 1950. A commission in charge of conferment of the International Peace Award, at a meeting in Prague on August 19–23, decided to confer the award in the sphere of literature to Hikmet. In November 1950, he was elected a member of the Presidium of the World Congress of Peace Supporters.59 Hikmet escaped Turkey for Romania in June 1951. Here, he wrote a detailed report on the reasons of his escape, including the following: “Soon after I was released, I received a telegram from the World Committee for Peace Defense. The telegram was signed by Freidrich Joliot-Curie, who invited me to the World Peace Congress in England. . . . A bit later, I received a second telegram that said the Congress would be held in Warsaw. I knew I would not be able to go there as Turkish authorities would deny me a passport. . . . Turkish reactionary papers then launched a campaign against me. Newspapers wrote that in Warsaw I had been elected the second Vice Chairman of the International Peace Committee, that I was the paid agent of Russians, and that the Russians had publicized all my notebooks. . . . Upon comrades’ consent, I decided to ask to be issued a passport. First, formalities were carried out. However, several days later, I was ordered to come to a military service and enlistment office

where they told me that I had to serve in the Army. I explained to them that I had been released from military service for health reasons and that appropriate papers were in the hospital. I was sentenced to house arrest. The military service and enlistment office told me that they would give me the passport if they found the documents. Given that I was under house arrest, the party decided that I should leave Turkey illegally. I needed money to escape the country. Upon Sabiha Sertel’s mediation, I asked the World Peace Committee to give her half of the money I would receive as a winner of the International Peace Award, and transfer the second half of the money to a Swiss bank. It was possible to enter the Black Sea through the Bosporus and then get to one of the popular democracies. . . . The sports motorboat we bought was very expensive. . . . I decided to flee on June 17. Changing taxis often, I got to the Bosporus. My brother-in-law arrived in the Bosporus with the motorboat to a place where no one else was around. The sea was quiet. Having left the Bosporus, we met ship Plekhanov, and then I decided, instead of going to Bulgaria, to stop the ship, call my name and, if they agreed to take me on the ship, to get to Romania. I loudly called my name to the sailors on board. Some of the sailors, who knew my name, told the captain who I was. He telegraphed to Constanta and from there to Bucharest; I was taken aboard in around 1.5 hours, and my brother-in-law went back. There were no passengers on the ship because it was a cargo ship. I arrived in Constanta on June 18. Security agents brought me to a port building and interrogated me there. A party comrade came a bit later and brought me to the party district committee. I arrived in Bucharest on June 19. To have the matters settled, I wanted to leave for Moscow.”60 Hikmet told the CC of Romania’s Working Party that he wanted to leave for Moscow. The Soviet leadership decided to arrange things as if Hikmet was invited by the USSR Union of Writers as a guest. Boris Ponomarev, Deputy Chairman of the UCP (b) CC Foreign Political Commission, wrote to Stalin on June 28: “The Union of Soviet Writers of the USSR (comrade Fadeyev) asked the UCP (b) CC for permission to invite Hikmet to the USSR as a guest of the Union of Soviet Writers. I think it is possible to approve the proposal of the Union of Soviet Writers.” Ponomarev attached to the letter a draft resolution of the UCP (b) CC, an inquiry of Hikmet, and a copy of Hikmet’s letter addressing the CC of the Romanian Working Party. The UCP (b) CC Political Bureau decided to make the USSR Union of Writers wholly responsible for the reception of the Turkish writer. The Moscow Council was given fifteen days to provide Hikmet with a three to four-room apartment; the Kremlin’s Healthcare Division and the UCP (b) CC Executive Office were instructed to provide for his medical care and everyday expenses.61 On June 29, a day after the Political Bureau’s decision, Hikmet arrived in Moscow as a political emigrant. On the same day, Ponomarev informed Stalin in detail about the ceremony of meeting the Turkish guest at the Vnukovo Airport, at the Union of Writers, and at the Soviet Peace Defense Committee. He wrote, “At the Vnukovo Airport, Hikmet was met by representatives of Soviet public organizations: the Union of Soviet Writers, the Soviet Peace Defense Committee, the Antifascist Committee of Soviet Women, the Antifascist Committee of Soviet Youth, the CC of Trade Union of the Workers of Press and Printing Industry, and other representatives of the Soviet community. Making the welcoming speech were N. S. Tikhonov

(on behalf of the Soviet Peace Defense Committee) and K. M. Simonov (on behalf of the Union of Soviet Writers). Hikmet, who spoke after them, said he was very happy that he was in Moscow and thanked them for the warm, cordial welcome. Hikmet continued to say, ‘I address the cordial words of welcome and friendship to my nation. The Turkish government, instructed by American lords, sends Turkish soldiers to Korea, but the people of Turkey, like all honest people involved in peace labor, want peace and will struggle for it under the banner of Stalin, the great friend and father of progressive mankind. I speak of Stalin because Stalin is the light of my eyes and clarity of my thoughts.’ In addition, Ponomarev reported that a friendly meeting of Hikmet with the leadership of the Union of Soviet Writers and SPDC- Fadeyev, Simonov, and Erenburg would take place on the evening of June 29. Hikmet voiced his desire to talk to a UCP (b) CC representative about the work of the Turkish Communist Party. The copies of Ponomarev’s letter to Stalin were sent to Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, Bulganin, and Khrushchev.62 In mid-July 1951, Hikmet met with responsible officials of the UCP (b) CC and examined the situation established at the Turkish Communist Party. Then, together with Marat Bostanji (whose real name is Bilen Ismail and who emigrated to Moscow in 1937), he made proposals on spreading the Turkish Communist Party’s activity. Vahan Grigoryan, Chairman of the UCP (b) CC Foreign Political Commission, reported this to Stalin and sent the proposals to Malenkov. The proposals were as follows: identification of the platform and tactics of actions of the Turkish Communist Party under the guidance of the CC CPSU; the Turkish Communist Party’s leading role in the United National Front against American imperialism; organization of the work of radio and press; organization of radio broadcasting under the name “Radio of Independent Turkey”; the strengthening of radio broadcasting from Moscow and popular democracies in Turkish; restarting the publication of the Turkish Communist Party’s central printed organ; creation, outside Turkey, of a foreign bureau as part of the CC of the Turkish Communist Party; and translation of classic works of Marxism-Leninism into Turkish. In early August, the UCP (b) CC discussed a matter entitled “On Requests by Comrades Hikmet and Marat (Bostanji)” and resolved the following: 1. We agree to give the necessary advice and help identify the platform and tactics of actions of the Turkish Communist Party after the Turkish Communist Party CC or a foreign bureau of the CC develops these documents. 2. The UCP (b) CC suggests placing the foreign Bureau of the Turkish Communist Party in Bucharest if Romanian comrades are in agreement. 3. We think the proposal on organization of a radio station under the name “Radio of Independent Turkey” that could broadcast on behalf of the Turkish United National Front is quite correct and acceptable. We will provide the necessary assistance to help organize radio broadcasting. The radio station should be deployed in a country where the foreign bureau of the Turkish Communist Party will be operational, since the radio station should operate under the Party’s control. 4. We think your proposal on improvement of radio broadcasting from Moscow is correct, so

we will undertake necessary measures. We also are prepared to provide the necessary assistance to strengthen radio broadcasting from a popular democracy over Turkey. 5. We also consider restarting the publication of the central printed organ of the Turkish Communist Party and creation of a new printed organ a timely, necessary measure. 6. Measures necessary to increase the issue of classic works of Marxism-Leninism will be undertaken. 7. Necessary assistance to Turkish Communist Party’s activists’ work in the CC foreign bureau will be provided.63 Work on the improvement of Moscow radio broadcasts in Turkish, including their quality and ideological significance, began immediately. On August 31, 1951 Grigoryan sent proposals titled “On Quality of USSR Council of Ministers’ Radio Broadcasting Committee’s Broadcasts into Turkey” to Molotov, noting that the initial broadcasts had to cover the following: disclosure of the Bayar-Menderes clique’s traitorous decision over Turkey’s entrance into NATO; Anglo-American contradictions over Turkey; the reactionary nature of the new “working law”; and the “antipopular” essence of the government sending Turkish soldiers to Korea. It was suggested to involve Hikmet, as well as specialists from Bulgaria, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, in the radio station’s work.64 After Hikmet resettled to the Soviet Union, special attention was paid to the publication of his works and paying him the highest possible author’s royalties. L. Grachev, head of the Main Publishing House, wrote to UCP (b) CC’s Y. M. Lomakin on November 14, 1951: “Upon your inquiry, we have to inform you of the calculation of payment of royalties to poet Hikmet for his verses publicized by the foreign literature publishing house and by the State Art Literature Publishing House. The royalties total 72,740 rubles from the foreign literature publishing house and 59,246 rubles from the State Art Literature Publishing House. On the two publishing houses, the royalties total 131,986 rubles to be paid to poet Hikmet.”65 The sum of the royalties was high at the time. This matter was considered without Hikmet’s knowledge by the UCP (b) CC Political Bureau, which made a positive decision. Hikmet was eager to take an active role in the work of the Turkish edition of the Moscow Radio. For this purpose, on November 22 he visited S. Vinogradov, Chairman of the Radio Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers, and offered himself as an editor of Turkish translations to be able to work at the editorial house one or two hours a day. “He asks to be given the microphone half an hour once a week to spread his comments, verses, addresses to the nation, and reports of his stay in the USSR to Turkey in Turkish. This broadcast could be called “Hikmet’s Hour.” Vinogradov replied that the broadcasting into Turkey was limited, so time was needed to think over the proposals. As for the stylistic interpretation, he thanked Hikmet for the services he had offered, but questioned that such a busy man would find time enough for such technical work. Nevertheless, Vinogradov reported the conversation to the UCP (b) CC. Instructed by the CC, on November 29, 1951, Grigoryan and Vinogradov presented their proposals on the possibility of using Hikmet in radio broadcasts in Turkish. The proposals were submitted to Stalin, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, and Khrushchev.

Two days later, it was reported to the Mikhail Suslov Secretariat that the matter of involving Hikmet in work for the Turkish edition of the Radio Broadcasting Committee had been examined by the Political Bureau. The Radio Broadcasting Committee was permitted to involve Hikmet in the stylistic and lingual correction of radio broadcasts into Turkey and let him make comments and speak of other materials in Turkish, while looking through preliminary records of these materials. However, the Political Bureau disagreed on call the performance “Hikmet’s Hour.”66 The Soviet leadership was eager to use Hikmet against Turkey, and particularly against the US’s Middle East policy, but at the same time it was afraid of him. Two weeks after Hikmet appeared in Moscow, A. Struchkov, head of the 1st unit of UCP (b) CC Special Division, sent top secret, “unmasking” material against the poet to A. N. Poskrebyshev and copies to Molotov and Grigoryan. According to the document, a certain Ferri had complained back in 1935 about Hikmet’s apostasy to G. Dimitrov, Chairman of the Communistic International executive committee. It was also noted that the father of Nazim—Hikmet bey—had been the editor of a pro-American newspaper, New East, publicized in Constantinople; his grandfather Ferid Enver Pasha had been a retired general; his uncle Ali Fuad Pasha had been Turkey’s ambassador to Moscow in 1922; his father’s brother Rifat bay had been the governor of Koniya and later issued a Panturkic newspaper in Angora. Hikmet’s university friend, Ali Yazyji, reported that Hikmet, after having been excluded from the party, had been defended by Ahmed Javad, who took Hikmet with him on his way from Batum to Moscow. The document stressed that “Hikmet belongs to Turkey’s top aristocracy that educated him” and that even a Turkish delegation had officially demanded to exclude him from the University of Workers of the East during the 4th congress of the Communistic International. The document is attached with Molotov’s resolution addressing Grigoryan: “It’d be good to inquire about Hikmet.”67 In addition, the Soviet leadership disliked Hikmet’s participation in the Youth Festival in Berlin in 1951. On August 2 the UCP (b) CC Political Bureau made a special decision on Hikmet’s work during the festival. As reported, Hikmet behaved carelessly and violated secret prescriptions by party bodies and intelligence services. Hikmet had been accompanied everywhere by secret agent F. Adilov, who on August 27 submitted a detailed report about adventures in Berlin to the UCP (b) CC and Grigoryan. Adilov wrote that Hikmet had been very active at the festival, so he was elected vice president of the jury on literature and president of the jury on dances. He very attentively examined verses and prose he had to check, and he responded very quickly. For example, upon Hikmet’s own insistence, the main award was conferred to the verses of a Greek poet on the brink of the latter’s execution. Adilov also reported that nine Turks, of whom six were Communists, had attended the festival. One of them named Dogan was a member of the French Communist Party; one fellow and a girl arrived straight from Turkey; and the others were university students in different European countries. First, Hikmet held an open meeting with them. He told them about the Soviet Union, how he had been received in Moscow, and how the city had improved since the years he had studied there. He most often met with two of the visitors: a girl who studied in Paris and graduated from a medical institute, whom he sometimes called Fatima and sometimes Sevim, and a lame

man wearing glasses whose name was a secret. In talks with Adilov, Hikmet simply called him Khroma, apparently hiding his real name. Intrigued, Adilov wrote, “If I came over while he was having a conversation with Khroma or the girl Sevim, he immediately changed the topic of his conversation, and I felt that his speech was not good and that they expected me to leave. . . . He once told me that he would send the girl Sevim to Turkey after the festival was over. She would have to pass his instructions to fellows in Turkey and then come back with two or three fellows, one of whom would be a secretary of the Turkish Communist Party.” In addition, Adilov reported that during the festival, Hikmet had met various people every day and had spoken only French. The meetings were arranged by the interpreter Kakhani. She and her husband were Communists. Kakhani was fluent in French, English, and German. Her husband worked in the media. She knew many people, and sometimes she herself decided whom Hikmet should meet. “I had difficulty knowing people and what they talked about. . . . I tried to use our men to replace the interpreter, but I failed because Hikmet defended her strongly,” Adilov wrote. The report further mentioned Hikmet’s meetings with Hasan Kudsi, the leader of the Syrian delegation, and with the Israeli and French delegations. Kudsi promised to help Turkish communists with crossing the Syrian border in both directions. Hikmet was met with thunderous applause, especially by the delegations of eastern countries and France. At a rally, Arabs carried him on their shoulders for nearly 200 meters, shouting “Long Live Hikmet!” and many times repeated the words “Stalin” and “Hikmet.” It is noteworthy that he really liked such receptions and meetings. It can be concluded from his talks and behavior that he was eager to be not only a popular poet but also a popular leader. His only disadvantage at the meetings was that he spoke unprepared. It was evident from his speeches in Turkish and in Russian that sometimes he spoke insipidly. He himself admitted that he was a bad orator. At the end of his broad inquiry, Adilov concluded: “Of course, you know Hikmet well as a poet. If we describe him briefly based on his behavior and work, we can say the following: he is a very capable man and a good organizer; he quickly adapts to all conditions and to people of different views and cultural levels. He works quickly, dislikes being slow and never puts off today’s work for tomorrow. When he is involved in work he is interested in, he is never tired, and he forgets about meals. He likes to be praised, wants to differ from all the rest always and everywhere, and always demands to be given honored VIP ticket at any reception. For example, he always wanted to know whether Pablo Neruda was invited to a reception and whether he was given honored VIP ticket equal to his. When he learned that Pablo had not been invited or given a special ticket, he was glad and said he was not treated that way. I must say that if Hikmet has no hidden thoughts, that is, he is our man, then he is a very valuable person.”68 Proceeding from this report and some others, Grigoryan informed Stalin of the misbehavior in Berlin on January 15, 1952. He wrote that the Arabs had carried Hikmet on their shoulders up to the rally’s rostrum. After this, Hikmet boasted several times to a man who accompanied him: “You see how I am received! Tell comrades in Moscow about this. If my authority is used in the East, this will help unite the democratic forces of these countries.” Grigoryan supplied his report to Stalin with a letter by Hasan Koreytem, secretary of the Syria

and Lebanon Communist Party CC, that Hikmet had openly explored the opportunities of illegal crossing the Turkish borders when he had spoken in Berlin in the presence of alien persons, and suggested establishing the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties of Middle Eastern countries. Hasan Koreyt reported that Hikmet behaved carelessly and could “make a lot of grave political mistakes, as well as mistakes in conspiracy issues.” Grigoryan reported to Stalin that Hikmet had met with Turkish students who had arrived from Turkey and France at the festival. One of the participants of the festival, Sevim Tari, a communist, left for Turkey carrying Hikmet’s instructions with her. Police shadowed her, so she was arrested upon her return to France from Turkey in October 1951. As a result of her arrest, leading organizations of the Turkish CP were destroyed and all the leaders of the CP were arrested. They were Reshat Fuat Baraner (Sidki), member of the CC and Political Bureau of the Turkish CP; Zeki Bashtymar (Aidyn), Acting Secretary of the Communist Party CC; Mehri Belli, member of the Turkish CP CC; and party members Shevki Akshit, Tevfik Dilmen, Abdulkadir Berkman, and others, a total of sixty-seven people were arrested. Grigoryan also reported to Stalin that the USSR KGB was aware that after Hikmet arrived in Romania and then to the USSR in June 1951, Turkish intelligence undertook measures to send provocateur agents to Paris-based Turkish progressive and communist organizations. Suspicious behavior of Atilla Ilhan, a reporter for the Turkish paper Gerchek (Real), who had recently appeared in Paris, drew attention. Masked as a communist, he tried to establish a link to Hikmet. In letters he sent to Moscow, Atilla asked for Hikmet’s “instructions.” As viewed by Soviet intelligence, Atilla Ilhan is a Turkish intelligence agent, a provocateur tasked to establish contact with Hikmet.69 As information on Hikmet’s suspicious behavior continued, the Soviet leadership questioned his past. After the archives of Communist International and Ministry of National Security were opened and compromised materials were collected in August 1951, Grigoryan composed a wide inquiry of Hikmet’s vital activity in 1925–1939. The inquiry on September 8 was sent to Stalin, and its copies to Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, Bulganin, and Khrushchev. An inquiry was identified dating back to April 14, 1937 composed by Galjyan, assistant referent of the IKKI Eastern Secretariat, for Alikhanov, then the head of the IKKI personnel division, reading the following: “Hikmet had a hostile attitude to Ferdi [secretary general of the Turkish CP CC—J. H.]. At a party conference in Vienna in 1926, he was elected a candidate to the CC but never did organizational work for the party. Hikmet built and led a group of oppositionists against the party’s leadership in 1929; moreover, Hikmet and his group primarily attacked Ferdi. . . . Hikmet himself became a suitable instrument in the hands of enemies, which used him to destruct the party.” The correctness of the document was confirmed by the signature of N. Vasyukov, deputy head of the UCP (b) CC top party control division.70 Another unsigned, undated document found at Communist International’s archive read: “The opposition that had separated itself from the party in 1930 and created its independent center existed in Turkey before 1933. Our party calls this opposition a ‘Trotskypolice opposition.’ This opposition was linked to Trotsky followers in other countries. It was written correspondence with them.” A comment on the document provided by A. Struchkov, head of the first unit of the UCP (b) CC Special Division, pointed to Hikmet’s participation in

this opposition. He sent this document to Grigoryan on August 17.71 A report titled “On Failures, Provocation, and Conspiracy in the Turkish CP” prepared by IKKI Eastern Secretariat’s employees on September 17, 1933 indicated that Hikmet, Tufan, and others “are organizing a new ‘communist’ party, the so-called Trotsky-police opposition, by separating some workers from the party; they enjoy the sympathies of some party members, even those who studied at the Communist University of Workers of the East.”72 Hikmet was also accused of defending Kemal followers and taking their side in the 1930s. In an inquiry on April 4, 1937, Communist International Office’s employee Polyachek indicated that Vedat Nedim, Ahmed Javad, Valia Nuretdin, Shevket, and Hikmet had openly taken the side of Mustafa Kemal. A letter the Turkish Communist Party CC sent to Communist International on December 12, 1934 read, “Hikmet writes for the Aksham newspaper under various pseudonyms. We read one of his articles on women’s issues. The article’s spirit favors the Kemal followers. Hikmet hides the fact that he works for Aksham. Ismet Pasha Inenyu has a 1/30,000 share in the newspaper Aksham. But in reality Aksham is his paper.”73 At the same time, Communist International’s archive contained documents describing Hikmet positively, from the perspective of Soviet ideology. For example, when he was in prison in Bursa in August 1945, Hikmet could send a letter to Kemal Tahir, a journalist and writer who was in the Chorum prison at the time, that “in the prison ward he is being beaten by a criminal who was jailed for espionage for the Germans and appointed as supervisor of the ward’s section where Hikmet was.” Tahir could resend the letter to Zekeriya Sertel, the owner of the newspaper Tan, with an addition that “on days when they speak of movement toward freedom, it is sad and tragic that a German Gestapo agent beats the great Turkish and world’s poet Hikmet. This tragedy also concerns the Turkish people and of course, you, as a Turkish intellectual, are also responsible for this. You should interfere with the case immediately and decisively protest the bad treatment of Hikmet and the Turkish literature.” Tahir addressed the President and Premier of Turkey, as well as Turkish prominent intellectuals Feridun Fikri Dushunsel, Nejmetdin Sadak, Fuat Keprulu, Asym Us, Reshat Nuri Guntekin, Bekir Sytky Kunt, Falih Ryfki Atay, Hasan Baltajioglu, and Ali Yujel with similar letters. Ivan Samylovsky, head of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’ Middle East Division, forwarded a copy of Tahir’s letter (reading that secretary of the Turkish Communist Party Hikmet had been beaten in prison) to Alexandr Panyushkin, deputy head of UCP (b) CC division: “This letter was received by our Embassy to Ankara and it was requested by Turkish democratic circles to publicize it in Soviet newspapers or broadcast it on the radio and, if possible, to report the facts of famous Turkish poet and secretary of the Turkish Communist Party Hikmet’s being beaten in prison in Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, or Romanian newspapers.”74 Hikmet’s visit to Bulgaria in September–October 1951 was not also traceless. Adilov informed Grigoryan of the Bulgarian adventures in detail as well. The report illustrates that the poet’s visit to Bulgaria and the meetings he held there with Turkish emigrants and representatives of the Turkish commune were under strict control by Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence. Adilov reported that Hikmet was secured better than in Berlin. “We were placed in a villa in Semenovka 15 kilometers from the city, and two or three guards always stayed

with us. No strangers were allowed to enter our place. . . . Having arrived at the appointed place (Semenovka), Hikmet demanded to be sent to the city to look at it and meet political emigrants. Chief guard Ali Rafiyev (head of Turkish CC division) denied Hikmet’s request, saying they had not been given instructions about this. After the September 9 demonstration, Hikmet and I sat in a restaurant of the Hotel Bulgaria attending the banquet hosted by Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. I sat next to Hikmet. Chervenkov, Marshal Sokolovsky, USSR Ambassador Bodrov, and others sat near us. Coming up to Hikmet, a waiter passed a written note to him and told him in Turkish that should telephone the written number. Hikmet wanted to leave and ring at once, but I restrained him and told him that it was inappropriate to leave now. When the dances began, Hikmet and I came up to Hristo Radevsky [Chairman of the Union of Writers of Bulgaria—J. H.] who showed him the telephone and dialed the number. Hikmet spoke with political emigrant Fahri. Hikmet promised to meet with him the next day.” All the political emigrants who were in Sofia gathered at the CC on September 10. There only six persons. Hikmet wanted to know about their problems. He met with Chervenkov the next day. Hikmet asked him what caused Turks’ emigration from Bulgaria. Chervenkov replied that it was a big mistake of Bulgarians, and the remaining Turks must be kept there somehow. Hikmet, Adilov, and more than twenty persons as security guards, reporters, cameramen, and so on, left on a ten-day tour on September 12 to areas where Turks resided in high concentration. Over that period, twenty rallies were held with the participation of 130,000 people. In his speeches, Hikmet urged Turks not to leave Bulgaria. Nevertheless, he said, “After five–six years when we take over power in Turkey, please come help us.” To keep Hikmet’s contacts with Turkish political emigrants under control, even before he visited Bulgarian regions Soviet intelligence agents had instructed CC Secretary, Todor Zhivkov, to provide references of Turkish political emigrants residing in Sofia. The Bulgarian Interior Ministry dealt with the task. In particular, Turkish political emigrant Deli Urman Mohammed Turul was listed as an employee of the newspaper Yeni Ishyk issued in Turkish. He was notorious for having distorted Chervenkov’s speech in the newspaper by replacing his words “Cooperatives work to peasants’ good” with the words “Cooperatives work to the detriment of peasants.” In addition, the editorial house missed an article entitled “Turkish Consul Takes Bribes” written by the Foreign Ministry of Bulgaria. Concerning Turkish political emigrant Ziya Yamach, it is asserted that he, as a member of the Committee for Hikmet’s release from prison, always objected to the formulation “led by the Soviet Union.” Adilov notes that Hikmet, when he was in Bulgaria, demanded to meet political emigrants with no strangers in his presence and claimed that “political emigrants can not tell everything in the presence of strangers.” “Proceeding from his descriptions given by the Interior Ministry, we worked to prevent Hikmet from conduct this meeting without his knowledge, though the meeting had been scheduled. Political emigrants, having gathered at the place, waited for him for several hours and then went away. Hikmet could not call them together again, as he had to leave Bulgaria several hours later.”75 Complaints about Hikmet kept on coming after Stalin died. In 1956, after the 20th congress,

Hikmet wrote a play titled Was There an Ivan Ivanovitch? which bemused the Soviet leadership. The play was publicized in the magazine Noviy Mir, Vol. 4. Hikmet arranged a discussion of the play with the participation of the youth of the institutes of history, philosophy, and economics on June 11, 1956. In explaining why he had written this play, the author voiced remarks criticizing some phenomena of USSR public life, particularly facts of extreme inequality. He spoke about a Kremlin hospital where children wore silky pajamas and another hospital where ill children wore linen pajamas; in Sochi, he saw a sanatorium divided by a fence into two parts: they in one part rest in the best conditions, while a “mob” rests in the other part. N. P. Vasilyev, secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences’ Philosophy Institute’s party bureau, reported to D. M. Kukin of the CC CPSU Science Division: “Hikmet spoke about the use of the word ‘host’ concerning leading comrades and the word ‘mob’ concerning the mass of workers as a consequence of the personality cult. He also said some well-paid Soviet officials had bad manners and taste, and that housemaids and drivers do not have dinner at a common table with the officials they serve, which he observed during a visit to a Soviet writer. He also noticed people striving to purchase expensive, tasteless jewelry items, misunderstanding the value of folk art and creativity.” The play Was There an Ivan Ivanovitch? aimed to draw attention to the necessity of counteracting stagnation, bureaucracy, indifference, and the consequences of the personality cult.76 Boris Ryurikov and Ivanov, responsible officials of the CC CPSU Culture Division, made an inquiry of Hikmet in July 1956, also mentioning the play Was There an Ivan Ivanovitch? and noting that some important issues of modern reality had been misinterpreted in the play’s first act. The play satirically displayed the history of an honest Soviet employee becoming a bureaucrat and snobbish official. As viewed by Ryurikov and Ivanov, the play’s biggest mistake is that “it depicted the personality cult as, to a certain extent, something conceived by the public system of the socialistic countries.” The Culture Division’s remarks relating to the play were reported to the editorial staff of the magazine Noviy Mir. Upon the editorial staff’s advice, Hikmet added some corrections to the play. After the 20th Congress, Hikmet told a meeting of writers that he planned to become a Soviet citizen and a member of the USSR Union of Writers shortly. However, the party leadership thought giving Hikmet Soviet citizenship was unsuitable at the time. Important steps were to be taken to normalize relations with Turkey, as the relations had deteriorated due to the intentional actions of a hostile gang led by Beria. The Turkish government deprived Hikmet of Turkish citizenship in 1951 and declared him an outlaw. Thus giving Hikmet Soviet citizenship in 1956 would have looked like a challenge to the Turkish government that could only hurt the process of normalization of relations between the two countries. The leadership recommended “not settling this matter at the moment.”77 Hikmet was given Soviet citizenship only one year before he died. Z. Bashtymar, secretary of the TCP CC, gave Hikmet a positive reference for the acquisition of Soviet citizenship on December 23, 1961.78 By that time, he had lost faith in the buildup of communism and had gotten involved in his uneasy personal life. Marat Bostanji, a TCP CC representative, wrote to the CC CPSU on December 25, 1961: “Hikmet lost the sympathies of many active members of the Turkish Communist Party in recent years. This is

because keeps his distance from the life of Turkish people and current sad state of affairs of the Turkish Communist Party. Hikmet’s latest arrival in the USSR changed him. Busy with his personal life, Hikmet seems to have forgotten the struggle of the Turkish people. Many comrades disapprove of his marital status. They say this step will make him quite distant from the struggle in Turkey. Now, the whole question for Hikmet is to find a way out of the isolation and not to forget that he is a member of the Turkish Communist Party. It’d be a great pity if he forgot that.”79 As we can see, Hikmet had many reasons not to answer the question he had been asked about the Azerbaijani language at the State University of Azerbaijan in October 1957. He had sufficient understanding of the Soviet “rules” of the game, as he had lived in the USSR since 1951. That’s why he knew he was under the strict control of intelligence services inside and outside the country. At the same time, Hikmet considered Azerbaijan the closest republic to him of all Soviet Union republics. On the one hand, this was caused by the great role Azerbaijan had played in the poet’s life in the 1920s; on the other hand, by the sincere love Hikmet was met with in Azerbaijan against the background of the system of prohibitions practiced in the USSR in the middle of the 1950s. He had close links with all writers, poets, figures of literature and culture, and scientists of Azerbaijan. In some cases, these ties grew into strong friendships. It is no coincidence that early scientific and research works of Hikmet’s life and creativity were created in Azerbaijan. The research went on after the poet died. A book by Akber Babayev issued in Moscow in 1957 was reissued in 1975. In addition, Babayev was the composer of an eight-volume issue of Hikmet’s works publicized in Bulgaria in 1962–1973. A book titled Hikmet by Akshin Babayev was issued in Baku in 1978. A book titled Social Motives in Turkey’s Modern Dramaturgy by Akshin Babayev appeared in 1982 and was largely devoted to Hikmet’s creativity. Arif Melikov, a pupil of Qara Qarayev, wrote a ballet in 1961 titled Legend of Love and a libretto of the same name based on Hikmet’s work. Later that year, the ballet was staged by the S. M. Kirov Leningrad Opera & Ballet Theater. The play’s conductor was the world-renowned Soviet master, Azerbaijani Niyazi, and choreographer Y. Grigorovitch. Legend of Love became an important event in the cultural life of the USSR and Azerbaijan. It was staged in all “ballet” countries worldwide and did not disappear from the stage of the Bolshoi and Kirov (Mariinsky) Theaters. The ballet remained in the Bolshoi Theater’s repertoire for thirty-three consecutive seasons! The famous painter Rasim Babayev illustrated Hikmet’s play Skull while sculptor Manzar Rzayeva fashioned a bust of him. Although mostly forgotten in Turkey after communism collapsed in Europe, Hikmet continued to be kept in the memories of Azerbaijanis. As national system development in Azerbaijan progressed, memories of him were held deep in the hearts of many Azerbaijanis like the “sprawling walnut in Istanbul’s Gulhana garden” in his works. Controversial processes and political intrigues in the USSR in the second half of the 1950s made the ruling elite take over the creative intelligentsia. The split nature of the 20th Congress’s decisions, the crisis of socialistic reforms in Eastern European countries, and the growing ideological decline in the Soviet society weakened, to a significant extent, intellectuals’ belief in a bright future. A series of art works publicized by “thick” magazines

and almanacs at the time clearly indicated the spirit of decline. The journal Noviy Mir became a vehicle for new stories and novels that pushed the frontiers of what was permissible.80 The historian Zubok wrote, “The season of literary sensations, however, was only beginning. Konstantin Simonov, Tvardovsky’s successor as editor of Noviy Mir, was determined to turn this journal into a vehicle of the cultural thaw. In the spring of 1956 Simonov read two potentially explosive manuscripts. One was Doctor Zhivago by Boris Pasternak. The other was Not by Bread Alone by Vladimir Dudintsev, a young jurist and war veteran. . . . As expected, the publication of Dudintsev’s novel in Noviy Mir in August through October set off public furor. The novel became a manifesto for those who took the secret speech as a call for new thinking and action.”81 According to American historian Ronald G. Suny, “Dudintsev’s novel stimulated a vigorous debate in Soviet society, and critics soon turned their wrath toward his characterization of Soviet officials.”82 But the editors of Literaturnaia Moskva rejected Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago as “too voluminous.”83 The third Plenum of the Union of Writers, held on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialistic Revolution, was marked by strong criticism of the magazine Noviy Mir and the almanac Literaturnaia Moskva. In a resolution, the Plenum noted: “The unhealthy attitudes of some writers, and works depicting reality one-sidedly and subjectively, publicized by the magazine Noviy Mir and almanac Literaturnaia Moskva in 1956, were unanimously and unconditionally condemned during the plenum’s discussion. The Plenum decisively rejects the position of clannishness occupied by the editorial staff of the almanac Literaturnaia Moskva, as one unbecoming of Soviet writers. A small group of Moscovite writers [Boris Pasternak, Konstantin Paustovsky, Anna Akhmatova, Nikolai Zabolotsky, Veniamin Kaverin, Viktor Shklovsky, Korney Chukovsky and others—J. H.] did not want to make conclusions from comrades’ fair criticism of the ideologically vicious works the almanac had publicized, abstained from the discussion, and made Plenum’s participants indignant by its position of keeping silent. By acting this way, the members of the group cast a shadow onto the whole politically healthy and creative strong collective of Moscow writers.” According to the resolution, friendly conversations with the CC CPSU First Secretary Khrushchev and other party leaders had helped the writers to more deeply and clearly understand the tasks of Soviet literature as it related to the situation.84 To prevent the development of undesirable tendencies among intellectuals, an article was compiled consisting of Khrushchev’s speeches at a May 13, 1957 meeting of the CC CPSU and a May 19 conversation with the creative intelligentsia at the CC, as well as informal remarks at a July meeting of party activists.85 The article, titled “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation,” was proofread by the party office and publicized by The Communist magazine, the CC CPSU political and theoretical organ, in its Vol.12, 1957. The first part of the article was devoted to the fulfillment of the 20th Congress’s decisions in the spheres of industry and agriculture, as well as the extension of the rights of the Russian Federation and other republics. The second part was wholly devoted to Stalin and his role in the world’s history. The criticism of Stalin’s personality cult had raised many questions among the public. Thus the article was distinguished by the line that had been adopted at the 20th Congress and in

CC CPSU resolutions. According to the article, for some reason some intellectuals had started questioning some aspects pertaining to complex ideological directives. What caused this doubt among figures of literature and art? The reason is that some comrades unquestioningly accepted the party’s criticism of Stalin’s personality cult. They considered the criticism as a definite denial of all the positive things relating to the name of Stalin and the life of the party and country. Having chosen only the shady side of the path along which the people had been progressing toward the victory of socialism, they started ignoring the historic achievements of the country of Soviets. The article’s third section was devoted directly to the peripeteia of ideological struggle in the sphere of literature and art. It noted that the modern stage of the ideological struggle and its complicity and peculiarities were such that it had become necessary not only to defend Soviet literature and art from raids from abroad but also to struggle with creative individuals who tried to derail the literature from its true path. The article particularly criticized Vladimir Dudintsev for his novel Not by Bread Alone and poetess Margarita Aliger. In one of his speeches, Khrushchev even said, “Soviet people reject slanderous works such as the book Not by Bread Alone by Dudintsev and such nauseous films as The Unforgettable 1919 or Guban Cossacks.”86 The main idea of the whole article was the strengthening of the party’s control of literature during the ideological struggle. The idea of culture that was national in terms of form and socialistic in terms of content was theoretically substantiated in the article, proceeding from the necessity to add socialistic color to the national ideas that had become stronger in Soviet republics as a consequence of conservative reforms in the 1950s. After Khrushchev’s article and speech, the almanac Literaturnaia Moskva was shut down. A long and vicious official campaign announced the end of the thaw to thousands of educated readers of Noviy Mir.87 Naturally, Khrushchev’s directives were discussed in all the Union republics. In Azerbaijan, this event was held with a delay but in a big way. A meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists, with all the party and government leaders in attendance, was held on December 4–5, 1957 to discuss the topic “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” Chairing the meeting, Mustafayev gave the floor to Deputy Culture Minister Israfil Nazarov, who specified a circle of tasks stemming from the 20th Congress’s directives and ideas laid out in Khrushchev’s article. A promise had been made to draw conclusions from all those critiques in addressing the republic. After a short break, reports were made by Rahimov, Chairman of the Union of Writers; Q. Qarayev, Chairman of the Union of Composers; and Mamedagha Tarlanov, Chairman of the Union of Artists. In his report, Rahimov specifically analyzed processes in the sphere of literature, checking whether they were in line with the concept of Khrushchev’s article. He pointed out certain achievements and touched on some aspects of art criticism. In his speech in Russian, Qarayev made some general conclusions on music. According to him, Azerbaijani composers Fikret Amirov, Jovdet Hajiyev, Soltan Hajibeyov, Said Rustamov, Niyazi, Jahangir Jahangirov, Rauf Hajiyev, Adil Rzayev, Tofik Quliyev, Aghabaji Rzayeva, and Gambar Huseynli had earned worldwide fame for Azerbaijan with their opuses in the genres of opera,

ballet, suite, love song, song, and symphonic mughams. Qarayev said the creativity of U. Hajibeyov was a model of attitudes to folk music. Hajibeyov had arranged regular congresses of folk singers, meetings of folk performers, and collected and studied folk music, and published notes. According to Qarayev, Bul-Bul and Rustamov had positive experience in this sense. Regretfully, no one in the republic is truly involved in this process, he said. Having highly appraised folk music, Qarayev made an interesting comparative analysis of the creative styles of Rustamov and Hajiyev. He said that both composers feed from the common roots of folk music. However, their creativity is distinctive. Rustamov treats folk heritage very cautiously. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish his songs from folk songs. But this does not mean that all composers should copy his manner. For example, we observe quite a different approach in the creativity of Hajiyev. “Composer Hajiyev prefers a freer contact with folk material, bravely transforms it, fully denies the method of quotations and, on the basis of folk intonation and rhythm, creates his own original themes, very brave in terms of structure but organically linked to our folk music. However, Hajiyev’s individual manner is not an indispensable example or law other composers should follow.”88 This concept by Qarayev caused many disputes at the meeting of activists. After Tarlanov made his speech, debates on the reports began. Speakers were Mustafa Mardanov, an actor, and Qasym Qasymzadeh, editor of newspaper Edebiyyat ve injesenet (Literature & Art). Qasymzadeh issued his first book titled Our Village in 1951; in 1956 he defended a dissertation to win the degree of candidate of philology, and a year later he was appointed editor of the newspaper Edebiyyat ve injesenet. In his speech, Qasymzadeh said that the newspaper, in order to strengthen its link to the republic’s cultural life, paid significant attention to readers’ letters and to discussions of questions raised by professional authors. For example, Bilgeis Mamedova, a secondary school teacher, addressed the newspaper with a letter concerning the publication of Azerbaijani literature classics. Forty-five readers from the republic’s regions responded to the letter. The masses were notified of their opinions, including the criticism of disadvantages in this sphere, particularly the absence of academic editions of classics. Though four to five months had passed since the publications appeared, the Culture Ministry had not yet found time to submit the question to its Board for examination. But the reader was waiting for a reply. Another serious question Qasymzadeh raised is the fashion of naming newborns after pseudo-pathos, revolutionary, and neo-Soviet names quite alien to the Azerbaijani mentality. An item in the newspaper titled “Open Letter to Fathers and Mothers” received broad responses from readers. The Communist newspaper and the magazine Kirpi (Hedgehog) followed the example of newspaper Edebiyyat ve Injesenet in making a laughing-stock of parents who named their children Tractor, Congress, MTC, Kolkhoz, November, Court, Committee, Shanghai, China, and so forth.89 Ali Veliyev, who spoke after Qasymzadeh, noticed some nuances in the report by Israfil Nazarov that a writer, apart from knowing the life of the nation, should also feel and love it from the heart. He said that works by Jalil Mamedquluzadeh, Jafar Jabarli, and Samed Vurghun will always be loved because their names are spoken with pride and because they are national, purely Azerbaijani writers. A writer who writes well of his people’s lives is a master. For

example, Ibrahimov not only writes but also feels. He says, “All of life has returned to normal, but the matter of Azerbaijan being separated into two parts can by no means be settled.” Everyone should care about this issue, so a novel titled The Day Will Come called attention to it. Then Veliyev reproached Qarayev because he had addressed Hajiyev with words of praise but had accused Rustamov of making quotations. Then the public listened to Ibrahimov with a great attention and pleasure. He started by saying that great masters should create good works. “Therefore, I’d like to appeal to the creativity of young writers: I read the novel At a Crossroads by Ismail Shikhly with great interest. I noticed repeatedly that kolkhoz workers and intellectuals are also interested in this book. Ismail Shikhly did not write it specifically for someone, he just put his soul’s feelings onto the paper. As for the second example, I’d like to tell about “Small Symphony,” a work by poet Ali Kerim. This is an excellent work. It reproduces the world of the author’s feelings and his life so sincerely.” Ibrahimov then started talking about music: “We should treat our past with great respect. The period when tar was excluded from the conservatory and they tried to replace it by violin is now over. I remember times in 1938–1939 when the opera Koroghlu was called primitive.” Changing the topic to Qarayev, Ibrahimov called him a talent the whole nation could be proud of, saying that they expected him to do much. Then, having turned his face toward Qarayev, he said, “Thus I want you to make a speech here in Azeri.” The words were met with thunderous applause. “Our people is small but noble, pure, heroic. They once tried to trample our people down to the level of an uneducated shepherd. Now a group of intellectuals is growing who do not know their native language. This is a disgusting fact. . . . Therefore, people who do not understand this are indifferent to the native language, creating a chasm between nations and falling into the chasm themselves. We love Russian. I translated Chernyshevsky, and I did it with great love. This language has opened the gates of Europe for us. But why should our native language be forgotten? When I visited military units, I saw that Azerbaijanis were almost 80 percent of the crew. Why should I speak to them in Russian? Of course, I must speak a language they understand.”90 Bayramov, CC Secretary, made a detailed speech at the meeting of the republic’s activists. He spoke about the place of literature and art and their role in the politics of the Communist Party and Soviet State, and how the party and Khrushchev led this sphere of public life. Then he spoke about Azerbaijan’s specifics. While there have been no ideologically rotten works, like Vladimir Dudintsev’s opus, in the Azerbaijani literature in some recent years, there are a fair number of weak works, he said. In their reports, Nazarov and Rahimov spoke in detail of the novel Hot Heart by Isa Huseynov. Thus, Bayramov also decided to touch upon this matter: “One of the great disadvantages of this work is that the author depicts the party regional committee’s first secretary as a negative character while the image of the second secretary opposing him is characterized with dull colors. We have lately been observing the appearance of a stereotype that a party employee should indispensably be a negative character.” By the way, it should be mentioned that on May 13, 1957, Rahimov, Chairman of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, sent a “Report on Creativity of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan after the 21st Congress of the CPA” to Shykhali Kurbanov, Head of the CC CPA Propaganda Division, noting

that Isa Huseynov was a talented writer; however, perhaps the random selection of vital facts and their incorrect artistic summarization led to big mistakes.91 In addition, Bayramov criticized Mamed Rahim’s rhyme “Sparrow” for its pessimism and accused the author of being close to the ideological roots of misanthropes, a literary direction under formation in France. He also told the audience that M. Rahim had a series of poems on his desk to be publicized only after his death. Rahim tried to deny this. Bayramov told him: “Anyway, we read your poem ‘Sparrow’ attentively.” The CC Secretary then fired criticism at Zeynal Khalil, using a poem titled “How Beautiful You Are” as an example. The party leader was particularly indignant that ten to fifteen days after the CC had strongly criticized this poem, Khalil read it to students of the Pedagogical Institute. It seemed that the poet was functioning completely separately from the CC. Moreover, Khalil added another book with a poem resembling the criticized one. Abdulla Bayramov voiced his grave concern over the permanently decreasing number of publications of classic works. While twenty-four classic works appeared in 1953, the number decreased to twenty-three in 1954, to only fifteen in 1956, and to eleven in 1957. At the same time, he said that some incomplete works by modern authors in both Azeri and Russian had already been publicized in magazines. But works by young authors, who could not fight for their rights, were not publicized in any language. Here, Bayramov drew an example from Tzarist Russia, in which it was said that 10 percent of landowners owned 90 percent of the land. Now we also see that 90 percent of all the publications are old writers’ works, he noted. To substantiate this thought, Bayramov referred to the author’s royalties paid in 1953–1957 where mature writers had an indisputable advantage.92 Speaking at the third meeting of the republic’s activists, Bakhtiyar Vagabzadeh also voiced his regret that some composers knew Azeri poorly; he substantiated this problem by saying that Azerbaijani poetry had a unique charm and its own internal harmony. As a positive example, Vagabzadeh spoke about the creativity of Huseyn Huseynzadeh, who very subtly dealt with the palette of lyric poetry. Then he touched upon the question of opening house-museums of classic writers: “Poets of the three Transcaucasian republics met in Tbilisi in 1954. There, we examined the house-museum exhibitions of Georgian classic writers. We even put a commemorative sign onto a place where Ilya Chavchavadze’s blood had spilled. But no such museums are created for our classic writers. The Akhundov House is in a state of ruin. We were unaware of the whereabouts of Haqverdiyev’s grave until lately.” Vagabzadeh further defended Isa Huseynov, saying the attack against his novel Hot Heart by both the media and party activists was unjust. In addition, it turned out that the party leadership was eager to make a young writer, who had been sent on a mission to virgin lands to create a novel titled Wide Horizons, a member of the Union of Writers. Vagabzadeh strongly objected the idea, believing that visiting the wilderness is an insufficient reason for one to become a member of the Union of Writers at once.93 In his speech, Huseyn, responsible secretary of the Union of Writers, defended Ibrahimov’s position concerning the preservation of the Azerbaijani language. He said, “Everyone liked what Ibrahimov said. It seems to me that Azerbaijani intellectuals who sit here understand the

significance of this problem much better than before. I remember when the leader of Azerbaijan at the time reported in this hall: ‘Why are you harping on the Azerbaijani language?’ Azerbaijani enlighteners fought heroically for the Azerbaijani language, and some of them were even killed in an unequal battle. Thus we awarded Ibrahimov with thunderous applause and are authorized to speak about this problem out loud. Many our writers were killed in the struggle for the modern Azerbaijani language in the beginning of the twentieth century. Respected Ibrahimov, his friend Ali Veliyev, and primarily Samed Vurghun contributed greatly to the language issue.” According to Huseyn, so far not a single reputable work had been published reflecting this historical struggle for the preservation of the Azerbaijani language.94 Speaking after Mamed Kurbanov, the Culture Minister, was Niyazi, a famous composer and conductor. First of all, he supported the fair statement of the question by Ibrahimov. He considered a symphony titled “On the Other Side of Arax” by J. Jahangirov and a symphony by Hajiyev illustrative examples of this issue. As for the knowledge of Azeri among composers, Niyazi did not fully agree with the previous orators and stated that knowing a native language was one thing, and that speaking as an orator from a rostrum was another thing. For example, Hajiyev is a very good composer but cannot speak Azeri as an orator. Niyazi correctly noticed that the root of the problem was that all the Conservatory’s textbooks, guidebooks, and workbooks were in Russian except one textbook by Rustamov. In addition, despite the availability of such coryphées as Bul-Bul and Rashid Beybutov, the repertories of folk singers largely consisted of falsifications and, to an extent, vulgar songs. Niyazi even drew an example of such vulgarity: “Look at Kaganovitch’s Head, Look at Basti’s Brother.”95 That made the audience laugh. As for the birth of professional Azerbaijani music, Niyazi said the founder of the composer school had been U. Hajibeyov. But he also said that we should not forget about the historic Tabriz school that had educated great music experts and musicians.96 In his speech, Suleyman Rustam highly evaluated the process of rehabilitation of poets and writers who had been repressed in the 1930s. He said, “I want to say some words of literary heritage. About thirty writers, once branded as ‘enemies of the nation,’ were removed from our literature. This stain has been removed from their names in recent years, so they have been rehabilitated. Those who got rid of Huseyn Javid in an administrative manner also disappeared.” However, the works and archives of writers repressed in the 1930s also needed to be rehabilitated. Definite steps were made in this direction in the second half of the 1950s; however, it still remained difficult to receive manuscripts and archives of the repressed writers from security bodies. Alisohbat Sumbatzadeh, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, wrote on April 25, 1957 to Mustafayev: “As it is known, prominent scientists and writers were arrested and convicted on fraudulent charges in 1936–1937. Valuable books, archives, and manuscripts were confiscated from them during their arrests. All this was kept at the Interior Ministry at a time when these materials could have provided invaluable assistance to the development of history, economy, philosophy, philology, art, and other sciences in Azerbaijan.” Thus, the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR AS asked Mustafayev to help provide the materials of the rehabilitated scientists and writers for the reasons of registration and

selection of what the country needed. A commission consisting of Prof. Hamid Arasly and Candidates of Philology Mamedagha Sultanov and Aziz Mirahmedov was assigned tasks accordingly.97 Y. Qasymov, head of the CC CPA administrative bodies division, was instructed to deal with the matter, so he appealed to the KGB under the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers. However, Abbas Zamanov, KGB Deputy Chairman, and D. Mamedov, KGB division deputy head, noted in a letter on June 28, 1957 that “no manuscripts or other materials indicated in the Academy of Sciences’ letter have been found at the archive of the KGB under the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers.”98 Backing Rustamov’s position in his speech, Mir-Jalal Pashayev urged everyone to pay attention to repressed poets such as H. Javid and A. Javad. As viewed by Pashayev, it was not possible to oppose H. Javid and Mirza Jalil even though they occupied opposite positions in literature. Justice demands deriving strength from the classical literature and correctly developing the traditions it had established. Pashayev was the first person to have raised the question of the necessity of issuing an encyclopedia in Azeri. He deeply regretted that the idea of the national encyclopedia was shut down due to the fault of reactionaries. Pashayev asked the audience to explore the opportunity of issuing at least a brief encyclopedia. Pashayev considered it inadmissible that Bayramov, in his speech, had told an unpleasant story that had happened to the son of one of the famous writers. He said, “The majority of those present here are fathers. It is not so bad to be a father. It is an honorable mission to bring up a son. Europeans give us much instructive on this occasion. Sometimes, a son makes his father turn red in the face. One of Lev Tolstoy’s sons went to a province to serve there. He kidnapped a governor’s wife there. Ashamed, Tolstoy could no longer look in the eyes of either other people or his son. This is a tragedy. But putting the very writer to shame is too much. I think it is enough to tell him about his mistakes tête-à-tête, but not put him to shame in front of the whole nation.” Pashayev raised one more important problem by saying it was essential to send Azerbaijani figures of literature and art on creative missions abroad.99 There had already been certain positive shifts in connection to this; for example, on October 17, 1957, Mustafayev forwarded the following request to the CC CPSU: “One of the leading composers of the republic, Honored Art Worker of the Azerbaijan SSR, winner of the Stalin Award, author of the opera Sevil and a number of vocal and symphonic works, Amirov Fikret Meshadi Jamil oglu, is currently working on an opera titled Sheykh Sanan whose topic is the life of Arabs. To complete his opera, composer Amirov needs to familiarize himself more closely with the lifestyle and culture of the nations of Arab countries. The CC CPA asks you to permit Amirov to make a one-month tour to Syria and Egypt.”100 Though such tours were only episodic, the experiment, as concerning the case of Amirov, was successful: a concerto for piano and orchestra was written jointly with Elmira Nazirova; music for the tragedy Sheykh Sanan was created based on H. Javid’s libretto; and later on, the ballet Arabian Nights was created, which would become world famous. Mustafayev delivered a speech to the meeting of activists. He commented in detail on a series of aspects of Khrushchev’s article and expressed his attitude to them: “I personally greatly respect all our composers, including Qara Qarayev, and I value his talent. At a CC Bureau

meeting devoted to the examination of the program of a ten-day festival of Azerbaijani literature and culture in Moscow, I suggested (I don’t know whether I was right) including the opera Leili & Mejnun in the program. Qarayev stated that this would be regarded as a step back. But if we want to show other nations our musical culture, we should start precisely with Leili & Mejnun. We should care about our music as we do about our language and traditions. All nations like the music of Indian films because it is national in form and is written on a folk basis. If it were created according to the structure of American jazz no one would have accepted it.” Mustafayev said he regarded the fact of cessation of teaching in Azeri at the Conservatory of Azerbaijan as a disgrace. There had been absolutely no difference between the Azerbaijani Conservatory and the Moscow Conservatory until lately. He said there were not even teachers available who could teach in Azeri. Following the death of U. Hajibeyov, national musical instruments started being removed from orchestras. When the leadership watched an opera titled Azad, Mustafayev told J. Jahangirov, “our composers began to forget national instruments, which now perform just for show. But they must e used organically in an ensemble. Hajibeyov had added kamancha, but they removed the kamancha as well.” Then Mustafayev described the situation in rural libraries where kolkhoz workers did not read library books but only used the magazine Kirpi, where they only looked at the pictures.101 But unlike Ibrahimov, Mustafayev did not go deep into the problem of language and national culture. He only spoke about a cluster of general problems, often referring to the directives in Khrushchev’s article. The speech of Ibrahimov at the meeting of activists was interrupted by applause more than once and backed by other speakers, which troubled the republic’s party leadership. Within a short period of time his speech was translated into Russian and sent to the CC CPSU. In an inquiry prepared for the CC CPSU Presidium, I. Shikin, deputy head of the department on work with Union republics’ party organs, noted that a large meeting devoted to cultural issues had been held a year ago. Qarayev, a well-known composer and People’s Artist of the USSR, spoke on the musical theme. His report was strongly criticized specifically because he had spoken Russian.102 Shikin included these words into the section of his inquiry part concerning Ibrahimov. The statement he had made during a meeting of Azerbaijan State University students with Hikmet in October 1957 and the speech he had delivered at a meeting of activists on December 4 decided his political career. Moscow made the decision. At the very end of 1957, upon the completion of the conservative reform era that had begun in 1953, Ibrahimov was removed “on his own accord” from a Committee responsible for awarding the Lenin Prize in the sphere of literature and art. That was the first step. NOTES 1. Resolution the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR “On the Conduct of All-Union Census.” 12.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1 r.44, v.55, pp. 72–73. 2. Meeting of Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On Conducting all-USSR Census.” 19.03.1957. // APDPARA, f.1 r.44, v.55, p. 66. 3. Vsesoyuznaya perepis naseleniya 1937 goda: obshiye itogi. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. M., 2007. (The All-Union Census of 1937: Overall results. Collection of documents and materials. Moscow, 2007), p. 9.

4. Ibid., p. 286. 5. Ibid., pp. 86–108. 6. Stalinskiye deportatsiyi. 1928–1953. Dokumenty. Pod obshey redaktsiey akademika A. N. Yakovleva. (Stalin Deportations. 1928–1953. Documents. Ed. A. N. Yakovlev. Moscow, 2005). p. 538. 7. Ibid., pp. 522–525. 8. Resolution of the State Defense Committee “On relocation of the border strip of the Georgian SSR Turks, Kurds and Hemshils.” 31.07.1944. // RSASPH, f.644, r.1, v.285, pp. 22–25; Stalinskiye deportatsiyi. 1928–1953. (Stalin Deportations. 1928–1953), p. 523. 9. Stalinskiye deportatsiyi. 1928–1953. (Stalin Deportations. 1928–1953), p. 534. 10. Resolution of the State Defense Committee “On relocation of the border strip of the Georgian SSR Turks, Kurds and Hemshils.” 31.07.1944. // RSASPH, f.644, r.1, v.285, p. 24. 11. From I. Mustafayev to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 12.08.1957.// APDPARA, f.1 r.44, v.120, pp. 122–123. 12. From p. Kovanov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. September 1957.// Georgian Presidential Archive (GPA), f.14 r.39, v.219, p. 2. 13. From I. Mustafayev to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 02.10.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 134. 14. Ibid. 15. From I. Mustafayev to I. Kuzovenkov. 16.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1 r.45, v.84, p. 19. 16. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On relocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality Resettled from the Georgian SSR in 1944.” 18.03.1958.// APDPARA, f.1 r.45, v.84, pp. 13–18. 17. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR “On Resettlement of USSR Citizens of Azerbaijani Nationality from the Uzbekistan SSR, Kyrgyzstan SSR, and Kazakhstan SSR to the Azerbaijan SSR in 1958–1960.” 24.07.1958.// APDPARA, f.1 r.45, v.115, pp. 161–166. 18. From Kozlov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Information of implementation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the citizens of the USSR, Turks, Kurds, Khemshils and Azerbaijanis living in the border areas of the Georgian SSR.” 19.06.1968.// APDPARA, f.1 r.45, v.115, pp. 339–340. 19. Action plan of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 18.12.1957. // State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f.411, r.41, v.148, pp. 201–204. 20. From Ibrahimov to Iskenderov. 07.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 7. 21. From Mustafayev to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 13.03.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 8. 22. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. On the implementation decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR on June 14, 1957 “On Involvement of Youth Graduated from Secondary Schools in Industrial and Agricultural Production.” 09.07.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.80, pp. 163–165. 23. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. On the implementation decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR on September 12, 1957 “On Involvement of Youth Graduated from Secondary Schools in Industrial and Agricultural Production.” 29.10.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.96, pp. 143–144. 24. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the implementation decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR on September 12, 1957 “On Involvement of Youth Graduated from Secondary Schools in Industrial and Agricultural Production.” 29.10.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.96, pp. 147–149. 25. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. “On the implementation decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR on September 12, 1957 “On Involvement of Youth Graduated from Secondary Schools in Industrial and Agricultural Production.” 29.10.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.96, pp. 144–146. 26. From Rahimov to Mustafayev. 18.04.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 60. 27. From I. Mustafayev and S. Rahimov to the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR. 22.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, pp. 61–62. 28. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR “On Schools’ Preparation for the 1957/1958 Academic Year in the Azerbaijan SSR.” 14.05.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.69, pp. 62–65. 29. Mirza Mamedov. Reference on the transition to universal secondary education in the Azerbaijan SSR. 31.10.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.80, pp. 94–116. 30. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR “On Measures of

Realization of Overall Secondary Education in the Azerbaijan SSR.” 09.07.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.80, pp. 74–79. 31. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On Establishing the House of Teachers in Baku.” March, 1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.80, pp. 177–181. 32. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On Unsatisfactory State of Children’s Compulsory Education.” 17.09.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.91, pp. 28–29. 33. From E. Ismailov to the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. 09.07.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 78–79. 34. From Mikail Useynov to Imam Mustafayev. 17.08.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 67–74. 35. From Mamedemin Qaziyev to the Central Committee CPA. 11.09.1956.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 75–77. 36. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA and Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR “On the State and Measures of Improvement of Preservation, Study, and Restoration of Monuments of Culture of Azerbaijan.” 23.04.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 62–66. 37. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the formation of Office for Architecture at the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, pp. 176–181. 38. From Ibrahimov to the Central Committee CPA. 20.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.102, p. 114. 39. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On Transcription of Names of Settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR.” 31.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.102, p. 112. 40. From Rahimov to the Central Committee CPA. 26.08.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, pp. 133–136. 41. From Ibrahimov to the Central Committee CPA. 20.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, pp. 133–136. 42. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On publications in the country the children’s magazine Goyarchin in Azeri.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, p. 201. 43. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On increase the frequency and circulation of Nakhichevan regional newspaper Sharg Gapysy.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, p. 210. 44. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the selection of grants newspaper Sovietakan Karabakh.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, pp. 235–239. 45. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Lenin Orderawarded M. F. Akhundov State Opera and Ballet Theater of Azerbaijan.” 19.11.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.98, pp. 85–86; 351–352. 46. From Mehdi Huseyn to the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR. 05.11.1957.// SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.554, p. 15. 47. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR. 25.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.102, pp. 14–16. 48. Communist (in Azeri), 1956, 15 April. 49. Statement of Bakhtiyar Vagabzade. 06.12.1957.// SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.600, p. 88. 50. From Mehdi Huseyn to Irakli Abashidze; From Mehdi Huseyn to Mikola Bajan. 25.12.1958.// SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.600, pp. 86–87. 51. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “About naming Nariman Narimanov Sari fish factory and the village area Lenkoran district.” 12.02.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.41, pp. 120–124. 52. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “Awarding of the Azerbaijan State Medical Institute named after Nariman Narimanov” 23.04.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.67, pp. 153–159. 53. Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA “On the naming of Nariman Narimanov children’s hospital in Baku.” 25.06.1957; “On renaming the Narimanov district Keshla.” 09.07.1957 // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.79, pp. 37–39; v.80, pp. 315–319. 54. Edebiyat ve injesenet (Literatura i iskusstvo in Azeri), 1957, 19 October. 55. Prezidium SK KPSS. 1954–1964, T.1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 365. 56. Ryurikov and Ivanov. Information on Nazim Hikmet, July, 1956. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), p. 51. 57. Informative note on Nazim Hikmet. 19.09.1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), p. 129. 58. From Ivan Bakulin to CC UCP (b). 15.10.1949; From Kuznetsov to Lomakin. 22.11.1949. // RSASPH, f.17, r.137, v.151, pp. 8–12. 59. Information on Nazim Hikmet. June, 1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, p. 65. 60. Explanatory note on Nazim Hikmet. 1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 66–70. 61. From B. Ponomarev to J. Stalin. 28.06.1951.// RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 62–65; Resolution of the Central Committee UCP(b). June, 1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, p. 73. 62. From Boris Ponomarev to Stalin. 29.06.1951.// RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 71–72. 63. From Vahan Grigoryan to Stalin. 25.07.1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 81–92. 64. From Grigoryan to Molotov. 31.08.1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 95–99. 65. From Grachev to CC UCP(b) Lomakin. 14.11.1951. // RSASPH, f.17, r.137, v.752, p. 145.

66. Conversation with the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet. 22.11.1951. // RSASPH, f.17, r.137, v.752, pp. 146–149. 67. From Struchkov to Poskrebyshev. 12.07.1951. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 79–80. 68. From Adilov to Grigoryan. 27.08.1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 159–164. 69. From Grigoryan to Stalin. 15.01.1952. // RSASPH, f.82, r.2, v.1330, pp. 128–129. 70. Vasyukov. A reference to a personal matter Nazim Hikmet. 03.08.1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part I), p. 99. 71. From Struchkov to V. Grigoryan. 17.08.1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), p. 96. 72. Informative note on Nazim Hikmet. 1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 68–69. 73. Ibid., pp. 70–71. 74. From Samylovsky to Panyushkin. 11.08.1945. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 80–81. 75. From Adilov to Grigoryan. Information about the trip to Bulgaria with N. Hikmet. 04.10.1951. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 154–158. 76. From Vasilyev to Kukin. 19.07.1956. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 54–55. 77. Ryurikov and Ivanov. A reference on Nazim Hikmet. July, 1956. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 51–53. 78. Bashtymar. A reference to Nazim Hikmet. 23.12.1961.// RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), p. 28. 79. From Marat to the CC of the CPSU. 25.12. 1961. // RSASPH, f.495, r.266, v.47 (part II), pp. 29–30. 80. See: Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 430. 81. Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, pp. 74–75. 82. Ronald Grigor Suny. The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. Second edition. New York, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 430. 83. Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, p. 73. 84. Resolution of the III Plenum of the Union of Writers USSR. 1957. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.554, pp. 33–34. 85. For more details see: Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, pp. 81–82. 86. Edebiyat ve injesenet (Literatura i iskusstvo in Azeri), 1957, 31 August. 87. See: Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, p. 81. 88. Meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists on the issue “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” 04.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.248, pp. 18–19. 89. Ibid., pp. 71–72. 90. Ibid., pp. 97–124. 91. From Rahimov to Qurbanov. Resolution of the III Plenum of the Union of Writers USSR. 13.12.1957. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.554, p. 68. 92. Meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists on the issue “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” 04.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.248, pp. 131–143. 93. Ibid., pp. 155–158. 94. Ibid., pp. 163–164. 95. Basti Baghirova was a famous cotton worker in Azerbaijan who initiated the motion of picking cotton with both hands and was twice awarded the title of Socialist Work Hero (in 1947 and 1950). 96. Meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists on the issue “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” 04.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.248, pp. 173–178. 97. From Alisohbat Sumbatzadeh to Imam Mustafayev. 25.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.163, p. 30. 98. From Zamanov and Mamedov to Qasymov. 29.06.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.163, p. 31. 99. Meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists on the issue “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” 04.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.248, pp. 199–206. 100. From Mustafayev to the Central Committee of the CPSU. 04.12.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 144. 101. Meeting of the republic’s literature and art activists on the issue “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” 04.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.248, pp. 226–228. 102. Prezidium SK KPSS. 1954–1964, T. 1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 365–366.

Chapter 7

Attempts of Party Bodies to Strengthen Control in Ideology

The end of 1957 was also the end of the period of half-finished reforms in the USSR. The establishment of Khrushchev’s personal power in 1958 brought about adventurism in the country’s politics and economy. The 1957 concept of “catch up and surpass America” in cattlebreeding production turned into a state program in March 1958, when Khrushchev became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Zubok concludes that the Soviet leader, triumphant in domestic politics, decided that he was ready for a foreign policy breakthrough.1 It was maize that became the key weapon in the struggle with America, therefore all rural regions of the country turned into areas for growing maize. The late ’50s were tired of the maize theme in the fullest sense of the word.2 Various economic subdivisions and state security bodies secretly reported that the country’s grain reserve was under threat; however, Khrushchev’s personal views on the role of maize in agriculture allowed no opportunity to combat voluntarism at the top level. All those resisting the adventurism were removed from power-holding structures. In the late 1950s maize became a chief symbol of the Soviet state. Figuratively speaking, the whole country smelled like silage. Methods used in the economy spread to the political sphere as well. Despite the plans announced at the 20th Congress, renovation gave way to the previous bureaucracy and totalitarianism. Contrary to a law of 1953 on prohibiting matching Party and State positions, the First Secretary of the CC CPSU held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which enabled him to declare at the May 1958 Plenum of the CC that the interests of the state afforded him no opportunity to make compromises. In particular, Khrushchev declared: “You are aware of the fact that some anti-Party elements intensified their activity after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and tried to oppose the Party line. When a group of these elements spoke at one of the major institutions, the CC expelled four people from the Party. As you know, this decision was distributed among Party organizations.” Suslov specified that this happened at the thermo-technological institute. “After adoption of this decision, the director of this institute phoned me. He is an academician, non-Party. He told me that my boys did something wrong and they were expelled from the Party, but these boys are very talented. I told him that they were expelled from the party for their anti-Soviet activity, and if they continue their activity, they will be brought to court and imprisoned. If we had not adopted this decision, we would had given the opportunity for every kind of anti-Party, anti-Soviet element to rule in

society and thus we would have lost leadership in the party. In this case, anti-Soviet elements could have stirred up their activity, and the situation would have resembled that in Hungary and in Poland. I am confident that if Rakoshi and other former Hungarian leaders had showed firmness and a strong will, arrested three to five ringleaders and imprisoned them, no counterrevolution would have taken place.”3 It should be noted that the Soviet leaders were dissatisfied with the state of affairs at the ideological front in Azerbaijan in the economic sphere, particularly in agriculture. Khrushchev dreamed of the victory of Communism, and his concept of reduction of individual farms prevailed among his voluntarism fantasies. In the meanwhile, the growth of individual farms in Azerbaijan in 1954–1958 and successes in cattle breeding were due to individual labor activity. Khrushchev harshly criticized the Azerbaijani Party Organization for these successes at the December 1958 Plenum of the CPSU. He put forward a plan of auxiliary plots and suggested giving cattle currently under individual use to Soviet collective farms as material compensation. When Mustafayev put forward the idea of providing collective pastures to the private sector as well as building roads and laying water pipelines at the expense of the money earned, Khrushchev rudely interrupted him and exclaimed that the village had to be built on socialist principles: “you are talking about a policy of taxes and penalties, but we need educational work among the masses. For this to happen, Communists engaged in the countryside should show their worth as true Communists, but in your case they are not Communist.”4 At the same Plenum, Khrushchev harshly criticized Mustafayev for his idea of delivering early vegetables from Azerbaijan to Moscow and Leningrad. In his view, if early vegetables were to be cultivated near the said cities, it would be much more profitable. His criticism was, in the first turn, attributable to discontent of the Soviet leadership with active development of individual farms in Azerbaijan. Such “tyranny” was regarded as departure from the general Party line to get out of the situation. Mustafayev tried to cite economic arguments in favor of his concept and link it with the specificity of agriculture in the republic. However, the Center was crazy with maize euphoria and did not want to hear anything. In August 1958, the CC CPSU adopted a decree by the RSFSR titled “On Prohibition to Maintain Cattle as Private Property of Citizens Residing in Towns and Working Settlements.” This decree affected interests of nearly 12.5 million urban families who had individual kitchen gardens. It was Khrushchev’s fellow villagers who were the first to back Khrushchev’s call and start building communism with cows. Thus, villagers of Kalinovka, of the Khomutovsk district of Kursk region, immediately sold their cows to the kolkhoz herd. The first secretary of the CC CPSU highly appreciated this initiative and the whole country received this appreciation as a Party directive.5 When putting these directives into practice, the authorities applied methods of forcible dispossession, confiscating cattle with the participation of police. Note that state and collective farms were not ready to accept such a great quantity of cattle: there was neither fodder nor space. As a result, all the cattle were slaughtered. Thus, “great successes” were achieved in 1958 in the direction of overtaking and surpassing America in procurement of meat per capita.6 To catch up with and overtake the United States, Soviet

farmers fattened their cattle with store-bought bread. Therefore, Khrushchev said, “rather than feeding the people, we are feeding pigs!”7 Party and Soviet bodies began buying up the cattle at the lowest prices and actually confiscating the peasants’ cattle. These actions caused great discontent of the population, so that in February 1959 Khrushchev, speaking at Ryazan, stressed the inadmissibility of forcible expropriation of personal cattle. In July–August 1959 many Supreme Soviets of Union Republics passed a decision which prohibited residents of towns and settlements to maintain cattle. In so doing, the authorities created a situation similar to the one in the epoch of collectivization.8 Khrushchev was displeasured by the fact that no progress was observed in Azerbaijan. As compared with other republics, the total number of personal cattle, excluding kolkhoz-sovkhoz cattle, saw a 300 percent increase over 1954–1958. Khrushchev received this as goal-oriented attack against Communism building. Suffice it to say that horses practically disappeared from farms, while there remained 49,000 horses in Azerbaijan. Khrushchev was infuriated and asked why there were so many horses in Azerbaijan. Mustafayev replied that “Our people are fond of horses, because cattle-breeders graze cattle on horseback.” Khrushchev insisted that it was wrong; that the kolkhoz herd was to be grazed on kolkhoz horses and that peasants maintained horses to gain profit, not to lose money feeding them for nothing. Khrushchev liked to bring up the fact that he came from a peasant background and that in his childhood he was a herdsman and pastured the landowners’ horses.9 Khrushchev was very discontented with Mustafayev because he didn’t expand areas for growing maize as did the rest of the whole country; and the cotton harvest dropped from 420,000 to 279,000 tons from 1954. The Soviet leaders were confident that the development of the private sector in Azerbaijan greatly damaged the principles of kolkhoz building and the building of Communism as a whole. In reality, mutual enmity was rooted much deeper. The Center was dissatisfied with the growth of national-patriotic sentiments in Azerbaijan headed by Ibrahimov, while Mustafayev did not resist this tendency; instead, in some cases he was in the ranks of active “nationalists.” Ibrahimov’s unilateral position at the March 1957 meeting of the CC CPA Bureau with the participation of CC CPSU senior officials, a speech to the audience of the Azerbaijan State University in the presence of Hikmet in October 1957 and his ardent speech in December of the same year at a meeting of republican intelligentsia all served to speed authorities’ approval of political decisions on the subject. Moscow realized that it was essential to neutralize the leader of these sentiments in the republic and thus block the development of nationalism in the country. Upon the Center’s instructions, the CC CPA appealed to the CC CPSU, following which Shikin prepared a presentation on January 8, 1958 to the CC CPSU leaders about dismissal of Ibrahimov from the post of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on his own decision, “according to his health conditions,” as well as “with the purpose of creating conditions for creative work.” According to the Center’s recommendation, Ibrahimov was dismissed from the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet under a decision of the bureau of the CC CPA in January 1958. In March, a regular session of the Supreme Soviet approved this decision of the bureau. Ibrahimov was replaced by Ilyas Abdullayev, former first deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The

Bureau decision asked to approve this reshuffle.10 Ibrahimov’s resignation was expected, but it happened strangely quickly. Note that a week before this event, on December 31, 1957, on the threshold of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Ibrahimov submitted to the CC CPA information about the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR scheduled on January 22–23. A list of reshuffles in the composition of the Presidium of Supreme Power said as follows: to elect Jafarov as deputy Chairman of the Presidium and Shukurova as Secretary of the Presidium. Not a word was said about Mustafayev’s resignation.11 The same meeting of the bureau which removed Ibrahimov from his post made another decision which proved to be crucial for the further political life of the republic. Veli Akhundov, who had led the Ministry of Public Health since 1954, was approved the Secretary of the CC CPA. Akhundov was born in May 1916 in the village of Saray, Baku province. In 1922–1929 he studied at a secondary school. In 1929–1931 he attended a vocational school linked to the Bilajari railway station, where his father worked. In 1931–1936 he was a student of the Baku industrial technical college. From 1936 to 1941 Akhundov was a student of the therapeutic school of the Azerbaijan Medical Institute. In his student years he demonstrated activity in public life and was elected secretary of the Komsomol organization. He graduated from the institute in the period which coincided with the start of the Great Patriotic War. From July 1941 to August 1945 Akhundov served as a military physician in the ranks of the Soviet army in Iran, Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. He demobilized from the army in March 1946 and began working as an assistant to the Chair of Public Health History of the Azerbaijan Medical Institute. In 1948–1949 Akhundov worked as deputy minister of public health and head of Baku’s public health department. In 1953–1954 he worked as deputy head of the administrative and finance/trade department of the CC CPA. Since 1954, Akhundov worked as Minister of Public Health.12 Until his election as secretary of the Central Committee, Akhundov remained at this post. Election to the top Party position opened up great prospects before him. In a short while he managed to climb to the top of the republic’s ladder of power. He worked as secretary of the Central Committee for less than six months. In June 1958, the personal case of Rahimov was discussed, and upon Mustafayev’s suggestion, Akhundov was appointed the head of the government. Thus, “upon Moscow’s Recommendation” Rahimov abandoned the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR six months after the resignation of Ibrahimov. While Ibrahimov suffered for stirring up nationalistic sentiments, Rahimov was charged with localistic tendencies. In the years under consideration, “localistic tendencies” was strongly different from its modern interpretation. In 1957 the Union Organs initiated debates over transport of Azerbaijani gas to Georgian and Armenia. Speaking at the CC CPA Bureau, Rahimov stressed that this project was impossible. He reminded them that the gas pipeline would be laid across Azerbaijani regions with no gas supply. In this case, it would be unfair to provide neighbors with gas when the country was deficient in this fuel. This stand of Rahimov on the issue reached the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As for petroleum products, Rahimov stressed the necessity of meeting the needs of Azerbaijan in the first turn, while he

suggested delivering gas to the neighbors according to residual principles. As a result, in 1958 Armenia received 7,500 fewer tons and Georgia 10,000 fewer tons of fuel oil than targeted. The working schedule of a plant in Rustavi was violated.13 The Azerbaijan government headed by Rahimov objected to giving electric power to neighboring republics from Mingechaur and ore from Dashkesan. It was no mere coincidence that Rahimov was charged with localistic tendencies. That was the real reason of Rahimov’s resignation; however, it was formulated in a different manner. The Center decided to return to the heated debates of March–April 1957. Though the “localistic tendencies” of Rahimov were reflected in the correspondence of CC CPSU senior officials, they were not a reason for his resignation, according to a decision of the CC CPA Bureau dated June 27, 1958 which said: “Having discussed a note of the Secretary of the CC CPA, Comrade Mustafayev, about the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, Comrade Rahimov, the CC CPA Bureau points out that Comrade Rahimov has been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic for four years and in every possible way set the Council of Ministers against the CC CPA. Moreover, he ignored the CC when solving major questions of planning and financing of the national economy of the Republic. In an attempt to consolidate all the issues on his hands, Comrade Rahimov expressed evident mistrust to his deputies and leaders of the State Planning Committee and showed subjectivity about questions put forward by the Council of National Economy of the Republic. The CC CPA Bureau emphasizes the fact that Comrade Rahimov did not make correct conclusions from the results of debates at the CC Bureau dated March 8 and April 5, 1957 regarding his wrong actions and misuse of trust, but rather continued to play the hypocrite and sow discord among CC Bureau members. The CC CPA Bureau opines that Comrade Rahimov has embarked upon the path of group interests and intrigues; he strove to win over to his side a member of the CC Bureau, Secretary of the Baku City Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Comrade T. Allahverdiyev, who withstood prevocational persuasion and informed the CC Bureau about it. Comrade Rahimov systematically, in an insulting form, pressured some CC Bureau members and leading officials. The CC CPA Bureau considers it inadmissible that Comrade Rahimov showed political immaturity and short-sightedness in solving some questions of nationwide importance. Comrade Rahimov admits partiality and unscrupulousness in the selection and distribution of the cadre. In so doing, he is guided by principles of personal loyalty and friendly relations. The CC CPA Bureau considers it intolerable when Comrade Rahimov shows arrogance, tactlessness and rudeness when handling senior officials of the republic and when he often insults his subordinates.” Hence, the CC CPA Bureau resolved: 1. To correctly and punctually recognize a note of Comrade Mustafayev I.D. about the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, Comrade S. H. Rahimov. 2. To dismiss Comrade Rahimov Sadikh Hadjiyaraliyevich from the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR for non-Party activities aimed at setting the Council of Ministers of the Republic against the central committee of Azerbaijan, for his aspiration to create intrigues and an atmosphere of mutual mistrust among CC Bureau

members, for political immaturity and short-sightedness in solving national questions, for rudeness, and insults of subordinates.14 It may be observed that the majority of Rahimov’s faults were discussed at the Bureau a year and a half before the described events, and he was punished along Party lines. The expression “in solving basic questions of national importance Comrade Rahimov showed political immaturity and short-sightedness” pointed to a time when he declined to provide neighboring republics with gas, petroleum products and ore. However, after his resignation, Rahimov headed the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR for security in industry and mining supervision on July 8 on the recommendation of the CC CPA Bureau. He worked in this capacity until 1961; in 1961–1965 he headed the Baku General Construction Department; and in 1965, on the recommendation of Akhundov, he was appointed the Minister of Light Industry and worked in this position until his death in 1975.15 Following Rahimov’s resignation from the post of the Chairman of Council of Ministers, Akhundov took this position on Mustafayev’s recommendation.16 Thus, the second campaign of cadre reshuffles took place in the leadership of the republic in 1958. However, the new Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Abdullayev, and the new chairman of the council of ministers, Akhundov, became active participants in processes going on in the Republic. This lasted up to June–July 1959 when Moscow began working on open correction of the course for national revival followed by the Republican leadership. At the 22nd Congress of the CC CPA in January 1958, Mustafayev managed to remove one of his rivals. On January 16, during a meeting of the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, the Chairman of the Union Suleyman Rahimov resigned “According to his own discretion.” In his speech he noted that during his leadership over the Union of Writers he did not follow his personal goals but worked for the common good. Despite some errors in the work of the Union of Writers, Azerbaijani literature was on rise as a whole. For the simple reason that the work in the Union of Writers demanded much time and impeded fruitful creative activity, Rahimov asked to be relieved from duties of chairman. He was followed by the writer Ali Veliyev, who emphasized that the speech of Suleyman Rahimov was very sincere and that indeed, public work requires much time, so its necessary to comply with his request, but this does not mean that Rahimov should be ignored in the future. Both the CC and the leadership should take care of his creative activity and create favorable conditions for his work. At that point Ibrahimov interfered, saying that it is very difficult to work in the Union of Writers: “To work in this organization, one must have much tolerance, nerves, and strength. In the most difficult period of Azerbaijani literature, Suleyman took this burden upon himself.” Osmal Sarivelly disagreed with him, saying that Rahimov’s resignation was consistent with the CC line on revival of the work of the Union of Writers: “I believe that Suleyman Rahimov should focus today on his errors, so that the new leaders of the Union of Writers do not repeat them. Suleyman Rahimov’s dismissal is not a mere caprice. For some time there have been too many shortcomings in the work of the Presidium of the Union of Writers, and the situation now is not very good. So we cannot let Suleyman Rahimov go without discussing his activity in detail.”

CC Secretary Bayramov became anxious about possible complications and had to declare that there was no necessity to discuss Rahimov’s report thoroughly. He said, “We all know about shortcomings in the work of this organization. We can discuss these shortcomings at our nearest meeting. Today, Rahimov is resigning of his own will. I can assure you that his resignation is connected with his creative work, so you must not think that somebody is forcing him to resign. Three bureau members spoke to him. Over the years of his leadership in the Union of Writers there were large and small shortcomings. Some of them were corrected, some were not. We shall discuss him in the near future.” Thus, a decision on Rahimov’s designation was adopted. He was given the floor to announce a candidature for the new Chairman. Rahimov referred to Mehti Huseyn, saying “Mehti Huseyn has long been attributable to literature. He is well known in Moscow. There were no differences in principle between us over the four years of my leadership in the Union of Writers. Huseyn is a top-level writer. His nomination is very useful for overall welfare.” CC Secretary Bayramov stated that Huseyn’s candidature was backed by the CC: “The Union of Writers is a very complex organization. Huseyn has all qualities to lead the literature, define its direction, comply with Party spirit in literature, and so on. However, the CC is well aware of his shortcomings. We know that his character is very tough. But this may be corrected using the efforts of our comrades. The CC puts forward his candidature for your consideration.” Following this recommendation, Huseyn was elected the Chairman of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan. After his election the post of executive secretary of the Union remained vacant. Ilyas Efendiyev was recommended to hold this post. However, he was not a member of the Communist Party, and some comrades expressed their doubts about him. They opined that his theoretical level was low, because he had no Party membership card, and that his organizational abilities were deficient. The candidature of Efendiyev was backed by Pashayev: “Ilyas Efendiyev is one of the most active heads of the writer’s section. Theoretically he is excellent, as is testified by his works. He is impartial and principled. He can collaborate with Mehti Huseyn, Chairman of the Union. We must help him with our advisers, and successes will be attained.” Finally, all the attendees agreed to elect Efendiyev as executive secretary of the Union of Writers. At last, Ibrahimov was elected a member of the Presidium of the Union of Writers. Note that a week before, Ibrahimov had been relieved from the post of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.17 Serious preparatory work for the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan started in 1958. The Congress was scheduled to start its work on January 28. A Plenum of the CC was held on January 24 to discuss preparedness for the Congress and approve the final version of the summary report on the Plenum’s decision; Mustafayev was to make the summary report. A decision was made to approve his idea of publishing a text of the report in Azeri and Russian and circulating this brochure among Congress delegates. In his view this would make it easier for the speaker to make his report and focus on its main aspects. Mustafayev gave a briefing about the content of his report for Plenum participants.18 On January 28, 1958, the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan began its work. Mustafayev opened the Congress with an introductory speech in Azeri. He reported that attending the Congress were 633 out of 677 delegates with a deciding vote. Note that forty-

three delegates out of fifty-two delegates with deliberative votes were present. He also reported that over the reviewed period the number of party members rose by 10,854 Communists, and as of January 1, 1958 the number of Party members of Azerbaijan reached 131,399. Of them 123,709 were Party members; 7,690 were candidates to be Party members. Out of the total number of Congress delegates, 480 were Azerbaijanis, 93 Russians, 67 Armenians, and 37—other nationalities.19 Mustafayev made a summary report. He touched upon the development of industry and agriculture as well as the situation within Party ranks. Then he turned to the people’s education and culture, saying that at present 578,500 pupils studied in 3,596 schools of the Republic. When comparing these figures with 1914–1915, the speaker pointed out that in the reviewed period 73,109 pupils studied at 976 schools of Azerbaijan. Mustafayev compared these figures with neighboring Iran. He emphasized that over the past thirty years a law on universal education had twice been adopted in Iran; however, about 60 percent of children of school age remained outside primary education, while 5,300,000 Azerbaijanis residing in Iran had no schooling in their mother tongue. At the same time, Mustafayev inferred that inspections in rural regions of the Republic revealed above 50,000 illiterate Azerbaijanis. Note that the construction of new schools do not meet growing needs of the population; in 1957 it was expected to complete the construction of thirty-seven schools for 14,500 pupils. However, just sixteen schools for 6,200 pupils were built. As a result, about 10,000 pupils attend schools in the third shift. Mustafayev’s report focused on one interesting figure: pre-school institutions had been reduced since 1940. In 1957, there were 869 kindergartens and day nurseries in the republic for 39,000 children, while in 1940 there were 1,300 kindergartens and day nurseries for 59,000 children. Mustafayev stressed that this was an unpardonable omission. As for higher and secondary special education, Mustafayev pointed out that there were 34,000 students in fifteen higher educational institutions of the Republic in ninety-two specialties. Every year higher educational institutions issued 5,000 specialists. He noted that 25,760 students attended seventy-five vocational and professional technical colleges. Annually, 9,000 specialists of the secondary schools went to the industrial sector. In accordance with directives of the CPSU 20th Congress, the Republic was doing its best to expand the correspondence course. Suffice it to say that in 1957, 2,895 students entered correspondence courses. However, Mustafayev confessed that the level of the correspondence courses was low. As for scientific institutions, the speaker noted that there are seventy-six scientific research institutions in the Republic and about 5,000 research workers, including 162 doctors of sciences and 1,664 candidates of sciences. He announced that an institute of oriental studies had been set up under the Academy of Sciences SSR designed for further development of oriental studies and complex research into the history, economy, and culture of oriental peoples. “Research workers of Academic institutions of social sciences, particularly historians, literary critics, and linguists, are tasked with making their contribution to the development of science in the country. Despite some decisions of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, a work has been underway for nine years to draw up The History of the

Azerbaijan SSR. It was repeated warnings of the CC CPA that made it possible to issue the first volume of the History of Azerbaijan. A work is still underway to create the History of Literature, though the third volume has hastily been issued, while the first and second volumes have not yet become ‘mature.’ The Institute of Literature and Language still fails to create monographs about classics of Azerbaijan literature. A universal vocabulary of the Azerbaijani language is not available.” Moving on to the analysis of creative organizations, Mustafayev pointed out that the CC CPA had recently held a meeting of workers of literature and art to discuss an article by Khrushchev titled “For a Close Link of Literature and Art to the Life of the Nation.” He underscored that in the reviewed period the writers, poets, and dramatists of Azerbaijan created a number of successful works of literature; however, he voiced his concern that “there are still ideologically and artistically incomplete works that sometimes distort our Soviet reality. These shortcomings are encountered in the works of not only beginners but some prominent writers as well.” Mustafayev harshly criticized the work of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan: “the organizational and creative work of the Union of Writers is at a very low level; creative sections are standing idle; the Presidium and Plenum of the Board of the UW are rarely convened to discuss topical problems of literature development. The UW practically ignores the creative growth of talented literary youth. The periodicals and literary fund of the Union of Writers are sometimes misused.” Mustafayev began analyzing the situation around musical creativity. First of all, he noted the opera Sevil by F. Amirov and the ballet Path of Thunder by Q. Qarayev which glorified our musical culture at the world level. “The musical art of Azerbaijan has been enriched by an outstanding work of composer Qara Qarayev, Path of Thunder, recently staged by the S. M. Kirov Leningrad Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet, and highly appreciated by the public of Leningrad and Moscow.” In the end of his speech Mustafayev noted that the 400th anniversary of Fizuli’s birth would be held in December of that year. In addition, a decade of art and literature of Azerbaijan would be held in early 1959 in Moscow: “That will be an important public showing of the achievements of culture of the Azerbaijan people, national in form and socialist in content.”20 Ibrahimov’s speech at the Congress was of great interest. Having recently been dismissed from the post of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, he touched upon problems of language and national culture. In particular, he noted: “In art and literature there are still people who disregard the rich art, musical, and literary folklore of our people. There are also those who do not take care to maintain them. It is difficult to create a good work of art without knowing traditions of national culture and art, without proper use of literary and artistic heritage of all the peoples. Estrangement from the people, disregard for literary and musical treasures may lead a creative worker down the wrong path, put him under the influence of modern decaying bourgeois art, bring him to formalism and worship of jazz, idle talk, and lack of ideology. Some comrades show disrespect for our literary and musical heritage, for example, ashug literature, wonderful mughams, and folk songs, denying them as outdated. In the meantime, mughams and ashug literature are excellent to make up an important stage in the spiritual development of the people. They are in keeping with our spiritual needs; they stir up good, pure sentiments in our hearts. Why should we reject them? The above-said also applies

to the language of belles-letters. All of you are well aware that the language of many works of literature is characterized by insipidity. Such language cannot bring a fine idea to the notice of a reader. The reason is that authors of these works are insufficiently attentive to the living folk language. In the meantime the Azerbaijani folk language is very expressive and flexible. Our ordinary people are fond of voicing their thoughts briefly, in expressive words. For example, an ordinary peasant characterizes a man without his own personal view and convictions as follows: “he is like a grass growing on a ridge. He may bend to one side or another.” In Baku, a person of this sort is defined as “a fish without bones; he may be swallowed without chewing.” Regretfully, the rich opportunities of our folk language are not properly used in our literary works.” Then Ibrahimov touched upon the language of periodicals—dry, official, and illiterate, with expressions distorting the Azerbaijani language. This is most frequently encountered in translations. One cannot distort the euphony of the language in periodicals and translated materials. Our newspapers must pay greater attention to the language of printed matter. It should be noted that sometime in the past the Party and Soviet organizations of the Republic took measures to ensure wider use of the Azerbaijani language in state institutions and public organizations. In connection to this, interest in studying the Azerbaijani language rose among our population. To conclude, Ibrahimov highly evaluated the expansion of rights of national republics over the past three to four years to thus consolidate the national sovereignty and positively affect the development of national languages.21 Newly elected Chairman of the UW of Azerbaijan, Huseyn, discussed the creative path of the Azerbaijani literary men in the reviewed period. He pointed out that names and works of writers such as Samed Vurghun, Jafar Jabbarly, Ibrahimov, Suleyman Rahimov, Abulhasan, Mir Jalal, Suleyman Rustam, Ilyas Efendiyev, Rza, Osman Sarivelly, Mamed Rahim, Zeynal Khalil, Ahmad Jamil, Sabit Rahman, Enver Mamedkhanly, and many others were famous far beyond the boundaries of our republic. Among successful works of literature of the recent times Huseyn referred to Great Stronghold by Ibrahimov; In Chichekli by Ali Veliyev; Vernal Floods by Ilyas Efendiyev; Crossroads by Ismayil Shikhly; Zangezur by Ayyub Abbasov; Mother by Yusif Azimzade; the poem “To My Egyptian Brothers” by Osman Sarivelly; and poems by Zeynal Khalil. He also referred to talented young poets Nabi Babayev, Huseyn Huseynzadeh, Bakhtiyar Vagabzadeh, Aliagha Kurchayli and Adil Babayev. At the same time, he criticized some works of literature, for example: a novel by Ali Veliyev, Bosom-friends for excessive emphasis on negative characters; the novel In the Mountains of Agbulag by Suleyman Rahimov for prolixity of narration; and a story by Isa Huseynov titled “Ardent Heart” for a negative image of the secretary of the regional Party committee. In particular, Huseyn noted: “Serious shortcomings characterize ‘Ardent Heart,’ authored by one of the most talented representatives of our literary youth, Isa Huseynov. He is skillful in unmasking a negative image of the secretary of the regional Communist Party, Amirly, but he is not skilful in describing images of active Party members opposing him. As a result, a reader is given a onesided view of our everyday life. In so doing, the author negatively affects the political and artistic influence of his work.”22 Then the floor was given to Mehtikhan Vekilov, rector of the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute, who spoke about the situation in the system of higher

education, training of pedagogical cadre, and historical events of the recent past. The rector highly evaluated changes in society that followed the CPSU 20th Congress. In particular, he noted: “now there is not violence and terror over thoughts and opinions; over creative work and initiative. All of us remember that when Bagirov came to visit the regional center, the leaders of the region hid themselves from him. If we faced Bagirov in the street, we hastened to go to the other side of the street, fearing troubles. Today, our society is free from fear forever. Friendly relations are maintained between the leadership and broader masses.” To sum up his speech, Vekilov read a poem of his brother Vurghun titled “Standard-bearer” which was dedicated to the Communist Party.23 The participants of the meeting welcomed the speech of the First Secretary of the CC Komsomol of Azerbaijan Abdurrahman Vezirov. The speaker pointed out the following: “To revive the work with the youth, it is essential to celebrate our folk holidays and rehabilitate many currently forgotten national games, for instance, ‘Top aldi gach,’ ‘Ox atma,’ ‘Gulesh,’ ‘Dire deyme,’ ‘At chapmag,’ and so on. Why should we not, like Muscovites, celebrate such holidays as Novruz Bayram, which has nothing religious in itself? Our people traditionally celebrated Novruz Bayram as the advent of spring. We are well aware of the fact that the clergy employs folk traditions and customs for its religious purposes. It’s our duty to celebrate these holidays in our own interests. When celebrating Novruz Bayram, many people clean the streets and courtyards, plant new trees, put on their best suits and cook tasty national dishes. In our view, Novruz Bayram should be celebrated as feast of spring, gaiety and youth.”24 His speech was followed by applauses and shouts of “right, right!” He was followed by the rector of Azerbaijan State University, Yusif Mamedaliyev, who stressed the necessity of preparing textbooks in Azeri. He highly evaluated the three-volume History of Azerbaijan Literature by Hamid Arasly, Feyzulla Gasimzadeh, and Jafar Khandan Hajiyev; Reader on the Literature of Soviet Peoples by P. Khalilov; Foreign Literature by A. Sultanly; textbooks on mathematics by M. Javadov, Prof. A. Huseynov, and assistant professor D. Gasimov; a textbook on chemistry by J. Zulfugarly; and a textbook on physiology of plants M. Abutalibov. Mamedaliyev noted the following: “In considering high qualification of university scholars, the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR decreed to provide the right to the Academic Board of the University to issue textbooks for higher education institutions. Should the university be materially assisted by the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR and the State Plan, we can assure the Congress that in the nearest five to six years the problem of textbooks and manuals for higher educational institutions in Azeri could mostly be solved.”25 On January 30, the Congress completed its work. Mustafayev made a concluding speech which clarified some aspects of the debates. He expressed his serious concern about the growth of criminality among youth. He said: “The situation of education of youth in our Republic is bad. I’d like to cite some figures not designed for open press. But it would be useful for all of us to know the reality. In 1956, there 4,865 crimes of different sorts and 10,654 people brought to court. In 1957, there were 5,996 crimes and 12,945 people brought to court. Most of the criminals are young people.” In addition, Mustafayev expressed his indignation that many complaints came from the Republic to the Center. Azerbaijan set a record

among republics in this matter. For instance, if a scholar was defending his thesis but his work had not yet reached the attestation commission, twenty to thirty requests were immediately submitted to the attestation commission. As a result, the commission had to suspend the conferment of a degree. Actions of this sort are not becoming of scholars. The point is that scholars defending their theses bestow honor on our Republic. From time to time, these applications are submitted on behalf of other people residing at different addresses. When the so-called author is asked if he has written this application, he replies that he has no idea who has written this application. But we are unmasking and shall be unmasking people of this sort.” Then Mustafayev said that 155 complaints had been submitted to the Congress, most of which ask for provision of a job or dwelling. The letters also touched upon forthcoming hearings at the CC CPSU on the work of the CC CPA in connection with elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.26 So, the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan completed its work, and at the Plenum of the CC Mustafayev was reelected the First Secretary of the CC CPA. In 1958, following the 22nd Congress of the CPA, the country made some important steps toward development of science, education, and culture. In the first turn, a joint decision of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was made “On Abolition of Illiteracy among the Population” dated January that gave impetus to country’s development. On January 11, the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR drew up measures and adopted an appropriate resolution to speed up the program’s implementation. It said that, according to the State Statistics Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, there 56,000 absolutely illiterate people aged eight to forty-nine in 1954. A substantial quantity of illiterate and semiliterate people resided in towns and settlements. It was planned to stamp out the illiteracy prior to the start of the All-Union Census of the Population in 1959. With that end in view, it was instructed to register the illiterate population aged sixteen to fifty by January 20, 1958. Emphasis was placed on the necessity of teaching illiterate people in their mother tongue. The Ministry of Culture of the Azerbaijan SSR was obliged to issue missing textbooks and manuals in Azeri by February 1, 1958. The Ministry was also ordered to bring the necessary number of textbooks and curricula from other Republics in the Russian, Armenia, and Georgian languages to teach the illiterate people. The resolution instructed local Party organs to report back to the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR by November 15, 1958 on the results of work to stamp out illiteracy and semi-literacy among the adult population.27 In April–August 1958, the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR checked and discussed the progress of execution of its resolution dated January 11. In April, a decision was adopted to oblige the Military Registration and Enlistment Office of the Azerbaijan SSR to regularly verify the work on abolishing the illiteracy and semi-literacy among youth of pre-conscription age and rendering practical aid to the bodies of people’s education in the program execution.28 A resolution of the CC and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR said that 38,299 out of 40,516 illiterates and 15,381 out of 20,718 semiilliterates were attending educational centers as of July 1, 1958. It pointed out that the work with illiterates was unsatisfactory. Party and Soviet bodies were instructed to deal with the problem in terms set forth by the Party and government.29 On March 20, 1958 the Presidium of

the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR passed a decision on transition to eight-year compulsory secondary education. A 1949 law on universal education mainly affected pupils residing in towns and settlements. As a rule, rural children refused to attend compulsory sevenyear education. A law of March 20 applied to all the population of the Republic, including the countryside. In mid-1958, the question was raised of making changes in the orthography of the Azerbaijani language and partial amendments to the Azerbaijani alphabet. To specify and improve the rules of orthography of the Azerbaijani language, the Nizami Institute of Literature and Language devised a new project in 1955. A commission was set up including M. Guluzadeh, J. K. Hajiyev, M. Shiraliyev, A. Demichizadeh, A. Jafar, M. Pashayev, R. Rustamov, M. Huseynzadeh, J. Efendiyev, A. Mahmudov, and A. Orujev. The commission gathered all proposals put forward at meetings and in press, summarized them, and, having discussed them at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet under Ibrahimov’s chairmanship on March 14, 1957, submitted them to the CC CPA. Having familiarized itself with these proposals, the Bureau adopted a decision to publish them in the press and submit them for discussions. Following all the discussions, on January 15, 1958 the CC Bureau approved a draft and recommended to ratify it in the near future. The chairman of the commission, Ibrahimov, wrote that “a decision was made to replace “й” with Latin “j.”30 On June 10, 1958 the CC Bureau discussed, jointly with commission members, the issue “On orthographic rules of the Azerbaijani language and partial changes in the Azerbaijani alphabet.” New Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Ilyas Abdullayev, asked: “If we were satisfied with the Latin alphabet, why had we turned to the Russian alphabet? The point is that when we adopted a partially Russian and partially Latin alphabet, we thus gave our children a lot of trouble. If the point is about mistake and this alphabet fails to meet the needs of our language, let’s discuss the issue and map out measures to correct the mistake. If we change the alphabet every ten to fifteen years, it’ll be an absolute disgrace. It is essential to work out the issue and finally solve it for 500 to 1000 years.” Mustafayev briefed about the history of the issue, and then added: “We introduced artificial, unnecessary letters in the language and thus made our people illiterate. If we fail to remove them, these letters will hamper our people, which is why the letters ‘я’ and ‘ю’ should be deleted from our language. The same is true of the letter ‘э.’ As for the letter ‘й’ in the form of Latin ‘j,’ it is used for convenience. I see no difficulty; there were thirty-five letters, and now there are thirty-two letters. As for orthographic rules, the situation is different. The language is being enriched, so amendments are to be made. Over the past ten to fifteen years changes have been made in the orthographic rules of the Azerbaijani language to thus improve literacy in language learning.” As chairman of the orthographic commission, Ibrahimov clarified some issues: “The point is that we should have dealt with this situation back in 1930. Earlier it was questioned whether people who supported the Russian alphabet would also take Russians’ side, and whether those who opposed the Russian alphabet were anti-Russian. I believe that we have nothing to lose financially. A mass of illiterates appeared in the country because of wrongly devised grammar.” N. Hajiyev, head of the CC CPA science and schools department, stressed that

“there is no need to be afraid of changing the alphabet of the Azerbaijani language. This question is raised every day in schools, universities, and in our writing, and we cannot say that we won’t change anything. The issue may be brought up that there are some complications in changing to thirty-two letters, but we are making an offer to circumvent hundreds of difficulties that arise in the course of education as long as we have the letters ‘я,’ ‘ю,’ ‘э.’ To sum up the debates, Mustafayev offered to approve the draft to exclude three letters from the Azerbaijani alphabet and substitute ‘й’ with ‘j.’31 A resolution of the CC CPA Bureau said as follows: “Owing to the fact that phonemes expressing double sounds, such as ‘э’ and ‘ю’, do violate some basic rules of morphology, and with a view of simplifying instruction of the mother tongue in schools, it is essential to a) exclude letters ‘ю’ and ‘я’ from the Azerbaijani alphabet; and b) change the function of the letter ‘е’ into the sound ‘э.’ In addition, a decision was made to change the letter ‘й’ into the letter ‘j.’ The Council of Ministers was instructed to approve “Orthographic Rules of the Azerbaijani Language” and fix the date of their implementation. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR was commissioned to legalize making partial amendments to the Azerbaijani alphabet to comply with the corresponding decree.32 In June 1958, the CC CPA Bureau passed a decision due to the 3rd Congress of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan. The Union was allowed to invite well-known poets and writers from the Union Republics for participation in the Congress to be held in November 1958. The decision underlined that speeches at the Congress should be made in the spirit of criticism and self-criticism to call writers towards implementation of directives of the XX Congress of the CPSU and the article by Khrushchev.33 Preparatory work for the Congress started as early as March 1958. On March 4, the Plenum of the Union of Writers, together with the debates over the results of the IV Plenum of the Union of Writers of the USSR, put on the agenda of the issue of preparatory work for the Congress. Huseyn reported back on the results of the IV Plenum of the Union of Writers of the USSR; Gasym Gasymzadeh reported on modern Azerbaijani poetry and its tasks. Huseyn said that the Moscow Plenum was characterized by heated debates and harsh criticism on the part of literary men who grouped around the magazine Noviy Mir (New World) and the anthology Literaturnaya Moskva (Literary Moscow) and set a goal for themselves to revise principles of Soviet literature.34 He detailed these events with a special emphasis on distortions admitted in Azerbaijani literature and harshly criticized “Ardent Heart” by I. Huseynov, saying: “Isa Huseynov’s guilt is not in the fact that he created a negative image of Soltan Amirly, secretary of the regional Party Committee, and thus tried to castigate a tendency toward a personality cult of regional scale. His basic mistake is that he is absolutely helpless in depicting strong-willed Soviet people capable of scoring a victory over those like Amirly.” Turning to literary criticism, Huseyn dwelt on a critical article by Abbas Zamanov titled “We did not imagine Sabir to be a poet of this sort.” The article dealt with the novel by Mir Jalal, Where Are We Heading? Huseyn disagreed with some of A. Zamanov’s theses.35 This article became a cause for long debates in the literary and criticism circles. Attending the debates on Gasymzadeh’s report was a young writer and critic from Moscow,

Chingiz Huseynov. He voiced interesting views on the creative work of young and well-known literary men such as B. Vahabzadeh, N. Babayev, and I. Kebirli, saying that Azerbaijani poetry, starting with Nizami and Fizuli and ending with Vurghun and other present-day Azerbaijani poets, was noted for its philosophical content, search for the meaning of life. To substantiate his idea, Huseynov referred to Vurghun, who once pointed out: “The point is about philosophical generalization of events that take place in our everyday life, about our ability to demonstrate the whole complexity of man’s inner world. High arts may be assessed from their degree of generalization.” Touching upon the latest verses of the three young poets, Huseynov stressed their profound philosophical nature: “We may cited as an example a verse by Bahtiyar Vahabzadeh, “Sounds of Strings” from the book Jeyran; the verse by Nabi Babayev “Cluster of Willow” from the book Eagle; and verses by Ibragim Kebirli “Helpless Man” and “Hard is the Road to Mountains.” These verses are distinguished by their sound philosophy and make us think of our future.” On the other hand, Huseynov criticized some verses, saying that it would be inexpedient to publish all of them, bur rather five or even ten of them should be selected for publication. Note that Huseynov singled out the said poets as representing the young generation of Azerbaijani poetry and literature as a whole. In his view, all of them should be responsible for their creative work and create profound, original works of literature.36 In a couple of days after the said Plenum, on May 5, 1958, a meeting was held in Moscow under the chairmanship of E. Vinokurov to discuss the book Mountain Sun by N. Babayev. Speaking first was A. Markov, who highly evaluated this book. In particular, he pointed out the following: “When you read a book of the national poet, you look for things that are not found in Russian poetry. Regretfully, very often books in translation are deficient in colors and description typical of peoples of any Union Republic. Verses arrive in Moscow but lose their profundity.” Further, Markov stressed felicitous translation of the verse “Deer” by Evgeniy Yevtushenko. Markov was greatly impressed by this verse and even recited it over the telephone. He was followed by A. Krongauz and others who highly evaluated Babayev’s literary activity.37 The three poets, as well as Ali Kerim, were highly evaluated by Ibrahimov. In the first turn, he noted the national spirit in their verses, saying: “people without national spirit are reminiscent of a man without human make-up.” He asked why Vurghun’s verses were so beloved by the nation. It was because he described national features in his verses. Some of his verses sounded like a program document. In his speech Vurghun pointed out that the translation of “Partizan Babash” was not good. However, the poet’s soul was put into the verse “Azerbaijan.” Everything was said in this verse. Ibrahimov highly evaluated Azerbaijani poetry’s ability to make use of the delights of the Azerbaijani language.38 Well-known translator of Azerbaijani poetry into Russian, P. Antokolskiy, spoke at a Plenum meeting on March 5. He highly evaluated Gasumzadeh’s report on Azerbaijani poetry. He stressed that the Azerbaijani poets were faced with great successes in the world of grand poetry. It would be appropriate to recall V. Shklovskiy’s phrase that “Mayakovskiy burst into poetry with rubbers on,” that is, in his original manner, and thus became a part of a revolution. Antokolskiy confirmed that he was delighted with Vahabzadeh’s verses; in addition, he compared A. Vahid’s ghazals with M. Fizuli’s masterpieces: “I dealt with Fizuli’s ghazals, and

I witness a new Fizuli in Baku. I’ve heard much of Aliagha Vahid, and I like his ghazals very much. All he writes about is echoed in the hearts of millions of Azerbaijanis.” Then Antokolskiy informed about a new edition of the anthology of Azerbaijani poetry to include beautiful specimens, including “Dede Korkud” and verses of young poets.39 A meeting was held on April 8 at the criticism sector of the Union of Writers to discuss the third volume of the History of Azerbaijani Literature. Debates broke out around the period in the development of Azerbaijani literature from 1917 to 1920. While Soviet literature sprang up from 1917, the chronology of Azerbaijani literature was quite different. It was pointed out that in 1918 the Soviet power had temporarily been established in Baku; however, no Soviet literature emerged here. The discussions stressed that the Azerbaijani literature of 1917–1920 was erroneously presented as a part of Soviet literature. As it is known, the Musavat government was active in the reviewed period. Was the Azerbaijani literature a part of the “Musavat” period? Yes, it was. For instance, “Sheik Sanan” was written in 1917; “Devil” in 1918; the total literature of the twentieth century covered a period of 1900–1917. In this case “Devil” couldn’t have been included in the second volume. However, neither “Devil” nor “Sheik Sanan” by Huseyn Javid can be separated from his pre-Revolutionary creative work. Participants in the debates pointed out that it would be difficult to demarcate the preRevolutionary and Soviet literatures. The publication of the third volume of History of Azerbaijani Literature aroused great interest in the Republic. Even Kheyrulla Mamedov, a secondary school teacher in the Lerik region of the country, submitted his critical notes to the Institute of Literature. He later on became famous as a researcher of Azerbaijani literature of the twentieth century.40 A regular plenum of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan was held on May 15–16, 1958 in Nakhchivan. Huseyn, Chairman of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, opened the plenum. Stalin Prize Winner Rza made a report titled “For Great Goals and Great Achievements.” A part of the report was devoted to the analysis of creative work of Nakhchivan writers. Touching upon questions of the Azerbaijani language, Rza noted: “The Azerbaijani people have a profound respect for the languages of all fraternal peoples, all nations, so our people create their own culture and science in their native language, study it in schools and colleges. The use of this language as the state one in all parts of Azerbaijan is a natural phenomenon. Though there are still elements of resistance or indifference in some places, it is because of misunderstanding of the national policy of the Party and the Soviet State or because of desire to stir up trouble. No doubt, the people are fond of their native language, like mother who loves her child, and he who seeks to stymie his development and envies his happiness won’t hear a good word. The Azerbaijani language has assumed its crystal-clear freshness in the verses of Hasanoglu and Nasimi; in immortal works of Fizuli; in dramas of Mirza Fathali; in the verses of popular poet Sabir; in stories and dramas of Jalil Mamedquluzadeh; in plays, verses and stories of Jafar Jabarly; in verses and dramas of Samed Vurghun.” Then R. Rza recalled the Book of My Mother by J. Mamedquluzadeh that had first focused on the question of mother tongue: “Some people tried to identify the spirit of nationalism; however, they failed, and remained empty-handed. In fact, Jalil Mamedquluzadeh does not deny the importance of

languages used by other peoples. But there is a great truth in this work: in turning away from the mother tongue, speaking an unintelligible language, the sons treat their native mother cruelly. Every people values its native language. He who tries ‘to study’ a language of another people at the expense of his native language shall obtain nothing but the hatred of his own people.” Citing many examples from the history of his land, R. Rza gave credit to patriots, saying that they struggled with strangers to save purity of their springs, harvests, cultural properties, language, and folklore. He said: “Feeling no animosity toward any nation, Azerbaijanis protected their lands just as an eagle takes care of his nestling. In the quest for ‘Great Armenia,’ Dashnaks are presently engaged in spoiling the pure air of our Motherland. The oldest part of our Motherland, the land of Nakhchivan that added brilliant pages to the history of the Azerbaijani people, is integrally related to Azerbaijan. Every inch of this land is sacred for us.”41 R. Rza recalled the profound roots of the culture of the Azerbaijani people, saying: “The history of Nakhchivan is instructive and interesting. As far back as the eight–seven centuries BC, these lands formed a part of the state of Media. In the four century BC, Alexander the Great conquered this territory, yet he failed to subdue the freedom-loving population. Neither the cruelty of Iranian Shahs and raids of Byzantines, nor policies of Arab caliphs could suppress our forefathers’ love for the Motherland. For many years in the twelve century, Nakhchivan was a capital of the Azerbaijani state of Eldegizes.” R. Rza’s initiative for the plenum of the Union of Writers to be held in Nakhchivan and the very subject of his report were not coincidental. In the mid-1950s, various Armenian organizations had launched a campaign of territorial claims to neighboring countries; in the end of the 1950s Nakhchivan was at the center of these claims. In 1958, the Armenian family of M. L. Episkopov and G. L. Episkopova sent a letter to the CC CPSU, which complained that Mountainous Garabagh was not given to Armenia, while Nakhchivan received the status of autonomous republic. In the meanwhile, Mountainous Garabagh had no status of autonomous republic. The Episkopovs tried to prove that Nakhchivan as a part of Azerbaijan did not prove its worth as autonomous republic and had no common border with Azerbaijan. Should Nakhchivan become a part of Armenia, it would enjoy the status of an autonomous republic. The letter stressed that “it would be fair if Nakhchivan were transferred to Armenia.” The CC CPSU informed Mustafayev about the letter. A detailed reference was prepared for Moscow to clarify the issue.42 Armenian claims to Nakhchivan disquieted the Azerbaijani intellectuals. The well-known man of letters Abbas Zamanov openly opposed Armenian insinuations and in 1961, upon the KGB’s “recommendation,” he was expelled from the Communist Party on nationalistic propaganda charges. On April 30, 1958, a memorial to M. A. Sabir was unveiled in Baku. The memorial was created by sculptor G. Karyagdy and architect H. Aliyev. The memorial proved to be an important marker in the cultural life of the Republic. It should be noted that the first memorial of Sabir was established in Baku as far back as in 1922 on Narimanov’s initiative. Minister of Culture M. Kurbanov noted that the memorial of the first years of the Soviet power failed to reproduce Sabir’s image properly. For this reason, the Party and the government decided to

create a new memorial. Kurbanov was followed by Huseyn, who stressed that Sabir was the pride of the Azerbaijani people to symbolize great achievements in poetry and literature. In turn, Huseyn was followed by Sabir’s son, M. S. Tahirzadeh, aged fourteen, who noted that thirty-six years ago the first memorial of Sabir was unveiled on the same square. He thanked Narimanov, a teacher and a writer, and devoted his life to the freedom of Azerbaijan; he also thanked delegates of the second congress of the Azerbaijani Soviets for giving Sabir the credit he was due. He said that he was happy to repeat his thanks for putting up a new monument to his father. In so doing, he considered it necessary to mention two heroic women who personified symbols of honest-minded and freedom-loving Azerbaijanis, who shared the joys and misfortunes of Sabir, were his comrades-in-arms, and who were patient and selfless custodians of his heritage and children: Sabir’s wife Billurnise-khanum and his daughter Sariye-Soltan. Tahirzadeh said that their souls would be filled with joy on this great day. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the memorial, Ibrahimov noted that Sabir was a saint, the greatness of whose soul was gifted by the ancient land of Azerbaijan, and his name would be honored as long as the Azerbaijani people exist. Sabir always lived the spiritual life of his people; his life was full of the nation’s sufferings and dreams. Sabir was as dear to Azerbaijanis as Beranget to Frenchmen or Nekrasov to Russians. The opening of the memorial of Sabir in Baku resulted from a great interest in his creativity. Mir Jalal’s novel Where Are We Heading? again made the poet’s hard life a subject of public discussion, while research by talented critic A. Zamanov greatly contributed to the study of Sabir’s creativity. Further, Zamanov continued his scientific works and published a series of interesting books that were significant both academically and to the public. The III Congress of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan was held in December 1958. Opening the Congress, Huseyn reported that out of 195 members of the Union, 180 were present. Famous writers, including Nazim Hikmet, attended the event from Moscow and all Union Republics. Head of the CC CPA department Kurbanov read the Party’s welcome address to the Congress. Huseyn made a report on the achievements of literature over the past four years. He detailed new works of writers; development of the Union of Writers; and acceptance of writers and poets from Southern Azerbaijan into the membership of the Union of Writers. As for large works created in the period between the Congresses, Huseyn detailed Ibrahimov’s novel Great Support, assessing it as a great achievement of Azerbaijani literature. However, he criticized Rahimov’s novel In the Mountains of Agbulag, calling it an incomplete, hazardous work. In his report, Huseyn again turned towards Mir Jalal’s novel Where Are We Heading?, giving the author credit for his ability to brightly depict the image of Sabir and the environment that had influenced his creativity. In addition, he praised Abulhasan’s work Old Tamasha’s Grandchildren and I. Efendiyev’s work Willows over Spring. He noted that the Efendiyev’s work was the best evidence of rapid growth of the artistic mastership of the current generation. As for Shikhly’s novel Crossroad, Huseyn expressed his agreement with Ibrahimov’s article about this novel and added that Shikhly, with his reverent talent, had added highly praiseworthy traits to the development of the writers’ culture. As for Huseynov’s novel Hot Heart, Huseyn noted how seriously the author had been

accused in the press: some accused him of an erroneous summarization under the creation of a negative image of the regional committee’s secretary, and others of slandering the Soviet reality. One of the critics even alleged that Huseynov, in creating the image of Soltan Amirly, gave a false depiction of Party work in Azerbaijan’s regions. Huseyn disagreed with such a concept but admitted that there were serious mistakes in the novel. Nevertheless, Huseynov’s creativity shows that Azerbaijani literature had been recently supplemented with young writers with many positive qualities. Of these young writers, noteworthy are Bayram Bayramov, Salam Gadirzadeh, Vidadi Shikhly, and Ali Kerim. As for poetry, in his report at the Congress and in the report to the CC, Huseyn noted the names of S. Rustam, R. Rza, O. Saryvelly, B. Azeroglu, M. Ragim, B. Vahabzadeh, Z. Khalil, M. Dilbazi, N. Rafibayli, A. Jamil, H. Huseynzadeh, A. Babayev, and N. Ganjaly whose works enriched Azerbaijani literature; and as for young poets, he mentioned I. Kebirli, N. Hasanzadeh, A. Gasymov, S. Akhmedov, H. Rza, A. Mamedov, A. Mirza-Jafarly, J. Novruz, Z. Jabbarzadeh, A. Aslanov, S. Asad, R. Akhundov, B. Nabiyev, G. Khalilov, Y. Seyidov, and E. Alibayli, who were all confidently walking their own creative paths.43 Huseyn was followed by M. Arif, who delivered a report about the Azerbaijani Soviet poetry, and was then followed by Efendiyev, who made a report on dramaturgy. Balash Azeroglu welcomed the Congress on behalf of the writers of the Southern Azerbaijan. He said, “Let me welcome the participants of the Congress who have gathered together in the sunny Baku of my native Azerbaijan on behalf of brothers and sisters living in the “Foggy Tabriz” on the other side of the Arax.” Azeroglu named his fellow colleagues Ali Tude, Fathi Khoshginabi, Abbas Panakhi, Hokuma Billuri, Medina Gyulgyun, Sohrab Tahir, Abbas Makulu, Ismail Jafarpur, Hamid Mamedzadeh, Ashyg Huseyn Javan, and others, who all depicted what happens on the other side of the border through artistic means. In his speech at the Congress, Ibrahimov defended the novel Hot Heart, which had become a target of criticism in some years past, and then emphasized Shikhly’s novel Crossroad. As for successful creative works in some recent years, Ibrahimov mentioned Abulhasan’s work Old Tamasha’s Grandchildren, Bayramov’s work Sacred Duty, Mir Jalal’s work Where Are We Heading?, and stories by S. Gadirzadeh. The delegates listened with great interest to Aziz Sharif, a professor of the Department of Literature of the Peoples of the USSR of the M. V. Lomonosov State University of Moscow. He made a series of critical remarks, particularly referring to low-quality translations. Tajik poet Abdulsalim Dekhoti reported that for some years past, Iran had been making provocative statements about nationality of the classics of Azerbaijani and Central Asian literature. When a question arose about celebration of the 1,100th anniversary of Rudaki, Iranians, as in the case with Azerbaijani poet Nizami, began to claim that he was an Iranian. Dekhoti said, “When we declared Rudaki’s jubilee, they raised a racket again, accusing not only us but also Azerbaijanis, and even the late scientist Bertels who had allegedly helped you and us to misappropriate Iranian classics. They termed this in a queer manner: “literary imperialism.” Dekhoti reported that in Dushanbe a competition had been announced for the best memorial of Rudaki and that Azerbaijani sculptor F. Abdurahmanov and architect M. Useynov won the first prize.44

First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev made a speech at the congress. He detailed preparations for the XXI Congress of the CPSU, as well as key targets of the seven-year plan, and voiced his confidence that the creative intelligentsia of the Republic would take an active part in the solution of the tasks set forth. Mustafayev described the insufficient attention to the works of classics of literature, to the translations of world literature and the literature of the peoples of the USSR into the Azerbaijani language as a big mistake. He noted that presentation of the classics of literature was equivalent to the presentation of a nation itself: “Our duty is to make our literary heritage a heritage of the world community. If we don’t make our classics famous, nobody will know us.”45 On the whole, the congress of the Union of Writers was held in the spirit of the latest resolutions of the CC CPSU; however, the pronounced statements of the national language and national idea were noted by the appropriate bodies. On the basis of these notes, following the completion of the congress, a voluminous report was drafted and further submitted to the CC CPSU. In reality, the “Fifth Column” of security agents among Azerbaijani writers was not so numerous. In 1958, out of 200 members of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, only five were KGB agents who performed just technical functions.46 Taking control of writers had been proposed directly by Khrushchev, who reported more than once at various meetings that issues relating to the national languages and overall manifestations of nationalism in the Republics were initiated by the creative intelligentsia. Evaluating the role of Khrushchev in culture and literature, Professor W. Taubman writes, “at first, the role of Khrushchev in the process was not great: trying to strengthen his authority, he was afraid to interfere in matters of culture. In Ukraine, it had already happened that there was a patron and persecutor of art, and he did not want to play the same role in Moscow.”47 Thus, processes that were happening in the Republic’s creative organizations, and primarily the Union of Writers, were always in the center of attention of the Soviet leadership. The Union of Writers of Azerbaijan, at its Party meeting after the congress, had raised a question that displeased, to a significant extent, the Center. A novel of nineteenth-century Armenian writer Raffi (Akop Melik-Akopyan), Hent, which had been printed as a series in 1880 in the newspaper Mshak and published as a separate book in 1881, was republished in Yerevan in the Russian language in 1958. The novel had an anti-Turkic, anti-Muslim orientation. Thus, its 1958 republishing displeased Azerbaijani writers, but the CC CPSU explained that the novel was devoted to the events of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878, so its anti-Turkish orientation should be accepted normally. Moscow did not accuse Armenians for such a publication, but accused Azerbaijanis for having blamed it.48 On December 10, 1958, jubilee events were held on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the day of the death of great Azerbaijani poet M. Fizuli; this event was significant for the life of not only the Union of Writers but also the whole intelligentsia of the republic. Back in early 1957 the CC CPA Bureau instructed a commission comprising Ibrahimov, Bayramov, A. Sultanova, N. Hajiyev, and T. Aliyev to draft proposals after having sought advice from appropriate organizations. On April 2, 1957, the commission proposed to the CC—given that Fizuli was a genius Azerbaijani poet, the creator of the literary Azerbaijani language, a great

humanist, a thinker recognized throughout the Orient—to hold the jubilee on an All-Union scale in September 1958.49 On the basis of the commission’s inquiry, on October 30, 1957 Mustafayev asked the CC CPSU for permission to arrange the jubilee events in the Republic. He wrote that “a genius poet and thinker Muhammed Fizuli died 400 years ago. His name is honored along with that of such genius poets of the Orient as Nizami Ganjevi, Firdousi, Saadi, Khafiz, and Navoi. Fizuli’s fame hasn’t dwindled over the centuries, so he remains a genius of lyric poetry. He played a particular role in the development of the literature of his nation. Fizuli’s works stood the test of time and became the poetic art school for the next generations. Fizuli’s creativity deeply penetrated the entirety of Azerbaijani art, developing and enriching it. For instance, the poem ‘Leili and Mejnun’ became the basis of U. Hajibeyov’s opera of the same name, which has constantly been performed at the Opera Theater since 1908.” With Fizuli’s merits before the Azerbaijani culture in consideration, Mustafayev asked the CC CPSU for permission to hold the jubilee undertakings in December 1958.50 Having received the appropriate permission from Moscow, on January 22, 1958 the CC CPA Secretariat discussed the jubilee commission’s proposals, and on February 18 the Bureau made a decision about conducting wide-scale jubilee events. A resolution called for conduction an academic seminar by the M. Gorkiy Institute of World Literature, the Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Union of Writers of the USSR; preparing Fizuli’s works for publication; shooting a feature film Leili and Mejnun, and so on. By its decision, the Bureau appointed Ibrahimov as chairman of the Republic’s organizational committee that included Secretaries of the Union of Writers of the USSR N. Tikhonov, K. Simonov, and Secretary of the CC CPA Bayramov, as well as A. Sultanova, S. Kurbanov, N. Hajiyev, A. Sumbatzadeh, M. Huseyn, T. Aliyev, M. A. Dadashzadeh, Bul-Bul Mamedov, Q. Qarayev, M. Guluzadeh, R. Rza, F. Amirov, M. Abdullayev, H. Arasly, and Mir Jalal Pashayev. Ibrahimov was given one month to prepare a detailed plan of events and submit it to the CC while the Council of Ministers was given the same period to make an estimate of expenditures.51 The Republican committee’s working plan covered numerous measures, including distribution of information about Fizuli’s life and creativity in the Russian language over the Union Republics; delivery of the poet’s works and materials about him from abroad; announcing a competition for the best sculpted memorial and portrait of Fizuli; control of the timely publication of the first two volumes of his works, and preparing the third volume for publication; facsimile reprinting of the Baku copy of Fizuli’s Divan in the Azerbaijani language; preparation of a theme almanac about Fizuli’s creativity; publication of the poem “Leili and Mejnun,” printing of 5,000 copies of the poem in Arabic print, and so forth. H. Arasly, Mir Jalal Pashayev, M. Guluzadeh, G. Mamedzadeh, G. Kendly, M. J. Jafarov, M. Sultanov, A. Efendiyev, Huseyn, S. Shamilov, G. Sultanov, J. Aleskerov, T. Aliyev, I. Akhundov, and I. Nazarov were in charge of implementing the plan.52 On April 8, 1958 the CC Bureau adopted a decision “On Additional Measures Pertaining to the 400th Anniversary of the Day of Death of Fizuli” that instructed A. S. Sumbatzadeh to take appropriate measures to collect the manuscripts of Fizuli and scientific works about him stored at libraries, museums and depositories of Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, and

other foreign countries. In addition, the composition of the committee was supplemented with Minister of Culture of the Azerbaijan SSR, M. Kurbanov, and Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR, B. Gafurov.53 A decision was made to invite scientists from Turkey, Iran, and Arab countries to attend the events. Head of the department of Middle Eastern Countries of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, A. Pavlov, relayed the consent of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR through a telephone message.54 To determine the composition of the invited Turkish delegation, Chairman of the Society of Friendship and Cultural Links V. Lobanov met with professor of the Philological Faculty of the University of Istanbul Ahmed Jafaroglu on May 9, 1958 in Istanbul. In their conversation, Jafaroglu told Lobanov that he had been deported from the Soviet Union in 1918, that he was very much interested in the life of present-day Azerbaijan, and that he regarded the invitation to attend Fizuli’s jubilee as a great honor to him, so he was pleased to accept this invitation. He suggested inviting a delegation of approximately six people from Turkey because four people had been invited from the USSR to attend the previous jubilee in Turkey. A. Jafaroglu suggested appointing as head of the Turkish delegation the former foreign minister and famous specialist of modern Turkish literature Professor Fuat Koprulu, who dreamed of visiting the USSR in the composition of a certain delegation. At the same time, Jafaroglu noted that F. Koprulu would leave on a three-month tour of the United States in August to give a series of lectures on modern Turkish literature and learn about the situation in the sphere of Turkic studies. In the opinion of Jafaroglu, F. Koprulu’s inclusion in the composition of the delegation would be favorably accepted by the Turkish government as well. Jafaroglu noted that the composition of the Turkish delegation supposedly would be as follows: professor of the Arab language and Persian language of the University of Istanbul, Ahmet Atesh; General Secretary of the Society of Linguists of Turkey, professor Agah Syrry Levent; professor of modern Turkish literature, Mehmet Kaglan; and professor of the history of Turkish literature of the University of Ankara, Kenan Akyuz. In his view, to organize arrival of the Turkish delegation, it was essential for the Soviet Embassy in Ankara to receive this invitation from the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and further submit it accompanied by a note to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey. If the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR sent personal invitations the Foreign Ministry would be asking why and for what they were invited.55 On September 27, Levent and Jafaroglu met with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy to Turkey, V. Fedorov, who gave the guests books that had been sent from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR, and they exchanged views on the forthcoming visit to Baku. Professor Jafaroglu noted that the Foreign Ministry of Turkey made a positive decision on their trip to Baku and sent an appropriate letter to the Ministry of Education. The Foreign Ministry of the USSR sent this information via V. Fedorov to the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR, and aide to the Minister Huseynzadeh reported this to CC Secretary Bayramov.56 As a result, of the professors mentioned above, only one—Agah Syrry Levent—managed to arrive for the jubilee. The Soviet Ambassador to Ankara sent Hasibe Mazyoglu’s book Fizuli-Khafiz published in Turkey by the date of the poet’s jubilee to the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR. The Foreign Ministry submitted it to Bayramov for the purpose of acquainting himself with it, and he passed the book on to the head of the

propaganda department of the CC, S. Kurbanov, and his deputy, R. Orujov.57 On November 28, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the course of preparations for the jubilee of Fizuli. A decision was made to carry out, on December 7–8, a joint scientific session of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR and the State University of Azerbaijan with foreign guests in attendance; to call up, on December 9, a joint plenum of the Union of Writers of the USSR and the Union of Writers of the Azerbaijan SSR and open, later the same day, an exhibition devoted to Fizuli’s life and activity at the Nizami Museum; and lay down, on December 10 midday, the foundation of a memorial of Fizuli on G. Dimitrov square and, in the evening of the same day, to hold a celebratory literary-artistic event with the participation of representatives of the public of Azerbaijan and Union Republics as well as foreign guests.58 On December 7, the Republic began celebrating the jubilee of Fizuli. All guests of the III Congress of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan—more than seventy poets and writers— attended the jubilee. Those invited included Louis Aragon, G. Leonidze, P. Tychina, M. Rylskiy, A. Safronov, V. Katayev, M. Shaginyan, S. Rashidov, E. Dolmatovskiy, A. Babayev, P. Antokolskiy, K. Simonov, N. Hikmet, A. Sharif, M. Tursunzadeh, N. Bazhan, I. Abashidze, M. Auezov, N. Tikhonov, K. Fedin, A. Surkov, R. Hamzatov, G. Ghulam, Huseynov and many others. In addition, about thirty great scientists were invited from the Academy of Sciences of Moscow and Union Republics. They included academicians V. Vinogradov, B. Gafurov, A. Palladin, I. Eichfeld, A. Upit, K. Korsakas, T. Sadybekov, A. Tokombayev, M. Aybek, G. Gulyamov, A. Mirzoyev, I. Grishishvili, G. Tsereteli, A. Shanidze, P. Azimov, B. Kerbabayev, G. Charyev, as well as corresponding members A. Kononov, I. Braginskiy, I. Anisimov, I. Petrushevskiy, and R. Aliyev.59 Young scientists from the Academy of Sciences and the University served as interpreters for the foreign guests. Turkish guest A. S. Levent was served by Gamid Aliyev; Iranian guest M. H. Faridan by M. Sultanov; poet laureate of the King of Afghanistan Khalilullah Khalili by Zakir Abdullayev; and Iraqi guest Huseyn Ali Mahfuz by Ziya Buniyatov.60 On December 7, Chairman of the jubilee committee Ibrahimov opened a joint scientific session of the Academy of Sciences and the S. M. Kirov State University of Azerbaijan. Then the following reports were made: “Worldwide Significance of Fizuli’s Poetry” (Prof. H. Arasly), “Questions of Mastership in Fizuli’s Creativity” (Prof. Mir Jalal), “Fizuli and the Azerbaijani Music” (A. Badalbayli), “Fizuli as Founder of Classical Azerbaijani Literary Language” (Prof. A. Demirchizadeh), “Fizuli as Outstanding Thinker and Scientist” (Prof. A. Zakuyev), and “Literary-Artistic Views of Fizuli” (candidate of philological sciences M. Gulizadeh). On December 9, a plenum of the Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaijan was held. Chairman of the Union of Writers Huseyn made an opening address. Ibrahimov made a large report titled “Fizuli and Our Modernity.” He was followed by writers and poets Suleyman Rustam, Mehti Seyidzadeh, Mamed Ragim, and P. Antokolskiy. An exhibition devoted to the life and creativity of Fizuli was opened later the same day. Here, speaking to the guests were A. Sumbatzadeh, H. Arasly, Bul-Bul, and M. Abdullayev. Eventually, the final event was held at the Opera & Ballet Theater on the evening of December 10. Mustafayev made the opening address, while the main report, “Life and Creativity of Fizuli,” was made by academician of

the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Ibrahimov. Then the floor was given to all foreign guests and those invited from Union Republics.61 Artistic masters of Azerbaijan performed a concert in the second part of the jubilee evening. On the jubilee days, Ibrahimov asked the CC CPA to name one of the regions of the Azerbaijan SSR after Fizuli. On December 9, 1958 the CC Bureau made a decision to ask the CC CPSU for permission to rename the Karyaginskiy region of the Azerbaijan SSR the Fizuli region; install a memorial of the poet in 1960 following the results of a competition for the best draft of the memorial; establish the Fizuli scholarships at the State University of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani Pedagogical Institute, and the Conservatory; permit the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan to publish an additional issue of the newspaper Edebiyyat ve injesenet to honor the jubilee of Fizuli; and publish 1,000 copies of the jubilee issues of the newspaper Communist (in Azeri) and the newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy on coated paper.62 The whole Republic broadly celebrated Fizuli’s jubilee, making it a large cultural event. In May 1958, the CC CPSU Presidium made a decision to correct mistakes in the assessments of the operas Great Friendship, Bogdan Khmelnitskiy, and From All The Heart. Back on February 10, 1948, the CC VCP (B) made a decision on V. Muradeli’s opera Great Friendship, recognizing that its musical and literary level was low. The explanation was given that Muradeli had fallen under the influence of formalistic trends fatal to the creativity of Soviet composers. As a very dangerous phenomenon, it was noted that this was not a single instance, and that formalism was growing in the Soviet musical environment. D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofyev, A. Khachaturyan, V. Shebalin, G. Popov, N. Myaskovskiy, and other composers were recorded as anti-national formalists; their music was declared “undemocratic” and alien to the Soviet people. Grave accusations were pressed against the above composers at a congress of composers in April 1948. Right after the congress, on May 12, 1948, the Political Bureau made a decision “On leadership of the Union of Soviet composers” and on May 17 “On improvement of the activity of the Bolshoi Theater,” thus damaging the creativity of very talented composers.63 It is evident from memoirs of D. Shepilov, who occupied a leading post in the propaganda department of the VCP (B) CC at the time, that Stalin disliked Muradeli’s opera Great Friendship and that, after having viewed it on November 7, 1947, he told A. Zhdanov that this was not music but a cacophony, disharmonic, and unpleasant to the ear. This settled the destiny of not only this opera but also a whole series of works created in those years. In the Political Bureau’s decision on this opera and in the speech of Zhdanov at a meeting of composers, some Soviet composers were accused of standing aside from the people and of falling under the influence of bourgeois music of Europe and America.64 Ten years later, in May 1958, a decision of the CC CPSU Presidium admitted that the assessment of Muradeli’s opera Great Friendship, Dankevich’s opera Bogdan Khmelnitskiy, and the works of a series of talented composers had been unfair. Nevertheless, it was confirmed again that the 1948 resolution had played, on the whole, a positive role in the progress of Soviet music development. After the February (1948) decision of the Political Bureau, on March 30 this question was discussed at the CC CPA Bureau, which adopted a resolution “On the State of Musical

Creativity and Training of Composer Cadre in the Azerbaijan SSR.” The document was fully in line with the spirit of the Moscow decision. D. Shostakovich’s pupil Qara Qarayev was accused of formalism, along with the emerging generation of Azerbaijani composers including F. Amirov, J. Hajiyev, S. Hajibeyov, Niyazi, J. Jahangirov, A. Rzayeva, Quliyev, A. Hasanova, A. Huseynzadeh, A. Mamedbayli, and A. Babayev. Some of them were charged with belonging to an anti-popular formalistic movement, and others with pseudo-popularity. Upon instruction of Party organs, articles harshly criticizing the creativity of these composers were published in the Communist newspaper in the Azerbaijani and Armenian languages and in the Bakinskiy Rabochiy newspaper in the Russian language. Naturally, after the CC CPSU Presidium made a decision in May 1958 to correct decadeslong erroneous assessments, the CC CPA Bureau again discussed this question on June 19 and made the expected decision. In full accordance with the Moscow document, the CC CPA Bureau pointed out that the decision made in 1948 “mostly correctly, from the point of socialist realism, determined the tasks of development of the musical art in the Republic. It rightly made composers aim at creation of highly ideological, artistically comprehensive works close and dear to the people. This resolution fairly condemned formalistic manifestations. On the whole, this resolution contributed to the development of musical art in the Republic and improvement of training composer cadre.” Nevertheless, in its resolution, the Bureau admitted that the criticism of the composers above had been unsubstantiated and unjust. “Their separate mistakes and errors that could have been subject to practical criticism were being exaggerated for a special purpose. Their creativity was trampled down without cause.” The CC CPA Bureau recognized that one-sided assessments of works of a number of composers of the Republic in the editorials of the newspapers Kommunist, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, and Communist (in the Armenian language) were wrong and thus instructed the editorial staffs of these newspapers to publish an editorial containing a comprehensive analysis of major questions of development of the Soviet musical art of Azerbaijan. It was also decided to hold, a general meeting of composers and musical critics of Azerbaijan on June 20, 1958 to discuss the resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium. Qarayev was appointed as a reporter.65 However, speaking first at the meeting was deputy head of the CC propaganda department Ruhulla Orujev, who explained the Party’s line in the sphere of art to the audience. He was followed by Qarayev, who detailed achievements of the Azerbaijani composer’s school over a decade since the March (1948) decision of the CC CPA Bureau. He pointed out the great significance of a decision of the CC CPSU Presidium of May 28, 1958 and a decision of the CC CPA Bureau of June 19, 1958. A. Badalbayli spoke during discussions of the report, noting that it had been in fashion to stigmatize composers in the past: some of them were called primitive, others formalists, and so forth. “An instruction was issued on the occasion of my opera in 1948. For some reason, Qara Qarayev did not consider it necessary to mention it. Newspapers were instructed to write nothing about my opera. Such instructions caused by someone’s prejudice discouraged me from a desire to create.” At the same time, Badalbayli noted that Azerbaijani composers displayed their strength at a musical festival called “Transcaucasian Spring” in Yerevan, but there was a problem with a lack of good performers. Participating in

the discussion, S. Rustamov noted that the Party’s decision on the opera Great Friendship and creativity of many outstanding composers had been extremely subjective and one-sided. The shortcomings of their works could be eliminated through practical criticism. He noted the following: “The opera From All the Heart was not so unsuccessful. Fikret Amirov, Jovdat Hajiyev and I visited the Ukraine upon their invitation and watched this opera there. Representatives of all Union Republics gathered there, and all of them, including me, praised this work very much. Further, the opera was shown to the wider public, staged at the Bolshoi Theater, and awarded with the Stalin prize. And suddenly the composer in a moment became a social outcast, and a number of similar works, including Bogdan Khmelnitskiy were evaluated one-sidedly. The same happened in our musical life. Under discussion of Stalin’s decision here, in the republic, big mistakes were made: they began striking out on every occasion. Some were called primitive composers, others formalists. In a nutshell, there are many dark spots in this story.” Musicians and composers listened to a speech of R. Rza with great interest. He noted the following: “The decision of the Political Bureau concerned composers, but could also be regarded as concerning writers, because something of this sort had been occurring in our environment as well. I remember that in approximately 1949–1950 a certain decision was made on literature, mentioning some writers. They wanted to include a work of one of our writers in this decision on charges of false popularity. Then this writer raised his hand and noted that this work had already been scolded in a previous decision of Party organs. Thus, it could not be scolded once again. A proposal was then made to substitute this work with the work of another writer. There was the impression that we were then fulfilling a certain plan of disclosures.” As for development of Azerbaijani music, R. Rza said, “The staging of Qara Qarayev’s ballet Path of Thunder at the Leningrad Theater is the most beautiful achievement of our art. When I had a vacation in Moscow, I specially went to Leningrad to view this play. This is one of the highlights in my memory. I enjoyed looking at the delightful reaction of the audience, who repeatedly called for the author to appear on the stage. When a Comrade asked me what this certain Kara had done and why we praised him so highly, I replied that he had been praised without our permission. Volume III of the All-Union magazine Music mentions Qara Qarayev’s ballet as an outstanding achievement of musical art. Out of ten pages of the text about Qarayev, nine pages praised him; however, this comrade does not want to take notice of them. He alleges that Qara Qarayev is under the influence of S. Prokofyev. I saw and heard Prokofyev’s ballet Romeo and Juliet. This is one of the genius works of our modern age. If the influence of such a composer is evident, this is not bad.” As for the question about performers touched upon by Badalbayli, Rza reminded the audience that the currently popular song by Tofik Quliyev, “All Will be Over,” had been performed in one play for almost a year but yielded no appropriate effect. Only after Rashid Beybutov performed it in his own manner, the song truly won national recognition. Thus, good music also requires a good performer. Further, the floor was taken by F. Amirov. He noted that Azerbaijani professional music had been raised to a substantial height owing to the contributions by Qarayev, S. Rustamov, S. Hajibeyov, Niyazi, and Quliyev. When the CC Bureau was making its decision a decade ago, the creative mistakes of Azerbaijani composers were determined by their young age. “Ten

years ago our Kara was about twenty-eight years old. This is young age and young creativity. This is the reason for our mistakes. In appraising this resolution, we have to keep in mind the following: if ten years ago Badalbayli’s opera Nizami or a Niyazi’s opera Khosrov and Shirin were not mentioned in the resolution, this does not mean at all that they are wonderful and may join the theater’s repertoire now. Something like Russia’s ‘Mighty Handful’ has now been created in our republic. However, our and their composers’ strengths are incomparable. Indeed, the appearance of an Azerbaijani play on the Leningrad stage is a great success. But it is hard to say that the composer is to the same extent successful on the Azerbaijani stage.” Amirov insisted that the matter of diplomas in musical creativity and performer’s art is of second importance. “When Uzeyir bey gathered us around him, none of us had a diploma. And now we should follow his path. Very often a comrade comes and tells me: ‘I’ve graduated from the conservatory; please employ me as a soloist.’ I tell him to sing, and he does, but this is not what we’re looking for. Did Rashid have a diploma? But look, can anyone from the conservatory sing Balash’s aria as Rashid sings it? It is not possible to be a soloist according to one’s diploma alone. Here, one should be clever, and maybe even circumvent the law.” Speaking in the discussions were J. Hajiyev, D. Danilov, J. Jangirov, T. Aliyev, and other musicians. In his closing speech to the audience, CC Secretary Bayramov commented on several important questions.66 On May 31, 1958, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR Ibrahimov asked Mustafayev to substantiate the necessity of creation of an Azerbaijani Soviet encyclopedia. The document read: “The encyclopedia’s role and great importance in the life of the people and development of its culture is well known. An encyclopedia is an invaluable means of education of public masses in various spheres of science and culture, and it provides assistance to intelligentsia and specialists in their everyday work. The level of general development of the Azerbaijani people makes it urgent to issue an encyclopedia in the Azerbaijani language. Apart from our great demand for this encyclopedia, we have enough skilled specialists and appropriate conditions to make it real. Our encyclopedia should be original and, apart from informing about the world history and general questions of science and art, it should also highlight specific questions of the history and culture of Azerbaijan. If we do it seriously and rapidly, the early volumes will appear right in 1959 or 1960. It would be best to issue a ten-volume encyclopedia. If you agree that this is a useful, urgent matter, then I’d like to ask you to make an appropriate decision.”67 On the same day, Mustafayev submitted this letter to Bayramov in order to prepare this question for discussion at the CC Bureau. In turn, Bayramov instructed the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences to prepare a report on the questions Ibrahimov had raised in his letter. Vice President of the Academy of Sciences Zahid Khalilov reported to the CC the following in August 1958: “The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, in connection with a letter of academician Ibrahimov, would like to inform us that issuing the Azerbaijani Soviet encyclopedia is an extremely useful, matured affair. In addressing you the draft of a resolution of the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers about this, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan would like to ask you to make a positive decision.”68

On the basis of this written correspondence, deputy head of the department on science and schools of the CC CPA, Vekilov, informed Mustafayev as follows on September 10: “According to your instruction, the department on science and schools of the CC CPA examined proposals of academician Ibrahimov and the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR on creation of the Azerbaijani Soviet Encyclopedia. Having examined this matter, the department on science and schools considers it possible to instruct the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR to begin, in 1959, preparation for publishing the Azerbaijani Soviet Encyclopedia in ten volumes to complete it within five years. To prepare for issuing the Azerbaijani Soviet Encyclopedia, a chief editorial office and editorial board should be established under the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Supposable composition of the chief editorial staff was mentioned in the information as well.69 At its meeting on September 17, the CC Bureau instructed V. Akhundov, Bayramov, M. Kurbanov, and Y. Mamedaliyev to examine Ibrahimov’s initiative and submit their proposals to the CC Bureau. On October 13, the required draft decision was submitted to the CC. On November 4, the CC CPA Bureau made a decision to issue the Azerbaijani Soviet Encyclopedia. The size of each volume was determined as fifty printer’s sheets; the circulation had to make up 50,000 copies. The Bureau appointed Y. Mamedaliyev as chief editor, Ibrahimov as his deputy, and as members of the editorial staff, famous scientists and artists of the Republic: Ilyas Abdullayev, Mamed Arif Dadashzadeh, Kerim Aliverdizadeh, Mehbaly Gasymov, Mirali Gashgay, Saftar Quliyev, Qara Qarayev, Firuz Melikov, Shafayat Mehtiyev, Imam Mustafayev, Murtuza Nagiyev, Ali Sohbat Sumbatzadeh, Mustafa Topchubashev, Valida Tutayuk, Zahid Khalilov, and Azad Efendizadeh.70 Changes occurred in the leadership of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR in spring of 1958. President of the Academy Musa Aliyev asked the CC to free him from the post of President of the Academy of Sciences for health reasons and at the same time from the post of leader of the Republican society of spread of political and scientific knowledge. On March 4, the CC Bureau resolved to release M. Aliyev from the post of the President of the Academy of Sciences and transfer him to the post of head of a department of the Institute of Geology. In addition, the Bureau recommended the general meeting of the Academy of Sciences to elect as its president Y. Mamedaliyev, the former president of the Academy of Sciences and the current rector of Azerbaijan State University. In April 1958 Y. Mamedaliyev was elected, so the CC Bureau approved the selection of scientists on April 22.71 At the same time, the structure of the Academy of Sciences was extended starting from early 1958. In January and February, a decision was made to open institutes of genetics and selection, economy, and Oriental studies. The question of opening the Institute of Oriental Studies was raised back in the beginning of 1957. A decision of the CC CPSU of January 11, 1957 “On Teaching Oriental Languages in a Series of Secondary Schools” paved the way for the development of Oriental studies in the Republic. Several days later, on January 23, rector of the university, academician Mamedaliyev addressed Mustafayev with a letter “On improvement of training the cadre of orientalists at the S. M. Kirov State University of

Azerbaijan.” He wrote that development of the Soviet school of Oriental studies and improvement of training the cadre of orientalists were one of the most important tasks of Soviet academics. A number of USSR-wide measures in this direction had been taken over the past years: the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was reorganized; a magazine titled Soviet Oriental Studies started being printed; and links with orientalist scientific institutions and organizations of other countries were being established. Mamedaliyev wrote: “In connection to this, our republic and Azerbaijan State University face important tasks. The University’s Orientalist Faculty, established in the early years of the Soviet power, played a great role in the development of Oriental studies and training orientalists in the Republic. Working at the University’s Orientalist Faculty were outstanding scientists such as academicians V. V. Bartold, N. Y. Marr, I. I. Meshaninov, N. I. Ashmarin, A. Samoylovich, A. Romaskevich, professors P. K. Zhuze, A. O. Makovelskiy, A. Gubaydulin, B. Chobanzadeh, J. Nagiyev, E. Bertels, N. Dmitriyev, R. Shor, Gulyayev, Komarovskiy, and others. The University’s Orientalist Faculty brought up a whole generation of orientalists and outstanding figures of science and art. Suffice it to mention famous figures of science and art such as J. Jabbarly, H. Huseynov, B. Khuluflu, A. Sultanly, M. Arif, A. Sumbatzadeh, A. Demirchizadeh, A. Badalbayli, M. Shiraliyev, S. Salamzadeh, A. Seyidov, F. Kasumzadeh, I. Hasanov, A. Kazymov, and Rahimov. Regretfully, following the University’s reorganization in 1929, the Orientalist faculty ceased to exist and thus caused a great deficiency in the development of the Orientalist science in the Republic. The faculty was restored in 1942 and since then, the University again became the main center of training and accumulation of Azerbaijani orientalists. Starting from 1948, of those who graduated from the Iranian philology department alone, more than twenty people defended their candidate’s theses. Many of the University’s graduates successfully work at research institutes of Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, and other cities.” Following his introduction, Mamedaliyev noted that the present-day state of the Orientalist Faculty of the State University of Azerbaijan was far from meeting modern requirements: the number of entrance vacancies had decreased sharply; the departments of Turkish philology and Arab philology were closed; and the Orientalist Faculty had become a small department of the philology faculty with a total number of fifty students. “Oriental studies at this faculty are limited to study of the Persian language and literature only. Insufficient attention is paid in the Republic to the study of the history of culture, ethnography, art, and economy of the Oriental nations and their languages, particularly the Arab and the Turkish languages. The Arab language is taught as an auxiliary subject at the Orientalist Faculty while the Turkish language and literature are studied only by a group of Bulgarian Turks, who were sent on a mission to Azerbaijan State University in 1954 and 1955.” Mamedaliyev suggested taking appropriate measures to further expand and develop Oriental studies and train orientalists in the Republic. This was dictated not only by the necessity of studying countries of the Middle East and Central Asia but also the factor that study of cultural heritage of Azerbaijan itself could not be successful without certain Orientalist training, and without the knowledge of language, history, and culture of countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Mamedaliyev noted, “Great figures of our national culture such as poet-scientist Bakui, Khatib

Tabrizi, Bahmanyar, Khagani, Nizami, Gatran Tabrizi, Shams Tabrizi, Mahmud Shabustarim, Arif Ardebili, Nasimi, Habibi, Fizuli, Mesihi, A. Bakikhanov, and others wrote their works in either Persian and Arabian or Azerbaijani, with the latter saturated with elements of the Persian and Arabian languages. It should also be noted that Azerbaijani literature of the classical period for many centuries was closely linked with the culture of countries such as Iran, Turkey, India, Afghanistan, and others, so it is not possible to fully explore the history of development of our culture without the comprehensive study and knowledge of the cultures of these countries.” Mamedaliyev suggested expanding the Iranian philology department and reorganizing the Arab and Turkish philology departments and thus establishing the full Orientalist Faculty in the Republic.72 Mamedaliyev’s efforts were a success. With the help of the Republic’s leadership, the departments of Arab and Turkish philology were restored at the Orientalist Faculty in the 1957–1958 educational year, and the Ministry of the Higher Education of the USSR permitted entrance of twenty-five students. Preparation for the establishment of the Institute of Oriental Studies under the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR began in summer of 1957. The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences was instructed to draft appropriate documents to substantiate the urgency of opening the Institute, its scientific basis, staff list, financial expenditure, and so on. and submit them for consideration to the CC CPA. In August 1957, Mustafayev and Rahimov asked the Council of Ministers of the USSR to explore the opportunity of opening the Institute of Oriental Studies. The document said, “A large quantity of oriental specialists involved in the study of Middle East and Central Asian countries work in Azerbaijan. In the system of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, dealing with separate orientalist questions or related issues currently are the department of history of countries abroad, the Institute of History, a group of research officers of the Nizami Institute of Literature and Language, the department of economy, the department of philosophy, and employees of some departments of Azerbaijan State University. But given that these forces are dispersed over various scientific institutions and higher education institutions, it seems impossible to carry out a deep, comprehensive study of urgent questions of the history, economy, and culture of peoples of the Orient. Proceeding from the above-stated, the CC CPA and the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR believe that there is quite a matured urgency of establishing a separate Institute of Oriental Studies in the system of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. The necessity of this is determined by, apart from the existence of skilled oriental specialists in the Republic, the existence of Azerbaijan’s long-standing ties with countries of the Orient and the existence of a large quantity of rare manuscripts devoted to the history of the Azerbaijani nation in these countries. In addition, the letter offered a staff list of eighty-eight people, including seventy-five research officers and thirteen people as the management.73 On September 10, 1957, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the question “On the Status and Measures of Development of Oriental Studies in the Azerbaijan SSR” with scientists and specialists in attendance. To speed up the process of opening of the Institute of Oriental Studies, a decision was made to ask the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR for permission to organize the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the

Azerbaijan SSR and name it after Narimanov, considering the latter’s great contribution to the development of Oriental studies. However, the latter provision was regarded cautiously under the preparation of a letter to the CC CPSU, and eventually this provision was canceled from the Bureau’s decision. The same decision instructed the rector of the University to train orientalists in the following three specialties: Persian studies, Arabian studies, and Turkic studies, and send a group of twenty-five people on each subject on a mission to Moscow every year. In accordance with this decision, on October 3 Mustafayev appealed to the CC CPSU, and a copy of the appeal was submitted to the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR, B. Gafurov.74 Having received Moscow’s permission, on February 1, 1958 the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR began its work; doctor of history, Prof. Abdulkerim Alizadeh was appointed as Director of the Institute. Following Mustafayev’s appeal to the Labor and Wages Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Institute of Oriental Studies was assigned the first category beginning in June 1958.75 The establishment of the Institute of Oriental Studies contributed to the study of not only the history and culture of countries of the Middle East and Central Asia but also the medieval history of Azerbaijan. Academician Ziya Buniyatov, a great scientist and creator of his own scientific school, won international recognition in this respect. About two months after the Institute was opened, A. Alizadeh raised before the Republic’s leadership the question of publication of Nizami Ganjevi’s scientific-critical text Khamse, which had been prepared by Soviet scientists, including the Azerbaijani E. Bertels as the editor. It was planned to time the publication for the XXV international congress scheduled to take place in Leningrad in 1960. This text was prepared on the basis of two manuscripts from the Paris National Library, manuscripts from the Oxford Museum and the British Museum, manuscripts from the Hermitage and the University of Leningrad, the manuscript’s foundation of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR, and manuscripts from the Nizami Institute of Literature and Language. Alizadeh believed that publication of this type of work would become a substantial scientific gift of the new Institute to the XXV International Congress. Considering this proposal as reasonable and, with an appeal first by Alizadeh and then by Mamedaliyev with A. Sumbatzadeh in mind, the CC CPA Bureau made a decision on June 10, 1958 to publish the scientific-critical text Khamse.76 In addition, in the mid-1950s the Republic’s leadership focused on the question of preparation of an academic edition of History of Azerbaijan, as well as History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. In connection with drafting a textbook, the CPA had made a special decision at the XVII Congress in 1949. As a result of intense work of a team of the Institute of History of the Azerbaijan SSR, a two-volume mockup of History of Azerbaijan was issued in September of 1954. The mockup was distributed to all scientific institutions, famous scientists, and Party and Soviet bodies. However, a discussion that had been scheduled for October 1954 in Moscow was postponed for unclear reasons. Following insistent reminders by the CC CPA leadership, the question of History of Azerbaijan was broadly discussed at the CC CPSU in February 1955. Generally speaking, there were no serious

principal objections; however, the CC CPSU leadership demanded that a chapter on Southern Azerbaijan be excluded from the book. At the same time, the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR received a series of valuable instructions pertaining to the mockup. As a result, various institutes and scientific institutions submitted around eighty reviews to the mockup’s authors in the summer of 1955. The situation in the sphere of ideology changed radically after the XX Congress of the CPSU. Rehabilitation of the repressed people required radical reconsideration of the 20th century’s problems. In connection to this, on October 18, 1956, the CC CPA Bureau discussed the situation and, in order to speed up publication of History of Azerbaijan, freed the authors and editors of the book from all other works. As determined by the Bureau, the textbook’s volume I had to appear on December 15, 1956, and volume II on July 1, 1957. A bit later, Director of the Institute of History A. Quliyev suggested increasing the quantity of volumes of History of Azerbaijan from two to three due to changes relating to the XX Congress. After lengthy discussions that lasted until February 1957, volume I was submitted to the CC CPA, and in September of the same year, the publishing house of the Academy of Sciences started working over the manuscript. However, the book’s printing was delayed for various reasons, and only on January 3, 1958 was volume I of History of Azerbaijan printed. It appeared later the same year. Quliyev explained such a considerable lagging behind from the timeline by the fact that the text of the book had been supplemented with materials about Lullubays and Kutiahs residing in the territory of the Southern Azerbaijan, as well as identification of the process of formation of the Azerbaijani nation and roots of the Azerbaijani language, so the book’s chronology changed. To speed up the work, Mustafayev instructed the head of the department of science and schools N. Hajiyev and head of the department of propaganda Kurbanov to draft and submit to the CC Bureau the question of the course of implementation of decisions on composing a textbook of the history of Azerbaijan, and separately the question of the history of Azerbaijan’s Party organization. In connection to this, Director of the Institute of History, Aliovsat Quliyev, and Vice President of the Academy of Sciences, Z. Khalilov, prepared broad inquiries on December 21, 1957 and on January 3, 1958, respectively. Having submitted a report of completed work, Quliyev noted that creation of the full, summarized work of the history of the Azerbaijani nation had been prevented by the absence of monographic literature pertaining to a series of important periods of Azerbaijan’s history. Thus, publication of O. Ismizadeh’s monograph on Yaloylutape archeological culture, I. Dyakonov’s monograph on the history of ancient Media, and Quliyev’s monograph on the history of medieval Azerbaijan helped improve the situation. Quliyev also noted that in connection with the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, the teams of research officers of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR had worked hard to revise the documentary funds of the Baku archive and archives of other towns; historical and autobiographical literature was under reconsideration. Quliyev wrote, “Owing to known reasons, the issued mockup of History of Azerbaijan misinterpreted or avoided reporting the revolutionary, Party and state work of outstanding figures of the Communist organization of Azerbaijan including Narimanov, S. M.

Efendiyev, H. Sultanov, D. Buniatzadeh, G. Musabekov, A. Qarayev, R. Akhundov, et al. Thus, under preparation of the materials of the second and third volumes emphasis is given to comprehensive elucidation of the lives of these figures.”77 Quliyev was right in claiming so. The political changes in the mid-1950s, along with the successful studies in the sphere of different periods of Azerbaijan’s history and the published related monographs, books, and scientific articles, made it necessary to revise some questions. Archeological excavations on the territory of Azerbaijan were essential to clarify a series of matters of ancient history. Excavations carried out by S. Kaziyev, M. Atakishiyev, E. Pakhomov, R. Vahidov, A. Alekperov, R. Gasymov, G. Aslanov, and others in Mingechaur; O. Habibullayev, T. Golubkina, M. Gashgay, and I. Selimkhanov at Kul-Tepe; a study of Gobustan by I. Jafarzadeh; and particularly the book Monuments of Azerbaijani History published in 1956; reports by A. Iessen and N. Minkevich-Mustafayeva about the Oran-Gala expedition; archeological excavations carried out by I. Narimanov in the area of Ganjachay, a work by J. Khalilov with material cultural artifacts of the Upper Bronze and Lower Iron Age in western Azerbaijan; a study of Azerbaijani pottery by G. Akhmedov; the startup of studies of the paleolithic by Huseynov; T. Buniyatov’s books Farming and Cattle-Raising in Azerbaijan in the Bronze Age and A Trip to the Distant Past of Azerbaijan; publication of I. Aliyev’s History of Midiya; articles by Z. Yampolskiy and K. Aliyev about Atropathena and the Caucasian Albania, and particularly articles by K. Aliyev titled “Ancient authors about the language of population of Azerbaijan” and “Materials of the life of population of Azerbaijan” published by an almanac News of the Academy of Sciences—all these elucidated a number of basic questions of the ancient period of Azerbaijan. In the mid-1950s, studies of the medieval history, publication of a series of medieval manuscripts, examination of epigraphic materials, and grave monuments in regions of the Republic made it possible to put forward new concepts of medieval history. In June of 1957, Tashkent hosted the first All-Union scientific conference of orientalists, where Azerbaijani scientists made interesting reports containing scientific innovations. The three-volume World History by Rashid ad-Din, considered a serious scientific source of the history of Azerbaijan, was published in Baku in 1957 with comments by Abdulkerim Alizadeh. In his welcoming address at the conference, Alizadeh described this book as the most valuable source for study of the history of Central Asian nations. The basis of source study of the history of Azerbaijan was enriched by A. Rakhmani’s articles about the life and creativity of Iskender Munshi; E. Ahmedov’s article about the history of publication of A. Bakikhanov’s work Gulistani-Iram, A. Huseynzadeh’s article about Jakhan-aran’s two manuscript lists, and S. Rustamova’s article about A. Bakikhanov’s new manuscript. In 1959, a book was published by Mirza Jamal Javanshir Karabagskiy titled The History of Karabakh, translated by F. Babayev and edited by R. Aliyev and S. Tagiyeva. This book, which still remains a scientifically valuable source, was published in the Azeri and in Russian. Back in the middle of the nineteenth century this work was published in brief in the Russian language by a Tiflis-based newspaper Caucasus. Professor Quliyev, as the Director of the Institute of History, initiated translation and publication of this book containing many interesting episodes on the history of Karabakh. After the XX Congress of the CPSU, certain

circles in Armenia started forwarding territorial claims against neighbors again, primarily Azerbaijan. Thus, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR considered it necessary to publish Javanshir’s book The History of Garabagh that answered many questions of the political history of this region from the ancient period to 1828. For the sake of avoidance of potential attacks by “concerned parties,” the original’s facsimile in Persian was also placed in the book together with the translations into Azeri and Russian. A survey of epigraphic monuments of the Guba, Khachmaz, and Kusari regions by Mashadikhanym Nematova opened a new orientation in Azerbaijani history. A study of the history of Azerbaijani towns of the ninth to thirteenth centuries by G. Akhmedov; numismatic research pertaining to the twelfth to thirteenth centuries by E. Pakhomov; a study of medieval Azerbaijani towns by S. Ashurbayli and her articles containing analysis of the trade and economic life of Baku and other towns; studies of the State of Ravvadids by M. Sharifli; of the internal and foreign policy of Shah Ismail the First by O. Efendiyev; of the social-economic system of Azerbaijan of the fifteenth century by D. Ibrahimov; F. Aliyev’s article about Azerbaijan’s trade links in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries; H. Abdullayev’s book Of the History of Northeastern Azerbaijan in the 1760–1780s; and other works substantially enriched the history. The volume I of the three-volume History of Azerbaijan still holds its scientific significance; this was essentially contributed to by studies carried out in the end of the 1950s. In his turn, head of the CC department Hajiyev noted in his inquiry that one of the reasons for the delay of publication of History of Azerbaijan was that there “were lengthy, useless disputes among members of the editorial staff” over the question of ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani nation and a series of other problems of the ancient period. 78 Soon after inquiry relating to the delay of the academic edition of History of Azerbaijan was prepared, Prof. Quliyev was released from the post of Director of the Institute of History and replaced by academician Ismayil Huseynov. The CC CPA Bureau, having discussed the question about preparation of the three-volume History of Azerbaijan for printing, demanded that the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR ensure the issue of volume I and volume II of History of Azerbaijan in 1958, and volume III in the first quarter of 1959. At the same time, the Ministry of Culture was instructed to provide for the timely issue of all the volumes. The third point of the Bureau’s resolution read as follows: “With the consideration of the necessity of teaching the history of Azerbaijan in secondary schools of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Academy of Sciences of the Republic shall submit to the science and schools department of the CC CPA a proposal of composing, on the basis of materials prepared by the Institute of History, a textbook of the history of Azerbaijan for secondary schools.”79 In addition to this decision, the CC CPA Bureau adopted an extended, seven-point resolution on July 1, 1958 titled “About teaching the history of Azerbaijan at secondary schools and universities of the Azerbaijan SSR.” The Bureau instructed the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR to introduce the teaching of history of Azerbaijan at ninth to tenth forms as a separate subject, fifty-one hours per year, in the second half of the 1958–1959 educational

year. The resolution’s second point instructed the composite authors Ali Sohbat Sumbatzadeh, Ismayil Huseynov, and Zulfali Ibrahimov to draft a textbook of twelve to fifteen printers’ sheets containing illustrations and maps of the history of Azerbaijan for secondary schools by November 15, 1958. The Ministry of Culture and Education was obliged to issue this textbook in Azeri and in Russian by December 20. Director of the Institute of History Ismayil Huseynov, Minister of Education Mirza Mamedov, and Rector of the Azerbaijan State University S. Mehtiyev were instructed to compose a program on the history of Azerbaijan for secondary schools and higher education institutions by September 15, 1958 and draft and distribute educational maps by 1960. The united publishing house of the CC CPA was instructed to issue a program of the course of history of Azerbaijan in Azeri and in Russian by November 1, 1958. Given that, upon insistence of the Republic’s leadership, the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR gave permission to restore the Department of the History of Azerbaijan at Azerbaijan State University, the resolution obliged the Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan SSR to restore this department at the Azerbaijani State Pedagogical Institute and teach the history of Azerbaijan at pedagogical higher education institutions of the Republic.80 The fact that volume I of the three-volume edition had already been published and that the other two volumes had practically been prepared for publication made implementation of the CC resolution much easier. Edited by Huseynov, A. Sumbatzadeh, Quliyev, and E. Tokarzhevskiy and having a team of authors including Huseynov, Z. Ibrahimov, Quliyev, E. Tokarzhevskiy, M. Sharifli, and M. Efendiyev, volume II of History of Azerbaijan became a great achievement for Azerbaijani history in the end of the 1950s. The book aroused interest both inside and outside the country. Representatives of intelligentsia who were living in regions of the Republic at the time asked their Baku colleagues to buy volume I of History of Azerbaijan especially for them. Mirza Rafi Hasanov, a teacher of Azerbaijani language and literature who lived in Masally in 1958, wrote to his scholar friend Aliyar Karabagly the following: “As usual, I’m forced to trouble you again. I heard rumors that History of Azerbaijan and Saadi’s almanac has been published. Naturally, such editions will unlikely get to our region. Thus, I beg you to send me one copy of History of Azerbaijan (naturally, in Azeri) and Saadi’s almanac.”81 Materials collected for the academic edition of History of Azerbaijan were also used for purposes of propaganda abroad. At this time, a certain Vincent Monteil published a book in France titled Soviet Muslims elucidating a series of questions pertaining to the Muslim nations of the Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan. For example, the author believed that the Soviet colonialism just slightly differed from the colonialism of the Tzarist Russia era and described the deprivation of USSR Muslim nations’ rights. Naturally, such assaults troubled the leadership of the CC CPSU. To weaken the ideological influence of such books, a member of the CC of the Communist Party of France, MP of the Parliament Marseille Egreto, who was responsible for colonial questions, was instructed to leave for the USSR. It is remarkable that he arrived in the USSR in a secret manner. In April 1958 he started collecting materials in the Muslim republics to prepare an article against Vincent Monteil’s book. Egreto spent three weeks in Azerbaijan, met leading historians, and collected rich material of the pre-

Revolutionary and Soviet history of Azerbaijan. Moscow gave the instruction to supply Egreto with the following materials: (1) information about population: correlation of urban and rural population; national composition; correlation of workers, kolkhoz workers, and intelligentsia; (2) state power bodies in Azerbaijan: Supreme Soviet and government of the Republic; who leads them; national composition of government and MPs of the Supreme Soviet; women in government; those descending from workers, kolkhoz workers and intelligentsia in the composition of government; and first name, last name, patronymic, and brief biography of every minister. (Egreto showed interest in this because the media of France published fictitious names of Ministers of Central Asian and Transcaucasian Republics citing nonexistent quotations from their speeches); (3) emancipation of women of Azerbaijan; their participation in state government, economy and culture, and women as members of intelligentsia; (4) development of national culture; continuation and development of national traditions starting from the Nizami era in literature and art; (5) national language: (a) press; (b) education; (c) literature. In addition, the guest displayed interest in other questions of the vital activities of the Republic, from the national perspective. In addition, he wanted to receive photographs reflecting all the submitted reports. All this was accompanied by a request not to inform the Republic’s newspapers about Egreto’s stay in Azerbaijan.82 In addition to History of Azerbaijan in the mid-1950s, a serious work was initiated to prepare the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. First it was planned to publish essays of the history of the Communist Party like it was done in the other Republics, but later a decision was made to create a fundamental scientific monograph. To speed up the work, Director of the Institute of the History of Party under the CC CPA—a branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU, A. H. Shahgeldiyev, asked secretary of the CC Bayramov on June 30, 1956 to establish an editorial staff consisting of J. Quliyev, Z. Ibrahimov, M. S. Iskenderov, E. Tokarzhevskiy, and Alihasan Shahgeldiyev. The document also requested to free, for the period of preparing the book for publication, the above individuals from their duties in other institutions and from teaching with their wages preserved.83 Following a discussion of this proposal, a decision was made to establish an editorial staff led by M. S. Iskenderov of the said composition. The editorial staff included Huseynov, J. Quliyev, D. Quliyev, M. Gaziyev, E. Tokarzhevskiy, and A. Shahgeldiyev. On November 23, 1956 the CC CPA Bureau made a decision “On composition and preparing for printing a book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.” A team of M. S. Iskenderov, V. Y. Samedov, J. B. Quliyev, M. A. Gaziyev, and A. Shahgeldiyev was established to compose the book and prepare it for publication. It was instructed to publish this book in the Azerbaijani language and in the Russian language in two volumes each with a size not exceeding twenty-five printer’s sheets; to free members of the team from performing their duties at their major posts with their wages preserved; to permit the team to involve employees of scientific institutions and higher education institutions in cooperation. The team was authorized to make use of all the materials of the Archive’s fund, manuscripts, and reports. The CC Bureau resolved to primarily approve a new approximate draft of the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and instruct the directorate of the Institute of the History of the

Party under the CC CPA to organize its broad discussion with the participation of historians, specialists, and teachers of public sciences of the Republic to further submit it for consideration to the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU. With Shahgeldiyev’s request in consideration, he was freed from the post of director of the Institute of the History of the Party but kept the position of senior research officer of this Institute and the position of head of the Chair of Journalism of the S. M. Kirov Azerbaijan State University. Head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA, Iskenderov, was appointed as Director of the Institute of the History of Party under the CC CPA.84 On March 26, 1957 Kurbanov was appointed as head of the propaganda department of the CC while Iskenderov returned to the post he had occupied back in 1951 under M. J. Bagirov—director of the Azerbaijani branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Mamed Salman oglu Iskenderov was born in 1908 in the village of Urud of the Zangezur district of the Yelizavetpol (Ganja) province. In 1917, his parents, in order to avoid being killed by Armenian armed gangs, resettled to the Jebrail district and only in 1922 returned to the territory of the Armenian SSR again. In 1928, Iskenderov graduated from one-year pedagogical courses in Yerevan and then worked as a teacher in the Gafan region and Zangezur district committee, he was responsible for Komsomol and Party work. In 1930–1933 he studied at the twenty-six Baku Commissars Transcaucasian Communistic University in Tbilisi. Upon graduation from the university, in 1933–1936 Iskenderov worked as an instructor under the Transcaucasian regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); following the liquidation of the Transcaucasian Federation, he briefly worked at the CC CPA (B), and in 1937, the Bureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia appointed him as editor of a newspaper Krasniy Voskhod (“Red Rise”) that was published in Yerevan in the Azerbaijani language. In 1937–1941 Iskenderov was the First Secretary of the Party of the Vedi region, then served as Secretary of the Yerevan City Party Committee, head of the industry department of the CC of the Armenian Communist Party (B). In March 1941 he was elected Secretary of the CC of the Armenian Communist Party (B) and worked at his post until 1943. In 1943–1947 he worked as Deputy Secretary of the CC of the Armenian Communist Party (B) and head of CC department; at the same time, in 1947 he graduated, as a correspondence student, from the faculty of history of the V. M. Molotov State University of Yerevan. In 1947– 1950 he studied at the postgraduate course of the Academy of Public Sciences under the CC VCP (B). He became a candidate of history, having defended a thesis “S. M. Kirov as the leader of Bolsheviks of Azerbaijan (1921–1925).” The young scientist was sent to Azerbaijan, and in September of 1950 the CC CPA Bureau made a decision to appoint him as deputy director of the Azerbaijani branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).85 After the 20th Congress, questions of the period of repressions had to be reconsidered; cases of the repressed Party leaders required an attentive examination. Thus, questions of the history of the Party organization of Azerbaijan also had to be specified to a considerable extent. Also involved in work for the Institute of the History of the Party were talented youth, for instance, Jamil Quliyev and Tofig Kocharli who later became the leading forces in Azerbaijani

historical science. They took an active part in writing History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. In 1957, Kocharli left the Ganja Pedagogical Institute for the Institute of History of the Party under the CC CPA as a research officer. Within a short period of time he became one of the leading historians as not only a researcher but also an organizer in charge of public sciences. Later on, Kocharli won the rank of an academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, became one of the authors of the Act of State Independence of Azerbaijan and, in the years of the Armenian ideological aggression, actively stood for the national interests of the republic. In the period of Azerbaijan’s independence, he published books titled Garabagh: Lies and Truth, Unforgettable Garabagh: Nakhchivan as Decoration of the World, and Garabagh combining scientific content and political importance. He wrote articles that enriched the historical sciences.86 To strengthen the cadre potential of the Institute of History of the Party, in July 1957 Mustafayev asked the CC CPSU to include the Institute in the number of first-category scientific institutions. He wrote, “The Institute . . . carries out substantial scientific and research work to study questions of the history of Revolutionary movement and Party organization of Azerbaijan. At present, the Institute has intensified its work to prepare the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in two volumes. . . . The Institute is preparing a large almanac of documents and books titled Active Fighters for the Soviet Power in Azerbaijan, The Communist Party as Organizer of Victory of the Soviet Power in Azerbaijan and a series of other scientific works.”87 To receive documents necessary for writing the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Mustafayev appealed to V. N. Malin, head of the general department of the CC CPSU, on August 14, 1957. In his letter, Mustafayev asked to supply J. Quliyev, who had been sent on a mission to Moscow, with documents pertaining to the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan covering the period of 1919–1921. Mustafayev reported that it seemed impossible to settle a number of most important matters of development of The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan without these documents.88 On September 3, 1957 the general department of the CC CPSU gave J. Quliyev a thirty-twoitem document relating to the history of Azerbaijan. The majority of these documents covered recognition of the social-democratic organization of the early twentieth century “Hummet” as an independent Communist Party of Azerbaijan; interrelations of the Transcaucasian Republics; written correspondence concerning Zangezur and Garabagh; and the role of Narimanov in the Azerbaijani Revolutionary movement. These documents were broadly used for the writing of History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.89 Some of the documents J. Quliyev had brought turned to be scandalous. For instance, in a secret letter to Lenin on June 20, 1920, a certain leader of the Bolshevik Army that had occupied Azerbaijan expressed his concern over the appearance of Turkish military units in Nakhchivan and thus questioned: were these actions a turning point in the policy of Turkish nationalists or an independent action of a separate military group? The letter admits “the mass battering of Muslims by our units in Yelizavetpol. . . . Turks’ movement toward Azerbaijan undoubtedly is connected with this.” The letter told Lenin the following: “The Azerbaijani

government announced its claim for Garabagh, Zangezur, and Sharuro-Daralagez provinces together with Nakhchivan, Ordubad and Julfa. . . . Anyway, it is out of the question to raise Azerbaijani soldiers against Armenians with the aim of depriving the latter of the provinces Azerbaijan had been claiming. . . . To deprive Armenia of some of its parts and pass them over, with our own hands, to Azerbaijan would have meant attaching the wrong coloring to our whole policy in the Orient.” Lenin reported the following: “A decision was made to occupy the disputable localities by Russian units to be subordinated by Russian occupation powers to make sure that these localities are conferred to neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia until the political situation becomes more favorable.”90 According to another document, in November 1921 the Political Bureau of the CC RCP discussed the situation in Azerbaijan and accused Narimanov of nationalism. Members of the Baku Committee Mikoyan, V. Lominadze, M. Kakhiani, Sarkis, and Yegorov were in a dispute with Narimanov. The themes of the discussions were the following: (1) work with Muslims; (2) expropriation of bourgeoisie; (3) understanding of the new economic policy; (4) cleansing and involvement in the Party; (5) work guidance; (6) factional struggles; (7) national trends. It is evident from the document that Narimanov acted against a thoughtless policy of the Baku Committee not to let Muslims enter the Party and leading posts, and against the removal of Turkic languages from office work. Though the Turkic language was declared the state one, the Baku Committee hindered its use in various ways, alleging that the use of the Turkic language would have strengthened nationalism among the non-Turkic population. Narimanov regarded such reasons as unsubstantiated. Members of the Baku Committee complained that they were called anti-Azerbaijanis only because they demanded to introduce a preparation period before transition to the Turkic language took place. The saboteurs wrote to Moscow as follows: “Comrade Narimanov accuses us of disrespect of local Azerbaijani conditions. The nationalistic trend in Azerbaijan is most clearly illustrated from the very existence (in Azerbaijan) of a faction led by Comrade Narimanov including not a single non-Muslim. Narimanov had solely non-Muslim employees dismissed.” The members of the Baku Committee further wrote: “This trend flares up passions and creates distrust among various nationalities in a single proletarian mass and strengthens the tendency of the mistrust of 1918 (‘Armenian-Muslim relations’).” They also criticized the Caucasian Bureau that “was going down the path of satisfying all the caprices of Comrade Narimanov.” In conclusion, members of the Baku Committee demanded the dissolution of Narimanov’s faction, warning that otherwise its members should be excluded from the Party’s ranks. Eventually, members of the Baku Committee in November 1921 started demanding Narimanov’s removal and submitting the question about him to discussion. Ordzhonikidze from Baku reported to Lenin and Stalin as follows: “The Narimanov-led group is surrounded. . . . The task is set to overthrow Narimanov.”91 On the whole, the new archive documents J. B. Quliyev had brought in accordance with Mustafayev’s letter reflected the historical reality, were extremely interesting and were issued in volume I of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan published by the Azerbaijani branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU in Azeri and in Russian.

Moscow was very much displeased with the book, and Khrushchev was aware of disputes over this book. Khrushchev stated categorically on this book: “Criticize it. Where are our critics in Moscow looking at? Publish an article in the Communist and butcher them.”92 What was it that angered Khrushchev? First, it was the first time since the establishment of the Soviet power that the Azerbaijanis themselves began writing the fundamental history of the activity of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan. Authors of various chapters of the book were Z. Ibrahimov, J. Quliyev, A. Dadashly, T. Kocharli, G. Mehtiyev, G. Madatov, A. Abdurakhmanov, M. Mirhadiyev et al. There were also non-Azerbaijani authors: A. Karenin, B. Stelnik, I. Strigunov, P. Mosesov, and E. Nalbandyan; however, they were the minority and thus could not seriously affect the ideological orientation of the book. Second, having ignored the decisions of the 10th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the authors considered the development of capitalism throughout Azerbaijan. Stalin, at the 10th Congress, analyzed this matter and made the wrong conclusion that it was a mistake to mix industrial Baku with the rural regions of Azerbaijan. Baku is not the whole Azerbaijan. Stalin said, “As for the very Azerbaijan, it is a country of most backward patriarchal-feudal relations. Thus, I treat Azerbaijan as a backyard that hasn’t passed capitalism.” Third, the answer to the question “was there or wasn’t there capitalism in Azerbaijan?” was answered with the question “was there or wasn’t there a nation?” Thus the authors of the book, in “returning” Baku toward the composition of Azerbaijan, actually answered the question of whether the nation existed through alleging the existence of capitalism at the Republic’s outskirts. Fourth, the authors laid the burden of political processes in Azerbaijan in the early twentieth century onto the shoulders of the organization “Hummet” and put in the center Narimanov, who was then rehabilitated in the mid-1950s. Fifth, all the Communist Parties of that period issued their opuses about the activity of Communists in the form of essays. Only Azerbaijan issued History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in the form of fundamental monograph. Moscow was particularly indignant at the fact that the book hadn’t been reviewed by the Institute of Marxism/Leninism before it was published. It should also be noted that this book was praised at the XXII Congress of the CPA in 1958. Thus, CC CPSU officials believed that not the authors but Mustafayev was to be blamed for the appearance of this book. In Moscow’s opinion, Mustafayev unreasonably exalted the History of Azerbaijan at the XXI Congress of the CPA and thus gave an impetus to this process that further affected all historical literature.93 Member of the CC CPSU Presidium Nureddin Muhitdinov noted that Mustafayev, in his speech, in listing the Baku Commissars, had allegedly put Narimanov or Azizbeyov in the foreground and Shaumyan in the background. With such an approach, Mustafayev allegedly made some immature people intentionally distort the history of the nation. “Why do Mustafayev and, with his blessing, some Azerbaijani historians do this? As it is known, the more the past is varnished, and history is distorted, the less the nation will trust it, not to mention that the very history ceases to be a science.”94 Head of the department of the CC CPSU, V. Snastin, openly noted that, following the speech of Mustafayev, some of the Baku Commissars turned out to be in the background in propagandistic articles; portraits were reshuffled, and so on. In many letters addressing the CC of the Party, people asked what caused these changes.95

To discuss History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan actually put Azerbaijani historians in their place, and upon the recommendation of the CC CPSU, a meeting of the leaders of the branches of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism and leading specialists from Moscow, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, the Kazakhystan SSR, the Turkmenistan SSR, and the Tajikistan SSR was held on November 18–21, 1958 in Baku. Heading the delegation was Deputy Director of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU, Professor N. Shatagin. Attending the meeting on behalf of Azerbaijan were employees of the departments of history of the CPSU of the Republic’s higher education institutions and a number of famous scientists. Head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA Kurbanov was present at the meeting until its end. The event was opened by Secretary of the CC CPA Bayramov. He reminded that a new attitude to the history of Revolutionary movement was being formed after the XX Congress of the CPSU, so natural, necessary reconsideration of the significance of some public and political events was taking place. In addition, Bayramov stressed that the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan held in January 1958 had confirmed the positive appraisal of this monograph through a report by Mustafayev. He noted that many books about the history of the Party had been issued in Transcaucasia before 1953; however, they were all marked with admiration for the personality cult. Speaking first was one of the authors and editors of the book, director of the Azerbaijani branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism, Iskenderov. He again defended the book’s key idea and made a new statement of a number of questions.96 Speaking on behalf of all those who disagreed with the new interpretation of the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was head of the chair of the Transcaucasian Higher Party School, Professor P. N. Valuyev. However, his speech was so long that he could be considered a co-rapporteur. Valuyev started his speech by stating that the authors and editors made old mistakes on a number of core issues. In turn, this led to erroneous conclusions and provisions, according to him. The assertion was a desire to link the book’s concept with the Bagirov-Beria period. On the other hand, he noted that an important political mistake in assessing the level of social-economic development of Azerbaijan had been made in the book: “A reader, in becoming acquainted with the book, considers the social-economic level of Azerbaijan as the level of a country that has passed the stage of industrial capitalism. . . . As a matter of fact, in claiming that all of Azerbaijan has passed industrial-capitalist development at once, the authors provided no specific economic material to substantiate this point of view.” Why did Moscow and its clientele (analysis of documents shows that Valuyev was specially trained for this purpose) stand so strictly for its position? Particularly, the head of department of the CC CPSU Snastin openly noted, “We must be shown directly where we were coming from and what peak achievements we came to. Is it unpleasant for us? This corresponds to the historical reality. Why should we spread the social-economic conditions of Baku over all of Azerbaijan? Attempts to color the past are made in the works of historians. As it was stated here, this is also stressed in the textbook of the history of Azerbaijan for secondary schools. Having been acquainted with this textbook, one should think that the history of Azerbaijan developed in the spirit of this flow. It is inappropriate to depict the history in such a manner, as it definitely damages our ideological work.”97 In his turn, head of the sector of the CC CPSU Kuzin noted

that the textbook prepared by academician Sumbatzadeh, academician Huseynov, and Professor Z. Ibrahimov illustrates that “the ancient period is depicted as not the struggle of the Azerbaijani nation but rather as the history of kings, military leaders, battles, and so on.”98 One of the main critics of History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Valuyev, detailed Stalin’s closing speech at the X Congress of the Party and Stalin’s concept of lack of capitalism in Azerbaijan. Stalin particularly noted, “Baku did not grow from the bowels of Azerbaijan but was constructed by Nobel and other capitalists.” Valuyev tried to use “factual materials” to substantiate the X Congress’s decision on Stalin’s thesis that the majority of Azerbaijan had not had enough time to move beyond the stage of capitalist development. At the same time, Valuyev accused Azerbaijani historians of an effort to revise the decisions of the Party’s congress. In addition, Valuyev criticized the book’s authors over the question of national composition of the Baku proletariat, as well as their position concerning the organization “Hummet” because “there is the impression that Hummet was an independent organization separated from the Baku Party organization. . . . The authors depict Hummet as an organization that had its lower groups, its regional committees, and its center that led these organizations in towns and provinces. But such elucidation of the material is wrong. The mistake of the authors is that they, in elucidating this question, misunderstood the theory of the question, that Hummet in the early years of its existence had been a department of the Baku committee, a department for work among Muslim proletariat, and in some cases, for tactical reasons, in dealing with other parties it formally acted as an independent organization.”99 At last, Valuyev also criticized Narimanov for his project of creating the Azerbaijani Communist Party of Bolsheviks only on the basis of Azerbaijani communists and his attempt to show Hummet as an independent Party of Azerbaijani Communists. Valuyev viewed Narimanov’s idea as politically incorrect, inconsequent nationalism. Valuyev was followed by a young teacher of Azerbaijan State University, Shirmamed Huseynov, who had just returned to Baku from Moscow where he had defended his thesis on the history of the press. He started his speech saying, “After this speech of Valuyev, my respect, my love for the history of the Azerbaijani Communist Party and for the team of authors who have written the history of our Party immensely increased. Because people who hadn’t known Azerbaijan had for long years been instructed to write the history of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. . . . They couldn’t read materials in the Azerbaijani language and thus couldn’t settle problems resulting from specific peculiarities of Azerbaijan. . . . A positive aspect of the book is that it truly, broadly elucidates the activity of the organization ‘Hummet.’ In the opinion of Huseynov, another positive peculiarity of the book is that it depicted, apart from the Bolshevik movement in Azerbaijan, the role of the Revolutionary-democratic movement. Huseynov noted, “It is known that either progressive writers of Azerbaijan or revolutionary democrats fought for Azerbaijan’s independence.” As for a part of the book’s preface, which speaks of the progressive meaning of Azerbaijan’s unification with Russia, Huseynov noted, “But at the same time we cannot allege that following this unification, the Azerbaijani people stopped fighting for its national independence. The book raises the alternative possibility of Azerbaijan’s unification with either Russia or Iran. A question arises in connection to this: didn’t six to seven-million people

with advanced intelligentsia have even a thought of national sovereignty?” At the end of his speech, Huseynov touched upon a very serious theme: the question of Azerbaijan’s reunification. He noted, “The book elucidates revolutionary links between Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Azerbaijan. However, the central question in my opinion—struggle for Azerbaijan’s reunification—is left in the dark. This question must be raised seriously.”100 Huseynov’s brave speech echoed in Moscow. Having read the speech’s shorthand record at the CC CPSU, Snastin was indignant, saying, “For instance, a teacher of Azerbaijan State University Comrade Huseynov raised the question so that Azerbaijan could unify with either Russia or Iran, but didn’t Azerbaijan have its own way of development? Was it necessary to raise the question in such a form? Does the working class or did the Bolsheviks settle these matters in such a manner? But Comrade Huseynov raised this question in such an improper form.”101 J. Quliyev chaired the second meeting on November 19, 1958 that was opened with a speech by Deputy Director of the Turkmen branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism, A. Roslyakov, who touched upon some interesting aspects. He noted that “Hummet” was of theoretical interest and, apart from this, had a great significance from the point of view of practice of Party forces of colonial and semi-colonial countries on the whole. The question about the organization “Hummet” is on a higher scale than Azerbaijan, so it must be well thought-out and properly settled. As for the role of Narimanov in “Hummet,” Roslyakov stressed, “The leader of ‘Hummet’ Narimanov dreamed of a much wider spread of the activity of ‘Hummet,’ alleging in his letter to Lenin in 1920 that Hummet members held the future of the Orient in their hands.” However, Roslyakov also confirmed that reading the book creates the impression that the Azerbaijan Communist Party had been established on the basis of “Hummet.” He explained this by the editors’ extreme liberality toward the authors. As for the events of the first half of 1918, Roslyakov admitted that for him as a reader “it is quite unclear what mistakes were made on the national question. . . . Here something went wrong, perhaps, in the relations with the Dashnaks. (Voices said: ‘You’re right.’) I can only guess this proceeding from what happened in Central Asia when Armenian squads of Dashnaks were formed in the first half of 1918 upon a request of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars under the pretext of provision of assistance to Baku.”102 G. Osmanov from Dagestan, S. Beysembayev from Kazakhstan, M. Mirmulayev from Tajikistan, and others largely maintained Moscow’s position in their speeches. For example, M. Mirmulayev was surprised why the book hadn’t been called Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan like the other Union Republics had done, and voiced his disagreement with the exaggeration of the role of Narimanov and “Hummet.” In his view, the fact that the name of Narimanov was mentioned eleven times on page 29 was a manifestation of the personality cult.103 On the last day of discussions, November 21, Azerbaijani scientists, who had been listening to groundless criticism of a good book for three days, gave a worthy reply to the faultfinders on a highly professional level. G. Shahgeldiyev, M. Vekilov, Huseynov, B. Akhundov, G. Dadashev, and Iskenderov razed to the ground the theses of Valuyev and scientists backing him over all principal matters. They categorically rejected attempts to separate Baku from

Azerbaijan or put a barrier between Baku and Azerbaijan in the issue of capitalism development, revision of the national composition of the industrial proletariat of Baku, and the unfair underestimation of the role and significance of “Hummet” and its leader Narimanov. Academician Huseynov made a scientifically based and at the same time very emotional speech saying: “The speech of Comrade Valuyev caused a relatively stormy reaction at our meeting, and it seems to me that this was with some hidden design. His speech was not well grounded. The speech smelled of hostility towards the co-authors. Comrade Valuyev used expressions and words that could in no way be regarded as friendly, though he noted that Mehtikhan Vekilov was a friend of his. Here I cannot help but recall a saying of Spinoza: ‘God, protect us from our friends, and we’ll cope with our enemies ourselves.’” Further, he accused Valuyev of calling Narimanov, Musabekov, Buniyatzadeh, Sultanov, Efendiyev, and other senior executives of “Hummet” nationalists: “You dare to call the greatest figure of our Party and a fellow of Lenin, Narimanov, a nationalist. I don’t know what to call you.”104 These words were pronounced so convincingly that first Deputy Director of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU, Shatagin, who was speaking next, was forced to return to this question. In defending Valuyev, he noted that “some of the speakers insulted each other, using indecent nicknames impermissible for a scientific discussion. This does not contribute to a practical, truly scientific settlement of the matter, but hinders it. Though Comrade Huseynov, in his speech, expressed the point of view I’m expressing, I’d like to say now, in the field of theory, that in practice his action created the opposite phenomenon, as he in his speech afforded himself impermissible attacks against Comrade Valuyev.” In addition, Professor Shatagin touched upon the question of elucidation of the activity of “Hummet.” “I must say that comrades who spoke here, either those who questioned the correctness of the whole reported material or those who perhaps misunderstood some speakers, defended ‘Hummet,’ though it had nobody to be defended from because none of the speakers attacked ‘Hummet,’ and only stressed that this question had been disclosed uncertainly in the book.” To end disputes the over “Hummet,” Shatagin stated, “I listened to Valuyev, and I don’t remember that he called Narimanov a nationalist.” As a response, voices from the hall noted that such a conclusion came from the tone of Valuyev’s speech. In continuing his speech, Shatagin explained that he was not going to defend Valuyev but that he wanted to speak on another question. “Didn’t Narimanov ever make a mistake? There are spots on the Sun as well. Lenin also sometimes made mistakes and was not afraid of courageously admitting his mistakes. What’s wrong here? What smears the name of Nariman Narimanov?” he asked emotionally.105 Thirty-one people made speeches during four days. Head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA, Kurbanov, made a closing speech. He highly evaluated the work of the meeting and the importance of the book under discussion. Further, he spoke on problems that had caused a discussion. He said, “one of the questions that caused hot debates at the meeting was the question about the Bolshevik organization ‘Hummet,’ since the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan had tried to restore justice for the first time ever, tell the historical truth about ‘Hummet,’ show its activity, and show its great role in a broad historical sense. . . . On the Party’s red banner there is blood of Hummet members as well. . . . It is necessary to issue a

special monograph devoted to the history of ‘Hummet.’106 Kurbanov highly evaluated the scientific content of the analysis of capitalism’s development in Azerbaijan in the speeches of B. Akhundov and G. Dadashev. As for the fact that the book mentioned no common Transcaucasian problems, Kurbanov said it was the fault of not the authors but the Institute of Marxism/Leninism under the CC CPSU. He said, “Isn’t it the responsibility of the head Institute to coordinate the work of its branches? To be frank, I do not want to criticize comrades from the head Institute very much, for they are our rare guests!”107 As for disputes over the title of the book, Kurbanov turned to the speech of M. Mirmulayev, who had noted that was no such party—the Azerbaijani Communist Party—so the book was ought to be titled Essays of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Kurbanov reasonably asked: “But why? What makes Comrade Mirmulayev question the true data everyone is aware of? He can with the same success state that there is no Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, no Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. There is a Communist Party of Azerbaijan. We do not say ‘Azerbaijani Communist Party of the Soviet Union,’ but we say ‘the Azerbaijani Communist Party’. . . . If we agree with Comrade Mirmulayev, it appears that Essays of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan are not possible either.108 As for unfair statements of Mirmulayev and others who had spoken about Narimanov, Kurbanov stressed the following: “I think it would be relevant to stress once again who Narimanov is. In February 1925 the whole Soviet country and the whole people celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the public, political, state, and literary activity of Nariman Narimanov. Comrade Ordzhonikidze wrote of Narimanov as follows: ‘Comrade Narimanov is the most outstanding figure of our Party. Narimanov was the best flag-bearer of our Party, Narimanov is a symbol. . . .’ The work of all institutions of Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union was stopped on the day of Narimanov’s funeral. . . . The ribbon of the wreath laid on Narimanov’s coffin on behalf of the Party CC read: ‘To the Revolutionary leader of nations of the Orient who fought for their full release of imperialism.’ Isn’t the Kyrgyz nation among the number of freed nations of the Orient? [Here there is apparently a mistake in the shorthand record. Evidently, the Tajiks were meant—J. H.] That’s who Narimanov is. Of course, you could have accused us, but you should have accused us not that we had shown Narimanov so vividly, but that we still haven’t created a monumental work of Narimanov so that everyone everywhere could know about this excellent man, who had done so much for the Azerbaijani people and had been a large state figure on the All-Union scale. We admit that this is our shortcoming.” Kurbanov participated in the work of the meeting from its beginning until the end and even chaired the last gathering of the meeting. He discovered that the organizer of a massive attack against the book was a representative of Moscow, Prof. Shatagin. Thus, he noted in his speech as follows: “Comrade Shatagin said that no one had attacked ‘Hummet’; may God let it be so, and Comrade Shatagin noted four questions pertaining to the correct elucidation of the activity of ‘Hummet.’ I must say that he noted that the authors had failed to answer any question correctly or clearly. But what shall we do then? Another thing, I must say, is that the book on the whole and the chapter dealing with ‘Hummet,’ in particular, contain no clear, strict formulations, so let’s fight to improve this situation. But it

would be wrong to allege that the authors failed to answer any of the four questions. At the end of his speech, he (Shatagin) noted that ‘Hummet’ had been one of the departments of the Baku Committee. Why did he mention this? I think he did this to justify the silence that had been observed with respect to ‘Hummet’ until recently. As I understood, some comrades objected. ‘Hummet’ was not a department. In addition, he said that it was needless to speak so much of ‘Hummet’ in such a serious work. I do not want to return to the initial position; in order to spare your time, I just want to tell Comrade Shatagin that it was needless to speak so unprofessionally about ‘Hummet’ at such a serious meeting. . . . Comrade Shatagin, commenting on the speech of Comrade Valuyev, warned us that he was not going to defend Valuyev, but it appeared from his speech that he defended him, so we believe that this is wrong. Here, there is a shorthand record, and which is why comrades won’t accuse me of falsifying a part of the speech where Valuyev called Narimanov a nationalist. The speech of Comrade Huseynov, to which Comrade Shatagin referred, had been, in our view, wellgrounded scientifically. Comrades, how is it possible to agree with Valuyev and defend him in these questions? It is to conclude from Comrade Valuyev’s speech that the authors of the book approach the peasant’s question from the position of socialist revolutionaries? I could never imagine that Comrade Valuyev, head of the chair of the Higher Party School, could address our scientific figures or historians with such a serious accusation. For my part, I condemn this behavior of Comrade Valuyev. How is it possible to assess so unprofessionally such a serious work as History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan? It is quite right that comrades, in their speeches, did not leave such important questions unanswered.”109 On November 22, the participants of the meeting from Moscow and other Republics were received by Mustafayev with V. Akhundov in attendance. Shatagin and head of the sector of the CPSU History of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism A. Lukashev took this opportunity to complain about Kurbanov’s closing speech to the leadership of the Republic. Mustafayev assured them that the CC CPA Bureau would express its weighty utterance after it was acquainted with the materials of the meeting. However, this conflict was not elucidated in a report about the meeting published by the Bakinskiy Rabochiy newspaper on December 30, 1958, and people concerned immediately reported this to the CC CPSU. That was the end of the epic discussion on volume I of History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. But that was not the end of a discussion on key issues that later became one of the points of an accusatory sentence to the Republic’s leadership at the end of the 1950s. On January 16, 1959, Shatagin, A. Lukashev, and senior research officer of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism S. I. Chivadze submitted a detailed report about the results of the Baku meeting to the CC CPSU. They detailed all events and disputes, particularly episodes pertaining to the level of social-economic development of Azerbaijan, the organization “Hummet,” and the activity of Narimanov. They wrote that questions relating to Hummet and to the establishment of the CPA had been stated erroneously and contradictorily at the meeting. The document reads that all Azerbaijani historians praised the book and that separate comrades made erroneous speeches. Particularly, a teacher of the Azerbaijan State University Huseynov, who had been speaking in Azeri (a part of his speech was translated into Russian by

A. Sumbatzadeh), declared that “the book raises the question as follows: Azerbaijan should have unified with either Russia or Iran. But didn’t Azerbaijan have its own, independent way of development?” The authors alleged that many Azerbaijani comrades “were intolerant of Comrade Valuyev’s speech.” And the speech of head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA Kurbanov greatly damaged the meeting. Instead of summarizing the pronounced critical remarks, Kurbanov “decisively spoke against principal, practical criticism of the book, defended the composite authors, and denied any critical remarks.” He said that Valuyev revised the history of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, and made demagogical attacks insulting the Deputy Director of the Tajik branch of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism, Mirmulayev. Such a speech of an official of the CC CPA may harmfully misdirect scientific research and eventually bring about undesirable results.110 Such a turn of events promised nothing good. The Center had already abstained from reformatory attempts or liberal trends at a time when “Communistic” nationalism continued to deepen in the Republics, including Azerbaijan. The Khrushchev-led Soviet leadership launched a crackdown that culminated in the change of the political leadership of a number of Republics in 1959. But compared with the situation in other Republics, nationalism in Azerbaijan was on a broader scale in the 1950s, so the struggle against it was the toughest of all. NOTES 1. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 122. 2. See: Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.). p. 346. 3. Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 4–7.05.1958.// RNHSA, f.2, r.1, v.317, p. 55. 4. Replica Nikita Khrushchev at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 15–19.12.1958.// RNHSA, f.2, r.1, v.344, pp. 80–81. 5. See: William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 407. 6. Pikhoya. Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voiny, 1945–1985, (Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 379–380. 7. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. Moscow: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.). p. 614. 8. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T.1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammi. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 1062–1063. 9. Ibid., p. 384. 10. About the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR. 08.01.1950.// APDPARA, f.1, r.87, v.808, p. 64. 11. From Ibrahimov to Central Committee CPA. 31.12.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.102, p. 96. 12. Personal file of Veli Akhundov.// APDPARA, f.1, r.80, v.177, pp. 5–46. 13. Presidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T.1. Chernovie protokolnie zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 364. 14. On the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR Comr. S. Rahimov. 7.06.1958. //APDPARA, f.1, r.87, v.1350, pp. 45–46. 15. Tsentralniy komitet KPSS, VKP (b), RSDRP (b): Istoriko-biograficheskiy spravochnik. (The Central Committee of the CPSU, the CPSU (b), the RSDWP (b): Historical and Biographical Directory), p. 345. 16. Meeting of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan brown on the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 27.06.1958.//APDPARA, f.1, r.80, v.177, p. 35.

17. Minutes of the meeting of Presidium of Writers Union of Azerbaijan. 16.01.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.608, pp. 7–14. 18. On the report of the Central Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 24.01.1958.//APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.25, pp. 3–19. 19. Shorthand report of XXII Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 28–30.01.1958. //APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.2, pp. 228–231. 20. Ibid., pp. 103–141. 21. Ibid., pp. 272–275. 22. Ibid., pp. 359–365. 23. Ibid., pp. 20–21. 24. Ibid., pp. 86–87. 25. Ibid., pp. 164–165. 26. Ibid., pp. 190–203. 27. On measures for implementation in the Azerbaijan. SSR Regulation CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers on January 4, 1958 “On Abolition of Illiteracy among the Population.” 11.01.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.72, pp. 260–263. 28. On implementation of the Azerbaijan Communist Party decisions. SSR and the Council of Ministers on 11 January 1958 “On Abolition of Illiteracy among the Population.” 29.04.1958.// APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.92, pp. 85–86. 29. On implementation of the Azerbaijan Communist Party decisions. SSR and the Council of Ministers on 11 January 1958 “On Abolition of Illiteracy among the Population.” 19.08.1958.// APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.120, pp. 73–74. 30. From Ibrahimov to CC CPA. 15.01.1958g. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.101, p. 29. 31. Meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee CPA. 10.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.101, pp. 5–13. 32. On orthographic rules of the Azerbaijani language and partial changes in the Azerbaijani alphabet. 10.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.101, p. 1. 33. The decision Bureau of the CC CPA “On the III Congress of Writers of Azerbaijan.» June, 1958 // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.102, p. 55. 34. For more information about Noviy Mir and Literaturnaya Moskva see: Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 169; William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, pp. 337–338. 35. Materials Plenum of Azerbaijan Writers Union. 04.03.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.608, pp. 3–29. 36. Ibid., pp. 198–206. 37. Transcript discussing creativity of Azerbaijani poet Nabi Babayev. 06.05.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.605, pp. 3–8. 38. Materials of Plenum of Azerbaijan Writers’ Union. 04.03.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.608, pp. 233–236. 39. Ibid., pp. 260–265. 40. Meetings Department criticism of Azerbaijan Writers Union. Discussion of the book “History of Azerbaijan literature.” 08.04.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.652, pp. 1–10. 41. Materials Plenum of Azerbaijan Writers’ Union. 16.05.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r.1, v.606, pp. 1–8. 42. M. L. Episkopov, G. A. Episkopova. On some facts of violation of the principle of equality of rights of nations and languages, rights of national minorities in the republics of Transcaucasia. 1958. // RNHSA, f.5, r.31, v.101, pp. 45–46. 43. Transcript of the III Congress of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan. 04–06.12.1958. // SALAAR, f.340, r 1, v.608, pp. 34–71. 44. Ibid., pp. 26–27. 45. Ibid., pp. 153–168. 46. From Kopylov to Mustafayev. Report on the results of agent and operational and investigative work KGB of Azerbaijan SSR in 1958. 22.01.1959. // From archive materials of the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic. 47. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 337. 48. Transcript of the meeting of the republican ideological workers. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, pp. 269–270. 49. From Ibrahimov to CC CP Azerbaijan. Abstract of Fizuli. 02.04.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.78, pp. 86–87. 50. From Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 30.10.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, pp. 147–148. 51. The decision Bureau of the CC CPA “On holding the 400th anniversary of the death of Muhammed Fizuli.” 18.02.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.78, pp. 57–59. 52. The action plan of the Republican Committee of Fizuli. 08.03.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.88, pp. 155–159. 53. The decision Bureau of the CC CPA “On Additional Measures Pertaining to the 400th Anniversary of the Day of Death of Mahammad Fizuli.” 08.04.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.88, p. 144. 54. From Pavlov to Aliyev. 25.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 17. 55. In the diary of Lobanov. Record of a talk with Professor Literature Department of Istanbul University, Ahmed Jaferoglu. 09.05.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.173, pp. 21–25.

56. From Fedorov to MFA USSR. 27.09.1958; From MFA Azerbaijan SSR to CC CP Azerbaijan. 22.10.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.378, pp. 157–158. 57. From Aliyev to Bayramov. 04.03.1958; From Ruhulla Orujev to Huseynzadeh. 28.10.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.378, pp. 194–195. 58. Postanovleniye Byuro TsK KP Azerbaidzhana “O provedenii 400-letiya so dnya smerti Muhammeda Fizuli.” Discussion of Bureau of the CC CPA on the course of preparation of a decision “On holding the 400th anniversary of the death of Muhammed Fizuli. 28.11.1958 // Ibid., v.140, p. 221. 59. List of invitees to the anniversary of Fizuli. 1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.140, pp. 232–237. 60. Ibid., p. 62. 61. Program of events dedicated to the anniversary Fizuli. December, 1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.140, pp. 226–228. 62. On additional measures related to the 400th anniversary of the death of Fizuli. 09.12.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.141, pp. 205–211. 63. Stalin and cosmopolitanism. 1945–1953. Agitprop Documents. Moscow, 2005, pp. 159–165. 64. Dmitriy Shepilov. Neprimknuvshiy (Shepilov D. Unjoined), pp. 99–107. 65. On measures to implement the decision of the Presidium of the May 28, 1958 “Correction of errors in the evaluation of the operas “Great friendship”,” “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” and “From all the Heart.” 19.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.102, pp. 38–39. 66. Minutes of the meeting of composers and musicians of Azerbaijan. 20.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.363, pp. 1–46. 67. From Ibrahimov to Mustafayev and CC CPA. 31.05.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.127, p. 261. 68. From Zahid Khalilov to CC CPA. August, 1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.127, p. 254. 69. From Vekilov to Mustafayev. 10.09.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.127, p. 250. 70. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the publication of the Azerbaijan Soviet Encyclopedia.” 16–17.09.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.137, pp. 228–229. 71. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the President of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan SSR.” 04.03.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.80, p. 237. 72. From Yusif Mamedaliyev to Mustafayev. 23.01.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.71, pp. 197–198. 73. From Mustafayev and Rahimov to Council of Ministers USSR. 23.08.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.90, pp. 89–90. 74. Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPA and the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan “On the status and measures of Oriental Studies in the Azerbaijan SSR.” 10.09.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.90, pp. 12–13, 65–66, 83–84. 75. Decision of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Labour and wages to classify the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences in the category of wages and leading scientists. 27.06.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.250, p. 21. 76. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the publication of scientific and critical text Khamsa N. Ganjevi.” 10.06.1958; From A. Alizadeh to CC CPA. 04.04.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.101, pp. 149–153. 77. From Zahid Khalilov to CC CPA “on the status of the three-volume history of Azerbaijan.” 03.01.1958.; From Aaliovsat Quliyev to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences on the status of the three-volume history of Azerbaijan. 21.12.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.71, pp. 217, 221–226. 78. Nazim Hajiyev. Reference the unsatisfactory implementation of the decision XXI sezda Party of Azerbaijan on the preparations for the publication of the “History of Azerbaijan.” 06.01.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.71, p. 215. 79. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On implementation of decisions of the Bureau Communist Party of Azerbaijan” On preparation for printing textbook on the history of the Azerbaijan SSR on October 18, 1956. 07.01.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.71, p. 209. 80. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “About teaching the history of Azerbaijan at secondary schools and universities of the Azerbaijan SSR.” 01.07.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.112, p. 63. 81. M.Teymurov, A. Idrisoglu. Light penetrating the darkness (in Azeri), Baku, 2006. p. 196. 82. From Okulov to Mustafayev. 12.04.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.378, pp. 244–247. 83. From Alihasan Shahgeldiyev to Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPA A. Bayramov. 30.06.1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.116, p. 115. 84. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On drafting and podgorovke for publication of the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.” 23.11.1956. // APDPARA, f.1, r.43, v.1168, pp. 99–100. 85. Biographical information on Mamed S. Iskenderov. 30.01.1951. // APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.3224, pp. 4–6. 86. Kocharli Tofig. Garabagh: Lie and truth. Baku, 1998 (in Azeri); Its the same.Unforgettable Garabagh. Nakhchivan as Decoration of the World. Baku, 1998 (in Azeri); Its the same. Garabagh. Baku, 2002 (in Azeri); Its the same. Collection of articles. Baku, 2004 (in Azeri). 87. From Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 04.07.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.120, p. 99. 88. From Mustafayev to CC CPSU. 14.08.1957.// APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.118, p. 2.

89. Inventory of copies of the archives, selected representative Azerbaijan Communist Party J. Quliyev Affairs VI Sector of the Central Committee CPSU. 03.09.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.118, pp. 3–5. 90. Note that the name of Lenin. 29.06.1920. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.118, pp. 15–19. 91. In the Politburo: From Ordzhonikidze to Lenin and Stalin. 19–21.11.1921. // APDPARA, f.1, r.44, v.118, pp. 63–76. 92. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. 1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 368. 93. Transcript of the meeting of the republican ideological workers. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, p. 289. 94. Transcript of IX Plenum of the CC Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 07.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.26, pp. 325– 326. 95. Transcript of the meeting of the republican ideological workers. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, p. 259. 96. Meeting to discuss the first book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 18–21.11.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.403, pp. 66–93. 97. Transcript of the meeting of the republican ideological workers. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, p. 255. 98. Ibid., pp. 236–237. 99. Meeting to discuss the first book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 18–21.11.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.403, pp. 78–81. 100. Ibid., pp. 94–97. 101. Transcript of the meeting of the republican ideological workers. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, p. 260. 102. Meeting to discuss the first book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 18–21.11.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.414, pp. 11–16. 103. Ibid., p. 18. 104. Meeting to discuss the first book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 18–21.11.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.416, pp. 67–74. 105. Ibid., pp. 95–104. 106. Ibid., pp. 129–130. 107. Ibid., p. 134. 108. Ibid., p. 137. 109. Ibid., pp. 138–142. 110. From Shatagin, Lukashev and Chivadze to CC CPSU. About the meeting in Baku to discuss the book History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 16.01.1959. // RNHSA, f.5, r.33, v.98, pp. 4–15.

Chapter 8

Summer 1959 Moscow’s Interference and Change of Leadership in Azerbaijan

Serious preparation for the XXI Congress of the CPSU began in the early days of 1959. The whole country discussed theses of Khrushchev’s report “Key Figures of Economic Development of the USSR in 1959–1965” which he was going to make at the Congress. The document was full of great promises of economic development, but the real living standards in the Soviet Union left much to be desired. Holding an extraordinary Congress hastily did not reflect solid political and economic motivation. Rather, it was caused by the desire to hide the failure of the sixth five-year plan whose benchmarks had solemnly been adopted at the XX Congress of the CPSU. A secret document indicating that the country was unable to accomplish key goals of the sixth five-year plan was submitted to the Soviet leadership in autumn of 1958. Public circles still echoed the disclosures made at the XX Congress when the time came to report on the results of the five-year plan. The lack of real achievements in the sphere of economy and the failure of social programs had more than just economic significance for the Soviet leadership. There was also the issue of loss of political authority. In the mid-1950s, it was precisely issues of economic development of the country that drove political collisions in the top powers. The group that held the upper hand in politics faced a real threat of defeat in economics. Having understood that economic disaster was near, Khrushchev and his team, instead of seeking a solution to the situation, suggested discussing longer-term promises, a set of economically unsubstantiated grandiose figures. The government chose the path of strengthening the propaganda of these figures, attaching official character to new promises and taking ideological measures to add some optimism to a society that was sliding into the economic deep. To select delegates to the XXI Congress of the CPSU and discuss key figures of the sevenyear plan of economic development (1959–1965), the extraordinary XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan started its work in Baku on January 8, 1959. Given that not even a year had passed since the XX Congress of the CPA was held in January 1958, this extraordinary Congress’ work was slack; it even finished ahead of schedule. Mustafayev made a report on “Theses of N. S. Khrushchev’s Report to the XXI Congress of the CPSU on Key Figures of Economic Development of the USSR in 1959–1965, and Tasks of Azerbaijan’s Party Organization.” Because the interval between the Congresses wasn’t long, Mustafayev based his speech not upon specific examples but on the current situation in various spheres of social life. As for the

present-day situation, he did not talk about the sixth five-year plan’s economic indicators, which had been propagated for a long time, but spoke only about 1958 results. In particular, he emphasized the growing importance of maize in agriculture, saying: “Maize plays an essential role among the crops in the Republic. In some years past kolkhozes and sovkhozes increased the areas of maize crops and achieved increased productivity per hectare. The area of maize crops increased from 10,500 hectare in 1953 to 109,000 hectare in 1958. Maize should occupy the determinative position in the balance of crops and fodder. Party and Soviet bodies are engaged, to an appropriate extent, in growing maize, in the spirit of Party demands. Any provocative demagogy against maize must be prevented decisively. We will be able to make up for our lag in the sphere of cattle-raising only at the expense of maize.”1 Taubman accurately writes that Khrushchev actually warned about maize mania, praising maize as the “Queen of the fields.”2 Probably for this reason, maize was expected to have great prospects according to the 1959–1965 key figures. The seven-year plan’s directives assumed an increase of areas for maize crops from 109,000 hectare in 1958 to 223,000 hectare in 1965 with the simultaneous increase of maize crops from 51,000 tons to 570,000 tons, and of silage from 525,000 tons to 3 million tons. Some unreal cattle-breeding figures were pronounced; however, the production of meat, butter, and milk per capita since spring 1957 was so ridiculous that at the XXIII Congress no one gave a hint of overcoming America. Mustafayev, strongly criticized at the Plenum by Khrushchev for an increase in the number of cattle on individual farms, pointed out in his report at the congress to Party and Soviet organs the necessity of buying cattle from kolkhoz workers to remove imbalances between the numbers of cattle on kolkhozes and private farms. This erroneous concept, imposed by Khrushchev’s dictate, further led to a crisis in the population’s supply of livestock products. Mustafayev explained the poor development of cattle-breeding farms in the Republic by the insignificant number of CPSU members among workers in this sphere. He said, “Despite repeated instructions by the CC CPA, Party committees in the Republic’s regions do not pay enough attention to the issue of Communists’ involvement in major agricultural activities, particularly cattle-breeding. Out of 70,000 cattle-breeders who work for kolkhoz farms, only 4,435, or less than 6 percent, are Communists.” Compared to other chapters of Mustafayev’s report, the chapter “Communistic Upbringing, People’s Education, Science and Culture Development” seems to be the weakest. Though Mustafayev talked about the “unprecedented progress” that Azerbaijani literature and art had reached, he stated that ideologically, artistically poor works were still being created, and the creativity of some writers, composers, and artists tended not to solve today’s most important tasks, and that the artistic criticism left much to be desired. Further, Mustafayev drew the audience’s attention to the significance of strengthening of the ideological work, which contributes to the political activation of masses, removes remnants of the past from people’s minds and helps unveil the intrigues of bourgeoisie ideology—the vilest enemy of the Soviet system. Ideological work leading to the consolidation of masses toward fulfillment of the seven-year plan’s directives should be carried out on a high level.3 Both Mustafayev’s report and Congress’s decisions were illustrative of trends of “gradual transition toward

Communism.” In the decisions of the XXIII Congress of the CPA, the following is written: “Scientific and research institutions operating in the sphere of public sciences should pay particular attention to the appropriateness of social development and create fundamental works summarizing the Republic’s experience in the building of socialism, and identify and study problems pertaining to the gradual transition toward Communism. Scientific works should be created showing, based on the example of the Azerbaijan SSR, the triumph of the Lenin national policy, unveiling present-day falsifications and lies of bourgeois ideologists, and comprehensively studying today’s social-economic position of the Middle East and Central Asian countries.”4 An extraordinary XXI Congress of the CPSU was opened on January 27, 1959. Khrushchev’s report “About Key Figures of Economic Development of the USSR in 1959–1965” consisted of five parts: great victories of the Soviet people; main tasks of the seven-year plan; the determinant stage of economic competition between socialism and capitalism; the new stage of buildup of Communism; and the Communist Party’s leading role in the Soviet people’s struggle for the victory of Communism. What Khrushchev reported was, as a matter of fact, not a report but a long sweet tale of Communism that would come true if the seven-year plan’s key figures were accomplished by 1965. Yet in the first phrase, Khrushchev noted that the XXI Congress was gathering to consider key figures, so the rise of Communism would be manifested not through life but through achievement of these figures. The idea of socialism’s final victory had theoretically been substantiated in the Soviet Union for more than thirty years, so Khrushchev decided precisely at the XXI Congress that the time had come.5 He proclaimed at the Party Congress that the USSR had completed the “full and final construction of socialism.”6 In fact, refusal from traditional five-year plans and the subsequent transition to the seven-year plan gave Khrushchev the opportunity to put off, to an extent, the date of an inevitable report on the country’s situation. Thus, key figures of the seven-year plan were inaccessibly attractive; theoretical calculations of the victory of Communism seemed alluringly unreal. Now we can say that the XXI extraordinary Congress laid the foundation and the start-up of political and, most importantly, moral degradation of the Soviet society that led to the breakdown of the USSR thirty years later. Mustafayev presided over one of the congress’s meetings, and he made a speech about Azerbaijan’s role in the fulfillment of the seven-year plan’s key figures in another one. He compared the economic indicators of modern Azerbaijan to 1913 and 1920, noting that gross industrial output had increased fourteen times compared to 1913. Naturally, Mustafayev linked this achievement to the leading role of the Communist Party with its Lenin national policy, and voiced his gratitude to the great Russian people who “won the great respect and love of workers worldwide for unselfish fraternal aid.” At this congress, attended by representatives of Communist and Working Parties of seventy-two foreign countries, Mustafayev compared indicators of Azerbaijan’s development with Turkey’s economic indicators. Though the comparison was fully conditional, Mustafayev reported that in 1958 Azerbaijan extracted 1.2 times more iron ore and produced 2.4 times and four times more steel and cement, respectively, than Turkey. Continuing the comparisons, Mustafayev reported that the number of

pupils per 10,000 members of the population was 2,126 in Azerbaijan and less than 1,000 in Turkey. He further stated the following: “Note that 35,500 students study at Azerbaijan’s higher education institutions; the number is equivalent to that of Turkey, though Turkey’s population seven times that of Azerbaijan’s. In Azerbaijan, there are 100 college students per 10,000 people, while the number is only fourteen in Turkey.” Naturally, Turkey was not chosen as a subject for comparison by accident.7 Without a doubt, there were more than enough countries in the Orient more backward than Turkey, compared to which Azerbaijan’s achievements would have been more impressive. Turkey was chosen due to the accusations of nationalism pronounced by Moscow as the processes of national revival in Azerbaijan were underway, especially after the Azerbaijani language was given state status. Reports by Party apparatus and state security bodies added to Khrushchev’s confidence that national-cultural processes in Azerbaijan, transition to the application of state language, and the fondness for historical heritage would lead to the strengthening of Turkey’s influence there. At Party events in Moscow, Party apparatus employees hinted to Mustafayev about this, while Khrushchev spoke of it openly. In addition, Khrushchev himself often made such comparisons, and liked listening to them afterward. During a campaign of combating manifestations of the personality cult, Khrushchev, denying rumors about the strengthening of nationalism in Georgia and even of this country’s desire to unite with Turkey, made a report “About the Personality Cult and Its Consequences” at the XX Congress in which he also gave figures and indicators showing Georgia’s supremacy over Turkey. He said that Turkey’s economic position was pathetic, so why should Georgians unite with it? In 1955, Turkey’s cast iron production was eighteen times less than Georgia’s. Per capita production of electric power in Georgia was nine times greater than in Turkey. According to the 1950 data, 65 percent of Turkey’s population was illiterate; as for women, the figure reached 80 percent. In Georgia there were nineteen higher educational institutions with 39,000 students, that is, an eightfold increase from Turkey, where the population was six times greater than Georgia’s.8 As a delegate of the XX Congress of the CPSU, Mustafayev remembered this comparison well. In addition, in autumn of 1957, as a member of the Political board of the Transcaucasian military district, he was a witness to military preparations against Turkey and anti-Turkish sentiments of government members, particularly Khrushchev. Taking all this into consideration, Mustafayev ended his speech by saying, “Iran and Turkey are our close neighbors. Establishment of good neighborly, friendly relations between us would have benefited primarily Turkey and Iran. However, certain imperialist countries try to make every effort to spoil our interrelations.”9 The XXI Congress ended its work on February 5. Khrushchev’s closing speech was wholly devoted to issues of foreign policy and “disclosure of international imperialism.” A banquet was given in honor of delegates of foreign Communist and Working Parties on February 6. Khrushchev raised his glass to wish these Parties every success in the struggle against imperialism. A great propagandistic campaign began in the country. Having called a Party activists’ meeting on February 16, Mustafayev told them about the decisions of the XXI Congress and tasks of the Azerbaijani Party organization. Naturally, the meeting adopted a resolution approving the documents of the CPSU Congress. Thus, with the Congress’s

decisions as the guideline, the leadership of Azerbaijan and throughout the Union started building a Communist society. However, the materials of the XXI Congress were based only upon ideological pathos, while threats in Khrushchev’s speeches addressing “international imperialism” and heads of foreign states could not stop the processes of moral degradation in the country. Several days after the XXI congress, on February 24, during a meeting with voters of Moscow’s Kalinin district, Khrushchev commented on Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pehlevi’s arrival in the USSR as follows: “When the Iranian Shah arrived in the Soviet Union, we met him with great hospitality as the head of a neighboring state. But he seems to have decided that we respect his personal qualities.”10 In the same speech, as talks about Iran went on, Khrushchev recommended strengthening Soviet intelligence organs. He noted that foreign intelligence kept their eyes open. If we have our vigilance lulled, this will give good chances to our enemy, he said. After Khrushchev’s speech, the KGB sought to infiltrate the entourage of the Shah. His first meeting with his future wife, Farah Diba, in the spring of 1959 in Paris was organized a KGB agent, a person authorized by the Shah to deal with Iranian students in Europe. A close relative of Farah Diba, a Majlis deputy, was also a KGB agent with the alias “Rion.”11 At the same time, at a meeting with Moscow’s voters in February 1959, Khrushchev made a statement concerning state security bodies that drew the whole world’s attention. He noted that the authorities had cut internal forces, including state security organs, and planned to cut them more, but this should be done cleverly to avoid getting into an awkward situation. The process initiated by Khrushchev did not bypass Azerbaijani state security bodies. Following the cuts above, in early 1959 the personnel of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR consisted of 843 staff employees, including 576 sergeants and officers. The cuts in the KGB apparatus, a decrease in the network of agents by almost half, substantially weakened the mechanism of control over the society. This became obvious from annual reports of state security bodies and protocols of repeated meetings of Republic’s Party activists. On January 22, 1959 Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan Kopylov reported to the CC First Secretary Mustafayev on measures taken. He submitted another, slightly different report to the USSR KGB. It may be concluded from these reports that the traditional activities of state security bodies, such as counteracting foreign intelligence, defense of borders, and enhancement of the network of agents since the mid-1950s were supplemented by the struggle with manifestations of nationalism. This was strictly displayed particularly in those Republics where the growth of national self-consciousness strengthened. The 1950s reforms weakened state security bodies as Khrushchev managed to take over KGB organizational structures and put them under Party organs’ control. However, the strengthening of anti-Soviet actions after the XX Congress together with the revival of nationalism again made the work of state security agents quite essential. In turn, KGB organs tried to make use of the rise of anti-Sovietism and nationalism to regain the past authority. A. N. Shelepin, who in 1952–1958 had led the Soviet Komsomol and in April–December 1958 had headed a CC CPSU department responsible for Party organs, was assigned by Khrushchev as the head of the

KGB of the USSR to strengthen the Party’s control of the organization. One of the reasons for this appointment was that anti-Sovietism and nationalism were most often observed among youth. Obviously, reshuffles in the leadership affected both KGB apparatus cadre and its agents. Central apparatus agents, local resident agents, and the whole apparatus were shaken by the reshuffle. In his report, Kopylov noted that the agents had lost political trust, so it became necessary to rid of people who, based on their personal and business qualities, could not help security bodies, and that 454 new agents and twenty new residents were offered for cooperation. As of January 1, 1959, the network consisted of 2,522 agents and 171 residents. The number of agents was cut in half from the previous years. This number included agents operating not only in the Republic but also in Iran and Turkey. In 1958 alone, there were engaged eight agents in Iran, some of whom were sent on fraudulent documents to capitalist countries for espionage purposes. At the same time, out of former Soviet citizens residing in Western Germany, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, forty-five people were recruited in the network of agents; they were likely to be used for espionage in special tasks against Turkey. For the reasons of counterintelligence operations, 359 agents were recruited, and the number of residents reached thirteen. To coordinate the actions, fifty-nine secret addresses were organized. In 1958, 478 people arrived in Azerbaijan from capitalist countries, of whom sixtynine were suspected of espionage. The military attaches of the United States, Canada, and the UK visited Baku in 1958. The suspicious behavior of the attaches and their aides, especially their attempts to penetrate restricted areas, were documented and reported to the KGB of the USSR. In June 1958, a US warplane violated the airspace of the Azerbaijan SSR but was shot down. The protocol of interrogation of the plane’s crew and operative information were submitted to the KGB of the USSR. In 1958 the 4th division of the KGB struggled primarily with manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. The division consisted of 290 agents and seven residents who were provided with forty-two secret addresses. Among the intelligentsia and 60,000 students of fifteen higher education institutions and seventy-five colleges, there were 133 agents and three residents. The “selfless” labor of this group unveiled seventy-three nationalists (Musavatists, Dashnaks, and others) and ninety-two members of various Zionist organizations in the Republic. Seventy-six agents worked exceptionally in this area. In 1958, the authors of 763 leaflets and ninety-five anonymous letters, mostly of nationalistic, anti-Soviet nature, were on wanted lists. The tense work resulted in the identification and arrest of the authors of thirty-four anonymous letters and twenty leaflets.12 State security bodies took young, talented scholars specializing in the sphere of natural sciences under secret patronage, protecting them against undesirable contacts. For example, a talented youngster from the Seyudlyu village of the Gedabey region, candidate of the physicalmathematical sciences, Goshkar Teimur oglu Ahmedli, fell under KGB control in the mid1950s. Fearing that this prominent scholar would fall under the influence of “alien elements,” the KGB established control of the place of his residence at the following address, Verkhnyaya Nagornay Street, blind alley 1, yard 2, by embedding an agent among the blind alley’s

residents. The security bodies especially worried because Abdulla Shaig Talybzadeh, an old Musavat member, lived opposite that place. Thus, not only Ahmedli himself but also his younger brothers Shamil, Jamil, and sister Huru were put under control. In the mid-1950s a rise of nationalistic sentiments was also observed at the Caspian Shipping Company. The written correspondence of suspect machinists, Ibadov and Islamov, was taken under control. Leaflets and letters of nationalistic content were identified among the inspected correspondence. It became clear from the text of the letters and leaflets that a group of young Azerbaijanis had created an organization “Liberation of the Nation” with the aim to create “a new independent Azerbaijan republic” and secede from the USSR. According to security bodies’ observations, young people grouped around the idea of “a new Azerbaijan republic” and held anti-Soviet-nationalistic talks, expressed displeasure over the position Azerbaijan was in, called Azerbaijan a colony of Russia, and declared the lack of rights and freedoms of the Republic’s indigenous population. As a result of a search carried out at a hostel under pretence, in Ibadov’s room appeals to the nation were detected explaining the aims and tasks of the organization “Liberation of the Nation” and calling for the nation to fight against Soviet expansionism. Meeting minutes and other documentation were also found. The investigation and the documents discovered made it clear that one more nationalistic organization also existed, led by Yashar Mamedov. There were many people under investigation in connection with the operation of these organizations; however, only three active participants were convicted.13 A group of young people with nationalistic sentiments was under operative search in 1959. The operation was carried out under the code name “Dregs.” Analysis of the materials of the case showed that a youth organization led by a twenty-six-year-old with no vital experience could not be the sole inspirer of bourgeois nationalism and its ideology. Investigators asked themselves: where could these young people have been taught nationalism? The investigation identified no potential instigators; the Soviet school that had taught them and the Soviet Komsomol that had brought them up could not have taught them nationalism. The question arose from where how nationalistic nonsense could penetrate the minds of these young people. It seemed that this was “the direct result of ideological influence of still unveiled remnants of nationalistic elements upon the unstable part of the youth. The remaining nationalists masked their true faces more thoroughly, changed their tune to a patriotic one, adapted to new conditions, improved their working methods, and applied deeper tactics. A series of measures to expand the rights of Union Republics have been taken in the past years. In connection to this, some institutions have started oppressing representatives of other nationalities; preference appeared toward so-called national cadre; and voices are heard demanding to deal only with national problems at the Republic’s scientific institutions. Who knows, maybe it is the nationalistic element that purposefully distorted the policy of Party and Government.” For example, there a story was reported of one scientist, head of a department of an institute of the Academy of Sciences, who was under security bodies’ “cover.” In this scientist’s view, only Azerbaijanis should deal with scientific problems pertaining to Azerbaijan because Russians and scientists of other nationalities had insufficient knowledge of these local issues. A

preliminary examination of the matter shows that he implanted anti-Russian sentiments, pursuing a policy of national restraint under the pretexts of scientific discussion with Russian scholars. The scientist assumed no nationalistic statements but pursued the policy of national limitation. Thus, as suggested by state security agents, “in connection with a change in the tactics of nationalists, state security bodies should also change the methods of fighting against them.”14 A meeting of leaders and operative agents of the KGB of Azerbaijan was held on May 30, 1959. Attendees were Mustafayev, first Deputy Chairman of the USSR KGB General-Major P. I. Grigoryev, First Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee T. Allahverdiyev, Republic’s Prosecutor A. Babayev, and Chairman of the Supreme Court S. Musayev. The meeting was devoted to the results of a recent All-Union meeting of security bodies. Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan Kopylov made a long speech. Along with problems raised in a report made by Chairman of the USSR KGB Shelepin, Kopylov detailed specific tasks the Azerbaijani security bodies faced. It became evident that the struggle with manifestations of nationalism was made largely the responsibility of not central but local KGB bodies, which now had their powers substantially expanded. Referring to Shelepin’s instructions, Kopylov reported that the United States had recently strengthened intelligence work against the USSR and that spies were embedded in groups of American tourists for this purpose. Thus, Kopylov gave an order to secure the places frequented by tourists, including parks, theaters, restaurants, and other public places. In addition, Kopylov demanded security officers leaving for trips abroad as members of Soviet groups to be vigilant, not yield to provocations or blackmail by foreign intelligence, and protect our citizens’ “security.” As for the number of agents working with intelligentsia and students, Kopylov said the number was sufficient but claimed that their distribution and the rationality of their use were not appropriate.15 The All-Union meeting held in early 1959 was Shelepin’s first meeting with high-ranking officials and operative officers of the KGB. A bit later, on June 15, 1959, he signed order #00225 to strengthen attention to the prophylactic work with Soviet citizens, establish close contacts with public organizations and broad layers of the population, provide for growth of tolerance in the KGB work while simultaneously keeping conspiracy rules in mind, and reform the methods of work of security bodies by removing rough, cruel manners inappropriate for the Soviet society.16 In discussions of this order at the KGB of Azerbaijan, the growth of nationalistic sentiments in the Republic was stressed, and facts were cited about performance of religious rituals. For example, Chairman of the KGB of Nakhchivan, M. Alizadeh, noted that in the Julfa region of the Autonomous Republic, M. Gasymov, who was chairman of a kolkhoz, a plenary member of the Party regional committee, and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic, took a kolkhoz car to drive his family and relatives to worship at the Asaf-Kafa sanctuary. Head of the department of KGB of the Mountainous Garabagh of the Azerbaijan SSR, V. Abramov, stressed that nationalism and anti-Sovietism were manifested in surrounding areas more frequently than in Mountainous Garabagh. For instance, in the Lachin region, a certain Agali Hasan oglu Najafov allowed himself to make anti-Soviet statements. Operative work revealed that Najafov listened to radio broadcasts from America, Turkey, and

other capitalist states. Another example was that a hospital physician in the Shusha region, Beyukkishi Mukhtar oglu Amirov, “slandered” the leaders of the Party and Government in his talks. Chief of the 5th Department of the KGB, M. Hamidov, noted that cases of corruption were spread among law enforcers as well, especially in cases when leaders of organizations were hiring employees. People were already sure that it was completely impossible to find a job without paying a bribe. The heads of some departments acknowledged that they had already lost four years in hunting for a group spreading anti-Soviet/nationalistic leaflets. In Azerbaijan and Georgia, this group had already spread 3,000 leaflets calling for an overthrow of Soviet power. Numerous assessments in Baku, Tbilisi, and Moscow had provided definite understanding of the age, education, and nationality of the author of the leaflets; however, he hadn’t yet been seized. Experienced security officers concluded that this group worked under the guidance of American intelligence. In his speech at a meeting, the new Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan, Alexandr Kardashov, touched upon a series of urgent problems proceeding from Shelepin’s order. First, Azerbaijan is located in the USSR frontier zone, so the Republic’s security bodies permanently stand face to face with the enemy’s intelligence. He explained that there were Azerbaijanis residing in Iran who had relatives in Soviet Azerbaijan. Without a doubt, the hostile intelligence was using them against the USSR. At the same time, Kardashov noted that in Azerbaijan there were many citizens with relatives in Turkey and Iran. Thus, those opportunities must be used. As for the work with emigrants, this sphere of operation of Soviet security officers was virgin territory because no one had so far done serious work in that area. Work abroad must be carried out so that common emigrants are no longer subordinated by their leaders and create progressive emigrants’ organizations, thus representing a threat not to us but to the government of the country of their residence. Our operative workers, upon their return from Sweden and Austria, reported that the homeland continues to remain the homeland in emigrants’ eyes. Regarding manifestations of nationalism, Kardashov stated that in some cases this was the result of misinterpretation of the national policy of the state, and that in other cases it occurred as some nearsighted leaders made mistakes in their work, thus allowing other immature people to inflame nationalistic passions and contribute to the appearance of nationalistic sentiments. He continued to say that state security bodies had recently been notified that nationalism was growing stronger; the information proved that the national policy was being misinterpreted. To put an end to these distortions, Kardashov considered it necessary to strengthen and improve the work of agents among the intelligentsia and students. Ending his speech with criticism of the Republic’s security bodies, he gave a warning that their work was being carried out poorly. Anti-Soviet leaflets were glued onto the walls of the House of Government in downtown Baku twice or thrice, but the criminal had not yet been identified.17 After Kardashov was appointed as Chairman of the KGB, control over creative unions, associations of intelligentsia, and even repertoires of theaters—everything that may represent national ideas—was tightened. Upon his instruction, Atif Zeinally’s play Nest of Mysteries, which had been staged at the J. Jabarly Dramatic Theater of Kirovabad, was removed from the repertoire. A nine-page negative notice was given about the play. When sending the notice to

the CC CPA, Kardashov wrote in the cover letter: “In our opinion, further staging of the play in the Republic’s theaters is inexpedient.”18 Some reports reflected the cases of contacts between Azerbaijani citizens and foreign delegations when Azerbaijanis complained about their living standards. For instance, citizen Zaki Saleh oglu Mamedzadeh, while at the Intourist Hotel, complained to an American about his living standards and material position. Of the 600 rubles he earned as wages, he paid 400 rubles as rent for an apartment. Mamedzadeh gave the American his address to allow him personally make sure that there were problems. The American took the address but noted that this matter had to be settled by the USSR government, not an American delegation. This case was reported directly to the Secretary of the CC CPA, V. Akhundov. Kardashov noted that Mamedzadeh’s actions caused Americans to propose that he leave the USSR, and entrance to the United States of America was open. It’s interesting that such a noisy case which received such a broad response on top levels ended quite amicably. When interrogated at the KGB, Mamedzadeh stated that the Soviet Union was his homeland, so he promised not to do such actions in the future. With these words, he was released without any negative consequences to him.19 Apart from tightening measures against nationalists, at the end of the 1950s security officers opened another front in their struggle, this time with dandies (stilyagi). There appeared so many dandies in Baku that even countrywide meetings of the KGB considered this phenomenon a threat to state security because the youth, with their fondness for fashionable dress, fell under the influence of the bourgeois lifestyle. As noted at the republican meeting of the operative staff of the KGB, special departments of the Baku anti-aircraft defense district and the 4th Army, as well as intelligence officers of the Azerbaijani Frontier District and security bodies, needed to take urgent measures to eliminate the bad influence of young people who, with their appearance and pro-Western manners, tried to divide the Soviet youth. Speaking at the meeting, security officers claimed that dandies (stilyagi) represented total spiritual emptiness, hankering after the worst parts of American lifestyle. The Soviet media called them “loafers,” “parasites,” and stilyagi (style-apers).20 Zubok wrote that “jazz concerts sparked enormous curiosity among the public, since Soviet ideologists had for years treated jazz as ‘enemy art,’ a tool of the United States in the Cold War.”21 They claimed that those behaving like dandies represented the worst form of servility to foreigners, which, as Khrushchev noted, was one of the forms of the struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat. Most ardent dandies should be identified and unveiled, and so should the places of their open and secret meetings; the media, Komsomol, and other organizations should be used to help create public opinion around them and bring them to accountability. Specific measures were drafted, but then were not approved by some senior executives.22 Further examination showed that the majority of Baku dandies were descendants of senior officials. Another problem—adoption of the law by a session of the Supreme Soviet on compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language in schools teaching in the Russian language—came into the focus of attention at the end of the 1950s. Yet in June 1958, the Presidium of the CC CPSU discussed the question “On the System of Popular Education in the USSR.” While making a

report on this topic, Khrushchev launched long-term experiments. He noted that there were many talks around the system of education, so whether this system was efficient was under question. Khrushchev alleged that Party and Soviet organizations involved in the sphere of education, the leaderships of Union Republics, and parents of pupils all noted that the existing system of education was unsatisfactory. He reported the same at the XIII Congress of Komsomols; however, his main idea and incentives were disclosed in the report to the Presidium. According to Khrushchev, the trouble with the secondary school is that it inherited too much from the pre-Revolution gymnasium system of education that had provided scattered knowledge. At the time, the state and the school were not interested the futures of graduates. While in the first years after the Revolution popular education organizers did pay attention to labor training, Stalin’s decisions in 1931–1935 returned to programs of classical gymnasium education, as a result of which the school put aside production activity and became an institution giving only academic knowledge. The steps that had once been taken were now causing mistrust. In Khrushchev’s opinion, the school should not only prepare the youth to enter higher education institutions but also perform the function of preparing them for life. There was now a situation in which graduates of secondary schools decided on their further destiny only upon entering a university or college. Those with tenth-grade education didn’t want to work at plants, factories, kolkhozes, or sovkhozes; some of them even considered such work as something insulting to them. Such an inappropriate, aristocratic attitude to physical labor is ridiculous. If a boy or a girl learns poorly at school, their parents and milieu would scare them by telling them that, for instance, if you don’t receive the gold medal or the silver medal or fail to enter the higher education institution, you will have to work as a common worker at a factory. Physical labor had become a scarecrow for the youth, not to mention that such opinions insult the builders of the socialist society.23 Khrushchev’s concept was as follows: in towns there should be trained workers; in villages there should be kolkhoz workers. On June 12, the CC CPSU Presidium decided to consider the questions raised by Khrushchev in a report “On the System of Popular Education in the USSR” as timely. The text of the report was distributed among CC members and candidates, the Communist Parties of Union Republics, and Party regional, district, and city committees. In addition, it was decided to hold a broad discussion of this question at the upcoming autumn Plenum of the CC.24 On June 24, the CC CPSU Presidium made a decision “On the System of Popular Education in the USSR,” under which the CC CPA, for reasons of comprehensive examination and subsequent realization of Moscow-dictated ideas, established a commission led by Bayramov and consisting of O. Sultanov, M. Mamedov, M. Poladov, D. Yusifov, R. Rajabov, V. Kurdyumov, V. Titarenko, A. Annagiyev, and A. Ibrahimov. The commission was instructed to explore the opportunity of reorganization of the system of popular education in the USSR and submit its proposals to the CC CPA Bureau.25 On September 9, the Bureau approved the commission’s proposals, readdressed them to the CC CPSU, and expressed its full consent with Khrushchev’s incentives on reorganization of the system of popular education. The traditional August meeting of teachers in 1958 was wholly devoted to a new directive document. As recommended by the CC Bureau, questions about education of schoolchildren, improvement of labor discipline, and

strengthening of the ideological-political work among pupils were discussed. At the same time, significant attention was paid to the startup of teaching the history of Azerbaijan and to new changes in the orthography of the Azerbaijani language.26 Khrushchev’s ideas pertaining to reorganization of the system of popular education were broadly discussed at the November (1958) Plenum of the CC CPSU. As the second issue of the Plenum’s agenda, the question “Strengthening of School’s Links to Life, and Prospects of Development of the System of Popular Education in the Country” announced significant changes in the system of education. The theses of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR again raised the question of the language of instruction at secondary schools throughout the Soviet Union that was made fully dependent on the will of parents of pupils. Parents were authorized to choose a language of teaching for their children. If a pupil attended a school with a national language of instruction, he also had to study the Russian language, in accordance with the common rule. If he attended a Russian-language school he could study the language of the indigenous nation of a Union Republic upon his own discretion or upon the discretion of his parents. As noted by the theses, this statement of the question was more democratic, since it made administration methods a matter of second importance and prevented pupils from getting overworked. But in reality, this approach caused serious problems for national languages, as it fixed the dominant position of the Russian language. Along with that, the leadership of the Republic tried to benefit as much as possible from the Center’s discussions and talks about reorganization of the system of popular education. To upgrade the quality of education in the Azerbaijani and Russian languages, on March 18, 1958 the CC CPA Bureau made a decision to open preparatory classes for the children of Avars, Lezghins, Tats, Talyshs, and other nationalities. Education Minister M. Mamedov appealed to Mustafayev with a request in October 1957. He wrote that there were schoolchildren attending the Republic’s schools and studying in the Azerbaijani and Russian languages for whom these languages were not native (Avars, Lezghins, Tats, Talyshs, and others) Naturally, they have plenty of problems in the process of studying. To eliminate these problems, it is essential to arrange preparatory classes for such children upon the discretion of their parents. With this in mind, the Education Ministry requests permission to open preparatory classes for the children of Lezghins, Kurds, Talyshs, Avars, Tats, and Mountain Jews. Proceeding from the Minister’s request, the CC CPA gave an instruction to open preparatory classes in the Azerbaijani and Russian languages for children of other nationalities starting from the 1958–1959 academic year. Children over six were allowed to enter preparatory classes.27 The wave of permissible nationalism raised at the end of the Great Patriotic War allowed Azerbaijan’s neighboring republics with strong positions in Moscow to start providing ideological and in some cases practical pressure against Azerbaijan. For example, a number of schools in regions bordering Georgia started teaching in the Georgian language, which caused protests of the local population. In August 1958 the residents of the Ititala village of the Belokan region raised the question of restoration of teaching in the Azerbaijani language at a school where teaching in the Georgian language had been introduced in 1944 without the knowledge of parents. They declared that the native language of the population of the village

was not Georgian but Ingiloyan, which is closer to the Azerbaijani language, thus their children faced hardships and were forced to attend schools in nearby villages. Chairman of the executive committee of the Belokan region, F. Efendiyev, sent a letter to Mustafayev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Akhundov on August 25 requesting them to take the desire of the population of Ititala into consideration.28 To check on the facts above, in line with Mustafayev’s instruction, the following commission was sent on a mission to the Belokan region: Deputy Minister of Education A. Aslanov, Instructor of the CC Department for science and schools M. Huseynov, and referent of the culture department of the Council of Ministers M. Mirzaliyev. The commission reported the following to Akhundov: “Jointly with the chairman of the Executive committee Efendiyev and Secretary of the Party regional committee Dibirov, we held a conversation with teachers of a local school and found out that lessons in this school had been taught in the Azerbaijani language before 1944. In 1944, lessons started being taught in Georgian without the knowledge of parents. On September 28, at a joint meeting of parents and teachers with the participation of the Baku commission and the leaders of the region, the question of the language of instruction in this school was discussed. In their speeches, parents said their children did not know Georgian because their native language was Ingiloyan, which is closer to Azeri. All economic and cultural correspondence in the village is in Azeri. Because of the poor knowledge of Georgian, graduates of this school cannot enter higher education institutions in either Azerbaijan or Georgia.” The commission noted that the language of local residents resembled Azeri, that the children were forced to attend school in nearby Azerbaijani villages, and that the parents asked to introduce the subject of the Azerbaijani language in first through fourth grades and open a preparatory class in the Azerbaijani language. Members of the commission regarded this as expedient.29 Proceeding from this inquiry, deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan M. Mamedov submitted a request to the CC to restore the teaching in Azeri in the first through fourth grades of the Ititala school and open a preparatory class for first graders in the following year.30 On October 14, 1958, the CC CPA Bureau instructed the Ministry of Education to provide for the transition to the Azerbaijani language of instruction in this village.31 In early 1959, CC CPSU theses were published on strengthening the link between school and life. The document made it possible to sort out the question of teaching Azeri in Russianlanguage schools of the Republic. Since the mid-1950s it was left to the full discretion of a pupil or his parents to decide whether to attend the Azerbaijani language lessons. As a rule, Azerbaijanis who studied at Russian schools were eager to study their native language, so they remained in the class while the rest went home. Given that, as of early 1959, the number of pupils of Baku Russian-language schools was 96,893, of whom 46,115 were Russians or Russian-speaking pupils, it is easy to imagine that only half of each class attended Azerbaijani language lessons. The situation became so ugly that teachers simply declared: “Azerbaijanis should stay, the rest should go.”32 Proceeding from local conditions, the leadership of Azerbaijan decided to amend the CC CPSU theses. First of all, the CC CPA department for science and schools was instructed to examine the abnormal situation and draft a new bill by the date of the March session of the

Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. The bill’s Article 11 read that teaching the Russian language in Azerbaijani-language schools and the Azerbaijani language in Russian-language schools is compulsory. The draft was submitted to the Ministry of Education of the USSR, which, after a series of critical remarks concerning Article 11, re-addressed it to the CC CPSU. In turn, Article 11 was adapted to the CC CPSUs’ 19th thesis and returned to Baku. Even Andreyev of the CC CPSU called the CC CPA and recommended that it not rush in this matter because the Russian Federation would discuss the question; most likely, all of the documentation would pass through all instances and it would then become easier for Azerbaijan to find a true solution to the situation.33 At first Mustafayev agreed with the recommendation, but on the eve of the session, having talked with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet I. Abdullayev, he demanded to discuss the question at the session. On these same days, March 16–17, the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR adopted a Law “On Strengthening the Link between School and Life, and Further Development of Popular Education in the Latvian SSR” with the text of the law published by the newspaper Soviet Latvia on March 20. Latvians went furthest of all, having decided to teach three languages in school: Latvian, Russian, and a foreign language. This added to the Azerbaijani leadership’s confidence that the language problem could be solved in a similar way. A session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR began its work on March 25, 1959. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan Akhundov delivered a long speech “On Strengthening the Link between School and Life, and Further Development of Popular Education in the Azerbaijan SSR.” In his report, he particularly noted: “In our schools, apart from the Russian language, pupils study the Azerbaijani language. The study of this subject not only proves the sense of brotherhood and friendship among Soviet nations but also is of great practical significance. The majority of pupils of Russian-language schools were born in Azerbaijan; after they graduate from schools they will follow the example of their parents to work in various branches of the Azerbaijani economy. Thus it is extremely essential for them to be proficient in Azeri as a means of communication. Therefore, the educational plans provide for Azerbaijani language teaching in Russian-language schools.”34 After Akhundov’s speech, a group of Bureau members led by Mustafayev gathered together in Abdullayev’s study and discussed the question again. Mustafayev, Abdullayev, and Akhundov reconfirmed that in our conditions teaching the Azerbaijani language and the Russian language on a voluntary basis was inadmissible, so both languages should be taught compulsorily, on legal grounds. Having ended the discussion, they decided to adapt an appropriate Article of the Latvian law to the conditions of Azerbaijan, with no foreign language introduced, and only two languages to be taught. In the second half of the same day a session of the Supreme Soviet adopted a law “On Strengthening the Link between School and Life, and Further Development of Popular Education in the Azerbaijan SSR.” Article 11 legalized the compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language in Russian-language schools and the Russian language in Azerbaijanilanguage schools. The law noted: “To determine that lessons in schools of the Azerbaijan SSR are carried out in the native language, parents are authorized to choose a language of study. The Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR is instructed to take measures to provide the

necessary conditions for the teaching of the Azerbaijani, Russian, and foreign languages.”35 A bit later, on April 15, 1959, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a similar law within the framework of the CC CPSU theses. The adoption of a law that introduced compulsory teaching of Azeri in Russian-language schools caused apparent anxiety in the Republic, especially among Baku’s Russian-speaking population, including Armenians. They showered anonymous letters to Moscow accusing the leadership of the Republic of nationalism. Sometimes these letters were written on behalf of non-Azerbaijani pupils and assumed expressions insulting Azerbaijanis. In terms of level and style, these letters addressing Khrushchev differed from school compositions. These letters accentuated the historical mission of the Russians in Azerbaijan and noted that the wave of nationalism in the Republic was becoming dangerous. All the letters ended with the same demand for Khrushchev and Soviet leadership to interfere and to take radical measures.36 Of course, Moscow was aware of this. The problem of Mountainous Garabagh and Nakhchivan that reemerged at the end of the 1950s and sometimes carried legal weight was directly linked to the development of nationalism and the strengthening of national awakening in Azerbaijan. In line with the Center’s interests, “the demands for Garabagh,” claims for the lands of Nakhchivan were artificially openly debated in Armenia where, in addition, antiTurkic sentiments were being inflamed. Even the Armenian Catholicos Vazgen I, in a conversation with the Azerbaijani leadership on his visit to Baku in 1958, talked about Mountainous Garabagh’s transition to Armenia, the opening of an Armenian theological seminary in Baku, permission for the Baku-based Armenian Church’s bell to ring in the morning, and so on. However, he was refused on all the questions he had raised.37 The law the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted in March 1959 was the last straw that exhausted Moscow’s patience. After all the Union Republics in March–April had adopted the laws on strengthening the link between school and life, it was found out that only in two Republics—Azerbaijan and Latvia—the law did not correspond to the CC CPSU’s 19th thesis. The Central leadership, seriously concerned over this, sent large commissions of CC CPSU officials to the both Republics. The commission to Latvia was led by N. Muhitdinov, while the commission to Azerbaijan was led by deputy head of the CC CPSU department for work with Party organs, General-Colonel I. Shikin. The commission that arrived in Azerbaijan consisted of twenty-six people. In accordance with the request of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, employees responsible for different departments of the Central Committee were included in the composition of the commission, including V. Snastin, Y. Polenov, A. Pavlyukov, N. Kuzin, A. Sennikov, P. Kuznetsov, A. Yudenkov, B. Semyonov, P. Lebedov, I. Krichenko, and others, as well as Shikin. It sought to find out everything ranging from the Republic’s economic life to ideological work, the shortcomings in carrying out the Party’s policy on the national question, serious violations of party principles in the selection and nomination of leading cadres, and school construction. It even investigated minutes from separate meetings. The investigation took a long time. The commission was particularly interested in questions relating to the August 1956 adoption of a law on state language and its

application; “distortions” in the writing of the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan; non-Azerbaijanis’ appeals to Moscow in connection with the strengthening of nationalism in Azerbaijan; and the law on compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language in Russianlanguage schools passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1959. The commission kept all its remarks secret from the leadership of Azerbaijan and discussed no questions. Until the discussions began in Moscow at the end of June and beginning of July 1959, no one in the Republic was aware of the results of the commission’s work; no one knew what the question would be about and what specific matters would be touched on. But it was clear than nothing good was expected to occur. As a result of a similar investigation in Uzbekistan in March 1959, First Secretary of the CC of Uzbekistan Sabir Kamalov had left his post. Everything began after information about alarming circumstances at the CC CPU Bureau was obtained in early 1959. To examine the situation, head of the department for food industry and household goods, L. I. Lubennikov, and first deputy chairman of the CC CPSU department for work with Party organs of Union Republics, P. F. Pigalov, were sent on a mission to Uzbekistan. On March 3 they submitted the results of the examination they had carried out to the CC CPSU Presidium. A Plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CPU) was called up to discuss an organizational question, so the CC CPSU officials arrived in Tashkent again. On March 14, Kamalov was dismissed from the post of First Secretary of the CC CPU and from his membership of the CC Bureau for the serious mistakes he had made. Sharaf Rashidov was elected the First Secretary.38 Thus, the Republic’s leadership decided to take a series of preventive measures. As the only solution to the situation, it was decided to sacrifice Ibrahimov as the initiator of the law on the state language. In January 1958, Ibrahimov was freed from the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet but remained a member of the CC CPA and CC CPSU Revision Commission. Thus, Ibrahimov became the main target of criticism at the CC CPA VIII Plenum on June 16, 1959. Chairing the Plenum, Mustafayev reported that apart from CC CPA and Revision Commission members and candidates, members of the CA, secretaries of regional, city, and district Party committees, chairmen of district executive committees, city executive committees, and regional executive committees, as well as heads of propaganda or political enlightenment departments, a total of 741 people were invited to attend the event. The agenda included the following issue: the tasks of Azerbaijan’s Party organization in connection with a CC CPSU resolution “On State and Measures of Improvement of Mass-Political Work among Workers of Stalin District.” Mustafayev gave the floor to CC CPA Secretary Abdullah Bayramov who, after having stated many common words, noted the most important thing: “Individual communists are allowing themselves to disregard the opinions of the Republic’s Party organization, acting against the will of its Central Committee. . . . Suffice it to mention the following unprecedented example. Many of you, perhaps, remember an article by Comrade Ibrahimov Mira titled “The Azerbaijani Language at State Institutions” published by the Communist newspaper in autumn 1956. This article was published without the knowledge of the CC CPA Bureau, though Comrade Ibrahimov was a member of the CC Bureau at the time. On March 16, 1957 at a meeting of the CC Bureau all its members admitted that the appearance of this article in the

press was wrong. What conclusion did Comrade Ibrahimov make of this discussion? The conclusions he made, frankly speaking, are apparently of non-Party character, indicative of at least inadmissible indiscipline of Comrade Ibrahimov. Comrade Ibrahimov included this same article, together with the three other articles on the language question he wrote in 1943–1945, in the almanac and, again without the knowledge of the CC CPA, used his position to issue it as a separate brochure in mass copies through the Academy of Sciences’ printing house three months after the talk on this topic at the CC Bureau. . . . A series of formulations of this article are deeply erroneous, so publication of these articles greatly damages the upbringing of our workers and youth.”39 At the end of his speech, Bayramov gave an instruction to strengthen exactingness on cadre, not to make concessions to anyone, and to observe the Party discipline. After the speech, other questions were put aside while CC members, Ministers, and others started criticizing Ibrahimov. Naturally, Ibrahimov understood that the organizer of this bashing session was Mustafayev. Thus, Ibrahimov built his retaliatory speech upon criticism of intolerable methods of work of Mustafayev himself and alleged that Mustafayev was responsible for all the mistakes committed in the Republic in the sphere of industry, agriculture, and, particularly, ideology. He stressed, “Comrade Shikin arrived here in 1954, at the very breakthrough period of our Party organization. I was twice or thrice called to the CC, where they asked me repeatedly who could be appointed as CC secretary, and I was one of those who named Comrade Mustafayev. I was convinced that this is a cultural, energetic Comrade and that the shortcomings of his character would disappear in the process of his work as a result of great responsibility. But what happened? It’s happened that the shortcomings of his character still exist and that he dislikes criticism. Party members have told me that if I cross him I will be his enemy until I die, and that if I want to flee the Republic, that’s another thing, that I should find myself another job and then leave. But I’m not going to leave for anywhere. I’m a writer, and I left the high post by myself; comrades witness that initially I twice refused the post they offered me. I’m fond of my profession and labor, and I think that this labor gives me enough room to faithfully serve my nation.”40 Further, Ibrahimov turned to the question about language. He noted that when he worked at the Supreme Soviet he had daily received twenty to forty people and many letters; people complained about a disdainful attitude to the Azerbaijani language. It was essential to act against this. “I could also turn a blind eye to this, because the situation was very good then and I could also say nothing. But it was necessary to liquidate such a disgrace, to act against a situation when an Azerbaijani worker submits a holiday request but a female accountant shouts at him: ‘I don’t understand your French!’ It was essential for us to intervene, to act against such things, because otherwise words of teaching internationalism were only empty words, rhetoric. . . . In these principal matters I made not a single step without with the agreement of the CC Bureau and Comrade Mustafayev personally. But he displayed duality I couldn’t understand. The question of application of the Azerbaijani language at some Ministries was prepared upon his consent to be examined at the Presidium. However, Comrade Mustafayev was absent on the day of discussion. I asked Salman Jafarov to phone Comrade Mustafayev to tell him that the Presidium was beginning, but he replied that he was ill. However, he recovered the next day.

Then I came to the conclusion that his line was not strict. Even concerning my article, he had said: well, this article could be either written or not written. Then I was under the impression that Comrade Mustafayev’s position was certainly dual and thus prevented employees from patterning their behavior correctly.”41 Further, Ibrahimov accused Bayramov of power abuses. He said, “Comrade Bayramov! You reproach me that I used my position. . . . Aren’t you remorseful? My book appeared two years ago. You were the CC Secretary when I occupied a certain post; you could have criticized me then and told me about my shortcomings, told me that the president had used his position. This would have taught me and others a lesson, and I would have been glad, but you are talking about this now when I’ve lost my high position.” Ibrahimov was followed by Minister of Culture Kurbanov, who said that Ibrahimov should make conclusions on the criticism pronounced in this hall and acknowledge his mistakes in a repeated speech at the Plenum. He noted, “When Comrade Ibrahimov was in office and raised the question of the Azerbaijani language, he made a lot of mistakes in the ways and forms of realizing this affair. None of us is against our people, our nation, or our republic. If Mirza Ibrahimov grew up on the other side of the Arax and reached such a position, I grew up on this side of the Arax, in the conditions of the Soviet power, and also reached a certain position . . . and I love my nation and I serve my nation. But the way Ibrahimov works makes it impossible to serve the nation. After the law announcing the Azerbaijani language as the state language was adopted, Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov hastily sent his men to Ministries to check on how translations into Azeri were carried out there. . . . The results of this investigation were discussed at the meeting of the Presidium. Comrades from the Ministries gave their opinions. I said that it was wrong to rush through this issue with such cursory methods, because this is a very deep political question that needs to be thought out thoroughly. Comrade Samedov, a member of the CC, spoke at this meeting. He and I noted that such talks made a very bad impression and that some elements, infected with the spirit of nationalism, use this and thus risk causing displeasure. Chairperson of the Republic’s Trade Union of Workers of Culture, Comrade Seyidova, is present here. She told me that when someone speaks at a meeting in Russian, some of our musicians interrupt him and prevent him from speaking. That’s why I told the Presidium that some comrades behaved very badly in this area. But Mirza Ibrahimov interrupted me and told me that if I disliked this, I could go wherever I wanted. . . . I’ve cited this example to show that the policy Mirza Ibrahimov pursued in the question of the Azerbaijani language was erroneous. As a result of this policy, to be frank, they started doubting whether the national policy in Azerbaijan was pursued correctly. Now this is spoken about elsewhere.”42 Ending his speech, Kurbanov asked the Plenum to demand Ibrahimov to acknowledge his mistakes. Chairman of the Soviet of Economy of the Azerbaijan SSR, Sabir Orujev, made a speech in approximately the same spirit: “Comrade Mirza, you cannot accuse me of lack of own opinion. In connection with your speech I felt that your words were groundless and that even, as literary figures use to say, the price for your speech is one cent. Why shouldn’t your speech—the words of one of the leading literary men—inspire the working class to labor? Does your speech help, say, me to cope with the Party’s tasks? Does it help a certain worker lay down his

life to get the seven-year plan implemented? Your speech does not contribute to this. I won’t touch upon the history of appearance of your book, I don’t know what is written there. I haven’t been in the Republic for long years, so I have great difficulty in reading Azeri. Your speech is unsubstantiated, unfounded, and, most importantly, is not in line with the instructions Comrade Khrushchev gave at the Congress of Soviet Writers. For some reason, you settle our Republic’s tasks through the “back door.” Go through the front door, and you’ll see our achievements in industry. I also read the speech of Comrade Khrushchev; I did this twice to understand it more deeply. I received aesthetic satisfaction from this speech. I’m delighted at Comrade Khrushchev’s Lenin-like emotional soul. But what soul do you have? What did you tell the Plenum to make them form conclusions from your words?” He was followed by Secretary of the Mir-Bashir regional Party committee, Nadir Rustamov, who criticized R. Rza, saying, “I was present at the discussion of the school reform at the last session. I must say that under the cover of talks about the language, some writers demonstrate petty bourgeois nationalistic aspirations. After the law on schools was adopted at the last session, Rza suggested writing the following in the law: Azerbaijanis can study only in the Azerbaijani language. I think this is a bad sign of petty bourgeois nationalism.” Further the floor was taken by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Akhundov. As for the question of language in his speech, Akhundov said it had not been necessary to adopt the law on language. “We haven’t still given a political appraisal of this. Now I’d like to give the political appraisal exactly because we didn’t give a timely political appraisal, and that’s why the backlashes of that sentiment still go on. Politically, this led some people, some elements with nationalistic sentiments, to revive. They raised a certain wave of nationalism and, as far as Comrade Ibrahimov had been the initiator of this process, they made him, voluntarily or not, their national hero. Some people, especially the youth and students, yielded to this sentiment. This explains the long, continuous applause every time Comrade Ibrahimov speaks. Today is the only instance that you weren’t applauded when you were making a speech. It’s not good for Comrade Ibrahimov as an experienced, very good writer and, I must say, a political worker and state figure, to swallow the bait of these elements and now follow them.” Having once again assured all those present that he respected Ibrahimov, Akhundov noted that it was Ibrahimov who had made a grandiose political mistake that confused everybody and that it was Ibrahimov’s initiative that caused so many squabbles. “In all, Comrade Ibrahimov, it is not possible to think that only you think about the nation, about workers, about the Republic. You cannot declare yourself a monopolistic patriot. . . . Believe me, we all love our people and our Republic; we love them more than ourselves and, if necessary, we will die for the Republic, for the Party, and for the nation, but this doesn’t mean that things like what you offer can be proposed to the Republic and to the nation, and, as a matter of fact, you do a disservice to them.”43 However, Akhundov didn’t touch upon the question of use of the state language in the system of healthcare he had led for a long time, though the majority of complaints filed from the Republic to Moscow was about filling in medical charts and case histories in the non-adopted state language. Secretary of the Pushkin regional Party committee Kamil Quliyev, in his speech, went deeper. He said that there were many writers like Ibrahimov in Azerbaijan. They must be sent to a

village to live there, occupy a certain position, and write afterward. The trouble is that such writers are unaware of life and thus speak in such a manner at meetings to raise their prestige. Here Ibrahimov spoke of his merits in the native language or the Azerbaijani language. I read his book about the Azerbaijani language. It was issued in many copies and sold everywhere. He wanted to say in this book that he’s a fighter for the Azerbaijani language in the Republic. In this book he published several articles full of nationalism and gross mistakes. Secretary of the Kasum-Ismailov Party regional committee, Mamed Aliyev, in turn, noted that after Ibrahimov put forth the language problem, part of the youth refused to study Russian. In such a period of history when we need the language of October, the language of Lenin as the air, the water, raising the question about language and the national question means hurting our common business, according to him. “I thought that Ibrahimov, after he was criticized in the report, would make up his mind and acknowledge his mistake. Instead, he attacked. This attack against the CC Bureau is purely slanderous.” Though all the speakers criticized Ibrahimov and defended Mustafayev, nevertheless, the first secretary instructed the key rapporteur, Bayramov, to respond to Ibrahimov’s attacks. For this reason, at the June 17 Plenum the floor was finally given to CC Secretary Bayramov. He noted that some speeches had urged that Ibrahimov be forced to obey the Plenum, and that this was unnecessary. Bayramov said that in his speech he had touched upon only the question of Ibrahimov’s lack of discipline and that he hadn’t touched upon the question of the Azerbaijani language. “I disagree with a part of the speech of Comrade Akhundov that this issue, particularly the adoption of the law on the Azerbaijani language, hasn’t yet been given a political appraisal. This is not quite so. Upon suggestion and insistence of a series of Bureau members on March 16, 1957, that is, six months after the law was adopted, this question was discussed for long hours. The majority of Bureau members— I’d like to stress, the majority, but not all Bureau members—opined that the facts that had been reported by Comrade Ibrahimov couldn’t be neglected; however, this did not require adopting this law in 1956 with referral to other Republics. By the way, this Article is contained in the Constitutions of only two Republics; moreover, those are Republics where the law had been written since before the Constitutions were adopted, not later as a separate article. Bureau members noted that referring to other Republics could not matter; that the adoption of this law led to a series of undesirable facts, and that it caused anxiety of a number of Bureau members.” It is necessary to note that after the law was adopted, people at enterprises and in collectives argued over the use of language, former friends became enemies, and Russian-speaking people started being dismissed from work. “Why does Ibrahimov cite examples with the statement, the resolution, and so on but does not cite other examples that, once this law appeared, we received lots of signed and unsigned appeals reading that people were dismissed from work only because they didn’t know Azeri? Not only typists, but also others were dismissed. Why was it necessary in 1957 to republish the articles that had been written in Tabriz in 1943– 1945? Why did Comrade Ibrahimov for the second time publish an article which had been discussed at the CC Bureau? If it were an abstract scientific article about linguistics, we probably would not have paid so much attention to it. But as a matter of fact, the article is titled Azerbaijani Language in State Institutions; before it appeared, a decree was issued that

declared the Azerbaijani language the state one. And when one reads this article in connection with the Decree, with the demands of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to immediately introduce the Azerbaijani language as the state one at all institutions, it seems politically hazardous. All Bureau members blamed the appearance of this article in print because it had added fuel to the fire, caused new appeals and new anonymous letters. If Baku were a city where up to 90 to 95 percent or at least 80 percent were Azerbaijanis and 5 to 6 percent were other nationalities, it would have been possible, at a stretch, to justify talks about transition of institutions toward the Azerbaijani language. But according to the latest Census, Azerbaijanis currently are only 38 percent of Baku’s population, while the other 62 percent are representatives of other nationalities. Moreover, such a national composition had been formed not only in the years of Soviet power but also, as noted here, due to the conditions of economic development of Baku, since the very birth of the oil industry in Baku. Geographically and territorially, Baku is the capital of Azerbaijan, and no one will deprive us of that; but it has to be kept in mind that representatives of all the nations of the Soviet Union reside in Baku. If we followed this path, our Party CC, the Soviet government would have needed to raise the question of resettling representatives of all the nations to their republics, establishing various conditions, limiting entries, exits, and so on.”44 Further, Bayramov read extracts from the article and stressed that the only thing Mustafayev could be accused of was his extremely liberal attitude and tolerance to Ibrahimov’s mistakes: “If Comrade Mustafayev displayed enough principality from the very beginning and made demands of all of us, including Comrade Ibrahimov, then maybe the question would not have acquired the form in which it is now discussed.” Summing up the results of the Plenum, Mustafayev asked whether anyone had questions. At this moment Ibrahimov asked to be given the floor again. Voices were heard saying that the debates had already finished. Nevertheless, the chairman gave him the floor. Ibrahimov said, “Comrades, I always say what I think. Of course, my thoughts may also turn out to be erroneous; if I felt I made mistakes, I always honestly acknowledged my mistakes, and I will acknowledge them in the future if I realize they are mistakes. . . . I spent time in thought after Veli Akhundov made his speech. In your speech, Comrade Akhundov, there are many things that make me think. Indeed, the resonance, the results from the law on state language are not particularly important, and I agree with this. When we raised the question of the state language, I personally did nothing; everything was approved by the Bureau. We thought that these measures would lead to elimination of perversions in our life. When I was writing the article I also planned to eliminate shortcomings. Like it seemed to all of you, Bureau members, when the law on state language was under adoption, it seemed to me that this would lead to something good. However, we didn’t foresee all the complications, the nuances that occurred later. Well, we didn’t foresee all the sides of life, but let’s correct them now. I left my post 1.5 years ago already. I haven’t had any relation to these things for 1.5 years. Over these 1.5 years I told you nothing, made no erroneous speeches anywhere. So what is the matter? Why don’t you correct the situation? If you need my help, my participation, call me and tell me what exactly should be corrected. If separate, high-ranking comrades make mistakes, why is it about me? Thus, it seems to me that it isn’t good to blame me for others’ mistakes. To

eliminate the shortcomings we committed, in my view, we should not be irritable or invent fairy tales.”45 Ibrahimov alleged that abstracts from his article were taken out of context and even distorted in some cases. A break was announced following Ibrahimov’s speech. Yet during Ibrahimov’s first speech at the Plenum, appropriate departments of the CC were commanded to sort out “suspicious” places in his almanac The Azerbaijani Language. When Mustafayev was summing up the results of the Plenum, this document was already prepared. Its eleven pages contained quotations from Mirza Ibrahimov’s articles, even with the indications of original sources.46 They wanted to pronounce this document to force Ibrahimov to keep silent because over two days of the Plenum’s work, about twenty CC members spoke against Ibrahimov, who responded to all of them. Mustafayev devoted the first part of his closing speech to the Republic’s achievements over the past years and then turned to Ibrahimov’s speech. He confirmed that the criticism that had been voiced was grounded and that this had to be kept in mind and corrected in the future. Then he launched an attack starting with the law on language. He said, “Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov raised the question of state language; at the time we all yielded to this sentiment; this question was discussed at the Bureau more than once. Perhaps, all those who were Bureau members then remember that we put off this question several times. At last, Comrade Ibrahimov reported that this question allegedly had been fully agreed with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Our mistake is that, despite the alleged accord, we should have raised this question before the CC CPSU. But we didn’t do I, because we trusted Mirza Ibrahimov’s authority. I’d say that even if we, having trusted Mirza Ibrahimov’s authority, wrote in the Constitution to legalize it, though it was quite unnecessary, nothing would have happened. But what followed then? It then followed that he began to speak. As it becomes evident now, this proceeded from not purely legal, patriotic intentions but unclear reasons. And what happened as a result, Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov? Does it befit a Party member, a CC member, even if the question is about his language, not to display cautiousness, tolerance, or attention?”47 Mustafayev focused his criticism not on the adoption of the law on language but on the administrative methods that had been used to implement the law. Having recalled episodes at the State University of Azerbaijan with the participation of Nazim Hikmet, at a meeting in connection with Q. Qarayev, and at a reporting meeting at the Academy of Sciences, Mustafayev built his criticism of the book Azerbaijani Language upon notes prepared beforehand. Ibrahimov reproached Bayramov that the mistakes in the book had should have been pointed out earlier, when Ibrahimov was in office. Having found fault with this thesis, Mustafayev asked emotionally: “You’d like to say that we did not dare to criticize you when you were the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. . . . True, many comrades did not dare criticize you, it was not possible to criticize such a person. Was it possible to tell you anything? Our Academy issued the third volume of the history of literature, but there are no first or second volumes. Indignant at this, I told Comrade Ibrahimov and the Academy’s Institute of Literature and Language: there is order, please, issue the first volume, the second volume, and when the things are about the third volume, issue the third volume. When we noted

that these things could not be done, Ibrahimov gave the following cue: I can yield agriculture to you, but I cannot yield literature and art to you. Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov, I’m the CC Secretary, but not a senior agronomist.”48 Further, Mustafayev stated that 1 to 1.5 months ago he proposed to Bureau members to call Ibrahimov for Party discipline because it was not possible to tolerate a situation when Ibrahimov comes up to a rostrum and is met by the audience with fifteen minutes of uninterrupted applause: “We cannot understand this applause. He likes it very much, but this is the misdirection of the youth. It appears that he is a people’s hero, a martyr who has been punished for something. He had repeatedly submitted appeals asking to be released; if a person asks, we agree to release him.” At the end of his speech, Mustafayev noted that Ibrahimov was a good, talented writer and that he wouldn’t like to lose him, but that Ibrahimov couldn’t afford to lose himself, either. Following Mustafayev’s speech, Ibrahimov demanded to be given the floor, and he got it. His aim was to give an inquiry on three questions. First, this was a question about language. Indeed, the question had been raised by Ibrahimov but should have been agreed with the CC CPSU by a Party leader. Second, the publication of the third volume and the delay of the first two resulted from serious mistakes that had been detected in the texts of the first and second volumes. As for the third volume, of the poets and writers noted in it, only a third are currently alive, and it is not their fault that the issue of the first two volumes is delayed. In addition, he noted that the first edition of the history of Azerbaijan, in two volumes, had appeared before the war, under Heydar Huseynov, who is now deceased. The Soviet period occupies a scanty place there. Third, as for the book The Azerbaijani Language, Ibrahimov noted again that the texts of articles in this book were directed against the Iranian reaction, and that now attempts were being made to falsify the sense of his phrases, to show that they were directed against Russia and the Soviet ideology. “Some who spoke here, including Comrade Mustafayev just now, for some reason, beat their breasts and cry of the significance of the Russian language and Russian culture.” Yet in 1945 Ibrahimov wrote: “If we want to improve and further develop our national culture, our morals, and our language, we must know the Russian language and Russian literature fluently.”49 With the speeches of the Plenum’s participants in mind, Mustafayev summed up the result, saying that Ibrahimov had made mistakes and that the Plenum blamed him. He entertained a hope that the great writer and clever man Ibrahimov would revise his mistakes and draw political conclusions from them. In its decision, the Plenum noted that CC member Mirza Ibrahimov did not correctly evaluate the criticism fired against him in the report by CC CPA Secretary Bayramov. The Plenum believed that Ibrahimov, instead of acknowledging the mistakes he had made, chose the path of groundless accusations which he leveled against the CC CPA First Secretary Mustafayev. The commission led by Shikin finished its work in the Republic and returned to Moscow by that time. A voluminous inquiry was submitted to the Department on work with Party organs of Union Republics. It was noted that “in Azerbaijan there are cases of manifestation of parochialism and violations of state discipline. The most striking manifestations of parochialism were unjustified objections of individual leaders of the republic to the

construction of the Karadag–Tbilisi gas pipeline, on the pretext of lack of gas reserves to meet the needs of the republic.”50 In connection to this, the national policy, commission wrote that “large deficit and allocation errors occur in the guide ideological work, in carrying out the national policy of the party. Over the past years, the country has held a number of events that, in our opinion, have hindered the cause of international education of workers and strengthening the fraternal friendship between peoples. As you know, in August 1956, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, a law on the introduction of the Azerbaijani language as a state language was adopted by the former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR, M. Ibrahimov, with the consent and approval of the Bureau of the Central Committee. The republic’s leaders claimed that the law on the state language was a vital need and was fully consistent with the principles of Lenin’s national policy. It is hardly necessary to prove that such a statement is completely unfounded. . . . There was no practical need for a law on the state language. Any flaws and distortions in the use of the Azerbaijani language in a number of public institutions of the republic could be corrected by other measures; however, this was not done. It is clear that the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan has shown clear political immaturity on the issue of the state language.”51 According to the approval of the members of the commission, “the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan did not remedy the distortions of the national policy of the party and did not make a political assessment of the performances of individual intellectuals who, under the pretext of special concern about the Azerbaijani language, led a nationalist demagogy. This explains why the question of the Azerbaijani language was again in the public eye in connection with the enactment of the school.”52 In addition, the document described in great detail the academic situation of the party’s history. It said, “Contrary to some historical facts, scientists require a review of well-known resolutions of the X Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) characterizing the level of socio-economic development of Azerbaijan, exaggerating the extent of its development up to the revolution and thus effectively diminishing the achievements of the republic during the Soviet period. . . . In the books on the history of the party and promotional articles, Nariman Narimanov’s name is mentioned hundreds of times out of place, and he is essentially put on par with Vladimir Lenin. . . . Mistakes and shortcomings associated with the conduct of the Azerbaijan language in the quality of government, as well as in the historical field in varying degrees, are also seen on the other side of ideological work—in the press, radio, television, cinema, and the work of arts organizations. We see the tendency toward national restrictions in the content of the ideological work.”53 The representatives of Moscow suggested in the note that “it turns out that leader I. Mustafaev is not politically mature enough for the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. We are convinced that it would be in the interest of the work to strengthen the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, and to use I. Mustafaev for other work.”54 At the CC CPSU Plenum on June 24–29, 1959, having acquainted himself with the preliminary results of the commission’s work, Khrushchev strongly criticized the Azerbaijani Party organization for the mistakes it had made in the development of cattle-raising and cotton-

growing, in the national policy, and in the sphere of ideology on the whole. Particularly, he said, “Comrade Mustafayev, your policy, as concerning national policy questions, is like that in Latvia. They made the same decision in respect to other nationalities. But you, Comrade Mustafayev, well know that the population of Azerbaijan consists of one-third Azerbaijanis, one-third Russians and other Slavic nationalities, and one-third Armenians.” (Khrushchev’s information about the national composition of Azerbaijan was incorrect. In 1959, Azerbaijanis made up 67.5 percent of the total population, Russians and Armenians, 13.5 percent and 12 percent, respectively). Mustafayev shook his head in responding to this falsification. This gesture angered Khrushchev: “You, Comrade Mustafayev, are shaking your head. You turned out to be inconsistent in leading the Party organization. The history of the Revolution is now described in Azerbaijan. Everyone knows the twenty-six Baku Commissars and their role. Who was the leader of these twenty-six Baku Commissars? (A voice from the hall: Shaumyan). Not at all. Not Shaumyan. Ask Mustafayev. It is definitely not Shaumyan. Do you know why this was switched? Because Shaumyan is an Armenian, but they say: but what about the nation? We (want) our own hero. . . . For this reason, they pervert the historical events of that period. A historical approach is needed. Be taught by the Russian people. . . . When the point was about reorganization of schools, we in the CC recommended establishing appropriate conditions for parents to let them choose a school for their children, a language their children wanted to study. Comrades, and what decision did the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan Republic make in this case? They ordered study in the Azerbaijani language only.” At this moment, Mustafayev again objected to Khrushchev, interpreting the law’s provision as freedom of choice of a language of study by parents. Khrushchev replied: “I was told a different thing.” Shikin interfered, explaining that the law consisted of two parts: the first part was right and the second one was discrepant. Khrushchev noted: “This is a very important question. I know who raises this question: intelligentsia, both in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. I heard some writers groaning. I behave as if I don’t hear. I heard, Ukrainian comrades, but I think that these groans were wrong. Let them groan and then recover from this disease. Do you understand what this means? Let’s consider the third who are Armenians, the third of Russians. These children must study two languages: the national language and their native language and, in addition, a foreign language. Obviously, they won’t cope with this task and will fall behind. As I understand, children must study in a language their parents choose. But why do they speak against this? They’re afraid that the Russian language will affect national languages. But do you, comrades, want to tell me that you want Turkey’s influence?”55 On June 29 the Plenum broadly discussed “rough violations” in the realization of national policy in Azerbaijan. Khrushchev noted that Mustafayev was a weak political figure and that, despite being a specialist in agriculture, he had failed to provide for development of all agricultural branches in line with the decisions of the September and further Plenums of the CC CPSU. The second Republic that was criticized because of the national question was the Latvian SSR.56 Right after the CC CPSU Plenum was over, the whole composition of the CC CPA Bureau was invited to Moscow. On June 30 the Presidium of the CC CPSU discussed the situation in the Azerbaijani Party organization and serious mistakes that had been committed in

the Republic’s economy. Speakers were Shikin, Mustafayev, and Khrushchev. As Mustafayev objected to the criticism from above, it was decided that the CC CPSU Secretariat would “consider the position of things in Azerbaijan and submit its recommendations to the CC Presidium.” Due to Mustafayev’s opposition, the meeting of the CC CPSU Secretariat was violent. CC Secretaries A. Kirichenko, E. Furtseva, I. Ignatov, N. Muhitdinov, P. Pospelov and others strongly criticized Mustafayev for disorder and an outburst of nationalism in the Republic. However, at the Secretariat’s meeting, Mustafayev adequately answered both the members of the investigation commission and the members and candidates of the Presidium, and he tried to prove that their accusations were groundless. The first and the second Secretaries of all the Republics and Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Republics attended the meetings of the Presidium and the Secretariat. CC CPA Second Secretary Yakovlev tried to defend Mustafayev but got a scolding from E. Furtseva.57 With such a turn of developments in mind, members of the CC CPA Bureau understood that Mustafayev’s destiny had been predetermined. Thus, some of them tried to protect themselves. For example, Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee Allahverdiyev, known as a close fellow of Mustafayev, told the CC Secretariat’s meeting: “I consider the speech of Comrade Mustafayev at the meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium as arrogant, nervous, making an impression that he thinks that he is the master of the Azerbaijani Party organization and is displeased that the CC CPSU has interfered with the businesses of his own princedom.”58 On July 1, the CC CPSU Presidium discussed Shikin’s report “On the Results of Investigation of Work of the Azerbaijani Party Organization” that aimed to break Mustafayev’s opposition. The meeting started with Khrushchev voicing his serious concern over the situation in Latvia. He said, “Returning to Latvia over the past two to three years were 32,000 Latvians [he meant emigrants—J. H.], including famous international leader of the Latvian Socialist Democracy Mengels [Khrushchev always mispronounced, the surname of Fricis Menders—J. H.] who, in his recent speech, praised the erroneous views concerning the national question. He cannot do it in another way because he pursues his own policy and has his own man in the government. Regretfully, this is not only in Latvia. They say that in Lithuania there are whole Polish regions where Poles reside, but the leaders are only Lithuanians; Russians are not nominated for any post except for militia; when it’s necessary to arrest someone, they appoint Russians as militia men to show others what Russians do. In Estonia, the situation is no better than in Latvia. Thus, we need to be self-critical. There is no tragedy there. Everything will be fine; we just need to tell the truth to raise the people against this. Comrade Shikin has proposed conducting hearings on Azerbaijan and then exchanging views.” But Shikin had hardly begun to speak, not even having finished his first phrase, when he was interrupted by Khrushchev, who said: “They can ask why Communists don’t check onsite; so if such a leadership pursues this line, it seems to be approved. But there is nothing of the sort, comrades, because their lower-ranking Party members also think so: if Kalnberzin was elected a candidate for CC Presidium membership, he chairs there; this probably proceeds from the policy the Party pursues, that is this is the line of the CC CPSU and thus, if we say they aren’t our men but the men of Ulmanis [Karlis Ulmanis was the Prime Minster and President of Latvia in 1936–1940—J. H.] and if they don’t

correct themselves, they will be corrected. This happens in Latvia, in Estonia, in Lithuania, in Baku, in any Republic, and in Ukraine. If it is stated loudly that the leadership acts wrongly, the Party will be strong enough to nominate worthy men to lead.”59 These words of Khrushchev seemed to call for an attack and encouraged Shikin, who was speaking. In his first phrase, Shikin noted that the appraisal of the situation at the Communist Party of Azerbaijan given by Khrushchev at the June Plenum of the CC CPSU was absolutely right. This is confirmed by the results of onsite investigation of the situation in the Republic. “The investigation, onsite examination of the situation, showed all that the Communist Party of Azerbaijan had gained, especially over the past several years: great successes in the development of economy and culture; the training of national cadre for all economic branches; improving the material position of the population; and developing a creative initiative and political, labor activity of the Republic’s working masses. The people of Azerbaijan are now very enthusiastic about working in all spheres of the economy and culture to implement the decisions of the XXI Party’s Congress and decisions of the CC Plenums. All these are indisputable things. At the same time, we consider it necessary to report that the Republic’s Party and Soviet organs, despite having great opportunities and development potential, primarily in the sphere of agricultural production, use the permanent aid they receive from the state poorly, so no realization of the decisions of the September Plenum of the Party CC and further Plenums on a radical improvement of agriculture has been realized.”60 Shikin started with the sad situation in cotton-growing and cattle-raising, noting that compared to 1954 cotton production had decreased from 420,000 tons to 270,000 tons while cotton productivity had fallen from 21 centners to 13 centners per hectare, and that the cost price for cotton had increased from 150 rubles up to 220 rubles per centner or even 300 rubles in some regions. He said, “the Republic’s Party leadership’s promises and assurances that the production of cotton will be increased up to 600,000 tons over the next two to three years remains a pipe dream. The year 1958 ended, but cotton production remained equivalent to 270,000 tons.” Having turned toward Khrushchev, Shikin noted, “Promises of this sort were given by Mustafayev in Tashkent in 1954. Attempts of the Republic’s leaders to explain the failure in cotton production by every kind of objective reason, including bad weather and low quality of the cotton brand ‘108f,’ are groundless.” At this moment Khrushchev interrupted Shikin again: “Comrade Mustafayev, what kind of harvests do the two women who had spoken in Tashkent and promised to collect 80 centners per hectare [one of them was brigadier of the kolkhoz “April 28” of the Yevlakh region Gilas Verdiyeva, another chairwoman of the Mikoyan kolkhoz of the Ujar region Mamedova—J. H.] achieve now?” Mustafayev replied that the first woman had harvested 50 centners and the other one, 43 centners. Khrushchev said, “May God help you to get a half of that with such brands and under this weather.” Shikin added that the productivity had been falling for the fourth consecutive year and that it had nothing to do with the weather. Further, Shikin talked about the Baku bazaars: “The trade of greens in Baku is primarily in the hands of profiteers who rip off workers. In our opinion, the CC and the Council of Ministers of the Republic do agricultural work badly; they don’t practice everyday control. The leadership

of regional executive committees and district committees is not diligent in controlling the situation in agriculture. They overlook, to a significant extent, such important aspects as the selection of managing cadre. Mustafayev is uncritical in assessing the position of things in agriculture, and has monopolized, to a significant extent, the issues of agricultural science, which, in our opinion, a bit restrains or chains local initiative.” As for industry, Shikin found many weak places here as well. He talked about the oil sector in particular: “While the whole oil industry fulfilled and exceeded last year’s plan and exceeds it this year, more than a quarter of the oilfields fail to fulfill their production plans over the past year, and in the five months of this year they are more than 300,000 tons of oil short of the plan. Oil refineries from year to year fail to fulfill the plan of refining petroleum products; as a result, in the past year alone the country was shorted 200,000 tons of diesel fuel, 250,000 tons of sweet fuel oil, and a lot of lubricants. Party and Soviet organs are aware of these shortcomings of the oil refineries but have reconciled and take no active measures.” Having listed the shortcomings in the oil industry, Shikin said, “manifestation of group interests and violations of state discipline are taking place in the Republic. The most obvious manifestation of group interests was that the Republic’s leaders opposed construction of the Kara-Dag-Tbilisi gas pipeline, explaining that they themselves were short of gas, with Comrade Rahimov telling a meeting that the gas is ours, Azerbaijanis’, and that we cannot give it to Georgians. But the Bureau decision did not evaluate this as a manifestation of group interests.” These words of Shikin again angered Khrushchev who, having interrupted the reporter, began to shout: “Some nationalities are against Russians; the Russians haven’t even said a word. The Russian Federation agreed to build a gas pipeline from the Stavropol region for the Georgians and Armenians. No question arose here. The Ukrainians now supply the gas to Moscow, further planning to supply it to Belarus and Leningrad. There is also no question here. Gas from Ukraine will be delivered to Riga. That’s what upbringing of Party cadre means.” To strengthen Khrushchev’s words, Shikin added, “Azerbaijan is in possession of huge gas reserves, enough to fully meet the demands of all the Caucasian Republics. Yet last year, gas production was decreased to 2–2.5 million cubic meters due to the absence of consumers. Hence, further development of the gas industry of the Republic depends on rapid completion of construction of a gas pipeline up to Tbilisi and Yerevan to make it possible to use this natural gas. At the moment, the gas industry is developing insufficiently.” Shikin criticized infringements of state discipline and failure to follow the Party and Government’s instructions that products should first of all be delivered to other economic regions. Last year Armenia was short 7,500 tons of fuel oil, and the Georgian industry- 10,000 tons, something that fevered the work of the Rustavi refinery, at a time when self-supply exceeded the plan by 23,000 tons of fuel oil.61 Shikin devoted the majority of his speech to disclosing mistakes committed in the sphere of ideology and realization of national policy. Having touched upon some aspects of the ideological work, Shikin noted that in leading this sphere of public relations, members of the Presidium had committed serious mistakes that did damage to the international upbringing of workers and friendship among nations. Regarding the law on language adopted in 1956 upon an initiative of then-chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic,

Ibrahimov, Shikin said, “The leadership of the Republic still alleges that this law was vitally necessary and fully corresponds to the Lenin national policy. This assertion is inconsistent. The adoption of this law directly contradicts the Lenin instructions. . . . The campaign around recognition of the Azerbaijani language as the state language led to negative consequences, revival of nationalistic sentiments, especially among the intelligentsia and students and perversion of the Party’s national policy. The adoption of the law was followed by the demand to introduce the Azerbaijani language at all the state institutions, industrial enterprises, medical facilities, and so on. According to this year’s Census, of Baku’s population of 968,000, 36.9 percent are Azerbaijanis and 63 percent are non-Azerbaijanis. Note that 600,000 are Russians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and representatives of other nationalities. Some leading figures have become more persistent in their demands for a gradual replacement of cadre with non-Azerbaijani nationalities.”62 At this moment Khrushchev commented that no such problem had occurred in Baku earlier. Further, Shikin started citing examples of Ibrahimov’s statements at various meetings. Particularly, Ibrahimov told a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan the following: “It is not the year 1920 now. Now we have enough cadres to substitute in all non-Azerbaijanis.” Ibrahimov continued to say that Ministers and heads of institutions should be gathered together and instructed: non-Azerbaijani employees should be allowed to continue to work but must be given six months to study the Azerbaijani language. When the Presidium talked about what to do with medical institutions where half of the physicians consisted of Russians and where case histories ought to be written, Ibrahimov noted, “Let Russians be in the situation we were in thirty-five years ago when we were given written case histories in the Russian language.” Comrade Mustafayev and other members of the Bureau were forced to speak at Party meetings when passions around this question flared up. Speaking at the State University of Azerbaijan, Mustafayev stated the following (here Shikin emphasized that he cited the text of a shorthand record—J. H.): “It is not possible to strike out people who do not know the Azerbaijani language with a stroke of the pen. It is necessary to employ them and let them be gradually substituted but not to go too far.” Mustafayev shouted from his seat that he had never made such statements. But Shikin went on reading his inquiry: “All this alarmed the non-Azerbaijani part of population, which makes up 63 percent of Baku’s population. These kinds of sentiments do not exist among the working class and peasants. But such sentiments do occur among some students and part of the intelligentsia. During a large meeting with students at the State University, writer Nazim Hikmet declined to give an answer when he was asked how an intellectual who doesn’t know the Azerbaijani language or knows but doesn’t speak it should be regarded, while the former chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic writer Mirza Ibrahimov called an intellectual who didn’t know the Azerbaijani language ‘ejlaf’ (a rascal, a traitor). His speech was thunderously applauded.” Indignant at this, Khrushchev asked: “Was it like this, Comrade Mustafayev?” Mustafayev replied that this had happened and that Ibrahimov was condemned and dismissed from all posts. Voices were heard from the hall that no discussions had occurred at any Party organization, State University, or Communist Party CC. Mustafayev’s answer did not satisfy Khrushchev, who angrily cried

out: “He was dismissed in common order when the question of Ibrahimov was under discussion and he couldn’t stay any longer. We will not only dismiss such Communists but will also order the Party organization to kick such people out of both the leadership and the Party. He is not a Lenin follower or a Communist but a nationalist, an enemy who penetrated the leadership.” Mustafayev replied that Ibrahimov was unemployed. Khrushchev was enraged: “Comrade Mustafayev, you aren’t so naive as to misunderstand the difference. You yourself are a suspicious man, you have the Party card, but you aren’t a Communist. You say, ‘He is unemployed.’ You aren’t a child, you’re a political figure, a member of the Central Committee, so you must understand the difference. ‘He is unemployed.’ You seem to have been sympathizing with this.” Adding fuel to the fire, Shikin cited two more examples from the Republic’s cultural life: “A broad republican meeting on the questions of culture was held last year. Reporting on musical questions to the meeting was famous composer Qara Qarayev, now the Soviet Union’s People’s Artist. He spoke in Russian; as a result, he was blamed simply because he had spoken Russian at the meeting. We talked to him, and he said that he felt hurt and offended. There’s also another example. In connection with the ten-day festival of the Azerbaijani SSR for literature and art in Moscow, the Republic’s People’s Artist, winner of the Stalin Prize Batashov, an artist of the Opera & Ballet Theater, was told by the theater’s chief conductor a month before the ten-day festival began that he wouldn’t appear in major parts of ballets because the ten-day festival allegedly had to show Azerbaijani performers and avoid showing too many Russian names. Despite Batashov’s natural protest, the conductor told him that should be thankful that he works for the theater.” (Here Khrushchev added: “And eats bread.”) Shikin read in full Batashov’s letter, ending with the following words: “But first of all, one must be a Soviet man.” These words offended Khrushchev who flared up, shouting: “To be a Soviet man is not the key quality for Comrade Mustafayev. And this man is called a Communist. So many excellent people have been raised up, but the shit floats to the top. We will clear it out like a housemaid does when she cooks borsch and then skims it off with a spoon. That’s the way we will skim it and clear it; people will always back us.” Shikin then analyzed the law on compulsory study of the Azerbaijani language in Russian-language schools, which had been adopted in March 1959: “In connection with the adoption of the Government’s law on the link between school and life in the Azerbaijan SSR, the formulation of the second part of its Article differs from the recommendation on reorganization of school work disclosed in the theses of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers. As a matter of fact, it denies the principle of voluntary study of language and may be interpreted as a demand for the compulsory study of the Azerbaijani language in all schools.” Here Shikin reported that half of the women present at a citywide meeting on March 8 didn’t know the Azerbaijani language and thus listened inattentively to the speaker, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, Abdullayev. Shikin said that conducting international events in the Azerbaijani language with no interpreter present was a big mistake. As usual, Khrushchev made a comment, saying: “I, for example, don’t know the Turkish language, so if I spoke to Turks in Russian they would not have listened to me.” At this moment, Shikin added some more fuel to the fire, citing several examples from the speeches of Ibrahimov and

Abdullayev. Khrushchev flared up again: “Comrades, this happens in Baku where 66 percent [the true figure is 62 percent—J. H.] are non-Azerbaijanis. Fundamentally, they may kick you off from the Party organization, as they are the majority. Elections in Canada are now underway; Canadians do not act against Ukrainians because there are 300,000 Ukrainians there, so they can make the elections fail. In America, there are also regions populated largely by Poles and Ukrainians. Americans take this into consideration. Even bourgeois figures do not act in the manner you do. Roughly speaking, this is a Hitler-like, zoological approach, with bourgeois democracy displaying no such approach. It creates certain autonomy for nations even if they are not a majority but represent a group that needs to be taken into consideration, but you ignore everything, and you are called Communists.”63 Further Shikin cited one more example of encroachment of interests of non-Azerbaijanis: “Comrade Abdullayev is present here. He recently chaired a meeting devoted to the conferral of government awards to oil workers. The meeting was attended by many people who did not know the Azerbaijani language. But this was not taken into account. Everything was held in the Azerbaijani language. There were no interpreters. Everyone who was present expressed displeasure.” In continuing his speech, Shikin spoke about the growth of nationalistic sentiments in the Republic reflected in the text of the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. According to him, the description of the revolutionary movement in the Republic tended toward national restraint, idealization of the past, and exaggeration of the role of the “Hummet” organization. Khrushchev asked: “Did they create the Baku Committee of Bolsheviks?” Shikin went on reporting, “There is exaggeration about the role of figures such as Nariman Narimanov who allegedly had neither hesitation nor mistakes. While the books about the history of the Communist Party point out to shortcomings and mistakes of figures such as Ordzhonikidze, Stepan Shaumyan, Japaridze, they say nothing of the shortcomings of Nariman Narimanov, though we know that he had great shortcomings, especially in the sphere of national policy.” Here Khrushchev again interjected: “They must be criticized. What are our critics in Moscow looking at?” Shikin added that specialists from all the Union Republics had gathered together in Baku to discuss the volume I of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and express critical remarks of ideological character. Azerbaijani comrades dismissed all these critical remarks out of hand. Khrushchev gave another instruction: “Publish an article in the Communist [the politicaltheoretical magazine of the CC CPSU—J. H.] and rake over the coals there.” Shikin began describing the course of the meeting: “Comrade Mirmulayev, a representative of Tajikistan, spoke and asked: won’t it be better to call this not history, but essays, like all the Union Republics do? The head of the propaganda department who chaired the meeting replied, “Why should it be essays? Maybe you’ll speak today and say that there is no Council of Ministers and CC CPA?” Comrade Mirmulayev again criticized him of exaggerating the role of Nariman Narimanov, but the head of the propaganda department made the following comment: “But who freed you and the Kyrgyzs?” Six months have passed since Comrade Kurbanov made, as a matter of fact, the incorrect closing speech, but the Party CC hasn’t so far found time to examine the results of the discussion, give its evaluation, and instruct the composite authors how to work further. In some works of art, in some speeches dealing with the description of the

activity of the twenty-six Baku Commissars, Stepan Shaumyan, in contrary to the historical truth, is reported as a man of secondary importance while representatives of the Azerbaijani nationality are mentioned as men of primary importance.” Further, in showing the copy of the newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy, Shikin said, “Comrades, yesterday some tried to allege that this had not been so. I’d like to illustrate one example. Here is the newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy. Read, please: Azizbeyov, Shaumyan, Japaridze.” Khrushchev asked: “What principle is used here? We, for instance, print according to the alphabet. Everyone knows that Shaumyan led the Baku government. He is an Armenian, but we never asked whether he was an Armenian or of another nationality. He was appointed by Lenin with the responsibility for all Transcaucasia. He spread his leadership over not only Baku but also Georgia and Armenia. Aren’t you ashamed of rolling into the swamp of bourgeois nationalism? You are called Communists. Let us get rid of such friends. We ourselves will get rid of enemies.” As for shortcomings and mistakes, Shikin noted that they were typical for not only interpretation of the history of the Party but also the press, radio, television, cinemas and all the creative organizations of Azerbaijan. In citing the example of Latvia, Muhitdinov mentioned that radio broadcasts there lasted twenty minutes while in Azerbaijan there were twenty-eight minutes in Russian and the same amount of time in Armenian per daily thirteen hours of radio broadcasting. Shikin listed mistakes in the sphere of ideology, saying: “The CC Bureau has not discussed principally the shortcomings and mistakes, has carried out no decisive ideological struggle with separate nationalistic manifestations, and poorly realizes its directing, organizing role in the ideological life of the Republic.”64 Furthermore, Shikin noted that Party principles were being crudely violated in the Republic in selection of cadre. Khrushchev was outraged again: “I asked why there are neither Armenians nor Russians in the leadership. Is it because these Communists are discredited, deprived of their political rights? Shame on you. There was Stalin once upon a time. Stalin was very strict and merciless in this respect. I knew an Armenian who worked for the aviation industry, Comrade Agadzhan. He was an excellent fellow. He worked as secretary of the aviation plant shop Party committee and I was a member of this Party organization. I did not even know that he was an Armenian. He had irreproachable Russian pronunciation, not like yours, Anastas (here Khrushchev appealed to Mikoyan), and had a different appearance. He was later sent to Gorkiy as plant director and then to Georgia. Stalin knew him. Further Georgians kicked him off from there. When I arrived, Stalin asked me, ‘Do you know Comrade Agadzhan?’ I replied that he was an excellent fellow. Stalin said, ‘But how can Georgians tolerate him? So they kicked him off.’ I remember a reception of Georgian kolkhoz workers before the war. I also sat in the Presidium with other people. Beria then worked as a secretary in Georgia. These people included a female kolkhoz worker who was a certain notorious teagrower. Beria said, ‘Here is an excellent woman, the best tea-grower, a Georgian.’ Stalin looked at her and noted, ‘She is an Armenian.’ Beria replied, ‘No, she is a Georgian.’ Then Stalin told him: ‘Ask her.’ The woman turned out to be an Armenian. Beria had not known that she was an Armenian, but when he found this out, she was soon removed from the scene. This is Beria, who was a nationalist.”65

Ending his speech, Shikin alleged that all the mistakes were the fault of Mustafayev, whom he accused of inability to govern the Republic, uncritical response to the situation, and unwillingness to make proper conclusions of criticism he faced from the side of the Party CC. In backing Shikin, Khrushchev noted that Mustafayev was a very self-confident man who thought he knew everything. He did not want to listen to anybody. Especially when about the discussion was about cattle-raising or horse-breeding, Khrushchev often interrupted Mustafayev, while CC Secretary A. Kirichenko and First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Moldavia Z. Serdyuk charged him with falsifying statistical data. Mustafayev explained an increase of the number of horses by saying that kolkhoz workers used their own horses to graze kolkhoz cattle. Khrushchev said that this was wrong, as they should have used kolkhoz horses to graze cattle. His viewpoint was that a kolkhoz worker owned a horse to receive additional profit; not just to feed it but to further send it to slaughter. Khrushchev spoke from his own experience: he had been a horseman grazing a landowner’s horses.66 At the end of the Presidium’s meeting, Khrushchev unexpectedly returned to the question of the state language of Azerbaijan. He said, “The decision that the Azerbaijani language should be considered the state language in Azerbaijan is the right decision because this is Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Republic, so its state language should be the Azerbaijani language, a language of the indigenous population. Owing to such a national composition here, we should think of how to realize this in practice. Apart from stating that the Azerbaijani language is the state one, we don’t have to ignore the 65 percent of other nationalities in Baku [the true figure is 62 percent—J. H.]. We should think of how to do office work; what language we should use. This question arose in Ukraine as well. Thus I’m prepared for it. There are many Russians in Ukraine. But what language is the state one in Ukraine? Naturally, this is Ukrainian. What state language is it in Latvia? Of course, it is Latvian. The Uzbeks have the Uzbek language as the official one, and so on. We will see tangle of circumstances going on, so we must find the right practice.”67 After long debates, Khrushchev proposed to the Secretariat to listen to this question today so that the Presidium would be able to discuss the matter again on the following day. In an attempt to make members of the Bureau and its leader clash with one another, Khrushchev prompted them, saying, “Bakuvians are sitting here, and I’m convinced that not all of them think in the way Comrade Mustafayev does.” Mustafayev’s attempt to argue with the theses of Shikin’s report was decisively prevented by Khrushchev: “Comrade Mustafayev, I treated you with respect, but this respect has now been substantially reduced because your activity does not earn respect for you. We in the CC have never interfered; people elsewhere reported onsite while the Party organization made decisions. But you attacked those checking you as an eagle. Are they your enemies? They are Party workers with lengthier experience in Party work than you, and they enjoy no less trust than you do. So why did you treat them so suspiciously, did they want to make you drown? No, they want to pull you out of the bog.”68 Following the two days of discussions, first at the CC CPSU Presidium, then at the CC Secretariat and finally at the Presidium again, Mustafayev understood that it was useless to try to defend himself. Thus, he told the final meeting the following: “Speaking at the Presidium and

at the CC Secretariat, I spoke in thoughtless manner, gave incorrect Party and political evaluations of serious mistakes and shortcomings in the work of our CC CPA Bureau. Nikita Sergeyevich! I take it very seriously that we have committed a series of shortcomings and mistakes in our work; when CC CPSU officials pointed out these mistakes to us, I did not appreciate their steps, as I was seeking to be justified. Now I have deeply thought over the strong, fair criticism you addressed to me while speaking at the Plenum and at the CC Presidium. I’d like to assure you and all members of the Presidium that I fully agree with your evaluation. You are absolutely right in saying that in solving important political questions I displayed immaturity; I did not rise to the occasion. In my activities I made unforgivable mistakes, especially in the question of the right realization of the Lenin national policy of our Party, did not give an appropriate political evaluation to the nationalistic statements and speeches of individual people, primarily the former chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and member of the CC Bureau, Comrade Ibrahimov. As a good writer, he enjoys great influence but wrongly implements the line of our Party.” Khrushchev rejected such an explanation, saying: “If his activity was directed against Communists, what do you mean by ‘a good writer?’ He’s our enemy.” Mustafayev added, “Ibrahimov was once considered a good fellow, but now the meeting of Party activists said he holds the wrong line, so we criticized his actions. He thrice took the floor at the Party activists’ meeting but no one defended him.”69 Summing up the discussion of the activity of the Azerbaijani Party organization, the CC CPSU Presidium decided to instruct the CC CPA to organize a discussion of ways of practical correction of the shortcomings indicated in Moscow. N. Muhitdinov was instructed to personally take part in the CC CPA Plenum’s discussions. At the same time, the whole composition of a CC CPSU commission that had investigated the Republic’s Party organization was sent on a mission to Baku.70 On July 2, the Presidium decided, “Mustafayev isn’t fit, didn’t justify hopes, and failed to manage.” Further, it was decided not to accentuate the national question at the CC CPA Plenum. Khrushchev himself did not support raising the national question. It was stated at this very meeting that it was unnecessary to artificially give gifts to our enemies so that they could speak of a certain crisis in our national policy. That would have been a mistake; in doing so we would have caused an artificial crisis. As for historic questions, it was decided not to underestimate the role of Shaumyan and not to exaggerate the role of Narimanov, and not to juxtapose them with one another.71 Apart from Azerbaijan, the CC CPSU Presidium meeting discussed the situation in Latvia, as reported by Muhitdinov. When the floor was given to the First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Latvia Yanis Kalnberzin, Khrushchev, unlike Mustafayev, tenderly noted: “Here I face my brother. Comrade Kalnberzin, you’re my brother, but the Party is above all.” Experienced Kalnberzin, who had witnessed how Mustafayev had been criticized in the Presidium and at the CC Secretariat and understood that opposition was useless, from his very first words acknowledged all the “mistakes” that had been made by the leadership of Latvia, noted that he was to be blamed for everything, and thanked everyone for their valuable remarks. He noted that no problems had occurred before 1956; however, later on there

appeared the “youth”—deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers Eduard Berklav and V. Kruminsh, CC CPL Secretary N. Bissenek and chief editor of the newspaper Sinya P. Pizan— who started pressing the “old fellows” by telling them that the national question hadn’t been settled in the Republic, that the Latvian language was spoken too little, and that Latvian national cadre had to be nominated. Some stated the issue as if Finns were closer to Latvians than Russians were. Kalnberzin suggested strengthening the leadership of the Republic at the expense of new people, strengthening the CC Bureau at the expense of cadre of Russian nationality. For example, he named P. Litvinov, the former deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia and currently first deputy chairman of the Economic Council. Hinting on Latvia’s realities, Khrushchev asked sarcastically: “Will you now employ aid-men at the hospital?” Kalnberzin gave an affirmative answer. Khrushchev liked this so he joked, “The late Shadenko managed to joke very much. When Kulik was conferred a rank, Shadenko, who treated him badly, told him that he was now a marshal so if that he was taken to the hospital a common man will lay him out in lavender. Now, if to rephrase this, if a Latvian is taken to the hospital, how will a Russian man be able to lay him out in lavender?” Kalnberzin was followed by Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia Vilis Latsis, his deputy V. Kruminsh, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council K. Ozolin who themselves acknowledged the existence of lots of mistakes and excesses in the Republic. Latsis spoke about the negative impact of the 1956 Hungarian events on Latvia’s students and youth, especially intelligentsia. The refusal to register Russian settlers and distortions in the application of the law on distribution of textbooks free of charge were recognized as manifestations of tyranny. V. Kurmanis noted that if you’re against the Russian language, this should be understood as an attack against the Russian nation. The Latvians tried to assure that there was no nationalism in Latvia; however, Khrushchev disagreed with this but agreed that the questions of nationalism in Latvia were not to be exaggerated for the sake of avoidance of clamor abroad. He noted that Kalnberzin was too old to remain a leader; however, considering his merits, recommended keeping him inside the Republic’s leadership. Khrushchev suggested electing Ozolin as the First Secretary of the Party CC and moving Kalnberzin to the position of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia.72 This recommendation was later taken into account, and change of the cadre in Latvia turned to be just a reshuffle. A meeting of the CC CPA Bureau began in the morning of July 6, 1959. Mustafayev chaired the meeting attended by I. Abdullayev, T. Allahverdiyev, V. Akhundov, A. Bayramov, M. Iskenderov, M. Mamedov, S. Orujev, Yakovlev, and CC CPSU Secretary N. Muhitdinov, as well as CC CPSU officials. The Bureau discussed the question of dismissing Mustafayev from the post of First Secretary of the CC CPA, as well as the draft decision of the IX Plenum of the CPA that had to take place after midday. The fact that Mustafayev chaired a meeting that was called up to dismiss him was, without a doubt, a manifestation of new trends in the spirit of the XX Party Congress. First of all, a resolution was read “On Serious Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Work of the CC Bureau and First Secretary of the CC CP of Azerbaijan Comrade Mustafayev I. D.” This resolution of the IX Plenum was read by Akhundov. During the discussion additions were made by Muhitdinov, Shikin, and other members of the Bureau.

Muhitdinov suggested strengthening part of the resolution which was related to ideological work, and stressed that “Ibrahimov had to be restrained; Article 11 of the Law on language could be not adopted; it would have been possible not to travel to Tbilisi for the ashes of Mirza Fatali Akhundov.” Turning toward Mustafayev, he detailed, “It was you who caused this case, so you’d better tell about this here to prevent accusation against the whole Party organization.”73 Further, Muhitdinov appealed to Bureau members about Mustafayev, saying: “As far as I understand the situation, I appeal to all of you; you had better see his shortcomings; he turned out to be an immature political leader who did not come to the necessary conclusions. . . . It’d be appropriate to write this paragraph as Nikita Sergeyevich ordered; he spoke on behalf of not him but the Presidium.”74 Some Bureau members voiced their displeasure that nothing serious about Ibrahimov was written in the resolutions of the Bureau and Plenum. They even suggested removing him from the composition of the CC and CC CPSU Revision Commission. The same proposals were made about Rahimov. In addition, some Bureau members accused chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Abdullayev of nationalism and thus demanded to dismiss him. Akhundov didn’t want the Plenum’s work to be directed against separate personalities. He noted that Ibrahimov had shortcomings but also had positive qualities. He was strongly blamed at the last Plenum, and that’s enough: “If we make organizational conclusions with respect to Ibrahimov, this will only add to talks about nationalism. And we were told to avoid such a juxtaposition, to be cautious in this question. Regarding Rahimov, I’d like to say that we’ve got a detailed decision of the CC Bureau about Rahimov’s group interests and shortcomings. The report directly reads that Rahimov displayed group interests, indicating his name, so is it appropriate to repeat this again in a decision today?”75 At the Bureau’s meeting, Muhitdinov suddenly showed his interest in Mustafayev and Ibrahimov’s proposal to bring the ashes of M. F. Akhundov to Baku. Mustafayev replied that he had visited the poet’s grave and that there was nothing blameworthy about this. Here Shikin quite sarcastically started retelling how it had happened, describing Mustafayev as a squabbler who had demanded the Georgian leaders to improve the grave, which had already been in an appropriate condition. He allegedly even noted that Akhundov’s bones were scattered all over the grave.76 Expressing his attitude to separate people accused in the Plenum’s decision, Muhitdinov noted, “I’m afraid that if we at the Plenum dismiss Comrade Mustafayev and if Comrades Ibrahimov and Rahimov regard this as their victory, as an indication that they were right and thus rehabilitated and thus the real guilt was removed, this would produce nothing but political complications for the Party organization of Azerbaijan. . . . What pertains to Ibrahimov and Rahimov is significant; this is a national question of countrywide interest. They both behaved absolutely incorrectly in this issue and now continue to misbehave. Thus, if you don’t react and explain properly, it may happen that not only Ibrahimov and Rahimov but also many of those with nationalistic sentiments who stand behind them will say that their business is right, that they should avenge him, so the situation would only become worse. This aspect should be taken into account.” He added, “Maybe the Plenum needs to write something in its decision to put everything into place; if the question is raised sharply about Ibrahimov, it is not denied that this question may

be raised before the CC CPSU and written down in the Plenum’s decision.”77 Finally, members of the Bureau reached consensus and made a decision of four points. The first point envisioned dismissal of First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev from his post and his removal from the composition of members of the CC CPA Bureau; the second point—the necessity of expansion of the composition of the CC Bureau; the third point—calling up a Plenum of the CC CPA on July 6, 1959 with 305 people as CC CPA members; and the fourth point— about approval of the report of Akhundov.78 The IX Plenum was opened in the second half of July 6. Elected the First Secretary of the CC CPA, Akhundov made a detailed report “On the Situation in the Republic’s Party Organization, on Serious Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Work of CC CPA Bureau and First Secretary of the CC Comrade Mustafayev I. D.” After a series of economic questions were touched upon, Akhundov noted that facts of group interests and infringement of state discipline had been identified in the Republic and that the most striking example of group interests was an unsubstantiated objection of the then-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, Rahimov, against the construction of the Kara-Dag-Tbilisi gas pipeline under the pretexts of a shortage of gas reserves for the Republic’s own needs. Failure to follow Party and Government’s instructions assuming supply of productions, primarily oilfield equipment and petroleum products, to other economic regions of the country as a first priority was assessed by Akhundov as a violation of state discipline. Further, he turned to mistakes and shortcomings in the ideological work and in the pursuit of the Party’s national policy. He said, “As it is known, in August 1956 upon an initiative of the then-chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic Comrade, Ibrahimov, and upon approval by the CC CPA Bureau, the session of the Republic’s Supreme Soviet adopted a law introducing the Azerbaijani language as the state language. I’d like to ask, was it practically necessary in 1956 to adopt the law on state language? As Comrade Khrushchev noted in his speech at the CC Presidium quite fairly and in true Marxist fashion, the state language of each national Republic is its national language. . . . The question of recognizing the Azerbaijani language as the state one occupied an exorbitant place in the republic’s life, led to negative consequences, revived nationalistic sentiments, and perverted the Party’s national policy. This question was used by various demagogical and nationalistic elements for the reasons of inflaming nationalistic passions, especially among intelligentsia and students.” He continued to say that the question about the Azerbaijani language had again come into the view of the broad public due to the adoption of the law on schools. Formulation of the second part of Article 11 of this law counters CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers’ theses about reorganization of the work of schools. In addition, Akhundov emphasized the question of the volume I of History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, saying: “After a meeting of the scientific community in Baku six months ago, the CC Bureau didn’t find it possible to discuss the results of this meeting, express its attitude toward the mostly fair criticism at this meeting, instruct the composite authors about further work, and correct the head of the CC propaganda department Comrade Kurbanov for his politically incorrect speech at this meeting.”79 In addition, Akhundov considered it incorrect that the VIII Plenum of the CC CPA had blamed the speech of Ibrahimov against

Mustafayev. Compared to the rigidity with which questions under discussion were raised in Moscow, Akhundov used a soft manner and avoided sharp corners as he guided the discussions toward a lower level of local district organizations. But to be frank, the activity of Mustafayev was criticized in every question under discussion. Akhundov noted that Mustafayev misbehaved, reacted extremely painfully and irritatingly to the smallest critical remarks. Under the discussion of the results of investigation at the Presidium and CC CPSU Secretariat, Mustafayev behaved inappropriately, not in the Party manner and, instead of making the necessary conclusions from criticism addressed to him by secretaries and members of the CC CPSU Presidium and frankly acknowledging his mistakes, he chose the path of full denial of mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the CC Bureau and the CC First Secretary revealed by CC CPSU officials, and thus confirmed that he hadn’t made the necessary conclusions from criticism addressed to him: “Comrade Mustafayev, with his non-Party behavior at the Presidium and CC CPSU Secretariat, rejected, as a matter of fact, the assistance that the Presidium, the CC CPSU Secretariat, and Comrade Khrushchev personally wanted to provide to him to give him the opportunity to look into his mistakes. Comrade Mustafayev did not have enough political courage to acknowledge his mistakes.”80 Akhundov was followed by Mustafayev, who fully recognized the fairness of all critical remarks addressing him and agreed that he had not been able to provide a high level of work in the Republic’s Party organization. Turning to the questions of cadre, Mustafayev also admitted that he had made mistakes in this sphere, especially in the city of Baku, where the Azerbaijani population had made up 38 percent but candidatures for leading posts had been nominated without the consideration of the ethnic composition of residents. He said, “As I myself understand, my first speech at the Presidium was a failure because I was unaware of the results of an investigation by the CC CPSU Commission on the course of developments. When I myself listened to it, I understood that these shortcomings had indeed taken place. At the Secretariat I also gave a series of explanations on those questions that had been forwarded by the Commission inappropriately. My speech satisfied neither the Secretariat nor the Presidium. I spoke for the second time at the Secretariat and I spoke at the last Presidium, and I acknowledged the mistakes I had made and promised not to make such mistakes in the future, no matter where I work.”81 When discussions on the report began, those who had accused Ibrahimov at the VIII Plenum of the CC CPA three weeks earlier took the floor. This time they pounced upon Mustafayev, of course, not forgetting about Ibrahimov as well. CC member V. Samedov built his speech upon theoretical questions of linguistics and national relations, citing quotations from Lenin’s works, and accused the CC CPA Bureau of having not called Ibrahimov to order at the right time: “Comrades, you know what serious abnormalities have resulted from the implementation of the law on state language, which, apart from other things, occurred in the atmosphere of nervousness, a certain haste, and under oral and written calls by Comrade Ibrahimov. And what about the CC Bureau? In this case it displayed a shameful lack of principality, lack of political foresight, and didn’t call people to order who claim the role of ‘fathers,’ ‘ideologists,’ or ‘defenders’ of our nation. The CC Bureau gave no principal political

evaluation of all the mistakes and abnormalities in this case. Thus, mistakes of some officials became bigger and did great damage to the Communist, international education and to the development of the friendship of nations. In the meanwhile, Comrade Ibrahimov cast aside all restraint. How should it be stated that when he was at the University, which, as we used to say, is the temple of science and culture, he, as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic and in the presence of a foreigner, drove a passionate audience into rounds of applause by calling Azerbaijanis, who do not speak the Azerbaijani language, that is, the Soviet people, ‘rascals’ and ‘scoundrels?’ Only three weeks ago the CC Bureau made, at last, an open but delicate, shy attempt to criticize Comrade Ibrahimov in a report at the Plenum but, as a matter of fact, not for his mistakes and nationalistic aspirations but rather for . . . violation of the Party discipline. It is clear to us that not an initiator, instigator of this case should now be sought (though this is also of no little importance) but that our common responsibility should be stressed for the consequences of this venture that grew and took on ugly forms over the past two to three years. . . . Aspiration for the state language, naturally, affected the study of the Russian language, since attention was turned toward the opposite side. We have made mistakes and violated the principle of democracy in studying languages. This was displayed, for instance, in the law on reorganization of the system of popular education the Supreme Soviet of the Republic had adopted. Regretfully, we have to note that attempts to correct such mistakes are thoughtless and clumsy.”82 In his turn, CC Second Secretary Yakovlev based his speech upon the “misbehavior” of Mustafayev in Moscow, the fact that he had “not reacted” to the criticism from above, and attempts to justify his actions. He stressed that the political incompetence of Mustafayev had also been displayed in the question on the state language, about the study of the Azerbaijani language at school: “Comrade Mustafayev did not consider it necessary to phone the CC CPSU to seek advice on this question. He allowed himself to be run by Comrade Ibrahimov . . . anyway, Comrade Mustafayev should have phoned the CC CPSU on this question of utmost importance, but he did not do this.”83 Further, the floor was given to Ibrahimov, who expressed his regret about mistakes he had made in the sphere of ideology. He stated the following: “I have to admit that indeed, when I raised the question on the state language, I did not foresee all the possible complications in life. I told the last Plenum why I had raised this question. There were attempts to pervert the Azerbaijani language when, for instance, telegrams or letters in Azeri were not received within the Republic. Some comrades disliked or even neglected the Azerbaijani language. I was forced to talk about these things because people had filed their complaints to me. I raised this question. I made a mistake as I did not foresee what complications could occur. Well, I recognize this, and I will make appropriate conclusions from this. I myself felt this 1.5 years ago when I left office. But did I, over these 1.5 years, do anything countering the policy of proletarian internationalism our Party pursues so successively? No! So what is the matter? Why did they treat me so at the last Plenum? I understand that we all are people, we all have passions, and the latest events in our Party organization illustrate that sometimes we lose our minds as passions flare up. We’re losing our sense of harmony.” Ibrahimov turned toward

Mustafayev, saying: “Why should we avoid the truth, Comrade Mustafayev? I was only telling the truth when I criticized you at the last Plenum. I thought this would help you. But as I criticized you, you and your lackeys attacked me, accusing me of all manner of sins. As for the question of state language, you were incorrect as well. You say that as if I did this by my own will, without you or without the Bureau. This is not true! I honestly tell that it was I who raised the question. I thought that this would create balance, strengthen our fraternal friendship, and help liquidate shortcomings in the use of the Azerbaijani language. I was mistaken. But the Bureau could correct this. Am I really higher than the Bureau? . . . But you speak all the time as if you have nothing in common with this question. What is this lie for? Your behavior makes me think that I was intentionally provoked in the questions of language. I remember that old members of the Party, more experienced people, told me in those days: ‘Be careful; they push you forward but do nothing, as if you’re a permanent representative on language, so they can do something against you.’ I naively supposed that their suspicion was too extreme, as I trusted your sincerity. Regretfully, I found myself in the position of Molla Nasreddin: as you know, a group of villagers calling themselves honest people persuaded Molla Nasreddin to go with them to Tamerlan to complain about his officials but, having seen the angry Tamerlan, they ran away in fear, so Nasreddin, when he turned, saw not a single honest man behind him. They treated me in the question of language almost in the same manner. This is not good.” As for the speech of Samedov, Ibrahimov reproached him, saying: “You were present at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan; you were a member of the Presidium; you voted for the Decree on the language, but now you dogmatically read us Lenin, the words said in different historical conditions, the words that strike at another problem but are not appropriate for the question of the Azerbaijani state language. It’s your dogma, but at the session you voted for the Decree. After the session, when I spoke, you yourself noted about speaking at the Presidium: ‘Mirza, you were right in saying that we comrades are not creating a revolution; that this is progressing in line with the Lenin national policy.’ In all, some of our people like having offices. There are people who, like office rats, feed on only papers and are far from life. Comrade Samedov, in your aspiration you reproach the Azerbaijani youth. You say that the latest language-related measures affected the study of the Russian language. You may accuse me of whatever you want. You may accuse me that I allegedly made the comment at the University ‘in the presence of a foreigner.’ You have repeated that several times: “in the presence of a foreigner.” And who is this foreigner? An English attaché, a US ambassador, or a Turkish pasha? This is a communist who struggles for peace, who was persecuted in his homeland and found asylum in the Soviet Union. You are fond of laying it on thick. This is the language of not a philosopher or a Party worker but the language of a prosecutor. . . . You may blame me as you did Heydar Huseynov, but do not shame the Azerbaijani youth. Comrade Samedov, you are a philosopher and Marxist, but did you speak even once before Azerbaijani peasants in their native language on certain questions of the Marxist philosophy or communistic education? How long have Communists been national nihilists, and are you proud of this? This is a sin and a shame.”84 Ibrahimov ended his speech at the Plenum by stressing again that one must know his native language. One of the active critics of Ibrahimov at the Plenum was a candidate for CC CPA

membership, Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee A. Karamyan, who noted, “Intrigues and noise around one nationality’s domination over others, along with thoughtless adoption of the law on state language, to be frank, secretly from the CC CPSU, and some bad consequences designated for backward people are not the opinion of the whole Communist Party of Azerbaijan or the Baku Party Organization. This is an unhealthy, in my opinion, and petty bourgeois manifestation of nationalism on the part of a small group of politically immature intellectuals led by Comrade Ibrahimov.” He turned to Ibrahimov, saying: “You damaged the friendship of nations of our Republic; you tried to sow seeds of discord, so you must be called to responsibility in the Party manner.” In addition, Karamyan demanded punishment for Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Abdullayev, who was “the direct successor of Comrade Ibrahimov on dirty soil.”85 Having listened to all the orators at the Plenum, CC CPSU Secretary Muhitdinov was the last to speak. In his speech, he covered all the questions that had been touched upon at the Plenum and at the Moscow meeting. Having explained the significance of the XX and XXI Party Congresses, as well as the latest CC Plenums to the audience, Muhitdinov detailed the situation in the Republic. He noted that cases of group interests and violation of state discipline had been committed in the Republic. An example of group interests was that the Republic’s organizations in some cases did not follow the Party and Government’s instructions that supplying products to other economic regions was a matter of first priority. These violations caused serious hardships in the work of the Rustavi metallurgic plant, the Yaroslavl oil refinery, oil enterprises of the Western Ukraine, and so on. Some comrades openly objected to construction of a gas pipeline leading toward Armenia and Georgia, claiming that Azerbaijan itself needed the gas. “There are geographical boundaries between Republics; however, it is senseless to observe them when the point is about the use of natural riches,” Muhitdinov quipped.86 Further, the orator spoke of some aspects of the ideological work and the practice of implementation of the Party’s national policy. Having started with the theory and Bolshevik concept of national relations, Muhitdinov summed up, saying, “If today we’re forced to speak about certain perversions of the Lenin national policy in the Republic, this is the fault of not the Party organization of Azerbaijan but its leadership, which politically lags behind from the level of the organization and, as a matter of fact, forces it back. Let’s consider the questions about state language. As you know, in August 1956 the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted a Law ‘On the Introduction of the Azerbaijani Language as the State Language.’ No one may doubt that in the state of Azerbaijan, in the Azerbaijan Republic the Azerbaijani language has actually and legally been the state language of the republic since it was established. So why was it necessary to cause confusion in an absolutely clear question no one doubted, not to mention doing so in such a rough, absurd way like it was done here. . . . The attempt of compulsory introduction of the state language in Azerbaijan is not a new one. In this respect, the authors of the current law on state language are not original. As a matter of fact, this is plagiarism. They copied the unreasonable things their unsuccessful predecessors did already forty years ago. In 1919 [1918—J. H.] when the Azerbaijani language [the Turkic

language—J. H.] was declared the state language, representatives of various nationalities were bewildered on this occasion, so this compulsory measure was given up. You have got the documents in the archive. So why did it become necessary to raise this law on the state language in Azerbaijan again? In the other Union Republics no one raises this question at the moment. . . . Regretfully, showing utmost diligence in this question was a prominent writer, who is well-known outside Azerbaijan, Comrade Mirza Ibrahimov. It is a great pity that this happened the way it did. He had always been valued as a master of the artistic word. The Party organization and the people surrounded him with attention, care and honor. He apparently misunderstood the true essence of the Lenin national policy. We listened to the speech of Comrade Ibrahimov very attentively here today. It was a pleasure to hear his recognition that he had made a mistake in the question of language. Comrade Ibrahimov, you say that you stated nothing about the language over 1.5 years. But did you think about how nervous and confused the Republic was for 1.5 years because of your mistake? I raise this question before your conscience; you do not need to reply to me personally. Here, you cited lots of quotations from Lenin’s speeches. But understand, Comrade Ibrahimov, that when the great Lenin talked about the Tzarist policy on the outskirts, that was one thing, and when Ibrahimov talks about this in 1959 it is quite another thing. Why do you, dear comrade and clever man, cite only these quotations of Lenin and mechanically project them on the life of glorious Azerbaijani people now, in the period of developed building of Communism in the country and in Azerbaijan? I’d like Comrade Ibrahimov to reply this question before his conscience as well.” Further, Muhitdinov again addressed Ibrahimov, saying, “In your speech you talked about sincerity, courage, and nobility. I’d very much like you, Comrade Ibrahimov, to display these qualities to publicly acknowledge your mistakes in the sphere of language not only from the rostrum of a closed-door CC Plenum but also before the people who have read your erroneous article. If you, dear Ibrahimov, write new articles about the language in the Leninist, Bolshevik manner, create new works about friendship and brotherhood between the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples of the USSR—and I’m sure you can do this if you want to—I’d like to assure you that we, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, like the whole nation, will read them attentively, with pleasure, feeling gratitude to you. Is it possible, Comrade Ibrahimov, for us to agree with you on this Party, Lenin basis?” Ibrahimov replied to this insidious question, saying, “Comrade Muhitdinov, I will do this.”87 Then Muhitdinov turned to the law on strengthening of the link between school and life and further development of popular education in Azerbaijan, which had been adopted in March 1959. He noted that an attempt had been made in Azerbaijan several years before to force all Azerbaijanis, in an administrative manner, to make their children study at Azerbaijani-language schools only. However, this venture was soon rejected due to the mass protests of the population. “At a time when the choice of language in schools of the other Union Republics was voluntary, in your Republic the study of the Azerbaijani language in Russian-language schools was compulsory. Is not there a difference for us, dear friends, between the great Russian language and foreign languages? Do we really have the same approach to all these languages?” Muhitdinov asked emphatically. “All the Republics considered this regulation in

the right way and amended their laws as stated in the theses of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the Union of SSR about school. . . . Why, comrades, was it necessary to give a different edition of the law only in one Republic, Azerbaijan? In fact, this means that we want, voluntarily or not, to revise what was approved by the CPSU Central Committee and confuse this clear affair. But it should be clear, comrades, that he who disdainfully treats study of the Russian language through speaking loudly under the pretexts of ‘defense’ of the national language only serves to damage to his own nation and its culture. Why do we pay so much political attention to the correct, in the Party’s view, solution of the question about language? Because the problem of the language is currently the most important problem in the national question.”88 Muhitdinov, having linked the roots of all mistakes to the personality of Mustafayev, nevertheless, closed his speech in a very illustrative manner: “We’d like to note that Comrade Mustafayev is not a lost man for the Party and that he is to be used at another appropriate work where he, as we hope, will benefit the organization through his honest work.” Inspired by such a turn of developments, Mustafayev took the floor to state that he agreed with all the speakers, except for Rahimov and R. Sadykhov, and lamented that until this Plenum, comrades had not criticized him in the real manner but only nodded, “how excellently you spoke, Comrade Mustafayev, how excellently you summed up everything, and so forth. . . . I trusted many of those working in the sphere of agriculture, considering them as honest, scrupulous people and thus did not react sharply to their shortcomings in work. . . . As for the ideological work, I also fell short of the occasion. Mistakes had been committed in either the law or the writing of the history of the Communist Party, but we did not correct them. As the First Secretary, I was engaged in nonsense, questions that absolutely had nothing in common with me, while the true political work was clouded from my field of view. . . . I promise all of you that no matter where I will work, I will try to use all my knowledge to eliminate all shortcomings, and mistakes in my activity and never repeat them again.”89 After three-day discussions, on July 8 the Plenum of the CC CPA adopted a Resolution “On the Situation in the Party Organization of the Republic, on Serious Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Work of CC CPA Bureau and CC First Secretary Comrade Mustafayev I. D.” reading as follows: “The Plenum of the CC CPA notes that serious shortcomings and mistakes occur in the ideological work and in the conduct of the Party’s national policy; recently, there has been weakened attention to the questions of international upbringing of workers and further strengthening of fraternal friendship of the Azerbaijani people with the great Russian people and all peoples of our country. The Plenum of the CC CPA believes that it was unnecessary to adopt the law on the state language. The CC CPA Bureau, in settling the question on language, did not display political maturity, which led some of the intelligentsia and students to nationalistic sentiments. Insufficient political maturity was also displayed in the settlement of the question on the study of languages at schools of the Azerbaijan SSR. A resolution adopted on this issue keeps silent on the principle of voluntariness in the study of a second language and counters the instructions set forth in the theses of the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR over reorganization of the system of popular education.

In highlighting the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the Revolutionary movement in the Republic, a tendency of national restraint is displayed; the historical truth is distorted; some phenomena of the past are idealized; and the role of separate personalities in history is reported subjectively.”90 The Plenum noted that substantial shortcomings and mistakes were due to the faulty style and methods of leadership of Mustafayev, while CC Bureau member Abdullayev had to bear his personal responsibility for the sharp lags in agriculture. The Plenum also noted that members of the CC CPA Bureau, primarily CC First Secretary Mustafayev, had not given principal Party evaluations in a timely manner, nor had they denied the politically erroneous speeches of CC member Mirza Ibrahimov on the questions of language or blamed his incorrect actions, which had damaged the international upbringing of workers. The Plenum took into account that Ibrahimov had acknowledged these mistakes and promised to correct them in his practical work.91 That was the end of the Plenum’s work. Of those forty-eight who had requested to be given the floor, thirty people were allowed to speak. Muhitdinov got many notes, signed and anonymous, demonstrating the political atmosphere and relations among senior executives. Upon the completion of the Plenum’s work, Muhitdinov returned to Moscow. However, people who had arrived in Baku together with him, including head of the CC CPSU propaganda department V. Snastin, head of the sector of science and schools I. Kuzin, leader of the Revision Commission of the CC CPSU Shikin, and other officials stayed in Baku. On July 11, 1959, a discussion was held on the results of the IX Plenum with the Moscow guests in attendance. Opening the meeting was CC Secretary for ideological questions, Bayramov, who made a report on the results of the Plenum and on the tasks ideological workers faced. He again listed all the problems strongly argued at the Plenum that had just been completed. The leadership of Azerbaijan was so frightened by the accusation of nationalism that Bayramov recommended taking into account the national composition of Baku even in artistic works, that is, as 38 percent of Baku’s population were Azerbaijanis, according to the 1959 Census, the same correlation should be preserved among personages of artistic works. Having taken the floor, Ibrahimov pointed out several aspects of Bayramov’s speech. He noted that, with some tendentious statements put aside, he considered the Party principal criticism mostly fair and right: “I think that, concerning many questions, I, along with other members of the Bureau or maybe even to a larger extent than they, displayed hastiness, disregarding all aspects of the questions and all the complications that might arise from quite irrelevant statement of this question. It was possible to find more correct methods to solve these questions, but as I hurried I did not look for them; as a result, my actions turned out to be useless, ineffective and even damaging. I honestly recognized this at the Plenum and I sincerely confess this at the moment.”92 Further, Ibrahimov turned to the topic of internationalism in artistic literature and protested questionable theses of Bayramov. Particularly, he said, “In connection with the reflection of the topic of internationalism in artistic literature I’d like to mention, Comrade Bayramov, arguing over one your theses. . . . I say this because have come to an extreme. We are hot people as we live in the East; the sun affects us . . . but we do not have to try to shoot ourselves in the foot.

Extremes only hinder us. . . . Now I’m writing a work where I show the images of oil workers, and I try to show all the good and pure that I have in my thoughts, to show the blood and conscience in my heroes. There are both Armenians and Russians among my heroes. But when you raise the question of 38 percent as the number of Azerbaijanis in Baku according to the latest Census data, I do not know what to do. Percent data, quantitative indicators, cannot be a basis for the artistic reflection of such important questions. I can name a series of things in artistic literature where there are shown everlasting images of heroes, regardless of their nationality. Let’s consider the Turgenev’s novel The Day Before. Turgenev had made Insarov his hero, his ideal, but even the Tzarist censorship did not accuse Turgenev for making Insarov was not a Russian but a Bulgarian.”93 Speaking at the meeting, head of a CC CPSU sector I. Kuzin accentuated the work of higher education institutions and secondary schools. The orator reported interesting facts, especially that first grade pupils in the 1949–1950 academic year numbered 103,000 pupils, of whom 50,000 or 49 percent got only a seven-year education, and not more than 23 percent of the total number of pupils graduated from secondary school.94 Kuzin insisted that for the benefit of the business and for improvement of school results, it was essential to observe the principle of voluntary choice of a second language and avoid administrative measures in this area. Kuzin regarded the cut of the Russian-language sector from higher education institutions as a serious factor: “Groups with the Russian language of study have tended to be reduced in size at your higher education institutions in some recent years. By the way, not only Russians, Armenians, Jews, and others but also Azerbaijanis study in these groups. I’d like to draw some examples. At the agricultural higher education institution, there is no entrance in Russian language at three out of five schools. The same is true of the polytechnic institute. So what do we see? Where should the youth who live in the Republic, who have graduated from the secondary school here and want to receive higher education, go? Should they go outside the Republic? This will not likely contribute to the international education of the youth.”95 In addition, Kuzin complained about an insufficient quantity of women leaders in the system of education. He was followed by the head of the sector of propaganda of the CC CPSU, Snastin. He started with an analysis of the international situation, achievements in the sphere of buildup of Communism, and even a desire to take over the United States. Then he turned to Azerbaijan: “To eliminate any misunderstanding, I must say from the very beginning that the CC does not and cannot have two opinions about Azerbaijan, about the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, about the successes of the national policy of Azerbaijan, or about achievements of Azerbaijan, both in economy and culture. I say this because when our group worked here, some negligent comrades set rumors afloat that the Moscovites tried to underestimate the achievements of the Azerbaijani people, especially in the sphere of national culture.”96 In addition, Snastin pointed out a series of serious mistakes in the sphere of ideology and national policy and linked this with the adoption of the law on language. He clearly let it be known that mistakes in the ideology strongly troubled the Center, saying: “Literary works on history published in the Republic contain distortions of historical facts and events;

manifestations of national restraint glorify figures of one nationality and belittle the merits of other historical figures, and so on. The point here is not only about one book, The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Comrade Iskenderov here could tell about a book that is his own brainchild, since he published a thick book The History of Bolshevik Organizations of Transcaucasia. He could also speak about other books, for instance, Active Fighters for Soviet Power in Azerbaijan, or cite a whole series of brochures and articles in newspapers and magazines.” For example, Snastin spoke about an article by J. Quliyev, which mentioned the name of Narimanov twelve to thirteen times on one page. The Soviet historiography has long abstained from such descriptions of history.97 The point of the speech of Snastin was that in Azerbaijan, much work had been carried out in studying the history of ancient and medieval times, the history of the peoples of countries of the Middle East and the Orient, but that no scientific work to propagandize decisions of the Party’s congress was being done, which was intolerable. A person not identified in the meeting’s shorthand record protested from his seat, saying: “I conclude from his (Snastin’s) statement that there exists, in particular, the Institute of History or the Institute of Oriental Studies responsible for the ancient period, medieval times, and new period. It appears that we should dismiss all the employees, close the departments, and switch to a new period. This is incorrect.”98 Snastin hurried to retreat and noted that he was misunderstood. He wanted to say that printing houses should first of all print books devoted to topics as recommended by Party congresses, and then books on the ancient period, medieval centuries, and so on. Akhundov delivered a closing speech at the meeting. He talked about the tasks the Republic faced and methods of correction of the mistakes made in the sphere of ideology. Following a measured dose of criticism addressing the Azerbaijani branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute and its director, M. Iskenderov, Akhundov noted that the composite authors responsible for the history of the Communist Party should be invited to the CC, given useful advice and shown a new direction. The Institute should rework the published volume, put the corrected variant in print shortly, and then complete the book’s second volume.99 As for the problems of artistic literature, Akhundov again turned to the role of Ibrahimov. He said, “Comrade Ibrahimov is a great writer; I’d say he’s the pride of modern Azerbaijani literature. We, in turn, should help him overcome his shortcomings and mistakes if we want to preserve Comrade Ibrahimov, if we want him to continue to create his excellent works and to keep the right political positions. Comrade Ibrahimov spoke at the Plenum, acknowledged his mistakes, and promised the Plenum and Secretary of the CC CPSU, Comrade Muhitdinov, to publish an article in the press to recognize his mistakes. . . . It seems to me that we ought to support Comrade Ibrahimov to make him publish such an article recognizing his mistakes. This must be done to benefit our common business.”100 A month after the events in Baku, on August 17, 1959 a discussion was carried out on the activity of the Institute of the History of the Party under the CC CPA at the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CC CPSU. A report of Iskenderov was heard; discussions of the report were held; and a Directorate’s decision was pronounced “On Work of the Azerbaijani Branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute over Development of the History of the Communist Party of

Azerbaijan” indicating that there were serious shortcomings and mistakes in the scientific work of the Institute of the History of the Party under the CC CPA. The book Active Fighters for Soviet Power in Azerbaijan that appeared in 1957 and included 177 brief biographical essays displayed national restraint. The book’s coverage did not include S. M. Kirov and G. K. Ordzhonikidze, but included B. I. Talybly, Asad Qarayev, I. Dovlatov, Z. Zeynalov, C. I. Ildrym, and others.101 The remainder of the decision was devoted to volume I of History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. As noted, a scientific meeting in Baku in November 1958 along with reviewing the book at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism had revealed large mistakes, shortcomings and inaccuracies in the book. Unlike the other IML branches, the Azerbaijani branch called a book devoted to the history of the CPA not Essays of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan but The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. The Directorate believed that it would be more correct to call such an edition “Essays” to underscore the difference between a textbook on the history of the united CPSU and books on the history of local Party organizations. A number of most important questions of the history of the CP of Azerbaijan were ignored in the book while interpretation of some events of the historical past displayed national restraint. The book tendentiously, incorrectly describes the social-economic situation in Azerbaijan at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century; the authors of the book exaggerate the degree of maturity of a village’s capitalist development, which, as a matter of fact, leads to revision of the decision of the X Congress of RCP (B). In addition, the decision reads that the book too minutely, contradictorily, and tendentiously reports the position of “Hummet” in the Azerbaijani Bolshevik organization. In the opinion of the authors of the decision, the Baku Bolshevik organization was sometimes hidden by Hummet. In Moscow’s view, the authors of the book glorified the roles of separate figures, for instance, Narimanov, and inappropriately and scantily reported the roles of others, such as P. A. Japaridze, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, J. V. Stalin, S. G. Shaumyan, V. Z. Ketskhoveli, B. M. Knunyant, and V. F. Efimov-Saratovets. The IML Directorate considered it necessary to note that “at a Baku meeting devoted to discussion of the book The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, speeches of separate comrades (S. K. Kurbanov, M. Vekilov, H. Efendiyev, I. A. Huseynov, M. S. Iskenderov, and others) were incorrect and thus did not contribute to practical criticism and, as a matter of fact, were directed against correct critical remarks of the meeting’s participants on the book’s shortcomings. The Directorate recommended that the Azerbaijani branch spend the next two years to focus on the pre-Revolution and Soviet periods of the history of the Party organization to issue Essays of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan as a single book by the end of 1960.102 The decision also included the instruction to publish a review of the book in the magazine Questions of History of the CPSU and the republican periodical press of Azerbaijan. A bit later, in volume 5, 1959, the magazine Questions of History of the CPSU published the editorial article “Scientific Development of History of Local Party Organizations as an Important Task of CPSU Historians” devoted, to a significant extent, to criticism of The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.103 This was not all. Following Khrushchev’s instruction, the theoretical, political magazine of

the CC CPSU Communist (Vol. 14, September 1959) issued an article, signed by Snastin, N. Shatagin, A. Lukashev, and A. Yudenkov, “On the Issue of Reporting the History of Local Party Organizations.” This was a rare instance when a head of the propaganda department of the CC CPSU personally wrote an article about a book issued in a province while the two other reviewers had been participants of the Baku meeting. This article reported critical remarks addressing Baku in a more academic manner than the Baku meeting did. Together with the authors of the book, Narimanov himself also turned into a target for criticism. The article read as follows: “In The History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Narimanov is mentioned 150 times, when necessary and when quite unnecessary. The role of Narimanov in many cases is described subjectively, as the authors try to link all the undertakings and events in the history of the Revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan to his name.”104 The article also criticized a monograph by Iskenderov “About the History of Struggle of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan for the Victory of the Soviet Power.” In addition, the review alleged that not only the authors of the book but also all historians of Azerbaijan, who had defended the book, were guilty of the revision of the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. An eloquent testimony to this was the Baku meeting that became an arena of dispute between Azerbaijanis and guests from other Republics: “Azerbaijani historians took it (the book) under their protection, praised it too much and thus did a disservice to the composite authors. Moreover, apparently erroneous speeches were made at the meeting. Particularly, they called for a revision of evaluation of the level of social-economic development of Azerbaijan, which had been given by the X Congress of the RCP (B).” The magazine Communist wrote the following of Kurbanov’s closing speech at the November 1958 meeting: “Head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA, Comrade Kurbanov, spoke absolutely incorrectly at the meeting. Instead of backing the participants of the meeting, who had noted serious shortcomings and mistakes in the treatment of the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Comrade Kurbanov defended the book and told the meeting that the criticism of the book was a ‘revision of important provisions concerning the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.’ In addition, the speech of Comrade Kurbanov contained erroneous instructions over organization of scientific work as well as insulting, tactless attacks against the participants of the meeting.”105 On October 20, 1959, the CC CPA Bureau discussed both critical articles and made a special resolution noting that “there are serious shortcomings and mistakes in work of the Institute of the History of Party (Director Iskenderov M. S.) in the preparation and publication of historical/Party literature.” The team of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism was instructed to develop a mockup of a book Essays of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to further discuss it at scientific institutions and Transcaucasian branches of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.106 Upon instruction of the CC CPA Bureau, the composite article signed by Snastin, N. Shatagin, A. Lukashev, and A. Yudenkov and published by the magazine Communist was reprinted in the newspaper Bakinskiy Rabochiy in its October 24 and October 25, 1959 issues. The critical article was followed by investigations at the Institute of the History of the Party under the CC CPA. Officials of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under

the CC CPSU checked everything at the Institute’s Azerbaijani branch to identify various things ranging from the amount of fees to the type of busses that carried Institute employees on missions. As a result, Institute Director Iskenderov was reprimanded.107 Yakovlev, who had poorly performed his functions as a supervisor and thus failed to justify Moscow’s trust, was dismissed from the post of the Second Secretary of the CC CPA and retired in August 1959. He was replaced by V. Semichastniy, a promising young Party worker who led the All-Union Komsomol in 1950–1958 and was head of the CC CPSU department on work with Party organs in 1959. He was appointed as Second Secretary of the CC CPA on August 10, 1959.108 Having worked in the Republic for two years, Semichastniy — one of Khrushchev’s close associates — was appointed as chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, where he worked in 1961–1967. Abdullayev, criticized in Baku and Moscow as a fellow and successor of Ibrahimov, was dismissed from the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan in October 1959. He was temporarily replaced by S. Jafarov. Upon Moscow’s “recommendation,” starting from autumn of 1959, the leaders of all printed media of Azerbaijan were obliged to report on treatment of the issues of international upbringing and friendship of the nations once a quarter. The Latvian SSR that had been accused, like Azerbaijan, of nationalism, also endured changes in the autumn of 1959. As Latvia had neglected to register settlers from Russia, distributed textbooks free of charge, and on the whole, connived at manifestations of nationalism, the leadership of Latvia, primarily Kalnberzin, who had led the CC CPL since 1940, were strongly criticized at the June (1959) Plenum of the CC CPSU. On August 5–6, 1959, the VIII Plenum of the CC CPL, having discussed the decisions of the June Plenum of the CC CPSU, pointed out serious shortcomings in the work of the CC Bureau. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia, E. Berklav, having been accused of bourgeois nationalism, was dismissed from his post. The so-called “nationalistic group” that had, together with Berklav, opposed inflow of additional workforce from Russia to the Republic, demanded the nomination of national cadre, and contributed to the spread of the Latvian language over enterprises and institutions was quietly removed from the political scene. At the November (1959) IX Plenum of the CC CPL that had discussed the results of the work done by Muhitdinov’s commission, Kalnberzin was freed from the post of First Secretary of the CC and moved to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR.109 Thus, First Secretary of the CC CPL Kalnberzin and First Secretary of the CC CPA Mustafayev lost their posts for “mistakes” made in the sphere of national policy. The leaders of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Moldavia were also accused of nationalism in 1959–1961.110 Thus, under various pretexts, Ibrahimov and Rahimov in 1958 and Mustafayev in 1959 were removed from the Republic’s leadership, though it was clear to everyone that the true reason of the “cleansing” was the processes of national revival and spread of national ideas (since the mid-1950s) that became the leading vector of all social processes in Azerbaijan. Not wishing to give its opponents any victories related to ideological struggle, the Soviet leadership did not

formalize these “cleansings” as documentary truth; however, the “top secret” archive materials preserved illustrate that the spread of the national idea was the root of all the problems. The processes of national revival that had begun in Azerbaijan in 1956 were curtailed in 1959 because of Moscow’s direct interference. Nevertheless, these processes, despite resembling communistic nationalism to extent, played an important role in the formation of national selfaffirmation, deepening of national self-consciousness, and birth of the national idea in literature and art, and thus put an indelible trace upon the renovated social idea. NOTES 1. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, January 9. 2. William Taubman. Khrushchev. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardia, 2008, p. 410. 3. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, January 9. 4. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, January 14. 5. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, January 28–29. 6. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 177. 7. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, February 3. 8. Doklad Nikita Khrusheva o kulte lichnosti Stalina na XX syezde KPSS. (Report of Nikita Khrushchev about the personality cult of Stalin at the XX Congress of the CPSU), pp. 96–97. 9. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, February 3. 10. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, January 26. 11. KGB in Iran, 1988. // Mitrokhin Collection, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, p. 18. 12. From Kopylov to Mustafayev. Report on the results of the agent, operational and investigative work of the KGB at the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan SSR in 1958. 22.01.1959. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 13. Shorthand record of the meeting of the republican KGB operational staff at the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR, special departments of the Baku district Anti Air Defense, 4th Army and intelligence officers of the Azerbaijani border district. 21.06.1960. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 14. Ibid. 15. Transcript of the meeting of the Republican leadership and operations of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 30.05.1959. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 16. Meeting of the KGB operative Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 14.11.1959. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 17. Ibid. 18. From Alexandr Kardashov to Veli Akhundov. 13.02.1960. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 19. From Kardashov to Akhundov. 30.06.1960. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 20. Vladislav M. Zubok. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 173. 21. Vladislav Zubok. Zhivago’s Children. The Last Russian Intelligentsia. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2009, p. 105. 22. Meeting of the KGB operative Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR. 21.06.1960. // From materials of the AMNS AR. 23. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. II. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. II. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 835–839. 24. Ibid., p. 835. 25. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the establishment of a commission to study the restructuring of public education.” August, 1958 // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.114, p. 29. 26. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On holding the August meeting of teachers.” 19.08.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.120, pp. 75–79. 27. Decision of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the open preparatory classes for the children of Avars, Lezghins, Tats, Talyshs and other nationalities.” 18.03.1958. // APDPARA, f.1. r.45, v.84, pp. 1–9. 28. From Efendiyev to Mustafayev and Akhundov. 25.08.1958. // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.134, pp. 14–15.

29. From Aslanov, Huseynov, and Mirzaliyev to Akhundov. October 1958 // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.134, pp. 9–11. 30. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR M. Mammadov, Azerbaijan Communist Party.13.10.1958 // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.134, p. 8. 31. Petition of Balakan District Executive Committee about the language of instruction in schools of Ititala village, Balakan district. 14.10.1958 // APDPARA, f.1, r.45, v.134, p. 1. 32. APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.87, p. 43. 33. APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.87, p. 57. 34. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, March 27. 35. Communist (in Azeri) 1959, April 2. 36. Transcript of VIII Plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 16.06.1959 // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, p. 205. 37. Azərbaycan tarxi. T. VII. (History of Azerbaijan. Vol. VII.), p. 158. 38. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. I. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. I. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 1052. 39. Transcript of VIII Plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 16.06.1959 // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, pp. 43–44. 40. Ibid., p. 106. 41. Ibid., pp. 109–110. 42. Ibid., p. 127. 43. Ibid., p. 168. 44. Ibid., pp. 201–202. 45. Ibid., pp. 212–213. 46. Excerpts from the brochure of Mirza Ibragimov “Azerbaijani language.” // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.25, pp. 186–196. 47. Transcript of VIII Plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 16.06.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.16, p. 327. 48. Ibid., pp. 330–331. 49. Ibid., pp. 331–359. 50. From I. Shikin, V. Snastin, Y. Polenov, A. Pavlyukov, N. Kuzin, A. Sennikov, P. Kuznetsov, A. Yudenkov, B. Semyonov, P. Lebedov, I. Krichenko to the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.25, p. 204. 51. Ibid., pp. 205–206. 52. Ibid., pp.206–207. 53. Ibid., pp.207–208. 54. Ibid., pp. 214–215. 55. Transcript of the June (1959) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. // RNHSA, f.2, r.1, v.374, pp. 146–149. 56. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. I. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. I. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 1058. 57. Transcript of IX Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 07.07.1959 // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.26, p. 88. 58. Ibid., pp. 327–328. 59. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. I. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. I. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 357. 60. Ibid., pp. 357–358. 61. Ibid., p. 363. 62. Ibid., p. 364. 63. Ibid., p. 365. 64. Ibid., p. 367. 65. Ibid., p. 369. 66. Ibid., p. 384. 67. Ibid., p. 370. 68. Ibid., pp. 386–387. 69. Ibid., p. 385. 70. Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU “Issues in Azerbaijan.” 02.07.1959. // RNHSA, f.3, r.14, v.304, pp. 16–17. 71. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. I. Cherjoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. I. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 382, 387. 72. Ibid., pp. 371–381. 73. Transcript of the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 06.07.1959.// APDPARA, f.1, r.42, v.87, p. 31.

74. Ibid., p. 32. 75. Ibid., pp. 51–52. 76. Ibid., p. 64. 77. Ibid., pp. 67–68. 78. Ibid., p. 12. 79. Regionalnaya politika N. S. Khrushcheva. TsK KPSS I mestnye partiynye komitety. 1953–1964 gg. (Regional policy N. S. Khrushcheva. CC CPSU and local party committees). Moscow, 2009, pp. 242–243; Report of V. Akhundov on IX Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 06–08.07.1919 // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.25, pp. 85–87. 80. Regionalnaya politika N. S. Khrushcheva. TsK KPSS I mestnye partiynye komitety. 1953–1964 gg. (Regional policy N. S. Khrushcheva. CC CPSU and local party committees). Moscow, 2009, p. 249. 81. Transcript of IX Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 06–08.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.26, pp. 36–37. 82. Ibid., p. 52. 83. Ibid., p. 79. 84. Ibid., pp. 169–178. 85. Ibid., pp. 239–240. 86. Ibid., pp. 299–300. 87. Ibid., pp. 305–308. 88. Ibid., pp. 309–310. 89. Ibid., pp. 334–337. 90. Resolution of the IX Plenum of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan “On the Situation in the Party Organization of the Republic, on Serious Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Work of CC CPA Bureau and CC First Secretary comrade Mustafayev I. D.” 06–08.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.25, p. 12. 91. Ibid., p. 14. 92. Transcript of meeting of the republican ideological workers on the results of the IX Plenum of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 11.07.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.401, p. 199. 93. Ibid., pp. 200–202. 94. Ibid., pp. 232–233. 95. Ibid., p. 241. 96. Ibid., p. 248. 97. Ibid., p. 258. 98. Ibid., p. 275. 99. Ibid., pp. 290–291. 100. Ibid., pp. 292–293. 101. Decision of administration of Institute of Marxism-Leninism about the Central Committee of the CPSU “On Work of the Azerbaijani Branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute on Development of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.” 17.08.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.108, p. 160. 102. Ibid., pp. 161–164. 103. Nauchnaya razrabotka istoriyi mestnykh partiynykh organizatsiy-vazhnaya zadacha istorikov KPSS //“Voprosy istoriyi KPSS”, N. 5, 1959. (Scientific Development of History of Local Party Organizations as an Important Task of CPSU Historians. // Questions History of CPSU), pp. 3–24. 104. Snastin V., Shatagin N., Lukashev A., Yudenkov A. K voprosu ob osvesheniyi istoriyi mestnykh partiynykh organizatsiy. // “Kommnist”, 1959, N. 14. (Snastin V., Shatagin N., Lukashev A., Yudenkov A. On the Issue of Reporting the History of Local Party Organizations. // Communist), p. 96. 105. Ibid., pp. 99–100. 106. Decision of the CC CPA “There are serious shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the Institute of the History of the Party (Director Iskenderov M. S.) in the preparation and publication of historical-Party literature.” 20.10.1959. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.108, pp. 132–136. 107. Decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 05.11.1957. // APDPARA, f.1, r.46, v.451, p. 31. 108. Autobiography of Vladimir Semichastniy. Characteristics of Semichastniy. // APDPARA, f.1, r.405, v.2735, pp. 4–8. 109. Centralniy komitet KPSS, VKP (b), RSDRP (b): Istoriko-biograficheskiy spravochnik. (The Central Committee of the CPSU, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks): Historical and Biographical Directory), p. 229. 110. Zubkova Elena. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsiyi v SSSR. 1953–1985 gody // Otechestvennaya istoriya, N.

4, 2004. (Zubkov Elena. Power and the Development of the Ethnic Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985// History of the Fatherland #4), p. 8.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the process of renovation that covered the Soviet society after Stalin died did not bypass Azerbaijan either. Bagirov, who had led the Republic’s Party organization for twenty years, was stripped of power after Beria was arrested. That was the end of Bagirov’s era in the history of Azerbaijan. The new leadership, after having been formed in FebruaryMarch 1954, ruled Azerbaijan until 1959. Mustafayev was First Secretary of the CC CPA, Ibrahimov was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, and Rahimov and then Akhundov led the Council of Ministers of the Republic. They were all in the focus of political processes that happened in Azerbaijan in 1954–1959. After Stalin died, the new Soviet leadership in 1953–1957 tried to lead the country on the path of liberal reforms. In separate spheres, these reforms were a success: changes for the better in the public-political, social-economic, and cultural life became obvious. Nevertheless, Khrushchev’s reforms were of a split nature, incomplete, and thus could not affect the foundations of social life. Changes that had lasted until the end of 1957 and were related to the name of First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev went down in history under the term of Khrushchev’s “thaw.” This “thaw” did not change Soviet society, since it was just a bit more liberal than Stalin’s totalitarian model of ruling the society. The XX Congress of the CPSU played an important role in the softening of the political climate in the USSR. The harsh criticism of Stalin’s personality cult by Khrushchev substantially weakened the people’s feeling of fear. The rehabilitation of the victims of Stalin’s repressions and the restoration of the rights of the deported nations created hope that justice would triumph. However, this process, despite having spread broadly in the beginning, remained incomplete as well. This is because all members of the Soviet leadership, including Khrushchev himself, had been active participants in Stalin’s repressions and deportations. The historic decisions of the XX Congress set the whole society in motion; however, neither Khrushchev nor his colleagues in the country’s leadership could lead this motion. The issuing of passports to the country’s rural population, which began in the mid-1950s, gave an impetus to migration processes. As a result, the urban population of the country increased. In addition, the flow of the local rural population changed the national composition of the capitals of Union Republics. This was particularly evident in some Baltic and Transcaucasian Republics. An increase in the local portion of the population in the cities of national Republics was accompanied by the transition of the majority of responsibility for governing the Republic to local cadres, which troubled Moscow. The 1950s reforms substantially strengthened the role of the Party apparatus in ruling the country. In the USSR a Party dictatorship was established in the full sense of this word. To

strengthen his power and keep it in his hands, Khrushchev masterly used the strength of the Party apparatus. At the June 1957 Plenum, this apparatus played a determinative role in Khrushchev’s victory over Stalin’s guards. In fact, Khrushchev’s reforms not only completed the process of formation of a new center of power in the form of a Party apparatus, but also led to the victory of this apparatus. However, since the end of the 1950s Khrushchev himself had been gradually turning into a hostage of the monster he created that mercilessly had its revenge over him when the time came. Having made the Party apparatus the social support of the society, Khrushchev weakened state security bodies, crushed their organizational structure, and established Party control over them. In so doing, he destructed the terrible phantom of security bodies that had been formed since the “iron Felix” era. Sergey Khrushchev writes that, “fears were gradually receding from society.”1 This was to Khrushchev’s great historical merit. Beria’s arrest and shooting essentially contributed to compromising security bodies. The Ministry of State Security, after having been abolished in 1954, became a Committee under the Council of Ministers. In March of the same year, a decision of the CC CPSU specified tasks and approved a Provision of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. On January 22, 1963, Chairman of the KGB Semichastniy submitted a note to the CC CPSU showing that 46,000 officers had been dismissed from state security bodies and that forty-six high-ranking executives had been stripped of the rank of General in 1954–1962. The personnel of the KGB, which had until recently a state within the state, was cut in half. The positions of the dismissed KGB officers started being occupied by Party cadre.2 District and urban departments of security bodies were replaced with regional departments. However, the latter failed to perform the previous functions. As an auxiliary measure, in 1960 the KGB was permitted to enjoy, in the summer months, the voluntary assistance of out-of-staff members to shadow foreigners in museums, at libraries, at swimming pools, and in other public places. For his part, on December 20, 1960, Chairman of the KGB Shelepin reported to the CC CPSU that the very first month of use of outof-staff agents had displayed the high efficiency of public representatives’ involvement in the work of security bodies and that this form of cooperation should be applied not only in the summer months but also all year round.3 The process of weakening the KGB by transferring it onto “public bases” lasted until the end of the 1960s and essentially contributed to the spread of dissent and anti-Soviet actions in the USSR as well as nationalism in Union Republics. However, Khrushchev’s reforms were aimed not at the destruction of state security bodies, but rather at weakening them and subordinating them to party organs. This is why during the entire Soviet society, including the Khrushchev era, the word “KGB” was written with capital letters and the word “God” with lowercase letters. The rights of the Union Republics were expanded in the mid-1950s. A series of enterprises of All-Union importance were put under their jurisdiction. The role of local authorities in economy planning and management increased to a certain extent. The reforms of government which were implemented in the country slightly weakened the methods of the command economy in agriculture. The establishment of the Economic Councils enhanced the role of national Republics in economic management. Certain peculiarities of the economies of these

Republics, and their language and cultural specificity, started being taken into consideration in some cases. Local ruling elite with representatives of indigenous nationality at the foreground started being formed in Republics. However, freedom was just nominal in many cases. For instance, following a declaration of expansion of the rights of Union Republics, Mustafayev had no right to employ two technical employees as CC apparatus members without Moscow’s consent. Or, while the rights of the Union Republics started being expanded after the XX Congress, it was customary to appoint Moscow’s protégés as Second Secretaries of the CC of Parties of Union Republics, naturally, as supervisors. The national question was the most sensitive one in the Soviet Union. Though it was not spoken of, information provided by intelligence services, written correspondence between Party organs, and discussions at the CC CPSU Presidium that played a determinative, directing role in governing the country demonstrated the existence of discord between the nations in an international country. Was there nationalism in the USSR? Without a doubt, there was. But in many cases this nationalism was of Communist nature, a direct consequence of the policy of national dissension pursued by Moscow. For example, the Defense Ministry of the USSR issued a decree that prohibited training and nominating Azerbaijani officers at the Transcaucasian military district. Only after strong objections by the Republic’s leadership and dismissal of G. Zhukov from the post of Defense Minister of the USSR did the CC CPSU Presidium, by its decision of November 12, 1957, cancel this unjust decree; nevertheless, this discrimination actually continued to exist for a long time. Another example is a decree of the chief commander of land troops of May 23, 1957 or a decree of the commander of the Transcaucasian military district of June 8 of the same year that gave an instruction to compose a parachute landing force only of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians; conscripts of only these nationalities were selected to serve in the Army abroad; conscripts from the Transcaucasian Republics were banned from serving in Transcaucasia; however, soldiers and servicemen of the Transcaucasian military district, that is, non-Caucasians, were allowed to become students of Transcaucasian military schools. Research on the processes of the 1950s shows that national cultures really developed, though on the basis of Communist ideology. However, national dissent was also observed in everyday practice. The national Republic felt discrimination; in some cases protests against it were heard even from the political elite. Mistakes made in the sphere of national policy, especially in office work, education, and so forth, were acknowledged by Party and state documents adopted after Stalin’s death. In addition, these documents admitted insufficient attention to the national languages, indifference to the interests of local ethoses, an imbalanced cadre policy, and attempts to use force to retaliate against underground nationalistic groups, which were not sufficiently effective.4 However, keeping in mind the international attention paid to the national question in the USSR, the Soviet leadership avoided too much noise in order to “not to give its enemies an additional cause.” For precisely this reason, leaders of the Republics who had committed outbreaks of nationalistic manifestations were dismissed from their posts under neutral formulations. At the end of the 1950s, the leaders of the Azerbaijan and Latvian Soviet Republics left their posts for various reasons, such as voluntary termination, because of age, or

for mistakes committed in the sphere of economics; however, the basis of all the reshuffling was that nationalism had been strengthening in both Republics. Formation of a new Azerbaijani leadership in 1954 was just a small part of the large attempt to rid the Soviet society of security bodies’ control and thus create a civil community in the country. Khrushchev’s career had not been linked with security bodies, so the terrible phantom of intelligence services permanently loomed over him in the years of Stalin’s terror. He always tried to keep his distance from security agents. For this reason, Mustafayev, who also had no contacts with security bodies and built his career in the spheres of economy and the Party, was elected as First Secretary of the CC CPA in 1954. As an expert in agriculture and a Secretary of the CC CPA, he caught Khrushchev’s attention after the September (1953) Plenum of the CC CPSU devoted to the questions of the development of agriculture. Two more remarkable appointments were made in 1954. Writer Ibrahimov, who had represented workers of culture, was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR, while economic leader Rahimov was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. In the 1950s, the national idea was spread in Azerbaijan through the struggle for the national language. The declaration of the Azerbaijani language as the state one and inclusion of an appropriate Article in the Constitution of the Republic without preliminary accordance with the CC CPSU and its Presidium countered the principles of ruling established by the Soviet leadership. Ibrahimov and Mustafayev, who played important roles in the adoption of this law, had been active participants of events in Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan in 1945–1946 when, in the conditions of Soviet occupation of the north of Iran, the USSR was creating structures of an autonomous Azerbaijani republic there. Ibrahimov, a native of Iranian Azerbaijan who had been taught civil opposition in his small native land in Tabriz, understood best of all the great significance of the factor of language in life of his native people. The adoption of the Law on the state language, its application in institutions and enterprises, and its wide use in office work gave a strong impetus to the development of the national idea. Only after this law was passed, the Azerbaijani people, who had long been under the pressure of national discrimination, felt as though they were the host of their own house. The public/political processes in Azerbaijan in the 1950s put forth a national leader, the bearer of the national idea and initiator of national actions Mirza Ibrahimov. He entered policy from literature, passed through an interesting course in life, had a broad world outlook, and had an excellent education. As a writer, he was known not only in the USSR but also in foreign countries. He was the author of the novel The Day Will Come devoted to historical goals and destinies of the Azerbaijani nation. The principality Ibrahimov had displayed in the adoption of the law on state language and its use in state institutions substantially raised his authority among the people. At meetings at the Academy of Sciences, of which he was a full member, at Republic-wide events, and at literature and art evenings, he was warmly welcomed. That cost him a high price. Fairly regarding him as the central figure of the raised banner of nationalism, Khrushchev called Ibrahimov a fascist. In 1958 Ibrahimov was released from his post, but, as he had enjoyed great influence upon society, he did not leave the political scene. The new leadership of the Republic that came to power after Mustafayev was dismissed continued to

take him into account. In 1961, he was conferred the honored rank of People’s Writer of Azerbaijan and, following the resignation of Khrushchev, in 1965 he was elected First Secretary of the Union of Writers of Azerbaijan upon the recommendation of Akhundov. Ibrahimov was removed from this post in the early 1970s. In 1959, Mustafayev was dismissed from his post on charges of nationalism. The leadership of the Republic was harshly criticized. Owing to Moscow’s pressure, the adoption of the law on state language and the compulsory teaching of the Azerbaijani language in the Republic’s Russian-language secondary schools were admitted as “erroneous steps,” and so were the canonic forms of description of Azerbaijan’s history and culture. After this, senior officials started speaking Russian at Party and state events; however, the national processes had already penetrated people’s consciousness so deeply that they became irreversible. Akhundov, who was elected First Secretary of the CC CPA in 1959, had also been an active participant of public processes in the Republic since the mid-1950s. Having become the Minister of Health in 1954, he was later elected Secretary of the CC and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1958. His political career was connected with Mustafayev. It could be regarded as Mustafayev’s merit that such a talented, generally educated, highly cultural personality as Akhundov was nominated for the key position in the Republic. The new leader of the Party organization did much to continue heading for the national revival that had taken its start in the 1950s. In his work, he had to take the realities of the political situation in the country into consideration. For example, Kurbanov, for his active participation in the national development processes, was released from the post of head of the propaganda department of the CC CPA in 1961 upon Khrushchev’s recommendation and appointed as head of the department of the Institute of Literature and Language of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. However, several years later, Akhundov moved him back to the CC CPA, promoted him to CC Secretary in charge of ideology, and instructed him to arrange undertakings to revive folk customs and traditions. As Kurbanov died soon after, he was replaced as CC CPA Secretary in charge of ideology in 1967 by talented critic and theorist J. Jafarov, who had been strongly criticized under Stalin’s rule and thus in the early 1950s removed from the leading Party work for manifestations of “formalism” and “cosmopolitanism.” Rza, who had taken an active role in a campaign that aimed to give the Azerbaijani language state status and was thus accused by Moscow emissaries of “lack of ideology,” was appointed by Akhundov in 1965 as chief editor of the Azerbaijani Soviet Encyclopedia, which had been under creation since 1958. Akhundov broke one more tradition that had long ruled the national Republics, including Azerbaijan. This was about the nationality of the heads of state security bodies of the Republic. The last Azerbaijani to head a state security body of the Republic had been Novruz Rizayev. An evident discrimination in this sphere is illustrated by the names of heads of the Azerbaijani security bodies since 1930: M. P. Frinovskiy, A. S. Agrba, Y. D. Sumbatov-Topuridze, M. G. Rayev, S. F. Yemelyanov, A. M. Guskov, F. I. Kopylov, A. V. Kardashov, and S. K. Tsvigun. Upon Akhundov’s insistence, an Azerbaijani Heydar Aliyev was appointed as Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR in June 1967. Aliyev later played

an important role in the destiny of both Azerbaijan and the whole Soviet Union. Another of Akhundov’s remarkable deeds is that he managed to obtain Moscow’s permission to rebury S. J. Pishevari, the head of the national government of the Southern Azerbaijan who in 1947 had been killed in a car accident under mysterious circumstances and was buried in the yard of a tuberculosis dispensary of the Buzovna settlement, in the Honored Burial Lane (a kind of Azerbaijani Pantheon). In February 1960, on the eve of the fifteenth anniversary jubilee of the Azer 21 (December 12) Movement and formation of the national government of Southern Azerbaijan, the CC of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan asked the leadership of the Republic to provide assistance to rebury Pishevari in the Honored Burial Lane, publish his selected works, and name one of the streets of Baku or an enterprise after him. However, the CC CPSU denied the request, explaining that such measures could spoil relations between the USSR and Iran.5 Nevertheless, Akhundov managed to receive permission to rebury the ashes in a worthier place, and on March 22, 1960 the CC CPA Bureau made a decision to organize the funeral at the Honored Lane.6 In 1965 Akhundov also managed to receive permission to publish selected works of Pishevari and name one of the streets of Baku after him. It was not easy to get this. Though Pishevari had been killed in 1947, the Soviet leadership, and particularly intelligence services, kept everything pertaining to his name in focus. On February 26, 1966, a deputy Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR reported to the CC CPSU international department that materials collected on the situation in the Popular Party of Iran also contained information about Pishevari.7 The material contained information about his whole life, including the smallest details ranging from his behavior at an Iranian prison to provocative information about him by one of the leaders of the Party, Tude A. Ovanesyan. For instance, it alleged that Pishevari, when he was in prison, said in the presence of everyone: “I’m aware of many cases pertaining to Communists; if I want to, I can cause them all to be shot, but I won’t do this.”8 In addition, the KGB dossier contained letters which had been written by Pishevari’s wife Masume and son Dariush to Khrushchev and K. Voroshilov, as well as documents indicating that the Pishevari family visited CC CPSU senior executives.9 The 1950s ended. The generation of the sixties appeared. A B. Vahabzadeh’s poem “Gulustan” appeared at the junction of the two decades. Artistically, it marked the end of old literature; politically, it marked the birth of new, patriotic-oriented literature. Young, talented people entered science, literature and art in the early 1960s. The transition from socialist literature to national literature began long before the USSR broke down. The national form of art, began to prevail over socialist content by becoming one the key means of displaying “national vividness” (the term was invented by the father of the first Azerbaijani independence, M. E. Rasulzadeh) in literature and essays. The crisis of Khrushchev’s rule started accelerating in the early 1960s. The 1961 money reform reduced the national value of the ruble and triggered inflation. The slowdown in agriculture beginning in 1958 led to a food shortage. In 1963, the USSR was quite short on bread. Attempts at baking bread from maize that should have been fed to cattle had a negative effect. Queues for bread in big cities were accompanied by mass disorder. The strengthening of a struggle against dissent did not stabilize the situation. Round-the-clock control of foreign

radio broadcasts by the KGB of the USSR, the Ministry of Communications, and the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting produced no effect, and neither did jamming or interfering with radio broadcasts. A 1961 proposal by deputy head of the CC CPSU department for propaganda in Union Republics, V. Snastin, and head of the sector of this department, G. Kazakov, to establish supplementary stations in Baku and Tbilisi to control the radio waves was of a temporary nature.10 The realities of life shook the foundations of Khrushchev’s power throughout the Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan. On the day of the celebration of the forty-sixth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, November 7, 1963, mass disorder occurred in Sumgait, a town of Socialism and youth. The reason for this was that some demonstrators came with portraits of Stalin in their hands. This had occurred earlier in Sumgait as well. As the crisis of the Khrushchev’s power deepened, citizens had already brought portraits of Stalin to the demonstrations in May and October 1962 and May 1963. Because the work of the XXII Congress of the CPSU was wholly devoted to the struggle with Stalinism, the Party, and ruling elite of the country, as well as the official Soviet press, stubbornly fought against manifestations of sympathies for Stalin. In the background of these processes, the authorities of Sumgait were reasonably afraid of being accused of being devoted to Stalinism. Thus, it was instructed to remove the portraits of Stalin. The confrontation between the demonstrators and militia gradually began to spin out of control. The angered mass of workers rushed toward the rostrum at the central square and threw stones onto the big portrait of Khrushchev. They brought a huge portrait of Stalin that they had found in a storeroom to the square. The demonstrators tore to shreds a truck decorated in the honor of the holiday with the banners, flags and portraits of the leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet state. They shouted slogans calling for an overthrow of the Soviet Government and CPSU leaders. Order in Sumgait was restored only with the help of the Baku militia after midday. The investigation of the mass disorder ended with six individuals’ sentencing to three to six years in prison.11 According to official written correspondence, this case was assessed as a recurrence of Stalinism, though in reality the people had acted against the Party and government leaders, primarily Khrushchev. Khrushchev’s voluntarism represented a weak form of Stalin’s totalitarianism but was steadily acquiring character more and more threatening to the country. Not long before his resignation, in a speech at a meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium in December 1963, Khrushchev recalled his grandfather’s exhortation, saying: “My grandfather, after he knew that I had been taught to count from zero to 100, told me: ‘enough, stop doing this; you’ll never reach any higher mark.’”12 Regretfully, Khrushchev recalled his grandfather’s exhortation too late. In autumn of 1964 he turned into an undesirable figure for both the country and the Party and state figures, who had backed him in the struggle with the “anti-Party group” in 1957. On October 13–14, 1964, the CC CPSU Presidium discussed the question of restoration of the principle of collective leadership at the CC CPSU. Presidium members, candidates of CC membership, and CC Secretaries noted that Khrushchev’s actions had lent an overall patience to the extreme camp, so the question of freeing him from his post ought to be raised. The plans of overtaking and surpassing America that had been proposed back in 1957 failed. Nikita

Khrushchev’s son Sergey Khrushchev later admitted that “it didn’t even work to catch up with them, never mind to surpass them.”13 The following weighty arguments were listed: the increase of wages of workers and employees provided by the seven-year plan of economic development was postponed; the Republics were demanded to take responsibility but given no rights (Pyotr Shelest); Khrushchev’s wrong, non-Party attitude resulted in an intolerable atmosphere and a new personality cult, this time around Khrushchev, and expressing opinions or touring districts had already been prohibited for 3.5 years (Gennadiy Voronov); the characteristics Lenin gave to Stalin were fully true about Khrushchev; traveling abroad had become a family manner, Khrushchev’s phrase is the following: “It is dames who made the Revolution” (A. Shelepin); nationalism prospered, consigning the national question to oblivion was dangerous; Khrushchev’s cult had gone too far, and it would be hard to correct it (Kirill Mazurov); all the positive was ascribed to Khrushchev and the negative to Party district committees; toadies were encouraged; signals from the “Family” were given great importance (M. Suslov); no single solution had been found to questions of material position following the results of the seven-year plan; it was inexpedient to concentrate power in a single person’s hands (Viktor Grishin); ten academicians of Timiryazev Academy had already failed to be received by Khrushchev for two years, but he received capitalists immediately, so the only way out of the situation would be his immediate resignation (Dmitriy Polyanskiy); Khrushchev’s method of work is not Lenin’s style, and nothing can be solved through split measures; and he made two reports at the XXII Congress, settled everything himself at Plenums and had now proposed the idea of an eight-year plan, so there would be no point to eliminating hardships, Khrushchev should be released from all his posts (Aleksey Kosygin). In a conversation with A. Mikoyan on October 13, Khrushchev agreed to yield the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers to A. Kosygin; however, the CC Presidium made a decision to release him from all posts. Formalization of the matter was postponed until October 14 at the CC Plenum’s discretion. Khrushchev acknowledged many of his mistakes, promising neither to avenge his critics (“Why shall I look for paints to stain you?”) nor to show resistance. He noted, “I’m glad that the Party, at last, has grown up and now can control any person.”14 On October 14, 1964, a Plenum of the CC CPSU was held that discussed the question “About the abnormal situation created at the CC Presidium in connection with N. S. Khrushchev’s incorrect doings.” Suslov reported on this issue. He noted that the CC Presidium had discussed the question of Khrushchev’s incorrect actions for two days. All members of the Presidium unanimously blamed the incorrect actions of Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CC and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As stated at the Plenum, “hastiness and itching for reorganization overstrained the Central and local apparatuses.” Khrushchev’s numerous notes and proposals simply prevented any work. When he was going abroad, he used to take, apart from his wife (as was the custom in Europe), his children, grandchildren, and other members of his family with him. When touring foreign countries, Khrushchev made independent decisions about conferring Soviet orders to bourgeois state figures. He demanded dissolution of the country’s scientific agricultural center (the Timiryazev Academy) because

many scientists disagreed with his erroneous directives. In fact, agricultural production stopped rising in 1958. Well-known hardships pertaining to the population’s food supply emerged in the country. This cast a shadow over the Party’s authority. Kalinovka (Khrushchev’s native village—J. H.) was praised so much by the Soviet leader that everyone’s teeth were set on edge. Khrushchev made serious mistakes in the questions of international policy. He ordered An-2 planes to be manufactured in Poland. The Poles built a plant and fell into debt. When the planes were built, he ordered that they not be bought from Poland. Thus, the economy of Poland was put in a sad position. Khrushchev got the idea that he would teach Romanians to grow maize, though harvests in Romania had been higher than in the USSR. Naturally, relations with the leaders of this country deteriorated. With all the above in consideration, the CC Plenum made a decision to release Khrushchev from all his posts. In addition, the Plenum decided that a single person should never be permitted to combine the posts of First Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR any longer. L. I. Brezhnev was elected First Secretary of the CC CPSU, while A. N. Kosygin was appointed, upon recommendation of the CC Plenum, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.15 This marked the beginning of the era of Brezhnev in the USSR. With insignificant exceptions, this era lasted until the startup of the disintegration of the USSR. Soon after he took office, Brezhnev felt that his powers had to be expanded. Though the CC Plenum in 1953 and in 1964 had already made decisions that banned concentration of the state power into a single person’s hands, Brezhnev, who had been Secretary General of the CC CPSU, took over the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1977 as well. Compared to Khrushchev’s stormy era, Brezhnev’s era was calm. This didn’t mean that displeased people disappeared in the country or that all the problems, even international ones, were solved. At first, this “calmness” resulted from the strengthening of command methods in Party and state apparatuses, and then from the strengthening of the KGB structures compared to Khrushchev’s era. In 1967, CC Secretary Yuriy Andropov was appointed as the head of security bodies, and later the same year he was elected as a candidate for the CC CPSU Political Bureau membership. No heads of security bodies had been elected to the Political Bureau (Presidium) since Beria. Andropov broke this tradition. After having been appointed Chairman of the KGB on June 17, 1967, Andropov, according to a decision of the CC CPSU to strengthen the struggle with “ideological provocations” of capitalist countries, created the Fifth Division of the KGB. According to the regulations, departments and sectors of this Division should also be created in KGB territorial bodies. The key objective was not to prevent ideological subversive acts at the USSR borders, but to control the figures of science, culture, and literature to prevent appearance of nationalistic tendencies and thus fight dissent. In a report on the results of KGB work for 1967 submitted to Brezhnev in May 1968, Chairman of the KGB Andropov wrote as follows: “Given that the enemy, in an effort to undermine socialism on the inside, largely banks on propagating nationalism, the KGB bodies took a series of measures to prevent attempts to carry out organized nationalistic activity in a number of the country’s regions, including Ukraine, Baltic,

Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, and Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingushetian, Tatarian, and Abkhazian ASSR.”16 The Czechoslovakian events of 1968 strengthened anti-Soviet sentiments in the USSR, while the national Republics started tending to revise Lenin’s national policy. Secret information of the events in the Czech SSR obtained through various means, as well as documents of discussions at the Political Bureau, illustrate that contrary to the declarative statements of the Soviet government, no one was quite sure that socialism was unshakeable. Available documents prove that in a whole series of cases, the Soviet leadership really feared that the “Prague spring” could not only spread over other socialist countries but also negatively affect various strata of the Soviet society, primarily intelligentsia and students, and arouse nationalistic sentiments in national Republics. The example of Slovakia showed to what extent the “Prague spring” was contagious for the Soviet Republics. When the Czechoslovakian events were in full swing, at a meeting on March 3, 1968, the CC Political Bureau recommended tightening control of authors of literary memoirs that turned out to be ideologically harmful for readers, preventing archive materials from getting into the hands of occasional persons, increasing attention to the work of the Union of Writers, and blocking the way to the dissident movement that expanded as the days went on. Speaking at this meeting, Brezhnev noted, “questions of work with intelligentsia are a serious question that cannot be settled by administrative measures alone. Always, at all stages of life and struggle, prior to and in the early years of the Soviet power, these questions were in focus, and a certain category of intelligentsia, for example, writers, were always encouraged.”17 Despite all the efforts of intelligence services, the influence of the Czechoslovakian events upon Azerbaijan was evident: nationalistic sentiments were spread among students; dissent and free thinking steadily grew. At this period, the Republic’s leadership regularly supplied Moscow with reports “About condemnation of the Czechoslovakian events,” but these reports were far from the truth. They only wrote what Moscow wanted to hear. No one was tricked into believing that in July 1969 Akhundov had left the post of First Secretary of the CC CPA and his membership of the CC Bureau “for health reasons and voluntary termination.” Standing behind this decision were processes that covered literature, culture, science, art, and public and political spheres in the 1960s. A sharp speech of First Secretary of the CC, Heydar Aliyev, at the CC CPA Plenum later (October 1971) which was devoted to ideological questions confirms the strengthening of nationalism among the intelligentsia and in the sphere of public sciences. In a report for 1972, the Fifth Division of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR notes that Turkish scientists, members of a “Society of Turkish Language” operational under the Universities of Istanbul and Erzurum, sent numerous “works” and “monographs” to Azerbaijani scientists. These materials pertained to history and philology and were of anti-Soviet, nationalistic nature. They called for unification of all the Turkic-speaking nations under Turkey’s supremacy. At the same time, the Fifth Division found enough time to trace an outgoing flow of scientific literature from Azerbaijan to Turkish and other famous foreign universities and personally to leading scientists of the world. Prominent scientist and patriot Abbas Zamanov, who had introduced the exchange of books in the system of scientific

links, actually expanded the geography of the spread of the Azerbaijani national idea. The Fifth Division noted in a report that anti-Soviet/nationalistic propaganda was positively accepted by intelligentsia. For instance, a member of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR, Akram Aylisli, told a meeting of the Republic’s Union of Writers that “in the creative process an idea is a mask, so Soviet citizens, under this mask, commit the dirtiest things, and our society is gradually turning into a bourgeois state. All vital activities are struck by corruption and bribery. Thus, these facts must be reflected in the works of writers.” With due pride, it was noted that the interference of security bodies prevented publication of a number of works directed against the Soviet system.18 Practically every issue of the almanac Gobustan which writer Anar had been publishing since 1969 was checked by the Fifth Division. Staying away from ideological dogmas, this publication played an invaluable role in the revival of cultural heritage, the formation of pan-Turkic thinking, the “Turkization” of the Azerbaijani language, and general familiarization of Azerbaijanis with their spiritual/national roots. In 1969, famous screen writer Rustam Ibrahimbeyov’s film “In a Southern City,” which revealed the deformity of the Soviet society, was made. New trends reflecting the diversity of views of the country’s past became apparent in the Azerbaijani historical science in the 1960s. This was particularly displayed in the interpretation of events of the early nineteenth century, known as Azerbaijan’s unification with Russia. Azerbaijani historians began to give up the version of “voluntary unification” and, in accordance with historical reality, called it a conquest. Appropriate evaluations of this turning point in the history of the Republic made by leading historians such as Ziya Buniyatov, Mahmud Ismailov, and Suleyman Aliyarov drew the attention of not only security bodies but also the Party leadership of the Republic. An open letter published in the newspaper Edebiyyat ve injesenet (Literature and Art) on January 8, 1966 by a docent of the State University of Azerbaijan, S. Aliyarov, received a great public response. In the letter, he suggested restoring the historical name of the city of Ganja. It was a very courageous action to launch a public discussion about renaming what had become Kirovabad in 1935 in honor of one of the Bolshevik apostles S. Kirov. In his letter, Aliyarov wrote as follows: “Ganja is an ancient town founded in approximately 945 AD. It represents the true monument of the rich history of the Azerbaijani nation. The name of the town also has its special history. It inherited its name from the capital of the ancient state of Atropathena that had existed in the territory of Azerbaijan BC. The name of this town contains the surname of one of the geniuses of world literature—Nizami (Gandjevi). Thus, it seems quite evident that this town’s renaming was one of the manifestations of the administrative tyranny that reigned in the 1930s.”19 Many literary figures and scientists attended the discussion. G. Gasymzadeh was one of those who backed the proposal. In the early 1960s, as the head of the newspaper Edebiyyat ve injesenet, he had published “nationalistic” verses by the poet Khalil Rza, and he had also published an issue devoted to the Novruz Holiday under the large headline “Novruz-Bayram” and was thus reprimanded by the Party. Apart from him, sharing Aliyarov’s views were K. Mamedov, T. Sultanov, G. Khalilov and many others.20 This discussion wasn’t in vain. For example, in 1968 it became possible to return the historical

name of Sheki to one of ancient towns of Azerbaijan. In turn, Kirovabad was renamed Ganja only in the years of the breakdown of the USSR. We’ve already mentioned the authorities’ attitude toward N. Narimanov in this book. This “problem” was finally resolved in the 1970s. Examination of this process has shown that attitudes toward N. Narimanov since the mid-1950s had been formed through the prism of his nationalism. This was displayed in the “Narimanophobia” of the Republic’s leadership and in Moscow’s jealous attitude to him. As it is known, in its July 2, 1959 resolution, the CC CPSU Presidium recommended “not underestimating the role of Shaumyan, not exaggerating the role of Narimanov, and not setting them one against another.” Pressure against Baku in those years was built upon “exaggeration” of the role of Narimanov in public processes and in the history of Revolutionary movement. In both official documents and unofficial “recommendations,” Moscow demanded that Narimanov be moved to the background and Shaumyan put in the foreground as a leader. Thus, in 1970 when the question of celebrating the 100th jubilee of Narimanov was raised, the leadership of the Republic faced serious hardships. First of all, conducting wide-scale jubilee events required the consent of the CC CPSU, which felt no warm sympathies toward the person whose jubilee was to be celebrated. Not 1970, but two years later, the Republic’s leadership managed to obtain full “rehabilitation” of Narimanov. The unveiling of a grandiose monument of Narimanov (sculptor J. Karyaghdy, architects T. Abdullayev and Y. Gadimov) in Baku took place on June 6, 1972, while a celebratory gathering in the honor of the 100th jubilee of Narimanov was held at the Opera & Ballet Theater on June 29 of the same year. The newspaper Pravda published an article on Narimanov’s activity. In addition, a film shot jointly by film director A. Ibrahimov and writer I. Huseynov was released, but the film’s initial title Dr. Narimanov was changed into the more neutral The Stars Won’t Go Out.21 At its meeting in March 1972, the CC CPSU Political Bureau listened to a report by Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Andropov, who talked about the growth of anti-Soviet sentiments in the country, Western propaganda and its influence, and the spread of “samizdat.” During discussion of the report the leaders of the Party and government focused on manifestations of nationalism. Political Bureau members were determined to urge giving up “extreme cautiousness” in combating nationalism. B. N. Ponomaryov described nationalism as one of the most widespread kinds of anti-Sovietism. Even Sovnarkhozes (Economic Councils) Khrushchev had established were assessed as a manifestation of nationalism. Summing up the discussion, Brezhnev urged, on the one hand, “to transit from defense to assault” to fight nationalism decisively, but on the other hand “to display a very cautious approach to the national question” as a complex one.22 While Moscow discussed this problem, a teacher of the School of History of the State University of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Aliyev (Elchibey), in Baku had already been propagating anti-Soviet nationalistic views; appropriate reports were being submitted to the Republic’s KGB. Elchibey graduated from the school of Oriental Studies of Kirov State University of Azerbaijan, then in 1963–1964 worked as an interpreter in Egypt. In May 1964, as an interpreter, he accompanied a Khrushchev-led Soviet delegation to Egypt. Upon his return to

Baku, he entered a post-graduate school and, under the guidance of Hero of the Soviet Union and prominent orientalist Z. Buniyatov, defended his candidate’s thesis. He had been teaching at the State University of Azerbaijan since 1968.23 In the early 1970s the State University of Azerbaijan turned into a center for secret groups of students who talked about the formation of national thinking, ways of restoration of independence of the Azerbaijan SSR, the possibility of its leaving the composition of the USSR, a national-liberation movement in Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan, unification of the separated parts of Azerbaijan, and so on. After the KGB discovered that Elchibey headed these groups, he was put under strict control in 1973 and arrested in January 1975. A conversation in a confinement cell between a KGB investigator and Elchibey is of utmost importance for the elucidation of the latter’s personality. Let’s quote extracts from the materials of the investigation: Investigator: What did you tell students about Lenin? We have documentary evidence. You may look at testimonies of witnesses. A. Aliyev (Elchibey): This is needless. The prison Lenin had created clearly illustrates who he was. The state he created is the most abominable form of a totalitarian regime. Mankind perfectly understands who Lenin was, as he deprived millions of people and dozens of nations their legal rights. Only you do not know about this. Investigator: This is empty talk; this is a headache. Soon you’ll understand what you’ll face for such talk about Lenin. You’re betraying the land that fostered and brought you up. You hold groundless talks about the Communist Party, our state and government. Anyway, you know what empty criticism of the Soviet Union, a superpower, may end in. A. Aliyev: Yes, I know. I’m a son not of Lenin, but of a nation that was skinned and had its blood sucked. For you, the USSR is maybe the motherland. But for me, the motherland is Azerbaijan, which is separated into two parts. The aim of my life is to cure this wound, and to lead Azerbaijan toward freedom together with all those who consider themselves Turks.24

An official accusation forwarded by state security bodies against Elchibey read as follows: “Senior investigator of the Chair of the History of Countries of Asia and Africa of S. M. Kirov State University of Azerbaijan, Aliyev Abulfaz Gadirgulu oglu, has conducted propaganda among teachers and students to stir up national dissention since 1970, as well as to spread lies and slander about the Soviet state and its public system. He insisted that Azerbaijan ought to rid itself of Russia’s political and economic oppression to gain independence. A. Aliyev insists that Russia’s influence negatively affects Azerbaijan’s culture and that this will eventually lead to Russification of the nation.”25 That’s how Elchibey, on charges of nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda, was sentenced to two years in prison in 1975 and lost the right to teach at universities. When the Soviet Union began to break down at the end of the 1980s, the majority of young, talented participants of the Republic’s national movement turned out to be his pupils, while he himself led the movement. Elchibey had predicted disintegration of the Soviet Union back in the 1970s, and he was right. Moscow’s political analyst, Professor D. Furman, later wrote a touching essay of this dissident of the 1970s who had played an important role in making the national idea the leading trajectory of Azerbaijan’s development.26 The issue of Southern Azerbaijan was touched upon in official written correspondence of political circles very cautiously long after the national government, which had been formed in 1945–1946, was defeated. Elchibey launched an open discussion of this question in the 1970s. The idea of common Azerbaijan was a polestar of his life. The problems of Southern

Azerbaijan were reflected even in diplomatic written correspondence. Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Iran, A. Asadullayev, submitted the following note to the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan SSR in March 1975: “As for the internal political situation in Iranian Azerbaijan, it is necessary to note that the Azerbaijanis, like other national minorities of Iran, live in the sad conditions of actual discrimination from the side of the Persians, who constitute less than half of the country’s population. This discrimination spreads over all spheres of public life, economy, culture, education, and other fields. as illustrated, in particular, by conversations with Azerbaijanis who visit, for various reasons, the consular department of the USSR Embassy to Iran, and through conversations with them during tours to Iranian Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis particularly harshly criticize the policy of the Iranian ruling circles in the sphere of culture and education. Issuing books and magazines in the Azerbaijani language is banned in Iran. In pursuing their great-power chauvinist policy, Iranian ruling circles aim at the forceful assimilation of non-Persian nationalities, that is, Azerbaijanis. This is directly indicated in the chapter on ‘Population’ of an almanac Iran-Almanac. 1974. According to many Azerbaijanis residing in Iran, the broadcasts of the Baku radio and television in the Azerbaijani language are particularly popular among the residents of Iranian Azerbaijan. According to the Justice Ministry, the number of criminal offenders in Iranian prisons has recently decreased while the number of political prisoners has increased. There are approximately 100 political prisoners per forty–fifty criminal offenders. Conversations make it clear that a series of groups opposing the regime are operational in Tabriz. Members of one of these groups were arrested and jailed on charges of an attempt against the Shah and his family members in 1973. The Shah and the Government of Iran cannot help but take the displeasure in Iranian Azerbaijan into consideration and thus are forced to take certain measures to develop this region of the country and improve, to an extent, the economic position of the population.”27 Starting from the 1950s, the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan had been trying to use the proAmerican policy of the Iranian Shah to solve the problem of Southern Azerbaijan and, in the background of anti-American propaganda, to draw the Soviet leadership’s attention to the Azerbaijani problem. Secret CIA materials disclosed in 2004 confirm that the United States was using the Azerbaijani factor to strengthen its control of Iran. In the 1950s, the CIA prepared a series of secret reports, for example, “Possible Resumption of Azerbaijani Separation”28 and “Revival of Actions of Separatists in Azerbaijan.”29 A memorandum drafted by the Operations Coordinating Board under the CIA for the US National Security Council and approved by the US president as a political course read as follows: “Iranians must understand that defense of the state independence of Iran is the primary task of the United States. This policy has openly been manifest since the times of the Azerbaijani crisis of 1946.”30 The leadership of Soviet Azerbaijan viewed the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 not only as a means of pushing Americans out of Iran but also as an opportunity to return national rights to the Azerbaijanis. In an instructive conversation on July 12, 1978 with the chief resident in Iran, Ivan Fadeykinym, Andropov called the attention of the Tehran resident toward exacerbating Iranian-American relations and actively working among Azerbaijanis in order to destabilize the regime.31 There was one goal set before the Iran division (division) of one Department of

the Azerbaijan KGB: to have the most effective impact possible on the Azerbaijani population in Iran, penetrating the Iranian secret services by working through the “green” border.32 On March 31, 1979, at a meeting with the leaders of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, H. Aliyev noted the following: “Here the national questions were touched upon; opinions were expressed about the autonomy of Iranian Azerbaijan. . . . The important thing is that the process of national awakening of Iranian Azerbaijan has already begun. . . . Following the suppression of the national democratic movement in 1946, the Shah of Iran did a lot of work in Iranian Azerbaijan, strengthening this region with the most devoted security agents of SAVAK. Thus, the people could not act because they were scared after having failed more than once at revolutionary actions. It seems to me that the Azerbaijani people haven’t yet awakened; they are waiting for their hour. Speaking in Tabriz, Bazargan [Mehdi Bazargan was the Prime Minister of Iran at the time—J. H.] admitted that he was a bad Azerbaijani, as he did not know his mother tongue. But is that the most important thing? It is important to feel that you belong to your nation, to keep your national soul. . . . On the other hand, maybe it’s good that no movement for autonomy has yet started in Iranian Azerbaijan. It has to be kept in mind that, like the Shah, Khomeyni and Bazargan fear the actions of Azerbaijanis. Thus, we shouldn’t scare them today; we should settle for more short-term tasks. . . . It is essential to make statements in the press, to carry out work among the population to demonstrate that Azerbaijan wants to have schools teaching in its native language, to develop its peculiar culture. . . . I personally believe that Iran could have developed as a federative state. The words of Talegani [here Ayatollah Mahmoud Talegani is meant—J. H.] that the Azerbaijan people were deprived of their native language for 2,500 years make us hope that Khomeyni will take the people’s aspiration for national independence into consideration.”33 However, these hopes of the Azerbaijani leadership did not come true. The Iranian Islamic Revolution did not solve the national problems of the Azerbaijanis. Following the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR in 1977, the Constitutions of the Union Republics should have been adopted correspondingly. A commission that was preparing a new All-Union Constitution had been established back in 1962. This commission comprised a group led by Mikoyan that was involved in the questions of national policy and construction of national statehood. The new constitution provided for expansion of the rights of the Union Republics and specified the basis of interrelations of the Republics and the Center. The Law Institute was instructed to draft a special document to generalize Western authors’ criticism of the national questions of the existing constitution. Such a document was submitted, concluding that the Soviet national policy was a form of colonialism and that the Soviet federalism was fiction. “The serious infringement of the rights of the Union Republics was stated (in the issues of budgetary policy; provision of sovereignty; opportunity for possession of their own armed forces and developing international links).” This work was suspended for a long period of time after Khrushchev resigned.34 Generalizations by Soviet lawyers, which had not been respected in the 1977 Constitution, were forgotten about as time went on. Moreover, in 1978 when the Union Republics were drafting their respective constitutions, the three Republics of the Southern Caucasus were instructed to remove the article of state language, which had

already existed in the old constitutions, from the text of the new constitutions. In connection with the new Constitution of the USSR, the newspaper Pravda issued an editorial article commenting on the national question in the following manner: “Equality of nations in our country is not only legal but also actual. All the Soviet Republics have already reached a high level of development. The unbroken friendship among the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the popular intelligentsia has become stronger. The boundaries between main social groups are being erased; all nations and peoples are becoming closer one to another. A new historical community, the Soviet people, has already been created.”35 The editorial article by Pravda was a type of instruction to the national Republics to observe the following principle: “one nation, one language.” At this time, the CC CPSU Political Bureau made a special decision “On improvement of the system of teaching of the Russian language in the Union Republics.” The decision was further approved in August 1978. The Baltic, Transcaucasian Republics, and Ukraine, which reacted particularly sensitively to the questions of national language, regarded such an instruction distinctively. An additional problem for the leadership of the Transcaucasian Republics was that, unlike the Constitutions of the rest of the Union Republics, the Constitutions of Georgia and Armenia since 1937, and the Constitution of Azerbaijan since 1956 had read that the national language was the state one. Giving up these provisions now would have put the leaderships of all the three Republics in a ridiculous position. In the 1970s, the application of the Russian language in Azerbaijan was expanded; Party and government events were conducted mostly in Russian; however, warm attitudes to the national language were felt everywhere. One example is that academician Mamedagha Shiraliyev was awarded the Republic’s State Prize in 1972 for his studies in the sphere of Azerbaijani linguistics, and that the same Prize was conferred in 1974 to a group of leading linguists who had written a multi-volume composite monograph Modern Azerbaijani Language. It goes without saying that these high prizes were conferred not only for scientific achievements in the sphere of the Azerbaijani language. The Institute of Linguistics, having been unified with the Nizami Institute of Literature in 1951, became an independent institute again in 1969 under the system of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. Since 1973 it was named after Azerbaijani thinker Nasimi. In the 1970–1980s, this Institute did important work to study the scientific basis of the Azerbaijani language and propagate the national language. In 1970, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR began issuing a joint edition of the scientific-theoretical magazine Soviet Turkology in Baku. Edited by M. Shiraliyev, six annual issues of the magazine elucidated the questions of Turkology; Turkic languages, including grammar peculiarities of the Azerbaijani language; and interconnections of these languages along with their common features. In addition, the magazine published articles about samples of ancient and medieval written languages, folklore, and philology. In discussions about inclusion of the article on state status of national language in the Constitutions of Union Republics, the leaders of all three Transcaucasian Republics acted as one and thus were able to break Moscow’s resistance. After the USSR broke down, H. Aliyev

recalled the peripeteia of the struggle of 1978, saying: “We then talked with the leaders of other Republics. I remember my tough conversation with Ukrainian leader Vladimir Sherbitskiy. He categorically objected, noting that ‘if you write down it that way, we also will have to write down “The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.”’ I replied that no one would stop him from writing it that way. ‘You are a bigger Republic than we, and your weight in the Soviet Union is much heavier than ours. So you may write it thus, if you want to. But why do you disturb us?’ The debate was very heated.”36 Georgia was the first Transcaucasian Republic that submitted, on April 14, 1978, a draft of its new Constitution for consideration to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. The capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, was in an alarmed state on that day. More than 10,000 citizens gathered in front of the House of Government demanding them to preserve the Article of state status of the Georgian language in the text of the new constitution. Official reports described this incident as “masses”; however, leading these masses were Georgian writers, academicians, and, in one word, advanced intelligentsia. Thus the government had to yield to the strength of this rally. Following emergent talks with Moscow and under the pressure of public opinion, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR later the same day made a decision on preservation of the previous article of the old Constitution about the state status of the Georgian language.37 At its extraordinary session on April 20, 1978, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR submitted a draft of a new Constitution of the Republic for discussion. Article 73 of the new Constitution of Azerbaijan adopted at a session of the Supreme Soviet on April 21 read as follows: “The state language of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic is the Azerbaijani language. The Azerbaijan SSR shall provide for the use of the Azerbaijani language in state and public bodies, institutions of culture, education, and other fields, and take care about its overall development.” Armenia made a similar decision. Thus, only the three Republics— Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—legally formalized the preservation of their national language. Azerbaijan, which since the 1950s had been struggling for preservation of its national roots, for the right to use its national language and to possess its national culture, and had undergone severe trials in this struggle but had passed all the tests with honor and had earned a historical victory. However, it would have to face even harder tests in the future. NOTES 1. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. M.: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.) p. 1057. 2. From Vladimir Semichastniy to CC CPSU. 22.01.1963. // The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 9030. pp. 57–60. 3. From Alexandr Shelepin to CC CPSU. 20.12.1960. // The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R10956. p. 9. 4. Elena Zubkova. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsii v SSSR. 1953–1985 gody. (Zubkova E. Power and the Development of the Ethnic Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985// “History of the Fatherland” #4,) 2004, p. 5. 5. From Akhmedov to the Bureau of the CC CP Azerbaijan. March, 1960. // APDPARA, f.1, r.89, v.205, p. 63. 6. Bureau meeting of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Question of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. 22.03.1960. //

APDPARA, f.1, r.89, v.205, p. 62. 7. Reference on the situation in the People’s Party of Iran. 26.02.1966. // RSASPH, f.495, r.217, v.222, p. 1. 8. Information about the Iranian Communists in prison. 20.10.1942. // RSASPH, f.495, r.217, v.222, pp. 81–83. 9. From Masuma Pishevari to Khrushchev and K. E. Voroshilov. 16.09–27.10.1957. // RSASPH, f.495, r.217, v.222, pp. 2– 18. 10. From Snastin and Kazakov to the CC CPSU. 04.11.1961. // RGANI, f.5, r.33, v.175, pp. 128–129. 11. Special report to the Central Committee for the celebration on November 7th. 04.11.1961. // RNHSA, f.89, r.6, v.27, pp. 1– 2; Kozlov. Neizvestniy SSSR. Protivostoyaniye naroda i vlasti 1953–1985 gg. M., 2006. (Kozlov. Unknown USSR. Confronting people and power1953–1985), pp. 412–416. 12. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. 1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), p. 814. 13. Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. M.: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), p. 614. 14. Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954–1964. T. 1. Chernoviye protokolniye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. (Presidium of CC CPSU. 1954–1964. Vol. 1. Draft of meeting minutes. Shorthand), pp. 862–872; For more information see: Sergey Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: reformator. M.: Vremya, 2010, (Sergei Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer.), pp. 11–24. 15. Information about the Central Committee plenum. 14.10.1964. // RNHSA, f.5, r.5, v.242, pp. 82–88. 16. From Yuriy Andropov to Leonid Brezhnev. The results of the KGB of the USSR and its local offices for 1967. 06.05.1968. // The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 8457, p. 6. 17. Pikhoya Moskva. Kreml. Vlast. Sorok let posle voiny, 1945–1985. ( Pikhoya. Moscow. Kremlin. Power. Forty Years After War, 1945–1985), pp. 526–529. 18. Extract from the report of the KGB of Azerbaijan SSR in 1972 (Report of the Fifth Division). // From materials of the AMNS AR. 19. Edebiyyat ve injesenet (Literature and Art), 1966, 8 January. 20. Edebiyyat ve injesenet (Literature and Art), 1966, 5 February. 21. See: Elmira Akhundova Heydar Aliyev. Lichnost i vremya. Chast II. Baku, 2007. (E. Akhundova. Heydar Aliyev. Personality and time. Part II), pp. 263–264. 22. Zubkova. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsii v SSSR. 1953–1985 gody. // (Zubkova. Power and Development of the Ethno-Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985). //Otechestvennaya istoriya (Native History), No. 4, 2004, p. 10. 23. Lyudi i sudby. Biobibliograficheskiy slovar vostokovedov-zhertv politicheskogo terrora v sovetskiy period (1917– 1991). SPb., 2003. (People and destinies. Bibliographical Dictionary of Oriental Victims of Political Terror in the Soviet period), p. 435. 24. Fazil Gezenferoglu. Ebulfez Elcibey. Tarihten Gelecege. Istanbul, 1995, s. 60–61; Akhundova. Heydar Aliyev. Lichnost i vremya. Chast II. (Akhundova. Heydar Aliyev. Personality and time. Part II), pp. 224–225; Narimanoglu Kamil Veli. Ebulfaz Elcibey—Azerbaycan Turklerinin Elcisi. Istanbul, 1992, pp. 32–33. 25. Gezenferoglu. Ebulfez Elcibey. Tarihten Gelecege, pp. 32–33. 26. Dmitriy Furman. Natsionalniy traur po dissidentu. (National mourning for dissident) // Obshaya gazeta. 2000. 24–30 August. 27. A. Asadullayev. Some aspects of economic political situation in Iranian Azerbaijan. 09.03.1975. // SAAR, f.28, r.1, v.28, pp. 38–41. 28. Central Intelligence Agency. Informational Report. Possible Resumption of Azerbaijani Separation. 12.01.1954. // National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 81, FLD 510. 29. Central Intelligence Agency. Informational Report. Revival of Actions of Separatists in Azerbaijan. 1954. // National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 80, FLD 513. 30. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for the Operations of Coordinating Board. Progress Report on NSC 5402 (Iran). 13.10.1954 // National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 80, FLD 513. 31. KGB in Iran, 1988. // Mitrokhin Collection, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, pp. 49–50. 32. KGB in Iran, 1988. // Mitrokhin Collection, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, p. 5. 33. Transcript of Heydar Aliev with members of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the ADP. 31.03.1979. // APDPARA, f.1, r.89, v.213, pp. 120–124. 34. Zubkova. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsii v SSSR. 1953–1985 gody (Zubkova E. Power and the Development of the Ethnic Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985// History of the Fatherland #4,) 2004, p. 7. 35. Pravda, 1977, 25 May. 36. Aliyev Geydar. Nasha nezavisimost vechna. (Heydar Aliyev. Our Independence Forever. (in Azeri)). Baku, 1998, pp. 427–428.

37. Zubkova. Vlast i razvitiye etnokonfliktnoy situatsii v SSSR. 1953–1985 gody. (Zubkova. Power and the Development of the Ethnic Conflict Situation in the USSR. 1953–1985// History of the Fatherland #4,) 2004, p. 23; Andrey Karaulov. Vokrug Kremlya. M., 1993. T.1. (Andrey Karaulov. Around the Kremlin), p. 398.

Bibliography

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Index

Abashidze, Irakliy, 62, 266, 325 Abasov, Midhat, 106 Abbas, Mirza, 47, 48 Abbasov, Ayyub A, 11, 12, 310 Abbaszade, Huseyn, 11 Abdullayev, Ilyas, 50, 145, 226, 374, 399 Abdullayev, Mikail, 46, 128, 323, 326 Abdurahmanov, Fuad, 46, 105, 321 Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic, 247, 433 Abkhazias, 63, 64, 84. See also Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic Abulhasan, Alekperzadeh, 11, 49, 97, 310, 320, 321 Akhmatova, Anna, 284 Akhundov, Mirza Fatali, 22, 146, 263, 295, 400 Akhundov, Ruhulla, 47, 320, 336 Akhundov, Suleyman Sani, 264 Akhundov, Veli, 30, 81, 110–11, 165, 175, 254, 267, 302–3, 305, 331, 352, 369, 373–75, 380–83, 399–403, 412, 419, 423, 428–29, 434 Aleskerov, Suleyman, 98 Alibeyov, Jamil, 128 Aliger, Margarita, 285 Aliyarli (Aliyarov), Suleyman, 435–36 Aliyev, Abulfaz (Elchibey), 437, 438 Aliyev, Fazil, 34 Aliyev, Heydar, 32, 33, 121, 142, 318, 434, 439, 442 Aliyev, Musa, 17, 97, 109, 264, 322, 331 Aliyev, Teymur, 115, 117, 122, 124, 125, 262 Alizadeh, Abdulkerim, 97, 334, 335, 337 Alizadeh, Mamed, 32, 35–36, 144–45, 368 Allahverdi​yev, Tofik, 50, 72, 74, 147–48, 150, 154–56, 176–79, 182, 184, 187, 188, 225, 254, 304, 367, 388, 399 All-Russian Special Commission (ARSC), 2 Amatuni, Amatuni, 74 Amirov, Fikret, 97–98, 100, 103, 263–64, 309, 323, 327, 329 Anar, Rzayev, 435 Andropov, Yuriy, 433, 436, 439 Antelepyan, Gegam, 13, 16 anti-Sovietism, 68, 193, 199, 202, 208, 364, 368, 436 Antokolskiy, Pavel, 31, 316, 325, 326 Aragon, Louis, 271, 325 Arasly, Hamid, 97, 123, 124, 291, 311, 323, 325, 326 Aristov, Averkiy, 44, 54, 194, 211, 212, 216 Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Armenian SSR), 7, 8, 39, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 96, 109, 116, 119, 120, 154, 247, 252, 341 Armenian theater, 9, 13, 14, 15, 81, 82 Arushanov, Pasha, 9, 13, 15, 50, 160 Arutinov, Grigoriy, 74–75, 77 Ashura, religious feast, 70

Atakishiyev, Aghaselim, 71, 72 Auezov, Mukhtar, 31, 325 Avidar, Yosef, 69 Aybek, Musa (Tashmuhammedov), 325 Aylisli, Akram, 435 Azerbaijan Democratic Party, 6, 429, 439 Azerbaijani Soviet Literature, 9, 11, 24, 29, 96, 269 Azerbaijani Soviet poetry, 10, 11, 320 Azerbaijani Young Communist League, 15 Azerbaijan Republic Communist Party (ARCP), 6 Azerbaijan State University, 17, 30, 67, 69, 97, 123, 125, 302, 311, 331–34, 339, 341, 348, 353 Azeroglu, Balash, 320 Azimzadeh, Yusif, 11 Babayev, Adil, 18, 48, 110, 149, 178, 197, 203, 204, 205, 269, 320, 325, 327, 367 Babayev Adil Gafar ogly, 11, 97, 310, 320, 325, 327 Babayev, Akber, 269, 283 Babayev, Akshin, 283 Babayev, Nabi (Khazri), 12, 315 Badalbeyli, Afrasiyab, 98, 102, 104, 137 Badalbeyli, Shamsi, 106 Bagirov, Mir Jafar, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 60, 63, 65–67, 70–72, 74–76, 85, 89, 91, 101, 107, 111, 114, 115, 117, 150, 164, 221, 310, 311, 341, 346, 423 Bagirov, Zakir, 101 Bahlulzadeh, Sattar, 104, 105 Bakikhanov, Abbas Gulu agha, 48, 333, 337 Bakradze, Valerian, 60–61 Balkars, 57, 249 Bartold, Vasiliy, 332 Baybakov, Nikolay, 50, 220 Bayramov, Abdulla, 9, 13–15, 17–20, 27–31, 50, 72, 107–109, 115, 120, 125, 127, 145, 146, 150–54, 173, 176, 179, 180–82, 187, 250, 254, 264, 288, 357, 399 Bayramov, Bayram, 97, 320, 321 Bazargan, Mehdi, 440 Bazhan, Mikola, 325 Belinskiy, Vissarion, 21 Belyayev, Nikolay, 211, 212, 215, 216 Beria, Lavrentiy, 1, 2, 17, 25, 38, 41, 51, 52, 57, 60, 61, 64, 68, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 114, 117, 221, 226, 238, 248, 273, 278, 282, 346, 396, 423, 424, 433, 446, 449 Berklav, Eduard, 399, 416 Bertels, Evgeniy, 321, 332, 335 Beybutov, Rashid, 290, 329 Biriya, Mohammad (Bagirzadeh), 204, 205 Bohlen, Charles, 60 Borshev, Timofey, 71, 72, 76 Brezhnev, Leonid, 193, 212, 216, 230, 433–34, 437 Brutents, Karen, 143 Bubennov, Mikhail, 25 Bulganin, Nikolay, 44–45, 52–53, 63, 79, 92, 96, 106, 108, 197, 209–11, 216–17, 219, 223, 232, 273, 278 Bulyga, Andrey, 32 Buniyatov, Teymur, 132, 337 Buniyatov, Ziya, 325, 334, 435 Central Committee Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CC CPA), 3–5, 7, 9, 13–15, 17, 18, 20–23, 26–30, 31, 33–41, 45–48, 50, 51, 63, 65–68, 72–74, 81, 85, 88–92, 95, 96, 101, 104, 106–11, 115–17, 119–25, 127, 130, 133, 137–42, 144–49, 152, 155, 160, 163, 169, 171, 173–80, 185, 188, 189, 190–92, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200–4, 206–8, 213, 215, 218, 224–28, 233, 234, 239, 241, 242, 246,

248–57, 259–64, 267, 288, 291, 302–5, 308, 312–14, 319, 321–23, 325–28, 330, 331, 333–36, 338, 339, 340–42, 346, 350, 352, 353, 355–57, 360, 369, 371–74, 377, 378, 385, 388, 395, 397–403, 406, 409, 413, 415, 416, 420, 423, 426, 428, 429, 434 Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34–41, 43–45, 50–53, 57–68, 72–91, 105, 107, 109, 116, 118, 120–22, 125, 130, 137–42, 146–48, 151, 156, 159, 160, 162, 168–74, 176–79, 183, 188, 193–96, 198–201, 205–10, 213–20, 222–30, 232–46, 248–50, 252, 253–55, 257, 264, 266, 269, 270, 273, 281, 282, 284, 285, 291, 292, 296, 298, 299, 301, 302, 304, 312, 318, 321–23, 326, 327, 328, 332, 334, 335, 340, 341, 343, 345–48, 350, 351–54, 356, 358, 364, 370, 371, 372–77, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 394, 395, 397, 398, 400–4, 406, 408, 409–11, 413, 414–19, 423–27, 429–33, 436, 441, 443, 446 Charents, Egishe, 17, 143 Charkviani, Kandid, 60 Chechen, 57, 75, 156, 249, 433 Cheryomyshkin, Sergey, 7 Chief Migration Department, 7 Chobanzadeh, Bekir, 55, 332 Chukovsky, Korney, 284 Communist (newspaper), 24, 112, 120, 125, 131, 152, 156, 158, 161, 166, 175, 265, 287, 327, 328, 377 Congress of the Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan, 9, 27 Crimean Tatars, 57, 87, 247 Dagestan, 247, 264, 346, 349 Dagestanly, Ismail, 12 Dashnaks, 8, 39, 71, 318, 349, 365 Davtyan, Markar, 13, 114, 115, 143 Demirchizadeh, Abdulazal, 97, 123, 325, 332 Dilbazi, Mirvarid, 11, 97, 320 Dudintsev, Vladimir, 284–85, 288 Dudorov, Nikolay, 60, 196–99, 213 Efendiyev, Hajibaba, 50, 145, 166, 267, 414 Efendiyev, Hidayet, 36, 150, 176 Efendiyev, Ilyas, 11, 49, 143, 320 Efendiyev, Sami Soltan, 33 Eldarov, Omar, 104, 105 Farhad and Shirin (drama), 31 French Armenian Cultural Union, 9 Furtseva, Ekatirina, 81, 212, 237, 388 Gadirzade, Salam, 11, 97, 320, 321 Gafurov, Bobojan, 323, 325, 334 Ganja, 3, 80, 72, 81, 82, 115, 122, 125, 146, 179, 180, 185, 187, 196, 197, 203, 253, 369, 435, 436 Gasymov, Imran, 11, 97, 201 Gasymov, Mehbaly, 97, 331, 368 Gasymzadeh, Gasym, 97, 315 Georgian SSR. See Gerogian Soviet Socialist Republic Gerogian Soviet Socialist Republic, vii, ix, 2, 8, 25, 34, 38, 57, 59–66, 69, 70, 74, 76, 78, 80–82, 84, 88, 91–96, 101, 109, 113, 114, 119, 120, 133, 146, 147, 153–55, 155, 157–159, 161, 162, 172, 221, 246–50, 266, 289, 293, 294, 303, 312, 363, 368, 373, 391, 395, 396, 401, 406, 441, 442 Glavlit, 206–8, 241 Gobustan (magazine), 435 Grakan Adrbedjan (magazine), 13, 143, 144 Greeks, 8, 57, 79, 246, 247 Grigoryan, Khoren, 71, 72, 75, 76, 114 Grigoryan, Samvel, 143, 144 Grigoryan, Vahan, 8, 271, 273, 274–280, 297 Grigoryan, Zhasmen, 9

Grishin, Viktor, 431 Gromov, Evgeniy, 3, 35–38, 41, 50, 51, 65, 79, 83, 120, 121, 138, 139, 142, 148, 187–89 Gromyko, Andrey, 9, 221 Gubaydulin, Aziz, 55, 332 Gulgun, Medine, 269 Guluzadeh, Mirzagha, 12, 313 Guskov, Anatoliy, 16, 18, 19, 32–37, 50, 66, 67, 89, 145, 186–89, 224, 236, 429 Hajibeyov, Chingiz, 7 Hajibeyov, Soltan, 7, 98, 100, 286, 327, 329 Hajibeyov, Uzeyir, 46, 55, 99, 100–3, 105, 106, 126, 264, 286, 290, 292, 322 Hajiyev, Covdat, 98, 100, 286, 287, 290, 328, 330 Hajiyev, Nazim, 12, 250, 257, 314, 322, 323, 336, 338 Hajiyev, Rauf, 98, 286 Hamzatov, Rasul, 96, 325 Heydarov, Nazar, 5, 89–90 Hikmet, Nazim, 267–83, 293, 296, 297, 302, 319, 325, 384, 392 History of Karabakh, 9, 337, 338 Huseinzadeh, Mehti, 200, 201 Huseyn, Mehdi, 11, 12, 19, 22, 27, 31, 46, 49, 97, 143, 144, 264, 266, 269, 289, 290, 296, 306, 310, 315, 317, 319, 320, 323, 326 Huseynov, Chingiz, 97, 266, 315 Huseynov, Heydar, 17, 47, 48, 385, 405 Huseynov, Isa, 11, 17, 97, 288, 289, 310, 315, 316, 320 Huseynov, Ismayil, 97, 338, 339, 341, 347, 349, 352, 353, 414 Huseynov, Shirmamed, 348, 353 Ibrahimbeyov, Rustam, 435 Ibrahimov, Mirza, viii, xi, 1, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 17–20, 22, 24–27, 29–31, 34, 36, 45–50, 88, 89, 97, 105, 108–13, 120, 121, 127–35, 144–46, 148–53, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160–68, 170–72, 174–76, 178–82, 184, 213, 226, 262–64, 268–69, 287, 289, 290, 292, 293, 302, 303, 305, 306, 309, 310, 313, 314, 316, 319–23, 325, 326, 330, 331, 386, 391–93, 400–10, 412, 413, 415, 416, 423, 427, 428, 436 Ibrahimov, Zulfali, 339, 341, 345, 347 Imanquliyev, Nasrullah, 262, 263 Ingushes, 57, 75, 156 Iran, 4–6, 33, 56, 58, 66, 67, 71, 98, 99, 101, 102, 147, 151, 167, 174, 203, 204, 221, 222, 264, 270, 303, 307, 321, 323, 325, 333, 348, 353, 363–365, 368, 427, 429, 438–440. See also Iranian Azerbaijan; South Azerbaijan Iranian Azerbaijan, 427, 437–40, 444, 447, 453 Iskenderov, Mamed Abdul ogly, 14, 16, 17, 18, 27, 35, 36, 50, 72, 74, 110, 111, 121, 127, 146–48, 150, 162–64, 176, 177, 179, 186, 187, 189, 225, 250, 252, 399, 412, 413 Iskenderov, Mamed Salman ogly, 262, 341, 342, 346, 349, 414, 415 Ismailov, Eldar, xiv Ismailov, Mahmud, 435 Jabbarly, Jafar, 11, 65, 85, 97, 310, 332 Jafarly, Gazanfar, 146, 150, 167, 168, 175–77, 179, 180, 182, 187, 225 Jafarov, Jafar, 11, 12, 19, 22–30, 40, 67, 89, 97, 105, 110, 130, 134, 149, 187, 207, 251, 302, 428 Jafarov, Mamed Jafar, 12, 251, 323 Jafarov, Salman, 130, 134, 149, 379, 416 Jahangirov, Jahangir, 98, 101, 290, 292, 327 Jambul region, 8 Jamil, Ahmed, 320 Javad, Ahmed, 92, 291 Javakhetiya, 78, 79 Javid, Huseyn, 48, 290, 317 Juvarly, Mamed, 47

Kaganovich, Lazar, 44, 73, 85, 240, 242, 243, 446 Kalinin, Mikhail, 47, 113, 363 Kalmyks, 56 Kalnberzin, Yanes, 389, 398–99, 416 Kamalov, Sabir, 376 Karabagskiy, Mirza Jamal Javanshir, 337 Karachays, 56 Karamyan, Armik, 13, 406 Kardashov, Alexandr, 368, 369, 429 Karyagdy, Jabbar, 46, 105, 318 Kaverin, Veniamin, 284 Kerim, Ali, 11, 31, 46, 95, 107, 132, 136, 198, 287, 316, 320 Kerimov, Ali, 31, 46, 95, 132 KGB, 16–19, 32–36, 41, 48, 51, 54, 65–71, 74, 85, 89, 108, 109, 138, 144, 145, 149, 187, 188, 194, 195, 200, 202–6, 210, 212, 213, 216, 219, 222–24, 227, 232, 237, 240, 241, 244, 269, 270, 278, 291, 318, 321, 355, 364–70, 415, 417, 424, 425, 429, 430, 433, 434, 436, 437, 439, 443, 444, 447 Khachaturyan, Aram, 326 Khalilov, Zahid, 97, 330, 331, 356, 357 Khomeyni, Ayatollah, 440 Khorkhdain grog (magazine), 12 Khrushchev, Nikita, x, xi, xii, xiii, 3, 6, 32, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 51–54, 56–63, 65, 67, 73, 75, 82–84, 87, 104, 106, 108, 113, 116, 118, 119, 137, 138, 145, 152, 159, 160, 174, 188, 193, 198, 205, 208, 209, 210–17, 224, 226, 227, 229–34, 237, 238, 240–43, 245, 266, 273, 275, 278, 284–86, 288, 292, 299, 300, 301, 308, 315, 321, 322, 345, 353, 354, 359–364, 370, 371, 372, 375, 380, 387–99, 402, 403, 414, 415, 417, 419, 423–33, 436, 437, 440, 443, 445, 446–51 Khrushchev, Sergey, 40, 57, 83, 84, 241, 242, 353, 354, 424, 431, 443 Kirichenko, Alexey, xi, 211, 212, 388, 396 Kirov, Sergei, 4, 54, 107, 205, 283, 309, 325, 332, 341, 342, 413, 437, 438 Kirovabad. See Ganja Kitabi Dede Korkud, epic, 123–25, 139 Kozlov, Frol, 21, 84, 211, 212, 216, 294, 443, 449, 450 Kocharli, Firudin, 266 Kocharli, Tofig, 342, 345 Kochinyan, Anton, 76 Kopylov, Fedor, 68, 70, 108, 109, 145, 149, 166, 200, 202–5, 364, 365, 367, 429 Kosygin, Alexey, 213, 432, 433, Kovanov, Pavel, 38, 70, 147, 249 Kruminsh, Viktor, 399 Kurbanov, Mamed, 105, 119, 131, 134, 165, 264, 290, 319, 323, 331 Kurbanov, Shik​hali, 175, 176, 207, 288, 323, 325, 336, 341, 346, 350, 351–53, 402, 414, 415, 428 Latvia SSR, xi, 58, 120, 374–76, 387–89, 395, 397–99, 416, 426 Lenin, Vladimir, 6, 34, 44, 54, 56, 78, 108, 111, 114, 151, 154–57, 159, 167, 173, 175, 176, 193, 195, 200, 204, 206, 210, 223, 227, 229, 234, 343, 344, 350, 361, 362, 381, 386, 392, 393, 395, 398, 405–7, 431–33, 437, 447 Literaturnaya Gazeta (newspaper), 21, 22, 96 Lusartsakh (newspaper), 9, 39 Magomayev, Muslim, 46, 99, 100, 101, 126, 153, 186 Makovelskiy, Alexandr, 17, 332 Malenkov, Georgiy, 1, 2, 58, 73–75, 77, 85, 193, 194, 198, 208–19, 221, 223, 226, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 248, 273, 275, 278, 446 Malin, Vladimir, 343 Mamedaliyev, Yusif, xiii, 97, 268, 311–33, 335 Mamed Arif, Dadashzadeh, 12, 97, 143, 320, 331–32 Mamedkhanly, Enver, 27, 29, 30, 97, 310 Mamedov, Ayvaz, 68, 104, 148, 177, 184, 198, 320 Mamedov, Bul-Bul, 323 Mamedov, Gambay, 33

Mamedov, Khudu, 106, 436 Mamedov, Mirza, 92, 95, 111, 135, 251, 339, 371–73, 399 Mamedquluzadeh, Jalil, 126, 127, 287, 317 Markaryan, Ruben, 71, 72, 75, 76, 114 Mazurov, Kirill, 431 Mehtiyev, Shafayat, 331, 339 Melikov, Arif, 101, 283 MGAR, 118, 119, 160, 245, 368 Mgeladze, Akakiy, 60–61, 63 Mikoyan, Anastas, 63, 74, 76, 106, 108, 198, 212, 216, 224, 273, 275, 278, 344, 390, 396, 432, 440 Minkevich, Dmitriy, 18–20, 337 Mirahmedov, Aziz, 97, 265, 291 Mirhadiyev, Miryusif, 345 Mir Jalal, Pashayev, 11, 12, 49, 97, 143, 291, 310, 315, 319, 320, 321, 323, 337 Mirzajanzadeh, Azad, 106 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 9, 44, 58, 73, 74, 193, 198, 208, 210–23, 226, 227, 237, 238, 240, 269, 273, 274, 276, 278, 342 Moslem alphabet, 65 Mountainous Garabagh, 8, 9, 13–16, 20, 60, 78, 80, 81, 82, 108, 118, 119, 126, 134, 149, 162, 201, 225, 263, 318, 368, 375, 376. See also MGAR Muhitdinov, Nureddin, 162, 211–12, 345, 376, 388, 395, 398, 400–1, 406–8, 410, 413, 416 Muradeli, Vano, 326, 327 Musabekov, Gazanfar, 47, 53, 336 Musavat, Political Party, 55, 57, 66, 67, 317, 365, 366 Musayev, Gylman, 11, 97 Mustafayev, Imam, x, xi, 1, 3–7, 14, 15, 18–20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29–37, 39, 45–47, 50, 51, 53, 65, 88, 92, 95, 101, 105, 108, 109, 117–22, 125, 127, 130, 133, 141, 144–48, 150, 151, 154, 159, 170, 173, 175–89, 197, 199–202, 213–16, 218–21, 223–25, 227–29, 233–40, 248–50, 252, 255, 257, 258, 264, 267, 285, 290–92, 300–305, 307–9, 311, 312, 314, 318, 321–23, 326, 330–34, 336, 337, 343–46, 352, 360–64, 367, 372–75, 377–79, 381, 383–85, 387–390, 392, 393, 396–404, 408, 409, 416, 423, 425–28 Mzhavanadze, Vasiliy, 62, 63 Nakhchivan, Autonomic Soviet Socialist Republic, 16, 36, 60, 72, 78, 80–82, 89, 90, 119, 125, 132, 144, 145, 199, 201, 225, 245, 253, 258, 261–263, 265, 317, 318, 342, 343, 357, 368, 375, 376 Narimanov, Nariman, xii, 45–47, 108, 264–67, 319, 334, 336, 343–45, 348–53, 386, 394, 395, 398, 412, 413, 414, 436 Niyazi, Taghizadeh-Hajibekov, 7, 98, 99, 100, 103, 283, 286, 290, 327, 329 Ordzhonikidze, Grigoriy (Sergo), 47, 158, 344, 351, 358, 395, 413 Orujev, Sabit, 250, 380, 399 Orujov, Ruhulla, 176, 325, 328 Ozolin, Karlis, 120, 399 Pan-Islamism, 9, 123 Pan-Turkism, 9, 123, 435 Pas​ternak, Boris, 284 Paustovsky, Konstantin, 284 Pehlevi, Mohammed Reza, 363. See also shah Pervukhin, Mikhail, 198, 210, 211, 216, 217, 219, 223 Pik​hoya, Rudolf, xiii, 211, 232 Pishevari, Seyyid Jafar, 71, 429, 443 Polevoy, Boris, 31 Polyanskiy, Dmitriy, 431 Ponomarev, Boris, 272, 436 Pyzhikov, Alexandr, xiii Qarayev, Ali Heydar, 47, 53, 336 Qarayev, Qara, 24, 46, 97–102, 137, 264, 283, 286, 287, 292, 309, 323, 327, 328, 329, 331, 384, 393 Quliyev, Aliovsat, 17, 97, 335–39

Quliyev, Jamil, 266, 341–45, 412 Quliyev, Teymur, 1–4, 34 Quliyev, Tofik, 286, 327, 329 Rafibeyli, Nigar, 11, 97 Rafili, Mikail, 11, 12, 23, 24, 97, 264 Rahimov, Sadykh, x, 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14–17, 23, 32, 35, 36, 45, 50, 53, 88, 96, 108, 120, 121, 125, 127, 139, 145–48, 150, 163–66, 172, 175–89, 197, 198, 213, 223, 225, 236, 250, 255, 261, 262, 286, 294, 303–5, 333, 354, 391, 400, 401, 408, 416, 423, 427 Rahimov, Suleyman, 9–12, 19, 22, 23, 25–31, 46, 49, 97, 126, 288, 305, 306, 310, 320 Rahman, Sabit, 11, 12, 27, 97 Rahmanzadeh, Maral, 105 Rashidov, Sharaf, 325, 377 Rizayev, Novruz, 47, 428 Rudenko, Roman, 44, 70, 72 Rudzutak, Yan, 56 Rustam, Suleyman, xiii, 10, 12, 46, 49, 97, 101, 103, 143, 264, 268, 290, 310, 320, 326 Rustamov, Seyid, 46, 286, 290, 328, 329 Ryurikov, Boris, 282 Rza, Khalil, 436 Rza, Rasul, 10, 11, 23, 24, 26, 29, 46, 97, 102–4, 111, 120, 261, 310, 317, 318, 320, 323, 329, 380, 428 Rzaquliyev, Elbey, 105 Rzayev, Nazim, 98 Saburov, Maxim, 44, 210–212, 217, 219, 223, 227 Sadykh, Avaz, 11, 24 Salakhov, Tahir, 105 Samedov, Hajibaba, 32 Samedov, Vitaliy, 15, 18, 19, 25, 35–38, 90, 91, 133, 341, 403, 405, 406 Sarkisov, Ruben, 71 Saryvelli, Osman, 11, 49 Seidbayli, Hasan, 201 Semichastniy, Vladimir, xii, 415 Shaginyan, Marietta, 114, 325 shah, 221, 364, 439, 440 Shahbazi, Tagi, 208 Shahgeldiyev, Ali Hasan, 264, 340, 341, 349 Sharif, Aziz, 12, 97, 321, 325 Shatagin, Nikolay, 346, 350–53, 414–15 Shaumyan, Stepan, 78, 346, 387, 395, 398, 413, 436 Shelepin, Alexandr, 65, 364, 367, 368, 425 Shelest, Petr, 431 Sherbitskiy, Vladimir, 442 Shestakovich, Dmitriy, 99 Shikhly, Ismail, 11, 97, 287 Shikin, Ivan, 32, 64, 82, 130, 150, 176, 185, 188, 226, 292, 302, 376–78, 385, 387–89, 400, 410 Shklovsky, Viktor, 284 Sholokhov, Mikhail, 20, 21 Shubin, Alexandr, 3, 38, 188 Shvernik, Nikolay, 14, 44, 54, 211, 212, 214, 216 Simonov, Kostantin, 12, 31, 284, 323, 325 Snastin, Vasiliy, 346–48, 376, 410–12, 414–15, 430 Soltan Galiyev, Mir Seyyit, 55 South Azerbaijan, xiii, 2, 4–6, 10, 99, 106 South Kazakhstan, 8, 269 Soviet Citizenship, 8, 248, 282 Stalin, Jozef, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 17, 21, 31, 39, 43–45, 51–54, 56–63, 65, 68, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 86, 87, 98, 104, 109, 111,

125, 159, 186, 193, 194, 200, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210–213, 216, 218, 221, 226, 227, 232, 233, 237, 240, 242, 243, 246, 248, 270, 272, 273, 275, 277, 278, 281, 285, 291, 293, 296, 297, 317, 327, 328, 344, 345, 347, 353, 355, 356, 358, 371, 377, 393, 396, 413, 417, 423, 424, 426, 428, 430, 431, 445, 446–49, 451, 453 Stalin Prize, 5, 10, 17, 21, 31, 45, 98, 104, 111, 317, 328, 393 Sukarno, Ahmed, 145, 146, 179, 181, 182 Suleymanov, Manaf, 11 Sultanova, Akima, 9, 13, 17, 30, 105, 146, 179, 180, 187, 199, 252, 254, 264, 322, 323 Sumbatov-Topuridze, Yuvelyan, 71, 76, 429 Sumbatzadeh, Ali Sohbat, 339 Surikov, Alexey, 31 Suslov, Mikhail, 44, 51, 79, 121, 142, 198, 210–212, 216, 218, 219, 229, 230–32, 234, 235, 238, 275, 300, 431, 432 Tairzadeh, Mirza Alekber Sabir, 105, 163, 207, 265, 266, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320 Taktakishvili, Otar, 99, 101, 104 Talegani, Mah​moud Ayatollah, 440 Talybzadeh, Abdulla Shaig, 208, 366 Tarlanov, Mammadagha, 104, 105, 286 Tashkent, 35, 37, 46, 55, 58, 79, 224, 251, 337, 377, 390 Taubman, William, xiii, 194, 216, 240, 322, 360 Teymurov, Molla Huseyn, 33, 357 Tikhonov, Nikolay, 31, 96, 323, 325 Tikunov, Vadim, 35 Tovmasyan, Parunak, 81 Tovmasyan, Suren, 76–78, 81 Transcaucasia, 8, 19, 33, 48, 60, 63, 70, 75–78, 81, 86–88, 98, 99, 104, 114, 136, 146, 161, 222, 227, 228, 230, 231, 234, 238–40, 248, 275, 289, 328, 340, 342, 343, 346, 351, 355, 363, 395, 412, 415, 424, 425, 426, 441, 442 Tsvigun, Semon, 429 Tude Party, 429 Turkey, 7, 55, 57, 66, 68, 70, 77–79, 82, 102, 123, 125, 125, 221–22, 247–49, 264, 268–72, 274–283, 323–25, 333, 362–63, 365, 368, 388, 434 Turkish Communist Party, 270, 273, 274, 277, 279, 280, 282 Tvardovskiy, Alexandr, 25 Ukraine SSR, xii, 58, 61, 82, 93, 94, 113, 155, 157, 161, 200, 213, 266, 322, 328, 387, 389, 391, 397, 406, 433, 441, 442 Ulmanis, Karles, 389 Ulubabyan, Bagrat, 143, 144 Ulvi, Rajab, 47, 48 Useynov, Mikail, 258, 259 Vahabzadeh, Bakhtiyar, 11, 12, 23, 97, 143, 315, 316, 320, 429 Vahid, Aliaga, 97, 316 Valuyev, Petr, 346–50, 352, 353 Vazgen I, (Armenian Catholicos), 79–81, 376 Vekilov, Mehtikhan, 310, 311, 349, 350, 414 Veliyev, Ali, 11, 12, 23, 26, 27, 49, 97, 143, 144, 287, 290, 305, 310 Vezirov, Abdurrahman, 225, 257, 262, 311 Vezirov, Suleyman, 146, 220 Voronov, Gennadiy, 431 Voroshilov, Kliment, 44, 88, 90, 109, 110, 112, 113, 133, 136, 155, 159, 164, 167, 175, 176, 210, 211, 213, 216, 217, 221, 429, 443 Vurghun, Samed (Vekilov), 46, 49, 89, 96, 101, 103, 105, 126, 127, 143, 144, 236, 264, 287, 290, 310, 311, 315–17 Writers’ Union of Azerbaijan, 5, 9, 12, 13, 21, 22, 27, 29, 30, 40 Yagubov, Mir Teymur, 1, 2 Yakovlev, Dmitriy, 3, 20, 35–38, 41, 50, 65, 72, 74, 79, 84, 86, 89, 107, 111, 137, 143, 143, 150, 156–61, 165, 172, 174, 176–78, 182, 184, 187, 191, 196, 218, 233, 240, 293, 388, 400, 404, 415, 446

Yemelyanov, Stepan, 32, 71, 72, 114, 429 Yezhov, Nikolay, 55 Yuzbashov, Ramzi, 106–9 Zabolotsky, Nikolai, 284 Zamanov, Abbas Fattah oglu, 97, 315, 318, 319, 434 Zamanov, Abbas Mamed-Tagi oglu, 32, 291, 298 Zarya Vostoka (newspaper), 63, 67, 76 Zeydman, Boris, 99, 100 Zhdanov, Andrey, 63, 84, 90, 232, 250, 327 Zhu De, 62 Zhukov, Georgiy, 141, 142, 190, 201, 202, 210–13, 216, 217, 219, 222, 226, 227, 229, 230–41, 244, 426, 446 Zubkova, Elena, xiii Zubok, Vladislav, xiii, 194, 212, 284, 299

About the Author

Jamil Hasanli was born January 15, 1952, in Azerbaijan. He graduated with a history degree from Baku State University in 1975. In 1984 he finished his PhD, and he served as a professor at BSU in 1993–2011 and a professor at Khazar University in 2011–2013. He was advisor to the president of Azerbaijan in 1993 and served two terms as a Member of Parliament of Azerbaijan in 2000–2010. Professor Hasanli was presidential candidate from the National Council of Democratic Forces of Azerbaijan in October 2013. He was a history and public policy scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center in 2011. Hasanli is the author of twenty-eight books published in Azerbaijan, Russia, United States, Turkey, Iran, and other countires. Two of his monographs were published in the Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series: At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946 (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006) and Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Lexington Books, 2011). His books Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1918–1920: The Difficult Road to Western Integration (2014) and Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov: Life for the Idea, 1863–1934 (2014) draw heavily upon information from newly opened archives.