Key Documents on the Reform of the un Security Council 1991-2019 [1 ed.] 9789004421738, 9789004415171

Citation preview

Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019

Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019 Edited by

Bardo Fassbender Professor of International Law at the University of St. Gallen

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Fassbender, Bardo, compiler. Title: Key documents on the reform of the UN Security Council 1991–2019 /  edited by Bardo Fassbender, Professor of International Law at the  University of St. Gallen. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill Nijhoff, 2020. | Includes  bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2019059231 (print) | LCCN 2019059232 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004415171 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004421738 (kindle edition) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations. Security Council—History—Sources. Classification: LCC KZ5036 .F37 2020 (print) | LCC KZ5036 (ebook) | DDC  341.23/23—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019059231 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019059232

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. isbn 978-90-04-41517-1 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-42173-8 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

How bright will seem through mem’ry’s haze Those happy, golden by-gone days … As a token of my deep and lasting gratitude, this work is dedicated to the Yale Law School.

∵

Overview of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 This collection of “Key Documents”: What it is, and how it is organized 1 1.2 Landmarks in the history of the Security Council reform debate 15 2 Earlier reform discussions: From the late 1940s to the start of formal discussions of Security Council reform in 1992 36 3 “The most productive time”: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group from 1992 to the Razali proposal of 1997 103 3.1 Statements by UN organs and officials 103 3.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 168 3.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 168 3.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 168 3.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 232 3.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 240 3.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 255 3.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 255 3.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 266 3.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 297 3.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 318 3.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 328 3.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 365 3.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 381 3.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 381 3.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 387 3.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 401 3.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 433 3.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 435

viii

Overview of Contents

4 Momentum and deadlock: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group after the Razali proposal, 1998-2008 509 4.1 Statements by UN organs and officials and Framework Documents 509 4.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 642 4.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 642 4.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 642 4.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 678 4.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 698 4.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 710 4.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 710 4.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 712 4.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 730 4.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 757 4.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 761 4.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 772 4.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 779 4.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 779 4.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 782 4.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 785 4.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 800 4.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 810 5 On a road to nowhere? The Intergovernmental Negotiations, 2009-2019 869 5.1 Statements by UN organs and officials, Framework Documents, Elements of Convergence, and Elements of Commonality 869 5.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 987 5.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 987 5.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 987 5.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 1018 5.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 1030

Overview of Contents

ix

5.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 1044 5.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 1044 5.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 1050 5.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 1084 5.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 1107 5.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 1111 5.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 1127 5.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 1135 5.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 1135 5.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 1139 5.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 1144 5.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 1154 5.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 1184 Annex I: Summary of group positions 1220 Annex II: Summary of country positions 1236 Annex III: Table of group positions 1288 Annex IV: Table of country positions 1300 Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states 1320 Annex VI: List of statements made by states 1326 Annex VII: Alphabetical list of the authors of academic and civil society proposals 1362 Annex VIII: Select Bibliography 1365

x

Table of Contents

Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 This collection of “Key Documents”: What it is, and how it is organized 1 The time covered by the documents of this collection 2 The thematic focus of the collection 2 Criteria for the selection of statements and proposals 3 Original page numbers, footnotes and endnotes 4 Periods of the reform debate 5 The arrangement of documents within each period of time 7 Guidelines for the assignment of documents to sections and subsections 8 Statements by UN organs and officials and framework documents 8 The composition of the Security Council 9 The problem of the right of veto 11 The annexes as a “navigation aid” 12 A note on the indication of websites 13 Acknowledgments 13 1.2 Landmarks in the history of the Security Council reform debate 15 “The most productive time” 16 Momentum and deadlock: Discussions in the decade between 1998 and 2008 22 On a road to nowhere? The Intergovernmental Negotiations since 2009 26 The project of Security Council reform against the background of the contemporary state system 33 2 Earlier reform discussions: From the late 1940s to the start of formal discussions of Security Council reform in 1992 36 2.1 14 April 1949, UN General Assembly, Resolution 267 (III), “The problem of voting in the Security Council” 36 2.2 19 June 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and Venezuela, Letter to the Secretary-General, Proposal of the inclusion of an item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/3138 of 26 June 1956 39 2.3 12 December 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/3446 40

Table of Contents

xi

2.4 18 December 1956, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/3468 and A/3468/Rev.1 (20 December 1956) 42 2.5 19 December 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Amendment to the twenty-Power draft resolution (A/3446), UN Doc. A/L.217 and A/L.217/Rev.1 42 2.6 October 1957, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations: Tenth Report of the Commission and Reports of the Special Study Committees 43 2.7 1958, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law 51 2.8 16 September 1963, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta and Yemen: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, UN Doc. A/5520 66 2.9 16 December 1963, Report of the Special Political Committee on the Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/5675 67 2.10 16 December 1963, Special Political Committee, Official Records, UN Doc. A/ SPC/SR.429 70 2.11 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly, Resolution 1991 (XVIII), “Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council” 73 2.12 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly, Official Records, UN Doc. A/ PV.1285 74 2.13 December 1969, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations: The Next Twenty-Five Years, Twentieth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 80 2.14 November 1971, Arthur Lall, The Security Council in a Universal United Nations 81 2.15 1974, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Modernizing the Security Council: Special Report 83

xii

Table of Contents

2.16 March 1978, United States of America, Administration of President Jimmy Carter, Report to the Congresss on UN reform 86 2.17 14 November 1979, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, Letter to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/34/246 88 2.18 11 December 1979, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, India, Iraq, Japan, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/34/L.57 and Add.1 (14 December 1979) 89 2.19 14 December 1979, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, Amendments to Draft Resolution A/34/L.57; UN Doc. A/34/L.63 and Add.1 90 2.20 1983, Hanna Newcombe, Design For a Better World 91 2.21 1987, Harold Stassen, The Stassen 1987 Draft Charter for a Better United Nations Organization 98 2.22 October 1991, Ambassador Peter Wilenski, Address on UN Reform to the United Nations Association of Australia 99 2.23 6 September 1992, Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, The Jakarta Message, NAC 10/Doc. 12/Rev.1 and 2, in UN Doc. A/47/675–S/24816 of 18 November 1992 101 3 “The most productive time”: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group from 1992 to the Razali proposal of 1997 103 3.1 Statements by UN organs and officials 103 3.1.1 11 December 1992, UN General Assembly, Resolution 47/62, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council 103 3.1.2 3 December 1993, UN General Assembly, Resolution 48/26, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council 104 3.1.3 20 May 1994, Non-Paper by the President of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council 105 3.1.4 27 May 1994, UN Secretariat, Background paper for the internal use of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council 108 3.1.5 18 September 1995, Compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen, their discussion papers, as well as proposals

Table of Contents

3.1.6 3.1.7

3.1.8

3.1.9

3.1.10 3.1.11 3.1.12 3.1.13

3.1.14

3.1.15 3.1.16

3.1.17

xiii

and other documents presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 121 24 October 1995, UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Resolution 50/6 140 16 January 1996, Prof. Diogo Freitas do Amaral, President of the General Assembly, “Prospects for Reform of the Security Council”, Presentation at a meeting of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, New York 140 September 1996, Report on the progress of the work of the Openended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1 145 10 and 14 March 1997, Statements made by the Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group, Mr. Wilhelm Breitenstein and Mr. Asda Jayanama, on the consultations held from January to March 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex VII 148 20 March 1997, Paper submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group (“Razali Reform Paper”), UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.1 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex II 152 18 April 1997, Bureau of the OEWG, Non-paper: Working methods and transparency of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.3 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex IV 155 29 May 1997, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Discussions held in the Working Group in 1997, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.8 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex IX 156 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Working methods of the Security Council, transparency of its work, as well as its decision-making process, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex III 159 27 April 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of proposals made by delegations during the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex X 161 1 May 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Sets of outstanding issues related to the expansion of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVIII 162 12 May 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of proposals made by delegations during the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XI 163 25 June 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Sets of outstanding issues related to the expansion of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.12/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XIX 166

xiv

Table of Contents 3.1.18

6 July 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of the proposals made on the issue of the extension of the veto to the new permanent members, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.12/Rev.1/Add.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XX 167 3.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 168 3.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 168 3.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 168 3.2.1.1.1 27 September 1991, Italy, Mr. de Michelis, UN Doc. A/46/PV.12, pp. 21-36 168 3.2.1.1.2 23 September 1992, Germany, Mr. Kinkel, UN Doc. A/47/PV.8, pp. 51-67 168 3.2.1.1.3 24 September 1992, Italy, Mr. Colombo, UN Doc. A/47/PV.10, pp. 26-51 168 3.2.1.1.4 28 September 1992, Lithuania, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis, UN Doc. A/47/PV.15, pp. 2-11 169 3.2.1.1.5 30 September 1992, Nigeria, Mr. Nwachukwu, UN Doc. A/47/ PV.19, pp. 76-85 169 3.2.1.1.6 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 169 3.2.1.1.7 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.1 182 3.2.1.1.8 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.2 185 3.2.1.1.9 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.3 186 3.2.1.1.10 23 November 1993, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/48/ PV.62, pp. 5-7 187 3.2.1.1.11 24 November 1993, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, pp. 9-12 188 3.2.1.1.12 24 November 1993, Romania, Mr. Botez, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, pp. 23-24 189 3.2.1.1.13 24 November 1993, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/48/ PV.64, pp. 24-26 190

Table of Contents 3.2.1.1.14

3.2.1.1.15

3.2.1.1.16

3.2.1.1.17 3.2.1.1.18 3.2.1.1.19 3.2.1.1.20 3.2.1.1.21 3.2.1.1.22 3.2.1.1.23 3.2.1.1.24 3.2.1.1.25

3.2.1.1.26 3.2.1.1.27 3.2.1.1.28 3.2.1.1.29 3.2.1.1.30 3.2.1.1.31

xv 30 November 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 5, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.5 190 9 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 7, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.7 191 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.9 193 13 October 1994, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Hurst, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 12-14 193 13 October 1994, Germany, Mr. Graf zu Rantzau, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 18-19 195 13 October 1994, India, Mr. Chaturvedi, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 20-22 196 13 October 1994, Brazil, Mr. Sardenberg, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 22-25 197 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-8 197 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 17-18 197 13 October 1994, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 23-24 198 14 October 1994, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 15-17 198 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 199 3 October 1995, Qatar, Sheikh Al Thani, UN Doc. A/50/PV.17, pp. 18-21 206 6 October 1995, Liechtenstein, Ms. Willi, UN Doc. A/50/PV.22, pp. 9-11 206 13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.57, pp. 16-18 207 13 November 1995, France, Mr. Ladsous UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 18-19 207 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 5-6 208 14 November 1995, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.59, pp. 2-4 209

xvi

Table of Contents 3.2.1.1.32 3.2.1.1.33 3.2.1.1.34 3.2.1.1.35 3.2.1.1.36 3.2.1.1.37 3.2.1.1.38 3.2.1.1.39 3.2.1.1.40 3.2.1.1.41 3.2.1.1.42 3.2.1.1.43 3.2.1.1.44 3.2.1.1.45 3.2.1.1.46 3.2.1.1.47 3.2.1.1.48 3.2.1.1.49 3.2.1.1.50 3.2.1.1.51 3.2.1.1.52 3.2.1.1.53

March 1996, France, Non-Paper 210 25 March 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Openended Working Group 210 27 March 1996, Australia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.16 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XIII, pp. 60-63 211 25 March 1996, Norway, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII, pp. 84-86 212 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the OpenEnded Working Group 213 28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 215 22 April 1996, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Osvald, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 215 23 April 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Openended Working Group 216 24 April 1996, United States of America, Department of State, Views on Reform Measures 217 10 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Openended Working Group 218 23 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Openended Working Group 218 2 July 1996, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.15/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XIV, pp. 64-66 219 30 September 1996, Bolivia, Mr. Aranibar Quiroga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.14, pp. 1-5 221 7 October 1996, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Lewis, UN Doc. A/51/PV.25, pp. 21-25  222 30 October 1996, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 13 222 30 October 1996, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 2-3 222 30 October 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 3-5 223 30 October 1996, Czech Republic, Mr. Rovenský, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 13-14 224 30 October 1996, Croatia, Mr. Nobilo, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 14-16 224 1 November 1996, Ecuador, Mr. Valencia Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 15-16 224 1 November 1996, Nicaragua on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Vilchez Asher, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 18-20 225 1 November 1996, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 20-22 225

Table of Contents 3.2.1.1.54

xvii

27 March 1997, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex III, pp. 10-12 227 3.2.1.1.55 17 July 1997, United States of America, Mr. Bill Richardson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 228 3.2.1.1.56 3 October 1997, Yemen, Mr. Al-Eryany, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 21-25 228 3.2.1.1.57 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17 229 3.2.1.1.58 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Meléndez-Barahona, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.63, pp. 41-43 229 3.2.1.1.59 5 December 1997, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 1-2 230 3.2.1.1.60 5 December 1997, Russian Federation, Mr. Gorelik, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, p. 11 231 3.2.1.1.61 5 December 1997, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.64, pp. 15-16 231 3.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 232 3.2.1.2.1 23 November 1992, Cuba, Mr. Zamora Rodriguez, UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 72-78 232 3.2.1.2.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 232 3.2.1.2.3 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.2, pp. 5-6 234 3.2.1.2.4 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council” 234 3.2.1.2.5 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/ PV.30, pp. 1-2 235 3.2.1.2.6 14 October 1994, Pakistan, Mr. Marker, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, p. 1-2 235 3.2.1.2.7 13 November 1995, Italy, Mr. Fulci, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 15-17 235 3.2.1.2.8 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.56, pp. 20-22 236 3.2.1.2.9 14 November 1995, Pakistan, Mr. Leghari, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 21-23 236 3.2.1.2.10 22 April 1996, Mexico, Mr. Tello, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 237

xviii

Table of Contents 3.2.1.2.11

26 April 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 237 3.2.1.2.12 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 238 3.2.1.2.13 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.45, pp. 9-11 239 3.2.1.2.14 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12 239 3.2.1.2.15 4 December 1997, Argentina, Mr. Petrella, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.63, pp. 16-17 239 3.2.1.2.16 4 December 1997, San Marino, Mr. Balestra, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.63, pp. 36-37 239 3.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 240 3.2.1.3.1 23 November 1992, Malaysia, Mr. Razali, UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 24-31 240 3.2.1.3.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 240 3.2.1.3.3 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 1, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.1 243 3.2.1.3.4 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.3 243 3.2.1.3.5 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 244 3.2.1.3.6 18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, The Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Final Document 245 3.2.1.3.7 13 November 1995, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martínez Blanco, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.56, pp. 13-14 246 3.2.1.3.8 15 November 1995, Belarus, Mr. Sychov, UN Doc. A/50/PV.60, pp. 10-11 247 3.2.1.3.9 29 October 1996, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 14-15 248 3.2.1.3.10 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17 248 3.2.1.3.11 30 October 1996, Latvia, Mr. Baumanis, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 1-2 249

Table of Contents 3.2.1.3.12

xix

30 October 1996, Bulgaria, Mr. Maximov, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 24-25 249 3.2.1.3.13 12 June 1997, Poland, Position Paper, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex X, pp. 51-54 250 3.2.1.3.14 27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XI, pp. 55-57 251 3.2.1.3.15 26 September 1997, Malta, Mr. Sant, UN Doc. A/52/PV.13, pp. 5-9 253 3.2.1.3.16 2 October 1997, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/52/PV.21, pp. 1-5 253 3.2.1.3.17 4 December 1997, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 22-24 254 3.2.1.3.18 5 December 1997, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Calovski, A/52/PV.64, pp. 21-22 254 3.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 255 3.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 255 3.2.2.1.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 255 3.2.2.1.2 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 260 3.2.2.1.3 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/ Add.3 262 3.2.2.1.4 3 October 1994, Australia, Mr. Evans, UN Doc. A/49/PV.15, pp. 6-13 263 3.2.2.1.5 13 October 1994, Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 5-7 264 3.2.2.1.6 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martinez Blanco, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 13-15 264 3.2.2.1.7 24 September 1996, Costa Rica, Mr. Villalobos, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.7, pp. 23-26 265 3.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 266 3.2.2.2.1 22 September 1992, Netherlands, Mr. Van Den Broek, UN Doc. A/47/PV.6, pp. 64-78 266 3.2.2.2.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 266

xx

Table of Contents 3.2.2.2.3

26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 270 3.2.2.2.4 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 270 3.2.2.2.5 30 September 1993, Italy, Mr. Andreatta, UN Doc. A/48/PV.10, p. 16 272 3.2.2.2.6 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.9 273 3.2.2.2.7 20 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 10, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.10 273 3.2.2.2.8 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council” 274 3.2.2.2.9 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/ PV.30, pp. 1-2 276 3.2.2.2.10 13 October 1994, Mexico, Mr. Flores Olea, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 2-5 276 3.2.2.2.11 13 October 1994, Turkey, Mr. Batu, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, p. 13-14 277 3.2.2.2.12 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 17-18 277 3.2.2.2.13 13 October 1994, Canada, Ms. Frechette, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 18-19 277 3.2.2.2.14 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 278 3.2.2.2.15 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.56, pp. 21-22 279 3.2.2.2.16 13 November 1995, Mexico, Mr. Tello, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 5-7 279 3.2.2.2.17 14 November 1995, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 17-18 280 3.2.2.2.18 15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/PV.60, pp. 3-4  281 3.2.2.2.19 28 February 1996, Spain, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VIII, pp. 37-39 281 3.2.2.2.20 May 1996, Italy, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IX, pp. 41-47 284

Table of Contents 3.2.2.2.21

xxi

22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statements in the Open-ended Working Group 289 3.2.2.2.22 17 June 1996, Monaco, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XI, pp. 56-58 289 3.2.2.2.23 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC. 247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90 291 3.2.2.2.24 29 October 1996, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 1-4 293 3.2.2.2.25 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.45, pp. 9-11 294 3.2.2.2.26 2 July 1997, Italy, Revised proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XIII, pp. 60-69 294 3.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 297 3.2.2.3.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 297 3.2.2.3.2 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 299 3.2.2.3.3 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 300 3.2.2.3.4 23 November 1993, Syria, Mr. Shaheed, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 1-3 300 3.2.2.3.5 29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, reprinted in UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27 301 3.2.2.3.6 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-8 302 3.2.2.3.7 13 October 1994, Organization of African Unity, Mr. Abdellah (Tunisia), UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 9-11 302 3.2.2.3.8 14 October 1994, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 17-18 303 3.2.2.3.9 29 September 1995, Malaysia, Mr. Mahathir, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.12, pp. 1-5 303 3.2.2.3.10 13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24 303 3.2.2.3.11 14 November 1995, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 7-8 304 3.2.2.3.12 14 November 1995, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 12-14 304

xxii

Table of Contents 3.2.2.3.13

14 November 1995, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 6-7 305 3.2.2.3.14 28 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 306 3.2.2.3.15 March 1996, France, Non-Paper 306 3.2.2.3.16 25 March 1996, Norway, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII, pp. 84-86 307 3.2.2.3.17 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group 307 3.2.2.3.18 28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 307 3.2.2.3.19 3 July 1996, Malaysia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVI, pp. 80-83 308 3.2.2.3.20 29 October 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 5-7 308 3.2.2.3.21 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20 309 3.2.2.3.22 30 October 1996, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 6-8 310 3.2.2.3.23 30 October 1996, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.45, pp. 13-15 310 3.2.2.3.24 30 October 1996, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 21-23 311 3.2.2.3.25 30 October 1996, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 2-3 311 3.2.2.3.26 30 October 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 3-5 312 3.2.2.3.27 30 October 1996, Sudan, Mr. Erwa, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 17-19 312 3.2.2.3.28 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8 313 3.2.2.3.29 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59 313 3.2.2.3.30 9 July 1997, Group of Arab States, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex VIII, pp. 30-31 315 3.2.2.3.31 3 October 1997, Jordan, Mr. Tarawneh, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 6-11 316 3.2.2.3.32 5 December 1997, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.64, pp. 2-3 316 3.2.2.3.33 5 December 1997, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 22-23 317 3.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 318 3.2.2.4.1 29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, in UN

Table of Contents

xxiii

Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27 318 3.2.2.4.2 13 October 1994, Germany, Mr. Graf zu Rantzau, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 18-19 318 3.2.2.4.3 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 319 3.2.2.4.4 13 November 1995, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 18-19 319 3.2.2.4.5 28 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 320 3.2.2.4.6 29 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 321 3.2.2.4.7 25 March 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, Statement in the Openended Working Group 323 3.2.2.4.8 27 March 1996, India, Mr. Shah, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group 324 3.2.2.4.9 29 October 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 7-9 326 3.2.2.4.10 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.45, p. 9-11 327 3.2.2.4.11 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8 328 3.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 328 3.2.3.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 328 3.2.3.2 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 332 3.2.3.3 23 November 1993, Thailand, Mr. Pibulsonggram, UN Doc. A/48/ PV.61, pp. 20-22 334 3.2.3.4 23 November 1993, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 7-8 334 3.2.3.5 23 November 1993, Maldives, Mr. Shahid, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 12-13 335 3.2.3.6 23 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 8, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.8 335 3.2.3.7 27 May 1994, United Kingdom, Mr. Gomersall, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 335 3.2.3.8 13 October 1994, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 19-21 336

xxiv

Table of Contents 3.2.3.9 13 October 1994, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 15-16 337 3.2.3.10 14 October 1994, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 8-9 338 3.2.3.11 14 October 1994, San Marino, Mr. Aita, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 9-11 338 3.2.3.12 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 339 3.2.3.13 9 October 1995, Maldives, Mr. Jameel, UN Doc. A/50/PV.25, pp. 5-8 350 3.2.3.14 10 October 1995, Mongolia, Mr. Gombosuren, UN Doc. A/50/PV.26, pp. 15-18 350 3.2.3.15 11 October 1995, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choi Su Hon, UN Doc. A/50/PV.29, pp. 5-10 350 3.2.3.16 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9 351 3.2.3.17 14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3 351 3.2.3.18 14 November 1995, China, Mr. Qin Huasun, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 9-10 352 3.2.3.19 15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.60, pp. 3-4 352 3.2.3.20 1 February 1996, Belize, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 353 3.2.3.21 1 March 1996, Italy, Mr. Fulci, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 356 3.2.3.22 22 April 1996, Mexico, Mr. Tello, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 356 3.2.3.23 3 July 1996, Belize, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XV, pp. 67-79 357 3.2.3.24 30 October 1996, China, Mr. Wang Xuexian, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 17-19 361 3.2.3.25 6 May 1997, Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 362 3.2.3.26 7 May 1997, Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 362 3.2.3.27 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17 363 3.2.3.28 4 December 1997, China, Mr. Qin Huasun, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 2-4 363 3.2.3.29 4 December 1997, Pakistan, Mr. Ahmad, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 12-16 364 3.2.3.30 4 December 1997, Malta, Mr. Saliba, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 30-31 364

Table of Contents

xxv

3.2.3.31 4 December 1997, Portugal, Mr. Soares, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 44-45 365 3.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 365 3.3.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 365 3.3.2 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 367 3.3.3 23 November 1993, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 5-7 368 3.3.4 24 November 1993, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, p. 12 368 3.3.5 20 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 10, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.10 368 3.3.6 27 May 1994, United Kingdom, Mr. Gomersall, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 368 3.3.7 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-8 369 3.3.8 13 October 1994, Turkey, Mr. Batu, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 13-14 369 3.3.9 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 16-17 369 3.3.10 13 October 1994, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 19-21 369 3.3.11 13 October 1994, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 14-17 370 3.3.12 14 October 1994, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, p. 10 370 3.3.13 14 October 1994, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 15-17 370 3.3.14 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 371 3.3.15 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9 373 3.3.16 13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 16-18 373 3.3.17 13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24 373 3.3.18 14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3 374 3.3.19 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 5-6 374 3.3.20 14 November 1995, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 17-18 374

xxvi

Table of Contents 3.3.21 3.3.22 3.3.23 3.3.24 3.3.25 3.3.26 3.3.27 3.3.28 3.3.29 3.3.30 3.3.31 3.3.32 3.3.33 3.3.34 3.3.35 3.3.36 3.3.37 3.3.38 3.3.39 3.3.40 3.3.41 3.3.42

15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.60, pp. 3-4 374 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group 374 27 March 1996, Australia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.16 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XIII, pp. 60-63 375 28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 376 24 April 1996, United States of America, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures 376 10 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 376 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Openended Working Group 377 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90 377 29 October 1996, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 1-4 377 29 October 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 5-7 378 29 October 1996, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 14-15 378 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20 378 30 October 1996, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 13 378 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17 378 27 March 1997, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex III, pp. 10-12 379 12 June 1997, Poland, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex X, pp. 51-54 379 27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.10 = Annex XI UN Doc. A/51/47, pp. 55-57 379 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59 380 17 July 1997, United States of America, Mr. Bill Richardson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 380 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17 380 5 December 1997, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 1-2 381 5 December 1997, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 15-16 381

Table of Contents

xxvii

3.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 381 3.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 381 3.4.1.1 14 October 1994, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, A/49/PV.32, pp. 10-11 381 3.4.1.2 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 5-6 381 3.4.1.3 27 March 1996, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 382 3.4.1.4 24 April 1996, United States of America, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures 382 3.4.1.5 21 May 1996, United Kingdom, Sir John Weston, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 382 3.4.1.6 22 May 1996, Russian Federation, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 383 3.4.1.7 23 May 1996, United States of America, Mr. Cameron R. Hume, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 385 3.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 387 3.4.2.1 25 September 1991, Venezuela, Mr. Carlos Andres Peres, UN Doc. A/46/PV.8, pp. 2-16 387 3.4.2.2 4 October 1991, Libya, Mr. Goma Goubail, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.8, pp. 7-8 388 3.4.2.3 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 388 3.4.2.4 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 391 3.4.2.5 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 393 3.4.2.6 1 October 1993, Malaysia, Mr. Mahathir, UN Doc. A/48/PV.13, pp. 15-19 394 3.4.2.7 23 November 1993, Syria, Mr. Shaheed, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 1-3 394 3.4.2.8 30 November 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 5, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.5 394 3.4.2.9 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.9 395 3.4.2.10 29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1996/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27 395 3.4.2.11 13 October 1994, Malaysia, Mr. Hasmy, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 9-11 396

xxviii

Table of Contents

3.4.2.12 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 1-2 397 3.4.2.13 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martinez Blanco, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 13-14 397 3.4.2.14 14 October 1994, Ghana, Mr. Lamptey, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 9-10 398 3.4.2.15 14 October 1994, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 17-18 398 3.4.2.16 11 October 1995, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choi Su Hon, UN Doc. A/50/PV.29, pp. 5-10 399 3.4.2.17 18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, The Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Final Document 399 3.4.2.18 13 November 1995, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martínez Blanco, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 13-14 400 3.4.2.19 13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24 400 3.4.2.20 14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3 400 3.4.2.21 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59 401 3.4.2.22 4 December 1997, Colombia, Mr. García, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 27-28 401 3.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 401 3.4.3.1 28 September 1992, Lithuania, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis, UN Doc. A/47/PV.15, pp. 2-11 401 3.4.3.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 402 3.4.3.3 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 405 3.4.3.4 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 405 3.4.3.5 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 406 3.4.3.6 7 December 1993, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, p. 12 407 3.4.3.7 9 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 7, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.7 407 3.4.3.8 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council” 408

Table of Contents

xxix

3.4.3.9 3 October 1994, Australia, Mr. Evans, UN Doc. A/49/PV.15, pp. 6-13 408 3.4.3.10 13 October 1994, Mexico, Mr. Flores Olea, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 2-5 408 3.4.3.11 13 October 1994, Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 5-7 409 3.4.3.12 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 410 3.4.3.13 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 20-22 411 3.4.3.14 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9 411 3.4.3.15 13 November 1995, Malaysia, Mr. Thanarajasingam, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.57, pp. 11-13 412 3.4.3.16 13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 16-18 413 3.4.3.17 14 November 1995, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 7-8 413 3.4.3.18 14 November 1995, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 12-14 413 3.4.3.19 14 November 1995, Ghana, Mr. Lamptey, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 16-18 415 3.4.3.20 28 February 1996, Spain, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VIII, pp. 37-40 415 3.4.3.21 29 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 416 3.4.3.22 27 March 1996, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII, pp. 33-36 416 3.4.3.23 23 April 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 419 3.4.3.24 13 May 1996, Mexico, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex V, pp. 28-30 419 3.4.3.25 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Openended Working Group 421 3.4.3.26 23 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 421 3.4.3.27 17 June 1996, Uruguay, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.14 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XII, p. 59 423 3.4.3.28 3 July 1996, Belize, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XV, pp. 67-79 424 3.4.3.29 3 July 1996, Malaysia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVI, pp. 80-83 424

xxx

Table of Contents 3.4.3.30 30 September 1996, Bolivia, Mr. Aranibar Quiroga, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.14, pp. 1-5 424 3.4.3.31 7 October 1996, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Lewis, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.25, pp. 21-25 425 3.4.3.32 29 October 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 7-9 425 3.4.3.33 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20 425 3.4.3.34 30 October 1996, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 13-15 426 3.4.3.35 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17 426 3.4.3.36 30 October 1996, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 19 427 3.4.3.37 30 October 1996, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 9-11 427 3.4.3.38 30 October 1996, Croatia, Mr. Nobilo, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 14-16 428 3.4.3.39 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8 428 3.4.3.40 1 November 1996, Ecuador, Mr. Valencia Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/51/ PV.49, pp. 15-16 429 3.4.3.41 1 November 1996, Nicaragua on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Vilchez Asher, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 18-20 429 3.4.3.42 1 November 1996, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 20-22 430 3.4.3.43 30 April 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/51/47 Annex V, pp. 18-23 430 3.4.3.44 27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XI, pp. 55-57 430 3.4.3.45 2 October 1997, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/52/PV.21, pp. 1-5 431 3.4.3.46 3 October 1997, Yemen, Mr. Al-Eryany, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 21-25 431 3.4.3.47 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17 431 3.4.3.48 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12 431 3.4.3.49 4 December 1997, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 37-38 432 3.4.3.50 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Meléndez-Barahona, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 41-43 432 3.4.3.51 5 December 1997, Sudan, Mr. Osman, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 16-17 433

Table of Contents

xxxi

3.4.3.52 5 December 1997, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Calovski, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 21-22 433 3.4.3.53 5 December 1997, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 22-23 433 3.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 433 3.4.4.1 23 November 1993, Chile, Mr. Somavia, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 3-5 433 3.4.4.2 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group 434 3.4.4.3 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90 434 3.4.4.4 1 November 1996, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 10-12 435 3.4.4.5 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12 435 3.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 435 3.5.1 December 1990, Keith Hindell, The UN Security Council I: filling the gaps 435 3.5.2 1991, Hans Köchler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council 437 3.5.3 17-19 September 1991, Second International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN-2), Concluding Statement 442 3.5.4 1992, Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order 443 3.5.5 1992, Louis B. Sohn, Modernizing the Structure and Procedure of the Security Council 454 3.5.6 1994, United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 456 3.5.7 1 March 1994, Peter Wallensteen, Representing the World: A Security Council for the 21st Century 457 3.5.8 20 May 1994, International Peace Academy and The Stanley Foundation, Reform of the Security Council: Memorandum Submitted to the President of the UN General Assembly 464 3.5.9 23 May 1994, Olara A. Otunnu, Statement at a Conference organised by the Global Policy Forum and the NGO Network on Global Governance 468 3.5.10 June 1994, The Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform 469 3.5.11 1995, The Commission on Global Governance, Report “Our Global Neighbourhood” 470 3.5.12 1995, Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, Report “The United Nations in its Second Half-Century” 473

xxxii 3.5.13 3.5.14 3.5.15 3.5.16 3.5.17 3.5.18

Table of Contents 1995, Emma Matanle, The UN Security Council: Prospects for Reform 477 1995, Vicenç Fisas, Blue Geopolitics, The United Nations Reform and the Future of the Blue Helmets 479 1996, Tatsuro Kunugi, Makoto Iokibe, Takahiro Shinyo and Kohei Hashimoto, Towards a More Effective UN: Research Project on a More Effective United Nations and Japan’s Options 488 1996, Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill and James Sutterlin, Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam 490 1997, Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN 492 1998, Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective 495

4 Momentum and deadlock: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group after the Razali proposal, 1998-2008 509 4.1 Statements by UN organs and officials and Framework Documents 509 4.1.1 23 November 1998, UN General Assembly, Resolution 53/30, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 509 4.1.2 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex IV 509 4.1.3 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VI 514 4.1.4 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.2/Rev.2 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VIII 528 4.1.5 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.2/Rev.3 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex XI 543 4.1.6 8 September 2000, UN General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 559 4.1.7 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council: The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex IV 559 4.1.8 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council: The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex V 566

Table of Contents 4.1.9 4.1.10 4.1.11 4.1.12 4.1.13

4.1.14 4.1.15

4.1.16 4.1.17 4.1.18 4.1.19 4.1.20 4.1.21 4.1.22 4.1.23

xxxiii

2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Expansion of the Security Council: total size of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.2 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VI 568 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Increase in the permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.3 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VII 570 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper, Increase in the non-permanent membership of the expanded Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.4 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex IX 576 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper, Question of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.5 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex X 580 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Principal elements of the suggestions contained in annex XI of the report of the Working Group (A/54/47) concerning the expansion of the Security Council: Revised summary, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.5/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XII 583 9 September 2002, UN Secretary-General, Report “Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change”, UN Doc. A/57/387 586 2003, Bureau of the OEWG, Revised conference room paper, Principal elements of proposals concerning (a) decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto, (b) expansion of the Security Council, and (c) the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2003/CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/57/47, Annex VI 587 23 September 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 2-4 592 23 March 2004, Bureau of the OEWG, Reference paper: Five points proposed for consideration by the informal meeting of the Working Group, UN Doc. A/58/47, Annex II 593 2004, OEWG, Chairman’s summary of discussions, UN Doc. A/58/47, Annex IV 596 1 December 2004, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc. A/59/565 of 2 December 2004 604 2005, Bureau of the OEWG, Informal summary on the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group on cluster II issues, UN Doc. A/59/47, Annex II 607 21 March 2005, UN Secretary-General, Report “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, UN Doc. A/59/2005 608 21 March 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/PV.83, pp. 1-4 611 16 September 2005, UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 612

xxxiv 4.1.24

Table of Contents

20 April 2006, OEWG, Closing remarks by the Vice-Chairpersons, UN Doc. A/60/47, Annex II 613 4.1.25 19 April 2007, Report of the facilitators to the President of the General Assembly on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex II 614 4.1.26 26 June 2007, Mr. Heraldo Muñoz and Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Report to the President of the General Assembly on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex IV 625 4.1.27 17 September 2007, UN General Assembly, Decision 61/561, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 630 4.1.28 9 June 2008, Report of the Vice-Chairpersons to the President of the General Assembly on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/62/47, Annex I 631 4.1.29 15 September 2008, UN General Assembly, Decision 62/557, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 640 4.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 642 4.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 642 4.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 642 4.2.1.1.1 22 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXII, p. 61 642 4.2.1.1.2 22 March 1999, Germany, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 643 4.2.1.1.3 23 March 1999, India, Mr. Pal, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 643 4.2.1.1.4 22 June 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. A. Granovsky, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 645 4.2.1.1.5 30 September 1999, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.18, pp. 4-8 646 4.2.1.1.6 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9 646 4.2.1.1.7 16 December 1999, India, Mr. Sharma, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 21-23 646 4.2.1.1.8 16 December 1999, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 17-18 647 4.2.1.1.9 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27 647

Table of Contents 4.2.1.1.10 4.2.1.1.11 4.2.1.1.12 4.2.1.1.13 4.2.1.1.14 4.2.1.1.15 4.2.1.1.16 4.2.1.1.17 4.2.1.1.18 4.2.1.1.19 4.2.1.1.20 4.2.1.1.21 4.2.1.1.22 4.2.1.1.23 4.2.1.1.24 4.2.1.1.25 4.2.1.1.26 4.2.1.1.27 4.2.1.1.28 4.2.1.1.29 4.2.1.1.30 4.2.1.1.31 4.2.1.1.32

xxxv 16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, pp. 30-31 648 20 December 1999, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 13-14 648 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 17-18 649 20 December 1999, Hungary, Mr. Erdös, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 4-5 649 20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9 650 20 December 1999, Mongolia, Mr. Enkhsaikhan, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 12-13 651 8 September 2000, India, Mr. Vajpayee, UN Doc. A/55/PV.7, p. 28 651 16 November 2000, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 2-4 651 17 November 2000, Thailand, Mr. Jayanama, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.66, pp. 2-4 652 31 October 2001, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, p. 15 653 14 October 2002, Germany, Mr. Schumacher, UN Doc. A/57/ PV.27, pp. 20-21 653 14 October 2002, Philippines, Mr. Yuchengco, UN Doc. A/57/ PV.28, pp. 11-13 653 15 October 2002, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 7-9 654 23 September 2003, France, Mr. Chirac, UN Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 14-17 654 14 October 2003, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 21-22 654 14 October 2003, Ukraine on behalf of the GU(U)AM Group, Mr. Kulyk, A/58/PV.31, pp. 1-2 655 17 October 2003, United Kingdom, Mr. Parry, UN Doc. A/58/ PV.36, pp. 9-10 655 21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement 656 24 September 2004, South Africa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Zuma 656 26 September 2004, Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs 656 27 September 2004, Philippines, Mr. Romulo, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.11, pp. 14-17 657 27 September 2004, Jordan, Mr. Muasher, UN Doc. A/59/PV.12, pp. 11-15 657 30 September 2004, Maldives, Mr. Jameel, UN Doc. A/59/PV.17, pp. 3-5 657

xxxvi

Table of Contents 4.2.1.1.33 4.2.1.1.34 4.2.1.1.35 4.2.1.1.36 4.2.1.1.37

4.2.1.1.38 4.2.1.1.39 4.2.1.1.40 4.2.1.1.41 4.2.1.1.42 4.2.1.1.43 4.2.1.1.44 4.2.1.1.45 4.2.1.1.46 4.2.1.1.47 4.2.1.1.48 4.2.1.1.49 4.2.1.1.50 4.2.1.1.51

11 October 2004, Thailand, Ms. Laohaphan, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.25, pp. 23-25 658 12 October 2004, Mongolia, Mr. Choisuren, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.26, pp. 13-15 658 27 January 2005, Germany, Mr. Pleuger, Informal Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 659 22 June 2005, United States of America, Ms. Patterson, USUN Press Release #119 (05) 660 6 July 2005, Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine, Draft resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.64 660 11 July 2005, Lithuania, Mr. Šerkšnys, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 19-20 663 12 July 2005, United States of America, Ms. Tahir-Kheli, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 9-10 664 12 July 2005, Czech Republic, Mr. Kmoníček, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.112, p. 14 666 12 July 2005, Samoa, Mr. Elisaia, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 18-19 666 12 July 2005, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 27-30 667 21 July 2005, United States, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mr. Burns, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 668 10 November 2005, United States of America, Mr. Bolton, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 3-5 670 10 November 2005, Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 22-23 671 11 November 2005, Cuba, Mr. Reyes Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/60/ PV.49, pp. 18-20 671 5 January 2006, Brazil, Germany and India, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.46 672 20 July 2006, Qatar, Mr. Al-Nasser, UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, pp. 13-15 672 12 December 2006, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, pp. 7-13 673 12 December 2006, France, Mr. Lacroix, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, p. 28 673 14 September 2007, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles,

Table of Contents

xxxvii

Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1 674 4.2.1.1.52 12 November 2007, United States of America, Mr. Khalilzad, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 12-13 675 4.2.1.1.53 13 November 2007, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/62/PV.49, pp. 14-16 675 4.2.1.1.54 13 November 2007, Philippines, Mr. Davide, UN Doc. A/62/ PV.50, pp. 14-15 675 4.2.1.1.55 14 November 2007, Mongolia, Ms. Enkhtsetseg, UN Doc. A/62/ PV.51, pp. 6-7 676 4.2.1.1.56 18 November 2008, United States of America, Mr. Wolff, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, pp. 23-24 676 4.2.1.1.57 18 November 2008, Brazil, Mr. Tarragô, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 20-21 677 4.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 678 4.2.1.2.1 23 September 1998, Italy, Mr. Dini, UN Doc. A/53/PV.11, p. 19-22 678 4.2.1.2.2 19 February 1999, Italy, Mr. Fulci, Statement in the Openended Working Group 678 4.2.1.2.3 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2 679 4.2.1.2.4 16 November 2000, Spain, Mr. Arias, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 9-10 680 4.2.1.2.5 16 November 2000, Canada, Mr. Heinbecker, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, pp. 14-16 680 4.2.1.2.6 16 November 2000, San Marino, Mr. Filippi Balestra, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 41-42 680 4.2.1.2.7 14 October 2003, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 13-14 681 4.2.1.2.8 14 October 2003, Italy, Mr. Spatafora, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 17-19 681 4.2.1.2.9 11 October 2004, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.24, pp. 22-23 681 4.2.1.2.10 24 June 2005, Costa Rica, Note verbale addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/856 682 4.2.1.2.11 11 July 2005, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 20-22 697 4.2.1.2.12 11 December 2006, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/61/ PV.72, pp. 15-17 697 4.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 698 4.2.1.3.1 May 1998, Hungary on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.15 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXIII, p. 62 698

xxxviii

Table of Contents 4.2.1.3.2 4.2.1.3.3 4.2.1.3.4 4.2.1.3.5 4.2.1.3.6 4.2.1.3.7 4.2.1.3.8 4.2.1.3.9 4.2.1.3.10 4.2.1.3.11 4.2.1.3.12 4.2.1.3.13 4.2.1.3.14 4.2.1.3.15 4.2.1.3.16

4.2.1.3.17 4.2.1.3.18 4.2.1.3.19 4.2.1.3.20 4.2.1.3.21 4.2.1.3.22

10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74 698 25 September 1999, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Paek Nam Sun, UN Doc. A/54/PV.14, pp. 6-10 700 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, pp. 23-24 700 16 December 1999, Czech Republic, Mr. Galuška, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 25-26 701 20 December 1999, Belarus, Mr. Sychov, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 15-16 701 20 December 1999, Georgia, Mr. Chkheidze, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.86, pp. 9-10 701 16 November 2000, Belarus, Mr. Ling, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 35 702 16 November 2000, Romania, Mr. Ducaru, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, pp. 39-40 702 17 November 2000, Ecuador, Mr. Alemán, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 11-12 702 17 November 2000, Bulgaria, Mr. Sotirov, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, p. 24 703 18 June 2001, Pakistan, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XVIII, p. 172 703 31 October 2001, Republic of Korea, Mr. Sun Joun-yung, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 10-11 704 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14 704 27 January 2005, Germany, Mr. Pleuger, Informal Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 704 28 February 2005, Group of Eastern European States, Annex to the letters from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/723 705 7 April 2005, Ukraine on behalf of the GU(U)AM Group, Mr. Kuchinsky, UN Doc. A/59/PV.88, pp. 21-23 705 11 July 2005, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23 706 11 November 2005, Slovenia, Mr. Kirn, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 6-7 706 11 November 2005, Belarus, Mr. Dapkiunas, UN Doc. A/60/ PV.49, pp. 7-8 707 12 December 2006, Belarus, Mr. Yaroshevich, UN Doc. A/61/ PV.74, pp. 16-17 707 12 December 2006, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/61/PV.75, pp. 19-20 707

Table of Contents 4.2.1.3.23

xxxix

21 February 2007, Group of Eastern European States, Ms. Intelmann (Estonia), Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 707 4.2.1.3.24 13 November 2007, United Kingdom, Mr. Sawers, UN Doc. A/62/PV.49, p. 12 708 4.2.1.3.25 24 September 2008, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN. Doc. A/63/PV.7, pp.17-20 709 4.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 710 4.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 710 4.2.2.1.1 11 July 2005, Sweden, Mr. Lidén, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 17-18 710 4.2.2.1.2 12 July 2005, United Kingdom, Mr. Jones Parry, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.112, pp. 19-20 710 4.2.2.1.3 11 November 2005, Sweden, Mr. Lidén, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, p. 24 711 4.2.2.1.4 14 December 2007, Iceland on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Hannesson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 711 4.2.2.1.5 10 April 2008, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 711 4.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 712 4.2.2.2.1 21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.68 712 4.2.2.2.2 26 July 2005, Canada, Mr. Rock, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 1-3 715 4.2.2.2.3 26 July 2005, Colombia, Ms. Holguín, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 4-6 717 4.2.2.2.4 26 July 2005, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 6-8 718 4.2.2.2.5 11 December 2006, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/61/ PV.72, pp. 15-17 720 4.2.2.2.6 11 December 2006, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 3-6 721 4.2.2.2.7 8 February 2007, Panama, Mr. Arias, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 721 4.2.2.2.8 22 February 2007, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 722 4.2.2.2.9 19 July 2007, Germany, Mr. Matussek, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 723 4.2.2.2.10 12 November 2007, Argentina, Mr. Argüello, UN Doc. A/62/ PV.47, p. 23 723 4.2.2.2.11 12 November 2007, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 4-6 724

xl

Table of Contents 4.2.2.2.12

12 November 2007, Canada, Mr. McNee, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 27-29 724 4.2.2.2.13 14 December 2007, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 724 4.2.2.2.14 20 March 2008, Cyprus on behalf of the members of the Overarching Group, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 24-28 725 4.2.2.2.15 27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration 728 4.2.2.2.16 10 April 2008, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 728 4.2.2.2.17 18 November 2008, France, Mr. Delacroix, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.53, pp. 14-15 729 4.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 730 4.2.2.3.1 27 January 1998, Bahrain on behalf of the Group of Arab States, A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXI, p. 60 730 4.2.2.3.2 8-10 June 1998, Senegal on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.16 and Corr.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXIV, p. 63 731 4.2.2.3.3 16 December 1999, South Africa, Mr. Kumalo, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.81, pp. 11-12 732 4.2.2.3.4 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18 732 4.2.2.3.5 16 December 1999, Argentina, Mr. Petrella, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.81, pp. 23-24 732 4.2.2.3.6 16 December 1999, Italy, Mr. Fulci, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 25-27 732 4.2.2.3.7 16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of the Southern African Development Community, Mr. Andjaba, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, p. 5 733 4.2.2.3.8 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7 733 4.2.2.3.9 20 December 1999, Kenya, Mr. Mbaya, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 19-20 734 4.2.2.3.10 20 December 1999, Ghana, Mr. Osei, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 7-8 734 4.2.2.3.11 20 December 1999, Zimbabwe, Mr. Muchetwa, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.86, pp. 19-20 734 4.2.2.3.12 16 November 2000, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/55/PV.64, pp. 12-14 735 4.2.2.3.13 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2 736 4.2.2.3.14 16 November 2000, Colombia, Mr. Franco, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, p. 37 736 4.2.2.3.15 16 November 2000, Nigeria, Mr. Mbanefo, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, pp. 46-48 736

Table of Contents 4.2.2.3.16 4.2.2.3.17 4.2.2.3.18 4.2.2.3.19 4.2.2.3.20 4.2.2.3.21 4.2.2.3.22 4.2.2.3.23 4.2.2.3.24 4.2.2.3.25 4.2.2.3.26

4.2.2.3.27

4.2.2.3.28 4.2.2.3.29 4.2.2.3.30

4.2.2.3.31

xli 17 November 2000, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 7-8 737 17 November 2000, Tunisia, Ms. Achouri, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 14-15 737 31 October 2001, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/56/ PV.35, pp. 21-22 738 1 November 2001, Sudan, Mr. Bakhit, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 9-10 738 15 October 2002, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 4-6 739 14 October 2003, South Africa, Ms. Ndhlovu, UN Doc. A/58/ PV.31, pp. 8-9 739 14 October 2003, Syria, Mr. Mekdad, UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, pp. 21-22 740 29 January 2004, European Parliament resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI)), P5_TA(2004)0037 740 23 September 2004, Austria, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, UN Doc. A/59/PV.8, pp. 27-30 744 24 September 2004, Egypt, Mr. Aboul Gheit, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.10, pp. 17-21 744 7-8 March 2005, African Union Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, AU Doc. Ext/ EX.CL/2 (VII) 745 14 April 2005, European Parliament, Resolution on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities, P6_TA(2005)0132 746 9 June 2005, European Parliament, Resolution on the reform of the United Nations, P6_TA(2005)0237 746 5 July 2005, African Union, Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.2 (V) 748 14 July 2005, Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.67 750 10 November 2005, Nigeria on behalf of the African Group, Mr. Wali, UN Doc. A/60/PV.47, pp. 14-15 752

xlii

Table of Contents 4.2.2.3.32 10 November 2005, Algeria, Mr. Benmehidi, UN Doc. A/60/ PV.47, pp. 20-22 753 4.2.2.3.33 11 November 2005, Ghana, Mr. Effah-Apenteng, UN Doc. A/60/ PV.49, pp. 9-10 753 4.2.2.3.34 21 September 2006, Sierra Leone, Mr. Berewa, UN Doc. A/61/ PV.15, pp. 23-24 754 4.2.2.3.35 11 December 2006, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 6-8 754 4.2.2.3.36 26 September 2007, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mugabe, UN Doc. A/62/ PV.7, pp. 20-23 754 4.2.2.3.37 12 November 2007, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/62/PV.47, pp. 18-21 754 4.2.2.3.38 12 November 2007, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 24-27 755 4.2.2.3.39 14 November 2007, Italy, Mr. Spatafora, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 8-12 755 4.2.2.3.40 18 November 2008, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, p. 16-19 757 4.2.2.3.41 18 November 2008, Tunisia, Mr. Mansour, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.54, pp. 9-10 757 4.2.2.3.42 19 November 2008, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.55, pp. 19-21 757 4.2.2.3.43 19 November 2008, South Africa, Mr. Sangqu, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.55, pp. 27-28 757 4.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 757 4.2.2.4.1 9 February 1999, Singapore, Mr. Mahbubani, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 757 4.2.2.4.2 13 November 2007, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/62/PV.50, pp. 8-13 758 4.2.2.4.3 14 November 2007, Mongolia, Ms. Enkhtsetseg, UN Doc. A/62/ PV.51, pp. 6-7 759 4.2.2.4.4 10 April 2008, India, Mr. Sen, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 760 4.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 761 4.2.3.1 16 December 1999, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 32-33 761 4.2.3.2 20 December 1999, Turkey, Mr. Vural, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 21-22 761 4.2.3.3 16 November 2000, Yemen, Mr. Al-Adoufi, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 41 762 4.2.3.4 17 November 2000, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.67, pp. 34-35 762 4.2.3.5 31 October 2001, Russian Federation, Mr. Ordzhonikidze, UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 16-17 763

Table of Contents

xliii

4.2.3.6 14 October 2002, China, Mr. Zhang Yishan, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 21-22 763 4.2.3.7 16 October 2002, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/57/ PV.31, pp. 22-23 764 4.2.3.8 17 October 2003, Yemen, Mr. Mubarez, UN Doc. A/58/PV.36, pp. 4-5 765 4.2.3.9 28 September 2004, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Final Communiqué of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, UN Doc. A/59/425–S/2004/808, p. 17 765 4.2.3.10 7 June 2005, China, Position Paper 766 4.2.3.11 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8 767 4.2.3.12 12 July 2005, Indonesia, Ms. Asmady, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 20-21 767 4.2.3.13 22 September 2005, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choe Su Hon, UN Doc. A/60/PV.20, pp. 26-29 768 4.2.3.14 10 November 2005, New Zealand, Ms. Banks, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 25-26 768 4.2.3.15 14 March 2008, Organization of the Islamic Conference, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 32-35 768 4.2.3.16 18 November 2008, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.54, pp. 3-4 771 4.2.3.17 18 November 2008, China, Mr. Liu Zhenmin, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 17-18 771 4.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 772 4.3.1 10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74 772 4.3.2 22 June 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. A. Granovsky, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 774 4.3.3 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9 774 4.3.4 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18 774 4.3.5 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27 774 4.3.6 16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 30-31 774 4.3.7 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7 775 4.3.8 20 December 1999, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 13-14 775 4.3.9 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.85, pp. 17-18 775 4.3.10 20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9 775

xliv

Table of Contents 4.3.11

20 December 1999, Georgia, Mr. Chkheidze, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 9-10 776 4.3.12 3 April 2000, United States of America, Mr. Holbrooke, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 776 4.3.13 5 April 2000, United States of America, Department of State 776 4.3.14 16 November 2000, Belarus, Mr. Ling, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 35 777 4.3.15 18 June 2001, Pakistan, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XVIII, p. 172 777 4.3.16 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14 777 4.3.17 22 June 2005, United States of America, Ms. Patterson, USUN Press Release #119 (05) 778 4.3.18 11 July 2005, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23 778 4.3.19 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8 778 4.3.20 14 December 2007, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, Statement in the Openended Working Group 778 4.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 779 4.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 779 4.4.1.1 24 March 1999, Russian Federation, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 779 4.4.1.2 23 September 1999, China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America, UN Doc. S/1999/996 779 4.4.1.3 16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 30-31 780 4.4.1.4 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.85, pp. 17-18 780 4.4.1.5 5 April 2000, United States of America, Department of State 780 4.4.1.6 16 November 2000, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/55/PV.64, pp. 25-26 781 4.4.1.7 14 October 2002, United States of America, Mr. Siv, UN Doc. A/57/ PV.27, pp. 10-11 781 4.4.1.8 16 October 2002, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/57/ PV.31, pp. 22-23 781 4.4.1.9 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8 781 4.4.1.10 20 July 2006, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, pp. 4-5 782 4.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 782 4.4.2.1 26 June 1998, Chile, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVII, p. 54 782 4.4.2.2 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9 782 4.4.2.3 16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Mr. Andjaba, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, p. 5 783

Table of Contents

xlv

4.4.2.4 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 23-24 783 4.4.2.5 20 December 1999, Pakistan, Mr. ul-Haque, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 9-11 783 4.4.2.6 16 November 2000, Kenya, Mr. Kuindwa, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 28-29 783 4.4.2.7 1 November 2001, Sudan, Mr. Bakhit, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 9-10 783 4.4.2.8 14 October 2002, Costa Rica, Mr. Stagno, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 11-12 784 4.4.2.9 16 December 2002, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/57/PV.32, pp. 6-8 784 4.4.2.10 26 July 2005, Colombia, Ms. Holguín, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 4-6 784 4.4.2.11 10 November 2005, New Zealand, Ms. Banks, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 25-26 785 4.4.2.12 8 February 2007, Panama, Mr. Arias, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 785 4.4.2.13 14 November 2007, Qatar, Mr. Al-Khater, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 12-13 785 4.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 785 4.4.3.1 10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/ CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74 785 4.4.3.2 23 March 1999, India, Mr. Pal, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 787 4.4.3.3 23 March 1999, Slovakia, Mr. Tomka, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 787 4.4.3.4 21 September 1999, Sweden, Ms. Lindh, UN Doc. A/54/PV.7, pp. 32-34 788 4.4.3.5 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18 789 4.4.3.6 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 23-24 789 4.4.3.7 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27 790 4.4.3.8 16 December 1999, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 32-33 790 4.4.3.9 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7 790 4.4.3.10 20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9 791 4.4.3.11 20 December 1999, Mongolia, Mr. Enkhsaikhan, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.86, pp. 12-13 791 4.4.3.12 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2 791

xlvi

Table of Contents 4.4.3.13 17 November 2000, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.66, pp. 7-8 792 4.4.3.14 19 July 2001, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/ CRP.7, Annex XIX UN Doc. A/55/47, pp. 173-174 792 4.4.3.15 31 October 2001, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 5-7 793 4.4.3.16 31 October 2001, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 19-20 794 4.4.3.17 1 November 2001, Romania, Mr. Niculescu, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 1-2 794 4.4.3.18 15 October 2002, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 4-6 794 4.4.3.19 14 October 2003, Syria, Mr. Mekdad, UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, pp. 21-22 795 4.4.3.20 29 January 2004, European Parliament resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations, P5_TA(2004)0037 795 4.4.3.21 12 October 2004, Mongolia, Mr. Choisuren, UN Doc. A/59/PV.26, pp. 13-15 796 4.4.3.22 21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.68 796 4.4.3.23 11 November 2005, Cuba, Mr. Reyes Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 18-20 797 4.4.3.24 30 May 2006, Non-Aligned Movement, Final Document, NAM Doc. NAM/MM/COB/8 797 4.4.3.25 12 December 2006, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, pp. 7-13 798 4.4.3.26 18 November 2008, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, pp. 15-16 799 4.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 800 4.4.4.1 21 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/ 1998/CRP.8 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XIV, p. 50 800 4.4.4.2 22 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXII, p. 61 800 4.4.4.3 25 June 1998, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVI, pp. 52-53 800 4.4.4.4 24 August 1998, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XV, p. 51 802 4.4.4.5 22 March 1999, Japan, Mr. Satoh, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 802

Table of Contents

xlvii

4.4.4.6 16 December 1999, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, pp. 17-18 803 4.4.4.7 16 December 1999, Czech Republic, Mr. Galuška, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, pp. 25-26 803 4.4.4.8 31 March 2000, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VII, p. 45 803 4.4.4.9 16 November 2000, Nigeria, Mr. Mbanefo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 46-48 804 4.4.4.10 17 November 2000, Thailand, Mr. Jayanama, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 2-4 805 4.4.4.11 17 November 2000, Costa Rica, Mr. Niehaus, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 10-12 805 4.4.4.12 17 November 2000, Bulgaria, Mr. Sotirov, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, p. 24 805 4.4.4.13 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14 806 4.4.4.14 31 October 2001, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, p. 15 806 4.4.4.15 11 October 2004, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.24, pp. 22-23 806 4.4.4.16 11 July 2005, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 20-22 807 4.4.4.17 3 November 2005, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution on the working methods of the Security Council 807 4.4.4.18 17 March 2006, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.49 808 4.4.4.19 11 December 2006, Costa Rica, Mr. Urbina, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 2-3 809 4.4.4.20 12 November 2007, Canada, Mr. McNee, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 27-29 809 4.4.4.21 20 March 2008, Cyprus on behalf of the Overarching Group, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 24-28 809 4.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 810 4.5.1 1999, Terence O’Brien, Electoral Group Reconfiguration and Present Day Realities 810 4.5.2 2000, David Annoussamy, Recasting the Security Council 814 4.5.3 2000, Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council 818 4.5.4 December 2001, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report “The Responsibility to Protect” 821 4.5.5 6 December 2003, Parag Khanna, One More Seat at the Table 824 4.5.6 2005, Kemal Derviş, A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform 824 4.5.7 April 2005, Antonio Missiroli, The UN Security Council Needs Fewer Europeans and More EUrope 836

xlviii 4.5.8 4.5.9 4.5.10 4.5.11 4.5.12 4.5.13 4.5.14

Table of Contents May 2005, Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyoruk, Security Council Reform Models: Models A and B, Italian (Regional) Proposal, Blue and Green Models and A New Model C 838 1 February 2006, Walter Hoffmann, A Competing Model: A Security Council with 20 Members 844 19 April 2006, Walter Hoffmann, Model Duo: Could “Dual Seating” Break the Deadlock on Security Council Reform? 846 8 June 2007, Hans Köchler, Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International Democracy 847 2008, Harald Müller, Wie kann eine neue Weltordnung aussehen? Wege in eine nachhaltige Politik [Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future] 852 May 2008, James Paul and Céline Nahory, “To contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security…”: The Case for Democratic Reform of the Security Council 853 May 2008, Richard Hartwig, Squaring the Circle: A Regional/Economic Proposal for Reform of the United Nations Security Council 856

5 On a road to nowhere? The Intergovernmental Negotiations, 2009–2019 869 5.1 Statements by UN organs and officials, Framework Documents, Elements of Convergence, and Elements of Commonality 869 5.1.1 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Report “Implementing the responsibility to protect”, UN Doc. A/63/677 869 5.1.2 18 May 2009, Overview of the first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, UN Doc. A/63/960, pp. 25-28 870 5.1.3 14 September 2009, UN General Assembly, Decision 63/565, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 871 5.1.4 13 January 2010, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin, Letter to the Permanent Missions with annexed “G4/South Africa letter” of 23 December 2009 872 5.1.5 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 874 5.1.6 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.1), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 888 5.1.7 27 August 2010, Second Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.2), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 892

Table of Contents 5.1.8 5.1.9 5.1.10

5.1.11

5.1.12

5.1.13 5.1.14 5.1.15

5.1.16

5.1.17 5.1.18

xlix

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 893 10 December 2013, Advisory Group appointed by the President of the General Assembly, Non-paper, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. John W. Ashe 912 8 July 2014, Assessment of the Intergovernmental Negotiations following the conclusion of the 10th round by the Chair, Mr. Zahir Tanin, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. John W. Ashe 916 26 March 2015, Framework Document, Annex to a letter dated 27 March 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Courtenay Rattray, and “Speaking Points” of 26 March 2015 924 5 May 2015, Framework Document As Populated by Member States, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Courtenay Rattray, to the President of the General Assembly 928 31 July 2015, “Text to form the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the Security Council”, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Sam K. Kutesa 943 14 September 2015, UN General Assembly, Decision 69/560, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 959 17 May 2016, Elements of Convergence on Two Key Issues of Security Council Reform: The Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and the Size of an Enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Ms. Sylvie Lucas 960 11 July 2016, Elements of Convergence on Two of the Five Key Issues of Security Council Reform: The Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and Size of an Enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Ms. Sylvie Lucas 961 27 July 2016, UN General Assembly, Decision 70/559, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 961 31 March 2017, Elements of Convergence, Commonalities and Issues for Further Consideration: Food for Thought for the 3rd IGN Session GA71 (3-4 April 2017), Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari 962

l

Table of Contents 5.1.19

7 June 2017, Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration: Food for Thought on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters, IGN GA71 Session, 12-13 June 2017, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari 966 5.1.20 23 June 2017, Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari 969 5.1.21 14 June 2018, Revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Kaha Imnadze and Ms. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh 972 5.1.22 29 June 2018, UN General Assembly, Decision 72/557, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 977 5.1.23 29 January 2019, Statement by the President of the General Assembly, Mrs. Marίa Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters 978 5.1.24 7 June 2019, Revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Christian Braun and Ms. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh, to the Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the UN 980 5.1.25 24 June 2019, UN General Assembly, Decision 73/554, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters 985 5.1.26 25 June 2019, Statement by the Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Christian Braun, in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, pp. 12-13 986 5.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 987 5.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 987 5.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 987

Table of Contents 5.2.1.1.1

li

4 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations 987 5.2.1.1.2 4 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations 988 5.2.1.1.3 11 June 2009, France, Mr. Lacroix, Intergovernmental Negotiations 989 5.2.1.1.4 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18 989 5.2.1.1.5 19 January 2010, France, Mr. Araud, Intergovernmental Negotiations 990 5.2.1.1.6 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-99 991 5.2.1.1.7 22 February 2010, L.69 Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 103 992 5.2.1.1.8 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom, Joint position on reform of the Security Council, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 117 993 5.2.1.1.9 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-114 993 5.2.1.1.10 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 142 994 5.2.1.1.11 4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-178 995 5.2.1.1.12 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin pp. 145-146 996 5.2.1.1.13 8 November 2010, United States, President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India 997 5.2.1.1.14 8 November 2011, France, Mr. Briens, UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, p. 16 997 5.2.1.1.15 2012, L.69 Group, Draft Resolution 998 5.2.1.1.16 21 February 2012, India, Mr. Singh Puri, Intergovernmental Negotiations 999 5.2.1.1.17 15 November 2012, Jamaica on behalf of the L.69 Group, Mr. Wolfe, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 6-7 1000 5.2.1.1.18 25 February 2013, Caribbean Community, Draft Resolution 1001 5.2.1.1.19 7 November 2013, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 28-29 1002

lii

Table of Contents 5.2.1.1.20 5.2.1.1.21 5.2.1.1.22 5.2.1.1.23 5.2.1.1.24 5.2.1.1.25 5.2.1.1.26 5.2.1.1.27 5.2.1.1.28 5.2.1.1.29 5.2.1.1.30 5.2.1.1.31 5.2.1.1.32 5.2.1.1.33 5.2.1.1.34 5.2.1.1.35 5.2.1.1.36 5.2.1.1.37 5.2.1.1.38 5.2.1.1.39 5.2.1.1.40 5.2.1.1.41

8 November 2013, Portugal, Mr. Moura, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 15-17 1003 8 November 2013, Guatemala, Ms. Bolaños Pérez, UN Doc. A/68/PV.49, pp. 2-3 1004 25 September 2014, G4, Joint Press Statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries on the margins of the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly 1004 26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum 1004 12 November 2014, Malaysia, Mr. Haniff, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 3-4 1005 30 October 2015, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 8-9 1005 30 October 2015, United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, p. 13 1005 30 October 2015, Brazil, Mr. De Aguiar Patriota, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, pp. 17-18 1006 30 October 2015, Japan, Mr. Okamura, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 19-20 1006 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.44, pp. 1-2 1007 9 March 2016, India, Mr. Akbaruddin, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1007 7 November 2016, Saint Lucia on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. Rambally, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 3-4 1009 7 November 2016, Germany on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Braun, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 6-7 1009 7 November 2016, United Kingdom, Mr. Rycroft, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 10 1010 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 22-23 1010 7 November 2016, Georgia, Ms. Agladze, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 2-3 1011 7 November 2017, Japan on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Bessho, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 5-6 1011 7 November 2017, Norway on behalf of the Nordic countries, Ms. Stener, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 8-9 1011 7 November 2017, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. King, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 9-10 1012 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.41, pp. 16-17 1012 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19 1013 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 8-9 1013

Table of Contents 5.2.1.1.42

liii

7 November 2017, United Kingdom, Mr. Hickey, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 27-28 1014 5.2.1.1.43 25 September 2018, Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Joint press statement 1014 5.2.1.1.44 27 September 2018, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum 1015 5.2.1.1.45 20 November 2018, India on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Akbaruddin, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 8-9 1016 5.2.1.1.46 20 November 2018, Iceland on behalf of the Nordic countries, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, p. 11 1016 5.2.1.1.47 20 November 2018, France, Mrs. Gueguen, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.37, pp. 15-16 1017 5.2.1.1.48 20 November 2018, Congo, Mr. Balé, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 26-28 1017 5.2.1.1.49 20 November 2018, United Kingdom, Mr. Allen, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.37, p. 28 1018 5.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 1018 5.2.1.2.1 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1018 5.2.1.2.2 17 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1022 5.2.1.2.3 24 March 2009, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1023 5.2.1.2.4 2 September 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1023 5.2.1.2.5 13 November 2009, Bolivia, Mr. Solón-Romero, UN Doc. A/64/ PV.45, pp. 24-25 1024 5.2.1.2.6 11 November 2010, Italy, Mr. Ragaglini, UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 16-17 1024 5.2.1.2.7 21 September 2011, Argentina, Ms. Fernández, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.11, pp. 24-28 1024 5.2.1.2.8 30 October 2015, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 14 1024 5.2.1.2.9 7 November 2016, Republic of Korea, Mr. Oh Joon, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 14 1025 5.2.1.2.10 7 November 2016, Turkey, Mr. Begeç, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 23 1025 5.2.1.2.11 7 November 2017, Pakistan, Ms. Lodhi, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 23-24 1026 5.2.1.2.12 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 3-4 1028 5.2.1.2.13 27 February 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1028 5.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 1030

liv

Table of Contents 5.2.1.3.1 5.2.1.3.2

5.2.1.3.3

5.2.1.3.4

5.2.1.3.5 5.2.1.3.6 5.2.1.3.7 5.2.1.3.8 5.2.1.3.9 5.2.1.3.10 5.2.1.3.11 5.2.1.3.12 5.2.1.3.13 5.2.1.3.14 5.2.1.3.15 5.2.1.3.16 5.2.1.3.17 5.2.1.3.18 5.2.1.3.19

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Ms. ‘Utoikamanu, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group 1030 16 July 2009, Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh Final Document (adopted by the Heads of States and Governments at the 15th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement), NAM Doc. NAM2009/FD/Doc.1 1031 16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 86 1031 4 March 2010, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 149-150 1032 11 November 2010, Belarus, Mr. Kolontai, UN Doc. A/65/PV.49, pp. 3-4 1032 7 November 2013, Belarus, Mr. Lazarev, UN Doc. A/68/PV.47, pp. 22-23 1033 12 November 2014, Maldives, Mr. Waheed, UN Doc. A/69/ PV.50, pp. 13-15 1033 30 October 2015, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Talbot, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 3-4 1034 30 October 2015, Poland, Mr. Winid, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 22 1034 30 October 2015, Romania, Mr. Jinga, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 19-20 1034 30 October 2015, Maldives, Ms. Naeem, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 23-24 1034 7 November 2016, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 12-13 1035 7 November 2016, Latvia, Mr. Mažeiks, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 5 1036 7 November 2016, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Kim In-ryong, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 8-9 1036 7 November 2016, Slovakia, Mr. Ružička, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 9-11 1037 7 November 2016, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 11-12 1037 7 November 2016, Canada, Mr. Bonser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 13-14 1038 7 November 2016, Hungary, Ms. Bogyay, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 16-17 1038 7 November 2017, Slovakia, Mr. Mlynár, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 27-28 1038

Table of Contents 5.2.1.3.20

lv

7 November 2017, Slovenia, Ms. Bavdaž Kuret, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 3-4 1039 5.2.1.3.21 7 November 2017, Maldives, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 5-7 1039 5.2.1.3.22 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24 1041 5.2.1.3.23 8 November 2017, Poland, Mr. Radomski, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 2-3 1041 5.2.1.3.24 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1042 5.2.1.3.25 5-6 April 2018, Non-Aligned Movement, Baku Final Document (adopted by the Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan), NAM Doc. NAM 2018/CoB/Doc.1 1042 5.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 1044 5.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 1044 5.2.2.1.1 13 November 2009, United States of America, Mr. Wolff, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, p. 18 1044 5.2.2.1.2 16 February 2010, Uruguay, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 89-90 1044 5.2.2.1.3 5 March 2010, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 180 1045 5.2.2.1.4 11 November 2010, United States of America, Ms. DiCarlo, UN Doc. A/65/PV.49, p. 18 1046 5.2.2.1.5 15 November 2012, United States of America, Ms. DiCarlo, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 9-10 1046 5.2.2.1.6 12 November 2014, United Kingdom, Sir Lyall Grant, UN Doc. A/69/PV.49, pp. 15-16 1047 5.2.2.1.7 16 April 2015, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, p. 114 1047 5.2.2.1.8 28 September 2015, Chile, Ms. Bachelet Jeria, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.14, pp. 3-4 1048 5.2.2.1.9 7 November 2016, United States of America, Ms. Sison, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 11 1048 5.2.2.1.10 7 November 2016, Singapore, Mr. Gafoor, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 25-27 1048 5.2.2.1.11 7 November 2016, Chile, Ms. Sapag Muñoz de la Peña, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 22 1049 5.2.2.1.12 7 November 2016, Uruguay, Ms. Sande, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 22-23 1049

lvi

Table of Contents 5.2.2.1.13

20 November 2018, United States of America, Mr. Hunter, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, p. 23 1049 5.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 1050 5.2.2.2.1 3 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1050 5.2.2.2.2 4 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1051 5.2.2.2.3 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1051 5.2.2.2.4 24 March 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1053 5.2.2.2.5 11 June 2009, France, Mr. Lacroix, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1053 5.2.2.2.6 12 June 2009, Switzerland, Ms. Grau, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1053 5.2.2.2.7 3 September 2009, Italy, Mr. Terzi di Sant’Agata, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1054 5.2.2.2.8 3 September 2009, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1055 5.2.2.2.9 3 September 2009, Turkey, Mr. Apakan, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1055 5.2.2.2.10 13 November 2009, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 1-2 1056 5.2.2.2.11 21 January 2010, Uniting for Consensus Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58 1056 5.2.2.2.12 9 February 2010, Slovenia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 83 1058 5.2.2.2.13 26 February 2010, Liechtenstein, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 104-107 1060 5.2.2.2.14 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom, Joint position on reform of the Security Council, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 117 1061 5.2.2.2.15 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111 1062 5.2.2.2.16 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-168 1063

Table of Contents 5.2.2.2.17 5.2.2.2.18 5.2.2.2.19 5.2.2.2.20 5.2.2.2.21 5.2.2.2.22 5.2.2.2.23 5.2.2.2.24 5.2.2.2.25

5.2.2.2.26 5.2.2.2.27 5.2.2.2.28 5.2.2.2.29 5.2.2.2.30 5.2.2.2.31 5.2.2.2.32 5.2.2.2.33 5.2.2.2.34 5.2.2.2.35 5.2.2.2.36 5.2.2.2.37

lvii 5 March 2010, Monaco, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 134 1064 12 July 2010, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1065 9 November 2011, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.52, pp. 5-6 1066 16 April 2012, Liechtenstein, Mr. Sparber, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1066 15 November 2012, Pakistan, Mr. Masood Khan, UN Doc. A/67/ PV.39, pp. 1-3 1067 7 November 2013, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/68/PV.47, pp. 6-7 1067 8 November 2013, New Zealand, Mr. McLay, UN Doc. A/68/ PV.48, pp. 17-18 1067 12 November 2014, Thailand, Mr. Sinhaseni, UN Doc. A/69/ PV.49, pp. 19-21 1068 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 122-123 1069 30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 5-6 1070 30 October 2015, Pakistan, Ms. Lodhi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 16-17 1071 30 October 2015, Spain, Mr. Díaz de la Guardia Beuno, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 18-19 1071 7 November 2016, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5 1072 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 9-10 1073 7 November 2016, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 14-15 1074 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 22-23 1075 7 November 2016, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 27-28 1075 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.43, pp. 1-2 1076 3 April 2017, New Zealand, Mr. van Bohemen, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1076 7 November 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Lambertini, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 6-7 1077 7 November 2017, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 12-13 1079

lviii

Table of Contents 5.2.2.2.38 7 November 2017, Thailand, Mr. Plasai, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 11-12 1079 5.2.2.2.39 7 November 2017, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 14-15 1079 5.2.2.2.40 7 November 2017, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 17-18 1080 5.2.2.2.41 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 3-4 1081 5.2.2.2.42 20 November 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Censensus Group, Mrs. Zappia, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 9-11 1081 5.2.2.2.43 29 January 2019, Liechtenstein, Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1082 5.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 1084 5.2.2.3.1 14 February 2009, Philippines, Specific reform proposals concerning equitable representation on and increase of membership in and on working methods of the Security Council 1084 5.2.2.3.2 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1085 5.2.2.3.3 31 March 2009, Italy, Mr. Terzi di Sant’Agata, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1085 5.2.2.3.4 25 September 2009, Kenya, Mr. Odinga, UN Doc. A/64/PV.8, pp. 27-30 1085 5.2.2.3.5 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 5-9 1086 5.2.2.3.6 12 November 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Sial, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 8-9 1087 5.2.2.3.7 8 December 2009, Philippines, Annex V to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 79-82 1087 5.2.2.3.8 12 January 2010, League of Arab States, Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Oman to the UN addressed to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin 1089 5.2.2.3.9 12 November 2010, Sudan, Mr. Elshareef, UN Doc. A/65/PV.50, pp. 8-9 1089 5.2.2.3.10 11 May 2011, European Parliament resolution on the EU as a global actor: its role in multilateral organisations, P7_TA(2011)0229 1089 5.2.2.3.11 8 November 2011, Algeria, Mr. Benmehidi, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.51, p. 20 1090 5.2.2.3.12 9 November 2011, Sudan, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 27-28 1091 5.2.2.3.13 21 February 2012, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1091

Table of Contents 5.2.2.3.14 5.2.2.3.15

5.2.2.3.16 5.2.2.3.17 5.2.2.3.18 5.2.2.3.19 5.2.2.3.20 5.2.2.3.21 5.2.2.3.22 5.2.2.3.23 5.2.2.3.24 5.2.2.3.25 5.2.2.3.26 5.2.2.3.27 5.2.2.3.28 5.2.2.3.29 5.2.2.3.30 5.2.2.3.31 5.2.2.3.32 5.2.2.3.33

lix 15 November 2012, Egypt, Mr. Khalil, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 4-6 1093 15 September 2013, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Mr. İhsanoğlu, Speech at the International Affairs Institute: “Future of the OIC, Its Role and Challenges in the Muslim World” 1093 8 November 2013, Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Mr. Aisi, UN Doc. A/68/PV.49, pp. 11-12 1094 1 May 2015, Group of Arab States, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, p. 115-121 1095 30 October 2015, African Union, Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 2-3 1096 30 October 2015, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 6-7 1097 7 November 2016, Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Union, Mr. Sumah, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 2-3 1097 7 November 2016, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 5-6 1098 7 November 2016, Egypt, Mr. Moustafa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 16-17 1098 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1099 17 May 2017, African Union, Communiqué of the Malabo Consultative Summit of the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government 1101 5 July 2017, European Parliament recommendation to the Council concerning the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, P8_TA(2017)0304 1102 7 November 2017, African Union, Mr. Sumah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 2-4 1102 7 November 2017, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Almunayekh, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 4-5 1103 7 November 2017, Nigeria, Mr. Nurudeen, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 25-26 1103 7 November 2017, Ghana, Ms. Pobee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 26-27 1104 8 November 2017, Algeria, Mr. Bessedik, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 7-8 1104 20 November 2018, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 2-3 1104 20 November 2018, Sierra Leone on behalf of the Group of African States, Mr. Kai-Kai, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 3-5 1105 20 November 2018, Morocco, Mr. Hilale, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 17-18 1106

lx

Table of Contents 5.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 1107 5.2.2.4.1 4 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1107 5.2.2.4.2 24 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1107 5.2.2.4.3 8 November 2013, Portugal, Mr. Moura, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 15-17 1108 5.2.2.4.4 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Akbaruddin, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1109 5.2.2.4.5 8 November 2017, Portugal, Mr. Duarte Lopes, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.43, pp. 5-6 1110 5.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 1111 5.2.3.1 25 May 2009, Organization of Islamic Conference, Resolution No. 20/36-POL of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the reform of the United Nations and expansion of UN Security Council’s membership 1111 5.2.3.2 25 September 2009, Organization of Islamic Conference, Final Communique of the annual coordination meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member States, United Nations Headquarters New York, OIC/ACM-09/FC/Final, pp. 27-29 1114 5.2.3.3 13 November 2009, Maldives, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 28-29 1115 5.2.3.4 4 March 2010, China, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 136-137 1116 5.2.3.5 11 November 2010, Non-Aligned Movement, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt), UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8 1117 5.2.3.6 9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.52, pp. 22-23 1117 5.2.3.7 15 November 2012, China, Mr. Wang Min, UN Doc. A/67/PV.39, pp. 14-15 1118 5.2.3.8 28 October 2013, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Mr. İhsanoğlu, UN Doc. S/PV.7050, pp. 3-6 1118 5.2.3.9 8 April 2015, China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 101-106 1118 5.2.3.10 14 April 2015, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 107-110 1120 5.2.3.11 30 October 2015, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp.10-11 1121 5.2.3.12 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, pp. 11-12 1121 5.2.3.13 7 November 2016, China, Mr. Liu Jieyi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 10-11 1122

Table of Contents

lxi

5.2.3.14 7 November 2016, Syria, Mr. Awad, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 23-24 1122 5.2.3.15 7 November 2017, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 7-8 1123 5.2.3.16 7 November 2017, China, Mr. Wu Haitao, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 10-11 1123 5.2.3.17 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 28-29 1124 5.2.3.18 1 February 2018, China, Mr. Zhaoxu, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1124 5.2.3.19 20 November 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 5-7 1125 5.2.3.20 20 November 2018, China, Mr. Ma Zhaoxu, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 23-24 1125 5.2.3.21 20 November 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Boguslavskiy, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 4-5 1126 5.2.3.22 27 February 2019, Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Polyanskiy, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1126 5.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 1127 5.3.1 7 April 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1127 5.3.2 12 June 2009, Switzerland, Ms. Grau, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1128 5.3.3 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, p. 5-9 1128 5.3.4 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18 1128 5.3.5 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-99 1128 5.3.6 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111 1129 5.3.7 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-114 1129 5.3.8 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-168 1129 5.3.9 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 142 1130 5.3.10 4 March 2010, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 149-150 1130

lxii

Table of Contents 5.3.11

4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-178 1130 5.3.12 5 March 2010, Monaco, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 134 1131 5.3.13 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 145-146 1131 5.3.14 9 November 2011, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 5-6 1131 5.3.15 9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.52, pp. 22-23 1132 5.3.16 15 November 2012, Jamaica on behalf of the L.69 Group, Mr. Wolfe, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 6-7 1132 5.3.17 7 November 2013, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/68/ PV.46, pp. 18-19 1132 5.3.18 30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 5-6 1132 5.3.19 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 11-12 1133 5.3.20 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 1-2 1133 5.3.21 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 9-10 1133 5.3.22 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 1-2 1133 5.3.23 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17 1134 5.3.24 7 November 2017, Slovakia, Mr. Mlynár, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 27-28 1134 5.3.25 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 8-9 1134 5.3.26 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 28-29 1134 5.3.27 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1134 5.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 1135 5.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 1135 5.4.1.1 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111 1135 5.4.1.2 5 March 2010, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 180 1135

Table of Contents 5.4.1.3

lxiii

9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/ PV.52, pp. 22-23 1135 5.4.1.4 2 September 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, Press Conference on the Security Council’s programme of work 1136 5.4.1.5 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, pp. 11-12 1137 5.4.1.6 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 9-10 1137 5.4.1.7 7 November 2016, United States of America, Ms. Sison, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 11 1137 5.4.1.8 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 28-29 1138 5.4.1.9 6 February 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Nebenzia, UN Doc. S/ PV.8175, pp. 7-8 1138 5.4.1.10 20 November 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Boguslavskiy, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 4-5 1138 5.4.1.11 27 February 2019. Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Polyanskiy, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1138 5.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 1139 5.4.2.1 16 March 2009, Caribbean Community, Mr. Wolfe (Jamaica), Intergovernmental Negotiations 1139 5.4.2.2 12 November 2009, Sierra Leone, Mr. Touray, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 9-11 1139 5.4.2.3 13 November 2009, Bolivia, Mr. Solón-Romero, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 24-25 1139 5.4.2.4 11 November 2010, Non-Aligned Movement, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt), UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8 1140 5.4.2.5 21 September 2011, Argentina, Ms. Fernández, UN Doc. A/66/PV.11, pp. 24-28 1140 5.4.2.6 1 October 2012, Ecuador, Mr. Albuja, UN Doc. A/67/PV.20, pp. 24-28 1140 5.4.2.7 30 October 2015, African Union, Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 2-3 1141 5.4.2.8 30 October 2015, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Talbot, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 3-4 1141 5.4.2.9 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 1-2 1141 5.4.2.10 7 November 2016, Turkey, Mr. Begeç, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 23 1141 5.4.2.11 7 November 2016, Ecuador, Mr. Sevilla Borja, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 4-5 1141 5.4.2.12 7 November 2016, Panama, Ms. Flores Herrera, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 21-22 1142 5.4.2.13 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17 1142

lxiv

Table of Contents 5.4.2.14 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19 1143 5.4.2.15 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 8-9 1143 5.4.2.16 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24 1143 5.4.2.17 20 November 2018, Cuba, Mrs. Rodríguez Camejo, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.36, pp. 25-26 1144 5.4.2.18 20 November 2018, Turkey, Mr. Sinirlioğlu, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 3-4 1144 5.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 1144 5.4.3.1 14 February 2009, Philippines, Specific Reform Proposals concerning equitable representation on and increase of membership in and on working methods of the Security Council 1144 5.4.3.2 16 March 2009, Caribbean Community, Mr. Wolfe (Jamaica), Informal Plenary of the General Assembly on the Question of the Veto 1146 5.4.3.3 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 5-9 1146 5.4.3.4 13 November 2009, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 1-2 1147 5.4.3.5 8 December 2009, Philippines, Annex I to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 66-68 1147 5.4.3.6 21 January 2010, Uniting for Consensus group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58 1148 5.4.3.7 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-99 1149 5.4.3.8 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-114 1149 5.4.3.9 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-170 1150 5.4.3.10 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 142-143 1152 5.4.3.11 11 November 2010, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8 1152 5.4.3.12 12 November 2014, Malaysia, Mr. Haniff, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, p. 4 1152 5.4.3.13 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19 1153

Table of Contents

lxv

5.4.3.14 20 November 2018, Ukraine, Mr. Fesko, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 31-32 1153 5.4.3.15 20 November 2018, Malaysia, Mr. Mayong Onon, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.37, pp. 21-22 1153 5.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 1154 5.4.4.1 16 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1154 5.4.4.2 17 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1154 5.4.4.3 April 2009, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 37-39 1154 5.4.4.4 22 June 2009, Liechtenstein, Mr. Stefan Barriga, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1155 5.4.4.5 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18 1155 5.4.4.6 4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-178 1155 5.4.4.7 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 145-147 1156 5.4.4.8 12 November 2010, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/65/PV.50, p. 11 1156 5.4.4.9 14 April 2011, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution 1156 5.4.4.10 15 May 2012, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Revised Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/66/L.42/ Rev.2 1158 5.4.4.11 24 September 2013, France, President François Hollande, UN Doc. A/68/PV.5, pp. 32-35 1158 5.4.4.12 4 October 2013, France, “A Call for Self-Restraint at the U.N.” 1159 5.4.4.13 7 November 2013, United Kingdom, Mr. Grant, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 20-21 1160 5.4.4.14 7 November 2013, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 28-29 1160 5.4.4.15 8 November 2013, New Zealand, Mr. McLay, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 17-18 1161 5.4.4.16 12 November 2014, United Kingdom, Sir Lyall Grant, UN Doc. A/69/ PV.49, pp. 15-16 1161 5.4.4.17 28 September 2015, Poland, Mr. Duda, UN Doc. A/70/PV.13, pp. 15-18 1162 5.4.4.18 28 September 2015, France, President Hollande, UN Doc. A/70/PV.13, pp. 38-41 1162

lxvi

Table of Contents 5.4.4.19 28 September 2015, Netherlands, King Willem-Alexander, UN Doc. A/70/PV.13, pp. 44-46 1162 5.4.4.20 28 September 2015, Chile, Ms. Bachelet Jeria, UN Doc. A/70/PV.14, pp. 3-4 1162 5.4.4.21 30 September 2015, France and Mexico, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities 1163 5.4.4.22 30 September 2015, Costa Rica, Mr. Solís Rivera, UN Doc. A/70/PV.19, pp. 13-17 1164 5.4.4.23 30 September 2015, Norway, Ms. Solberg, UN Doc. A/70/PV.19, pp. 41-43 1164 5.4.4.24 20 October 2015, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries, Mr. Skoog, UN Doc. S/PV.7539, pp. 20-22 1164 5.4.4.25 23 October 2015, Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, UN Doc. A/70/621–S/2015/978 dated 14 December 2015 1165 5.4.4.26 30 October 2015, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 8-9 1167 5.4.4.27 30 October 2015, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 10-11 1168 5.4.4.28 30 October 2015, United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 13 1168 5.4.4.29 30 October 2015, Japan, Mr. Okamura, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 19-20 1168 5.4.4.30 30 October 2015, Australia, Ms. Bird, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 20-21 1169 5.4.4.31 30 October 2015, Panama, Ms. Flores Herrera, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 21-22 1169 5.4.4.32 30 October 2015, Poland, Mr. Winid, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 22 1169 5.4.4.33 30 October 2015, Guatemala, Mr. Orellana Zabalza, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.44, p. 2-3 1170 5.4.4.34 30 October 2015, Romania, Mr. Jinga, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 19-20 1170 5.4.4.35 7 November 2016, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 12-13 1170 5.4.4.36 7 November 2016, Republic of Korea, Mr. Oh Joon, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, p. 14 1171 5.4.4.37 7 November 2016, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 14-15 1171 5.4.4.38 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 22-23 1172 5.4.4.39 7 November 2016, Singapore, Mr. Gafoor, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 25-27 1172

Table of Contents

lxvii

5.4.4.40 7 November 2016, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 27-28 1173 5.4.4.41 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 1-2 1173 5.4.4.42 7 November 2016, Latvia, Mr. Mažeiks, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 5 1173 5.4.4.43 7 November 2016, Slovakia, Mr. Ružička, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 9 1174 5.4.4.44 7 November 2016, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 11-12 1174 5.4.4.45 7 November 2016, Canada, Mr. Bonser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 13-14 1175 5.4.4.46 7 November 2016, Hungary, Ms. Bogyay, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 16-17 1175 5.4.4.47 7 November 2016, Chile, Ms. Sapag Muñoz de la Peña, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 22 1175 5.4.4.48 3 April 2017, New Zealand, Mr. van Bohemen, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1176 5.4.4.49 7 November 2017, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.41, pp. 12-13 1176 5.4.4.50 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17 1177 5.4.4.51 7 November 2017, Slovenia, Ms. Bavdaž Kuret, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 3-4 1177 5.4.4.52 7 November 2017, Thailand, Mr. Plasai, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 11-12 1177 5.4.4.53 7 November 2017, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 14-15 1178 5.4.4.54 7 November 2017, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 17-18 1178 5.4.4.55 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24 1178 5.4.4.56 7 November 2017, Qatar, Mr. Al-khalifa, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 24-25 1179 5.4.4.57 7 November 2017, Ghana, Ms. Pobee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 26-27 1179 5.4.4.58 7 November 2017, United Kingdom, Mr. Hickey, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 27-28 1180 5.4.4.59 8 November 2017, Poland, Mr. Radomski, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 2-3 1180 5.4.4.60 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.43, pp. 3-4 1180 5.4.4.61 6 February 2018, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 47-48 1181

lxviii

Table of Contents

5.4.4.62 6 February 2018, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. S/ PV.8175, pp. 57-58 1181 5.4.4.63 6 February 2018, Uruguay, Mr. Bermúdez Álvarez, UN Doc. S/ PV.8175, pp. 59-60 1182 5.4.4.64 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1182 5.4.4.65 29 January 2019, Liechtenstein, Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Intergovernmental Negotiations 1183 5.4.4.66 20 November 2018, France, Mrs. Gueguen, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 15-16 1183 5.4.4.67 20 November 2018, United Kingdom, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, p. 28 1184 5.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 1184 5.5.1 1 December 2009, Denis Halliday, The United Nation’s Role in Peace and War 1184 5.5.2 14 June 2011, Joan Marc Simon, An EU Seat in the Security Council as a First Step towards a Democratic Organisation of World Security 1185 5.5.3 2013, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Transforming the United Nations system: Designs for a workable world 1186 5.5.4 2012, Richard Butler, Reform of the United Nations Security Council 1201 5.5.5 2013, Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World 1202 5.5.6 2014, James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence 1207 5.5.7 7 February 2015, The Elders, Strengthening the United Nations 1209 5.5.8 17 March 2015, Elect The Council, Towards a legitimate and effective UN Security Council, Concept Note, Version 1 1211 5.5.9 3 October 2017, Elect The Council, Avoiding Crisis: Towards a legitimate and effective UN Security Council, Version 6, Summary Note 1215 5.5.10 June 2018, Adeleke Olumide Ogunnoiki, Reforming the United Nations in the 21st Century: A Discourse on the Enlargement, Democratisation and the Working Methods of the Security Council 1218 Annex I: Summary of group positions 1220 Annex II: Summary of country positions 1236 Annex III: Table of group positions 1288 Annex IV: Table of country positions 1300 Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states 1320 Annex VI: List of statements made by states 1326 Annex VII: Alphabetical list of the authors of academic and civil society proposals 1362 Annex VIII: Select Bibliography 1365

1 Introduction Bardo Fassbender

This introduction has two main sections: In the first section, it is explained what the purpose of this collection of documents is, what material has been included, and how this material was selected and organized in Parts 2 to 5 of this work. The first section of the introduction also offers some advice about how to make the best use of this rather voluminous work. The second section of this introduction, beginning on page 15 below, briefly recalls some “landmarks” in the history of the Security Council reform debate since the early 1990s, as they are reflected in the documents published in this work. The word “briefly” must be emphasized because that account of main developments of the discussions, and of the main caesurae one can identify in their course, is also only meant to facilitate the use of this work, in the same way as the first section. The idea is to give the reader – in particular the reader not yet familiar with the issues of Security Council reform – a general orientation, allowing her to find more easily the information she is looking for. This brief account is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the issues in question, or a critical synopsis of the extensive academic literature published in the course of almost three decades – something which could only be carried out in the form of (yet another) monograph.1

1.1 This collection of “Key Documents”: What it is, and how it is organized The purpose of the present collection has been to put together, and thus preserve for future consultation and study, primary sources reflecting the political and academic discussions about a reform of the United Nations Security Council as they have taken place since 1991. Earlier discussions (from the late 1940s until 1991) have also been covered (in Part 2 of the work) as far as this seemed useful for the understanding of the current debate. We endeavoured to make the collection representative of the debate as a whole, in the sense that it truthfully, and without bias, reflects the different positions and perspectives of all participants, including civil society. The collection thus is a kind of archive, saving the reader the labour and pains of locating and studying literally hundreds of documents produced in almost thirty years in and by governments, UN bodies, universities and think tanks. Many of the early documents of the 1990s exist only in paper form, others were electronically available at some time but are no longer, either because they were removed as “outdated” from a website (which has happened regularly in the case of the websites of the permanent missions of UN member states in New York), or because the respective website does not exist anymore (as is true for some NGOs which at some point of time stopped working). 1  For a select bibliography of books and articles on the issue of Security Council reform, see Annex VIII (p. 1365 et seq.), at the very end of this work. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_002

2

1 Introduction

But this collection of documents not only wants to function as an archive for those who wish to study in more detail the development of the reform debate, or who will participate as academics, diplomats or politicians in future discussions of fundamental questions of world organization. The work also wants to contribute to an analysis of the reform debate. While it was not possible to accompany each document included in this work with an own comment or explanation, there is already a measure of analysis involved in the selection of documents, in the way the documents have been classified, arranged and sometimes also annotated, and further in shortening the often lengthy texts in an effort to identify their respective substance or novelty. Further, the eight annexes which the reader finds at the end of the work offer analysis of the progress of discussions and of the views held and revised by individual states and groups of states. The time covered by the documents of this collection As regards the time covered by the collection, most documents included date from the beginning of the 1990s (when, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a long-awaited opportunity opened up for a substantial reform of the Security Council) until 2019 (the year in which we concluded our editorial work). However, in part 2 of the work earlier reform discussions (which began indeed already in the late 1940s with efforts of the General Assembly to limit the use of the veto power2) are considered. Although the end of the Cold War was a caesura in the history of the UN, triggering efforts to reform the political bodies of the Organization which had been unthinkable before, there is also an element of continuity from the past, linking the more recent discussion especially with earlier endeavours t0 enlarge the membership of the Council. Accordingly, in part 2 the reader not only finds material relating to the so far one and only successful Charter amendments concerning the Security Council – the amendments to Articles 23 and 27, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 19633 –, but also documents concerning the failed efforts to increase the membership of the Council in 19564 and 1979.5 The thematic focus of the collection The discussions about Security Council reform have referred to, and continue to refer to, a number of different aspects of reform. The focus of the present collection is on two issues which mainly triggered the discussions at the beginning of the 1990s, and which still are the most controversial issues – firstly, the composition and size of the Security Council, and secondly the decision-making of the Council, in particular the so-called right of veto of the permanent members (Article 27, para. 3, of the UN Charter). That means that a cluster of issues summarised by the notion of “working methods of the Security Council” is not covered by the present work. That cluster was in the course of the discussions separated from the issues of composition/size and

2  See this work’s subsection (in the following indicated with a rightwards arrow →) 2.1. 3  → 2.8-2.12. 4  → 2.2-2.5. 5  → 2.17-2.19.

1 Introduction

3

decision-making.6 The main reason for that separation was the difficulty of UN member states to agree on an amendment of the UN Charter (as the only way to achieve a reform of the composition/size or formal decision-making of the Council), and the idea that one could at least improve the functioning of the Council in ways not requiring such an amendment. And indeed, in that respect some progress could be made in recent years.7 With documents regarding working methods generally not included in the present work, exceptions have been made in the case of more recent initiatives which, although discussed under the label of working methods, in substance aim at establishing “informal” restrictions on the use of the right of veto. Further issues outside the focus of the present work are the (future) relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and between the Council and civil society,8 and the reform process itself (for instance the question of the proper forum of discussions, of majorities required in the General Assembly for certain decisions, or of political steps necessary to move forward) which lately has come to dominate the debate. Criteria for the selection of statements and proposals Notwithstanding the undisputed principle of sovereign equality of states which entitles every state equally to participate in the reform discussions,9 it was for obvious reasons not possible to document in the present work the views of all UN member states which have participated in the debate. An effort to do so not only would by 6  See, for instance, the “Informal note prepared by the President on the reform of the Security Council”, UN Doc. A/58/47, Annex I, paras. 5 and 7: “The main issues that the Working Group is considering have been divided into two clusters. Cluster I consists of: Increase in membership and related matters. […] Cluster II consists of: Working methods of the Security Council and transparency of its work, (i) Improving the transparency and working methods of the Security Council, (ii) Participation of non-permanent members in the work of the Security Council, (iii) Relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly and other organs.” 7  For an overview, see Christian Wenaweser, Working Methods: The Ugly Duckling of Security Council Reform, in The UN Security Council in the Twenty-First Century (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., eds., 2016), pp. 175-194. See also Peter Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 2016, pp. 95-115; Martin Daniel Niemetz, Reforming UN Decision-Making Procedures, 2015, pp. 88-125; Susan Hulton, Council Working Methods and Procedures, in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 237-51 (David M. Malone, ed., 2004); and Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3rd ed. 1998, pp. 388-411. For a comprehensive list of the recent practices and newly agreed measures regarding to working methods, see the Presidential Note of 30 August 2017, UN Doc. S/2017/507. For the records of the 2019 open debate of the Security Council on working methods which took place on 6 June 2019, see UN Doc. S/PV.8539. The New York based non-profit organisation “Security Council Report” has regularly covered the issue of Security Council working methods in its publications, see . The latest research report “Security Council Working Methods: Provisional Progress” was posted on 22 January 2018. 8  For a discussion of these two issues, see Niemetz, ibid., pp. 126-146 and 147-169, respectively. 9  See Bardo Fassbender, Comment on Article 2, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, in: The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd edn. (Bruno Simma et al., eds.), 2012, vol. I, pp. 133-165.

4

1 Introduction

far have exceeded the capacities of a single academic and his small staff. It would also have resulted in a multi-volume edition very difficult to use, and impossible to sell. The imperative of making difficult choices in the selection of documents, I believe, works for the benefit of the reader. We started with those eighty-two states which in 1993, at the very beginning of the debate, had contributed substantial submissions on the “question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”.10 We then continuously followed the evolution of the views of those states (and the groups in which they organized themselves) in the following years. In addition, statements of other states were included if those states were influential in the debate, if they participated regularly, or if they belonged to one of the main groups of states shaping the debate. Furthermore, statements were covered if they presented an original idea or proposal. A factor in the selection of documents was also the clarity with which a position was expressed. Statements of a general character which did not support or reject a particular position were considered less relevant than more specific or concrete opinions. However, these demands for clarity and originality were not equally high for all states; they were reduced in proportion to the extent the role of a state was considered to be pivotal in the reform process. Regarding the texts and proposals presented by individual scholars, think tanks and non-governmental organizations collected in Parts 2, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5, we followed the general rule to include only texts we considered to be sufficiently original and/or concrete. Accordingly, texts limiting themselves to an analysis of the reform debate without presenting own ideas were not included. In general, for the early texts the required level of originality or detail was not as high as for later writings. If a specific idea was presented for the very first time, the respective text was included in the collection, even if the proposal was not very detailed. That having been said, it must be added that in the application of the aforementioned criteria an element of subjectivism could not be avoided. So inevitably some readers will miss certain texts, or will find other texts dispensable, or will not agree with the excerpts we have made from a particular text. By way of apology, we can only answer that we tried our best, and that additional texts can be identified by consulting the select bibliography in Annex VIII.11 Original page numbers, footnotes and endnotes In all documents and texts (except for the statements of states and groups of states), the original page numbers are indicated with the respective number put in square brackets and in bold face, for instance [22]. Omissions from the original text are indicated with ellipsis points, also put in square brackets, like […]. Footnotes included in the original document or text are indicated with an asterisk, for instance*22, and reproduced as endnotes, entitled “original footnotes”, at the 10  Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. A/48/264 and Add.1 to 10, 20 July 1993. 11  In a very few cases, we could not obtain from the owner of the copyright the permission to reprint a certain text, or were not able to afford the fees claimed by the copyright owner. Exceptionally, the editor then has summarized the respective proposal in his own words.

1 Introduction

5

very end of the respective document or text. Sometimes, these original footnotes are not self-explaining because they refer to preceding footnotes in the respective work which have not been reproduced. In such cases, the additional information necessary to understand the original footnote (e.g., the full name of a quoted author, or the full title of a quoted book) was added in square brackets. – By contrast, footnotes added by the editor to a document or text appear at the bottom of the respective page; they are consecutively numbered for each main part of the work. In particular, such added footnotes refer to other documents reproduced in the present work. Periods of the reform debate The documents included in the present collection are arranged in four periods of time: the late 1940s-1992, 1992-1997, 1998-2008, and 2009-2019. As mentioned before, efforts to reform the Security Council did not begin only after the end of the Cold War. In fact, they started as early as in the late 1940s, a prominent example being the proposals presented by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn12 which at the time were widely discussed in the United States. Part 2 of this work documents these earlier reform discussions which in the late 1970s gained some momentum when a group of ten states from the global South, led by India, successfully requested to include an item “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” in the agenda of the 34th session of the General Assembly.13 India asserted that the increase in membership of the UN since 1963 had led to an underrepresentation of non-aligned and developing countries in the Council. The Assembly considered the question at two plenary meetings on 14 December 1979, during which India (supported by a number of other, mainly developing countries, but also Japan) presented a draft resolution on the subject.14 By the operative provisions of the draft resolution, the Assembly would adopt and submit to member states for ratification several amendments to the Charter. These would, in amending Article 23, increase the membership of the Security Council to nineteen, fourteen of which (rather than the current ten) would be elected. A pattern of geographical distribution for the fourteen non-permanent seats was also included. Amendments to this Indian draft were submitted by a group of Latin American states, intending to increase the Council’s total membership to twenty-one, sixteen of which would be elected.15 Following discussion of these proposals (with all permanent members of the Council, except China, opposing any expansion of the Council), India, on behalf of the sponsors of the first draft resolution, announced that they would not press it to a vote; the country proposed instead that consideration of the question be postponed until the Assembly’s regular 1980 session. The Assembly endorsed that proposal on 14 December 1979 with its decision 34/431.16 Although the item remained inscribed in the agenda of the

12  World Peace Through World Law, → 2.7 and Annex VIII. 13  14 November 1979, → 2.17. 14  → 2.18. 15  → 2.19. 16  See Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Thirty-fourth Session, UN Doc. A/34/46, p. 266.

6

1 Introduction

General Assembly in all following sessions, no substantive discussions on the matter were held until 1992. Part 2 also includes documentation regarding the successful reform of the UN Security Council that took place in 1963, when the number of nonpermanent members was increased from six to ten. Before that date, the discussion had been mostly academic. Among the documents which are important indicators of the discussions that led to the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 47/62 of 11 December 199217 is the so-called Jakarta Message, a declaration in the Final Document of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, adopted on 6 September 1992,18 which concludes Part 2. The document can be regarded as a kind of bridge, connecting the earlier efforts mainly of developing countries to adapt the composition of the Security Council to a postcolonial membership of the UN with the reform discussion which started in the early 1990s in a new climate of international cooperation. Part 3 includes documents from what is perceived by many as the most productive period in the reform debate. The beginning of this period is marked by the adoption of Resolution 47/62. By this resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to invite member states to submit written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council, and to submit to the Assembly a report containing these comments. The Secretary-General presented the comments submitted to him by altogether eighty-two member states in a report dated 20 July 1993 and ten later addenda to this report.19 The report and following debates in the 48th session of the General Assembly20 resulted in the establishment of an “Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council” by Resolution 48/26, adopted on 3 December 1993.21 The most productive phase of the work of this Working Group culminated in the so-called Razali Reform Paper,22 presented by the President of the General Assembly and Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Razali Ismail. The paper had the form of a draft resolution of the General Assembly. It provided for a reformed Security Council with 24 members in total, including four new non-permanent members and five new permanent members, the latter not enjoying the right of veto. Part 3 includes all statements up to the presentation, discussion, and eventual rejection of the Razali proposal. Part 4 begins with the 53rd session of the General Assembly in 1998 and covers the decade until 2008, when the Assembly decided to make the new “Intergovernmental

17  → 3.1.1. 18  → 2.23. 19  Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. A/48/264 and Add.1 to 10, 20 July 1993. 20   UN General Assembly, 48th Session, Provisional Verbatim Records of the 61st, 62nd and 64th plenary meetings, 23 and 24 November 1993. UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, A/48/ PV.62 and A/48/PV.64. 21  → 3.1.2. 22  → 3.1.10. See infra, p. 21.

1 Introduction

7

Negotiations” (IGN) the main forum of the reform debate.23 During this period, the debate gained some momentum, with the United Nations Millennium Declaration including a commitment of member states “[t]o intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects”.24 However, even the much discussed report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change25 could not prompt a successful reform of the Council. Hence, the decade between 1998 and 2008 was also characterized by what diplomats and academic observers described as an “impasse” or “deadlock”. In order to overcome this impasse and to make a kind of “fresh start”, the General Assembly then decided to change the forum of the reform discussions. Part 5 eventually assembles documents of the period between 2009 and the end of the 73rd session of the General Assembly in 2019. That period was marked by considerable controversy over the process of negotiations as such. Important developments in that last period covered by this work were the preparation of a negotiation text in 2010,26 the subsequent revisions of that text,27 and the formulation of a framework document in 2015.28 The latter was followed in 2016 by another negotiation text,29 the “elements of convergence”,30 and in 2017 and 2018 by different versions of the “elements of commonality and issues for further consideration”.31 Of the many issues discussed in the context of a reform of the Security Council, that of possible formal or informal restrictions of the right of veto gained most attention and support. This was mainly due to initiatives launched by France32 and by the “Accountability, Coherence and Transparency” (ACT) group.33 The arrangement of documents within each period of time Within each of Parts 3 to 5, documents have been arranged according to the following criteria which partly relate to the author of a particular document, and partly to the substance of the respective statement or proposal. Each of the three parts is structured as follows: The first section includes statements by UN organs and officials addressing the issue of Security Council reform from a position aiming at neutrality rather than supporting a specific proposal. Prominent examples of such statements are the conference room papers presented by the chairs of the Open-ended Working Group and of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. 23   UN General Assembly Decision 62/557, 15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 24  8 September 2000, → 4.1.6. 25  1 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 26  10 May 2010, → 5.1.5. 27  26 May 2010, → 5.1.6; 27 August 2010, → 5.1.7; and 23 February 2011, → 5.1.8. 28  26 March 2015, → 5.1.11. 29  31 July 2015, → 5.1.13. 30  17 May 2016, → 5.1.15 and 11 July 2016, → 5.1.16. 31  31 March 2017, → 5.1.18; 7 June 2017, → 5.1.19; 23 June 2017, → 5.1.20; 23 March 2018 and 14 June 2018, → 5.1.21. 32  See, e.g., the statements of 24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11, 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12, 28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.18, and 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21 (France and Mexico). 33   ACT Code of Conduct, 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

8

1 Introduction

The second section consists of statements by member states (and their groups) regarding the composition of the Council. Statements in this second section are organized as follows: The first subsection contains statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of membership; the second subsection is made up of statements addressing new categories of seats; and the third subsection is composed of statements which address issues of the composition but do not clearly support the enlargement or creation of a specific category. The third section of Parts 3 to 5 is devoted to the size of an enlarged Security Council. The fourth section consists of statements by member states discussing the right of veto, either with the intention to retain the veto as it is, or with the intention to abolish it, or wishing to introduce formal or informal restrictions. The fifth and last section of Parts 3 to 5 covers Security Council reform proposals made by academics and civil society. In each of the sections or subsections, documents are chronologically organized. Guidelines for the assignment of documents to sections and subsections Assigning documents and excerpts from documents to the different sections and subsections of the present work was not always easy. This is especially true for the many statements which discuss more than one of the issues of Security Council reform. The rule followed in these cases was to divide the relevant documents into several parts and to assign those parts to the respective sections and subsections. If a document was split in that way, footnotes indicate where the other part or parts of the same document can be found in the collection. However, it was not always possible to divide a statement without rendering the individual parts incomprehensible. In such cases, the statement was included in the section that best corresponded with its principal message. If a statement could not be divided but was deemed particularly important to more than one thematic issue, the same statement was included in all relevant (sub-) sections. Sometimes a government in one statement supported more than one position, rendering the statement relevant to more than one (sub-) section. For instance, governments often argued fervently in favour of one position and, at the same time, less enthusiastically in favour of another (as indicated by a phrase like “consideration should also be given to …”). In these cases, the statement will be found in the (sub-) section representing the position defended more enthusiastically. Positions which were reiterated throughout the discussions were consistently assigned to the same (sub-) sections, even if a specific aspect was not explicitly repeated in a later statement. Statements by UN organs and officials and framework documents The first section of Parts 3 to 5 includes documents that have shaped the reform debate without originating from a specific state or group of states. It consists of the central documents determining the principles according to which first the Open-ended Working Group and then the Intergovernmental Negotiations have operated. Other important documents in that section are those issued by the Secretary-General (e.g., Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report “In larger freedom”34), or adopted by UN 34  21 March 2005, → 4.1.21.

1 Introduction

9

member states on the occasion of special dates (e.g., the Millennium Declaration35). The section also contains summaries of the discussions drawn up by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group, and the reports of the Facilitators36 and the Vice-Chairpersons.37 In Part 5, the first section mainly consists of the different documents drafted in the effort of establishing a negotiation text. The composition of the Security Council As explained before, the statements included in the second section of each of the Parts 3 to 5 were divided into three subsections, depending on whether they discussed an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of membership, a creation of new categories, or an expansion without referring to a specific category of seats. The first subsection includes statements discussing an expansion of the Council in the existing categories (permanent members and non-permanent members). These statements are organized in three sets: (1) support for additional permanent members, (2) opposition to additional permanent members, and (3) a focus on the addition of non-permanent members. (1) The first set includes statements supporting an addition of permanent members that would have the same status as the current P5. This set of documents also comprises statements regarding specific candidates for new permanent seats, and the criteria to be applied for identifying such countries. Statements in favour of permanent membership which endorse a periodical review were also included here.38 In the context of permanent membership, careful distinctions had to be made regarding the issue of regional representation. Statements arguing in favour of a permanent seat for a regional organization, and not a specific state, were classified as proposals of a new category of membership. The proposals that most clearly fall into this category are those in favour of a permanent seat held by the European Union. Support of a new category of membership was also assumed in the case of proposals which endorse membership of individual states but are based on the idea that a state as permanent member represents, and is accountable to, a regional organization. The African Common Position on Security Council Reform,39 for instance, not only claims two African permanent seats with the right of veto, but also demands that the African Union selects the African members of the Security Council. Therefore, statements endorsing the African Common Position were assigned to the subsection on regional seats (3.2.2.3, 4.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.3).

35  8 September 2000, → 4.1.6. 36  → 4.1.25 and → 4.1.26. 37  → 4.1.28. 38  Given that the positions did not always fall neatly into one category, or were not always articulated clearly, the following criteria were applied to guide the inclusion of statements in this set of documents: If states argued in favour of additional permanent members, but did not explicitly say whether they wanted such new permanent members to enjoy the veto power, it was assumed that they were advocating for new permanent members with all the privileges of the current P5. 39  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10.

10

1 Introduction (2) The second set of documents in the “expansion in the existing categories” subsection consists of statements arguing against an expansion of the Council in the category of permanent members. Statements in favour of permanent seats without the right of veto were not included here. Instead, they can be found in the subsections addressing “new categories of seats” (3.2.2, 4.2.2 and 5.2.2). (3) The third set of documents in the “expansion in the existing categories” subsection consists of statements focusing on an expansion in the category of nonpermanent membership. While some statements also take an explicit stance with regard to other categories of seats, the statements in this set mainly reflect an interest of the respective states in the addition of non-permanent members. Typical statements in this third set are those of the Eastern European States advocating for an additional non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe, or those of the Caribbean Community supporting a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States. The position of the Non-Aligned Movement that “if there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category”40 was also assigned to this set.

The second subsection has its focus on statements discussing new categories of seats. These statements have been organized according to the following four main positions: (1) Support for permanent seats without the right of veto. Statements put in this first set favour the creation of a new category of membership, namely permanent membership without the right of veto as enjoyed by the present P5.41 Since the veto power is an essential feature of the current permanent members’ status, permanent membership without such a power would be categorically different and evidently constitute a new category of membership. (2) Support for non-permanent seats with longer terms, or for semi-permanent seats. The second set consists of proposals in favour of non-permanent seats with terms longer than the two years presently provided for in Art. 23, para. 2 of the UN Charter, and/or the possibility of immediate re-election (which presently is excluded by the last sentence of the same provision of the Charter). Also included in this set are proposals in favour of so-called semi-permanent seats which would rotate among two or three countries, allowing for a more frequent presence of those states on the Security Council. (3) Support for regional seats. The third set of documents in this subsection is made up of proposals supporting new categories of membership that include an element of regional representation, either by assigning a seat to a region instead of a country, by establishing a rotational system among states of a particular region, or by introducing similar mechanisms. Proposals which formally endorse membership of individual states but are based on the idea that a permanent member represents, 40  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5. 41  If a state explicitly opposed an extension of the veto power to new permanent members and later simply referred to an expansion in permanent and non-permanent membership, the later statements were also treated as supporting a new category of permanent membership without the right of veto.

1 Introduction

11

is accountable to, or is elected by, a regional organization have also been included in this third set (e.g., statements endorsing the African Common Position). (4) Opposition to new categories of seats. Finally, the fourth set of documents consists of statements opposing the creation of a specific new category of membership, or of new categories of membership in general. The third subsection consists of statements by member states in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats. This subsection is not further subdivided in sets of documents. The third section of each of the Parts 3 to 5 is devoted to statements discussing the size of an enlarged Security Council. That third section is not subdivided in subsections. The problem of the right of veto The fourth section of each of the Parts 3 to 5 consists of statements by member states regarding the issue of the right of veto. Documents were assigned to subsections according to whether the respective state or group of states has argued in favour of retaining or abolishing the right of veto, or in favour or against formal or informal restrictions of the use of the veto power. The first subsection gathers statements in favour of retaining the right of veto as it is currently laid down in the UN Charter. The states which have taken that position are mainly the current permanent members of the Security Council. The African states want to see the veto power abolished, but as long as it exists they claim the same power for the two permanent seats they demand for the African continent. The second subsection consists of statements supporting an abolition of the right of veto. In principle, a call for an abolition of the veto power is rather clear-cut. However, most states arguing against the veto power see that it is unrealistic to expect that this power can be eliminated altogether, given, in particular, the respective definite position of the present permanent members. Thus, these states argue in favour of instituting formal or informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto as a second best option, or as first steps towards an eventual abolishment of the veto power. The decision about whether to include a statement in the category of statements arguing for an abolition of the veto, or in one of the categories of proposals aiming at formal or informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, was made according to the emphasis of the statement.42

42  For example, some states have put forward several arguments against the veto power as such, and take a strong stance in favour of its complete abolition. In doing so, they acknowledge only incidentally that a complete abolition is unrealistic and that therefore one should aim at least at restricting the use of the right of veto to the extent possible, without further specifying these restrictions. This type of statement was included in the second subsection (“abolishing the right of veto”). In contrast, statements in which states only mention that they prefer a complete abolishment of the veto power as an introductory remark for the presentation of specific restrictions of the use of the veto power were assigned to one of the two subsections dedicated to formal or informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto.

12

1 Introduction

The third subsection puts together proposals for formal restrictions of the right of veto, that is proposals aiming at a restriction of the veto power in a way that would require a Charter amendment, or at least the formal adoption of a legal text officially interpreting the Charter. Accordingly, the subsection includes, for instance, statements wishing to limit the scope of the veto power to decisions made under Chapter VII of the Charter, or to introduce some kind of “appeals mechanism” located in the General Assembly, or to agree upon an authoritative interpretation of the term “procedural matters” in Article 27, para. 2 of the Charter, or to introduce a so-called “double veto” procedure according to which a draft resolution would have to be vetoed by at least two permanent members to prevent its adoption. In the course of the reform debate, the focus of proposals regarding a limitation of the veto power changed considerably. While initially the discussion mainly revolved around formal restrictions, the focus has shifted more recently towards informal restrictions of the veto power. This was taken into consideration when it proved difficult to assign a particular statement to either the subsection addressing formal restrictions or to the subsection addressing informal restrictions. In such a case, we tried to gather from the context, that is from the focus of discussions at the respective time, what kind of restriction was meant. The fourth subsection consists of statements proposing informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto. These proposals are characterized by the fact that they do not suggest to establish legally binding restrictions of the right of veto. The subsection includes all statements which urge or admonish the permanent members to restrain themselves in their use of the veto power, in particular in cases in which the subject of a draft resolution is action against genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Important and widely supported initiatives in that respect are those of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT),43 and of France and Mexico.44 The fifth and last section of each of the Parts 3 to 5 presents proposals made by academics, think tanks, and civil society.45 The annexes as a “navigation aid” The eight annexes to the work want to facilitate the access to the documents presented in Parts 2 to 5, and to help readers to understand these documents. The annexes include summaries of the positions of states and groups of states regarding the issues of Security Council reform, tables providing an overview of those positions, a list of statements by member states and groups of states, and a select bibliography of works dealing with a reform of the Security Council. Annexes I and II: The summaries of the positions of states and groups of states want to provide an overview of the most important views held by the groups and countries the statements of which are included in the present collection. It was not intended to give a complete or detailed account of the respective groups’ and countries’ participation in the discussions, but rather to briefly inform the reader about the main views taken 43  → Annex I. 44  → Annex II. 45  For the criteria we tried to apply in the selection of these “private” proposals, see supra, p. 3, Criteria for the selection of statements and proposals.

1 Introduction

13

by them, and about significant changes of those views. The summaries of country positions are primarily based on statements made individually by the respective countries, but the positions of the groups to which they belong(ed) were also taken into consideration. This is especially true for countries which affiliated strongly with a certain group, or countries which only rarely expressed an individual opinion. Annexes III and IV: The tables of group and country positions want to give a concise overview of the respective group’s or country’s main positions as expressed in the course of the reform discussions. The tables do not take account of every detail of a group’s or country’s views; they also do not reveal every alteration to these views. The tables rather indicate the general views held by a state or group of states. If a state or group changed significantly its views in the course of the debate, the most recent position was described in the table. The respective group or country was marked with an asterisk *. In that case, the reader may wish to consult the summaries of positions in Annexes I and II to find information on how the respective views changed. Annexes V to VII: Annex V is a list of statements made by groups of states. The groups are listed in alphabetical order, and their statements in chronological order, together with a brief description of their respective content. Annex VI consists of a list of statements made by individual states. The states are listed in alphabetical order, and their statements in chronological order, together with a brief description of their respective content. Annex VII is an alphabetical list of the authors of academic and civil society proposals reproduced in Parts 2, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5. Annex VIII: The select bibliography lists in alphabetical order literature on the issues of Security Council reform covered in the present collection, without claiming to be complete. It is divided into the sections (1) books, (2) journal articles and chapters in books, and (3) working papers, reports, and papers available on the Internet. A note on the indication of websites If specific website addresses are stated in the original footnotes of a text or document, we left this information as it was in the original text. We did not update this information. On the other hand, we were very cautious about indicating ourselves specific website addresses for individual documents because experience taught us that these addresses change very frequently. Very often, material is reorganized on a particular website, or deleted from it. According to our experience, the best way to see whether a particular document or text is (still) available on the Internet is to enter its title, date or key words into one of the known search engines, especially the most popular one. Websites of particular importance are those of the United Nations, of other international organizations (like the African Union or the League of Arab States), of non-governmental organizations which have focused on Security Council issues (like Security Council Report, Center for UN Reform Education, or Global Policy Forum), and of the permanent missions of member states to the United Nations in New York. For UN documents, the “United Nations Digital Library” at present offers the easiest access, in particular if a UN document number is known. Acknowledgments I began collecting documents and texts relating to the reform of the Security Council in the 1990s when I worked on my book on the veto power of the permanent members of the Council, its place and meaning in the framework of the UN Charter understood

14

1 Introduction

as the constitution of the international community, and its possible reform.46 That work was done first in New Haven, Connecticut, in the friendly environment of the foreign & international law section of the Yale Law Library, headed by Mr. Daniel Wade, and then in Berlin at the Humboldt University. Some of the material I used later for some further studies of the reform process.47 For some years, I had been thinking of publishing a comprehensive collection of “important” documents on the issues of Security Council reform, but I could launch this project only after I had joined the law faculty of the University of St. Gallen in the spring of 2013. In St. Gallen, I could put together a team of graduate student assistants helping me to accomplish that long-conceived plan. Their first task was to arrange in proper order the mass of papers and photocopies which I had brought with me to Switzerland, and to begin to identify additional material, in particular of the more recent years. The team was constituted of the following persons: Ms. Sué González Hauck, Mr. Raffael Gübeli, Mr. Karl Hampel, Ms. Isabelle Maurer, Mr. Nicolas Mortier, and Ms. Elisa Kempe. In a second phase of the project, a new team took over the work, further improving the structure and the comprehensiveness of the collection. The team, composed of the following persons, also worked towards the production of the manuscript in accordance with the publisher’s standards: Ms. Laura Ablondi, Ms. Fiona Hensel, Ms. Isabelle Maurer, and Ms. Nathalie Schmidt. The work of the first team was coordinated by Ms. González Hauck, and that of the second team by Ms. Maurer. I am very grateful for the assistance of these young people. I could convince them that it is meaningful to spend so much time on reading, arranging and rearranging documents which relate to efforts which so far have not been successful. But failure needs to be studied too, especially if it concerns something so important as the future of world organization. The University of St. Gallen generously supported this project by providing the necessary facilities and by remunerating the student assistants. A research sabbatical in the spring term of 2019 allowed the editor to focus on the completion of this work. The editor further wants to thank the owners of the copyright to the reprinted “private” proposals by individual authors and organizations for their permission to use the respective material. In most cases, that permission was kindly granted free of charge. Only that generosity made it possible to include these texts in the present collection. The editor is grateful to the publisher, Koninklijke Brill in Leiden, The Netherlands, for including this work in its prestigious list, and in particular to Ms. Marie M. Sheldon,

46  See Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective, 1998. 47  See, in particular, Bardo Fassbender, All Illusions Shattered? Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN Security Council, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 7 (2003), pp. 183-218, and id., On the Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The Project of a Reform of the UN Security Council after the 2005 World Summit, International Organizations Law Review, vol. 2 (2005), pp. 391-402.

1 Introduction

15

Publishing Director for International Law at Brill Nijhoff, Ms. Kelley Baylis and Ms. Kristen Chevalier for their steady interest and support.

1.2 Landmarks in the history of the Security Council reform debate Writing these lines in the summer of 2019, I wonder who will read them, and when, and with what kind of interest or general feelings. In the near future following the publication of this book, a typical reader could be a doctoral student doing research on exactly one of the issues covered by this collection of documents and proposals, for instance the arguments put forward in favour or against the right of veto of the permanent members. Or it could be a younger diplomat, more inquisitive than the average, who just has arrived in New York and is asked by the head of her mission to attend a meeting dealing with issues of Security Council reform, issues she wants to understand better and in more detail than by only reading a memo hastily written by her predecessor in the mission. In contrast, in a more distant future a reader of this book will rather be someone interested in the history of international law and international relations, and in particular in the history of international organization(s), who comes across this volume in a library, or an archive, or some future digital database. Will such a person in a few decades from now look at the United Nations in the way we today approach the League of Nations – as something quite old and distant, captured on slightly damaged black-and-white photos? Will the UN then still exist, or only its name, representing something different? If the Organization still exists, will there have been a meaningful reform of the Security Council, of its membership and decision-making procedures, in the ways reflected upon in the documents and proposals collected in this volume? Could states agree on such a reform in rational and fair deliberations, or did it take some catastrophic event for them to accept reform as a necessity? Or did the UN manage to survive, or even better: to live up to its responsibilities, without such a reform? Assuming a failure of the efforts to reform the Security Council which by now already last for more than twenty-five years, it will probably depend on circumstances how people will assess, in 2030 or 2040, the inability of the “international community” at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century to adjust the United Nations to the conditions and needs of a new time. Will people be of the opinion that this failure did matter, that it made a difference in the history of humankind in the first half or so of the twenty-first century? In any case, I think, people looking back on our time will be astonished to find that the member states of the United Nations could not agree in discussions, led since the beginning of the 1990s, on a reform of the Council, leaving the body essentially the way it was established in 1945 in the wake of World War II. For what was proposed and discussed was not a revolutionary rearrangement of world organization. It was not the establishment of a world state, or a world federation. It was not the introduction of a global system of democratic government, and it was not a global redistribution of wealth. Instead, the intentions of the reformers were rather modest. They did not question the general structure of the UN as an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states, and did not wish to change the mandate of the Organization as defined in its Charter. They also did not challenge

16

1 Introduction

the general division of powers among the principal organs of the UN. Instead, they only sought to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of one of those principal organs, and thus to reinforce the existing organization of the UN. That such a rather modest change was obstructed (not exclusively, but mainly) by competing national (and, to a lesser extent, regional) self-interest and egotism is indeed something one must regret. From a distance, I suppose, people will wonder to what high degree international politics of our time remained informed by patterns of the nineteenth century, by a competition of states for power, wealth and prestige, as if one of them could be self-sufficient. However, will a future generation have succeeded in replacing the outmoded patterns and concepts with something better working? As I said before, this second part of the introduction can only recall some landmarks, or important stages, in the development of the reform discussions since the early 1990s, in order to facilitate the work with the present book, or the navigation through the many documents and texts. These brief remarks are not meant to be a comprehensive or detailed history of the debate on a reform of the Security Council, or of particular issues of that debate, as it has been written by other authors.48 These remarks also cannot analyse or even summarize the impressive amount of scholarship, in legal science and in political science, produced in the last twenty years or so about the role, the work and the probable future of the Security Council, some of which is represented in the “Proposals by academics and civil society” sections of this work (3.5, 4.5 and 5.5). “The most productive time” In retrospect, the five years from 1992 to 1997 appear to be those in which there was a window of opportunity for a reform of the Security Council. That window became narrower soon after, never to be as wide open as in these first years. In the early 1990s, there was broad agreement among governments, supported by a general sentiment in academia and organized civil society, that the international state system had experienced a change so profound that the set-up of 1945 could not be maintained without running the risk of relegating the UN to the backseats of international life. That change had a long-time aspect (developments like decolonization and the emergence of many new independent states, economic growth in Asia and Latin America, but also demographic change around the world) and a current quality, the latter more tangible than the former and addressed, for instance, by UN Secretary-General Boutros 48  For a more detailed account of the discussions and negotiations in the different bodies of the General Assembly since 1992, see, in particular, the two reports by von Freiesleben and Swart: Jonas von Freiesleben, Security Council Reform, in Estelle Perry et al., Managing Change at the United Nations, New York: Center for UN Reform Education, 2008, pp. 1-20; reprinted under the title “Reform of the Security Council: 1945-2008” in Jonas von Freiesleben/Lydia Swart, Governing & Managing Change at the United Nations: Security Council Reform from 1945 to September 2013, New York: Center for UN Reform Education, 2013, pp. 1-22; Lydia Swart, Reform of the Security Council: 2007-2013, in von Freiesleben/Swart, 2013, pp. 23-59. See also Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Working Together, 2010, pp. 12-18 (Security Council Reform, 1993 to 2006), and 40-46 (Security Council Reform, 2006 to 2009).

1 Introduction

17

Boutros-Ghali when he said in 1995 that “as a result of the sudden acceleration in the pace of change, a certain number of principles which, in the past, were the foundation for international society have become outdated or obsolete.”49 Different from earlier efforts, which were largely concerned with a possible reorganization of the Secretariat and UN bodies in the economic and social field,50 the debate of the time focused on the Security Council, its composition, decision-making process and competences, and its relationship with the General Assembly. Although not expressly mentioned by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, one of the principles of the past which many hoped to overcome was the quasi-hegemonic status of the victorious powers of the Second World War, translated into UN law as permanent membership in the Security Council with the so-called right of veto. The early 1990s, one must remember, were a time of optimism. Many new opportunities seemed to open up, not least for the United Nations. The most important reason for the prevailing spirit of hope and optimism was the end of the Cold War effected by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern and central Europe and, shortly afterwards, of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the division of Germany and Berlin could be overcome which had been a source of international friction since the late 1940s. Germany’s reunification went along with the country’s definite recognition of its Eastern borders as determined by the Allied Powers in 1945. In November 1990, the member states of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” and proclaimed “a new era of democracy, peace and unity”:51 We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe. Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.52 The Charter of Paris emphasized the importance of the United Nations and of the UN Charter. “The destiny of our nations”, it said, “is linked to that of all other nations.” 49  Statement delivered to the Congress on Public International Law held at the United Nations, 17 March 1995; UN Press Release SG/SM/5583 and L/2710 of 17 March 1995, p. 2. 50  These reform initiatives are one of the core themes of the Reforming the United Nations volumes edited by Joachim Müller (→ Select Bibliography, Annex VIII of the present work). 51  Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted in Paris, 19-21 November 1990. 52  Ibid., preamble, paras. 1-3.

18

1 Introduction We support fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles. We recognize with satisfaction the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the improvement in relations among our States.53

The liberation of Kuwait, which had been invaded and occupied by Iraq in August 1990, by a U.S.-led military operation authorized by the UN Security Council in January and February 1991 seemed to demonstrate the newly established effectiveness of the UN Charter’s methods of maintaining and restoring international peace. On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of heads of state and government for the first time in the history of the United Nations. A number of representatives, especially from developing countries, took this opportunity to suggest that the structure and the working methods of the principal organs of the UN be reviewed.54 In a statement made on behalf of the members of the Council at the conclusion of the meeting, the President of the Security Council, the British Prime Minister John Major, declared, inter alia, that the members of the Council consider that their meeting is “a timely recognition of the fact that there are new favourable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.55 He continued to say that “this meeting takes place at a time of momentous change. The ending of the Cold War has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable and more humane world. Rapid progress has been made, in many regions of the world, towards democracy and responsive forms of government, as well as towards achieving the Purposes set out in the Charter.”56 “The members of the Council agree that the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations.”57 At the summit meeting of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in Jakarta in September 1992, UN reform became a major topic, and a high-level working group was charged with the elaboration of concrete proposals. In its Final Document, the Conference welcomed “the ongoing endeavours aimed at reforming and improving certain structures and procedures of the United Nations as an essential component of strengthening multilateralism, with a view to ensuring equal participation, more balanced representation and better equilibrium in keeping with the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations”.58 The Jakarta Conference deplored 53  Ibid., section “The CSCE and the World”, para. 1. 54  See UN Doc. S/PV.3046, reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. II, 1997, pp. III.28/1-III.28/63. 55  See Note by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/23500 of 31 December 1992, p. 2. 56  Ibid. 57  Ibid., p. 5. 58  Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Jakarta, 1-6 September 1992, Final Document, Chapter II: Global Issues. Political and Economic Committees, para. 30, → 2.23.

1 Introduction

19

that this reform continued “to be hampered by those who seek to preserve their privileged positions of power”. The democratization of the United Nations and its bodies should avoid perpetuating the current inequities by creating new centres of privilege and be pursued in the spirit of the sovereign equality of all States. They appealed to the major States to accept this inevitable process in the broader interest of all humankind.59 During the following months, almost global consent developed according to which the increase in membership in the UN since the last (and so far only) enlargement of the Security Council in 1963,60 the fundamentally changed international situation after the end of the Cold War, and the new challenges faced by the Organization required a thorough review of the structure and working methods of the major UN organs, including the Security Council. The permanent members of the Security Council, who wanted to avoid a general review of the Council’s composition and functioning, were not able anymore to contain the discussion. The new current of opinion became visible at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly in November 1992 when representatives of sixteen states took the floor,61 among them India, Brazil, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, Japan, Mexico and Pakistan – countries which continued to be vocal in the discussion until today. Tellingly, none of the five permanent members participated in the debate. The “question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979 at the request of ten states, among them Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria.62 From 1980 to 1991, the item remained inscribed in the agenda, but the General Assembly deferred its consideration. As a result of the November 1992 meeting, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/62.63 In its operative part, the resolution requested the Secretary-General “to invite Member States to submit […] written comments on a possible review of the membership in the Security Council”. The Secretary-General presented the comments submitted to him in a report dated 20 July 1993 and ten addenda to this report.64 Altogether, eighty-two member states from all regions replied. The submissions can be regarded as the most comprehensive statement of the original ideas and aspirations of UN member states with regard to a reform of the Security Council. After discussing the matter at its 48th session, the General Assembly decided to establish an Open-ended Working Group “to consider all aspects of the question of an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council”.65 In the spring 59  Ibid. 60  → 2.8-2.12. 61   UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 69th plenary meeting, 23 November 1992, UN Doc. A/47/PV.69. 62  → 2.17. See supra, p. 5. 63   UN General Assembly Res. 47/62, 11 December 1992, → 3.1.1. 64  Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. A/48/264 and Add.1-10. 65   UN General Assembly Res. 48/26, 3 December 1993, → 3.1.2.

20

1 Introduction

of 1993 it was still possible to believe that the chances of an improvement in UN peace and security institutions had never been better.66 But then came the American retreat from Somalia, announced after the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers in October 1993. President Clinton issued a policy directive in April 1994 that, in the words of a Foreign Affairs article, “implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions and that marked a retreat from his administration’s earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism”.67 Unilateralism became the preferred mode of U.S. foreign policy. The phrases “the United States as the only remaining superpower” and “Pax Americana” became popular, suggesting that the United States was now able unilaterally to assert its claims, and was no longer in need of a forum for negotiations like the UN which had been useful in the bygone era of a bipolar world. So perhaps US interest in UN reform would have been stronger if the Soviet Union had survived and if someone like Mikhail Gorbachev had still been around as leader of a powerful but reliable rival power. Other major developments negatively influencing the international climate were the violence in the Balkans following the breakup of Yugoslavia, in particular the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina taking place between 1992 and 1995, and the genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi in April, May, June and July 1994. The result was indeed a “sea-change in the reputation, authority and prospects of the UN”68 in all parts of the world, reducing the disposition of governments and political parties to concern themselves with a reform of the UN – although developments seemingly proving a “failure” of the UN rather should have prompted the opposite reaction. By the year 1997, the prospects for a reform of the Security Council thus had become rather bleak: If, in addition to the American reluctance to take up a comprehensive UN reform, we also consider the sharply differing goals pursued by other member states, and, furthermore, what Professor Falk described as the unwillingness of leading states to compromise their predominance in relation to violent conflict by building up the autonomous capabilities of the United Nations to provide peace and security to the peoples of the world,69 it becomes apparent that today a reform which would deserve the name is almost out of reach. According to Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, any formal amendment requires the ratification by two-thirds of the member states, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. For the time being, no such majority can be mustered. Regarding the veto – the fundamental rule of UN decision-making and, at the same time, the most direct expression of the inequality of states in contemporary international law –, the states entitled to it are not inclined to agree to substantial limitations; the strongest candidates for permanent membership in the Security Council will not accept a second-class 66  See Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN, 1997, p. xvii. 67  See Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2, March/April 1996. 68  See Dore, footnote 66 above, p. xvii. 69  See Richard A. Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, in: Saul H. Mendlovitz & Burns H. Weston (eds.), Preferred Futures for the United Nations, 1995, pp. 301 et seq., at 328.

1 Introduction

21

affiliation which would not include the right of veto; and the developing countries, who have jointly fought the veto for decades, are split into those who now aspire to permanent membership and the veto (in particular Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, India, Indonesia and Brazil), and those who maintain a negative stance.70 A clear indication of the stalemate in which the reform efforts had become locked was the failure of an initiative taken earlier in 1997 by the then President of the General Assembly and Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group, Ambassador Razali Ismail (Malaysia). The ambassador presented a paper in the form of a General Assembly draft resolution.71 He proposed that, in a first stage, the General Assembly should adopt with a simple majority a resolution calling for the Council to be enlarged by five permanent and four non-permanent members. The resolution would allocate the new permanent seats to the “industrialized states” (2) and to the developing states of Africa (1), Asia (1), and Latin America and the Caribbean (1). The new permanent members would not enjoy the right of veto. Of the four new non-permanent seats, one would go to Africa, one to Asia, one to Eastern Europe, and one to Latin America and the Caribbean. In a second stage, specific states would be designated as permanent members by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. A week later, in a third stage, the necessary amendments to the Charter would be adopted by the Assembly in accordance with Article 108 of the UN Charter, that is again by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. Ten years after the entry into force of the amendments, a conference would be convened under Article 109 of the Charter “in order to review the situation created by the entry into force of these amendments”. However, this attempt to distinguish the principal question of whether and how to enlarge the Council from the question of which states should become members of an enlarged Council, and to circumvent the stumbling stone of the two-thirds majority for the first decision, was expressly repudiated by the General Assembly on 23 November 1998 when it determined, referring to Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter, “not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, without the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the Members of the General Assembly”.72 This rejection of a piecemeal approach aimed at leading the members of the Assembly more smoothly from one decision to the next was clearly a success of the opponents of new permanent seats (most prominently, at the time, Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Argentina, Spain and South Korea), but also of the Non-Aligned Movement73 the support of which is indispensable for any proposal to overcome the hurdle of the twothirds majority. The controversies stirred up by the Razali proposal led to even more

70  Bardo Fassbender, Reforming the United Nations, Die Friedens-Warte, vol. 73 (1998), no. 4, pp. 427-42, at 440. 71  → 3.1.10. 72   UN General Assembly Res. 53/30 (emphasis added), → 4.1.1. 73  See the final communiqué of the NAM summit in Cartagena de Indias of 10 July 1998, para. 2, → 4.3.1.

22

1 Introduction

rigid positions of the different groups. Statements became increasingly monotonous and repetitive.74 Why is it still possible to refer to these first five years as “the most productive time” of discussions? I think one can say so because the discussions were animated, lively and serious. Delegations were rather frank and undisguised in presenting their opinions, and ready to listen to each other. In that climate, a wealth of ideas and proposals was put on the table, not yet as restricted by notions of “realism” as in later years. Many proposals were rich in substance and detailed, and tried to state reasons for the respective solution, in an effort to convince other states. Indeed, almost all important aspects of a Council reform, and the pros and cons of specific proposals, were addressed in these first years, with little new argument added later. It is a different question to what extent major players adopted a wait and see attitude, allowing the less influential participants to freely express their views and wishes without taking them really seriously. Momentum and deadlock: Discussions in the decade between 1998 and 2008 In a second phase of discussions, after the failed Razali initiative of 1997, statements of delegations in the Open-ended Working Group generally became shorter, now often including phrases like “our position is well known”, or “as we said many times before”. Also, mutual recriminations began, with one side accusing the other of an uncompromising policy or a responsibility for a “deadlock” discussions had reached. Now and then, reform supporters proclaimed that the process had “gained momentum again”, which was to some extent true for the time surrounding the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 in which the heads of state and government renewed their commitment “to intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects”.75 Another impetus came in December 2004 from the report “A more secure world”76 prepared by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which Secretary-General Kofi Annan had appointed the year before. The report proposed, alternatively, two models for an expansion of the Council, both providing for an enlarged Council with a total of twenty-four members. While “model A” intended an addition of six permanent members without the right of veto and of three non-permanent members, “model B” suggested the creation of a new category of eight seats with (renewable) terms of four years, and the addition of one (traditional) non-permanent seat. In the second phase, the question of majorities necessary for respective General Assembly action also became an often addressed issue. With the formation of groups of states, certain countries became spokespersons for a particular group, regularly issuing statements, while other countries now only occasionally raised their voice, or even lapsed into silence. From the beginning, the five permanent members of the Council had been well aware of their extraordinary power over the reform process due to Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter which make an entry-into-force of a Charter amendment dependent on ratification by “all the permanent members”, and thus extend the veto power of the 74  See von Freiesleben (2013), footnote 48 above, at 5. 75  → 4.1.6. 76  → 4.1.19.

1 Introduction

23

P5 to amendments of the Charter. The permanent members assumed a reserved stance, acting more than an observer than a participant of discussions. However, they left no doubt that they would intervene, and assert their positions and interests, whenever they saw fit to do so. The uncertainty about when and how they would do so always overshadowed the discussions. None of the P5 was really ever in favour of adding new permanent members (with or without the right of veto) to the Council, or of formally limiting the veto power they presently enjoy. Only reluctantly or late, some permanent members responded positively to claims made for permanent seats by close allies (in particular, Japan and Germany as allies of the United States). Generalising, one can say that the P5 preferred to let the supporters and the opponents of a particular reform proposal exhaust and neutralize themselves – and this is exactly what happened to a large extent. The P5 would have been (and possibly still are) ready to accept a modest increase in the number of non-permanent seats, as it took place in 1963 when this number was raised from six to ten.77 But such an expansion was never the centre of interest of those states most energetically striving for a reform of the Council. The crucial point was exactly the power of the P5 in the Security Council and “beyond” (i.e., in the many UN organs and institutions the composition of which reflects that of the Council),78 obtained and secured by permanent membership and the right of veto. It was that power which particularly the developing countries attacked as unjust, undemocratic and outdated, and which in contrast other states aspired to – either wanting no longer to stand in the shadow of the victors of World War II, or wishing to find recognition of their economic or political importance established in the last decades. It was clear from the start that a reform which did not address this central issue would not succeed. This time, and different from the 1960s, neither the countries of “the South”, constituting a large majority of the membership of the UN, nor the – primarily “Northern” – states calling into question the status asserted by the P5 since 1945 would be satisfied with a minor increase in the number of non-permanent seats (even seats which could be held by a state for a longer term). Such a reform, effected by UN Charter amendment, would not only leave the fundamental power structure of the UN intact but even confirm and solidify that structure, possibly for decades to come. In other words, the resort to a “small solution” modelled on the 1963 enlargement – as suggested, for example, by the Non-Aligned Movement as a “fall-back position”79 – is blocked today. Even if Germany and Japan would accept it, India and the African states, in particular, could not; to them, it would be a political defeat too severe. In July 2005, the Japanese and the German Government concluded that after years and years of discussions it was time to force member states to take decisions on the controversial issues of Security Council reform. They were afraid that, in the absence of a new initiative, the whole process would come to a standstill, and were hoping that 77  → 2.11. 78  For a description and critique of that “cascade effect”, → 3.2.3.12 (submission of Argentina) and 4.2.1.2.10 (Costa Rica). 79  See the NAM statement of 13 February 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5: “If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category.”

24

1 Introduction

they could push through a solution with a majority large enough to have the heads of state and government endorse it in September of the same year when they would meet to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations. Together with Brazil and India, who had joined Japan and Germany in the “Group of Four” (G4), and supported by a number of other states, the two states tabled a draft resolution80 according to which the membership of the Security Council will be increased from fifteen to twenty-five by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members. The six new permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: two from African states, two from Asian states, one from Latin American and Caribbean states, one from Western European and Other States (WEOG). Of the four new nonpermanent seats, one should go to each of the following groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America/Caribbean. Given the sponsors of the draft resolution, only the states occupying the new African permanent seats remained to be decided upon. As regards the veto, the G4 maintained, as a matter of principle, their claim that the new permanent members “should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members”. However, realizing that this demand had little prospects of success (because it was objected to not only by a vast majority of member states who oppose the veto as a matter of principle but also by the present P5), they offered not to exercise the right of veto in a transitional phase, i.e. until a review of the situation fifteen years after the entry-into-force of the respective amendments to the UN Charter. The G4 initiative was a move similar to that made by Ambassador Razali in 1997. It was somewhat forced in the sense that it did not commend itself as natural, or as an obvious reflection of the current state of discussions. It surely reflected an understanding in Berlin and Tokyo that time was not on their side. Different from the early 1990s, Germany and Japan were not generally seen any more as candidates for permanent membership. Germany had not gained the expected political weight in Europe, while Japan still suffered from a severe economic stagnation following the collapse of the asset price bubble in 1991-92. It therefore should not have come as a real surprise that the G4 did not find too many co-sponsors for their draft resolution (the most important being Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Poland and Portugal), in any case less than they had expected as a result of earlier consultations. The G4 initiative was severely weakened by the fact that the African states did not support it. Instead, the African group (or, to be more precise, 43 African states, that is nine less than the number of members of the African group in the General Assembly) tabled an own draft resolution81 according to which the membership of the Council should be increased from fifteen to twenty-six, with the eleven additional seats to be distributed as follows: two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats (i.e., one more than in the G-4 proposal) for African states; two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian states; one non-permanent seat for Eastern European states; one permanent and one 80   UN Doc. A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. The draft resolution was sponsored by Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine. 81   UN Doc. A/59/L.67, 14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30.

1 Introduction

25

non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean states; and one permanent seat for WEOG. Apart from the additional non-permanent seat claimed by Africa, the main difference between the G4 and the African draft resolutions was that the latter unequivocally demanded to “accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as those of the current permanent members, including the right of veto”. This demand was in accordance with a common African position adopted by the Executive Council of the African Union at a meeting in Swaziland in March 2005, the so-called “Ezulwini consensus”,82 to which the African states hold on until today. In that declaration, it was said that “even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council”. This significant difference of opinion among the states favouring new permanent seats with the right of veto was welcomed by the Italian-led “Uniting for Consensus” group (originally the “Coffee club”).83 Italy, together with eleven other states (Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey), also sponsored an own draft resolution in July 200584 according to which the number of non­-permanent members should be raised to twenty, with no additional permanent members. The twenty non-permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: six from African states, five from Asian states, four from Latin American and Caribbean states, three from WEOG, and two from Eastern European states. “Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups. […] [E]ach of the five existing geographical groups […] shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group.” Originally, Italy had proposed a new category of ten non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three states, making a total of thirty states to be selected “on the basis of objective criteria by the General Assembly”.85 With their 2005 draft resolution, Italy and its co-sponsors gave up this idea of creating a clear-cut “third category” of Council members which had met with much opposition from countries strongly believing in the principle of sovereign equality of states. The draft resolution left it to the regional groups to decide by whom and for long they wish to be represented in the Council. However, none of the three draft resolutions was put to a vote in the General Assembly, the necessary two-thirds majority not being in sight for any of them. In addition, the United States and China did not support voting in the Assembly at that point of time. In reaction to the G4 draft resolution, U.S. Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for UN Reform, said, inter alia: “[W]e will oppose any proposal that would make the Security Council less effective than it is today. And we will oppose calling for votes on proposals that do not command the breadth of support necessary to be put into practice. […] The U.S. does not 82  → 4.2.2.3.26. 83  In early 2005, the group consisted of Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea and Spain. China is an active participant in meetings at the expert level. See Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 51. 84   UN Doc. A/59/L.68, 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 85  See the Italian submission of 30 June 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2.

26

1 Introduction

think any proposal to expand the Security Council – including one based on our own ideas – should be voted upon at this stage.”86 Consequently, the “World Summit” of September 2005, attended by more than 170 heads of state and government, came and went by without any progress on the issues of Council reform, with the outcome document limited to a repetition of generally accepted catchwords: “We support early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.”87 On a road to nowhere? The Intergovernmental Negotiations since 2009 In September 2007, member states agreed to move the reform effort from the Open-ended Working Group (which, however, was not dissolved but formally kept alive so that states could return to it)88 to a new format, the “Intergovernmental Negotiations” (IGN).89 The main reason for this change was the frustration of many states, in particular the G4, with the slow progress the reform process had made in the Working Group which, since it had been established, had made its decisions by “general agreement”, that is more or less consensus.90 The idea was probably that the IGN would allow for voting on draft resolutions, as in the main committees of the General Assembly, and more readily lead to definitive votes being taken in the General Assembly itself. A first step towards that end would be “real” negotiations about a particular proposal (“text-based negotiations”) instead of the Working Group’s endless compilations of views. But, as Lydia Swart explains, “it took a year before the parameters of the negotiation process were agreed to, as delineated in [General Assembly] decision 62/557 of 15 September 2008,91 which has inspired contradictory interpretations ever since.”92 After the negotiations had officially started in early 2009, it took another year before a first so-called negotiation text93 was produced. This text, in fact a compilation of proposals submitted by member states, has since been revised numerous times. The entire phase of discussions since 2009 has been characterized by the conflicting wishes of two main “camps” of member states – the first promoting substantial negotiations on a reform of the Council (in particular its membership) to begin as soon as possible, the second, in contrast, wishing to delay such negotiations and to maintain, in principle, the status quo. The core of the first grouping is made up of those 86  Statement in the General Assembly, 12 July 2005 (U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release no. 130(05)). 87   UN General Assembly Res. 60/1, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, 16 September 2005, para. 153, → 4.1.23. 88  The last report of the Open-ended Working Group, covering its work in the 63rd session of the General Assembly, was published on 11 September 2009 as UN Doc. A/63/47. The last meeting of the Open-ended Working Group took place on 9 September 2009. 89  See UN General Assembly, Decision 61/561, 17 September 2007, → 4.1.27. 90  See Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 26. 91  → 4.1.29. 92  Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 23. 93  10 May 2010, → 5.1.5.

1 Introduction

27

states who seek permanent membership, and are mainly organized in the G4 group (plus Nigeria and South Africa). The centre of the opposed grouping is constituted of states who want to prevent additional permanent seats, and who have organized themselves primarily in the Uniting for Consensus group, in which Italy plays a leading role. The group is dominated by mid-sized states (like Argentina, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain and Turkey) which do not see for themselves a chance of obtaining a permanent seat, but which at the same time oppose respective aspirations of states they regard as rivals, mainly in a regional context (with Argentina and Mexico disapproving the claims of Brazil, Pakistan those of India, and Italy and Spain those of Germany). Although the active membership of the group is not large, they are – openly or quietly – supported by quite a number of countries, in particular smaller states, which find attractive the proposal to create a new category of longer-term seats and to increase the regular non-permanent membership. The first “camp” has tried to make the negotiation process swifter and more efficient, for instance by strengthening the role of the chair of the IGN, or by advocating a relatively short text as the basis for further discussions, or by considering the possibility of taking votes in the General Assembly. By contrast, the second grouping has aimed at a further protraction of the decades-long process, for instance by insisting on lengthy and hard to handle negotiating texts which include the positions of “all” states, or by accusing the chair of the IGN of being biased, or by insisting on a continued formal existence of the Open-ended Working Group beside the IGN, or by maintaining consensus as the modus operandi in the IGN. So far, the second grouping has been more successful in its endeavours than the first. The shift of the discussions away from the Open-ended Working Group to the IGN did not lead to the results hoped for by the states belonging to the first grouping. Compared to the state of affairs in 2008, right before the beginning of the IGN, a significant convergence of positions could not be achieved. It seems that by now a majority of member states, especially smaller states and developing countries, prefer the status quo over a reform entailing new permanent or semi-permanent seats, the consequences of which states find difficult to foresee. In this situation, reports are credible that say that only about one quarter of the UN membership has been actively engaged in the intergovernmental negotiations.94 In general, the discussions of the last decade about the different versions of a “negotiation text”, a “framework document”, “elements of convergence” and “elements of commonality”, respectively, have been of a technical nature, and not determined by major new political developments or initiatives. That nature is apparent from the format of the “negotiation text” and its successors, with their endless listing of alternative positions and a use of phrases which are comprehensible only to a small circle of insiders. As was true for the Open-ended Working Group, there are no official records of the meetings of the IGN, and the statements of member states are distributed as conference room papers or non-papers, if they are circulated at all. Their availability mainly depends on the practice of the respective delegation of making them public (in particular, on the websites of the Permanent Missions in New York). 94  See Center for UN Reform Education, Security Council Reform Update 2015: Similar Senarios, Same Positions, New Outcomes?, 12 January 2015.

28

1 Introduction

One gets the impression that for a long time now it has been primarily left to the experts in the missions to further develop the negotiation text within the wider or narrower limits of – sometimes not so recent – directives from the foreign ministries of their countries. It seems that in many states the issue of Security Council reform has not got the attention of the highest political level for many years, so that diplomats continue their work without renewed impetus or even serious interest from the part of their governments. As defined in General Assembly decision 62/557, the five “key issues” of the intergovernmental negotiations are essentially the same as those discussed in the Open-ended Working Group, namely (1) categories of membership; (2) the question of the veto; (3) regional representation; (4) size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and (5) the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. During the 63rd session of the General Assembly in 2008, the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan Mr. Abdul Zahir Tanin was appointed Vice-Chair of the Open-ended Working Group and Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. He was reappointed to chair the IGN during the 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th and 68th sessions by the respective President of the General Assembly, making him the person with the longest tenure in that office. It is apparent from the documents included in part 5.1 of this book that Ambassador Tanin also was one of the most active chairs. The groups of member states most actively participating in the discussions in this phase since 2009 have been the African Group, the G4, the Uniting for Consensus group, and the L69 (a coalition of states of the South named after a draft resolution of the 61st session,95 among them Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa).96 After four rounds of negotiations had taken place between March 2009 and early 2010,97 a “negotiation text”98 was sent to member states on 10 May 2010 by the chair of the IGN. Since then, the negotiations have been based on a single written document (“text-based negotiations”). The 29-pages text was a compilation of the thirty proposals that Tanin had received from member states and their groups, among them the African Group, the Arab Group, China, the G4, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the permanent members. The text was divided into five parts, in accordance with the five “key issues” mentioned above. “The multitude of often clashing proposals on the five key elements immediately reconfirmed that reaching solutions would not be easy, but the text did provide more clarity on the positions that were on the table and their key proponents.”99 From June 2010 to August 2013, the fifth to ninth rounds of negotiations followed, during which several revisions of the negotiation text were discussed. A first revised text was distributed on 26 May 2010,100 a second on 27 August 2010,101 and a third on 95   UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1, 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 96  For descriptions of these groups and their positions, see Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 43-52. 97  For details, see Swart, ibid., at 31-35. 98  → 5.1.5. 99  Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 35. 100  → 5.1.6. 101  → 5.1.7.

1 Introduction

29

23 February 2011.102 However, subsequently member states could not agree on which revision the following negotiations should be based (the African Group and Uniting for Consensus favouring Revision 2, and the G4 and L69 Revision 3). There was also no agreement on how to arrive at a shorter version of these texts.103 Ambassador Tanin’s suggestion of July 2012 that he as chair could produce a “concise working document” to speed up the discussions expectedly met with a mixed response: It was welcomed by the G4 and L69 groups but dismissed by the African Group and Uniting for Consensus, as well as by China, the Russian Federation and the United States.104 On 22 October 2013, the President of the 68th session, Mr. John Ashe, appointed an “Advisory Group” consisting of six permanent representatives105 with the purpose “to produce a basis for the start of the Intergovernmental Negotiations that reflects the ideas put forward in the negotiations so far, and also identifies available options”.106 The Advisory Group wrote a six pages long non-paper distributed on 10 December 2013.107 It was described by the chair of the IGN as “a clear overview of the main positions of Member States”108 but failed to receive the necessary wider acceptance as a shorter negotiation text (opposition came from Africa, Uniting for Consensus, and some permanent members). Regarding the question of “categories of membership”, the nonpaper listed the following options: a. Enlargement in both existing categories, permanent and non-permanent. b. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (x) years to be converted into permanent seats, as well as enlargement in the non-permanent category. c. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (8-12) years that are immediately renewable, without prejudice to the possibility of enlargement in the non-permanent category. d. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (3-5) years, as well as enlargement in the non-permanent category. e. Enlargement in the non-permanent category only: i. With the possibility of immediate re-election. ii. Without the possibility of immediate re-election.

102  → 5.1.8. 103  See Security Council Reform Update 2015, footnote 94 above. 104  See Swart, Reform of the Security Council, footnote 48 above, at 40 et seq., and Center for UN Reform Education, No Strong Support for Drafting of Concise Working Document, April 2013. 105  The Advisory Group was composed of the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Liechtenstein, Papua New Guinea, San Marino, and Sierra Leone. 106  Letter of the President of the General Assembly, 22 October 2013, quoted in Lydia Swart, The Creation of an Advisory Group to provide a basis for Security Council reform negotiations unsurprisingly meets opposition, Center for UN Reform Education, 9 November 2013. 107  → 5.1.9. 108  See Assessment of the Intergovernmental Negotiations following the conclusion of the 10th round by the Chair, 8 July 2014, → 5.1.10.

30

1 Introduction

The “question of the veto” was dealt with as follows: 2.1 In relation to enlargement: a. Extension of the veto to the new permanent members. b. Extension of the veto to the new permanent members, subject to a moratorium on its use for 15 years. c. No extension of the veto. d. Abolition of the veto. 2.2 In relation to the use of the veto: a. Limit the use of the veto: i. Not to be used to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. ii. To Chapter VII matters. b. Require non-concurring votes by two permanent members to block a Council decision. At the request of the President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Tanin prepared a comprehensive assessment of the IGN upon the conclusion of the 10th round of negotiations which took place in a series of six meetings between March and May 2014.109 The document gives an overview of the state of discussions at the end of the 68th session of the General Assembly. It emphasized the need to have a “commonly agreed concise working document”: “[I]n order to achieve our goals we must continue to work towards basing our negotiations on an agreed text.”110 Member states did not follow the suggestion of the chair to mandate an “independent political figure, to be selected by the Secretary-General or the President of the General Assembly in consultation with the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations”, to carry out an “audit of endeavours to achieve early reform of the Security Council […] for the consideration of world leaders during a high-level event at the General Debate of the 70th General Assembly”.111 Possibly satisfying a wish expressed by the G4, the President of the 69th session of the General Assembly, Ambassador Sam Kutesa from Uganda, did not reappoint Mr. Tanin as chair of the IGN but chose instead the Permanent Representative of Jamaica, Mr. E. Courtenay Rattray.112 After lengthy consultations, the new chair on 26 March 2015 submitted a one-page “framework document”,113 actually a kind of questionnaire, and asked member states to “populate” the text within three weeks. The idea was to make a fresh start after the quarrels about Revision 2 and Revision 3 of the negotiation text and the failure to establish the non-paper of the Advisory Group as a new generally accepted basis for negotiations. Approximately 115 member states made contributions, mostly in groups. However, the Arab Group, Uniting for Consensus, 109  Ibid. 110  Ibid., section “The way forward”, numbered para. 2. 111  Ibid., section “The way forward”, numbered para. 1. 112  For this and the following, see Lydia Swart, Timeline UN Security Council Reform, 1992 – November 2015, Center for UN Reform Education, November 2015, p. 6. 113  → 5.1.11 (together with the chair’s explanatory “speaking points” of the same day).

1 Introduction

31

China, Russia and the United States objected to the process and did not want their positions to be included in the “Framework Document as Populated by Member States” submitted to the President of the General Assembly by Ambassador Rattray on 4 May 2015, and distributed by the President on 5 May 2015.114 Instead, their responses were added to the document in an annex. On 31 July 2015, the President of the General Assembly distributed a new version of the populated framework document as “text to form the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the Security Council”.115 In addition to the document itself, the President also circulated a two part annex which compiled the submissions of individual member states for inclusion in the document (with China, the Russian Federation, Laos, the United States, the Arab Group, and Uniting for Consensus submitting letters instead). On 14 September 2015, the General Assembly adopted by consensus decision 69/560116 to carry the efforts to reform and increase the membership of the Security Council into the 70th session. This decision, proposed by President Kutesa, reaffirmed the Assembly’s central role in reforming the Council, and intended to build on positions as established in the populated framework document of 31 July 2015. In October 2015, the new President of the General Assembly (70th session), Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, appointed Ambassador Sylvie Lucas of Luxembourg as chair of the IGN. Ms. Lucas convened the first meeting of the IGN in the 70th session, dedicated to the issue of the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council, on 3 February 2016.117 On 17 May 2016, Ambassador Lucas circulated a very short paper entitled “Elements of Convergence on Two Key Issues of Security Council Reform: The Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and the Size of an Enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council”.118 If this paper was meant to give the process renewed impetus by basing it on a concise working document (in accordance with the constant demands of the G4), it was easy to see that the “Elements” only appeared to be such a document. In fact, it was only a summary of positions on isolated, albeit central issues, separated from the assumptions on which the different positions were based, as well as separated from the other “key issues”. On 27 July 2016, the General Assembly discussed the question of Security Council reform in a plenary meeting. Decision 70/559,119 adopted by the Assembly by acclamation, was the result of the President of the Assembly’s consultations with member states regarding the “Elements of Convergence” (as of 11 July 2016).120 The decision reaffirmed the central role of the General Assembly concerning Security Council reform, 114  → 5.1.12. For a report on the discussion of the populated framework document in interactive meetings of member states on 14 and 15 May 2015, see Lydia Swart, The Chair Advances Security Council Reform, but Substantial and Procedural Complexities Persist, Center for UN Reform Education, 29 May 2015. 115  → 5.1.13. 116  → 5.1.14. 117  For a coverage of that meeting, see Alex Maresca, IGN on Security Council reform begin for the 70th Session, Center for UN Reform Education, 14 March 2016. 118  → 5.1.15. 119  → 5.1.17. 120  → 5.1.16.

32

1 Introduction

and decided to continue the IGN, “building on the informal meetings held during its seventieth session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, reflected in the text and its annex circulated on 31 July 2015, and using the elements of convergence circulated on 12 July 2016 to help to inform its future work”. As before, the General Assembly further determined to reconvene the Open-ended Working Group “if Member States so decide” (which did not happen). In the 71st session of the General Assembly, the President of the Assembly for the first time appointed two co-chairs of the IGN, namely the Permanent Representatives of Romania, Dr. Ion Jinga, and of Tunisia, Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari. They presented on 31 March 2017 so-called “Elements of Convergence, Commonalities and Issues for Further Consideration: Food for Thought for the 3rd IGN Session GA71 (3-4 April 2017)”.121 At the beginning of this paper, the co-chairs said that “[t]o the elements of convergence identified by IGN GA70 on the two clusters mentioned above [i.e., the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council], we add some issues for further consideration and encourage colleagues to further contribute”. Accordingly, what was new in comparison to the “Elements of Convergence” of 2016 was a summary of – necessarily very broadly defined – “commonalities”, and a list of well-known and controversial “issues for further consideration”. In section IV.1, the paper put on record that “the text and its annex circulated by the PGA [President of the General Assembly] with his letter of 31 July 2015 remains a reference for the IGN”. Subsequently, this paper was revised twice in June 2017,122 then in March/June 2018,123 and again in June 2019.124 The Presidents of the following sessions of the General Assembly stayed with the dual leadership of the IGN. In the 72nd session, the Permanent Representatives of Georgia, Mr. Kaha Imnadze, and of the United Arab Emirates, Ms. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh, were appointed co-chairs of the IGN. In the 73rd session, Ms. Nusseibeh was reappointed in that function, while the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg, Mr. Christian Braun, became the new co-chair. On 29 January 2019, the President of the General Assembly, Mrs. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, opened a closed meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. In her statement,125 she recalled that it is now over twenty-five years since the Open-ended Working Group was formed, and that the Intergovernmental Negotiations began more than a decade ago. “Progress this year is critical”, she said, and that “many Member States feel that we have reached a ‘make or break’ point”. Other member states were concerned that the IGN “may not be the appropriate forum for advancing Security Council reform”. She encouraged “continued interaction between the main negotiating blocs to seek further areas of convergence and to reassess their positions, bearing in mind that the clock for reform is ticking.” Following a proposal submitted by its President, the Assembly decided on 24 June 2019 that only two documents would be rolled over to the IGN in the next session starting in September 2019, namely “the 121  122  123  124  125 

→ 5.1.18. → 5.1.19 and 5.1.20. → 5.1.21. → 5.1.24. → 5.1.23.

1 Introduction

33

revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration, circulated on 7 June 2019, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, reflected in the text and its annex circulated on 31 July 2015”.126 It remains to be seen whether that decision will indeed lead to more focused negotiations. Delegations cannot be hindered from again making reference to other texts. Already in the General Assembly plenary meeting of 25 June 2019 many delegations criticized the last version of the “revised elements of commonality” as too vague or incomplete.127 In a statement of the same day, the co-chair of the IGN Ambassador Braun admitted that “today we close a somewhat difficult session of the intergovernmental negotiations, which saw Member States divided both on process as well as on substance”.128 It is difficult to see how that division could be overcome in the next session, a session leading to the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations in September 2020. The representative of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the G4, desired “more focused and results-oriented” discussions. “If our aim is to bridge our differences, there is no point in holding general debates, as has been done over the past ten years. The preliminary work has been exhausted. We now need real negotiations, real give-and-take, in order to reach a workable text that can move us ahead in the process. Instead of repeating ourselves, let us sit down and discuss concrete proposals.”129 On the other hand, the representative of China explained “to date, no proposed reform approach or concrete solution has garnered wide support from Member States”. “That is the reality facing us, and face it we must. If we were to disregard it and artificially expedite the process, set a time limit and rush into text-based negotiations, it would only exacerbate the polarization and confrontation and undermine the efforts made over the years, forfeiting any results achieved.”130 Different from Germany or Japan, the People’s Republic is convinced that time is on her side, that China will further increase its political, economic and military strength in the coming years, so that its negotiating position can only become better. The project of Security Council reform against the background of the contemporary state system Everything taken together, today the forces supporting the status quo in the composition of the Security Council are markedly stronger than the advocates of change and reform. With perhaps the exception of China, all present permanent members are afraid of losing some of their power or influence as a result of a substantial Council reform. The United Kingdom and France find it increasingly difficult to defend their present status (which is a reason of the concessions they have already made with regard to their use of the veto power). To a lesser extent, the same is true for the Russian Federation as the self-appointed successor of the Soviet Union which in her day was much more powerful on a global scale. The United States equates every expansion of 126   UN General Assembly, Decision 73/554, → 5.1.25. 127  See, e.g., the statements of 25 June 2019 made by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group, by Brazil on behalf of the G4, and by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group; UN Doc. A/73/PV.92. 128   UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, pp. 12-13, → 5.1.26. 129  Mr. Vierira (Brazil), UN Doc. A/73.PV.92, pp. 3-5, at 4. 130  Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China), UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, pp. 8-9, at 9.

34

1 Introduction

the Security Council, in particular in the category of permanent or semi-permanent members, with an increase in the costs involved in securing a majority for decisions it wants the Council to take, and with an increase in the risk of failing to secure such a majority. Accordingly, it is now also a clearly stated position of the United States to oppose any reform that would extend the veto power to states beyond the present P5.131 Concomitantly, the states constituting the core of the Uniting for Consensus group prefer the present setup of the Council to one in which the status of their regional rivals would be enhanced, putting themselves in what they regard as an inferior position. But even in the groups which vehemently take a stand for change we find states who are not so sure where exactly they would find themselves after a reform of the Council. For instance, the “common position” adopted by the African states only papers over the persistent disagreements between them. Would a system of rotation really work for an African “permanent” representation on the Council? Or would in the end the most powerful African states assert themselves and use their seats primarily to increase their power on the continent itself, to the detriment of the majority of smaller states in Africa? And what would a stronger African presence on the Council mean for the consideration of questions relating to Africa which figure very prominently on the agenda of the Council? In Germany, to give another example, the claim for a permanent seat was never strongly supported by any of the chancellors. The foreign policy of Helmut Kohl, who held the office from 1982 until 1998, gave priority to consolidating German reunification in the framework of European integration, and to further strengthening the friendship with France. For the pragmatic Angela Merkel, chancellor since 2005, the idea of a German permanent seat never became politically feasible to the extent that would have made it worthwhile to dedicate herself to it. Further, Ms. Merkel was fully aware of the many problems, both at home and in Germany’s foreign relations, a permanent German presence on the Council would cause in view of the pacifist stance of a clear majority of the German people. In 2011, Germany had abstained as a non-permanent Council member in the vote on the draft which was adopted as Resolution 1973 on the situation in Libya,132 a text France, the United Kingdom and the United States used afterwards as a justification for their military intervention in Libya. The fierce controversies in the German public and between the German political parties caused by that abstention, and the disagreement of Germany with its closest Western allies demonstrated what kind of difficulties could come along with a permanent seat and the necessity to take a stance on all kinds of international conflicts. In that general situation, only a drastic event or development effecting in the global state system a significant new configuration of interests and power could overcome the prevailing interest in maintaining the status quo in the Security Council – an event we should be very cautious to be desirous of because in the past such major change was always a result of war. At the beginning of these observations, I blamed competing national self-interest and egotism for the failure of a reform of the membership and the decision-making procedure of the Security Council. That charge is not wrong, but it is also not the entire 131  See, for instance, the statement of 7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.7. 132   UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011), adopted on 17 March 2011.

1 Introduction

35

truth. The make-up of the Council is a consequence, and a reflection, of the state of the international system at a particular moment of history – the very end of World War II. At that moment, two victorious powers, who jointly had stronger military forces than all the other states of the world together, were able to determine the key parameters of the new world organization they established in place of the League of Nations, and for which they assumed the “primary responsibility”. Among those key parameters were their permanent membership in the Council and their so-called right of veto, on which they only had been able to agree after long and difficult negotiations. That moment in 1945 is long gone, but so far it has not been replaced by an equivalent new moment. To be sure, there has been structural change of the international system, some important aspects of which were addressed above. But that change has not resulted in a new configuration (or concentration) of power comparable to that of 1945. With a term I borrowed from Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional history of the United States,133 one could say that there has not been since an equivalent international “constitutional moment” in which the basic coordinates of the international state system could have been newly defined. Immediately after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, some recognized the existence of such a moment (describing it, for instance, as “the end of history”), but if it was really there it went by too quickly to be translated into a new political and legal world order. The idea that new parameters of an international power structure could be agreed upon in fair discussions and negotiations between representatives of close to two-hundred sovereign states is very likable and desirable but unrealistic in the world as it (still) is. To blame states for behaving in an egotistic or self-centred way also misunderstands the fact that this behaviour is fully in line with a state system not based on solidarity but on competition, especially in the economic field. In other words, why should states selflessly support a reform of the Security Council geared toward a “common good” of an “international community” if everywhere else they are competing with another for wealth, resources and power? “Road to Nowhere” is a song written by David Byrne for the 1985 Talking Heads’ album “Little Creatures”. “I wanted to write a song that presented a resigned, even joyful look at doom”, David Byrne recalled later.134 However, the song does not entirely lack optimism. The second verse, for instance, says: “And we’re not little children / And we know what we want / And the future is certain / Give us time to work it out.” And another verse, repeated twice, reads: “There’s a city in my mind / Come along and take that ride / And it’s all right, baby it’s all right / And it’s very far away / But it’s growing day by day”. Could that city not be a juster and more peaceful world?

133  See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 36 (1998), pp. 529-619, at 573 et seq., with reference to Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1: Foundations, Harvard University Press, 1993. 134  In the liner notes of the album “Once in a Lifetime: The Best of Talking Heads”, released in 2003.

2 Earlier reform discussions: From the late 1940s to the start of formal discussions of Security Council reform in 1992 2.1 14 April 1949, UN General Assembly, Resolution 267 (III), “The problem of voting in the Security Council”1 The General Assembly, Having considered the report of its Interim Committee on the problem of voting in the Security Council,*1 and Exercising the authority conferred upon it by Article 10 of the Charter to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter or relating to the functions of any organ of the United Nations and to make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations and to the Security Council thereon, 1. Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to any other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural, the decisions set forth in the attached annex be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly; 2. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon what possible decisions by the Security Council they might forbear to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been cast in the Council, giving favourable consideration to the list of such decisions contained in conclusion 2 of part IV of the report of the Interim Committee; 3. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to avoid impairment of the usefulness and prestige of the Council through excessive use of the veto: (a) To consult together wherever feasible upon important decisions to be taken by the Security Council; (b) To consult together wherever feasible before a vote is taken if their unanimity is essential to effective action by the Security Council; (c) If there is not unanimity, to exercise the veto only when they consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and to state upon what ground they consider this condition to be present; 4. Recommends to the Members of the United Nations that in agreements conferring functions on the Security Council such conditions of voting within that body be provided as would to the greatest extent feasible exclude the application of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members. 1  Adopted by the General Assembly by 43 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions. For the drafting history of the resolution, and the discussions in the Ad Hoc Political Committee and in the General Assembly, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49, pp. 426-31.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_003

2 Earlier reform discussions

37

ANNEX Decisions deemed procedural Decision to postpone consideration of or voting on a recommendation of a State for membership until the next occasion for the consideration of applications. Submission to the General Assembly of any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Request to the General Assembly that the General Assembly make a recommendation on a dispute or situation in respect of which the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter. Consent to notification by the Secretary­-General to the General Assembly or to Members of the United Nations of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council. Consent to notification by the Secretary­-General to the General Assembly or to Members of the United Nations of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security with which the Security Council ceases to deal. Request to the Secretary-General for the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly. Approval of credentials of representatives of members of the Security Council. Approval of annual reports to the General Assembly. Submission and approval of special reports to the General Assembly. Organization of the Security Council in such manner as to enable it to function continuously. Arrangement of the holding of periodic meetings. Holding of meetings at places other than the seat of the United Nations. Establishment of such subsidiary organs as the Security Council deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Steps incidental to the establishment of a subsidiary organ: appointment of members, terms of reference, interpretation of terms of reference, reference of questions for study, approval of rules of procedure. However, the approval of the terms of reference of such subsidiary organs should require the unanimity of the permanent members if the subsidiary organ were given authority to take steps which, if taken by the Security Council, would be subject to the veto, or if the conferring of such authority would constitute a non-procedural decision. Adoption of rules of procedure: Decisions to adopt rules of procedure and decisions in application of the provisional rules of procedure, not contained elsewhere in the list: (1) Overruling of ruling of the President on a point of order (rule 30). (2) Order of principal motions and draft resolutions (rule 32). (3) To suspend the meeting; to adjourn the meeting; to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely (rule 33). (4) Order in which amendments to motions or draft resolutions are to be voted upon (rule 36). (5) Request to members of the Secretariat or to other persons for information or for other assistance (rule 39).

38

2 Earlier reform discussions

(6) Publication of documents in any language other than the official languages (rule 47). (7) To hold a meeting in private (rule 48). (8) To determine what records shall be kept of a private meeting (rule 51). (9) To approve important corrections to the records (rule 52). (10) To grant access to the records of private meetings to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations (rule 56). (11) To determine which records and documents shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall remain confidential (rule 57). Adoption of the method of selecting the President. Participation without vote of Members of the United Nations not members of the Security Council in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of those Members are specially affected. Invitation to a Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or to any State which is not a Member of the United Nations to participate without vote in the discussion relating to a dispute to which it is a party. Enunciation of conditions for such participation of a State which is not a Member of the United Nations. Decision whether a State not a Member of the United Nations has accepted the conditions deemed just by the Security Council for participation under Article 32 of the Charter. Approval of credentials of representatives of States invited under Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Decision to remind Members of their obligations under the Charter. Establishment of procedures for the hearing of disputes or situations. Request for information on the progress or the results of resort to peaceful means of settlement. Deletion of a question from the list of questions of which the Security Council is seized. Decision to consider and discuss a dispute or a situation brought before the Security Council (adoption of the agenda). Decision whether a State not a Member of the United Nations has accepted, for the purposes of the dispute which it desires to bring to the attention of the Security Council, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter. Invitation to a Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces. Approval of rules of procedure and organization of the Military Staff Committee. Request for assistance from the Economic and Social Council. Decision to avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the Trusteeship System relating to political, economic, social and educational matters in the strategic areas. Decision to dispense, on grounds of security, with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council.

2 Earlier reform discussions

39

Request of the Security Council for the appointment of a joint conference for the purpose of choosing one name for each vacant seat in the International Court of Justice. Fixation of a period within which those members of the International Court of Justice who have already been elected shall proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. Fixation of the date of the election to fill vacancies in the International Court of Justice. Original footnote *1 See document A/578. [“The Problem of Voting in the Security Council”, 15 July 1948, in Reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to the General Assembly (5 January to 5 August 1948), General Assembly, Official Records: Third Session, Supplement No. 10, Paris 1948, pp. 1-17.]

2.2 19 June 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and Venezuela, Letter to the Secretary-General, Proposal of the inclusion of an item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/3138 of 26 June 1956 […] On behalf of our respective Governments we have the honour to propose the inclusion of the following item in the provisional agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly: Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council. In conformity with the provisions of rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly our proposal is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. […] EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM At the end of last year there was a substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations and it is probable that more Members will be admitted in the near future. In the light of that development and with a view to maintaining a satisfactory distribution in the membership of some of the principal organs of the United Nations and to facilitating the participation of new Members in the work of those organs, the representatives whose signatures appear on the note of today’s date to the Secretary-General have deemed it desirable to propose the inclusion of the following item in the provisional agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly.

40

2 Earlier reform discussions

Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council. The Sponsors of this item are of the opinion that an amendment to the Charter is unnecessary in the case of the Trusteeship Council because under Article 86 of the Charter its membership is automatically increased upon the admission of [a] State administering Trust Territories.

2.3 12 December 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/34462 The General Assembly, Having regard to the increase in the membership of the United Nations and to the functions of the Security Council, Considering that, in order to give due regard to the contribution of Members of the United Nations which are not permanent members of the Security Council 2  For explanation of this document and the following 2.4 and 2.5, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, pp. 147-49: “The question of amending the UN Charter so as to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and to enlarge the Economic and Social Council came before eight plenary meetings of the General Assembly held at various times between 7 December 1956 and 26 February 1957. The question of amending the Charter to enlarge the Security Council and also to increase the number of votes needed for the Council to take a decision was put on the agenda of the Assembly’s eleventh session on the proposal of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil […] [→ 2.2]. The discussions in the Assembly revealed considerable agreement on the need for an increasing size of the principal organs of the UN to reflect the rise in UN Members with the admission of 20 new Members since December 1955 mainly from Asia and Africa – areas which several representatives felt were under-represented in these bodies. Some representatives, however, while acknowledging the importance of equitable geographical representation in the membership of the main organs of the UN, considered that other factors, too, had to be taken into account in the composition of these bodies. […] Several representatives, including that of the USSR, thought it would not be appropriate to amend the Charter as long as the gentleman’s agreement made in London in 1946 on the geographical distribution and rotation of seats of non-permanent members on the Security Council continued to be flouted in the case of the Eastern European countries. In addition, they were against enlarging the main organs of the UN and amending the Charter to that end as long as the question of the representation of China remains unsolved. Two draft resolutions were submitted in the course of the Assembly debate. One [→ 2.3] envisaged amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter so as to increase the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 13 by providing for two

2 Earlier reform discussions

41

to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution, it is desirable to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council, 1. Adopts the following amendments to the Charter and submits them for ratification to the Members of the United Nations: (a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the word “eleven” in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word “thirteen” and the word “six” in the third sentence by the word “eight”. (b) In Article 23 the following new paragraph 3 shall be inserted, and the former paragraph 3 shall be renumbered 4: “3. Of the two additional non-permanent members first elected after the entry into force of the amendment increasing the membership of the Security Council from eleven to thirteen, one shall be replaced at the first, and one at the second, regular election thereafter, and their terms shall expire at the same times as those of the other non-permanent members replaced at those elections.” (c) In Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter the word “seven” shall be replaced by the word “eight”. (d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word “seven” shall be replaced by the word “eight”. (e) These amendments shall be inoperative unless, within three years from the date of their adoption by the General Assembly, they are ratified as required by the Charter for entry into force. 2. Urges all Members of the United Nations to ratify the above amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, with the least possible delay; 3. Decides to fill the seats of the two non-permanent members added to the Council by the above amendments as soon as possible after the amendments have entered into force, and if necessary to hold a special session of the General Assembly for that purpose.

additional non-permanent members. […] The second draft resolution [→ 2.4] was submitted partly because of the diverse views expressed in the Assembly […] and partly because of dissatisfaction with some of the possible implications of the 20-Power draft resolution [→ 2.3] and the amendment thereto [→ 2.5], such as the possibility of inadequate representation for Asian and African countries on the Security Council. […] Neither draft resolution, however, was voted on. Instead, on 26 February 1957, the Assembly agreed without objection that consideration […] be postponed until the twelfth session.”

42

2 Earlier reform discussions

2.4 18 December 1956, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/3468 and A/3468/Rev.1 (20 December 1956)3 The General Assembly, Having regard to the increase in the membership of the United Nations and the developments in the status and role of Member States since the adoption of the Charter, and having regard to the nature of the functions of the Security Council, Considering that, in order to give due regard to the increasing contribution of the generality of Member States of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the Organization, and to equitable geographical distribution, it is desirable to increase the number of members of the Security Council, Considering further that an adequate and appropriate increase in the number of members of the Security Council requires an amendment of the United Nations Charter and the resolving of diverse important views, which can best be effected after the necessary studies and discussions have been made, Decides to appoint a committee of fifteen members to study, in the light of the deliberations of the General Assembly, this matter in all its aspects, and to report to the General Assembly at its twelfth session.4

2.5 19 December 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela, “Question of Amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the Procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to Increase the Number of Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Number of Votes Required for Decisions of the Council”, Amendment to the twenty-Power draft resolution (A/3446), UN Doc. A/L.217 and A/L.217/Rev.15 Add the following paragraph at the end of the operative part: 3   The revised text of the draft resolution submitted by the same group of states on 20 December 1956 is identical with the original text of 18 December 1956, except for the four very last words “at its twelfth session” which were omitted in the revised text. See further footnote 2 above. 4  See footnote 3 above. 5  The revised text of the draft resolution submitted by the same group of states on the same day of 19 December 1956 is identical with the original text, except for the words “in conformity with”, which in the revised text were replaced with the words “pursuant to”, and the word “British” in “British Commonwealth of Nations”, which in the revised text was replaced with the word “the”. See further footnote 2 above.

2 Earlier reform discussions

43

4. Recommends, in conformity with6 Article 23 of the Charter, that when the foregoing amendments enter into force Member States should take the following distribution into account in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council: Latin America, two seats; Asia and Africa, two seats; British7 Commonwealth of Nations, one seat; Western and Southern Europe, two seats; Eastern Europe, one seat.

2.6 October 1957, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Strengthening the United Nations: Tenth Report of the Commission and Reports of the Special Study Committees, New York: Harper & Brothers8 [ix] Foreword The United Nations was designed for an age that is rapidly passing away. What gunpowder and printing did to the Middle Ages, atomic bombs and electronic communications are doing to what we used to call Modern Times. The new super-powers are widening the gap between themselves and the lesser powers, while the latter make an agonizing reappraisal of the alternatives to a precarious independence. The old colonial empires are in process of liquidation, and yet the new national states cannot assure the defense of their peoples. The endless adventure that is the government of mankind enters a new phase, in which the nations must look more to reason than to tradition for their guide. The Organization, established under the United Nations Charter, has met the challenge of this new age with imagination and vigor. […] [x] […] The Charter of the United Nations is a document not to be meddled with lightly. It contains the plan of an Organization which has shown itself to be both rigid enough to withstand the shocks of unexpected crises and flexible enough to accommodate itself to changing circumstances. This adaptable Organization could perhaps, by the prudent exercise of its existing powers, grow bigger and stronger without formal amendments to the Charter, and with good fortune survive into the unpredictable period ahead when far greater demands than heretofore are likely to be made upon it. But weaknesses in its structure and processes have been apparent from the beginning,

6  See footnote 5 above. 7  See footnote 5 above. 8  The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace was an organization established during World War II to promote the formation of a world organization as successor to the League of Nations. It was founded in 1939 by Prof. James T. Shotwell of Columbia University, Prof. Clyde Eagleton of New York University, Prof. Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago, and League of Nations Association director Clark Eichelberger. The Commission continued its work after the war. The latest report listed in the Library of Congress Catalog was published in 1980. The 22 reports issued between 1940 and 1972 were put together in two volumes published in 1973: Building Peace: Reports of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, 1939-1972, Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1973, vol. I and II. At the time of publication of the 1957 report reprinted here, the chairman of the Commission was Arthur N. Holcombe. The Drafting Committee for the Tenth Report was composed of Quincy Wright (Chairman), Inis L. Claude, Jr. (Rapporteur), Clyde Eagleton, Clark M. Eichelberger, and Stephen M. Schwebel.

44

2 Earlier reform discussions

and no convenient opportunity to correct them should be neglected. The proposed Charter Review Conference may supply such an opportunity. […] We do not regard a Charter Review Conference, if one should be held in the near future, as a means of supplying the world with a definitive constitution. More time will be needed for such a development. We do contend that it is possible to take some firm forward steps now. We think that a Charter Review Conference might be [xi] helpful, though much can be done to strengthen the United Nations by the General Assembly without such a Conference. Even more could be done by the governments of the leading Member States, if they could be persuaded to work more resolutely through the United Nations. We insist that it is important to make the necessary effort without further delay. There is no way in which sovereign states of the traditional kind can be made strong enough to protect their peoples by the force of their own arms alone. There is no rational alternative to strengthening the United Nations. Our program consists of proposals of three kinds. We recommend a few changes in the United Nations Charter; we recommend a greater number of changes in the policies and practices of the Organization; and we recommend some changes in the policies and practices of our own government, encouraged in this part of our program by our hope that other governments will follow a good example when set by the Government of the United States. […] [xi] […] Responsibility for the contents of the reports of the Study Committees rests exclusively with their respective members, [xii] who have signed their names thereto. […] [1] part 1: TENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION […] [11] II. Text of the Report […] [32] […] We look, as an ultimate goal, to a Security Council continuously adaptable, in composition, to the dynamics of a world in which the roster of the most important and powerful states is subject to change. Advantage should be taken of the growing demand for enlargement of the Security Council to improve its representative character. A moderate expansion of the Council should include provision to ensure implementation of the first criterion for elective members, that is, contribution “to the maintenance of international peace and security,” as well as of the second, “equitable geographical distribution.” This alteration, which should be achieved as soon as possible, would [33] have the fundamental purpose of contributing to the psychological revitalization of the Security Council. The low estate of the Council is not attributable solely to the fact that the veto has paralyzed its operation. A part of the difficulty lies in the fact that too few governments are interested in making the Security Council a significant element in the operating mechanism of the United Nations. It is to be hoped that the proposed change would stimulate a broader concern for making the Council work effectively. A second necessary element in the project for rehabilitating the Security Council is the reduction of the impact of the veto power upon its capacity for exercising its functions. The practicable aim in regard to the veto is that which was stated in the Vandenberg Resolution of June 11, 1948: the removal of the veto on the admission of new Members and on the functioning of the Council in the field of pacific settlement (Chapter VI). The gradual restriction of the veto power should next extend into the area of peace preservation (Chapter VII), enabling the Council to make recommendations to the Members concerning

2 Earlier reform discussions

45

the existence of threats to or breaches of the peace or of acts of aggression, concerning provisional measures in such cases, and concerning sanctioning measures if such provisional measures are not observed. The Commission believes that this limited reduction of the veto power is an essential objective whose achievement will contribute significantly to the revitalization of the Security Council. No prescriptions are available for producing the progressive relinquishment of the veto power. This result is clearly dependent upon the diminution of the tensions of the Cold War and the basic adjustment of relationships among the Great Powers. Perhaps the most that can be done at the institutional level is to promote the development of a general interest in making the Security Council an effective agency, thereby creating a demand which cannot be ignored by the possessors of the veto power. It is to be hoped that the alteration of the composition and the voting rules of the Security Council along the lines which we have suggested would enable that body to achieve reinstatement as a genuinely useful organ of the United Nations. Given its psychological and procedural revitalization, the Council could play a role in the management of global political affairs for which no other international agency is suited. […] [58] part 2: REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEES I. Maintenance of International Peace and Security […] [75] […] 2 ORGANIZING UN RESOURCES TO PRESERVE PEACE9 […] [79] […] Security Council The architects of the UN Charter clearly expected that the Security Council would be the principal organ in the settlement of disputes, and it was given broad authority to deal with disputes at such a time and in such a manner as would be most likely to prevent them from endangering peace and security. The Security Council was thus given express power (1) to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction, (2) to intervene at any stage of the dispute, (3) to recommend appropriate procedures or methods to be used by the parties, and (4) in certain circumstances to formulate and recommend its own terms of settlement. Although a number of disputes have been settled under these provisions, and perhaps some small wars averted, the Security Council has been badly hampered by the veto provisions of the Charter. The qualification of the veto in respect to peaceful settlement, that is, the provision that a party to a dispute, even though a Great Power, shall abstain from voting, has been largely nullified by the “chain-of-events” interpretation written into the records of the San Francisco Conference and by the disposition of some Great [80] Powers, not themselves parties to a dispute, to use the veto on behalf of states within their orbit of interest or influence. Thus, the potentialities of the Security Council as a mediator, adjuster, conciliator between contending parties were greatly weakened from the early days of the United Nations. It should be noted, however, that important steps have also been taken to clarify and make easier these procedures for peaceful settlement. The United States Senate, on June 11, 1948, adopted by a nearly unanimous vote (64-4) the Vandenberg 9   This Special Study Committee was composed of Richard R. Wood (Chairman), Clarence A. Berdahl, Donald C. Blaisdell, Denna F. Fleming, Donald Harrington, and Elmore Jackson (p. 88 of the Report).

46

2 Earlier reform discussions

Resolution,10 which included express approval of “Voluntary agreements to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations”; and the General Assembly, on April 14, 1949, by an overwhelming vote (436-2), approved the report of the Interim Committee (Little Assembly), which proposed among other things that questions in respect to pacific settlement should not be considered subject to the veto. It does not seem completely impossible, in view of these and other developments, that the Charter may be revised or clarified in this respect.11 If formal revision or interpretation cannot be secured because of USSR or other obstruction, it would be possible to accomplish the objective in some measure through a multilateral treaty, in which those states that desire these more effective procedures for peaceful settlement could agree among themselves to renounce the veto, to accept a majority vote of the Security Council, and otherwise to make the intent of the Charter provisions easier to carry out. […] [224] IV. Center for International Organization […] [238] 11 THE SECURITY COUNCIL12 [243] […] 3) Size. The number of Security Council members was determined at the San Francisco Conference largely on the assumptions (a) that it should be as small as possible in order to operate expeditiously, and (b) that it should include the Great Powers, possessing most of the industrial and military resources of the world, plus a group of other states chosen from the entire United Nations membership. These assumptions were consistent with the fact that the functions assigned to the Security Council would require quick action in an emergency. A large number of members was not necessary in order to include the states on which the chief responsibility for maintaining the peace would fall, and the General Assembly would provide broad and inclusive representation in the work of the United Nations. Thus, the size of the Security Council was deliberately made small and it was rigidly specified in the Charter at the figure of eleven, five permanent and six nonpermanent members. These provisions were in contrast to those of the League of 10  See United States Senate. 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Resolution 239, 11 June 1948 (“The Vandenberg Resolution”), which reads in part: “… be it resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter: 1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members. […] 6. If necessary, after adequate efforts towards strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General Assembly.” Department of State (ed.), A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1941-1949, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 197. 11  Resolution 267 (III), → 2.1. 12   This Special Study Committee was composed of Willard N. Hogan (Chairman), Harding F. Bancroft, Benjamin V. Cohen, Leland M. Goodrich, Boyd A. Martin, and Paul E. Smith (p. 249 of the Report).

2 Earlier reform discussions

47

Nations Covenant, which allowed the Council and the Assembly to increase the number of Council members. That arrangement had the advantage of flexibility, but it also led to political difficulties arising from pressures to increase the size of the Council from time to time. The United Nations Charter obviated this difficulty by requiring a formal amendment to change the size of the Security Council. It is widely agreed now, however, that the UN Charter goes too far in this direction and that a greater degree of flexibility would be desirable. Most of the discussion since 1945 concerning the size of the Security Council has retained the assumption that it should continue as a small body. There has developed, however, a widely shared opinion to the effect that some increase should be made in the number of Security Council members. Discussion along this line usually has been based on the argument that, with only six elected members, it is not possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of all geographic areas, groups of states, and important “middle powers.” An increase in [244] United Nations membership from sixty to eighty-one between December 1955 and March 1957 has given impetus to the belief that a Security Council of eleven members is not adequately representative, and discussion of this matter in various official and non-official circles has been intensified. In December 1956, the General Assembly debated a resolution introduced by nineteen Latin American countries and Spain, proposing to increase the number of non-permanent members from six to eight.13 Another resolution, introduced by a group of Asian-African countries, provided for establishment of a committee to make a further study of the problem.14 Although these resolutions were concerned primarily with geographic allocation of Security Council membership, they necessarily involved the question of size. Assuming that some increase in the size of the Security Council is appropriate, three alternatives present themselves. First, one might argue for a minimum increase, to reach a total of thirteen or fifteen members. There are several advantages in this approach. It retains the assumptions that a small Security Council can operate more effectively in an emergency, and that a larger number is not necessary in order to include the leading industrial and military states together with a sufficient representation of other countries. From a practical point of view, it would probably be easier to obtain a moderate increase in the size of the Security Council than to secure approval of a more drastic proposal. Certainly this approach is in line with the resolutions recently debated in the General Assembly. The second alternative is that of enlarging the Security Council substantially, to a membership of twenty or so, on the assumption that this would allow adequate representation of the broad range of geographic and other interests. It is also possible to suggest a variation of this approach, for example, that the maximum size of the Security Council be fixed at a fraction (one-fifth or one-fourth) of the total number of UN members. Proposals of this type make the implicit assumption that the Security Council should be representative of the entire United Nations membership, rather than that it should be a small body including those states having the resources and

13  12 December 1956, UN Doc. A/3446, → 2.3 and 19 December 1956, UN Doc. A/L.217 and A/L.217/Rev. 1, → 2.5. 14  18 December 1956, UN Doc. A/3468 and A/3468/Rev.1 (20 December 1956), → 2.4.

48

2 Earlier reform discussions

power to implement decisions with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. The third alternative follows a different approach by introducing the concept of flexibility. If the Charter is merely amended to allow [245] a moderate increase in the size of the Security Council, serious difficulties will continue to exist for any further adjustments which may become desirable. Why not, then, provide that the Council itself with the approval of the General Assembly may establish the number of members of the Security Council? It is the consensus of this Committee that this approach is preferable to any attempt to specify the precise size of the Security Council. This recommendation is made with full realization of the difficulties which the League of Nations encountered with a rather flexible arrangement. Nevertheless, we believe that the UN Charter went too far in the other direction, and that discretion in this matter should be placed with a qualified majority of United Nations members. We believe that this is the appropriate location for this responsibility and that we are entitled to assume that it will be prudently exercised. In order that a group of small states will not be able to increase the size of the Security Council when all or most of the Great Powers might be opposed, a decision on this matter should reflect the support of a majority of the permanent members. This Committee proposes, therefore, that the Charter be amended to provide that the size of the Security Council be determined by a two-thirds vote of the members of the Security Council, including a majority of the permanent members, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. 4) Composition. The basic problem involves the number and identity of permanent members, the number of non-permanent elected members, and the balance between them. The Charter provisions relating to permanent members should be changed in two ways. First, the five “Great Powers” of 1945 named in Article 23 do not accurately reflect the present distribution of world power, and the arrangement is almost certain to become progressively unrealistic. India, for example, might well become a permanent member of the Security Council, and the claims of Germany and Japan are an obvious future problem. Certainly, the list of permanent members is likely to be enlarged rather than reduced. One suggestion has been that the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members be abolished and that the General Assembly elect all members, expecting that the major powers would always be chosen (just as they are in the Economic and Social Council). This proposal, although it may be desirable theoretically, does not seem to be practical in the near future. [246] Second, revision is needed in the method of designating additional permanent members, since it is generally agreed that the naming of particular states in the text of the Charter is undesirably rigid. One method, that used by the League of Nations, is to declare certain members eligible for immediate re-election. Another suggestion is that it might be possible to devise some objective criteria, related to actual and potential capacity to contribute to the suppression of aggression on the analogy of appointing certain states of “chief industrial importance” to the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization. No one has devised, however, a satisfactory formula that could be automatically applied. Designations might be made by the General Assembly, thus leaving to future sessions of that organ the competence to make additions or modifications. This possibility has some merit, but it is open to the criticism

2 Earlier reform discussions

49

that the small countries might have too much influence in the matter. A better arrangement, and the one recommended by this Committee, is to utilize the same procedure as for determining the size of the Security Council, namely, by a two-thirds vote of the Security Council, including a majority of the permanent members, with the approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly. Another important question concerning the composition of the Security Council is that of the criteria for selecting the non-permanent members. The Charter (Article 23) provides for “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.” In actual practice the latter criterion has been the dominant one, and the six non-permanent members of the Security Council usually have been distributed with two seats for Latin America, one for Western Europe, one for Eastern Europe, one for the British Commonwealth, and one for the Middle East. The resolution debated by the General Assembly, in December 1956, proposed an increase to eight non-permanent seats distributed as follows: two for Latin America, two for Western and Southern Europe, one for Eastern Europe, two for Asia and Africa, and one for the Commonwealth. Representatives of Asia and Africa objected to this proposal on the ground that it discriminated against those continents, whether considered on the basis of geographic distribution, population, or total number of states involved. It was claimed, [247] for example, that 130,000,000 Europeans would get preference over 386,000,000 Asians, and this was completely unacceptable to the latter. The Asian-African countries offered a resolution of their own providing for a committee to study the problem, in the hope of obtaining a more favorable arrangement by delay and further consideration. The General Assembly debate on these two resolutions was almost entirely concerned with the criterion of geographical distribution. On the other hand, there is indisputable merit to the suggestion that eligibility for membership in the Security Council should be based on contributions to world peace. Admittedly, there is a serious question as to whether this criterion can be applied accurately and objectively, and it must be recognized that a similar provision already in the Charter had very little significance in the first decade of the United Nations. The selection of non-permanent members in practice can be expected to result in some type of “balanced representation” of geographic regions and groups of states. Nevertheless, this Committee strongly recommends that the criterion of contributions to peace and security be retained in the Charter. This is an eminently sound principle, and it should not be eliminated simply because it is not easy to apply. If this principle does not make much difference in the geographical distribution of Security Council seats, it may still find application when choices are made between candidates within a given region or group of states. This would give a better chance of selection to the “middle powers,” a fact which in itself should increase the effectiveness of the Security Council. No change is proposed in the present method of electing non-permanent members of the Security Council by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. 5) The voting procedure of the Security Council must be changed if the size and composition of the Security Council are altered, since the Charter provisions for decision-making in that organ are in the form of absolute numbers rather than in proportions. Various suggestions have been considered, and this Committee agrees on

50

2 Earlier reform discussions

the recommendation that procedural matters be subject to a majority vote and that substantive decisions be made by a two-thirds vote of the total Security Council membership. The two-thirds vote required for a decision on matters under Chapter VII of the Charter or for recommending the appointment of a Secretary-General should in[248] clude the concurrence of the permanent members, and a vote to alter the size or composition of the Security Council should include the concurrence of a majority of the permanent members. The rule of unanimity among the permanent members, or veto privilege, has been one of the most controversial provisions of the Charter. At the San Francisco Conference, the smaller states objected to the voting procedure as proposed for the Security Council but the Great Powers insisted on it. Subsequent abuse of the veto privilege by the Soviet Union seriously weakened the Security Council and made its voting procedure the object of more discussion and proposals for revision than any other provision of the Charter. The United States has been on record since 1948 as supporting an elimination of the veto privilege on questions of admission to membership in the United Nations and of recommendations for the pacific settlement of international disputes. The Committee supports this position. Certainly, the veto should not apply to recommendations for pacific settlement and the privilege should not be invoked except on issues of vital importance. The Committee agrees that the rule of unanimity among the Great Powers should continue in force with respect to questions of enforcement (or other action under Chapter VII of the Charter). In saying this, we recognize that it is possible to think of arrangements with varying degrees of flexibility. For example, a distinction might be made between a recommendation which would authorize enforcement action and a decision which would impose an obligation to take enforcement action. Or, there might be merit in a provision that a resolution receiving two-thirds vote in the Security Council, but lacking unanimous support of the permanent members, be formally transmitted to the General Assembly for its information and guidance. In the event that the composition of the Security Council is changed to provide for one or more additional permanent members, a special problem arises on the question of requiring unanimity of the “permanent members” for substantive decisions. The Committee agrees that the veto privilege should not be extended to new permanent members. This would result in two different categories of permanent members, those with and those without the veto privilege. It is to be hoped that this would not be a serious political problem, especially if questions subject to veto are restricted as suggested. In any case, we do not believe that the veto should be extended to any additional Security Council members. If this were done, it would [249] probably make decisions even more difficult since the prospects of unanimity are diminished as the number of participants in a decision increases. Summary. This Committee recommends that: 1) The functions of the Security Council should remain as stated in the Charter. 2) No change should be made in the Charter provisions establishing the Security Council as a principal organ coordinate with the General Assembly. The relationship in practice should be left for definition in accordance with needs and events, within the broad and flexible framework of the Charter. 3) Article 23 of the Charter should be amended to provide that the size and composition of the Security Council be determined by a vote of two-thirds of the members

2 Earlier reform discussions

51

of the Security Council, including a majority of the permanent members, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. 4) The voting procedure of the Security Council should be changed so as to restrict, but not remove, the veto privilege. […]

2.7 1958, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, Cambridge: Harvard University Press15,16 […] [xi] INTRODUCTION By Grenville Clark This book sets forth a comprehensive and detailed plan for the maintenance of world peace in the form of a proposed revision of the United Nations Charter. In so doing the

15  Copyright © 1958, 1960, 1966 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted with permission of Harvard University Press.    Grenville Clark (1882-1967) was an American Wall Street lawyer, co-founder of the law firm of Root Clark & Bird (later Dewey Ballantine, then Dewey & LeBoeuf), and member of the Harvard Corporation (for details, see the biography written by Gerald T. Dunne, Grenville Clark: Public Citizen, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1986). From 1940 to 1945, he served as confidential counsel to U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. In October 1945, before the UN Charter entered into force, Clark, retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, former New Hampshire Governor Robert P. Bass, and more than forty others held the “Dublin Conference” in Dublin, New Hampshire. There they passed a “Dublin Declaration”, which, judging the UN Charter inadequate to preserve peace, proposed transformation of the UN General Assembly into a world legislature. In 1965, Clark held a second “Dublin Conference”. In the following years, he became active in the United World Federalists and the World Federalist Movement. Together with professor Louis B. Sohn (see below), Clark drafted amendments to the UN Charter which sought to transform the United Nations into a body effectively safeguarding world peace. They published their proposals in World Peace Through World Law, first in 1958. A “second, revised” edition appeared in 1960, and a “third, enlarged” edition in 1966. Throughout these three editions, the main ideas and proposals remained the same. Compared to the first edition partly reprinted here, the third has some changes (in particular in Article 27 about voting in the Council) which are mentioned in the following footnotes.    Louis B. Sohn (1914-2006) served on the Harvard Law faculty for 35 years; from 1961 until 1981, he was the Bemis Professor of International Law. Mandatory retirement at Harvard approaching, he accepted a chair at the University of Georgia School of Law at the invitation of Dean Rusk. Subsequently, he was a Distinguished Research Professor of International Law at the George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Louis Sohn: Grandfather of International Human Rights Law in the United States, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 20 (1998), pp. 924-44, and Thomas Buergenthal, Louis B. Sohn (1914-2006), American Journal of International Law, vol. 100 (2006), pp. 623-26. 16  A limited number of a preliminary print of this proposal was published by Clark and Sohn in 1953 (Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision: Detailed Proposals for Revision of the United Nations Charter, Dublin, New Hampshire, 1953) with a supplement (Dublin, New Hampshire, 1956) and distributed to interested persons throughout the world. That

52

2 Earlier reform discussions

purpose is to contribute material for the world-wide discussions which must precede the establishment of truly effective institutions for the prevention of war. At the outset, it may be helpful to explain: first, the underlying conceptions of this plan for peace; and second, the main features of the plan whereby these conceptions would be carried out. The fundamental premise of the book is identical with President Eisenhower’s pronouncement of October 31, 1956: “There can be no peace without law.” In this context the word “law” necessarily implies world law, i.e., law which would be uniformly applicable to all nations and all individuals in the world and which would definitely forbid violence or the threat of it as a means for dealing with international disputes. This world law must also be law in the true sense of law which is capable of enforcement, as distinguished from a mere set of exhortations or injunctions which it is desirable to observe but for the enforcement of which there is no effective machinery. The proposition “no peace without law” embodies the conception that peace cannot be ensured by a continued arms race, nor by an indefinite “balance of terror”, nor by diplomatic maneuver, but only by the acceptance of institutions corresponding in the world field to those which maintain “law and order” in local communities and nations. A prime motive for this book is that the world is far more likely to make progress toward genuine peace, as distinguished from a precarious armed truce, when a detailed plan adequate to the purpose is available, so that the structure and functions of the proposed world institutions may be fully discussed on a world-wide basis. Consequently, this book comprises a set of definite and interrelated proposals to strengthen the United Nations through the establishment of such legislative, executive and judicial institutions as are necessary to maintain world order under enforceable world law. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES The following are the basic principles by which Professor Sohn and I have been governed. First: It is futile to expect genuine peace until there is put into effect an effective system of enforceable world law in the limited field of war prevention. This implies the adoption on a world-wide basis of the measures and institutions which the experience of centuries has shown to be essential for the maintenance of law and order, namely, clearly stated law against violence, [xii] courts to interpret and apply that law and police to enforce it. All else, we conceive, depends upon the acceptance of this approach. Second: The world law against international violence must be explicitly stated in constitutional and statutory form and must, under appropriate penalties, forbid the use of force by any nation against any other for any cause whatever, save only in self-defense.   original version is not as detailed and differs from the 1958 version in several aspects, including the size of the Council and the majorities necessary for decisions of the Council.

2 Earlier reform discussions

53

Third: World judicial tribunals to interpret and apply the world law against international violence must be established and maintained, and also organs of mediation and conciliation, – so as to substitute peaceful means of adjudication and adjustment in place of violence, or the threat of it, as a means of dealing with international disputes. Fourth: A permanent world police force must be created and maintained which, while safeguarded with utmost care against misuse, would be fully adequate to forestall or suppress any violation of the world law against international violence. Fifth: The complete disarmament of all the nations (rather than the mere “reduction” or “limitation” of armaments) is essential, this disarmament to be accomplished in a simultaneous and proportionate manner by carefully verified stages and subject to a well-organized system of inspection. It is now generally accepted that disarmament must be universal and enforceable. That it must also be complete is no less necessary, since: (a) in the nuclear age no mere reduction in the new means of mass destruction could be effective to remove fear and tension; and (b) if any substantial national armaments were to remain, even if only ten per cent of the armaments of 1957-58, it would be impracticable to maintain a sufficiently strong world police force to deal with any possible aggression or revolt against the authority of the world organization. We should face the fact that until there is complete disarmament under world law there can be no assurance of genuine peace. Sixth: Effective world machinery must be created to mitigate the vast disparities in the economic condition of various regions of the world, the continuance of which tends to instability and conflict. […] [xiii] […] MAIN FEATURES OF THE WHOLE PLAN […] [xviii] […] (3) The Executive Council. It is proposed to abolish the present Security Council and to substitute for it an Executive Council, composed of seventeen Representatives chosen by the General Assembly itself. This new and highly important organ would not only be chosen by the Assembly, but would be responsible to and removable by the Assembly; and the Council would serve for the same four-year terms as the Representatives in the Assembly. Special provision would be made for representation of the larger nations, whereby the four largest nations (as of July 1957, China, India, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) would each be entitled at all times to have one of its Representatives on the Council; and four of the eight next largest nations (as of July 1957, Brazil, France, West Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Pakistan and the United Kingdom) would in rotation also be entitled to representation, with the proviso that two of these four shall always be from nations in Europe and the other two from nations outside Europe. The remaining nine members would be chosen by the Assembly from the Representatives of all the other member Nations and the non-self-governing and trust [xix] territories under a formula designed to provide fair representation for all the main regions of the world and to ensure that every member Nation, without exception, shall in due course have a Representative on this all-important Council. In contrast to the voting procedure of the present Security Council, whereby any one of the five nations entitled to “permanent” membership has a veto power in all nonprocedural matters, the decisions of the new Executive Council on “important”

54

2 Earlier reform discussions

matters [as defined in paragraph 2 of revised Article 27]17 would be by a vote of fourteen of the seventeen Representatives composing it. Other decisions would be by a vote of eleven. This Executive Council would constitute the executive arm of the revised United Nations, holding much the same relation to the General Assembly as that of the British Cabinet to the House of Commons. Subject to its responsibility to the Assembly, the new Council would have broad powers to supervise and direct the disarmament process and other aspects of the whole system for the maintenance of peace provided for in the revised Charter. The Executive Council would, for example, decide (subject to review by the General Assembly) as to whether each stage of the disarmament process had been satisfactorily completed and, once complete national disarmament was achieved, would watch over its maintenance. Nevertheless, the Council would always remain subordinate to the Assembly, which would have final authority to make such crucial decisions as the possible postponement of stages of the disarmament process, and the imposition of sanctions in case of any breach of the peace or serious violation by any nation of the authority of the United Nations. […] [61] CHAPTER V THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL COMPOSITION Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 17  Added in the third edition of 1966, p. xxiii.

1. The Executive Council shall consist of seventeen Representatives. They shall be elected by the General Assembly within thirty days from the beginning of the first regular session of each newly chosen Assembly, and shall serve during the fouryear term of the Assembly by which they are elected and until their successors are elected by a new Assembly.

2 Earlier reform discussions 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the nonpermanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

55 2. The General Assembly shall elect the members of the Executive Council in accordance with the following formula and method:

[62] a. Each of the four member Nations which, pursuant to Article 9,18 are entitled to thirty Representatives in the Assembly shall have the right to have one of its Representatives elected to the Council at every quadrennial election of the Council. b. Each of the eight member Nations which, pursuant to Article 9, are entitled to sixteen19 Representatives in the Assembly shall have the right to have one of its

18  Article 9 of the proposal reads in part: “1. The General Assembly shall consist of Representatives from all the member Nations and from the non-self-governing and trust territories under their administration.   2. For the purpose of determining the number of Representatives in the General Assembly from the respective member Nations, the member Nations shall be divided into seven categories as follows:   a. From any member Nation having a population of over 140,000,000 there shall be thirty Representatives.   b. From any member Nation having a population of over 40,000,000 and not over 140,000,000 there shall be sixteen Representatives.   c. From any member Nation having a population of over 20,000,000 and not over 40,000,000 there shall be eight Representatives.   d. From any member Nation having a population of over 5,000,000 and not over 20,000,000 there shall be five Representatives.   e. From any member Nation having a population of over 1,500,000 and not over 5,000,000 there shall be three Representatives.   f. From any member Nation having a population of over 500,000 and not over 1,500,000 there shall be two Representatives.   g. From any member Nation having a population of not over 500,000 there shall be one Representative.   3. The apportionment of Representatives pursuant to the foregoing formula shall be made on the basis of world censuses […].   […]   7. Representatives shall be chosen for terms of four years, […].   […]”    In the third edition of 1966, Art. 9 para. 2 provided for six categories (instead of seven) which were defined in a somewhat different manner but still in accordance with the size of populations. Also the numbers of the respective representatives were slightly different. See the third edition, p. 20 et seq. 19  In the third edition, “fifteen”.

56

2 Earlier reform discussions Representatives elected to the Council at every alternate quadrennial election of the Council. […] c. The member Nations other than the twelve mentioned in the foregoing subparagraphs (a) and (b) and the non-selfgoverning and trust territories under the administration of member Nations shall between them have the right to have nine of their Representatives elected to the Council at every quadrennial election of the Council. […] Prior to each election, the Assembly shall designate a member Nation or non-self-govern- [63] ing or trust territory in each subgroup which shall have the right to have one of its Representatives elected to the Council provided that: (1) in the case of a subgroup which does not include any non-self-governing or trust territory, no member Nation shall be redesignated until every other member in that Nation subgroup has been designated; and (2) that in the case of a subgroup which does not include one or more non-selfgoverning or trust territories, no member Nation shall be redesignated until every other member in that Nation subgroup has been designated and also at least one of the non-self-governing or trust territories. d. After the designations called for by the foregoing subparagraphs (b) and (c) have been made, the Representatives of the seventeen member Nations or the nonself-governing or trust territories which are entitled to have Representatives elected to the Council at the particular election, shall hold separate meetings which shall respectively nominate to the Assembly two of their own number deemed by the separate meetings best qualified to serve on the Council, provided that in the case of any such member Nation or non-self-governing or trust territory, which has either one or two Representatives, their names shall be deemed automatically nominated.

2 Earlier reform discussions

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

57 e. After the nominations called for by the foregoing subparagraph (d) have been made, the Assembly shall elect to serve on the Council one of the two nominees [64] of each of the seventeen member Nations or non-self-governing or trust territories which are then entitled to have one of its Representatives on the Council, taking into account the personal qualifications of each nominee for service on the Council, except that if any of such seventeen member Nations or non-self-governing or trust territories has only one Representative in the Assembly, that Representative shall be deemed automatically elected. 3. [Adjustments in the representation on the Council in the case of changes in population, the merger or division of member Nations, or the coming into existence of new independent states.] [65] […] 4. [Vacancies in the membership of the Executive Council.] 5.20 The General Assembly may by a vote of lack of confidence discharge the Executive Council as a whole, provided: (a) that the members of the Council so discharged shall continue to serve until their successors are elected; (b) that the Assembly shall proceed forthwith to the election of a new Council; (c) that the members of [66] the new Council shall be elected from among the Representatives of the same member Nations or non-selfgoverning or trust territories which were represented on the discharged Council; (d) that the members of the new Council shall be nominated and elected by the same formula and method as called for by paragraph 2 of this Article; and (e) that the new Council shall serve, unless sooner

20  In the third edition, this paragraph is renumbered 4 (para. 3 of the 1958 draft having been omitted).

58

2 Earlier reform discussions discharged, until the regular quadrennial election of the Council following the quadrennial election of the Assembly. 6. The members of the Executive Council shall retain their seat in the General Assembly. 7. The members of the executive Council shall, during their period of service thereon, receive additional compensation to be fixed by the General Assembly.

Comment. The proposed revision requires important changes in Chapter V which deals with the present Security Council, since the revision proposes entirely to abolish the Security Council and to replace it with an Executive Council, differently composed and with different functions, powers and voting procedures. Basic changes are needed in the present Articles 23-27 which deal with the “Composition”, “Functions” and “Powers” and “Voting” of the Security Council; while minor changes are needed in the remaining Articles 28-32 of Chapter V. Detailed provisions for the composition and mode of selection of the new Executive Council are contained in this revised Article 23. The revised Articles 24-26 deal with the powers of the new Council; and revised Article 27 deals with voting procedures and abolishes the present “veto”. It will be recalled that by revised Article 11, paragraph 1, the General Assembly would have the “primary responsibility” for the maintenance of peace, so that the new Executive Council would not have the basic responsibility in this respect possessed by the Security Council under the present Article 24. Instead, the Executive Council would, by revised Article 24, function in this all-important field as “the agent of the General Assembly”, subject at all times to the Assembly’s supervision and direction. [67] Despite this different status, the proposed Executive Council would be an organ of great authority and importance. In particular, the new Council would have general executive responsibility for the carrying out and maintenance of the whole plan for complete national disarmament, including supervision of the proposed Inspection Commission and Nuclear Energy Authority (Annex I, Articles 4 and 25). The new Council would also have general control of the United Nations Peace Force, and in an emergency not admitting of delay could even direct action by that Force to maintain or restore international peace (revised Article 42 and Annex II). In view of these vitally important functions of the proposed Executive Council and its relationship to the General Assembly, it is clearly necessary to make most careful provisions for the composition of the Council and for the procedures whereby its members are chosen. Accordingly, this revised Article 23 embodies a necessarily elaborate plan for the selection of the Council, designed to create a carefully balanced body representative at all times of the whole membership of the United Nations. In contrast to the present Security Council, composed as it is of delegates appointed by the governments of the member Nations, it is proposed that the Executive Council shall consist of seventeen Representatives in the General Assembly, chosen by the Assembly itself from its own membership. In this way no nation as such would be

2 Earlier reform discussions

59

entitled to appoint any member of the new Council and the Council would consist solely of persons well-known to the Assembly and enjoying its confidence. The plan also provides that, while no member Nation would be entitled to “permanent” representation, the few very largest nations (comprising the first category under paragraph 2 of revised Article 9) would be entitled to representation at all times so long as their respective populations continued to exceed 140 million, or such higher limits as would presumably be established within a few decades by the General Assembly pursuant to paragraph 5 of revised Article 9.21 It is also proposed that the nations comprising the second category under paragraph 2 of revised Article 9, i.e., with populations between 40 and 140 million (or between later higher limits fixed under paragraph 5 of revised Article 9),22 shall be entitled to representation on the Council during alternate General Assemblies. As of July 1957,23 the four member Nations in the first category (China, India, the Soviet Union and the United States) would each be entitled to have one of its Representatives on the Executive Council at all times. Each of the next eight largest nations would be entitled to be represented in the Council for four years out of every eight years, under a provision whereby their representation would rotate within two geographical subgroups of four member Nations each. This second category of eight nations would initially be composed of four European nations (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) and four non-European nations (Brazil, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan). It is, therefore, proposed that the four nations in this group which any one time would be entitled to have Representatives on the Council shall be equally divided between the subgroups, – two from Europe and two from outside Europe. [68] The smaller member Nations (comprising the last five24 categories under paragraph 525 of revised Article 9), together with the non-self-governing and trust territories under the administration of member Nations, would as one group be entitled to nine seats on the Executive Council. In order to ensure equitable distribution of seats among the members of this large group, the smaller nations (assumed in revised Article 9 to number eighty-one26) and the territories would be divided into nine regional subgroups. These nine subgroups would be as nearly equal as possible in the number of nations in each subgroup; and each subgroup would have attached to it the non-self-governing and trust territories in its general area. While it is likely that each subgroup would itself recommend which nation (or non-self-governing or trust territory) in the subgroup should have one of its Representatives elected to the Council at a particular election, the final designation would be in the hands of the General Assembly itself. To ensure, however, that every one of these smaller nations shall in due course have one of its Representatives on the Council, it is proposed that no member of a subgroup shall be redesignated until every other member Nation in that subgroup has been designated. Provision is also made to ensure that in the subgroups 21  The words in italics are omitted in the third edition. 22  The words in italics are omitted in the third edition. 23  In the third edition, “as of July 1965”. 24  In the third edition, “four”. 25  In the third edition, “paragraph 4”. 26  In the third edition, “eighty-seven”.

60

2 Earlier reform discussions

which include one or more non-self-governing or trust territories (mostly in Africa and the Pacific), at least one such territory shall be designated before any member Nation can be redesignated. In practice this plan for representation on the Executive Council would give a slight majority (nine to eight) to the group consisting of the small nations and the non-selfgoverning and trust territories. While as of July 195727 this group contained only about 31 per cent of the world’s population (an estimated 848 million out of 2,763 million),28 the group nevertheless includes more than five sixths of the independent states of the world. The plan therefore represents a compromise between representation on the basis of population and representation on the basis of the separate sovereignties. But it is a compromise which recognizes the representation of the separate national states as the dominant factor rather than representation on the basis of population, just as the plan for representation in the General Assembly itself gives similar preponderant weight to the element of separate nationhood.29 The proposed method of choosing the individual members of the Executive Council from among the Representatives of the designated nations or territories embodies another careful balancing of the interests of particular nations and of the world community. Although it is proposed to vest in the General Assembly the ultimate power of choosing the individual members of the Council, the Assembly’s choice would be restricted to Representatives nominated by the member Nations (or nonself-governing or trust territories) which are entitled to representation on the Council during a particular term of the Assembly. The Representatives of each member Nation (or territory) thus designated would be required to name two candidates for the seat allocated to that nation (or territory); and the Assembly would then select the one deemed to be the better qualified for service on the Council. As above indicated, the proposed formula for representation in the Executive Council is based on the assumption that for the foreseeable future there [69] will be four nations in the first category, comprising the nations with the very largest populations; and that there will be eight nations in the second category comprising the middle-sized countries. It seems reasonable to anticipate that there will be no changes for a long time in the number of member Nations in these two categories, especially in view of the fact that large increases in population would be balanced by the adjustments in the population limits of the categories which are required by paragraph 5 of revised Article 9. For example, before another member Nation reaches a population of 40,000,000, entitling it to sixteen Representatives in the General Assembly, the minimum requirement for that number of Representatives would almost surely have been raised to 44,000,000 and so on. It is conceivable, however, that unequal changes in population, or the merger or division of nations, might result in changes in the number of nations belonging to the

27  In the third edition, “as of July 1965”. 28  In the third edition, “an estimated 986 million out of 3172 million”. 29  The following four paragraphs have been rephrased in the third edition, see its pp. 72-73.

2 Earlier reform discussions

61

first two categories. And since the success of the plan for a careful balance of representation on the Executive Council clearly depends on the permanent maintenance of that balance, it is necessary to provide a method for adjusting the number of members of the Council itself. Since it does not seem necessary to require amendment of the Charter in such a contingency, it is proposed to grant to the General Assembly, acting by two-thirds majority of its whole membership, the power to make the necessary adjustments: […]. The proposed voting procedure in the Executive Council is also carefully in such a way as to ensure that the Council’s decisions would reflect the opinions of a considerable majority of its members and thus, due to the balanced method of their selection, also reflect the opinion of the majority of the General Assembly and presumably of the world’s people. For this reason, it is proposed that all decisions on important questions shall require a majority of fourteen out of seventeen votes, and decisions on all other questions shall require a majority of eleven votes rather than a bare majority of nine (revised Article 27). The provisions concerning vacancies are also intended to ensure that the carefully planned balance in the composition of the Executive Council shall not be disturbed. For this reason, it is proposed that any vacancy must be filled by the election of a Representative from the same nation (or territory) from which the outgoing Council member came. The close correlation between each General Assembly and the body which [70] would serve as its executive is assured through the provisions whereby their periods of service would be almost identical. This results from the requirement that each new General Assembly shall elect a new Executive Council as soon as possible (within thirty days) after the beginning of the Assembly’s first session; and from the further provision that the Council shall serve for the remainder of the full four-year term of the Assembly which elects it and for the short further period until the election of a new Council by the next Assembly. This relationship would be further safeguarded by the proposed power of the General Assembly to declare that the Executive Council no longer has the confidence of the Assembly, with the consequence that an entirely new Council must be forthwith chosen. While provision is made only for the replacement of the Council as a whole and not of individual members, the Assembly might well re-elect some or most of the individuals composing the discharged Council, dropping out only those members whose continued service is no longer deemed desirable. Provision is also made that, as in the case of vacancies, the members of a new Council must come from among the Representatives of the same nations (or territories) which were represented on the discharged Council. This provision with respect to the discharge of the Executive Council follows to some extent the usual parliamentary system. Similarly, the proposal that members of the Council shall retain their seats in the General Assembly and thus maintain close contact with the activities and trends of the Assembly reflects the usual parliamentary practice. […]

62

2 Earlier reform discussions FUNCTIONS AND POWERS Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,[71] and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, the Executive Council shall act as the agent of the General Assembly in the fulfillment of the primary responsibility of the [71] Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security and for ensuring compliance with this revised Charter and the laws and regulations enacted thereunder. The General Assembly shall supervise the carrying out by the Executive Council of its duties, and the Assembly may from time to time issue such directions to the Council as the Assembly deems necessary. 2. In discharging its duties the Executive Council shall act in accordance with this revised Charter and the laws and regulations enacted by the General Assembly, and in accordance with the directions of the Assembly. Certain specific powers granted to the Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII, and in Annexes I and II. 3. The Executive Council shall submit annual reports to the General Assembly and such special reports as the Council may deem necessary or the Assembly may call for. If the Council decides to take emergency action under Chapter VII, it shall immediately submit a report thereon to the Assembly which, in accordance with Article 39, be immediately convened to consider such report.

Comment. As already noted, the composition, status, functions and powers of the Executive Council would be very different from those of the present Security Council. The individuals composing the new Council, instead of being appointed by their respective governments, would be chosen by the [72] General Assembly itself from among its own members. Moreover, instead of being, like the Security Council, an independent body, the Executive Council would, under paragraph 1 of this revised Article, act as the executive arm of the Assembly in respect of the maintenance of

63

2 Earlier reform discussions

peace, being responsible to the Assembly and subject at all times to the Assembly’s direction and control. […] […] [76] […] VOTING Article 27 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party [77] to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

1. The members of the Executive Council shall vote as individuals, and each of them shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Executive Council on important matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of fourteen30 members.31 These matters shall include: action with respect to the pacific settlement of international disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Articles 33 through 44, Articles 50 through 53 and Annexes I and II,32 and every other matter which the General Assembly may from time to time define as important. 3. Decisions of the Executive Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of eleven members.33 [77]

30  In the third edition, “twelve”. 31  In the third edition it is added, “which majority shall include a majority of the members of the Council elected from among the Representatives in the General Assembly from the member Nations entitled to fifteen or more Representatives in the Assembly and also a majority of the members of the Council elected from among the Representatives in the General Assembly from the member Nations entitled to less than fifteen Representatives in the Assembly and from the non-self-governing or trust territories”. 32  In the third edition, “in accordance with Articles 33 through 53 and Annexes I and II”. 33  In the third edition, “of any twelve members”.

64

2 Earlier reform discussions 4.34 In case the General Assembly shall increase or decrease the membership of the Executive Council pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 23, the required majority for decisions of the Council shall be increased or decreased in the ratio of one vote for each two members added to or subtracted from the membership.

Comment. As noted in the comments on revised Articles 23-26, the proposed Executive Council would be a body of the highest importance. In fact, the greatly increased scope and authority of the United Nations under the revised Charter would make the Executive Council of greater importance than the present Security Council, even though the new Council would mainly function as an agent of the General Assembly rather than as an independent body. It is by reason of the vital functions of this new Executive Council that the elaborate procedures for its selection are proposed in revised Article 23, – in order, by ensuring a careful balance in its composition, to promote a high degree of confidence in the Council. The voting procedures in this revised Article 27 are also intended to promote maximum confidence in the decisions of the new Council. No provision is made corresponding to the “veto” power of any one of the “Big Five” contained in the present Charter, since it is clear that in the new Executive Council no decision, great or small, should be blocked by any single vote. On the other hand, it will be best to require that all its decisions shall be by a substantial majority; and of the utmost importance that every important decision be based on so large a majority vote as clearly to command the support of the General Assembly and of world opinion.35 To this end, the voting provisions should not be so rigid as to prevent the new Council from functioning effectively, and yet strict enough to ensure that its decisions, especially the important ones, will have very strong support. It is believed that the requirement of a minimum majority of eleven36 of the seventeen Council members for any decision (paragraph 3), together with the requirement of a minimum majority of fourteen in “important matters” (paragraph 2),37 meets these tests.38 According to the estimates contained in revised Article 9, the populations of the four largest nations (each of which would be entitled to have one of its Representatives on the Executive Council) were, as of July 1, 1957: China, 615,000,000; India, 391,000,000; 34  This paragraph is omitted in the third edition. 35  In the third edition, “that every important decision shall command a clear majority of members from both the main groups of nations, i.e., from the group comprising the largest and medium-sized nations and also from the more numerous group of smaller nations”. 36  In the third edition, “twelve”. 37  In the third edition, “together with the requirement that on ‘important matters’ this majority shall include a majority of Council members from the nations entitled to fifteen or more Representatives in the General Assembly and also a majority of the members from the smaller nations (paragraph 2)”. 38  The following three paragraphs are omitted in the third edition.

2 Earlier reform discussions

65

United States, 174,600,000; U.S.S.R., 204,200,000. Thus the combined population of these four nations in 1957 was roundly 1,384,800,000 or 50.1 per cent of the estimated total world population of 2,763,135,000. The estimated 1957 population of all the other eighty- [78] nine nations listed in revised Article 9 (and of the non-self-governing and trust territories) is, therefore, approximately 1,378,335,000 or 49.9 per cent of the assumed world population. Based on these figures, it will be seen that with the proposed minimum requirement of fourteen affirmative votes for important decisions, no such decision could be made unless supported by Executive Council members representing not only a majority of the nations, but also a majority of the world’s population. (This is on the assumption, of course, that the Council members elected from the smaller nations are regarded not as representing their respective nations, but rather the respective regional groups established under revised Article 23 in which their nations are included.) It will also be seen that the requirement of fourteen out of seventeen votes on important questions would make impossible a decision on such questions if the Representatives from any four of the eight larger nations then represented on the Council voted against the proposed decision. Moreover, this requirement would prevent a decision opposed by any four members of the Council representing any four of the nine small-nation regional groups. Even as to less important decisions, the requirement of eleven affirmative votes – two more than a simple majority – would ensure substantial support. The proposed voting procedure would eliminate the distinction between procedural and substantive matters under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present Article 27. This distinction does not exist in the other two Councils of the United Nations (the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council). Neither does it exist in the International Court of Justice, nor in most parliamentary and executive bodies. The difficulties arising from that distinction have often been demonstrated by the experience of the present Security Council; and there seems to be no good reason for the continuance of this complication. The revised Article, therefore, merely distinguishes between “important” matters and other matters; and as to what matters shall be deemed “important” it specifies that they shall include all decisions with regard to the pacific settlement of international disputes and the maintenance of peace, and “any other matters” which the General Assembly may choose to define as important. It is believed that this method of determining what questions are of sufficient consequence to require the larger majority of fourteen would be more in harmony with realities and more workable than the distinction between “procedural” and other matters.39 The proposed distinction between “important” and other questions is also identical with that made under revised Article 18 with regard to decisions of the General Assembly itself, whereby decisions of the General Assembly on “important” matters would require a majority of all the Representatives whereas decisions on other matters would require no more than a majority of the Representatives present and voting. […] [79] […] Another fundamental difference from the present Article 27 is proposed by the provision of revised paragraph 1 that the members of the Executive Council “shall vote as 39  The preceding sentence is omitted in the third edition.

66

2 Earlier reform discussions

individuals”. This corresponds to a similar provision in revised Article 18 in respect of voting by Representatives in the General Assembly. Both provisions embody the conception that the revised United Nations would be something very different from and more than a league of sovereign states represented by delegates selected by governments; and that its governing bodies should be more directly representative of and responsible to the peoples of the world. It is a reasonable expectation that through these provisions there would develop a spirit of world citizenship whereby the Representatives in the General Assembly, and especially those Representatives chosen to serve on the Executive Council, would come to think of themselves as representing not so much their own nations as the world community. For just as in parliamentary government the members of the national legislature commonly regard themselves as responsible for the interests of the entire people even though they may properly pay special attention to the interests of their constituencies, so in the revised General Assembly and new Executive Council a corresponding sense of responsibility for the interests of the whole world may be expected to develop. The provision in revised Article 23, whereby the General Assembly could discharge the Executive Council by a vote of lack of confidence, might well operate to aid the development of such a sense of world responsibility. For, if it seemed to the Assembly that too many members of the Council were adopting excessively nationalistic or narrow views, the Assembly could at any time discharge the Council and omit those particular Representatives upon the appointment of the new Council. It should be emphasized that the provisions of revised Article 23 relating to the Executive Council’s composition, of revised Articles 24-26 relating to its powers and of this revised Article 17 relating to its voting procedures are closely interrelated and should be read together. Taken together, it is believed that they would produce a well-balanced executive body which could not only function effectively but also command world confidence. […]

2.8 16 September 1963, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta and Yemen: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, UN Doc. A/5520 On behalf of our respective Governments, we have the honour to request the inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly “Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council”. In conformity with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, an explanatory memorandum is attached herewith.

2 Earlier reform discussions

67

Explanatory Memorandum Since the Charter came into force in 1945, sixty new Member States have been admitted to the United Nations. This increase, which has more than doubled the original membership of the Organization, is mainly due to the emergence, and admission to the United Nations, of a large number of new States from Africa and Asia. At present, the Member States belonging to these two continents constitute more than half the membership of the United Nations. In view of this development, and the likelihood of further increase in membership, it has become necessary to review the composition of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, with a view to providing for a more equitable representation that would reflect the increase in the membership of the United Nations. The General Assembly at its eighteenth session should be called upon to take measures deemed necessary for equitable representation in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. […]

2.9 16 December 1963, Report of the Special Political Committee on the Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/5675 QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL […] 8. On 10. December Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela submitted two joint draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.104 and A/SPC/L.105). 9. Under the operative part of the first draft resolution as revised on 11 December (A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1) the General Assembly would (i) decide to adopt, in accordance with Article 108, the following amendments to the Charter and submit them for ratification by the Members of the United Nations: (a) “In Article 23 (1) of the Charter, the word ‘eleven’ in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word ‘thirteen’ and the word ‘six’ in the third sentence by the word ‘eight’. (b) “In Article 23, the second sentence of paragraph 2 shall read: ‘However, (a) in the first election of the non-permanent members, three shall be chosen for a term of one year, and (b) in the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to thirteen, one of the two additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year.’ (c) “In Article 27 (2), the word ‘seven’ shall be replaced by the word ‘eight’. (d) “In Article 27 (3), the word ‘seven’ shall be replaced by the word ‘eight’.” (ii) further decide that these amendments would be inoperative unless, within two years from the date of their adoption by the General Assembly, they were ratified as

68

2 Earlier reform discussions

required by Article 108 of the Charter; and (iii) urge all Members of the United Nations to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, with the least possible delay. […] 12. On 13 December […]. 13. On the same day Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic and Upper Volta submitted two draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.109 and A/SPC/L.110). 14. Under the operative part of the first draft resolution A/SPC/L.109 the General Assembly would (i) decide to adopt in accordance with Article 108 the following amendments to the Charter and submit them for ratification by the Members of the United Nations: (a) “In Article 23 (1) of the Charter, the word ‘eleven’ in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word ‘fifteen’ and the word ‘six’ in the third sentence by the word ‘ten’. (b) “In Article 23, paragraph 2, the second sentence shall be reworded as follows: ‘In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year’. (c) “The former paragraph 3 shall be renumbered 4. (d) “In Article 27 (2) of the Charter the word ‘seven’ shall be replaced by the word ‘nine’. (e) “In Article 27 (3) of the Charter the word ‘seven’ shall be replaced by the word ‘nine’.”; (ii) call upon all Members of the United Nations to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965 as required by Article 108 of the Charter; and (iii) further decide that the ten nonpermanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: (a) (b) (c) (d)

5 from African and Asian States; 1 from Eastern European States; 2 from Latin American and Caribbean States; 2 from Western European and other States.

[…] 18. At the 4429th meeting, on 16 December, the representative of India introduced oral amendments to the twenty-one-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.104 and Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.105). These amendments were co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, [9] Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon,

2 Earlier reform discussions

69

Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zanzibar. The amendments to document A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 were as follows: “1. Add the following as the first preambular paragraph: Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced; “2. In operative paragraph 1 (a) replace the word ‘thirteen’ by the word ‘fifteen’ and the word ‘eight’ by the word ‘ten’. “3. Replace operative paragraph 1 (b) by the following: (b) In Article 23, paragraph 2, the second sentence should be reworded as follows: ‘In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year’. “4. In operative paragraph 1 (c), replace the word ‘eight’ by the word ‘nine’. “5. In operative paragraph 1 (d), replace the word ‘eight’ by the word ‘nine’. “6. Replace operative paragraphs 2 and 3 by the following; 2. Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965; 3. Further decides that the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) 5 from African and Asian States; (b) 1 from Eastern European States; (c) 2 from Latin American States; (d) 2 from Western European and other States.” […] 19. At the same meeting, the representative of El Salvador, on behalf of the cosponsors of the draft resolutions contained in documents A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 and A/ SPC/L.105, accepted the above amendments. 20. The Committee then proceeded to vote on the draft resolutions and the amendments before it. […] […] The twenty-one-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1), as amended, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 96 to 11, with 4 abstentions (see paragraph 17 below, draft resolution II A). The voting was as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra

70

2 Earlier reform discussions Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zanzibar. Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. […]

2.10 16 December 1963, Special Political Committee, Official Records, UN Doc. A/SPC/SR.429 Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (A/5520 and Corr.1, A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1, A/SPC/L.105, A/SPC/L.109, A/ SPC/L.110) (concluded) 1. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet Union had always been and continued to be in favour of proper representation for the African and Asian countries in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council by means which included the expansion of the membership of those bodies. That was impossible at the present time, however, owing exclusively to the position of the Western Powers, which had prevented the restoration of the rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. That was the essence of the problem. In the circumstances his delegation thought that a vote on the draft resolutions proposing the expansion of the membership of the Councils should be deferred to allow for consultations which might result in a solution acceptable to all. If, on the other hand, the draft resolutions in question were put to the vote, his delegation would have no choice but to vote against them. […] 4. Mr. CHANDERLI (Algeria) noted that the two great Powers and certain other delegations, although in disagreement as to the substance of the problem, had coincided in recommending that the Committee should defer action to satisfy the admittedly just claims of the African and Asian Members to equitable representation in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Also, certain delegations had observed that a great country which was not seated in the Assembly would object to any action resulting in an amendment to the Charter. It was becoming increasingly clear that the interpretation placed on the intentions and views of that country did not correspond to reality, so that in the mind of certain delegations, including his own, the argument was not as strong as it was being made out to be. He therefore hoped that at the current meeting the majority would unite in a common front to request the Assembly to recognize the legitimacy of the claims put forward by the under-represented countries. At the same time he would remind the delegations of the great Powers that time wrought many changes and that attitudes which had a certain value at a given moment might appear in quite a different light in other circumstances. Ratification of any amendments to the Charter would not take effect for another two years. If at

2 Earlier reform discussions

71

the current session the great Powers adopted a completely negative position it would make it difficult for their governments and parliaments subsequently to change that position if political developments favoured such a step. Accordingly, he expressed the hope that any members which could not support the texts before them would abstain rather than cast negative votes, thus leaving the door open for the possibility of ratification. By doing so they would demonstrate their recognition of the legitimacy of the African and Asian countries’ claim to equitable representation. In the past those countries had been ignored and for long periods of time they had been unable to participate in the life of the international community. Now that changing circumstances had given them a place among the other nations of the world it appeared that the great Powers which had drawn up the Charter were trying to impose their will on them, even if only indirectly. The result was that while they had finally been admitted to the world Organization they were not being allowed to participate fully in its work. He asked those delegations which had apparently not yet fully grasped the significance for the African and Asian countries of their request for equitable representation to try to understand that position so that the United Nations could become a truly universal organization and better serve the course of international understanding and peace. […] 16. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) announced that an agreement had been reached between the African-Asian and the Latin American groups to fuse the four draft resolutions relating to equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council by amending the two draft resolutions sponsored by Latin American countries (A/SPC/L.104/ Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.105). The amendments40 in question would be read out by the representative of India. […] 20. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana), speaking on behalf of the African sponsors of the amendments, said that they had put forward the amendments in order to be able to join forces with practically all the Asian and Latin American delegations. The understanding had been reached, with regard to the Security Council, that there would be five elective seats for Africa and Asia, of which three would go to African States and two to Asian States. […] 21. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), speaking on behalf of the African-Asian group, of which he was the Chairman for the month of December, confirmed the understanding by which of the five elective seats in the Security Council to be set aside for African and Asian States, three seats would go to African States and two seats to Asian States. 22. Mr. ALVAREZ VIDAURRE (El Salvador), speaking on behalf of the Latin American sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.105, reviewed the traditional concern of the Latin American countries for an equitable apportionment of the elective seats in the Security Council and the seats in the Economic and Social Council. That desire to do scrupulous justice to all regions had impelled the Latin American countries to accept modification of their original draft resolutions. He was happy to announce that the amendments introduced by the representative of India were acceptable to the Latin American sponsors and he hoped that the revised draft resolutions would command unanimous support. 40  16 December 1963, UN Doc. A/5675.

72

2 Earlier reform discussions

[…] 25. Mr. JACKLING (United Kingdom) said, in explanation of the vote of his delegation on the revised draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.105) concerning the Councils, that the particular responsibilities which Article 108 of the Charter imposed on the five permanent members of the Security Council with regard to amendment of the Charter required the United Kingdom delegation to adopt a position of reserve for the time being. As members were already aware, his delegation approached the debate in full sympathy with the overwhelming majority in their wish to enlarge the two Councils. The effect of the revised draft resolutions, however, went further than the petition which had been before the Committee at an earlier stage, and his delegation would need more time for study than was available at the current session. 26. His Government would give careful and urgent consideration to the new proposals and to the views expressed during the discussions and in the various negotiations which had been proceeding outside the Committee. It should be clearly understood that the position of abstention which his delegation had to adopt did not prejudice in any way the conclusions which his Government would reach when it had had time to consider the matter again. 27. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) explained that his delegation would abstain from the vote on the two revised draft resolutions. It had repeatedly made it clear that the United States was strongly in favour of increasing the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in order to permit adequate representation of the African-Asian States. It had deeply regretted that one of the members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union, had prevented such a solution. His delegation had been prepared to vote for the earlier draft resolutions which would have had the effect of increasing the membership of the Security Council from eleven to thirteen and that of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-four. 28. The proposals to increase the membership of the Security Council to fifteen and that of the Economic and Social Council to twenty-seven had been very recent and if they had been put to the vote at the 428th meeting of the Committee, his delegation would have had to vote against them because of the lack of complete unanimity among those who favoured immediate increases in the two Councils. Since then, a wider measure of agreement had developed as a result of further consultations and, as a consequence, the United States delegation had been authorized to abstain. It took that position without prejudice to the final position of its Government on the proposed amendments to the Charter, which would be determined after further consultations with other Member States act in accordance with his country’s administrative and constitutional processes. […] 49. Mr. TINE (France) explained that his delegation had voted for draft resolution A/ SPC/L.101 and Add.1 and 2 for the reason stated at the 427th meeting. While his delegation had always favoured a reasonable enlargement of the Councils, it had not been able to vote for either draft resolution A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 or draft resolution A/SPC/L.105 as revised, because it felt that a thorough study of the complex issues involved had not been possible in the short time available. His delegation had hoped that it would have been possible to continue the discussions so that a unanimous decision could have been reached at the nineteenth session and followed by effective action. […]

2 Earlier reform discussions

73

2.11 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly, Resolution 1991 (XVIII), “Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council”41 A42 The General Assembly, Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced, Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus providing for a more adequate geographical representation of non-permanent members and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,*1 1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations: (a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, the word “eleven” in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word “fifteen”, and the word “six” in the third sentence by the word “ten”; (b) In Article 23, paragraph 2, the second sentence shall then be reworded as follows: “In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year”; (c) In Article 27, paragraph 2, the word “seven” shall be replaced by the word “nine”; (d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word “seven” shall be replaced by the word “nine”; 41  The Assembly adopted Resolution 1991 A (XVIII) by a roll-call vote of 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions, as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia. – Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. – Abstaining: Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. See Yearbook of the UN 1963, p. 87.    The amendments to Art. 23, 27 and 61 of the UN Charter (the latter having been the subject of Res. 1991 B (XVIII), also adopted on 17 December 1963) entered into force on 31 August 1965, the requirements of Art. 108 having been fulfilled. See Yearbook of the UN 1965, p. 76. 42  Part B of the resolution concerned the enlargement of the membership of the Economic and Social Council.

74

2 Earlier reform discussions

2. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by 1 September 1965; 3. Further decides that the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) Five from African and Asian States; (b) One from Eastern European States; (c) Two from Latin American States; (d) Two from Western European and other States. 1285th plenary meeting, 17 December 1963. Original footnote Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 21, document A/5487, para. 9 [4 September 1963]. *1

2.12 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly, Official Records, UN Doc. A/ PV.1285 […] Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/5675)43 […] 76. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The General Assembly has before it the Report of the Special Political Committee [A/5675] on its consideration of the question of equitable representation on the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the General Committee. 77. The inclusion of this question, put forward by a large group of African and Asian countries [A/5519 and A/5520], in the agenda of the General Assembly’s eighteenth session was due to the legitimate efforts of the young independent States of Africa and Asia to assert and consolidate their equality and sovereignty by securing an equal voice not only in the United Nations itself, but also in its main organs. […] 81. The sympathies of the Soviet Union and its people are completely on the side of the young independent States. It is our unshakable belief that there can be nothing but justification for a decision ensuring that the African and Asian states which have become Members of the Organization in recent years and now constitute more than half its membership are suitably represented in the appropriate organs of the United Nations. 82. The Soviet Union has no intention of defending the unjust distribution of power which now exists in the main organs of the United Nations. It is clear to all that if the young independent States do not at present have due voice in these organs, it is not because the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries occupy a predominant position in them. It is no secret that such predominance in United Nations organs is at the 43  16 December 1963, → 2.9.

2 Earlier reform discussions

75

present time held by the Western Powers and is used against both the young States of Africa and Asia and the socialist countries. 83. Let me adduce some proofs of this. It is well known that a completely abnormal position has developed, for example, with regard to the representation of East European countries on the Security Council. The right of countries from that part of the world to occupy proportionate places as non-permanent members of the Security Council is being undermined without the slightest justification. Furthermore, the place of those countries on the Security Council has been usurped for half the period of eighteen years during which the United Nations has existed. It is very significant that, throughout this time, the place reserved for a West European non-permanent member of the Security Council has remained inviolate. […] 91. The Soviet Union, as we have repeatedly pointed out, has consistently advocated that the countries of Asia and Africa be granted their due representation not only in the General Committee, but also in such main organs of the United Nations as the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. As is known, the proposals put forward in this matter by the Soviet Government provide, in particular, that the Afro-Asian countries should be granted not less than half of the places on the Security Council reserved for non-permanent members. 92. We would also specially stress that, in advocating due representation for the countries of Africa and Asia on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet Union in no way excludes, but indeed contemplates, the possibility that the membership of these main United Nations bodies may be increased for this purpose. Allow me to recall that this position of the Soviet Union is a logical premise and a natural consequence of the proposal regarding the need for structural reorganization of the controlling organs of the United Nations which was made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. N.S. Khrushchev, as long ago as the fifteenth session of the General Assembly [869th meeting, paras. 273-285;44 882nd meeting, paras. 2-5445]. 93. In its advocacy of changes in the composition of the principal organs of the United Nations, the Soviet Union has always laid special stress on the desirability of increasing the membership of that main organ of the United Nations which bears responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security – the Security Council. 94. The fundamental desirability of a change in the composition of the Security Council along these lines has been indicated by the Head of the Soviet Government in his speeches, including that delivered at a meeting of Moscow workers on 20 October 1960 regarding the work of the Soviet delegation to the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The fundamental position of the Soviet Union in this matter is thus perfectly clear. 95. We all know, however, that if the membership of such main organs of the United Nations as the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council is to be increased, appropriate amendments must be made to the Charter of the United Nations. We also know that, under the provisions of the Charter itself, the amendment of any part of the Charter would be invalid and unlawful unless approved by all five permanent members 44  2 3 September 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.869, pp. 68-84. 45  3 October 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.882, pp. 317-321.

76

2 Earlier reform discussions

of the Security Council. Since the Western Powers persist in their policy of refusing to restore the lawful rights in the United Nations of the People’s Republic of China, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, the solution of this problem, solely because of the attitude of those Powers, remains impossible. […] 103. May I point out that the difference of opinion, in essence, does not at present turn on the question whether we should meet the request of the African and Asian countries in regard to their fairer representation in the main organs of the United Nations. On that point the Soviet Union is in complete agreement with those countries; it advocates, as it always has done, that that problem be solved as speedily as possible. The question we are discussing is a different one. It is this: how we are to proceed to a solution of this problem without violating the Charter of the United Nations. The Soviet Union is convinced that such a solution can be found. 104. Given all these considerations, the Soviet delegation appeals to the General Assembly not to permit unjustified haste, but to display good sense and to postpone the voting on the draft resolutions regarding the enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council until such time as a universally acceptable solution to this problem has been found. 105. If, however, these draft resolutions calling for amendments to the Charter are nevertheless put to the vote, the Soviet delegation, in the circumstances which have developed, will have no choice and will be compelled to vote against them. 106. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (translated from French): Now that we are about to proceed to the vote, my delegation considers it necessary to recall once again that, on two occasions in the Special Political Committee [427th46 and 429th47 meetings], it expressed, as clearly as it could, the opinion that a decision at this stage, which would not receive the unanimous support of the Members, would not hasten the day when, as we hope and as we have affirmed, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council could be enlarged in such a way as to give satisfaction to the new Members and to respect the delicate equilibrium on which the Charter was established. 107. In the circumstances, my delegation considers that the Assembly would demonstrate great wisdom and political sense if it postponed its decision on draft resolutions II A and II B concerning the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, which were approved last night by the Special Political Committee, until a decision acceptable to all has been reached. […] 138. Mr. Tallarigo (Italy): The Italian delegation, confirming its vote of last night in the Special Political Committee, will […] vote in favour of the two draft resolutions, draft resolution II A, relating to composition of the Security Council and draft resolution II B, relating to composition of the Economic and Social Council, as they appear in that report. 139. This attitude is consistent with the policy constantly pursued by the Italian delegation in order to provide, through the enlargement of the principal bodies of our Organization a more equitable representation for African and Asian countries in those 46  1 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/SPC/SR.427, pp. 272-273. 47  16 December 1963, UN Doc. A/SPC/SR.429, p. 288.

2 Earlier reform discussions

77

bodies. […] Our favourable vote was cast notwithstanding the fact that this resolution entails certain sacrifices for the geographic group to which my country belongs, in relation to the position reserved to other groups. We were, however, happy to support these resolutions as a contribution toward the attainment of the goal which we all strive to achieve. We trust that the same spirit will guide all delegations and that, pending the necessary ratifications, no initiative will be taken which could destroy the present atmosphere of co-operation between groups. This very co-operation will in fact be required if the new balance, so laboriously achieved, is to become a reality. 140. It is with this understanding that my delegation will vote in favour of the three draft resolutions. 141. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): We should like to explain why the delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, which in the Special Political Committee voted against draft resolutions A/SPC/L.104/Rev.1 and A/SPC/L.105, that is to say, against Parts A and B of draft resolution II in the report submitted to us [A/5675, para. 21], cannot now vote differently in the General Assembly. […] 146. We cannot, however, support draft resolutions II A and II B concerning an increase in the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council because those draft resolutions could not be adopted and put into effect without a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The enlargement of the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council is a question which is governed directly by the provisions of the Charter and not, as in the case of the General Committee, by the rules of procedure. 147. Now, any revision or amendment of the United Nations Charter requires, under Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter itself, to be ratified by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. At the present time, however, there are only four permanent members seated in the Security Council, the fifth being absent owing to the fact that the People’s Republic of China is not represented in the United Nations. 148. This state of affairs, resulting from the maneuvers of certain Powers who oppose the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China makes it impossible for us at present to take up the question of any revision or amendment of the Charter. If we want to undertake such changes, all the conditions for the proper functioning of the United Nations must be fulfilled. That is even more necessary in a matter of such importance as amending the text of the Charter, which is the Fundamental Law and Constitution of our Organization. 149. The question of a revision of the Charter of the United Nations was first mooted a long time ago, but it has proved impossible without the participation of China. It now seems that despite the reservations of the representatives of the western Powers in their statements in the Special Political Committee and despite the abstention of some of them in the voting, those Powers are endeavouring in particular to prepare public opinion for an amendment of the Charter in the absence and without the participation of the People’s Republic of China. In this way, they are trying also to postpone indefinitely the restoration of that country’s lawful rights in the United Nations. 150. The representatives of the western Powers had already indicated in their statements in the Special Political Committee that despite their abstention they would be

78

2 Earlier reform discussions

inclined to reconsider their present position and to seek some way of bringing about the proposed amendments. It is to be anticipated that when the time comes all the western Powers, and in particular those who have abstained, will make it their duty to ratify the amendments provided for in the resolutions concerned, not only to justify the attitude they have taken in regard to the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, but also to try to preserve the status quo in the United Nations. […] 153. Meanwhile, a temporary solution, that we think might be considered in order to achieve a fairer representation of Member States in the principal organs, would be to redistribute the existing seats. In the absence of anything better, that would certainly be the best and most practical solution, and it could be adopted without violating the Charter of the United Nations. 154. At the same time, in order to avoid any new complications and difficulties that might be raised in the way of a just and equitable representation of Member States in the principal organs of the United Nations, it would be preferable not to press the draft resolutions in question to a vote at this stage. In this way, talks could be started immediately between the various groups and the states concerned with a view to finding a solution to the problem as soon as possible. That, we think, would be the quickest, shortest and most effective way of achieving positive results satisfactory to all concerned. 155. We think, too, that the declaration by the spokesman of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, which was read out to us in the course of a statement on a motion for the adjournment of the debate, fully confirms our point of view. 156. Mr. C.M. CHANG (China): I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to make a brief explanation of vote. My delegation has always been in favour of enlarging the principal organs of the United Nations so that the growing importance of Africa and Asia may be faithfully and adequately reflected in the composition of those Councils. […] […] 164. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now take up draft resolution II. This draft resolution consists of two parts, A and B. I shall put part A to the vote first and then part B. A roll-call vote has been requested for both parts. A vote was taken by roll-call. Peru, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first. In favour: Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg,

2 Earlier reform discussions

79

Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay. Against: Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Mongolia. Abstaining: Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Part A of draft resolution II was adopted by 97 votes to 11, with 4 abstentions. […] 173. Mr. MISHRA (India): My delegation was very happy to take part, indeed an active part, in the deliberations and negotiations leading to the adoption of the three draft resolutions on the composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly, the expansion of the non-permanent membership of the Security Council and the expansion of the membership of the Economic and Social Council. We co-sponsored various draft resolutions and amendments to them, and are gratified at the result. 174. The resolution on the composition of the General Committee has been approved unanimously. The overwhelming majority which voted for the adoption of the draft resolutions on the expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council is beyond expectations. At the beginning of this session it was difficult to imagine the way in which things would move, and there were cynics among us who until even a few days ago thought that we were engaged in fruitless discussions and negotiations. The negotiations have been successful because the African-Asian delegations were solid on this question. Their solidarity did not come out of any desire, to use a colloquialism, to gang up against other delegations in the Assembly. The solidarity was born out of the belief of the African-Asian delegations that their cause was just and that the time was ripe to remedy the situation arising out of inequitable and unbalanced representation in the principal Councils of the United Nations, and their proposals were fair and equitable to all groups. 175. All our proposals were motivated by the desire to correct the imbalance by justice and fair play rather than by taking away seats from particular groups of States. Thus, in our proposal for the distribution of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council, due regard was paid to the capacity, contribution and willingness of various groups of States with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security and the other purposes of the Organization. At the same time, the need for equitable geographical distribution was taken into account. It was because of this that the African-Asian delegations were able to obtain the support of all the Latin Americans and also of the West Europeans, with a few exceptions. Our thanks are due to these delegations, and particularly to those of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which facilitated the negotiations. My delegation takes this opportunity to thank the delegations of Ghana and Syria, and specifically Mr. Quaison-Sackey and Mr. Tarazt, for the magnificent contribution which they made to the success of the resolutions. […]

80

2 Earlier reform discussions

2.13 December 1969, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations: The Next Twenty-Five Years, Twentieth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 197048 […] [14] II. The Goals and the Steps […] [55] 9. Improving the Decision-Making Capacity of the United Nations The Goal: To ensure that the decisions of the United Nations are made expeditiously and authoritatively. Comment: It would be dangerous to increase the powers of the United Nations, as outlined in previous sections of this report, without at the same time strengthening the supervisory machinery of the United Nations and increasing the will of the peoples and governments of the world to maintain that organization. World law requires an institution for its enactment, interpretation and enforcement. […] Decisions of the United Nations need to be given universal scope, they should apply to all States whether they are Members of the United Nations or not, and all States should be entitled to participate in decisions affecting them. The decisions of the United Nations should be made by majorities speaking authoritatively for the world community and including those whose support would be needed to make the decisions effective, and should be arrived at by expeditious procedures. [56] Important changes need to be made with respect to the structure, mode of operation and voting procedures of various United Nations organs. As far as the Security Council is concerned, the permanent members might be asked to accept certain restrictions on their right to veto the decisions of the Council. The Commission has considered the question of revising the composition of the Security Council, especially with respect to permanent membership. It has discussed, among others, the following proposals: a. That when the credentials of the People’s Republic of China are accepted by the Security Council, India and Japan should be included at the same time among the permanent members of the Security Council; and that the Federal Republic of Germany should be given the same status upon its admission to the United Nations. b. That all States with a population of over 40 million, other than the present permanent members of the Security Council, should be entitled to semi-permanent seats on the Security Council, rotating at two-year intervals. (This would include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Mexico.) c. That the ten States ranking highest by a formula taking into account population, industrial and commercial importance, and contributions to the United Nations budget should be entitled to permanent or semi-permanent seats on the Security Council. (This would include, in addition to the present permanent members, the following semi-permanent members: India, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Brazil.) 48  For information about the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, see footnote 8 above. At the time this 1970 report was published, Louis B. Sohn (for biographical information, see footnote 15 above) was chairman of the Commission, and Clark M. Eichelberger was its executive director.

2 Earlier reform discussions

81

d. That all States with population over 200 million or contributing more than five per cent of the United Nations budget (the People’s Republic of China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States) should have permanent seats; and that all States with population over 40 million but less than 200 million (Brazil, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, [57] Pakistan, and, though it does not yet fulfill the population criterion, the United Arab Republic) would have semi-permanent seats. As none of these suggestions commanded wide consensus, the Commission decided to recommend no changes in the permanent membership of the Security Council at present. […] [60] […] Recommendations: The Commission believes that the United Nations can become more effective through an overhauling of its procedures, an improvement of its voting rules and the development of new institutions for the expression of world public opinion. The following steps might be taken to achieve these objectives: a. With respect to the Security Council: Step 81: The permanent members should relinquish their right of veto with respect to recommendations relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter, and the voting rules of the Security Council should be changed to allow decisions by a concurrent vote of a majority of permanent members and a majority of non-permanent members. Step 82: The veto should be removed with respect to decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter relating to enforcement measures not involving use of armed force by the United Nations. [61] Step 83: The new voting rules to be adopted with respect to decisions under Chapter VI (Step 81, above) should be extended later to decisions under Chapter VII, with the proviso that no State should be required to use armed force without its consent. […]

2.14 November 1971, Arthur Lall, The Security Council in a Universal United Nations, Occasional Paper No. 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace49 […] […] The first postulate would be that the Security Council would function on the basis of arriving at consensus or agreement, or at least of smoothing away opposition, 49  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.    Arthur S. Lall (1911-1998) was an Indian diplomat of the Jawaharlal Nehru generation who helped secure his newly independent country a place near the center of world affairs in the 1950s and 1960s. He was Consul General for India and then India’s representative at the United Nations in New York in the 1950s. He later represented India at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. After the end of his diplomatic career he taught international relations at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs in New York. For an obituary, see Barbara Crossette in The New York Times, 21 September 1998, p. B12.

82

2 Earlier reform discussions

among all the regions of the world. The second postulate would be that each region would also be represented in the transient member category and that the transient member, or members, for a region would have the right of discussion and consultation with the permanent member of the region in regard to all issues before the Council. In this way the non-permanent members would be assured of an input in the decisionmaking process of the Council. Furthermore, in some of the regions the permanent seat might be a composite one – as has been suggested as a possibility in the case of Western Europe. In Africa in particular a composite seat for, say, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Zaire Republic (formerly Congo-Kinshasa) might be envisaged. Perhaps in Latin America, too, a composite seat would be the best arrangement. The regions, the permanent members, and the non-permanent memberships might be as follows: Proposed regions, permanent and non-permanent members Region Africa & Middle East East Asia East Europe Latin America North America & non-Spanishspeaking states of Caribbean Pacific South & Southeast Asia Western Europe

Permanent Non-permanent Total Member Member(s) Composite seat 2 3 China 1 2 USSR 1 2 Brazil or composite seat 1 2 United States 1 2 Japan India

1 1

2 2

EEC seat for 4 states

2

3

In addition there would be one floating seat, bringing total membership to nineteen to permit some adjustment to be made as required. A second non-permanent seat has been given to Africa to ensure adequate representation of the Middle East and North Africa. The similar additional seat shown for Western Europe is meant to ensure representation of all the neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. The permanent members, under this arrangement, would represent regions, and would tend to be responsive to the situations and needs of their regions. The stipulation of obligatory consultation with the non-permanent members would conduce to the same end. In this manner the concept of global security – in which all regions have a lively interest – would become a reality. Under the present system of five hegemonical powers this is just not possible. […] A more explicit regional input in peace and security is called for, and the proposals made here would go as far as is feasible to secure such an input. […] Rationalization of the permanent membership of Western Europe will probably have to come sooner or later in any case, whether or not the Security Council is restructured as suggested. This does not in fact reduce the privileges of France or the United

2 Earlier reform discussions

83

Kingdom, because they will continue to be represented in the inner circle of decisionmakers in the Council in an even stronger role than at present – combined as they will be with West Germany and Italy.*1 True, the suggestions made do not establish an entirely democratic Security Council in terms of the 131 members of the United Nations. However, it does achieve a balance between regions. If it does not go further it will be conceded, I believe, that the logic of the emergence and development of our world system precludes an arithmetically democratic system. Furthermore, there is the question of which arithmetic is to be taken as the basis – that of population, or that of the number of members of the United Nations, or that of other tangibles? I personally would like to see the world advance to the point where each of the eight or so regions could elect its representatives to the Council with permanency for none. But this course would be rejected out of hand by the powerful states and by many others. I believe that the suggestions made achieve a balance between power and a necessary diffusion of the decision-making process in the Council in order to reflect legitimate global interests and concerns. Original footnote *1 Considering the increasing experience of the EEC [European Economic Community] in arriving at consensus it would appear to be not unrealistic to envisage the four leading Western European powers arriving at joint positions for their participation in Security Council affairs. Moreover, some of the members of the EEC are already talking about a common foreign policy. Any movement in this direction would increase the workability of composite representation. 2.15 1974, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Modernizing the Security Council: Special Report, New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace50 […] [5] Introduction There was a period in the history of the United Nations during which the role of the Security Council diminished considerably. More recently, however, the Security Council has again started to exercise the role assigned it in the Charter – the effective maintenance of international peace and security. In order to enable the Security Council to perform this function more effectively, it seems desirable to modernize that Council, taking into account the recent universalization of the United Nations. Rejecting for the moment more radical solutions, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends at this time two moderate, though important, steps toward such modernization: 50  For information about the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, see footnote 8 above. At the time this 1974 report was published, Louis B. Sohn (for biographical information, see footnote 15 above) was chairman of the Commission, and Richard N. Swift (a professor of politics at New York University whose studies focused on international law and the United Nations; see the obituary in PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4, Dec. 2002, p. 768) was its vice chairman. Both are mentioned on the title page of the report.

84

2 Earlier reform discussions

1. Article 23/2 of the Charter should be amended in such a way that any nonpermanent member could be immediately re-elected to the Security Council, should its regional group so desire. This would allow the major powers in each region to occupy a seat in the Council for more extended periods, in a semi-permanent fashion, without increasing the number of States wielding the veto. 2. The Security Council should in the future regard decisions under Chapter VI as “procedural” rather than substantive and thus not subject to the rule of unanimity. As most decisions of the Security Council have been taken under Chapter VI, such a change would enable the Council to take these decisions more promptly in all situations other than those involving breaches of the peace under Chapter VII. This would obviate the need of removing cases to the General Assembly which has parallel powers to make recommendations but cannot function as expeditiously as the Security Council. […] [11] […] Permanent Membership One of the basic problems with the Security Council’s ability to adapt to changing international reality is the rigidity of Article 23 in actually naming the permanent members of the Security Council. Delegates at San Francisco in effect paid a price in 1945 to gain for the United Nations what the League of Nations never had – the support of all the major powers at any one time – but the result is that to substitute new names for any of the “Big Five” requires the Members to amend the Charter. Presumably, adding new permanent members to make the Council more “representative” would arouse less opposition than attempting to substitute a new name for an existing permanent member, but even such changes have limited value. Any list of names is bound to need revising in another generation and to raise periodically the problem of amending the Charter. It seems to us far better to think in terms of [12] amendments that will have a chance of enduring and that provide in themselves for changes as time dictates their wisdom. We do not now advocate any change in the Council’s permanent membership. Because none of the permanent members has shown any desire to step down from its privileged position and because any one of them could veto a proposal to alter the present arrangements, we believe that any effort to challenge the status quo would lead only to frustration and to a probable increase in international tension. We would emphasize, however, that it is no more difficult for established powers to admit changes in their own power status, than it is for newer states to exercise the patience necessary for peaceful change. And just the majority of Members would be well advised to exercise some restraint in reforming the Security Council, the present permanent members should themselves begin to consider the rational arguments that can be advanced for a restructured Security Council – perhaps along the lines suggested below. Restructuring the Security Council […] [13] […] We have refrained above from recommending changes in the Charter which would reconstitute the permanent membership of the Council with, for instance, only one permanent member from Europe, or a Council with one seat permanently allotted to an undesignated African state and occupied by a different state in successive terms, or a Council with all its members elected. Rational arguments can be advanced for each

2 Earlier reform discussions

85

of these ideas, but the practical difficulties seem too great to surmount. Nonetheless, some give and take is required of both the old and new orders if neither wishes to bear the responsibility for rending the delicate fabric that holds the international organization together, and we believe that much can be done now by focusing on the non-permanent membership and on new ways of interpreting Council practice. [14] Non-Permanent Members and Article 23/2 […] Because of our confidence in the delegates’ judgement and because we are resigned to the inevitable working in a political organization of a political process, we wish to improve the capacity of the Security Council to function as an executive organ by ensuring places among the non-permanent members for those best suited to carry out the re- [15] sponsibilities of Council membership. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, therefore, recommends amending Article 23/2 to eliminate the last sentence forbidding the immediate re-election of non-permanent members.*1 With that one simple change the Assembly, by re-electing one or more non-permanent members, would in effect accord them semi-permanent membership without special voting rights. The proposal would reduce the opportunities of some Member States to serve on the Council, but since re-elected states would presumably have the full support of their respective regions, the proposal protects the Members’ interest in regional representation. Most like-minded or regional groups of states could, moreover, regularly advance the candidacy of one of their number (or the candidacy of one of a few designated states within their group) for a seat on the Council. […] [16] […] To avoid the need for amending the Charter constantly to meet newly perceived needs to add non-permanent members to the Council, the United Nations may be tempted to follow the League of Nations example, when the Council created additional seats with the approval of a majority of the League Assembly. United Nations Members could, for instance, amend Article 23/1 of the Charter to authorize the Security Council to increase the number of members with the approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly. We do not recommend this course, however, because the experience of the League of Nations offers some warnings against it. […] [17] […] The Veto No proposals for amending the Charter can avoid considering the problem of the “veto”. Originally, the defense of the rule of unanimity rested on the case that could be made that the veto reflected international reality. When used occasionally and as intended, to warn other United Nations Members that they are treading on a “vital interest” of a state with the capacity to plunge the world into war, or to ensure unanimous Big Power consent to the use of force, the rule of unanimity still serves a purpose. There never has been any valid constitutional reason, however, for regarding as subject to the veto the procedures for pacific settlement contained in Chapter VI of the Charter. At San Francisco, the Sponsoring Governments justified applying the veto to Chapter VI decisions by the so-called “chain of events” theory. They subscribed to a Statement setting out their understanding of the way the veto would operate: […] [19] […] All that is now required is for the Big Five to re-assess their Statement and to acknowledge tacitly, if not overtly, that no significant chain of events starts under Chapter VI,

86

2 Earlier reform discussions

but only under Chapter VII after the Council determines the existence of a threat or breach of the peace. Better yet, the Council might, and the Commission recommends that the Council should in the future regard decisions under Chapter VI as “procedural” rather than substantive and thus not subject to the rule of unanimity.*2 No legal obstacles stand in the way of such an interpretation, for the San Francisco Statement itself was never formally approved by the technical committee, Commission III, or by the United Nations Conference on International Organization itself,*3 and Security Council practice in distinguishing between procedural and substantive issues is far from consistent. Following these recommendations will leave the Council freer in the future than it has been in the past to “make peace” and to meet the criticism that the United Nations has spent far too little time on such activities to date. The steps are modest, but important, and we urge all concerned to consider them seriously. Original footnotes *1 Art. 23/2: “The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years…. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate reelection.” (If the Members agree to amend this paragraph, they need retain only the first sentence, since the second sentence, not reproduced here, applied only to the first election of non-permanent members.) *2 See also CSOP, Twentieth Report, p. 60. [The United Nations: The Next Twenty-Five Years. Twentieth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1970, p. 60; → 2.13.] *3 See Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, p. 221. [Leland M. Goodrich/Edvard Hambro/ Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 221.]

2.16 March 1978, United States of America, Administration of President Jimmy Carter, Report to the Congress on UN reform51 REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM Report by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate Pursuant to Section 503 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal year 1978 (Public Law 95-105). […] B. DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE UNITED NATIONS Weighted voting in the General Assembly and modified veto powers in the Security Council There is no prospect for the adoption of a generally applicable weighted-voting system in the General Assembly. Even on a limited basis it has little likelihood of being accepted. In fact, pressure for change has been in the opposite direction: to replace weighted-voting in global institutions where it now exists with decision-making procedures on the model of the General Assembly. The tradeoffs proposed, which involve 51  The full text of this report is reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. I, 1997, pp. III.8/1-III.8/55.

2 Earlier reform discussions

87

sharp curtailment of our veto power in the Security Council, are not in U.S. interests. Nor do we believe they would serve the organization well. Therefore, it would be better to employ our efforts toward defining voluntary but common standards to curtail the use of the veto in the Security Council and reduce the necessity of invoking it. We are also prepared to examine the offer to very small new States of some form of associate status with the United Nations, short of full membership and voting privileges. Consensus decision Consensus offers an alternative to formal voting as a way of arriving at decisions. It is increasingly used in the General Assembly and other UN organs. We hope that genuine consensus will become the principal method of conciliation in the continuing North-South dialogue in the United Nations. We are prepared to give substantially greater weight in our national policy to decisions so arrived at. […] REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT ON REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM INTRODUCTION In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1978 (Public Law 95-105), the Congress requested in Section 503 a report from the President on reform and restructuring of the United Nations System. The Department of State has undertaken a review of the specific issues raised in Section 503 as well as other proposals relating to UN reform. The following sections present a detailed analysis of these various issues as well as Department of State recommendations for future courses of action. […] II. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE UNITED NATIONS […] Modification of the veto power in the Security Council Proposals for changes in the Charter or for voluntary agreement among the permanent members to restrict the exercise of veto immediately give rise to two problems: they encourage proposals by other Member States for more far-reaching changes than any of the permanent members of the Security Council is prepared to accept and they give rise to objections by one or more of the permanent members to any dilution of the veto power. In light of these problems, even proponents in this country of restrictions on the use of the veto power in the Security Council as a quid pro quo for a change in General Assembly voting procedures have approached the matter cautiously. Indeed, various proposals which have been made – e.g., non-use of the veto in cases of establishment of fact-finding missions – appear intended primarily to make acceptable to the bulk of the UN membership significant changes in General Assembly voting procedures without seriously diluting the veto power. For that very reason they are not likely to provide an effective incentive to the bulk of the membership to accept such trade-off. Conversely, there seems very little reason for the permanent members of the Security Council to consider either elimination of the veto or its serious curtailment, as many

88

2 Earlier reform discussions

countries would like, in exchange for voting procedures of uncertain worth in the General Assembly. There is undeniably some attraction in an exchange which would involve very modest voluntary curtailment of veto rights in the Security Council – e.g., non-use of the veto on membership issues – in return for an increased voice for major contributors in budgetary questions coming before the General Assembly. We are prepared to explore with other UN members the general attitude towards such an exchange. Our strong belief, however, is that it would be virtually impossible to gain consensus for a formula of this kind satisfactory to the United States. Our efforts would be better employed in seeking to define with the other permanent members areas of Security Council work with respect to which it would be in the interest of the permanent members themselves to exercise voluntary restraint in the use of the veto. At the same time we shall continue to explore all possibilities for achieving agreement on matters coming before the Council in order to reduce the necessity of invoking the veto to a minimum. […]

2.17 14 November 1979, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, Letter to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/34/24652 […] On behalf of our respective Governments, we have the honour to request the inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly: Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. In conformity with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, an explanatory memorandum is attached. […] ANNEX Explanatory memorandum 1. Since the amendment of the Charter of the United Nations in 1963, enlarging the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 members, the membership of the United Nations has increased from 113 to 152. This increase is mainly due to the 52  At its 80th plenary meeting, on 28 November 1979, the General Assembly on the recommendation of the General Committee as set forth in its fifth report (A/34/250/Add.4, paras. 3 and 4), decided to include this item in its agenda and to consider it directly in plenary meeting as agenda item 34. See Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Thirty-fourth Session, UN Doc. A/34/46, p. 3. From 1980 to 1991, the item remained inscribed in the agenda, but the General Assembly deferred its consideration.

2 Earlier reform discussions

89

emergence and admission to the United Nations of a large number of new States from Africa, Asia and Latin America. 2. However, this increase has not been reflected in the membership of the Security Council. Presently the global average of the number of countries represented by one non-permanent seat in the Security Council is 14.7. The number of Asian countries represented by one non-permanent seat is 18.5. The corresponding figure for African States is 16.3, for Latin American States, 14, for the West European and other States, 11 and for Eastern European States, 10. This state of affairs constitutes an underrepresentation of non-aligned and developing countries on one of the principal organs of the United Nations. 3. In order to strengthen the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is necessary that the composition of the Security Council be reviewed with a view to providing for a more equitable and balanced representation that would reflect the increase in the membership of the United Nations. 4. Accordingly, the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session should be called upon to take measures to amend the Charter in this respect.

2.18 11 December 1979, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, India, Iraq, Japan, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/34/L.57 and Add.1 (14 December 1979)53 The General Assembly, Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced, Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus providing for a more adequate geographical representation of non-permanent members and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations:

53  With an addendum (UN Doc. A/34/L.57/Add.1, 14 December 1979), the sponsors of the draft resolution requested to add Iraq and Mauritius to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution. For the treatment of the draft resolution and the amendments to that resolution (→ 2.19) by the General Assembly, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1979, p. 436: “The Assembly considered the question at two plenary meetings on 14 December […]. Following discussion […], India, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, announced that they would not press it to the vote; India orally proposed instead that consideration of the question be postponed until the Assembly’s regular 1980 session. The Assembly adopted the Indian proposal without vote on 14 December as decision 34/431, by which it also decided to transmit to that session the draft resolution and related documents.” See also the introduction to this work, → 1.1., Periods of the reform debate.

90

2 Earlier reform discussions

(a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, the word “fifteen” in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word “nineteen”, and the word “ten” in the third sentence by the word “fourteen”; (b) In Article 23, paragraph 2, the second sentence shall then be reworded as follows: In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to nineteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year; (c) In Article 27, paragraph 2, the word “nine” shall be replaced by the word “eleven”; (d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word “nine” shall be replaced by the word “eleven”; 2. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by 1 September 1981; 3. Further decides that the fourteen non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) Four from African States; (b) Three from Asian States; (c) One from Eastern European States; (d) Three from Latin American States; (e) Two from Western European and other States; (f) One non-permanent seat shall alternate between African and Asian States.

2.19 14 December 1979, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, Amendments to Draft Resolution A/34/L.57; UN Doc. A/34/L.63 and Add.154 1. In paragraph 1 (a), replace the word “nineteen” with the word “twenty-one” and the word “fourteen” with the word “sixteen”. 2. In paragraph 1 (b), replace the word “nineteen” with the word “twenty-one” and the words “two of the four” with the words “three of the six”. 3. In paragraph 1 (c), replace the word “eleven” with the word “thirteen”. 4. In paragraph 1 (d), replace the word “eleven” with the word “thirteen”. 5. Replace paragraph 3 with the following text: 3. Further decides that the sixteen non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) Five from African States; (b) Three from Asian States; (c) One from Eastern European States; (d) Three from Latin American States; (e) Two from Western European and other States; 54  With an addendum (UN Doc. A/34/L.63/Add.1, 14 December 1979), the sponsors of the amendments (draft resolution A/34/L.63) requested to add Chile and Guatemala to the list of sponsors of the amendments. See further footnote 53 above.

2 Earlier reform discussions

91

(f) One non-permanent seat shall alternate between Latin American States and Asian States; (g) One non-permanent seat shall alternate between Eastern European States and Western European and other States.

2.20 1983, Hanna Newcombe, Design For a Better World, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America55 […] [129] […] However, in what follows we shall suggest some rather more extensive reorganization of the Security Council. Specifically, we have two plans in mind: one linked to weighted voting, and one based on regionalization. We shall now turn to these two proposals. 2. Weighted voting plan for the Security Council. Traditionally, the Security Council is the body in which the great powers outweigh the smaller members. In the present Security Council, this is achieved by the clumsy device of the unanimity principle, the veto. This divides Council membership into the first-class citizens (the Permanent Members) and the second-class citizens (the nonpermanent members). Only the first-class citizens can veto majority decisions. We propose that the unanimity provision be replaced by a weighted voting scheme, in which there indeed would be differences in decision-making power among the nations, but not in the form of second-class nations. We would no longer be burdened with arguments about which nation should now be admitted into the exclusive club of the Great Powers, or which should perhaps be expelled because of its loss of prestige. The voting weight assigned to the nations would vary with time, according to a prearranged formula enshrined in the Charter, as explained before. The formula used could again involve population and GNP (or its equivalent) in some form, as described previously for the General Assembly. The Security Council, of course, unlike the General Assembly, does not contain all the nations as members. Under weighted voting, when the General Assembly elects Security Council members for their next term of office, the nations would, of course, vote according to their voting weights. Thus, although there would formally no longer be any “permanent” members assured of automatic membership on the Council, the great powers could be assured of being elected, because they could muster sufficient votes in the General Assembly just by voting for themselves, even if no one else did. The rule in this election would be that the top 15 states are declared elected, with a procedure specified to eliminate a tie if necessary. Supposing we use formula 25 (population and health/education index.) Assuming that every nation votes for itself, on the first ballot, the U.S., China, USSR, India, Japan,

55  Copyright held by the Estate of Hanna Newcombe. Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of Mr. Ian P. Newcombe. – Hanna Newcombe (1922-2011), co-founder of Peace Research Abstracts and Peace Research Reviews, was the recipient of the 1997 Pearson Medal of Peace and a member of the Order of Canada (elected in 2007) for her work in peace research and international relations. After studying chemistry and receiving her PhD from the University of Toronto, she shifted to working on peace research. Together with her husband Alan, she was also part of the world federalist movement.

92

2 Earlier reform discussions

FRG, France, and U.K., would automatically be elected. If the smaller nations then decided which ones of the remaining large nations to vote for, we might see the election of, perhaps, Canada, Italy, Indonesia, Brazil, Netherlands, Mexico and Poland (or Bangladesh or Sweden), to give a 15-member Council. On the other hand, if the small [130] African nations combined their votes, they could easily elect one of their number to the Security Council, such as Nigeria, thus giving regional representation to that part of the world. In voting within the Security Council, each member would carry a number of votes equal to that which elected it to the Council in the Assembly; that is, in addition to its own voting weight according to the formula, a nation such as India would also have in addition the votes of its supporters in the General Assembly. Each Council member would thus not merely represent itself, but its whole bloc of supporters. This scheme lends itself to self-adjusting regional or political bloc representation, which may vary quite naturally, and without any further Charter revision, as the political alignments change. In such a new Security Council, the very large nations cannot, each by itself, block any action which they consider harmful to their own interests. Let us assume that the required majority for the adoption of an important or substantive resolution is 2/3. The total of all votes for all nations (now represented by “proxy” in the Security Council) is 1,015 for formula 25, but let us assume that a few General Assembly members abstained in the Security Council election and that the total is 1000; a majority of 667 votes would be required for adoption, and 333 would be a “blocking third” which could prevent adoption. The largest nation, U.S., has only 154 votes by itself, the others have less. Even with the addition of votes of those nations who elected them in the General Assembly, the large nations might not achieve a blocking third. For example, the U.S. could not count on the support of the whole Western bloc (which would give it 385 votes, enough for a blocking third), because its larger allies (e.g. Japan, FRG, France, U.K.) might disagree with the U.S. and have opinions of their own. The Soviet Union with its faithful allies stick much more closely together than the Western bloc does, and would probably vote alike; but they muster only some 120 votes or so. The others would not even come close to the 333 votes required for the blocking third. However, if the Western nations on the Security Council voted together, they would easily achieve a blocking third. A look at the East-West and North-South balances in Table 6 is instructive here. East and West would each have a blocking third on East-West issues, and North and South would each have a blocking third on North-South issues, under formula 25. If the absence of a virtual veto (blocking third) of the great powers in the Security Council is unacceptable to them, several modifications might be considered: [131] (1) The veto might be retained on a very restricted range of issues which are of vital interest to the three largest nations (U.S., USSR, China), or perhaps 4 nations (including India) or to any one of them. These 3 or 4 nations would be the only ones entitled to exercise the veto under any conditions, even these restricted ones. The range of issues to which this would apply should be very carefully defined in advance. (2) Alternatively, we could stipulate that it would take a 3/4 or 4/5 majority to override a negative vote by one of the 3 or 4 largest nations. In addition, the rule could be that any two of the largest nations voting against a motion would automatically defeat it.

2 Earlier reform discussions

93

These milder forms of the veto could form a transition stage to a veto-less Council, which should be the final aim. 3. Regionalization of the Security Council: Regional Security Commissions. In conflicts generally, the nations directly involved locally have a much higher degree of concern in the matters in dispute, and are much more affected by the violence taking place. Therefore, their votes and their opinions should somehow receive greater weight and greater attention than those of more distant nations. Yet, conflict settlement procedures of any kind need third parties, in addition to the parties in dispute. These might be the great powers; but in many cases it is better if these powers do not get involved at all, even in conciliatory roles, since they might use this to build additions to their spheres of influence, and this might contribute to future, more serious conflicts. The third parties needed for conciliation might better be supplied from the region itself, from among the local states not directly involved in the conflict. (An alternative procedure of using non-local ‘peacemakers’ is outlined at the end of this article.) How might this regionalization be carried out? The U.N. Charter (Articles 52-54) provides for regional arrangements, and our suggestions try to be consistent with the principles expressed there. The Articles stress ‘pacific settlement of local disputes’ and actions ‘consistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations.’ […] [132] […] Ever since the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed in Helsinki in 1975, there has been a need for an all-European agency whose purpose would be to solve various aspects of the East-West conflict on the European continent. One possibility for a continuing institution would be, according to suggestions, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The reason for suggesting the ECE for this function is simply that it is the only existing regional organization operating in Europe which includes all the European states, East, West, and neutral (excepts until recently the German Democratic Republic). All other European regional inter-governmental organizations are more limited in their membership, usually dividing along the East-West line. We might add that, in the light of the previous discussion, the ECE is also the most ‘compatible’, being part of the UN family of agencies. While it has been rather inactive through the years of the cold war in Europe, it has kept alive, by its very [133] existence, a bridge across the ideological chasm, a gate through the Iron Curtain. However, the goals and purposes are not primarily economic; they are more political and military, being concerned with security questions. Johan Galtung (1971) has therefore suggested the formation of a Security Commission for Europe (SCE), corresponding in its membership and extent of territory covered to the ECE, but being concerned with the security function. What we would then have is a compatible regional organization in Europe concerned with peace and security. Among possible advantages of this SCE, Galtung enumerates the following: (1) It would provide a UN setting for intra-European problems. (2) It would provide a common arena for NATO and Warsaw Pact, in a symmetrical fashion, as the ECE does in the economic sphere for EEC and Comecon. (3) It would pose no threat to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. (4) All European nations would belong individually, not in blocs. (5) Neutrals are included, so there is universal membership within the region. (6) NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be organizational members of the SCE if desired, in addition to the nation members. (7) Both Germanies would be members on equal terms.

94

2 Earlier reform discussions

Among the possible functions of the SCE, Galtung mentions (1) security research; (2) arms control and disengagement; (3) regional peace-keeping. The position of the US and Canada would need to be decided. These two nations have been invited, after some initial hesitation, to the European Security Conference; but would they or should they be part of a permanent SCE? Our suggestion is that either both the US and USSR be included, or both be excluded, for reasons of balance. The inclusion of the USSR only, on purely geographical grounds, would be a seriously unbalancing factor politically, and would interfere with the harmonious operation of the system. We prefer the exclusion rather than the inclusion of both superpowers in the SCE, since their presence might overshadow SCE operations too overwhelmingly, the same way as the US has dominated the OAS, making it ‘the majority of one, the minority of many’. The territory of the SCE should be, not ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’, but ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Soviet border’. The superpowers would, of course, retain informal links with the SCE through their allies and could even jointly guarantee the security of the entire area. We would then have in the European area a system of interlinked or overlapping alliances: Some nations (Western Europe) would belong to NATO and the SCE, other nations (East Europe) to the [134] SCE and Warsaw Pact, some (neutrals) only to the SCE, some (US and Canada) only to NATO, some (USSR) only to the Warsaw Pact. It is our belief that such interlinked alliances help to knit the world together. It is a well-documented fact in sociology that, if racial, religious, national, economic, ideological, and other divisions between groups coincide, the polarization tends to be more extreme and the resulting conflict potentially more violent. A good example of this is a study carried out in Northern Ireland in 1966, which found the Protestant-Catholic division and the rich-poor division coinciding, and very little social interaction occurring across this boundary. This study therefore predicted open conflict, and was unfortunately proven correct by subsequent events. (Boserup & Iversen, 1967.) Conversely, if divisions between groups are different for the language factor, the religious factor, the class factor, the ideological actor, and so on; if these boundary lines criss-cross rather than coincide, then conflict may be avoided. It is simply not so easy to pinpoint ‘the enemy’, for this designation differs according to the factor under consideration; and therefore feelings do not build up to fever pitch. Similarly, in international affairs, possibly the most dangerous situation is “tight bipolarization” – a division into only two, inwardly very close, but mutually hostile blocs, with very few if any nations outside. The world of the cold war was close to this, but was always moderated by some neutrals or quasineutrals. While tight bipolarization favors conflict, especially if the two blocs differ on ideology, wealth, religion, culture, power interests, etc., a condition of interlinking or overlapping alliances should inhibit conflict, since this corresponds to the ‘criss-crossing’ of division boundaries as discussed above. Galtung also proposed and discussed a system of UN Regional Security Commissions in areas other than Europe, but our proposals differ in certain respects from his, and we shall carry on our discussion without much further reference to his scheme. In Africa, there is now the UN ECA, as well as the OAU formed by the Africans themselves. The OAU has members both in Arab Africa North of the Sahara and Black Africa South of the Sahara, but of course not in the White-dominated Namibia and South

2 Earlier reform discussions

95

Africa. The ECA again is more universal and did include South Africa until 1963. The proposed SCA should be a universally inclusive regional organization. But are such mutually hostile countries compatible within the same regional organization? We would argue that, since [135] Regional Security Commissions (RSCS) are designed precisely for the control of local conflicts, they should contain within themselves countries from both sides of such regional conflicts as exist within their area. In fact, if this were not so, the RSCS would once more become similar to alliances of like-minded nations and the conflicts which exist (as between East and West Europe, or between Black and Southern Africa) would become inter-regional rather than intra-regional. If this were so, we would soon witness conflicts between the RSC and another, despite the UN connection; and the regional organizations would become incompatible, not only with the UN, but with each other. Such conflicts and incompatibilities as now exist should exist within the RSCS, so that each RSC could try to deal with them, with or without the help of the UN Security Council, but always under UN rules and supervision. Proceeding now along similar lines, we should create also a Regional Security Commission for the Middle East (SCME). There might be some overlap of membership with the SCA (Security Commission for Africa) on one hand and the SCAFE (Security Commission for Asia and the Far East) on the other; this would not hurt, since the regional division of global security responsibilities does not have to be such that each nation has responsibilities in one region only. The divisions do not have to be mutually exclusive; nor do they have to be, as we shall see later, jointly exhaustive – there may be regions of the world not covered by any RSC. Using once more the principle that an RSC should contain within itself both sides of the most acute local conflict, the SCME, unlike the Arab League, which is its ‘incompatible’ local parallel, should also contain Israel as a member. The rationale is the same as for the inclusion of South Africa with the OAU within the SCA, and need not be repeated here. In the ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), all states of Asia and the Far East are included, as long as they are UN members. This creates some gaps in Korea, North/South, just as the ECE used to have a gap in Germany. These gaps should all be filled, and universality achieved. Then several acute conflicts would be included in the region of the SCAFE: the conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, Pakistan-India, and P.R. China-Taiwan. The principle of including both sides of each conflict (sometimes two parts of divided countries) would be deserved. Outside powers which claim to have ‘interests’ in the area would not be included. Both the US and USSR (although the latter has a vast territory in Asia) would be excluded, for reasons of balance. The People’s Republic of China would be included, because it is fairly well balanced by India on one side and Japan on the other. Perhaps SCAFE is too large, and contains too many conflicts. Vietnam-Cambodia replaced the Vietnam-US war. Perhaps we should [136] divide SCAFE into two parts: Security Commission for South Asia (SCSA) and Security Commission for East Asia (SCEA). The former would look after the India-Pakistan and Vietnam Cambodia conflicts, the latter the China-Taiwan and Korea conflicts. The SCLA (Security Commission for Latin America), the equivalent of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), presents a different problem from the other regions. In the other regions, the problem was to include more members than

96

2 Earlier reform discussions

the corresponding ‘incompatible’ regional organization: e.g. the SCE is more inclusive than either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, the SCA is more inclusive than the OAU, the SCAFE is more inclusive than the SEATO. In the Latin American area, however, we would obtain better results if the SCLA excluded the U.S., so that it would be smaller than the OAS. The reason is again balance, since the U.S. inevitably dominates any organization to which it belongs by its sheer size, especially an area composed mainly of small poor countries (with some exceptions) like Latin America. Cuba should be a member of the SCLA. We seem to be arriving at a principle which tends to exclude the superpowers from the RSCS. This is perhaps just as well. The superpowers would, of course, be present in the UN Security Council as a whole, and could there interact with the RSCS from the different regions. But if local conflicts were managed by the RSCS, then the exclusion of the superpowers from the RSCS might help keep the superpowers out of these local conflicts. This would add greatly to the overall stability and security of the international system as a whole. Besides the superpowers, Canada is also left out of any RSC, because of its geographic position. Australia could be part of SCAFE, or it could be left outside. What would be the relation of the RSCS to the UN Security Council? The latter could be composed of: (1) The US and USSR. (2) Two representatives from each RSC, preferably one from each side of a conflict, where there is one. (3) Any large powers which could not be accommodated as RSC representatives. RSC representation could rotate; this could be at the discretion of each RSC, which would select its representatives, subject to approval by the General Assembly. This type of representation of the RSCS in the Security Council would tend to over-represent the nations in trouble spots: e.g. Israel, South Africa, and Cuba would always be members. However, this is probably justified, since it is precisely the trouble spots that get most of the attention in Security Council discussions, and the nations concerned should be present to participate actively in the discussions held and the decisions made. [137] The division of functions between the RSCS and the Security Council could be as follows: (1) the RSCS would be the first instances to try to settle or manage conflicts within their area. (2) The Security Council would be the instance of appeal for intra-regional conflicts which an RSC could not settle, or which got out of hand. (3) The Security Council would deal with inter-regional conflicts, or very large conflicts involving more regions or the whole world. The composition of the RSCS would be subject to change with time, but always observing the principles established here: containing both sides of local conflicts, excluding the superpowers, striving for local balance, and remaining compatible with the U.N. Within these rules, membership could be regulated according to the wishes of individual nations, which may change from time to time. Changes would be subject to approval by either the Security Council or the General Assembly or both, but should be fairly freely given. Membership should remain regional in the geographical sense: Cuba should not join Eastern Europe, or Israel Western Europe, since this would defeat the basic purposes of the RSCS. The RSCS are not to be blocs of politically congenial or homogeneous nations, but geographically contiguous groupings. Changes in memberships would thus probably have to be shifts in geographical boundaries, involving whole groups of countries. However, since overlapping membership is not excluded,

2 Earlier reform discussions

97

perhaps this would never occur. Since Egypt could belong to both the SCA and SCME, it might never feel the need to shift from one to the other. The main conflicts within the RSCS may also change from time to time. The Arab vs. Black conflict in Africa may one day become more severe than the White vs. Black conflict. Since this cannot be predicted, one should always remain flexible with respect to the possibility of reorganizing the whole system in accordance with need. What about some transregional overlapping groupings? Groups that come to mind are the Commonwealth and Francophonie; a Spanish speaking group might also arise one day. These could also help to knit the world together through overlapping membership, and there is a possibility of giving them formal recognition by allowing them representation, separately, in the UN Security Council, by creating additional seats for them. We suggest another addition to the transregional groupings: a “World Peace-Makers Association of Nations”, which could be abbreviated ‘World Peace MAN’. The idea is as follows: Perhaps, since the nations represented on the UN Security Council make political security decisions, they should not also administer them (principle of separation of powers). The World Peace MAN would [138] be composed of nations who specialize in UN peacekeeping, mediation, and other conciliation services. They would stay out of military alliances, and pledge to use their military forces only for home selfdefence or UN duties. (In the history of Switzerland, some cantons specialized in this way as peace-makers among some of the other cantons which were at loggerheads. See Lloyd 1969). Some natural members would be the Scandinavian countries (Nordic Council) and Canada, all with long and rich peace-keeping experience. (This is almost a regional grouping, across the top of the globe). Other additions would be invited, always remembering that, by the principle of overlapping membership, inclusion in WPMAN does not exclude simultaneous membership in one (or even two) of the RSCS. However, to maintain the ‘separation of powers’ mentioned above, the rule should be that the nations representing the RSCS on the Security Council should not also be members of WPMAN, at least not simultaneously, during their Security Council term of office. Thus the Security Council, in ordering UN troops to a trouble spot, would never be ordering troops to any nation making the decision. This specialization would give Canada a place in the international system, since, as we noted, it is not member of any RSC. Perhaps world integration would be encouraged by promoting specialization of nations for particular world tasks; some in peace-keeping and peace-making, some in economic integration, some in environmental protection and conservation, etc. Thus nations would acquire new images, new pride, based not on conquest or aggressive values but rather on service to the world. […] [304] […] VI Transition Paths. A. Stages and Sequences of Previously Discussed Plans. […] [312] […] The Security Council should go into its reorganization (according to either of the two proposed alternative plans) by 1990. By 2000 it should switch to weighted representation, simultaneously with the General Assembly. If the Regional Security Commissions are then in operation, the weighted representation might seriously stress the RSCS, and a rethinking of this scheme might be in order. By the year 2010, the Security Council should reorder its relationship to the General Assembly (which would then be a world legislature), and become responsible to it in the sense

98

2 Earlier reform discussions

in which a cabinet (or an executive) is responsible to a legislature in parliamentary or presidential systems: that is, not only would Security Council members be elected by the General Assembly, as they are now, but they could also be recalled by the General Assembly (by means of a vote of no confidence) if the General Assembly is not satisfied for any reason with the performance or the decisions of some member or members of the Security Council. By 2020, the transition of the Security Council to a cabinet structure would be completed, in the sense that delegates to the Security Council would now be elected as individuals, not as representatives of nations; and chosen for their personal skills, knowledge, and value beliefs. The name might now be changed to Executive Council, and it could, if it wished, elect a World President or Prime Minister; but collective leadership might be acceptable too, perhaps even preferable, to avoid “the cult of personality”. […]

2.21 1987, Harold Stassen, The Stassen 1987 Draft Charter for a Better United Nations Organization, Glenview: Glenview Foundation56,57 […]

[…]

THE STASSEN 1987 DRAFT CHARTER for a better United Nations to emerge from the original Presented, urgently, to the peoples of the world and to their governments, in this 42nd Anniversary year of the first United Nations Charter, by one of the drafters and signers of that original Charter, Harold E. Stassen. CHAPTER V THE SECURITY COUNCIL Article 23

Composition 1. The Security Council shall consist of nineteen Members of the United Nations. Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, or such of these states as are Members of the United Nations, shall be 56  Harold Edward Stassen (1907-2001) was the 25th Governor of Minnesota (1939-43), President of the University of Pennsylvania (1948-53), and Director of the United States Foreign Operations Administration (1953-55). He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco founding conference of the United Nations and a leading candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in 1948, considered for a time to be the front-runner. He thereafter regularly continued to run for that and other offices. 57  Stassen had already forwarded an advance copy of this draft to the representatives of the then 159 members of the UN, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Secretary-General of the UN. The 1985 version, as opposed to the one included in the present collection, featured only two special permanent seats to be allocated to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., respectively. Stassen republished the 1987 draft in 1990.

2 Earlier reform discussions

99

permanent Members of the Security Council. Of these permanent Members, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be special permanent Members. The eight permanent Members who are not special permanent Members may elect one of their number to have for a three-year term, all of the voting rights, and responsibility, authority, and restraints, of a special permanent Member. The General Assembly, acting with the weighted vote provided in Article 66, shall elect additional Members of the Security Council to bring the total number to nineteen, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 2. The non-permanent Members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent Members, however, onehalf shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring Member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. 3. Each Member of the Security Council shall have one representative. […] Article 27 Voting 1. Each Member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of ten Members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve Members including the concurring votes of the special permanent Members and the concurring vote of three-fourths of the permanent Members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter IX, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

2.22 October 1991, Ambassador Peter Wilenski, Address on UN Reform to the United Nations Association of Australia58 […] Nevertheless, the path is at the present time open for much larger steps than at any time in the UN’s history. As we have noted, the five permanent members of the Security Council are for the first time in agreement on a range of issues and the tone of the North-South confrontation has also become more muted. If the incoming Secretary­-General were to wish to build on what has already been done and proposed 58  Peter Wilenski, News and Views: Address on UN Reform to the United Nations Association of Australia, May 1991 (Revised October 1991), Diplomatic World Bulletin, vol. 22, no. 13 and 14. The full address is reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. II, 1997, pp. III.26/1-III.26/15. –    Peter Stephen Wilenski (1939-1994) was a senior Australian public servant and diplomat. He was a champion of women’s rights and equal opportunity. He served as Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations from 1989 to 1992 when he was appointed Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. See Gareth Evans, The world after Wilenski: An Australian who mattered, Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 22 June 1995.

100

2 Earlier reform discussions

by the current Secretary-General and to take a keen and active interest in reform, he or she could do much to improve the organisation’s effectiveness and standing. There are five major areas where reform is currently under discussion and which I should like to deal with in turn setting out the ideas that are abroad and my view of the likelihood of change. These areas are the Security Council, peacekeeping and peacemaking, the General Assembly, the economic and social structures and the Secretariat. Security Council As the UN body responsible for international security issues and the only UN body whose decisions are binding on member states, the Security Council wields considerable power and attracts the greatest interest. The domination of the Council by the victors of World War II was an anachronism that did not excite much discussion for as long as the Council was paralysed by the Cold War. But during the Gulf War, as the importance of the Council became publicly evident, the gap between it and the 144 member states not represented on it (as well as the gap between the permanent and temporary members) became the subject of much debate and generated demands that the Council more accurately reflect the modern world. Any change to the Council’s composition would, however, require the assent of each of the current permanent members, and this will not come easily or quickly. There have been few serious attempts to alter the composition of the Council, which has been unchanged since the Assembly agreed to increase the non-permanent membership from 6 to its current 10 in 1963 – an increase which took effect in 1965. The only concerted effort to change the composition of the Council since the 1965 expansion came during the 1979 General Assembly.59 India proposed that the non­ permanent members be expanded from 10 to 14, with the four extra to come from the African Group (up 2 to 5), and the Asian and Latin American Groups (both up 1 to 3). All the PS except China were opposed to any expansion. Due to the opposition of most of the permanent members, the issue was never thoroughly debated by the General Assembly and within a few years had lost all momentum. Although the item remains on the Assembly’s agenda, debate has been non-existent in recent years and it is just routinely rolled over. More recently, discussion of possible changes to the Council has focused on the central question of permanent membership and the related veto power. While there are few formal proposals, the countries most generally mooted for permanent membership of the Council are: Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria and Egypt. What is usually proposed is a kind of second class permanent membership without the power of veto. Japan is the one candidate which figures on nearly all lists. Its economic power is indisputable and it is the second largest contributor to the UN’s budget and while Japan’s claims are probably the most widely recognised, a simple PS + 1 scenario is unlikely, as the wider UN membership would be unlikely to countenance any expansion which did not take account of the aspirations of other emerging powers. Germany’s present preoccupation with domestic issues has meant that its leaders have kept a low profile on the expansion issue. As Germany increasingly asserts itself 59  → 2.17–2.19.

2 Earlier reform discussions

101

in Europe, it is likely to demand a reconsideration of its role in the multilateral system. A recent Italian proposal, to replace France and UK with Japan and EC (P5 – 2+2) has the virtue of keeping the Council the same size but is some way down the track given the formidable difficulties ahead in the EC for the co-ordination of foreign policy on a Community or supra-national basis. Moreover, it again does not address the aspirations of the Third World membership of the UN. A more wide-ranging reform (Brazil has proposed P5+5 non-veto permanent members) is therefore the more feasible, although still very much in the realms of speculation. Perhaps the greatest drawback in making the Council more representative is the practical risk that a significantly enlarged Council would make decision-making more difficult. P5 co-operation, while at times frustrating to the rest of the membership, has brought great benefit in the resolution of regional conflict. There is considerable resistance to tampering with the Council just at the time it is showing it can work. It must be able to respond quickly to threats to international security if it is to continue acting as the founders of the Charter envisaged, and an unwieldy three tiered structure could inhibit quick Council action. The behind-the-scenes negotiation of the texts of resolutions would become even more complex and tedious. This unwieldiness would carry with it the risk not merely that responses would be too late, but also that the major powers would become less willing to devote the time and effort needed to work through the Council and would be readier to adopt unilateral action. The challenge is thus to ensure that any change to the Council’s structure accurately reflects current global power relationships but is implemented in such a way as to minimise any reduction in the speed and efficiency of the current decision-making process. The forces arranged against change (and the fact that the P5 do continue to have strong claims solely in terms of military power on security issues) ensure that this is a challenge which will not be taken up until the Council’s membership is so at odds with the modern world that the point is reached where this dysfunction undermines the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions. In the meantime, only very minor procedural reforms (e.g. regular procedures for informing the rest of the membership of the calling of Council meetings and/or of the progress of informal consultations) are likely to be accepted in order to close the gap between the Council and the rest of the membership. […]

2.23 6 September 1992, Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, The Jakarta Message, NAC 10/Doc. 12/Rev.1 and 2, in UN Doc. A/47/675-S/24816 of 18 November 1992 The Jakarta Message: A Call for Collective Action and the Democratization of International Relations (NAC 10/Doc. 12/Rev.1) 1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, representing the vast majority of humankind, meet in Jakarta, Indonesia, at a momentous juncture in history; a time of profound change and rapid transition, a time of great promise as well as grave challenge, a time of opportunity amidst pervasive uncertainty.

102

2 Earlier reform discussions

[…] 23. The United Nations, as the universal embodiment of multilateralism, has a unique opportunity to become the primary, collective instrument to construct a new, just and equitable world order. To ensure the achievement of these objectives, our Movement is determined to play a leading role in contributing to the revitalization, restructuring and democratization of the United Nations System. To this end, we have decided to establish a high-level Working Group charged with the elaboration of concrete proposals for the restructuring of the United Nations. […] Final Document, Chapter II, Global Issues, Political and Economic Committees (NAC 10/Doc. 1/Rev.2) […] 32. The Heads of State or Government noted the new cooperative spirit prevailing in the Security Council which has allowed it to take a number of unanimous positions on some of the most critical and complex issues. However, they expressed concern over the tendency of some states to dominate the Council which could become an institution for the imposition of the will of the strong upon the weak, and reaffirmed that all nations and States, large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, have the right to full independence and sovereign equality in international relations. It is therefore essential to ensure that the exercise of special powers does not create imbalances and discriminatory treatment in the international community or in the United Nations, or lead to world affairs being run by a small group of powerful nations. Moreover, the credibility and moral authority of the Security Council can only be enhanced by acting in a prompt, even-handed and impartial manner and in the interest of all States through the full implementation of its resolutions without discrimination or selectivity. They were of the view that the veto powers which guarantee an exclusive and dominant role for the permanent members of the Council are contrary to the aim of democratizing the United Nations and must, therefore, be reviewed in line with the reform of the United Nations aimed at bringing about greater democratization and transparency in the work of the United Nations bodies. They also called for a review of the membership of the Council with a view to reflecting the increased membership of the United Nations and promoting a more equitable and balanced representation of the members of the United Nations. They expressed the need for a workable and effective system of collective security in accordance with the United Nations Charter and for the development of modalities for preventive diplomacy, fact-finding and good offices missions, and United Nations observers or presence in areas of conflict in full respect of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. […]

3 “The most productive time”: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group from 1992 to the Razali proposal of 1997 3.1 Statements by UN organs and officials 3.1.1  11 December 1992, UN General Assembly, Resolution 47/62, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [without reference to a Main Committee (A/47/L.26/Rev.11 and Add.1)] The General Assembly, Recognizing the increasingly crucial role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, Recognizing also the changed international situation and the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, the total membership having reached one hundred and seventy-nine, Acting in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirming the principle of sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations, Mindful of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, Realizing the need to continue the process of revitalization and restructuring of certain organs of the United Nations, Recalling the statements made on the subject at its forty-seventh session,*1 as well as the statement on the same subject contained in the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992,*2 1.  Requests the Secretary-General to invite Member States to submit, not later than 30 June 1993, written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council; 2.  Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, for its consideration, a report containing comments made by Member States on the subject; 3.  Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-eighth session the item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”.

1  9 December 1992, Revised Draft Resolution. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_004

104

3  “ The most productive time ”

Original footnotes See A/47/PV. 69. [23 November 1992, e.g. → 3.2.1.2.1 and 3.2.1.3.1.]. *2 See A/47/675-S/24816, annex, document NAC 10/Doc.1/Rev.2, sect. C. [6 September 1992, → 2.23]. *1

3.1.2  3 December 1993, UN General Assembly, Resolution 48/26, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 47/62 of 11 December 1992,2 Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General which reflected the views of a number of Member States on the agenda item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, Recalling also the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, especially Article 23, Recalling further that the Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf, Recognizing the need to review the membership of the Security Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations, Bearing in mind the need to continue to enhance the efficiency of the Security Council, Reaffirming the principle of the sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations, Acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, Mindful of the importance of reaching general agreement, 1. Decides to establish an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council; 2. Requests the Open-ended Working Group to submit a report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly before the end of its forty-eighth session; 3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”. 69th plenary meeting 3 December 1993

2  → 3.1.1.

3  “ The most productive time ”

105

3.1.3  20 May 1994, Non-Paper by the President of the Open-ended Working Group3 on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council4 This is a President’s non-paper and represents an attempt to facilitate a systematic and constructive exchange of views in the second round of discussions. It is not a summary or synthesis of the views of Member States expressed in the first round of discussions. All the issues are interlinked and decisions will be taken as a package. The list of issues and questions in this paper is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Delegations can raise any relevant issues or questions for discussion. The debate in the first round of discussions of the Working Group revealed areas of general convergence as well as areas where more discussions are required to achieve convergence. Further discussions will be necessary on both areas before agreement can be reached. The debate on clusters 3 to 6 in many aspects recapitulated the issues and questions discussed earlier on the first two clusters. Issues covered by more than one cluster are included only once. […] [2] Cluster 1:  Equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, including regional distribution, categories of membership, numbers and modalities of selection 1. Areas of convergence appear to be: a) The present size and composition of the Security Council are not representative of the general membership of the United Nations, which now stands at 184, and do not adequately take into account the changes which have taken place in the international community. b) The present size of the Security Council does not allow for equitable participation of all Member States, especially the smaller and medium-sized countries. c) More equitable and representative participation in the Security Council could be achieved by increasing the overall number of seats in the Security Council. d) The optimal size of the reformed Security Council could be in the low 20s, within a range of 20-25. e) Reform of the Security Council should at the same time enhance the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness. f) Concerning the possible increase in the non-permanent seats the criteria in Article 23 (1) of the Charter should apply without prejudice to further criteria to be agreed on or prioritization of the criteria. 3  The President of the General Assembly, Mr. S.R. Insanally, served as Chairman of the Working Group. 4  See Report on the progress of the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/47 of 2 September 1994, para. 6: “It was also thought to be useful for the President of the General Assembly to prepare a non-paper, reflecting his personal views, in an attempt to facilitate a systematic and constructive exchange in the second round of discussions. The non-paper by the President was issued on 20 May 1994 […] for the internal use of the Open-ended Working Group.”

106

3  “ The most productive time ”

2. Further discussion is needed on the following: a) Increase in non-permanent membership: If the increase is only limited to non-permanent members, what other criteria than those in Article 23 (1), if any, should apply. b) Increase in permanent membership: If there is to be an increase in permanent members, there are different views on the question of criteria: – some see the need for a set of criteria to be agreed upon first; – some others have suggested that irrespective of, or in addition to, the criteria set out in Article 23 (1) other factors such as global influence and power or regional distribution could be possible criteria; – some have mentioned particular Member States as candidates for permanent membership without necessarily mentioning specific criteria. c) [3] New categories: A number of delegations have suggested the creation of a new category of “semi-permanent” membership. Some delegations have voiced a concern that this might lead to another privileged class in the Security Council. Some delegations noted that the attributes, selection and a number of members for this new category need to be examined further. Other variations of new categories of membership include proposals such as “regional members” and “members representing constituencies”. d) Re-election: It has also been proposed that non-permanent members of the Security Council should be allowed to seek immediate re-election at the end of their tenure to enable them to serve successive terms in the Security Council (i.e. amend Article 23 (2)). e) Veto power: some delegations thought that the veto power should not be extended to new permanent members. Others stated that new permanent members should enjoy the same rights and privileges as the existing permanent members of the Security Council. Some delegations maintained that the veto power of the existing permanent members should be abolished. Others demurred. There were also different proposals to limit or modify the use of the veto. 3. Delegations also expressed the view that the questions of numbers and categories of membership in the Security Council are linked to the issues of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and other matters related to the Security Council. 4. Annex I lists issues, in the form of questions, that have to be addressed. [4] Cluster 2:  Other matters related to the Security Council: relationship of the Security Council with the General Assembly, other bodies and organizations as well as non-members of the Security council; reform by the Security Council of its working methods and procedures […] [6] Cluster 3: Effective and efficient functioning of the Security Council 8. Areas of convergence appear to be: a) It is vital to have an efficient and effective Security Council. b) Improvements in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council should be undertaken with a view to enhancing its efficient and effective functioning.

3  “ The most productive time ”

107

c) The Security Council needs as much relevant information as possible on the issues under its consideration. It is therefore important to enhance the mechanisms for gathering and analysing such information. 9. The debate revealed that many of the issues discussed in this cluster are closely linked to Clusters 1 and 2. Many of the specific measures which have been suggested to enhance the efficient and effective functioning of the Security Council were earlier mentioned under Cluster 2. Areas which require further discussion were also largely covered in the first two clusters. 10. Please refer to Annexes I and II for relevant questions. Cluster 4: Decision-making in accordance with the provisions of the Charter 11. The debate revealed that many of the issues discussed in this cluster are closely linked to Cluster 1. The main issue was the veto. Further discussion is needed on the use of the veto in the present world situation; the granting of the veto to new Security Council members; and whether the veto should be limited or modified. 12. Please refer to Annex I for relevant questions. [7] Cluster 5: Elections and terms of office 13. The debate revealed that many of the issues discussed in this cluster are closely linked to Cluster 1. Areas of convergence and areas which would require further discussion were largely covered in Cluster 1. 14. Please refer to Annex I for relevant questions. Cluster 6: Modalities for bringing changes into effect and consideration of related Charter amendments […] [8] Questions: ANNEX 1 1. Is it possible to further narrow down the frequently cited optimal size of 20-25 members for the Security Council to 20-22, 22-24, or 23-25? 2. How should such an increase of the Security Council be effected: a) Should the increase comprise non-permanent or permanent members or both? If so, how many of each? b) For non-permanent members, are the criteria in Article 23 (1) sufficient? c) For new permanent members, would a set of criteria for selection be necessary? If so, what should these be? d) If the increase includes new permanent members, what are their responsibilities, obligations and privileges? 3. There have been proposals for possible new categories of membership: 3.1 Semi-permanent members: a) What would be their responsibilities, obligations and privileges? b) What would be their terms of office? c) What would be the criteria for semi-permanent membership? 3.2 Regional seats/members a) What would be their responsibilities, obligations and privileges? b) What would be their terms of office? c) How should they be selected?

108

3  “ The most productive time ”

d) Would regional seats/members encapsulate the concept of “constituencies seats/members”? 3.3. If there are to be semi-permanent or regional members, what should their numbers be within the context of the size of the Security Council, to be agreed on in questions 1 and 2? [9] 3.4. Allowing all/some non-permanent members to serve successive terms a) Should all/some of the non-permanent members be allowed to seek immediate re-election to serve successive terms in the Security Council? If so, how many re-electable and non re-electable non-permanent members should there be? b) Should there be a limit to the number of times non­-permanent members can seek re-elections? c) How should they be selected? 4. Should the veto power be retained, modified or limited? If so, how can this be achieved? 5. How do the size and composition of the Security Council affect its effective and efficient functioning, its transparency, legitimacy and other matters related to the Council? […] 3.1.4 27 May 1994, UN Secretariat, Background paper for the internal use of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council5 1. The present non-paper is prepared on the basis of the views expressed by Member States during the first round of substantive discussions in accordance with the programme of work, which was agreed upon at the 3rd meeting of the Working Group held on 1 March 1994. The Working Group devoted 14 meetings to the first round of discussions between 1 March through 17 May 1994. 2. The list of views contained in the present non-paper is intended to provide background material for the Working Group. It is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of every view presented by the delegations concerned; rather, it seeks to identify salient points and broad trends. 3. The views reproduced in the present non-paper have been made by one or several Member States. Furthermore, the views contained in the list are not necessarily identical with the exact expressions used by Member States as similar positions have been grouped together under a given category. It should be noted further that the order of listing of the items neither reflects nor implies any order of priority.

5  See Report on the progress of the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/47 of 2 September 1994, para. 6: “At the end of the first round of discussions and after informal consultations conducted by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group, the Secretariat was asked to prepare a second background paper on the views expressed by Member States during the first round of discussions. The paper was issued on 27 May 1994 […] for the internal use of the Open-ended Working Group.”

3  “ The most productive time ”

109

Cluster 1 I.  EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION, CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP, NUMBERS AND MODALITIES OF SELECTION A. Equitable representation 1. General

Regional representation (1) A more balanced regional representation in the Security Council is in order. (2) Increase both permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council on the basis of an equitable distribution of seats among different regions of the globe. (3) Each regional group should be entitled to a number of seats in the Security Council that would reflect its percentage vis-à-vis the total membership of the United Nations. (4) The present inadequacy of representation by Africa, Asia and Latin America compared to the situation of West European and other States needs to be rectified. (5) It is important that whatever the size we eventually agree upon, it should ensure the greatest degree of representativity. Central aspects in this exercise are expansion in the context of the regional perspective so as to ensure a proper regional representation and the need to underline that increase in the number of seats would be meaningless without qualitative representativity. (6) Each regional group should have the right to determine its representatives. (7) The Council should represent and act on behalf of all members of the Organization and should resist any changes that would lead to regional group building within the Council. Representation of major centres of power (1) There are two strands to representativity: representation of the membership of the United Nations as a whole and representation of the major centres of political and economic power. (2) Increasing the number of the permanent members would not in itself enhance democracy. Nor should we look for strict equitable geographical representation. Global economic and political power is not evenly distributed. These realities should be kept in mind when considering an increase in the number of permanent seats. (3) We need to adjust the composition of the Security Council in two basic ways: to improve the regional representation and to adjust the number in light of the expansion of the membership of the United Nations. There is a need to give appropriate recognition to those few countries whose global role and importance has manifested itself. (4) The structure of the Security Council must be credible: it must reflect as closely as possible the new realities and the changed configuration of international relations. (5) Article 23 of the Charter specifies contributions in peace-keeping forces to maintain international peace and security. Would it be worthwhile to mention that 40 per cent of the 71,000 members of the peace-keeping forces are from the Western European and Other States Group? The financial contribution of the WEOG to the regular budget of the United Nations exceeds 77.03 per cent.

110

3  “ The most productive time ”

(6) Reform of the Council should be done in the general context of adapting the United Nations to the new political and economic realities of the world. Principle of sovereign equality (1) The composition of an expanded Security Council should among others be strictly based on the principles of sovereign equality of all States and equitable regional representation. (2) There has been an attempt to link the criteria of Article 23.1 concerning “contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization” to the rights of middle-sized countries to be elected to the Security Council with greater frequency. The language in Article 23.1, while not a rigid or automatic formula, is an indicator of the factors to be taken into account by the United Nations General Assembly. But nowhere is the size of the country mentioned as one of the criteria. (3) Measures should be undertaken which will permit small States to have an opportunity to sit in the Security Council, in keeping with the principle of sovereign equality of States. Size and economic wealth should not be the only standards in determining membership of the Security Council. (4) A country, big, medium or small, rich or poor ought to be able to seek membership in the Security Council as it is seen to act in accordance with the values enunciated with the principles of sovereign equality of States. In this context, reservations were made on some proposals which, despite some merit, would seem to perpetuate the present imbalances in the membership of the Security Council. Ratio between permanent and non-permanent members (1) An important element of the vision of the increased Security Council is the need to preserve the current ratio among the permanent and non-permanent members. The present proportion is appropriate and should therefore be retained. (2) It would be entirely inequitable if any increase in permanent membership were to further distort the balance between permanent and non-permanent members. Equity requires that if the number of permanent members were increased, there would need to be a correspondingly larger increase in the general membership. Constituency (1) Members of the Council should not only represent their own countries, but also a smaller or larger group of other countries, which form part of their particular constituency. (2) Any reform would still leave the vast majority of the United Nations membership largely outside the inner circle. It is therefore in the manner in which this inner circle, however constituted, is seen to act in response to the real concerns of the wider United Nations membership that the most urgent measures relating to the Security Council must be contemplated. In this perspective, the put forward of ‘constituencies’ where individual members of the Council would also represent other countries forming part of that constituency is important. (3) There is a consensus on equitable representation that assures a modicum of representation by very small States on the Security Council. To achieve this presence on the Security Council, taking into account the personnel required of Missions and

3  “ The most productive time ”

111

the scarce material resources which would have to committed, there may be a need to create a constituency-based system. (4) Consideration should be given to constituencies, or groups of States which do not exactly coincide with any of the five regional groups, such as the Arab Group. Criteria (1) The General Assembly has to provide guidelines for the selection of members to the Security Council. Criteria such as populations and financial contribution could be examined. (2) The criteria for membership of the Council contained in Article 23, by and large, remain valid, i.e. contribution to international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization and equitable geographical distribution. Implicit in Articles 24 and 25 are two additional criteria, namely, (a) a willingness to act on behalf of the Members of the United Nations in a prompt and effective manner (Article 24, para. 1); and (b) a Member State’s consistency in abiding by the decisions of the Council (Article 25). (3) The ground rule for any sort of membership in the Council is the payment of all dues. (4) The notion of equitable representation goes beyond the concern of equitable geographical representation mentioned in Article 23 of the United Nations Charter. It includes: – The willingness of members to shoulder responsibilities inherent in the Security Council’s onerous mandate; – Strategic considerations; – The representation of the main forms of civilization, the principal legal systems of the world and diverse cultural systems; – A democracy which affords to small, as well as large States, a crucial voice in the preservation of security, irrespective of size. (5) A new composition of the Council cannot be the product of criteria designed to accommodate certain pre-selected countries. The right to be part of the Security Council should not focus on a few powerful nations that owing to their military, technological and economic capacity could contribute to the Organization’s operations. (6) Any extension of the Security Council must not reduce the special responsibility of its permanent members nor alter the status of non-permanent members. (7) Will a new caste system of varying degrees of privileged positions emerge creating distinctions among Member States? In other words, is the underlying assumption valid that only States with potential for larger global or regional outreach, military capability and economic capacity should have a more privileged status in the Council in terms of representation? (8) The Security Council is the only United Nations organ for which the Charter has specified criteria for its membership. The General Assembly should shed more light on the meaning of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional groupings (1) One should be prepared to look at changes to traditional regional groupings if that can facilitate the search for an equitable formula.

112

3  “ The most productive time ”

B. Additional seats 1. Total number of seats (1) Strong support for expanding the number of members of the Council by at least 5 and perhaps more. (2) A new Security Council should consist of a maximum of 25 countries – a number which is still manageable and compatible with effectiveness. (3) An expanded Security Council would have 25-26 members. (4) The most commonly quoted figures are in the low 20s. A Council of this size would appear to be in line with the proportion of non-permanent members in 1946 and 1965. (5) Relative to the overall increase in United Nations membership, the membership should increase by additional 6 to 10 new seats to bring the overall membership to between 21 and 25. (6) There is a size beyond which it is extremely difficult to think the Council would be able to function effectively simply because of the inherent dynamics of organs larger than 25 members. Indeed a number closer to 20 would be even more effective. (7) The number should be as close to 20 as possible. (8) The Council should comprise a total membership between 20 and 22 States. This would imply an increase of between 5 to 7 non-permanent members. (9) Aim for the low-twenties as a manageable size for the Council. (10) If we go beyond the number of about 20 members, the disadvantages may easily outweigh the advantages. (11) It is proposed first to increase the membership from 15 to 25 which ready reflects the largest number feasible. (12) The maximum increase in the total number of Security Council members should not exceed 8-10 range. (13) The membership of the Council should increase to 20 or eventually no more than 25 members. (14) One of the major strengths of the Council lies in its limited membership. A prudent increase is with not more than 10 seats. (15) It is imperative to have an increase to at least 20 to 25. (16) There should be a modest increase in the low twenties consistent with the increase in the overall membership of the United Nations and conforming to the broadly established mathematical ratio of 10 per cent of the total United Nations membership. (17) The increase must be limited – the number of seats should be in the low 20’s – so as not to affect negatively the capacity of the Council to perform its tasks. (18) At this stage we find the number 20 a sound basis for further discussion. (19) The Council should be enlarged by an additional 6 to 10 new members. (20) Twenty-three might be an appropriate figure, if the ratio between the whole membership and the Council membership in 1965 were to be maintained. (21) There is a strong argument for the need to restore the balance between the general membership and the Security Council. Such a balance would be achieved by increasing the membership to 25 to 30 members. (22) Council seats should be increased to 25-35.

3  “ The most productive time ”

113

2. Existing and new permanent seats No change in status quo (1) The existing permanent members of the Security Council are countries with global political and economic influence and a capacity to contribute to global peace and security. Their status should remain unchanged. Fully appreciating that permanent membership entails accepting an active role in global peace and security, one can strongly support new permanent membership for two major countries with global influence. (2) Those countries that were the major Powers at the time the Organization was established will serve as permanent members of the Security Council and guide its work. Changes suggested in status quo (1) The permanent member’s category should be frozen and gradually eliminated. (2) Time has come for an examination of permanent membership and how permanency is regarded by the general membership. Even the Permanent Members can go astray and not qualify to be permanent. There are past instances of the rise and fall of major countries. General criteria for expansion (1) Any new permanent members should be willing and able to participate in the implementation of decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. This means that any such new members will have to shoulder their obligations in the maintenance of international peace and security economically and by committing troops or equipment, etc. to peace-keeping operations. (2) In support of the expansion of the ranks of permanent members, we would need to take a much harder look on the criteria and modalities for selection above and beyond the broad-based criteria laid in Article 23.1, such as population, economic capacity, willingness to implement Council decisions, payment of all dues, acceptance of jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and compliance with disarmament treaties. (3) The criterion on equitable geographical distribution, as stipulated in Article 23.1, does not necessarily apply to the selection of new permanent members. Regional representation (1) It would be inequitable if an extension of permanent membership were to do further damage to the already unsatisfactory geographical balance on the Council. (2) It would not be appropriate to take account of the regions of the permanent members to whom the criteria are not applied by Article 23 and who clearly are selected for entirely different reasons. (3) Two or three seats should be additionally given to each of the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America from the newly increasing seats of the Security Council, and the permanent seat of the Security Council be allocated to the non-aligned countries. (4) Additional permanent seats should be created, and they should be earmarked as seats specifically belonging to regional groups of countries. (5) Permanent members cannot be counted when establishing the geographical distribution of seats in the Council.

114

3  “ The most productive time ”

Representation of major centres of power (1) Countries that have in recent decades emerged as major political and economic Powers should be added to the Council’s permanent membership. (2) A limited increase in the number of permanent seats should take place. This is to ensure that countries with a global potential will be in a position to substantially contribute to the activities of the United Nations, in particular in the field of the maintenance of peace and security and of global development. (3) The number of permanent members should be increased in order to more accurately reflect the present global economic and political situation as well as to take into account the actual as well as potential contributions of certain United Nations Member States to the work of the United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security. (4) Credibility is another required feature of the Council. One essential element of credibility for the Council is the assurance that it can and will deliver on its decisions. It is not to deny the sovereign equality of States to recognize that the capacity to implement the Council’s decisions vary widely among States. (5) In the case of permanent membership, the Council should include additional countries that due to their specific weight on a global level, within the context of contemporary economic and political relations, should assume greater responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. (6) One necessary enhancement is the addition of two new major centres of world power to permanent membership, a change that will help the Council better reflect the contemporary realities of global power. 3. “Semi-permanent” seats Support for the creation of “semi-permanent” membership (1) Ten members from a new category consisting of 20 countries or so would alternate Council seats every two years. The number 20 is a hypothetical figure: a higher number of such countries could be identified, but this would obviously result in a less frequent rotation. The countries making up this group should meet a series of objective criteria and parameters, namely: – A more equitable geographical distribution; – The ability and political willingness to make a special, qualified contribution in military personnel, and not only in financial resources, to the maintenance of international peace and security; – The ability to contribute financially to the other purposes of the Organization (for example, to the regular budget of the United Nations); – The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for political and economic development as well as in the humanitarian field. Additional factors could also be considered: – Geographical size and population of a country; – Its economic dimensions; – The degree to which its internal organization enables it to guarantee effective support to the United Nations in terms of civilian and humanitarian personnel; – The level of its cultural contribution;

3  “ The most productive time ”

115

– Whether its mass media technology enables it to marshall strong public support for the Organization; – The number of refugees from war-torn areas to which it has given shelter. The basic premise of this proposal is that there be no increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council. (2) The proposal to create 20 or so rotating Council members is not intended to create any new “category” or new privileged caste in the strict sense of the word, but to ensure a fair chance for small and less resourceful countries to become members of the Council. The composition of “semi-permanent” members will be reviewed every 15 to 20 years. (3) The possible creation of a category of semi-permanent members deserves serious consideration. This category could provide the possibility for the inclusion into the membership of the Security Council of many States which are prominent in their particular region, as well as of many States from regions which are now underrepresented in the Security Council. (4) If we were able to overcome the problems with the present system of permanent membership and, at the same time, maintain and improve the financial viability of this Organization, one delegation’s constructive and imaginative idea of semi-permanent members should be supported. (5) Candidates for a “semi-permanent” membership should be nominated at the regional level. (6) Removal of the re-election ban would in no way be a substitute for the creation of a “semi-permanent” membership. Qualified support for and/or reservations about the creation of “semi-permanent” membership (1) The idea of a new category of semi-permanent members in the Council is a concept which deserves close study. One problem, however, is that there is no common view about what it really means. Each Member State gives a different interpretation of the concept; according to its size, geography and region. While the concept merits further examination and discussion, it is necessary to clarify exactly what it entails for the membership in general. (2) Proposals must be examined in the context of the overall increase in the membership of the Council, which must be limited. Such a new category could provide a possibility to take into consideration various regional aspirations and pressures. (3) All innovations should be consistent with the principle of sovereign equality of all States, and prudence is required when considering new and potentially open-ended exceptions to the rule of sovereign equality of all members of the United Nations. (4) To examine the arguments for and against the new category, at least three aspects are vital in this examination. First, any third category of members should not perpetuate themselves indefinitely thereafter. Second, there should be very clear objectively applicable criteria for a State to qualify for this special status and such criteria should be agreed upon by consensus in the General Assembly. Third, it is the Member States of the region concerned, which should have the initial responsibility for selection. Stringent criteria for any new categories as well as the consideration of

116

3  “ The most productive time ”

added qualifications should be advocated. The “vulnerability factor” is also important in determining the membership of the Council. Some representation for this group must be a feature in the Council, so that 11 States truly feel that their concerns are not submerged. (5) Any solution that does not give reasonable opportunity to contribute to the work of the Security Council, in keeping with the criteria laid down in Article 23, would be contrary to the principle of equitable representation. (6) The proposed creation of a third category merits serious consideration although it too has the weakness of creating perpetual semi-permanent States. (7) Semi-permanent membership is acceptable if it prevents an increase in permanent members constituted on present basis and with right of veto; and if it serves to open up space between what is now permanent and non-permanent members. (8) New category of semi-permanent members would devolve against the principle of sovereign equality which is the bedrock of the Charter, for that matter all other international organizations, it would not ease in any significant degree competition for limited sizes. Size of the States has never been a distinguishing criteria in the United Nations. (9) The new category of semi-permanent member merits consideration only to the extent that it increases the chances for participation on the Council by small States. (10) Solution to the legitimate perception of inequity might not lie in creating another category of the privileged. It is true that within each geographical grouping at the United Nations, some leading members aspire to a more visible role. (11) The idea of creating a third category of membership should at least not be incompatible with the elements such as the need to increase permanent members and rectify the geographical imbalance of the membership. (12) Proposals to introduce a third category for semi-permanent members seem to impose new constraints and restrictions on Member States’ freedom of choice and lead to a number of difficult questions with respect to the status of members of that third category. This might create more problems than these proposals pretend to solve. (13) Exploring the idea of a new category of membership does not prejudice or preclude discussion on the possibility of a limited increase in permanent Security Council membership. With regard to the proposal of a category of semi-permanent Security Council members, it is quite evident that States making up such a category would have to meet very clearly defined and objective criteria – criteria which should be agreed by the General Assembly. (14) The number of “semi-permanent” seats should be much less than 10, and there should be a balancing increase of at least the same number of seats in the existing nonpermanent member category. (15) It is difficult to determine criteria for exemption from the ban on immediate re-election under Article 23.1 of the Charter and even more difficult to objectively assess candidates’ claims against such criteria. Life expectancy in the Council should be determined through an elective exercise. 4. Non-permanent seats Regional representation (1) In connection with the method of election of non-permanent members, the method should be based on geographical distribution by regions.

3  “ The most productive time ”

117

(2) It is necessary to increase the number of non-permanent members to reflect adequately the increase of United Nations Member States during the past two decades, while maintaining the effective functioning of the Council. Special consideration should be given to those regions that are now under-represented, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America. (3) The 20 non-permanent seats, which increase the actual membership by 5, could be equally distributed among the five regions, i.e. 4 per region. (4) Africa is entitled to 2 additional non-permanent seats. Criteria for selection (1) If the increase in the Security Council comprises only non-permanent members, then the criteria in Article 23.1 must apply. (2) Countries which to date have never been represented in the Security Council, or have been there only once, should have improved chances of becoming nonpermanent members in the Council. (3) There should be continuation of the present system which requires nonpermanent members to secure two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly. The principle of equitable regional distribution is important. (4) One new element could be labelled “negative criteria” – how have the States in question acted in carrying out their obligations in the United Nations? Have they paid their assessed contributions to the regular budget and peace-keeping operations on time and in full; how have they implemented the decisions of the Security Council, including those concerning the sanctions; and how in general have they fulfilled their membership obligations? Removal of re-election ban (1) Consideration should be given to amending Article 23 of the Charter to remove the existing prohibition on successive terms of membership for non-permanent members. Such an amendment would permit more opportunity for increasingly frequent membership. (2) The existing ban on self-succession by non-permanent members should be reexamined. It does not seem appropriate to dictate tight term limits to regional groups which have the task of deciding which countries to nominate. One should consider proposals for selecting Candidates for temporary seats who might serve for longer than the two years stipulated in Article 23. This measure, combined with a modest expansion, would serve to create more rather than fewer options for membership and thus empower regional groups to play a greater role in managing the selection of temporary members. (3) The regions should be provided with the greatest possible autonomy and freedom of choice on whom they want to send to the Security Council. If, as it seems to be the case, these regions find it difficult to agree on which of their States should become permanent members of the Security Council, the removal of the ban to reelect non-permanent members would provide for a way out. (4) Non-permanent members should exclusively be the objects of any increase in the Council’s composition. According to the General Assembly decisions on each opportunity, some new seats could be granted re-election.

118

3  “ The most productive time ”

(5) It would be useful to explore a third category of semi-membership comprising a relatively long term and eligibility for immediate re-election. (6) An exception to the ban on re-election should be limited to no more than one non-permanent seat for each region. (7) The two-year term for non-permanent members would suffice. The ban on immediate re-election should continue. Cluster 2 II. OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] B. Relationship with other bodies and organizations […] C. Reform by the Security Council of its working methods and procedures […] Cluster 3 III. EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A. General (1) The need to preserve and enhance the Security Council’s effectiveness and efficiency is at the very core of the deliberations of the Working Group. Maintaining and, where possible, enhancing the effective and efficient functioning of the Council should be a key objective of the Working Group, and a criterion against which all proposals must be judged. (2) Enlarging the size of the Security Council is necessary but should not be considered by itself as a panacea. Our efforts should encompass all the various dimensions of the Council’s discharge of the primary responsibilities. Distinction between efficiency and effectiveness (1) Due attention should be paid in order not to confuse or equate efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency would derive from the process of the Council taking action promptly, and its effectiveness would stem from the Council taking action that yields the intended results. (2) One can imagine a Council which is highly efficient, but its decisions are not implemented, so that the effectiveness is low. Similarly, even a relatively inefficient Council can still be effective in some instance. It is the effectiveness of the Security Council, therefore, which is one of the key aspects to be considered in this reform process. (3) Efficiency relates to the swiftness of the decision-making process in the Council. Effectiveness is a much broader term. It signifies that the Security Council is able not only to arrive at the decisions required but also to see them implemented. (4) Efficiency and effectiveness are closely linked and mutually reinforcing concepts. (5) The question of efficiency should not be treated merely as an insignificant technical matter because the efficiency with which Council decisions were taken should be regarded as a precondition for those decisions’ effectiveness.

3  “ The most productive time ”

119

B. Relationship between size and efficiency Support for the linkage (1) The requirement for efficiency must mean that an increase in the Council’s membership would have to be relatively limited in size. (2) Too large an expansion might furthermore negatively affect the development of more open and transparent decision-making procedures in the Council, to the detriment of non-members and smaller Council members alike. (3) It is axiomatic that the larger the decision-making body, the more challenging and generally the more protracted will be the process of defining a consensus and then organizing that consensus in such a way as to permit clear and practical action. Other views on the linkage (1) There is no direct linkage between an increase in the number of membership in the Security Council and its efficiency and effectiveness, which depends on the methods of work of the Council; its authority, credibility and legitimacy, as well as its capacity to reach a consensus on substantive issues. (2) The Council’s effectiveness would be maintained if it acts impartially and consistently on behalf of the general membership. (3) The wider the measure of international acceptance enjoyed by a Council decision, the greater the prospect of its implementation being effective. (4) Effectiveness is predicated on objective elements such as political, diplomatic and other resources at the disposal of the Council, as well as on the existence of political will to exercise all its functions in a firm and impartial manner. Need for right balance (1) It is necessary to strike a right balance: expanding the membership not so little as to be unrepresentative, but not so much as to be inefficient. (2) The Council’s effectiveness would be enhanced if an adequate balance is achieved between industrialized and developing countries in an expanded Council, including the permanent membership. C. Working methods of the Security Council […] D. Information-gathering and analysis capabilities […] Cluster 4 IV. DECISION-MAKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER A. Views on veto No change in status quo (1) There should be no change or modification of the requirement in the Charter for the concurrence of all permanent members in its substantive decisions. (2) Retaining the right to veto is a vital element in preserving the Council’s effective functioning.

120

3  “ The most productive time ”

(3) The status of the existing permanent members of the Council, because of their global political and economic influence and capacity to contribute to global peace and security, should remain unchanged, including the right to the veto. (4) There should be no correction or addition to Article 27 of the Charter. (5) The ideas of requiring two negative votes for the exercise of a veto and of expanding the scope of procedural matters to which veto will not apply are ill-advised solutions in search of a problem which does not exist. Abolishment of and/or modification of and restrictions on veto (1) It would be useful to set a timetable that progressively and gradually limits the use of the veto and, finally, eliminates it. (2) The veto power should be abolished or restricted as such a privilege for a few Member States is undemocratic and undermines the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter. (3) Now that the Cold War, which was given as an excuse for the existence of veto, is over, the time has come to review the veto power. (4) The use of veto should be limited by requiring permanent members to obtain at least two negative votes for their exercise of veto. (5) The sphere of issues to which the right to veto applies should be identified clearly. The sphere should essentially be related to actions undertaken by the Council under Chapter VII, actions concerning the status of members of the Organization, and cooperation with regional organizations and agencies in the performance of coercive action. (6) The identification of the areas in which veto could or could not be used should be done in the course of updating and finalizing the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. (7) The use of veto should be limited to the imposition of sanctions against the violators of the international order. (8) Some mechanism should be established to override the veto power. B. Extension of veto to new permanent members Support for extension (1) The veto power of the permanent members should be limited in principle. However, any new permanent members should have all the rights of the present permanent members and no “second class” permanent membership should be created. (2) There is a direct link between the requirement for the concurrence of all permanent members in decisions and the effectiveness of Security Council action which we are seeking to conserve, even in the eventuality of an enlarged Council with additional permanent members. Views against extension (1) It might not be desirable to extend the right of veto to other members of the Council as part of the current reform process. (2) The number of permanent members with the veto power should not be expanded.

3  “ The most productive time ”

121

(3) It is difficult to comprehend how an extension of veto to any new permanent members would lead either to greater transparency of the Council’s decision-making process or to more effective and efficient functioning of the Council. C. Other issues (1) The term “party to a dispute” that shall abstain from voting in the Council according to Article 27 of the Charter should be defined more clearly. Cluster 5 V. ELECTIONS AND TERMS OF OFFICE (Views related to the creation of “semi-permanent” membership and the removal of the ban on re-election are covered in Cluster 1) (1) The term of non-permanent members should not be shortened to less than two years. (2) Regional groups should be encouraged to strengthen their internal process to facilitate elections of their candidates to the Security Council. (3) Rotating seats should be established in the Council. Each rotation will allow for incumbency in the Council for three or even four years. (4) There should be scope for members of specific regions to decide that one or more of the elected seats allocated to their region should be occupied relatively regularly by one or more of the countries which play a leading role in their region. It does not need any provision in the Charter other than the deletion or modification of the last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 23. Cluster 6 VI. MODALITIES FOR BRINGING CHANGES INTO EFFECT AND CONSIDERATION OF RELATED CHARTER AMENDMENTS […] 3.1.5 18 September 1995, Compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen, their discussion papers, as well as proposals and other documents presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/9656 […] [4] A/AC.247/1 15 September 1995 I. OBSERVATIONS ON AND ASSESSMENT BY THE VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK OF THE OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DURING THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 6  Reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. III, 1997, pp. III.45/1-III.45/86. The submissions by member states or groups of member states presented in this compendium can be found in the sections of this work collecting the statements of member states, → 3.2.1.1.25, 3.2.1.3.5, 3.2.2.2.14, 3.2.2.4.3, 3.2.3.12, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12.

122

3  “ The most productive time ”

Introduction 1. This document is prepared by the Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council in their personal capacity. The purpose of this document is to: − provide more detailed insight into the progress of the work of the Working Group during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly; − reflect accurately the dynamism and richness of the discussions in the Working Group during the forth-ninth session of the General Assembly; − encapsulate the various ideas and proposals that were presented to the Working Group since January 1995; and −  present observations and assessment of the Vice Chairmen on the work of the Working Group at its present stage, as well as to offer their suggestions on the future work of the Working Group. It is hoped that this document could serve as a useful contribution to the work of the Working Group as it proceeds toward the negotiating phase. 2. In an attempt to reflect faithfully the nature and substance of the discussions in the Open-ended Working Group during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly as well as to highlight what the Vice-Chairmen believe are the main issues relevant to the work of the Open-ended Working Group, this document is organized around three major topics, namely, Cluster I (Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council), Cluster II (Other Matters Related to the Security Council), and suggestions for the work of the Open-ended Working Group during the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. Fully aware that the Open-ended Working Group has not concluded its discussions on the first two topics, following are the summary of discussions on the topics at their present stage, [5] including the Vice-Chairmen’s observations and assessment, and the Vice-Chairmen’s comments and suggestions for the future work of the Open-ended Working Group. Cluster I: Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council I. The Expansion of the Security Council 3. Discussions showed that there was agreement in the Open-ended Working Group on the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Security Council by an increase in its membership in order to reflect more accurately the important international changes that have taken place, including the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries. Discussions further showed that there was agreement on the need to review the Council’s composition, its working methods, and other matters related to its functioning. It was recognized that the principles of the sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations and equitable geographical distribution and representation as well as the concepts of transparency, legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency should guide the work on the reform of the Security Council. On the basis of the agreement that the membership of the Security Council should be enlarged, the Open-ended Working Group continued its discussion on the scope and nature of such enlargement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

123

II. The composition and size of the Security Council 4. A variety of proposals were made on the optimal composition and size of an expanded Council. A number of delegations sought an increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership. Some delegations supported an increase in just one of the existing categories, although a number of delegations rejected an increase in permanent membership alone. Others introduced a new category, new categories, a new type, or new types of membership. Some delegations argued that the size of an increase in one category would affect the size of an increase in the other. A large group of delegations felt that if there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category. 5. There was growing support for a Council with a total size in the mid to low 20s. Many who sought to increase permanent membership advocated an increase of five seats. A large group of [6] delegations suggested that an enlarged Council should comprise at least 26 members. III. Permanent membership A. Principles governing the possible expansion of permanent membership 6. In addressing the issue of permanent membership of the Council, most delegations focused on whether the permanent membership category should be expanded, and if so, how. A number of delegations insisted that the principle of equitable geographical distribution necessitated an increase in permanent members that would reflect the current membership of the United Nations. Equally, a number of delegations sought permanent representation for those States whose present world positions reflect global shifts that have taken place since 1945 in economic and political influence and power, and in the capacity to share global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. For those delegations, an increase in the permanent membership would strengthen the United Nations and increase its legitimacy through bringing the Organization closer to present-day global realities. Other delegations argued against enlarging this category of membership on the grounds that appointing new permanent members would work against the principle of democratization in international relations. In their view a mistake was made in San Francisco in 1945 with the creation of a permanent membership category in the Security Council; the same mistake should not be repeated. Many delegations expressed strong opposition to an increase in permanent members for the reasons that this would run contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of all UN members, and would exacerbate the disparity already existing in the Security Council. They also maintained that appointing new permanent members would not help to improve Council efficiency and effectiveness. Many delegations stated that an expansion in the permanent membership category that only resulted in increase of industrialized countries in the Council would be unacceptable. Some delegations expressed the need for a periodic review of permanent members and a few sought a means by which a member’s permanent status could be terminated. B. Criteria for new permanent members 7. There were differing views on the need to elaborate criteria for new permanent members. Some questioned the need for an elaboration of criteria since this was an issue for political negotiation and decision. Others suggested a range of criteria including: those contained in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, which are applicable at present only to the selection of non[7]-permanent members; adequate representation for developing countries; population size; size of economy and future potential; willingness to

124

3  “ The most productive time ”

contribute to, and consistency in support for, peace-keeping and UN political and economic activities; and financial contributions to the UN, including to voluntary funds and programmes. Some of those who favored an increase in permanent members also made implicit or explicit references to a number of States, from both developed and developing countries, thought to be possible candidates for permanent membership. C. Modalities of the selection of possible new permanent members 8. Views were similarly divided on how, if there was to be an expansion in permanent membership, such members should be selected. Some delegations favored a global approach whereby the General Assembly would choose the new permanent members, possibly on the basis of an agreed formula for regional distribution. Others believed that primary responsibility for selection should lie with regional groups, with the possible need for endorsement by the General Assembly. IV. Non-permanent membership A. Principles governing the possible expansion of non-permanent membership 9. There was strong support for enlarging the non-permanent membership of the Council, on the basis of the need to ensure equitable geographical representation. A number of delegations referred to the fact that the membership of the United Nations has considerably increased since the last enlargement in non-permanent membership took effect in 1965, warranting a further expansion in this category. The legitimacy of the Council to act on behalf of the whole membership, as required under Article 24 (1) of the Charter, would hence be strengthened. Many insisted that the increase in non-permanent members should be limited to avoid impairing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. Others countered with the arguments that such an increase would not impair efficiency and could in fact lead to improved Council effectiveness. They also stressed that the enlargement of the membership in this category provides better opportunities for more States to serve on the Council, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, contributing to further democratization of the United Nations and its principal organs. [8] B. Criteria for the selection of new non-permanent members 10. The criteria in Article 23 (1), namely the contribution of Members to the maintenance of international peace and security, to the other purposes of the Organization, and equitable geographical distribution, were strongly supported as appropriate criteria in considering the enlargement of the non-permanent membership. However, a few delegations were concerned that the present criteria had not effectively ensured that all UN Members have had an equal opportunity to serve on the Council. It was generally recognized that the representation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean should be enhanced on the Council. The adequacy of the present representation of Eastern Europe was also questioned. C. Possible changes in the modalities for the election of non-permanent members 11. An argument was advanced that the opportunities for UN Members to serve on the Security Council are not equal; some larger States are frequently re-elected to the Council whilst a number of other UN members have never served on it. Some delegations pointed to the lack of uniformity in the way UN regional groups selected candidates for non-permanent membership. In this connection, with reference to the system of rotation used by the African group in contrast with the practice of other groups, it was suggested that the selection procedures of the different UN groups could

3  “ The most productive time ”

125

be unified to ensure equality of treatment across regions. Another proposal was put forward with the intended effect of regularizing the current practice of selecting some States more regularly for non-permanent membership of the Council. This envisaged a formula by which certain agreed named States would be elected to additional nonpermanent seats on the Council on a more frequent basis than others. Views were expressed both in support of, and against, lifting the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members contained in Article 23 (2). Some delegations suggested that this question depends on other aspects of a proposed package agreement. V. New categories of membership and alternative proposals for an increase in the present categories 12. Proposals were made for the creation of a new category, new categories, a new type, or new types of membership. Some of these proposals entailed an allocation of seats to be occupied by States who would serve longer and/or more frequent terms than existing non-permanent members. Some of them envisaged the sharing of seats by two or more States, or by a regional grouping or organization. A number of delegations insisted on retaining [9] only the two categories established by the Charter. An alternative proposal for an increase in the non-permanent membership category was also made; this envisaged a formula referred to in paragraph 10 above. Concern was expressed that a new category or categories, and some other proposals relating to the expansion of the Council, could have the effect of relegating the majority of members to third-class status, or restricting their opportunity of election to the Council. There were also delegations which wished to keep these proposals as options for future consideration. VI. Voting procedure in the Security Council, including the veto*1 13. There was extensive discussion on voting procedure in the Security Council, particularly on the question of the veto. Most delegations emphasized that any genuine reform of the Council must address the veto. A large number of delegations regarded the veto as anachronistic and sought its eventual abolition. They argued that the mere existence of the veto constituted a constant threat to the decision-making process in the Security Council. Opponents of the veto asserted that it was intrinsically undemocratic, and that its existence is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States. Some felt that it had severely impaired the work of the Security Council during the first four decades of the United Nations. Supporters of the veto asserted that it was never intended to be democratic, but rather had been a useful device which bad helped to preserve unanimity among the Permanent Members, and had ensured the continued participation of the major powers in the Organization. The veto was viewed as useful in helping to guarantee that the decisions taken by the Council were balanced, as well as providing stability, preventing conflicts between major powers which could undermine UN collective security. A. Limitations in the scope and use of the veto 14. A large number of delegations proposed that the veto should be limited in its scope and use. Proposed restrictions included: removing the use of the veto from decisions concerning the admission of new UN Member States; the sending of investigative missions of the Council under Chapter VI; decisions relating to [10] provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter; measures under Article 50 of the Charter relating to economic problems of third countries arising from UN-imposed sanctions; the recommendation for the appointment of the UN Secretary-General; issues relating to

126

3  “ The most productive time ”

humanitarian law, e.g. a decision calling for a cease-fire; and disputes to which a permanent member is a party. A number of delegations advocated permitting veto use only for decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, and others suggested that two or more negative votes by permanent members should be required for a veto to take effect. In this connection, reference was made to the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, dated 7 June 1945,7 and General Assembly Resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949.8 15. Some pointed to the fact that procedural issues under Article 27 (2) are not subject to a veto, and that an examination be undertaken to determine which decisions should be considered procedural in nature. Reference was made to the recommendations of the Interim Committee9 and General Assembly Resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949 in this regard. It was emphasized that certain measures to limit the scope of the veto would not require an amendment to the Charter, but could be achieved through revisions to the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, current practices within the Council, and General Assembly resolutions. A few delegations opposed any restrictions on veto use, and argued that it was difficult in practice to separate decisions taken under Chapter VI and VII. They also pointed out that there are a number of severe legal, political and substantive problems involved in limiting the use of the veto and that it would be advisable not to spend too much time discussing the veto as presently constituted. Others acknowledged the recent restraint by permanent members in the use of the veto, and regarded this as a positive step forward. B. Extension of veto to possible new permanent members 16. Views differed as to whether possible new permanent members should be granted the right of veto. Those who supported the granting of the veto to new permanent members argued against the creation of a new category of second-class permanent members. In this respect, they pointed out that equal treatment for current and new permanent members was an important principle. Some delegations argued that since all permanent members would have the same obligations, they, particularly those which were developing countries, should be entitled to the same privileges. Moreover, some delegations argued that the present imbalance in the Security Council would only be partially redressed if new permanent members were denied the right of veto. Delegations who opposed granting the veto to new permanent members regarded any [11] such extension as furthering an inherently undemocratic privilege which should actually be restricted and eventually abolished in the post-Cold War world. They felt that any extension of the right of veto would be contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States and the spirit of cooperation in the collective security system. 7  See United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), 1945, Vol. XI, pp. 71014, reprinted in: Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 936-38. 8  → 2.1. 9  See UN Doc. A/578, “The Problem of Voting in the Security Council”, 15 July 1948, in: Reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to the General Assembly (5 January to 5 August 1948), General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Supplement No. 10, Paris 1948, pp. 1-17.

3  “ The most productive time ”

127

Opponents of such an extension also feared that it could prove detrimental to the Security Council’s efficiency and effectiveness and could reinforce prevailing regional imbalances. 17. It was suggested that new permanent members could make unilateral declarations on their intentions to restrict veto use. This proposal was supported by some delegations but others had doubts regarding the actual effect of such political declarations. A number of delegations believed that the question of the extension of the veto could only be decided after an agreement had been reached on whether or not there would be new permanent members and on who would occupy these seats. C. De facto privileges 18. Some delegations cited the de facto privileges enjoyed by permanent members, including permanent representation in UN bodies such as the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council and the General Committee of the General Assembly. It was suggested by these delegations that a review be undertaken of both the current privileges of permanent members and whether these privileges should accrue to new permanent members. Other delegations questioned the existence of such privileges, citing that the permanent members of the Security Council had always to stand for election to other UN organs and bodies. D. Voting majority 19. A number of delegations drew attention to the need to examine the voting majority prescribed in Article 27 (3) for an enlarged Council, with some advocating retaining a proportionally similar figure. VII. Periodic reviews 20. Many delegations welcomed the proposal that the size and composition, as well as the veto and other voting procedures, of the Security Council be periodically reviewed. Some delegations, on the other hand, had reservations over the concept of periodic review. Some delegations argued that to have periodic reviews would be tantamount to an admission of failure in the current reform process, while others asserted that periodic reviews would [12] bring about a situation in which some States would be perpetually conducting electoral campaigns. A number of delegations pointed out, however, that the concept of review had been an integral part of the UN from the beginning and could be activated by invoking Article 109 of the UN Charter. Cluster II: Other Matters Related to the Security Council

A/AC.247/3 6 January 1995

[…] [23] III. PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MEMBER STATES DURING THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1. The present non-paper is prepared solely on the basis of the views expressed by Member States during the general debate as well as the debate on agenda item 33 at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. 2. The list of views contained in the present non-paper is intended to provide background material for the Working Group. It should be read together with the two similar

128

3  “ The most productive time ”

compilations dated 28 February and 27 May 1994,10 respectively. The non-paper is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of every view presented by the delegations concerned; rather, it seeks to identify salient points and broad trends to help facilitate deliberations of the Working Group. 3. The views reproduced in the present non-paper are not indicative of the number of delegations holding a similar position on specific suggestions and proposals. The views were expressed either by one or several Member States. Furthermore, the views reflected in the list are not necessarily literal transcriptions of the exact expressions used by Member States as similar positions have been grouped together under a given category. It should be noted further that the order of listing of the items neither reflects nor implies any order of priority. [24] CONTENTS CLUSTER I: EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ............................................ 25 A. General ................................................................................................................................... 25 1. Principles of membership expansion ......................................................................... 25 2. Optimal size of an expanded Security Council .......................................................26 B. Specific categories of membership .................................................................................26 1. Permanent membership ..............................................................................................26 (a) Member States which have explicitly declared candidacies .......................26 (b) Criteria for new permanent members ..............................................................26 (c) Extension of veto to new permanent members .............................................. 29 2. Non-permanent membership .................................................................................... 30 (a) General ....................................................................................................................... 30 (b) Removal of re-election ban .................................................................................. 30 3. New categories of membership ..................................................................................31 CLUSTER II: OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ................. 33 A. Transparency in decision-making process ................................................................... 33 1. General ............................................................................................................................. 33 2. Briefings on Security Council proceedings, including informal consultations ................................................................................................................... 34 3. Consultations with troop-contributing countries ................................................ 34 4. Sanctions committees .................................................................................................. 35 B. Relationship with other primary United Nations organs ......................................... 36 C. Working methods of the Security Council ................................................................... 37 D. Decision-making in accordance with the Charter ..................................................... 37 [25]

10  Background paper prepared by the UN Secretariat, → 3.1.4.

3  “ The most productive time ”

129

CLUSTER I: EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A. General 1. Principles of membership expansion The Council should be representative, while avoiding too large an increase that might jeopardize its effectiveness. One cannot avoid change in the Security Council, which should remain a sufficiently compact and efficient working body … The present status of permanent members should be maintained. Collective security requires the Council to be genuinely representative of the entire UN membership. A limited expansion of the number of members, paying regard to an equitable geographical participation, should still be a priority for the health of the Organization. The increase in the membership of the United Nations justifies the enlargement of the Council. The principal criterion continue to be preservation of the effectiveness of the Council. Enlargement should be accomplished on a consensus basis and as a package … The interests of all UN regional groups need to be respected in the reform process. *** Any predetermined selection excluding the Non-Aligned and other developing countries would be unacceptable to the Movement of Non-Aligned countries. Regarding the Security Council, it is necessary to increase the number of both its permanent and non-permanent members. In doing so, equitable geographical representation and efficiency must be taken into consideration. It is important to emphasize that the Security Council acts on behalf of the general membership of the United Nations. Unless its actions are based on the widest possible support, Council decisions will not be universally respected, nor be truly effective. Any reform measures should reflect the interest of every Member State. In this regard, in the course of the expansion of the Council, the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be observed and full consideration should be given to the aspiration and interest of developing countries which account for [26] the majority of the UN membership so as to enable them to play a more active role in UN affairs. The transformation of the Security Council into an instrument for justification or enforcement of policies of a number of permanent members is not at all compatible with the spirit of the Charter and contradicts the very letter of Article 24, according to which the Council acts on behalf of the entire membership of the Organization. The examples and the debates of the past year on restructuring of the General Assembly and the Security Council have amply shown that the procedures and methodology of the Security Council must be re-evaluated and changed in order to enable the Council to address transparently and in a just and serious manner issues affecting international peace and security. 2. Optimal size of an expanded Security Council The numbers suggested by Member States as the optimal size of an expanded Security Council were: 17 or 18; 19 or 20; about 20; the low twenties; 20 or 21; 21; the middle twenties; 25.

130

3  “ The most productive time ”

B. Specific categories of membership 1. Permanent membership a) Member States which have explicitly declared candidacies A number of Member States, including Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and Nigeria, expressed their willingness to accept the responsibilities as new permanent members, if the Security Council was to be expanded. b) Criteria for new permanent members A country’s specific strength – its capacity for constructive global influence, its capacity to undertake and sustain heavy global responsibilities – are a critical test of eligibility for permanent membership. If consensus can be reached, certain countries, by virtue of their global interests, and their contribution to international security and to UN operations should be invited to accept the responsibilities of permanent membership. Only a limited number of new seats should be allocated as permanent seats. A measured, realistic extension on the composition of the Council would be appropriate. [27] It is crucial that permanent members of the Council have the capacity and the political will to assume fully the global responsibilities that come with that status, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. New permanent members of the Security Council should be chosen from among the countries which make an exceptional contribution to achieving the goals of the United Nations Charter. The international community could, as a measure with immediate advantageous effect, grant an additional non-permanent seat to regions which consider themselves to be under-represented and confer permanent member status on those two economic powers whose positive contribution to world affairs has long been recognized. One of the most important of the international changes since the establishment of the UN is the emergence of two major economic powers. They should join the Security Council as permanent members. *** This (permanent) category should not be exclusive of large economic powers associated with the West. Mere adding of two or more permanent members to cushion the financial obligations of some veto-wielding powers would not be enough. United Nations Security Council reform means more than merely adding two or more industrialized permanent members. A selective, piecemeal expansion of the permanent members’ category would not be prudent. The Security Council is not a corporate board, where equity shares determine voting power. *** A more equitable geographical representation is critical, along with an increase in permanent representation for developing countries. The Non-Aligned and other developing countries make up a majority of the UN’s membership. For a fair and due representation of the demands and interests of these countries in the resolution of major international issues, the developing countries should, on all accounts, become permanent members of the UN’s Security Council. Permanent status should be granted to two countries in Africa, two countries in Latin America and Caribbean, and two developing countries in Asia.

3  “ The most productive time ”

131

[28] The present arrangement where Africa and Latin American regions are not represented at all amongst the veto-wielding permanent members should not be allowed to continue. The time has come to move away from the anachronism of five permanent members and to establish arrangements which are capable of change with the passage of time and the evolution of events. The time has come for equity for all nations – large and small – in the membership of the Council. The model that would most simply meet the legitimate aspirations of the largest States presently excluded from permanent membership of the Security Council would involve the creation of 5 new permanent membership seats. Assuming the continuation of the existing regional groups, 3 new Permanent Members would come from Africa and Asia, 1 from the Western European and Other States group (WEOG) and 1 from Latin America and the Caribbean. Certain developing countries, on account of sheer population numbers and geopolitical realities should be permanent (or indefinite) members; that contributions to the peace-keeping budget should be a relevant criterion for permanent (or indefinite) membership; and that, in both existing categories of membership, adjacent States should be permitted to pool their resources as composite members. Developing countries have a legitimate right to be represented on the permanent slate of the Security Council, for their concerns are different from those of the industrialized and developed countries. The African and Latin American continents should imperatively have their share of the responsibility incumbent on the Council. Africa, which consists of 1/3 of the world population, has the right to a permanent seat with veto power in the Security Council. In line with the principle of geographical and equitable representation, Africa is entitled to an appropriate representation of not less than two permanent seats on the Security Council. *** While the principle of geographic representation is important, it should not be the only criterion to determine eligibility for new permanent members. Other objective criteria are equally important such as political, economic and demographic realities and a country’s capability and record of contributing to the [29] promotion of peace, security and economic development, both regionally and globally, as well as the commitment of States to assume the responsibilities inherent to such a status. Regional representation should not be determined on the basis of the biggest and the most powerful in the region but in accordance with dynamics operating in the region … If regional organizations provide the interlocking network for globalism, clearly the permanent interests of regions must be given preeminence. It is imperative to achieve a more representative Council without diminishing its decision-making capacity. It is, therefore, better to avoid ambitious projects which would give privileged status to several ‘regional powers’ according to imprecise criteria but would not reinforce the Council’s ability to shoulder its responsibilities. Any attempt to provide greater representation to various regions should not fuel the tendencies towards hegemony and domination which are manifest in some regions. An increase in the permanent membership of the Council would only serve to alienate small- and medium-sized countries, which constitute a majority in the General Assembly, instead of enhancing the effectiveness of the Council.

132

3  “ The most productive time ”

c) Extension of veto to new permanent members*2 It is essential that all permanent members have not only equal responsibilities but also equal prerogatives. All permanent members should enjoy the same status and privileges and assume the responsibilities incumbent on membership. *** The right of veto should not be granted to any State in any circumstance, whether they may be called permanent or semi-permanent members … Now that the Cold War is over, the right of veto no longer has any justification or raison d’être. The possible extension of veto to new permanent members would be controversial and lead to an early impasse in the discussion of the Working Group. [30] 2. Non-permanent membership a) General In enlarging the Council, priority should be given to creating additional seats for non-permanent members allocated under the principle of equitable geographical distribution. As the Council is unrepresentative, the first steps for reform must be towards increasing the number of non-permanent members. Non-permanent membership should be expanded at least in proportion to an increase in permanent seats in order to rectify the imbalance in the Council’s composition between the North and South. There is the need for an increase in non-permanent seats, namely an additional three seats, for a total Council membership of 20. Additional non-permanent seats should be granted to the regions that consider themselves underrepresented. It would be necessary to take into account all regional groups recognized in the United Nations. In this sense, an additional seat should be granted to each geographic group, including countries from Eastern Europe. b) Removal of re-election ban In order to give Member States greater influence over the selection of nonpermanent Council members without restricting the opportunity for small countries to serve as Council members, non-permanent seats should be exempted from the prohibition on re-election. Should agreement not be possible now with regard to permanent seats for countries from the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the following alternative could be considered: To improve the possibilities of representation from the regions, Article 23, Paragraph 2, of the UN Charter should be amended to allow re-election of Member States to the Security Council. At the same time the number of non-permanent seats ought to be increased in favour of these regions. As a consequence, countries with the ability and willingness to contribute more than the average to the UN activities and the maintenance of international peace and security could serve on the Council on a more frequent or even continuous basis. A compromise should be found in the form of an arrangement or a set of arrangements which, it is generally agreed, improves the representation in the council. That might mean permanent members [31] for certain major countries from the South … It might also mean, either as a complementary or as an alternative formula, an increase

3  “ The most productive time ”

133

in the number of non-permanent members, provided that the increase is only moderate and would not paralyse the Council’s work … Making the non-permanent members eligible for another term after their two years in the Security Council would provide some flexibility in the formulas for representation. 3. New categories of membership It may be worth giving consideration to a more complex alternative mode. This alternative model would involve, in addition to the five existing Permanent Members (whose veto power would again be slightly diluted), the creation of eight quasipermanent seats (allocated among regional groups) for which consecutive re-election would be possible, together with 10 rotating Non-Permanent seats. It would make abundant sense for the existing regional groups to be at the same time modified to reflect post-Cold War realities … On this model, the question of which States become quasi-permanent members, and how long they remain on the Council in that capacity, would be a matter for determination by the regional group in question. The number of permanent members should be kept at the current five … Instead, non-permanent members should be increased from ten to twenty. The ten new seats would be allotted, in turn, to a group of twenty (or eventually thirty) Member States. The main criteria that could be adopted to identify these countries are already listed in Article 23 of the Charter. The first is their ability and willingness to participate in peace-keeping operations with financial, human and military resources. The main purpose of the Council is to maintain peace … The two other criteria listed in Article 23 are equitable geographic distribution and a country’s contribution to the other purposes of the Organization. In addition, other criteria could be taken into consideration, such as population size, economic resources, and willingness to contribute to humanitarian causes … In substance, this formula would guarantee the continuous presence in the Council of the current permanent members, and at the same time a more frequent presence for twenty or thirty mid- to large size countries. Moreover, the larger number of Members would make it easier to redress the present geographic imbalance on the Council. New ideas put forward (see above) could provide elements of a solution, and thus merit further study … The concept of semi-permanent seats, to be shared for twoyear periods by two or more countries, is particularly interesting and warrants further exploration. The creation of such a category would have the double advantage of allowing countries that more fully meet the requirements of Article 23 of the Charter to sit more frequently [32] on the Council, and would lessen the number of candidates for non-permanent member status. The following points should be emphasized regarding the process of the reform of the work of the Security Council: (1) It must be on a regional basis, not on a specific country basis. (2) The new seats – which may be two additional seats for each region; Latin America, Asia and Africa – must be allocated on the basis of the criteria stipulated in the Charter. (3) It is not essential at this stage to specify the two States from each region who are to occupy the additional seats. The principle of rotation may be applied to several States which meet the criteria agreed upon, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. All UN Member States would benefit from establishing a “third category”.

134

3  “ The most productive time ”

The representative weight of the Security Council should be enhanced by enlarging its size and by establishing a more fair and orderly system of rotation within the geographical groups. A new category with a rotation arrangement, to be determined by regional groups, should be established. A new category of regional members without the right of veto but with an extended mandate could be created. Given the difficulties that stand in the way of achieving consensus on new permanent members, especially given the near universal opposition to extending the veto, any concrete proposal which has a realistic chance of success needs to contain options for handling the aspirations of those States with an expressed and widely supported interest in relatively regular membership. The key to successful handling of such aspirations is to look at solutions which are regionally based. The inclusion of new categories of States – such as that of semi-permanent members – under the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be supported, as long as this allows a more appropriate representativeness and equal operational opportunity. Nevertheless, this innovation must be based on the idea that ‘more privileges entail more obligations’, including financial ones. New members should be elected for fixed terms, in representation of each region and with a mandate encompassing regional interests. Their re-election might be acceptable provided they have the support of the States in their own region. CLUSTER II: OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] [37] […] D. Decision-making in accordance with the Charter The present veto system should be maintained for some more time to come. *** We call for the complete cancellation of the veto right as it contradicts the principles of democracy and maintains the hegemony of the minority. The veto power is outdated and undemocratic and should be abolished. *** If the abolition of veto is politically unrealistic, the use and threat of such power should be restricted. Veto should not be extended to any new permanent member; at the same time, it would be appropriate to slightly dilute the veto power of the existing 5 Permanent Members by requiring 2 from their number to concur it its exercise. The question of membership should take into account the large increase in membership of the Organization and put limits on the use of the veto. A review of the use of the right of veto needs to be subsequently undertaken. [38] The veto, a creation of power politics of the past, must be part of the total reform of the Council. The permanent membership and the veto power are not compatible with the democratic system. All members of the Security Council should be elected on the principle of equitable geographical representation. The veto right should be allowed only in regard to Chapter VII of the Charter decisions. […] [39]

3  “ The most productive time ” IV. OBSERVATIONS ON CLUSTERS I AND II

135 A/AC.247/4 (a) 12 July 1995

1. Observations on Cluster I NON-PAPER QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS I. Principles on Membership Expansion 1. In discussing principles concerning the expansion of the Security Council, many delegations emphasized that high importance should be attached to the principles and concepts of equitable geographical representation, legitimacy, and efficiency. In particular, it was pointed out that the principle and concept of equitable geographical representation and legitimacy were closely linked. The composition of an expanded Council should reflect more accurately the universal character of the United Nations and present-day realities by allowing the widest possible participation in the Council’s work and decision-making process in an equitable manner. Wider participation in the council’s work would, in turn, lend added credibility and legitimacy to the Security Council’s decisions. 2. As for efficiency, while some delegations expressed the view that size did not necessarily determine efficiency, most delegations supported the view that the increase in membership should be moderate and that the expanded membership should be able to ensure the efficiency of the Security Council. II. Permanent Membership A. General 3. Diverse views were expressed on whether or not there should be an increase in the permanent membership. A number of delegations favoured an increase in this category, along with an increase in non-permanent members, while some delegations expressed the view that there should be no changes in the current composition of the permanent membership. On the other hand, there were delegations who questioned the justification for the existence of the permanent membership in the present-day international atmosphere. 4. Some of those who supported an increase in the permanent membership argued that the increase, based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution, would make the Security Council more representative and democratic. Those delegations who did not support an increase, on the other hand, argued that increase in the permanent membership would not help improve the efficiency of the Security Council. Some of those who favoured an increase in the category also made implicit or explicit references to a number of countries thought to be possible candidates for the permanent membership. B. Qualifications for Permanent Membership 5. Some delegations suggested that the Working Group should come up with a set of criteria for the selection of new permanent members. A number of delegations, however, questioned the necessity and timeliness for the discussion and elaboration of criteria for additional permanent members at this juncture since the selection of new permanent members would be a political process and, prior to that, the decision

136

3  “ The most productive time ”

on the increase of new permanent members itself would have to be made through the negotiating process of a package solution. 6. Nevertheless, views were expressed on the qualifications of candidates for permanent membership. While some delegations suggested that the criteria provided by Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter could be applied to new permanent members, others proposed that other criteria should also be taken into consideration. These additional criteria could include: sufficient ability and willingness to contribute resources to the maintenance of international peace and security in a global context (both in military and non-military terms); size of population; distinctive record on contributions to the work of the UN, including contributions to voluntary funds and programmes. C. Modality for Selecting New Permanent Members 7. The Working Group discussed the method by which new permanent members would be selected, should there be an agreement to expand the permanent membership. Some delegations proposed that the method of global selection, i.e. election by the General Assembly, should apply, while a number of delegations preferred the method of regional selection, i.e. selection by regional groups. Those who supported global selection felt that the method would be the more practical alternative because it would be quite difficult for regional groups to reach an agreement on the selection of regional [41] representatives. The proponents of regional selection, on the other hand, believed that the regional approach was more appropriate and that regional groups should have the primary responsibility in selecting their representatives on the Council. D. Size 8. Many delegations expressed the view that, if there was to be an increase in the permanent membership, the said increase should be moderate. In this connection, many suggested an increase of five seats or less. III. Non-Permanent Membership A. General 9. Most delegations agreed that there should be an increase in non-permanent membership and that equitable geographical representation should be the guiding principle for the expansion. Furthermore, many delegations expressed the view that the increase should be to a manageable number and should be in proportion to the increase of permanent members, if any, and to the size of the permanent membership. Many delegations referred to the Non-Aligned Movement’s position that, if there was no agreement on other categories of membership, for the time being, expansion should take place only in the non-permanent category. B. Criteria for Selecting Non-Permanent Members 10. Most delegations who expressed their view on this matter believed that, as far as the selection of non-permanent members was concerned, the criteria provided by Article 23 (1) were sufficient. Many delegations emphasized that all interested UN members, particularly small States, should have equal opportunity to serve on the Security Council. [42] C. Election of Non-Permanent Members 11. Most delegations expressed the view that the current system of electing nonpermanent members should be maintained. In this connection, the Working Group also discussed whether or not the provision contained in Article 23 (2) of the UN

3  “ The most productive time ”

137

Charter, on the ban on immediate re-election for non-permanent members, should be maintained. While some delegations spoke in support of the removal of the ban, and others thought that it should be retained, most delegations shared the view that the provision should be examined in the context of the overall agreement on the expansion of the Council, particularly in connection to the decision on the creation of new categories of Council members. D. Tenure on the Security Council 12. Most delegations shared the view that non-permanent members of the Security Council should continue to serve two-year terms. Some delegations, however, suggested that, due to their ability to contribute to the work of the UN, some States or groups of States should be allowed to serve longer terms. Each of the terms could range between 4 to 6 years. Such proposals were closely linked to suggestions for the creation of new categories of Council members. E. Size 13. While there was agreement that the increase in non-permanent membership was closely linked to the decisions on the increase in permanent membership, the establishment of new categories of membership, and the size of the expanded Security Council, some delegations nevertheless proposed possible numbers and formulae for the distribution of seats for the Working Group’s consideration. The proposed number of new non-permanent seats ranged from 3 to not fewer than 11. IV. New Categories of Council Members 14. A number of specific proposals for the creation of new types or categories of Security Council membership were presented for the Working Group’s consideration. The proposals, although different in detail, all suggested that the new types or categories of members should be inserted between permanent and non-permanent categories of members. In order to ensure that States with exceptional ability to contribute to the work [43] of the UN would be able to maintain a continued presence on the Council, members of such types or categories would be allowed to serve longer and/or more frequent terms than non-permanent members. It was also suggested that States belonging to the new types or categories could be designated as “quasipermanent”, “semi-permanent”, or “composite” members. 15. Some delegations expressed their objection to these proposals, while others suggested that the proposals deserved to be further examined. V. Veto and the Voting Procedure within the Security Council 16. There was an extensive discussion on the veto. Many delegations suggested that the veto should be reviewed in the light of changing international circumstance. In this connection, a number of delegations expressed the view that the veto was anachronistic and should eventually be abolished, while some delegations argued that the veto did have positive aspects which served useful purposes and that it should be maintained. 17. Proposals were made to limit the scope and use of the veto. For instance, it was suggested that the veto should not apply to the admission of new UN Member States, procedural matters in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the UN Charter, disputes to which a permanent member was a party, the Security Council’s decision to send investigative missions in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, issues

138

3  “ The most productive time ”

relating to provisional measures under Article 40 of the UN Charter, measures under Article 50 of the UN Charter relating to economic problems of third countries arising from UN imposed sanctions, recommendation for the appointment of the UN Secretary-General, and issues relating to international humanitarian law, e.g. a decision calling for a cease-fire. Many emphasized that the veto should only apply to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Several delegations also proposed that two or more negative votes by permanent members should be required for the veto to take effect. Furthermore, with regard to limiting the scope and use of the veto, some delegations made reference to the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, dated 7 June 1945, and General Assembly Resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949.11 18. A number of delegations pointed out that some of the measures to limit the scope and use of the veto could actually be implemented without making amendments to the UN Charter, and instead could be done through revisions of the Provisional Rules of Procedures of the Security Council, current practices within the Council, and General Assembly resolutions. [44] 19. In this connection, a proposal was made that, as a goodwill gesture, current permanent members could exercise voluntary restraint and make unilateral declarations not to use the veto in certain situations and on certain issues. While a number of delegations expressed support for the idea, some did not think that such unilateral political declarations would be useful or have any practical effect. 20. On the question of whether or not new permanent members should be accorded veto rights in the event that there were to be new permanent members, a number of delegations expressed support for the idea that new permanent members should be entrusted with the same rights and obligations accorded to current permanent members. Some delegations expressed opposition to any expansion of the veto. At the same time some delegations pointed out that discussion on the issue should not take place until a decision had been made on who would be the new permanent members. Same delegations also stated that, if accorded the veto right, the new permanent members could commit themselves to unilateral declarations on voluntary restraint on the use of the veto. 21. As far as the voting procedure in the Security Council was concerned, a number of delegations drew attention to the need to address the voting majority prescribed in Article 27 (3), as a consequence of the increase in Security Council membership and appointment of new permanent members. 22. Apart from the question of the veto, other rights and privileges of permanent members in other contexts were also discussed. In this connection, some delegations pointed out that, in addition to their permanent status on the Security Council and their veto power, permanent members were also enjoying other de facto privileges (the so-called “cascade effect”) which include permanent representation in UN bodies such as the ICJ, ECOSOC, and the General Committee of the General Assembly. In addition, nationals of the permanent members of the Council also held key senior positions in the UN Secretariat. The question was asked whether new permanent members would also enjoy the benefits of this “cascade effect”. 11  → 2.1.

3  “ The most productive time ”

139

VI. Size of the Security Council 23. A number of delegations stressed that the size of the expanded Security Council could only be determined when agreement had been reached on all aspects of the increase in membership of the Security Council. Many delegations, however, were willing to state their preferred number of Council members. These numbers ranged from 20 to 33. Most of the proposals, however, now centred around low and mid-20s. At the same time, [45] many delegations referred to the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that the enlarged Council should comprise at least 26 seats. Some delegations also submitted specific proposals on the size and composition for an expanded Security Council. VII. General Comments and Proposals 24. Some delegations pointed out that, in order to achieve a genuine reform, the expansion of the Security Council should include the increase in both permanent and non-permanent members. A number of delegations, however, expressed the view that it was not necessary to increase the membership in both categories of members to fulfil the objectives of the reform process. To this latter group of delegations, increase of membership could take place only in either one of the categories. Many preferred an increase only in the non-permanent membership. 25. In discussing the ratio between permanent and non-permanent members of the expanded Council, while some delegations expressed the view that the current ratio of 2:1 should be maintained, a number of delegations expressed the view that it was not imperative to maintain the said ratio. 26. Many delegations welcomed the proposal that the size and composition of the Security Council be periodically reviewed. Some delegations, on the other hand, thought that periodic review would be tantamount to an admission of failure in the reform process. Furthermore, it would also bring about a situation in which some States would be perpetually conducting electoral campaigns. A number of delegations pointed out, however, that the concept of review had been an integral part of the UN from the beginning and could be activated by invoking Article 109 of the UN Charter. 27. Finally, the Open-ended Working Group also discussed the expansion of the Security Council in the context of the overall reform. In this connection, many delegations expressed the view that the expansion of the Security Council and the improvement of Security Council’s working methods and other related issues should be seen as a package. All matters relating to the reform of the Security Council should be agreed upon at the same time. A number of delegations, however, suggested that progress and implementation of reform in one area should not be impeded by the lack of progress in another and that work in all areas (work on both Clusters) should be allowed to proceed concurrently. […] Original footnotes *1 Although questions relating to the veto have been considered by the Open-ended Working Group under both Clusters I and II, they are addressed here only under Cluster I in order to show clarity and consistency of presentation. *2 The question of veto is also discussed in Cluster II. D. “Decision-making in accordance with the Charter”.

140

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.1.6 24 October 1995, UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Resolution 50/6 The General Assembly, Adopts the following Declaration: DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS […] Our resolve on this historic occasion is clear. The commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations must be seized as an opportunity to redirect it to greater service to humankind, especially to those who are suffering and are deeply deprived. This is the practical and moral challenge of our time. Our obligation to this end is found in the Charter. The need for it is manifest in the condition of humankind. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, we, the Member States and observers of the United Nations, representing the peoples of the world: – Solemnly reaffirm the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and our commitments to them; – Express our gratitude to all men and women who have made the United Nations possible, done its work and served its ideals, particularly those who have given their lives during service to the United Nations; – Are determined that the United Nations of the future will work with renewed vigour and effectiveness in promoting peace, development, equality and justice and understanding among the peoples of the world; – Will give to the twenty-first century a United Nations equipped, financed and structured to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established. In fulfilment of these commitments we will be guided in our future cooperation by the following, with respect to peace, development, equality, justice and the United Nations Organization: […] UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION 14. In order to be able to respond effectively to the challenges of the future and the expectations of the United Nations held by peoples around the world, it is essential that the United Nations itself be reformed and modernized. […] The Security Council should, inter alia, be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency; as important differences on key issues continue to exist, further in-depth consideration of these issues is required. […] 3.1.7 16 January 1996, Prof. Diogo Freitas do Amaral, President of the General Assembly, “Prospects for Reform of the Security Council”, Presentation at a meeting of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, New York12 […] 12  Source: Global Policy Forum. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council is a group of about thirty NGO representatives whose organizations have a special interest in Council matters. Founded in 1995, the group organizes briefings with the permanent representatives of the members of the Security Council, with UN officials, ministers,

3  “ The most productive time ”

141

First of all, let me recall that the Working Group on the Reform of the Security Council was created three years ago by the General Assembly and has been working for three consecutive General Assembly sessions. It is still far from reaching a conclusion, which does not mean that the working group has not worked. It means that the subject is very difficult. Not difficult in theoretical terms, but very difficult in political terms, because countries do not agree on a common approach to the problem. They have very national, tough approaches to the solutions that are envisioned. Let me give you an example. If someone were to say that Germany should become a new permanent member of the Security Council, then Italy or perhaps Spain would say: “Why not us? We also want that seat.” If some countries say that Brazil should become a permanent member, then immediately Mexico, Argentina and perhaps, Venezuela will say: “Why not us? We want that seat, too.” To mention a final example, some say that India should become a permanent member, while others immediately argue: “Why not Pakistan, Indonesia or Malaysia, instead?” It is really a very difficult question. If we could have a Security Council of 185 seats, like the General Assembly, everything would be okay. But, then, of course, it would not be an executive, efficient body, as it must be. We have a certain amount of work done and I would like to point out that the latest published progress report is document A/49/965 dated September 18, 199513 (but distributed a little later). It is a report signed by the two Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group on the Reform of the Security Council, Ambassadors Breitenstein of Finland and Pibulssongram of Thailand. If we try to make a synthesis of their conclusions as of mid-September 1995, I would say that there are a certain number of points of agreement among countries, and a certain number of points of disagreement. The first point of agreement is that the Security Council should be enlarged. Everybody agrees on that. At least, nobody dares to disagree. The second point of agreement is that enlargement should be made according to the criterion of a more equitable geographic representation, bearing in mind that the Security Council was conceived 50 years ago for a United Nations with 51 members and now we have a United Nations with 185 members. Thirdly, we should at least have an increase in the number of the non-permanent members and they should be chosen with more uniform criteria by different regional groups, because at present there are some regional groups which take very seriously the task of selecting their candidates and there are others which do not proceed in the same way. Finally, there is agreement that we should ameliorate methods of work, procedures and transparency. These are the matters of general agreement on reform of the Security Council. The main points of disagreement are these: First of all, the size of the Security Council, if it is enlarged. Should it go from 15 to 20, 22, 25, or even 30, as some countries propose? Here, of course, we have a conflict between representation and efficiency. If you want to stress representation, you can go

parliamentarians and NGO experts. See also James A. Paul, A Short History of the NGO Working Group, Global Policy Forum, September 2010. 13  → 3.1.5.

142

3  “ The most productive time ”

higher and higher and 30 perhaps would not be enough. If you want to stress efficiency, you cannot go very high and perhaps 23 or 25 would be the maximum acceptable. Secondly, should we have new permanent members or not? And if so, how many? And according to what criteria should they be selected? A third point: if one should drop the idea of new permanent members, should we just enlarge the number of non-permanent members or should we create, as some countries have proposed, a kind of third category of states, quasi- or semi-permanent members, or rotational members, et cetera. These are the main difficult problems that have yet to be solved and we do not know whether they will be solved. Personally, committed as I am to the reform of the United Nations and to the momentum and positive climate for reform provided by the 50th session, I would very much like to see the reform of the Security Council included in the global reform package. But at this stage, we cannot know and I cannot tell you whether or not we will have a reform of the Security Council. Before I proceed, let me read you what the entire membership of the United Nations unanimously approved on the occasion of the 50th anniversary celebration, last October. In the declaration on the 50th anniversary of the United Nations which was approved on the 24th of October 1995,14 this paragraph was included and unanimously approved: “The Security Council should, inter alia, be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character, and improve its working efficiency and transparency. As important differences on key issues continue to exist, further in-depth consideration of these issues is required.” So, this confirms what I said before: that there is consensus – and in this case consensus means unanimity – about expanding the Security Council to make it more representative and ameliorating its methods of work to make it more efficient, effective, and transparent. Let us assume that there is now consensus about the ideas of enlargement, better representation (namely geographically), improvement of the efficiency, transparency and methods of work, and finally the idea that if there is enlargement, it should at least include an increase in the number of non-permanent members. Let us then concentrate on the biggest and most difficult question – should we or should we not increase the number of permanent members? This question is a very difficult one and it includes in itself a lot of sub-questions. First of all, is it necessary, convenient, or advisable to increase the number of permanent members, irrespective of which countries could or should be selected for the seats? Is it a good idea to increase the number of permanent members? There is no consensus so far about this question. Although, I think there is a majority that says: “Yes, we should augment the number of permanent members.”

14  → 3.1.6.

3  “ The most productive time ”

143

Personally, I have some doubts. I am not sure whether it is a good idea because of efficiency, et cetera, et cetera. But it is an open question and we must during the coming months see how the different countries react to this question. A second point: is it possible to make a small increase in the number of permanent members? Say, the proposal of some delegations that the increase should be Germany and Japan. The reason being that they are both big, rich countries which can be relied upon as countries which conform to United Nations Charter principles and can provide support politically, financially, and militarily for the activities of the UN. I do not think this idea will be accepted by the majority of the General Assembly members. What I have heard during the plenary session debates from September to December – and especially during the three-day special commemorative meeting of the 50th anniversary – was that the majority of countries of the South consider that it would be completely unacceptable to include in the enlargement only two industrialized countries without representation of the non-industrialized Southern developing countries. It is my personal conviction (I am speaking on a purely personal basis, I am not engaging the United Nations or the General Assembly), it is my assessment, my feeling, that such a proposal would not command the support of the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly that would be necessary for it to allow a revision of the Charter. On the contrary, the proposition coming from the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77, and other countries is that if we are to have an increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council, then we should add to those two countries – or any other couple of countries from the North or from the industrialized world – about three from the South. This is the second question that we have to face. The third question is this: provided there would be agreement on the idea of increasing the number of permanent members and agreement on the criteria (say, to simplify, two from the North and three from the South), how do we select those countries? I would again like to give you my personal opinion. So far, we have witnessed some countries letting it be known that they would like to be considered as candidates for the new seats or we have heard third countries presenting the case for this or that country to be a permanent member. Much talk has been circulating in the corridors of power, discussing the possibilities, the advantages, and the objections to each name. I want to tell you that, personally, I do not believe that with this method we will ever reach agreement on a single country, because the national competition in favor of one’s own candidacy or against other candidacies will be so strong that even if we discussed this issue for ten years, no consensus would be reached. But there is a way in which this problem could be solved. The Working Group on the Reform of the Security Council should put out of its mind the question of which countries would be the new permanent members and should only address the question of how many new permanent seats there should be and according to which criteria, in the abstract, without referring to any names, without negotiating with any country. This proposal would be approved by the Security Council and the General Assembly with a two-thirds majority and afterwards ratified by at least two-thirds of the parliaments of various member nations. Then, in two or three years’ time, we would reach a stage in which the choice of the new permanent members would be made. At that time, and only at that time, one would open an election within the General Assembly

144

3  “ The most productive time ”

in which all countries conforming to the defined criteria could present their candidacy. There would be a secret ballot and those who won would be the new permanent members. My idea is that if we want to proceed in the direction of new permanent members, we must separate the question of how many new permanent members, and according to which abstract criteria, from the question of which specific countries. Because if you mix both things, you spoil everything. If you discuss whether there will be two, three, five or six new permanent members, and whether there will be two or three from the North or three or four from the South, and you don’t say anything else, and you allow two or three years for this decision to be approved by the United Nations and national parliaments, and then you hold an election in which all countries who want to be considered can present themselves and can feel that they have a fair chance of being chosen, perhaps it will work. But if you discuss it in the corridors, in closed, restricted, more-or-less non-transparent ways, all the others will feel that they are going to be excluded and that they do not have a fair chance and they will block the reform. This is my personal conviction. The third and last question is this: If we come to the conclusion that for the time being it is not possible to include new permanent members in the Security Council, should we stay with only the category of non-permanent members or should we create a third category – quasi- or semi-permanent members? I think this is an important question, which has perhaps not been thoroughly enough discussed. There is a proposal by Italy15 that goes in the direction of a third category. There is a proposal by Mexico16 that goes in that direction also. I am informed that there will be one or two other proposals that will be presented this month or in the beginning of February from other countries which go in the same direction. Perhaps this could be a compromise solution. After all, the United Nations works very much on the basis of compromise. If you have one clear-cut position on one side and another clear-cut position on the other, you must make a rapprochement between the two and find a compromise solution. That compromise solution, for the time being, would not create seats for new permanent members, but would envisage possibilities of having some countries with a more stable presence in the Security Council if they meet the criteria: absolute compliance with the principles and duties of the Charter, cooperation in the activities of the United Nations, troop contributing to the peacekeeping operations, payment of the assessments in full and on time, etcetera, etcetera. To be frank with you, I am not sure whether this is an acceptable solution, or whether it is the best solution for the problem we face. But, I think it deserves consideration, because the other is so difficult that it will lead us nowhere. This is how I see the problem today. A substantive discussion of the reform of the Security Council will begin on the first of February. I do not yet know what new propositions are going to be presented. I do not know whether from last July to February, the member countries have changed their minds. But this is how I see the situation 15  See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 30 September 1993, → 3.2.2.2.5; and 29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 16  See, e.g., the statements of 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.10; 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14; and 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.16.

3  “ The most productive time ”

145

on the eve of the beginning of a new round of discussions and consultations. I very much hope that the discussion that will follow will not only provide the opportunity for giving you more information, but also provide me with the opportunity to hear good suggestions from your side. 3.1.8 September 1996, Report on the progress of the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.117 […] [6] III. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS […] [7] Size and composition of the Security Council 23. Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group reaffirmed the agreement reached at the forty-ninth session that the Security Council should be expanded. The expansion should ensure equitable geographical distribution, taking into account the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as important changes in international relations. As to the overall size and composition of an expanded Council, the need to ensure the Council’s representative character without impairing the efficiency and effectiveness of its work was underlined. Views on how to bring about an expansion continued to differ. It became clear also that a number of Member States were not ready to take final positions because of interlinkages between the size and composition and other matters in the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group. 24. The view was expressed that expansion of the Security Council should also take into account the increase in the membership of the United Nations by countries belonging to Eastern Europe in the context of an overall equitable geographical distribution. 25. Proposals for an increase in the non-permanent membership only, including proposals on more frequent elections for a number of Member States (see, for instance, the proposals by Italy,18 Mexico19 and Turkey20 in document A/49/965, and by Italy in annex IX to the present report21) received both support and objections. 26. Both support and objections were expressed with regard to an increase in permanent members (see, for instance, the African common position22 and proposals by Monaco,23 Australia24 and Germany25 in annexes IV, XI, XIII and XIV and proposals 17  3 1 January 1997. Originally issued in an advanced version as UN Doc. A/50/47 and Corr.1 and Add.1 of 13 September 1996. 18  15 May 1995, UN Doc. A/49/965, pp. 83–91. 19  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14. 20  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14 and 3.3.14. 21  May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20. 22  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 23  17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 24  27 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.34 and 3.3.23. 25  2 July 1996, → 3.2.1.1.43.

146

3  “ The most productive time ”

by Austria, Belgium, Cuba,26 the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Slovenia27 and the Nordic countries28 in document A/49/965). In the event that there is agreement for an increase in the permanent membership, an increase only by industrialized countries would be widely regarded as unacceptable. The view that there is a need to redress the existing imbalance in the composition of the [8] Council by adding permanent members representing developing countries received both support and objections. 27. The concept of regional rotation of permanent seats was introduced in the debate (see, for instance, the African common position paper submitted by OAU in annex IV, as well as working papers by Belize,29 Malaysia30 and Norway,31 in annexes XV, XVI and XVII). Both support for and objections to this concept were expressed. The concept of shared seats was also discussed (see the submission by Belize in document A/49/96532 and in annex XV to the present report). 28. The Open-ended Working Group discussed criteria for non-permanent members, including a system for more frequent rotation of non-permanent members of the Security Council (see the proposal by Spain in annex VIII33). The Open-ended Working Group also heard views on criteria for permanent membership (see, for instance, the proposals by Indonesia34 and Singapore35 in document A/49/965). 29. The proposal that, in case of no agreement on the increase of other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the nonpermanent category received wide support (see the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in document A/49/965).36 Others regarded such expansion as insufficient. 30. The Open-ended Working Group also discussed the possible wider implications of the permanent membership of the Security Council on the membership in other principal organs and bodies of the United Nations as well as its other implications (the so-called “cascade effect”; see, for instance, the submission by Argentina in A/49/965).37 C. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto 31. The decision-making in the Security Council, including the question of the veto, continued to be an important element in the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group. Several proposals were made on this issue during the fiftieth session. In a position paper submitted by a group of countries, it was suggested that the veto should be curtailed and rationalized and that the Charter should be amended so that, as a 26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37 

1 8 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25 and 3.3.14. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23 and 3.4.3.28. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19 and 3.4.3.29. 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35 and 3.2.2.3.16. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12. 28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12.

3  “ The most productive time ”

147

first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter (see the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, annex VII).38 Amendments were proposed to articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 of the Charter seeking to limit the use of the veto (see the working paper by Mexico, annex V).39 It was also proposed that the right of veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly (see the working paper by Uruguay, annex XII).40 These proposals to limit the scope and use of the veto were widely supported in the course of the discussions. However, opposition to any limitation in the scope and use of the veto was also expressed. The question of the possible extension of the veto to possible new permanent members was also discussed. Both support and objection were expressed. While objections were expressed to any extension of the veto, some delegations expressed the view that extension of the veto, if agreed, should be done in a non-discriminatory manner. 32. The Open-ended Working Group exchanged views on the effects of the enlargement of the membership of the Security Council on its decision-making procedures in broader terms, addressing such issues as the de facto blocking power of developing countries that were non-permanent members of the Council and the number of affirmative votes required for Council decisions on both [9] substantive and procedural matters (the so-called “action threshold”; see, for instance, the working paper by Ukraine, annex XVIII).41 It was felt that discussions on those topics should continue, while bearing in mind that the final outcome would be dependent on the results of consideration on other issues mentioned above. D. Amendments to the Charter 33. An enlargement of the Security Council will necessitate amendments to the Charter. In the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group, the view was also expressed that; in some instances, the improvement of the Council’s working methods and transparency in its work might be done through such amendments. However, a number of measures to improve the working methods and transparency of the Council and its relationship with non-members of the Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations could come into effect through changes in the provisional rules of procedure of the Council or otherwise. These changes could, inter alia, be the result of formal recommendations of the General Assembly to the Council, subject to consideration and adoption by the Council itself. The relative merits of resorting to provisions in Articles 108 or 109 of the Charter in amending the Charter were also discussed by the Open-ended Working Group. E. Periodic review 34. The Open-ended Working Group discussed the possibility of periodic reviews of the composition and size of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. The point was made that providing for such periodic reviews could be 38  39  40  41 

2 7 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 17 June 1996, → 3.4.3.27. 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23, 3.3.28 and 3.4.4.3.

148

3  “ The most productive time ”

an important element in facilitating the efforts towards reaching final agreement on the issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group (see, for instance, the working paper by Germany, annex XIV to the present report). Others disagreed and thought that such a provision was unnecessary. […] 3.1.9 10 and 14 March 1997, Statements made by the Vice-Chairmen of the Openended Working Group, Mr. Wilhelm Breitenstein and Mr. Asda Jayanama, on the consultations held from January to March 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex VII [25]42 1. The present conference room paper, issued by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group, at the request of the Working Group, contains the Statements made by Mr. Jayanama of Thailand on behalf of himself and Mr. Breitenstein of Finland, Co-Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group. These statements, made on 10 and 14 March 1997, outlined major findings of the consultations held by the Co-Vice-Chairmen from 28 January to 5 March 1997. Statement made on 10 March 1997 2. Our Working Group has been functioning for the past three years and this is the beginning of the fourth year. It is approximately six months since our last formal meetings. We have had much in-depth discussion, particularly in the last five weeks, on both clusters of issues. However, those who have actively spoken in the Open-ended Working Group constitute only about 30 per cent of the full membership of the United Nations. The Bureau felt that it had to reach out to those who had hardly spoken, both in the Open-ended Working Group and at the General Assembly, in order to hear their views. This overwhelming but silent majority easily constituted over 100 Member States. 3. In addition to reaching out to the majority, we also felt that it was also a good idea to further exchange views with the rest of the membership. While their views might be well-known already, nevertheless we considered they could do with further clarification and exposition. 4. With this rationale in mind, we decided to invite representatives of all United Nations Member States to informal private consultations between 28 January to 5 March 1997. We met with them at the United Nations, either individually or in small groups, to discuss the subject of Security Council reform. For those who found our proposed schedules inconvenient, we offered second and even third opportunities to meet with us. In the end, a total of 165 delegations participated in these discussions. Participants were very appreciative of our efforts, especially those from smaller countries and we hope that this exercise was as rewarding for them as it was for us. 5. Before we give you the findings of our consultations, we want to inject a note of caution; namely, the objective of these consultations was to obtain more extensive views from the membership on some issues concerning Security Council reform. The Bureau

42  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/51/47.

3  “ The most productive time ”

149

hoped to get a general feeling of where the Open-ended Working Group stands, overall as well as on some specific issues. We believe that this limited objective was achieved. 6. The major findings from the consultations are: An increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership in the Security Council was supported by a very large majority of those interviewed, including those who indicated that they would go along with this option if the majority of the membership preferred it.  [26] A few interviewees expressed categorical opposition to an increase in permanent membership, only advocating increase in non-permanent membership. Recognizing the problems involved, a number of delegations which supported an increase in both categories also expressed readiness to support an increase in the non-permanent category as a first step provided that the Open-ended Working Group would continue to address the increase in permanent membership. The majority of those who addressed the size of the Security Council supported an overall expansion of the membership to 26, while some others preferred an expansion to the low 20s. Safeguarding the efficiency of the Council was a common concern of many delegations. The majority of supporters of an increase in both categories of membership supported an increase of five non-permanent members and five permanent members. Most of these supporters wanted the five new permanent members to come from both developing and industrialized countries and many stressed that there should be no discrimination between present and new permanent members. The veto was considered anachronistic and undemocratic by a vast majority of interviewees, although it was acknowledged that it was not realistic to expect the veto to be abolished. Many interviewees stressed the importance of adhering to the principles – already recognized in earlier reports of the Open-ended Working Group – of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of all Member States with regard to the size and composition of an expanded Security Council. A large majority supported moving ahead with improvements in the working methods of the Security Council and enhancement of the transparency of its work without having to wait for solutions on the expansion issues. While preference for reaching consensus was expressed, there was a recognition that in the end consensus would not be a realistic objective; many therefore suggested that the aim should be to gain as wide, representative and qualitative support as possible for the reform of the Security Council, while others thought that a simple vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly would be enough (Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations). A number of other issues were discussed during the consultations. As these issues were not addressed in a sufficiently structured manner, findings on them are not reflected in the present note. 7. According to the findings above, it seems that a clear majority of those interviewed supported the Open-ended Working Group in moving into more comprehensive, focused and solution-oriented work with the objective of fulfilling its mandate within

• • • • • • • • •

150

3  “ The most productive time ”

an expeditious and realistic time-frame. Therefore, the Co-Chairmen propose that we address the various substantive issues in order to provide a comprehensive picture of all issues falling under the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group. The Co-Chairmen have been informed of certain initiatives relating to the working methods, transparency, and [27] efficiency of the Security Council. We therefore propose to start our work by looking into those issues this week. Statement made on 14 March 1997 8. Earlier this week some delegations raised questions or sought clarification on certain points made in our earlier statement (see above). We would like to address some of these questions before we move on to more specific discussions on cluster II issues. Before doing so, we would like to express our gratitude to our colleagues for the many expressions of interest, understanding and support, both inside and outside this hall, for our efforts. 9. First, the Bureau would emphasize that the whole purpose of the consultations was to provide it with a more detailed but comprehensive picture of the views held by the membership on substantive and procedural issues falling within the mandate of the Working Group. Therefore, this consultation was an internal exercise, at least at the beginning. Because the Bureau received many inquiries, it felt that it should share the main findings from these consultations with the membership of the Open-ended Working Group. It was never the intention of the Co-Chairmen to attempt to replace the multilateral discussions and negotiations taking place in the Open-ended Working Group with these consultations. Everyone knows that this usurpation cannot be effected. And at the end of the day, decisions on this very important subject will be made at our capitals. 10. Second, questions concerning issues strictly falling within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council were put to delegations, with some differences in order and emphasis, depending on the perception of the Bureau on positions of individual countries. These questions were: SIZE AND COMPOSITION 1. Overall size of the reformed Security Council; 2. Increase in both categories, permanent and non-permanent, of the membership of the Security Council; increase only in the non-permanent category; 3. Number of new non-permanent and new permanent members; 4. Election/ selection/ nomination/ appointment of new permanent members; the role of regions in this process; QUESTION OF THE VETO 5. Extension of the veto to possible new permanent members; WORKING METHODS AND TRANSPARENCY 6. More rapid progress on the working methods of the Security Council and transparency of its work; a package solution including both expansion and working methods and transparency; de-linking the clusters from each other; [28] TIME-FRAME AND/OR URGENCY OF THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

3  “ The most productive time ”

151

7. Urgency of the reform of the Security Council; time-frame for conclusion of the reform; PROCEEDINGS OF THE OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP DURING THE FIFTYFIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 8. Proceedings of the work of the Open-ended Working Group in March. As already mentioned, these questions were more or less posed to all delegations. No leading follow-up questions were made and if any delegations made reference to a well-known position it had taken earlier no detailed follow-up questions were deemed necessary. Some delegations did not answer all questions. 11. Third, in addition to answers to the above-mentioned questions, several delegations volunteered additional information, e.g. regional rotation, candidates they supported for permanent membership, limitations or elimination of the veto, support for or comments on specific proposals. However, since these questions were neither addressed in a structured manner nor by all delegations, findings on these issues were not included in our earlier statement (see above) on the results of the consultations. 12. Fourth, during our debate, it was suggested that it would be helpful if the Bureau could provide details concerning support for different findings in numerical terms. However, the Bureau is not in a position to do this. Participants were assured by the Co-Chairmen that the consultations were confidential and that results in specific terms would not be revealed. 13. Fifth, the Bureau would like, however, to provide a specific answer to the delegation which wondered whether a different kind of a majority could be built around an increase in non-permanent membership on the basis of the second finding on categorical opposition to an increase in permanent membership and the third finding on readiness to support an increase only in the non-permanent membership as a first step. Clearly, the answer is that no such majority could be found. 14. Sixth, some delegations also pointed out that the findings from the consultations were not in conformity with the Open-ended Working Group’s report to the General Assembly which was adopted by consensus. Nor did it conform with discussions under agenda item 47 of the General Assembly and other relevant agenda items. It is very clear to the Bureau that the report of the Open-ended Working Group to the General Assembly was a negotiated document, adopted by consensus, and in a way representing the lowest common denominator. Our private consultations, however, were not negotiations but exchanges of views in which participants expressed their opinions in a more open manner. Furthermore, statements under different agenda items have not gone into as much detail as the consultations and, of course, all delegations did not address the same issues in their statements. 15. Seventh, with regard to the comment that these consultations were not transparent and that the Co-Chairmen had no mandate to conduct these consultations, the Co-Chairmen feel that it is fully within their mandates to utilize any means of consultation within the traditional practices of the United Nations to exercise their duties and responsibilities as elected Co-Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group. Indeed, by sharing with the Working Group the results of what began essentially as an internal exercise, we should have dispelled any fear that our efforts were not transparent.

152

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.1.10 20 March 1997, Paper submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group43 (“Razali Reform Paper”), UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.1 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex II44 [6]45 The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,46 Recognizing the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing also the functions and powers of the General Assembly on matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security as contained in the Charter, Welcoming closer cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, Noting that the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the work of the Security Council depend on its representative character, on its ability to discharge its primary responsibility and in carrying out its duties on behalf of all members, Reasserting the purposes and principles of the Charter and recalling that under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, every Member State has pledged to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter”, Stressing that the permanent members of the Security Council bear a special responsibility both to uphold the principles of the Charter and to give their full support to the Organization’s actions to maintain international peace and security, Acknowledging that there are many ways for Member States to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining that members of the Security Council should be elected with due regard to their record of various contributions to this end, and also to equitable geographical distribution, as noted in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, and for their demonstrated commitment to and observance of international norms, Recognizing the ongoing effort of the Security Council to improve its working methods, 43  In the 51st session, the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Razali Ismail, served as chairman of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. 44  The paper took the form of a draft resolution of the General Assembly. It was not put to a vote. On 23 November 1998, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 53/30 (→ 4.1.1), determining that the General Assembly will not adopt any resolution or decision on Security Council reform without the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of Assembly members. Thereby, the Assembly implicitly rejected President Razali’s proposal to effect an enlargement of the Council in three stages (the first being a framework resolution increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members; the second an implementing resolution selecting the new permanent members; and the third a resolution formally amending the Charter), and to require only for the last resolution an approval by a two-thirds majority of all member states (Article 108 of the Charter), while for the previous two resolutions a two-thirds majority of Assembly members present and voting would suffice (Article 18, para. 2). 45  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/51/47. 46  → 3.1.2.

3  “ The most productive time ”

153

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, which began its work in January 1994, Seeking to reach general agreement on specific steps to enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy and the representative character of the Security Council, [7] Recalling Article 15 (1) of the Charter, and recognizing the need for enhanced cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, 1. Decides: (a) To increase the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twentyfour by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members; (b) That the five new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from the developing States of Africa; (ii) One from the developing States of Asia; (iii) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two from industrialized States; (c) That the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from African States; (ii) One from Asian States; (iii) One from Eastern European States; (iv) One from Latin American and Caribbean States; 2. Invites interested States to inform the members of the General Assembly that they are prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council; 3. Decides to proceed by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, by 28 February 1998, to the designation of the States that will be elected to exercise the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council, according to the pattern described in paragraph 1 (b), it being understood that if the number of States having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership, new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining category or categories, until five States obtain the required majority to occupy the five seats; 4. Recognizing that an overwhelming number of Member States consider the use of veto in the Security Council anachronistic and undemocratic, and have called for its elimination, decides: (a) To discourage use of veto, by urging the original permanent members of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter; (b) That the new permanent members of the Security Council shall have no provision of the veto power; [8] 5. Decides that, for peacekeeping assessments, all new and original permanent members of the Security Council shall pay the same percentage rate of premium surcharge over and above their regular budget rate of assessment; 6. Decides that:

154

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) No later than one week after the designation of States elected to serve as new permanent members of the Security Council, a resolution adopting amendments to the Charter arising from decisions taken in paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 (b) will be put to the vote in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) The resolution will also include amendments to Article 27 (2) and (3) of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of twenty-four members of the Security Council for a decision; (c) The resolution will also include amendments to Article 53 of the Charter to delete reference to former enemies of its signatories, and to eliminate Article 107; 7. Agrees that the aforementioned amendments to the Charter in paragraph 6 (a), (b) and (c) shall come into force following ratification by States Members consistent with Article 108 of the Charter; 8. Decides that a review conference will be convened under Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, ten years after the entry into force of the amendments described in the present resolution, in order to review the situation created by the entry into force of these amendments; 9. Urges the Security Council to undertake the following measures to enhance transparency and to strengthen the support and understanding of its decisions by the whole membership of the Organization: (a) Implement fully and effectively its presidential statements of 16 December 1994, calling for greater recourse to open meetings of the Council, in particular at an early stage in its consideration of a subject; (b) Institutionalize regular monthly consultations between the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, together with the Chairs of the Main Committees of the General Assembly and members of the Security Council; (c) Conduct consultations between the President of the Security Council and the respective Chairs of the regional groups when necessary; (d) Conduct regular and substantive briefings by the President of the Security Council on informal consultations of the Security Council for all Member States; (e) Encourage consultations between members of the Security Council and the countries most affected by a decision of the Council; (f) Invite non-members of the Security Council to participate in the informal consultations of the Security Council under Article 31 and Article 32 of the Charter; [9] (g) Institute provisions for the prompt convening of formal meetings of the Security Council no later than 48 hours after the request of a State Member of the United Nations; (h) Institutionalize a system of consultations during the decision-making process on the establishment, conduct and termination of peacekeeping operations in order to strengthen the measures outlined in the presidential statement of the Security Council dated 28 March 1996; (i) Institutionalize the practice of giving opportunity to concerned States and organizations to present their views during closed meetings of the Sanctions Committees on issues arising from implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council; (j) Implement fully and effectively the provisions on sanctions and Sanctions Committees as recommended by the Subgroup on the Question of United

3  “ The most productive time ”

155

Nations-Imposed Sanctions of the Informal Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on an Agenda for Peace; (k) Make available records of the Sanctions Committees to all Member States; (l) Operationalize Article 50 of the Charter, on the right of Member States to consult the Council with regard to a solution of their problems arising from implementation of preventive or enforcement measures imposed by the Council; (m) Hold frequent orientation debates before the Council takes a decision on a particular matter; (n) Encourage greater use of the “Arria formula” to facilitate consultations between members and non-members of the Council; (o) Clarify what constitutes a procedural matter as reflected in Article 27 (2) of the Charter; (p) Invite the participation of all Member States in the deliberations of the applicable subsidiary organs of the Council established in pursuance of Article 29 of the Charter; (q) Make greater use of the International Court of Justice by seeking its advisory opinion consistent with Article 96 (1) of the Charter; (r) Consult with regional organizations, agencies and arrangements, at appropriate levels, on matters affecting the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter; 10. Urges the Security Council to issue its annual and special reports to the General Assembly taking into account General Assembly resolution 51/193 of 17 December 1996. 3.1.11 18 April 1997, Bureau of the OEWG, Non-paper: Working methods and transparency of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.3 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex IV [13]47 Based on various contributions received from Member States and groups of Member States concerning the working methods and transparency of the Security Council, and the discussions on those proposals in the Working Group – in particular on the negotiating paper by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on Cluster II issues – the Bureau proposes that the following measures should be considered by the Open-ended Working Group with a view to their eventual adoption as part of a comprehensive package of a reform of the Security Council: […] [16] […] V. DECISION-MAKING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE VETO A. Veto 1. The Security Council should: –  [17] Update the annex of General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949,48 containing a list of decisions deemed procedural; – Explore the proposal on achieving an understanding that a permanent member can cast a negative vote on a substantive matter without it being interpreted as a veto; – Explore individual voluntary declarations by the permanent members to limit the scope of application of the veto. 47  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/51/47. 48  → 2.1.

156

3  “ The most productive time ”

2. The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should apply only to actions taken under Chapter VII. […] 3.1.12 29 May 1997, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Discussions held in the Working Group in 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.8 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex IX [32]49 1. The purpose of this conference room paper, prepared by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group, is to produce a distillation of discussions held during the two substantive sessions of the Working Group in 1997, recognizing that a comprehensive package needs to be formulated to begin negotiations to achieve general agreement on all aspects of the reform of the Security Council. The first part of this paper deals with the expansion and composition of the Council and the second part with the working methods of the Council, the transparency of its work as well as its decision-making process. PART A: SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL I. SIZE 2. The size of the reformed Security Council, taking into account representivity and legitimacy and considerations of effectiveness and efficiency, should be from 24 to 26 through an expansion in permanent and non-permanent membership. The new permanent seats will be allocated to Member States representing both developing countries and industrialized countries. [33] II. COMPOSITION Permanent Members 3. The number of permanent members should be increased by 5 or 6. In the event of 5 being the decision, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the developing States of Africa;* (b) One to the developing States of Asia; (c) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) Two to industrialized States. * OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States. 4. Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional considerations prior to the election by the General Assembly. Non-Permanent Members 5. The number of non-permanent members should be increased by 4, 5 or 6. In the event of 4 being the decision, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: 49  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/51/47.

3  “ The most productive time ”

157

(a) One to the African States;** (b) One to the Asian States; (c) One to the Eastern European States; (d) One to the Latin America and the Caribbean States. ** In case additional five seats being the decision, the additional fifth seat should be allocated to the African States. 6. In the event that no general agreement is reached on expansion of the Security Council in both categories of permanent and non-permanent membership, an expansion in the non-permanent category only will be considered. III. ELECTION 7. The General Assembly shall elect the new permanent members by a two-thirds majority upon endorsement of the respective region or in the lack thereof from the individual candidatures presented to it. Balloting shall continue until all allocated permanent seats have been filled by the required majority. This will take place subsequent to a decision to be taken by the General Assembly on the framework for the comprehensive reform of the Security Council. [34] IV. VETO 8. The veto as a voting instrument relates primarily to the decision-making process in the Security Council and is dealt with as such in the section covering “Decision-making in the Security Council” in Part B of this paper. 9. The question of the veto is closely linked to an increase in the number of permanent members. The view held by an overwhelming majority is that the veto is anachronistic and undemocratic and should be eliminated in a modernized United Nations. The veto should not perpetuate differences and discrimination among members of the Security Council on the one hand or between present and proposed new permanent members on the other. This view has been strongly underlined by the membership. However, the permanent five have indicated that they will not accept or ratify any Charter amendments which aim at abolishing or limiting the veto. 10. Several approaches to solve this problem have been suggested: – no extension of the veto – full extension of the veto – full extension of the veto in principle but linked to a formula which would suspend the application of the veto by new permanent members for a period to be determined – unilateral (voluntary or binding) declaration by a new permanent member containing a commitment not to resort to the veto (100 percent or partially; could also be applied to present permanent five) – provision to enable a new permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares (could also be applied to the permanent five) – establishing a list – positive or negative – of matters which are not subject to the veto (applicable to both present and new permanent members) – instituting some form of a collective veto for possible new permanent members (requiring 2, 3, 4 or 5 negative votes to constitute a veto in the sense now applicable to any of the permanent five)

158

3  “ The most productive time ”

– in addition to any of the above illustrations a recommendation by the General Assembly urging the permanent members (both present and new) to refrain from resorting to veto either generally or by the way of suggesting either a positive or negative list. Every effort should be made to avoid a veto and to promote [35] consensus-building in the Council. Improvements in the working methods of the Council should help discourage a veto, especially in areas relating directly to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council’s decision-making. V. PERIODIC REVIEW 11. A periodic review should be conducted on the basis of automaticity every 10 years, the first of which will be held 10 years after the entry into force of the adopted arrangements and amendments resulting from the present reform exercise. The scope of the review process should be comprehensive to evaluate the situation created by the present reform of the Security Council, including the status of new permanent members – whether their status should be terminated or reaffirmed by two-thirds majority – as well as the questions of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation of any region and its continuing interest in enhanced representation on the Council in the permanent or non-permanent category of membership, as well as the question of over-representation. The review process should not be subject to the veto. PART B: WORKING METHODS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TRANSPARENCY OF ITS WORK AS WELL AS ITS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS […] [48] […] X. DECISION-MAKING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE VETO A. Veto (a) The question of procedural or substantive matters 60. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 267(III) of 14 April 1949, the Security Council has on several occasions engaged in deliberations without definite resolution as to what constitutes a procedural or substantive matter. The matter remains open as to whether a subject matter under discussion, or to come under discussion before the Council, is procedural or substantive. To date the status quo has been maintained to the effect that a decision to that end is itself subject to the veto. (b) The question of voluntary exercise of the veto 61. It is now a settled practice that the requirement for “an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members” on a substantive matter (Art. 27(3) of the Charter) does not necessarily entail affirmative votes by all permanent members of the Council; only that none of them casts a negative vote. There have been instances where a permanent member of the Council has either abstained, or not participated in the vote, or been absent from the pertinent meeting on a substantive matter, and the resulting vote has been held to be valid and binding. Members of the Council must abstain from voting on decisions under Chapter VI and under Article 52(3) of the Charter, relating to disputes to which they are a party – the so-called obligatory abstention. [49] (c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:

3  “ The most productive time ”

159

62. The Charter should be amended so that: – as a first step, the veto should apply only to action taken under Chapter VII; – a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal which has achieved the required majority; – the right of veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly; – the Articles 4(2), 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting or abolishing the application of the veto. OR 63. The Security Council OR the General Assembly should: – update the annex of General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949, containing a list of decisions deemed procedural; – provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Art. 27.2 of the Charter); 64. The Security Council should: – explore further the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares; – explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. (d) Proposed form of institutionalization: 65. Amend the Charter and/or to be included in Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. B. Action threshold 66. If the present action threshold is maintained at the approximately present level (60 percent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24: 14, in a Council of 25: 15 and in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action [50] threshold have been made. (d) Proposed form of institutionalization: 67. Amend the Charter accordingly. […] 3.1.13 1998,50 Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Working methods of the Security Council, transparency of its work, as well as its decision-making process, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex III [10]51 I. Introduction I. The Open-ended Working Group achieved substantial progress during the fiftyfirst session of the General Assembly in its discussions on the working methods and transparency of the Security Council. The results of the debates are reflected in the negotiating paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on cluster II 50   UN Doc. A/52/47 was published on 24 August 1998. For the previously issued document A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.4 no date is given. 51  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47.

160

3  “ The most productive time ”

issues,*1 which was first submitted to the Working Group in March 1997, and in conference room papers 3 and 8 of the Bureau*2, prepared on the basis of the debates of the Working Group on the negotiating paper submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. During its deliberations in July 1997, the Working Group also discussed in detail the working methods and transparency of the Council based on part B of conference room paper 8, but no new conference room paper was prepared as a result of the discussions at that time. The present document attempts to incorporate the views expressed in those discussions.*3 […] [15] […] VI. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto A. Veto 26. Suggested improvements to the present practice: (a) The Charter should be amended so that: (i) As a first step, the veto should apply only to action taken under Chapter VII; (ii) A single veto will not prevent action on a proposal that has achieved the required majority; (iii) The right of veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly; (iv)  Articles 4, paragraph 2, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting the application of the veto; OR/AND (b) The Security Council OR the General Assembly should: (i)  Update the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949, containing a list of decisions deemed procedural; (ii) Provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter); (c) The Security Council should: [16] (i) Explore further the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares; (ii) Explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. 27. Proposed form of institutionalization: Amend the Charter and/or include in the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. B. Action threshold 28. If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24:14, in a Council of 25:15 and in a Council of 26:16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold have been made. 29. Proposed form of institutionalization: Amend the Charter accordingly. […]

3  “ The most productive time ”

161

Original footnotes *1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/51/47), annex V [30 April 1997, → 3.4.3.43]. *2 Ibid., annexes IV [18 April 1997, → 3.1.11] and IX [29 May 1997, → 3.1.12]. *3 Ibid., annex IX. 3.1.14 27 April 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of proposals made by delegations during the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex X*1 [42]52 Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto I. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council A. Proposals aimed at curtailment, limitation or discouragement of the use of the veto which do not necessarily require amendments to the Charter 1. The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. 2. The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The permanent members should always provide a written justification whenever they exercise the veto. 3. The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. 4. A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decision-making of the Security Council should be formulated. A list of decisions of the Security Council deemed procedural should be developed, inter alia, through the revision of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949. 5. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. The declaration should also contain recommendations to the Council aimed at curtailing, limiting or discouraging the use of the veto. B. Proposals aimed at curtailment or limitation of the use of the veto requiring amendments to the Charter 6. The Charter should be amended to provide for restriction of the veto to questions falling under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 of the Charter. [43] 7. The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly.

52  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47.

162

3  “ The most productive time ”

8. The Charter should be amended so that a single negative vote by a permanent member of the Security Council will not prevent action on a proposal that has received the required majority. II. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council 9. If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 20: 12; in a Council of 21: 13; in a Council of 23 or 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold could be also considered. Original footnote *1 The present paper does not reflect proposals to the effect that the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council should continue to be discussed within an open-ended high-level format of the General Assembly; nor does it deal with proposals concerning the extension of the veto to possible new permanent members of the Security Council. 3.1.15 1 May 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Sets of outstanding issues related to the expansion of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/ CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVIII [55]53 I. Total size of the enlarged Security Council: Option 1: 20; Option 2: 21; Option 3: 23; Option 4: 24; Option 5: 25; Option 6: 26. II. Categories of the membership to be increased: Option 1: Increase of permanent and non-permanent membership; Option 2: Increase only of non-permanent membership. III. Issues related to the increase of permanent and non-permanent membership: 1. Ratio between new permanent and non-permanent seats. 2. Number and distribution of new permanent seats. 3. Rotational arrangements for new permanent seats:  Option 1: Application of rotational arrangements to all or some of new permanent seats;  Option 2: Rejection of the idea of rotational arrangements for new permanent seats. 4. Procedure for the designation of new permanent seats. 5. Extension of the veto to the new permanent membership: Option 1: No extension of the veto to the new permanent membership; Option 2: Full extension of the veto to the new permanent membership; Option 3: Other arrangement. 53  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47.

3  “ The most productive time ”

163

6. Number and distribution of new non-permanent seats. 7. Election of new non-permanent members:  Option 1: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members; [56]  Option 2: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members, with the establishment of rotational arrangements for new non-permanent seats; Number and selection of States to be subject for rotational arrangements. IV. Issues related to the increase only of non-permanent membership: 1. Number and distribution of new non-permanent seats. 2. Election of new non-permanent members:  Option 1: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members;  Option 2: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members, with the establishment of rotational arrangements for new non-permanent seats; Number and selection of States to be subject for rotational arrangements. 3.1.16 12 May 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of proposals made by delegations during the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XI*1 [44]54 Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto I. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council A. Proposals aimed at curtailment, limitation or discouragement of the use of the veto which do not necessarily require amendments to the Charter of the United Nations 1. A proposal was made to the effect that the permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. 2. A proposal was made to the effect that the permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification which would be considered legally binding. 3. A proposal was made to the effect that the Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote 54  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47.

164

3  “ The most productive time ”

without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, nonparticipation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decisionmaking process. 4. A proposal was made to the effect that a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decision-making of the Security Council should be formulated. In lack thereof, clear criteria as to which matters are of a procedural nature should be developed. A proposal was made to the effect that decisions referred to as being of a procedural nature could be based on the following criteria: (a) All decisions adopted in application of provisions that appear in the Charter under the heading “procedure”; [45]  (b) All decisions concerning the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Security Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations; (c) All decisions related to the Security Council’s internal functioning and the conduct of its business; (d) All decisions that bear a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria; (e) Certain decisions instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision. 5. A proposal was made to the effect that the permanent members shall generally be guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 194955 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural. 6. A proposal was made to the effect that the annex to resolution 267 (III) should be updated and a complementary list of Security Council decisions deemed procedural should be developed. Proposals have been made suggesting that the following decisions be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III): (a) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (i) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (ii) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (iii) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; (b) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (c) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (d) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly;

55  → 2.1.

3  “ The most productive time ”

165

(e) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (f) Decisions taken under Article 40 relating to provisional measures; (g) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50. 7. A proposal was made to the effect that resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. B. Proposals aimed at curtailment or limitation of the use of the veto requiring amendments to the Charter 8. A proposal was made to the effect that the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 of the Charter. [46] 9. A proposal was made to the effect that paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. 10. A proposal was made to the effect that the Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. 11. A proposal was made to the effect that the Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. 12. A proposal was made to the effect that the Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption of a decision that has received the required majority. II. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council 13. If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 20: 12; in a Council of 21: 13; in a Council of 23 or 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold could also be considered. Original footnote The present paper does not indicate the level of support by delegations for the proposals contained herein. Nor does it reflect the number of delegations that made the same proposal. It should also be noted that the present paper does not include proposals to the effect that the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council could continue to be discussed within an open-ended high-level format of the General Assembly; nor does it deal with proposals concerning the extension of the veto to possible new permanent members of the Security Council. *1

166

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.1.17  25 June 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Sets of outstanding issues related to the expansion of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.12/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XIX [57]56 I. Total size of the enlarged Security Council: Option 1: 20; Option 2: 21; Option 3: 23; Option 4: 24; Option 5: 25; Option 6: 26; Option 7:  at least 26*1. II. Categories of the membership to be increased: Option 1: Increase of permanent and non-permanent membership; Option 2:  Increase only of non-permanent membership. III. Issues related to the increase of permanent and non-permanent membership: 1. Ratio between new permanent and non-permanent seats. 2. Number and distribution of new permanent seats. 3. Rotational arrangements for new permanent seats: Option 1: Application of rotational arrangements to all or some of new permanent seats;*2 Option 2:  Rejection of the idea of rotational arrangements for new permanent seats. 4. Procedure for the designation of new permanent seats. 5. Extension of the veto to the new permanent membership: Option 1: No extension of the veto to new permanent membership; Option 2: Full extension of the new permanent membership; Option 3:  Other arrangement. 6. Number and distribution of new non-permanent seats.*3 7. Election of new non-permanent members: Option 1: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members; [58] Option 2:  Maintaining the established practice for the election of new non-permanent members, with the establishment of rotational arrangements for new non-permanent seats;  Number and selection of States to be subject to rotational arrangements. IV. Issues related to the increase only of non-permanent membership: 1. Number and distribution of new non-permanent seats. 2. Election of new non-permanent members: Option 1: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members;

56  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47.

3  “ The most productive time ”

167

Option 2: Maintaining the established practice for the election of new nonpermanent members, with the establishment of rotational arrangements for new non-permanent seats;  Number and selection of States to be subject to rotational arrangements. Original footnotes *1 See the annex to document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2, letter from Bahrain dated 27 January 1998, containing the position of the Group of Arab States on expansion and composition of the Security Council [→ 4.2.2.3.1]; annex XI to the report of the Working Group to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/51/47); and document A/AC.247/1997/CRP.10, submitted by Egypt, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, informing the Working Group about the outcome of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement held at New Delhi regarding the reform of the Security Council [→ 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44]. *2 See document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.16, containing the decision of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the procedure for rotation of the two permanent seats claimed by Africa in the expanded Security Council [8-10 June 1998, → 4.2.2.3.2]. See also the annex to document A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.2, letter from Bahrain dated 27 January 1998, containing the position of the Group of Arab States on expansion and composition of the Security Council [→ 4.2.2.3.1]. *3 See document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.15, containing the joint position paper of the States members of the Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership in the Security Council [May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1]. 3.1.18 6 July 1998, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Summary of the proposals made on the issue of the extension of the veto to the new permanent members, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.12/Rev.1/Add.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XX [59]57 The principal options related to the issue of the extension of the veto to the new permanent members are contained in section III, paragraph 5, of document A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.12/Rev.1, entitled “Sets of outstanding issues related to the expansion of the Security Council”.58 However, in the course of the consideration of item 3 of the Working Group’s programme of work, entitled “Expansion of the Security Council” (see A/AC.247/1998/CRP.5),59 a number of more specific proposals and comments on this issue were made. They are summarized below: 1. Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment or limitation of its use*1 by the current permanent members. 2. The veto should not be extended to new permanent members.

57  The page numbers refer to UN Doc. A/52/47. 58  → 3.1.17. 59  = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex II.

168

3  “ The most productive time ”

3. New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as the current permanent members. 4. Candidates for permanent membership should indicate their willingness to become new permanent members of the Security Council without the veto. 5. New permanent members should agree not to exercise their veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. 6. Decision on the extension of the veto to the new permanent members should be taken once the new permanent members of the Security Council have been elected. 7. A high-level working group of the General Assembly should be established to consider the extent to which the veto should be extended to new permanent members. During this interim period the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto, and the concurring vote of a determined number of new permanent members (for example four out of five) will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Original footnote For concrete proposals to this effect, see document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10/Rev.1 [→ 3.1.16].

*1

3.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 3.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 3.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 3.2.1.1.1 27 September 1991, Italy, Mr. de Michelis, UN Doc. A/46/PV.12, pp. 21-36 […] A second goal should be the expansion of the Security Council, with the increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members, which would not necessarily entail extending the right of veto to all the new permanent members. We propose that the selection of the latter should be made on the basis of objective criteria, such as the size of the country’s population and its gross national product. […] 3.2.1.1.2 23 September 1992, Germany, Mr. Kinkel, UN Doc. A/47/PV.8, pp. 51-67 […] A debate on reforming the Council is under way. We Germans will not take the initiative in this respect, but if a change in the Council’s composition is actually considered we too shall make known our intention to seek a permanent seat. […] 3.2.1.1.3 24 September 1992, Italy, Mr. Colombo, UN Doc. A/47/PV.10, pp. 26-5160 […] Italy, along other countries, has already stated that the question of revising certain parts of the Charter relating to matters such as the composition of the Security Council 60  Italy confirmed this position on 23 November 1992 in UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 31-33.

3  “ The most productive time ”

169

must be adequately debated. We still believe that the Council could be made more authoritative and representative by increasing the number of temporary and permanent members, choosing the latter on the basis of objective criteria. Italy will also assert its aspiration for a more adequate representation in the Security Council at that moment, unless institutional developments in the European Union will not allow at a certain stage the institution of a European seat in the Security Council. […] 3.2.1.1.4 28 September 1992, Lithuania, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis, UN Doc. A/47/ PV.15, pp. 2-11

[…] The Security Council could be expanded to include three new permanent members – Japan, Germany and India and the exercise of the right to veto from that day forward could require not one but at least two permanent members’ invoking that right at the same time. […] 3.2.1.1.5 30 September 1992, Nigeria, Mr. Nwachukwu, UN Doc. A/47/PV.19, pp. 76-85

[…] The composition of the permanent membership of the Security Council represents three out of five regions. Seen in the North-South context, four of its members come from the North. In addition, new demands on the issue have emerged with the recent changes in the international system. The parameters of democracy as well as size and role within the global system have become relevant criteria for adjudging the issue of representation. The need to increase the number of permanent seats in the Security Council is in our view an idea whose time has come. Therefore, it should be a matter of principle for the international community that Africa must not continue to be a region without representation in the permanent membership of the Security Council. Nigeria, the most populous African nation, with the largest economic potential and its proven commitment to the cause of world peace and security, possesses the qualifications to fulfil Africa’s aspirations in this regard. […] 3.2.1.1.6 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [4] […] II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA [Original: English] [29 June 1993] […] [5] […] 5. In 1945 the Security Council had 11 members; the number was adequate taking into account the size of the membership of the United Nations at that time. Today, the United Nations has grown to 183 members. Five permanent and 10 rotating members for the Security Council is inadequate. The Government of Antigua and Barbuda proposes eight permanent and 17 rotating members. Such a number would be proper and manageable, and would fairly reflect the world body’s numerical growth.

170

3  “ The most productive time ”

6. The question of the composition of the Security Council is also very important. Since the current five permanent members are industrial Powers, and the majority of these are European, the nations of the developing world outside of Europe have lesser representation on the Council. They none the less constitute a larger percentage of the total membership of the world body and of the world’s population. In the eyes of the developing world, there is a justifiable prima facie case for concluding that the Security Council is not representative. A situation of resentment and discontent could develop which would undermine the support for the Council’s actions. Increased membership, to include at least four developing and four industrialized nations as permanent members, and 12 developing and five industrialized nations on the rotating membership of the Security Council, is a political and practical necessity which will go a long way in helping the Council to maintain world peace and security. 7. The Government of Antigua and Barbuda would therefore conclude that the Security Council membership should be enlarged on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, taking into account the increase in membership of the United Nations and the size of the regional groups which comprise that membership. [6] 8. The composition could be as follows: (a) African States. The Group of African States totals 54 members; one permanent member and six rotating members would equitably represent this very large group. (1 + 6) (b) Asian States. The Group of Asian States has 44 members; one additional permanent member and three rotating members would serve to represent this group equitably. (2 + 3) (c) Eastern European States. The Eastern European States Group has 26 members. The Russian Federation has permanent representation on the Council. Consideration should be given to adding one rotating member to the Council for a total of three. (1 + 2) (d) Latin America and Caribbean States. The Latin American and Caribbean Group is comprised of 34 Member States and none are permanent members of the Security Council. Consideration should be given to adding one permanent member and having three rotating members. (1 + 3) (e) Western European States. The Western European and Other States Group has 26 members. Of these 26 States, three have permanent membership on the Council. However, consideration should be given to one additional member on a rotating basis. (3 + 3) 9. With eight permanent and 17 rotating members, for a total of 25 members, the equitable geographical balance within the Security Council would better reflect the realities of the modern era. […] [11] […] BELGIUM

[Original: French] [4 June 1993]

[…] [12] […] Belgium recognizes the merits of this desire for reform: it is essential that the international community considers itself properly represented in the Council.

171

3  “ The most productive time ”

4. However, geographical distribution is not the sole criterion to be taken into account in this context. Given the very heavy responsibilities which the Security Council must assume, its members and, in particular, its permanent members, must be in a position to make a special political, military and financial contribution with respect to the actions and operations decided on by the Council. The inability of permanent members to satisfy this criterion would rapidly compromise the authority and mobilizing power of the Council. 5. Similarly, it is reasonable to desire appropriate representation by non-permanent members, whose constant and substantial contributions make it possible to implement the decisions of the Council as well as those of other United Nations bodies and the specialized agencies. The collective contribution of these Member States must not be underestimated. 6. In concrete terms, the foregoing considerations could lead to the admission of two new permanent members, provided that they assume all the obligations incumbent upon such members. An increase in the number of permanent members should by no means result in a decrease in the number of non-permanent members. In the case of certain geographical groups which consider themselves underrepresented, consideration undoubtedly also should be given to adding one non-permanent seat. Such a limited expansion would not restrict the effectiveness of the Council and would significantly improve its representative nature. 7. In order to supplement this structural balance through equitable representation within each regional group, the groups should be encouraged to conclude rotation agreements. […] [13] BRAZIL

[Original: English] [4 June 1993]

[…] [14] […] 7. Over the past few years, it has been suggested by growing numbers of Governments, analysts and commentators that the time has come to increase the number of permanent members of the Security Council so as to reflect better the overall membership of the United Nations and the changed international situation. Brazil believes that, in order to ensure a more equitable and balanced composition of the Security Council as a whole, both among permanent and non-permanent members, serious consideration should be given to the idea of entrusting the responsibility of permanent membership in the Council to perhaps two additional major industrialized States, as well as to one major country from each of the main regions of the developing world; an appropriate limited increase in the number of other members could also be provided at the same time. The new Security Council would have a total of 23 or 24 members, including nonpermanent and permanent members. […] [19] […]

172

3  “ The most productive time ” COLOMBIA61

[Original: Spanish] [29 June 1993]

[…] [20] […] 6. A balanced increase in the number of members of the Security Council, both permanent as well as non-permanent members, has become an imperative need in view of international realities. Such an increase should reflect the current number of States Members of the Organization, the realities of the new international situation and an equitable distribution among all existing regional groups. 7. Colombia believes that, in order to ensure such an equitable composition, the Council should admit two more countries from the developed world as well as two countries from each region of the developing world, namely, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. The criteria set forth in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, in our view, are still fully valid. In any event, any change in the membership of the Council applying to certain regions only would be contrary to those criteria and, in addition, to the spirit on which any change in the Council’s composition should be based. This proposal, which would enhance the representative character of the Council, would not affect its effective functioning. […] [24] COSTA RICA62

[Original: Spanish] [6 July 1993]

[…] 2. […] (b) The composition of the Security Council should be reviewed. Two States that are major industrial and economic Powers should be made permanent members of the Council; to that end, the Charter’s anachronistic Article 53 should be amended. In addition, one State for each of the three regional groups of developing countries should be admitted as a permanent member; this would bring the number of permanent members to 10. The number of non-permanent members should be increased by five, and care should be taken to ensure equitable regional representation. This would bring the number of seats for both categories to 25, or 13 per cent of all the States represented in the [25] General Assembly; this number is still less than the initial 20 per cent required when the Organization was founded. This would ensure adequate representation without detriment to the efficiency of the system. Moreover, the criticism that the Council is run by a small number of Powers would no longer be justified, and it would be clear that the Council was guided by a spirit of solidarity and joint participation. (c) A very good principle would be to assign the non-permanent seats to three States on the basis of common interests; this has been the practice of the Bretton Woods institutions and it has had good results. In this case, even though the seat is given to 61  → 3.4.3.2 for Colombia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 62  → 3.4.3.2 for Costa Rica’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

173

3  “ The most productive time ”

only one State, the other two States would serve as alternates and would enjoy all the privileges of that status. […] [26] CROATIA

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

[…] General considerations […] 4. The Republic of Croatia is aware of the fact that during the years of the substantive debate on the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” the impression among the membership as a whole has been that, in spite of the fact that the Security Council in recent years has acted with considerable effectiveness, it does not in its composition and procedures fully and adequately respond to contemporary realities. It is essential to stress the need for governing criteria in the possible reform of the Security Council – namely, the necessity of its representativity and legitimacy – but at the same time for efficiency, i.e., that the Security Council should be able to act rapidly, decisively and with authority. […] [27] […] 6. The growth in membership of the United Nations and the changed geopolitical reality of the world require that the Security Council, as well as the other organs of the Organization, should be examined to ensure the new and enhanced role now required of the United Nations. The Republic of Croatia supports the majority view in favour of an increase in the membership of the Security Council to ensure representativity and legitimacy, but at the same time is fully aware of the importance of the Council’s retaining its effectiveness. All these elements should be taken into consideration and carefully examined to ensure that the Security Council will be considerably strengthened and better equipped to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Composition 7. It is necessary to stress the importance of the criteria for the election of nonpermanent members of the Security Council as foreseen in paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter, which says that the General Assembly shall elect 10 other non-permanent members, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 8. Having in mind these provisions which contain the aforementioned criteria, the Republic of Croatia strongly supports the increase in the number of members of the Security Council. The Republic of Croatia is of the opinion that the membership of the Security Council should be increased for both permanent and non-permanent members, taking into account the new world Powers as well as the States which are important for the stability of a certain region. […] 10. The Republic of Croatia is of the opinion that the actual global geopolitical situation requires an enlargement of the Security Council in order to ensure all the criteria prescribed in the Charter. On the other hand, attention should be given to the fact

174

3  “ The most productive time ”

that the Security Council be primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security in order to ensure effective and prompt action by the United Nations. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the composition of the Security Council is truly [28] representative of the entire membership of the United Nations. Such a composition would ensure the legitimacy of the Council’s action. 11. With the enlargement of the United Nations membership, consideration should also be given to the possible creation of a central European group which would reflect particular similarities and interests of the region. It is obvious that the existing regional structure does not reflect the actual geopolitical situation. With the disappearance of the Berlin Wall, a large part of the European continent has gone through a significant political and economic metamorphosis. With the end of old ideological systems and divisions, new countries have emerged, thus reshaping the geopolitical picture of the European continent. Recognition of the particular Central European interests is a logical process that should be reflected in the operational structure of the United Nations Organization. Although the number of East European States has increased, there are still many States which cannot find their geopolitical identity in any of the existing regional groups. […] [40] FRANCE

[Original: French] [30 June 1993]

[…] [41] […] 4. While due in part to the new climate prevailing in international relations, the Council’s effectiveness is also bound up with the fact that it has a limited number of members, which permits it to achieve compromise and reach decisions reflecting as often as not a consensus agreement within the United Nations as a whole. 5. The 10 non-permanent members of the Council already ensure an equitable geographical representation of Member States, and they have contributed to the Council’s primary role now at last restored to its original character. The responsibilities and duties of the permanent members of the Council are dictated both by the Charter itself and by experience and the difficulty of the tasks the Council must assume, particularly in the maintenance of international peace and security. 6. France intends to participate in the consideration of the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” in a spirit of openness. 7. It considers that the increase in the number of States members of the General Assembly and the political and economic changes that have taken place over the past decade do indeed prompt consideration of an enlargement of the Security Council. 8. In this respect, France is of the view that the prime dictate of effectiveness should be maintained. 9. Any contemplation of an increase in the number of permanent members must take account not only of the relative weight acquired by certain States by virtue of their level of economic development but also of their participation or willingness to participate in peace-keeping operations and the interest evinced by them in discharging global responsibilities in the field of international peace and security. Any enlargement there may be that admits new permanent members should not diminish the

175

3  “ The most productive time ”

ability of other States in the different regions to secure representation in the Council as non-permanent members. […] [43] […] GERMANY

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] 4. It [the Federal Government] shares the view expressed in the resolution [Resolution 47/6263] that the changed international situation and the steadily increasing membership of the United Nations necessitate reconsideration of the present composition of the Security Council. In the question of a possible increase in the membership of the Security Council, the Federal Government is guided by the recognition that the Council’s efficiency and credibility are of equal importance for its composition. [44] 5. […] The Federal Government is gratified that a number of Member States have expressed the view that the Federal Republic of Germany should be a natural candidate for permanent membership on the Security Council. It regards this as an appreciation of its political, material, financial and personnel contribution towards preserving world peace. The Federal Government is also prepared to assume the responsibilities which permanent membership of the Security Council entails. GUATEMALA64

[Original: Spanish] [28 June 1993]

[…] [45] […] 6. Guatemala believes that the appropriateness of retaining the system of permanent members of the Security Council must be studied. The criteria used in granting certain States permanent membership were based on historical events and the military and nuclear capacities of the States in question. It must be determined whether those criteria remain valid or whether there are other criteria, including active support for major economic and social development efforts and respect for commitments made in the field of economic cooperation for development under General Assembly resolutions and declarations, which might lead to a change in one of the permanent members of the Council and thus bring that body’s membership into line with current historical realities. 7. Guatemala supports the effort of various developing countries to ensure greater representation of their regional groups by seeking an increase in the number of seats that would let those countries play their rightful leading role in contemporary international relations. Increasing the number of “non-permanent” members of the Security Council is thus necessary and must strictly observe the principle of equitable geographical distribution which allows large and small countries to participate on an equal footing. […] 63  11 December 1992, → 3.1.1. 64  → 3.4.2.3 for Guatemala’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

176

3  “ The most productive time ”

11. Guatemala is of the view that creating a new category of permanent members that lack the right of veto constitutes an infringement of the principle of the sovereign equality of States and would limit the right to participate as members of the Security Council, to which all Members of the United Nations are entitled to aspire. [46] […] INDIA65

[Original: English] [29 June 1993]

[…] [47] […] 2. In 1945, the General Assembly had 51 members. At the time, the Security Council had a total of 11 members, which included 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent members. In 1963, when the strength of the General Assembly was 113, the Security Council membership was expanded from 11 to 15. Since then, the membership of the Assembly has gone up to 183. The ratio between the Security Council membership and the General Assembly membership has declined from 1:4.6 in 1945 to 1:12 today. Though the 1963 amendment increased the total number of Security Council seats to 15, the number of permanent seats was not increased; it has remained frozen at five since the inception of the Council. Thus, there has been a particularly steep fall in the ratio between the number of permanent members and the General Assembly membership, which has declined from 1:10 in 1945 to 1:36 today. This aspect especially needs to be redressed now. India is of the view that the number of permanent members of the Security Council should be increased to 10 or 11 and the non-permanent members to 12 or 14. […] 5. India is of the view that the review in question should be undertaken on the basis of equitable regional representation, consistency in support for, and participation in, important political and economic activities and peace-keeping operations of the United Nations; and consistency in fulfilling financial obligations towards the United Nations and the specialized institutions. For selecting additional States in an expanded Security Council, population, size of the economy and future potential of the countries concerned should also be taken into account. 6. Population represents both an expression of the principle of democracy and an element of power. With increasing emphasis on the principle of democracy at the national level, there is a need for extending this principle to the international level also. The present permanent members of the Security Council have a combined population of less than 1.75 billion. This leaves two thirds of [48] the world’s population without representation in the permanent members’ category. Population, combined with rising levels of literacy and growing industrialization, is also an element of power. 7. Size of economy, its resilience and self-sufficiency in terms of raw material supply and markets are factors which have a bearing on a particular country’s ability to exercise independence of judgement and action on international issues. This, in turn, is an important consideration in deciding permanent member status. 65  → 3.3.1 for India’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

177

8. A Member State’s contribution to peace-keeping operations of the United Nations would be an important criterion in judging its suitability for inclusion in the permanent members’ category. Financial contribution and support to United Nations activities need also to be considered. Here, it is important to bear in mind not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment should also be taken into account. 9. History has witnessed ebb and flow in the power of nations. This is more true today than ever before. Not only is change taking place, but the pace has quickened. The interregnum between the present and the future is getting shorter and shorter. It is, therefore, essential to take into account both the present and future dimensions of power. Future potential as a criterion for inclusion among permanent members of the Security Council is not a new principle. This indeed has been an important consideration in making the choice of permanent members in the past. 10. The growing interdependence of the world is reflected in many spheres. Problems of poverty and environment cannot be tackled without cooperation by both the developed and the developing countries. These concerns are indeed reflected in the agenda of the world body, which is no longer confined to the traditional issues of world politics. The principles of interdependence must be recognized and reflected in the composition of the Security Council by accommodating developing countries in the permanent members’ category. 11. The imperative necessity of reviewing the membership of the Security Council is evident, is politically of great significance and is unambiguously articulated in General Assembly resolution 47/6266 of the Charter. It can be given effect by amending Articles 23, paragraph 1, and 27. The modalities of functioning of the new permanent members could be discussed further. 12. In the interest of equity, whatever arrangement is evolved for the new permanent members should be uniformly applied to new entrants to this category from all regions. The choice of additional States to be selected for the permanent members’ category should emerge from decision of the General Assembly and the Security Council as provided for in the Charter. All Member States should be given an opportunity to exercise their choice of new permanent members of the Security Council, collectively in the General Assembly, as responsibilities of permanent members go beyond a region or subregion. The principle of rotation is already embodied in the non-permanent members’ category, which indeed needs to be expanded along with an increase in the number of permanent members. Therefore, this principle need not be replicated with the [49] introduction of permanent membership on a rotational basis. This would compromise the element of predictability in the decision-making of the Security Council and further accentuate the inequities of the present structure. […] [52] […]

66  11 December 1992, → 3.1.1.

178

3  “ The most productive time ” JAPAN

[Original: English] [6 July 1993]

[…] [53] […] Implications for the Security Council […] [54] […] 6. The functions of the Security Council should be further strengthened. The Council should provide a forum where a comprehensive approach to issues concerning world peace and security can be taken. In this sense, those countries that are clearly capable of assuming responsibility for the implementation of its resolutions, for example, by making financial contributions, should be more actively involved in the decisionmaking process so as to ensure that the resolutions the Council adopts are in fact implemented. 7. The Council should be restructured based on the above-mentioned considerations. In particular, it is important that those countries having both the will and the adequate capacity to contribute to world peace and stability be actively engaged; this being the case, the Security Council and, in the end, the United Nations as a whole, will be certainly strengthened. In this context, Japan is prepared to do all it can to discharge its responsibilities on the Security Council. […] Specific recommendations for restructuring the Security Council 9. In view of the foregoing, it is essential that the membership of the Security Council be adequately enlarged, provided that the effective functioning of the Council will not be impaired. Specifically, the Council should be enlarged to have around 20 members at most, by adding to the current permanent members a certain number of permanent and non-permanent seats in an appropriate ratio. In so doing, special consideration should be given to the question of equitable geographical distribution in relation to non-permanent membership. 10. The efforts to enlarge the membership of the Council should be guided by the principle that underlies paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter, more specifically: (a) The primary criteria for membership on the Security Council should be the will and the capability of the Member State to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability; (b) It must be borne in mind that issues of peace and stability today must be considered in close relation to economic and other non-military factors; [55] (c) As regards the permanent membership, consideration should be given to whether the weight that the Member State in question carries is global in political, economic and other terms. […] [70] NIGERIA

[Original: English] [30 June 1993] 1. The case for increasing the membership of the Security Council as a means of enhancing the Organization’s effectiveness in the discharge of its functions [71] cannot be overstated. It is our considered view that to continue with the status quo with respect to the Security Council not only perpetuates the Council’s representational

3  “ The most productive time ”

179

inequality, but also negates the principle of democracy and universality which the Charter of the United Nations speaks to in several of its articles. 2. It is unsatisfactory, for example, that Africa with 52 Member States out of a total United Nations membership of 183 has no representation on a permanent basis in the Council. The African situation contrasts sharply with that of other regions such as Eastern Europe with 25 Member States and two seats (one of which is permanent); and the Western European and Other States Group, which has 24 Member States but occupies five seats, three of which are permanent. 3. The existing inequity becomes even more apparent when the population statistics of regions, vis-à-vis the strength, or lack of it, of representation in the Security Council, are considered. In this connection, it may be noted that while Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean States with a combined population of 3.8 billion have only one permanent seat in the Council, Europe (both Eastern and Western) and North America with a combined population of 906 million occupy four out of the existing five permanent seats in the Council. 4. Against this backdrop, there is a compelling need for an expansion of representation in the Security Council to reflect global changes, and especially the current membership of the world body. We suggest not only an increase in permanent membership but also in the non-permanent membership of the Council, by making the following proposals: (a) First, it is important that the Security Council expansion takes account of the geographical spread of the membership of the world body in a manner which can be perceived by all to be fair and equitable so that the universal character which the Council is supposed to epitomize may indeed be reflected. In other words, all regions of the globe should be represented in the Council on both a permanent and nonpermanent basis in a fair and equitable manner; (b) Secondly, expansion of the Security Council should be conducted in a manner which allows for the inclusion of States which, in terms of regional roles, have evinced a capacity for effectively contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such capacities should be measured not only in terms of sophisticated military and technological resources available to such States, but in terms of a ready disposition on the part of States to utilize such resources in the pursuit of Security Council objectives. We urge, in this connection, that prime consideration be given to States which, in a consistent manner, have supported peace-keeping efforts. 5. Finally, two other factors, namely, economic potentialities and population resources, deserve due consideration in determining which States become permanent members of the Security Council. To the extent that economic performance in some States has led to the current suggestion that certain advanced States be considered for inclusion as permanent members of an expanded Security Council, to that extent also should the real growth and/or potential for viable economic performance in key developing countries be recognized and [72] utilized in determining which of the developing countries becomes a permanent member of the Council. 6. The population criterion is of great importance; a permanent member of the Security Council must be able in time of emergency to muster the human resources needed to play a credible role in global crisis management and conflict resolution. In addition to this, the Preamble to the Charter adverts to the notion “We the peoples of the United Nations”, in which context is subsumed the very idea of peoples as opposed

180

3  “ The most productive time ”

to institutions, Governments and corporate bodies. The concept “We the peoples” encapsulates the notion of peoples, the aggregation of which is the population of the world. For the Security Council to be representative it must sufficiently reflect the population distribution of the world. 7. On the basis of the foregoing Nigeria suggests the expansion of the Security Council to include at least seven additional permanent seats and nine non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows: two permanent seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, one for Western Europe and one for Eastern Europe. 8. As to the additional non-permanent seats, the distribution should follow the traditional pattern of allocation of non-permanent seats in the Security Council. NORWAY67

[Original: English] [2 July 1993]

[…] 3. In principle Norway is prepared to accept a limited increase in the membership of the Security Council, with a view to further enhancing the latter’s role as the most important executive instrument of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Minor adjustments as regards regional representation and permanent seats on the Council are acceptable in this perspective. 4. Any changes should be implemented in a way that does not in any manner diminish the effectiveness of the Council and its work. Changes should also be effected in a way that does not necessitate any major review of the Charter. […] [75] […] PANAMA

[Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993]

[…] [76] […] 7. The need for representativity therefore means that account must be taken not only of numerical factors but also of such obvious factors as the major political changes that have taken place over the past five years and the presence on the international scene of prominent individuals who should assume in the field of the maintenance of international security the important role they play in other areas of human endeavour. 8. Account must also be taken of the fact that as a result of the ending of colonialism one region of the world has greater representation on the Council than it should, by rights, thus reducing the number of opportunities for other regions of the world to make their voices heard in that forum. In our view, these considerations apply to both permanent and non-permanent members of the Council. In view of the foregoing, any amendment of the Charter must ensure that representation is not only broad but also balanced and equitable. 9. Although we believe that the criteria for membership on the Council set out in Article 23 of the Charter do not need to be amended, it is clear that they must not be interpreted restrictively, but rather in the light of a given country’s overall contribution 67  → 3.2.2.3.1 for Norway’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

181

3  “ The most productive time ”

to the world body. A country’s military contribution to peace-keeping operations should not be the only yardstick used. We believe this not only because nowadays the situations in question arise with increasing frequency but also because they are not merely of a military nature. The maintenance of international peace and security also has a preventive aspect, which is necessary for peace-building and for setting up the social and administrative structures that are essential to the existence of a modern state. Only a democratic membership will lead to full acceptance of the work of the Council, whose tasks now cover more than just military matters. […] [77] […] 12. To sum up, the issue of the composition of the Security Council must be considered and settled not only on the basis of the Council’s structure in numerical terms but also on the basis of the new international situation, the emergence of new prominent individuals on the international scene, the need for the Council to be representative in terms of the current regional and functional groupings within the Organization, and the need to set up new categories of members and forms of participation in the Council’s functions that differ qualitatively from the current categories and systems. Furthermore, the Council’s action must be made more transparent and democratic and methods of communicating with Member States and with other international agencies and arrangements must be strengthened, in view of the need to lighten the Council’s agenda by means of bilateral and regional action. […] [79] PERU

[Original: Spanish] [29 June 1993]

[…] 4. The measures to be adopted could be summed up as follows: (a) Negotiations with a view to increasing the number of both the permanent and the non-permanent members of the Security Council should begin as soon as possible. With respect to its permanent members, the Council should accommodate two additional countries which, because of their global importance in the context of contemporary economic and political relations, should assume greater responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. With respect to the non-permanent members of the Council, the addition of one member for each developing region would reflect the growth of the Organization and the need to place greater emphasis on the principle of equitable geographic distribution and uphold the principle of the legal equality of States, as well as other principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations; […] [90] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] 3. In exercising this role the Security Council has endeavoured to address the vital peace and security needs of the entire world community. Therefore, it is a matter of great importance to all Members of the United Nations not to impede this effort by changing the Council’s composition in ways that undermine its effectiveness.

182

3  “ The most productive time ”

4. The United States believes that the composition of the Security Council should continue to reflect the intent of the Charter as well as political, economic and security realities. Guided by these principles, we are willing to consider changes to the Council which enhance its representative character while reinforcing its capacity and effectiveness. 5. These considerations lead the United States to draw several conclusions regarding the question of possible changes in Security Council membership: (a) First, the current permanent members of the Council are countries with global political and economic influence and a capacity as well as a will to contribute to global peace and security through peace-keeping and other activities. Their status on the Council should remain unaltered; [92] (b) Second, the United States supports permanent membership for Japan and Germany as well, fully recognizing that permanent membership entails assuming an active role in global peace and security activities. We are also prepared to consider carefully how the Council might be further expanded to include a modest number of additional seats. […] 3.2.1.1.7 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 CANADA

[Original: English] [21 July 1993]

[…] 8. In particular, the creation of a limited number of permanent seats to be assigned singly or in rotation should be pursued in order to reflect the emergence since 1945 of a number of Member States as major participants in international relations, bearing in mind the need for geographic balance within the Council. 9. The further creation of a limited number of non-permanent seats should also be envisaged so as to ensure better access to the Council by the broader membership, in particular States making a significant contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this connection, the [7] provisions of Article 23 barring re-election of non-permanent members could be repealed in order to increase the options available to the membership. […] INDONESIA68

[Original: English] [13 July 1993]

[…] [8] […] 3. Indonesia is also firmly of the view that an increase in the membership of the Security Council should accommodate new Members which, if they are not to be 68  → 3.4.2.4 for Indonesia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

183

3  “ The most productive time ”

given veto powers, should at least serve as permanent members. They should join the Council on the basis of a combination of appropriate criteria that would adequately reflect the political, economic and demographic realities of the world today, including in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Council should include countries which were on the losing side of the Second World War but which subsequently have begun to play an increasingly important role in the global economy. They are not less important in the context of the changing concept of security which now emphasizes the economic and social aspects as much as the military. It is also axiomatic that international security and prosperity can be promoted effectively and equitably by according recognition to the political and economic weight of the developing countries, particularly those among them with the largest populations. Such a judicious approach, besides one based on equitable geographic distribution, would, we believe, ensure a more representative character of the Council. […] [9] […] JORDAN

[Original: Arabic] [12 July 1993]

[…] 4. Following the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era in the international political reality, a new factor has emerged that has altered the concept of international security, which has evolved so as to be no longer restricted to the maintenance of a military balance between the nuclear-weapon States but also related to the economic and developmental reality of States and to the condition of interdependence which the world is experiencing. We therefore feel that this reality and this new security concept should be reflected in the membership of the Security Council. Accordingly, Jordan proposes the following: (a) Japan and Germany should be made permanent members of the Council, by reason of their economic capacities and their contributions to the various activities of the United Nations in the service of the Organization’s security and development aims. (b) The developing countries of the South have become the second pole in the world today, assuming that the first pole is the industrialized North. Differences between North and South have engendered – and continue to engender – many major problems, and this has had an ongoing impact on international peace and security. We therefore need a new kind of balance, namely, a North-South balance. Since the North now has a monopoly over permanent membership in the Security Council, we seek a balance, and, as we are committed to the concept of complementarity in the service of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, it is necessary to ensure representation on the Council to all three southern continents: Asia, Africa and Latin America. [10] (c) The permanent members whose addition is proposed must enjoy all the powers of permanent membership laid down in the Charter, including the right of veto, because that, in our opinion, would bring about equitable representation, as well as imposing a kind of cooperation between Member States, particularly the permanent members.

184

3  “ The most productive time ”

5. In order for the Council to be able to work in the best and speediest manner, it is necessary for the number of non-permanent members to be increased. There must also be a change in the procedure for distributing seats among geographical regions, in order to achieve more equitable and more balanced representation that takes greater account of the diversity of States. 6. We should like here to propose that the number of non-permanent members be increased to 15, to be selected as follows: (a) Four members from Asia, distributed as follows: (i) One member representing Eastern and South-East Asia; (ii) One member representing Western Asia; (iii) One member representing Central Asia; (iv) One member representing the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand; (b) Five members from Africa, distributed as follows: (i) Three members from north of the equator; (ii) Two members from south of the equator; (c) Three members from the Americas, distributed as follows: (i) Two members representing North and Central America and the Caribbean; (ii) One member representing South America; (d) Three members representing Europe, distributed as follows: (i) One member representing Eastern Europe; (ii) One member representing Northern Europe; (iii) One member representing Western Europe. 7. We believe that this geographical division would give us a more balanced representation of the continents. […] [16] […] PORTUGAL

[Original: English] [9 July 1993]

[…] [17] […] 8. In view of such arguments, the Government of Portugal believes that the following elements should be weighed in the debate that is now being initiated: (a) An increase in the number of non-permanent members, on a one per regional group basis, could answer the calls for greater representativity of the Security Council, while ensuring a faster rotation among such groups (which should be encouraged to reach internal agreements in this respect); (b) An increase of permanent members should reflect the will of the United Nations membership as a whole. In addition, it should benefit only those States which are in a position to assume the responsibilities entailed by that status and could contribute to the reinforcement of the role of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. Such an increase should not be to the detriment of the number of seats allotted to non-permanent members; (c) The consolidation of the European Community as an effective political entity in international relations might, in the future, raise the issue of its own level of representation in the Council. […] [19]

185

3  “ The most productive time ” SUDAN69

[Original: Arabic] [12 July 1993]

[…] 4. Consideration of the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council should therefore aim at achieving the following: (a) A restoration of the international equilibrium disturbed by the waning of the Cold War by establishing democratic procedures within the Council and equitable treatment of international issues without partiality, selectivity or the use of double standards; (b) The permanent and equitable representation of all continents or geographical groups in the Council on an equal footing with permanent members. This can be achieved by increasing the membership of the Council and amending its powers so that its composition accords with the great increase in the number of States Members of the Organization; (c) The representation of all segments of the international community in order to embody the principle of equality and justice between States in respect of rights and duties. In this connection, permanent membership of the Council should not be regarded as the privilege of certain States or as a recognition of their military, economic or political power; […] [20] […] 6. At the same time, the Sudan is of the view that consideration of the question of equitable representation on the Council can be expanded to include the adoption of measures to accord the General Assembly increased importance and greater powers so that it can, as the world parliament, provide a counterbalance to the weight and powers of the Security Council with a view to achieving the greatest possible degree of democracy in the functioning of the Organization. This can take the form of legal amendments on the basis of the mandates of the General Assembly and the Security Council set forth in the Charter. Consideration can also include the introduction of controls on the working procedures of the Council to prevent it from engaging in the use of double standards and in selective treatment and to achieve the desired transparency and democracy in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. […] 3.2.1.1.8 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 […] [2] EGYPT70

[Original: English] [2 August 1993]

[…] 5. The Government of Egypt believes that the enlargement of the membership of the Security Council (permanent and non-permanent) is an essential step to initiate 69  → 3.2.2.3.2 for Sudan’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.2.4 for Sudan’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, both, presented in the same statement. 70  → 3.2.2.3.3 for Egypt’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

186

3  “ The most productive time ”

the process of strengthening the Council. This should be done without prejudice to the efficiency and effectiveness of the work of the Council. 6. This enlargement should reflect both the nature and extent of the new balance of power, as well as the prominence of regional Powers as major international actors. Due regard should be paid, in this context, to the interests of developing countries. 7. The Government of Egypt is of the view that since the ideological divide which characterized the world scene for several decades has ceased to exist, a larger Security Council will certainly be more credible, yet not less efficient and responsive. […] [3] […] 9. Furthermore, it has become the practice to assign Africa relatively more seats than other groups in United Nations organs, in recognition of the fact that it is the regional group with the largest membership. This practice should be duly followed in the efforts to enlarge the Council. […] [8] YEMEN71

[Original: Arabic] [9 August 1993]

[…] [9] […] 7. It is our belief that a review of the United Nations system cannot be effective if no account is taken of global democratic representation and of balance between the interests of all States. 8. The following points, which a great many Member States find essential, represent a general approach to such restructuring: (a) An increase in the membership of the Security Council to take account of equitable geographical representation; (b) A review of permanent membership of the Council in such a manner as to accord with the new changes and achieve overall international peace and security while ensuring that the conditions required for permanent membership are met; […] (g) Consideration for the relative population figures of each grouping in the allocation of non-permanent seats. 3.2.1.1.9 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [5] […]

71  → 3.4.2.5 for Yemen’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 3.2.2.3.3 for Yemen’s support of regional seats, both, presented in the same statement.

187

3  “ The most productive time ” GHANA72

[Original: English] [9 September 1993]

[…] [6] […] Permanent membership 10. The Government of Ghana believes that permanent membership in the Council of the five major victorious allies was well founded and has served a useful purpose. It is recognized that now that there are no allied forces or enemy States in the meaning of Article 53, continued permanent membership in the Council is irrelevant, outdated and probably undemocratic. The Government of Ghana sees merit, however, in allowing the present beneficiaries to continue to enjoy the status of permanent members. The number of permanent members should, [7] however, be increased to foster a sense of equality and also promote equitable representation and global balance in what has become the most vital organ of the United Nations. Decision-making […] Transparency […] 13. Against this background, the Government of Ghana wishes to offer the following proposals for the consideration of the Organization: (a) The membership of the Council should be increased from 15 to 25. Five of these will be the present permanent members while the remaining 20 will be composed as follows: Africa (6), Asia (5), Latin America and the Caribbean (4), Western Europe (3) and Eastern Europe (2); […] (c) By virtue of their economic might and their ability to assume increased obligation, Germany and Japan should become permanent members against seats allocated to their geographical groups; (d) Africa should be granted two permanent seats against the six seats; (e) Latin America and the Caribbean should be allocated one permanent seat against the four seats; (f) Asia, which already will have had China and Japan as permanent members, should be allocated an additional permanent seat against the five allocated to them; […] 3.2.1.1.10 23 November 1993, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 5-773 […] Let me therefore summarize the main points of the Austrian position on this issue. First of all, is there a need for an enlargement of the Security Council? At the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the ratio of the overall membership of the Organization to the membership of the Security Council was roughly six to one. The first enlargement of the Security Council occurred in 1965, taking into account the substantial 72  → 3.4.3.5 for Ghana’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 73  → 3.3.3 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

188

3  “ The most productive time ”

increase in the overall membership of the United Nations that took place at that time. Despite this enlargement, the ratio achieved was only eight to one. The recent dramatic increase in the membership of the United Nations has made the ratio drop to twelve to one. It seems obvious that the increase in overall membership of the Organization has to be reflected in the composition of the Security Council. My second point relates to criteria for the enlargement of the Security Coun­ cil. Besides the arithmetical criterion to which I have just referred, aspects such as the efficiency and functionality of the Security Council cannot and must not be ignored. In order to preserve the efficiency of the Council, any enlargement should be limited to a small number of additional permanent and non-permanent members. It was pointed out this morning that all of us, but especially the smaller countries, which form the majority of the membership, have a particular interest in the effectiveness of the Council. […] Fourth, in order to achieve a broad, representative character any enlargement of the Security Council must maintain a balance between permanent members and non-permanent members. Thus, enlargement cannot be limited to one category of membership in the Security Council. Equally, any enlargement has to strike a balance between developing and developed members. Fifth, the choice of additional permanent members of the Security Council should certainly take into consideration their potential for making a contribution both in the political and financial domain and to the overall peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the broad sense of this term. Careful attention has to be paid to all the criteria mentioned in Article 23, paragraph 1 of the Charter, which requires us to pay due regard to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. Sixth, it is often said that the Council would profit from a more democratic decisionmaking process. We believe that due consideration will have to be given to this matter in order to maintain the trust of the United Nations membership as a whole in the activities of the Security Council. While the abolition of the veto power seems unrealistic and would in fact reduce the relevance of Security Council decision-making, certain modifications might certainly be discussed. […] 3.2.1.1.11 24 November 1993, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, pp. 9-12 […] Here, a general thought on the relationship between the concept of effectiveness and that of legitimacy might be appropriate. It is generally accepted that an increase in the membership of the Security Council should not prejudice its effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, the increase should be modest. On the other hand, however, the increase should be sufficient to represent a meaningful step towards a genuine representative character and to rally Member States’ effective support for the Council’s actions. In order to act effectively, the Security Council should act in a manner that commands the very broad support, or – if at all possible – a consensus of United Nations Member States. An appropriate increase in the membership of the Security Council

3  “ The most productive time ”

189

could therefore – if it is appropriately designed – serve as a method both of enhancing the Council’s legitimacy and of strengthening its effectiveness. An important element in this vision of an enlarged Security Council is the need to preserve the current ratio of permanent to non-permanent members. The present ratio is appropriate, and should be retained in an expanded Council. While an increase in membership and the preservation of the current ratio of permanent to non-permanent members seem generally acceptable – and perhaps even common sense – some other ideas require careful reflection. This is true, for example, of the idea of introducing new permanent members in the Security Council without the right of veto, and of the idea of deleting the rule of the non-eligibility of a retiring member for re-election to the Security Council. Both of these ideas could be described as making the functioning of the system more complicated, and the election of new members of the Security Council more difficult. The exceptions to the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States, expressed, at present, in the form of the special status of the permanent members of the Security Council, should not be multiplied by the addition of new and open-ended exceptions. The new permanent members of the Security Council should have a status equal to that of the present members, and should be chosen from amongst Members that can make a genuinely outstanding contribution, including, in particular, a contribution to financing the Security Council’s operations. Adequate geographical representation, on the other hand, should be sought through the composition of the Security Council as a whole. Let me emphasize that the question of equitable geographical representation, while important in the context of the present discussion, is of wider relevance for the future of the United Nations system as a whole. The present regional arrangement was established many years ago in a different political reality, and is today outdated in some important respects. The former political divisions that shaped it no longer exist, and the importance of subregional groups is steadily growing. This calls for a general re-evaluation of the regional groups, which is something that could be pursued in another context, perhaps as part of the discussions on the preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. What needs to be said today, however, is in fact a statement of the obvious: an increase in the membership of the Security Council will gain its full meaning only after the reform of the system of regional groups. Only then will the system provide all the necessary conditions for the Security Council to be properly representative. […] Let me conclude by reiterating Slovenia’s commitment to the Charter of the United Nations. In the present rapidly changing world, every effort must be made to ensure that the practical work of the United Nations corresponds to the aspirations expressed in the Charter. 3.2.1.1.12 24 November 1993, Romania, Mr. Botez, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, pp. 23-24 […] If we are to be at the level of our predecessors of 1945 – who designed a world organization able to respond properly to world challenges for almost 50 years – we should examine the plausible alternative scenarios for world evolution in the decades to come, select the possible old and new challenges that may arise, and only then finally design organizational structures capable of responding to them.

190

3  “ The most productive time ”

This suggests a new concept that may possibly be useful in our analyses and decisions: that of developing an anticipatory design for our world Organization, and in particular for the Security Council. This will not be an easy task; we must construct, now, an organization flexible enough to respond to the still-unknown challenges of the coming decades. Thus, we must first, try to determine, which are the stable axes of world evolution – axes that are common to alternative scenarios – and then anticipate the potential crises associated with this unknown future. The organizational structure of the Security Council is therefore only a tool whose degree of adaptation can be assessed only in terms of how capable it is of dealing with these challenges. This is the perspective in which we view the reform of the Security Council. Let me note in passing that – taking into account the alternative, future-oriented scenarios – we have decided to support Germany and Japan as legitimate candidates for permanent membership. […] 3.2.1.1.13 24 November 1993, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, pp. 24-26 […] We are of course in favour of a new structure with an increased number of permanent and non-permanent members, designed in such a way as to take account of the emergence of new economic Powers recognized as such and committed to the cause of international peace and cooperation. We must, however, refrain from defining this concept of power hastily and for transitory reasons; and we must eliminate from it any hegemonistic connotations – themselves challenged in the world today – particularly because the current exercise aims at adapting this concept to the new requirements of changing international relations. Beyond the objective criteria that could be generally accepted for qualifying for permanent or non-permanent membership for a renewable period, or for non-permanent membership within the framework of the current principle of rotation – criteria which should in no way depart from the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter – account must be taken of the performance of Member States internally in the economic, social and human spheres and also of their adaptation to democratic requirements in social relations and the establishment and consolidation of the concept of a State based on the rule of law. […] 3.2.1.1.14  30 November 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 5, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.5 […] [2] TANZANIA*1 74

[Original: English] [10 August 1993] 1. The African Group of States Members of the United Nations submits herewith its position on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council (General Assembly resolution 47/6275), as decided by the 74  → 3.4.2.8 for the African Group’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 75  11 December 1992, → 3.1.1.

3  “ The most productive time ”

191

Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its fifty-eighth ordinary session, which convened at Cairo in June 1993. 2. Africa supports the current efforts aimed at ensuring a more balanced composition in the membership of the Security Council. In this context, the Group of African States is strongly in favour of any initiative that will ensure equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, for the following reasons: (a) The Security Council is playing an ever increasing and crucial role in the efforts of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) The need for greater and broader involvement of the United Nations membership in the Council’s decision-making process; (c) The substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations; (d) The realization of the overall need to continue the revitalization of the organs of the United Nations based on the principles, purposes and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account the changes taking place in the world; (e) The need to ensure equitable geographical distribution. 3. In view of the increased involvement of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, conferred on it by the States Members of the Organization as a whole, it is increasingly important that the Council’s work should reflect the provision in Article 24 of the Charter that “in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”. […] [3] […] 6. It is the view of the Group of African States that the Council’s membership should be enlarged by increasing both permanent and non-permanent seats. […] 8. As far as the allocation of additional Security Council seats is concerned, Africa should have two permanent seats with all privileges attached to permanent membership, and more non-permanent seats. […] Original footnote

*1 Transmitted by the Permanent Representative of

his capacity as Chairman of the African Group.

the United Republic of Tanzania in

3.2.1.1.15 9 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 7, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.7 […] [2] SINGAPORE76

[Original: English] [7 February 1994]

[…] 4. There are a few basic problems which need to be addressed. The first is to decide the current configuration of international power and how that should be reflected in the distribution of permanent seats. This had been a difficult exercise after the Second 76  → 3.4.3.7 for Singapore’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

192

3  “ The most productive time ”

World War, and it will be even more difficult today. Following the end of the Cold War, economic, political and military powers no longer necessarily cohere in a single locus. 5. The second problem relates to the international as opposed to the supranational nature of the United Nations. The United Nations was created by sovereign States and can do nothing without their assent. At the same time, the permanent members have a more than proportionate say through their veto. These are the realities of the United Nations and in the Security Council. Any design to change the composition of the Council will have to bear these realities in mind, and not be based solely on the abstract. 6. The Government of Singapore is of the view that to progress, there is no alternative but to shape a consensus gradually through a patient process of debate and discussion in this exercise. It will entail thinking through the role of the United Nations into the next century. At this preliminary stage of the exercise, we deem it most useful to try to identify and build consensus on objective general criteria for a general review of the Security Council, especially its permanent membership. 7. In this regard, the Government of Singapore believes that the following considerations need to be borne in mind: [3] (a) There should be a level playing-field with regard to all present and future members of a possibly expanded Security Council; […] (c) Suggestions that there could be different classes of permanent members without the veto are also impractical; […] (e) Privilege must be paid for. An expanded role for the Security Council will require more resources. A permanent member should therefore carry a larger portion of the financial burden of the United Nations. Each permanent member should pay at least 9 per cent of the operating expenses of the United Nations, as well as 11 per cent of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, which are the average percentages of the permanent five’s current collective percentage of these budgets. (The five permanent members of the Security Council currently pay 43.5 per cent of the regular budget of the United Nations. This averages out to an assessment of approximately 9 per cent each. They pay about 56 per cent of all peace-keeping expenses, averaging out to be about 11 per cent each.); (f) Permanent members must have muscle, and the will and ability to wield it for the cause of the United Nations. The main mission and primary responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. Force will be needed in pursuit of order. All permanent members should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations, to uphold international order; (g) Consistent with subparagraph (c) above, permanent members must also have the requisite moral authority to assume their exclusive positions. They must have a good record of adhering to the purposes and principles contained in the Charter, and have been consistent and active in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. […]

3  “ The most productive time ”

193

3.2.1.1.16 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.9 […] [2] KAZAKHSTAN77

[Original: Russian] [17 March 1994]

[…] 4. Being guided by Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, under which Security Council decisions are taken on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations, Kazakhstan considers it necessary to re-examine Security Council membership with a view to achieving adequate representation of all the geographical groups from which the membership of the United Nations is drawn. Changes in membership on the Security Council could be made as follows: (a) Germany and Japan, as major economic Powers whose contribution to the cause of world peace and security is widely recognized, should be made permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, a representative of the group of developing countries should also be made a member. Thus, the number of permanent members of the Council would increase to eight. (b) The non-permanent membership of the Council should be increased by three states – one each from the three regional groups of developing countries (Asia, Africa and Latin America). […] 3.2.1.1.17 13 October 1994, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Hurst, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 12-14

[…] When my Prime Minister addressed this deliberative body a week ago, he said the following: No State or group of States can proclaim the overarching importance of democracy, nor can any nation or group of States claim to intervene in another State in the interest of upholding democracy, if that nation or group of States is unwilling to democratize the Security Council itself…. The time has come for equity for all nations – large and small – in the membership of the Council. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 20th Meeting, p. 19) In the short time allotted each delegation in this debate, Antigua and Barbuda would wish to expand on these remarks and to make pellucid its position on Security Council reform, without necessarily repeating, although abiding by, the statements my delegation made during debates at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.78 77  → 3.2.2.2.6 for Kazakhstan’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.4.2.9 for Kazakhstan’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, both, presented in the same statement. 78  See the statements of 8 October 1993, UN Doc. A/48/PV.23, pp. 11-17; and of 23 November 1993, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 17-18.

194

3  “ The most productive time ”

My delegation regards as established wisdom the view that Security Council decision-making will be the most significant factor in fashioning a new world order in the post-cold-war world. My delegation also regards as established wisdom the view that small States require the protection offered by the Security Council much more than do large States. As a small State, Antigua and Barbuda regards adherence to international law as a cardinal rule from which no State should ever deviate; given their relative inability to defend themselves militarily, small States must depend on the structures of international law to deter external aggression. How then does a small and militarily weak State, that does not produce oil and that dwells on the periphery of the economic system, compel the attention of the Security Council at a time of crisis? It is my delegation’s view that to succeed in receiving so much as an attentive glance there must be equity for all nations – large and small – in the membership of the Security Council. In this context, “equity” means that decision-making within the Security Council must take into account the views of small States. Given the present configuration of the Security Council, small States must be seated at the Council table if it is to be said that their views count and that equity prevails. The present debate seems to be reduced to the question whether two additional large and wealthy States are to realize their ambition of being included in the roster of the permanent membership of the Council. Such a debate excludes the principle of equity for all nations, large and small. The discussion will thus appear unnecessary and wasteful if the only criterion for membership remains the economic wealth of aspirant States. That approach harks back to the days of colonial rule in Antigua and Barbuda when the privilege of offering oneself as a candidate for parliament was limited to those who possessed valuable property; that inequity was outlawed in 1951 in my small country when adult suffrage became the law. In 1945, six years before that historic event, the United Nations was created. Eight months from today, the United Nations will mark 50 years since the signing of the Charter. The United Nations Charter proclaims that its Members are determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights … in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. But can its large and powerful Members truly proclaim that they are abiding by its Charter if small nations are excluded by deliberate design from the halls of decisionmaking? Can its large Members truly proclaim that they are abiding by its Charter when the possession of wealth appears to be the only criterion for inclusion in Security Council membership and decision-making? There is an urgent need for large and wealthy States to engage in meaningful dialogue with small and poor States in the Councils of this parliament of parliaments. Small and poor States will not depend upon goodwill; the United Nations Charter obliges Member States to sit in counsel with those reliant upon the Council’s decisionmaking powers. As we enter the twenty-first century, the United Nations will become more important, not less; the obligation of history and the legacy of those who struggled to make membership within the United Nations a reality for small and poor nations, like mine,

3  “ The most productive time ”

195

imposes on my generation a commitment to stand guard against the privilege which prevailed in the age of its founding. That is a charge we shall never surrender. We continue to abide by our earlier proposals for equitable geographical representation on an enlarged Security Council along the following lines: within the African States, one permanent member and six non-permanent members; for the Asian States, two permanent members and three non-permanent members; for the Eastern European States, one permanent member and two non-permanent members; for the Latin American and Caribbean States, one permanent member and three nonpermanent members; for the Western European and Other States, three permanent members and three non-permanent members. This arrangement, in our view, encompasses equity for all nations, large and small. Our ambition, as our Prime Minister has declared, is after all to democratize the Security Council. 3.2.1.1.18 13 October 1994, Germany, Mr. Graf zu Rantzau, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 18-1979

[…] Four key elements appear to be essential, plausible and necessary to any Security Council reform. First, all world regions should be equitably represented on the Security Council. In particular, the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean need stronger representation. Secondly, countries that are able and willing to contribute on a global scale to the maintenance of peace and security and are already shouldering a large responsibility in respect of international development and United Nations activities should be permanently represented on the Council. Thirdly, the general membership of the United Nations should have the potential to be represented on the Council more often. […] We therefore support an increase in the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council to allow both a better representation of the regions that are currently underrepresented and a more adequate representation of countries which shoulder a large share of the United Nations overall burden. Germany would support proposals to create additional permanent seats for countries from the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. As far as we are concerned, we have repeatedly made it clear in the past and we state again today that we are willing and prepared to shoulder the special responsibilities deriving from permanent membership. In this context, it appears essential to us that all permanent members have not only equal responsibilities but also equal rights. Should agreement not be possible now with regard to permanent seats for countries from the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, the following alternative could be considered. To improve the possibilities of representation from the regions, paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter should be amended to allow the re-election of Member States to the Security Council. At the same time, the number of nonpermanent seats ought to be increased in favour of these regions. As a consequence, 79  → 3.2.2.4.2 for Germany’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement.

196

3  “ The most productive time ”

countries with the ability and willingness to contribute more than the average to United Nations activities and the maintenance of international peace and security could serve on the Council on a more frequent or even continuous basis. In order to enable the largest contributors to the United Nations system, which share global responsibilities and which, together with the United States, carry more than 50 per cent of all expenditures, to participate in the Council’s work, two permanent seats should be added to the Security Council. […] 3.2.1.1.19 13 October 1994, India, Mr. Chaturvedi, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 20-22 […] The general debate in the plenary this year has turned up a number of imaginative and innovative proposals for the expansion and reform of the Security Council. We shall study them and give them our full consideration as they come up for discussion in the Open-ended Working Group. But our basic approach is that the expansion should take place in the existing categories and on the basis of present geographical groupings. A radical reorganization of the Council, with new categories of members, or new geographical arrangements, will lead to more complications and retard the progress we have achieved so far. Such proposals may even require a comprehensive review of the Charter itself. The time has come for us to work out an expansion package within the framework that the Charter provides. Durability, resilience and expedience, rather than expediency, should determine the time frame for such an expansion. […] We often come across proposals that one country or another should be added to the permanent member category without going through a systematic process of selection on the basis of relevant criteria. We would advise against a selective, piecemeal expansion of the permanent member category. The laws of the corporate world, where equity shares determine voting power, should not apply to the Security Council, nor should we emulate the Bretton Woods institutions in which wealth determines the strength of the votes. Here at the United Nations, we believe in the principle of sovereign equality of nations. To maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should be representative of the international community as a whole, and its agenda should not vary from that of the general membership. Democracy and good governance are as good for the United Nations as for its Member States. The only prudent method we can follow, therefore, is to elaborate the set of criteria against which the claims of Member States for permanent membership should be judged. In our view, these criteria should include population, size of economy, contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to peace-keeping and future potential. There may be others, but selection of a country should follow rather than precede the establishment of the criteria. The non-aligned Foreign Ministers representing the largest grouping of Member States at the United Nations agreed on this point when they recently declared any predetermined selection excluding the nonaligned and other developing countries unacceptable to the Movement. As stated by the leader of the Indian delegation, we are confident that India deserves to be a permanent member of the Security Council judged against any set of criteria. We stand ready to serve in that capacity whenever we are called upon to do so. […]

3  “ The most productive time ”

197

3.2.1.1.20 13 October 1994, Brazil, Mr. Sardenberg, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 22-25 […] A balanced quantitative as well as qualitative expansion of the Council’s composition should contemplate the following aspects. First, appropriate proportionality between the size of the Council and that of the entire membership of the organization; secondly, concomitant increase of permanent as well as non-permanent seats in the Council; thirdly, adequate participation of both industrialized and developing countries in a future expansion of permanent members; fourthly, adequate presence of the international community in all its expressions, regional and otherwise; fifthly, due regard should be specially paid to the capability of members to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization; sixthly, appropriate arrangements should be made in order to allow better participation of medium-sized and small Member States in the Council. […] 3.2.1.1.21 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-880 […] Secondly, the work of the Security Council has in the past greatly benefitted from the input of both categories of its members – permanent and non-permanent. Thus the necessary continuity in its work and an appropriate reflection of the international power structure were combined with democratic elements ensuring representativeness and providing fresh ideas for the solution of impending problems. We therefore argue for the maintenance of such a balance between permanent and non-permanent members. Thirdly, in the debate so far the case has been made for additional permanent members. In our view, the choice of such members must reflect political and economic realities and be based on their ability to contribute financially as well as to the overall peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations. […] 3.2.1.1.22 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 17-1881 […] First of all, some States that are capable of making a decisive contribution to the United Nations in the maintenance of peace want to shoulder greater responsibilities in the Security Council. Germany and Japan are, in my delegation’s opinion, fully eligible to sit in the Security Council as permanent members, with all the prerogatives and obligations of the present permanent members. My delegation’s view is that it would be in the best interests of the United Nations to grant seats to these two States to enable them to shoulder the responsibilities to which they aspire.

80  → 3.2.2.3.6 for Austria’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.7 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 81  → 3.2.2.2.12 for France’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.3.9 for France’s position on the size of the Security Council, both, presented in the same statement.

198

3  “ The most productive time ”

Secondly, an increase in the representation of the more advanced countries must not create an imbalance that operates to the detriment of the developing world. This means that if Japan and Germany were to join the Security Council as permanent members, a seat should be given to the developing countries to preserve a desirable balance. As for the modalities to ensure such complementary representation, my delegation is open to all suggestions at this stage; we do not rule out anything. For us this is not a question of principle on which permanent members have any particular concept to defend. We need to find a compromise in the form of an arrangement or set of arrangements which it is generally agreed improves the representation in the Council. That might mean permanent membership for certain major countries from the South. My delegation does not see any obstacle in principle to that. It might also mean, either as a complementary or as an alternative formula, an increase in the number of non­ permanent members, provided that the increase is only moderate and would not paralyse the Council’s work. […] 3.2.1.1.23 13 October 1994, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 23-24

[…] If we take these principles to be our compass, we cannot fail to see our course clearly. Indeed, the views of the United States are precisely along these lines. First, we welcome changes to the Council’s composition that enhance its representativeness while protecting its effectiveness and efficiency. Secondly, the existing permanent members of the Security Council are countries with global political and economic influence and a capacity to contribute to peace and security by concrete measures on a global basis. Thirdly, guided by the criteria just noted, we enthusiastically endorse Japan and Germany for permanent membership. Fourthly, we also see the need for an increase in non-permanent seats, namely, an addition of three seats for a total Council membership of 20. Fifthly, in order to give Member States greater influence over the selection of non-permanent Council members without restricting the opportunity of small countries to serve as Council members, we favour exempting non-permanent seats from the prohibition of re-election. Finally, the Security Council is actively pursuing means by which non-members may contribute to its work. The United States is directly engaged in this effort, which has already produced valuable results, and we believe that it must continue. […] 3.2.1.1.24 14 October 1994, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 15-1782 […] This brings me to the issue of equitable regional representation in the Security Council. I have already stressed the importance of the geographical dimension with regard to threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, it is in the interests of the Council that all regions be equitably represented by both the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council. An effective regional representation 82  → 3.3.13 for Kenya’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

199

will ensure that the Council is adequately sensitized with regard to the regional perceptions and complexities of the conflict in question. A better-informed Council would naturally make more objective and popular decisions on behalf of the general membership of the Organization. Not only should the Council’s decision-making be objective, it should be seen to be objective, and in the interest of the general membership. That consideration is more evident at the present time, when the Council is being over-stretched by the growing number of conflicts in which the United Nations is involved throughout the world. With regard to the size of the Council, we appreciate the rationale behind the present number of permanent seats. None the less, the notion of perpetual permanent seats on the Security Council does not appear to be consistent with the evolution of world power relationships. This is one of the reasons why a proposal has been made to expand the number of permanent seats to include a few other world Powers that have emerged since the Organization was founded. It would be of great significance if the notion of permanency were qualified in the reformed Security Council to make possible a review of the membership of permanent seats after a decade or two. The non-represented regions of Africa and Latin America and the under-represented region of Asia should be accorded their due share of permanent seats. The criteria for the selection of permanent members of the Security Council set forth in Article 23 of the Charter need to be interpreted more liberally to include the principle of regional representation. In this regard, seats allocated for regional representation should be filled by election by the General Assembly on the basis of regional nominations. This process would ensure the maintenance of the important principle that Security Council members act on behalf of the general membership. The non-permanent seats on the Security Council, which currently stand at 10, are too few for the remaining 179 Member States of the United Nations. It is imperative, therefore, that the number be correspondingly increased, taking into account the Charter requirement for equitable geographical distribution. […] 3.2.1.1.25 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/96583 […] [51] V. SUBMISSIONS BY MEMBER STATES OR GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES […] [65]

83  → 3.2.1.3.5 for the parts of the Compendium focusing on an expansion in the nonpermanent category, 3.2.2.2.14 for statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and semi-permanent seats, 3.2.2.4.3 for statements opposing new categories of seats, 3.2.3.12 for statements not supporting a specific category, 3.3.14 for statements on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.12 for statements on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto.

200

3  “ The most productive time ” 2. Australia

A/AC.247/5 (b) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

[…] [66] ANNEX

Possible models for enlarging the Security Council Existing arrangement a/ Western Europe Eastern Europe Africa and Asia (27) (20) (102) PM b/ 3 1 1 NPM c/ 2 1 5 Total 5 2 6

Latin America and the Caribbean (33) 2 2

Total  5 10 15

a/ As at 1 March 1995, three Member States were not members of any regional group b/ Permanent member c/ Non-permanent member

Simple model

PM NPM Total

Western Europe (27)  4  2  6

Eastern Europe (20)  1  1  2

Africa (53)  2  3  5

Asia (49)  2  2  4

Latin America and the Caribbean (33)  1  2  3

Total 10 10 20

Eastern Europe (20)  1  1  2

Africa (53)  3  3  6

Asia (49)  1  2  2  5

Latin America and the Caribbean (33)  2  2  4

Total  5  8 10 23

[67] Alternative models A. Existing groups Western Europe (27) PM  3 QPM d/  1 NPM  2 Total  6

d/ Quasi-permanent member (i.e. re-elected)

3  “ The most productive time ”

201

B. New groups

PM QPM NPM Total

Central and Middle East Central Asia East Asia Western Eastern and and Indian and Europe Europe Maghreb Africa Ocean Oceania Americas (24) (22) (19) (43) (17) (25) (35) Total  2  1  1  1  5  1  1  1  1  2  2  8  1  1  1  3  1  1  2 10  4  2  2  4  2  4  5 23

[68] 3. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia84 A/AC.247/5 (c) [Original: English] [9 May 1995] Discussion paper 1. The present discussion paper on the main issues under consideration in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has been prepared by an informal group of small and medium-sized countries. 2. In drawing up the paper, the delegations concerned considered that a sufficient level of broad agreement existed between their positions on the principal issues under consideration for it to be worthwhile setting these down with a view to establishing a general framework within which further work could be undertaken. […] General comments 6. The reform of the Security Council should be in accordance with the following principles: (a) The reform of the Security Council must not put in danger its effectiveness, on the contrary it should strengthen it; (b) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance its representativity, taking into account the emergence of new economic and political powers as well as the increase of United Nations membership; [69] (c) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance equitable geographic representation;

84  → 3.2.2.4.3 for the position of these states regarding new categories of seats, 3.3.14 for their position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.12 for their position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

202

3  “ The most productive time ”

(d) The possibility for smaller Member States to serve on the Security Council should not be diminished; (e) Enlargement should take place in both categories of permanent and nonpermanent members. Cluster 1 1. Permanent membership 7. There is a need to increase the number of permanent seats (two to five additional permanent seats). Global influence, capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular through peace-keeping operations and through the assumption of an additional financial burden (peacekeeping operations budget) should be taken into account for selecting new permanent members. Fixing objective criteria for selecting new permanent members would, however, be difficult to achieve and might threaten the whole process of reform. In addition to Germany and Japan, already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats, Africa, Asia and Latin America should also be given permanent seats. 2. Non-permanent membership 8. The increase in permanent seats should be accompanied by an appropriate increase in non-permanent membership in order to preserve as much as possible a balanced configuration of the Security Council. The current criteria for selecting nonpermanent members (Article 23.1 of the Charter) should be maintained. […] [70] […] 6. Other matters 12. Review of the composition of the Security Council should remain possible in order to adapt it to the changing configuration of international relations. […] [77] 5. Cuba

[…] [78]

A/AC.247/5 (e) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

ANNEX 1. One of the formulas for the process of expansion and reform of the Security Council can be the following. 2. The increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members should be strictly in accordance with the principle of the equitable geographic representation. 3. In any formula, the expansion of the permanent membership should not only contemplate industrialized countries. This would simply generate a further imbalance in the membership of the Council. New permanent members from developed and developing countries should enter the Council together and at the same time. 4. The total number of members of the enlarged Security Council could be 23, with the following distribution: (a) Three from Asia; (b) One from Europe and others;

203

3  “ The most productive time ”

(c) Two from Africa (as this is the decision of the Organization of African Unity, although taking into account the amount of countries in this region and their diversity, the number could be higher); (d) Two from Latin America and the Caribbean. [79] 6. Indonesia

[…] [80]

A/AC.247/5 (f) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

ANNEX Criteria for permanent membership in the Security Council

[…] 2. Objective criteria should therefore guide the selection process for an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council. While the principle of equitable geographic representation is a valid basis, it should not constitute the sole criterion to determine eligibility for permanent membership. A host of other criteria are equally important to assume the responsibilities inherent in such a status. 3. Far from paying mere lip service and perfunctory exhortations, States must have supported the United Nations as the principal multilateral organization through which Governments can and should resolve conflicts and thereby seek to strengthen the validity and efficacy of its organs as forums for consultations and negotiations on all issues of global concern. Such a stance, stemming from a genuine commitment to an active and independent foreign policy that is free from externally induced constraints must have the continuing and steadfast support of the Governments and peoples concerned for the United Nations and, most importantly, in their timely contributions to its budget. 4.  Furthermore, the willingness of Member States to assume the onerous responsibilities inherent in permanent membership of the Security Council and thereby bolster its capacity in fulfilling its mandate must be deemed to be essential. These should have been convincingly demonstrated by their contribution to the promotion of regional peace and global security through successful diplomatic initiatives to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Equally important is participation in peace-keeping activities over a period of time, as well as contributions to the civil, military, financial and other resources of the United Nations. Proven capacity for constructive global influence and for undertaking global responsibilities, especially in guiding a coalition of the largest number of States in history comprising all continents and regions, would constitute yet another criterion. It is also pertinent to take into account the size of the population. [81] 5. Moreover, a country’s standing within the new realities of regional and subregional dynamism and in building the edifice of confidence and concordance should be fully considered. It is also pertinent to take into account the legitimate aspirations of the largest States and the varied abilities and potentialities of their populations as important attributes for permanent membership. Of no less importance is a prominent and constructive role in resolving issues of global concern, particularly through compromise, cooperation and consensus.

204

3  “ The most productive time ”

6. Additionally, economic power – both current and potential – and social stability, as well as the capacity and willingness to contribute significantly to socio-economic development, are other factors. Another central criterion that should be taken into account is a record of strength and sustained economic growth, including progress towards balanced, equitable and sustainable development that would make it one of the largest and vibrant economies in the world. This could be assessed by such characteristics as rapid output and productivity in agriculture and industry together with increased growth rates in physical and human capital. Likewise, sustained economic performance and resilience even in the face of adverse global economic conditions such as recession should also be given due weight. Stable macroeconomic performance, substantial domestic and foreign investment flows and demographic strength, not just in quantitative terms but also with regard to quality and participation in economic growth and development, are also essential attributes. It is from such strengths that a country’s capacity to contribute towards development cooperation under multilateral auspices is derived. 7. An increase in membership of the Security Council should therefore accommodate new permanent members who should join on the basis of a combination of appropriate criteria, which would reflect, among others, the new and emerging constellation of powers, their proven regional and global responsibilities as well as political, economic and demographic realities. 8. A measured and realistic expansion of the permanent membership in the Security Council has become both necessary and appropriate. In these endeavours, the exclusion of developing countries through a process of predetermined selection should be unacceptable. Enlargement should be accomplished through a process of open-ended negotiations on the basis of consensus and as a comprehensive package. The time for reform and restructuring of the Security Council has long been overdue. It has now become imperative to achieve a more representative Security Council. […] [104] 10. Nordic countries

A/AC.247/5 (j) [Original: English] [14 June 1995]

Position paper Cluster I − The fundamental objective of an enlargement of the Security Council should be to strengthen its capacity to discharge the duties assigned to it by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. − There should be an increase in the number of both permanent and nonpermanent members. − In enlarging the Security Council special importance should be given to the principle of equitable geographical representation. − The total size of the Security Council should be a function of the abovementioned requirements. It should be in the low twenties, preferably 23. − Five new seats could be allocated as permanent seats for qualified States. − It is important that the veto does not weaken the ability of the Security Council to play the role assigned to it by the Charter. The question of additional vetoes

205

3  “ The most productive time ”

should therefore be considered in the broader context of decision-making in the Council, including the proper role and function of the veto instrument. − The ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members should be maintained in the interest of the vast majority of Member States. − Regional groups should be encouraged to establish equitable systems of rotation for non-permanent members. − The competence of regional groups freely to agree on appropriate systems of such rotation should not be circumscribed. Countries should not be assigned for privileged frequent rotation except by agreement of their regional group. −  [105] The question of the composition of the Security Council should be reexamined a suitable period (10-20 years) after the entry into force of changes as a result of the present consideration. […] [106] 11. Singapore

[…] [107]

A/AC.247/5 (k) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

ANNEX Proposal for the reform of the Security Council 1. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has discussed the critical issue of permanent membership in the Security Council since the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Several Member States have been proposed as new permanent members. Each of the prospective candidates has its own strengths and weaknesses. At this stage, however, no consensus exists on which specific Member State could be elevated to this status. 2. There are two basic problems. The first is simply to decide what the current configuration of international power is that should be reflected in the distribution of permanent seats. This is not as straightforward as it may seem. 3. When the Charter was being drafted, the end of the Second World War was in sight and prepared for, with easily discernible winners and losers. The intention was for the winners to have primary responsibility for guiding the new international order. The end of the Cold War took everyone by surprise and was far from clear-cut in its resolution. Economic, political and military power no longer necessarily cohere in a single locus. 4. The second problem is even more vexing. If the new Security Council is really to reflect the current international distribution of power, it should logically entail the relegation of some from the elite as well as the appointment of others. Even if some were to be so elevated without necessarily displacing others, the expansion of the small group of the select would imply the relative diminution of the status of the current permanent members. This reality compels us to confront the difficult question of the veto. 5. To make progress, Singapore is of the view that there is no alternative but gradually to shape a consensus through a patient process of debate and discussion. To force the pace or attempt to impose a majority agreement will not work.

206

3  “ The most productive time ”

6. At this stage, it would be most useful to try to identify and build consensus on objective general criteria that all permanent members, present or aspiring, must fulfil. This is a more clinical and constructive approach than attempting to identify and promote one specific Member State or another. To attempt to do so at this stage is premature and as the Working Group’s experience of the past two years has demonstrated, is only divisive. The identification of objective criteria will set a common standard, and if we can agree on them, a consensus on specific countries will naturally emerge. 7. Singapore suggests the following criteria that could be used for selecting new permanent members of the Security Council: (a) A permanent member must have a long-established tradition of good conduct in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United [108] Nations and in particular in the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) The Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A permanent member must therefore first of all have the capacity and will to wield military force in support of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. All permanent members should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations; (c) A permanent member must also have the capacity and will to contribute civilian and humanitarian resources, which are increasingly needed in the growing multidimensional nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations; (d) Privilege must be paid for. A permanent member should not shirk its financial commitments to the United Nations and must be prepared to carry a larger portion of the financial burden of the United Nations. In particular, a permanent member must bear special financial responsibilities for peace-keeping; (e) A permanent member must be a major contributor to other aspects of the United Nations besides peace-keeping. These include international economic, financial and social cooperation, which are major elements in bringing about international peace and security; (f) A permanent member should have the widest possible if not consensual support of all the members of the United Nations. […] 3.2.1.1.26 3 October 1995, Qatar, Sheikh Al Thani, UN Doc. A/50/PV.17, pp. 18-21 […] We know that the obstacles facing the Security Council have been the reason behind the demand for reforming that principal organ with the Charter responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A high priority is given to this reform of the Security Council which tops the list of the desired reforms of the United Nations. As for the State of Qatar, it attaches particular importance to efforts to reform the Council and to increase its membership proportionately with the increased membership of the United Nations itself. We must also bear in mind the need to increase the number of permanent seats to ensure balanced representation. […] 3.2.1.1.27 6 October 1995, Liechtenstein, Ms. Willi, UN Doc. A/50/PV.22, pp. 9-11 […] Many people wrongly identify the United Nations only with the activities of and the decisions taken by the Security Council. While we must work together in order to

3  “ The most productive time ”

207

promote understanding and knowledge of other United Nations activities, which are equally important, we also have to understand that issues of international peace and security directly or emotionally affect people all over the world. We therefore have to make every effort to enhance the effectiveness and the credibility of the work of the Council. A limited expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership and improved working methods, as well as enhanced transparency, would certainly make an important contribution in this respect. […] 3.2.1.1.28  13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 16-1885

[…] First, in our view, the main objective of the reform must be to guarantee a high degree of representativity in the Council and the efficiency and effectiveness of its work. With this in mind, its future enlargement – which, in any case, should not exceed a total of 25 members – has to take full account of the reality and pluralism of today’s world and satisfy the need for equitable geographic representation. Secondly, during the last 50 years the concept of having both permanent and nonpermanent members has proved its merits. The necessary continuity of the Council’s work and the appropriate reflection of the international power structure were combined with democratic elements, thus ensuring a certain degree of representativity and providing fresh ideas for the solution of upcoming problems. In our view, on the basis of this experience, any future enlargement should take place within the existing categories by preserving as much as possible the present configuration of balance between permanent and non-permanent seats. Thirdly, the general criteria for the choice of new permanent members must be political and economic realities, the global influence of the potential candidates and their capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, including through contributions to peace-keeping operations. The principle of equitable geographic representation has to apply. Fourthly, for the election of non-permanent members – based, again, on the principle of geographic representation – the current criteria listed in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter should be maintained. […] 3.2.1.1.29 13 November 1995, France, Mr. Ladsous UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 18-1986 […] France favours an increase in the number of members of the Security Council in the two existing categories, and without any changes in their attributions. In our view, this should be accomplished through the inclusion of new partners as permanent members. Germany and Japan seem to us to be fully qualified to join that category, as are some States of the South whose role on the international political scene deserves to be recognized and taken into account. Some new non­-permanent seats could also be 85  → 3.3.16 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.16 for Austria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 86  → 3.2.2.4.4 for France’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement.

208

3  “ The most productive time ”

established in order to improve the geographical representativity of the Council, but this should be done in moderation so as not to cast doubt upon the Council’s ability to act effectively and quickly. Allow me to recall briefly the reasons why this option is in our view the one that would contribute most effectively to strengthening the Security Council while preserving the major checks and balances which have marked the establishment, the life and the success of the Organization for 50 years. […] [I]t is our opinion that the concept which inspired the Charter has rendered inestimable service to mankind and that it is important, for the future, to strengthen it while adapting it to the new characteristics of the international situation. The number of Member States has of course increased considerably, and that is why it is desirable that this greater diversity in international political life be reflected in a larger number of Council members. Moreover, the number of States that are playing a leading role in the world has also increased and their permanent presence in the Security Council is therefore justified. Hence, we are firmly convinced that the action of the Security Council, and consequently of the United Nations, would be strengthened by recognizing the role played today – side by side with China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States – by countries such as Germany and Japan as well as by other great countries belonging to the developing world. This recognition would enable those States to contribute fully to international peace and security. It would therefore contribute to the achievement of the purposes of the Charter. […] 3.2.1.1.30 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 5-687

[…] Strengthening of the Security Council through its careful enlargement is an extremely important step for the United Nations and for its role in global peace and security. The United States position has been consistent throughout this long discussion. We are open to expansion. We support an enlargement which would strengthen the capacity of the Council to shoulder the heavy tasks the global community now gives to it. In particular, first, we enthusiastically endorse the candidacies of Japan and Germany for permanent membership. Their record of constructive global influence and their capacity to sustain heavy global responsibilities merit the very wide support their candidacies are now receiving. Indeed, the United States could not agree to a Council enlargement that did not result in their permanent membership. […] Thirdly, we would support a modest number of additional seats beyond those for Japan and Germany. However, we believe the total size of the Council should not exceed 20. Fourthly, the scope for the participation of developing countries in the Security Council must be enlarged. In this regard, we believe that the views of the regional groups, including especially the three largest – Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 87  → 3.4.1.2 for the United States position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

209

and Africa – should guide the allocation of additional seats for countries in those regions. […] 3.2.1.1.31 14 November 1995, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 2-4 My delegation fully associates itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Colombia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.88 […] The imbalances and inequities inherent in the present structures and practices of the Council, including permanent membership and the power of veto, defy logic and run counter to the very democratic principles and values that Member States are promoting in their domestic political practices. Permanent membership and the power of veto hold collective international decision-making hostage to the narrow interests of a privileged and powerful few. Democratization, transparency and equitable geographical representation should not be elements of dispute at all in this reform process. Ideally, and in the long term, all members of the Security Council should be elected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical representation to ensure their accountability to the general membership of the Organization, on whose behalf, in accordance with the Charter they carry out their primary function of maintaining international peace and security. It is regrettable that this logical and self-evident approach appears not to be acceptable to the present permanent members of the Security Council. The work done so far in the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly suggests that it will take time to tackle the issue effectively with this serious approach. In the meantime, therefore, we are forced to seek reform within the very narrow confines of outmoded structures and practices. Proceeding from the premise that the Security Council acts on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations, it is logical that an expanded United Nations, which has grown from 51 Members in 1945 to the present 185, would dictate an increased membership of the Security Council if that subsidiary organ is to be representative and democratic. Debate on this issue has clearly demonstrated that the Council can no longer continue to operate as an exclusive club purporting to serve the interests of the full membership of the United Nations. Furthermore, the permanent membership of the Council must reflect a fair geographical representation of all the regions of the world. In this regard, it is objectionable that all of Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are unrepresented and Asia is underrepresented in the permanent membership of the Council. We believe that Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean should each have at least two permanent seats, with incumbents enjoying the same rights and privileges as the present permanent members. Additional non-permanent seats should also be allocated to each of those regions so as to ensure equitable geographical representation commensurate with the vastly increased membership of the United Nations. […]

88  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

210

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.1.1.32 March 1996, France, Non-Paper89 […] (b) Le seul critère qui en définitive importe pour le choix de nouveaux membres permanents est l’assentiment d’une majorité suffisante d’Etats membres de l’Organisation à voir l’un des leurs accéder à cette catégorie. C’est ainsi qu’il a été procédé en 1945. Bien entendu, ce choix se fera en tenant compte de considérations multiples; mais il ne sert à rien à notre avis de s’efforcer de mettre au point une liste de critères agréés qui seraient tous contestables, tant dans leur pertinence que dans leur application. Ce sera à chaque Etat de se déterminer en fonction des priorités qui sont les siennes. (c) Le nombre des nouveaux membres permanents nous parait devoir être de l’ordre de cinq. Nous n’attachons à ce chiffre aucune valeur magique. Il ne constitue qu’un ordre de grandeur. Mais il sera à notre avis difficile de trouver une solution qui comprenne un nombre de membres permanents moins grand, compte tenu de la nécessité à laquelle nous souscrivons de donner aux pays du sud une place adéquate dans cette catégorie. Il ne sera pas facile non plus de s’écarter beaucoup de ce chiffre vers le haut, car l’efficacité du Conseil ne serait plus assurée s’il était trop nombreux. Or il faut avoir à l’esprit le fait qu’aux nouveaux permanents devront s’ajouter aussi de nouveaux non-permanents. […] (f) Nous n’avons pas de difficultés particulières à admettre que la règle du veto puisse s’appliquer à de nouveaux membres du Conseil de Sécurité, puisque nous avons toujours estimé que les membres permanents nouveaux devraient avoir les mêmes responsabilités et les mêmes prérogatives que les anciens. Toutefois, nous ne serions pas opposés par principe à d’autres formules si elles devaient faciliter l’accord sur un cadre d’élargissement. Nous pensons que cette question ne doit pas être utilisée comme un moyen de bloquer la négociation. […] 3.2.1.1.33 25 March 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group Permanent and Non-Permanent Seats […] [M]y delegation suggests to increase the Security Council in both, permanent and non-permanent categories. An increase in both categories, permanent and nonpermanent seats, would reflect the increase in the General Membership which has occurred since 1965. It would guarantee an improved chance for all countries to be represented better and more often on the Security Council. My delegation believes that in order to achieve this, we need if not consensus then broad agreement among Member States as a support. By the same token, the so-called “quick-fix” solution, insinuating Japan and Germany were looking for permanent seats only to themselves, will never work. And quite rightly so. It would definitely lack the necessary support of the Membership. The legend of the “quick-fix” does not reflect reality. New non-permanent seats should include a new seat each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and for Eastern Europe. In the view of Germany, an increase in the category of permanent seats – should make the Security Council more representative by including countries selected by the three regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; 89  → 3.2.2.3.15 for France’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

211

– should make the Security Council more effective by including countries with the capacity and willingness to contribute on a global scale to the maintenance of peace and security. Here I think of Japan and Germany; – should allow these countries to better discharge their responsibility for international peace and security which they bear already. They could contribute to the Council’s work on a continued basis without losing the expertise which goes along with permanent membership; – should be the beginning of a modern Security Council which Member States would no longer regard as a “closed shop”; – should include for the first time states without nuclear capacity in the group of permanent members; –  should – together with the increase in non-permanent seats – accommodate some 70 countries that have not participated in the last reform in 1965 and that are part of the new realities of the Organisation, among them Germany; –  should show, that the General Membership acknowledges a sound record of respect for human rights, support for regional integration and multilateral cooperation, and contributions to international economic development and UN activities. […] [B]y saying what I have said in the last paragraph, I feel a bit like someone who has broken the copy right of other authors. In fact, the arguments for an increase of the category of permanent seats are nothing my delegation had to be creative about. It is simply what we have been told by many Member States who would wish to see a new and strengthened Security Council. Let me add a word on the right to veto and recall what Germany has stated on other occasions, particularly in the light of what has been said by Ambassador Elaraby on behalf of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries: The right to veto is per se not an objective for us. But the bottom line is clear: if Germany shall become permanent member of the Security Council this has to be on an equal footing with the other permanent members, without discrimination, i.e. with the same rights and the same obligations. Since this question is a separate and important point, I shall limit myself to these preliminary observations and come back to the question at a later stage of our session.90 […] 3.2.1.1.34 27 March 1996, Australia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.16 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XIII, pp. 60-6391 SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBERS Australia: working paper

[…] 17. The present paper now returns to the question of what outcome the application of a representation ratio of 12:1 for elected members of the Security Council would produce. 90  → 3.2.1.1.42 for Germany’s elaboration on that position. 91  → 3.3.23 for Australia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

212

3  “ The most productive time ”

18. Employing the four existing electoral groups, the present five representatives from African and Asian States could be increased to seven; the present one representative from Eastern European States could be increased to two; the present two representatives from Latin American and Caribbean States could be increased to three; and the present two representatives from Western European and other States could be increased to three. […] 20. When consideration is given to the illustration above of a possible distribution of 15 seats deriving from a ratio of 12:1, it is important to call attention to the fact that the African and Asian Group represents some 55 per cent of the pool of 180 States; the Eastern European Group 11 per cent; the Latin American and Caribbean Group 19 per cent; and the Western European and Other States Group 15 per cent. […] 25. In considering an expansion in the permanent membership category, the following basic points are now the subject of considerable convergence of views: (a) The present permanent five will remain; (b) For reasons consistent with the concepts in the Charter and with reality, Japan and Germany must be added; (c) There must be a developed/developing country or North/South balance within the permanent membership, a balance that is, at present, deeply lacking; (d) This suggests that three other permanent members, which are not from the industrialized North, should also be added. 26. If these perspectives were to be followed it is easy to see that the permanent membership of the Council in the future would be made up of 10 members. These, together with the 15 elected members produced by a ratio of 12:1 would provide a Council of 25 members. […] 3.2.1.1.35 25 March 1996, Norway, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XVII, pp. 84-86 REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL Norway: working paper

[…] 3. As the delegation of Norway has had the opportunity to state in this Working Group on earlier occasions, we believe that a balanced approach to this question requires an enlargement with both permanent and non-permanent seats. 4. The founding Members of the United Nations as well as all other Member States have freely decided to adhere to the Charter, and have agreed to the principle of the Security Council being a representative body with limited membership and particular authority and responsibility. 5. The structure that was established for the Security Council in the Charter has contributed to conferring on the Council the authority and legitimacy essential for the fulfilment of its primary responsibility: the maintenance of international peace and security. Another structure, without permanent members and the particular rights and obligations pertaining to this status, could have led to matters of peace and security being dealt with elsewhere. Unilateralism would have replaced multilateralism. This is also the reason why attempts to abolish the category of permanent seats would

3  “ The most productive time ”

213

not only be unrealistic, but would also tend to impair the ability of the Security Council to discharge its duties. 6. An increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent seats is therefore the logical outcome of a process of reflection as to how the composition of the Security Council, with its existing two categories of membership, could best reflect present political and economic realities. 7. The factors that should guide us in the increase in the number of permanent seats are the following: (a) the capacity and the readiness of Member States to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the United Nations; and (b) the need for a more equitable and balanced geographical representation. 8. Considering this need for a more equitable and balanced geographical representation, as well as the new political realities, we suggest the following: (a) The permanent membership should be increased by five new seats; (b) Three new permanent seats should be for developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America; (c) Two new permanent seats should be for industrialized countries. […] 9. With regard to the three new permanent seats for the developing countries, discussions in this Working Group so far indicate, in our view, that one realistic option would be a regionally based rotational system, establishing permanent regional rotating seats. 10. Within the framework we suggest, it would be for the countries in the regions to decide how their new permanent seat should be allocated. This could be to one single country; it could be to a few countries on a rotational basis; or it could be on another basis the region might choose, the principle remaining that each region decide for itself. 11. We have noted that a number of Member States during the last session of this Working Group expressed interest in further discussing a model for enlargement of the Council along the lines the delegation of Norway has suggested above. We therefore believe that a more focused discussion on this approach in the time ahead might prove to be fruitful. 12. Finally, while care should be taken not to impair the efficiency of the Security Council, an enlargement of the Council by five new permanent seats as suggested should be complemented by an enlargement with a number of new non-permanent seats, in order to maintain a reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Council, and to enhance further the representativity and the equitable geographical distribution of its membership. 3.2.1.1.36 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group92

[…] There is a consensus in this Working Group that the Security Council should be enlarged. The question now facing us is: to what extent and in what way should it 92  → 3.3.22 for Japan’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.4.2 for Japan’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

214

3  “ The most productive time ”

be enlarged? The first point to be considered in this context is whether the increase both in the permanent membership and non-permanent membership of the Council will be warranted. While I acknowledge that the very concept of permanent membership has been called in question by some, I believe that the present structure of the Council, consisting both of permanent membership and non-permanent membership reflects the present-day realities of the international community in a harmonious way and has contributed to the viability and effectiveness of the Council as the central organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security. The Representative of Norway made this point so cogently in his statement on Monday. As he noted, “Another structure, without permanent members and the particular rights and obligations pertaining to this status, could have led to matters of peace and security being dealt with elsewhere. Unilateralism would have replaced multilateralism.”93 If this is the case, I believe that it is high-time that we set to the task of deciding the process of how the new permanent members are to be selected. […] Along with an increase in the number of permanent seats, an appropriate increase in the number of non-permanent seats on the Council will be in order, so that the Council can be truly representative in its composition. The specific method by which the non-permanent seats are increased, the number of additional seats, and their distribution among regions will depend on how the permanent membership is going to be expanded as well as on how the goal of greater equitable geographical representation on the Security Council as a whole will be realized. It is essential that we realize the enlargement of both categories of membership in a manner that redresses the existing imbalance in geographical representation on the Council. […] As for the question of the relationship between the status of the new permanent members in an enlarged, reformed Council and the veto power, a wide spectrum of arguments both pro and con have been introduced. I wish to confine myself at this stage to pointing out that this question will require a careful examination from the viewpoint of an overall equity, including the question of principle relating to the equality among the permanent members, the question of legitimacy involved in the use of veto and so forth. In light of these complex factors to be considered, it is Japan’s view that the issue of the veto should be resolved as part of the entire package of reforms. […] Let me come back to where I started and get down once again to the genesis of our reform efforts. In undertaking these reforms, our ultimate objective should be to strengthen the Council by enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness. If such is the goal, it can only be achieved with a comprehensive reform package that will include first, a limited increase in the Council’s permanent membership; second, the addition of an appropriate number of non­-permanent seats; and third, redressing of the existing geographical imbalance in the membership of the Security Council as a whole. All of these elements, together with an improvement in the Council’s working methods, must be included in a comprehensive reform package; a partial reform will not suffice. If we fail to realize these reforms, I am afraid there will be a grave price to pay in terms 93  25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35.

3  “ The most productive time ”

215

of loss of public confidence and support for the United Nations. It will be a fatal loss to all of us. […] 3.2.1.1.37  28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group94

[…] Our position remains that, in this expanded Council there should be permanent seats for Japan and Germany and additional seats for Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. […] 3.2.1.1.38 22 April 1996, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Osvald, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group Allow me to say a few words on behalf of the Nordic countries; that is Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In view of your particular role in this Working Group, Mr. Chairman, Finland is not participating in the statement. I will address the question of the composition and size of the Security Council; point one of the work program: Our point of departure remains that we want to strengthen the capacity of the Security Council to discharge the duties assigned to it by the Charter. In order to achieve this, special emphasis must be given to the principle of equitable geographical representation. We firmly believe that an increase should take place in the permanent as well as in the non-permanent membership of the Council. The obvious reason for this is that we want to correct the current imbalances in both existing categories of membership. As we have stated before, the Nordic countries believe that the permanent membership should be increased by five new seats. These new permanent seats should be allocated with the aim of having the Security Council better reflect present political and economic realities – including improved representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Council. We firmly reject the notion of the so-called “quick fix”. The question which must now be addressed is how the new permanent seats should be allocated. Discussions in this Working Group have clearly shown that we must seek compromises which could reconcile opposing positions. In this respect, we believe that the regions concerned should be instrumental in finding solutions. This is vital if we are to achieve the general agreement necessary not only with a view to reaching a final decision, but also with a view to the future legitimacy of the Council. At the same time, it will be essential to strike the right balance between the role of the regions and that of the General Assembly. Additional seats should also be provided for new non-permanent members, thus creating a Security Council with a total membership in the low to mid-twenties. We continue to believe that the regional groups should establish equitable systems for rotation for the non-permanent members, large and small. The ban on immediate re-election should be maintained for this category of members, in the interest of most of us. 94  → 3.2.2.3.18 for the United Kingdom’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.24 for the United Kingdom’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

216

3  “ The most productive time ”

Finally, we would like to emphasize the importance of periodic reviews of the size and composition of the Security Council, in order to continually keep it “up to date” with the realities of the world. 3.2.1.1.39 23 April 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group95

[…] With regard to criteria for new permanent members, this is obviously a very important aspect of the reform effort. As the compendium shows, an enormous amount of thoughts and work has already been invested in this question. Many criteria for permanent membership have been put forward, some more, some less convincing. We believe that the reform should be inspired in the first place by the Charter of the United Nations itself. Indeed, we are convinced that not only relevant but the most important criteria are contained in the Charter. They should guide our decisions when we decide on new permanent members: –  Article 4 of the Charter stipulates that members of the United Nations should be “peace-loving”. The language may be a little bit idealistic, but the concept is in our view as valid and convincing as ever. We believe that the electorate of new permanent members will consequently carefully examine, whether the candidate for a new permanent seat demonstrated in word and deed its commitment to peace and international security. –  Article 23 of the Charter stipulates that with respect to non-permanent members of the Security Council, regard shall be specially paid in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation. In our view, it is only natural that this is even more valid for permanent members. We, therefore, believe that the members of the United Nations will carefully examine the record and the overall performance of a candidate for a permanent seat with regard to the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation. At the same time, it is also clear that the notion “contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security” is very wide and comprehensive. – The notion of equitable geographical distribution also contained in Article 23 is obviously not a criterion for a member state as such, but a rule for the selection of non-permanent members. As the German side stressed, we regard the current state of permanent membership as being not equitable, especially with regard to the member states of the South. This must be redressed. […] The Charter of the United Nations contains provisions which point to the most important criterion, indeed the criterion which overrides all other criteria: This is a criterion which was stressed at our last session, in particular by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Pakistan, my friend Ambassador Kamal. He very rightly underlined that when all the chips are down, the decisive criterion according to the Charter is and will be whether a candidate for a permanent seat will enjoy the trust 95  → 3.4.3.23 for Germany’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

217

and support of two thirds of the membership of this organisation, including the permanent members. This is a wisdom which the fathers of the Charter have bestowed upon us. The Charter itself assures that we cannot, that we will not neglect it. This decisive criterion, in our view, takes care of many concerns. It has the effect that even very strong elbows and the readiness to use them are not a criterion for permanent membership. […] As to the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, let me again sum up the German position: In the first place, we understand the misgivings that many countries obviously have with regard to the right to veto. Interesting proposals to limit the right to veto have been put forward. They should lead to a dialogue between the general membership and the permanent members. Germany, for its part, can accept any reasonable procedure with regard to decision-making in the Security Council. The right to veto is per se not an objective for us. At the same time, Mr. Chairman, why is it that if the old permanent members keep their veto – I think, a reasonable assumption – we favour a veto for the new permanent members, too? It is, because we want the new permanent members to carry weight. If they are not on equal terms with the old permanent members, if they can give only their advice, and their individual consent is not required – then they are permanent members in the sense that they are longer in the Council than a couple of years, but they are not capable of bringing to bear their opinion. This may all be right, if we send them into the Council out of devotion only – an attitude against which the Italian President quite rightly warned us. If however, we want the new permanent members to perform and to carry their point, then we have to equip them with the same armour the other permanent members have. The question of the veto for the new members is a question of the degree of their effectiveness. That is, Mr. Chairman, why we are for equal status of all permanent members, old and new. […] 3.2.1.1.40 24 April 1996, United States of America, Department of State, Views on Reform Measures96

[…] Since the UNSC was created fifty years ago, the global economic and political situation has been transformed. Aided by postwar reconstruction efforts, Germany and Japan have become stable democracies and are among the world’s leading economic powers. Nations with growing economies and increasing political influence have emerged in Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin America. The end of colonialism and the breakup of the Soviet Union have contributed to an increase in the number of UN members from the original 53 to 185 today. Within the UN, there is broad agreement that the structure of the Security Council should be altered to reflect these changes. A High-Level Working Group on Security Council Reform has been established to formulate recommendations. The United 96  The United States confirmed this position on 30 October 1996 in UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 16-17, and on 4 December 1997 in UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, p. 27.

218

3  “ The most productive time ”

States believes it is essential that the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNSC be preserved. To this end, our position is that: ◯ Germany and Japan should be added to the Council as permanent members; ◯ up to three more seats should be added to allow representation from various regions; ◯ consideration should be given to allowing non-permanent members to serve more than one consecutive term; ◯ the size of the Council should not exceed twenty members; ◯ Council procedures should be reviewed to ensure greater transparency and a flow of information to the overall UN Membership; and ◯ the powers of the current permanent members of the Council must be preserved. Despite the widespread acceptance that change is needed, the pace of Security Council reform has been slow. This is due primarily to the lack of a consensus about how many seats should be added, rivalry between or among some regional powers, and concerns about geographical balance. 3.2.1.1.41 10 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group Composition and Size of the Security Council: Non-permanent Members […] The new overall-size of the Council should be in the low mid-twenties. As we have stated on numerous occasions, it is a must that the South gets permanent membership. Germany supports permanent membership for Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, three seats altogether. At the same time, we believe Japan and Germany eligible for permanent membership. The number of new non-permanent seats should be four, one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and for Eastern Europe. We feel due consideration should be given to the question of creating an additional (fifth) non-permanent seat. […] 3.2.1.1.42 23 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group97 Decision-making Process in the Security Council, including the Veto […] Security Council Reform is an immensely important and at the same time very complex issue, as we all know. Perfect solutions that satisfy all of us are indeed difficult to achieve. But a reform is possible now, based on the central requirements of better geographical representation and effectiveness. Such a reform would constitute a considerable improvement over the status quo. At the same time, a review clause would open up possibilities for further improvements. Germany, therefore, joins the many delegations which have argued in favour of periodic reviews. The review would of course have to address all aspects of the reform package, including new permanent memberships. Therefore, by reforming the Security Council we will not create new “eternal” or only “momentaneous” members, but new permanent and non-permanent members. It is as simple as that. Those who claim the contrary ignore intentionally the 97  → 3.4.3.23 for Germany’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

219

possibilities which a review clause would offer us. The review clause should in our view be based on three elements: – it would apply to the enlargement and the new composition and size of the Council, including new permanent and non-permanent members; – it would be limited and not include other issues; – it would provide for a review after a certain period. The period should be fore­seeable and not too long. At the same time, it should be realistic and not destabilize the new Council and its members from the beginning. The “review clause” can be a helpful and important element in the final reform package. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden – to quote only one speaker – has said in his intervention in this Working Group on 22 April 1996 also on behalf of four more Scandinavian countries: It would keep the size and composition of the Security Council “up to date” with the realities of the world.98 This is what we all aim at with the reform of the Security Council. […] 3.2.1.1.43 2 July 1996, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.15/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XIV, pp. 64-66 PERIODIC REVIEW CLAUSE Germany: working paper The mandate of the Open-ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council is defined in General Assembly resolution 48/26 of 3 December 199399 as “to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council”. In the preamble to the resolution the Assembly recognized, inter alia, the need to review the membership of the Security Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations. Based on that mandate, reform efforts are aimed at achieving a comprehensive and genuine reform, embracing at the same time so-called cluster II (“other matters related to the Security Council”) and cluster I (“increase in the membership of the Security Council”) issues. In Germany’s view, the latter implies an increase in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership. Any other result would remain partial. It would ignore the new realities and changes in international relations as mentioned in resolution 48/26. Submissions in document A/49/965 of 18 September 1995100 indicate that only a small minority of States so far wishes to exclude an increase in the category of permanent membership. 98  → 3.2.1.1.38. 99  → 3.1.2. 100  → 3.2.1.1.25 for the statements included in the Compendium supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto; → 3.2.1.3.5 for statements focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category; → 3.2.2.2.14 for statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and semi-permanent seats; → 3.2.2.4.3 for statements arguing against new categories of seats; → 3.2.3.12 for statements not supporting a specific category; → 3.3.14 for statements on the size of the Council; and → 3.4.3.12 for statements on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto.

220

3  “ The most productive time ”

In the same document, several countries have proposed to re-examine or to review periodically the new composition of the Security Council as an element of an overall agreement (Nordic countries,101 Movement of Non-Aligned Countries102). Germany shares their view and has stated this on several occasions. In Germany’s view, a periodic review clause will represent an essential element for reaching general agreement on a comprehensive reform package: Benefits 1. The periodic review clause will guarantee that an increase in both membership categories is not irreversible. All new permanent and non-permanent seats would be subject to re-examination after a certain period. As far as new permanent members are concerned, their status will be permanent but not eternal. 2. New permanent members will become accountable to the general membership. The performance and the action of any new permanent member will be taken into account at the moment of review. Any new permanent member could be replaced. 3. Countries whose aspirations have not been taken into consideration for a seat in the Security Council keep their chance to improve their status. They may demonstrate their qualification for a better status, including the possibility of permanent membership, at the moment of the review of the composition of the Council. 4. A periodic review will allow the membership to re-examine the composition of the Council against the background of possible new political and economic realities. This flexibility would better meet the needs of a political decision of this kind than any “objective” criteria, be they based on the size of population, financial contributions or military troop contributions. 5. Altogether, the periodic review clause would allow a far-reaching, genuine reform while maintaining the possibility of adapting the composition of the Security Council in the future to new and changing realities. Terms of reference. Field of application 6. A review should address all aspects of a reform package. The elements of a comprehensive reform package are closely interlinked. It would therefore be difficult to exclude any of them from a periodic review. This refers to all elements contained in clusters I and II that will become part of the package. 7. A periodic review clause would not restrict rights and obligations held by the existing five permanent members. 8. New permanent members would not be entitled to use a possible veto right regarding the review results. 9. The review would take place after 15 years. Fifteen years is the average of existing proposals, which have mentioned periods of 10, 12, 15, 20 or 10-20 years. A period of 15 years is less than half of the time that has gone by since the last change in the composition of the Security Council (1965-1996). Fifteen years would be a foreseeable and at the same time stabilizing time period with regard to any new composition of the Council. The period would start after the entry into force of the changes agreed upon in the comprehensive reform package. 101  → 3.2.1.1.25. 102  → 3.2.1.3.5.

3  “ The most productive time ”

221

10. The review would be compulsory and be automatically put on the agenda of the General Assembly. An eventual new composition of the Council would have to be decided within two years, that is, at the latest at the end of the following session of the General Assembly. Possible reading 11. An appropriate place for a periodic review clause would be Article 23 (4, 5 new) of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 23 would read as follows: Article 23 (1) [to be adapted] (2) [to be adapted] (3) Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative. (4) New permanent members who are not the original five permanent members are subject to a periodic review in accordance with Article 108. The review process is compulsory and will take place after fifteen years. Ratification of the review result does not necessarily require ratification by the new permanent members. (5) Other changes regarding composition and working methods of the Security Council than those mentioned in paragraph 4 are subject to the same periodic review. 12. This reading is a preliminary proposal. The final wording is subject to further discussion. 13. In the same context, other Articles of the Charter may also need to be amended. Furthermore, details of the review process could be included in a resolution of the General Assembly. 3.2.1.1.44 30 September 1996, Bolivia, Mr. Aranibar Quiroga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.14, pp. 1-5103

[…] We have participated in the debates on reforms of the United Nations Charter, and we believe that it is of the utmost importance to reach consensus in order to strengthen the multilateral system in the interests of the world community. We support the positions set forth by the Non-Aligned Movement104 in this regard. With regard to the expansion of the Security Council, we consider it necessary that Germany and Japan be present as new permanent members and that three other permanent members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean be selected. The expansion should be complemented by an appropriate number of non-permanent members from the developing world. Of course, if consensus could be reached on other formulas, then other proposals, such as the one presented by Italy,105 would need to be considered. […]

103  → 3.4.3.30 for Bolivia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 104  See, e.g., → 3.2.1.3.5. 105  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20.

222

3  “ The most productive time ” 3.2.1.1.45 7 October 1996, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Lewis, UN Doc. A/51/PV.25, pp. 21-25106

[…] At present, even though the discussions have been considered to have made progress, there is not even the glimmer of a discernible outcome in regard to the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”. Although consensus exists on expanding the Council, the manner in which that can be achieved equitably remains to be resolved. Antigua and Barbuda is firm in its declared position that any expansion should include developing countries and that both the African and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups should be represented. Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda would like to see certain restrictions placed on the use of the veto. We understand that all efforts at restructuring and reform in the United Nations, however, should be focused on economic growth and development. […] 3.2.1.1.46 30 October 1996, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 13107 […] The increase should be designed to ensure better representation of developing countries in the Council. In our view, this presence of the developing countries should be reflected in both categories of Council members: the non-permanent and the permanent members. The general debate has shown that this idea enjoys very broad support. Furthermore, we can all see that certain States today have an international influence which should be exercised in a more sustained and official way in the United Nations. This is the case with Germany and Japan, which have our full support on this point, as well as the support of many other States. France also believes that the large States of the South should have an appropriate place. Finally, we readily acknowledge that no geographical group should be excluded from the expansion effort. All groups of countries whose numbers have increased are justified in demanding not to be left out. […] 3.2.1.1.47 30 October 1996, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 2-3108 […] However, there is also a majority trend that rejects any increase in the membership of the Security Council that would exclude the non-aligned countries. That trend holds that if there is no agreement on the other categories of membership, the increase should affect only the non-permanent members. But let us make no mistake: this does not mean that there is a dominant trend in favour of increasing only the non-permanent membership. It merely means that if the increase in the number of permanent members were to involve only the developed countries, such an increase would be unacceptable. 106  Antigua and Barbuda confirmed this position on 1 October 1997 in UN Doc. A/52/PV.20, p. 7. 107  → 3.3.33 for France’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 108  → 3.2.2.3.25 for Tunisia’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

223

[…] While we support the accession of Germany and Japan to permanent membership in the Security Council, given their economic and political importance, we believe that Africa, Asia and Latin America, which are underrepresented in the Council, should be given seats in the same category as well as in the non-permanent category. That is the whole raison d’être of the reform process. Those who are against an increase in the number of permanent members maintain that it would merely be tantamount to an extension of the privileges of permanent membership. However, by advocating the status quo, are we not attempting to perpetuate the existing imbalance in the Council to the disadvantage of the developing countries? […] 3.2.1.1.48 30 October 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 3-5 […] While the position of the Government of Japan on the question of Security Council reform has been elaborated on previous occasions, I believe it is useful to mention several salient points to which it attaches particular importance. At the outset, let me state once again that our ultimate objective in reforming the Security Council is to create a stronger, more credible Council by enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness. A package of reforms must therefore be devised which includes the following elements. First, in order to ensure the Council’s effectiveness, a limited increase in its permanent membership should be realized through the inclusion of countries – both developed and developing – which have both the capacity and the willingness to assume global responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. As to the modality for the permanent representation of the developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, I am of the view that this might be left to the regions themselves to determine. A rotational representation system might, as an interim arrangement, provide a realistic solution. Secondly, in view of the dramatically expanded membership of the United Nations as a whole, it is necessary to enhance the representativeness of the Security Council by adding an appropriate number of non-permanent seats. I would emphasize that, in expanding the Council, utmost care should be taken so as to ensure that a balance is maintained between the need for enhanced legitimacy and the need for greater effectiveness. Thirdly, taking into account the newly created balance in the geographical distribution of States in the world, the geographical imbalance that now exists in the Council as a whole should be redressed, with particular attention given to the regions that are currently under-represented. Japan wishes to make clear its position that a reform plan must include all three of these elements. Anything less would not lead to our goal of recreating a United Nations capable of carrying out its expected role in the new world. For that reason, the proposal that has been made to increase only the Council’s non-permanent membership category would not be acceptable. Japan calls upon Member States to recognize that the reform must be both genuine and comprehensive, and to commit themselves to achieving that objective.

224

3  “ The most productive time ” 3.2.1.1.49 30 October 1996, Czech Republic, Mr. Rovenský, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 13-14

[…] Let me now briefly recapitulate the salient features of the Czech position on the reform of the Security Council. We support an increase in both permanent and non­ permanent seats, while insisting on safeguarding rapid and effective Security Council action. We recognize that an inordinate increase in the number of permanent and non­-permanent members would hinder the effectiveness of the Council. Therefore we advocate a modest expansion in both categories. We oppose new categories of Security Council membership under whatever guise they may be proposed. The criteria for new permanent members of the Security Council should include, inter alia, their level of commitment to maintaining international peace, promoting development and meeting financial obligations towards the United Nations. We believe that Germany and Japan are suitable candidates and support expanded representation of Africa, Latin America and Asia. […] 3.2.1.1.50 30 October 1996, Croatia, Mr. Nobilo, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 14-16109 […] Croatia believes that Germany and Japan, due to their firm adherence to democratic principles and to their active and valuable involvement in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, deserve to be permanent members of the Security Council. My delegation also views favourably proposals that countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America should be among the permanent members of the Security Council, with possibly one permanent member from each of these three regions. Permanent membership for these regions should be considered not only in order to ensure equitable geographical distribution, but also because countries from these regions have significant political and economic influence and have played a constructive role in international affairs, including peacekeeping. Croatia would, of course, respect the decision reached by States from these regions as to how they would prefer to be better represented in the Council. With regard to the duration of the terms of both new and present permanent members, my delegation believes that the adjective permanent should not be taken literally. We support the view that there should be a review mechanism, whereby the status of permanent members would be considered every 10 to 15 years. […] 3.2.1.1.51 1 November 1996, Ecuador, Mr. Valencia Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 15-16

[…] First, Ecuador considers it necessary to increase the membership of the Security Council in both categories, permanent and non-permanent, since its composition must reflect the current number of United Nations Members and new political realities. Secondly, an increase in the number of permanent seats must be conditioned on the admission to that category of one country from each region of the developing 109  → 3.4.3.38 for Croatia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

225

world: Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Thirdly, Ecuador opposes the maintenance of the veto privilege, considering it to be an anti-democratic and obsolete mechanism that does not reflect new global realities. If it is not possible to eliminate the veto, Ecuador suggested that its exercise be limited to cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. Fourthly, if an agreement on an increase in the membership in both categories cannot be reached, we should promote an increase in the number of non-permanent members, as the Council cannot continue with a totally defective anti-democratic composition. To that end, there are several proposals that could serve as a basis, of which we wish to highlight the Italian proposal.110 […] 3.2.1.1.52  1 November 1996, Nicaragua on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Vilchez Asher, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 18-20111 I am speaking on behalf of the countries of Central America participating in this debate on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other related matters. We participate because we are a group of small countries that belong to a region that is not sufficiently represented in the Council and we feel a responsibility to express our position on what the Security Council should be in the next century. […] For Central America, which has in the past benefited from the work of the Security Council, in coordination with the General Assembly and other United Nations organs, it is of singular importance that the membership of the Security Council be enlarged. As the report notes, the Council must reflect the opinion of the vast majority of States, including those of our region, and there must be an increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership. Here, we would emphasize the right of developing countries to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent memberships of the Council in order to maintain an overall balance in its membership. […] 3.2.1.1.53 1 November 1996, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 20-22112 […] Fiji was the first South Pacific island country to join the United Nations, in 1970, five years after the membership of the present Council was revised. Today, there are 14 independent sovereign island States in the Pacific region, 8 of which are Members of the United Nations. In addition, there are seven overseas and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the region. Those 14 Pacific island nations have formed a regional organization with Australia and New Zealand for economic and political cooperation, known as the South Pacific Forum. Our total population is well over 25 million, making it a significant subregional group by itself. As a regional organization, the Forum enjoys observer status with the United Nations. In the same way that the Caribbean is recognized as a distinct subregion of the Latin American regional group, the South Pacific would like to be recognized as a distinct subregion of the Asian group. This distinct 110  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20. 111  → 3.4.3.41 for the Central American Countries’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 112  → 3.4.3.42 for Fiji’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

226

3  “ The most productive time ”

identity is not new and is already recognized in the United Nations system by the new designation adopted by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. It is therefore the humble submission of my country that, based on the United Nations principles of the sovereign equality of all its Members, of universality of membership, and of equitable geographical representation, the South Pacific region, which includes the island nations along with Australia and New Zealand, should be recognized as a geopolitical region for the purpose of regional representation and membership of the Security Council. The breakup of the former Soviet Union following the end of the cold war also gave rise to a dramatic increase in the membership of the Eastern European group. Any expansion of the Council should therefore take into account this new political reality. In order to address the current imbalanced regional representation and to ensure broader representation of developing countries in the Council, my delegation would like to propose that the non-permanent membership of the Council be increased from 10 to 17, as follows: Africa and Asia, an increase from the present five to nine; Eastern Europe, from the present one to two; Latin America and the Caribbean, from the present two to three; and Western European and other States, from the present two to three. In keeping with the principle of equitable geographical and regional representation, my delegation would further propose the following geographical distribution of these non-permanent seats. Within the African group, one seat each could be allocated to southern Africa, western Africa, eastern Africa, central Africa and the League of Arab States. Within the Asian group, one seat each could be allocated to South Asia, West Asia, East Asia, and the South Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand. Within the Latin American group, one seat each could be allocated to South America, Central America and the Caribbean. Finally, the group of Western European and other States could be allocated three seats and the Eastern European group could be allocated two seats. This would make a total of 17 non-permanent seats. While we respect the right of each region and subregion to decide how these nonpermanent seats should be distributed among their membership, my delegation believes that the only way to ensure an equitable and wider representation of the membership is through the adoption by regions and subregions of an equitable rotation system. We also support the retention of the ban on immediate re-election. My delegation supports the proposal that the permanent membership of the Council be increased by two, and that the two additional seats should be taken up by Germany and Japan. We would also be prepared to support consideration of one permanent seat each for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean in order to make the group of permanent members more representative. However, for the permanent seats, we believe that in addition to the criteria in the Charter, the principal consideration should be the political, economic and diplomatic weight of the Member State concerned. My delegation believes that our proposals on the size of the permanent membership and on the size and geographical composition of the non-permanent membership are a material and proper approach to the reform of the Security Council if the Council is to continue to have credibility as an institution which is representative of the international community as a whole and which therefore has the legal and moral authority to act on its behalf. It cannot claim to be such an organization if it continues to be a club of permanent members and those non-permanent members who have a lock on

227

3  “ The most productive time ”

Council seats, getting themselves re-elected repeatedly while denying the opportunity to others from their regional groups. […] 3.2.1.1.54 27 March 1997, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex III, pp. 10-12113

[…]

AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CZECH REPUBLIC, ESTONIA, HUNGARY, IRELAND, PORTUGAL AND SLOVENIA: DISCUSSION PAPER

General comments 6. The following principles should guide the reform of the Security Council: (a) The reform of the Security Council should strengthen its effectiveness. Any expansion should not be so large as to impede unduly its efficiency. (b) Enlargement of the Security Council must – ensure representativity of the increased general membership. – take into account new economic and political powers. – enhance equitable geographic representation. – take place in both the categories of permanent and non-permanent members. (c) The possibility of all Member States to serve on the Council on the basis of the criteria of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter remains an important consideration. […]

Cluster 1

Permanent membership 8. – Global influence, capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular through peacekeeping operations and through the assumption of an additional financial burden (peacekeeping operations budget) and equitable geographic distribution should be taken into account for selecting new permanent members. Fixing objective criteria for selecting new permanent members would, however, be difficult to achieve and might threaten the whole process of reform. – Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, in keeping with the principles mentioned in paragraphs 6 (b) and 6 (c) above and the criteria listed in the above paragraph. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats. – The idea of rotational regional seats for permanent members has been noted. Its feasibility both practical and political would need to be further explored. – Expansion in the category of permanent members should be undertaken in a non-discriminatory manner.

113  → 3.3.35 for these states’ position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

228

3  “ The most productive time ”

Non-permanent membership 9. – The increase in and geographic distribution of non-permanent seats should ensure as much as possible a balanced configuration of the Security Council. The criteria for their selection (Article 23.1 of the Charter) should be maintained. – Special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established. […] 3.2.1.1.55 17 July 1997, United States of America, Mr. Bill Richardson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group114 Mr. Chairman, at my initiative, the U.S. Government has just undertaken a thorough review of our policy on Security Council reform. Secretary Albright played a central role in this review. As a result of our review, we can now agree in principle to having developing countries sit on the Council as new permanent members. These new members could be either named or rotational. Additionally, we are now prepared to accept a review clause so that what is decided this year is not set in stone for all time. We support President Razali’s objective of approving a draft framework resolution in the GA this fall and will continue to work toward that end. We also hope to examine Senegalese Ambassador Ka’s creative idea about studying the veto question in a special working group.115 Such an approach would allow this sensitive issue to be examined objectively and rationally, in a spirit of cooperation. Our policy review also determined that we have no flexibility above and beyond 20-21 seats on a reformed Council. This would permit expansion of the council by onethird, with up to five new permanent seats. We would oppose any resolution which called for higher numbers. Our proposal for up to three permanent seats from the developing world could also provide greater access to non-permanent seats for other developing nations, even more so if one or more regions adopt a rotational system. I hope we can work together on this basis. The pieces for a framework agreement are falling into place. We believe our decisions demonstrate our sincere interest in Security Council reform and our desire for early closure on it. We challenge the other members of the Working Group to respond in kind: to take equally bold steps to help close a ratifiable deal on Council reform. […] 3.2.1.1.56 3 October 1997, Yemen, Mr. Al-Eryany, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 21-25116 […] With regard to the question of reforming and expanding the Security Council, which has been under much discussion for some time and is referred to in the Secretary-General’s report, we strongly support the expansion of the representative 114  → 3.3.39 for the United States position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 115  4 December 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 11-13 (Mr. Ka explains the position of April 1997). 116  → 3.4.3.46 for Yemen’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

229

basis of the Council, either by accepting Japan and Germany as new permanent members or by increasing the number of permanent members through an increase in the representation of geographic groups and by allowing each group to rotate its permanent seat among the countries of that group. […] 3.2.1.1.57 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17117 […] Like those of most other Member States, the Austrian position on Security Council reform has been expressed in detail over the last four years. Our views have been incorporated in a working document that we submitted together with Belgium and a number of other Member States. That paper is reproduced in document A/49/965.118 We believe that expansion should occur in both categories – permanent and non-permanent – and that the balance in the composition of the Council between permanent and non-permanent membership should be maintained within an overall number not exceeding 25. The representative character of the Council depends not only on the number of permanent members but also on the specific contributions nonpermanent members have consistently made over the years to the work of the Council. New ideas and new approaches have again and again been initiated by non-permanent members, and more often than not, these members have also made valuable efforts to maintain the necessary liaison with the vast majority of United Nations Members not serving on the Council. Expansion of membership in both categories will have to ensure a better representation of developing countries. Thus, while we support the interest of Japan and Germany in serving as permanent members, we equally support parallel interests from qualified countries of the South. Expansion in the non-permanent category will, by and large, have to follow recognized principles of geographic distribution. […] Finally, we believe that a periodic review of the composition of the Council would also help maintain its representative character for the future. Such a review should examine whether potential future changes in international relations should and could be reflected through further structural changes in the composition of the membership. […] 3.2.1.1.58 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Meléndez-Barahona, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 41-43119 I am pleased to make this Statement in the context of our consideration of agenda item 59, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, on behalf of the Central American countries of Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. […] 117  → 3.2.3.27 for Austria’s position on regional rotating membership, 3.3.40 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.47 for Austria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 118  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 119  → 3.4.3.50 for the Central American Countries’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

230

3  “ The most productive time ”

The Security Council needs to be strengthened and given a fully legitimate, democratic, effective and transparent character, particularly if it is to carry out its mandate in the interests of all Members of the Organization that contribute to the financing of its operations. It should be a body set up to respond to the global and priority interests of the international community and not the special interests of a single country or group of countries. We support an increase in new permanent and non-permanent members on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution, in accordance with the rights and obligations set forth in the Charter for both categories of members. This distribution of seats should take into account the interests and aspirations of the Latin American and Caribbean region. We favour an adequate and rational increase in permanent and non-permanent members that will guarantee representativity for all geographical regions in such a way as not to undermine the Capacity and efficiency or the Security Council in discharging its lofty responsibilities. […] 3.2.1.1.59 5 December 1997, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 1-2120 […] It cannot be overemphasized that the fundamental goal of the current debate on the reform of the Security Council is to create a Council which is democratic and accountable to the broader membership of the Organization. Indeed, if the Security Council is to fulfil the role of custodian of peace and security envisaged for it in the Charter, it must be perceived to be legitimate by Member States and the international community. This can happen only when its composition reflects the broad membership, which has almost quadrupled since 1945, thereby making it crucial that developing States be party to decision-making in the new Council. The recent proposal by some of the five permanent member States to grant five permanent seats – two to developed and three to developing countries – would lead to a Council with an unbalanced configuration in favour of the industrialized countries: a ratio of 6 to 4. It has also been indicated that the extension of the veto to the new members might be considered on the condition that the candidates have been clearly identified and that any increase above the figure of 20 or 21 in the number of seats to be allocated would be strongly opposed. Let me hasten to say that these proposals fail to accommodate Africa’s legitimate claim to a total of five non-permanent and at least two permanent seats in the new Security Council. South Africa believes that any attempt to allocate only one permanent seat to Africa, without the prerogatives and powers accorded to the current permanent membership, would be discriminatory and unjust. It will lead to the further marginalization of Africa, the largest regional group represented here at the United Nations. […] With regard to the issue of permanent membership, such membership without the veto would represent a merely symbolic gesture to the new members of the Council. South Africa would therefore reject the notion of inferior members that may serve without the prerogatives and privileges attached to permanent membership. […] 120  → 3.3.41 for South Africa’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

231

3.2.1.1.60 5 December 1997, Russian Federation, Mr. Gorelik, UN Doc. A/52/ PV.64, p. 11

[…] Further progress can be achieved only by the same path of laborious negotiations, which are imperative in finding a genuinely viable solution. This essential issue for the future of the United Nations must not hinge on the vicissitudes of the voting machinery. Russia fully shares the view, predominant in the United Nations, that a forced hastening of the discussion and negotiating process is unacceptable and that the imposition of arbitrary time frames is counter-productive. This view is reflected in the unanimous decision to continue the work of the General Assembly’s Open-ended Working Group, which has not yet exhausted its potential. Our delegation will participate constructively in the Group’s work, thus encouraging the collective search for a decision. This, we emphasize, is the common responsibility of all Member States. Sound political logic and balanced reasoning are required from all of us, primarily with regard to the pivotal equation, that is, finding the golden mean between the level of representation on the reformed Security Council and the imperative need to ensure its effectiveness. We continue to believe that an increase in the membership of the Council should be minimal, so as not to have an adverse effect on its efficiency and effectiveness. In principle, Russia is open to a number of specific ideas currently on the negotiating table, such as an expansion of the Council in both categories and the idea of rotating membership – provided such is the wish of the respective regional groups. We are convinced that the most important thing is to make sure that the Security Council expansion is well-balanced and carries out the present project of increasing the developing countries’ representation on the Council. We have already stated at a high official level that, objectively, Germany and Japan are real candidates for a reformed Council. It is also clear, however, that the attainment of a broad agreement with regard to the parameters of the expanding Council implies the granting of permanent seats to representatives of Asia, Africa and Latin America. […] 3.2.1.1.61 5 December 1997, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 15-16121 My statement will be brief. Its purpose is to reaffirm France’s continued interest in the current work on the expansion of the Security Council. This endeavour, in which we have now been engaged for the last four years, must be successfully concluded. France’s position is unambiguous. We are in favour of an increase in the membership of the Security Council in the two existing categories. We are in favour of admitting Germany and Japan, as well as three countries of the South, to permanent membership, and support the creation of new non-permanent seats in order to improve the Council’s geographic representation. […] We are in favour of the new permanent members’ having the same prerogatives as the present members, while we are ready to work on drawing up any formula which would lead to general agreement. Moreover, we are ready to continue to pursue in a pragmatic manner the effort which has been under way for four years to make the working methods of the Security Council more transparent. 121  → 3.3.42 for France’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

232

3  “ The most productive time ”

We believe that the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council during the fifty-first session has allowed us to make progress towards the achievement of general agreement. The approach proposed by President Razali122 entails proceeding in several stages. The first stage would be to decide on the framework for expansion. The second would be to decide on its implementation, in particular by electing the new permanent members. The third stage would be that of amending the Charter. This approach has the advantage of allowing sufficient time for agreement to emerge gradually – first on a framework and then on the names of the new members, including possible formulas for regional rotation. There is an opportunity to begin in earnest the process leading to expansion of the Council. […] 3.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 3.2.1.2.1 23 November 1992, Cuba, Mr. Zamora Rodriguez, UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 72-78 […] The number of Council members, the existence of the category of permanent member and the veto mechanism, inter alia, respond to situations that have nothing to do with present-day realities. The fact that our Organization has more than tripled in size in recent decades and that interests have multiplied within it, that the centres of power have shifted through the years and that the need to democratize international organizations has become more and more imperative, makes clear the anachronistic nature of the institutions that continue to hold sway over the Council without justification. Can anyone now seriously justify the fact that there are States that have the prerogative of belonging eternally to a given body, as if by divine right? Can anyone give a convincing reason why, in today’s world, there should be States that have special powers giving them primacy over the rest, as if the principle of sovereign equality of States did not exist or were not now more valid than ever? Can anyone maintain that it is fair that, while our Organization has grown threefold, the number of members of one of its main organs has remained the same? Can anyone seriously claim that perpetuation of this situation benefits the international community as a whole? Whom does the status quo benefit the majority of the nations of the world, or the very small group of countries, rich and powerful as they are, that defend the status quo? […] 3.2.1.2.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [34] DENMARK [Original: English] [1 July 1993] [35] […]

122  September 1996, → 3.1.10.

233

3  “ The most productive time ”

6. However, it must be stressed that any changes in the composition of the Council, including a limited expansion of its membership, must not be permitted to impair the effective operation of the Security Council. Great care should therefore be exercised with regard to amending Article 27 of the Charter as regards the provision on concurring votes of the permanent members. In the view of the Government of Denmark, the number of permanent members whose concurring vote is needed for decisions on substantive matters should not be expanded. 7. Under all circumstances, it is important that the regional groups be invited to establish a system of rotation with a view to securing a fair representation on the individual members of a regional group. […] [73] […] PAKISTAN123

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] [74] Composition of the Security Council 5. The Government of Pakistan considers that, in consonance with the position of the non-aligned countries,124 any decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council will have to conform to the following criteria: (a) It should increase the Council’s representative character; (b) It should enhance the Council’s ability to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter; (c) It should promote greater democratization in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of States; (d) It should not enlarge the existing inequalities in the rights and privileges of States Members of the United Nations; (e) It should be compatible with the overall measures to restructure and strengthen the United Nations in various areas; (f) It should be achieved through consensus and agreement among the States Members of the United Nations. General observations 6. The Government of Pakistan recognizes the newly emerging trends in international relations. Nevertheless, the process of democratization and the transparency in the work of the United Nations and its many bodies should avoid perpetuating the current inequities by creating new centres of privilege. It should be pursued in the spirit of sovereign equality of all States. The objective of the present review should be the promotion of a more equitable and balanced representation. […]

123  → 3.4.3.2 for Pakistan’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 124  6 September 1992, → 2.23.

234

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.1.2.3 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2, pp. 5-6 […] [5] […] REPUBLIC OF KOREA [Original: English] [3 August 1993] […] 3. […] [T]he Republic of Korea wishes to make the following points: (a) First, the Republic of Korea proposes that due consideration be given to creating a new category of members of the Security Council. The members in this category should be selected on the basis of their ability and willingness to promote international peace and security. While the details such as the number, selection process and status (including the term in the Council) are subject to discussion by the Member States, the Republic of Korea does not [6] consider it desirable to extend the right of veto to the members of this category; (b) Second, the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should be expanded in view of the substantial increase in the total membership of the United Nations. These additional seats should be equitably distributed among the regional groups, based on the number of States, population and other relevant factors of each region; (c) Third, the Republic of Korea believes that there is a need for discussion on ways and means to improve the present veto mechanism. The right of veto has rarely been exercised over the past few years, a fact which, in our view, has contributed much to the revitalization of the Security Council. The Republic of Korea considers this a positive trend which should be encouraged to continue. […] 3.2.1.2.4 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council”125

[…] 6) REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE EXTENSION OF VETO POWER. Veto power – invoked as an inalienable prerogative of permanent membership by some Countries aspiring to that status – is an obsolete institution, which during the Cold War years played a decisive part in paralyzing the Security Council’s activities. While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guarantees that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council’s proceedings and the final outcome of its debates. This is why Italy is resolutely opposed to extending veto power to other Countries. One of the main advantages of Italy’s proposal for reform is – in its opinion – the avoidance of this eventuality. […]

125  → 3.2.2.2.8 for Italy’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.4.3.8 for Italy’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

235

3.2.1.2.5 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 1-2126 […] In our opinion, there should be a freeze on the category of permanent members and it should gradually be eliminated. Those seats are the result of negotiations conducted in the past which have no validity in our times. […] 3.2.1.2.6 14 October 1994, Pakistan, Mr. Marker, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, p. 1-2 […] The Council’s current composition lacks balance in terms of geographic distribution. However, any attempt to provide greater representation to various regions should reflect the circumstances existing within each region. The arguments for equitable regional representation must be viewed in the context of the legitimate concerns of all Member States within the region concerned. The accommodation of regional representation should not fuel tendencies towards hegemony and domination which are manifest in some regions. Again, our approach must uphold the sovereign equality of States, large or small. We must bear in mind that this item was originally inscribed to consider an increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council. We should not allow the present consultations to be taken over to accommodate the objectives of only a few countries. An increase in the permanent membership of the Council, instead of enhancing the Council’s effectiveness, would serve only to alienate the small and medium-sized countries that constitute a majority in the General Assembly. […] 3.2.1.2.7 13 November 1995, Italy, Mr. Fulci, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 15-17 […] Some Members States maintain that we should increase the number of permanent seats by two – a solution that has been dubbed “the quick fix”. Even though this formula has apparently been abandoned by some of its initiators, others still seem to favor it. Reform of this type would not be evolution. Rather, it would be involution of the present system. The five current permanent members are all from the northern hemisphere, and almost all of them are fully industrialized, prosperous nations. Adding two more with the same profile, rather than correcting this imbalance, would clearly aggravate it. A variation of this formula is the so-called “2 + 3” proposal: two permanent seats for highly developed nations, and three for the developing world – that is to say, one to Asia, one to Africa, and one to Latin America. Objections have been raised to this approach, for many reasons. First, it would benefit only two or five members of the United Nations, to the detriment of the remaining 175. The end result would be a small directorate of big countries, making critical decisions on questions that affect us all, but on which we would have no say. Furthermore, this formula would introduce the concept of elitism – of continental, hegemonic power – where it has so far been absent and where, I believe, it does not belong: in the world of non-aligned countries. 126  → 3.2.2.2.9 for Colombia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.4.2.12 for Colombia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

236

3  “ The most productive time ”

Secondly, this formula would double the number of Council members fully absolved of the need to stand for democratic elections. And, to me, one thing is clear: if 10 members of the Security Council were never again – no more, for eternity – to have to pass the test of an election, the General Assembly’s attempts to dialogue and interact with such a Council would have almost nil results. Thirdly, there are countries who contribute more to the United Nations budget than do some of the current permanent members. Others have larger populations or make more substantial contributions to United Nations activities. If they were shut out of permanent membership, they would inevitably compete for non-permanent seats much more frequently than they do now. This, in turn, would greatly diminish the election chances of other, medium-sized to small, countries in their respective geographic groups. Disharmony, resentment, even acrimony would prevail if the “quick fix” or the “2 + 3” formula were adopted. Fourthly, since permanent members cannot be removed, except by their own agreement – a most unlikely occurrence – the new permanent members would, in principle, sit on the Council for eternity, impervious to changes in the world or in their own fortunes. Fifthly, permanent members, as we all very well know, are assured a continuous presence in other important bodies of the United Nations system. If other permanent members were to be created, they would undoubtedly aspire to those same benefits, considering them an implicit and undeniable prerogative of their new status. This would risk creating a virtual monopoly of permanent members – old and new – over many bodies in the United Nations system, the so-called “cascade effect”. Last but not least, increasing the number of permanent members would double the number of vetoes on the Council, and threaten to paralyse its activity. The veto, as has already been stated by the two previous speakers, is an institution whose time has come – during the cold war years – and gone. We should be focusing on how to limit its use, not on how to proliferate it. […] 3.2.1.2.8 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 20-22127

[…] Fifthly, my delegation strongly opposes the extension of the veto power beyond the five current permanent members. We have in the past repeatedly voiced our strong opposition to such proliferation. The veto is an anachronistic institution that should be discarded eventually – definitely not one that should be extended to other members of the Council. […] 3.2.1.2.9 14 November 1995, Pakistan, Mr. Leghari, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 21-23 […] The concept of permanent membership is at variance with the principle of sovereign equality, which is the operating principle of the United Nations. The present inequity that is inherent in the concept of permanent membership should therefore 127  → 3.2.2.2.15 for the Republic of Korea’s support of semi-permanent seats, and 3.4.3.13 for the Republic of Korea’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

237

not be further strengthened or consolidated. It is in this context that Pakistan is against any increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council. Such an expansion would merely serve to accommodate the interests of only a few countries and alienate the smaller and medium-sized countries, which constitute an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. As my Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto stated in this very Hall on 24 October 1995: “The Security Council needs enlargement, but not in its permanent membership.” (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session. Plenary Meetings. 39th meeting, p. 24) Pakistan would thus like strongly to advocate an increase in the category of nonpermanent members that would proportionately reflect the increase in the general membership of the United Nations, particularly the large number of small and medium-sized States. We strongly support the view that the Security Council’s reform and the expansion of its non-permanent membership should be a comprehensive exercise with a view to enhancing its effectiveness as well as its efficient functioning. Pakistan would like to reiterate the importance it has always attached to the reform of the United Nations. Pakistan fully supports the reaffirmation made only recently by the non-aligned Summit in Cartagena128 that both the reform of the Security Council and its expansion should take into account the principles of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution. […] 3.2.1.2.10 22 April 1996, Mexico, Mr. Tello, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group129

[…] Extension of the Veto We do not want an extension of the veto to any other country. We have even attempted through our proposed amendments to seven Articles of the Charter to limit the existing veto, following the line of the Non-Aligned Movement, limiting the veto only to matters related to measures under Chapter VII.130 Consistent with that position, we are categorically opposed to making this privilege extensive in any way, and we definitely do not favour granting it to any new country. […] 3.2.1.2.11 26 April 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] No civilized and democratic society in today’s world allows permanent leadership. That would be un-democratic and in-permissible. […] Just as global realities have changed up until now, so will they continue to change from now on. Countries both evolve and digress. […] […]

128  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20 (Mr. Londoño-Paredes presenting the content of the Final Document of the Movement’s Cartagena Summit held on 18-20 October 1995). For the Final Document, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 129  → 3.2.3.22 for Mexico’s position on rotational seats, presented in the same statement. 130  → 3.2.1.3.6, 3.4.2.17 and → 3.4.3.22.

238

3  “ The most productive time ”

In this regard, we believe that any countries chosen as Council members through democratic elections should be subject to a mechanism which ensures some degree of accountability in the future. Qualifications should not go permanently unchecked. Democratic review in the form of elections is a must in our view. We note with interest that even those who support the expansion of Permanent Membership also endorse the notion of periodic review. In this regard, it is interesting to note that a new concept of “standing” members was introduced by the Commission on Global Governance.131 […] The exemption from democratic elections for a certain group of countries, whether it is 5, 7 or 10, is tantamount to denying the progress of history and, moreover, to depriving future generations of their legitimate right to verify the qualifications of Security Council members. […] 3.2.1.2.12 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group132

[…] We note that a number of delegations support an increase in the permanent category though they cannot as yet agree upon who that will be. Some further contend that without an increase in permanent membership, Security Council reform would be neither complete nor balanced. My delegation is not yet convinced of that argument. Although we agree the current composition of the Security Council is in need of improvement, we are not sure that an increase in permanent membership is the best option. […] Another primary issue with respect to the veto system is its extension to potential permanent members. We note that some delegations are pushing for equality among permanent members. I personally have always found “equality” to be an attractive goal. Yet this issue begs an important question. Is equality among a chosen few more important than equality among all members of the United Nations? In this regard, I recall the Brazilian ambassador’s interesting observation that increased competition among veto-holders would accentuate the exceptional nature of the veto, ultimately contributing to its neutralization. But who can predict the outcome of an untried experiment? Unfortunately, history cannot be made an object of experimentation. It is possible that the more veto holders there are, the more overuse or abuse of veto power there will be; effectively paralyzing the functioning of the Security Council mandated by the UN Charter. In particular, sensitive and important issues may rarely appear in the agenda of the Security Council wherein abundant veto power would await. This is a very important point we have to bear in mind. We note that the argument in favor of granting veto power to new permanent members is presented mainly by those ambitious to assume permanent membership. 131  1995, Our Global Neighbourhood, → 3.5.11. 132  → 3.2.2.2.21 for the Republic of Korea’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, 3.3.27 for Korea’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.25 for Korea’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

239

This is yet another source of our concern over the expansion of permanent membership. […] 3.2.1.2.13 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 9-11133

[…] The notions of “permanency” and “the veto” have become rather outdated. Despite the reality of the current permanent members, we are not yet convinced by the argument that without an increase in permanent membership, Security Council reform would be neither balanced nor complete. This cannot be reconciled with the new era of democratization, global cooperation and interdependence. […] 3.2.1.2.14  4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12134

[…] Most countries ready to accept the responsibilities of permanent Council membership have also expressed the wish to acquire the corresponding rights, including the veto. The difficult task of finding a way of combining this aspiration with the requirements of efficient decision-making in the Security Council still lies ahead. It would not be an ideal option to have a Security Council in which perhaps 10 countries were endowed with veto powers as presently constituted. The Council could again become paralysed on a number of issues. And even if that were not to occur, such a situation could marginalize the non-permanent members of the Council. […] 3.2.1.2.15 4 December 1997, Argentina, Mr. Petrella, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 16-17 […] The expansion that some are promoting would lead precisely to what no one wishes to see: more discrimination. It is for that reason that this exercise is not making headway. This is because it is difficult to accept that the Council will improve and become more democratic merely through the addition of new permanent members. The discrimination that this implies creates insurmountable difficulties. […] 3.2.1.2.16 4 December 1997, San Marino, Mr. Balestra, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 36-37

[…] My country is in favour of an increase in the non­-permanent membership. This would ensure the better participation of all countries in the Security Council, with more equitable geographical representation, through democratic elections in the General Assembly. […]

133  → 3.2.2.4.10 for the Republic of Korea’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 134  → 3.4.3.48 for the Nordic Countries’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, and 3.4.4.5 for the Nordic Countries’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

240

3  “ The most productive time ”

We have all learned from Greek philosophy the concept of panta rei – “everything flows”; why should we ignore it now? My delegation wonders if it is politically correct and if it is really the intention of the General Assembly to confer, for the first time since the establishment of the United Nations, privileges to a few countries on the basis of their dimensions or economic power. We also wonder if it is fair to correct a favouritism undoubtedly justified by particular historical circumstances with a further inequity. This would not represent a mere amendment of the Charter, but would hurt the basic principles on which this Organization is founded. […] 3.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 3.2.1.3.1 23 November 1992, Malaysia, Mr. Razali, UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 24-31 […] To bring the distribution of the Council seats closer to regional representativeness, it is possible, for example, to consider enlargement of the non-permanent membership by an additional eight seats, of which three could be allocated to Asia, three to Africa and two to Latin America. This would provide an equity distribution ratio of 9 to 1 from these three regions. For the developing countries, this would also have the effect of balancing the current over-representation by industrialized countries. The above formulation is merely an example and a preliminary idea which requires deeper examination. Also, the question of permanent membership and its veto power has to be closely examined. My delegation has always questioned the right of the Five to decide on behalf of the rest of the membership. We cannot accept the premises of 1945 to be perpetuated. We do not believe that the five permanent members now even if we are to accept the concept of permanent membership in any way fully represent all the world’s power centers. Then again, what constitutes the equation of power in the context of the new realities? If the Security Council is to be the nucleus for a collective world authority with increasing powers of enforcement in all the aspects contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, there must be a reordering of what constitutes eligibility for permanent membership in the future. At the same time, my delegation finds it difficult to accept that the way out is to have more permanent members or the idea of establishing a third category of membership, as permanent members without the veto or as semi-permanent members electable for a period of five to six years without the right of veto. We can study and deliberate over these ideas but, basically, the Security Council of the future cannot be a body wherein reside countries that claim political primacy. […] 3.2.1.3.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 ARGENTINA

[Original: Spanish] [23 June 1993]

[…] [7] […] 6. The Argentine Government therefore believes that the membership of the Security Council could be reviewed, taking account of the following:

3  “ The most productive time ”

241

(a) An increase in the number of non-permanent members only, sufficient to ensure proper representation of the States Members of the Organization without diminishing the Council’s flexibility and effectiveness; the increased Council membership should also ensure equitable geographical distribution, among all regions; (b) However, if a consensus emerges that a new category of members should be created, the Argentine Republic may consider joining such a consensus, provided that the principle of the sovereign quality of States is fully respected and that States that have consistently shown their firm determination to support the collective security system laid down in the Charter and the relevant security Council decisions are not excluded. The change in membership must guarantee that the Security Council will function effectively and ensure equitable geographical representation; (c) The criteria for membership of the Council set out in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter must remain fully applicable; […] [55] […] MALAYSIA135 […] [57]

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

B.  The membership of the non-permanent members of the Security Council should be expanded to reflect equitable geographical representation 7. The current membership structure of the Council is not consistent with Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which requires the Council to consider, inter alia, equitable geographical distribution in the elections of its non-permanent members which, as currently constituted, has too many from the European/Western groups, at the expense of other regions. 8. The significant increase in the total membership of the United Nations and the end of the cold war and East-West ideological rivalry, which in reality brought about a single Europe rather than Western and Eastern Europe, have in fact distorted the distribution of the Council seats to the benefit of European/Western countries, which have four permanent members and three non-permanent members (7 out of 15 Council members). For instance, the ratio of the average number of countries in a region represented by one permanent seat in the Council reveals that currently the ratio is 24:1 for Asia; 17:1 for Africa and Latin America; 12:1 for Western Europe and others; and 11:1 for Eastern Europe. (See the table below.)

135  → 3.4.2.3 for Malaysia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

242

3  “ The most productive time ”

Equity distribution ratio of number of countries represented by one non-permanent seat in each region

Year 1963 (last expansion) 1993 (present position)

Western Europe

Eastern Europe

Eastern/Western European Group combined

Asia

Africa

Latin America

1 : 12

1 : 11

1 : 10

1 : 10

1:9

1 : 10

1 : 24

1 : 17

1 : 17

1 : 12

1 : 11

1 : 12

9. In addition, the European/Western group of countries is overrepresented in the Council, holding four out of five permanent memberships. All in all, the European/ Western group of countries with 37 members has seven members in the Council, whereas the rest of the 133 members from Asia, Africa and Latin America have to share the remaining seven seats on the Council, excluding one permanent seat held by China. 10. Therefore, it is the view of the Government of Malaysia that in order to balance the overrepresentation of the European/Western countries and to provide an equitable distribution ratio among the various geographical regions, the [58] membership of the non-permanent members should be increased by an additional 10 seats, according to the following distribution: (a) Asia (47) – 4 seats (b) Africa (52) – 4 seats (c) Latin America (34) – 2 seats C. Permanent members 11. If the Security Council is to be the nucleus for a collective world authority with increasing powers of enforcement in all aspects contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, there must be a redefinition of what constitutes eligibility of a permanent membership in the future. In this regard, the general membership of the United Nations, inter alia, will have to address the following questions: (a) Which countries should be accepted as new permanent members among the new economic Powers? (b) What should be the basis and criteria of eligibility for countries in the South to be admitted as permanent members? 12. In considering the expansion of the membership of the Security Council, Malaysia has serious reservations about the idea of increasing the number of permanent members. However, we are prepared to consider the idea of establishing a third category of membership as semi-permanent members, electable for a period of five to six years, without the veto right. […]

3  “ The most productive time ”

243

3.2.1.3.3 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 1, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [11] LIBYA136 [Original: Arabic] [8 June 1993] […] [12] […] 4. Accordingly, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supports the expansion of the membership of the Security Council (by the addition of non-permanent members) so that this increase will reflect the number of States Members of the United Nations and take into consideration the equitable geographical representation of regional groups (continents) that are the least represented at the current time. […] 3.2.1.3.4 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [9] […] ROMANIA [Original: English] [17 September 1993] […] 2. Ensuring efficient functioning of the Security Council, as a collegiate body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, is a matter of high priority. Any debate or proposal, in this context, including those referring to an increase in the membership of the Council, are to be related to this basic requirement. Any change should ensure the most favourable conditions for the discharging by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations in terms of maximum efficiency. 3. Romania shares the generally accepted opinion that the changes that have taken place in the international arena in the last few years, as well as the increase in the membership of the United Nations, are important elements of the debate on equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. However, changing the Council’s membership is not an end in itself. It is supposed to meet the need to enhance its decision-making and capacity for taking timely action for the maintenance of international peace and security. To this effect, in order to ensure an appropriate balance between the regional and individual aspirations for adequate representation, on the one hand, and the need for efficiency and prompt reactions of the Council, on the other hand, Romania deems desirable a moderate increase in the membership of the Security Council. 4. Taking into consideration their potential role in and contributions to the United Nations activities and their possibilities for undertaking specific responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security, Romania [10] supports the candidatures of Germany and Japan for permanent seats in the Security Council. 136  → 3.4.2.4 for Libya’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

244

3  “ The most productive time ”

5. At the same time, while considering the distribution of seats in the Council, an equitable representation has to take into account all regional groups recognized in the General Assembly. In this context, the aspirations and interests of mediumsized countries with a recognized role in their respective regions are to be taken into account. Therefore, Romania favours the idea of an additional seat being granted for every regional group, including for countries of Central and Eastern Europe. […] 3.2.1.3.5 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965137 […] [94] 9. Movement of Non-Aligned Countries138 A/AC.247/5 (i) [Original: English] [13 February 1995] CLUSTER I REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL As regards the expansion of the Security Council, the Non­-Aligned countries are guided by the positions enunciated in the final documents adopted at the Jakarta Summit139 and at subsequent Ministerial meetings in Cairo140 and New York.141 1. Guiding principles established by the movement of the non-aligned countries: a. Equitable geographical distribution b. Sovereign equality of states 2. The non-aligned countries are grossly under-represented in the Council. This under-representation should, therefore, be corrected by enlargement of the Security Council which should enhance the credibility of the Council, to reflect the universal character of the world body, and to correct existing imbalances in the composition of the Security Council in a comprehensive manner. 3. The extent, nature and modalities of the expansion of the Security Council should be determined on the basis of the above principles. Attempts to exclude NAM from any enlargement in the membership of the Security Council would be unacceptable to the movement.

137  → 3.2.1.1.25 for the statements included in the Compendium supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.2.14 for the statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and semi-permanent seats, 3.2.2.4.3 for the statements opposing new categories of seats, 3.2.3.12 for the statements not supporting a specific category, 3.3.14 for the statements on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.12 for the statements on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto. 138  → 3.3.14 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 139  6 September 1992, → 2.23. 140  29 July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/287; S/1994/894. 141  30 September 1994, UN Doc. A/49/462 and Corr. 1.

245

3  “ The most productive time ”

4. The negotiating process should be fully democratic and transparent and negotiations on all aspects should be held, in all cases, in an open-ended setting. 5. If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category. [95] 6. Increase the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 based on the guiding principles (see Annex). 7. The last sentence of Article 23.2 (immediate re-election) of the United Nations Charter may be examined in the context of the over-all agreement on the expansion of the Council. 8. After an over-all agreement on the reform of the Security Council has been reached, there should be a periodic review of the composition of the Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. [96] ANNEX As an example, the mathematical formula when applied* would lead to the following result:

REGIONAL GROUPS WESTERN EUROPEAN & OTHER STATES GROUP EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP ASIAN GROUP AFRICAN GROUP LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN GROUP TOTAL

NO. OF COUNTRIES

PROPOSED MEMBERSHIP NOT LESS THAN

 27

 4

 20  49  53

 3  7  7

 33

 5

182

26

example, mathematical formula applied * X = Y/Z × W X = PROPOSED NEW MEMBERSHIP FOR EACH REGION Y = PRESENT NUMBER OF MEMBERS PER REGION Z = TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS W = PROPOSED TOTAL NEW MEMBERSHIP

[…]

3.2.1.3.6 18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, The Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Final Document142

[…] 51bis. They reaffirmed that both the reform and the expansion aspects of the Security Council should be considered as integral parts of a common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographic distribution, as well as the need for transparency, accountability and democratization in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, including its 142  → 3.4.2.17 for NAM’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

246

3  “ The most productive time ”

decision-making process. They noted positively the proposal submitted by NAM to the open-ended working group on Security Council reform,143 encompassing the issues of membership, transparency and working methods of the Council. They emphasized that the proposal to expand the Council should be comprehensive in nature, in order to improve its credibility and thus reflect the universal character of the world organization. They considered it essential to substantially increase the proportion of members of the Council belonging to the Movement and to that end they urged that the Non-Aligned Countries should work towards increasing the representation of developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Security Council. Any attempt to exclude Non-Aligned Countries from any expansion in the membership of the Security Council would be unacceptable to the Movement. They therefore agreed on the need for a coherent and coordinated approach by the Members of the Movement. […] 3.2.1.3.7  13 November 1995, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martínez Blanco, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 13-14 Honduras is speaking in the debate on item 47 of the agenda, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, on behalf also of the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. […] Central America shares the view that the objective of increasing the membership of the Security Council is to enhance its legitimacy while maintaining its effectiveness. The increase will have to reflect the changes that have taken place on the international scene, including the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations. The desire expressed by the Members of the United Nations to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council will become reality if we make the Council as representative an organ as possible, reflecting the universal character of the United Nations and including within it the greatest possible variety of interests and views, and if we adopt, as guiding principles to that end, those of the sovereign equality of States and of equitable geographical distribution, as provided in the Charter. Central America believes that the principle of democratization in international relations requires greater representativity in the organs of the United Nations. Only a Security Council with a broad membership based on the principle of equitable geographical representation can have the necessary legitimacy to act on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations, as it should pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Only a broad membership can give the Security Council greater credibility, for its members will then be inclined to greater participation in the collective responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security. We recognize the importance for the composition of the Council of the participation, as permanent members, of those States that have global political and economic influence and the capacity to share in, and contribute financially to, the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, we would deem it unacceptable if, through the application of those criteria, only developed countries could 143  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5.

3  “ The most productive time ”

247

be admitted to the category of permanent membership. That would be incompatible with the principles of the sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations and the democratization of international relations. We believe that, in order to arrive at a consensus in selecting new permanent members, we should include developing countries in that category, applying the same criteria as those set forth in the Charter for the election of non-permanent members. Ideally, the category of permanent membership would be eliminated gradually, because its creation was justified by past realities but is no longer appropriate in the new international context. The Central American region strongly supports the idea of increasing the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council, in view of the need for equitable geographical representation. In this context, we believe that the various proposals submitted by the Member States deserve careful analysis. We are of the view that the countries of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia should have increased representation in the Council. The United Nations has grown considerably in the past 30 years. This justifies increasing the membership of the Council, mainly with developing countries – which constitute the majority of Member States – so that their interests can be duly represented, thereby preserving the pluralistic nature of the Council and democratizing its decision-taking processes. We believe also that the nonpermanent members should have an opportunity to be re-elected alternately. To that end, Article 23, paragraph 2, of the Charter would have to be amended. This measure could help to improve representation in the Council. The countries of Central America believe that the right of veto should be limited and ultimately abolished. The circumstances at the end of the Second World War that gave rise to the veto have changed and there is no longer any justification whatsoever for the veto. Central Americans feel that the right of veto should not be granted to any potential permanent members of the Security Council. Equal treatment for new and old permanent members is an unacceptable legal basis for granting it, also because the veto in itself is an anti-democratic practice and is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Any reform of the Council will have to settle this issue with a view ultimately to abolishing the veto. To that end, we agree with the proposal to hold periodic reviews of the veto and other voting procedures. […] 3.2.1.3.8 15 November 1995, Belarus, Mr. Sychov, UN Doc. A/50/PV.60, pp. 10-11 […] Our approach to a possible resolution of the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council related matters is based upon the following elements: The important changes which have taken place in international relations, including a substantial increase in the number of United Nations Member States, presuppose the need to make the Security Council a more effective and larger organ. The enlargement of the Security Council should proceed with respect both to permanent and to non-permanent members. The expansion of the Security Council should be based upon the principle of equitable geographical distribution of States, elected by secret ballot by the General Assembly within the framework of the agreed distribution pattern among regional groups. New permanent members, as well as the five original permanent members, must bear a special political and financial responsibility – not only for maintaining international peace and security, but also for achieving the purposes of sustainable social and economic development. Any increase

248

3  “ The most productive time ”

in the permanent membership should not affect chances for other States to be elected to the Security Council as non-permanent members. In the enlargement of the Council we should envisage the allocation of an additional non-permanent seat for each of the existing regional groups, including the Group of Eastern European States. Nomination for non-permanent seats by regional groups should be based upon interregional rotation and equitable geographical distribution. The two categories of Security Council members, as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, should be preserved. The veto power should not be extended to new permanent members; the veto power and other voting procedures of the Council should be given thorough consideration. […] 3.2.1.3.9 29 October 1996, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 14-15144 […] While we are most favourably considering various ideas concerning increased representation for other regional groups, we have to state quite clearly that any enlargement of the Security Council should also result in augmented representation for Eastern Europe, a region in which the number of States has more than doubled in recent years. We cannot go along with any formula which would, directly or indirectly, imply a discriminatory stance towards the Eastern European Group and in which all other regions would get a share in the extension. Having already endorsed the entirely justified aspirations of Germany and Japan to permanent membership in the Security Council, we also support an enhanced representation of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America in both categories of membership of the Council. […] 3.2.1.3.10 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17145 […] Even among those who do support the addition of new permanent members, there are differences as to how this should be done. The “quick fix” solution – the simple addition of two permanent members – has not attracted the support it needs to be a realistic option. Other formulas have been put forward in an effort to square the circle, but these have proved similarly problematic and are unlikely, in our assessment, to receive widespread support. One option that received considerable attention this year is the idea of regional rotating permanent members. Variations were proposed, including one that would mix regular with rotating permanent seats. We have strong reservations about all of these proposals. While various formulas espousing the theme of rotating permanent members would certainly enhance the status of a very select group of Member States, it remains entirely uncertain how these formulas would work and, even less, how they would benefit the large majority of Member States. Most fundamentally, we share the strong concerns expressed by others that these formulas might restrict rather than enhance access to the Council by the majority of the United Nations membership. We fully appreciate the motivations of those countries that have developed these proposals. In our view however, they are simply not the way to achieve a more representative Council. 144  → 3.3.31 for Poland’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 145  → 3.3.34 for Canada’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.35 for Canada’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

249

We have indicated before that the aspirations of several countries to permanent member status is understandable. Nevertheless, it seems difficult not to conclude from our extensive discussions on this issue that the addition of new permanent members – of whatever kind – faces hurdles that, at this time, we simply cannot overcome. The deadlock on this subject is impeding our ability to decide on an expanded Council membership that will respond to the needs of all Member States. It is in effect blocking the reform that we have all agreed is needed to enable the Security Council better to reflect changing times and challenges. In these circumstances, we wonder whether it might not be easier to obtain agreement, for the present, on expanding the Security Council in the non-permanent category. Agreement here ought to be easier to obtain. This would be a first step that would not by any means preclude future discussion on permanent membership. […] 3.2.1.3.11 30 October 1996, Latvia, Mr. Baumanis, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 1-2 […] One procedural possibility that appears promising to our delegation is a long-term, multi-stage procedure for expanding and changing the composition of the Security Council. The Group could, for example, explore a procedure that would make no changes with regard to the right to veto during the first stage of expansion, but would respond to the new situation created by the many, mostly small, States that have recently joined the United Nations. […] Our delegation would also like to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the end of the cold war led to an increase in the number of Member States in the Eastern European Group of States. However, the number of seats allocated to the Group in many United Nations bodies has not changed. In this regard, we support the view of the delegation of Ukraine that any expansion of the Security Council should take into account the legitimate interests of the Eastern European regional group, which has more than doubled its membership in recent years. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 44th meeting, p. 2) My delegation offers its modest proposals for serious consideration by other delegations and is ready to cooperate with them. 3.2.1.3.12 30 October 1996, Bulgaria, Mr. Maximov, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 24-25 […] An increase in the membership of the Security Council should be directed at enhancing its capabilities in the discharge of its duty to maintain international peace and security. We support the search for an appropriate balance between the need to increase the membership of the Council due to the growth in United Nations membership over the past few years and the need to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in its work. In this process, it is indispensable to ensure that the number of non-permanent members is increased in a manner that will maintain both the ratio between permanent and non­permanent members and a broadly representative proportion among the regional groups. In this context, we are studying carefully all proposals, including

250

3  “ The most productive time ”

the one put forward by Italy,146 that aim to change the principles of rotation of nonpermanent seats; of the right of veto; and of the so-called enemy States, which results from the Second World War, as well as other ideas that could serve as a basis for reaching consensus. In practical terms, this should ensure that States carrying considerable weight in the international political and economic arena – Germany and Japan for example – as well other influential countries in regional and global terms, could assume the responsibility of permanent status in the Security Council. An additional non-permanent seat should be designated for the Group of Eastern European States. It would be appropriate to recall once again that this regional group has more than doubled its membership since the last enlargement of the Council in 1965, while the overall number of the United Nations Member States has increased by about 50 per cent over the same period. […] 3.2.1.3.13 12 June 1997, Poland, Position Paper, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex X, pp. 51-54147 I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS […] 5. Our conviction as to the desirability of changes has been strengthened by the experience of Poland’s membership in the Security Council since 1 January 1996. 6. The present position paper stems organically from this experience. Our conclusions from participation in the work of the Security Council confirm that reform should be based on two main pillars: (a) enlargement in the membership of the Security Council; and (b) improvements in its methods of work. II. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 7. Representative membership is of key importance for the credibility of the Council and its ability to ensure proper implementation of its decisions. 8. […] The increase should result, among other things, in an augmented representation for Eastern Europe, a region where the number of States has more than doubled in recent years. We cannot go along with any formula which would, directly or implicitly, imply a discriminatory stance towards the Eastern European Group while all others would get a share in the enlargement. 9. We support the idea of granting permanent seats to Germany and Japan. Permanent membership represents increased responsibilities and intensive engagement in carrying the burden involved therein. Both Germany and Japan are not only willing but also fully able to carry it. The enlargement of the Council should also ensure a wider representation for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. 10. We consider that no change is indispensable in the prerogatives of the existing permanent members, including the veto power.

146  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 147  → 3.3.36 for Poland’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

251

11. We agree with the assumption that there is a sizable group of States which on the basis of their considerable capabilities to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security deserve to be elected to the Council more frequently. 12. The voting procedures should make it possible to preserve the existence of a de facto “collective veto” arrangement. 13. The arrangements concerning the size of the Council might be reviewed in 10 to 15 years, if necessary. […] 3.2.1.3.14  27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XI, pp. 55-57148 I. Declaration adopted at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997*1 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997, addressed the question of reform of the United Nations, with particular attention to expansion of the Security Council. While reiterating the basic position of the Movement, as reflected in the Final Document, and in keeping with the essential need for democratization of the United Nations they emphasized the following: – There shall be no partial or selective expansion or enlargement of the membership of the Security Council to the detriment of developing countries; – Efforts at restructuring the Security Council shall not be subject to any imposed time-frame. While recognizing the importance of treating this issue as a matter of urgent attention, no effort should be made to decide the question before general agreement is reached; – The Ministers decided to remain seized of the issue and its development, which they will review at their next annual meeting on the occasion of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly; – […] – Improvement of the working methods of the Security Council should be given equal importance. At this decisive juncture in the evolution of the United Nations, the Ministers urged the leaders of the developed world to seize the opportunity of working together with developing countries to bring about necessary reforms in the United Nations on an equitable and democratic basis. The Ministers stressed that, at this historic moment, the international community has a joint responsibility collectively to reshape this unique world body to meet the aspirations of all humanity. II. Section of the final document of the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries related to the reform of the Security Council*2 27. The Ministers comprehensively reviewed discussions on the reform and restructuring of the Security Council in the light of the position papers adopted by the Movement 148  → 3.4.3.44 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

252

3  “ The most productive time ”

on 13 February 1995149 and 20 May 1996,150 the decisions of the Cartagena Summit151 and the Movement’s negotiating paper on cluster II issues dated 11 March 1997.152 28. The Ministers recalled that discussions in the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council have shown that, while a convergence of views has emerged on a number of issues, important differences still exist on many others. They noted that the Open­-Ended Working Group has resumed its discussions and underlined the necessity of the Movement maintaining its unity and solidarity on this critical issue. They reaffirmed that the Movement should, in the ensuing negotiations, continue to pursue directives given by the Cartagena Summit and contained in the Movement’s position papers. The Movement would be guided by the following considerations in approaching the issue of Security Council reform in discussions at the United Nations: – Both reform and expansion of the Security Council should be considered as integral parts of a common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution, as well as the need for transparency, accountability and democratization in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, including its decision-making process; – The non-aligned countries are grossly under-represented in the Council. This under-representation should, therefore, be corrected by enlargement of the Security Council, which should enhance the credibility of the Council to reflect the universal character of the world body and to correct existing imbalances in the composition of the Security Council in a comprehensive manner; – The extent, nature and modalities of the expansion of the Security Council should be determined on the basis of the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. Attempts to exclude the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries from any enlargement in the membership of the Council would be unacceptable to the Movement; – The membership of the Security Council should be increased by not less than 11 members based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States; – The negotiation process should be truly democratic and transparent, and negotiations on all aspects should be held, in all cases, in an open-ended setting. 29. The Ministers reaffirmed the Movement’s proposal that if there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category. […] 31. The Ministers underlined the need for a coherent and coordinated approach by the Movement in the ensuing discussions in the Open-Ended Working Group. The Ministers, mindful of the importance of reaching general agreement, as reflected, inter

149  → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14. 150  → 3.4.3.22 (presented on 27 March 1996). 151  18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 152  → 3.4.3.43.

3  “ The most productive time ”

253

alia, in General Assembly resolution 48/26,153 called for fuller discussions of various proposals submitted to the Working Group. 32. The Ministers stressed the importance of enhancing the transparency of the Security Council through improvement of its working methods and its decision­making process. They called on the Open-Ended Working Group to agree on and the General Assembly to recommend specific and substantive measures to be implemented by the Security Council based on the measures proposed in the Movement’s negotiating paper on cluster II issues. They also urged the Security Council to institutionalize such measures, and stressed that a commitment to institutionalize them should be an element of a package agreement on the reform of the Security Council. […] Original footnotes *1 Previously issued as Movement of Non-Aligned Countries document NAC/FM 12/ Doc.12. *2 Previously issued as Movement of Non-Aligned Countries document NAC/FM 12/ Doc.1/Rev.3. 3.2.1.3.15 26 September 1997, Malta, Mr. Sant, UN Doc. A/52/PV.13, pp. 5-9 […] On the issue of the expansion of the Security Council, Malta believes that the Charter of the United Nations considers all States to be equal, and therefore it follows that though we should have a more representative Security Council that reflects today’s membership of the United Nations, this can easily be achieved by increasing the number of non-permanent seats to the Council. […] 3.2.1.3.16 2 October 1997, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/52/PV.21, pp. 1-5154 […] In order for the Security Council to reflect the new political and economic realities of a changing world, it must increase the number of its non-permanent members to provide for just and balanced representation and to enable the Council to deal with the new international realities and shoulder its responsibilities by becoming more democratic through the adoption of a rotation system, not limiting membership to certain States, and by giving all States the opportunity to participate in its work and assume their share of international responsibility. Although we understand the opinions advocating an increase in the number of permanent members, we believe that the coexistence of permanent members that have the power of veto with permanent members that do not, plus non-permanent members, runs counter to the concepts of equality among States, geographic and cultural representation and international participation. It also runs counter to the principle of democratic decision-making. In order to achieve the required balance, fairness, justice, equality and reason call for an increase in Security Council membership for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Together, those three continents have the majority of world 153  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2. 154  → 3.4.3.45 for Qatar’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

254

3  “ The most productive time ”

population and States. Nevertheless, their representation on the Security Council is less than 50 per cent. […] 3.2.1.3.17 4 December 1997, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 22-24 […] Two of the more prominent proposals to come before the Open-ended Working Group have had the effect of blurring the concepts of permanent and non-permanent membership, namely, the proposal with which Ambassador Razali’s name is most often mentioned,155 whereby the notion of rotation among regionally selected States for a regional Council seat was introduced, and the Italian proposal,156 for which we had considerable sympathy, under which Member States would be elected from a group of countries which have made a significant contribution to the values and work of the Organization to periodic terms on the Council, thereby allowing them to rotate in and out of the Council on a regular and predictable basis. […] It is the concept of addition of new permanent members which seems to be creating the divisions that at this time we cannot bridge. If we find that general agreement continues to elude us, the straightforward non-permanent expansion of the Council, reflecting the new circumstances of the Organization, may indeed be our best course to follow. Canada will oppose any proposal which has the effect of marginalizing countries like our own, not the biggest, the most populous, the most powerful or the rich and famous, but countries which, through their effort, commitment and contribution, are here to make the United Nations work, not only for themselves but also for the collective benefit of all the Member States. […] 3.2.1.3.18 5 December 1997, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Calovski, A/52/PV.64, pp. 21-22157

[…] My delegation is strongly in favour of the following positions. First, the present international political reality favours an increase in Security Council membership, both in the permanent and the non-permanent categories. In our view, the General Assembly should elect 15 non-permanent members: five from Africa, four from Asia, two from Western Europe, two from Eastern Europe and two from Latin America.158 Second, the increase in Security Council membership should be acceptable to Member States’ Parliaments. […] Fourth, the non-permanent members of the Security Council should be elected on a predictable basis. Each Member State has a duty under the Charter to serve on the Security Council and should be enabled to do so. […] 155  September 1996, → 3.1.10. 156  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8, and May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20. 157  → 3.4.3.52 for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 158  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia confirmed this position on 17 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 28-29.

3  “ The most productive time ”

255

3.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 3.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 3.2.2.1.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [8] AUSTRALIA159 [Original: English] [7 July 1993] […] Effectiveness and decision-making […] 6. Consideration should also be given to retaining an appropriate balance in the proportion of permanent to non-permanent members. While the Council’s effectiveness is well served by having a core of members with lengthy experience, it also rests on the healthy rotation of membership of countries, large and small, which bring the full range of perspectives on international affairs to the work of the Council. 7. The existing permanent members of the Security Council have, individually and cooperatively, made a very important contribution to the Council’s revival. In any system of collective security, there will be a need for some form of “last resort” safeguard to protect the national interests of the strongest players in that system, if only to ensure that they have a stronger stake in acting within the system than outside of it. In terms of the Council’s effectiveness, a review of its composition which called into question the status of the current permanent members would, in the view of the Australian Government, be counter-productive. 8. There are good grounds, however, not to extend the veto power any further. The evolution of the Security Council’s collective security role has seen diminished recourse to the veto. The Council’s early history none the less illustrated how misuse of the veto could hinder prompt and effective decision-making. The Australian Government would regard the extension of the veto power as inconsistent with its diminishing use in a more cooperative atmosphere for collective security decision-making. In practical terms, it is difficult to see how an increase in the number of members with the veto power – even if this were to be accompanied by a new requirement that the veto, to be effective, be exercised by two (or three, or even more) permanent members – would improve the efficacy of the Council’s decision-making. […] [10] […] Legitimacy […] 13. To guarantee its legitimacy, the Council’s composition needs to reflect the realities of global and regional power. For this reason, the Australian Government has publicly expressed its support for Japan’s obtaining permanent membership of the Security Council. Such an enhanced status for Japan should not, however, preclude additional representation from the Asia/Pacific region in an enlarged Council. […] [15] 159  → 3.2.2.2.2 for Australia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.3.1 for Australia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

256

3  “ The most productive time ” CHILE160

[Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993]

[…] [16] […] CONCLUSIONS 11. In light of the foregoing, Chile’s preliminary view is that the political dialogue on the reform should focus on the following key elements: (A) Number of members by which to enlarge the Council and categories of membership (1) Chile believes that the Security Council should consist of no more than 24 or 25 members, in the following four categories: (a) Permanent members; (b) Permanent members without the veto; [17] (c) Regional members serving a long term of office; (d) Non-permanent members; (B) Modality and criteria for increasing the membership: (categories; regional participation; powers; duration of terms of office; re-election) (2) The following suggestions for this list of categories may be considered: (a) Permanent members with the veto There would be no changes in this category of Council membership. (b) Permanent members without the veto A new category of permanent members without the veto would make it possible to include nations which, given their economic and industrial potential, now have a real capacity to make a substantial contribution to the work of the Security Council (one from Asia and one from Europe). (c) Regional representatives serving a long term of office […] (d) Non-permanent members Non-permanent members would be elected in accordance with procedures the same as or similar to those currently in force, which means that equitable geographical distribution would be taken into account, members would serve for two-year terms and they would not be able to be re-elected. […] [37] FIJI161

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

[…] 2. The essential character of the Security Council as a body representative of all States Members of the Organization should be made more meaningful to ensure that the Council does not become the preserve of only a few. It is, therefore, necessary to create conditions that would provide opportunities for all Member States to serve on

160  → 3.2.2.3.1 for Chile’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 161  → 3.4.3.2 for Fiji’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

257

3  “ The most productive time ”

the Council if they so wish. Accordingly, in the election of non-permanent members from various regional groups, priority should be given to Member States that have not served on the Council, say, during the previous 10 years. [38] […] 4. The number by which the membership of the Security Council is to be increased should be the subject of a process of consultations, and it is desirable that no particular timetable for the conclusion of this process be established. 5. In deciding on the increase in the membership of the Security Council, the following points should be taken into consideration: (a) The present number of non-permanent members of the Council should not be reduced, if provision is made for additional permanent members; (b) New permanent members should not have the right of veto; (c) The increase in the size of the Council must be consistent with the overriding requirement of preserving the efficiency of the Council and its ability to take “prompt and effective action” on major crises; (d) New permanent members must have a long-standing record of upholding, maintaining and observing the principles contained in the Charter and must be free from any impediments to their full and effective participation in carrying out their responsibilities under the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security; (e) In the light of their special responsibilities and privileged positions as permanent members, all permanent members should be collectively responsible for the bulk of the financial requirements of the Organization’s regular budget, and for all its peace-keeping activities. […] MAURITIUS

[Original: English] [16 June 1993]

[…] [61] […] 5. In this perspective, therefore, Mauritius would like to propose that any new configuration for the Security Council should be based on the following principles: (a) The functional effectiveness of the Security Council should not be impaired by too large a membership; (b) It should be widely representative of the regional distribution of Members in the United Nations; (c) It should be the product of as large a consensus as possible to preserve its credibility. Proposals (a) That the total membership of the Security Council be raised to 21; (b) That the number of permanent members be increased from five to 12, i.e., on a continental basis it would be as follows: Americas 2 Western Europe and Other States Group 4 Eastern Europe 1 Africa 2 Asia 3 Total 12

258

3  “ The most productive time ”

6. It should be noted that at present Latin America and Africa are not represented as permanent members. 7. The seven additional new permanent members will not have veto power as against the existing five permanent members. [62] 8. In the light of the above, the elected non-permanent members may be reduced to nine. The geographical distribution may be as follows: Africa and Asia 4 Eastern Europe 2 Latin America and the Caribbean 2 Western Europe and Other States Group 1 Total 9 9. The distribution of non-permanent members as contrasted against the earlier one can be justified as follows: (a) Africa and Asia, which constitute the largest group of countries, are at present underrepresented in the Council; (b) The increase in the Eastern Europe Group matches the increase in the number of countries in that group following the end of the cold war and breakdown of the USSR; (c) The Western European and Other States Group is provided one seat as it already would be represented on a permanent basis by four States 10. The enlargement of the Security Council will eventually give the opportunity to this body to have more meaningful and democratic debates on major issues with less bias and more pragmatism. […] [68] NEW ZEALAND

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] Permanent membership 9. If the membership of the Organization judges it appropriate to increase the permanent membership of the Security Council, New Zealand would support a very small and carefully managed increase. We recognize that any formal definition of criteria for new permanent members would be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, in our view that basic, though not necessarily only, prerequisites are: (a) A long established tradition of respect for and adherence to the purposes, principles and obligations of the Charter; (b) Commitment to an active role in the maintenance of international peace and security and especially a readiness to commit substantial forces to peace-keeping and peace enforcement; (c) Significant financial contributions to the operations of the United Nations. 10. A question which might be addressed is whether, in addition to these other prerequisites, there should be a financial threshold for permanent membership of the Security Council. 11. New Zealand remains, as it was in 1945, adamantly opposed to the veto. New Zealand will vote against any proposed Charter amendment on additional permanent

259

3  “ The most productive time ”

membership of the Council that includes such a provision. We would support removal of veto rights from the five existing permanent members, or the placing of restrictions on the use of the veto. 12. There are various options that could be considered either in conjunction with an increase in permanent membership of the Security Council or as alternatives which would not require fundamental restructuring. For example, the possibility could be explored of amending Article 23, paragraph 2, of the Charter so that non-permanent members could sit for more than one term on the Council, in succession, if elected to do so. Non-permanent membership 13. The membership of the United Nations has grown steadily since 1945 while the membership of the Security Council has increased only once, in 1965. In the interests of equity, New Zealand would support an expansion of the non-permanent membership of the Security Council, bearing in mind the principle of proportionality referred to above. It is our view that the total size of the Security Council should not exceed 21 members. [70] 14. If an expansion of the Council were approved, the actual distribution of seats among regional groups would be a matter for further discussion, taking into account, inter alia, changes in the size and composition of those groups, and in the relationships among member countries. […] [83] […] SPAIN

[Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993]

[…] [85] […] 9. (a) Increased membership: The membership of the Security Council should be increased moderately to take into account, in particular, the fact that since the last enlargement of the Security Council, in 1963, 70 new States have joined the United Nations, and that this number is likely to continue increasing. (b) The creation of new categories should be considered, to enable certain States which play an important role in international relations and have the capacity and willingness to make a significant contribution to the purposes of the Organization to be included as members of the Council. Accordingly, we would envisage a limited increase in the number of permanent members, which would not be entitled to cast a veto. Consideration also should be given to the creation of a new category that would permit more frequent membership in the Council of certain States in accordance with objective criteria based on the principles established in Article 23 of the Charter. In addition to reflecting the new realities on the international scene, the presence of such States on the Council would prompt them to assume obligations to contribute substantially to the conduct of the Council’s work. In addition to enlarging the membership, such a step also would provide a counterweight to the actions of the permanent members. In any event, the selection criteria for access to these categories should guarantee balanced geographical distribution and, on a rotating basis, should include certain States of particular importance within their respective regional groups. […]

260

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.1.2 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [3] ALGERIA162 [Original: French] [16 July 1993] […] [4] […] A. Need to increase the number of non-permanent members 7. The enlargement of the Security Council from 11 to 15 members took place when international relations had a conflictual structure and the United Nations had only 113 Members. The balance sought at that time was achieved because of a relative underrepresentation of the regional groups to which the developing countries belong, beginning with Africa. The decolonization movement and the action of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) made of Africa a homogeneous and sizeable geopolitical unit that was faced with multidimensional problems frequently having a direct impact on international peace and security. 8. Apart from the concern for a dynamic proportional relationship between the membership of the United Nations and that of the Security Council, and over and above other pertinent numerical data, the spirit of cooperation and solidarity which has replaced in the Council the operating methods of a few years ago augurs well for a more equitable approach in the form of the enlargement of the geopolitical base of the Council so as to give rise to a more representative and more effective body. 9. The priority of this matter, given the necessity of equitable representation on the Security Council, calls for the following dual objective to be achieved in conditions compatible with the nature and scope of the prerogatives of the Security Council: correcting the obvious imbalances in the structure of the Council’s current membership in view of the requirement of equitable geographical representation, and reflecting the considerable increase in the number of States Members of the United Nations. In this respect, Algeria feels bound to emphasize the obvious underrepresentation of Africa on the Council and the consequent need for a substantial increase in the number of seats to be assigned to the African continent in all of the possible scenarios. B. Question of permanent members 10. The question of the increase of the number of members of the Security Council with a view to equitable representation poses, as a corollary, the question of the status of permanent members of the Security Council and also that of the scope of amendments to or revision of the Charter of the United Nations which would be required and for which prior political consensus would be indispensable. 11. The status of permanent member of the Security Council was created by special historical circumstances. Equally special responsibilities and prerogatives are vested in the permanent members by the Charter, as drafted by the 51 founder States, including prerogatives with respect to the entry into force of any amendment to the Charter itself. 12. Since there would have to be general consensus of opinion on the principle of any increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council and [5] on the 162  → 3.2.2.3.2 for Algeria’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

261

3  “ The most productive time ”

prerogatives of any new permanent members in reference to those of the five current permanent members, the granting of such a status to new States should be the result of mature deliberation in a process that not only takes into account the realities of today’s world but also bases itself on innovative criteria that will meet with the widest possible degree of acceptance in the international community. From this standpoint, an equitable balance between developed countries and developing countries should be achieved among States destined to become permanent members of the Council, with factors inherent in economic power or contributory financial capacity being duly assigned relative weights. […] [6] SAMOA163

[Original: English] [16 July 1993]

[…] [18] […] 4. Samoa considers that a relatively small Security Council can best ensure the prompt and effective action required of the United Nations under paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the Charter. It is of primary importance that the Security Council be allowed to function expeditiously and effectively. 5. It is necessary, however, to make allowance for the growth in the membership of the Organization, which now numbers 183 States. In 1963 when the number of nonpermanent members of the Security Council was increased from 6 to 10, the United Nations membership stood at 113. The resulting and existing imbalance should be addressed. The Government of Samoa believes there is a demonstrated need for a small increase (see para. 4 above) in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council. 6. In terms of Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council functions on behalf of all Member States. It follows that the Council should be truly representative, in numbers as well as in its geographical spread. The increase in the membership of the United Nations would seem to have put equitable representation on the Security Council at some risk, in that at least one regional group is overrepresented to the disadvantage of others. This aspect, too, would need to be carefully looked at. 7. In particular, the Government of Samoa believes that there is a valid case for some restructuring of the Security Council membership to make allowance for States which in recent years have emerged with the influence and ability to bear responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Samoa would support the creation of new permanent members for such States, but without the right to veto. […] 9. With reference to paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter, Samoa agrees with a broad reading of the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security expected of Member States. This need not be restricted to the contribution of troops to collective actions or peace-keeping operations. […] [20] […] 163  → 3.4.3.3 for Samoa’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

262

3  “ The most productive time ” SWEDEN

[Original: English] [1 July 1993]

[…] [21] […] 6. Article 23 of the Charter, determining the composition of the Security Council, states that in electing members to the Council, due regard shall be specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 7. In the view of the Government of Sweden, any review of the membership of the Security Council should be based on the same considerations. Members of the Council, and in particular the permanent members, have a special responsibility to secure the basis for the activities of the United Nations and to contribute politically and financially as well as with civilian and military personnel to the implementation of the Council’s decisions. 8. The increase in the membership of the Organization provides a case for a limited increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Also, Members of the United Nations other than the present permanent members of the Council may have a legitimate desire to see their role and responsibilities acknowledged in the context of the composition of the Council. In both cases due regard should be paid to geographical distribution. 9. In the opinion of the Swedish Government, the number of permanent members whose concurring vote is needed for decisions on substantive matters should not be expanded. 10. It is also important that the regional groups be invited to establish appropriate systems of rotation aimed at securing a fair representation of the individual members of the group. […] 3.2.2.1.3 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [8] […] MONGOLIA

[Original: English] [30 August 1993]

[…] 3. Mongolia favours a limited enlargement of the Council in both its permanent and non-permanent membership. This may, on the one hand, be explained by the emergence of new power structures of States with considerable capabilities to contribute to the activities of the Organization. On the other hand, it would be equally important to secure an adequate representation of small- and medium-sized States in the increased membership of the Council, as they represent a majority of the Members of the Organization and share many political, security and developmental concerns unique to them. 4. A more balanced and fair regional representation in the Council would, among other things, help enhance its image and credibility.

3  “ The most productive time ”

263

5. Viewing the right to veto as unavoidable at this time, Mongolia, nonetheless, would not be supportive of extending that right to other would-be permanent members. Moreover, the idea of limiting the scope of veto [9] application, as well as a requirement that, for a veto to become effective, it should be exercised by at least two permanent members, should be given careful consideration. […] 3.2.2.1.4 3 October 1994, Australia, Mr. Evans, UN Doc. A/49/PV.15, pp. 6-13 […] If the United Nations decision-making bodies are to have legitimacy and guaranteed international support in responding to the range of new and difficult situations with which the international community is now being confronted – particularly deadly conflicts and massive human rights violations occurring within States – they must be representative of the broad range of interests and perspectives of United Nations Member States. This is a key reason why enlargement of the Security Council’s membership is a pressing concern for this General Assembly. It should be said, at the same time, that the Security Council’s legitimacy will ultimately depend, not just on its representativeness, but upon the quality of its performance, and in that context it will be very important that the Assembly apply very rigorously the criteria and qualifications for Security Council membership elaborated in Article 23 of the Charter. The model that would most simply meet the legitimate aspirations of the largest States excluded at present from permanent membership of the Security Council – including Japan and Germany, whose claims we support – would involve the creation of five new permanent membership seats. Assuming the continuation of the existing regional groups, three new permanent members would come from Africa and Asia, one from the Western European and Other States Group, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean. Australia would prefer not to extend the veto to any new permanent member. At the same time, we believe it would be appropriate slightly to dilute the veto power of the existing five permanent members by requiring two from their number to concur in its exercise. If – as seems not impossible – agreement on a simple model of this kind proves not easily reachable, it may be worth giving consideration to a more complex alternative model. We have in mind one which would no doubt in practice guarantee effective permanency for the largest States currently excluded from the Council, including Japan and Germany. But it would at the same time give a greater degree of flexibility to the Council’s structure and greater opportunities for the recognition of several other countries which have made a major contribution to the Organization. It might, for those reasons, be a model capable of commanding more widespread support. This alternative model would involve, in addition to the five existing permanent members – whose veto power would again be slightly diluted, as already outlined – the creation of eight quasi-permanent seats allocated among regional groups for which consecutive re-election would be possible, together with 10 rotating non-permanent seats as at present. It would make abundant sense, in our view, for the existing regional groups to be at the same time modified to reflect post-cold-war realities. A suggested way in which these 23 seats might be distributed among such a new set of regional groups is set out in the table attached to the circulated text of this statement; that table also sets out the way in which the seats might be distributed among the existing groups. On this model, the question which States became quasi-permanent members and how long

264

3  “ The most productive time ”

they remained on the Council in that capacity would be a matter for determination by the regional group in question. […] 3.2.2.1.5 13 October 1994, Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 5-7164 […] Thus, from the methodological point of view, my delegation opted for a comprehensive approach and expounded its ideas on the basis of two postulates. The first concerned the inequitable nature of the Council’s present composition and its geographical and cultural imbalance. In addition, there is the fact that, given the large increase in membership in recent years, from a purely numerical point of view, the Council does not reflect the Organization’s present-day composition. The second postulate concerns the climate created by the end of the cold war, which has given the international community the hope that it could look forward to the emergence of a new world governed by law, an order based on democracy and participation that would opt for consensus in decision-making and that would ensure that this should be reflected in the Council’s functioning and procedural working methods. Accordingly, with regard to the issue of increased membership of the Council, we have focused on the criteria of equitable representation and the logical implication of the need to give priority to seeing that any increase of whatever kind in the number of members should help redress the present imbalance. We have also emphasized the need to abide by the criteria enshrined in the Charter and by the requirement that regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States, be considered in any attempt to adjust the regional balance and the need to enshrine the principle of rotation in discharging the Council’s responsibilities, in keeping with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, just as it is also necessary to take into account the readiness of Member States to shoulder their responsibilities in the achievement and maintenance of collective security. In this same context, we have frankly and clearly drawn attention to the need to regulate and limit the areas and subjects which may continue to be subject to the veto. We have voiced our principled conviction that the granting of veto power to other Member States would not be conducive to democratization of the Council or make it more effective. To the contrary, such a step would be likely to worsen the imbalances that exist between developed and developing countries and give rise to competition and prejudicial contradictions that could affect the political climate prevailing in the world and within regional groupings. […] 3.2.2.1.6 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martinez Blanco, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 13-15 I am highly honoured to speak on behalf of the countries of Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. […] Thus, as the States of Central America see it, it is necessary to revise the membership of the Security Council on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical 164  → 3.4.3.11 for Algeria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

265

distribution – which will make it possible to increase the number of permanent and non-permanent members on the most democratic basis possible – while studying the desirability of creating a new category of semi-permanent members, as suggested in the Open-ended Working Group. At the same time, thought needs to be given to the basic indicators that would enable us to establish, in an appropriate way, the number of members. […] It is our hope that genuine and thorough reform of the Security Council, grounded in democratic principles of equitable geographical distribution of seats, would provide for greater participation in the work of the Council for all Members of the United Nations, including small States and, in general, all those States that have never had the opportunity to participate in the Council’s work. From this standpoint, the proposals put forward by a number of eminent persons at the current session of the General Assembly are extremely useful. Once they have been carefully studied, they may well serve as the basis for a text that reflects the objectives we all seek to achieve. The countries of the Central American region believe that any reform formula that is adopted should, in any event, go hand in hand with corresponding reform to the Charter of the Organization and at the same time provide for the total and absolute removal of the right of veto, a right currently enjoyed by the five permanent members. The right of veto should not be granted to any State in any circumstances, whether they may be called permanent or semi-permanent members, for that right is an anachronism which 50 years ago may perhaps have had some logical justification, since the world was just awakening from the nightmare of the Second World War. But at the present time, now that the cold war is over, the right of veto no longer has any justification or raison d’être. Its total and utter removal will serve fully to safeguard the principle of the sovereign equality of States Members of this Organization, contained in Article 2 (1) of the Charter. […] 3.2.2.1.7 24 September 1996, Costa Rica, Mr. Villalobos, UN Doc. A/51/PV.7, pp. 23-26

[…] My delegation attaches fundamental importance to the restructuring of the Security Council. We cannot arrive at the year 2000 still using the calendar of 1945. The Council cannot continue to be held in a framework that has been fully overtaken by the reality of international politics. Costa Rica considers it a priority to take up this task, both in order to grant permanent membership to Germany and Japan and to a representative of each of the three developing regions – Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition, we must reorganize the powers of the Council and of its members. If the political conditions for a reform of this kind do not exist, we must then consider other possibilities, such as the proposal made by the Government of Italy.165 […]

165  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20.

266

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 3.2.2.2.1 22 September 1992, Netherlands, Mr. Van Den Broek, UN Doc. A/47/ PV.6, pp. 64-78166 […] So what are we to do when faced with the question of the Council’s effectiveness on the one hand and its representativeness on the other? A possible solution to this question might be found in severing the automatic link between permanent membership of the Council and the right of veto. A number of concrete options can be considered in this respect. One would be to consider the adoption of a double veto: two negative votes by permanent members being required to hold up a decision instead of one. Another suggestion put forward is the creation of semi-permanent membership of the Security Council. This membership would apply to a certain category of important States for a period of, say, five to seven years, possibly without the right of veto. To determine which countries would be eligible for this type of membership, it seems that two criteria are relevant: both the political weight of the country concerned and the degree to which its membership would contribute to a more equitable geographical distribution of the Council’s composition. In view of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it would appear to me that those two elements should be carefully balanced against each other. […] 3.2.2.2.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [8] AUSTRALIA167 [Original: English] [7 July 1993] […] [10] Possible changes to the Council’s composition […] 15. Consideration should be given to amending Article 23 of the Charter to remove the existing prohibition on successive terms of membership for non-permanent members. Such an amendment would permit more opportunity for increasingly frequent membership for major regional Powers which do not have permanent membership, although this should not be at the expense of opportunities for smaller countries to serve on the Council. A refinement of such an amendment could therefore be to extend the removal of the current prohibition in Article 23 to no more than one nonpermanent seat for each region. […] [35]

166  The Netherlands confirmed this position on 23 November 1992 in UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 87-91. 167  → 3.2.2.1.1 for Australia’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.3.1 for Australia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

267

3  “ The most productive time ” ECUADOR

[Original: Spanish] [11 June 1993]

[…] [36] […] 5. The number of members of the Council can be increased on the basis of a new juridical and political approach which provides for the possibility of immediate reelection of members or longer terms on the Council. In any event, it must be pointed out that the veto is an anti-democratic practice that must not be extended. […] [51] […] ITALY

[Original: English] [30 June 1993] 1. Italy is aware of the need to improve the effectiveness of the Security Council to deal with the ever-greater demands being placed on it in the present phase in the life of the international community. But it is equally convinced that its effectiveness must be consistent with its representativeness, and that every effort must be deployed to enhance the structure of the Security Council in terms of the criteria enshrined in Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Article provides that due regard should be paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization. Italy has repeatedly expressed this conviction in the past. It should be recalled that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Emilio Colombo, reiterated and clarified the indications made by Italy on previous occasions, when he emphasized the need to reform certain aspects of the Charter, including the composition of the Security Council.168 2. Italy is convinced that ways of guaranteeing the authority and the broader representativeness of the Security Council must be rethought in broad and innovative conceptual terms, in this difficult but stimulating moment in international life. For we are not insensitive to the new times, the emergence of new roles and situations on the international stage, the need to ensure that the contributions, the new stimuli, the new equilibria and the great economic potential that is now emerging can be adequately represented in the main decision-making body of the United Nations, which must of necessity reflect the development of international society. We also believe that the present debate will provide us with the opportunity to embark on a wide-ranging and constructive process of adjustment of the composition of the Council to the new conditions and responsibilities. 3. The most effective way of attaining these ends could be to divide the seats of the Security Council into three categories: (a) First, the group of permanent members with the right of veto, having a mainly historical basis, which would remain intact, for we are convinced that this right is now being superseded in practice, and is used on extremely rare occasions, while consensus is being increasingly sought nowadays, and this trend must be encouraged; 168  See, e.g., the statement of 24 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.3. Italy confirmed this position on 23 November 1992 in UN Doc. A/47/PV.69, pp. 31-33.

268

3  “ The most productive time ”

(b) This group should be joined, through an appropriate enlargement of the Council, by a second group comprising about 10 seats for States in all five continents which make the greatest contribution towards the purposes of the Organization. This could be gauged in terms of the financial support they might [52] contribute, or on account of their large dimensions, population size and efficient internal organization, enabling them to guarantee effective support in terms of manpower, military or otherwise, or because of the high level of their cultural contribution and their advanced mass media technology, enabling them to marshal strong public support for the Organization. These States, which should not number more than about 20, would revolve in twos as members of the Council, thereby guaranteeing a semi-permanent presence; (c) Finally, the third category should comprise the other States grouped into vast geographic constituencies, appropriately rotating to fill the remaining seats. Altogether, the Council would have between 20 and 25 members. Allowance would also have to be made for developments in international society, and hence the possibility of groups of States being formed or existing groups breaking up. For example, the day on which the European Union comes into being with a strong political identity of its own, the problem will arise regarding the position it will be given in the Security Council. 4. As Italy has already indicated in the past, what must be preserved are the purposes of the Charter which will always remain essential. But in a world that has changed radically since 1945 and is changing today at an even greater pace than ever before, it has become essential to act boldly to renew instruments and ideas, and the composition of governing bodies. It is only thanks to this beneficial tension between its permanent aims and new instruments, to which all of us must contribute, that we shall be capable of taking up the challenges of our age. Italy is also convinced that a reform of the Council along the lines indicated above would fit in fully with the principles enshrined in the Charter and underpin its democratic nature, authority and representativeness. *** Should it be decided to increase the number of permanent members, Italy feels entitled to be one of them, on the basis of its record as one of the major contributors to the United Nations and to the peace-keeping Operations decided on by the Security Council. […] [66] […] NETHERLANDS

[Original: English] [8 July 1993]

[…] [67] […] 5. However, any change to the composition of the Security Council should also serve to create a more accurate reflection of the membership of the United Nations as a whole, in order to underline the global nature of its responsibilities. One possibility would be to give each regional group within the Security Council an extra member, in addition to expanding the number of permanent members. Such a step would make the Council more representative and enhance its legitimacy. One seat in each regional group could be granted an exemption from the rule, set out in Article 23, paragraph 2, of

269

3  “ The most productive time ”

the Charter, that a retiring member may not be immediately re-elected; this would help to reflect the greater influence of some States within the regional groups. It would be up to the regional groups themselves to decide which of their non-permanent members should be granted such an exemption. An amendment to Article 23 of the Charter to this effect might also be considered. The result of such a move would be to create, in effect, semi-permanent members. […] [87] TURKEY169

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

[…] 6. Together with the enlargement, serious consideration should also be given to the creation of a new category of seats in the Security Council, as a means of enhancing its efficiency. This new category, comprising what could be qualified as semi-permanent seats, would rotate among a specific number of States to be designated according to objective criteria. 7. With these considerations in mind and leaving aside the permanent seats in the Council as an issue which should be addressed in a different framework, the following could be proposed for the structure and the composition of an enlarged Security Council: (a) Raising the number of non-permanent seats from 10 to 15; (b) Creating 10 new seats to be rotated among a specific number of States which would be designated according to the following criteria: (i) Population; (ii) Geopolitical situation; (iii) Military capacity; (iv) Economic potential; (v) History of working within the Charter; (vi) Record of contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization; (vii) Equitable geographical distribution. 8. In 1945, the ratio of Security Council members to United Nations Members was 1:5. Today, it stands at 1:12. A Security Council composed of 30 members would establish this ratio at 1:6 and make the Council more representative, responsive, transparent and accountable. The enhancement of the representative character of the Council is actually a tacit requirement inherent in the spirit of Article 24 of the Charter, which stipulates that the Security Council, in carrying out its duties, acts on behalf of all Member States. Indeed, democratization of the Council’s structure would be a further encouragement for the Member States to participate more actively in the Council’s work and would strengthen the moral ground for the implementation of its resolutions.

169  → 3.3.1 for Turkey’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

270

3  “ The most productive time ”

Geographical representation 9. The creation of a new category of membership as indicated in paragraph 7 (b) above would introduce a new concept of constituency in the distribution of seats in the Council. Within this context, it could be envisaged that half of these semi-permanent seats rotate among 10, and the other half among 15 States. This would mean the creation of five constituencies grouping two States, and five constituencies as grouping three States. [89] 10. On the other hand, the extension of this concept of separate constituencies to the distribution of all elective seats seem worth considering. Designation of separate constituencies representing more or less equal potential and means, as well as a common determination to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, for each elective seat, could further enhance the representative character of the Council and ensure more equitable geographical distribution. […] 3.2.2.2.3 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [6] CANADA170

[Original: English] [21 July 1993]

[…] 9. The further creation of a limited number of non-permanent seats should also be envisaged so as to ensure better access to the Council by the broader membership, in particular States making a significant contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this connection, the [7] provisions of Article 23 barring re-election of non-permanent members could be repealed in order to increase the options available to the membership. […] 3.2.2.2.4 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 […] [4] QATAR [Original: Arabic] [27 July 1993] […] 2. Qatar therefore believes that the membership of the Security Council must be increased so as to make the Council more representative of the international community in the exercise of its extensive powers under the Charter of the United Nations. If it was reasonable at the outset that the Council should be composed of 15 members out of a total United Nations membership of under 50, the current membership of the 170  → 3.2.1.1.7 for Canada’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

271

3  “ The most productive time ”

General Assembly, which totals nearly 200, makes it necessary to expand the membership of the Security Council, perhaps not in the same proportion but, at all events, to more than 15. 3. From another viewpoint, it may be noted also that the five permanent members, which have the veto, include three States from one continent, namely, Europe, and one State from Asia and do not include any state from the African continent or from South America. While this composition represents the realities of the international situation as it was some 50 years ago, it now lags behind developments in the international community and the balances of forces prevailing in it. 4. In order to avoid increasing the number of permanent members holding the veto, consideration might be given to the establishment of a European seat that the three European States that are currently permanent members, with the addition of Germany, in acknowledgement of its new status as a major Power, might occupy by rotation. Similarly, consideration might be given to the establishment of another Asian seat (in addition to that occupied by China) that might be occupied in rotation by such Asian States as Japan and India, in acknowledgement of the demographic, territorial or economic size of those states and their impact on the current international situation. An African seat might [5] on the same grounds, and a Latin American seat, to be occupied in rotation by the major States of that continent, such as Brazil and Argentina. 5. If these proposals were put into effect, the number of States with permanent seats would thus become six (the United States, China, the currently incumbent European State, the currently incumbent second Asian State, the currently incumbent African State and the currently incumbent Latin American State). This number is not much larger than that of the current permanent members. This is in order to obviate the complications that might arise from a large increase in the States having the veto. 6. There is, however, another aspect of the matter, which relates to the non-permanent members, whose number might be increased from 10 to 15 or perhaps more, according to the consensus of the views of States that emerges from the inquiry conducted by the Secretary-General pursuant to the General Assembly resolution. 7. An increase in the number of non-permanent members might provide an opportunity to regional groups that are similar than the present ones to elect non-permanent members from each group. […] [6] UKRAINE171

[Original: Russian] [2 August 1993]

[…] 3. In the solution of this problem, account must be taken of the emergence of new participants in inter-State relations which have both potential and real capabilities of playing a major role in the work of the Organization at the present time, especially in the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, and which bear a substantial part of the financial burden of the United Nations. 171  → 3.4.3.4 for Ukraine’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

272

3  “ The most productive time ”

4. It would be useful to study the question of the extent to which the two-tier model of membership of the Security Council corresponds to present-day circumstances, in which one part of it comprises permanent members and the other non-permanent members, elected for two years from a number of candidates from the regional groups. This system, as a rule, permits a State to aspire to a seat on the Council in reality no more than once in 10 to 15 years. Perhaps the time has come to envisage an intermediate tier, i.e., a third category of members of the Council comprising two or three important States in each regional group which would take turns in serving on the Council. This proposal could be put into practice by having each of the regional groups fill one additional seat on the Council. States making the greatest contribution to the maintenance of international peace and the attainment of other United Nations objectives and bearing the heaviest financial burdens of the Organization would have greater opportunities to participate in the Council’s work. In this way, Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter would be complied with more fully. Ukraine considers it necessary to fulfill more consistently the criteria for membership of the Security Council laid down in Article 23, paragraph 1. In the elections, due regard should be specially paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the United Nations. 5. There is also a need to find forms of effective participation in the work of the Council by the largest States in terms of population, for example, those with a population of over 50 million people. An informal “group of fifties” of this kind (which, as of now, together with the permanent members, would consist of 22 States), representing more than half of mankind, would, if created, significantly strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the Council’s decisions. […] 3.2.2.2.5 30 September 1993, Italy, Mr. Andreatta, UN Doc. A/48/PV.10, p. 16 […] Italy welcomes the renewed central role of the United Nations, and at the same time supports a reform of its institutional mechanisms. Let us first consider the possibility of a change in the membership of the Security Council. As Italy emphasized to the Secretary-General last June,172 since the Security Council is moving towards a future of greater burdens and responsibilities, its representativeness and effectiveness must develop in parallel. What we suggest is that, in addition to the permanent members with veto power and the non-permanent members, a third category be established. It would be made up of countries able to make a special contribution to achieving the objectives of the United Nations. What matters is not drawing up controversial lists, but identifying objective criteria for selection, based on economic factors, human resources, culture, and mass communications. These countries would rotate two at a time, thereby becoming semi-permanent members of the Council. […]

172  → 3.2.2.2.2 (presented on 30 June 1993).

3  “ The most productive time ”

273

3.2.2.2.6 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.9 […] [2] KAZAKHSTAN173

[Original: Russian] [17 March 1994]

[…] 5. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan welcomes the proposal of Italy174 on restructuring the Council on the basis of the principle of universality and the granting of equal opportunities to all States. In view of the need for equitable representation of States Members of the United Nations and for the maintenance of an appropriate balance between all members of the Security Council, Kazakhstan views positively the idea of including a group of “semi-permanent” members on the Council, since, in our view, creating such a [3] group would make it possible to enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of Security Council actions for the welfare of the world community. […] 3.2.2.2.7 20 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 10, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.10 […] [2] MONACO [Original: French] [9 May 1994] […] [3] On that basis, the Principality of Monaco wishes to submit a proposal that might respond to many of the wishes that have been expressed, without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the Security Council. First, the number of members of the Council should be increased from 15 to 25; this already seems to have the support of many States. The 20 non-permanent members, five more than the current number, could be divided equitably among the five regions, in other words, four members would be chosen from each region, according to the following procedure: (a) On the proposal of each regional electoral group, 10 members, two from each region, could be elected by the General Assembly by a two-thirds qualified majority, for a period of at least five years. Their term would be renewable. As representatives of large or medium-sized regional Powers, these members could play an important and long-term role in the Council. The spirit of the end of paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter, which recommends that due regard should be paid, in the first instance in the composition of the 173  → 3.2.1.1.16 for Kazakhstan’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.4.2.9 for Kazakhstan’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 174  → 3.2.2.2.2 (presented on 30 June 1993); 30 September 1993, → 3.2.2.2.5.

274

3  “ The most productive time ”

Security Council, to the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, would be respected. The Member States most involved in this action might find in it a just reward for their efforts as well as an incentive for continuing them. (b) The 10 other non-permanent members, also two from each region, would be elected by the General Assembly by an absolute majority, also on the proposal of their regional groups, and for a period of only one year. Their term would not be immediately renewable. These 10 seats, renewable on an annual basis, would provide an opportunity for each Member State, including those with the most modest resources, to participate with other nations in defending international peace and security. Thus, the principle of equitable geographical distribution could, undoubtedly, be taken into greater account, while maintaining the role and effectiveness of the Security Council. 3.2.2.2.8 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council”175

[…] Italy’s proposal can be summarized as follows: – The two categories of permanent and non-permanent members should be kept, and the current permanent membership should remain the same; – Ten additional non-permanent seats should be created, to be assigned to a more frequently and regularly rotating group of Countries to be selected on the basis of objective criteria. Such a group could include 20 States (or perhaps as many as 30). In the first case, the 20 Countries chosen for a more frequent rotation would be divided into two sub-groups (let’s say, sub-group A and sub-group B), each of which would alternate a two-year term in the Council, with a two-year period of absence from it. In other words, in the two years when the ten Countries of sub-group A are in the Council, the ten Countries of sub-group B remain out, and vice-versa. If the Countries entitled to a more frequent rotation are 30, a division into three sub-groups would then be necessary; each sub-group would serve in the Council for a two-year term and remain out four years, in order to allow the other two sub-groups each to sit for a two-year term in the Council. Such a reform would in fact reflect an existing situation (some Countries have been members of the Council much more frequently than others), and merely establish clearer and more precise rules for rotation. – The Security Council would thus be made up of 25 member States (5 permanent and 20 non-permanent), a number deemed still compatible with the need for efficiency. – The group of Countries to rotate with greater frequency would be subject to periodic revisions (i.e., every 10 or 15 years), thus avoiding the risk of creating new situations of “eternal” privilege. A Country’s remaining or not remaining in this 175  → 3.2.1.2.4 for Italy’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.3.8 for Italy’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

275

group should depend essentially on the degree to which it has managed to meet the higher responsibilities arising from its more frequent rotation. The possibility of more frequent rotation would thus be open to other Countries. 3) CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH GREATER FREQUENCY The selection of the 20 or more Countries to rotate with greater frequency should be made on the basis of the criteria provided for by article 23 of the Charter, supplemented by others. One could imagine the following objective criteria: a) the geographic area to which a Country belongs (existing imbalances among different geographical groups could be more easily redressed from a basis of 20 Countries rather than 2 or 5); b) the capability and political willingness of States to contribute to peace-keeping operations with military personnel and financial resources; c) the ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development, and the protection of human rights; d) the geographic, demographic, and economic dimensions of States (which, however, should not be decisive for the selection); e) the degree to which a State’s internal organization enables it to guarantee effective support to the United Nations in terms of civilian and humanitarian personnel; f) the number of refugees from nearby war-torn areas to which the States have given shelter. Needless to say, various other criteria could also be taken into consideration. 4) ADVANTAGES FOR THE ORGANIZATION The Italian proposal presents the following advantages for the United Nations: − A Council of 25 members, and therefore more representative of the present U.N. membership. − A greater and more democratic participation of all the member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for a greater effectiveness of its decisions. − An important incentive, for developed Countries, for a stronger and more sustained commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, and to assuming a higher share of the related financial costs. − The avoidance of new situations of “eternal” privilege (as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created). 5) ADVANTAGES FOR THE DIFFERENT MEMBER COUNTRIES: MID-SIZED AND SMALLER COUNTRIES; COUNTRIES ROTATING WITH GREATER FREQUENCY; AND PRESENT PERMANENT MEMBERS The proposal also presents a set of concrete advantages for all member States of the United Nations: – The mid-sized and smaller Countries would see an end to the present situation in which all Countries can in theory compete for non-permanent seats, whereas in reality some mid- to large-sized Countries are the ones that, in the absence of any rule, often preclude the election of smaller States, despite previous agreements on rotation inside the Groups. Adopting the mechanism of more frequent rotation for mid- to large-sized Countries would remove this impediment, and

276

3  “ The most productive time ”

make it possible for smaller Countries to rotate more regularly. A more equitable and regular rotation in the Security Council of mid-sized and smaller Countries represents an essential requisite for an effective democratization of the United Nations. – The Countries rotating with greater frequency could plan in a more regular and continuous way their policy of support for the United Nations and their contribution, financial and otherwise, to the achievement of the goals of the Organization, in particular of the Security Council. – The five permanent members could see their present burden for peace-keeping operations significantly reduced, since it could be shared not only with 2 or 5 additional members, but with 20 or 30 more frequently rotating Countries. 3.2.2.2.9 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 1-2176 […] We believe that the best way to adjust the Council to the new realities is through an increase in the number of its non-permanent members. Similarly, we could agree to re-election of some seats according to the decisions of the General Assembly on a case-by-case basis. Thus the whole membership would endorse those States that had gained the confidence and support of the international community. Clearly, the main criteria would continue to be equitable geographical representation and the equality of States. […] 3.2.2.2.10 13 October 1994, Mexico, Mr. Flores Olea, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 2-5177 […] Regarding the necessary increase in the membership of the Security Council, Mexico believes that there is no justification for the inclusion of new permanent members. The specific weight of certain countries in the international community cannot be disregarded, but this in itself does not warrant granting them exceptional privileges, such as the right to be members of the Security Council for an indeterminate period with extraordinary and disputable prerogatives, especially in a constantly changing world that aspires to true legal equality among States. We acknowledge the wishes expressed by certain countries, and after careful consideration Mexico is inclined to go along with the idea of an expansion of the membership of the Security Council comprising new, non-permanent members and, in due course others with an extended mandate or with the possibility of more frequent rotation. The selection of those non-permanent members or of those serving on a rotation basis or with an enlarged mandate would first and foremost be decided upon by each regional group. […]

176  → 3.2.1.2.5 for Colombia’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.2.12 for Colombia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 177  → 3.4.3.10 for Mexico’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

277

3.2.2.2.11 13 October 1994, Turkey, Mr. Batu, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, p. 13-14178 […] The enlargement should be coupled with a fair system of workable rotation. In this context, we firmly believe that the proposal submitted by Italy179 to the Open-ended Working Group merits careful consideration. […] We hold the view that the Security Council should be enlarged by 10 additional nonpermanent members. This new membership should rotate among a list of countries. However, this list could be updated after a certain time so that it does not lead to new privileges. […] 3.2.2.2.12 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 17-18180 […] Making the non-permanent members eligible for another term after their two years in the Security Council would provide some flexibility in the formulas for representation. […] 3.2.2.2.13 13 October 1994, Canada, Ms. Frechette, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 18-19 […] We should be ready to use our imagination and to consider different options. In this connection, new ideas such as those advanced by Italy181 and Australia182 could provide elements of a solution, and they merit further study. Canada is open to a number of possibilities: creating new permanent seats, establishing a category of semi-permanent seats, creating new non-permanent seats with or without the possibility of re-election, or reviewing the composition of regional groups. In our opinion, none of these ideas excludes any other. We think that the concept of semi-permanent seats, to be shared for two-year periods by two or more countries, is particularly interesting and warrants further exploration. The creation of such a category would have the double advantage of allowing countries that more fully meet the requirements of Article 23 of the Charter to sit more frequently on the Council and of lessening the number of candidates for non-permanent Member status. […]

178  → 3.3.8 for Turkey’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 179  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 180  → 3.2.1.1.22 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.3.9 for France’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 181  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 182  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; 3 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.4.

278

3  “ The most productive time ” 3.2.2.2.14 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965183 8. Mexico

A/AC.247/5 (h) [Original: Spanish] [15 September 1995] It is my pleasure to attach herewith the Mexican proposal for a new composition of the Security Council which was submitted in April 1995 to the Working Group of which you are Vice-Chairmen (see annex). I should be grateful if you would have this proposal included in the Working Group’s compendium of documents which will be issued shortly. [93] ANNEX [Original: English] Proposed new membership of the Security Council Region Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Western Europe and other States Eastern Europe Permanent members Japan Germany Total

Existing  3  2  2  2  1  5   15

First two-year period Second two-year period  4  4  3  3  3  3  3  2  1  2  5  5  1    1 20 20

[…] [109] 12. Turkey184

A/AC.247/5 (l) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

[…] [110] […] 4. The Security Council should be enlarged with an additional 10 non-permanent members. Thus, the existing ratio of 1:3 between permanent and non-permanent members should be reorganized as 1:5.

183  → 3.2.1.1.25 for the statements included in the Compendium supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.1.3.5 for the statements focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, 3.2.2.4.3 for the statements opposing new categories of seats, 3.2.3.12 for the statements not supporting a specific category, 3.3.14 for the statements on the size of the Council, and 3.4.3.12 for the statements on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto. 184  → 3.3.14 for Turkey’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

279

5. These new additional seats should rotate among a predetermined list of countries. The number of countries to be included in this list could be fixed between 30 to 40. 6. The selection of the countries to be included in the list could be made according to a set of objective criteria. 7. The criteria and the list should be flexible so that it could be updated after a certain period of time, that is, there should be a mechanism that would ensure that political and economic changes in the international scene would be reflected in the composition of the Council more regularly. The review of the list could be made either every 12 or 16 years. 3.2.2.2.15 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 21-22185

[…] My delegation has always believed that the expansion of the Security Council should incorporate the full range of interests and points of view, rather than be designed to accommodate the needs and privileges of some select groups of countries. For these reasons, the enlargement and composition of the Council must reflect the universal character of the United Nations and must be guided by the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution. In this regard some concepts advocating the creation of regional or semi-permanent membership have been introduced. In the past, my delegation has expressed its interest in the proposals based on these concepts. We remain interested in these proposals, in the belief that the creation of such a membership would be beneficial to both small and medium-sized countries. […] 3.2.2.2.16 13 November 1995, Mexico, Mr. Tello, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 5-7 […] […] [T]he Government of Mexico submitted in April 1995 a proposal186 for increasing the number of members of the Security Council. The main elements of that proposal are the following: first, the membership of the Security Council would increase from 15 to 20 countries; secondly, there would be no increase in the number of permanent members, because, in our view the five stipulated in the San Francisco Charter are more than enough; thirdly, two Member States would alternate, every two years, in occupying a non-permanent seat. In recognition of the role they play in the Organization; fourthly, there would be one additional seat for Africa, one for Asia and one for Latin America and the Caribbean, while another seat would be rotated every two years between Eastern and Western European countries; and, fifthly, the competence of the regional groups in considering and deciding on the allocation of the seats assigned to their respective regions would be strengthened. […]

185  → 3.2.1.2.8 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.3.13 for Korea’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 186  → 3.2.2.2.14 (submitted to the Working Group in April 1995).

280

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.2.17 14 November 1995, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 17-18187 […] The delegation of Ukraine firmly believes that additional seats in the Security Council should be provided for all the regional groups. I wish to stress that Ukraine will not support any variant of the reform of the Security Council that does not provide for additional seats for the Group of Eastern European States. At present, that regional Group, despite having almost doubled in size to 20 States, has only one non-permanent seat. Thus, excluding Russia, 19 States of the Group theoretically have a chance to be elected to occupy this seat in the Council once every 35 years. In our opinion, any change in the composition of the Security Council should take into account the contributions of individual States to United Nations activities in the maintenance of international peace and security, their participation in United Nations humanitarian-assistance activities and their support for peace-keeping operations. In this light, Ukraine would like to see Germany and Japan permanently present in the Security Council. On the basis of the same criteria for expansion, the proposal of the delegation of Italy,188 which has been supported by quite a large group of States, looks very attractive. We are prepared to cooperate in the search for a comprehensive solution to this extremely important issue. The delegation of Ukraine believes that the creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate between three States, making a total of 24 States, would make it possible for the countries which make considerable contributions to United Nations peace-keeping activities and the financing of the Organization and which represent the majority of the world’s population to take on the great responsibility of being engaged in the peacemaking activities of the international community. At the same time, those eight members would not be eligible to occupy the 10 seats allocated at present to the non-permanent Security Council members. In our opinion, this would give small Member States an opportunity to be elected to the Council more often. Naturally, the exact criteria and mechanism for selecting those 24 States should be negotiated by the Member States and adopted by the General Assembly. Ukraine is of the opinion that the issue of certain modifications of the veto right and its gradual elimination should be studied. The elimination of the ideological rivalry between the East and the West and the establishment of partnership relations between the permanent members of the Security Council make the institution of the veto historically obsolete and politically unjustified. Its existence only seduces the permanent members of the Security Council into sometimes using this organ in their narrow national interests, to the detriment of the interests of the international community as a whole. It is the Ukrainian delegation’s firm conviction that the issues of cluster II should not be held hostage to the principal problem of the expansion of the Security Council. […] The reform of the Security Council is long overdue. The Member States should finally take on this burden of responsibility of historic dimensions and start reforming 187  → 3.3.20 for Ukraine’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 188  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8.

3  “ The most productive time ”

281

the United Nations. Let me remind members of the words of one of the most outstanding Presidents of the United States of America, Thomas Jefferson, which are inscribed on the memorial to him in Washington: I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But, as circumstances change, institutions must also advance to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man still to wear the coat which fitted him when a boy as require civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. […] 3.2.2.2.18 15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.60, pp. 3-4189 190

[…] At the same time, we support the proposal by a number of States to remove the provision in paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations that retiring members of the Council shall not be eligible for immediate re-election upon the completion of their term. […] 3.2.2.2.19 28 February 1996, Spain, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VIII, pp. 37-39 SUMMARY OF IDEAS ON A POSSIBLE SYSTEM OF MORE FREQUENT ROTATION IN ADDITIONAL NON-PERMANENT SEATS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL Spain: working paper 1. Our Working Group should now take up the study of the proposals – mainly those of Italy,191 Turkey192 and Mexico193 – which concern systems of rotation in the Security Council. Pursuant to these proposals, it is not a question of creating new categories of membership of the Council, but of allowing some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Organization’s purposes, to participate more frequently as members of the Council. 2. The purpose of the present paper is to outline a few ideas and thoughts in order to illustrate the functioning of a possible system which would allow a relatively broad group of States to participate more frequently in the Security Council in accordance with objective criteria based on the principles established by Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. This system could function independently and without detriment

189  → 3.2.3.19 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 3.3.21 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 190  Russia confirmed this position on 30 October 1996 in UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 19-21, and on 5 December 1997 in UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, p. 11. 191  See, e.g., 3.2.2.2.2 (presented on 30 June 1993); 3.2.2.2.5 and 3.2.2.2.8. 192  See, e.g., 3.2.2.2.2, 3.2.2.2.11 and 3.2.2.2.14. 193  See, e.g., 3.2.2.2.10, 3.2.2.2.14 and 3.2.2.2.16.

282

3  “ The most productive time ”

to any solutions that may be deemed appropriate with regard to the question of a possible increase in the number of permanent seats, with or without the right of veto. 3. The delegation of Spain is of the view that the criteria to be applied in order to ensure the proper application of Article 23 of the Charter should be: (a) Objective, so that they will enjoy general consensus and the support of all Members of the Organization; (b) Open and flexible, so that they will allow participation by any State that meets the criteria. Thus, flexible access to more frequent participation in the Security Council will become an incentive for countries to maintain or increase their contribution to the tasks of the Organization, particularly those relating to international peace and security. 4. The point of departure should be Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides, in respect of the election of non-permanent members of the Council, for due regard to be specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 5. Accordingly, the first criterion to be applied should be the contribution of military, police and civilian personnel to United Nations peace-keeping operations. Indeed, the most serious commitment that Member States can make to the Organization is the contribution of their nationals to such operations, which often constitute high-risk situations. Such contribution may be said to be the touchstone of each country’s real commitment to the tasks of the Organization with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The intense national debates that arise in many countries when contributions to such operations are being decided on, negotiated and assessed bear witness to this. 6. Another criterion could be the financial contributions effectively disbursed to the Organization’s budgets. This is an important criterion, as it ensures crucial financial support, not only for the day-to-day functioning of the Organization, but also for the implementation and development of peace-keeping operations. This is especially relevant at the present moment, when the Organization is undergoing a financial crisis. 7. Lastly, without excluding any other criterion that might be applied, it is necessary to take into account the population of Member States. At a time when efforts are being made to democratize the Organization, it would be very beneficial for the countries with larger populations to participate more frequently in the Security Council. In addition, by increasing the participation of developing countries, such a demographic criterion would offset the previous criterion, which is based more on economic capacity. 8. A given percentage could be established for each of the three criteria mentioned above which would allow a number of countries to be included in the more frequent rotation cycle. The cycle would include those countries which had the required percentages in any of the following categories: (a) Total personnel assigned to peace-keeping operations; (b) Total financial contributions effectively disbursed, both to the Organization’s regular budget and to the peace-keeping budgets; (c) Population as a percentage of the world total. The percentages could be calculated with reference to a certain period immediately preceding the start of the respective cycle. Since non-permanent members of the Council are elected for a

3  “ The most productive time ”

283

term of two years, a few simple calculations can be done, purely for illustrative purposes, on the basis of a two-year period (1994-1995), in order to consider the results. 9. Thus, for example – leaving aside the current permanent members of the Council – we find that (a) Fifteen countries have a population totaling over 1 per cent of the world total; of these, six have a population totaling over 2 per cent; (b) Ten countries have made contributions totaling over 1 per cent of the United Nations budgets (both the regular and the peace-keeping budgets); of these, six have made contributions totaling over 2 per cent; (c) Lastly, 27 countries have each contributed over 1 per cent of the personnel assigned to peace-keeping operations; of these, 13 have contributed over 2 per cent. 10. Of the 39 States that are above the 1 per cent level in at least one of these categories, 18 are developed countries and 21 are developing countries. Overall, 18 States score above 2 per cent in at least one of the three categories. Eight of them are developed countries and 10 are developing countries. The countries on both lists belong to all the regional groups recognized by the Organization. 11. Thus, a list of countries formed on the basis of these criteria would not be composed exclusively of either rich countries (since population and troop contributions would both be taken into account) or large countries, since small countries with relatively large troop contributions could also be included and have their efforts acknowledged by the international community. 12. Another advantage of a system such as this is that the list would be renewable at the end of every cycle, allowing new States to be included in the rotation, on the basis of data reflecting changes in their participation in United Nations activities or their population. 13. At this point, it is necessary to return to Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The regional groups would continue to submit their candidacies to the General Assembly in accordance with a pre-established rotation, as they have done up to now; the Assembly would have the last word, by electing these countries to the Security Council through a two-thirds majority vote, as in the case of the other non-permanent members. This would ensure that the countries elected to the Council would not only convey the concerns and aspirations of the various regions, but would also act on behalf of the entire international community, as stipulated by Article 24 of the Charter. 14. What has been stated on previous occasions bears repeating, namely, that a system of more frequent rotation for a certain number of States will also increase opportunities for participation by other, smaller States, which, when being endorsed by their regional groups, are frequently displaced by other States with greater influence in the region. 15. From a legal standpoint, a system of rotation such as the one described would be simple to implement, since the only change that would need to be made to the Charter would be to amend Article 23 so as to increase the number of non-permanent members. The rest of the system could be put in place through a General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus or with very broad support. 16. In conclusion, a system structured along these lines would be more equitable than the present one, would ensure a more efficient Security Council, and would be objective, thus winning the acceptance of all Members of the Organization.

284

3  “ The most productive time ”

Appendix Ideas for adaption of the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions A compromise solution with a view to adapting the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions could be based on the distinctions established in Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations. This would allow for differentiation of three types of Council decisions, concerning: (a) Procedural matters: Decisions would be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of the Council, (b) Substantive matters not related to Chapter VII: A special qualified majority would be required, without the right of veto (this majority could be established at three fifths or two thirds of the members of the Council); (c) Substantive matters related to Chapter VII: The same qualified majority would be required, but with the possibility for permanent members to exercise the right of veto. 3.2.2.2.20 May 1996, Italy, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex IX, pp. 41-47194 A REVISED PROPOSAL FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS Italy: working paper INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 1. It is generally agreed that the present membership of the Security Council is in need of expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership of the United Nations. General membership has grown from 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965 (date of the Council’s only enlargement, from 11 to 15 seats), to 185 today. 2. The five permanent members all belong to the northern hemisphere and four of them are economically developed countries, while one is rapidly approaching industrialized status. To add new permanent seats only for two developed countries, which also belong to the northern hemisphere, would not be equitable or democratic. Rather than correcting the existing imbalance, such a solution would aggravate it. 3. Moreover, the establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundation of the United Nations. Fifty years after the establishment of the Organization, an imaginative effort is needed to search for new formulas, rather than merely extending old privileges to other countries. 4. The reform must move in a democratic not an elitist direction. 5. A more equitable solution for all would be to increase non-permanent seats only, as was the case with the reform of 1965. Among other things, this would prevent the difficulties connected with the proliferation of veto power and its dangers. 6. The numbers speak clearly: 77 countries have never been members of the Security Council, while 47 others have been able to serve only once (see annex I). The problem 194  This proposal is based on the Italian proposal of 29 June 1994 (→ 3.2.2.2.8). In the same year of 1996, Italy refined the election procedure for the rotating non-permanent members in “The Reform of the Security Council – an Italian Proposal”, published by the Italian National Committee for the Celebration of the United Nations Fiftieth Anniversary, pp. 12-13.

3  “ The most productive time ”

285

stems mainly from the fact that, within each geographical group, several large countries tend to compete for a Security Council seat much more frequently, thus elbowing out the smaller countries. A formula must be found to redress this chronic situation and to provide for a greater and more regular involvement of the many, not of the few, in the Security Council. I. THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 7. Italy first presented its proposal on 30 June 1993,195 in response to the Secretary-General’s questionnaire. The proposal was later illustrated by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on 30 September 1993,196 and gradually modified in the light of observations and proposals made by other countries in the course of the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. The present document is the latest revision of the Italian proposal, which can now be summarized as follows: (a) The two categories of permanent and non-permanent members should be kept and the current permanent membership of five should remain the same; (b) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, 3 States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly; (c) All 30 countries due to rotate more frequently and regularly would be subject to regular elections. They would need to obtain two thirds of the votes of the General Assembly, by secret ballot, in a manner similar to the present clean-slate mechanism, every time it is their turn. Should the candidates not obtain a majority by the third ballot, the second country from the same subgroup of three states could then run, according to the same procedure. If this second country also fails to obtain the required majority, this seat would become open to election to all members of the same geographical group, according to current practices; (d) Obviously this model presupposes maintaining the Charter provision that bans immediate re-election for a member who has just completed a two-year term. In fact, if the ban were to be abolished, the number of spaces available for other countries would automatically be reduced, limiting the right of all to equitable representation. We should not forget that in the League of Nations the possibility of immediate reelection to a seat on the Council was one of its key problems; (e) The list of the above-mentioned 30 countries to rotate with greater frequency and regularity would be subject to periodic revisions (every 10, 12 or 15 years), thus avoiding the risk of creating new situations of “eternal” privilege. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country has managed to honour the commitment and meet the increased responsibilities stemming from its more frequent rotation. If it has not, it should be replaced, by resolution of the General Assembly, with another country; 195  20 July 1993, UN Doc. A/48/264, → 3.2.2.2.2. 196   UN Doc. A/48/PV.10, → 3.2.2.2.5.

286

3  “ The most productive time ”

(f) The geographic distribution of these additional non-permanent seats should be such as to privilege the continents that are currently underrepresented. So if 10 new seats were to be added, 5 of them should go to the Groups of African and Asian States, 2 to the Group of Latin American and Caribbean states, 2 to the Group of Western European and Other States (which by itself continues to shoulder 65.13 per cent of the United Nations regular budget and 73.675 per cent of the peace-keeping budget), and 1 to the Group of Eastern European States. In this way, 70 per cent of the additional nonpermanent seats would be reserved for developing countries; (g) For financing peace-keeping operations, the present permanent members are required to pay a sum amounting to their contribution to the regular budget, plus a surcharge. The possibility could be envisaged of charging the more frequently and regularly rotating members an additional percentage on their financial contributions to peace-keeping operations, equivalent to half the percentage paid by the permanent members for the same purpose. This would greatly help the United Nations to overcome its present financial crisis and spread the additional burden to a group of 30 countries rather than to 2 or 5 members alone. The Secretary-General has recently written that the Organization’s excessive dependence on the assessments of a single Member State is unhealthy. The same would also be true if the United Nations had to depend only on the assessments of two or three Member States; (h) Finally, the majority required for the adoption of a resolution, provided for by Article 27 of the Charter, should be adjusted to the new size of the Security Council. Consequently, the Council would make decisions by an affirmative vote of 15 members rather than by the present 9. 8. The Italian proposal may be better illustrated by the following diagram: Permanent members:

Non-permanent members:

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ordinary rotation

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

More frequent rotation

3  “ The most productive time ”

287

II. CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH GREATER FREQUENCY AND REGULARITY 9. By way of example, one could consider the following criteria: (a) The contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization (Article 23 of the Charter); (b) Equitable geographic distribution (Article 23 of the Charter); (c) The capacity and willingness of States to contribute specifically to peacekeeping operations with military personnel, equipment and financial resources; (d) The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development and the protection of human rights. 10. Needless to say, additional criteria could be taken into consideration. III. ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 11. Following are some of the benefits to the Organization: (a) An enlarged Council more representative of the increased general United Nations membership; (b) Avoidance of new situations of “eternal” privilege, as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created; (c) A greater and more democratic participation of all Member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for more effective decisions; (d) A more equitable geographic distribution of the seats in the Council. It is easier to obtain this result on a basis of 30 countries than on the more limited basis of 2 or 5 additional permanent member countries; (e) An important incentive for more frequently and regularly rotating members to keep or increase their commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, in particular for the maintenance of international peace and security. Such members might be asked to make an increased contribution to peace-keeping operations: this would be a tangible sign of the greater responsibilities deriving from their more frequent presence in the Council; (f) Lowering the growing contentiousness that seems to characterize elections to the Security Council IV. ADVANTAGES FOR ALL MEMBER STATES 12. The proposal also presents a set of concrete advantages for all Member States of the United Nations, namely: (a) Smaller countries would be given a more fair chance of being elected to a nonpermanent seat by removing and shielding them from the unequal competition of the larger ones in each regional group. Even better, rotation agreements could be reached, and respected, within each group, thus ensuring that also for ordinary rotation the “clean slate” formula could be adopted; (b) Countries rotating more frequently and regularly would be given recognition of their more substantial role in support of the United Nations. They could also plan – in a more regular and long-term way – their policy of support for the United Nations and their contribution; financial and otherwise, to the achievement of the goals of the Organization, in particular to those of the Security Council. Furthermore, those

288

3  “ The most productive time ”

countries could establish among themselves special links, in groups of three, for rotating the additional non-permanent seats; (c) The permanent members could see their present burden for peace-keeping operations reduced, since it could be shared not with 2 or 5 additional members, but with 30 more frequently and regularly rotating countries. V. REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE EXTENSION OF VETO POWER 13. Veto power – invoked as an inalienable prerogative of permanent membership by some countries aspiring to that status – is an institution that may have been justified during the cold war years. Nowadays, the hope of many is that it may become obsolete through non-use. 14. While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guarantees that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council’s proceedings and the final outcome of its debates. 15. This is why Italy is opposed to extending veto power to other countries. One of the main advantages of the Italian proposal to increase non-permanent members is that the issue of such an extension would not arise at all. 16. Moreover, while it may appear unrealistic to hope that the current holders of the veto will be willing to renounce it spontaneously, Italy shares the opinion of those who believe that its use should nevertheless be regulated and contained as much as possible: by trying to limit its area of application, for example, or requiring at least two vetoes to block the adoption of a resolution. VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 17. If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons: (a) It would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 30 countries rotating more frequently and regularly; (b) The General Assembly would periodically, every 10-15 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition; (c) All non-permanent members of the Council – without exception – would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly, and obtain a two-thirds majority. 18. An increase in permanent seats would widen the gap between the Security Council and the General Assembly, since the new permanent members would not have to stand for democratic elections and thus would not in practice be accountable to the General Assembly. The Italian project would instead foster a smoother and more harmonious relationship between the two bodies. 19. Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their initial selection, review and election for every term, these countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly, like all non-permanent members. Secondly, while members rotating more frequently and regularly would stand for election every six years, the other countries

3  “ The most productive time ”

289

could compete – in theory – every four years. Thirdly, shielded from the competition of larger countries, mid-sized and small States could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for “clean slates”, with a realistic hope of being elected. 20. What the Italian proposal aims to do is ease rivalries and foster a climate of greater harmony. Other projects would instead heighten the competition between them. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would be the smaller and mid-sized States, 79 of which have been kept out of the Council so far. 21. Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two Articles in the Charter, Article 23 (Composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and Article 26 (Voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions. 3.2.2.2.21 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statements in the Open-ended Working Group197

[…] Finally, regarding the subject of non-permanent membership, my delegation notes a substantial degree of convergence of opinion on the need for expansion. If we are unable to narrow the gap between opposing views on the expansion of permanent membership, one option would be an increase in the non-permanent category only, bringing the total size of the Security Council to the low or mid-twenties. In contemplating the appropriate expansion of non-permanent membership, we do not necessarily have to restrict our consideration to the original two-year term. We might as well explore the possibility of adding longer-tenure members to the current 10 two-year term membership, if such an idea serves as an important element in a compromising package. Longer tenure could mean more credibility, consistency and additional responsibilities and obligations, perhaps including a greater financial contribution. Therefore, adding several members with a longer term may enhance the overall representativity, effectiveness and credibility of the Security Council. It is our view that the introduction of longer term non-permanent members, with no discriminatory pre-selection process but the ban on immediate re-election still in place, warrants further consideration. […] 3.2.2.2.22 17 June 1996, Monaco, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XI, pp. 56-58 PROPOSALS ON ROTATION OR SHARED SEATS, INCLUDING ARTICLE 23, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER Monaco: working paper Monaco’s contribution relates to Subparagraph 2 (a) of document A/AC.247, “Proposals on rotation or shared seats, including Article 23.2 of the Charter”. It 197  → 3.2.1.2.12 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.3.27 for Korea’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.25 for Korea’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

290

3  “ The most productive time ”

elaborates and complements the proposals previously outlined by the Monegasque delegation.198 The wish to increase the membership of the Security Council is clear. It is a logical reflection of the profound transformation that has taken place in international society and, particularly, of the significant increase in the number of States Members of the Organization. This is undoubtedly the only point on which there is really widespread agreement among States. Regarding the modalities for this increase, in contrast, it is difficult to find any real agreement, even though some ideas appear to attract more interest than others. It is in this spirit that Monaco submits for the attention of the working group a simple and specific suggestion with a view to facilitating, if possible, the negotiations on increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. It consists of a formula which, as far as we know, has not yet been properly explored. Assuming an increase of 10 in the Security Council’s membership, taking the number of members from 15 to 25, the formula could be as follows: – Increasing from five to ten the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on a regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peace-keeping operations; – Increasing the number of non-permanent members from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between 6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. Candidates should be capable of responding, as in the case of permanent members, to the need for an effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the Organization, and paying due regard, of course, to equitable geographical distribution (Art. 23, para. 1, of the Charter). The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years, in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Charter. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms. In Monaco’s view, this proposal would have three advantages: – First, it would provide an opportunity for five new major powers which are particularly representative and contribute substantially to peacekeeping operations and international security to have a permanent seat on the Security Council; – Second, it would give an opportunity to five other leading Powers, in particular regional Powers, which regularly participate in such operations and contribute substantially to them to be involved in the work of the Security Council for long periods of time; – Lastly, the more modest Powers would be able to participate in the Security Council with greater frequency, since the larger States which very often sit on the Security Council as non-permanent members would become permanent members or be elected for longer terms. […] 198  20 May 1994, → 3.2.2.2.7.

3  “ The most productive time ”

291

3.2.2.2.23 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC. 247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90199 COMPOSITION AND SIZE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE VETO WORKING METHODS AND PROCEDURES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL Ukraine: working paper 1. Ukraine is convinced that the outcome of the work of the Open-ended Working Group is of great importance to the future of the United Nations. A revitalized and reformed United Nations is impossible without a more representative and open Security Council. In the view of Ukraine, the enlargement of the Security Council will enable it to function in a more transparent and democratic manner. Delays in resolving this matter impair the United Nations’ ability to respond adequately to the challenges of the times and do nothing to enhance the Organization’s prestige. The lack of tangible progress in the work of the Group also has an adverse effect on the negotiations on all other aspects of the Organization’s future activities. The work of the General Assembly working groups on the financial situation of the Organization, on the strengthening of the role of the Organization, on an agenda for peace and on an agenda for development has for all intents and purposes been blocked. 2. The reform of the Security Council should be carried out in strict observance of the purposes and principles and other basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 3. At present, in the opinion of Ukraine, there is a real opportunity to reach an agreement in principle on a number of matters that have been under consideration by the Open-ended Working Group since its establishment. The reaching of an agreement will have extremely important political and practical consequences for the work of our Group. First and foremost, such an agreement would signify that, in their work, delegations had progressed from the stage of explanation of their positions to the stage of practical negotiations. 4. The Open-ended Working Group’s two previous reports200 reflected the agreement by all States Members of the United Nations that the membership of the Security Council must be increased. Unfortunately, it was not possible to reach an agreement on the parameters and configuration of such an increase. At the same time, there was a significant convergence of views among delegations in the Working Group regarding the future size of the Security Council. An absolute majority of delegations were in favour of expanding the Council to 23 to 25 members. 5. In this regard, Ukraine considers that, at the current stage, the Working Group could recommend that the General Assembly consider the question of increasing the membership of the Security Council to 25 members, which would provide a framework for 199  → 3.3.28 for Ukraine’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.4.3 for Ukraine’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 200  2 September 1994, UN Doc. A/48/47; 15 September 1995, UN Doc. A/49/47.

292

3  “ The most productive time ”

future negotiations in the Working Group. Such a decision would not predetermine the outcome of negotiations on whether or not the number of Council members in both categories – permanent and non-permanent – should be increased and, if so, in what proportion. 6. Ukraine believes that consideration should first be given to increasing the number of seats of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical distribution as set forth in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter. 7. While it is not in principle opposed to an increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council, Ukraine considers that the number of Council members in this category could be increased by including those States that make an exceptional contribution to the work of the United Nations and the implementation of the Organization’s functions, in accordance with universally recognized criteria. In this regard, Ukraine supports the desire of Germany and Japan to become permanent members of the Security Council, while retaining the principle of equitable geographical representation of States in the Council as a whole. 8. Ukraine considers that, if 2 additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by 8, which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for non-permanent members could be distributed as follows: – four (4) seats for Asian and African countries; – two (2) seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; – one (1) seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; – one (1) seat for the regional group of East European countries Thus, the Ukrainian proposal may be expressed by the formula “2 + 8”. 9. Ukraine believes that the creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three or four States (for a total of 24 to 32 States) would enable countries that make a substantial contribution to United Nations peace-keeping activities and the financing of the Organization, and countries that represent the majority of the world’s population, to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Of course, the precise criteria and the mechanism for selecting these 24 to 32 States must be agreed by Member States and adopted by the General Assembly. On the whole, Ukraine’s conceptual approach to this question is similar to the approaches adopted in the Open-ended Working Group by the delegations of Italy,201 Spain202 and Mexico.203 10. At the same time, the States claiming the 8 new seats with more frequent rotation would not seek to occupy the 10 seats currently allocated to non-permanent members of the Security Council. In our view, this would make it possible for small Member States to be elected to the Council on a more frequent basis. 11. In order to ensure that greater account is taken of the interests of small countries, Ukraine proposes that the regional groups should be given the right to determine themselves how many of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council available to the countries of a given region would be subject to the rule of more frequent rotation. 201  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 202  See, e.g., 3.2.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.2.19. 203  See, e.g., 3.2.2.2.14.

3  “ The most productive time ”

293

12. The implementation of Ukraine’s proposal would make it possible to increase the representation of the developing countries in the Security Council to 13. […] 3.2.2.2.24 29 October 1996, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 1-4204 […] The new permanent members, if there should be any, should be chosen on an ad hoc basis, as stipulated by the Charter. Thus, any State which is individually capable of assuming primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and whose candidature is acceptable at both the regional and global levels can become a permanent member of the Security Council through the relevant procedure. In this context, we think that only Germany and Japan meet the criteria. Ukraine supports the desire of these countries to acquire permanent membership of the Security Council.205 This process should be accompanied by an increase in the number of non-permanent members, due regard being specially paid, inter alia, to equitable geographical distribution. […] Ukraine believes that, if two additional seats for permanent members in the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight, which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for non-permanent members could be distributed as follows: four seats for Asian and African countries; two seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; one seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; and one seat for the regional group of Eastern European countries. Thus, the Ukrainian proposal may be defined by the formula “2+8”. Through our proposal, we can achieve a balance by increasing the representation of developing countries in the Security Council to 13. If the current decision-making procedure is retained, the approval of a decision in the enlarged Council would require 15 votes in favour, provided that none of the permanent members votes against. With 13 votes, the developing countries would have an effective group veto, without leaving the veto as the prerogative of any one State. As to the status of these new non-permanent seats, Ukraine supports a well-known proposal by Italy.206 At the same time, to accommodate the interests of small countries, the following modification might be considered. First, regional groups might be given the right to determine how many seats – except one that would stay under the regular two-year rotation rule – would be used for frequent rotation. Secondly, the regional groups might be permitted to use their non-permanent seats – except one that would stay under the regular two-year rotation rule – on a one-year rotation basis. The position of Ukraine on the veto issue is well known. We consider the existence of the power of veto, under present political realities, to be unjustified. In the framework of the Open-ended Working Group, our delegation voiced its support for the idea of the so-called “diluted veto”, as well as for restricted implementation of the veto by the Security Council permanent members. In our opinion, these modifications could 204  → 3.3.29 for Ukraine’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 205  Ukraine confirmed this position on 31 October 2001 in UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 14-16. 206  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, 3.2.2.2.20.

294

3  “ The most productive time ”

have limited the opportunities of the permanent members to use the veto only in their own national interests, to the detriment of the interests of the international community as a whole. But one has to be a realist. We do understand that only the permanent members themselves can abolish or at least modify the right to veto. 3.2.2.2.25 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 9-11

[…] As to a concrete modality for enlargement of the non-permanent category, we are open to a variety of proposals, including the simple addition of several non-permanent members or schemes providing more frequent rotation. We believe that the Working Group must concentrate on working out a modality for non-permanent expansion that would be acceptable to the general membership, rather than focusing on a highly divisive and controversial issue, namely, whether or not permanent members should be added. In this connection, I agree with the views of the Italian Ambassador that we stand at the crossroads, leading either to new permanent seats or to new elected seats,207 and I emphasize, elected seats. As regards the question of new elected seats, we do not confine our thinking to the current two-year term for non-permanent members. For instance, we might consider the addition of several new non-permanent members, perhaps as many as eight, with tenures longer than two years, such as a four-year term, which would be elected in exactly the same manner as the current non-permanent members. The equal eligibility of all Member States for that new opportunity could circumvent the strong conceptual objections that any creation of a preselected and privileged group of countries would incur. This can also enhance the overall representativity and credibility of the Security Council. […] 3.2.2.2.26 2 July 1997, Italy, Revised proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.12 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XIII, pp. 60-69208 The Italian proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council was initially presented in June 1993,209 in response to the questionnaire of the secretary-General; it was subsequently illustrated by the Italian Foreign Minister before the General Assembly in September 1993,210 and later introduced in the Working Group, in several revised versions, the latest in May 1996.211 In the light of the developments that have taken place since the latest version and taking into account the observations and comments of other Member States, Italy 207  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 9-12. 208  This proposal is a revision of the Revised proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council presented by Italy in May 1996. The parts in bold face are new in comparison to the proposal of 2 July 1997, whereas the remaining text was already part of the May 1996 proposal. Hence, only the new parts and the parts necessary to understand them are reproduced here. For the remaining parts of the proposal, → 3.2.2.2.20. 209  → 3.2.2.2.2 (presented on 30 June 1993). 210  → 3.2.2.2.5. 211  → 3.2.2.2.20.

3  “ The most productive time ”

295

deems it appropriate to reintroduce its proposal. The adjustment brought about to the Italian proposal are highlighted in bold in the attached text. 1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS […] Moreover, the establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other Countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundations of the United Nations. Fifty years after the establishment of the Organization, an imaginative effort is needed to search for new formulas, rather than merely extending old privileges to other Countries. As the President of the Italian Republic, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, stated in his address to the General Assembly on April 3, 1996: “An Olympus of powerful countries could alienate and thus diminish the interest of the excluded, demeaning their political will and perhaps marginalizing them, giving them the dangerous feeling that they are mere tokens, mere spectators. All Member States must feel that they are active participants in the great project envisaged by the founders of the United Nations”.212 […] 2) THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL Italy first presented its proposal on 30 June 1993, in response to the Secretary-General’s questionnaire. The proposal was later illustrated by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on 30 September 1993, and gradually modified in the light of observations and proposals made by other Countries in the course of the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. The present document is the latest revision of the Italian proposal, which can now be summarized as follows: […] – Currently, the permanent members provide, for the financing of peacekeeping operations, the same share they pay toward the regular budget plus a surcharge of 20%. On the basis of the present proposal by Italy, the more frequently rotating Countries would also have to shoulder an additional burden of, for example, 10%. On the one hand, this would allow for an increase in available resources that is not inferior to what would be obtained from applying a 20% surcharge to two industrialized Countries, in the event that they became permanent members of the Council. On the other hand, this solution would spread the burden to a larger number of Countries: thirty rather than two, decreasing the Organization’s dependence on the contributions of a very limited number of Countries. Moreover, this solution could make it possible to further reduce the contributions required of less developed Countries and, in the long term, to reassess the surcharge paid by the permanent members. […] 3) CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH GREATER FREQUENCY AND REGULARITY By way of example, one could consider the following criteria: 212  3 April 1996, UN Doc. A/50/PV.103, pp. 3-4.

296

3  “ The most productive time ”

[…] – Additional criteria could be taken into consideration, on the recommendation of the General Assembly. 4) ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS Following are some of the benefits to the Organization: […] – An important incentive for more frequently and regularly rotating members to keep or increase their commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, in particular for the maintenance of international peace and security. As indicated above, these Countries would be asked to make an increased contribution to the financing of peace-keeping operations, as a tangible sign of the greater responsibilities deriving from their more frequent presence in the Council. […] 5) ADVANTAGES FOR ALL MEMBER STATES […] 6) REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE EXTENSION OF VETO POWER […] 7) FINAL CONSIDERATIONS If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons: (a) It would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 30 Countries rotating more frequently and regularly; (b) The General Assembly would periodically, every 12-18 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition; (c) All non-permanent members of the Council – both the current non-permanent and the new more frequently rotating ones – would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly, and obtain a two-thirds majority. An increase in permanent seats would widen the gap between the Security Council and the General Assembly. In fact, once the new permanent members were in place, they would no longer have to submit to democratic elections, and thus in practice would not be accountable to the General Assembly. The Italian project would instead foster a smoother and more harmonious relationship between the two bodies. Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their initial selection, review and election for every term, these Countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly, like all non-permanent members. Secondly, while members rotating more frequently and regularly would stand for election every six years, the other countries could compete – in theory – every four years. Thirdly, shielded from the competition of larger Countries, mid-sized and small States could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for “clean slates”, with a realistic hope of being elected. What the Italian proposal aims to do is ease rivalries and foster a climate of greater harmony. Other projects would instead heighten the competition between Member States, as demonstrated by recent discussions on other proposals to establish new permanent seats. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would be the smaller and mid-sized States, 77 of which have been kept out of the Council so far.

3  “ The most productive time ”

297

Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two Articles in the Charter, Article 23 (Composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and Article 26 (Voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions. *** Italy stands behind the principles embodied and elaborated in its proposal, described above and is gratified and encouraged by the expressions of support for and interest in its proposal from more than eighty Member States. However, having served in the Security Council for the 1995-96 biennium, Italy realizes that in order for the Council to remain effective, efficient, and above all manageable, its membership should not be increased by too large a margin. We are therefore willing to consider a more limited increase in the number of the frequently rotating seats than originally envisaged. Furthermore, as Foreign Minister Dini stated in his address to the General Assembly in September 1996, Italy is “willing to discuss and adhere to a formula that is not inconsistent with the fundamental principles that govern its own proposal.” These principles are democracy, transparency, efficiency, and equitable geographic representation. In concrete terms, Italy believes that an increase in non-permanent seats only would be appropriate. In particular, Italy shares the approach proposed in the so-called “fall back position” of the Non-Aligned Movement, for an increase – for the time being – only in non-permanent seats. In the exact number of new non-permanent seats, Italy remains flexible. Such an approach would lead to a reform to the benefit of all Member States, in all regional groups, which would allow easier and more frequent access of all Countries to the Security Council. 3.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 3.2.2.3.1 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [15] CHILE213 [Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993] […] [16] […] CONCLUSIONS 11. In light of the foregoing, Chile’s preliminary view is that the political dialogue on the reform should focus on the following key elements: (A) Number of members by which to enlarge the Council and categories of membership (1) Chile believes that the Security Council should consist of no more than 24 or 25 members, in the following four categories: 213  → 3.2.2.1.1 for Chile’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.3.1 for Chile’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

298

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) Permanent members; (b) Permanent members without the veto; [17] (c) Regional members serving a long term of office; (d) Non-permanent members. (B) Modality and criteria for increasing the membership: (categories; regional participation; powers; duration of terms of office; re-election) (2) The following suggestions for this list of categories may be considered: (a) Permanent members with the veto There would be no changes in this category of Council membership. (b) Permanent members without the veto [… (c) Regional representatives serving a long term of office Other nations from the major regions of the developing world could, by virtue of their importance in their region, join the Council on behalf of regions or subregions, as regional representatives serving a long term of office, also without the veto The modalities applicable to this category certainly merit further detailed studies which, broadly speaking, might be based on criteria similar to those prevailing in international financial bodies, where the “shared seat” or other rotation mechanisms are used. Thus, a Council member in this category might have two “alternates” from nations in the region it represents. Such an arrangement would make it possible to satisfy and reconcile individual and regional aspirations and would effectively help to satisfy the desire for greater democratization and balance in the composition, deliberations and decision-making process of the Council, without impinging on its ability to act expeditiously. Regional representation must never remain the province of a single country, and the votes of regional members should represent the views of all the nations of the region, although ultimately the vote cast is that of the country actually represented in the Council. Members serving as regional representatives would be elected for longer periods than non-permanent members and would be able to stand for re-election. (d) Non-permanent members Non-permanent members would be elected in accordance with procedures the same as or similar to those, currently in force, which means that equitable geographical distribution would be taken into account, members would serve for two-year terms and they would not be able to be re-elected. […] [72] NORWAY214

[Original: English] [2 July 1993]

[…] [73] 5. The relevant regional groups should themselves decide upon the manner in which they would fill any extra regional seats on the Council. Article 23, paragraph 2, of the 214  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Norway’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

299

3  “ The most productive time ”

Charter could be amended, so as to allow for immediate re-elections of outgoing Council members. […] 3.2.2.3.2 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [3] ALGERIA215

[Original: French] [16 July 1993]

[…] [4] […] 13. On the subject of innovative criteria, it should be stated that the resources of regional organizations, such as OAU, could be tapped in regard to permanent representation on the Security Council. Through arrangements yet to be determined, they could establish the means of rotation of the States that would fill the permanent seats assigned to groups of States members of a given regional organization. Representation of the various forms of culture and civilization could also be combined with the establishment of permanent representation for regional political groupings and interregional support frameworks. As to the application of these innovative criteria and the implementation of the specific arrangements to which they would give rise, the will and the ability to contribute to the discharge of the Security Council’s functions should be the criteria governing the selection of States which would periodically represent the entities holding permanent seats. […] [19] SUDAN216

[Original: Arabic] [12 July 1993]

[…] [20] […] 5. As a non-aligned country, the Sudan has continued to urge the need to increase the membership of the Council to include States from all groups and (as one possible option) to assign a permanent seat to the Non-Aligned Group of States to be occupied on the basis of rotation in accordance with a mechanism to be agreed upon. […]

215  → 3.2.2.1.2 for Algeria’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 216  → 3.2.1.1.7 for Sudan’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.4.2.4 for Sudan’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

300

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.3.3 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 […] [2] EGYPT217

[Original: English] [2 August 1993]

[…] 8. In order to take into account the new developments that have recently emerged in our contemporary world, it would be beneficial to devise a new category of membership in the Council that recognizes present regional realities. An intermediate group of members between the permanent members and the non-permanent ones should be established. A possible formula to address [3] this issue would be to establish in each region one or more seats without veto power to rotate between the major Powers of that region. In this context, due regard should be paid – in accordance with the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter – to the contribution of States Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the Organization, including the participation in peace-keeping operations, where developing countries are offering a substantial contribution and assuming increasing responsibilities. […] [8] YEMEN218

[Original: Arabic] [9 August 1993]

[…] [9] […] 8. The following points, which a great many Member States find essential, represent a general approach to such restructuring: […] (f) Inclusion of regional organizations in non-permanent membership through representation by the current chairman or president of their supreme organs; […] 3.2.2.3.4 23 November 1993, Syria, Mr. Shaheed, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 1-3219 […] There is no doubt that an equitable increase in the membership of the Security Council, whose work has been hampered in general by the actions of its permanent members over the past decades, would not in any way hamper its work or make it less effective. Rather, such an equitable increase would increase the ability of the Security 217  → 3.2.1.1.8 for Egypt’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 218  → 3.2.1.1.8 for Yemen’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.2.5 for Yemen’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 219  → 3.4.2.7 for Syria’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

301

Council to reflect more effectively the concerns of the Organization’s membership which, at present, stands at 184 States, most of which are developing countries that have the will and the ability to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security through peace-keeping and other activities of the United Nations. That is the reason why those Member States should be given access to the permanent membership of the Security Council. This could be done by adding one permanent member to represent each developing region. For example, a permanent seat could be given to the Arab Group in the Security Council, with all the attendant powers. That seat would be rotated in a manner to be decided within the framework of the Arab Group. Giving one permanent seat to the Arab Group will certainly enable the Arab countries to play a role that would contribute effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security. […] 3.2.2.3.5 29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, reprinted in UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27220 UNITED NATIONS REFORM African common position*1 Equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council 31. The increase in the membership of and equitable representation on the Security Council has become imperative because of the need to democratize the Council and make it more efficient and transparent. The democracy that is currently being preached at the national level should prevail in the international system. It is therefore necessary to review the composition and the decision-making process of the Council in line with the above principles, as well as the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. In the implementation of these ideals, it is important to bear in mind the need for equitable geographical representation with the emphasis on an increase in the permanent membership for the benefit of developing countries, in particular Africa. Ultimately, with the progress in the democratization of the international system, permanent membership and the right of veto would be reviewed and all members of the Security Council would be elected according to the principle of equitable geographical representation in order to ensure their accountability to all the members of the United Nations, on whose behalf they assume the primary function of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. […] 33. […] This can be achieved by the following steps, inter alia: […] (d) An increase in the number of members of the Council, both permanent and non-permanent; […]

220  → 3.2.2.4.1 for the Organization of African Unity’s position against new categories of seats, and 3.4.2.10 for the Organization’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

302

3  “ The most productive time ”

34. Without prejudice to the fact that it should have a proportionate number of nonpermanent seats on the Security Council, Africa should be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. The permanent seats allocated to Africa will be assigned to countries on the decision of the Africans themselves, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the criteria of the Organization of African Unity currently in force and subsequent elements which might subsequently improve those criteria. 35. In principle, there will be a need for the periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council in order to make it better able to respond more effectively to the new challenges arising from developments in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security. In this connection, the Open-ended Working Group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/26,221 constitutes the appropriate forum which could be transformed into a democratic instrument for debate and reflection on all aspects of the reform of the Security Council. 36. Eventually, the current permanent members should also be subject to nomination by their respective regions and should be elected by the General Assembly. Such a system of periodic elections of the permanent members of the Security Council would ultimately make the decisions of the Council less subject to the strictly national interests of various members. […] Original footnote Extract from Organization of African Unity Document NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2 of 29 September 1994.

*1

3.2.2.3.6 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-8222 […] Fourthly, the future composition of the Security Council should reflect, through an appropriate balance in its membership, the reality and plurality of today’s world. In our view, the addition of a limited number of regional seats endowed with rights similar to those of the existing permanent members could meet these requirements. […] 3.2.2.3.7 13 October 1994, Organization of African Unity, Mr. Abdellah (Tunisia), UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 9-11

[…] One of the sacrosanct principles of our Organization is equitable regional representation. In this regard, we consider that Africa, like Asia and Latin America, is entitled to be equitably represented on the Security Council. I shall take the liberty of recalling the terms of the African ministerial declaration which states that at least two permanent seats should be given to this continent in the course of the current restructuring 221  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2. 222  → 3.3.7 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.2.1.1.21 for Austria’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

303

process. It goes without saying, in our opinion, that rotation continues to be essential, including within regional groups. It is indeed contrary to the very essence of the democratization we are trying to achieve in a Security Council adapted to new realities to offer special status, in rather questionable fashion, to a new category of States or seats. […] 3.2.2.3.8 14 October 1994, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 17-18223 […] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has issued an African common position,224 and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has issued declarations and communiqués stating its position225 on the issues currently before us. Zimbabwe fully supports and subscribes to these collective positions on the restructuring and reorganization of the Security Council. […] It is quite clear that the geographical distribution of both permanent and nonpermanent membership of the Security Council is grossly inequitable. This has to be rectified if the decisions of the Council are to get the stamp of legitimacy that the nature of its mandate requires. However, we believe that, in the interim period, the mandates of any additional members of the Security Council should be subject to periodic review. Nevertheless, for their periods on the Council they should enjoy the same rights and privileges, including the veto, as the existing permanent members. The ultimate goal should continue to be that all members of the Security Council are subject to election. The principle of the consent of the governed is paramount. […] 3.2.2.3.9 29 September 1995, Malaysia, Mr. Mahathir, UN Doc. A/50/PV.12, pp. 1-5226 […] A more equitable representation on the Security Council is a must. This means that permanent seats should be given to regions, possibly determined by a regional mechanism. […] 3.2.2.3.10  13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24227

[…] […] We are of the view that the current two-year term of office for the nonpermanent members of the Security Council has worked well and should therefore be continued. This system, while affording an opportunity for Member States to have a role in discharging the responsibilities that go with membership, also ensures that as

223  → 3.4.2.15 for Zimbabwe’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 224  → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 225  See, e.g., 2.23, and further 3 June 1994, Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Final Document, in UN Doc. A/49/287; 5 October 1994, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries, Communiqué, in UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 14-15. 226  Malaysia confirmed this statement on 13 November 1995 in UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 11-13. 227  → 3.3.17 for Kenya’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.2.19 for Kenya’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

304

3  “ The most productive time ”

many States as possible are given the opportunity to present their candidature for election. The procedure for the nomination of permanent and non-permanent members should be reserved for regional groups, with elections carried out by the Assembly, as has been the practice for the non-permanent seats. At the same time, we are of the view that the length of permanent membership needs to be pegged to a specific term in such a way that periodic reviews are carried out at the end of that fixed term, with the possibility of new permanent members being elected to replace the old ones. […] 3.2.2.3.11 14 November 1995, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 7-8228 […] I wish to associate myself fully with the statement made by the representative of Colombia on behalf of the non-aligned countries,229 and I should like to share some of my own thoughts with the Assembly. Any reform of the Security Council should be guided by the principles of democratization, sovereign equality of countries and equitable geographic distribution. It should involve a revision of the composition and size of the Security Council, as well as of its practices and working methods, two aspects that are complementary. The revision of the composition and size of the Security Council, affecting permanent and non-permanent members alike, is imperative given the new global economic and political realities. In the light of these new realities, Japan and Germany are claiming – understandably so – a permanent seat. These same realities entitle the developing countries to their proper place in the Council, a place justified by the part they play in international affairs. This restructuring must be undertaken in a spirit of democratization and legitimization so as to correct the regional imbalance within that body. Three regions are inadequately represented in the Security Council. In that light, Africa, which represents a third of the world’s population and accounts for the majority of States Members of the Organization, should be granted two permanent seats. Those seats would be assigned on the basis of a system of rotation and according to criteria established by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council must be based solely on the criteria spelt out by the Charter, namely, contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, along with equitable geographic representation. […] 3.2.2.3.12 14 November 1995, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 12-14230 […] I wish to state that Egypt supports the statement of the representative of Colombia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement,231 since our position is based on the following: 228  → 3.4.3.17 for Tunisia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 229  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20. For the Final Document, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 230  → 3.4.3.18 for Egypt’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 231  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20. For the Final Document, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

3  “ The most productive time ”

305

First, any increase in the Council’s membership must be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality among States, with a view to imbuing the work of the Council with greater legitimacy and credibility. Secondly, there is a need to address the imbalance caused by the under-representation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Security Council. Thirdly, it is important to undertake a periodic review of the questions agreed upon. Fourthly, there is a need to review the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the general membership of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, with a view to enhancing the transparency of the Council’s work and the participation of non-member States in decision-making. Fifthly, the Working Group must address in a parallel and interconnected manner the questions of increase in membership and development of the Council’s work and accord them the same degree of attention. The increase in the membership of the Security Council should not lead to an increase in the number of permanent seats for developed States at the expense of the developing countries. What is needed now is creating the desired balance in the Council’s composition. This will be achieved only through the addition of a number of developing States whose ability to shoulder their new responsibilities has been demonstrated through the contributions they have made and the role they have played at the regional and international levels. As my Foreign Minister said earlier this session, Egypt’s role, inter alia in the Arab, African, Middle Eastern and non-aligned frameworks, and its continued international contribution in support of United Nations activities, qualify it to shoulder its responsibilities in a new Security Council with an increased membership and balanced representation of all regions. We turn next to the optimal method for agreeing on criteria for increasing the Council’s membership. The delegation of Egypt considers that this requires us to be absolutely realistic so that we may accurately reflect the realities of our contemporary world. There are certain States that perform an active international role and there are others that bear a burden of regional responsibilities which varies from one region to the other. At the same time, due account must be taken of the principle of sovereign equality to ensure that there are equal opportunities to attain membership of a new Security Council in a democratic framework. In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of Egypt considers that applying the criterion of realism requires discussion of the views concerning the addition of a number of seats to be rotated among a certain number of States from each region. Such ideas afford a larger number of Member States the opportunity of sharing the responsibilities of Council membership in rotation, in every region and thereby consolidate the Council’s role and reaffirm its credibility. […] […] So long as the definition of the scope of the veto remains unclear, it will be unacceptable to grant such broad undefined powers to any other member. […] 3.2.2.3.13 14 November 1995, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 6-7 […] We all agree that there must be an increase in the membership of the Security Council. The questions confronting us are: by how many and in which categories?

306

3  “ The most productive time ”

South Africa fully endorses the views of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the increase should be both in the permanent and in the non-permanent categories. We believe that should there be an enlargement of the permanent membership of the Security Council, it should be based on the principles of equitable geographical representation. It should be up to the region concerned to select the countries that should fill those seats. In other words, any increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council by the addition of countries from the developed world must be balanced by the addition of countries from the developing world. The size of any enlargement of the Security Council, taking into account the aforementioned principles, should not exceed a number beyond which the effective functioning of the Council is impaired. Any new permanent members added to the Security Council should have all the rights, privileges and responsibilities associated with permanent membership. […] 3.2.2.3.14 28 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group232 Rotating Seats, Semi-Permanent Seats, Regional Seats: General Remarks […] 6. After all, it seems that shared seats would be a new category of seats extremely difficult to handle in practice. Special seats are neither fairer nor more harmonic than increases in both the traditional categories. They raise more questions than they promise to solve. This does not mean that ideas of special seat systems must not work at all. Some Member States have suggested – without specifying details – an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats plus regional rotation systems. One example is the proposal of the Nordic Countries contained in the Compendium, which reads: “Regional groups should be encouraged to establish equitable systems of rotation for non-permanent members.”233 This proposal would strengthen the regional influence on the composition of the Council which is an aspect that in my delegation’s view deserves further consideration. Regional, not exclusive rotation systems, could also serve as an option for those regions which are attributed a permanent seat, but prefer sharing it. […] […]

3.2.2.3.15 March 1996, France, Non-Paper234

(e) Les formules de roulement sur une base régionale nous paraissent donc fournir une option intéressante pour ceux des sièges permanents qui ne pourraient, faute d’une majorité suffisante, être attribués à des Etats nommément désignés. […]

232  → 3.2.2.4.5 for Germany’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 233  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 234  → 3.2.1.1.32 for France’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

307

3.2.2.3.16 25 March 1996, Norway, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII, pp. 84-86235

[…] 9. With regard to the three new permanent seats for the developing countries, discussions in this Working Group so far indicate, in our view, that one realistic option would be a regionally based rotational system, establishing permanent regional rotating seats. 10. Within the framework we suggest, it would be for the countries in the regions to decide how their new permanent seat should be allocated. This could be to one single country; it could be to a few countries on a rotational basis; or it could be on another basis the region might choose, the principle remaining that each region decide for itself. Within the framework we suggest, it would be for the countries in the regions to decide how their new permanent seat should be allocated. This could be to one single country; it could be to a few countries on a rotational basis; or it could be on another basis the region might choose, the principle remaining that each region decide for itself. […] 3.2.2.3.17 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group236

[…] Many Member States have indicated their support for the addition of a few countries with readiness and capacity to shoulder global responsibilities as permanent members. With a view to strengthening the Council in its effectiveness, in addition, support has also been expressed for an expanded permanent membership that would also include countries from the newly emerging regions of the world. Japan would welcome such a development that as an essential element for realizing greater legitimacy for the Council. I note with interest in this connection the proposals made by several representatives during the recent and current rounds of discussions to establish regional rotating permanent seats. I believe that this proposal deserves serious consideration as a possible option to solve a number of thorny problems, which at present stand in our way toward attaining a comprehensive reform plan. […] 3.2.2.3.18  28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group237

[…] Our position remains that, in this expanded Council there should be permanent seats for Japan and Germany and additional seats for Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. As to the nature of those additional seats, we remain open-minded, although the views of the regions themselves will clearly be important. In this context, 235  → 3.2.1.1.35 for Norway’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 236  → 3.2.1.1.36 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.3.22 for Japan’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.4.2 for Japan’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 237  → 3.3.24 for the United Kingdom’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

308

3  “ The most productive time ”

we think that the discussion at our last meeting on rotational arrangements was a rewarding one. It helped demonstrate the variety of possible rotational arrangements, including schemes offering more permanent representation for the regions of the developing world. […] 3.2.2.3.19 3 July 1996, Malaysia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVI, pp. 80-83238

[…] II. CONCEPT OF PERMANENT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION 6. Permanent regional representation is a form of representation in the Security Council where a number of members represent a specific geographical region. Essentially the proposal seeks to address the need for an equitable and balanced geographical representation. 7. In political and economic context, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are regions of developing countries. These three regions require permanent representation. It is also conceivable that the industrialized countries are an identifiable region. Japan and Germany are in that group. 8. It is proposed that each developing region be allocated two seats. Each seat will clearly represent countries of the region and not purely that of a country. 9. A regional mechanism will decide on how the seats are to be allocated. The right of any country in a region to serve in the permanent seat is always maintained. In practice selection will take into account important factors such as contribution to United Nations efforts, such as peace-keeping, upholding universal values, including human rights, size, population, global involvement and capacity to pay. Regional permanent members together with other members in the region will share the financial costs of regional representation in the Security Council. 10. The representatives will continue to represent the region until other countries in the region are chosen in replacement. […] 18. It is important to emphasize that each developing region be given two seats to balance a Council that will be overloaded with industrialized countries if Japan and Germany are admitted. With 8 new permanent members and 5 existing and 10 existing non-permanent, it would alone total 23; and there should be 7 new non-permanent making a total of 30 members. 19. Thirty members out of 185 countries is not large. The Council can act effectively with 30 members. […] 3.2.2.3.20 29 October 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 5-7239 […] The recent discussions have focused on how to determine who should have access to the three new permanent seats for the South. In this context, we have noticed that 238  → 3.4.3.29 for Malaysia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 239  → 3.3.30 for Germany’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

309

quite a number of Member States who have expressed support for the creation of new permanent seats have also mentioned the Italian proposal.240 This may be understood as a desire to combine the principles of permanent regional representation and rotation, leading to permanent regional rotating seats. This is one possible solution to the problem of selecting permanent members from the three regions I mentioned. […] 3.2.2.3.21 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20241 […] In this regard, I recall the positions presented to the Working Group by the Non-Aligned Movement,242 as well as by the African group.243 As an active member of those two groups, I can only but reiterate the position already eloquently and succinctly presented to the Working Group by the groups, both of which have presented concrete proposals. […] The question of the distribution of permanent and non-permanent seats must be reconsidered in view of the important role that the Security Council continues to play in international peace and security, taking into account that most conflicts are now concentrated in developing countries. There is no more justification for the continuation of a situation in which at least two continents are not represented in the permanent membership. In this regard, Africa has made a case for at least two permanent seats in the Council. There is also a need to address the question of an expansion of the non-permanent membership to give greater meaning to equitable geographical distribution. In order to agree on the distribution of seats, it is important that agreement be reached on the overall size of the Council. The figure of 25 is the very minimum that would ensure equitable distribution. This is the only way that could enable us to address the existing imbalance in the Council, where four out of five permanent members now present virtually the same form of civilization. There is no more justification for Africa and Latin American and the Caribbean not being represented in the permanent membership. The African common position makes it clear that seats allocated to the regional groups should be subject to nomination by their respective regions for eventual election by the General Assembly. We are of the considered opinion that members of the Security Council must, individually and collectively, act in the collective interest of international peace and security and not on the basis of their own narrow national interests. The principle of regional seats would, in our view, go a long way towards ensuring this. Whereas it is imperative that consideration be given to a country’s contribution to international peace and security, we are of the view that a criterion based purely on factors such as the size, power, population or even wealth of a nation would be flawed since none of these factors is static. The new arrangements must therefore have the

240  → 3.2.2.2.8 and 3.2.2.2.20. 241  → 3.4.3.33 for Kenya’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 242  → 3.4.3.22. 243  → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10.

310

3  “ The most productive time ”

intrinsic capacity to be regularly reviewed to reflect the changing realities of international power relations. […] 3.2.2.3.22 30 October 1996, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 6-8 […] The main question, however, remains whether the expansion of the size of the Security Council should take place only in the category of non-permanent seats or should encompass both permanent and non-permanent seats. While the opinions on this question remain divided, it is important to note that innovative approaches have been suggested and are mentioned in paragraph 27 of the report before us.244 We support the proposal for two regional permanent seats for Africa proposed in the African common position,245 and we noted that in his statement yesterday,246 the Permanent Representative of Kenya emphasized the importance of that proposal. We think that this proposal should be given particularly careful attention at a subsequent stage of the work on the reform of the Security Council. We also believe that other proposals of this kind should be studied with a view to ascertaining to what extent the concept of regional rotation can meet the needs of different regions. […] 3.2.2.3.23 30 October 1996, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 13-15247

[…] My delegation would also like to associate itself with the statement made by the delegation of Colombia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.248 The Movement has made concrete proposals on all aspects of the reform and restructuring of the Security Council, which we hope will be a positive contribution to the building of consensus on this vital issue. […] Only a month ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe addressed the fifty-first session of the General Assembly and reiterated the urgent need to ensure that developing countries are adequately represented in the permanent category. The Minister stated: We in Africa maintain that the present arrangement where Africa and Latin America have no permanent representatives on the Security Council, while Asia has only one, is unjust and antidemocratic and must not be allowed to continue. Those three regions should each have at least two permanent seats, with incumbents enjoying the same rights and privileges as the present permanent members. Additional nonpermanent seats should also be allocated to each of those regions so as to ensure equitable geographical representation proportional to the numerical strength of 244  3 1 January 1997, UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, p. 8 (originally issued as UN Doc. A/50/47 on 13 September 1996). 245  → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 246  29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.21. 247  → 3.4.3.34 for Zimbabwe’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 248  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 23-24.

3  “ The most productive time ”

311

each region in this Organization. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 10th meeting, p. 17) As is evident from that quotation, Zimbabwe is committed to the common African position,249 as clearly stated by the Organization of African Unity. It is inconceivable that, in an era when the virtues of democracy and good governance at the national level are being preached, such democracy is not applied at the level of the United Nations and that an entire continent of 54 Member States is not represented in the Security Council in the permanent category. A Council where all regions are equitably represented will, no doubt, not only enhance the credibility and legitimacy of one of the principal organs of the United Nations, but also enhance the credibility of those who champion the ideals of democracy in human relations. […] 3.2.2.3.24 30 October 1996, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 21-23 Egypt supports the statement made by the representative of Colombia on behalf of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.250 […] Our paper also makes it clear that we must correct the imbalance that exists in the Council at present, which is to the detriment of the representation of the States of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, it is absolutely necessary to respect the principle of equitable geographic distribution and the sovereign equality of Member States. That is why the Non-Aligned Movement has declared that any predetermined selection of States that is to the detriment of the non-aligned countries or the developing countries would be unacceptable. […] Egypt believes that, if we are to implement all of these criteria realistically, we must consider creating new seats for a restricted number of States from each region. Such an arrangement could allow the largest possible number of States to play a role within the Security Council. Egypt has also raised the idea of rotation within each region and, in this context, would like to address the question of the consensus that prevails in the Organization of African Unity on Africa’s right to hold two permanent seats on the renewed Security Council. […] 3.2.2.3.25 30 October 1996, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 2-3251 […] I also wish to endorse the statement made by the Ambassador of Colombia on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.252 […] Although, owing to what we view as an exaggerated – to say the least – regard for balance, the report gives the same weight to all the proposals submitted during the course of the Group’s work, we feel that among them there are some that deserve special attention. I refer to the notion of rotating permanent regional seats. That proposal 249  → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 250  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 23-24. 251  → 3.2.1.1.47 for Tunisia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 252  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 23-24.

312

3  “ The most productive time ”

is not only supported by its sponsors and the countries members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which are using it as a basis for claiming two permanent seats for Africa, but by many other countries as well. It is at the origin of other proposals along the same lines, which gives it a more generalized scope that affects other regions. Many believe that this proposal affords a real opportunity for the participation, for the first time, of the developing countries in a club that has heretofore been closed to them. […] The concept of rotating permanent regional representation, as developed by Tunisia over the past three years, seems to us best to respond to the new realities of our world, a feature of which is the emergence of regional groupings. The Charter of the United Nations itself encourages regional efforts in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Let us not forget that the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the United Nations. In other words, in their decisions the members of the Security Council must take into account the collective interest. We believe that this interest would be better served by the formula that we advocate. The system of periodic elections of the permanent members that this proposal would establish – the candidate being first selected by its region and then endorsed by the General Assembly – would make the decisions of the Council less dependent on the strictly national interests of those members. Looking further forward, all permanent members should be nominated by their respective regions and elected by the General Assembly. […] 3.2.2.3.26 30 October 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 3-5253 […] First, in order to ensure the Council’s effectiveness, a limited increase in its permanent membership should be realized through the inclusion of countries – both developed and developing – which have both the capacity and the willingness to assume global responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. As to the modality for the permanent representation of the developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, I am of the view that this might be left to the regions themselves to determine. A rotational representation system might, as an interim arrangement, provide a realistic solution. […] 3.2.2.3.27 30 October 1996, Sudan, Mr. Erwa, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 17-19 […] In this regard my delegation agrees with the Malaysian proposal254 for an increase in the membership of the Council on a regional basis, with each region choosing its representative according to set criteria. In this way, the primary role of those States would be to represent their regions. Such a proposal, which would put an end to the practices of some States, which seem to believe that their membership in the Council is an honour attaching to them alone, and which do not even bother to consult with other States of the region they represent. […] 253  → 3.2.1.1.48 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 254  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19.

3  “ The most productive time ”

313

3.2.2.3.28 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8255 […] The foregoing is not to suggest that there were no positive developments in our deliberations during the past year. For example, the notion of a so-called “quick fix” under any guise has been put to rest. It is inequitable and politically unacceptable, and I am certain that even the potential beneficiaries of such an arrangement would be uncomfortable with such an outcome. Similarly, the concept of rotational permanent seats, even on a regional basis for developing countries, has not found favour with all Member States. There is therefore the need to revisit the concept. […] Concerning the composition and size of the Council, my delegation continues to assert that the current anomaly of non-African representation in the permanent membership category deserves urgent correction, for the continent has not only the largest number of United Nations Member States, but those States, collectively, constitute almost one third of the United Nations general membership. In this context, the collective decision of Africa to have a two-seat representation in the permanent membership category deserves the full support of all Member States. We would, however, wish to clarify that the modalities of that representation should be left to Africa. The Charter recognizes two categories of membership. We believe that the proposed increases should therefore be in these two categories, permanent and non-permanent membership, without discrimination between the powers of the old permanent members and the new ones. All permanent members should enjoy the same rights and powers and assume the responsibilities incumbent on membership. Besides, the Charter provisions should not be amended solely to serve a short term purpose. […] 3.2.2.3.29 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59256 HARARE DECLARATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL*1 We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in our thirty-third ordinary session at Harare from 2 to 4 June 1997, Reaffirming the Declaration we adopted at Tunis at the thirtieth ordinary session of our Assembly, on the reform of the United Nations Security Council, Reiterating the need to democratize the Security Council and make it more efficient and transparent, Convinced of the necessity to enlarge the composition of the Security Council and reform its decision-making process,

255  → 3.2.2.4.11 for Nigeria’s position against new categories of seats, and 3.4.3.39 for Nigeria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 256  The Harare Declaration was later also published as an appendix to Annex XIII in UN Doc. A/53/47, pp. 54-55.

314

3  “ The most productive time ”

Stressing the imperative need for ensuring equitable geographical representation in the Security Council, Recognizing the collective responsibility of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, Declare as follows: 1. The composition of the Security Council should be democratized to reflect the increase in the number of States Members of the United Nations; 2. The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. This expansion of the Security Council should embrace both categories of its membership, for the benefit of developing countries, and African countries in particular; (a) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats. These seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of Africans themselves, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the Organization of African Unity and subsequent elements which might improve upon these criteria; (b) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council; 3. New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as the current members. Ultimately, the permanent members should also be nominated by their respective regions and elected by the General Assembly. Such a system of periodic elections of permanent members of the Security Council, will in the final analysis ensure that the decisions of the Council are less subject to the strictly national interests of its various members; 4. It is necessary to strengthen the transparency of the Security Council, improve upon its functioning, methods of work, decision-making process and relations with States non-members of the Council. We endorse the measures proposed in the relevant document of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at New Delhi on 8 April 1997;257 5. A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security; 6. By adopting these decisions, we reaffirm that: (a) Efforts aimed at restructuring the Security Council should not be subjected to a pre-determined timetable. While we recognize the need to deal with the issue as a matter of urgency, no decision should be taken before a general agreement has been reached. (b) The same importance should be accorded to the enlargement of the composition of the Security Council and improvement in its method of work; (c) The exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated; 7. In pursuit of the above, we: (a) Direct the Group of African States at the United Nations to continue to consider in detail the proposals submitted to the Open-ended Working Group on the

257  → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44 (dated 27 June 1997).

3  “ The most productive time ”

315

restructuring of the Security Council in order to arrive at a general agreement which takes into account the interests of Africa; (b) Mandate our Permanent Representatives at the United Nations in New York to continue to defend the African common position and examine in greater detail the concept and modalities of rotation as well as its application to the permanent seats; 8. Finally, we request our Ministers for Foreign Affairs to remain seized of the matter and its developments. Original footnote Adopted at the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Harare from 2 to 4 June 1997.

*1

3.2.2.3.30 9 July 1997, Group of Arab States, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex VIII, pp. 30-31 GROUP OF ARAB STATES: WORKING PAPER ON INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND REFORM OF ITS WORKING METHODS 1. The States members of the Group of Arab States, in common with all other Member States, are extremely interested in the issue of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. They believe that the maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility which calls for the active and tireless participation of all. The Group of Arab States wishes to play an effective role and to increase its participation in this regard. 2. The Group of Arab States considers that the process of increasing the membership of the Security Council and the reform of its working methods and decision-making process are complementary, and should be carried out with complete transparency. The process should result in a Security Council which represents Member States fairly and works effectively on their behalf. The Group supports the position adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to the issue of the increase in the membership and reform of the Security Council.258 3. The 21 Arab States Members of the United Nations represent approximately 12 per cent of the total number of States Members. Pursuant to resolution 5336/100 adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 21 September 1993, the Arab States would like to put forward their views on the following issues: A. Increase in the membership of the Security Council 4. The Arab States are in favour of an increase in the membership of the Security Council that respects the principles of equitable geographical representation and the sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations. In accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Group of Arab States requests the following: 258  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14; 18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14.

316

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) The allocation to the Group of at least two non-permanent seats on the Security Council; (b) In the event of an increase in the number of permanent Security Council seats, the allocation to the Group of Arab States of a permanent seat with full privileges.259 This seat would rotate among the Arab States in accordance with the usual practice in the League of Arab States. The Group of Arab States affirms that this request would be implemented in consultation with the African and Asian regional groups, and with their understanding; (c) The Group of Arab States stresses the need to maintain the procedure for electing non-permanent members of the Security Council, in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. […] C. Periodic review 6. The Group of Arab States believes that a conference should be held in order to review the Charter of the United Nations 10 years after the entry into force of the amendments to it. The review process should not be subject to use of the power of veto. 3.2.2.3.31 3 October 1997, Jordan, Mr. Tarawneh, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 6-11 […] There are many useful and feasible concepts that have appeared in the context of reform. What has been lacking so far is the collective political will to translate these concepts into reality. In this regard, Jordan feels that any new restructuring of the Security Council must take into account the representation of the developing countries throughout the globe. We feel that the Arab Group, in view of its major and effective role, is entitled to a permanent seat on the Security Council. […] 3.2.2.3.32 5 December 1997, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 2-3 […] Expansion in both categories is essential to meet the needs and views of a vast majority and wide range of Member States. It is also essential to maintain a balanced ratio between the two categories of the Council’s membership. In this regard, I wish to seize this opportunity to reiterate Africa’s strong position260 that it should be allocated no less than two permanent seats, to be allotted to countries by a decision of the Africans themselves, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the OAU and subsequent elements which might improve upon these criteria. Africa should also be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. These are not outrageous demands. These are

259  The Group of Arab States confirmed this position in a letter dated 13 June 2008 by the Permanent Representative of Mauritania in his capacity as chairman of the Arab Group (UN Doc. A/62/47, Annex II, p. 37), and in a letter dated 12 January 2010 by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Oman in his capacity as chairman of the Arab Group (→ 5.2.2.3.8). 260  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29.

3  “ The most productive time ”

317

reasonable demands based on the principle of democratic representativity on a proportional basis among the regions. Furthermore, and in order not to perpetuate differences and discrimination among members of the Security Council, particularly in the permanent category, it is Africa’s principled and cardinal position that the new permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers, including the power of veto, as the current members now enjoy. This is based on the principles of non-discrimination and sovereign equality of Member States. A major flaw in the Razali proposals261 is that they are not guided by these cardinal principles. […] 3.2.2.3.33 5 December 1997, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 22-23262 […] Our views for the achievement of equitable geographical representation in the Council have been clearly defined in the Non-Aligned Movement’s statements and working papers presented to the Open-ended Working Group263 entrusted by this Assembly with the mandate to consider and report on all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. These views were reiterated only yesterday by the Permanent Representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the States members of the Non-Aligned Movement.264 The Movement has called for an increase in the Council’s membership by not less than 11 seats. This additional number is fair and reasonable and can accommodate the legitimate claims of all regions of the world to be represented in the all-important body entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The expansion of both the permanent and the non-permanent categories of the Council, as recommended by the Non-Aligned Movement and several other delegations, will go a long way towards meeting our objectives and responding to the requirements of the vast majority of Member States. It is only through the expansion proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement that the views expounded by the vast majority of Member States can be accommodated without impairing the efficiency of the Council. We also wish to reaffirm the subscription of our country to the common African position265 which calls for the allocation of two permanent rotating seats to the continent, with the same prerogatives and privileges as are accorded to all other permanent members, old and new. In this connection, the Organization should avoid the creation of a new underprivileged class, as this can only mask the problem we are seeking to address. […] 261  20 March 1997, → 3.1.10. 262  → 3.4.3.53 for Ghana’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 263  See, e.g., the statements of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14, and of 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 nd 3.4.3.44. 264  4 December 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 4-5. 265  See, e.g., the statements of 29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10; and of 27 June 1997 (Harare Declaration), → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21.

318

3  “ The most productive time ”

The proposal for a periodic review of the composition of the Council has great merit and deserves serious consideration. Such periodic review, with the possibility of replacing non-performing members or any member, as may be decided by its regional constituents, would enhance accountability and make the Council more responsive to the needs and interests of the international community at large. We wholeheartedly subscribe to this proposal. […] 3.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 3.2.2.4.1 29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, in UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/ CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27266 UNITED NATIONS REFORM African common position*1 Equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council […] 37. Africa rejects both the concept of a third category of so-called “semi-permanent members” and the proposal for a pool of some 20 countries from which the actors would be recruited on a rotational basis. […] Original footnote *1 Extract from Organization of African Unity Document NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2 of 29 September 1994. 3.2.2.4.2 13 October 1994, Germany, Mr. Graf zu Rantzau, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 18-19267

[…] Proposals to introduce a third category of semi-permanent seats, would, in our view, not improve the chances for the large majority of Member States to serve more often on the Council. In addition, such a proposal would widen the gap between permanent and non-permanent members. It would marginalize the role and potential of a majority of the other countries to influence the Council’s decisions. In the League of Nations, a system of several classes did not work. We cannot support such proposals. What is needed is not greater division but more homogeneity among the members of the Council. […]

266  → 3.2.2.3.5 for the Organization of African Unity’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.2.10 for the Organization’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 267  → 3.2.1.1.18 for Germany’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

319

3.2.2.4.3 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965268 […] [68] 3. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia269 A/AC.247/5 (c) [Original: English] [9 May 1995] Discussion paper […] [69] […] 3. Other categories of membership 9. An increase in membership should take place within the framework of the current distinction between permanent and non-permanent; special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established. […] [71] 3.2.2.4.4 13 November 1995, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 18-19270 […] I should also like to take this opportunity to recall that the Charter designates the permanent members to exercise global responsibilities on behalf of all the Members of the Organization. There is no question of their drawing their legitimacy from any regional mandate whatever. For that reason, in particular, the idea of “regional permanent seats” seems to us to lend itself to controversy. Indeed, we do not think that the idea of semi-permanent members was broadly supported within the Working Group. Moreover, we have reservations as to the idea that the choice of Council members should be removed from the General Assembly and left to the discretion of regional groups. In fact, this idea is not in keeping with the rule that States must be accountable to the entire Assembly for the way in which they carry out their responsibilities. […]

268  → 3.2.1.1.25 for the statements included in the Compendium supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.1.3.5 for the statements focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, 3.2.2.2.14 for the statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and semi-permanent seats, 3.2.3.12 for the statements not supporting a specific category, 3.3.14 for the statements on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.12 for the statements on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto. 269  → 3.2.1.1.25 for these states’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.3.14 for their position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.12 for their position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 270  → 3.2.1.1.29 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

320

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.4.5 28 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group Rotating Seats, Semi-Permanent Seats, Regional Seats: General Remarks […] 3. “Semi-permanent” or “special” seats cannot be considered to be fairer than other seats. Introducing a system of special seats means giving 20, 30 or 40 shareholders the privilege to sit more frequently on the Council than other countries: a) This new category would simply institutionalize the advantages that larger countries have had in the past when they were more often represented on the SC than smaller countries. It would mean: Cementing de facto structures. From now on, larger countries would have an explicit right to more frequent election, to the disadvantage of the 79 Member States which have not served at all and of the 44 Member States which have served only once on the SC. All these countries would by definition become third class Members. We wonder if they are really interested in obtaining this status. b) Access for smaller countries to non-permanent seats would not be “greatly facilitated” by eliminating rivalry of mid-size powers. First: There will again be a similar and natural rivalry among the remaining candidates for non-permanent seats. Secondly: If the SC is increased by 10 seats shared by 30 Member States, the remaining 150 Member States will compete for 10 regular non-permanent seats. This ratio of 15:1 means theoretically one seat on the SC every 30 years. Under the existing circumstances, 180 Member States compete for 10 non-permanent seats. The ratio of 18:1 leads theoretically to a seat every 36 years. Does a theoretical difference of 6 years (as an example: a country which has never served in the SC would join it in the year 2026 instead of 2032) mean a “great facilitation” or “greater democracy”? Can this difference compensate a whole region and its Member States for not being permanently represented on the SC? c) Special seats would downgrade non-permanent members. So far, non-permanent members are the majority in the SC (10:5). In a system of special seats, links between permanent members with semi-permanent members would be automatically closer than those with non-permanent members. Non-permanent members would become a minority vis-à-vis combined permanent- and semi-permanent members (10:15). d) Finally, it is hard to see which criteria could be established to entitle certain Member States to shared seats. There seems to be no fair or objective method which would allow an entire group of 20, 30 or 40 Member States to enjoy more privileges than the remaining 140 to 160 Member States. 4. Many questions remain unanswered regarding the contributions of semipermanent members to peace-keeping burdens: – Will the semi-permanent countries, according to the principle of special financial responsibility, be assessed a surcharge for peace-keeping operations? Will this surcharge apply whether a semi-permanent Member State occupies the seat on the SC or not? – Will the financial burden of the 20, 30 or 40 semi-permanent members correspond to the burden of the five permanent members?

3  “ The most productive time ”

321

– Will semi-permanent Member States be selected according to their capacity to pay increased contributions for peace-keeping operations? – Can the peace-keeping contributions of semi-permanent members realistically equal the contributions of possible new permanent members? 5. Other questions arise regarding the election of semi-permanent members – What happens, if a semi-permanent state is not elected by the GA? Does one of the remaining shareholders take the seat or does the seat become vacant or non-permanent? – What happens if more than one semi-permanent member is not elected? Does the remaining shareholder then become a “quasi-permanent” member? – Can a non-elected Member State compete for a seat of the third category, i.e. a seat of those countries which do not participate in the special seat system? – Are Member States allowed to refuse special seats and instead compete for the other seats? 6. After all, it seems that shared seats would be a new category of seats extremely difficult to handle in practice. Special seats are neither fairer nor more harmonic than increases in both the traditional categories. They raise more questions than they promise to solve. This does not mean that ideas of special seat systems must not work at all. Some Member States have suggested – without specifying details – an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats plus regional rotation systems. One example is the proposal of the Nordic Countries contained in the Compendium, which reads: Regional groups should be encouraged to establish equitable systems of rotation for non-permanent members.271 This proposal would strengthen the regional influence on the composition of the Council which is an aspect that in my delegation’s view deserves further consideration. Regional, not exclusive rotation systems, could also serve as an option for those regions which are attributed a permanent seat, but prefer sharing it. 3.2.2.4.6 29 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group272 Observations concerning the Submissions by Belize,273 Italy,274 Mexico,275 the Nordic Countries276 and Turkey277 I would like to add some remarks to yesterdays’ discussions, which in my view were remarkably frank and useful. To my feeling, they have shown three things: 1) If you look closer to semi-permanent or frequent rotation models, they are less promising than at 271  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 272  → 3.4.3.21 for Germany’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 273  18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12; 1 February 1996, → 3.2.3.20. 274  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 275  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.10; 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.16. 276  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 277  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.11; 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14.

322

3  “ The most productive time ”

a first glance, 2) They offer neither to the regions nor to smaller countries accountable advantages, 3) They let basic questions unanswered. […] My delegation firmly believes that this new category of special seats does not solve our problem. As far as the word “shareholder” is concerned, I don’t understand the excitement about it. It describes exactly what is the gist of the creation of the new category of rotating or semi-permanent seats: as sovereign a member country may be, it would not have a seat of its own; it would have to share a seat. And that is what, mustering all my knowledge of the English language, I shall continue to call “shareholding”. The Italian and the Turkish model do not differ very much in substance. I don’t want to repeat my general remarks of yesterday, but I could sum up what are in my view the basic defaults of these special seats as follows: – They exclude additional permanent seats, a feature which we and many others feel important – Would create new privileges (24-30 seat sharing countries) – No substantial advantages for remaining 150 Member States; some Member States speak even of “marginalisation” of smaller states – No convincing criteria for drawing the line between 30 privileged and 150 regular members – A lot of unanswered questions linked with financial contributions and elections The Turkish proposal to increase the number of members occupying special seats to 40 would make it even more difficult to justify their privileges compared to the remaining “ordinary” Member States. Let me mention in this context, that one delegation has submitted yesterday a tentative list of objective criteria which could be applied to semi-permanent seat-candidates. This list seems to be carefully elaborated and the intent deserves applause. However, it shows very clearly, how extremely difficult it would be to define which country would be included and who would not be. I do not see how this difficulty could ever be overcome. Coming back to the Turkish idea of introducing new regional groups, this idea seems to be an interesting one, but it would certainly lead to new problems of distributing seats and balancing regional interests. An analysis of the Mexican proposal shows that this model does not change the number of permanent members. In this respect, it misses the chance – as do the Italian and Turkish proposals – to increase the small number of permanent members and to adapt it to today’s realities and a better representation of the regions. – The proposal reflects better the weight and standing of my country than other seat-sharing models. It is difficult to see, however, why a permanent seat for Germany is refused, but a seat every two years would be acceptable. – An advantage of the Mexican proposal would be that it avoids to create a completely new category of 20-40 rotating Member States at the expense of the remaining smaller countries. – However, the rotation between an Asian and a Western European Country is not coherent with the overall system of geographical distribution of seats in the SC. – The proposal does not seem to be fair to Eastern European Countries, which deserve 2 non-permanent seats, and should not be obliged to share one of their seats with another regional group.

3  “ The most productive time ”

323

– An increase of 5 new seats does not seem to be enough to reflect the new realities and the increase in the membership since the last increase in 1963. As to the model proposed by Belize, our main observations are: – The proposal offers an interesting, rather unorthodox approach. The proposal in the Compendium278 has been amended by the proposal suggested by Belize in the last Meeting of the Working Group on February 1, 1996.279 The main disadvantage of both proposals is probably their often technical and sometimes maybe unrealistic approach. – It does not seem appropriate to speak of permanent or “indefinite” members, if these are only elected for a term of five years. – The overall number of 33 seats is likely to harm the efficiency of the work of the SC. Given the character of the UN as an intergovernmental body, SC seats should not be given to agencies but only to states. – The model of Belize foresees permanent membership for countries which qualify on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the UN. This seems to be a realistic approach which should be seriously taken into account when discussing an increase of the traditional category of permanent seats in other proposals. […] An analysis of the model of the Nordic countries shows a lot of positive ideas, such as – Balanced and appropriate increase in permanent membership. – The ratio between non-permanent and permanent seats is fair. – The idea of regions establishing their own regional seat system is a very interesting one. […] 3.2.2.4.7 25 March 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group TALKING POINTS ON: PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE VETO […] 5. Our Charter recognizes two categories of Security Council members, permanent and non-permanent. The two attributes of the permanent member category are indefinite participation in the Council’s activity, and the prerogatives outlined in Article 27, more commonly known as the veto. Is it realistically within our reach to contemplate their elimination within the context of the U.N.’s 50th anniversary? 6. The simple answer is no. The question that remains then is, are there other alternatives that would bring us closer to our objective of creating a more equitably constituted, more representative, more legitimate Security Council? The answer, of course, is in the affirmative. In examining such alternatives, however, we must not embark in directions that will either leave us with less than satisfactory results in terms of fulfilling our mandate, or compound present imbalances in the Council’s structure with additional ones, in absolute contradiction with aims we’ve established for ourselves. 278  1 8 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12. 279  → 3.2.3.20.

324

3  “ The most productive time ”

7. What do I mean by less than satisfactory results? There is no disagreement that an expansion in the non-permanent membership of the Council is desirable. But representation in that category is to a large extent already equitable, even if some adjustment may be needed. It is therefore insufficient to expand only the non-permanent member category, and leave the permanent member category under the sign of inequitable representation for another generation. By the time we reopen the debate it might be too late to restore the Council’s credibility, and the concept of collective security may have suffered irreparable erosion. […] 14. But, by the same token, we do not find it justifiable that present imbalances in the permanent membership remain unaddressed. We have not been debating for over two years on how to reform the Council in the context of the post-cold war environment to come to the conclusion that what is needed is a cosmetic adjustment. It is in this respect that the idea of institutionalizing rotation arrangements does not address the crux of our problem. In fact rotation already exists, and there are advantages in keeping rotation flexible as it is at present. Limiting modalities for rotation cannot be considered a solution to the international community’s wish for a more legitimate and representative Security Council. 15. Let me stress the following remarks, Mr. Chairman. I have already indicated why my Delegation is of the view that proposals for expansion in the non-permanent member category only fall short of our objectives. But I wish to add that the selective application of the ideas for rotation, contained in some of those proposals, to the developing world only, coupled with the creation of permanent seats for industrialized countries, is outright discriminatory. This kind of variation of the so-called quick fix approach, can’t be seen as a middle ground or a fall-back position, as it merely revives – under a different guise – the proposal that dissatisfies the greatest number of participants. […] 3.2.2.4.8 27 March 1996, India, Mr. Shah, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group

[…] 5. Mr. Chairman, we have also been encouraged by several statements since Monday morning emphatically rejecting the so-called “quick-fix” solution of making two industrialised countries as permanent members. India, and a large number of Non-aligned countries have repeatedly, and right from the very beginning, rejected the “quickfix” approach. However, Mr. Chairman, we have been disappointed that a number of speakers while proclaiming themselves against “quick-fix” solutions, have in fact made proposals which are nothing less than “quick-fix” solutions by the “back door”. 6. Let me elaborate. Those who loudly opposed “quick-fix”, then went on to suggest that, amongst the new five permanent members, Germany and Japan should automatically be selected, which really is the essence of a “quick-fix”. On the other hand, they want developing countries to submit themselves to a complicated procedure of getting regional endorsement. Some went even further to suggest that the regional endorsement could be for any country, or for a rotational list of countries, regardless of the ability or willingness to contribute to the work of the United Nations in achieving international peace and security. A number of speakers from the developing countries,

3  “ The most productive time ”

325

particularly the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia and Brazil280 have clearly rejected this proposal as impractical and discriminatory. My delegation fully concurs with their views on this subject. Suggestions of this nature which are both discriminatory and are made with the full knowledge that regional endorsement has not been provided in the Charter even for election of non-permanent members, raise the question of motivation of the sponsors. So, Mr. Chairman, what is sought to be achieved? Is it a “quick-fix” by the back door? At the end of the exercise, will they say that they support induction of five new permanent members but since developing countries are divided amongst themselves, let us forget about them and bring Japan and Germany as permanent members in the Security Council, while keeping the issue of developing countries open? 7. Mr. Chairman, my delegation would have shown some understanding if those who spoke in favour of the five new permanent members had stated that all new permanent members should be elected by the General Assembly, as is provided in the UN Charter, and that there should be no pre-selection. My delegation would have understood if it had been stated that all five new permanent members should seek regional endorsement, even though we believe that it would be a dangerous principle to be introduced in the UN Charter. 8. Mr. Chairman, my delegation rejects “quick-fix” whether by the front door or by the back door. My delegation rejects blatantly discriminatory treatment – preferred treatment for industrialized countries and second class treatment for developing countries. My delegation rejects the implication that industrialized countries deserve special treatment. 9. Mr. Chairman, my delegation is willing to work with other member countries and the Bureau in making progress on this issue, but we can only do so as long as we adhere to agreed basic principles. The first basic principle is non-discrimination; second, no increase in the permanent membership without developing countries becoming permanent members; third, equitable representation means geographical, but it also means that permanent membership status cannot be given to the industrialized countries alone. Finally, the criteria for admission as new permanent members, and the procedure of their election, must apply equally, without discrimination and uniformly to all. 10. Mr. Chairman, I am greatly in agreement with what the Permanent Representatives of Germany,281 Brazil282 and Indonesia among others said yesterday about increase in permanent membership. They had cogently, clearly and fairly argued the case for any increase in the permanent membership. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Security Council in the coming years rests squarely on the expansion of permanent membership with the presence of developing countries in it. 11. Mr. Chairman, there has been very substantial support in this group for the proposition that the expansion of the permanent membership should be based on objective criteria that are universally applied to all prospective permanent members. When we support the expansion of the permanent membership, we also support the laying 280  25 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.7. 281  Probably 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33. 282  Probably 25 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.7.

326

3  “ The most productive time ”

down of objective criteria in their selection. The reason is simple. Transparency and fairness demands that we judge everyone by the same yardstick. When delegations talk about preselection of Japan and Germany on the ground that they have capacity and willingness to contribute on a global scale to the maintenance of peace and security, what do they mean? Willingness is easy to express. Capacity and contribution have to be judged on the basis of the size of the country, its prospects, its population, its economic strength, its military capabilities, its scientific and technological achievements, its intellectual and conceptual inputs or initiative for solution of major issues, its contribution to the achievements of the U.N., its contribution in blood, sweat and money to UN Peace Keeping Forces, its industrial growth, its agricultural production, and its active participation in international conferences, etc. It is ironic that those who preselect two industrialised countries, are the most reluctant to indicate, on which of these criteria have they based their judgement. If they do so, we might proceed to lay down a set of objective criteria by which to judge each country’s credentials universally and without discrimination. It does not make sense to assert that X or Y has the capability and willingness to carry out the responsibilities of permanent membership of the Security Council, and then refuse to reveal the basis on which such a decision is arrived at. My delegation is willing to discuss the setting up of the objective criteria, an important aspect of work of this group which unfortunately has been generally ignored by the Bureau in its work programme. 12. Simultaneously with the increase in the permanent membership, Mr. Chairman, my delegation also supports the increase in the non-permanent membership to enable the larger membership in the General Assembly to have an opportunity of being represented in the Security Council more frequently. 13. Mr. Chairman, I will end with some brief thoughts on the question of issue of veto power. Whatever the decision in regard either to keeping of the veto or elimination of the veto, or its curtailment or its regulation of use, my delegation firmly believes that there should be no discrimination between the present permanent members and the new permanent members on this score. […] 3.2.2.4.9 29 October 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 7-9283 […] Prolonged discussions in the Working Group exposed the inherent flaws in proposals that conceived of a regional process for the selection of permanent members from some quarters while exempting two industrialized countries from the same type of selection procedure. The attempted justification for such ideas remains unconvincing. It is said, for example, that there seems to be a lack of agreement in three regions with regard to who should occupy the corresponding permanent seats. Nothing is said of the regional situation of the two particular industrialized countries, although some of the strongest opposition to the idea of permanent membership is to be found precisely in their parts of the world. In our view, the concept of “equitable representation” certainly encompasses the idea of equitable geographic or regional representation. However, it also has other connotations. A body of such limited composition and wide-ranging powers as the 283  → 3.4.3.32 for Brazil’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

327

Security Council must be perceived as legitimate, and for that to be the case it must include, as permanent members, a sample of Member States that is broadly seen as representative of different perspectives. We believe that the regional component must be kept in mind in any plan for reform, but not as a pretext for establishing inequities at the outset of the reform process, in contravention of our very mandate. The selective application of regional procedures for identifying new permanent members, to which I have just referred, is a case in point. Logically, the so-called regional permanent seat – whether as its rotating variant or in some other guise – might have an operational meaning in parts of the world where integration in the fields of foreign policy and defence has advanced substantially. However, if the one region of the world where this is already happening does not feel ready to embrace the regional permanent seat for itself, it is doubtful whether there is a legitimate basis for encouraging others to do so. Furthermore, care should be taken not to confound the informal regional groupings of the United Nations system with regional bodies in the field of international affairs. Let us not forget that the establishment of a common foreign or security policy only comes about, if at all, as one of the last stages in any process of regional integration. Perhaps we will head towards an interregional world with a higher standard of understanding among Governments and peoples in the future; that is certainly desirable. If – or when – that happens, a revision of the basis for representation in the Security Council would be in order. However, for the time being, the truth is that we still live and work in an inter-State world – at least as far as cooperation for the maintenance of peace and security is concerned. The current permanent members of the Security Council have given no indication whatsoever that they think otherwise. […] 3.2.2.4.10 30 October 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 9-11284

[…] The idea of permanent regional representation or permanent regional rotating seats was floated and discussed during the past session of the Working Group as a way of bringing the developing world into permanent membership. However, it allows ONLY the industrialized nations to join permanent membership in the traditional sense, leaving the developing world in a state of great uncertainty. Moreover, given the complex regional dynamics of the developing world, I wonder how such a formula could work. I note several delegations already expressed, rather convincingly, conceptual objections to this apparent oxymoron. It was interesting to hear from the Mexican Ambassador that permanent regional rotating seats are nothing new, and that non-permanent members have all been elected to seats permanently assigned to each region.285 […]

284  → 3.2.1.2.13 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 285  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, p. 16.

328

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.2.4.11 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8286 […] There was also the notion of a concert of medium Powers that would rotate more frequently as non-permanent members of the Security Council. The difficulty with that option relates to the modalities of determining membership of such a group. In any event, it would be tantamount to establishing a third category of membership that is not recognized by the United Nations Charter. My delegation believes that that option should not really be pursued. […] 3.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 3.2.3.1  20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [4] […] […] [11]

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES BAHAMAS*1

[Original: English] [30 June 1993] 1. The “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”, included in the agenda under resolution 47/62 of 11 December 1992,287 is of particular interest to States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and formal comments will be submitted as soon as possible, following the meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government to be held in the Bahamas. 2. It has been agreed, however, that some preliminary views should be submitted to you, taking into account the deadline of 30 June 1993 for the receipt of replies for inclusion in your report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. 3. Permanent Representatives of CARICOM agreed on the need for an increase in the membership of the Security Council in the light of the changing world political environment and its impact on the membership of the United Nations. 4. Further, Permanent Representatives of CARICOM are of the view that discussions on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council should also take into account key aspects of the Council’s decisionmaking process including the veto concept, accountability and transparency, as well as contributions to the United Nations with special emphasis on the financing of peacekeeping operations. […] [18] […]

286  → 3.2.2.3.28 for Nigeria’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.3.39 for Nigeria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 287  → 3.1.1.

329

3  “ The most productive time ” CHINA

[Original: Chinese/English] [30 June 1993]

[…] 2. It is worth noting that the United Nations itself has, in close interaction with the outside world, undergone tremendous metamorphoses since its birth in 1945, with its membership expanded from 51 at its inception to the current total of 183 Member States, most of them being developing countries. It is therefore quite understandable that many a country has put forward various proposals and suggestions regarding the expansion of the Security Council. It is the view of the Chinese Government that there is a need to expand the membership of the Security Council in an appropriate manner when the time is ripe, so that the Council, in keeping pace with the changing situation both inside and outside the United Nations, will carry out its functions in an even more effective and vigorous way in international affairs. In this connection, China welcomes discussions among all the Member States and is prepared to engage in a positive and pragmatic exchange of views with other countries. [19] […] 4. Any measure to reform the Council, including the expansion of its membership, should be guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter and take full account of the need for equitable geographical distribution. […] [29] […] CUBA288

[Original: Spanish] [29 June 1993]

[…] [30] […] 8. Accordingly, in the judgement of the Republic of Cuba, one of the most urgent steps which must be taken to reform the Security Council is to increase the number of Council members, having due and especial regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, which constitutes, beyond all doubt, one of the keystones of the Organization’s activities. Of course, any new distribution of seats that is adopted must necessarily include, within each region’s respective apportionment, all the regional members participating in the work of the Council, whether or not they are permanent or non-permanent members should it be decided that such a classification is to be retained. This would, in practice, be a means of helping to ensure that no region, through the number of its representatives on the Council, exercises power that is disproportionate to its true numerical weight within the total membership of the United Nations. […] 10. One should perhaps consider whether the current permanent members of the Council would not also benefit, in terms of their image and potential authority visà-vis the international community, if their status as members of the Security Council were ratified periodically by all the members of the Organization. This would also provide an important means of measuring the world’s appreciation of their conduct 288  → 3.4.2.3 for Cuba’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

330

3  “ The most productive time ”

of matters and establish a democratic principle of indisputable worth. It should not be forgotten in this context that it is the Members of the United Nations that, under Article 24 of the Charter, confer on the Council members “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”. 11. It would be worthwhile to explore whether the members of the international community as a whole are of the view that the current permanent members are indeed acting on their behalf and faithfully discharging the responsibilities conferred on them. It seems to us that the permanent members, if they believe that they are not abusing the responsibility placed on their shoulders by all States, have nothing to fear from the prospect of their status as members of the Council being renewed periodically. 12. A possible means of attaining this objective might be to require the names of the current permanent members of the Council to appear, every two or three years, on the list of candidates from their regional group which is considered by the General Assembly, and to submit themselves to the regular voting procedure utilized by the Assembly to elect members of the Security Council. A measure of this kind would no doubt add much more balance and would make a contribution to the more equitable representation on the Security Council sought under General Assembly resolution 47/62,289 just as it would give practical expression to the principle of the sovereign equality of States. […] [75] […] PANAMA290

[Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993]

[…] [76] […] 7. The need for representativity therefore means that account must be taken not only of numerical factors but also of such obvious factors as the major political changes that have taken place over the past five years and the presence on the international scene of prominent individuals who should assume in the field of the maintenance of international security the important role they play in other areas of human endeavour. 8. Account must also be taken of the fact that as a result of the ending of colonialism one region of the world has greater representation on the Council than it should, by rights, thus reducing the number of opportunities for other regions of the world to make their voices heard in that forum. In our view, these considerations apply to both permanent and non-permanent members of the Council. In view of the foregoing, any amendment of the Charter must ensure that representation is not only broad but also balanced and equitable. 9. Although we believe that the criteria for membership on the Council set out in Article 23 of the Charter do not need to be amended, it is clear that they must not be interpreted restrictively, but rather in the light of a given country’s overall contribution to the world body. A country’s military contribution to peace-keeping operations should not be the only yardstick used. We believe this not only because nowadays the situations in question arise with increasing frequency but also because they are not 289  11 December 1992, → 3.1.1. 290  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Panama’s position on general aspects of the reform, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

331

merely of a military nature. The maintenance of international peace and security also has a preventive aspect, which is necessary for peace-building and for setting up the social and administrative structures that are essential to the existence of a modern state. Only a democratic membership will lead to full acceptance of the work of the Council, whose tasks now cover more than just military matters. […] [77] […] 12. To sum up, the issue of the composition of the Security Council must be considered and settled not only on the basis of the Council’s structure in numerical terms but also on the basis of the new international situation, the emergence of new prominent individuals on the international scene, the need for the Council to be representative in terms of the current regional and functional groupings within the Organization, and the need to set up new categories of members and forms of participation in the Council’s functions that differ qualitatively from the current categories and systems. Furthermore, the Council’s action must be made more transparent and democratic and methods of communicating with Member States and with other international agencies and arrangements must be strengthened, in view of the need to lighten the Council’s agenda by means of bilateral and regional action. […] [90] UNITED KINGDOM

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] 2. The United Kingdom recognizes that the increase in United Nations membership has understandably raised the question of increasing the membership of the Security Council, including the question of increasing the permanent membership of the Council. […] 6. In the past few years the Security Council, in exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and working with an unprecedented degree of consensus, has responded to challenges in Kuwait, Namibia, Somalia, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and many other parts of the world. States are increasingly turning to the Security Council for assistance. They need a Council which remains able to respond rapidly and effectively. 7. Present arrangements allow for the equitable representation of States from all regions working with permanent members able to assume global responsibilities. This is not an argument against change and the United Kingdom believes that success should be built upon. At the same time it is crucial that [91] neither a protracted debate on enlargement, nor precipitate action, should be allowed to diminish the Council’s effectiveness. The first priority must be to safeguard the effective operation of the Council, and its ability to fulfil its primary responsibility under the United Nations Charter, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security. […] Original footnote Transmitted by the Permanent Representative of the Bahamas in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). *1

332

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.3.2 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [3] BELIZE291

[Original: English] [14 September 1993] 1. We are gratified that the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council has now become a priority item on the agenda of the General Assembly. We are confident that, in the prevailing spirit of improvement, the Organization will definitively conclude this exercise in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Organization. 2. In our view, General Assembly resolution 47/62 of 11 December 1992292 states as the twin objectives of the review: (a) further democratization of representation and of allocation of responsibilities within the Council; (b) the need to increase membership. 3. Equitable representation in the sense of democratization is qualitatively different from equitable geographical representation, one of the selection criteria specified in Article 23 of the Charter. Presumably, it includes, inter alia, such factors as: (a) The willingness of members to shoulder financial and other responsibilities inherent in activities pursuant to the Council’s mandate and in the fall-out from fractured peace and security; (b) The geographical and, especially, strategic location of members, e.g. near certain sea lanes; (c) The members’ reputation for judiciousness, in view of the Council’s substantive adjudicative role; (d) The need to have represented “the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world”, in the words of Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; (e) The size of the population of members and the need to ensure that the democratic ideals of the architects of the United Nations will now bear fruit by ensuring that due weight is given to the most populous, as well as to the least populous, nations. 4. As noted above, resolution 47/62 has as its second objective the need to increase the Council’s membership. However, the membership must not be so large as to impair functional flexibility. 5. It is assumed that the above-mentioned twin criteria in resolution 47/62 will be reiterated in any revision of Article 23. These criteria should be applicable, without restriction, both to permanent and non-permanent members. In other words, if a permanent member ceases to satisfy the criteria, it would be expected to step aside. [4] 6. There would also be retained in Article 23 the existing non-exclusive criteria applicable to the selection of non-permanent members (“due regard being specially paid”) 291  → 3.4.3.5 for Belize’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 292  → 3.1.1.

3  “ The most productive time ”

333

of contribution of aspirant Council members “to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization and also to equitable geographical distribution”. These non-exclusive criteria should continue to be realistically and flexibly applied in a manner which fully acknowledges the organic and evolutive development of the Organization, as exemplified by the tremendous normative and doctrinal developments of the purposes of the United Nations stated in the Charter, particularly in Article 2, namely: (a) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (b) Disarmament, including denuclearization; (c) Obligatory international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and ecospheric fields; (d) Human rights and fundamental freedoms in the aforementioned fields. 7. One of these non-exclusive Article 23 criteria must now be regarded as transcendent. It is the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. As already intimated in Chapter VIII of the Charter, this comprehends coordination by regional organizations with the efforts of the Council at pacific settlement and enforcement. Such organizations must now be brought into the formal structure of Article 23. 8. In the light of the aforementioned considerations, we propose that Article 23 be amended as follows: (a) The total membership of the Council should be 20 States; (b) The clause naming specific permanent members in the existing text should be replaced by one limiting the number of permanent members to eight or nine and specifying the following categories of members: (i) These with populations in excess of 800 million. For the present, these would be China and India; (ii) These with populations in excess of 100 million, each of which contributes at least 6.5 per cent of the budget of the United Nations. At present, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America would qualify; (iii) Composite members: any two adjacent countries with a combined population of over 100 million and a combined contribution to the budget of at least 8.5 per cent would be eligible to be elected to two-year renewable terms. They would rotate a single vote and veto power, probably at quarterly intervals. Possible combinations are France and Great Britain and Germany and one of its neighbours. “Adjacent” would include trans-ocean adjacency, e.g. Brazil and Nigeria. The maximum number of composite permanent members would be limited to, perhaps, three; [5] (iv) Any State which is currently a permanent member and is not qualified pursuant to categories 1 to 3 above would retain its status for a brief period after the entry into force of the amendment; […] (d) There would be two groups of non-permanent members: (i) Five regional members representing Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Pacific. Each member, which would serve for two years, would be selected respectively by the States of the region. Permanent members would be excluded from each regional group and its selection process; (ii) Seven or eight members, each serving for two years. […]

334

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.3.3 23 November 1993, Thailand, Mr. Pibulsonggram, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 20-22 […] The last time the Security Council was enlarged was in 1963. This was based on the rationale that United Nations membership had significantly increased – from 51 Members in 1954 to 113 in 1963. Now, 30 years have passed, and there are 184 Members. Profound changes in the international system and in the configuration of power as well as the increase in the number of new Member States are valid grounds on which to consider all aspects of the question of increasing the membership of the Security Council. The examination of this issue must include a review of matters relating to the working methods of the Security Council and to the evolving relationship of the Security Council and the United Nations membership as a whole. My delegation realizes that this could be a long process. It is all the more urgent, then, that we take the initial step as soon as possible. My delegation firmly believes that this review should be based on the principles stated in Article 23 of the Charter. We are also willing to consider an increase in the number of permanent or non-permanent members, as well as other categories of membership. The Secretary-General’s report (A/48/264 and Add.1-4) would provide a useful and valuable background for this consideration. The opinions sent to the Secretary-General by Governments would also be of great importance to our deliberations on these issues. […] 3.2.3.4 23 November 1993, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 7-8 […] In the view of the Polish delegation, any expansion of the membership of the Security Council must not endanger its effectiveness. Also, it must not put in jeopardy the Council’s ability to discharge its functions and powers. Here I am referring inter alia to the special responsibility of the permanent members and the existing status of non-permanent members of the Council. The well-established decision-making procedures should be maintained. It must also be ensured that every regional group recognized in the United Nations is fairly represented in the Council, that the aspirations and interests of medium-sized States are met and that due attention is given to their political role in the region. As it is rightly stressed in the preamble to the draft resolution under review,293 no effort should be spared to build a consensus on the issue under consideration. If adopted, the draft resolution should be seen as the beginning of the very important, but difficult and complex, process of forging an eventual agreement. We support the draft resolution, as it gives us a sufficiently broad and flexible framework to consider all the relevant issues. We hope that, in the end, the Security Council will be better equipped to cope, on behalf of the international community, with its primary task of maintaining international peace and security and facing any challenge ahead.

293   UN Doc. A/48/L.28. The draft resolution was adopted on 3 December 1993 as Res. 48/26, → 3.1.2.

335

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.2.3.5 23 November 1993, Maldives, Mr. Shahid, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 12-13 […] The question of permanent members and the right of veto is a key issue. In addressing that issue, we have to fully understand that privileges come with additional responsibilities and obligations. As the Security Council is the organ of the United Nations with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, its members, especially the permanent ones, should be willing to accept additional responsibilities and obligations in that connection and in making the United Nations more effective and efficient. It is important to highlight the fact that the question of the permanent members and the right of veto should be addressed without prejudice to the efficiency and effectiveness of the work of the Council. […] 3.2.3.6 23 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 8, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.8 […] [2] EGYPT

[Original: Arabic] [23 February 1994] [The following communication was transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations on behalf of the Arab States.] […] 3. The Arab States believe that it is vital for the United Nations to move with the growing trend aimed at using action in the regional context as an indispensable contribution to the shaping of future international political relations. 4. The Arab States also affirm the need to readjust the ratio between the number of Security Council members and the total number of Members of the United Nations, which has been disturbed as a result of the recent large increase in the membership of the Organization, and to achieve an equitable distribution of Security Council seats among the various geographical regions with a view to securing the effective participation of each group in the decision-making process in the Council, which would have positive effects on the strengthening of international peace and security. 5. In the light of the above, the Arab States urge the necessity of ensuring that their representation on the Security Council is proportionate to the number of Arab States among the total membership of the United Nations, bearing in mind that the Arab States share historical and cultural links. 3.2.3.7 27 May 1994, United Kingdom, Mr. Gomersall, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group294 […] My delegation has listened most carefully to your remarks this morning in introducing your “non-paper”295 and to your suggestions for the further work of the Group. We 294  → 3.3.6 for the United Kingdom’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 295  → 3.1.4.

336

3  “ The most productive time ”

greatly appreciate your efforts, and those of the Bureau, in seeking to move our work forward. The essence of my comments is that the paper overstates the degree of convergence on some of the key issues and that for our future work, we could do better to proceed by more informal consultations than by repetition of formal statements in open session. […] […] It is also somewhat strange to refer, as the non-paper does in 2(b), to the fact that some have mentioned particular member states as candidates for permanent membership without naming those states. The two states mentioned in this context were Germany and Japan, and the non-paper could usefully have been clear on that point. We also agree with other delegations that the non-paper gives inappropriate emphasis to the question of criteria. While some in this Working Group have mentioned the need to develop new criteria for additional permanent members, or semi-permanent members, a number of delegations have spoken out against the setting of criteria. It is clear that such an academic exercise would only delay the process of enlargement indefinitely. We would support the suggestion of other delegations that a shorter list of essential questions be prepared. […] 3.2.3.8 13 October 1994, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 19-21 […] It is clear that in the new world order, democracy and equality are the paramount values. For self-evident reasons, these should be reflected in various aspects of each body of our Organization, especially in the title and incidents of membership of the Security Council. This delegation therefore proposes that there should be two classes of members: indefinite members, to replace the existing category of permanent members, and regular members, to replace the present category of non-permanent members. Each indefinite member would sit on the Council as long as it satisfied the relevant criteria. Let it be stressed that our proposals are equally applicable if the two present classes of permanent and non-permanent members are retained. The criteria for indefinite membership should be grounded in the realities of international relations. This delegation proposes that the most crucial realities here are size of population, contribution to the Organization’s budget and contribution to international peace and security. This delegation therefore proposes that the threshold for indefinite membership should be a population of 100 million. To the population threshold should be added the criterion of contribution to the Organization’s budget. This delegation proposes that the minimum contribution threshold should be 5 percent. In this connection, we refer to the British proposals on assessment currently being informally discussed. A higher assessment of an additional, for example, 2 percent over the initial 5 percent would compensate for a population deficit of between 10 and 40 million. Finally, countries with populations in excess of 800 million would automatically be indefinite members without having to satisfy additional criteria. The chief criterion for regular Council membership would be membership of the United Nations. Such seats would be allocated on a strictly equitable geographical basis, utilizing the Organization’s continental regions, and otherwise on the basis of Article 23 of the Charter, as at present written.

3  “ The most productive time ”

337

It is further proposed that a State that fails to satisfy the population threshold for indefinite membership might, by agreement, combine with one or more adjacent States as a composite or constituency indefinite member. Adjacency would include strategic adjacency across a body of water, no matter how large. This delegation would like to stress that under this modality, the right to vote and the exercise of the veto would be rotated, possibly at intervals of one to three months. The composite modality is clearly a form of constituency association, which is becoming relatively popular in organizations and agencies that provide specific benefits or have defined and tangible functions. It should therefore work well in the Security Council. It would work particularly well in connection with regular membership. In this context it would dramatically improve the opportunities of many scores of developing countries which, as demonstrated by a survey referred to by the delegation of Italy,296 have never been members of the Council. Furthermore, the composite or constituency modality would encourage effective regionalism and the establishment of regional arrangements or agencies under Chapter VIII of the Charter, since membership in such arrangements or agencies as are approved by the Council could be deemed to satisfy the adjacency criterion. This proposal would go far towards de-emphasizing the elitism that is now endemic in the Council. The composite or constituency notion might be regarded as novel. In fact, the very essence of the concept of security ushered in by the Second World War and the Charter is its shared nature. This is underscored by Chapter VIII and by the main institutions of Chapter VII, including collective self-defence. Current trends in peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance would appear to confirm this point. Therefore, the Belize proposals, while giving full scope to the present, somewhat arbitrary, continental regions, also emphasize a variety of types of genuine security regions. It is proposed that the maximum number of seats in the Council would be approximately 23. Of these, there would be a maximum of 9 indefinite members and a minimum of 14 regular members. Since, in both categories, a composite or constituency group of two or more States would count as one member, the actual number of participating States could be considerably larger than 23. […] 3.2.3.9 13 October 1994, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 15-16297 […] Emerging from the cold-war era with an authority and effectiveness that belie its many years of sterility, the Security Council is also, however, clearly in need of functional reform. Addressing this issue at the Institute of International Relations in Budapest earlier this year, Malta’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Guido de Marco, stated that Any consideration of reform of the Security Council, be this in terms of composition or of the working methods, is surrounded by the legitimate concern that no proposed action 296  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14. 297  → 3.3.11 for Malta’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

338

3  “ The most productive time ”

should impair its existing vitality. The real dilemma lies, however, in the fact that its present course of action could, if it remains unsupported by some measure of reform, itself lead to an undermining of this vitality. This is the principal criterion that has guided the delegation of Malta in its approach to the discussion on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. […] At the same time, we believe, as do others, that one of the major strengths of the Security Council lies in its limited membership. For this reason, my delegation would support a prudent increase of not more than 10 seats. […] 3.2.3.10 14 October 1994, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 8-9 […] Spain is in favour of a moderate increase in the membership of the Security Council, an increase that would allow for the more frequent presence in the Council of States whose weight and influence in international affairs is unquestioned and which have the will and the ability to contribute significantly to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the achievement of other purposes of the United Nations as set forth in Article 29 of the Charter. The expansion of the Council would also facilitate equitable geographical representation, again in accordance with Article 23, thus making it possible for many medium-sized and small countries that thus far have not been able to do so to take a direct part in the Council’s work. In any event, it is essential to maintain the principle enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter that the Security Council acts on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations in carrying out its duties related to the maintenance of international peace and security. […] 3.2.3.11 14 October 1994, San Marino, Mr. Aita, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 9-11 […] The large industrialized States have never really had any problems over representation – or almost anything else. They are big enough and powerful enough to take care of themselves. Medium-sized States, developing or industrialized, have done very well during the last 49 years. We wish them continued luck. Small States, however, have not been as lucky. They comprise about 125 Members and thus constitute the two-thirds majority needed for amendment of the Charter, should amendment take place. These small States have not had their proportional share of representation on the Security Council. Equitable representation is the main issue; it is the reason for our presence here today, and it led to the formation of the Open-ended Working Group. It is one of the most important issues concerning the small States, including San Marino. In plain, simple language, small States want a finger in the pie – the opportunity to participate in the decision making process, to promote and further consolidate the principle of the need to defend all States that cannot militarily defend themselves, and to share the responsibility of advancing the peace and security agenda while ameliorating human rights and increasing prosperity in every corner of the world. […]

339

3  “ The most productive time ”

The Italian proposal298 would give small States 10 non-permanent seats on the Security Council, to be shared by 125 States on a frequent-rotation basis. In view of the considerable number of small States, that proposal is hardly Utopian. Nevertheless it at least guarantees us the enjoyment of our equitable rights approximately once every 22 years, should we opt for two-year tenure. Should we, however, opt for only one year, that right would be exercised in almost half the time, that is, once every 12 years for each of the 125 small States. […] 3.2.3.12 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 […] [51] V. SUBMISSIONS BY MEMBER STATES OR GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES 1. Argentina

[…] [52]

A/AC.247/5 (a) [Original: English] [14 September 1995]

ANNEX Submission by Argentina on the “cascade effect”: effects of the status of the permanent membership of the Security Council on the United Nations system 1. The present working paper is only a first and preliminary attempt to examine, in both quantitative and comparative terms, the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations system as a whole. 2. When analysed in contrast with United Nations institutional regulations, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, a statistical study of the actual participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the various organs of the system makes possible the identification of a problem intrinsic to the Organization’s representative mechanism, namely, the large representation ratio of certain countries to the detriment of others. 3. Such a de facto situation is somehow analogous to granting a different status to a number of Member States in the system as a whole. Given its vast repercussions, it reflects a reality of the United Nations beyond the stipulations of the Charter. 4. We will, therefore, consider both the Charter and the representation figures separately, and take as a basis for comparison the situation of the five permanent members of the Security Council – France, China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation – to try to assess their overall representational advantage, as the centrepiece of the paper.

298  29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8.

340

3  “ The most productive time ”

I. REGULATIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5. On the basis of Charter regulations, the status of permanent member has special bearing on: (a) Voting prerogatives in the Security Council – veto right – (Art. 27); (b) Composition of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47), which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members or their representatives; (c) Composition of the Trusteeship Council (Art. 86, b), integrated by the five permanent members. China joined the group in 1989. 6. As regards participation in the General Assembly, the Charter regulations postulate, inter alia, the following: (a) General Committee (i) According to rule 31 of its rules of procedure, the General Assembly elects 21 vice-presidents. By decision 1 of the Assembly (in [53] reference to resolution 33/138 of 19 December 1978), five of these vice-presidents are representatives of the five permanent members; (ii) The General Committee is highly significant, given its role in assessing the provisional agenda and supplementary list of items, and introducing recommendations as to their inclusion in agenda rule 40); (iii) On the other hand, permanent members may not assume the chairmanship of the General Assembly, or the chairmanships of the Main Committees. The latter conforms to rule 31, which indirectly indicates that the presidencies of the Assembly and chairmanships of the Main Committees cannot correspond to the same countries; (iv) Likewise, it is established practice that the permanent members do not assume the posts of vice-chairman or rapporteur of the Main Committees; (b) Committee on Contributions. […] II. STATISTICAL FINDINGS A. General Assembly 1. Committee on Contributions 7. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members belonged to the Committee in any given year, showing a 70 per cent re-appointment rate; that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed – on average – 7 out of the 10 times they were eligible for re-appointment. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a 48 per cent re-appointment rate, that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed a little under 5 out of 10 times when they were eligible for re-appointment. 2. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions […] [54] […] 9. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members served on the Committee in any given year. They presented a combined re-appointment rate of 70 per cent, with France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation each presenting a 100 per cent re-appointment rate. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a combined re-appointment rate of 41 per cent, re-entering the Committee only 4 out of 10 times when they are eligible to do so.

3  “ The most productive time ”

341

3. General Assembly ad hoc and subsidiary organs 10. Permanent members also take part in a number of important United Nations bodies dependent on the General Assembly: (a) Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements. […] The Committee is constituted by the members of the current or most recent General Committee, which includes permanent members; (b) International Law Commission. […] With the sole exception of the United Kingdom, who did not participate for four years, the permanent members belonged to it continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired, at a rate of 20 per cent; (c) United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine. […] The Committee’s regular members are France, Turkey, and the United States of America – two of them Security Council permanent members; (d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. […] For the period 1984-1993, at least three of the seven positions of the Tribunal corresponded, at any one time, to permanent members, with their tenure averaging 45 per cent of the total; [55] (e) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. […] With the exception of three years, in which only four of the five permanent members participated, the five permanent members were included continuously in the Committee during 1984-1993; (f) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. […] Its membership has been gradually expanded to a present total of 53 members, which includes the five permanent members, on a continual basis; (g) Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. […] it consists of 34 members, including the five permanent members on a continual basis; (h) Joint Inspection Unit. […] It consists of no more than 11 Inspectors elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution and serving in their personal capacity for a term of five years, which can be renewed only once. With the exception of China, permanent members averaged 3 Inspectors out of 11 at any one time; (i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. […] With the exception of 1985, when only four of the five permanent members participated, all five served continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired at a rate of 15 per cent; (j) Committee on Relations with the Host Country. […] it consists of 15 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, which includes the five permanent members on a continual basis; (k) Consultative Committee on Disarmament. […] the Committee is composed of 20 eminent personalities, all nominated by the Secretary-General. It includes experts representing the five permanent members on a continual basis; (l) Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. […] After a number of [56] successive expansions, the Committee today consists of 47 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis; (m) Committee on Information. […] it has undergone successive expansions and currently consists of 83 members assigned by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

342

3  “ The most productive time ”

(n) United Nations Environment Programme. […] is composed of 58 members elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution and four-year terms. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation, thus covering the entire period. The rest of the members combined – averaged eight years of participation; (o) Human Rights Committee. Based on available information for the period 19861993, three permanent members participated in this Committee continuously during the given period, while the rest of the membership was subject to rotation or changes at a rate of 12 per cent; (p) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. […] it consists of 18 experts elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, two permanent members were added to two others (who had already been on the Committee) in 1986, after which all four served on a continual basis. On the other hand, other Committee members were rotated or retired at a rate of 21 per cent. B. Economic and Social Council 11. The five permanent members are also part of the Economic and Social Council and various standing organs of limited membership, re-elected successively since the establishment of such organs. 1. Economic and Social Council (general membership) 12. Consisting originally of 18 members, it was successively expanded to include its present total of 53 members with three-year terms. Eighteen of these are nominated every year in General Assembly elections. With the exception of China, the five permanent members belonged to it almost continuously from its beginnings, until 1993 (combined default time: two [57] years).*1 For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while all other members – combined – averaged 3.9 years of participation (39 per cent) in the same period. […]. 2. Subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council 13. Permanent members have also taken part in a number of other important United Nations bodies dependent on the Economic and Social Council: (a) Statistical Commission. […] Its membership has been expanded a number of times to a present total of 24, elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 3 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members combined averaged 3.2 years of participation (32 per cent) in the same period; (b) Population Commission. […] Its membership has been expanded successively since 1946, now standing at a total of 27. Members are elected by the Council for fouryear terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period;

3  “ The most productive time ”

343

(c) Commission for Social Development. […] Its membership, elected directly by the Council for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution, has been expanded a number of times and now stands at 32. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 11 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.8 years of participation (88 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.9 years of participation (29 per cent) in the same period; (d) Commission on Human Rights. […] [58] […] Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 53. Members are elected for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members were members of the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: three years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members averaged 3.5 years of participation (35 per cent) in the same period; (e) Commission on Transnational Corporations. […] the Commission comprises 48 members elected directly by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). The remaining members averaged 4.8 years of participation (48 per cent) for the same period; (f) Committee for Programme and Coordination. […] Its membership has been expanded a number of times to its present total of 34. Members are elected by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.4 years of participation (94 per cent), while all others averaged 3.7 years of participation (37 per cent); (g) Commission on Narcotic Drugs. […] the Commission comprises a total of 53 members elected by the Council for four-year terms at two-year intervals on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.6 years of participation (96 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.2 years (52 per cent); (h) Commission on Human Settlements (Habitat). […] the Commission comprises a total of 58 members elected for three to four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.4 years of participation (84 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.5 years (55 per cent); (i) Commission on the Status of Women. […] the Commission comprises a total of 45 members elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Commission almost continuously from its beginnings until 1993 (combined default time: eight years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.6 years of participation [59] (86 per cent), while the remaining members averaged a total of 3.7 years (37 per cent). […]

344

3  “ The most productive time ”

C. International Court of Justice 15. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not directly specify it, the five permanent members of the Security Council are de facto permanent members of the Court. D. Related United Nations programmes and specialized agencies 1. International Atomic Energy Agency 16. […] With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Board continuously since 1957. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 years of participation (100 per cent); other members combined averaged 3.1 years of participation (31 per cent) in the same period. 2. International Civil Aviation Organization 17. […] Its executive body is the members’ Council, composed of 33 contracting States. Permanent members participated in the Council for an average of 35.6 years (possible total: 46 years) between 1947 and 1993, that is, almost 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years of participation (18 per cent) in the same period. 3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 18. Established in 1945, FAO includes a main Council as its chief executive organ, composed of 49 member nations elected by the FAO Conference for three-year terms. With the exception of the Russian Federation, which is not a member, the permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent) in the period 1984-1993; the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period. [60] 4. International Maritime Organization 19. […] Its chief executive body is the IMO Council, composed of 32 members. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Council continuously since 1959. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period. 5. International Telecommunication Union 20. […] With the exception of the United Kingdom, the permanent members have been members of the Council continuously since 1947. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.9 years (19 per cent) in the same period. 6. World Meteorological Organization 21. […] Permanent members sat on the Council for an average of 31 years (possible total: 42 years) between 1951 and 1993, that is, 75 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 8.7 years (87 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.

3  “ The most productive time ”

345

7. World Health Organization 22. […] Permanent members served on the Board for an average of 36 years (possible total: 45 years) between 1948 and 1993, that is, 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 2 years (20 per cent) of participation in the same period. 8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 23. […] Its chief executive organ, the Executive Board, is elected by the UNESCO General Conference and consists of 51 member States who appoint representatives for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, China, the Russian Federation and France were members of the Board continuously (10 full years of participation), while the rest of the membership averaged 3 years (30 per cent) of participation in the same period. [61] 9. United Nations Children’s Fund 24. […] Its leading executive body is the Executive Board, comprising 36 members elected for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the remaining members averaged 3.6 years (36 per cent) of participation in the same period. 10. United Nations Development Programme 25. […] The Council’s membership has been successively expanded – now standing at a total of 48 – and is elected on the basis of equitable distribution among “developed” and “developing” countries as two separate categories. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while average participation for the remaining “developed” countries (excluding the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation) averaged 6.5 years (65 per cent). 11. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 26. […] The Committee’s membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 46 regular members, which includes (and has always included) all Security Council permanent members except for the Russian Federation. 12. Universal Postal Union 27. […] For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 6 years (60 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 2.1 years (21 per cent). 28. The above data make it somehow clear that the effective rates of participation of the five Security Council permanent members seem to be not directly reflective of Charter stipulations. In effect, they may be producing a certain degree of disequilibrium in the United Nations structure.

346

3  “ The most productive time ”

29. Such an apparent disequilibrium may find its roots in a number of reasons, which cause what can be called the “cascade effect”. The permanent members’ relative weight and negotiational advantage when soliciting their admittance into organs outside of the Security Council may well be reverberating throughout [62] the Organization. The ongoing review of the Security Council may well grant all members an opportunity to look also in depth into this particular matter. […] [71] 4. Belize299

[…] [72]

A/AC.247/5 (d) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

ANNEX Answers to suggested questions for Cluster 1 and related Statement delivered on 25 January 1995 to the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly by His Excellency Mr. Edward A. Laing, Permanent Representative of Belize

I. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO CLUSTER 1 QUESTIONS 1. Indefinite (permanent) membership (a) The number should be increased by between five and eight; (b) There should be established the principle of at least two members from each of the five regions; (c) Subject to what is said in section VII below, in each of the five regions any State would have the right to contest a seat in elections conducted within the United Nations for each regional group. Tenure would not exceed a renewable period to be prescribed. In addition, the States contributing a specified minimum percentage of the Organization’s budget would be members; (d) Deferred, except for 4 below. 2. Regular (non-permanent) membership (a) The number should be increased by approximately 10; (b) The Article 23 criteria would be essentially the same as at present, with the emphasis on equitable geographical distribution; (c) The ratio between the two categories should be approximately 2:1. 3. Other categories of membership (a) There is no need for additional substantial categories of membership. As stated in 1 (c), regional representation should be the main criterion of indefinite (permanent) membership. It should also be the main criterion for regular membership. In both membership categories, pairs of prospective members should also have the purely voluntary option of forming composite or constituency groups; (b) The basis for self-selection through this modality would be geographical, including trans-aquatic, adjacency or common membership of a Chapter VIII agency; (c) The right to vote, exercise the veto (if any) and participate in debates and in closed sessions would be rotated monthly. However, at all times, the delegation 299  → 3.4.3.12 for Belize’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

347

would be comprised of representatives from either participants in the composite or constituency group. [73] […] II. INTRODUCTION 1. At various times this delegation has presented its ideas both in this Working Group and in the plenary, as it did on 13 October 1994. Given the diversity of cultures, regions and economic and social realities, and the complexity of our proto-twenty-first century world, we stand by the proposals elaborated on that occasion. Nevertheless, in our endeavour to move forward, this delegation is today offering some additional thoughts. Some of these are based on ideas that have been expressed by several distinguished delegations. At the same time, our present formulation includes several elements from our previous proposals. Chief of these is the composite or constituency modality of membership. 2. Central to our notions is the importance of ensuring democracy in the United Nations. If this Organization’s moral authority is to be preserved in an increasingly democratized world, it is inescapable that its own processes must be made more democratic. The essential ingredients of such democracy must be the introduction of equality and even-handedness. The first notable area in which this must be accomplished is that of membership categories and terminology. Surely the very notion of permanent membership contradicts the fundamental principle of democracy for which we have waged at least one major war in this century. It was a cardinal principle in the Atlantic Charter of the Second World War and the Charter of this Organization, which was spawned by that war. I would insult the intelligence of my listeners if I were to say any more on the history of this subject than that an entire large branch of international law and United Nations law is based on a veritable forest of weighty resolutions of this Assembly, notably resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples. In view of the vital importance of democracy, this delegation therefore proposes that the category of permanent membership should be relabelled “indefinite membership” and that the incidents of that category should reflect the basic notions of democracy, without posing any threat whatsoever to the peace and security of the world. […] 4. Democracy obviously requires that there should be essential equality between the weak and the strong, between the poor and the rich, and between the small and the large. It requires the widest possible participation in representative bodies. No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must [74] become as complex as to preclude a category of State from participation. Wisdom, like democratic rights, should be widely shared. There must be full access to the distilled experiences of the weak, the poor and the small. Thus, ideas on Council reform should squarely reflect this concern. 5. In addition to democracy, we must acknowledge that, like States, international organizations are dynamic organisms. Their structures must therefore be flexible. That is an additional reason why modification of the veto and of permanent membership is required. Membership criteria and other structures must therefore reflect the reality that, throughout history, the dimensions, composition, boundaries and very existence of States have often been in flux. When these changes have taken place through democratic and peaceful means, this Organization has generally made the necessary

348

3  “ The most productive time ”

accommodations. The very notions of permanent membership and the veto, as they presently exist, preclude such accommodation in cases of State succession. We must ensure that this is now rectified. 6. The final introductory point is that, in view of the dynamism to which reference has been made, an institution as vital as the Security Council must be provided with a mechanism for orderly change. This includes the Council’s membership criteria. At the same time, reform should not be as idealistic and radical as to deprive the international system of the continued benefit of those States which have furnished yeoman service in the sensitive and dangerous fields of peace and security. III. INDEFINITE MEMBERSHIP 7. Indefinite membership would replace the present category of permanent membership. This delegation envisages that there might be two such members from each of the Organization’s [five] regions. It might be argued that there are disparities between the existing regions in size and population numbers. However, that argument does not detract from the imperative of giving equal and democratic representation to each region. The solution to this perceived problem might be to reform the Organization’s regional system. 8. Tenure would be indefinite in the sense that it would be of longer duration than the two years for regular members. The period could conceivably be five years, if indefinite membership included such responsibilities and obligations as justify an extended period for the amortization of necessary investments. Clearly, one of the incidents of such a status as indefinite membership should be indefinite renewability. 9. Elections of the permanent members from each region would be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, with participation of all the members of each respective regional group. 10. In addition to this modality of selection based on regional considerations, this delegation proposes that two or three additional permanent members would so qualify on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the Organization. It is submitted that, in view of the size of the Organization’s budget for international security, it is unrealistic to deny the nexus between financial [75] contributions and peace and security. One State that would obviously qualify under such criteria is the United States of America. This delegation further suggests that such States would not be counted among those which are qualified as contestants and electors in the regional elections described in the preceding paragraph. 11. To either type of indefinite membership could be applied the optional selection modality of composite or constituency membership. In the case of the budget-contribution criterion, the contributions of both States in a composite/constituency group would be aggregated in order to determine whether they satisfied the required threshold. The adjacency criterion would be applied as described in section V below. IV. REGULAR MEMBERSHIP 12. Because of the imperatives of democracy (from the perspective of both equality and even-handedness), the label “non-permanent membership” conveys a sense of second-class citizenship. It is therefore proposed that it be relabelled “regular membership” or simply “membership”. For reasons that have been canvassed in this Statement, the number of regular members should be increased so that the proportion of regular

3  “ The most productive time ”

349

to indefinite members would be approximately 2:1. In that event, the total number of members of the Council would be approximately 33, which would be consistent with efficiency, particularly if the Council ensures that its procedures are consistent with the effective use of time. As long as there is continued emphasis on equitable geographical distribution and the composite or constituency modality is utilized, it is perceived that the criteria presently in Article 23 (1) would suffice. V. COMPOSITE OR CONSTITUENCY MEMBERSHIP 13. Regionalism is at the core of the proposals discussed so far. The expression has been used mainly in the sense of the existing United Nations regional groups. Consistently with the Council’s role in peace and security, it has also been used in the sense of the functional security regions, which are the subject of Chapter VIII of the Organization’s Charter. As noted in the Secretary-General’s recent update to (A/50/60-S/1995/1)300 and the Council’s recent debate on the Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111),301 the Organization has been relying increasingly on regional mechanisms. Since it appears likely that this trend will continue, it is rational to relate the composition of the Council to this reality, which bears a broad relationship to collective self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter). This is the essence of the composite or constituency modality, which follows a development in agencies that provide specific benefits or have certain defined or tangible functions. 14. This modality of membership would facilitate the effective participation in the work of the Council of the scores of States that have never been able to afford to participate, while providing the breadth of experience and nuanced views prevailing in the various functional regions. [76] 15. It is most important to stress that this modality of membership would be available for both categories of membership. It would be purely optional for pairs of adjacent States. The concept of adjacency would include trans-aquatic adjacency and nonadjacent States that are members of a regional agency certified by the Security Council. 16. The vote and veto, if any, would rotate monthly between the parties to the composite/constituency arrangement. So would be the right to speak in debates, in both open and closed sessions. At all times, however, the delegations of composite members would include delegates from each component, who would be seated accordingly and would participate fully in committee work without regard to rotation. […] VII. THE ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR INDEFINITE MEMBERSHIP 18. As an alternative to today’s proposal on the criteria for indefinite membership, this delegation wishes to reiterate the proposals it last summarized on 13 October 1994.302 It will be recalled that the most important elements in those proposals are population size (with a threshold of 100 million) and contribution to the Organization’s budget. They also include a criterion based entirely on extraordinarily large population size. In addition, concepts are included for compensating for marginal non-satisfaction of the population and contribution criteria and for “grandfathering” existing members. These 300  3 January 1995, UN Doc. A/50/60-S-1995/1. 301  17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111. 302  → 3.2.3.8.

350

3  “ The most productive time ”

concepts on grandfathering should be included in the new proposals outlined in the present statement. To that extent, the regional concept could not be fully applied in at least one of the five regional United Nations groups. 19. Nevertheless, I understand that at least one other delegation, fully cognizant of the changeability of international life, suggests that the Assembly should revisit this matter at regular prescribed intervals, in the first instance not later than 10 years from the date of effectiveness of the forthcoming set of reforms. This delegation endorses that suggestion. […] Original footnote Combined default time: total time of non-participation.

*1

3.2.3.13 9 October 1995, Maldives, Mr. Jameel, UN Doc. A/50/PV.25, pp. 5-8 […] Meanwhile, the role and functions of the Security Council should be strengthened and improved upon in a way consistent with the realities of the present time, which obviously are significantly different from the geopolitical conditions which prevailed 50 years ago. However, the Maldives is of the view that if a major restructuring exercise is to be carried out it should be a result-oriented one, which would strengthen the authority of the Council and increase its ability to implement its decisions rather than simply increasing the number of members of the Council on a selective basis. Even if we go along with the emerging consensus that the membership of the Council should be increased, my country strongly feels that careful consideration should be given in the process to ensuring that the Council remains a representative body for all regions and groups of nations, including, of course, the developing countries and small States that share the responsibilities for maintaining peace and security in the world with the more developed and the larger Member States of the United Nations. The main criteria should be, we believe, the capability of the Member States to fulfil their obligations and commitments towards the United Nations and its principles, and their respect for and adherence to international covenants. […] 3.2.3.14 10 October 1995, Mongolia, Mr. Gombosuren, UN Doc. A/50/PV.26, pp. 15-18 […] It is Mongolia’s considered view that expansion of the Security Council should be based on the principles of fairness and equitable representation. This should be ensured by, inter alia, the admission of countries with a global reach, like Japan and Germany, as well as representatives of developing countries. […] 3.2.3.15 11 October 1995, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choi Su Hon, UN Doc. A/50/PV.29, pp. 5-10303 […] The restructuring of the Security Council is most essential for the democratization of the United Nations. 303  → 3.4.2.16 for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

351

One of the key points in the expansion of Security Council membership is to accord priority to the developing countries that form an absolute majority of the United Nations membership, and apply the principle of equal regional distribution with due consideration given to the number of countries in each region. A country like Japan which has not apologized enough for, and wiped the slate clean of, its past wrongdoings is not entitled to become a permanent member of the Security Council. […] 3.2.3.16 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9304 […] Spain believes the increase should incorporate a system providing for a more frequent presence in the Council of States with weight and influence in international relations and with the ability and desire to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter. In this connection, special reference should be made, inter alia, to Member States’ contributions of troops and other personnel to peace-keeping operations. This would not mean creating a new category of members of the Security Council, since the States enjoying a more frequent presence would periodically be subject to election by the General Assembly, as are the other non-permanent members of the Council, so that the democratic legitimacy of such members of the Council would always be duly guaranteed. Any expansion of the Security Council will inevitably mean a change in the majority required for decision making. On the basis of the provisions of Article 27 of the Charter, a distinction in this respect could be drawn between three types of decisions: first, decisions on procedural matters; secondly, decisions relating to substantive issues outside the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, which are essentially questions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes; and, finally decisions within the framework of Chapter VII, which entail recourse to coercive measures. Decisions in each of these categories would require a different majority: the more important the decision to be taken, the greater the required majority. Thus, the so called right of veto of the permanent members would be applicable only in the third category of decisions, those adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 3.2.3.17  14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3305 […] Although not all are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, CARICOM States find themselves in general agreement with the fundamental thrust of the position enunciated recently at the Movement’s eleventh Summit, held in Cartagena, Colombia.306 304  → 3.3.15 for Spain’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.14 for Spain’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 305  → 3.3.18 for CARICOM’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.2.20 for CARICOM’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 306  18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

352

3  “ The most productive time ”

As small States in the international community, we attach the highest importance to democracy and equity not only in our own internal affairs but also in our international relations. We will therefore be concerned to see that these principles are taken fully into account in the reform of the Council. Our right to serve on the Council and to make our contribution to the cause of peace must be assured. On these matters there can be no compromise. […] Our sense of equity does not make it easy for us to contemplate additional permanent members, particularly from any one region. However, we will not be averse to considering any formula that offers a feasible balance which does not harm our fundamental principles. Our analysis of the various proposals before us leads us to believe that some accommodation is possible. […] 3.2.3.18 14 November 1995, China, Mr. Qin Huasun, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 9-10 […] Under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council acts on behalf of all United Nations Member States and therefore should be accountable to them in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Issues handled by the Security Council have a direct bearing on the interests of all countries, particularly those of the countries concerned and in the relevant regions. It is the general desire and request of the entire membership that necessary measures be taken to make the Council’s actions and decisions better reflect the collective will of Member States and better safeguard their interests, particularly those of the developing countries, which make up an overwhelming majority of United Nations membership. The Chinese delegation concurs with the statement in the report of the Working Group that the composition and size of an expanded Council should more accurately reflect the universality and current situation of the United Nations. In expanding the Council, the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be particularly observed, and the representation of various regions in the Council strengthened, so as to give better play to the positive role of the developing countries and small and medium-sized countries in United Nations affairs. […] 3.2.3.19 15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/PV.60, pp. 3-4307 […] In recent years, the Security Council, for the first time in many decades has been carrying out this very difficult mission energetically and fruitfully. It has to its credit a number of successful United Nations peace­keeping operations and numerous important decisions aimed at conflict prevention and resolution, as well as the strengthening of stability and security in various regions of the world. Among the members of the Security Council there are relations of positive and resolute cooperation in the joint and constructive search for optimum solutions to complex world problems.

307  → 3.2.2.2.18 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.3.21 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

353

That is why we attach high priority to the consideration of the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council in a business-like and constructive atmosphere, with an extremely thorough and expert review of the political, organizational and procedural aspects of this multifaceted problem. In the view of the present complex transitional developments in the international system, we cannot allow any erosion or weakening of a mechanism that on the whole is successfully carrying out its functions. In the opinion of the Russian Federation, the strengthening of the Security Council’s effectiveness and its ability to respond speedily and effectively to new threats to international peace and security are essential, fundamental requirements for resolving the question of an increase in the membership of the Security Council. Russia recognizes the need for a limited expansion of the membership of the Council – up to 20 members – which would make it possible to preserve its compact nature, which is important for its efficiency. Taking into account the interests of all regions, it is important to be guided by the criteria of membership in the Security Council enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Under those criteria, due regards must be specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical representation. Clearly, the present status of the permanent members of the Security Council, as regards the full, organic relationship between their rights and duties, must remain unchanged. […] We remain convinced that in further refining the Security Council’s methods and procedures we should proceed in stages and in a balanced manner, without hasty or precipitate decisions. All practical steps should be developed and implemented on the basis of consensus, and they should be introduced only after such innovations have been duly approved and accepted. […] 3.2.3.20 1 February 1996, Belize, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group Shared Seats on the Security Council I. INTRODUCTION 1. The purpose of this document is to elaborate on certain aspects of the proposal that, on an optional basis, regional arrangements or agencies or ad hoc groups of members of the United Nations should be at liberty to share single seats on the Security Council. II. DETAILS A. Basic Structure 2. There are two alternatives: (a) From time to time the Council will certify that a regional arrangement or agency is qualified for purposes of membership of the Council. It is expected that, with the widespread popularity of those institutions, the Council will readily certify many of the arrangements or agencies presently in cooperation with the United Nations or which have conducted regional peace-keeping and similar exercises. Upon presentation to the Council by one of the members of

354

3  “ The most productive time ”

a document signed by the representatives of all of the members of the certified arrangement or agency attesting to their desire to participate as a group in membership of the Council, the presenting member will be permitted to offer itself as a candidate representing a group in the next election to the Council. (b)  Between two and five adjacent states would have the liberty of offering themselves as a candidate for group membership of the Council. The representatives of the participating members would all sign a document attesting to their desire to participate as a group in membership of the Council. The member presenting that document would be listed as a candidate representing a group in the next election to the Council. 3. Adjacency. In the second alternative, the following groups of states would satisfy the adjacency criterion: (a) Two or more mainland states each of which is contiguous to at least one other member of the group. (b) Two or more island states from each of which an imaginary straight line can be drawn to at least one other member of the group. (c)  A combination of one or more mainland and one or more island states which satisfy the requirements of (a) and or (b). 4. Head of delegation. (a) In the first alternative, the chair of the group and head of delegation would be the presenting member state. (b) The chair of any ad hoc group and head of delegation would be the presenting member state. (c)  At any time, the states participating in alternatives (a) or (b) could designate another state as the chair of the group and head of the delegation. 5. Voting. Only the current chair and head of delegation would have the right of speaking and voting. Although for the purpose of counting votes in the Council, any such vote would be deemed to be on behalf of the voting member only, the other members of the group would be bound by it. 6. Security Council Committee membership. A Security Council Committee member from any state member of a group would represent all members of the group. It would be expected to share information and consult with the other members of the group. 7. Termination. Any participant in alternative (a) would become ineligible to continue participation upon the date on which its membership of the arrangement or agency terminates. Any participant in alternative (b) would be at liberty to withdraw from participation by written notification to the President of the Council. B. Limitations 8. Number of members of groups. There would be no limit to the maximum number of participants in alternative (a). In alternative (b) the maximum number of participants would be five, the number of seating places in the Council chamber presently assigned to each delegation. 9. Number of groups. If it is desired to limit the number of groups, various formulae could be devised. C. Probable Beneficiaries 10. Subject to any limitations, it is probable that potential beneficiaries of this modality of membership could include states from some seven or eight major sub-regions.

3  “ The most productive time ”

355

III. JUSTIFICATION A. United Nations Charter 11. The critical importance of the sub-regional dimension in international peace and security is rooted in the Charter, Article 51 of which recognizes the saliency of the collective self-defence notwithstanding the Charter’s establishment of enforcement by the global organization. This theme is further elaborated by Chapter VIII, which acknowledges the potential importance to peace and security of regional agencies and arrangements. The proposal outlined in this document is entirely consistent with those provisions, as well as with the spirit of international cooperation which pervades the Charter and which inspired the General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. B. Recent Practice 12. In recent years, a very substantial proportion of peace-keeping exercises has been conducted by regional agencies or arrangements. Examples are the recent actions by NATO in the former Yugoslavia; by members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia; by members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in Haiti; by members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and of the CARICOM in Grenada. These recent trends might resemble earlier actions by members of the Organization of American States. The solidarity in security matters which has epitomized those actions is the thrust of the proposal of this document, as is the repeated emphasis by the Secretary-General that peace and security should increasingly be viewed as a shared endeavor between the global organization and regional agencies. C. Economy and Efficiency 13. Apart from the relevancy and efficacy of peace-keeping from within a region, such activities are often cost effective and economically efficient. This is strongly underscored by the dire financial condition of the United Nations. In view of the financial dependence of the organization, it is clear that it is essential to devise modalities for cost-sharing. Since very few states are able to afford to maintain the large delegations (of up to 15 persons) required to service a Council member, this proposal addresses the issues of economy and efficiency. D. Security Concerns of Small States 14. A crucial aspect of many of the situations of conflict and security in the twentieth century has been the targeting of small and weak states by aggressor states. It is therefore fair and rational to facilitate the participation on the Council of small states. 15. In fact, during the past fifteen or so years, small states which were usually unrepresented in the Council, have been critically involved in many of the matters of the most crucial importance dealt with by the Council. Examples have been destabilization, mercenaries and insurrection (Maldives, Comoros, Grenada); nuclear testing and passage of nuclear waste (Pacific, Caribbean); regional conflict (Central America). 16. The locales of many of the unrepresented small states are also included among the world’s most strategic areas. E. Improvement of the Council’s Decision-Making 17. It has been noted that the emergence to independence of many small states and their immediate acceptance by other nations and their constructive involvement in international life have helped to substantiate the theory that each unit in the

356

3  “ The most productive time ”

international system plays an important role regardless of its size and wealth. Recent illustrations of the high quality of inputs of the smaller states are the contributions of members of the Alliance of Small Island states to the work products of the Barbados Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the Conferences of the Parties to the Biodiversity and the Climate Change Conventions. It has been further noted that the recognition of the personality of such small entities adds to the diversity necessary for the healthy growth of human society and international law. Expressions such as the “family of nations” and the “international community” are quite common. A small family of creatures, all of fairly advanced ages and with preordained limitations on attributes such as size and wealth, however, has the germs of atrophy and decay. An international family consisting of members with a wide variety of attributes is more likely to grow. 18. It is submitted that, in addition to the important contributions which, as a result of this proposal, small states will be enabled to make in matters directly affecting them, their input will be invaluable in decision-making on the establishment, implementation and modification of Security Council sanctions regimes. […] 3.2.3.21 1 March 1996, Italy, Mr. Fulci, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group “THE CREATION OF NEW PERMANENT SEATS” […] 3. In this exercise there has been a great deal of talk about the “new international realities” and the need for them to be reflected in the reform of the Council. As various colleagues have pointed out, including the Permanent Representatives of Mexico and Pakistan, one of the main new realities is the process of regional integration. This process includes the highly advanced and articulated process in the European Union. Italy hopes that both at the UN and in other contexts, the European Union can sooner or later speak with a single voice, including that of the current permanent members. At this time, the assigning of a new permanent seat to a third member of the European Union would not in any way facilitate the process of integration and elaboration of a common foreign policy. Instead a choice of this type would move against the currents of history, and against the progressive affirmation of what in our opinion is one of the main and most concrete “new realities” of our times: the European Union itself. […] 3.2.3.22 22 April 1996, Mexico, Mr. Tello, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group308 […] We will carefully study the Tunisian statement we just heard. But I must say that rotation still causes doubts. How would the rotation system be applied? Tunisia has told us that a region could allocate the seat for six years to a given country with the possibility of reelection. If, for example, Africa decides to allocate its rotating seat following an alphabetical order, the first country to occupy it would then be Algeria. Since Algeria is a very respectable and respected country, it would undoubtedly be possible 308  → 3.2.1.2.10 for Mexico’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

357

for it to be re-elected for another six years, bringing its tenure to twelve years. In this hypothesis, and considering that the African Group has 53 members, when would the permanent membership go to Zimbabwe? 53 multiplied by 12 gives an awesome total: Zimbabwe would come up for membership approximately in six hundred years, or at least every three hundred if reelection is not possible. We could, of course, devise other ways of determining rotation. For example, the Asian countries could decide in a very democratic way: by drawing lots, and convene on no reelection. Let us suppose that the draw favours India for six years; that country then will be followed by Indonesia, then Iran, and then Iraq, and so on and so forth until they come back to the letter pulled out. I think this would also raise any possible imaginable problems, and it would take a very large number of years for a country to become again a so-called permanent member. The other problem we are having with these rotational schemes is which countries can participate. I assume, but it is not clear, that all countries are entitled to participate in the rotation if they so wish. Since I believe we are trying to democratize the United Nations, I believe that, for instance, each and every one of the Latin American and Caribbean countries will have an opportunity of being permanent member with veto power, not excluding anyone if we truly want to act in a democratic fashion. What is not mentioned in any proposal is the financial implications of being a permanent member of the Security Council. But maybe the financial and economic situation of the entire international community will be better in 25 or 30 years from now when we conclude this exercise, which is not leading us anywhere. Finally, do the countries holding a regional permanent seat represent their region or their respective countries? When Mexico, as we calculated, would be a permanent member roughly in the year 2200, do we represent Mexico or will we be acting on behalf of Latin America and the Caribbean? We are not clear on that at all. 3.2.3.23 3 July 1996, Belize, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XV, pp. 67-79 PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL I. SUMMARY 1. PM = Permanent Member. ANY State is eligible. NPM = Non-PM. P5 = The five PMs as of 1945. No change of status. FPM = Financial (% budget contribution) PM. 2. This scheme is a compromise between proposals for: (a) Retention/expansion of PMship; (b) Abolition of PMship; (c) Expansion of non-PMship. Frequent rotation; (d) Extending PMship to additional named States. Principles of (a) democracy, (b) economy/efficiency < limit tenure and veto and < convergence of P and NP categories. 3. Optional group/regional sharing (Belize paper) applies to ALL categories. 4. Veto = two [or three] concurring blocking votes by PMs in one or more category. 5. Numbers of PMs:

358

3  “ The most productive time ”

Alt. 1 No. –  P5 5 – 1×4 regions; excluding the Group of Western 4 (regional election) European and Other States – FPMs; excluding the United States of America 2 Alt. 2 No. – 2×5 regions; including P5; excluding 9 (regional election) the United States of America – FPMs; including the United States of America 3 6. Tenure: – FPMs – as long as qualified. – Non-P5 PMs – three years. 7. Total numbers rationalized (impact of #2-#6, above): Alt. 1 – 11 PM + (9 to 11) NPM = 20 to 22. Alt. 2 – 12 PM + (9 to 11) NPM = 21 to 23. […] III. BROAD OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR REFORM […] B. Retention and expansion of permanent membership 13. At one extreme are various proposals the thrust of which is that the existing permanent five should retain their status of eternal membership, which should be extended to a variety of additional beneficiaries on a number of bases, including size of population, size of economy, demonstrated commitment to global peace and security, and global and/or regional importance. These ideas are to be warmly commended. However, the application of any set of apparently objective criteria is open to subjectivities. Furthermore, although many of these criteria encompass the principle of democracy, several fail to address the principle of economy and efficiency. C. Abolition of permanent membership 14. Proposals that permanent membership should be abolished comport with the principle of democracy and might crudely comport with the economic principle. Nevertheless, the reality is that peace and security is an occupation that is resourceintensive in terms of personnel, experience and finance. These proposals may therefore fail the test of efficiency to the extent that they do not identify a modality for effectively identifying a core of Council members morally or legally expected, by virtue of their status and its attendant privileges and/or prerogatives, to assume field responsibilities and leadership in the Council’s decision-making. D. Continuation of permanent five plus frequent rotation of some non-permanent members 15. The last-mentioned proposals bear some resemblance to the suggestion that permanent membership status should be frozen and, in place of additional new permanent members, there should be systems of frequent rotation of a specified number of seats by special non-permanent members. These latter members would be identified by criteria to be devised. It is argued that occupation by such larger States of a specified number of non-permanent spaces would free up the remaining slots for

3  “ The most productive time ”

359

the masses of presently disenfranchised smaller and more disadvantaged States. Here, again, possibly selective or subjective application of even objective selection criteria poses a problem that challenges the democracy principle. E. Extension of permanent membership to further named States 16. The same may be said of proposals that the existing system of permanent membership should be extended by according that status to specific additional named States. Although those proposals comport with the desire for economy, they are not entirely in harmony with democracy. An additional problem with such proposals is that, in the absence of safeguard devices, future problems of reductions of state territory and population and other changes provoking issues of State succession could bedevil this modality of membership, rendering it both undemocratic and inefficient. […] IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS A. Introduction 17. It is recommended that the dictates of democracy and economy/efficiency require the closest possible approximation and convergence of both existing forms of membership, namely, permanent and non-permanent membership. Those principles and, in turn, such convergence would appear to necessitate restructuring of the institution of the veto. While practical reality appears to militate against proposals limiting tenure of the permanent five, such limitation is justifiable in all other cases. Democracy (along with considerations of equity) and economy/efficiency justify permitting groups of States in the same neighbourhood to pool their resources and offer themselves as joint candidates in elections to the Security Council. B. Optional sharing of seats 18. In a related paper, it has been recommended that: “On an optional basis, regional arrangements or agencies or ad hoc groups of members of the United Nations should be at liberty to share single seats on the Security Council.” Submission of the delegation of Belize, “Shared seats on the Security council”, Submitted to the Working Group on Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council on 29 January 1996.309 In that submission, it was suggested that the Council could certify particular regional arrangements and agencies as notionally satisfying Chapter VIII of the Charter for the purposes of common Council membership. Alternatively, two to five States satisfying specified criteria for adjacency would be automatically qualified without the requirement of Council certification. The submission also proposed details about voting. Council committee membership, termination and certain limitations in relation to those arrangements/agencies or groups that became members of the Council. […] 21. As noted, this concept is animated, inter alia, by the principle of economy/efficiency. On the basis of fairness and democracy, it is recommended that this modality of membership should be optionally available to both permanent and non-permanent 309  → 3.2.3.20 (dated 1 February 1996).

360

3  “ The most productive time ”

members. The sharing of seats facilitates participation in the Council of a much larger number of States than hitherto possible without encumbering the process by the multiplication of voices and votes and the addition of noise and clutter. C. Approximation and convergence of both forms of membership 22. In our view, especially for reasons of democracy, but also because of economy/ efficiency, permanent membership should be available to ALL members of the Organization, and no further attempt should be made to devise qualification criteria. This is a logical consequence of and, at the same time, facilitates approximation and convergence of both forms of membership. Universal eligibility for both forms of membership is also facilitated by seat sharing, since aggregations of states are better able to compete for permanent membership. In addition, approximation and convergence of both forms of membership, along with seat sharing, advances the beneficial objectivity of the proposals summarized in paragraphs 13 to 15 above. We now turn to the collateral issues of financial permanent membership, tenure and the veto. 1. Financial permanent membership 23. Notwithstanding the notion of democracy, it is recommended that there should be introduced a new subcategory of financial permanent membership whereby individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial contributions to the Organization’s budget. This is strongly motivated by the desperate financial emergency presently being undergone by the Organization. It is clear that several of the proposals for naming specific States for membership are thinly disguised efforts to obtain infusions of funds into the Organization’s coffers. It is possible that the probable consistency of that motivation with the economy/efficiency principle is a substantial justification for facial violation of the democracy principle. 2. Tenure 24. Since the notion of financial permanent membership has an undemocratic element, in the crucial matter of the tenure of the status it should be restricted. It is therefore proposed that the tenure of that status should not be eternal, but for as long as the member is qualified. Furthermore, if additional States eventually satisfy the financial criteria, a system for rotation might have to be considered. 25. It is also proposed that the tenure of the new general class of permanent members should be three years, thus somewhat approximating non-permanent tenure (two years), while permitting any new permanent member which has made an investment related to its membership to fulfil its responsibilities. 26. In order to permit groups or individual members to continue to perform such responsibilities, on the one hand, and so as not to deny the members of the new general class the incidents of membership enjoyed by the permanent five, on the other hand, it is recommended that permanent (and non-permanent) members should be able once to succeed themselves, that is, to enjoy two successive terms. […] V. NUMBERS A. Permanent members 28. Two alternative models are proposed. In the first, (a) the permanent Five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western Europe And Other (WEOG) (already represented by France and the United Kingdom); (c) there would be financial

3  “ The most productive time ”

361

permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America (USA), already included under (a)). 29. In the second model, (a) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members; the existing permanent Five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the USA; (b) there would be three financial permanent members, including the USA. 30. It would be probably wisest to return regional members in elections conducted at the United Nations exclusively among regional members. B. All members 31. Under both alternatives, there could be nine to eleven non-­permanent members, bringing the total membership to 20 to 22 and 21 to 23. It should be stressed that while it might appear that these schemes involve a reduction in the number of non-permanent members, the approximation and convergence of both categories should result in a substantial increase in participation. At any rate, it might be decided to provide for a larger gross number of members in that class. […]310 3.2.3.24 30 October 1996, China, Mr. Wang Xuexian, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 17-19 […] The enlargement of the membership of the Council is at the core of its reform. China is in favour of its appropriate expansion. Since 1963 the United Nations membership has increased by over one-third in the wake of the upsurge of national liberation movements and profound changes on the international scene. However, no corresponding change has been made to the composition of the Council over the past 30 years. What is even more worrisome is that there has long been a serious imbalance in the composition of the Council. Developing countries make up more than two-thirds of the United Nations membership. However, this reality is far from adequately reflected by their representation in the Council. This is particularly true for Africa and Latin America, where there is a concentration of developing countries. This imbalance merits our serious attention. […] As an important component of United Nations reform, the reform of the Council must focus on redressing imbalanced regional representation, particularly the serious inadequacy in the representation of developing countries. It must in no way further aggravate this imbalance. Without attaining this objective, the enlargement of the Council cannot be regarded as reform in a real sense; it would be, rather, a failure to reform. Therefore, no reform plan that excludes or discriminates against developing countries will ever be accepted by the general membership of the United Nations, including China. I also wish to emphasize here that the Council is not a club of the rich, still less a board of directors. Increasing the membership of the Council cannot and should not depend solely on a country’s financial contributions to the United Nations. What is more important is whether it has a correct understanding of war and peace both from 310  Here follows an appendix which includes the text of the document Shared seats on the Security Council which Belize presented on 1 February 1996, → 3.2.3.20.

362

3  “ The most productive time ”

a historical and from a current perspective and whether it is a positive factor in promoting international peace and security. That is precisely why the United Nations was created and why the Council is entrusted with the major responsibility of maintaining international peace and security to free mankind from the scourge of any future war and aggression. We are of the view that the reform of the Council is by no means simply a matter of increasing the number of members. It is, in the final analysis, aimed at making the Council a true representative of the interests of all countries in the world, one that enjoys their trust and support, thus better reflecting the purposes and principles of the Charter. This bears on whether the Council can better fulfil its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security and enhance the authority and representativeness of its decisions. […] 3.2.3.25 6 May 1997, Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group I feel obliged to respond to the remarks just made by the distinguished representative of Germany on the proposed periodic review for new permanent members. The important question is whether periodic review affords a degree of accountability for new permanent members. Let us be clear and candid on this. Review is not tantamount to elections. Review maintains permanent status only if successful in blocking an opposed 2/3 majority. In other words, securing just 1/3 support. Hence, this could degrade the concept of review to a mere rubber stamp by which to legitimize their de facto eternal status. It is difficult for us to accept the possibility that a one-time decision will hold sway for all-time. 3.2.3.26 7 May 1997, Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] Just a follow-up to the current interesting debate on Permanent Regional Rotation (PRR). Although the distinguished representative of Malaysia just responded to several questions raised by India, my delegation believes it is still valid to ask additional questions, despite some possible overlapping. “Permanent” and “rotational” do not go hand in hand, as several delegations already noted. Therefore, we conclude that this may be meaningful only if it carries the prerogatives which Permanent Members have, such as veto power. Then, several questions naturally arise. As other delegations have pointed out, is it feasible given the prevailing atmosphere in this Working Group, to empower rotational seats with the right of veto? Moreover, is it desirable or constructive to do so? If they have veto power, are they supposed to use it only on behalf of the region they represent? If so, should some new, special decision-making mechanism be devised to ensure that those who assume a PRR seat use the veto power to the benefit of the entire region? If those who take on these seats do not reflect the will of the region as a whole, assuming there is a unified will of the region, then how do we deal with that scenario? Here, we assumed there exists such a thing as a common position of the region on specific issues the SC deals with, but, does it really exist? From our experience in the Council, it is sometimes not easy to establish even a national position on a given issue. Just imagine 48 Asian countries trying to forge a consensus position.

3  “ The most productive time ”

363

In this regard, another fundamental question comes to mind. Is PRR really supposed to represent the interests of the region? To my delegation’s understanding, the Charter never intended for the interests of geographical sectors to be represented by one or two regional countries. The five current regional groups were established in the UN for the practical purpose of elections to ensure equitable geographical distribution. Here, I emphasize the word distribution, not representation of the regional common interests. All in all, the notion of PRR seems to us interesting and creative, as all oxymoron’s do. But frankly, it gives my delegation a headache when we think of all the possible questions and problems that might arise from any attempt to materialize this idea. Who will resolve these questions? We might simply end up risking an unnecessary confrontation in the region. Especially in Asia, I see little prospect of reaching an agreement on such issues as who will assume the seats, their tenure, and the establishment of some mechanism to ensure that the so-called “common regional interests” are suitably represented. I may be wrong, but it could take a long time to reach agreement among the Asian countries on these issues. And thus, my final question: How does this entire reform process move forward in the interim? Do we have to wait until a possible outcome emerges among the 48 Asian countries? 3.2.3.27 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17311 […] Finally, on rotating permanent membership, I do not wish to hide the fact that my delegation still has certain difficulties with this concept, as do others. However, should this be the key to the magic solution we seem to be looking for, I believe the concept would and could then gain sufficient support; but for that to happen further explanations will be necessary. Under Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations confer upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in the discharge of this duty the Council acts on their behalf. What can be done to reconcile this concept with systems of regional rotation? In the most likely case – that future permanent members will not enjoy veto powers – can one envisage permanent members without the two main characteristics of permanent membership? If so, what can be done to minimize this obvious inconsistency? […] 3.2.3.28 4 December 1997, China, Mr. Qin Huasun, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 2-4 […] The core issue in the reform of the Security Council is how to enlarge it. The Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pointed out in his statement during this year’s general debate that:

311  → 3.2.1.1.57 for Austria’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, 3.3.40 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 3.4.3.47 for Austria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

364

3  “ The most productive time ”

The enlargement of the Security Council should follow the principle of equitable geographical distribution and ensure a proper balance between developing and developed countries. The Security Council will better perform the lofty mission entrusted to it under the United Nations Charter only when it becomes more broadly representative. [See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting] In 1963, the membership of the Security Council grew from 11 to 15. Since then there have been tremendous changes on the world stage, the most important of which is the emergence of a vast number of developing countries. Developing countries represent more than two thirds of the total United Nations membership and have an ever-growing influence on world affairs. The reform of the Security Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations system, should first and foremost reflect this change and redress the longstanding imbalance in geographical representation in the Security Council, particularly the imbalance between the developed and developing countries. […] It is noteworthy that as a result of discussions in the Working Group over the past several years, the so-called “quick-fix” proposal – that is, admitting some countries into the Security Council first – has been rejected. However, a small number of countries are still using such arguments as “to view the question practically and take into full consideration the actual situation in various different regions” as an excuse to apply double standards and discriminate against developing countries. We should be especially vigilant against such quick fixes “through the back door”. We believe that the legitimate demand for equitable representation of the developing countries in the Security Council is widely recognized and supported by all countries. This hardwon common understanding should be the basis and prerequisite for the future reform of the Council. Any reform plan that deviates from this common understanding will not be feasible. […] 3.2.3.29 4 December 1997, Pakistan, Mr. Ahmad, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 12-16 […] While we agree that the Security Council needs to be reformed to reflect some of the shifts and changes in the world over the past decades, we see no justification in allocating yet another seat to a single, coordinated European Union, which already occupies two of the five permanent seats in the Security Council. […] 3.2.3.30 4 December 1997, Malta, Mr. Saliba, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 30-31 […] The expansion of the permanent category today would set a precedent for future expansions of this kind, given that current decisions would be taken based on criteria that are themselves changing. This could pave the way for a situation where, in future, other States might lay claim to qualification as permanent members. This could ultimately lead to an erosion of the concept of rotation through a nonpermanent presence on the Council, which is where the larger majority of States, particularly smaller ones, will continue to serve given the constraints on the overall

3  “ The most productive time ”

365

size of the Council to preserve efficiency. It is thus that we view such safeguards as those contained in Article 23.2 on the prohibition of immediate re-election to the nonpermanent category as a guarantee of the ability of all Member States to serve and to continue to serve in future on the Security Council. […] 3.2.3.31 4 December 1997, Portugal, Mr. Soares, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 44-45 […] Another element that in our view should constitute an essential condition to be met by all permanent members is their acceptance in full of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. […]

3.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 3.3.1  20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 [8] AUSTRALIA312 [Original: English] [7 July 1993] […] Effectiveness and decision-making 5. Any change in composition must allow the Security Council to retain the capacity to act decisively and in a timely fashion, as required by Article 24 of the Charter. An increase in the membership of the Council has to be measured against the way the Council takes decisions. This requires, in the first instance, that consideration be given to the overall size of the Council. A limit of 20 seems appropriate to maintain operability. A Council of 20 would permit the preservation of the current proportion of affirmative votes [9] constituting a qualified majority (9 affirmative votes out of the 15 members), which would become 12 affirmative votes out of 20 members. […] [10] […] Possible changes to the Council’s composition 14. The Australian Government does not believe that reallocation of seats within the current size of the Council is a viable option. Australia would regard positively the creation of a small number of additional seats to be allocated among regions in a manner which promotes the Security Council’s representativeness. […] [15]

312  → 3.2.2.1.1 for Australia’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.2.2.2.2 for Australia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, both presented in the same statement.

366

3  “ The most productive time ” CHILE313

[Original: Spanish] [30 June 1993]

[…] [16] […] CONCLUSIONS 11. In light of the foregoing, Chile’s preliminary view is that the political dialogue on the reform should focus on the following key elements: (A) Number of members by which to enlarge the Council and categories of membership (1) Chile believes that the Security Council should consist of no more than 24 or 25 members, […] […] [46] […] INDIA314

[Original: English] [29 June 1993]

[…] [47] […] 4. The argument that considerations of efficiency necessitate a freezing of the size of the Council is to be weighed against the fact that unity of purpose, rather than size, is the factor determining the efficiency of the Organization. […] [52] […] JAPAN315

[Original: English] [6 July 1993]

[…] [54] […] Specific recommendations for restructuring the Security Council 9. In view of the foregoing, it is essential that the membership of the Security Coun­ cil be adequately enlarged, provided that the effective functioning of the Council will not be impaired. Specifically, the Council should be enlarged to have around 20 members at most, […] […] [68]

313  → 3.2.2.1.1 for Chile’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.2.2.3.1 for Chile’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 314  → 3.2.1.1.6 for India’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 315  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

367

3  “ The most productive time ” NEW ZEALAND316

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] Size of the Security Council 7. It is important that the Council structure facilitates efficient and effective decisionmaking. At the same time, the wider interests of the Organization would be better served if the Council’s membership better reflected the current membership of the Organization. New Zealand would support a limited [69] increase in the membership of the Council. It considers that such an increase would not impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. […] Non-permanent membership 13. […] It is our view that the total size of the Security Council should not exceed 21 members. […] [87] TURKEY317

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

[…] 5. Turkey agrees that any change must take into account the overriding necessity of preserving the Security Council’s ability to act quickly in major crises. A Security Council that is more representative would have more authority and consequently greater effectiveness to do so. However, a workable Security Council would also imply that its membership is not expanded beyond a [88] certain level. Turkey believes that a Security Council with as many as 30 members could meet these requirements. […] 3.3.2 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [3] BELIZE318

[Original: English] [14 September 1993]

[…] [4] […] 8. In the light of the aforementioned considerations, we propose that Article 23 be amended as follows:

316  → 3.2.2.1.1 for New Zealand’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.4.2.3 for New Zealand’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 317  → 3.2.2.2.2 for Turkey’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 318  → 3.2.3.2 for Belize’s position on composite permanent members, and 3.4.3.5 for Belize’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

368

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) The total membership of the Council should be 20 States; […] 3.3.3 23 November 1993, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/48/PV.62, pp. 5-7319 […] Third, what do we think would be the optimal size for an enlarged Security Council? We believe that a possible size, both allowing efficient work and reflecting the increase in the overall membership, would range somewhere between 21 and 25, which would mean a ratio of approximately nine to one or seven to one respectively. […] 3.3.4 24 November 1993, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, p. 12 […] Finally, Belize proposes that the membership of the Council should be increased in order to afford greater equality of opportunity to the vastly increased membership of the United Nations. Yet the Council must not become unwieldy. Thus Belize would agree to a membership of between 20 and 25. […] 3.3.5  20 May 1994, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 10, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.10 […] [2] MONACO320

[Original: French] [9 May 1994]

[…] [3] On that basis, the Principality of Monaco wishes to submit a proposal that might respond to many of the wishes that have been expressed, without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the Security Council. First, the number of members of the Council should be increased from 15 to 25; this already seems to have the support of many States. 3.3.6 27 May 1994, United Kingdom, Mr. Gomersall, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group321 […] My delegation has listened most carefully to your remarks this morning in introducing your “non-paper”322 and to your suggestions for the further work of the Group. We greatly appreciate your efforts, and those of the Bureau, in seeking to move our work forward. The essence of my comments is that the paper overstates the degree of 319  → 3.2.1.1.10 for Austria’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 320  → 3.2.2.2.7 for Monaco’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 321  → 3.2.3.7 for the United Kingdom’s position on the non-paper submitted by the chairman of the OEWG, presented in the same statement. 322  27 May 1994, Non-Paper by the chairman of the OEWG, → 3.1.4.

3  “ The most productive time ”

369

convergence on some of the key issues and that for our future work, we could do better to proceed by more informal consultations than by repetition of formal statements in open session. […] […] It was probably not wise, for example, to try to specify figures for an enlarged Council at this stage. But if it were to be done, the range of 20-25 would be too high since some of those who expressed support for a modest enlargement did not support an enlargement as high as that, given the risks to the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. […] 3.3.7 13 October 1994, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 7-8323 […] First, the basic guideline for the future composition of the Council is the need to ensure its representative character as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of its work. The envisaged enlargement should therefore be limited: the number of additional members should be relatively small. We believe that the future composition of the Council should in any case not exceed 25 members. […] 3.3.8 13 October 1994, Turkey, Mr. Batu, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 13-14324 […] The idea that there is a correlation between the size of the Council and its efficiency is inherently misleading. The determining factor in increasing the efficiency of the work of the Council will be the political will of its members and the support of the general membership, rather than its size. The Council will become more effective when it is perceived by the international community as being more equitably representative of the general membership, and thus more authoritative in its decisions. […] 3.3.9 13 October 1994, France, Mr. Ladsous, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 16-17325 […] It might also mean, either as a complementary or as an alternative formula, an increase in the number of non­-permanent members, provided that the increase is only moderate and would not paralyse the Council’s work. We could envisage a membership of about 20. […] 3.3.10 13 October 1994, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 19-21326 […] It is proposed that the maximum number of seats in the Council would be approximately 23. Of these, there would be a maximum of 9 indefinite members and a 323  → 3.2.1.1.21 for Austria’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.3.6 for Austria’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 324  → 3.2.2.2.11 for Turkey’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 325  → 3.2.1.1.22 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.2.2.2.12 for France’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 326  → 3.2.3.8 for Belize’s position on redefining the two existing categories of membership, presented in the same statement.

370

3  “ The most productive time ”

minimum of 14 regular members. Since, in both categories, a composite or constituency group of two or more States would count as one member, the actual number of participating States could be considerably larger than 23. […] 3.3.11 13 October 1994, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 14-17327 […] At the same time, we believe, as do others, that one of the major strengths of the Security Council lies in its limited membership. For this reason, my delegation would support a prudent increase of not more than 10 seats. […] 3.3.12 14 October 1994, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, p. 10328 […] In the opinion of the Russian Federation, an absolute, mandatory condition for resolving the question of increasing the Council’s membership is that the effectiveness of the Security Council be maintained and strengthened, especially in the present situation, when the world has barely recovered from the threat of global nuclear confrontation and is facing new challenges to international peace and security. For that reason, Russia supports the proposal for a limited expansion of the membership of the Security Council, up to a limit of 20 seats. This would make it possible to maintain the Council’s ability to react effectively and promptly to sudden changes in international affairs. […] 3.3.13 14 October 1994, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 15-17329 In this regard I wish to associate my delegation with the views that were ably expressed by Tunisia on behalf of the Organization of African Unity330 and by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.331 […] Many delegations have expressed the view that a Security Council of 25 members would, at present, be a realistic option. We subscribe to that view, taking into account the arguments that have been presented on the need to ensure legitimacy, equitable regional representation and proportionate representation of the general membership. Among those 25 seats it is possible to negotiate the distribution of both permanent and non­-permanent seats to correct the imbalance created by history, particularly with regard to the distribution of the permanent seats on the Security Council. […]

327  → 3.2.3.9 for Malta’s position on the membership of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 328  → 3.4.1.1 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 329  → 3.2.1.1.24 for Kenya’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 330  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.3.7. 331  13 October 1994, pp. 14-15.

371

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.3.14 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 […] [68] Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia332 A/AC.247/5 (c) [Original: English] [9 May 1995] […] [69] […] 5. Size [70] 11. Twenty to 25 should be the size of an enlarged Security Council. […] [71] 4. Belize333

A/AC.247/5 (d) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

[…] [75] IV. REGULAR MEMBERSHIP 12. […] For reasons that have been canvassed in this Statement, the number of regular members should be increased so that the proportion of regular to indefinite members would be approximately 2:1. In that event, the total number of members of the Council would be approximately 33, which would be consistent with efficiency, particularly if the Council ensures that its procedures are consistent with the effective use of time. As long as there is continued emphasis on equitable geographical distribution and the composite or constituency modality is utilized, it is perceived that the criteria presently in Article 23 (1) would suffice. V. COMPOSITE OR CONSTITUENCY MEMBERSHIP 13. Regionalism is at the core of the proposals discussed so far. The expression has been used mainly in the sense of the existing United Nations regional groups. Consistently with the Council’s role in peace and security, it has also been used in the sense of the functional security regions, which are the subject of Chapter VIII of the Organization’s Charter. As noted in the Secretary-General’s recent update to (A/50/60-S/1995/1)334 and the Council’s recent debate on the Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111),335 the Organization has been relying increasingly on regional mechanisms. Since it appears 332  → 3.2.1.1.25 for these states support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.4.3 for these states’ position against new categories of seats, and 3.4.3.12 for these states’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 333  → 3.2.3.12 for Belize’s position on redefining the two existing categories of membership, and 3.4.3.12 for Belize’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 334  3 January 1995, UN Doc. A/50/60-S-1995/1. 335  17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111.

372

3  “ The most productive time ”

likely that this trend will continue, it is rational to relate the composition of the Council to this reality, which bears a broad relationship to collective self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter). This is the essence of the composite or constituency modality, which follows a development in agencies that provide specific benefits or have certain defined or tangible functions. […] [94] 9. Movement of Non-Aligned Countries336

A/AC.247/5 (i) [Original: English] [13 February 1995]

CLUSTER I REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL As regards the expansion of the Security Council, the Non­-Aligned countries are guided by the positions enunciated in the final documents adopted at the Jakarta Summit337 and at subsequent Ministerial meetings in Cairo338 and New York.339 […] [95] 6. Increase the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 based on the guiding principles (see Annex340). […] [104] 10. Nordic countries341,*1

A/AC.247/5 (j) [Original: English] [14 June 1995]

Position paper Cluster I – The fundamental objective of an enlargement of the Security Council should be to strengthen its capacity to discharge the duties assigned to it by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. – There should be an increase in the number of both permanent and nonpermanent members. – In enlarging the Security Council special importance should be given to the principle of equitable geographical representation. − The total size of the Security Council should be a function of the abovementioned requirements. It should be in the low twenties, preferably 23. 336  → 3.2.1.3.5 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the nonpermanent category, presented in the same statement. 337  6 September 1992, → 2.23. 338  29 July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/287-S/1994/894. 339  30 September 1994, UN Doc. A/49/462 and Corr.1. 340  → 3.2.1.3.5 for the other part of the Non-Aligned Movement’s position, presented in the same statement. 341  → 3.2.1.1.25 for the Nordic Countries’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

373

3  “ The most productive time ” […] [109] 12. Turkey342

A/AC.247/5 (l) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

[…] [110] […] 3. Turkey holds the view that a Security Council with at least 25 members would be more representative as well as more effective and efficient. […] Original footnote Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

*1

3.3.15 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9343 […] There is consensus on the principle of expanding the Council, but not on its total membership or its composition. Spain favours a moderate increase in the number of members of the Council to a total of 21 to 25 members. This would make it possible to improve the representativeness of the Council by making it more balanced and democratic, while at the same time maintaining a composition consistent with the requirements of efficiency and speed in deliberation and decision-making. […] 3.3.16 13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 16-18344 […] First, in our view, the main objective of the reform must be to guarantee a high degree of representativity in the Council and the efficiency and effectiveness of its work. With this in mind, its future enlargement – which, in any case, should not exceed a total of 25 members – has to take full account of the reality and pluralism of today’s world and satisfy the need for equitable geographic representation. […] 3.3.17 13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24345 […] My delegation has previously expressed the view that the Security Council should be expanded to at least 25 members. We still subscribe to this view, as we feel that it is possible to distribute the seats in a fairer way with this number of members and to correct the imbalance that has characterized the Council’s membership to date. […] 342   → 3.2.2.2.14 for Turkey’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 343  → 3.2.3.16 for Spain’s position on the possibility of a more frequent presence of certain states on the Security Council, and 3.4.3.14 for Spain’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 344  → 3.2.1.1.28 for Austria’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.3.16 for Austria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 345  → 3.2.2.3.10 for Kenya’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.2.19 for Kenya’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

374

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.3.18 14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3346 […] In so far as the optimal number of members in any reconstituted Council is concerned, we are willing to show reasonable flexibility. While favouring the middle to upper end in a range of 20 to 30 members, we are not as yet wedded to a precise figure. Our final determination will be made once we are persuaded that the criteria of equitable distribution and the Council’s effectiveness have been satisfied. […] 3.3.19 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.58, pp. 5-6347 […] Thirdly, we would support a modest number of additional seats beyond those for Japan and Germany. However, we believe the total size of the Council should not exceed 20. […] 3.3.20 14 November 1995, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 17-18348 […] Ukraine favours an increase in the composition of the Security Council of up to at least 25 members, which would incorporate the interests of all the regional groups and correspond to the principle of equitable geographic distribution. […] 3.3.21 15 November 1995, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, UN Doc. A/50/PV.60, pp. 3-4349 […] Russia recognizes the need for a limited expansion of the membership of the Council – up to 20 members – which would make it possible to preserve its compact nature, which is important for its efficiency. […] 3.3.22 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group350 […]

346  → 3.2.3.17 for CARICOM’s position on Security Council reform, and 3.4.2.20 for CARICOM’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 347  → 3.2.1.1.30 for the United States nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.4.1.2 for the United States position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 348  → 3.2.2.2.17 for Ukraine’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 349  → 3.2.3.19 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 3.2.2.2.18 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 350  → 3.2.1.1.36 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.3.17 for Japan’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.4.2 for Japan’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

375

[…] My delegation believes that the membership of an expanded Council should be in the low twenties in order to ensure a proper balance between the need to enhance representativeness and the need to maintain efficiency. […] 3.3.23 27 March 1996, Australia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.16 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XIII, pp. 60-63351 SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBERS

[…] 6. When the 1963 decision was taken to increase the elected membership of the Council from 6 to 10 members, the membership of the United Nations was 109 Member States. Subtracting the 5 permanent members from that number and then dividing 104 by 10 reveals that the representation ratio for non-permanent members of the Council was 10.4:1. 7. If such a ratio of representation were applied to today’s membership of 185, minus 5 permanent members, that would suggest that there should be 17 or 18 non-permanent members. 8. This points, straightaway, to an issue on which there has been widespread agreement within the Working Group, namely that whatever expansion of the Council is agreed upon should not produce a Council of an overall size that would reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of its work. A Council of 18 non-permanent members, together with the present 5 permanent members, would begin to approach the margin of such effectiveness and efficiency of operation. In addition, when taking into account the widespread agreement that the expansion of the Council must be in both Charter categories of membership and thus include an increase in the number of permanent members in a way that responds to both contemporary realities and the imperative of balance between North and South within the permanent membership, then that margin is reached. 9. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these central facts is that the ratio of representation for non-permanent that existed in the past, namely 10.4:1, must now be altered. 10. Turning to today’s membership of 185 States and subtracting 5 permanent members so that the electoral pool is 180 States, the question becomes – what ratio of representation should be applied? 11. If that ratio were moved from 10.4:1 to 11:1 then this would mean between 16 and 17 non-permanent members. If the ratio were 12:1 then this would mean exactly 15 Member States. 12. Fifteen non-permanent Member States plus the five present permanent Member States would provide a Council within the numerical limit that is considered efficient and effective. But it would again fail the requirement to expand the Council in each of the Charter categories of membership. Accordingly, if the category of permanent membership were also to be expanded by 5, as is widely discussed, then the overall size 351  → 3.2.1.1.34 for Australia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

376

3  “ The most productive time ”

of the Council, 25, would be of a size that a very large number of Member States have indicated they believe would be acceptable. […] 3.3.24 28 March 1996, United Kingdom, Mr. Manley, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group352 […] For my delegation that means that all proposals for enlargement, in whichever category, have to be judged against the criteria of effectiveness. That means that, in terms of size, the enlargement should be of five or so seats and not one which undermines the Council’s deliberative and decision-making process and, in particular, its ability to react quickly to threats to international peace and security. […] 3.3.25 24 April 1996, United States of America, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures353 […] Since the UNSC was created fifty years ago, the global economic and political situation has been transformed. […] Within the UN, there is broad agreement that the structure of the Security Council should be altered to reflect these changes. A High-Level Working Group on Security Council Reform has been established to formulate recommendations. The United States believes it is essential that the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNSC be preserved. To this end, our position is that: ◯ […] ◯ the size of the Council should not exceed twenty members; ◯ […] […] 3.3.26 10 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group354 Composition and Size of the Security Council: Non-permanent Members […] The new overall-size of the Council should be in the low mid-twenties. […]

352  → 3.2.2.3.18 for the United Kingdom’s support of regional seats, and 3.2.1.1.37 for the United Kingdom’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 353  The United States confirmed this position on 30 October 1996 in UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 16-17, and on 4 December 1997 in UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, p. 27. → 3.2.1.1.40 for the United States nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.4.1.4 for the United States position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 354  → 3.2.1.1.41 for Germany’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

377

3.3.27 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group355 […] Finally, regarding the subject of non-permanent membership, my delegation notes a substantial degree of convergence of opinion on the need for expansion. If we are unable to narrow the gap between opposing views on the expansion of permanent membership, one option would be an increase in the non-permanent category only, bringing the total size of the Security Council to the low or mid-twenties. […] 3.3.28 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90356 […] 4. The Open-ended Working Group’s two previous reports357 reflected the agreement by all States Members of the United Nations that the membership of the Security Council must be increased. Unfortunately, it was not possible to reach an agreement on the parameters and configuration of such an increase. At the same time, there was a significant convergence of views among delegations in the Working Group regarding the future size of the Security Council. An absolute majority of delegations were in favour of expanding the Council to 23 to 25 members. 5. In this regard, Ukraine considers that, at the current stage, the Working Group could recommend that the General Assembly consider the question of increasing the membership of the Security Council to 25 members, which would provide a framework for future negotiations in the Working Group. Such a decision would not predetermine the outcome of negotiations on whether or not the number of Council members in both categories – permanent and non-permanent – should be increased and, if so, in what proportion. […] 3.3.29 29 October 1996, Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 1-4358 […] At this stage, we believe, the least controversial issue is the number of seats in the expanded Security Council. Using the principle of the lowest common denominator, the Working Group could have taken a decision to expand the Council to 25 or 26 members. My delegation put forward this proposal during the work of our Working Group and would like to reaffirm that it is still on the negotiating table.

355  → 3.2.1.2.12 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.2.21 for Korea’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.4.3.25 for Korea’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 356  → 3.2.2.2.23 for Ukraine’s support of semi-permanent seats, and 3.4.4.3 for Ukraine’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 357  2 September 1994, UN Doc. A/48/47; 15 September 1995, UN Doc. A/49/47. 358  → 3.2.2.2.23 for Ukraine’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement.

378

3  “ The most productive time ”

One of the positive aspects of such a decision lies in its confidence-building potential. Once assured that the interests of all regional groups have been met, Member States, not afraid of being overwhelmed, would be more inclined to reach an agreement. At the same time, this would make further negotiations more parameter-oriented. […] 3.3.30 29 October 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 5-7359 […] Together with new non-permanent seats, the overall size of a future Security Council should be between 23 and 26, preferably 24. […] 3.3.31 29 October 1996, Poland, Mr. Włosowicz, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 14-15360 […] At this stage I would like to focus on one point. We believe that the solution concerning the size of the Council is to expand it to between 21 and 25 members. […] 3.3.32 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20361 […] In order to agree on the distribution of seats, it is important that agreement be reached on the overall size of the Council. The figure of 25 is the very minimum that would ensure equitable distribution. This is the only way that could enable us to address the existing imbalance in the Council, where four out of five permanent members now present virtually the same form of civilization. There is no more justification for Africa and Latin American and the Caribbean not being represented in the permanent membership. […] 3.3.33 30 October 1996, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 13362 […] We must draw a clear conclusion from this mandate: the number of members of the Security Council must be increased, but in a way that will not prevent it from responding swiftly to crisis situations that pose a threat to international peace and security. For that reason we feel that a few more than 20 members should be the maximum. […] 3.3.34 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17363 […] […] An expansion in the non-permanent category would therefore require enhanced participation from all geographic regions. Such an expansion would also 359  → 3.2.2.3.20 for Germany’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 360  → 3.2.1.3.9 for Poland’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 361  → 3.2.2.3.21 for Kenya’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.3.33 for Kenya’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 362  → 3.2.1.1.46 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 363  → 3.2.1.3.10 for Canada’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 3.4.3.35 for Canada’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

379

need to be relatively modest, perhaps 6 to 10 members, to enhance the effective functioning of the Council. […] 3.3.35 27 March 1997, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex III, pp. 10-12364 […] Cluster 1 Size 7. The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25. […] 3.3.36 12 June 1997, Poland, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex X, pp. 51-54365 […] II. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] 8. We are ready to accept proposals for an increase in the membership of the Council of up to 21 to 25 members. […] 3.3.37 27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.10 = Annex XI UN Doc. A/51/47, pp. 55-57366 […] II. Section of the final document of the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries related to the reform of the Security Council […] 28. […] The Movement would be guided by the following considerations in approaching the issue of Security Council reform in discussions at the United Nations: […] − The membership of the Security Council should be increased by not less than 11 members based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States; […]

364  → 3.2.1.1.54 for these states’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 365  → 3.2.1.3.13 for Poland’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 366  → 3.2.1.3.14 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 3.4.3.44 for the Movement’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

380

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.3.38 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59367 HARARE DECLARATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL*1

[…] 2. The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. This expansion of the Security Council should embrace both categories of its membership, for the benefit of developing countries, and African countries in particular; […] Original footnote Adopted at the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Harare from 2 to 4 June 1997.

*1

3.3.39 17 July 1997, United States of America, Mr. Bill Richardson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group368 Mr. Chairman, at my initiative, the U.S. Government has just undertaken a thorough review of our policy on Security Council reform. Secretary Albright played a central role in this review. […] Our policy review also determined that we have no flexibility above and beyond 20-21 seats on a reformed Council. This would permit expansion of the council by onethird, with up to five new permanent seats. We would oppose any resolution which called for higher numbers. […] 3.3.40 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17369 […] We believe […] that the balance in the composition of the Council between permanent and non-permanent membership should be maintained within an overall number not exceeding 25. […]

367  → 3.2.2.3.29 for the Organization of African Unity’s support of regional seats, and 3.4.2.21 for OAU’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 368  → 3.2.1.1.55 for the United States support of additional permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 369  → 3.2.1.1.57 for Austria’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, 3.2.3.27 for Austria’s position on regional rotating membership, and 3.4.3.47 for Austria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

381

3.3.41 5 December 1997, South Africa, Mr. Jele, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 1-2370 […] […] [A]ttempts to limit the overall increase in the membership to a total of fewer than 26 members will constitute an under-representation of the developing countries and therefore not amount to a meaningful enlargement of the Council. It is our view that the whole question of Security Council efficiency can be properly addressed by improving the working methods of that body rather than by limiting its expansion, because such a restriction would ignore the principle of the sovereign equality of States and the need for representation based on equitable geographical distribution, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. […] 3.3.42 5 December 1997, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 15-16371 […] We believe that in order not to jeopardize the ability of the Council to act rapidly and effectively, the total number of members should remain below 25. […]

3.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 3.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 3.4.1.1 14 October 1994, Russian Federation, Mr. Fedotov, A/49/PV.32, pp. 10-11372 […] it is very important to observe the criteria laid down in the Charter for membership of the Security Council, to the effect that due regard should be specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. In our view, the present status of the permanent members of the Security Council should be maintained. […] 3.4.1.2 14 November 1995, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, UN Doc. A/50/ PV.58, pp. 5-6373 […] Secondly, there should be no change in the status, powers and obligations of the current permanent members, all of which are countries with global political and economic influence and a capacity to contribute to peace and security by concrete measures on a global basis. […]

370  → 3.2.1.1.59 for South Africa’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 371  → 3.2.1.1.61 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 372  → 3.3.12 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 373  → 3.2.1.1.30 for the United States nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.3.19 for the United States position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

382

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.1.3 27 March 1996, United States of America, Mr. Inderfurth, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] The US does not support any abridgement of the right of veto or its scope of application as set forth in Article 27 of the Charter. As a matter of daily practice we seek to use the Council as effectively as possible and thus try vigorously to reduce or minimize conditions which may lead to veto use. These efforts are increasingly successful. There are exceptions, but they are rare and they carry far less risk for the United Nations or the world community, than veto restriction or abolition. It is a fact that the continued existence of the veto has repeatedly avoided a level of disunity or direct confrontation between the major powers, or any one of them and the United Nations, which could subvert a Council action or fatally impair the Council’s ability to carry out its duties. We do not take this fact lightly or casually or see it as anachronistic. On a veto-related matter I must admit that we are unpersuaded that the absence of Charter definition of “procedural” issues is in itself a compelling argument to spell this out in great detail today. The fact is that the question of which issues are procedural and which are not is not now a matter of particular difficulty in the Council. It has not stimulated disputes or led to operational impediments. On the other hand the effort to nail down these questions may well give rise to serious problems. […] 3.4.1.4 24 April 1996, United States of America, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures374 […] The United States believes it is essential that the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNSC be preserved. To this end, our position is that: […] ◯ the powers of the current permanent members of the Council must be preserved. 3.4.1.5 21 May 1996, United Kingdom, Sir John Weston, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group375 […] The manner in which Article 27(3) is expressed on what we colloquially call the veto power makes clear that the purpose is not to confer upon certain states a privilege which they may abuse, but to ensure that the important decisions of the Council, which may involve the use of force or economic measures to uphold international peace and security, are taken with the commitment of the permanent members to cooperate in applying and supporting such measures. It is the one provision which, perhaps together with the limited size of the Council, most distinguishes the Security Council from the other bodies of the United Nations and contributes most directly to the authority of the Council and the achievement of decisions by the highest possible degree of consensus. As such we believe it is vital to retain this central part of the constitution of the Security Council given what the Charter has to say about the need for prompt and effective action by the United Nations.

374  → 3.2.1.1.40 for the United States nomination of Germany and Japan for permanent membership, and 3.3.25 for the United States position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 375  Source: Global Policy Forum.

3  “ The most productive time ”

383

The veto power is popularly associated with the period of the Cold War when the Council was largely unable to function in major confrontations between the two major blocs. Even then, as has been noted by several in this Working Group, the existence of the veto at least protected the authority of the United Nations from being coopted or usurped by one bloc or the other. The role of the UN may have been diminished during the Cold War but a consequence of the veto in those years was that the United Nations survived, and that the Organisation has become the forum for genuine cooperation between the members of the same blocs since the end of the Cold War. While we see no likelihood of a return to international bloc politics, the fact that the veto served in those years to protect the neutrality of the United Nations and its unique position as the single global forum accepted by all is still relevant. Overall, both within the United Nations and beyond, the verdict on the cooperation of the permanent members in managing international peace and security in post-Cold War years so far has been largely positive. Today’s multi-polar and interdependent society recognises the need for an international capability and authority for the application of legally endorsed measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. The pressures from the international community on all members of the Security Council, including the permanent members, to cooperate in expressing the will of the international community and finding real solutions to intractable problems is extremely strong. Hence, for example, the Security Council was able to reach a unanimous position on recent events in Lebanon which was not possible in the General Assembly. That is why the Council, including the permanent members, regularly strives to avoid conditions in which a veto could be used and in this it very largely succeeds. The very few instances on which it has been used or threatened do not invalidate the overall judgement that the existence of the veto has not impeded, but actually enhanced the cohesion of the Council during these latter cooperative years. If the international community is to be in a position to ensure, through the Security Council, the prompt and effective action demanded by the Charter in confronting the day-to-day challenges of international peace and security, it is essential that its decisions be backed by the collective commitment of the Council’s members, including the permanent members. That is what Article 27(3) is designed to ensure and it continues to prove its worth. 3.4.1.6 22 May 1996, Russian Federation, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group376 […] The Russian delegation had had a number of opportunities to express its position with regard to all the items on the Working Group’s agenda, including that of decisionmaking procedures in the Security Council. Today, we would like to focus once again on the veto issue. We proceed from the assumption that this issue is one of the most important aspects of ensuring a successful work of the Council. This is why an extremely cautious, objective, and realistic approach is needed to its consideration – an approach ruling out rash and emotional assessments. 376  Source: Global Policy Forum.

384

3  “ The most productive time ”

We do not share the opinion held by some other delegations that the right of veto is an anachronism inherited by the United Nations from the times of the Cold War. Suffice it to recall that the Charter of the United Nations was elaborated and entered into force before the Cold War started. Its fundamental elements, including Article 27 (3), were initially oriented towards a long-term historic perspective which would take into account inevitable changes in the system of international relations. Topicality of these provisions today, in qualitatively new world realities, only confirms the truthfulness of the above statement. The experience of the Security Council activities, including – as rightly stated by the Permanent Representative of Great Britain377 and a number of other delegations – the Cold War period, attests to the fact that the veto is indeed a critically important and indispensable component of the mechanism of harmonizing positions and decisionmaking in the Council. The existence of the institution of the veto, its, so to say, political and psychological effect help, to a very high degree, to ensure a balanced nature of the Council decisions, to adequately take into account, during their elaboration, opinions and interests of all of its members, oftentimes, interests of other UN Member states. We agree with the evaluation of the right of veto as a peculiar guarantor of a true support, for the part of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, of the implementation of decisions being taken. This is a substantial factor of the Security Council’s effectiveness. History cannot tolerate conditionality. We can only guess how many more problems and obstacles there would have been in the way of the United Nations hadn’t its founding fathers provided a number of “in-built stabilizers” in its Charter, of which the right of veto is one. Today’s day-by-day activities of the Security Council give a number of instances when this institution, while insuring a truly collective nature of the Council’s work, exerts a positive regulatory influence. Of course, one should distinguish between the actual use of the veto and a potential possibility of its use. Within the framework of our Group, the statistics of a progressive decrease in the number of instances of the use of veto over the last years have been cited repeatedly. The practical use of veto is an exception today. As any other exception, it just corroborates the rule: the existence of a deterring factor in the form of veto is an additional encouragement for members of the Security Council to search for consensual solutions to common problems. Dialectical logic must be at work here, but this is the real state of affairs. In the last few years, we have been witnessing a serious and progressive consolidation of consensus in the Council’s activity. Taking into account the above considerations, we cannot agree with any formulas or initiatives meant to undermine or revoke the right of veto envisaged in the Charter. This has been our invariable position. Neither can we agree with arguments in favor of restricting the use of the right of veto. Veto is an integral institution which can perform its important stabilizing functions only as such. The disintegration of this integral mechanism – by the way, all the criteria suggested in this regard look pretty arbitrary – is likely to hamper the Security Council’s ability to work, which subsequently affects the UN effectiveness and 377  21 May 1996, → 3.4.1.5.

3  “ The most productive time ”

385

efficiency in general. We are confident that nobody in our Group is sincerely interested in such an outcome. We hope that the above-mentioned largely artificially raised questions won’t get in the way of a successful progress towards implementation of the Group’s mandate. For our part, we are ready to contribute, in every way possible, to the achievement of this goal. The distinguished bureau can continue to count fully on our support. 3.4.1.7 23 May 1996, United States of America, Mr. Cameron R. Hume, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group378 My remarks today bear primarily upon the question of decision-making within an expanded Security Council, specifically the veto. The issue of Security Council decision-making is of course larger than this since it involves the number of votes necessary to adopt procedural decisions as well as the size of the requisite majority for decisions on all other matters. While important questions, both of these are difficult to address meaningfully without reference to the number of total votes represented by the new Council. The veto is different because its status does not depend upon the total size of the Council, a number that has changed once since 1945 and may, if this working group is successful, change again. The unique constitutional character of the veto expresses an important and abiding reality in a world of nation states. This is the fact that international political authority cannot endure as an abstraction. Rather, it draws its life and meaning from the willingness of countries, including in particular the most powerful countries, to support that authority. The function of the veto is to help give effect to that abstraction by fusing power with authority in two ways. First, the veto excludes the possibility of disagreement among the permanent members or between some of them and the Council. Either of these circumstances could disable the Council’s capacity to act and could even provoke major conflict. Second, it assures that when the Council does act it acts with the support of its most powerful members. Its measures are thus more credible and efficacious. Same delegations concede that these considerations were relevant in 1945 but argue that following the Cold War they have become anachronisms. We disagree for two reasons. First, the veto is not a symptom of world politics but a way of regulating it. The welcome reduction in tensions between the major powers does not take away the need for the veto as a kind of emergency circuit-breaker – however less frequent may be the need for its use. Second, even as the potential for nuclear and ideological conflict between the major powers has declined, the need for their cooperation in global security efforts by, or in conjunction with, the United Nations has intensified. This growing impetus to cooperate influences the permanent members to minimize those occasions which could give rise to the threat or use of the veto. Mr. Chairman, the Movement of Non-aligned Countries379 and others have suggested restrictions on the scope of the veto as a step toward its eventual abolition. In its paper the NAM recounts the discussion concerning the scope of application of the veto that took place in various venues from 1945 through 1949 and reports that this 378  Source: Global Policy Forum. 379  18-20 October 1995, → 3.4.2.17; 27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22.

386

3  “ The most productive time ”

early attention did not lead to a legally binding agreement. On this basis the NAM concludes that there is now an urgent need to clarify the scope of veto application. The United States agrees that article 27 (3) is not dispositive on procedural versus non-procedural questions. However, we do not agree that such lack of specificity is a flaw in the Charter or Rules of Procedure or that it is a matter which urgently requires correction. Indeed, the NAM paper offers no substantive reason to change it. Decision-making is the core of this Council’s capacity to function and we ought not to embark upon change casually. The onus is upon those who seek change to show that the lack of specificity on procedural as opposed to non-procedural matters has particular cases prevented the Council from fulfilling its mandate. We see no evidence that this has. Furthermore, we see no grounds for regarding this as an urgent question. On the contrary, for more than 35 years the veto has not been used to block an action which a majority of Council members regarded as procedural. The Council has decided between procedural and substantive questions without particular difficulty and certainly without the dramatic step of Charter amendment. With respect to the NAM proposal to restrict the veto to chapter VII and to the Mexican paper380 detailing the resulting Charter amendments, I believe the United States has a profound difference of view. The necessity for consensual decision-making involving all of the permanent members exists in a wide variety of situations and not only in the case of actions under Chapter VII. The distinguished permanent representative of Mexico maintains that the permanent members, in their capacity as permanent members, lack any particular role or responsibility regarding the admission of new members of the United Nations, the suspension or expulsion of UN members, the restoration of the same, the selection of a Secretary-General and the ratification of Charter changes. He argues that these are not matters relevant to the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We disagree. Regarding UN membership, there is relatively recent evidence, in the Balkan states and elsewhere, that considerations of regional and international security can have a direct and important bearing on all membership issues. Likewise, the capacity of a future Secretary-General to play a constructive role in international peace and security matters, in cooperation with those countries having special responsibilities in this area, is surely at the heart of an assessment of his or her qualifications for the job. Our views on the proposed deletion of the veto from Articles 108 and 109 are implicit in what we have said today and since 1993: the veto is not a matter we are prepared to submit to negotiation or vote in a general conference or other venue. Finally, the case for exempting Chapter VI from the veto is in our view unconvincing. The history of conflict, including conflict since the end of the Cold War, demonstrates that international tensions and Security Council actions bearing upon them are not separable into distinct baskets according to some measurable quotient of their vital security content. For this and similar reasons the four power statement of June 1945381 380  20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 381  See United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), 1945, Vol. XI, pp. 710-14, reprinted in: Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 936-38.

3  “ The most productive time ”

387

explicitly applied the veto to the entire spectrum of Council actions regarding disputes, from proposals for peaceful settlement to actions for the removal of threats. The United States views Chapters VI and VII as legal categories that describe member state obligations and not as reliable tools for assessing, in advance and in the abstract, security concerns in a particular case and thus the relevance of the veto. In that regard it may be instructive to consider the most sensitive Chapter VI peacekeeping missions and ask whether, if the views of the most concerned permanent members were over-ruled, would such a trend make the world more or less safe? Mr. Chairman, in closing let me make two comments. First, the United States has not yet taken a position on the question of extending the veto to new permanent members. Second we are disturbed to hear a few delegations comment that without action on the veto they see no possibility for agreement. From the time of our initial statement in June of 1993382 until today’s meeting the United States has stated consistently that the veto is not a subject on which we are prepared to negotiate. That is not news for my colleagues. I believe that most members of that working group have engaged in these discussions for two and a half years without expecting that at the last minute the permanent members might be persuaded to set aside the veto. Nor, and here I respectfully disagree with the Permanent Representative of Australia, is agreement to adjust the veto a part of our mandate. Our mandate is “to consider all aspects of the question of the increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council.” The reason our mandate includes no explicit reference to the veto is that there was no agreement to do so in 1993 and that remains the case today. Mr. Chairman, the United States will continue to seek broad agreement an appropriate expansion of the Security Council. However, we would not be acting in good faith if we were to suggest that such an agreement could include a change in the existing veto right. Thank you. 3.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 3.4.2.1 25 September 1991, Venezuela, Mr. Carlos Andres Peres, UN Doc. A/46/PV.8, pp. 2-16 […] I responsibly heed the call of many peace-loving Governments so that our own people’s aspiration for democracy can also become a permanent aspiration of the United Nations. The Organisation will not be strengthened unless an agreement is reached to eliminate the right of veto exercised by the permanent members of the Security Council, a right that responded to circumstances and realities that have ceased to exist. This mechanism runs counter to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and limits its effective contributions to collective security. The right to veto Security Council resolutions is a mechanism that limits the achievement of consensus among the Member States of the United Nations. The Security Council must be a representative body, and in no way should any of its members 382  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

388

3  “ The most productive time ”

negate the majority view of the United Nations. If we want collective and democratic security, we must aspire to universal egalitarian law. I wish to propose formally that this Assembly entrust to a committee of experts the study of new foundations for the organisation and functioning of the Security Council. The countries now holding a decisive privilege would be full-fledged permanent members of the Council and the membership might even be expanded. Decisions on collective security would need at least a qualified majority of its members to reflect the general will of the international community. […] 3.4.2.2 4 October 1991, Libya, Mr. Goma Goubail, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.8, pp. 7-8 […] 24. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had been the first country to urge the international community to seek ways of strengthening the United Nations system and ensuring compliance with its resolutions: it had in fact called repeatedly for a rescinding of the right of veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council which allowed each of them to paralyse the Organization. […] 3.4.2.3 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [29] […] CUBA383

[Original: Spanish] [29 June 1993]

[30] […] 9. Although a procedure such as that outlined above would, in the view of Cuba, be an important step in the right direction, it has become patently clear, particularly in recent years, that the special privileges enjoyed by some members of the Security Council have no justification, either in the light of current realities or of the process of democratization required in our Organization. The fact that there are members whose presence in the Security [31] Council has become a quasi-divine right, without an opportunity for the Members of the United Nations as a whole to confirm periodically whether they wish to see them participate or not in the Security Council, the anachronistic and unjust “veto”, which has already exceeded the original purpose the founders of the Organization sought to ascribe to it and has become a licence which has virtually made the rules of procedure that should prevail in the work of the Council inoperable, and other rights which some countries have arrogated to themselves by virtue of their status as permanent members of the Security Council, all make it necessary for there to be a thorough and urgent review of the question. […] 13. Because the view of the Republic of Cuba on the anachronistic and unjust “veto” is well known, we shall not dwell excessively on this topic. Suffice it to recall that, in 383  → 3.2.3.1 for Cuba’s position on a periodical review of the current permanent members, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

389

our view, this procedure irretrievably vitiates the attempts to democratize the United Nations which the Secretary-General, quite properly and fairly, has considered to be his “central priority as Secretary-General”, in the report on the work of the organization which you submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.*1 Just as dangerous as the use of the “veto” in the case of Security Council resolutions, is the tendency prevailing in the Council for certain members to assume the “right” to interrupt the work [32] of the Council, to frustrate or delay the holding of formal meetings of the Council which have been duly and properly requested, and to disregard, under the pretext of a practice created expressly by them, the procedural provisions that should govern the work of the Council. 14. We believe that a genuine process of reform and democratization of the Security Council, closely linked to the objective of attaining equitable representation on the Council, must remove once and for all, not only the “veto” as reflected in the Charter, but also what might be termed the “indirect veto” now used by certain members of the Security Council. […] [44] […] GUATEMALA384

[Original: Spanish] [28 June 1993]

[…] [45] […] 9. The right of veto is, in Guatemala’s view, an institution which is contrary to democratic principles and stands in direct opposition to the sovereign equality of States. While the Council’s decision-making process is set out in the Charter, this process must be revised by eliminating the veto or, failing that, by taking decisions to regulate its use, thereby making it impossible for any permanent member to prevent the Council from adopting resolutions or decisions. […] [55] […] MALAYSIA385 […] [58] […]

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

D. The veto powers enjoyed by the permanent membership should be abolished 13. In the long term, consistent with many changes that are taking place around the world, a new mechanism that would abolish the vetoing power now enjoyed by the permanent members of the Security Council needs to be introduced. 14. The victorious Powers of 1945 which accorded themselves special privileges as permanent members are no longer the exclusive pre-eminent Powers, as other new centres of power have since emerged.

384  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Guatemala’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 385  → 3.2.1.3.2 for Malaysia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement.

390

3  “ The most productive time ”

15. An assessment of utilization of veto power would indicate that the veto is being used in support of partisan and national interest rather than in defence of issues and principles and in the interest of the international community. Since the inception of the United Nations in 1945, a total of 280 vetoes were exercised by the permanent members of the Security Council, as follows: [59] No. of vetoes Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russian Federation) 124 (1) United States of America 82 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 33 China 22 France 18 The recourse to the veto in most of the above cases tarnished the veto mechanism. 16. Before any final decision on the abolishment of veto power is made, ideas such as the one suggested by the Netherlands386 should be closely examined. In order to restrict any abuse of the privilege of veto, the Netherlands suggested the adoption of a double veto, i.e., two negative votes by permanent members being required to veto a decision instead of one. The bottom line is that no country, however powerful, should arbitrarily stand in the path of collective needs as determined by the general membership of the United Nations. 17. In the meantime, the idea of a veto has amplified the dominant role of the permanent members of the Security Council, turning them out to be an exclusive group which has diminished the role of non-permanent members. The threat of a veto on recent occasions has been utilized to stymie worthwhile initiatives of other members of the Security Council. […] [68] NEW ZEALAND387

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] [69] […] 11. New Zealand remains, as it was in 1945, adamantly opposed to the veto. New Zealand will vote against any proposed Charter amendment on additional permanent membership of the Council that includes such a provision. We would support removal of veto rights from the five existing permanent members, or the placing of restrictions on the use of the veto. […] Original footnote Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/47/1), para. 9.

*1

386  22 September 1992, → 3.2.2.2.1. 387  → 3.2.2.1.1 for New Zealand’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, and 3.3.1 for New Zealand’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

391

3.4.2.4 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [7] […] INDONESIA388

[Original: English] [13 July 1993]

[…] [8] […] 4. It may also be timely and pertinent to undertake a constructive review of the veto powers so as not to perpetuate imbalances and discriminatory treatment in the United Nations. The veto powers, which ensure an exclusive and dominant role for the permanent members of the Council, are incompatible with the ongoing endeavours aimed at reforming and improving certain structures and procedures of the United Nations as an essential component in efforts to strengthen multilateralism. […] [11] LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA389

[Original: Arabic] [8 June 1993]

[…] 2. The Charter was approved in an international situation that was totally different from the current one, and the challenges confronting international peace and security at the current stage of international relations, which emerged following the end of the cold war and the disappearance of international equilibrium based on bipolarity, require a new approach capable of dealing with them. There is now a more urgent need than at any time in the past to review the Charter, particularly representation on the Security Council, so as to make the Charter reflect the current realities of inter­ national relations and capable of coping with the new international situation. The most important of these realities are as follows: […] (b) Respect for the principle of equal sovereignty of States and equal rights and obligations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter make it necessary to review the right of veto. […] [12] […] 6. There is a close link between the question of equitable representation on the Security Council, on the one hand, and strengthening the role of the Council and enhancing its effectiveness, on the other. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya therefore stresses the importance of finding ways and means to strengthen the role of the Security Council in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security and considering the elimination of the negative influences [13] that prevent the Council’s performance of the tasks entrusted to it under the Charter. In this connection, it emphasizes the following: 388  → 3.2.1.1.7 for Indonesia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 389  → 3.2.1.3.3 for Libya’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement.

392

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) Abolition of the veto in the Security Council, because the veto represents an absence of equality of sovereignty among States and is contrary to the principle of democracy. It accords a right to a small number of States and enables them to paralyse any action that the Council wishes to take where such action conflicts with their interest or the interests of their allies, in disregard of the wishes of the States Members of the United Nations on whose behalf they are acting. (b) Identification of those non-procedural matters in which the use of the veto can be suspended or restricted, for example, where this right is invoked to defend acts of aggression, occupation or injustice. […] (d) Reorientation of the work of the Security Council so that it may play the role entrusted to it on behalf of Member States in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. This reorientation should comprise, in particular: […] (iv) Eliminating the contradiction arising from the implementation of collective security measures in the event of the occurrence of aggression, on the one hand, and the right of a permanent member to use the veto on a question in which it has a direct interest, on the other. […] [19] SUDAN390

[Original: Arabic] [12 July 1993]

[…] 2. With the emergence of what has been called the new international order, there has surfaced the phenomenon of the use of double standards and of the selectivity with which the Security Council addresses general issues. This has prompted the developing countries to call for an increase in the membership of the Council in order to create places in it for themselves so that they may safeguard their interests and, in another respect, cast some light on the negative repercussion of the use of the veto. […] 4. Consideration of the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council should therefore aim at achieving the following: […] (d) The mitigation of the negative repercussions of the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Council, or the introduction of essential controls [20] on its use preparatory to its complete abolition, so as to embody the principle of equality among States in the decision-making process and ensure democratic practice in the Council, given that the right of veto offends against the principle of one Member State, one vote. […] [22] […]

390  → 3.2.1.1.7 for Sudan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.3.2 for Sudan’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

393

3  “ The most productive time ” VENEZUELA

[Original: Spanish] [22 July 1993]

[…] [23] […] III. QUESTION OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 6. We agree that, while taking steps with respect to the need to increase the membership of the Security Council, it is necessary concurrently to open a debate on the question of the veto and review thereof; Venezuela has repeatedly emphasized this matter, although historically we believe the right of veto to be an extraordinary power that arose from exceptional circumstances and was designed to consolidate and preserve the United Nations. Today this reality has been superseded and therefore it is necessary to consider the issue of the veto, perceived as anachronistic, anti-democratic and contrary to the basic principle that all States Members of the United Nations have equal rights and duties. 7. On these bases, Venezuela hopes to participate in the consideration of this question, guided by a constructive spirit and inspired by the desire to make its contribution to strengthening the role of the Security Council as the principal instrument designed to preserve international peace and security. We are fully aware of what a review of the veto power will entail and of the risks to which the system may be exposed; however, we believe that the time has come to move towards more democratic procedures in the adoption of decisions that affect us all, and that this cannot be the exclusive responsibility of a handful of States. 8. We are convinced that the new international setting – in which, although peace has gained ground over war, danger still persists – requires a Security Council which takes decisions by more democratic means, thereby rendering them more universal, acceptable and legitimate, a Security Council in which no one has exclusive and discriminatory rights. Consequently, Venezuela believes that so exclusive a privilege as the right of veto must be reviewed, particularly since the members of the Security Council – permanent and non-permanent alike – act on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations and are not prompted by their own interests. […] 3.4.2.5 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 […] [8] […] YEMEN391

[Original: Arabic] [9 August 1993]

[…] [9] […] 8. The following points, which a great many Member States find essential, represent a general approach to such restructuring: […]

391  → 3.2.1.1.8 for Yemen’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.3.3 for Yemen’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

394

3  “ The most productive time ”

(c) Abolition of the veto system and adoption of another voting system based on democratic principles (and inhibiting attempts by Member States to abuse it). A system based on the consensus or majority of States members of the Council may perhaps be the best option; […] 3.4.2.6 1 October 1993, Malaysia, Mr. Mahathir, UN Doc. A/48/PV.13, pp. 15-19 […] We talk of democracy as the only acceptable system of government. It is so good that we cannot wait for the democratic process to bring about its own acceptance by every country. It must be forced upon everyone, whether welcome or not. Yet when it comes to the United Nations, we eschew democracy. And the most undemocratic aspect of the United Nations is the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. We can accept some weighting in their favour, but for each of them alone to be more powerful than the whole membership of the United Nations is not acceptable; it was not before, it is not now, and will not be in the future. For the time being, there can be some permanent members. But the veto must go. A formula must be found for new permanent members of the Security Council. Whatever the other qualifications may be, they must include a genuine and sincere interest in international welfare. […] 3.4.2.7 23 November 1993, Syria, Mr. Shaheed, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 1-3392 […] The veto power was instituted in response to realities and situations that no longer obtain. A number of delegations are of the view that the veto is now non-existent in practice, as it has not been exercised of late regardless of the fact that there are numerous international crises. However, the fact that it has not been used of late is no guarantee that it will not be used again. Therefore, we must abolish the right of veto if possible or, at least, restrict its use, especially that since the Council was established, the exercise of the veto has been used with the purpose of imposing solutions that reflected the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council. This has proved to be obstructive to the performance of the Council’s paramount role, namely the maintenance of international peace and security. […] 3.4.2.8 30 November 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 5, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.5 […] [2] TANZANIA*1 393 […] [3] […]

[Original: English] [10 August 1993]

392  → 3.2.2.3.4 for Syria’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 393  → 3.2.1.1.14 for the African Group’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

395

7. Efforts should be made to eliminate the veto prerogative. If maintained, the additional permanent members should be granted the same status as the current five permanent members of the Council, and efforts to limit the use of the veto to certain specific issues only should be seriously pursued. […] Original footnote *1 Transmitted by the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group. 3.4.2.9 23 March 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 9, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.9 […] [2] KAZAKHSTAN394

[Original: Russian] [17 March 1994]

[…] [3] 7. Kazakhstan believes that the rule of “great Power unanimity”, often called the “veto”, does not meet the needs of the changed geopolitical situation in the world. It is Kazakhstan’s position that a need exists to work out a democratic decision-making mechanism directed towards guaranteeing that the Security Council functions effectively and takes comprehensively into account the interests of all Member States. […] 3.4.2.10  29 September 1994, Organization of African Unity, African Common Position, Doc. NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex IV, pp. 26-27395 UNITED NATIONS REFORM African common position*1 Equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council 31. The increase in the membership of and equitable representation on the Security Council has become imperative because of the need to democratize the Council and make it more efficient and transparent. The democracy that is currently being preached at the national level should prevail in the international system. It is therefore necessary to review the composition and the decision-making process of the Council in line with the above principles, as well as the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. In the implementation of these ideals, it is important to bear in mind the 394  → 3.2.1.1.16 for Kazakhstan’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 3.2.2.2.6 for Kazakhstan’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 395  → 3.2.2.3.5 for the Organization of African Unity’s support of regional seats, and 3.2.2.4.1 for the Organization’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement.

396

3  “ The most productive time ”

need for equitable geographical representation with the emphasis on an increase in the permanent membership for the benefit of developing countries, in particular Africa. Ultimately, with the progress in the democratization of the international system, permanent membership and the right of veto would be reviewed and all members of the Security Council would be elected according to the principle of equitable geographical representation in order to ensure their accountability to all the members of the United Nations, on whose behalf they assume the primary function of maintaining inter­ national peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. […] […] 33. […] This can be achieved by the following steps, inter alia: […] (e) The review and eventual elimination of the right of veto. Current efforts to limit the use of the veto, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations (Chapter VI), should continue to be encouraged as they reflect the consensus which is currently emerging in international relations. If the veto is to be maintained, Africa might request that the additional permanent members should be granted the same privileges as the five current permanent members of the Security Council. The number of vetoes required to block action should be increased. […] Original footnote Extract from Organization of African Unity Document NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev.2 of 29 September 1994.

*1

3.4.2.11 13 October 1994, Malaysia, Mr. Hasmy, UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 9-11 […] Another equally important aspect that we are seeking in the reform exercise is the elimination of the veto. My delegation has always questioned the continuing relevance of the veto in the light of some unhealthy trends in the Security Council, where only one Power or group of Powers increasingly appears to be taking control of decisionmaking. In this regard, my delegation would like to reiterate that the veto should be abolished for the following reasons: First, the victorious Powers of 1945, which accorded themselves special privileges as permanent members, are no longer the exclusive pre-eminent Powers, as new centres of power have since emerged. Therefore, in our view, the veto is obsolete in the context of current realities. Secondly, the right of veto undermines the principle of the sovereign equality of States as provided for in the Charter. Thirdly, the veto undermines the concept of collective security of States as enshrined in the Charter. As we indicated in our submission to the Secretary-General, no country, however powerful, should arbitrarily stand in the path of collective needs as determined by the general membership of the United Nations. (A/48/264, p. 59)396 396  20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3.

3  “ The most productive time ”

397

Fourthly, the veto power allows the permanent members to protect or shield any States they desire from the governance of the Security Council. An assessment of utilization of the veto would indicate that it is being used in support of partisan and national interests rather than in defence of issues and principles and in the interests of the international community in the maintenance of international peace and security. Fifthly, the threat of the use of the veto is often used even to prevent or delay a request for debate intended to allow the general membership to make its pronouncements on critical issues relating to international peace and security. Finally, the veto marginalizes the role of the non-permanent members. My delegation is fully aware that no permanent member will at present accept a Charter amendment that results in the abolition of the veto power. In this regard, my delegation shares the views of those delegations that have proposed restrictions on the application of that power. The details of our proposal will be raised when the Working Group convenes. […] 3.4.2.12 13 October 1994, Colombia, Mr. Londoño, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 1-2397 […] In our opinion, there should be a freeze on the category of permanent members and it should gradually be eliminated. Those seats are the result of negotiations conducted in the past which have no validity in our times. Likewise, the veto should be restricted and eventually eliminated. Clearly, the idea of its extension to more members of the Security Council should be discarded. […] 3.4.2.13 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martinez Blanco, UN Doc. A/49/PV.31, pp. 13-14398 I am highly honoured to speak on behalf of the countries of Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. […] The countries of the Central American region believe that any reform formula that is adopted should, in any event, go hand in hand with corresponding reform to the Charter of the Organization and at the same time provide for the total and absolute removal of the right of veto, a right currently enjoyed by the five permanent members. The right of veto should not be granted to any State in any circumstances, whether they may be called permanent or semi-permanent members, for that right is an anachronism which 50 years ago may perhaps have had some logical justification, since the world was just awakening from the nightmare of the Second World War. But at the present time, now that the cold war is over, the right of veto no longer has any justification or raison d’être. Its total and utter removal will serve fully to safeguard the principle of the sovereign equality of States Members of this Organization, contained in Article 2 (1) of the Charter. […]

397  → 3.2.1.2.5 for Colombia’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.2.9 for Colombia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 398  → 3.2.2.1.6 for the Central American Countries’ support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

398

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.2.14 14 October 1994, Ghana, Mr. Lamptey, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 9-10 […] Furthermore, the Ghana delegation believes that permanent membership in the Security Council of the five major wartime allies, although well-founded then, has become obsolete. And if it is thought necessary to retain permanent membership of the Council, then new arrangements must be reached which will create a general sense of equality and global balance in an organ as vital as the Security Council. The question that immediately comes to mind is whether or not the veto power in the possession of the five permanent members is still necessary in the present era. This is certainly a matter that needs to be discussed thoroughly if the reform is to promote equity. Ghana subscribes fully to the position collectively articulated by the African Group399 on this question. At the same time, we are aware of the varied positions assumed by other groups and countries. We shall join in the creative effort to find meaningful compromises to ensure a better system. What is important to emphasize here is that, despite our call for the increase in the number of Security Council members to 25, the issue is not a quantitative one – it is a qualitative one. It has to do with the exercise of power. It is the perception of most, including Ghana, that the power inherent in the right of veto should no longer be exercised by a privileged few and that its exercise should be democratized in such a way as to reflect balance, equity and the reality of the present international order as symbolized in the membership of this Organization. There could be many ways to achieve this objective and we should all be creative in this regard. We need a new Security Council that will reflect the will of every nation on earth. We need a Security Council whose work is transparently reflective of all our common aspirations. We need a Security Council shorn of every vestige of big-Power politics, self-righteousness and the arrogance of size or wealth. Above all, we need a Security Council that will not usurp the function of bona fide international legal institutions and their regimes of the rule of law, a Council that cannot assume the role of a global supreme court without the benefit of a balanced mechanism through which accused nations can defend themselves, a Council without the attributes of prosecutors, judges and executioners of judgments at times flawed by bias, prejudice and preconceptions. It is time to construct a new Security Council if we are to move away from the failures of the past and remove the blatant weaknesses of the present. […] 3.4.2.15 14 October 1994, Zimbabwe, Mr. Sengwe, UN Doc. A/49/PV.32, pp. 17-18400 […] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has issued an African common position,401 and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has issued declarations and communiqués stating its position402 on the issues currently before us. Zimbabwe fully supports

399  See, e.g., the statements of 30 November 1993, → 3.4.2.8, and of 29 September 1994, → 3.4.2.10. 400  → 3.2.2.3.8 for Zimbabwe’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 401  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 402  See, e.g., the statements of 6 September 1992, → 2.23, 3 June 1994, Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Final Document, in UN Doc.

3  “ The most productive time ”

399

and subscribes to these collective positions on the restructuring and reorganization of the Security Council. […] Thus any Security Council reform must begin on the premise that the democratic ethic that is now a cause for celebration within our national borders should find expression at the international level too. In this respect, the notion of absolute permanent membership of the Security Council and the attendant veto should now be regarded as relics of a bygone era and should therefore be abolished. Is it not the greatest irony of our times that those who assiduously resist the democratization of relations between nations are the most vocal in insisting on democratic governance within nations? From the work done so far, it would appear that attainment of the goal of abolishing absolute permanent membership and the veto may be long in coming. Therefore, any transitional arrangements arrived at must seriously address the imbalances and injustices of existing arrangements. […] We believe that while the institution of the veto lasts, its use should be circumscribed so as to prevent its unilateral use to promote or protect narrow national interests. […] 3.4.2.16 11 October 1995, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choi Su Hon, UN Doc. A/50/PV.29, pp. 5-10403 […] Another point is that the veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council should be abrogated. The removal of the veto system will mean removing the major stumbling-block to the democratization of the United Nations and the elimination of the legacies of the cold-war era that have encouraged hegemonistic and high-handed actions by a minority of big Powers. […] 3.4.2.17  18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, The Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Final Document404 […] 50. In view of the increasing trend on the part of some countries to exercise undue influence over the Security Council and the privileged and dominant role that the veto rights ensures for the Permanent Members of the Council, which is contrary to the aim of democratizing the United Nations, they reiterated their position adopted at the Fifth,405 Sixth406 and Tenth407 Summits, regarding the special privilege by Permanent A/49/287-S/1994/894, and of 5 October 1994, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries, in UN Doc. A/49/PV.29, pp. 14-15. 403  → 3.2.3.15 for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s position on the representation of developing regions and against a permanent seat for Japan, presented in the same statement. 404  → 3.2.1.3.6 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the nonpermanent category, presented in the same statement. 405  16-19 August 1976, UN Doc. A/31/197 (dated 8 September 1976). 406  3-9 September 1979, UN Doc. A/34/542 (dated 11 October 1979). 407  6 September 1992, → 2.23.

400

3  “ The most productive time ”

Members of the Security Council to exercise the veto, and committed themselves to actively promote its curtailment with a view to its elimination. Furthermore, while welcoming the actions taken by the Council with regard to its transparency and working methods, they considered them still insufficient and urged the General Assembly to recommend to the Council further measures to ensure its full democratization. […] 3.4.2.18 13 November 1995, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Martínez Blanco, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 13-14408 Honduras is speaking in the debate on item 47 of the agenda, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, on behalf also of the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. […] The countries of Central America believe that the right of veto should be limited and ultimately abolished. The circumstances at the end of the Second World War that gave rise to the veto have changed and there is no longer any justification whatsoever for the veto. Central Americans feel that the right of veto should not be granted to any potential permanent members of the Security Council. Equal treatment for new and old permanent members is an unacceptable legal basis for granting it, also because the veto in itself is an anti-democratic practice and is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Any reform of the Council will have to settle this issue with a view ultimately to abolishing the veto. To that end, we agree with the proposal to hold periodic reviews of the veto and other voting procedures. […] 3.4.2.19 13 November 1995, Kenya, Mr. Muthaura, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 23-24409 […] With regard to the veto power, my delegation is of the view that the veto is a negative instrument, which cannot play a useful role in the changed circumstances, characterized by consultation and consensus. It is anachronistic and undemocratic. It is a legacy of the cold war and has now been rendered obsolete. […] 3.4.2.20 14 November 1995, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Insanally, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 1-3410 […] Finally, inasmuch as the principle of equity makes it difficult for us to accept the concept of permanent membership, we must oppose the power of veto which accompanies this privileged category. We must persevere in our efforts to restrain, modify and ultimately abolish the use of the veto so that more democratic decision­-making can prevail in the Council. We support the concrete suggestions made in this regard

408  → 3.2.1.3.7 for the Central American Countries’ position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 409  → 3.2.2.3.10 for Kenya’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.17 for Kenya’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 410  → 3.2.3.17 for CARICOM’s position on Security Council reform, and 3.3.18 for CARICOM’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

401

by members of the Non-Aligned Movement and others, and urge that they be carefully studied with a view to adoption. […] 3.4.2.21 27 June 1997, Organization of African Unity, “Harare Declaration”, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XII, pp. 58-59411 HARARE DECLARATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL*1 […] Declare as follows: […] 6. By adopting these decisions, we reaffirm that: […] (c) The exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated; […] Original footnote Adopted at the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Harare from 2 to 4 June 1997.

*1

3.4.2.22 4 December 1997, Colombia, Mr. García, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 27-28 […] My delegation fully supports the statement made by the Ambassador of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.412 […] As to the Security Council’s decision-making process, my country has maintained an unswerving position of rejection of the veto as anti-democratic and contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The Charter should be amended so as to ensure that, as a first step, the veto can be applied solely to measures adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. The ultimate goal must be the elimination of the veto. […] 3.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 3.4.3.1 28 September 1992, Lithuania, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis, UN Doc. A/47/ PV.15, pp. 2-11 […] The Security Council could be expanded to include three new permanent members – Japan, Germany and India and the exercise of the right to veto from that day forward could require not one but at least two permanent members’ invoking that right at the same time. […]

411  → 3.2.2.3.29 for the Organization of African Unity’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.38 for the Organization’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same declaration. 412  4 December 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 4-5.

402

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.2 20 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/48/264 […] [19] […] COLOMBIA413

[Original: Spanish] [29 June 1993]

[…] [21] B. Voting. Privilege of the right of veto 8. From the beginning, the right of veto was the subject of considerable controversy not only because it is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States but also because it is a mechanism of non-cooperation in a system of collective security which necessarily requires cooperation. Colombia voted against the veto in San Francisco because it considered it anti-democratic. On the other hand, it was obvious that the effective establishment of the United Nations would have been impossible in 1945 without the right of veto for some of the Members of the Organization. 9. At the current time, however, the right of veto has lost practically all its raison d’être, having become a privilege lacking any proportion. In any event, an increase in the number of permanent members should not involve additional rights of veto since that would be unjustifiable in view of current realities. Obviously, any change in the voting procedure, including the right of veto, is subject to the majority provided for in Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter and confirmed in article 40 in the rules of procedure of the Security Council. This brings us to the need to consider revising these articles, since there is no basis in current realities for the veto mechanism. The flexibility and consent of the permanent members are determinant in this regard. Otherwise, the international community may ultimately repudiate the very authority of the Security Council. 10. In accordance with the foregoing, it has become necessary to formulate specific proposals on ways to replace the veto mechanism, either through a qualified majority or by a weighted vote, depending on the type of decision to be taken or, if this is not accepted, through the active participation of other bodies of the United Nations system as appeal mechanisms, particularly through the General Assembly (on the basis of special majorities). General Assembly resolution 377 A (V), entitled “Uniting for peace”, is an example illustrating the active participation of the Assembly and the exercise of its functions in the area of international peace and security. In any event, as an exceptional and extreme measure to be used on a provisional basis, the use of a veto could be limited exclusively to decisions that fall under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] [24]

413  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Colombia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

403

3  “ The most productive time ” COSTA RICA414

[Original: Spanish] [6 July 1993]

[…] 2. This question is of special interest to Costa Rica since, having constitutionally abolished the army as a permanent institution – and, in doing so, it was ahead of its time – Costa Rica today depends essentially on collective systems of security. Our ideas on the matter, which go beyond the simple question of membership, are as follows: […] [25] […] (d) We consider that the right of veto, which is the prerogative of the current five permanent member States, is not very democratic, since it allows the opinion of a single country to prevail over all the others. Moreover, it is anachronistic since it goes back to the Second World War, which occurred half a century ago. Although it can be said that the right of veto has not been applied recently, this does not guarantee that it will not be used again. Moreover, its very existence constitutes a means of exerting pressure – an “indirect veto”. We understand that it will not be easy for the States that have this right to relinquish it; however, perhaps this privilege could be restricted as far as possible (for example, it could be used only in a special and limited way to implement Chapter VII of the Charter). […] [37] FIJI415

[Original: English] [28 June 1993]

[…] [38] […] 3. While it is recognized that the device of a veto for certain major Powers is consistent with the special responsibilities that they have under the Charter of the United Nations, it will nevertheless be useful to review the scope of its use. Consideration might be given to limiting the use of the veto to recommendations or decisions on measures to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council should, in any case, work on the basis of consensus as a general rule. […] [62] […] MEXICO

[Original: Spanish] [1 June 1993]

[…] [64] […] 12. Ever since 1945, the Government of Mexico has regarded the veto as an undemocratic institution,416 even though its existence is recognized in the Charter. Accordingly, Mexico believes that new ways must be considered of regulating the exercise of the 414  → 3.2.1.1.6 for Costa Rica’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.2.2 for Costa Rica’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 415  → 3.2.2.1.1 for Fiji’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 416  Mexico confirmed this position on 13 November 1995 in UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, p. 6.

404

3  “ The most productive time ”

veto so that no permanent member on its own can block the Council’s decisions and resolutions. […] [73] […] PAKISTAN417

[Original: English] [30 June 1993]

[…] [74] […] General observations 6. The Government of Pakistan recognizes the newly emerging trends in international relations. Nevertheless, the process of democratization and the transparency in the work of the United Nations and its many bodies should avoid perpetuating the current inequities by creating new centres of privilege. It should be pursued in the spirit of sovereign equality of all States. The objective of the present review should be the promotion of a more equitable and balanced representation. 7. The Government of Pakistan considers it pertinent to recall here the following views of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the subject as contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Conference on Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta in September 1992:418 (a) Paragraph 30 of chapter II of the Final Document (A/47/675-S/24816) states, inter alia: “They [the Heads of State or Government] expressed their determination to participate constructively in the process of adaptation and reform, in the firm conviction that the United Nations is an indispensable forum to be supported and strengthened. Yet, democratization of the international political and economic institutions inherent in such a process continues to be hampered by those who seek to preserve their privileged positions of power. The democratization of the United Nations and its bodies should avoid perpetuating the current inequities by creating new centres of privilege and be pursued in the spirit of the sovereign equality of all States. They appealed to the major States to accept this inevitable process in the broader interests of all humankind.” [75] (b) Paragraph 32 of the same chapter states, inter alia, that “They [the Heads of State or Government] were of the view that the veto powers which guarantee an exclusive and dominant role for the permanent members of the Council are contrary to the aim of democratizing the United Nations and must, therefore, be reviewed in line with the reform of the United Nations aimed at bringing about greater democratization and transparency in the work of all United Nations bodies. They also called for a review of the membership of the Council with a view to reflecting the increased membership of the United Nations and promoting a more equitable and balanced representation of the Members of the United Nations.” […]

417  → 3.2.1.2.2 for Pakistan’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 418  6 September 1992, → 2.23.

405

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.3 26 July 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.1 […] [17] […] SAMOA419

[Original: English] [16 July 1993]

[…] [18] […] 8. Samoa welcomes the non-exercise of the veto in recent years and would favour any move to have the veto institution carefully examined to see if there are new ways to regulate the exercise of the veto to avoid one permanent member, on its own, blocking the Council’s decisions and resolutions. […] 3.4.3.4 27 August 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 2, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.2 […] [6] UKRAINE420

[Original: Russian] [2 August 1993]

[…] 6. The question of the composition of the Council cannot be resolved satisfactorily in isolation from its voting procedure and, in particular, without modifying the right of veto. This institution, having been incorporated in the United Nations Charter from the League of Nations, acquired a somewhat different hue once in the Organization: from an instrument for maintaining the [7] balance of power between the major States during the period preceding the Second World War, it became in the post-war period a lever to counteract attempts to foist upon one ideological system, or upon individual States belonging to that system, the will of another system or of individual States belonging to it, and thereby avert a conflict, the consequences of which would have been hard to foresee. The partnership relations currently existing among the permanent members of the Security Council overcome that problem. In that connection, and also in the light of other realities of the contemporary world, it should be possible to take a second look at a procedure whereby a single State is, in essence, able to block a decision on any issue, even one of interest to the entire international community. At this point, it would be appropriate to study the possibility of introducing one of the forms of modification of the right of veto. This could be, for example, a suspension of the vote or the granting to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, the composition of which would have been especially expanded for 419  → 3.2.2.1.2 for Samoa’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 420  → 3.2.2.2.4 for Ukraine’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement.

406

3  “ The most productive time ”

such cases, of the right to overrule the veto, if invoked by only one permanent member of the Security Council. […] 3.4.3.5 4 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 3, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.3 […] [3] BELIZE421

[Original: English] [14 September 1993]

[…] [5] […] (c) No permanent member would be at liberty to veto a decision concerning a matter in which the remaining permanent members unanimously consider that it has a personal interest; […] GHANA422

[Original: English] [9 September 1993]

[…] [7] […] Decision-making 11. Under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter affirmative and concurrent votes of the permanent members of the Council are required for all non-procedural matters. The requirement was understandable and probably necessary in the immediate postwar era when the victorious allies had to avoid military confrontation amongst them in order to concentrate their might against the enemy States. The Government of Ghana believes that the end of the cold war and the admission of the enemy States into the United Nations have nullified the requirement. What is required now is enhanced legitimacy of the decisions of the Council. It is therefore the view of the Government of Ghana that Article 27, paragraph 3, should be reviewed to make more democratic the decision-making process of the Council. […] 13. Against this background, the Government of Ghana wishes to offer the following proposals for the consideration of the Organization: […] (b) The application of Article 27, paragraph 3, should be limited to action under Chapter VII of the Charter; […] [8] […]

421  → 3.2.3.2 for Belize’s position on composite permanent members, presented in the same statement. 422  → 3.2.1.1.9 for Ghana’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ” MONGOLIA423

407 [Original: English] [30 August 1993]

[…] 5. Viewing the right to veto as unavoidable at this time, Mongolia, nonetheless, would not be supportive of extending that right to other would-be permanent members. Moreover, the idea of limiting the scope of veto [9] application, as well as a requirement that, for a veto to become effective, it should be exercised by at least two permanent members, should be given careful consideration. […] 3.4.3.6 7 December 1993, Belize, Mr. Laing, UN Doc. A/48/PV.64, p. 12 […] The veto is inconsistent with the modern United Nations institution of democracy. Logically, it should be abolished. Nevertheless, we lend our voice to that of those delegations that take a somewhat realistic approach to this matter. We do not subscribe to the view that we must tabulate a priori the instances in which the veto would be permitted. Instead, our delegation would allow a permanent member the free exercise of the veto unless all the other permanent members determined that its exercise was inappropriate. Alternatively, the suggestion that at least two permanent members must agree to the exercise of the veto has some merit. […] 3.4.3.7 9 February 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, Addendum 7, UN Doc. A/48/264/Add.7 […] [2] SINGAPORE424

[Original: English] [7 February 1994]

[…] 5. The second problem relates to the international as opposed to the supranational nature of the United Nations. The United Nations was created by sovereign States and can do nothing without their assent. At the same time, the permanent members have a more than proportionate say through their veto. These are the realities of the United Nations and in the Security Council. Any design to change the composition of the Council will have to bear these realities in mind, and not be based solely on the abstract. 6. The Government of Singapore is of the view that to progress, there is no alternative but to shape a consensus gradually through a patient process of debate and discussion in this exercise. It will entail thinking through the role of the United Nations into the next century. At this preliminary stage of the exercise, we deem it most useful to try to

423  → 3.2.2.1.3 for Mongolia’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 424  → 3.2.1.1.15 for Singapore’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

408

3  “ The most productive time ”

identify and build consensus on objective general criteria for a general review of the Security Council, especially its permanent membership. 7. In this regard, the Government of Singapore believes that the following considerations need to be borne in mind: [3] […] (d) It is not practical or even desirable to do away with the veto. The fact that the veto has been abused does not detract from its intended function. It is a recognition of the hard reality that great Powers will not consent to put their powers at the disposal of a sheer majority for the implementation of decisions with which they do not agree. It is a safety-valve that prevents the United Nations from undertaking commitments that it lacks the power to fulfil. However, to minimize the misuse of the veto, if permanent membership is expanded, there should be at least two vetoes to block a draft resolution; […] 3.4.3.8 29 June 1994, Italy, “A Proposal for the Enlargement of the Security Council”425 […] Moreover, while it may appear unrealistic to hope that the current holders of the veto be willing to spontaneously renounce it, Italy shares the opinion of those who believe that its use should nevertheless be regulated and contained as much as possible: by limiting its area of application, for example, or requiring at least two vetoes to block the adoption of a Resolution. […] 3.4.3.9 3 October 1994, Australia, Mr. Evans, UN Doc. A/49/PV.15, pp. 6-13426 […] Australia would prefer not to extend the veto to any new permanent member. At the same time, we believe it would be appropriate slightly to dilute the veto power of the existing five permanent members by requiring two from their number to concur in its exercise. […] 3.4.3.10 13 October 1994, Mexico, Mr. Flores Olea, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 2-5427 […] Mexico has always opposed the veto because it runs counter to the principles of democracy and the equality of States before the law. Moreover, rather than making it less difficult to reach agreements among the nations it fosters differences and confrontation. But the exceptional circumstances that gave rise to the veto at the end of the Second World War have now, fortunately, been overcome. My delegation maintains that it is not possible to revive artificially the conditions of the past, or to repeat the errors imposed by a political situation that no longer exists, by granting the veto 425  → 3.2.1.2.4 for Italy’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.2.8 for Italy’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 426  → 3.2.2.1.4 for Australia’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto. 427  → 3.2.2.2.10 for Mexico’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms or semipermanent seats, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

409

to possible new members of the Council. To accept this would be to contradict once more the very foundations of the Organization. Nor is this all: it would once again present the States and the international public at large with the spectacle of the United Nations as an organ more interested in protecting the interests of a few Powers than in attending to the urgent needs of the international community, particularly when economic capabilities are invoked as the main reason for being elected. Neither the United Nations nor the Security Council can be compared to the board of directors of a business. Nothing would be more degrading for the prestige and image of the United Nations than artificially to revive non-democratic arrangements to accommodate the wishes of only a few countries. We repeat that it would be desirable to eliminate the veto, while recognizing the difficulty of this idea, because it seems unimaginable in realpolitik that any of the five permanent members would be sufficiently disinterested – and the clear-sighted – to recognize the political requirements of today and to give up that right. Such fantasy can only feed our illusions but can go no further. None the less, we should not unnecessarily repeat the errors of the past. We should aspire to regulate the use of the veto by the current five permanent members, whose number – I repeat – should not be increased for any reason. In this connection, we were encouraged by the proposal made before this Assembly a few days ago by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Mr. Gareth Evans,428 namely that we gradually dilute the veto by requiring that, in order for it to be valid, at least two of the permanent members would have to agree to block the decision of the Council. At the San Francisco Conference, in 1945, Australia also proposed that the veto not apply in cases involving the exercise of the Council’s mandate under Chapter VI. This would be in keeping with the spirit of the Charter, granting the five permanent members the exclusive responsibility of adopting sanctions under Chapter VII without the possibility of paralysing the Council’s efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution in accordance with Chapter VI. We believe the time has come to reconsider this proposal with a broad, long-term political vision that goes beyond vested interests. […] 3.4.3.11 13 October 1994, Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, UN Doc. A/49/PV.30, pp. 5-7429 […] In this same context, we have frankly and clearly drawn attention to the need to regulate and limit the areas and subjects which may continue to be subject to the veto. We have voiced our principled conviction that the granting of veto power to other Member States would not be conducive to democratization of the Council or make it more effective. To the contrary, such a step would be likely to worsen the imbalances that exist between developed and developing countries and give rise to competition and prejudicial contradictions that could affect the political climate prevailing in the world and within regional groupings. […]

428  3 October 1994, → 3.4.3.9. 429  → 3.2.2.1.5 for Algeria’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

410

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.12 18 September 1995, Compendium of Observations and Assessment of the Two Vice-Chairmen, Their Discussion Papers, as well as Proposals and Other Documents Presented to the Open-ended Working Group, UN Doc. A/49/965 […] [68] Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia430 A/AC.247/5 (c) [Original: English] [9 May 1995] […] [69] […] 4. Veto 10. There would be value in limiting the use of veto and the suggestions already made in this regard should be considered. […] [71] 4. Belize431

[…] [72]

A/AC.247/5 (d) [Original: English] [15 September 1995]

ANNEX Answers to suggested questions for Cluster 1 and related statement delivered on 25 January 1995 to the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly by His Excellency Mr. Edward A. Laing, Permanent Representative of Belize I. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO CLUSTER 1 QUESTIONS […] [73] 4. Veto Ideally, the veto power should not be retained. If this is not feasible, it should be thus modified: a minimum of 3 States (if the Council is enlarged to over 25) or 2 States should jointly cast vetoes. II. INTRODUCTION […] 3. Similarly, overall democracy within the Organization and internal democracy within the Council itself must be made to apply to the incidents of voting, particularly the veto, which this delegation has previously recommended should be the foundation of reform. Logic would suggest that the veto should be abolished. But, in the realm of peace and security, logic is an abominable master. Therefore we repeat our suggestion that the veto should be reformed.

430  → 3.2.1.1.25 for these states’ nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, 3.2.2.4.3 for these states’ position against new categories of seats and 3.3.14 for these states’ position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 431  → 3.2.3.12 for Belize’s position on redefining the two existing categories of membership, and 3.3.14 for Belize’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

411

[…] [74] […] 5. In addition to democracy, we must acknowledge that, like States, international organizations are dynamic organisms. Their structures must therefore be flexible. That is an additional reason why modification of the veto and of permanent membership is required. Membership criteria and other structures must therefore reflect the reality that, throughout history, the dimensions, composition, boundaries and very existence of States have often been in flux. When these changes have taken place through democratic and peaceful means, this Organization has generally made the necessary accommodations. The very notions of permanent membership and the veto, as they presently exist, preclude such accommodation in cases of State succession. We must ensure that this is now rectified. […] [76] […] VI. THE VETO 17. As this delegation has previously recommended, the exercise of the veto would be limited to cases in which more than one indefinite member coincided in its exercise. It is recommended that if the total size of the Council is increased beyond 25, the minimum number of coinciding members should be 3. Otherwise, it should be two. […] [82] 3.4.3.13 13 November 1995, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 20-22432 […] The veto system is incompatible with the principles of democracy and sovereign equality. While it is true that the veto has rarely been used in recent times, there are no assurances that it will not be used again. Moreover, the international community is aware of many instances in which the threat to use the veto, or even the possession of that power, influenced the deliberations and decisions of the Council. As it stands, however, none of the permanent members is willing to accept the abolition of the veto. Under the circumstances, we share the view of those delegations that advocate a realistic approach based upon pragmatism. In that regard, we are pleased that many proposals designed to limit the veto power in its scope and use have already been tabled, and we believe that the Working Group should discuss them in detail and identify the areas where we can take some positive steps. […] 3.4.3.14 13 November 1995, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 8-9433 […] Any expansion of the Security Council will inevitably mean a change in the majority required for decision-making. On the basis of the provisions of Article 27 of the Charter, a distinction in this respect could be drawn between three types of decisions: first, decisions on procedural matters; secondly, decisions relating to substantive issues 432  → 3.2.1.2.8 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.2.2.2.15 for Korea’s support of semi-permanent seats, presented in the same statement. 433  → 3.2.3.16 for Spain’s position on the possibility of a more frequent presence of certain states on the Security Council, and 3.3.15 for Spain’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

412

3  “ The most productive time ”

outside the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, which are essentially questions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes; and, finally, decisions within the framework of Chapter VII, which entail recourse to coercive measures. Decisions in each of these categories would require a different majority: the more important the decision to be taken, the greater the required majority. Thus, the socalled right of veto of the permanent members would be applicable only in the third category of decisions, those adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 3.4.3.15 13 November 1995, Malaysia, Mr. Thanarajasingam, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 11-13 […] The question of veto is one of the cardinal issues, as it impinges directly on the decision-making process of the Council. Malaysia has consistently spoken out against the veto power. In his address of 29 September 1995, the Malaysian Prime Minister reaffirmed this position, saying: The veto power should be dropped. Under no circumstances must the Security Council be made an instrument of any one country. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 12th meeting, p. 4) The veto power negates the principle of sovereign equality and is anachronistic. While its explicit exercise has declined since the end of the cold war, the threat of its use has often been exploited to prevent the Council from fulfilling its Charter mandate. There would seem to be a correlation between its non-use and the increasing number of informal meetings, often involving select Member States, where decisions are often made. At the same time, it is evident that those with the veto power would not give their assent to its abolition. Notwithstanding this position, the international community must be relentless in this struggle. We fully support the proposal to define Article 27 of the Charter, which in its current state is ambiguous. Article 27 makes a distinction as to voting procedure between procedural and substantive questions, without, however, defining these terms. According to Goodrich and Hambro, the authors of a book, published in 1949, No article of the Charter has in practice aroused greater controversy than Article 27. (Charter of the United Nations – Commentary and Documents, p. 220) Based on General Assembly resolution 267 (III),434 adopted in 1949, we believe that the time has come for a serious and in-depth examination of the application of Article 27. In this regard, my delegation endorses the following specific proposals: firstly, to establish general criteria for the identification of what are to be considered actions of a procedural nature, as stated in Article 27 (2) of the Charter; secondly, to identify the 434  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III).

3  “ The most productive time ”

413

questions of “vital importance”, as stated in resolution 267 (III), where the veto could be applied; and, thirdly, to establish a mechanism that would modify the present voting system, including ensuring that a single vote would not be sufficient to prohibit the overwhelming majority within the Council from making a pronouncement or taking a decision. While recognizing the difficulties, we believe that the application of the veto could be modified by procedures and understandings that could be developed in the course of our next stage of discussions in the Open-ended Working Group. We hope that the permanent members will be forthcoming and not adopt a dogmatic approach if substantive progress in all aspects is to be made. My delegation fully subscribes to the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, as reflected in its position paper contained in document A/49/965.435 […] 3.4.3.16 13 November 1995, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/50/PV.57, pp. 16-18436 […] Fifthly, as the deliberations within the Working Group clearly demonstrated, one of the main concerns of delegations is the future voting procedure in the Council, in particular the question of the veto. Austria, along with a significant number of other countries, is of the view that the veto should and could be limited in its scope and use. […] 3.4.3.17 14 November 1995, Tunisia, Mr. Abdellah, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 7-8437 I wish to associate myself fully with the statement made by the representative of Colombia on behalf of the non-aligned countries,438 and I should like to share some of my own thoughts with the Assembly. […] We stand convinced that the time has come to consider at least the regulation, if not the elimination, of the veto. If the veto is retained, it should be granted to the new permanent members. Regulating this power would consist of limiting its use. Its exercise could for instance, be limited to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. A double veto would be required to block any decision. […] 3.4.3.18 14 November 1995, Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, UN Doc. A/50/PV.58, pp. 12-14439 I wish to state that Egypt supports the statement of the representative of Colombia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement,440 since our position is based on the following: 435  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5. 436  → 3.2.1.1.28 for Austria’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.3.16 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 437  → 3.2.2.3.11 for Tunisia’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 438  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20. For the Final Document, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 439  → 3.2.2.3.12 for Egypt’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 440  13 November 1995, UN Doc. A/50/PV.56, pp. 19-20. For the Final Document, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

414

3  “ The most productive time ”

[…] It is not possible to speak of measures to develop the Security Council without touching on the Council’s voting system, a system that has yet to reach completion owing to the fact that it has not been possible to agree on clear criteria for distinguishing the substantive from the procedural in matters that are put to the Council. The delegation of Egypt considers that, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Council, it is necessary that the scope and limits of the veto power should be defined, either by amending the Charter or by updating the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and making them permanent. In that connection, the firm position of the Non­Aligned Movement is that the right of veto must be reviewed, a position that Egypt has held since the San Francisco Conference. Members know that the provisions of Article 27 of the Charter differentiate between procedural and all other matters without stating clearly what is meant by each term. The five permanent members have tried to impose their own exhaustive interpretation, set out at the San Francisco Conference in a document of 7 June 1945, known as the “San Francisco Statement”.441 However, the Conference did not endorse that document, and all attempts to include its content in the Council’s first rules of procedure have failed. Continued disagreement on the matters that should or should not fall within the scope of the veto had the result of making the Council’s rules of procedure “provisional”, to this day. We are all aware of the adverse effects on the work and the credibility of the Council of the abuse of the veto power in an earlier period. We also know that the right of veto continues to be used covertly: the veto is threatened with a view to changing the contents of some draft resolutions. In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of Egypt considers it necessary to stress a number of points: First, there is no definite, agreed and unambiguous legal definition of the matters to which the veto applies. Adherence to the San Francisco Statement in this respect opens the door to the unrestricted use of the veto, as the Statement was based on the concept of the “chain of events”, by which the scope of applicability of the veto can be expanded infinitely. Secondly, analysis of the Council’s practice in distinguishing the substantive from the procedural in the issues it deals with shows that in many cases the Council has defined such matters on the basis of the provisions of the San Francisco Statement, even though the Statement lacks any legal basis, not having been adopted by the San Francisco Conference and not having been incorporated into the provisional rules of procedure. In addition, those provisions run counter to sound logic and lack in clarity, which can only lead to arbitrary interpretations of the provisions of the Charter. So long as the definition of the scope of the veto remains unclear, it will be unacceptable to grant such broad undefined powers to any other member. […]

441  See United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), 1945, Vol. XI, pp. 710-14, reprinted in: Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 936-38.

3  “ The most productive time ”

415

3.4.3.19 14 November 1995, Ghana, Mr. Lamptey, UN Doc. A/50/PV.59, pp. 16-18 […] If Ghana, arguendo, were to be made a member of the Security Council and given a permanent seat on a regional basis, its exercise of the veto power would be influenced by its national perception of the issue at hand, even if it took into consideration the views of the African Group, bearing in mind that perceptions in the Group might vary. In short, the exercise of the veto power could be only national, not regional. An increase in the membership of the Security Council, coupled with an arrangement of permanent seats ensuring regional balance, is a move that we must all support, even if we consider it only symbolic. It is untenable that one nation can have the power to frustrate the will of an Organization of 185 Member States. The increase in the membership of the Security Council should be the first point in a two-pronged reform. The second, and perhaps the more crucial point, is to provide that the exercise of the veto power could be overridden by the votes of a set number of the members of the Security Council. […] 3.4.3.20  28 February 1996, Spain, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VIII, pp. 37-40442 SUMMARY OF IDEAS ON A POSSIBLE SYSTEM OF MORE FREQUENT ROTATION IN ADDITIONAL NON-PERMANENT SEATS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] Ideas for adaption of the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions A compromise solution with a view to adapting the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions could be based on the distinctions established in Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations. This would allow for differentiation of three types of Council decisions, concerning: (a) Procedural matters: Decisions would be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of the Council, (b) Substantive matters not related to Chapter VII: A special qualified majority would be required, without the right of veto (this majority could be established at three fifths or two thirds of the members of the Council); (c) Substantive matters related to Chapter VII: The same qualified majority would be required, but with the possibility for permanent members to exercise the right of veto.

442  → 3.2.2.2.19 for Spain’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

416

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.21 29 February 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group443 Observations concerning the Submissions by Belize,444 Italy,445 Mexico,446 the Nordic Countries447 and Turkey448 […] As to the model proposed by Belize,449 our main observations are: […] – The idea of linking the veto of a permanent member with the veto of a nonpermanent member also deserves further consideration. In the long run, the veto, if maintained, must be qualified and newly defined in its scope. […] 3.4.3.22  27 March 1996, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII, pp. 33-36 THE QUESTION OF THE VETO Egypt [on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries]: working paper 1. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Article 27 that the voting in the Security Council shall be as follows (emphasis added): “1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. “2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. “3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” 2. The provisional rules of the Security Council also mention voting in rule 40, which reads: Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 3. It thus appears that there are no provisions in either the Charter of the United Nations or the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council of any modalities and/or criteria for the use of the veto in decisions of the Security Council. 4. On 7 June 1945, the four sponsoring Governments (China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of 443  → 3.2.2.4.6 for Germany’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 444  18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12; 1 February 1996, → 3.2.3.20. 445  29 June 1994, → 3.4.3.8. 446  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14. 447  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 448  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14. 449  1 February 1996, → 3.2.3.20.

3  “ The most productive time ”

417

Soviet Socialist Republics) with France later subscribing to their position made a statement on the voting procedure in the Security Council.450 The statement was their view on the question on voting in the Security Council, whereby they stated that (emphasis added): “(a) The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council has two broad groups of functions: “(i) Decisions which involve the Security Council’s taking direct measures in connection with settlement disputes will be governed by a qualified vote;*1 “(ii) Decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures, will be governed by a procedural vote;*2 “(b) The first group of functions will also include decisions and actions by the Security Council which may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might in the end require the Security Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter; “(c) The ‘veto’ is not a new right. It is a right which the permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations always had. In the Statement, the five countries argued that the Yalta formula substituted for the rule of complete unanimity of the Council of the League of Nations a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Moreover, the Yalta formula would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity; “(d) It is not to be assumed that the permanent members would use their veto power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Security Council. “(e) The decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” 5. It is to be noted that this statement was seen as unacceptable to the rest of the members and was not incorporated in the Charter or attached as an annex or even referred to in the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. 6. In 1947, in its resolution 117 (II) of 21 November 1947, the General Assembly requested the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to consider the problems of voting in the Security Council. The Committee first examined a list of possible decisions of the Council and classified them in categories according to the voting procedures applicable to each of them to determine those decisions which its members considered procedural within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Charter. The conclusions reached on the decisions referred to as of a procedural character within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 27 were to be based, inter alia, on the following criteria:

450  See United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), 1945, Vol. XI, pp. 710-14, reprinted in: Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 936-38.

418

3  “ The most productive time ”

(a) That all decisions of the Security Council adopted in application of provisions that appeared in the Charter under the heading “Procedure” were procedural and as such were governed by a procedural vote; (b) That all decisions that concerned the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations were procedural and consequently were subject to a procedural vote; (c) That all decisions of the Security Council that related to its internal functioning and the conduct of its business were procedural and consequently were to be taken by a procedural vote; (d) That certain decisions of the Security Council that bore a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria were procedural and were therefore subject to a procedural vote; (e) That certain decisions of the Security Council, such as those taken on items 32, 33, 46 or 27, that were instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision were procedural. 7. On 14 April 1949, the General Assembly adopted resolution 267 (III),451 on the question of the voting in the Security Council, to which was attached an annex listing 35 decisions the General Assembly deemed procedural, hence subject to a procedural vote. 8. For the past 20 years, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has called for a review of the veto power. The Movement addressed the need to review the veto power in the declarations of Summits of the Movement held at Colombo (1976),452 Havana (1979),453 New Delhi (1983),454 Harare (1986),455 Belgrade (1989),456 Jakarta (1992)457 and Cartagena, Colombia (1995).458 The Cartagena Summit of October 1995 specified that the veto power was contrary to the aim of the democratization of the United Nations and must therefore be curtailed with a view to its elimination. 9. We can thus conclude from this introduction the following points: (a) The subject under discussion, that is, the voting in the Security Council, has been considered previously by the Members of the United Nations; (b) Yet there has been no legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature and what is not; (c) There is no constitutional basis or agreed upon clarification of the scope of application of the veto. It is therefore appropriate at a time when the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council are being considered that Member States undertake the codification of the scope of application of the veto; 451  → 2.1. 452  16-19 August 1976, UN Doc. A/31/197 (dated 8 September 1976). 453  3-9 September 1979, UN Doc. A/34/542 (dated 11 October 1979). 454  7-12 March 1983, UN Doc. A/38/132; S/15675 (dated 8 April 1983). 455  1-6 September 1986, UN Doc. A/41/697; S/18392 (dated 14 October 1986). 456  4-7 September 1989, UN Doc. A/44/551; S/20870 (dated 29 September 1989). 457  6 September 1992, → 2.23. 458  18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

3  “ The most productive time ”

419

(d) The position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the question of the veto has been consistent since the Colombo Summit Declaration of 1976.459 10. It would be recalled that in 1949 the General Assembly, in conformity with Article 10 of the Charter, adopted resolution 267 (III) on the scope of application of the veto. Today, as the international climate is more favorable to improving the working methods of the Security Council, and 47 years after the adoption of resolution 267 (III), it is appropriate for the General Assembly to review the scope of the application of the veto in a consistent and authoritative manner. 11. Given the view expressed by many States that the veto should be curtailed and rationalized, the Working Group ought to recommend, inter alia, that the Charter be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Original footnotes *1 A “qualified vote” means the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. *2 A “procedural vote” means the vote of any seven members. 3.4.3.23 23 April 1996, Germany, Mr. Eitel, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group460 […] The ratio of permanent membership to non-permanent membership is in our view also closely related to the question of the necessary quorum for decisions. We believe that non-permanent members should have the possibility to bring about out of their own strength decisions of the Security Council on substance even when – theoretically – not a single permanent member casts an affirmative vote. In the same manner, we believe non-permanent members should have the possibility to block a decision of the Security Council on substance even when – again theoretically – all the permanent members cast a positive vote. […] 3.4.3.24 13 May 1996, Mexico, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex V, pp. 28-30 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS The question of the veto Mexico is convinced of the need to strengthen the role of the General Assembly, the international community’s most representative body, in the decision-making process in the United Nations. It likewise believes that steps must be taken to restrict the use of the rule requiring unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security Council, also known as the “right of veto”, to questions relating to the Council’s primary responsibility, namely the maintenance of international peace and security.

459  16-19 August 1976, UN Doc. A/31/197 (dated 8 September 1976). 460  → 3.2.1.1.39 for Germany’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

420

3  “ The most productive time ”

Following are proposed amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which seek to achieve these objectives:*1 Article 6 A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Article 27 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters and on matters pertaining to Chapters VI, VIII and XXX shall be made by an affirmative vote of [nine] members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [nine] members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Article 97 The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. Article 108 Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Article 109 1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference. 2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Original footnote *1 For greater clarity, those portions of the Articles which it is proposed to delete have been shown with a line through them, while proposed additions are shown in boldface type. In addition, in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 27 and paragraph 1 of Article 109,

3  “ The most productive time ”

421

the number of Security Council members required for the adoption of a decision has been placed in square brackets, since this figure will be determined by the number of members agreed upon by the Working Group in its deliberations. 3.4.3.25 22 May 1996, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group461 […] Revision and possible extension of the veto Concerning the subject of the veto, my delegation believes this system needs to be reconditioned and revised in such a way as to reduce its overuse or abuse. In this regard, we welcome wholeheartedly the consolidating trend of not resorting to the veto in the work of the Security Council since the collapse of the Cold War. But a trend is one thing and an entrenched right is another. We all know that the true power of veto also lies in the threat of its use. Therefore, we support the idea of circumscribing the scope of veto to Security Council decisions under Chapter 7, which was endorsed by the NAM462 and elaborated by the Ambassador of Mexico.463 […] 3.4.3.26 23 May 1996, Germany, Mr. Henze, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group464 […] On the limitation in the scope and use of the veto, our position is clear: We understand the misgivings that many countries obviously have with regard to the right of veto. Egypt has presented a very accurate paper on behalf of the NAM on the question of the veto.465 So have Austria466 and many others. Japan467 has pointed out that some legitimate circumscription of the use of the veto would be appropriate and useful. The Philippines has recently made thoughtful comments on the veto in the context of permanent rotating seats. Even the Mexican proposal468 that proposes concrete Charter amendments but is probably too far reaching in a number of aspects deserves interest. We believe that these and other proposals can lead to a dialogue between the general membership and the permanent members. Germany, for its part, can accept any reasonable procedure with regard to decision-making processes in the Security Council. Together with Japan and many others, we believe that the veto power should not be available to a permanent member, be it an existing member or a new one, for the pursuit of its parochial interests rather than for the maintenance of international peace 461  → 3.2.1.2.12 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.2.21 for Korea’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 3.3.27 for Korea’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 462  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 463  13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 464  → 3.2.1.1.42 for Germany’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 465  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 466  See, e.g., the statement of 13 November 1995, → 3.4.3.16. 467  See, e.g., the statement of 27 March 1996, → 3.4.4.2. 468  13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24.

422

3  “ The most productive time ”

and security. Germany is open for proposals aiming at achieving this objective in a unilateral or multilateral way. It has always been one of the fundamental opinions of my country in the current reform debate, that the reform must lead to both greater legitimacy and cohesion of the Security Council. We are deeply convinced that the introduction of new groupings will not lead to this end and is not in accordance with the general philosophy of the Security Council reform which as far as we can see most of us share. In other words: All permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. Obviously the same holds for all non-permanent members. At the same time, it should be obvious from what I have stated above that as far as Germany is concerned the veto right per se is not an objective for us. We have very early in the debate stated that we are ready to support a credible and workable compromise solution in the question of veto power. I welcome therefore the calls of many speakers to work towards that end. Let me also repeat very clearly at this point, what we have outlined in our statement of 23 April 1996:469 Germany is not going to profit from a “cascade-effect” of permanent-membership-rights. We are perfectly ready and we are stating this here clearly and openly, that we are willing to bear the consequences of this position. […] The veto discussion, important as it is, should not obscure the fact of the Council’s almost daily positive decision-making. Equally important as the question of how to prevent a decision is the question of how to arrive at a decision in the Security Council. Art. 27 (3) of the Charter states that decisions of the Council on other than procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. With the actual size of 15 Security Council members, nine votes can only be achieved if at least one non-aligned member of regions from the South contributes to the majority vote of nine members. Asia, Africa and Latin-America and the Caribbean together dispose of 7 votes, i.e. of a blocking minority. If the future Council is to have a size of 24, as we have suggested in our statement of 10 May 1996,470 the number of votes needed for the Council to act could be fixed at 13 or 14 (one resp. two votes more than the half of 24 Council members). Given the fact that the Council would then consist of 4 permanent members from the South (China plus three) and 10 non-permanent members of the South (7 from Asia and Africa, 3 from Latin-America and the Caribbean), these countries would dispose of 14 votes. These 14 votes are complemented by 10 votes from Council members from the North (4 present permanent members, 2 new permanent members and 4 nonpermanent members). The weight of the South in Council decisions would thus be considerably increased (14:10 instead of 8:7). Without countries from the South, no decision could be taken in the Council. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his lecture delivered at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mexico-City, on 4 March 1996, has explicitly referred to proposals raising the number of affirmative votes needed for the Council to act. He has stated – I quote: “In this way, an effective ‘group veto’ might be created for the developing world – without placing that veto into the hands of any single state. By greatly 469  → 3.2.1.1.39 and 3.4.3.23. 470  → 3.2.1.1.41 and 3.3.26.

3  “ The most productive time ”

423

enhancing the strength and importance of the new non-permanent members, raising the threshold for Council action is seen by some as a key element of a new framework balancing the possible addition of Germany and Japan as permanent members with the imperative of making the Council more representative by strengthening the voice of the developing world”.471 I have nothing to add to these words. One thing is for sure: There is no need at all to create special categories linked with new imbalances to obtain eventually a “sixth collective veto power”. As I have shown, the “group veto” can easily be obtained by a reasonable and responsible increase in both traditional membership categories, the non-permanent and the permanent. It does not matter if there is rotation within the permanent category or if the increase finally results in an overall size of 25 new Council members. In all cases, a strong and effective group veto in favour of non-aligned countries and the regions from the South will be the result. […] 3.4.3.27 17 June 1996, Uruguay, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.14 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XII, p. 59 THE QUESTION OF THE VETO Uruguay is fully convinced of the need of democratization of the organization. This issue is linked to the need for strengthening of the General Assembly, the main representative organ, a fully representative organ whose composition and functioning are unquestionably democratic. This strengthening will be achieved through democratization of the system. This goal has been expressed unanimously in numerous statements and declarations, both by Member States and by the most senior officials of the Organization, first and foremost among them the Secretary-General. The right of veto is undoubtedly one of the features that must be changed if progress is to be achieved in the democratization of the Organization and the strengthening of the General Assembly. Most of the democratic constitutions of the States Members of the United Nations provide for the right of veto by the executive branch in order to establish a balance between the executive and legislative branches. Accordingly, and in conformity with this practice, which is common to all democratic systems of government, Uruguay is of the view that it would be appropriate to apply it to the United Nations in respect of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Uruguay proposes, therefore, that the right of veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. As is readily apparent, the scope of the exercise of this power by the General Assembly would be very broad, and should be subject to negotiation if this proposal is accepted.

471  See UN Press Release SG/SM/5906.

424

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.28 3 July 1996, Belize, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XV, pp. 67-79472 PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] 3. Veto 27. What would continue to be the most attractive feature of permanent membership to its possessors, despite limited tenure, is the ability to exercise the veto. It is proposed that, pending the ultimate abolition of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two (or three) permanent members concur in its exercise. We believe that the suggested alternative of restricting the use of the veto in certain areas (e.g. Chapter VII action) is excessively restrictive, especially in view of the possibility that there might be future cases arguably falling under that Chapter which the international community and/or the Council might deem require action by the Council. […] 3.4.3.29 3 July 1996, Malaysia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XVI, pp. 80-83473 […]

PERMANENT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

V. VETO 20. Genuine reform in the Security Council must include reform of the veto. The veto is obsolete and politically untenable in an increasing number of cases, but as it cannot be removed because the present permanent five will not relinquish the veto, the reformed veto must be seen to be increasingly a unique act of concerted action under extraordinary circumstances and not as it is now, the prerogative of five countries. 21. There is a universal clamour to reform the veto, even if it cannot be eliminated. 3.4.3.30 30 September 1996, Bolivia, Mr. Aranibar Quiroga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.14, pp. 1-5474 […] With regard to the veto, Bolivia shares the view that, ideally, the international community should move towards eliminating this device – and, one would hope, in the not-too-distant future. In the meantime, use of this device should be strictly limited to actions relating to cases of threats to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression referred to in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. […]

472  → 3.2.3.23 for Belize’s position on optional shared seats, presented in the same statement. 473  → 3.2.2.3.19 for Malaysia’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 474  → 3.2.1.1.44 for Bolivia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

425

3.4.3.31 7 October 1996, Antigua and Barbuda, Mr. Lewis, UN Doc. A/51/PV.25, pp. 21-25475 […] Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda would like to see certain restrictions placed on the use of the veto. […] 3.4.3.32 29 October 1996, Brazil, Mr. Amorim, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 7-9476 […] It is impossible to discuss last year’s report without taking due note of the wide support expressed in the Working Group for proposals to limit the scope and use of the veto. We sympathize with many such proposals, in particular those submitted by countries of the Non-Aligned Movement,477 and with the interesting suggestions by the delegations of Uruguay478 and Mexico479 referred to in paragraph 31 of document A/50/47. At the same time, we recognize that these proposals have met with some resistance, in particular on the part of the existing permanent members. In Working Group discussions I alluded to an idea that I believe could help to discourage resort to the veto without abridging the current rights of permanent members. This would allow permanent members to cast negative votes in the same way as non-permanent members cast them: without blocking decisions. Were the Council’s permanent members granted such a faculty, it would offer new possibilities for selfrestraint, not by limiting their prerogatives but by giving them an additional option that, strictly speaking, they do not enjoy. They would still be entitled to vote in favour of or to abstain on a resolution, or to veto it. But in addition, they would be entitled to vote against without vetoing, in the same way as the non-permanent members have done for more than 50 years. It would be like allowing someone who is used to being chauffeur-driven around town in a comfortable private limousine the right to use public transportation. It could not do any harm, and would probably have some constructive repercussions. This idea is certainly not a panacea, and does not address all concerns, but it may be worth considering. […] 3.4.3.33 29 October 1996, Kenya, Mr. Mahugu, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 18-20480 […] On the question of the veto, we have noted the reluctance of some members to accept any changes regarding either its elimination or the curtailment of its use. The veto power may have had a justification during the cold-war era. However, with the emergence of the new international order, characterized by increased consultations and consensus, the prolongation of such power and privilege can no longer be 475  → 3.2.1.1.45 for Antigua and Barbuda’s position on the importance for adequate representation of Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, presented in the same statement. 476  → 3.2.2.4.9 for Brazil’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 477  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 478  17 June 1996, → 3.4.3.27. 479  13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 480  → 3.2.2.3.21 for Kenya’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.32 for Kenya’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

426

3  “ The most productive time ”

justified. My delegation sincerely hopes that an agreement will be reached at least on the limitation of the use or threat of use of the veto, along the following lines: restricted use under Chapter VII of the Charter; a requirement that at least two members be required to enforce the veto; and an enumeration of issues on which the veto cannot apply. Although the use of the veto has been minimized since the end of the cold war, there is no doubt that the threat of the use of the veto has made it impossible for States Members of the Organization to engage in a meaningful dialogue on some issues of grave importance. The use or the threat of use of the veto creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to reach a consensus on such issues. My delegation continues to hold the view that the veto is a negative instrument which cannot play a useful role in decision-making in the prevailing international atmosphere. […] 3.4.3.34 30 October 1996, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mapuranga, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 13-15481 […] The Non-Aligned Movement presented a position paper482 on the veto that was supported by an overwhelming number of delegations. The veto is a relic of the cold war. The Non-Aligned Movement’s proposal is clear. The scope of the veto has to be curtailed and restricted to only those matters that fall under Chapter VII of the Charter. Eventually, the veto has to be abolished altogether. It is clear from the discussions that took place in the Working Group on this subject that the permanent five are reluctant to discuss this subject seriously. Their intransigent posture, if it persists, will be an obstacle to the reform process. We therefore appeal to them to review their position on this vital issue. […] 3.4.3.35 30 October 1996, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, pp. 15-17483 […] Concerning decision-making, the focus of the Working Group’s attention has been, of course, tightly focused on the question of the veto. We share the view expressed by the majority of delegations opposing any extension of the veto and supporting an urgent examination of how to limit the current veto power and better define its scope. In particular, we believe the current veto ought to be restricted to Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter. This needs to be considered further in the Working Group. To this end, we believe that the papers presented by Mexico484 and Egypt on behalf of the Movement of the Non­-Aligned485 this year provide a good basis for further discussion. The message from most delegations over the past year has said very clearly that extending the veto privilege is decidedly not the best way to deal with the very many concerns already expressed about this issue. Any extension would exacerbate current problems, make decision-making more difficult, potentially exclude more conflicts 481  → 3.2.2.3.23 for Zimbabwe’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 482  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 483  → 3.2.1.3.10 for Canada’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 3.3.34 for Canada’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 484  13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 485  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22.

3  “ The most productive time ”

427

from the purview of the Council and, once granted, would of course be difficult to review. In short, it would neither improve the functioning of the Council nor enhance its representative nature. Extending veto privileges would almost certainly militate against the effectiveness of the Council in its efforts to maintain international peace and security. […] 3.4.3.36 30 October 1996, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/51/PV.45, p. 19 […] Regarding the issue of expansion, Ghana subscribes to the position of the African Group,486 which calls for at least two permanent seats and a proportionate number of non-permanent seats for our continent. On the question of the veto, the delegation of Ghana is of the view that although there might have been good reasons for the veto power when the Charter was drawn up, it is anachronistic in its present form and must be modified and limited to clearly defined situations within the context of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Our delegation suggests that consideration should be given to a review of the number of negative votes that can constitute a veto in the Council, and that additionally a formula should be worked out under which a Council veto can be overridden by a certain number of votes in the General Assembly. But whatever decision is arrived at on the scope and parameters of the veto, it must be extended to any new permanent members of the Council in order to conform to the principles of equity and sovereign equality which are the bedrock of the Charter of the Organization. […] 3.4.3.37 30 October 1996, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 9-11 […] I would also like fully to endorse the statement of Colombia as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.487 […] Indeed, the important qualitative changes that have occurred in international relations, together with the irreversible move made by the international community towards democracy and the achievement of consensus in multilateral forms, underline with particular emphasis the anachronistic, anti-democratic and unacceptable character of the veto. It must also be clearly stated that the veto, a tool that was frequently resorted to during the cold war, can by no means be invested with legitimacy after the cold war through its attribution to new permanent members. Finally, a simple reading of the provisions of the Charter, in particular Article 24, makes clear beyond any doubt that the common will of the international community represented in the United Nations cannot be defeated by a formal or disguised veto. This means that, since the veto is the core issue, it has to be separated from the status of permanent member if we wish seriously to consider the various proposals aimed at allowing certain States or groups of States to enter the Security Council for a period of variable length and at varying frequencies. 486  See, e.g., the statement of 29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 487  29 October 1996, UN Doc. A/51/PV.44, pp. 23-24.

428

3  “ The most productive time ”

Regarding the use of the veto, it should be recalled that the Non-Aligned Movement has made a reasonable and interesting proposal488 which represents a moderate and constructive translation of the position constantly reiterated at the various Non-Aligned Movement summits over the last 20 years.489 By proposing that, as a first step, the use of the veto should be limited to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Movement has made the abolition of the veto the final objective. It is therefore unfortunate that this proposal, which enjoys the support of a great number of countries, including some that are not members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and which could show the way for the modernization and democratization of the Council, has not met with approval from permanent members of the Council. […] 3.4.3.38 30 October 1996, Croatia, Mr. Nobilo, UN Doc. A/51/PV.46, pp. 14-16490 […] It is difficult to discuss an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council without at the same time reflecting on the power of the veto which the permanent members enjoy. The Republic of Croatia wishes to reiterate its general position that there should be a limitation of the right and exercise of the veto. However, since it is highly unlikely that the power of the veto will soon be abolished, the Republic of Croatia believes that the proposal to require at least two vetoes to be cast in order to nullify a Security Council resolution deserves serious consideration. This proposal would be even more appropriate in a Security Council with an increased number of permanent members. Additionally, it is our opinion that the scope of the veto should be limited only to enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 3.4.3.39 1 November 1996, Nigeria, Mr. Ayewah, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 7-8491 […] On the question of the veto, the Non-Aligned Movement, in a paper that has received overwhelming support,492 has offered a view. The conclusions reached in that paper deserve the serious consideration of the current permanent members of the Security Council. In our view, permanent membership confers a privileged status that in turn implies responsibilities and obligations. It is our hope, therefore, that the permanent members will see their way clear as to the necessity of the needed reform of the Security Council and extend their willing cooperation to the process in the interest of their own credibility, equity and justice. Until the veto is ultimately abolished, we believe that its use should be rational and selective and confined only to issues under 488  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 489  See, e.g., the statements of 16-19 August 1976, UN Doc. A/31/197 (dated 8 September 1976); 3-9 September 1979, UN Doc. A/34/542 (dated 11 October 1979); 7-12 March 1983, UN Doc. A/38/132-S/15675 (dated 8 April 1983); 1-6 September 1986, UN Doc. A/41/697-S/18392 (dated 14 October 1986); 4-7 September 1989, UN Doc. A/44/551-S/20870 (dated 29 September 1989); 6 September 1992, → 2.23; and 18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 490  → 3.2.1.1.50 for Croatia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 491  → 3.2.2.3.28 for Nigeria’s support of regional seats, and 3.2.2.4.11 for Nigeria’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 492  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22.

3  “ The most productive time ”

429

Chapter VII of the Charter. Clearly, we fail to understand why, in today’s world and in terms of realpolitik, the decision on the appointment of a Secretary-General – and for that matter, the next Secretary-General of the Organization – should be subject to the preferred options or predilections of one or two powerful Member States. It is a question that should be considered in a fully democratic and transparent manner by the General Assembly so as to ensure that whoever emerges enjoys the support of all Member States. The same principle should apply when we consider the admission of new Members. […] 3.4.3.40 1 November 1996, Ecuador, Mr. Valencia Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 15-16493 […] Thirdly, Ecuador opposes the maintenance of the veto privilege, considering it to be an anti-democratic and obsolete mechanism that does not reflect new global realities. If it is not possible to eliminate the veto, Ecuador suggested that its exercise be limited to cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 3.4.3.41 1 November 1996, Nicaragua on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Vilchez Asher, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 18-20494 I am speaking on behalf of the countries of Central America participating in this debate on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other related matters. We participate because we are a group of small countries that belong to a region that is not sufficiently represented in the Council and we feel a responsibility to express our position on what the Security Council should be in the next century. […] Central America has been following the work of the Working Group and therefore appreciates the contents of the report it has submitted to us recently. There are certain proposals or positions annexed to the report that the Group felt should be taken into consideration by the General Assembly. In that connection, we welcome the Non-Aligned Movement’s annex on the question of the veto.495 Central America, like the great majority of Members, is of the opinion that at the present time the veto has lost its raison d’être and that ideally it should be completely eliminated. Nonetheless, realistically, since it would be extremely difficult to achieve that, we believe that the Non-Aligned Movement’s proposal offers a viable alternative which should be given great attention by this Assembly. In this respect, we agree with those who have made concrete proposals to restrict the veto to Chapter VII. And once again we express the opinion of Central America that the effectiveness of the Council in fulfilling its mandate depends to a great extent on the legitimacy of its decisions. The use of the veto limits the Council’s responsibility when it acts on behalf of all Members of the United Nations. […] 493  → 3.2.1.1.51 for Ecuador’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 494  → 3.2.1.1.52 for the Central American Countries’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 495  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22.

430

3  “ The most productive time ”

3.4.3.42 1 November 1996, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 20-22496 […] On the matter of the veto, my delegation is of the view that the veto power should be eliminated. However, taking into account the current realities of international relations, my delegation would support, as an initial step in that direction, the proposal that the scope and use of the veto should be limited and should apply only to measures taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. My delegation additionally wishes to propose that if a permanent member uses the veto power outside the scope of Chapter VII of the Charter, the use of that veto should be subject to the right of appeal by another permanent Council member to the General Assembly for a final decision; the decision of the General Assembly on the appeal should be on the basis of a two thirds majority vote. […] 3.4.3.43  30 April 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1997/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/51/47 Annex V, pp. 18-23 CLUSTER II ISSUES Negotiating paper submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Set of measures to be adopted)

[…] 14. Measures relating to the working methods and decision-making of the Security Council: […] (e) Given the view expressed by many States that the veto should be curtailed and rationalized, the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter; […] 3.4.3.44 27 June 1997, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XI, pp. 55-57497 I. Declaration adopted at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1997, addressed the question of reform of the United Nations, with particular attention to expansion of the Security Council. While reiterating the basic position of the Movement, as reflected in the Final Document,498 and in keeping with the essential need for democratization of the United Nations they emphasized the following: […] − Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination; […] 496  → 3.2.1.1.53 for Fiji’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 497  → 3.2.1.3.14 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 3.3.37 for the Movement’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 498  18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

3  “ The most productive time ”

431

30. The Ministers reaffirmed the Movement’s proposal that the veto should be curtailed, with a view to its elimination, and that the Charter of the United Nations should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 3.4.3.45 2 October 1997, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/52/PV.21, pp. 1-5499 […] The Security Council must also be reformed, so that it can carry out the role it has been entrusted with, because it has a special status among the United Nations bodies, as defined in the Charter. In our view, this cannot be achieved except through a general agreement that would regulate the use of the veto power, limiting such use to cases covered by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, namely, threats to international peace. […] 3.4.3.46 3 October 1997, Yemen, Mr. Al-Eryany, UN Doc. A/52/PV.24, pp. 21-25500 […] We support what has been said about the need to reduce the use of the power of veto by permanent members. Indeed, its use should be limited to matters that directly affect the highest national interests. In this way, we can avoid the arbitrary use of the veto power in matters that are irrelevant to such interests, but affect narrow regional calculations or temporary political gains unrelated to issues of international peace and security. […] 3.4.3.47 4 December 1997, Austria, Mr. Sucharipa, UN Doc. A/52/PV.62, pp. 15-17501 […] We advocate a curtailment of the veto power, ideally limiting it to actions under Chapter VII, and do not wish to see more prominence being given to this instrument through the expansion of the category of permanent membership. […] 3.4.3.48 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12502 […] The power of veto is a unique aspect of decision-making in the Security Council. Paradoxically, it both paralysed and held together the Organization during the long period of the cold war. But with the end of the cold war the veto has become rare, albeit not yet extinct, in the practice of the Council. The new international situation 499  → 3.2.1.3.16 for Qatar’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 500  → 3.2.1.1.56 for Yemen’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 501  → 3.2.1.1.57 for Austria’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, 3.2.3.27 for Austria’s position on regional rotating membership, and 3.3.40 for Austria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 502  → 3.2.1.2.14 for the Nordic Countries’ position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.4.5 for the Nordic Countries’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

432

3  “ The most productive time ”

has created new opportunities for unity in the Security Council and for a truly cooperative approach to its decision-making. The Council has moved a considerable way in that direction. As the Security Council hopefully continues on this course gradually to curtail the use of the veto, it should also become less difficult to find a solution to the problems it poses to the negotiations on Security Council reform. […] And, as part of the Charter amendments in connection with an enlargement of the Council, the possibility of a veto could perhaps be excluded from a number of specific situations. […] 3.4.3.49 4 December 1997, Fiji, Mr. Bune, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 37-38 […] The status quo of the Council permits any one of the five permanent members to influence the decision of all 15 members through the use of the veto. The five permanent members are not elected, rendering the system undemocratic. The system 15 members to decide for 185 Member countries without a democratic right of appeal, and the remaining 170 members are sidelined and without a veto. Democracy in decision-making is about the will of the majority, not the superiority of the will of one or two States over the majority will. We should not, therefore, focus only on a marginal increase in members; we must focus on real change. Any such change or reform should include a provision that if a permanent member uses the veto power, the use of that veto should be subject to another permanent member’s right of appeal to the General Assembly for a final decision, and the decision of the General Assembly on the appeal should be on the basis of a two-thirds-majority vote. This will ensure that the Council functions in a structured relationship with the General Assembly, which should be the paramount organ of the United Nations. […] 3.4.3.50 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, Mr. Meléndez-Barahona, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 41-43503 I am pleased to make this Statement in the context of our consideration of agenda item 59, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, on behalf of the Central American countries of Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. […] As to the right of the veto, since it is not feasible to eliminate it at this time, its use should be limited to Chapter VII of the Charter, with a gradual, clear-cut tendency towards its elimination, in order fully to comply with Article 2 of the Charter, which establishes that the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States. In particular, the use of the veto should be limited in order to avoid the abuse of a privilege that in no circumstances should be used to secure unilateral advantages unrelated to the objective of the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary responsibility of the Security Council. […]

503  → 3.2.1.1.58 for the Central American Countries’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

433

3.4.3.51 5 December 1997, Sudan, Mr. Osman, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 16-17 […] While discussing the reform of the Security Council, we must stress that the reform that we seek and are striving to achieve must include the concept of veto. In this respect, the delegation of the Sudan, like a majority of Member States, finds that the concept of the veto power runs counter to the principle of equality among States stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations. Thus that power must be abrogated. If it is difficult at present to do that, then we support the proposal that calls for confining this veto power and restricting its use only to matters coming under Chapter VII of the Charter until the political will can be mustered for its final abrogation. […] In conclusion, the delegation of the Sudan would like to express its support for the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, which stresses the need to reach a general agreement with regard to all aspects of Security Council reform.504 3.4.3.52  5 December 1997, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Calovski, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 21-22505 […] Third, the use of the veto should be limited. The foundation of Security Council decisions should be the maturity of the arguments and the effort to reach consensus, in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.506 […] 3.4.3.53 5 December 1997, Ghana, Mr. Wilmot, UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, pp. 22-23507 […] My delegation also recognizes the inherent problems associated with the use and abuse of the veto, and we reiterate our call for the limitation of its usage to clearly defined situations under Chapter VII of the Charter, pending agreement, at an appropriate time, on its total abolition. The time has come to review the concept of the veto, an undemocratic and anachronistic relic of the post-war era, in view of its frequent misapplication by a privileged few in furtherance of parochial national objectives, thwarting the will of the general membership of the Organization. Whatever the outcome of our deliberations on this subject, it is my delegation’s considered view that all permanent members, new and old alike, should be accorded the same privileges and prerogatives. […] 3.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 3.4.4.1 23 November 1993, Chile, Mr. Somavia, UN Doc. A/48/PV.61, pp. 3-5 […] With regard to the veto power, Chile believes as a matter of principle that the veto is not a democratic mechanism. Nevertheless, we believe that, for the time being, reform of the veto power is not viable. We recognize that the Council’s work has been 504  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44. 505  → 3.2.1.3.18 for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 506  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia confirmed this position on 17 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 28-29. 507  → 3.2.2.3.33 for Ghana’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

434

3  “ The most productive time ”

facilitated by the climate of improved cooperation and political consensus which has prevailed in this new phase of international relations, one very positive result of which has been the limited use of the veto power. On the basis of that experience, we could perhaps explore formulas that could regulate the use of the veto power in future. For example, I think it would be possible for the five Powers that have the veto power in the Security Council to undertake voluntarily, in a great democratic gesture, to renounce its use in one crucial and symbolic decision of the Organization: the election of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This would indeed be a great democratic gesture on the part of the five Powers. […] 3.4.4.2 27 March 1996, Japan, Mr. Owada, Statement in the Open-Ended Working Group508 […] Before concluding my remarks today, I wish to touch upon an issue that inevitably arises in any discussion of the Security Council’s permanent membership, namely, the question of the veto. It is a question of crucial importance, and one that requires our careful attention, lest it should become a stumbling block in our efforts to reach an overall agreement on the necessary reform. The issue of the veto – its abuse and, indeed, its very existence – has elicited many critical comments. Some of these comments may be valid, others less so. In the view of my delegation, it would be appropriate for this Working Group to make a careful study of the situations in which the use of veto could be considered legitimate. I note in this connection the statement made by the Representative of Egypt on Monday in which he expressed his intention to introduce a paper on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement which deals with this question.509 I look forward to studying that paper in the belief that it will be a useful contribution to this study. […] 3.4.4.3 11 July 1996, Ukraine, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.20 = UN Doc. A/50/47/ Rev.1, Annex XVIII, pp. 87-90510 […] 13. If the current decision-making procedure is retained, the approval of a decision in an enlarged Security Council would require 15 votes in favour, provided that none of the permanent members voted against that decision. With 13 votes, the developing countries would have an effective group veto, without leaving the veto as the prerogative of any one State. 14. The end of ideological rivalry between East and West and the establishment of relations of partnership among the permanent members of the Security Council makes the veto historically obsolete. Recognizing that only the permanent members of the Council themselves can abolish the veto, Ukraine believes that the international community has an opportunity to limit the permanent members’ use of the veto, especially 508  → 3.2.1.1.36 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 3.2.2.3.17 for Japan’s support of regional seats, and 3.3.22 for Japan’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 509  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 510  → 3.2.2.2.23 for Ukraine’s support of semi-permanent seats, and 3.3.28 for Ukraine’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

3  “ The most productive time ”

435

by increasing the number of non-permanent members in the Council. Thus, it may be assumed that the speedy solution of the question of enlarging the Security Council will contribute to the voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by the permanent members. […] 3.4.4.4 1 November 1996, Malta, Mr. Cassar, UN Doc. A/51/PV.49, pp. 10-12 […] […] Malta has already stated that the question of veto can best be resolved by letting the veto fall into disuse without prejudicing future discussion on the desirability of its abolition. […] 3.4.4.5 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Salander, UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, pp. 10-12511 […] The power of veto is a unique aspect of decision-making in the Security Council. Paradoxically, it both paralysed and held together the Organization during the long period of the cold war. But with the end of the cold war the veto has become rare, albeit not yet extinct, in the practice of the Council. The new international situation has created new opportunities for unity in the Security Council and for a truly cooperative approach to its decision-making. The Council has moved a considerable way in that direction. As the Security Council hopefully continues on this course gradually to curtail the use of the veto, it should also become less difficult to find a solution to the problems it poses to the negotiations on Security Council reform. The Nordic countries would want to see concerted action to reduce the role of the veto. The permanent members should be strongly encouraged to minimize their use of the veto. They should now be able to do what the General Assembly already requested 50 years ago, namely, agree among themselves on limiting the number of situations in which the veto may be used, and on which issues should be defined as procedural ones. And, as part of the Charter amendments in connection with an enlargement of the Council, the possibility of a veto could perhaps be excluded from a number of specific situations. […]

3.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 3.5.1 December 1990, Keith Hindell, The UN Security Council I: filling the gaps, The World Today, Vol. 46, No. 12, pp. 216-217512 […] By calling on Germany and Japan to provide financial backing for the economic and military blockade, the Security Council has admitted that its resources are inadequate.

511  → 3.2.1.2.14 for the Nordic Countries’ position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 3.4.3.48 for the Nordic Countries’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 512  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

436

3  “ The most productive time ”

On the initiative of the Soviet Union the Council members are discussing whether or not to revive the Military Staff Committee as the best means to direct a possible military intervention against Iraq. But already the Council has found it cannot carry out its policies without enlisting the economic power of Germany and Japan. At America’s instigation, the Group of Seven has set up the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, but it has every appearance of being the Security Council’s de facto ‘economic staff committee’. This co-option of Japan and Germany as ‘bankers’ for the Security Council sanctions against Iraq provides an opportunity to remodel the international security system. The American Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, may be the group’s chairman, but it is Germany and Japan that will have to dig deeper into their reserves than any other countries. Instead of providing military backup, they are expected to bankroll the poorer members of the UN affected by the Security Council’s blockade. If, therefore, Germany and Japan become the muscle in a new financial arm of the Security Council, they will underline their claim to have an enhanced role in the security system. While it seems likely that the Security Council will manage the Kuwait crisis successfully, it obviously needs restructuring if it is to cope with more difficult situations in the future. The present Security Council plan to restore independence and democracy to Cambodia, for instance, will need far more economic backing than was available for the UN’s Namibia operation, which itself evoked constant cries of pain from the Council’s leading members who paid most of the bill. Consequently, to improve its effectiveness, the Security Council should now include Germany and Japan to be permanent members, making seven in all (Britain, France, China, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States). By itself this change might restrict the Council’s freedom of action because two more countries would be able to block any action with a single vote. So a veto in the enlarged Council should require three negative votes of the permanent members. A ‘three-vote-veto’ would be a liberalising measure enabling the Council to act more often than it has in the past and making it possible to act against one of the permanent members. This would be highly desirable in a new era when American and Soviet power are no longer in balance. Germany and Japan were originally excluded from membership of the UN, but now their economic power is needed to confront an aggressor. To be useful members of the Security Council, both would have to amend their constitutions so that they could also use their military power in the cause of international peace. Membership of a Council with a three-vote-veto would mean that they accepted a political constraint upon their freedom of action in foreign policy and their ability to make war. But then so would the five existing members of the Council. Under the present system, Britain and France were able to ward off international action at the time of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956; the Soviet Union could stymie the Council when it invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; and the United States took little notice of hostile Council majorities during its bullying of Nicaragua and its invasions of Grenada and Panama.  Keith Hindell is an English journalist. He worked for the BBC as producer, editor and, from 1980 to 1984, United Nations correspondent. Educated at Oxford and the University of Illinois, he also was a lecturer at the SOAS Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (1994-2008).

3  “ The most productive time ”

437

If the Security Council does manage this crisis successfully, then the prospects for containing future breaches of international security are improved, except when they are caused by one of the existing veto powers. It is this gap which should now be filled. […] An enlarged Security Council with a three-vote-veto would bring the era of ‘teflon America’, nearly exempt from any UN action, to an end. A number of countries can now afford to apply sanctions, if need be, against the United States. For example, they could boycott American goods or deny landing rights to American aircraft. America’s NATO allies are not so dependent on it for protection or for weapons; some of its trading partners depend less on it than it does on them. Of course, America is the extreme case. Any measures which can be taken against the United States [217] could certainly be taken against the other six Council members, including Britain and the Soviet Union. Not that the UN could in the foreseeable future deal with the United States or the Soviet Union as it is now dealing with Iraq. Military encirclement would probably be too dangerous, even if it were practicable. But this may be the time to subject the world’s most powerful nations to increased international discipline. Most of it should come from peer pressure, especially from other members of NATO and organisations such as the Western European Union and the European Community. An enlarged Council with a three-vote-veto would fashion a new instrument for restraining the powerful in addition to these existing channels of diplomacy. One objection to this scheme is that it is unfair, in that it denies representation to the developing world. But the Council is not primarily about fairness. It needs to be an international peace executive, able to act quickly, using the resources of its own members and not subject to intimidation from petty tyrants. As yet no developing country possesses the political maturity and economic infrastructure, so necessary for swift, resolute and possibly prolonged action. […] 3.5.2 1991, Hans Köchler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council, in: idem (ed.), Democracy and the International Rule of Law: Propositions for an Alternative World Order. Selected Papers Published on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Vienna/New York: Springer, 1995, pp. 85-116513 […] [111] […] 7. The Abolition of the Veto as the Only Alternative to Traditional Power Politics Since the foundation of the United Nations, experts have pointed out the discrepancy between juridical equality (i.e. “equality of voting [112] strength”) and the 513  Reproduction of this chapter courtesy of Hans Köchler. This text was originally published in German in 1991: Hans Köchler, Das Abstimmungsverfahren im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen: Rechtsphilosophische Überlegungen zu einem normenlogischen Widerspruch und seinen Folgen für die internationalen Beziehungen, Innsbruck: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991.    Hans Köchler (*1948) is a professor of philosophy. From 1982 to 2014, he held the chair of political philosophy and philosophical anthropology at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Following his election as a lifetime fellow in 2006, he was elected co-president of the International Academy for Philosophy in 2010. He served in several committees and expert groups dealing with issues of international democracy, human rights and

438

3  “ The most productive time ”

“inequality of the interests involved.” Various committees repeatedly discussed proposals on weighted voting to resolve these inconsistencies.*1 With a constantly growing membership, they argued, this contradiction becomes intensified and could cause many international organizations to gradually lose their authority. Schermers states that, in principle, “… a delegate of a large State will represent more interests than his counterpart from a small State.”*2 Indeed, this rule “though irreconcilable with the general doctrine of international law” was used to justify the veto in the Security Council. “Weighted voting” was therefore encouraged for international institutions to protect the interests of larger groups. It is unfair, the experts argued, to set aside a large population’s interests in favour of those of several smaller groups (whose combined population is less than that of the one large group). Indeed, this dilemma depicts the role of the “mini-states” in the United Nations system. Here, too, the insurmountable difficulties exist in formulating criteria for weighting the states’ voting power. The same holds true for the attempt to define a “material inequality” to justify the normative inequality created by the veto rule. Is it the size of the population or the state’s economic and military power that is to be decisive in the weighting process? Or is it the financial contribution to the organization’s budget?*3 A political and legal organization such as the United Nations, attempting to control and restrict the exercise of Power, can by no means adopt the voting rules of an international financial institution (e.g. the International Monetary Fund). Any type of weighted voting, therefore, does not offer a viable alternative to the dominant votes of the five permanent members in the Security Council.*4 [113] If one rejects the veto privilege of the permanent members for the sake of normative consistency, ethical and democratic credibility and the establishment of a peaceful world order, three alternatives – selected more or less arbitrarily from an array of possibilities – emerge as new “idealistic” determinations of the voting procedure.*5 Each of these alternatives includes an adequate protection of minority rights as a general guideline. This, of course, implies measures restricting the dictatorship of the majority while maintaining the traditional concept of state sovereignty. (A) If the category of permanent membership remains, the number of member states in the Security Council must increase (e.g. from the present 15 to 21) to provide a more equitable geographical representation.*6 At the same time, the number of permanent members should increase (e.g. from 5 to 7). Permanent membership should principally be linked to the demographic size of a country. Economic strength should never be the main criterion because this would lead to the emergence of a new kind of North-South conflict. At certain intervals, the list of permanent members would have to be revised because states are not Platonic entities and are therefore not immune to the changes of time. The status and “weight” of a state*7 within the international system may change drastically. The General Assembly would define and regulate

development. He is the founder and president of the International Progress Organization (I.P.O.), an NGO which aims to encourage cultural exchange between all nations and to promote tolerance towards all nationalities and cultures, and which emphasizes the importance of human liberties, social and economic development, peace, and the international rule of law.

3  “ The most productive time ”

439

these matters with a two-thirds majority. In the Security Council, substantive matters would require a two-thirds majority; a simple majority would decide procedural issues. (B) A second alternative is the transformation of the category of permanent membership into a «collective membership» on the basis of intraregional rotation. This system now partially exists in the geo- [114] graphical representation of the non-permanent members of the Council. From a list of countries meeting the qualifications of alternative (A), a simple majority in the General Assembly would elect a country to represent a certain region for a period of one or two years. One might also consider the current regional organizations (EU, OAU, OAS, and Arab League) as collective members.*8 Such a measure could, to a certain extent, counterbalance the arbitrary shaping of majorities in the Security Council. This plan would guarantee that not only proxies – “viceroys” in terms of power politics – serve as permanent members. A qualified two-thirds majority would decide all issues. (C) A third alternative is the general introduction of the unanimity rule within the present structure of the Security Council. Such a model, however, would reduce the Council’s effectiveness considerably, but this plan would strengthen the influence of smaller states and better correspond to the traditional understanding of sovereignty. However, the failure of the League of Nations shows the weaknesses of this system. Regardless of the alternative chosen, the system must facilitate a new multipolar world order. The United Nations is currently based on a factual and normative inequality. The implementation of an alternative system will require radical restructuring and ideological reorientation. The so-called “World Order” (referring to the actual balance of power among states) is undergoing a revolutionary change, unforeseen just a few years ago. These developments have led to a sudden disintegration of once powerful states and a rise of other states and regional groups to international power. The balance of power of 1945 cannot eternally regulate the system of international law. This would make today’s nations prisoners of the past and allow the declining superpowers of past decades to exercise a legal arbitrariness*9 that is politically unacceptable, inconsistent with legal theory and in no way proportional to the actual strength of these states in today’s world. The Charter of a world organization must not be misused simply to safeguard its authors (the “sponsoring governments”) against the uncertainties of [115] future international developments. But this legal protection exists in Art. 108, where the permanent members subjected the ratification of any Charter amendment to their veto power. With power politics playing such an important role, the author is quite conscious of the fact that the realization of an alternative system remains far away. A philosophical analysis, however, should demonstrate how a system of norms of international conduct could be consistently established. Such efforts attempt to explain corrective measures that are indispensable if the system is not only to provide legality secured by power politics, but also legitimacy based on moral principles. For this reason, revision of the UN Charter is necessary from (a) the legal standpoint, requiring the abolition of the veto causing a normative contradiction which threatens the coherence of the entire system established by the Charter, and (b) the political standpoint, requiring the abandonment of the veto privilege in order to control power politics effectively and to adapt the Charter to the newly emerging multipolar world order.*10

440

3  “ The most productive time ”

The abolition of the veto would be the decisive step towards restoring the credibility of the United Nations. The idea of maintaining peace through universal co-operation would replace the philosophy of securing peace through co-ordination among the few privileged holders of power (whose present unity is euphorically welcomed, but may not last). This reorientation would finally bring to life the concept of “collective security” and would be the decisive factor in establishing the rule of law in international relations.*11 By no means must a structural deficiency in the Charter be retained in the wavering hope that the international political order would remain as “favourable” as it now exists, whereby the unity among the superpowers neutralizes the damaging effects of the veto power. The deficiency itself must be eliminated. This would make all of the abstention clauses, casuistic differentiations and definitions of categories of possible decisions obsolete. All of these difficulties clearly indicate that the international community, under the pressures of realpolitik, endorsed a principle that is totally incompatible [116] with the spirit of the UN Charter. Undoubtedly, the victors of World War II (and drafters of the veto rule) have meanwhile squandered their moral credit attained as those who saved the world from the scourge of fascism. These countries, therefore, can no longer claim special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and justice. At the San Francisco Conference, the main argument for accepting the veto rule was purely pragmatic: “it was unconceivable that the United Nations should undertake enforcement action against a great power.”*12 The surrender to power politics was thus present from the very beginning of the United Nations. To no one’s surprise, the Security Council was therefore, as stated by Lord Caradon, “sadly and tragically neglected” as an instrument to maintain peace and establish a just world order.*13 The fundamental readjustment in the global political order cannot hide the structural deficiency inherited by the Charter (i.e. the basic mistake committed at the foundation of the United Nations). If one wants to preclude, also for the distant future, the paralysis of the United Nations in its primary tasks of maintaining peace and providing a framework for collective security, one must seek a new consensus and the revision of the Charter in order to abolish the special voting privilege that is incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality. Only then can the United Nations credibly claim to keep power politics in check and to have outlawed, once and for all, the use of force in inter­national relations. A veto privilege actually compensating the super­powers for the earlier abrogation of the jus ad bellum is a disgrace to modern international law. Original footnotes *1 See Henry G. Schermers, International Institutional Law, vol. II: International Law. Leyden, 1972, p. 330. See also Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen einschliesslich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften. Köln et al.: Heymanns, 3rd ed. 1979, pp. 147 ff. *2 Schermers, International Institutional Law, ibid., p. 330. *3 See Carol Barret and Hanna Newcombe, Weighted Voting in International Organizations. Peace Research Reviews, vol. II, no. 2 (April 1968) [→ 2.20 (1983)]; A. Newcombe, H. Newcombe, J. Wert, Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations. [preprint] Peace Research Institute. Dundas, Ont., 1970; as well as

3  “ The most productive time ”

441

the suggestion on voting by Harold E. Stassen in his 1990 Draft Charter suggested for a better United Nations Organization to emerge from the original, New York, 1990, Art. 18, p. 32. [→ 2.21 (1987).] *4 Only in a totally different international system in which the individual (not the state) would enjoy the status of a primary subject of international law could the vote of each state be weighted according to the number of voting citizens of the respective state. This, however, would entail the abandonment of the concept of state sovereignty in the Charter. In such a system (essentially a “World State”) the delegates of member states would be direct democratic representatives of an exactly determined number of citizens. It goes without saying that in such a system, “the weighting of votes”, for example according to income, would be unacceptable. *5 This is not in accordance with Harold E. Stassen’s suggestion for reform of the United Nations (The 1990 Draft Charter, see footnote *3 above) that clings to a superpower regime and even pleads for a reduction of the number of permanent members provided with the veto privilege (pp. 36ff.). *6 At an earlier stage, ten member states presented a proposal to the General Assembly for the increase in membership (Question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council, General Assembly, 35th Session, Autumn 1980, Doc. A/34/246) [14 November 1979, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, Letter to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, → 2.17]. Likewise, the question of increasing the number of permanent members (without veto power) was considered, mentioning India, Japan, Brazil, a reunified Germany, etc. (see Benjamin Cohen, The United Nations: Constitutional Development, Growth and Possibilities, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 98; David Nicol, The United Nations Security Council: Towards Greater Effectiveness, New York: UN Institute for Training and Research, 1982, pp. 13 ff. *7 With regard to the territorial composition, economic strength, etc. – A striking example was the change of the social and national identity of the Soviet Union as a formerly unified state, its later disintegration and succession by Russia. *8 The discussions about the new international role of Germany have led to recent considerations of a collective membership for the European Community in the Security Council on a rotational basis. *9 F.A. Freiherr von der Heydte describes this challenge in his article about the socalled “Thornburgh Doctrine”: “There will be serious consequences for the community of nations when the arrogant despotism of a world power raises itself up thus, to be lord not only over war and peace, but even over law itself.” (“The Thornburgh Doctrine: the end of international law”, in Executive Intelligence Review, May 25, 1990, p. 62.) *10 This implies the relinquishment of the “realistic” theory of foreign policy that makes the legal dimension subordinate to national interest. This refers not only to Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy, but also to Hans Morgenthau’s doctrine of the “national interest”: In Defense of the National Interest. A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, New York, 1951. *11 As for tying international authority to the rule of law as the basic measure for the establishment of a system of collective security, see Rudolf Weiler, “Friede durch internationale Rechtsordnung”, in Internationale Ethik. Eine Einführung, vol. 2, Berlin, 1989, pp. 123 ff.

442

3  “ The most productive time ”

*12 Sidney Bailey, Veto in the Security Council. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1968, p. 36. *13 Quoted according to David Nicol [footnote *6 above], p. 12.

3.5.3 17-19 September 1991, Second International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN-2), Concluding Statement The Second International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN-2), met under the title of “The United Nations and a New World Order for Peace and Justice” on 17-19 September 1991 at the UN’s Vienna International Centre. The Conference was convened by Dr Hans Koechler, President of the International Progress Organization. The Conference considered a wide range of proposals and suggestions on the subject of the reform and modernization of the United Nations, including those put forward by the Stockholm Initiative*1, Harold Stassen*2, Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers*3, and by the participants of CAMDUN-1*4. The Concluding Plenary Session agreed to the release for distribution of the following lists of some of the issues that were discussed. Governments, non-governmental organizations and the interested public are invited to give these items their consideration. LIST 1 Proposals that appear feasible under the UN Charter as it exists […] 1.8 Adhering to Article 27(3) so that an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council is not regarded as an affirmative vote*5. […] LIST 2 Proposals that may require Charter amendment […] 2.2 Enlarging the Security Council to 18 members*2. 2.3 Abolishing the Security Council “veto”*4 *6, by instituting non-discriminatory voting powers or failing this by providing for a non-concurring vote of permanent members to be overridden by a concurring vote of the non-permanent members*5. […] Original footnotes

*1 The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. Common Responsibility in

the 1990s. Stockholm: Office of the Prime Minister of Sweden, 1991. *2 Harold Stassen, Draft Charter Suggested for a Better United Nations Organization. 4th edition. New York: The Glenview Foundation, 1990. [→ 2.21 (1987).] *3 Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990. *4 Proceedings of the 1990 International Conference On A More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN-1). Building A More Democratic United Nations. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1991. *5 CAMDUN-2. The United Nations and a New World Order for Peace and Justice. 17-19 September 1991, Vienna. *6 Hans Koechler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council. Examining a Normative Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences on International

3  “ The most productive time ”

443

Relations. Studies in International Relations, Volume 17, Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1991. [→ 3.5.2]. 3.5.4 1992, Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order, Military Law Review, Vol. 138, pp. 187-262514 […] [189] […] While we must seek to improve the Security Council, the task will not be easy. Improving the effectiveness of the body will require permanent members to commit themselves to future Security Council decisions. This presents a classic prisoners’ dilemma.*1 Specifically, each member nation not only recognizes that collective security requires a commitment to abide by the collective will, but also faces the need to protect its own sovereignty.*2 Because these interests may conflict, the members of the organization naturally will remain wary.*3 This dilemma arises whenever states consider a collective security organization. For example, the Hague Conference of 1899 tried to reduce armaments but, after meeting for over ten weeks, the members refused to commit to any reductions.*4 The Hague Conference did establish the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but excepted from its jurisdiction all significant cases.*5 Similarly, in 1918, Nicaragua would not renew the Central American Court of Justice Treaty “because two decisions … were adverse to her.”*6 Decisions in the League of Nations required unanimity,*7 which protected each member from the collective will. Likewise, the United Nations Charter obligates all states to follow Security Council decisions, but the veto power effectively excuses permanent members from that obligation.*8 Eliminating the veto, of course, would reintroduce this classic dilemma. The permanent members – that is, the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and the Soviet Union – [190] reserved the veto to preserve their own interests.*9 The United States government, for instance, feared that the Senate would not consent to membership without the veto.*10 The Soviets, on the other hand, insisted on the veto because they feared that the Western powers would outvote them.*11 At the United Nations conference in San Francisco, delegates strongly criticized the veto.*12 Nevertheless, the permanent members defended it, and demanded its acceptance.*13 Because self-interest persists, the veto will be both difficult to live with and difficult to change. Despite recent international cooperation, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that the present period of global harmony will continue indefinitely; when the harmony ceases, the political machinery, unchanged, will prove to be just as inadequate as during the Cold War.”*14 Because the veto protects their self-interests, the permanent members will be reluctant to give it up. Consequently, today the community of nations faces new and old – new opportunities arising from the Cold War’s end, as well as old, familiar choices between self-interest and collective interest. The members of that community should take this opportunity to consider critically whether the world has entered an era in which each nation comfortably can sacrifice considerable self-interest to promote collective interest. The world certainly will “miss the boat” if it does not use the end of the Cold War to create a global system for the new millennium – one that preserves peace, 514  K  eith L. Sellen is an American lawyer. At the time of writing of this article, he was a Judge Advocate in the General’s Corps of the U.S. Army, assigned as Chief of the Criminal Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, in Fort Gordon, Georgia.

444

3  “ The most productive time ”

fosters economic growth, and prevents the deterioration of the human physical and environmental condition.*15 If the world truly has entered an era marked by a new international order, nations should consider, in particular, [191] whether the ultimate protection of international self-interest – that is, the veto power retained by the permanent members of the Security Council – must be eschewed. To improve the Security Council, the United Nations should replace the permanentmember veto with a “double-majority” voting method. This voting method would require the concurrence of a majority of all members, as well as an independent concurrence by a majority of the permanent members, before a Security Council resolution passes. Realistically, resolutions considered under this voting system will pass only if member states respect the Security Council’s effectiveness and fairness. Accordingly, the double-majority voting scheme not only elevates collective interests above often-selfish domestic interests, but also promotes respect for the Security Council itself. A heightened recognition of collective interests and a heightened respect for the Security Council are both essential if law is to rule the international community. Because the United States benefits from improved international security, it should agree to replace the veto. This is especially important now because the United States likely will be less dominant in international politics in the future. Several factors support a proposal to replace the permanent-member veto with a double-majority voting scheme. First, United States security improves as international security improves. Second, international security improves as the Security Council acts more effectively. Third, the Security Council acts more effectively as it becomes more authoritative – that is, as it operates without the veto. Fourth, eliminating the veto is in the United States’ best interests. Fifth, a double-majority voting method is the best way to make the Security Council more authoritative, considering its purpose and the international community’s needs. […] [230] […] IV. The Security Council Will Become More Effective as it Becomes More Authoritative Given that today’s security threats are indivisible and resolved best through the Security Council, the international community naturally should seek to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council. In particular, nations should consider improving the function of the Security Council to maximize its facility to promote unity, coercion, and justice. Nevertheless, because the efficacy of Security Council proceedings has depended on voluntary cooperation since the body’s inception,*16 no state reasonably could be expected to surrender substantial authority to it, except to an extent consistent with that state’s self-interest. Although even this level of commitment is necessary and worthy, the Security Council’s functional limitations at enforcing such commitments – the most visible and substantial of which is the [231] permanent member veto provision – undermine the Security Council’s ultimate objectives relating to international security. Accordingly, changing the veto provision would improve the Security Council’s effectiveness by compelling each of its members to confront and solve security problems, rather than to eschew them by exercising a veto. Although eliminating the veto is a difficult task*17 – a task that still will require acceptable conditions*18 – it is an important one. If no veto exists, permanent members must become problem-solvers. Rather than make futile gestures, they must find solutions that all of the members

3  “ The most productive time ”

445

can support.*19 Moreover, without a permanent member veto provision, the Security Council would be more authoritative, thereby improving its ability to promote unity, making it more effective at enforcing community values, and enhancing its legitimacy as an honest broker. […] [251] […] B. The United States Should Recommend a Double Majority Voting Method as a Veto Alternative Promoting respect for the Council and for a veto alternative creates acceptable conditions for making the legal change. In addition to this, however, the United States should recommend the alternative best suited to the Security Council’s functions and the community’s needs. Possible alternatives to the permanent member veto mechanism include a simple majority, special majority (a requirement for a two-thirds concurrence), composite majority (a majority of permanent members and a majority of nonpermanent members), and double majority (a majority of the entire Security Council and a majority of the permanent members). Determining which alternative is best first requires identification and definition of the criteria that make an alternative well suited to the Security Council and the community. It then requires a careful evaluation of those criteria. 1. Defining Criteria. – Many considerations impact on voting schemes, but the fundamental consideration is that the form be well suited to the institution’s purposes.*20 The Security Council’s purpose is to maintain international peace and security,*21 which requires unity, coercion, and justice. Therefore, the voting form should promote these three attributes. Nevertheless, because any mechanism for legal decision-making is ineffective without community acceptance, accommodating those three considerations alone is insufficient to form a set of defining criteria. Instead, because the permanent members must consent to any amend- [252] ments to the United Nations Charter, they must be receptive to a change in the voting scheme, and must find the chosen alternative acceptable. Accordingly, a comprehensive analysis of potential alternatives to the permanent member veto mechanism must address the criteria of unity, coercion, justice, and acceptance. Unity means commitment to a common purpose.*22 Therefore, the value of an alternative depends on how well it tends to promote commitment to a common purpose. Two considerations are important in evaluating a voting scheme’s facility for commitment. First, while special majority voting schemes protect the rights of minorities, such schemes often allow small voting blocs to dictate community policy; therefore, special majorities potentially can frustrate unity.*23 Policy founded on the consensus of a majority of parties manifestly will promote better unity than an insubstantial policy that merely incorporates the denominators held by a minority faction.*24 Therefore, an alternative that most often expresses a majority consensus is best. Second, voting should promote consensus, rather than merely parliamentary victory.*25 When every party has a risk of losing, each participant in the process will feel pressure to seek consensus. The present permanent member veto mechanism removes this risk of losing. Accordingly, the Security Council often is confronted with multiple counter-proposals – each receiving majority support, yet none passing – leaving crises to continue.*26 Ambassador Pickering’s practice of seeking solutions that every participant can support clearly offers a better solution.*27

446

3  “ The most productive time ”

Coercion is the ability to enforce community values.*28 Therefore, in addition to considering each alternative’s potential for fostering unity, each alternative must be evaluated to determine which is best at enforcing community values.*29 First, [253] the voting procedure must allow the organization quickly to determine an appropriate response.*30 Typically, a small number of states should be able to reach agreement with greater speed and urgency than a larger group whose manifold special interests may predominate. Second, the voting procedure must ensure that the organization musters sufficient power to enforce its decision.*31 These two considerations tend to work against each other. Specifically, a procedure that allows for a quick decision may not muster enough enforcement power. Conversely, a procedure that depends upon the coalescing of enforcement power may be slow to reach consensus. Justice, the third necessary criteria for evaluating alternatives to the permanent member veto mechanism, requires the facility of an honest broker.*32 Accordingly, each alternative must be evaluated to determine which one will maximize the Security Council’s capacity to act as an honest broker. Proposals first must correlate each state’s power to influence decisions with its obligations to support the Security Council.*33 A state’s accumulation of influence may inure to its eschewing its obligations and eventually may tempt it to exploit its advantage over less influential states.*34 This detracts from the Security Council’s image as an honest broker. In addition, proposals must prevent a particular state’s self-interest from being decisive. The veto allowed any permanent member to paralyze the majority for its own interests.*35 To preserve impartiality, the voting method should force states’ interests to compete with one another. Finally, any alternative to the permanent member veto mechanism must be evaluated in terms of its acceptability – that is, the willingness of states to adopt the proposal. The degree of unity, coercion, and justice accommodated by each alternative affects its acceptability. Additionally, proposals that protect against majoritarian tyranny naturally are more acceptable than [254] those that do not.*36 Finally, proposals that oblige the Security Council to control itself are more acceptable than those that could allow the Security Council to take arbitrary or capricious actions.*37 In other words, proposals that harness the natural conflicts of interest between powerful groups are beneficial because they tend to moderate the Security Council’s proceedings with an inherent structure of checks and balances. Consequently, an acceptable alternative to the permanent member veto should serve the Security Council’s purpose and the community’s needs. These considerations suggest the following four criteria: (1) the extent to which each promotes commitment to a common purpose; (2) the extent to which each promotes enforcement of community values; (3) the extent to which each allows the Council to act as an honest broker; and (4) the extent to which the community accepts each. 2. Evaluating the Alternatives. – (a) Applying the criteria. – (i) Unity. – Choosing the voting alternative that best promotes unity requires an empirical analysis of the following two factors: (1) the total number of Security Council members that must agree to pass a resolution; and (2) the number of permanent members that must agree to sustain it. Based on these two factors, the alternative that most easily expresses a majority consensus is the simple majority, which requires

3  “ The most productive time ”

447

agreement by any eight members. The next best alternative is the double majority, which not only requires agreement by eight members, but also requires that at least three of those eight be permanent members. The third best alternative is the composite majority, which requires a nine-member majority vote – at least six of the ten nonpermanent members and at least three of the five permanent members. Finally, a special majority requiring a two-thirds vote of the Security Council’s membership apparently would reflect consensus. Nevertheless, like the composite majority, having to obtain full agreement among nine or ten members could hinder much of the relatively routine business of the Security Council. Accordingly, the composite majority and special majority voting schemes often would sacrifice Security Council action for apparently marginal indicia of [255] consensus. Therefore, the simple and double majority mechanisms strike the best balance between the beneficial attribute of promoting unity and the essential attribute of facilitating action. (ii) Coercion. – Which alternative best empowers the Security Council to coerce depends upon how rapidly it permits the body to respond to crises and how readily it allows the body to muster its enforcement power. The voting mechanism that is most effective at moving states toward consensus also will hasten the Security Council’s response. Accordingly, the analysis from the preceding paragraph – which supports the employment of simple or double majorities to promote unity – also tends to support them to reduce the Security Council’s response time. On the other hand, the alternatives that muster the most enforcement power are the composite majority and double majority – both of which require support from at least three of the powerful permanent members. Finally, because the special majority and simple majority would allow resolutions to pass without the backing of any of the permanent members, these major players understandably may be dilatory in employing their powers to enforce such resolutions. The voting mechanism’s two major influences on coercion – that is, the speed and effectiveness of the organization’s ultimate response – are inversely related, making comparisons difficult. For instance, although a decision supported by a composite majority typically would muster the most enforcement power, the relative difficulty in achieving such a composite majority may reduce the circumstances under which the Security Council actually would employ such power. On the other hand, while a simple majority facilitates quick responses, the bloc of states that comprises such a majority need not have great influence. Accordingly, without requiring the support of the more powerful permanent members, a resolution passed by simple majority may not necessarily muster the enforcement power needed to coerce compliance effectively. Despite this difficulty, two conclusions are clear. First, because mustering the enforcement powers of the permanent members will be critical to the Security Council’s ability to coerce in almost every circumstance, the voting mechanisms that require acquiescence from the permanent members are better than the others. Second, the difference between the composite majority and double majority is slight; only the vote and support of one nonpermanent member distinguishes the two. Nevertheless, because the double majority requires one less vote than the composite majority, a double majority can be achieved – and thereby can approve action – with greater speed. [256] (iii) Justice. – In considering the voting alternative under which the Security Council acts most like an honest broker, two factors are important. First, the voting

448

3  “ The most productive time ”

mechanism must fairly correlate each state’s capacity to influence decisions with its obligations to the Security Council. Second, the mechanism must prevent an individual member’s self-interest from being decisive. Because of the permanent members’ economic, political, or military strengths, they come to the Security Council sharing most of the world’s influence. Those strengths mean not only that the permanent members come to the Security Council with substantially greater resources than the nonpermanent members, but also that the permanent members attract a concomitant expectation to obligate their resources to promoting the success of the United Nations. The simple majority and special majority voting schemes, however, make no distinction between the votes of permanent members and nonpermanent members. Under both of these voting mechanisms, each state has equal capacity to influence decisions even though the permanent members have greater obligations. The composite majority is slightly better at accommodating the greater obligations of the permanent members because it – unlike the simple and special majorities – allows a majority of the permanent members to negate Security Council actions. Nevertheless, the composite majority scheme effectively grants to any majority formed by nonpermanent members – that is, only six states – the prerogative of negating actions supported by the other nine members, including actions having the full support of all permanent members. Accordingly, notwithstanding the tremendous disparity in their obligations to the organization, the permanent members and the nonpermanent members essentially would enjoy equal capacities to influence Security Council decisions. The double majority, on the other hand, grants special status to the permanent members – a special status that fairly provides them with voting influence that squares with their greater obligations. While the composite majority requires that at least six nonpermanent members agree on any resolution, a double majority never would require support from more than five nonpermanent members. In addition, the permanent members can negate Security Council actions as easily under the double majority as under the composite majority. Consequently, the double majority scheme tends to correlate voting influence with voter obligation better than the other options. Nevertheless, if the Security Council is to act as an honest broker, it also must prevent the self-interest of a single member from paralyzing the whole community. The alternative that most [257] easily overcomes the obstacle of self-interest also will be the alternative that best promotes unity. Though no voting mechanism can assure that states regularly will elevate the common good above self-interest, the simple majority is the only scheme that prevents a state or bloc of states to dictate policy based on individual or factional self-interests. As noted above, however, the simple majority is the poorest voting alternative at compensating a state’s obligation by granting it enhanced influence. Consequently, reconciling both factors that affect justice in a voting scheme requires balancing the benefits of correlating obligation and influence against the benefits of attenuating the manifestations of self-interest. The double majority voting mechanism emerges as the best alternative because, while it is the second best option at preventing individual state self-interest from paralyzing the Security Council, it is the best option at correlating each state’s capacity to influence decisions with its obligations to the organization. Accordingly, among the voting mechanisms examined, the double

3  “ The most productive time ”

449

majority is best at promoting justice and at facilitating the Security Council’s function as an honest broker. (iv) Acceptance. – The acceptability of a voting scheme depends on its ability to prevent majoritarian tyranny and its facility to compel the Security Council to control itself. The alternative that best prevents majoritarian tyranny is the one that is least likely to develop a consistent voting majority that effectively controls the Security Council’s proceedings at the peril of the other members. In particular, because the special and composite majority schemes require resolutions to be founded on some degree of consensus among members – rather than on sheer numbers – they are better able to prevent majoritarian tyranny than the simple and double majority mechanisms. In addition to its capacity to prevent majoritarian tyranny, an acceptable voting scheme must force the Security Council to control itself by setting groups against each other. The simple majority and special majority do not tend to promote such deliberative tensions between groups. On the other hand, because they require agreement among the permanent members by separate ballot, the composite majority and double majority voting schemes naturally encourage some degree of adversity between the permanent members and the other states. The composite majority would be particularly effective at creating such adversity because it would require agreement by a majority of two exclusive voting blocs – permanent members and nonpermanent members. Accordingly, based on the two principle criteria that determine a proposal’s acceptability – preventing major- [258] itarian tyranny and facilitating internal checks and balances – the composite majority is the most satisfactory voting alternative. It prevents majoritarian tyranny effectively and it compels the Security Council to control itself by creating a climate of deliberative adversity. Finally, the other general criteria – unity, coercion, and justice – also affect a proposal’s acceptability. Most notably, proposals that poorly correlate a state’s capacity to influence decisions with its obligations to the Security Council likely will be unacceptable. The simple majority, special majority, and composite majority share this problem. Specifically, a powerful nation understandably would be apprehensive about obligating to a process in which it often must shed much of its influence potentially to its own detriment to satisfy the adverse interests of weaker states. Consequently, although a composite majority voting scheme appears to be the most functional alternative for promoting the normative criteria for acceptability, the double majority mechanism actually is more acceptable now because it would not obligate the most powerful nations on the Security Council to eschew their influences in total – an obligation that the international community still cannot reasonably expect the permanent members to make. (b) Comparing the alternatives. – (i) Simple majority. – The simple majority is best at promoting unity because it requires the fewest members to make a decision. That, however, is its only advantage. A simple majority musters the least enforcement power of all the alternatives. While it hastens decision-making, the resulting decisions often may not enjoy the broad support needed to credibly enforce them. In addition, the simple majority voting scheme poorly correlates a state’s capacity to influence decisions with its obligations to the Security Council. Finally, the simple majority mechanism is the least acceptable alternative. It provides the least protection against majoritarian tyranny and no

450

3  “ The most productive time ”

self-checking mechanism on Security Council power. Because of the simple majority’s many disadvantages, it is a comparatively poor alternative. (ii) Special majority. – The special majority, on the other hand, is reasonably acceptable because it protects against majoritarian tyranny. Nevertheless, it has many disadvantages. It is the least effective alternative for promoting coercion not only because resolutions could pass without mustering the powers of permanent members, but also because the time needed to amass the required votes often would make the Security Council dilatory [259] in responding to security threats. Finally, the special majority’s principal drawback is its failure to correlate a state’s capacity to influence Security Council proceedings with its obligations to the organization. Because these disadvantages greatly outweigh its advantage, the special majority also is a comparatively poor alternative. (iii) Composite majority. – Unlike the special majority, the composite majority voting scheme effectively promotes coercion by mustering the most enforcement power. It also is the most acceptable proposal because it inherently imposes checks on majoritarian tyranny and Security Council capriciousness. It has only two comparative disadvantages to other proposals. First, it promotes unity less effectively than the simple and double majority mechanisms because it requires nine votes for a decision rather than eight. Second, it correlates a state’s capacity to influence decisions with its obligations to the Security Council less effectively than the double majority. Accordingly, while the composite majority voting scheme suffers from some marginal disadvantages, its facility to promote coercion and its potential for acceptance make it a comparatively good voting mechanism. (iv) Double majority. – The double majority voting scheme has only minor disadvantages. It is less acceptable than the composite majority. A double majority also could pass a resolution with one less nonpermanent member’s acquiescence than a composite majority. Accordingly, the double majority voting scheme is less capable of mustering coercive power than the composite majority mechanism. The double majority alternative, however, best facilitates the Security Council’s role as an honest broker by accommodating the closest correlation between a state’s capacity to influence decisions and its obligations to the Security Council. It also promotes unity more effectively than all alternatives except the simple majority. Consequently, the double majority appears to be a comparatively good voting mechanism. C. Summary The composite majority and the double majority voting schemes emerge from the analysis as the best two balloting proposals to replace the current permanent member veto mechanism. Between these two proposals, however, the double majority is the better choice. It promotes unity slightly better than the composite majority, requiring eight votes rather than nine. In addition, while a composite majority would have to muster the support of one more nonpermanent member than a double majority, the coercive benefit derived from that additional [260] vote would be negligible. Specifically, a double majority – like the composite majority – still would have to muster support from a majority of the more powerful permanent members. Moreover, while the requirement for one less nonpermanent member vote could result in marginally less coercive power, the time saved by not having to elicit that vote often will permit the Security Council to respond more rapidly to a crisis.

3  “ The most productive time ”

451

The double majority also facilitates the Security Council’s role as an honest broker. The justness of this voting mechanism is most apparent in that it is the only alternative that effectively compensates permanent members’ obligations to the Security Council with enhanced influence in its formal decision-making process. Finally, even though the composite majority voting scheme is the proposal that most effectively prevents majoritarian tyranny and Security Council capriciousness, the double majority nevertheless provides adequate protection by preventing a permanent member’s self-interest from paralyzing the organization. Consequently, although the composite majority voting scheme is a favorable alternative to the current permanent member veto mechanism, the double majority fares as the best alternative among the proposals examined. Accordingly, the United States should continue its commitment to improve the Security Council by proposing a veto alternative. Such a proposal will continue the trend toward increased respect for international authority, which grows more important as the world grows more integrated. To facilitate the proposal’s adoption, the United States should develop conditions in the international community that will make a veto substitute acceptable. In particular, the United States should work through the Security Council to resolve threats to international security, maintain constructive relationships among its members, and support its efforts to communicate community values. The United States, therefore, should propose an alternative to the permanent member veto. It should offer that proposal before the United Nations so the international community can discuss and decide the issue. Most importantly, however, it specifically should propose a double majority voting method as the veto replacement that best suits the Security Council’s purpose and best serves the international community. […] Original footnotes See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. chi. L. Rev. 633, 640 (1991). *2 See Claude, [Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. New York: Random House, 4th ed. 1971], at 253 (discussing the need for commitment to the collective interest); id. at 5, 39 (discussing the need to protect individual independence and sovereignty). *3 Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 356 (1961). *4 Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for the World Peace Through Six Centuries 128 (1943). *5 Id. (“Not a single power … was willing to bind itself by a hard and fast rule to submit all questions to arbitration, and least of all the United States”). *6 Id. at 137. *7 League of Nations Covenant art. 5, para. 1. *8 U.N. Charter art. 24, 25, 27. *9 Id. art. 27, para. 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” (emphasis added)). The phrase “all other matters” means *1

452

3  “ The most productive time ”

nonprocedural matters, a clause subject to varied interpretation. See id. art. 27, para. 2; Leland M. Goodrich & Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations 221-3 (2d ed. 1949). *10 Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 61-62. *11 Id. at 155. *12 Goodrich & Hambro, [Leland M. Goodrich & Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations. London: Stevens, 2d ed. 1949] at 215. *13 Id. at 219. The permanent members “suggested that the proposed text and statement of interpretation were as far as their Governments were prepared to go, and called attention to the serious consequences that would follow so far as the work of the Conference was concerned from any rejection of the proposed text.” Id.; see also Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 143 (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull as saying that the United States supported the permanent member veto and would not have participated in the United Nations without it). *14 Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 Int’l L. & Pol. 601, 614-5. *15 Id. at 601. *16 Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 100-01 (“the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ has served to emphasize the fact that the United Nations is an international organization to facilitate voluntary cooperation among its Members”). *17 See U.N. Charter art. 108 (requiring the concurrence of all permanent members for ratification of amendments to the United Nations Charter). *18 See McDougal & Feliciano, [Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961] at 374-75. *19 See Goshko, [John M. Goshko, A World of Difference at the United Nations, WASH. Post, Nov. 12, 1991] at A19 (noting Ambassador Pickering’s efforts to mold the permanent members into a team, and quoting him as saying, “our goal was to convince them [the Soviets] that we could reach a new era where the pressure is on everyone to find negotiated solutions”). *20 Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 119. *21 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. *22 See Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 251. *23 Id. at 120 (noting that unanimity requirements lead to paralysis and anarchy, which is the opposite of unity); id. at 124 (noting that one vote for each state does not express the will of the majority properly); The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961) (arguing that, as to the colonies, a majority of states was not necessarily a majority of the country); McDougal & Feliciano, [Law and Minimum World Public Order] at 362 (noting that special majorities enable minorities to determine community policies). *24 Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 125. *25 Id. at 140.

3  “ The most productive time ” *26

453

See [Proposed UN force for Lebanon rejected in Security Council; Soviet veto, OPI, Mar. 1984, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File (reporting a Soviet veto to a United States proposal to send a United Nations peacekeeping force to Lebanon for fear of increased American power in the region)]; See [U.S. Vetoes Proposal, Council session on southern Lebanon; United Nations Security Council, OPI, June 1988, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File (noting the United States veto of a resolution condemning Israel for its invasion of Lebanon); United States vetoes draft resolution condemning Israeli acts in Lebanon, OPI, Mar. 1985, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File; United States vetoes Security Council proposal concerning Israeli measures in Lebanon; Includes summaries of delegates’ speeches, OPI, July 1984, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File] and accompanying text. *27 See Goshko, [A World of Difference at the United Nations] at A19. *28 See [Robert D. Culver, Toward a Biblical View of Civil Government. Moody Press, 1974] (describing the biblical account of the origins of government as necessary to preserve community interests against individual self-interest); see Hemleben, [Sylvester J. Hemleben, Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943] at 193 (analogizing the problem of governing individuals with that of governing states) and See Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 218 (noting that a task of international organizations is to make peaceful means available “and to encourage if not insist upon their utilization”); id. at 228 (noting that voluntary participation is a “major limiting factor” in pacific settlement methods); McDougal & Feliciano, [Law and Minimum World Public Order] at 121-23 (arguing the need for international control over the processes of coercion between states); id. at 214 (“low expectations as to the effective competence of the general organization of states to protect individual members … make indispensable the permission of some self-defense.” If the international community is incapable of deterring aggression, aggression is more likely to occur); id. at 363 (criticizing the competence of the Security Council and International Court of Justice to prescribe norms)] and accompanying text. *29 See McDougal & Feliciano, [Law and Minimum World Public Order] at 374 (noting that legal techniques can affect community behavior). *30 See Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 120 (noting that a unanimity requirement often leads to paralysis); The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961) (arguing that a government must be able to control the governed); Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 219 (criticizing the permanent member veto as paralyzing the Security Council). *31 Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 29. This is one reason the veto was necessary in 1945. *32 See [U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3 (“in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”). Interestingly, any party to a dispute is permitted to vote; and, if that party is a permanent member, it can cast a veto in cases under Chapter VII. Id. chap. VII (providing for decisions on binding sanctions); see Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 25 (quoting Hugo Grotius); id. at 217 (noting the practice in Greek city-states); Culver, [Toward a Biblical View of Civil Government] at 206

454

3  “ The most productive time ”

(commenting on Leviticus 19:17-18, which prohibits private revenge in deference to civil authority); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961); Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 224 (quoting President Franklin Roosevelt); hemleben, [Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries] at 48 (quoting William Penn); U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; see Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 93; Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 94 (discussing the drafters’ intent). The authors immediately point out that “no state which has taken the law into its own hands should be allowed to stop the [Security] Council from acting.” Id. This concern about states taking the law into their own hands implies that the Security Council should act as an honest broker] and accompanying text. *33 The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961); Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 199. *34 See Claude, [Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization] at 63 (“if great nations are inclined to abuse their strength by behaving dictatorially, small ones are often tempted to abuse their weakness by behaving irresponsibly”). *35 See [Proposed UN force for Lebanon rejected in Security Council; Soviet veto, OPI, Mar. 1984, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File (reporting a Soviet veto to a United States proposal to send a United Nations peacekeeping force to Lebanon for fear of increased American power in the region)]; See [U.S. Vetoes Proposal, Council session on southern Lebanon; United Nations Security Council, OPI, June 1988, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File (noting the United States veto of a resolution condemning Israel for its invasion of Lebanon); United States vetoes draft resolution condemning Israeli acts in Lebanon, OPI, Mar. 1985, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File; United States vetoes Security Council proposal concerning Israeli measures in Lebanon; Includes summaries of delegates’ speeches, OPI, July 1984, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, UNCHRN File] and accompanying text. *36 See Goodrich & Hambro, [Charter of the United Nations] at 224 (noting Soviet use of its veto as a means to prevent tyrannical treatment by the majority of western states on the Security Council). *37 See The Federalist No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1961) (“the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself”). 3.5.5 1992, Louis B. Sohn, Modernizing the Structure and Procedure of the Security Council, in: René-Jean Dupuy (ed.), The Development of the Role of the Security Council: Workshop, The Hague, 21-23 July 1992, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 385-397515 […] [387] […] Something less drastic is necessary, that would not involve a revision of the Charter, but nevertheless would provide for adequate par- [388] ticipation of other major Powers in the Security Council on a sufficiently continuous basis. As a first step, the 515  For biographical information on the author, see Part 2, footnote 15 above.

3  “ The most productive time ”

455

General Assembly may revise its 1963 resolution which provided for distribution of seats among regional groups*1, and this time place more emphasis on the Charter’s injunction that due regard be paid “to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization”. The new resolution might start with granting to each of the major groups of States two seats on the Council, thus providing for election to the Council of two States each from Africa, Asia, Central and South America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the group of Western European and other States. In the second place, the General Assembly might determine that in each region two principal States, because of their large population or economic power (or both), would be entitled to a semi-permanent seat on the Security Council, rotating every two years. Subject to the power of the General Assembly to revise this distribution from time to time, the new resolution might allocate these seats between the following pairs of States: Egypt and Nigeria, India and Japan, Brazil and Mexico, Poland and Ukraine, and Germany and Italy. The other seat in each region would continue to rotate among other States of the region, but in selecting their nominees the regional groups should still pay attention to the injunction that the State selected should be one that is likely to contribute to a better functioning of the Security Council. For instance, the regional group might consider whether a State has been willing to contribute contingents to the United Nations peace-keeping forces, or has taken an active part in the leadership of the group through excellent representatives able to participate intelligently, constructively and imaginatively in solving difficult and complex problems in an equitable way. In order to provide additional permanency to each selection, the General Assembly might recommend to the Security Council, and the Council might adopt appropriate additions to its regulations that would enable the Council to make special arrangements for the two groups of non-permanent members. These arrangements might provide, for instance, that under Article 31 of the Charter, the Security Council might determine that the States entitled to the rotating semi-permanent seats would, during the period that they are not on the [389] Council, be considered, in view of their special interest in both global and regional issues, to be entitled to “participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council”*2. The Security Council might also make similar arrangements for the other occupants of non-permanent seats. There are two possibilities: the Council might provide that the States whose term has expired might continue to sit on the Council, without vote, for two additional years, so that the Council would have the benefit of the knowledge of both procedural and substantive issues they have acquired during the previous two years. Alternatively, the system of pre-election may be adopted, if the General Assembly should agree to select the nominees for a particular seat two years in advance, to enable the Council to grant them Article 31 status for the two years preceding their actual election. In this case, they would participate for two years, without vote, in the discussions of the Council, and when they later join the Council as full members, with a right to vote, they would be able to capitalize on their two years of experience and participate in the discussions with a full knowledge of the antecedents of each situation or dispute, instead of starting from scratch, without prior preparation.

456

3  “ The most productive time ”

In this manner, without changing the Charter, or giving veto rights to additional States, ten States would be given in fact permanent seats on the Council, sometimes with the right to vote and sometimes without it. Ten other States would be able to participate in the Council’s discussions for four years, again with a vote for part of the time, and without it for the remainder of the period, and would both acquire better knowledge of the way the Council works and contribute more and better to the solution of problems facing the Council. The result would be, in the case of both groups of States, that the Council would have the benefit of a wider range of opinions, and that decisions adopted by the Council with their participation would be more acceptable to the other States and to the world’s public opinion. This approach would also democratize the Council, thus adapting it to the current trends in world affairs. Unlike an amend- [390] ment to the Charter which might be difficult to change should it prove unworkable, the proposed arrangement, being adopted by resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, can be easily adjusted to changing circumstances. In particular, should the leadership of any region change, it would be possible to change the selection of the States representing that region in the Council. As far as the practicality of this proposal is concerned, it depends in the first place on its acceptance by the five permanent members and the ten other countries chosen for the five semi-permanent seats. Together they represent almost half of the world’s population and much larger proportion of the world’s economic power. They should be able to persuade the rest of the world that the proposed solution would result in a Council more representative of the world as a whole than one in which ten of the Council members are selected mostly by a random rotation among more than 160 States many of which represent less than one-hundredth of 1 per cent of the world’s population or economic power. Granted that some of the important leaders of several groups of States have come from small States it might be expected that if the election from these regions would be the result more of the quality of the person that would represent the region rather than of blind rotation, these leaders and their States would obtain the seats on the Council that are due to them. […] Original footnotes *1 See [GA resolution 1991 A (XVIII), 17 December 1963; GAOR, Supp. 1, pp. 21-22, → 2.11]. *2 Article 31 of the Charter provides: “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specifically affected.” 3.5.6 1994, United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press […] [84] […] Economic Security Council A further step in strengthening the UN role in sustainable human development would be the creation of an Economic Security Council, a decision-making forum at the highest level to review the threats to global human security and agree on required actions.

3  “ The most productive time ”

457

The council must be kept small and manageable. Its membership could consist of 11 permanent members from the main industrial and more populous developing countries. Another 11 members could be added on a rotating basis from various geographical and political constituencies. An intermediate alternative would be to extend the mandate of the present Security Council so that it could consider not just military threats but also threats to peace from economic and social crises. For this purpose, it may be necessary to establish a separate entity within the council – one with an enlarged membership and a new role in socio-economic security. Another possibility would be to use the Economic and Social Council, establishing within it a small and manageable executive board that could meet in permanent session and make decisions to be ratified later by the entire body. The voting system in an Economic Security Council should not include a veto. But to reassure all constituencies that their legitimate interests would be protected, the voting system should be to have all decisions ratified not just by a majority of all members but also by majorities of the industrial and the developing countries. As well as coordinating the activities of the UN agencies, the Economic Security Council would act as a watchdog over the policy direction of all international and regional financial institutions. To implement its decisions effectively, the council should have access to the global human security fund proposed earlier. The council would need to be backed by a professional secretariat to prepare policy options for its consideration. […] 3.5.7 1 March 1994, Peter Wallensteen, Representing the World: A Security Council for the 21st Century, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 63-75516 […] [67] […] [T]here are three criteria for an effective and legitimate Security Council: It would have to be small in size; have a reasonable geographical composition, giving room for larger countries, without eliminating powerful ones; and have a degree of economic representation. To solve this quandary we will have to consider the present setting of the Security Council. Ten seats are filled in two-year terms through elections by the General Assembly. An agreed regional distribution is used, as mentioned previously. Five seats, i.e. one third of the Security Council, are permanent, and with distinct advantages. This permanent membership involves two aspects. First, it means that some members of the most powerful organ are not elected by the members of the organization which they are set to lead. In terms of responsibility, the leadership of the permanent members are accountable to their own populations, not to the organization as such. For the permanent members this provides an independence of action and freedom from manoeuvring in the General Assembly. It runs counter, however, to normal 516   Copyright © 1994 by SAGE Publications, Ltd. Reprinted by Permission of SAGE Publications, Ltd. – Peter Wallensteen (*1945 in Stockholm, Sweden) is a Senior Professor in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, where he directed the Uppsala Conflict Data Program until 2015. He was the first holder of the Dag Hammarskjöld Chair in Peace and Conflict Research (1985-2012).

458

3  “ The most productive time ”

democratic procedures for free associations. This has implications for legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions of the organization. Secondly, there is the right of veto which is attached to the permanent membership: i.e. that only decisions which are not actively opposed by one of the permanent members can be made by the organization. Together these two aspects give the permanent members a strong influence over the decisions of the Security Council. The Secretary General, for instance, is elected for five years and participates in the deliberations of the Council, without voting rights. The post does not represent any particular grouping, although all holders have so far come from other than permanent members.*1 The considerations behind these arrangements reflected the realities of the situation in 1945: the main victors of World War II constructed the new organization. It also rested on the experiences of the League of Nations. The possibility that decisions could be made against a strong member would have meant that the organization could be used in a conflict between major powers. In such a confrontation a big power might (threaten to) leave the organization. This experience is still relevant. The strength of the United Nations depends on the power that the permanent members are willing to give to the organization. The UN does not command forces or finances of its own. The compulsory and voluntary contributions of its member-states determine its military strategy [68] and overall economy. Thus, there has to be consonance between the real distribution of power in the world and influence inside the United Nations in order for the organization to be operative. At the same time, however, its legitimacy rests on the ability of the weaker states to exert influence. This pressures the organization to become more representative, geographically as well as economically, without losing its ability to make decisions. This is the delicate balancing act that always has to be upheld when considering constitutional issues of the UN. 3. Senatorial Members and Qualified Majority Are there other ways to handle the delicate balancing act than those developed and agreed in San Francisco in 1945? First, let us consider the permanent membership. There is a demand from states to become permanent members for varying reasons. Different schemes are possible for solving this problem. One which is gaining support has already been indicated: to increase the number of permanent members. Germany and Japan are candidates, but among public proposals also Italy and India have been mentioned. It is not far-fetched to assume that Nigeria and Brazil would aspire to such seats. A Security Council with another two to five permanent members would also have to consider adjusting the decision rules. It has been suggested that new permanent members would enter without veto powers. The Security Council would, thus, consist of three types of members: five permanent ones with veto, two to five permanent members without a veto and ten (or more? or less?) non-permanent members without individual veto.*3 In this way, economic and geographical representation could be maintained, the Council would still be reasonably small (ca. 17-20 members), and the present permanent members would remain. Such a scheme has considerable political attraction. For the sake of the argument, it is interesting to explore a move in the opposite direction. By making all members of the Security Council equal on the model of the present non-permanent members – i.e. all Council members would be elected for two years by the General Assembly – a complete and radical reform of representation would be achieved. This would meet the demands for geographical representation, if

3  “ The most productive time ”

459

the formula for the present distribution of non-permanent members were retained. On the other hand, this reform would not address the needs of the delicate balancing act we just identified. This proposal does not consider the distribution of power, and might not become accepted. If somehow forced on the organization, it might lead to withdrawal by powerful states. What would be a third reform alternative which could meet the need for the delicate balancing act? One possibility is to convert the permanent seats into six-year mandates, on the model of many domestic constitutions (e.g. the US Congress). This would mean the creation of a set of senatorial positions. Such a membership would outlast the normal reign of most governments (where electoral mandates constitutionally mostly last for three to five years). The [69] principle of elections to the highest organ would at the same time be instituted and strengthened. It would give Japan and Germany a chance of becoming senatorial members, as could India, Brazil or Nigeria. If this were combined with a certain enlargement of the Security Council, the proposal might become politically more acceptable. If the Security Council were increased from the present 15 to 18, 21 or 24 members, while retaining one third of the seats for more privileged positions, the more powerful seats would increase from the present 5 (today’s permanent seats) to 6, 7 or 8 seats. Potentially this would allow for the inclusion of present permanent members as well as present candidates, but now as ‘senators’. The advantage in this reform would be to bring home the principle of accountability of the most important members to the main body of the organization. Furthermore, as the basic principle of this proposal is one of unrestrained elections, countries could be re-elected. Let us explore this possibility one step further. As already indicated, the other aspect of the present permanent seats is the possibility to veto particular decisions. If the number of privileged seats is increased, as envisioned in the first reform proposal, this would also mean increasing the number of conflicts which might remain outside the reach of the organization. Seven to ten powerful states are likely to be involved in a great number of conflicts in the world, and would presumably prefer to direct the Security Council in accordance with their own interests. This could mean either to keep the UN out – or call it in, but on their terms. This would be a most unsatisfactory form of ensuring international peace and security. This is an important drawback with the first reform proposal, although it avoids giving veto rights to the new permanent members. Their significance could still have a restraining impact of the activity of the organization. Also in the third proposal this element is there: The enlargement of senatorial seats would threaten, paradoxically, to make the UN less capable of acting, by reducing the agenda of actions.*4 The logical conclusion is that it is not appropriate to retain the veto, when extending the permanent membership or when creating senatorial seats. Instead, it would be preferable to institute a normal constitutional rule: serious decisions require a qualified majority. If a rule specifying that actions under Chapter VII of the Charter require the consent of three-quarters of the Security Council membership, the veto of an individual member would disappear, but it would be replaced with a collective veto. A minimum of one quarter of the Security Council membership would be able to block a decision. In a Security Council of 15 members, 4 could prevent actions; if the total is 18, 21 or 24 it would require 5, 6 and 6 respectively, with rounding off rules. If the blocking minority is defined as the share of the full membership, whether all members are present or not at a particular meeting, this rule become predictable and obvious.

460

3  “ The most productive time ”

What would be the effects of such reforms on the UN Security Council? Table 2 spells out some implications, primarily in geopolitical terms. It specifies the [70] likely composition in terms of regional distribution with the introduction of senatorial seats replacing permanent seats. For comparison, the distribution of the present Security Council is included. It should be recalled that this proposal does not include a change in the voting rules. Thus election to a seat requires a 2/3 majority among all voting members of the General Assembly, as is currently the case for non-permanent membership. Table 2 Geographical composition of the Security Council (SC) Present SC Derived Present SC with Reform proposals formula formula Total number Permanent/Senatorial seats (33% of all seats) W. Europe and Others (= P1, P2, P3) Eastern Europe (= P4) Africa-Asia (= P5) S. America Non-permanent/Non-senatorial seats (66% of all seats) W. Europe and Others E. Europe Africa-Asia S. America

15  5   3  1  1  0 10  2  1  5  2

%  99   33   13  40  13 100   20  10  50  20

15  5   2  1  2  0 10   2  1  5  2

18  6   2   1  2  1 12

21  7   2   1  3  1 14

 3  1  6  2

 3  1  7  3

24  8   3   1  3  1 16   3  2  8  3

Note: Formula for regional distribution of senatorial seats is derived from the composition of the present full Security Council, with minor adjustments. Permanent members are distributed according to regional memberships. P1 = USA, P2 = UK, P3 = France, P4 = Russia, P5 = China. Formula for regional distribution of non-permanent/non-senatorial seats is the one in use today: Western European and other states 20%, Eastern Europe 10%, Africa-Asia 50%, South America 20%.

The regional groups, the formulas as well as their application are likely to be a subject of discussion in case the proposed reforms are considered. The power of the stronger is assumed to be reflected in the present formulas, and consequently they constitute the point of departure. Even so, the formulas cannot be applied strictly, as there will be difficulties in determining how to approximate numbers, etc. Table 2 is a way to begin a discussion. The first column in Table 2 shows the present composition of the Security Council, when permanent members are distributed to relevant regional groupings. The strength of the WEOS group is quite obvious: It has three out of five permanent seats (i.e. 60%) and two of the non-permanent seats (i.e. 20%): this is five out of fifteen or 33% of all seats.

3  “ The most productive time ”

461

The second column shows the formulas that can be derived from the present composition of the Security Council. For the permanent (i.e. proposed senatorial) seats the composition of today’s full Council is used, whereas present [71] practice for nonpermanent seats is retained. The third column shows the impact of introducing elected senatorial seats according to the derived formula for a Security Council of the present size, that is fifteen members. The Western European grouping would have one seat less, and that seat would go to Africa-Asia. This North-West vs South-East dimension comes clearly out in many reform proposals. It is interesting to compare this with the first scheme outlined above, assuming it would mean that ten permanent seats were created from a body of twenty seats. The WEOS group would then have four permanent members (USA, UK, France, Germany), i.e. 40%, proportionally less than today. If Japan, one additional Asian country and one African country were to be added to the permanent seats, the share of Africa-Asia would rise to 40%. Also in this scenario WEOS yields relative weight to Africa-Asia. The following three columns of Table 2 shows the possible composition of a differently enlarged Security Council. In all scenarios, the Africa-Asia group emerges as the most numerous one. This is, as we have just seen, also a likely outcome of other proposals under consideration. It should be noted that regional concerns impact on the election chances of present permanent members. Only in the case of a 24-member Security Council would all present permanent members have the possibility of being elected senatorial members. With the proposed reforms of Table 2, Germany would have to compete with major European countries to get a senatorial seat. Japan, on the other hand, would have a good chance of acquiring one of Africa-Asia’s seats. For both, as well as other contenders, the reforms of Table 2 retain the possibility of acquiring a non-senatorial seat. If the reform proposal incorporates the abolition of the veto, such seats would not necessarily be unattractive. This would be even more true if the present rule against re-election were removed. What would be the implication of the proposed reforms for the decision-making and in particular the individual or collective veto? As the present Security Council has in fact a collective veto, requiring nine consenting votes for a decision (in addition to the permanent member’s individual veto, according to Article 27 in the Charter), the idea of collective veto is not new. It has rarely (if ever?) been used in a vote, but probably plays a role in the deliberations leading to decisions.*5 The proposed qualified majority rule is, thus, simply an extension of an existing regulation. Table 3 specifies some implications of such a rule. From Table 3 we see that Africa-Asia together with South America already today has a veto as a combined group, as well as through one permanent member, China, if it were to act within the regional bloc. The only individual region without a veto is South America alone. The reforms would affect this pattern only partly. In a Security Council with 18 seats and where five go to the WEOS group, this group would retain its veto.*6 Eastern Europe would lose its veto, however. In a 21-seat Security Council WEOS would lose the collective veto, but regain it in a 24-seat Council. If the two ‘European’ groups combine, as shown at the bottom of Table 3, their veto would be restored. In a polarization [72] between North-West and the South-East, both groups would be able to block each other, thus either paralysing the organization or providing incentives for consensus-building.*7

462

3  “ The most productive time ” TABLE 3 Who Has a Veto in the Security Council? Present SC

Total number Required for veto Separate Groups Western Europe and Others Eastern Europe Africa-Asia South America Combined groups Western + Eastern Europe Africa-Asia + S. America

Possible reforms

15 7 (or 1 PM)

18 5

21 6

24 6

5 Veto due to PM 2 Veto due to PM 6 Veto due to PM 2 No veto

5 Veto 2 No veto 8 Veto 3 No veto

5 No veto 2 No veto 10 Veto 4 No veto

6 Veto 3 No veto 11 Veto 4 No veto

7 Veto 8 Veto

7 Veto 11 Veto

7 Veto 14 Veto

9 Veto 15 Veto

Note: Qualified majority rule for decisions over the application of Chapter VII. Assuming proposed reforms of Table 2, and assuming groups vote in united blocs. PM = permanent member.

The original argument for the veto – the danger that the organization could be used against a major power by a hostile majority – is partly alleviated with the qualified majority rule. It requires that a major power has allies or can muster enough abstentions to prevent a negative decision in the Council. If that power has been elected, such support is likely to exist. Also, as new elections will always be coming up, there is a chance of influencing the majority in the Council. Instead of shifting conflicts to occur outside the organization, the chances might increase that they are channelled within the constitutional framework of the organization. The real danger would instead be that a major power might not be elected to the Council at all, and could thus choose to leave the organization. The probability of this happening is difficult to assess. It can be debated whether this is a more likely and less preferable outcome than the present use of the veto, which may serve to remove significant issues from the agenda. The regional groups are not as cohesive as the figures in Table 3 imply on all issues all the time. In fact, the rich-poor dichotomy could cut through some of [73] the groups. Africa-Asia includes Japan as well as Cambodia and Afghanistan, oil producers as well as nomadic societies. The diversity on many of the issues to arise after the Cold War makes bloc voting increasingly unlikely, particularly if issues such as apartheid in South Africa and the Israel-Arab conflict find solutions. The new issues emerging – such as containing and solving domestic ethnic issues, handling climate changes which impact on security, humanitarian and environmental consequences of the many Third World wars, human rights violations, etc. – are likely to give rise to new and varying constellations of states and powers. In this more volatile and mobile situation, also UN voting patterns would become more unpredictable, making regions less

3  “ The most productive time ”

463

unified on issues of peace and security. Concluding this, it appears that enlarging the UN Security Council to 18 members and replacing the veto with a qualified majority on Chapter VII questions would seem a fitting way of responding to the changing times. The most practical gain is the one in accountability of all the members of the Security Council. At the same time, however, this proposal manages the problems of geographical and financial representation while retaining swiftness of action. 4. Is it practical? For such a reform proposal to be implemented, there would have to be some who would gain from the change, and some who lose but would not oppose it vehemently. The winners in the proposal are likely to be found in Asia: Japan and the new industrial states in Pacific Asia would increase their representation. These countries, largely bent on industrial and economic development, are likely to become important in the next century. They would probably support changes or even come to demand them. The losers are those members who are now permanent members and who in the future would have to stage election campaigns to retain a corresponding role. If these are countries who firmly believe in democratic principles for domestic affairs, they should have less hesitation in engaging in such a procedure. In fact, they would have a considerable advantage, knowing how to campaign. As no defeat would be permanent, such an outcome should be manageable. The importance of democratic principles would be strongly demonstrated to the world. In other cases, a reform of the permanent membership might, in the end, be a question of changes also in domestic politics. In fact, domestic democratization of most societies might be a precondition for changes to become practical. Studies show that democratic states are less likely to fight wars among each other.*8 Domestic democratization may be a condition for a future of peace between countries. Today’s democratic Germany and Japan appear as open societies without expansionist and militarist tendencies. The spread of democratic domestic politics around the world would probably reduce the fear of sharing control over the United Nations and the Security Council. In effect, domestic and international democratization may go hand in hand, reducing the risk of international conflict as well as [74] laying the foundation for a functioning international system. The reform proposal might become more practical as democracy spreads around the world. Whether it should or could be implemented before or after such a development is for the debate to determine. Original footnotes Small countries may, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld argued, have a greater need of the UN, as major powers will always be able to fend for themselves. Thus, the Secretary-General could be seen as a channel of influence for smaller countries. However, the Secretary-General is bound by the decisions of the Security Council. A hitherto unexplored idea is to make the Secretary-General an independent member of the Security Council with the right to vote, on an equal level with states. This would be parallel to the way Chief Executive Officers of major corporations are sometimes included on the boards of their companies. *3 Logically, we would expect also a category of non-permanent members with veto rights. *4 This conclusion builds on the record of UN inability to deal with central Cold War issues or matters close to particular permanent members. *1

464

3  “ The most productive time ”

*5

See Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 2d edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 201-209 for a discussion on the role of the veto, and on procedural issues as distinct from substantial ones. In 1945-1986, 203 proposals were vetoed. *6 A dispute may arise as to whether WEOS is entitled to a fifth seat or South America to a fourth one. Mathematically both regions would have 2.4 non-senatorial seats. The assumption here is that power prevails and that the seat is taken by WEOS. *7 Table 3 retains the formula for regional distribution from Table 2. Moving in a more ‘geo-democratic’ way by using the present non-permanent membership formula for the entire Security Council would in effect only give veto to the Africa-Asia group. In a rich-poor polarization, however, both sides would be able to exert a veto. *8 See Bruce M. Russett et al., Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 3.5.8 20 May 1994, International Peace Academy and The Stanley Foundation, Reform of the Security Council: Memorandum Submitted to the President of the UN General Assembly INTRODUCTION With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is for the first time in a position to fulfil the role envisaged for it under the Charter. Freed from the ‘East-West’ gridlock that often paralysed action, the Council has emerged as a central stage for multilateral action for peace and security. The enhanced authority and activism of the Council, together with the rearrangement of power relations in the world have brought to the fore the question of the role and membership of the Security Council. Against this background, the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the Stanley Foundation have conducted over the last 18 months a series of informal consultations with members of the United Nations community as well as with concerned scholars and policy-makers. The discussion has gathered new momentum with the establishment in December 1993 of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. The International Peace Academy and the Stanley Foundation are pleased to offer a set of observations intended to stimulate discussion and clarify some of the issues under consideration by the Working Group. COMPOSITION Unlike any other organ of the United Nations (UN), the decisions of the Security Council are binding on all Member States, under Article 25 of the Charter. The legitimacy of the Security Council derives from the special responsibility conferred upon it, pursuant to Article 24(1), by the membership of the UN as a whole; thus the 15 members of the Security Council act on behalf of the entire 184 members of the organization. In order that decisions of the Council have broad-base support and legitimacy, there is strong support for changing the present composition of the Council. SIZE A point often made in the debate over enlargement is the disparity between the founding proportion of Security Council members to total UN members (more than 20 per cent) and the current proportion (less than 8 per cent). This growth partly explains

3  “ The most productive time ”

465

the current movement for enlargement of the Council. However, those worried about upsetting the balance that has allowed the Council to operate more efficiently in recent years suggest there is an optimum size beyond which it should not grow. Others tend to distinguish the notion of efficiency from that of effectiveness, arguing that, while a larger Council might make decisions less rapidly, the decisions it did make would have more authority and legitimacy and, therefore, would be more effective. In deciding how great the enlargement should be, two sets of considerations come into play. The first concerns the need for a Council which is both large enough to be representative of the entire UN membership and small enough to function smoothly. The second concerns the gap between political realities and what can be called the ‘democratic ideal’. The goal is to strike an appropriate balance between the two sets of considerations, thus making for an effective Council – one whose decisions are timely, responsive to the demands of a crisis, capable of implementation and widely supported by the international community. Discussion about the optimum size of a recomposed Council is converging on 20-25 seats. Some states feel that as many as 30 would be necessary to preserve a reasonable balance between the various categories of membership being proposed. Most, however, are concerned that a Council of that size would be unwieldy and would likely be dominated by a small inner group. CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP AND MODALITIES FOR SELECTION A central issue in the debate over enlarging the Security Council is whether new categories of members should be added. Currently there are permanent members with veto power and non-permanent members without veto power. These and various proposed options for new categories and modes of selection are described below. Present Arrangement Permanent Membership with Veto Power The Charter provides for five permanent members – the Republic of China (now occupied by the People’s Republic of China), France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now occupied by the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom and the United States. For the time being, this arrangement is likely to remain unchanged. It is generally recognized that no permanent member will at present accept a Charter amendment that results in a change of its status. Two-year Membership Currently, non-permanent members without veto power are elected for two-year terms that cannot be renewed immediately. In principle, they are elected on the basis of standards set out in Article 23 of the Charter – contribution to international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Charter, as well as equitable geographical distribution. Possible New Categories Permanent Membership without Veto Power The rising status and influence of some states require that consideration be given to naming new permanent members. There is, however, substantial opposition to extending the veto to more members.

466

3  “ The most productive time ”

Tenured Membership A new category of ‘tenured’ seats could be established. These members occupy seats for a period longer than two years but less than permanent (perhaps five years). Rotating Membership Another possible new category is ‘rotating’ seats shared by, for example, two members. These members would rotate periodically (perhaps every three years), without having to be elected each time. Extended Membership These seats would not be subject to the prohibition against re-election and, therefore, could be held for consecutive two-year terms. Selection Process for New Categories Two broad approaches to selection of members for possible new categories are discernible in the debate. The first entails selecting states on a regional basis; the second is a more global approach. The main advantage of the regional approach lies in the fact that it responds to the concern that the ‘North’ is overrepresented in the current Council membership. Selecting states from the developing regions for one or more of the new categories is the best way of rectifying the present imbalance. Furthermore, the regional approach takes into account the likelihood that violent conflicts in the foreseeable future will unfold at the regional rather than the global level. Enhancing regional representation would ensure that at least some of the key states in any given region would be engaged in the decision-making process. It also could promote good ‘regional citizenship’ by providing an incentive for states to play a constructive role in maintaining regional peace and security. The primary strength of the global approach is that it reflects both the universal character of the United Nations and the reality of global interdependence, in which geographic proximity has become relatively less important. It would also provide more opportunities for Council membership for powers who contribute significantly to the maintenance of international peace and security. In that sense, it would promote good ‘UN citizenship’ as well as the long-term development of the organization as an effective multilateral agency. Alternative Options Clearly, there are many conceivable formulas that might balance the regional and global approaches. The following paragraphs illustrate the range of options available. One option is to name five new permanent members without the veto in a Charter amendment, and to add up to five two-year seats. Of the five new permanent members, two could be selected on a global basis, plus one each from Africa, Asia and Latin America. In allocating the additional two-year seats, account should be taken of the regional balances that would result from establishment of the new category. A second option is a ‘two plus three plus one’ formula: grant permanent seats (without veto) to Germany and Japan, three ‘tenured’ seats to members selected regionally – one each from Africa, Asia and Latin America and one to a member elected globally, by the General Assembly. In addition, up to four two-year seats could be added. Ideally, election to the global tenured seat should be from a short-list of states determined

3  “ The most productive time ”

467

according to objective criteria, more specific than the general criteria of Article 23 of the Charter. Such criteria might include contribution of peacekeeping troops, and financial contributions to the United Nations in general and to peace operations in particular. In practice, agreeing on a determinative set of criteria would be very difficult. Nevertheless, even if such criteria were merely taken into account in election by the General Assembly, they would provide an incentive for good ‘UN citizenship’. A third possible formula is a variation on the second: ‘two plus six plus two’, which would entail permanent status (without veto) for Germany and Japan, two tenured seats for each developing region and two global tenured seats. To keep within the upper limit of 25, no new two year seats could be added. It is important to bear in mind that small states as well as large would be eligible for the tenured seats. A fourth option is to establish five rotating seats and to add five two-year seats. Two of the rotating seats could be shared on a global basis and three regionally. The countries to share each seat could be named in a Charter amendment – in effect on the basis of a once-only election. Alternatively, they could be identified according to objective criteria, although the difficulty of agreeing on such criteria suggests that this exercise more likely would be settled through political bargaining based on global and regional influence. VETO POWER Four options concerning the veto power are discernible in the current debate: – grant it to new permanent members – abolish it altogether – modify it by requiring two or more negative votes to exercise a veto – maintain the status quo There is little support for extending the veto to new members, even to Germany and Japan. An important impetus behind the movement to alter the composition of the Security Council is the perceived imbalance between ‘North’ and ‘South’. Granting veto power to Germany and Japan would add to that perceived imbalance. On the other hand, although the mood in the international community is towards restricting the use of the veto, it would be politically impractical and probably imprudent to try to abolish or modify it now. Maintaining the status quo in this regard is the most likely outcome for the time being but, in a package deal on recomposition, the Working Group might wish to consider a political declaration calling on the permanent members to narrow the range of issues to which the veto applies. A declaration from the Working Group expressing concern about the use of the veto would not be legally binding, but it would generate ‘peer pressure’ on the veto powers in favour of a restrained use of the veto. The language of the declaration could be recommendatory – such as ‘in using the veto, the following considerations should be taken into account’. This would convey the sense of disquiet that the general membership feels about unfettered use of the veto. It would also place the political burden of justification on the vetoing state. Furthermore, this approach has the merit of avoiding a direct confrontation on this issue between the current five permanent Security Council members and the general UN membership. Without amending the Charter, there are ways of building on the recent pattern of non-use of the veto. According to Article 27 of the Charter, procedural matters are not subject to the veto. Adhering to that rule more strictly and expanding the range of matters which are treated as procedural by the Council would be one way of restricting use of the veto.

468

3  “ The most productive time ”

A case can be made that a decision to establish a subcommittee under Article 29 to carry out an investigation or enquiry is a procedural decision not subject to the veto. In the long term more substantive limitations on the veto could be considered. Those supporting tighter limitations suggest that a Charter amendment might focus on issues such as the following: –  non-application of the veto to election of the Secretary-General –  non-application of the veto to Chapter VI action by the Council, when no Chapter VII action is contemplated nor vital national interest at stake – requiring the negative votes of more than one veto power to block an action – granting a ‘regional veto’, by which negative votes from all members from a given region would constitute a veto – a system of weighted voting, modelled on the practice of the Bretton Woods institutions VOTING With expanded membership, it seems appropriate to maintain the present proportionality for voting requirements. Thus if the Council was expanded to 25 seats, decisions would require affirmative votes, including concurring votes of the five veto powers on substantive matters. […] 3.5.9 23 May 1994, Olara A. Otunnu, Former President, International Peace Academy 1990-98, and Member of the Commission on Global Governance, Statement at a Conference organised by the Global Policy Forum and the NGO Network on Global Governance517 The reason and need for reform of the Security Council has already been laid before you. I see the reform as being in at least two stages. The first could be done immediately, short term. That is all that may be possible right now – something transitional to correspond to the transitional nature of our international relations. The other is more long term, possibly more radical, which may not be realized until several years down the road. Therefore, any package emerging after the present exercise, including what the Special Working Group is working on, should be a transitional package with a time frame put on it. With regard to the composition of the Security Council during the transitional period, I will put a few ideas on the table. In my opinion, it is going to be very difficult to exclude Germany and Japan from the Security Council as permanent members. But I do not think there is the willingness right now to extend veto power to them as well. I would have no difficulties with the two being permanent members, without the veto. I think it would be equally difficult to have Germany and Japan join as permanent members without seeking some way to redress the imbalance which will be 517  Source: Global Policy Forum. – Olara A. Otunnu is a Ugandan politician, diplomat, and lawyer. He was Uganda’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations (198085) and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1985-86). Later, he was President of the International Peace Academy (1990-98), and an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (1997-2005).

3  “ The most productive time ”

469

accentuated – the North-South imbalance within the Council. At the very least during this transitional period, we would need to have what one might call “tenured members” of the Council. Those who would serve for a period longer than two years – maybe five, six or seven years – but who would not be permanent members. A possible formula would be three-plus-one. Three tenured members would be drawn from the three regions of the world which are now not represented on a permanent basis – Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. The remaining one would be a global seat, tenured, elected on the basis of some rough standard of good UN citizenship. It would allow a number of countries, who would not necessarily belong to the three regions mentioned previously, but who contribute very actively to the purposes of the UN, to be invited to serve on this tenured basis. Now I come to the use of the veto, which obviously has to be discussed in any context, whether it is transitional or long-term. In the long term, I am not sure what the fate of the veto is going to be. I have a feeling that it will be a major issue of discussion. As we move into a world that is more democratic (in spirit if not always in practice), the veto will increasingly be questioned. But in the transitional package, I see the veto being retained by those who now have it, for purely practical purposes. They will not cooperate on anything that prejudices their right of veto. However, I think it is important for the Working Group to come out with a statement on the use of the veto, with a “sense of the house,” which would not limit in legal terms the use of the veto but would provide very important peer pressure. It would list the kinds of situations where the veto might and might not be applied and shift the burden onto those who cast the veto to prove to the community that it is justified. This, of course, will not be satisfactory for the long term, but for the immediate future it would at least bring into focus the sense of the international community when the veto should or should not be used. […] 3.5.10 June 1994, The Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Canadian Priorities for United Nations Reform518 […] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Reform of the Security Council In particular, reform of the Security Council is pressing for two reasons: first, its permanent membership no longer reflects the reality of global power; secondly, its credibility as an impartial intervenor in situations that threaten common security is undermined by the disproportionate influence within it of Northern, and especially North Atlantic, states. The significance of these shortcomings in the Security Council is magnified by the fact that, alone among UN bodies, its decisions are binding on all member states. 518  The Canadian Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations was launched by the United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) in order to develop a strategy for the Canadian UN policy. The chair of the committee was the author, parliamentarian, diplomat and peace activist Douglas Roche (*1929) but the “Canadian Priorities” were mainly written by Michael Oliver (1925-2004, President of UNA-Canada and professor of political science at McGill University) and Gregory Wirick (1952-1998, associate of the Parliamentary Centre and Executive Director of UNA-Canada). The full text of the “Canadian Priorities” is reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. III, 1997, pp. III.39/1-III.39/38.

470

3  “ The most productive time ”

At some future time, the distinctions between permanent and non-permanent members, members with and without a veto, deserve to be eliminated. That time, it is generally agreed, is not yet. Nevertheless, proposals for interim steps that might help have accumulated in great number and variety since the General Assembly, in December 1992, invited all member states to submit written comments on the membership of the Security Council. If, as the Secretary-General still hopes, a partial reform of the Security Council is still possible for the 50th Anniversary, intensive negotiations will take place, and compromises will have to be reached. Canada, as an active member of the Open-ended Working Group on the Reform of the Council, will have a vital role to play in these negotiations. Rather than adopting a fixed position, it is recommended that Canada should follow these guidelines: – Support an increase in the number of Security Council members up to 21 members (from the current 15). – Agree to an increase in the number of permanent seats for developed countries only if permanent seats are added for three states from the South. – Work for reduction in the significance of the veto power by such means as: (a) denying the veto power to new members of the Security Council; or (b) making the veto valid only if exercised by three permanent members rather than, as at present, any one permanent member; (c) and/or limiting the kinds of issues on which the veto can be exercised (at a minimum, the veto over amendments to the Charter and the appointment of the Secretary-General should go); and/or (d) establishing new majorities for passage of categories of Security Council resolutions to replace the general veto for permanent members. – Support the principle of a fixed proportion of the seats on the Security Council coming from the South. […] 3.5.11  1995, The Commission on Global Governance, Report “Our Global Neighbourhood”, UN Doc. A/50/79-S/1995/106 of 6 February 1995519 [2] A call to action Summary of “Our Global Neighbourhood”. The report of the Commission on Global Governance520 […] [3] EXTRACTS FROM CO-CHAIRMEN’S FOREWORD The Charter of the United Nations was written while the world was still engulfed in war. Face to face with untold sorrow, world leaders were determined never to let it happen again. Affirming their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person, they 519  The Commission on Global Governance, initiated by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt and established in 1992 with the support of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was co-chaired by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal. It consisted of twenty-eight members. Its 1995 report made recommendations to promote the security of people, manage economic interdependence, strengthen international law, and reform the United Nations and other international institutions. It also examined what common values should guide the peoples and nations of the ‘global neighbourhood’. The full text of the report was published in 1995 by Oxford University Press. 520  Reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. III, 1997, pp. III.42/1-iii.42/16 (with a list of the members of the Commission).

3  “ The most productive time ”

471

set their minds on the advancement of all peoples. Their vision produced the world’s most important political document. Half a century has passed since the Charter was signed in San Francisco. There has been no world war in that time, but humanity has seen much violence, suffering and injustice. There remain dangers that could threaten human civilization and, indeed, the future of humankind. But our dominant feeling is of hope. We believe the most notable feature of the past fifty years has been the emancipation and empowerment of people. People today have more power to shape their future than ever before; and that could make all the difference. At the same time, nation-states find themselves less able to deal with the array of issues – some old, some new – that face them. States and their people, wishing to control their destinies, find they can do so only by working together with others. They must secure their future through commitment to common responsibility and shared effort. The need to work together also guided the visionary men and women who drew up the Charter of the United Nations. What is new today is that the interdependence of nations is wider and deeper. What is also new is the role of people and the shift of focus from states to people. An aspect of this change is the growth of international civil society. These changes call for reforms in the modes of international co-operation – the institutions and processes of global governance. The international system that the UN Charter put in place needs to be renewed. The flaws and inadequacies of existing institutions have to be overcome. There is a need to weave a tighter fabric of international norms, expanding the rule of law world-wide and enabling citizens to exert their democratic influence on global processes. We also believe the world’s arrangements for the conduct of its affairs must be underpinned by certain common values. Ultimately, no organization will work and no law will be upheld unless they rest on a foundation made strong by shared values. These values must be informed by a sense of common responsibility for both present and future generations. [4] The members of the Commission, all serving in their personal capacities, come from many backgrounds and orientations. Yet, over the last two years together we have been united by one desire: to develop a common vision of the way forward for the world in making the transition from the cold war and in managing humanity’s journey into the twenty-first century. We believe this report offers such a vision. Each member of the Commission would have chosen different words, if he or she were writing this report alone. Everyone might not have fully embraced each and every proposal, but we all agreed on the overall substance and direction of the report. The strongest message we can convey is that humanity can agree on a better way to manage its affairs and give hope to present and future generations. The development of global governance is part of the evolution of human efforts to organize life on the planet, and that process will always be going on. Our work is no more than a transit stop on that journey. We do not presume to offer a blueprint for all time. But we are convinced that it is time for the world to move on from the designs evolved over the centuries and given new form in the establishment of the United Nations nearly fifty years ago. We are in a time that demands freshness and innovation in global governance.

472

3  “ The most productive time ”

Global governance is not global government. No misunderstanding should arise from the similarity of the terms. We are not proposing movement towards world government, for were we to travel in that direction we might find ourselves in an even less democratic world than we have – one more accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather than the rights of people. This is not to say that the goal should be a world without systems or rules. Far from it. A chaotic world would pose equal or even greater dangers. The challenge is to strike the balance in such a way that the management of global affairs is responsive to the interests of all people in a sustainable future, that it is guided by basic human values, and that it makes global organization conform to the reality of global diversity. Many pressures bear on political leaders, as they seek both to be effective and to retain support at the national level. Notwithstanding the drawbacks of nationalism, however, the history of even this century encourages us to believe that from the very best of national leaders can come the very best of internationalism. Today, a sense of internationalism has become a necessary ingredient of sound national policies. No nation can make progress heedless of insecurity and deprivation elsewhere. We have to share a global neighbourhood and strengthen it, so that it may offer the promise of a good life to all our neighbours. Important choices must be made now, because we are at the threshold of a new era. That newness is self-evident; people everywhere know it, as do governments, though not all admit to it. We can, for example, go forward to a new era of security that responds to law and collective will and common responsibility by placing the security of people and of the planet at the centre. Or we can go backwards to the spirit and methods of what one of [5] our members described as the ‘sheriff’s posse’ – dressed up to masquerade as global action. There should be no question of which way we go. But the right way requires the assertion of the values of internationalism, the primacy of the rule of law world-wide, and institutional reforms that secure and sustain them. This report offers some suggestions for such responses. Removed from the sway of empires and a world of victors and vanquished, released from the constraints of the cold war that so cramped the potential of an evolving global system throughout the post-war era, seized of the risk of unsustainable human impacts on nature, mindful of the global implications of human deprivation – the world has no real option but to rise to the challenge of change, in an enlightened and constructive fashion. We call on our global neighbours, in all their diversity, to act together to ensure this – and to act now. Ingvar Carlsson Shridath Ramphal Stockholm London November 1994 [6] SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS In setting out the major proposals made by the Commission, we wish to emphasize that all the proposals form a coherent body – not inseparable, but mutually reinforcing. We encourage their consideration as such. […]

3  “ The most productive time ”

473

[11] […] Reforming the United Nations We do not believe the UN should be dismantled to make way for a new architecture of global governance. Much of the necessary reform of the United Nations system can be effected without amending the Charter, provided governments are willing. But some Charter amendments are necessary for better global governance. [12] UN reform must reflect the realities of change, including the new capacity of civil society to contribute to global governance. Reform of the Security Council is central to reforming the UN system. Permanent membership limited to five countries that derive their primacy from events fifty years ago is unacceptable; so is the veto. To add more permanent members and give them the veto would be regressive. We propose a process of reform in two stages. First, a new class of five ‘standing’ members should be established to serve until the second stage of the reform process. We envisage two from industrial countries and one each from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The number of non-permanent members should be raised from ten to thirteen, and the votes required for a decision of the Council from nine to fourteen. To facilitate the phasing out of the veto, the permanent members should enter into a concordat agreeing to forgo its use save in exceptional and overriding circumstances. The second stage should be a full review of the membership of the Council, including these arrangements, around 2005, when the veto can be phased out, the position of the permanent members reviewed, and account taken of new circumstances – including the growing strength of regional bodies. […] [13] […] Strengthening the Rule of Law World-wide The global neighbourhood of the future must be characterized by law and the reality that all, including the weakest, are equal under the law and none, including the strongest, is above it. Our recommendations are directed to strengthening inter­ national law and the International Court of Justice in particular. […] The Security Council should appoint a distinguished lawyer to provide advice at all relevant stages on the international legal aspects of issues before it. It should also make greater use of the World Court as a source of advisory opinions, to avoid being itself the judge of international law in particular cases. […] 3.5.12 1995, Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, Report “The United Nations in its Second Half-Century”521 Preface The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations was convened by the Ford Foundation at the request of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late 1993. […] The Independent Working Group sought to make as clear a statement as possible to the governments and peoples of the world about the need to enhance and realign the United Nations so that it might better meet the challenges of the decades ahead. Throughout this Report, we have repeatedly stressed the need for the Member States 521  The full text of the report is freely available in The Yale University Library Digital Collections, and has been reprinted in Joachim Müller (ed.), Reforming the United

474

3  “ The most productive time ”

to provide the leadership, common will and purpose which we believe are necessary to create a more effective United Nations. […] Moeen Qureshi, Co-Chair

Richard von Weizsäcker, Co-Chair

[1] 1. The Challenges to Humanity at Century’s End […] For a vastly altered world, the United Nations offers broader promise than even its founders could have imagined. But it has not come through these fifty years unscathed. Like any good vessel, it needs refitting, weak timbers replaced, compasses reset. This is the objective that underlies the present report. The recommendations that are put forward can, we believe, make the United Nations a sounder Organization, adjusted to what we foresee as the central needs of the next half-century. They will be of little avail, however, unless governments grant to the United Nations a degree of commitment and support commensurate with the promise it offers and with the tasks it will need to fulfill. […] [7] 2. The Future United Nations System […] What might a successful UN system look like some decades hence, when our children and grandchildren confront these global challenges? Such a vision need not imply a total transformation of today’s world. We imagine that the UN of the next century would still remain an organization of nation-states responding to its members’ concerns and needs. By the mid-twenty-first century, however, it is likely that the nature of statehood and assumptions about national sovereignty will have evolved in response to global needs and to an enlarged sense of world community. […] The Security Council will have been enhanced by a more representative structure and by the willingness of governments to contribute [8] regularly to the effectiveness of UN security operations. The veto power will have been modified, at least to the extent of the Permanent Members agreeing to limitations on its application. By next century we foresee that the Security Council will have developed better methods of dealing with civil and ethnic conflicts within states’ borders, benefiting from early warning and analysis that will permit the more effective exercise of preventive diplomacy. Where inter-state conflicts and the collapse of civil authority threaten to cause a human disaster, the United Nations will by then have a capacity for rapid deployment immediately upon the decision of the Security Council. Regional organizations will also play a more effective role, in partnership with the UN. The need to Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, vol. III, pp. III.44/1-III.44/37. – In 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested the establishment of an independent working group to reassess the role, mission and functions of the United Nations. Later that year the Ford Foundation convened the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, co-chaired by Moeen Qureshi (1930-2016), former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Richard von Weizsäcker (1920-2015), former President of Germany. With a secretariat based at Yale University and directed by professors Paul M. Kennedy and Bruce Russett, the Group issued its report in 1995. In addition to the two co-chairs, it had ten members, mainly former diplomats and ministers.

3  “ The most productive time ”

475

assist faltering states and bring them back into the international community will have been broadly recognized by UN members, and the necessary legal, nation-building and other guidelines agreed upon. […] [12] 3. Strengthening the United Nations for its Second Half-Century We are at present far from this ideal of a functioning, properly endowed United Nations system. Yet, seen against the daunting problems of the future, it is both realistic and essential to move towards that vision. We have come a long way from the dark valley of the Second World War. Governments and peoples have advanced toward the goal of creating common policies and shared structures that would help Member States achieve together what they could not secure in isolation. Objectives that seemed impossible yesterday are accepted facts today. But the world organization has arrived at a plateau. Its members should aspire to new heights by establishing a United Nations significantly more effective than today’s body. […] [15] […] The Security Council: Sustaining Authority and Effectiveness Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has become a much more active decision-making body, with its members showing increased awareness of their responsibility to maintain peace and of their ability to do so. Nevertheless, its present membership and composition do not reflect the reality of economic and political changes over the past 50 years, still less the fact that the relative position of nations is likely to be even more transformed during the next half century. The Security Council must become more representative of diverse perspectives if its actions are to command full respect in all parts of the world. A Security Council of larger membership and different composition should not be hindered in its ability to take action. If more countries possess veto privileges in the Security Council, the UN faces the increased possibility of paralysis should one Permanent Member oppose the great majority of states. This risk would be particularly acute if, as during the Cold War, the veto were to be invoked over a broad range of issues and [16] not just on enforcement measures. We therefore suggest both the expansion of the Permanent Membership and a restriction of the existing veto privilege. Members of the General Assembly have given extensive consideration to changes in the size of the Security Council without yet reaching consensus, but we recommend the following compromise: the Security Council would be expanded from its present membership of 15 to a total of approximately 23 Members, of whom not more than five would be new Permanent Members. All new Members should be selected with attention to the accepted principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. The new Permanent Members would be chosen also for their ability and will to contribute, according to their capabilities, to peacekeeping and enforcement operations. At the same time, the veto would be applicable only to peacekeeping and enforcement measures. This would return the UN to the original spirit of the Charter, where the veto was intended mainly to prevent the Security Council from authorizing military action against a Permanent Member or requiring use of its forces against its will. In fact the veto has been invoked over a much wider variety of decisions and resolutions. A change in the use of the veto could be arranged by agreement among the Permanent Members and without Charter amendment, and would be in order even if no alteration is made in the Council’s membership. However, if there is an increase in the number of Members accorded veto rights – necessarily by Charter revision – as

476

3  “ The most productive time ”

a complementary measure, an amendment restricting the scope of the veto for all Permanent Members would be desirable. The advantages of these twin changes are clear: the Security Council, when it does decide to intervene, will be speaking for a truly global constituency. The distinction between the Permanent and Non­-Permanent Members will not be as large as before. And the veto will no longer be used to delay progress on the wide array of other issues with which the Security Council is concerned. […] [41] […] Leadership […] The Charter represents a universal code of conduct for nations and peoples. Wherever it is observed, the international system can exist in harmony; where it is violated, and the international community does not contest that transgression, the system is in peril. In this respect, the responsibility of those nations that command great military and economic resources, in particular the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, is critical. If they fail to support the United Nations, the Organization is unlikely to flourish or develop. When they cooperate with other states in support of the Charter, the UN’s prospects brighten. In the future, the willingness of Permanent Members to join with other Member [42] States in making the Security Council more representative would greatly enhance the standing and authority of the UN. […] […] [48] 4. Reaching the Common Goal The founders of the United Nations, like ourselves, recognized that they could not envision exactly how the world would look 50 years hence. Instead they identified basic principles and purposes and placed them in a Charter of sufficient flexibility to allow the Organization to serve the ends of peace and to evolve in response to new challenges. The Charter has endured, and its principles and purposes need no revision for the next half­-century. But the vastly changed circumstances in which the UN will be operating require modifications in the Organization’s structure and in its operational practices. This is the main intention of the recommendations we have put forward. We have tried to address global problems that, in the coming years, will define the future of the world. The United Nations needs to be equipped to deal with these problems in order to achieve the abiding objectives of peace, freedom, and well-being for succeeding generations. […] Our focus is not on the distant future, but on how the UN can assist the world to get through the intermediate period without serious breakdown or failure. […] [51] 5. Summary of Principal Recommendations For the United Nations to confront successfully the challenges and opportunities of the next half-century, new institutional mechanisms are needed to prevent or resolve intrastate as well as interstate conflicts, and to promote sustainable economic and social progress. To achieve these objectives, Member States must reaffirm their commitment to the institution. The central recommendation of this Report calls for three related Councils: a new Economic Council, a new Social Council, and the existing but enhanced Security Council, all three serviced by a common Secretariat and working together on behalf of human security and sustainable development. Because of the intimately connected nature of the UN’s economic and social agendas, the Economic Council and the Social Council would coordinate policy and

3  “ The most productive time ”

477

programs through a Global Alliance for Sustainable Development, comprised of state representatives of the highest level. Providing Security From the Scourge of Violence Expand the membership of the Security Council to a total of not more than 23 Members, taking into consideration the principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. Not more than five new Members would be Permanent Members. Limit the use of the veto to issues related to Chapter VII or to other decisions entailing the use of military personnel. […]

• •

3.5.13 1995, Emma Matanle, The UN Security Council: Prospects for Reform, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Discussion Paper 62)522 […] Compromise solutions began to appear in the 49th General Assembly session, but a common criticism of the proposals that suggest quasi- or semi-permanent status is that they do not give states (especially those in favour of expanding permanent membership) a satisfactory sense of permanency. Taking all the views expressed into consideration, the following model suggests a new approach. If a total SC membership of 25 is accepted, then, using percentages of geographical distribution, the following proportionate regional allocations are generated: WEOG incl. USA 14.6% of 25 = 3.65 = 4 Africa 28.6% of 25 = 7.15 = 7 Asia 26.5% of 25 = 6.62 = 7 Eastern Europe 10.8% of 25 = 2.70 = 3 Latin America 17.8% of 25 = 4.45 = 4 Total   25 The composition shown in Table 5.1 might then be possible. The increase in permanent membership by two is designed to allow for the addition of Japan and Germany, with veto power. The idea of the senatorial seat*1 is different from that of the semi- or quasi-permanent seat. Here states would be elected by the GA to the Council for a period of six years and could be re-elected after the six-year period. They would not have the veto, but the period of six years would give states more permanent representation, and a chance to influence Council decisions over a longer period of time, as well as to elect regional powers, but with the ability to vote them off after six years if desired; it would also avoid the problem of constant campaigning for re-election that the semi- and quasi-permanent seats would present. 522  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs.    At the time she published the paper partly reproduced here, Emma Matanle was a junior researcher in the International Security Research Programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. She is the chair and co-founder of the Fair Funding for All Schools Campaign in St Albans, England, and has worked in communications and publications, and as a researcher, for a wide range of organisations, including BBC World News and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme in Afghanistan.

478

3  “ The most productive time ”

The total Council size would be 25 members, which it is hoped would limit the damage to the Council’s efficiency. The model could allow for the following composition: seven permanent members (US, UK, France, China, Russian Federation, Germany and Japan), four senators of the Council (one northern and one southern African country, one Asian and one Latin American) and 14 non-permanent members. The number of votes needed to pass a resolution would be 60 per cent of Council membership, i.e. 15 with the concurrence of the seven permanent members. This format would also allow for better numerical representation and redress the imbalance in the geographical distribution of seats among regional groups, and could give better representation of political realities. It would also redress the complaints about the historical anachronisms embodied in the permanent membership. The model satisfies US and British views since it allows for Japan’s and Germany’s permanent membership with veto. It addresses France’s preference for permanent membership for Japan and Germany and representation for developing countries, although not permanent membership to which France might object. Russia prefers a Council size of 20 and may object, but China’s desire to see better representation of developing countries is satisfied. The OAU’s desire to have two permanent Table 5.1 A proposed composition for an expanded Security Council WOEG incl. USA Permanent seats Senatorial seats Non-permanent seats Total

4 2 6

Africa

Asia

2 4 6

2 1 3 6

Eastern Europe 1 2 3

Latin America and Caribbean

Total

1 3 4

 7  4 14 25

seats would not be met, but the idea of the senatorial seat goes some way towards meeting their demands. It would give the region an opportunity for two countries to represent sub-regions of the continent. If those states that object in principle to the expansion of permanent membership rejected this model, then Japan and Germany could possibly be made senators instead of permanent members. This would create a Council of five permanent, six senatorial and 14 non-permanent members. One element left to be determined is the veto. If Japan and Germany are given the veto, thus extending the use of what is regarded as an unfair tool, could there be an agreement to dilute the veto in some way? The veto is regarded by member states as undemocratic, unfair and not necessary in the post-Cold War world. It is sometimes likened to the possession of nuclear weapons, since the mere threat of its use is effective in preventing certain decisions from being taken. The problem with reforming the veto is that it cannot be eliminated or significantly limited without the consent of those who hold it (the P5), and the P5 are not at present willing to give up any element of their veto power. But despite this, there was an extensive discussion during the 49th session of the GA on ways in which the veto might be limited. Its exclusion was suggested: (1) on the admission of new UN member states; (2) on procedural matters in accordance with Article 27(2) of the UN Charter;

3  “ The most productive time ”

479

(3) on disputes to which a permanent member was a party; (4) on the Security Council’s decision to send investigative missions in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter; (5) on issues relating to provisional measures under Article 40 of the UN Charter; (6) on measures under Article 50 of the UN Charter relating to economic problems of third countries arising from UN-imposed sanctions; (7) on recommendations for the appointment of the UN Secretary-General; (8) on issues relating to international humanitarian law, e.g. a decision calling for a ceasefire.*2 Some members suggested during the 49th GA that use of the veto should be restricted to those decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter alone; a further idea was that two or more negative votes by permanent members should be required for the veto to take effect. Because none of the permanent members has given any indication that it is willing even to discuss ways in which the veto might be limited or diluted, the best that member states can hope for is an informal agreement from the current permanent members and any new permanent members that their use of the veto would be limited to extreme cases that severely affected their national interest. This could be done in a goodwill declaration, stating their commitment to the limited use of the veto to enable the efficient functioning of the Council. […] Original footnotes

*1 For a similar idea see Peter Wallensteen, “Representing the World: a Security Council

for the 21st Century”, Security Dialogue, 25: 1 March 1994, pp. 63-75 [partly reproduced in this volume, → 3.5.7]. *2 Non paper produced 12 July 1995. [UN Doc. A/AC.247/4 (a) in UN Doc. A/49/965, → 3.1.5]. 3.5.14 1995, Vicenç Fisas, Blue Geopolitics, The United Nations Reform and the Future of the Blue Helmets, London: Pluto Press523 […] 2 Enlarging the Security Council [20] […] Japan and Germany are suitable candidates on account of the economic weight they carry, ranking second and third in the world in this respect, above Russia. In an increasingly interdependent world, it is difficult to exclude these two powers from an organ of political decision-making such as the Security Council, especially when both countries are also among the largest contributors to the United Nations’ finances: Japan ranks second and Germany fourth and, what is more, neither of them have debts outstanding.

523  Copyright Pluto Press with Transnational Institute. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. – Vicenç Fisas (*1952) is the founder (1999) and director of the School of the Culture of Peace of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He held the UNESCO chair for Peace and Human Rights at the same university (1997-2015) and advised the UNESCO Director-General on issues of disarmament, the culture of peace, and the prevention of conflicts (1987-1999).

480

3  “ The most productive time ”

If we consider large economic powers to be countries with a GNP larger than or close to $ 1 billion (million million), then as well as the United States, Japan, Germany, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, Italy ought to be amongst the candidates. Its qualifications include the seventh position it has to occupy amongst contributors to United Nations funds and its active participation in the organisation’s peace-keeping operations. On the other hand, it would be the [21] fifth European country on the Security Council, which would, of course, be out of all proportion. The idea that it should be the European Community or, even better, the CSCE (now OSCE) who appointed one, two or three representatives to the Council is fairer, would help to reinforce regional organs and therefore be a step towards decentralising the United Nations. In economic terms, Canada would be the eighth candidate, although it comes well below the countries mentioned above. It is also the eighth contributor to the United Nations. In its favour (and this is something that ought to carry more weight), along with Ireland, it is the country that has taken part in most peace-keeping operations. This fact brings with it a considerable moral authority in the United Nations. Unless the Security Council is to become a political expression of the club of the top economic powers, the demographic weight of nations is the other important factor to be taken into account in the debate on the enlargement of the Security Council. This especially affects India, a country whose population represents 16 per cent of humanity. This alone makes it difficult to exclude it from the Security Council. Of the ten countries with more than 100 million inhabitants, half of them would be entitled to a place on the Security Council under the criteria listed so far. These are China, India, Russia, the United States and Japan. The other five are, in order of population, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Should any of them occupy a seat on the Security Council? Of the Asian countries, Indonesia would be the only possible candidate, although its low economic level (its GNP is half that of South Korea, for example) and its disregard of civil and political rights detract from its suitability beside other candidates. In any case, this fourth candidate reduces the chances for Bangladesh and Pakistan. Africa, on the other hand, only has Nigeria to offer as a country with a large population, even double that of Egypt, the second African state in terms of population. But Nigeria is not even the country with most economic resources. Both Egypt and Algeria carry more economic weight in the continent, a fact which complicates the choice. In this case, the best formula might be that of regional representation through the OAU, unless one accepted Nigeria and Egypt, representing black Africa and the Arab world, respectively. It could also be said that the Arab world should have a permanent member appointed by the Arab League, so long as this organisation acted more in keeping with the spirit and the affairs of the United Nations. In Latin America, Brazil is the country with most likelihood of joining a new Security Council. It ranks sixth in the world in [22] population and tenth in GNP, far ahead of any other Latin American country. Mexico would be the second candidate. However, if Latin America were to have two representatives on the Council, the fairest arrangement would be to include one from Brazil and one elected by the OAS. There remains the possibility of including the Middle East as a region, though no one would question the difficulty of finding a candidate who did not put backs up in some countries in the area. Iran would be the most suitable candidate, in terms both of

481

3  “ The most productive time ”

population and of economic weight, but this would only make sense in the framework of a regional agreement on security, disarmament and co­operation yet to be invented. The present situation rules out this possibility. One thing which up till now has had a lot to do with the immobility of the Security Council is the fact that the countries making it up all possess nuclear arms. Nuclear power has been a synonym for political power. But in the new plan for the future, the possession of nuclear arms should be considered an obstacle, not a virtue, for anyone wanting a seat on the Council which, amongst its other missions, must encourage disarmament and denuclearisation of the planet. The new nuclear or quasi-nuclear powers (India, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan and a few more) should not only not make use of this strength to press their candidacy, they should cancel their nuclear projects if they aspire to occupying a seat. The Security Council of the year 2000 should bear no resemblance to the Security Council of the Cold War, or even to today’s. Ideally, it should be formed by those countries which in the last decades have shown the greatest commitment to the objectives of the United Nations programmes; that is, security, disarmament, cooperation and human rights. In this case, all the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark), along with Canada, Ireland and Holland, are more entitled to give advice and take decisions than any of the superpowers. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that Article 23.1 of the Charter states that, in electing non-permanent members, ‘due regard [will be] specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization’, in view of the difficulty of reorganising the Council on the basis of this legitimating principle, it would not be a bad idea to remember this if the OSCE ever had to decide who to send as its representatives. Even if it never gets a chance to be put into practice, I find Richard Falk’s suggestion that a permanent place be reserved [23] on the Security Council for a ‘moral superpower’ elected by a panel of Nobel Peace Prize winners very edifying.*1 This criterion was also used by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, Javier Solana, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1993, when he proposed a new category of non­-permanent members who would have a place on the Security Council more frequently than other countries, on the basis of their contribution to international peace and security; in other words, to the stipulations of Article 23 mentioned above. There are, therefore, various formulas that could be used to change the composition of the Security Council. One would be to include, as well as the five present members, eight more who stand out for their economic or demographic status and which would affect the countries shown in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 Formula for composition of the Security Council (1) Present members

Economic weight

Demographic weight

United States Russia China United Kingdom France

Japan Germany Italy Canada

India Indonesia Brazil Nigeria

482

3  “ The most productive time ”

A Permanent Council made up in this way would include five representatives from the Third World and eight from the First, a far more balanced proportion than the present 1 to 4, but with Africa and Latin America barely represented as compared to the overwhelming Euro­-Asian predominance. Furthermore, countries with a similar level of population to Nigeria, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, might be tempted to stimulate their already high rate of population growth so as to qualify for entry to the club, something which would obviously be counterproductive. A second proposal would be to set the number of permanent members at eleven, following more geographical criteria and introducing representatives of regional organisations. The two great military powers, the United States and Russia, would be guaranteed their present seats on the basis of their economic and demographic weight. China would be entitled to a seat on the significant grounds of representing more than one-fifth of the world’s population, as would India for similar reasons of population. Japan, which controls 15 per cent of the world’s GNP, could not be excluded either. On the other [24] hand, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, which form part of the EC and the OSCE, could take turns in a quota of seats assigned to the OSCE, one of which would be reserved for them. Italy has already suggested that France and the United Kingdom should take a joint EC seat, which is much the same as the proposal above. There is still the question of whether Brazil, with its immense weight in Latin America, could also occupy a permanent seat on the Security Council, while the second seat would be for a country appointed by the OAS. In Africa, where there is no one country that leads the continent in any sense, the two representatives could be chosen by the OAU, and perhaps also by the Arab League. This would give rise to the following composition: Table 2.2 Formula for composition of the Security Council (2) United States Russia OSCE China India Japan

1 1 2 1 1 1

Brazil OAS Arab League OAU

1 1 1 1

Under this arrangement, the North-South balance would be improved, and every continent except Oceania would be represented by at least two members. Whatever the formula used to elect members to the Security Council, what is certain is that they must have the legitimacy to impose sanctions on any country not complying with the Council’s resolutions. However, there are serious doubts as to whether or not its composition could carry this moral authority. A few significant figures, though, should clear up these doubts. Of the 13 countries referred to in the first proposal, only five (United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, India and Nigeria) have made declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as binding.*2 The other eight do not accept its rulings as binding. With this state of affairs, how can the Council recommend or oblige conflicting parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this high court?

3  “ The most productive time ”

483

Another interesting figure concerns arms trading by this group of countries. The present five permanent members are also the world’s leading exporters of heavy weaponry. Germany ranks third, Italy ninth and Czechoslovakia seventh. How can these countries be responsible [25] for the control and reduction of arms movements if they themselves are the chief instigators of this activity? How can they promote disarmament when six of them have nuclear weapons and the 13 countries put together have a total of twelve million soldiers? Table 2.3 Arms exporting countries and the Security Council Exporters (1989-1993) 1 United States 2 Russia 3 Germany 4 France 5 United Kingdom 6 China 7 Czechoslovakia 8 Netherlands 9 Italy 10 Israel

Security Council status permanent member permanent member non-permanent member (1995-1996) and candidate for permanent membership permanent member permanent member permanent member non-permanent member (1994-1995) … non-permanent member (1995-1996) and candidate for permanent membership …

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1994, p. 484

The countries belonging to the Security Council, both permanent members and others, have yet to sign a large number of treaties and pacts on human rights. Of the nine existing juridical instruments touching on the matter, the United States has yet to sign eight, China four and the United Kingdom three. The permanent members have yet to sign more than a third of these treaties and pacts, a proportion not very different from that corresponding to the 20 non-permanent members of the Council during 1993, 1994 and 1995. Amongst these, Djibouti, Oman, Botswana and Indonesia stand out for having signed only one or two, followed by Pakistan, Japan and Honduras, with three agreements signed in September 1993. With such glaring contradictions, how can the Security Council encourage or oblige respect for and fulfilment of rights in the world? These questions lead us into the realms of political fiction which, while unrealistic, is nevertheless highly instructive as the place in which to consider the rules and conditions for admission to the Security Council. These conditions could include that applicants must: [26] be fully paid up with the United Nations; have signed and ratified the chief agreements on disarmament and human rights; respect the rulings of the International Court of Justice; devote less than 3 per cent of their GNP to military expenditure; take part in the United Nations peace forces; and have fulfilled all the Security Council resolutions affecting them.

• • • • • •

484

3  “ The most productive time ”

Imposing conditions for membership of the Security Council is not frivolous or an attempt to prevent certain specific countries from taking part. It is simply a basic condition for endowing this organ with a legitimacy it has not had up to now. The Council can only take decisions affecting the international community if it acts coherently, responsibly and with moral authority. So-called ‘world governance’ must on no account depend on the military might of a superpower with mercenary leanings, but on the ability of the Security Council, and especially of the permanent members, to exact respect for the rules of conduct approved by the United Nations, by whatever means necessary, but always from a position of legitimacy conferred on them by their own compliance to these rules. As for non-permanent members, the present formula of ten members for a twoyear period, with five members renewed each year, could continue. In this way, the Security Council would be made up of a total of 23 or 21 members according to the formula chosen, with the permanent members slightly outnumbering the nonpermanent members. Needless to say, non-permanent membership would also be subject to certain prior conditions. The lack of legitimacy I referred to in speaking of the five present members with right of veto also affects several of the ten non-permanent countries on the Security Council in 1993 or 1994 (Japan, Venezuela, Hungary, Cape Verde, Morocco, Brazil, Pakistan, Spain, New Zealand and Djibouti in 1993. In 1994 the first five were replaced by Argentina, Oman, Nigeria, Rwanda and the Czech Republic). Let us look at some examples. In October 1993, apart from the United States and Russia which are permanent members, five of the ten non-permanent countries on the Security Council (Venezuela, Morocco, Cape Verde, Brazil and Djibouti) had payments outstanding of $ 355 million to the United Nations regular budget, and nine of the 15 countries owed dues to peacekeeping operations (PKOs) carried out in previous years. Of the five which joined in 1994, three (Nigeria, Argentina and Rwanda) were behind in their payments to the regular budget and three [27] Table 2.4 The Security Council and human rights CESCR United States Russia France United Kingdom China 1992-1993 Japan Venezuela Hungary Cape Verde Morocco 1993-1994 Brazil Pakistan Spain

OPI

OPI2

CERD

APAR

CEDAW

CAT

CRC

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no no

no no no no no

no

no

no

no

no

no

CCPR

no

no no

no no

no

no no

no no no no

no no no

no no no

no

no

485

3  “ The most productive time ” Table 2.4 The Security Council and human rights (cont.)

N-Zealand Djibouti 1994-1995 Argentina Oman Nigeria Rwanda Czech Republic 1995-1996 Germany Italy Indonesia Botswana Honduras Key: CESCR CCPR OPI OPI2 CERD APAR CEDAW CAT CRC

CESCR

CCPR

OPI

OPI2

CERD

APAR

CEDAW

CAT

no

no

no

no

no

no no

no

no

no

no

no no no

no no no no no

no

no no no

no no

no no no

no no no

no no no no

no

no no

no no no no no

no

no no no

CRC

no

no

International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. International covenant on civil and political rights. Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights. Second optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights aimed at the abolition of capital punishment. International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. International convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid. Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading forms of treatment or punishment. Convention on the rights of the child.

Source: United Nations, Statut des instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme au 1 septembre 1993, Geneva, 15 September 1993

[28] (Czech Republic, Argentina and Rwanda) had debts outstanding from PKOs. But there is more to come. In January 1994, three countries, Argentina, Brazil and Pakistan, had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Venezuela, the Antarctic Treaty; Morocco had not ratified the BW Convention; Japan, the Treaty of Rarotonga, and eight countries had not signed the Inhumane Weapons Convention. Oman, which joined the Council in 1994, has hardly signed or ratified a single agreement on disarmament, excepting the BW Convention. Indonesia, Botswana and Honduras, three new non-permanent members in 1995, had not signed the Enmod Convention and the Inhumane Weapons Convention.*3 Furthermore, the 15 non-permanent countries during the two-year period 1993-4 bought heavy armaments to a value of over $ 24,000 million in the five years 1988-92. Curiously enough, 90 per cent of this armament was sold by the five permanent members, which goes to show how difficult it is to reduce this deadly trade, following the example of our supposed mentors in disarmament.

486

3  “ The most productive time ”

Of the ten non-permanent members during 1993 or 1994, three (Oman, Morocco and Pakistan) maintain a very high level of military expenditure, both as a proportion of GNP and of the total national budget. The Czech Republic, Spain and Brazil, though to a lesser degree than the five permanent members, also rank amongst the arms exporters. In short, a poor example to set. It is not yet clear whether the right of veto is maintained for some countries and whether permanent membership is indefinite in all cases or for a fixed period of time to be decided. Since both the demographic and economic criteria used in gauging a country’s status undergo changes, we could consider a temporary period of, for example, ten years for the new permanent members, which would be eight countries in the first option and seven in the second. Every ten years, therefore, the composition of this Council would be revised. A proposal of this nature has been made by the United Nations Association of the United States, which suggests that permanent members should not be perpetual, but subject to periodic renewal on the basis of previously defined criteria, such as their financial contribution to the United Nations, their contribution to the peace-keeping forces or their total population. Regarding the right of veto of the five countries which at present hold this privilege, the aim ought to be its definitive abolition before the year 2000. In the meantime the five permanent members should commit themselves to not using this right, so as to get the new mechanisms greased. At all events, it is very strange that these five [29] countries should not be able to adopt any kind of joint action directed against the interests of any of them.*4 With the right of veto abolished, and with 23 or 21 members on the Council, decision-making can never be made to depend o on unanimous agreement. A majority of three-quarters ought to be enough, leaving a margin of five dissenting voices in the two options discussed. Table 2.5  World candidate checklist (*)

China India United States Indonesia Brazil Russia Japan Nigeria Pakistan Bangladesh Mexico Germany Italy United Kingdom France Canada Spain

Pop.

GNP

 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 16 17 19

11 13  1 10  9  2

16  3  5  6  4  7  8

UN quota

No. PKF

No. PKO

 1

 3  7 18

12 17

21  

14

10  3  2  

4  7  6  5  8  9

1  4 15  6  5  2  9 22

12  6  6 17  2 25

Accept. ICJ N Y N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y Y

3  “ The most productive time ”

487

(*) The rank occupied is only mentioned when it stands out in the international context Key: GNP PKF PKO ICJ

Gross National Product Peace-keeping Forces Peace-keeping Operations International Court of Justice

Article 24 of the United Nations Charter confers on the Security Council ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ and Article 25 states that United Nations Members ‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council’. [30] But the responsibility and the commitment the members of the Council acquire regarding the international community is also included in the following article, Article 26, not widely publicised on account of its compromising nature, since it points out that: in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating … plans … for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The commitment to peace and security, in the widest sense is, according to the Charter, what legitimates the Security Council. Until very recently, the permanent members of the Council have been responsible for rearmament and international militarisation – in other words, the opposite. The challenge as we turn the century is therefore to return to the principles expressed in the Charter, with a structure, composition and working of the Security Council which can guarantee that its members will not behave in a way which is clearly incompatible with their role as instigators of a worldwide security policy. Proposals Increase the number of permanent members to 11 or 13. Increase the presence of Third World countries. Introduce the presence of regional organisations (OSCE, OAU, OAS, etc.). Within the OSCE, guarantee a place for France, the United Kingdom and Germany on a rotational basis. A temporary period of ten years for new permanent countries. Abolish the right of veto by the year 2000. Maintain the present structure of ten non-permanent members sitting for a twoyear period. Lay down conditions for membership of the Council: – be fully paid up with the UN; – accept the International Court of Justice; – take part in the United Nations Peace Forces; – fulfil the Council’s resolutions; – sign agreements on disarmament and human rights. Decisions by a three-quarters majority.

• • • • • • • • •

488

3  “ The most productive time ”

Original footnotes

*1 El País, 21 January 1993, p. 2 (supplement). [Richard Falk, Una Oportunidad Histórica:

“[…] Y, lo que es aún más ambicioso, también se podría reservar un asiento permanente a una superpotencia moral elegida por un panel de ganadores del Premio Nobel de la Paz, y a la que los miembros accederían siguiendo un orden de rotación […].”] *2 Among the countries which in November 1991 had not yet recognised the jurisdiction of the ICJ as binding are the following: Venezuela, Hungary, Cape Verde, Morocco, Brazil, Djibouti, United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Iran, Taiwan, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Poland and Turkey. *3 SIPRI Yearbook 1994, pp. 767-83. *4 Brian Urquhart, “The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?” Adelphi Papers, No. 265, Winter 1991-92. 3.5.15 1996, Tatsuro Kunugi, Makoto Iokibe, Takahiro Shinyo and Kohei Hashimoto, Towards a More Effective UN: Research Project on a More Effective United Nations and Japan’s Options, Kyoto/Tokyo: Peace and Happiness through Prosperity (PHP) Research Institute524 […] [26] […] II. Towards Strengthening Democracy and Effectiveness Establishment of Regional Permanent Seats in the UN Security Council In order to increase the legitimacy and credibility of the United Nations in the twentyfirst century, within this present century we must reform the Security Council as a core organ of the UN and increase the numbers of its permanent and non-permanent seats. On this point there is a broad agreement among Member States. The Security Council also needs to be reformed so that it can play a central role in promoting the new security concept (i.e., “cooperative security”) and disarmament. 524  Reproduction of this text courtesy of the PHP Institute, Inc., Kyoto, Japan. – Tatsuro Kunugi (*1934) is a former Japanese diplomat and UN official. He was UN Assistant Secretary-General and Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN in Geneva, and from 1990-2004 a professor at the International Christian University. His specializations include global governance, international law and international administration. He received his education from Tokyo University, Cornell University and his PhD from Columbia University.    Makoto Iokibe (*1943) is Professor of Political and Diplomatic History at the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, Japan. From 2007 to 2012 he was President of the National Defense Academy. He studied law and political science at Kyoto University.    Takahiro Shin’yo (*1950) is a Japanese diplomat and legal scholar. Having graduated from the Osaka University School of Law, he joined the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. He was head of the division for disarmament, and later for UN Policy, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He taught at Osaka University, the Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, and Tokyo University. In 2006-07, he served as the Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN, and from 2008 to 2012 as Japanese Ambassador to Germany. Since 2012, he is Vice President of Kwansei Gakuin University.    Kohei Hashimoto (*1960) was a research fellow (1992-96) and a senior research fellow (1996-2001) at the PHP Research Institute. He studied at the American University of Beirut (BA) and at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford (M.Phil. and D.Phil.), specializing in Modern Middle Eastern Studies. Before joining the PHP Research Institute, he was a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Lebanese Studies.

489

3  “ The most productive time ”

The problem is that in order for the Security Council to retain its effectiveness while impressing us with the change it has undergone, it is not enough just to add Japan and Germany to the list of permanent members. We also need representatives from the developing nations as permanent members. Further, in order to democratize the decision-making process, we need to reform the rules concerning the right of veto. The total number of Member States of the UN Security Council should be increased from the present 15 to 24. Specifically, there should be six new permanent members. These would be Japan, Germany, and one state from each of the following four regions: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and “western Europe and others” plus eastern Europe (two plus four). Popular opinion may widely support the “two plus three” system (i.e., Japan and Germany plus one state from each of the three regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America). However, we have purposely adopted the “two plus four” system because we believe this will also include Oceania, Canada, and eastern Europe, thereby realizing our wish to represent all [27] of the world’s regions. As for “western Europe and others,” with the addition of eastern Europe, a swing-seat system may be used within the group. For the non-permanent members, three seats should be added: one from each of the regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Among permanent members, the five existing members should have global permanent seats, with the addition of Japan and Germany. The remaining four seats should be regional permanent seats, whose occupancy would be rotated among different states. The occupants of the regional permanent seats will be elected from each region (maximum three states in one region), taking into account the states’ population and GNP as well as the level of their contribution to international peace and security such as PKO, ODA, and emergency humanitarian relief activities. Occupancy of the regional permanent seats will be rotated every three years. The regional permanent seats will be reviewed every nine years. The newly appointed permanent members will not possess the right of veto. The existing permanent members will discuss the limits of the right of veto – including a consideration of banning independent vetoes and limiting the exercise to certain actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and PKO – and reach a conclusion within two years following the expansion of the Security Council. In the meantime, the permanent members will issue a declaration stating that they will refrain from the excessive use of the right of veto. Structure of the United Nations Security Council Present system

Western South Sub Grand Europe Eastern and Asia Africa total total and Europe Central others America

Classification

Basic character

Permanent

Right of veto/ 3 Fixed

No right of Non-permanent veto/ 2-year term

1

1

 5 15

2

1

2

2

3

10

490

3  “ The most productive time ”

Proposed system Western South Sub Grand Europe Eastern and Asia Africa total total and Europe Central others America

Classification

Basic character

Global permanent

Review right 3 of veto/ fixed No right of veto/ fixed

Regional permanent

1

1

No right of –1– 1 veto/ 3-year Swing-seat system term rotation within group

Non-permanent No right of veto/ 2-year term

2

1

3

1

 5

1

 2

1

1

 4

3

4

13

24

[…] 3.5.16 1996, Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill and James Sutterlin, Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam, in: Global Governance, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 65-80525 […] [76] Breaking the Logjam It is hard to see how any of the current proposals can be adopted. One state or another, or a group of states, appears to have an ability, and an interest, to obstruct any particular change. For some, the status quo is quite satisfactory, and better than any change other than one that specifically gives them more power. But any long extension of the status quo carries serious dangers and, for many states, is not acceptable. If expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council is out of the question – with or without veto power to the new members – other elements of a possible package must come into play. And while the package will hardly delight anyone, it must have something to please, in some degree, all the numerous players who have 525  Bruce Russett (*1935) is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Yale University. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and held visiting appointments at Columbia, Michigan, North Carolina, Harvard, the University of Tel Aviv, and Tokyo University Law School.    Since 2001, Barry O’Neill is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He studies decision-making in social and political contexts. His work applies game theory to study foreign policy decisions, with a view to preventing war. Previously, he was an assistant and associate professor at Northwestern University, York University, and the Yale School of Management.    James S. Sutterlin (1922-2017) was an American author, academic, and officer at the U.S. Department of State. He served in the U.S. Foreign Service for many years and also spent 13 years working in various capacities for the UN Secretariat. Furthermore, he chaired the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) and was Director of Research and Adjunct Professor at the Long Island University Institute for the Study of International Organizations.

3  “ The most productive time ”

491

the ability to block its adoption. The power to affect passage of a resolution is a zerosum game. For every gain to one or more states, others must lose, and they will resist that loss. But voting power is not everything. States not given much formal power may nevertheless be satisfied by reforms that give them greater respect, a sense of larger participation in decision-making, a perception that the council is more representative, and an expectation that it will be able to take effective decisions of which they largely approve. A possible package might look like this: 1. Eliminate the charter provision – in Article 23(2) – that prohibits the immediate reelection of a nonpermanent member whose term has expired. This would be attractive to several big regional powers as promising more or less permanent presence on the council. In particular, it would partially address the wishes of Germany and Japan. It is substantially less than they want, but – with some other concessions identified below – might suffice. 2. Expand the nonpermanent membership (including any of the above) to sixteen, for a total council body of twenty-one. Given the vastly enlarged membership of the UN, some such expansion of the council is essential to meet the wish of smaller states for some greater opportunity to serve as members, particularly if two or more states can be expected to gain near-perpetual status. Although a total of twenty-one begins to push the limits of what some see as a council that can be effective in the conditions of international military and political crisis, it would still be a reasonably manageable body. 3. Raise the number of affirmative votes needed to pass a resolution to at least thirteen or possibly fourteen of the total of twenty-one. The lower number (61.9 percent of the total) would be above the current 60 percent but a bit below the percentage before the 1965 council expansion; the higher (66.7 percent) would be substantially higher. Even the lower number would compel the five permanent members to acquire seven out of the [77] sixteen nonpermanents for any winning coalition – a harder job than the current task of gaining four out of ten. While no one should be deluded into thinking that any such increment to the power of nonpermanent members would be more than marginal, it could offer some modest reward to the nonaligned. This possibility has been a neglected element in discussions so far and could constitute a new element that would help to break the impasse. 4. Restrict the scope of the veto in some manner. The veto was originally intended to protect the vital interests of those great powers whose assent to UN actions for peace and security was essential to the viability of the organization. In practice, the veto right has been abused, employed over a much wider range of substantive concerns, including the admission of new members and even the election of the Secretary-General. The veto might be limited to enforcement measures proposed under Chapter VII, or to other decisions entailing the use of military force. But the existing permanent members will vigorously resist any restriction on the veto. Perhaps simply moving the Secretary-General’s election outside its formal scope would be a small and acceptable price they would pay to get the rest of the package. Such a change could possibly be achieved through a joint resolution by the permanent members, without a formal charter amendment. 5. Delete Article 107, which refers to “any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present charter,” and modify Article 53 to

492

3  “ The most productive time ”

remove a similar reference. These provisions are uniformly viewed as anachronistic and have been officially renounced by the United States and the U.S.S.R. as they refer to Germany, Japan, and Italy. However, they remain an affront to those countries and to smaller states that were once their allies. This loose end should be snipped off.*1 6. Accompany these changes by a resolution of the Security Council expressing the decision: (a) to take further measures to increase the transparency of the council’s operation; (b) to collaborate more closely with the General Assembly on security matters, including disarmament; (c) to engage in wide consultations with concerned parties, including regional organizations; and (d) to reexamine the structure and composition of the Security Council at a specified time, perhaps fifteen years hence. How do these add up for each of the major groups? Germany and Japan do not get permanent membership or a veto. But with likely successive reelection, they achieve semipermanent status, and with the scope of the veto somewhat reduced, their deprivation is less. Repeal of the enemy clauses and reexamination of the council’s composition in fifteen years offer some small benefits, at no cost to others. [78] All the current permanent members sacrifice a little of the scope of their formal veto power, but some of them might even gain from restricting others’ ability to cast vetoes. Otherwise, none of them loses much of any substance. The South derives modest gains from restricting the veto, increasing consultation and transparency and raising the required voting majority.  Most of these gains are largely symbolic, with no one a serious loser. The balance of power is not tipped markedly in anyone’s favor. The efficiency of the council is essentially preserved, which would not be likely if the veto power were extended to new members or if the total membership of the council were enlarged above twenty-one. […]

• • • •

Original footnote *1 The Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and the Strengthening of the Organization, at the 1995 session, recommended that the General Assembly should express its intention to initiate, at the earliest appropriate future session, the procedure to amend the charter with a view to deleting the “enemy states” clauses. [29 March 1995, UN Doc. A/50/33, para. 65]. 3.5.17 1997, Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN, London/New York: Routledge526 […] [126] 10 The restructuring and strengthening of the UN […] THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] [127] The question is, what to propose for the ‘thus and thus’ – what concrete measures to advocate. Certain starting points seem obvious. 526  Reproduced with permission of Routledge in the format Book via Copyright Clearance Center.    Ronald Philip Dore (1925-2018) was a British sociologist specialising in Japanese economy and society and the comparative study of types of capitalism. He was a fellow

3  “ The most productive time ”

493

1 Differential voting rights are obviously unavoidable. The more a country possesses the wealth and power, the deployment of which is necessary for the effective functioning and development of the UN, the more important is its cooperation, and there is probably no better way of securing that cooperation than by giving it greater voting influence on decisions. 2 It appears that many matters are today decided by informal discussions among the five veto powers. The procedure works because few are involved. The need for a sort of ‘inner cabinet’ to work out draft resolutions is clear and such an inner group should not be too big. 3 When the UN was founded it was generally believed that for any of the Big Five themselves to be made the object of sanctions by the others, would either lead to a new world war or to the breakup of the UN itself. The right of veto was the institutional recognition of that reality. But that argument is far weaker today, now that the major likely cause of a third world war – the ideological and geopolitical competition between the US and Russia – has come to an end, and now that – partly thanks to the UN itself over its half-century of history – the restraining effects of ‘international opinion’ on the behaviour of states is a good deal stronger than it was. Given the above, one might think of the problem as one of getting the right balance on three different dimensions. a) The composition of the Security Council; a replacement for the notion of ‘permanent member’. One needs some arrangement which allows flexible change over time, reflecting changes in the power balance and changes in ‘international opinion’ – for example three or four seats for ‘major [128] powers’ elected for ten years at a time and re-electable; and several two-to-three year seats for ‘middlerange powers’. The criteria for categorizing countries into their respective ‘major’, ‘middle-range’, ‘lesser’ constituencies could be multiple. Financial contributions to the UN would be one, but so would population. (If it is ‘mankind’s UN’, one has to listen to the countries which have a large share of mankind.) Perhaps there should be regional constituencies as at present. There is a lot to be said also for performance criteria – the willingness to contribute to the UN and its work, as evidenced in prompt payment of assessed contributions, provision of troops and funds for peace-keeping, the proportion of foreign aid channelled through multilateral agencies, etc. Such criteria could usefully encourage countries to ‘earn brownie points’ in ways that strengthen the UN system. b) One might also think of institutionalizing a kind of inner five-or six-country cabinet or ‘standing committee’ of the Security Council. A Japanese diplomat’s analysis of the present situation in the Security Council is suggestive.*1 At present, resolutions are mostly drafted in informal meetings of the five permanent members, and thereafter it is as much as Japan, or any of the other ten members, of the British Academy, the Japan Academy, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He taught at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, the London School of Economics, the University of British Columbia, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Financial Times described him as «a fiercely energetic Japanologist who urged the West to take Japan seriously» (Mari Sako, Ronald Dore, sociologist, 1925-2018, in: Financial Times, November 27, 2018).

494

3  “ The most productive time ”

can do to effect minor amendments. Moreover, of those five members one can observe ‘a generally shared outlook and value system on the part of the four – US, UK, France and Russia’. China tends to play the role of a passive onlooker role, and on many issues, out of weakness, abstains. But in one thing it is consistent – in challenging anything which smacks of ‘intervention in countries’ internal affairs’. Given the tendency for the other powers to be increasingly willing to contemplate such interventions, it may, he suggests, be only a matter of time before China uses the right of veto which has been in abeyance for (as of then) over three years. The long history of thinking about the need for international organization – about the creation of a ‘government of mankind’ – is indeed a product of the ‘generally shared value system of US, UK, France and Russia’, that is to say of the cultural traditions which had their origins in the Mediterranean basin. Can one expect nations representing a different – a Confucian or an Islamic – cultural tradition to converge towards that value system – at least that part of it relevant to ideals of an international order based on the rule of law? What inhibits such convergence at the moment – as seen in China’s rejection of all ‘internal interference’ – is not, it seems to me, primarily a difference in culture in itself. When Confucian scholars spoke of ‘peace and plenty under Heaven’ they did not mean anything very different from the Christians’ ‘peace on earth’. The problem lies, rather, in the fact that for several centuries it is white-skinned peoples of Mediterranean Christian culture who have dominated over and frequently colonized peoples of Confucian and Islamic culture, and that it is still those same nations which quite frequently act as if they were masters of the earth, putting pressure on [129] others in ways seen as oppressive. That is the reason why the concrete interpretations of ‘human rights’, ‘justice’, ‘rule of law’ as defined by those white-skinned nations are not likely to be accepted without resistance – because they are seen sometimes as arguments justifying their superior attitudes. But, as argued at the Chapter of 6, apropos the argument of Professor Nakanishi, actual convergence in the values themselves seems to me not impossible – a view supported not just by appeal to arguments about ‘common humanity’, but by the evidence of the evolution in the years since the war of international activity in support of the protection of human rights. To conclude, therefore, what started as a discussion of a possible ‘inner cabinet’ of the Security Council, it would need to have, in its membership, representatives from the Confucian and Islamic culture areas. c) One could think of various kinds of substitute for the present (almost unrestricted) veto power. For example, certain countries might have the right of veto over a particular resolution, but with provisions for reconsideration of the matter, this time with majority voting provisions (an eighty per cent majority, say) if, after a certain period of time, no compromise could be found. There might also be formal rules to preclude from voting on resolutions critical of, or imposing sanctions on, certain countries, those countries themselves and countries which are in military alliance with them. One other thought. In most national parliaments there is a rule that before a member speaks on a certain policy issue, he is required, at the beginning of his speech, to declare any personal interest he might have in the questions at issue. Might one look

3  “ The most productive time ”

495

forward to the day when speeches in the Security Council begin with a declaration of the national interest reasons delegates might have for favouring one or the other party to a dispute? It is unlikely that the practice could be legislated from nothing. It would require certain countries which were agreed on its desirability to agree to adopt it, thus eventually, one hopes, shaming the others to conform. […] Original footnote *1 Shinyo, Takahiro, ‘Kokuren no saikasseika o motomete’ (‘In search of ways to revitalise the UN’), Gaiko Forum, No. 46, p. 20. 3.5.18 1998, Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International527 Chapter 10: A Constitutional Right of Veto […] [318] […] III. Principled Reform: Composition and Decision-Making of the Security Council Reviewing again the different principles and concepts outlined above, we find that they not only have a different legal standing but are also suited to support different tendencies of Council reform. The principle of constitutional equality suggests inclusiveness, that is a rather high number of Council members, and an abolition, or at least limitation, of special rights like permanent membership status and the veto power. The concept of representativeness, on the other hand, expresses the idea that a body with legislative functions should reflect actual dissimilarities of its constituent members. In other words, representativeness may require inequality. The idea of effective governance, for its part, emphasizes the need for a Council able to perform its tasks “effectively” and “efficiently”. It supports a rather small body and a broad operation of majority voting. In legal terms, it describes, however, only ultimate limits of admissible Charter reform. Democracy, understood as “government by the people”, is not acknowledged by the UN Charter as a system to be applied in the organization, whereas legitimacy, if distinguished from constitutionality, does not provide a legal standard for Charter reform. In the following, we will determine in greater detail what follows from an application of these principles and concepts to two questions, i.e., the recognition of a special constitutional status of certain states in the form of (1) permanent or semi-permanent

527  This text was completed in August 1997. All footnotes on the pages reproduced here have been omitted. – The author is professor of international Law, European law and public law at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. He studied law, history and political science at the University of Bonn (Germany) and holds an LL.M from Yale Law School and a Doctor iuris from the Humboldt University in Berlin. He was a Ford Foundation Senior Fellow in Public International Law at Yale University and a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. Before joining the University of St. Gallen in 2013, he held the chair in international law and human rights law at the Bundeswehr University in Munich. At the time the book was published from which this excerpt is taken, the author was an assistant professor of law at Humboldt University.

496

3  “ The most productive time ”

membership in the Security Council, and (2) the possession of a right of veto with regard to decisions taken by the Council. A. Permanent and Semi-permanent Membership Throughout the history of the United Nations, public discussion has been focusing on the right of veto whenever the question of special status of certain member states was addressed. Permanent membership as such has been much less attacked. It is, nevertheless, in and by itself a highly critical [319] privilege. It entails a permanent presence in the most important organ of the United Nations (this status again involving a steady flow of information provided by the Secretary-General that is not available to the general membership) and the Military Staff Committee (see Article 47, paragraph 2) – and, above all, a permanent right actively to take part in the decision-making of the Council. De facto, permanent membership in the Council in the past also involved membership in a high number of other organs and bodies of the UN system – something which in the present discussion is labelled the “cascade effect”. A prominent case in point is the International Court of Justice. It is understood that each one of the P-5 may always have a member of the Court of its nationality if it so wishes. A higher degree of equality would be realized if all members of the Council were regularly elected on the same terms. For instance, the present dualism of permanent and non-permanent members could be replaced with a system of general elections providing for a possibility of immediate reelection. Unlike the UN, the League of Nations allowed such reelection of Council members. Regarding the election of non-permanent members of the Council, Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Covenant gave the Assembly full scope; it simply stated that those members should “be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion”. In a resolution of September 15, 1926, the Assembly decided to elect each year three of the nine non-permanent members for a period of three years. This période d’exercice was to be followed by a three-year période de repos during which reelection was not possible. However, a state could apply for a formal declaration of the Assembly that, as an exception, its immediate reelection was permitted. Such declara- [320] tion, to be adopted by a two-thirds majority, and only at the end of the three-year term (so that the Assembly had a chance to consider the conduct of the respective state), only made possible a new candidacy; it did not guarantee reelection, and was effective only for three years. Not astonishingly, this rather complicated procedure could do little to ease off the enduring controversy about Council membership. As Professor Mosler aptly set out, the existence of a limited number of states exerting a distinctive influence on the international political and legal order has been a constant feature of the international system since the rise of the modern state. It does not matter whether one calls them, as in the past, “Great Powers” or prefers another expression which has a less old-fashioned and pompous ring to it. It does not matter whether one likes the idea of having such extraordinarily influential states around or not. What matters is their existence, as a matter of fact, and the well-founded reason to believe that in the foreseeable future this characteristic of the international system will not disappear. A contemporary reader will probably be annoyed about the insensitivity with which Oppenheim-Lauterpacht’s treatise described this reality:

3  “ The most productive time ”

497

Arrangements made by the body of the Great Powers tend to gain the consent or the acquiescence of the minor States. The Great Powers are the leaders of the Family of Nations, and every advance of the Law of Nations during the past has been the result of their political hegemony, although the initiative towards progress was frequently taken by a minor Power. For most of its history, international law turned away from these inequalities in fact and insisted on equality in and before the law: “Great powers did not enjoy any superiority of right…. Nor has a state the character of a Great Power by law” (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht). This is quite understandable. Power seemed to make itself felt strongly enough, and law was meant to bolster the weak. It was only when, with the League of Nations, a first attempt was made to build a global constitutional structure that the special role of the leading powers [321] “was … given a legal basis and expression”. This did not happen by chance. Unlike a legal system which is without any overarching permanent structure, a constitutional order cannot simply ignore actual differences in its constituency which bear strongly on the political and legal course the community is steering. However, the Covenant as well as the Charter did not do more than take note of the existence of the “Great Powers”, and assign in law that role to them which they already played in fact. At this point we turn again to the principle of representativeness. Further above, we recognized the principle as a guiding idea behind the composition and decisionmaking of the Security Council, and Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter as provisions giving effect to it by introducing special rights for certain states in accordance with their respective status and role. Thus, representativeness legitimizes, as a constitutional principle, an elevated position of particular states, balancing the principle of equality or, if one wishes to say so, allowing of exceptions to it. Striving to realize and enhance as much as possible the representative character of a body intended to give faithful expression to community interests and opinions, the principle is communityoriented, different from the notion of sovereign equality which accentuates a state’s individual legal position and interests. Therefore, it is not by an act of recognition of a Great Power’s “claim to leadership” or a specifically extensive competence that the special role of a state is constitutionally understood. Instead, the special role finds legal expression due to, and by means of, a constitutional principle which seeks to strengthen a central community institution. Accordingly, the long-term inclusion of certain states in the Security Council is not just a matter of political expediency or necessity. It has been given a constitutional basis and legitimation by the idea that the Council has to be truly representative of the international community in its diversity. To some, the principle of representativeness may do nothing more than provide a skillful justification for the aspirations of mighty and wealthy states. We cannot but answer that a constitutional legitimation entails subjecting the respective status to constitutional rules and commitments. From a legal point of view, this is always preferable to political arbitrariness. Apart from such a long-term membership of particular states, representativeness of the Council may also require a certain ratio of “permanent”, or longtime, members to non-permanent ones or, alternatively, a weighting of votes. Shortly after the UN Charter

498

3  “ The most productive time ”

had been signed, Professor [322] Briggs drew attention to the fact that “within the League the composition of the Council never accurately reflected the power situation”. The four or five Great Powers in the League at any one time were never a majority of the Council and were at times confronted with nine to eleven small, and frequently very weak, states, the vote of each of which was equal to that of a Great Power, with all its population, territory, and its industrial and military potential. The not unnatural result was an “inner circle tendency” in the Council…. [T]he Great Powers … made decisions … in advance of League meetings, and subsequently steam-rollered the decisions through the League…. To attribute the failure of the League to the small states would be to misconceive the problem; it was the unworkable nature of the doctrine of equal rights that caused power, like water, to find its level, and the real decisions to be made outside Geneva. “Things of this world”, John Locke wrote, “are in so constant a flux that nothing remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their stations; flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries filled with wealth and inhabitants.” More laconically, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht said that in the circle of Great Powers “changes … often take place”. For that simple reason, the principle of representativeness requires a possibility of adapting the status of states to changed circumstances, as it is offered by Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter. Since it can be amended, Article 23 is not a clause providing for “eternal” or truly “permanent” privileges which would run counter to the principle. It is, however, problematic that the status of the permanent members cannot be changed without their endorsement. To be perfectly clear, this requirement does not contradict the Charter-based principle of representativeness which, similar to the principle of constitutional equality, only exists in the form and shape it was given by the Charter. The rule that special rights can only be modified or revoked with the consent of the [323] privileged can, nevertheless, be regarded as an exception to full representativeness which may be reconsidered in the context of Council reform. Regarding the composition of the Council, the Covenant of the League of Nations was considerably more flexible than the UN Charter. Consider Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant: With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council. While thus making relatively easy an enlargement of either category of Council members, the provision did not address the problem of how to deprive one of the original permanent members determined in Article 4, paragraph 1, of its status. Here, as in the case of the Charter, only an amendment could bring about change, and this required the consent of the privileged. In the discussions of the Open-Ended Working Group, it has been suggested to introduce a mechanism through which the status of “permanent” members would

3  “ The most productive time ”

499

regularly be reexamined. It is difficult to see how one could get such mechanism working. If (which is likely) the prerogatives of certain states remain to be defined in the Charter, the mechanism would involve a special form of Charter amendment, perhaps providing for less than two-thirds majorities. Would the permanent members of the day have to concur? [324] Taking into account the unwillingness of the present five permanent members to waive their veto regarding Charter amendments, Germany has suggested that only new permanent members should be subject to a “periodic review in accordance with Article 108” which is “compulsory and will take place after fifteen years”. Ratification of the review result shall “not necessarily require ratification by the new permanent members”. The adoption of such a rule would entail a severely diminished status of the new “permanent” members and actually create a third category of Council membership which Germany always rejected. Further, it is unclear what would happen if the agreement required for a Charter amendment by Article 108 could not be reached. Will in that case the then existing arrangement remain in force until a new majority is ready? It therefore seems that a system of periodic elections is preferable according to which a certain number of Council seats would be allocated for ten or twelve years’ terms. To these elections, the normal rule (two-thirds majority decision of the General Assembly) would apply. By improving chances of states to see the special role played by them reflected in the composition of the Council, such a new category of Council membership would not only suit the principle of representativeness better than the prevailing system, but also the principle of constitutional equality. In Article 23, paragraph 1, the Charter named China, France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States as permanent members. With the exception of France, this choice was not disputed. It was in line with the idea of representativeness in that it accorded the politically, militarily and economically most powerful states of the time a special status in the new organization. Although the continuance of this status to the present day cannot be deemed unconstitutional, it seems appropriate to ask whether today the same application of the principle of representativeness would lead to a different result. Which states qualify for permanent (or, if the proposed change were introduced, prolonged) membership? Professor Mosler rightly held that the “requirements [of Great Power status] are not measurable”. A Great Power politically sets itself off by its own efforts. There has never been an examination of its actual resources and assets. The effective weight of a Great Power is a factor which cannot be ignored in international relations. The possibility alone of assessing, in a political procedure, the existence and the degree of influence on world politics would be the clearest indication that the claim to Great Power status is unfounded. [325] For this reason, the different attempts of governments and scholars to formulate lengthy catalogues of “objective criteria” which permanent members of the Security Council should meet are of little help. Generally, it is all to clear who can be called a leading power in a given period of time. If there are serious doubts about a state’s status, it is more likely than not that it does not have the rank of a “Great Power”.

500

3  “ The most productive time ”

Today, the outstanding position of the United States, China and Russia (probably in that very order) is not challenged, while the status and claims of every other contestant are heavily disputed. As the discussion about Japan’s and Germany’s aspirations has shown, military strength, and the readiness to use it, are still considered to be an indispensible prerequisite of a privileged position in the international community – unfortunately so, because “[s]uch a suggestion encourages States to develop military muscle as an admission ticket to the Council, for permanent as well as nonpermanent membership” (Robert Johansen). The relevant entity in the prevailing system is the individual state. The principle of representativeness corresponds to a system of states and seeks to bring about a composition of the Council which is reflective of the individual states’ status and possible contribution to the achievement of community goals. One can, albeit not without difficulty, imagine a state drawing its particular strength from the fact that it represents an entire region. Such representation would not follow from regional hegemony (this would fit well in the traditional concept of individual state power) but a mandate freely (“democratically”) given by the states of the region. This is the idea behind the African proposal of “regional rotating permanent seats”. In the history of international relations, it would be a novelty to see states conferring powers in that way to another state which would then, for the duration of its term, have a free hand in the exercise of the rights arising from “permanent” membership. It is far from clear whether the respective states would in fact be able to agree on a representative power and, if so, whether such an agreement would reflect that degree of support necessary to legiti- [326] mize this approach in view of the principles of representativeness and, in particular, constitutional equality. It is also doubtful what effect an introduction of such an element of indirect representation of states would have on the cohesion of the international community. Besides the principle of representativeness, it is difficult to see which constitutional axiom could legitimize such exception from the principle of equality of (individual) states. “Equality of regions” or “equality of North and South”, the principal arguments for an inclusion of developing countries in the group of permanent members, are notions not to be discerned in the Charter. B. The Right of Veto Modified and Limited As was tried to demonstrate above, the principles of constitutional equality and effective government suggest an abolition, or limitation of the scope, of the right of veto. They do not require such a reform, but to limit the use of the veto seems to be more in line with their principal ideas, or rationales, than to preserve the veto in its present shape. On the other hand, the veto is defended as part of a system of checks and balances. However, the veto does not appear to be an appropriate means of constitutional control. There is no way of establishing the motives of a state which casts a negative vote. Generally, political considerations will prevail over legal ones. It also seems that in the practice of the Security Council there is hardly a case in which a veto can be said to have prevented the Council from taking an unconstitutional decision. What is more, the main argument supporting this view – i.e., the absence of other mechanisms of constitutional control, in particular judicial review – is rather weak if we are dealing

3  “ The most productive time ”

501

with reform. For a reform proposal would seek to strengthen the role of the ICJ which, as an independent judicial organ, clearly is better equipped to check the legality of Council action. On the face of it, even the General Assembly, as a body distinct from the Security Council, seems to be in a better position to exert constitutional control over the Security Council. If, nevertheless, the veto were accepted as a means of such control, a proposal comes to mind according to which only a negative vote cast by at least two permanent members could frustrate a decision. Since constitutional control is to be performed on behalf of the entire legal community and for the sake of community interests, the requirement of two states joining together in rejecting a draft resolution or decision shall prevent a state from acting solely in its own national interest. In its rationale and ef- [327] fect, this proposal is similar to the already existing so-called “collective veto” of the non-aligned states which denotes the ability of any seven non-permanent members to defeat a draft resolution by their joint abstention or opposition. The principle of representativeness, on the other hand, is meant to give effect to the actual status of individual states, their particular strength and ability to contribute to the achievement of community goals. Does it, therefore, legitimize a state’s individual right of veto as a means of protecting national resources against undue encroachments? This was, after all, a principal rationale of the veto back in 1945. However, it appears that a longtime membership of certain states in the Council satisfies what the principle of representativeness calls for. The principle is of course open to interpretation, but we believe that to say it mandated a right of veto of longtime members would mean overstretching the notion. This leaves us with a last and simple argument in favor of the veto. This argument, which at first seems to be merely practical, goes as follows: If those states whose active participation in the work of the United Nations is indispensable for an achievement of its goals and, therefore, for the welfare of the international community, make their contribution dependent on a bestowal of the veto, the community, in the present state of its development, has no choice but to comply with their wishes. This practical argument gains legal importance upon realization of the fact that rejecting the leading powers’ claims would be tantamount to jeopardizing a further development of international constitutionalism and accepting a severe decline in international order. To the extent that this argument is recognized as valid, the idea of a veto jointly to be exercised by two or more permanent members becomes questionable. For in that case it cannot be challenged as unconstitutional that a state acts in its own interest. However, not every interest can legitimately be pursued. It is only a protection of a state’s military and economic resources against undue claims by other states which we acknowledged, from a constitutional point of view, as a proper national interest. Accordingly, national interests cannot be asserted against a draft resolution which does not specially burden the state in question. From these considerations one could deduce certain substantive limits of the exercise of the veto power. A state could be required to explain why it intends to cast a negative vote, and only reasons either reflecting com- [328] munity interests or a narrowly defined national interest as described here could be recognized as valid. In this context, one may recall an early recommendation of the General Assembly to the permanent members “to exercise the veto only when they consider the question of vital

502

3  “ The most productive time ”

importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and to state upon what ground they consider this condition to be present”. As a political means such a procedure could remind the permanent members of their special responsibility for the functioning of the Council, and encourage selfrestraint in the use of the veto. Understood as a legal requirement, its merits are less clear. By inducing permanent controversy among states, it would unduly interfere with the work of the Council because, in the absence of a comprehensive system of judicial review, there is generally no final arbiter of a conflict regarding the constitutionality of a veto. And even if there were comprehensive judicial review, it is doubtful whether a court could scrutinize the reasons offered by a state. Finally, in view of the fact that also a negative vote cast by a non-permanent member can make a draft resolution fall through, would not the same regime have to be applied to non-permanent members? For these reasons, the idea of a legally binding “vital interest” requirement is not supported. However, the use of the veto may be curtailed in other ways. Not every wish of a “Great Power” has to, and may, be accommodated. The international community must instead balance the gains of a participation of a particular state against those of a fuller realization of the principles of constitutional equality, representativeness, and effective governance. Since even the most powerful state would act against its own well-understood interest if it withdrew, or stayed away, from an organization as universal as the present United Nations, the international community’s bargaining power is not to be underestimated. Before, in the light of the foregoing remarks, specific limitations of the scope of the right of veto will be suggested, we turn to a legal principle which is also working in favor of a certain modification of the veto. In its traditional Latin phrasing, this is the Nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa rule. The question of the voting power of a permanent member being involved in a dispute under consideration by the Council was an insurmountable stumbling block to agreement at Dumbarton Oaks. The Nemo debet esse judex maxim is of Roman origin. The Codex Iustinianus (Cod. Iust. 3,5) pronounces it under the heading Ne quis in sua causa judicet vel sibi jus dicat as follows: [329] Generali lege decernimus neminem sibi esse iudicem vel ius sibi dicere debere. In re enim propria iniquum admodum est alicui licentiam tribuere sententiae. (We [the Emperors Valens, Gratianus and Valentinianus] decree by general law that no one ought to be his own judge or administer justice in his own cause. For it is very unjust to give somebody permission to pass judgment in his own cause.) According to Article 15, paragraphs 6 and 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations the votes of the parties to a dispute were not to be taken into account when the Council or the Assembly made recommendations with regard to the dispute. Referring to those provisions, the Permanent Court of International Justice held in its advisory opinion concerning the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne “that the votes cast by representatives of the interested Parties do not affect the required unanimity”, and that “[t] he well-known rule that no one can be judge in his own suit holds good”. [330] A careful analysis led Professor Bin Cheng to the conclusion that the principle “undoubtedly constitutes the most elementary and essential guarantee of impartiality

3  “ The most productive time ”

503

in the administration of justice”, and that it is recognized as a general principle in international law. It is a truism that the Security Council is not a court but a political body, made up of diplomats, not of judges. It is also true that according to Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter legal disputes shall “as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice”. However, in the scheme of the Charter, which does not provide for a strict separation of powers, the Council also performs a judicial function. If parties to a dispute bring the matter before the Security Council (Article 37, paragraph 1), or if the Council decides to attend to a dispute in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1, and has to pronounce on a legal question, it cannot but apply international law. This was the definite position of the American and British delegations at Dumbarton Oaks, and it is the reason why Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter stipulates that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. It is worth remembering the statement by Senator Tom Connally, U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly, of November 15, 1946: [331] It is perfectly clear that the purpose of this [the provision just quoted] was to prevent the party [to a dispute] from being a judge in its own cause, to establish in the Charter a principle of justice which is elementary in every legal system. We would not permit a party to a lawsuit to sit as a member of the jury. President Roosevelt firmly believed that this principle constituted a very great contribution to the development of international organization. Its acceptance first at Yalta, and then at San Francisco, is a landmark. The fact that obligatory abstention was limited to these decisions only resulted from Soviet insistence on a broadly defined veto. Clearly, decisions of the Council under Chapter VII also require legal assessment. Notwithstanding the fact that so far efforts have failed comprehensively and conclusively to define the terms “threat to the peace”, “breach of the peace” and “act of aggression”, which Article 39 refers to as alternative preconditions of Council action, and while it may even be argued that such a definition would stand in the way of effective Council action, they are legal terms which the Council has to apply as such. As Professor Skubiszewski has pointed out, “the Council operates under limitations resulting from the rule of law which is an essential element of the constitution of the international community”. And, in the precise words of Professor Brownlie, “there is no dichotomy involving discretionary power and the Rule of Law. A discretion can only exist within the law and the real question relates to the ambit of and conditions attaching to the discretionary power”. Professor Lauterpacht was the first calling attention to the fact that on a number of occasions “the Security Council has framed its resolutions not in terms of directives as to conduct but in language resembling a judicial determination of the law and of the legal consequences said to flow from the conduct of the State that is arraigned”; “[i]nto this category would fall legal findings that certain conduct is ‘unlawful’ or is ‘invalid’ or ‘null and void’”. The obligations in question (such as the prohibitions of [332] Apartheid, genocide, acts of terrorism, and grave violations of human rights, rules of humanitarian law, and the right of self-determination), breaches of which the Security Council increasingly considers as threats to the peace, also require the Council to make legal determinations.

504

3  “ The most productive time ”

Therefore, the language of Judge Schwebel’s statement that the Council, as a political organ, “may take legal considerations into account but, unlike a court, [it] is not bound to apply them”, is too broad. The Nemo judex rule is a general principle of international law partly incorporated by the Charter. A Charter reform oriented to the rule of law should strive fully to realize the principle by deleting from the text of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter the words “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52”, thereby making it clear that parties to a dispute shall under no circumstances be able to vote in their own cause. “[A] body determining facts and applying legal principles with dispositive effect, even if it is not constituted as a tribunal, should observe certain standards of procedural fairness” (Ian Brownlie). Such a reform would eventually heed Hans Kelsen’s admonition of 1945: “The principle that nobody should be judge in his own case, accepted by the Covenant …, can hardly be rejected by the Charter of the new League without seriously endangering its authority in the public opinion of the world.” As explained further above, in the practice of the Council the rule requiring abstention of parties to a dispute has often been disregarded. Especially the permanent members sought to retain their right to vote, and were therefore not willing to agree on a definition of a “dispute” (as distinct from a situation) and a “party” thereto (as opposed to states merely affected by a dispute), respectively. As part of a reform of the veto power, a new effort should be made to arrive at such a generally accepted definition which would provide guidance for governments and make it less easy to circumvent the obligation set out in Article 27, paragraph 3. A good starting point would be a British proposal adopted by the Interim Committee of the General Assembly in 1948. Further, the Security Council [333] should formally approve the recommendation of the Interim Committee that the determination of the question whether a particular matter was a “dispute” or a “situation”, and the decision as to whether any member of the Council was a “party” to a dispute before the Council, be made by any seven (now nine) members of the Council. With the exception regarding the mandatory abstention from voting of parties to a dispute stated in its third paragraph, Article 27 subjects all non-procedural decisions of the Security Council to the right of veto. These decisions include: – All decisions under Chapter VI and Article 52, paragraph 3 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), – All decisions under Chapter VII, – Recommendations with respect to the admission of new members (Article 4, paragraph 2), [334] – Recommendations with respect to the suspension from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership (Article 5), – Recommendations or decisions on measures to be taken to give effect to a judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice (Article 94, paragraph 2), – Recommendations with respect to the appointment of the Secretary-General (Article 97), – Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (Article 96, paragraph 1), – Decisions with respect to the submission of reports to the General Assembly (Article 24, paragraph 3),

3  “ The most productive time ”

505

– Decisions to bring a question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security before the General Assembly (Article 11, paragraph 2), – Decisions to request the recommendation of the General Assembly concerning a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Security Council (Article 12, paragraph 1), – Decisions to request assistance from ECOSOC (Article 65), – Decisions to permit the participation of members of the UN in the discussion of any question where the Council considers that the interests of the member are specially affected (Article 31), – Decisions to invite a member state which is not a member of the Security Council, or a State not a member of the UN, which is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council to participate without vote in the discussion relating to the dispute (Article 32), – Decisions with respect to conditions for the participation of non-member states in the discussions according to Article 32, – Establishment of subsidiary organs (Article 29). Above, it has been pointed out that the granting of privileges to a state should be based on a case-by-case appraisal which pays regard to the constitutional principles we have set out on the one hand, and the position of the state in question on the other hand. However, overlooking the present scope of the veto, and taking into consideration the circle of states which can possibly lay claim to that right, the following general limitations are suggested. They would essentially confine the use of the veto to decisions under Chapter VII. We believe that their implementation would be a [335] major step in the development of the institutional law of the international community, and, at least at the present stage, be preferable to a more complicated system of weighted voting. First of all, it should no longer be possible to veto decisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI and Article 52, paragraph 3). As military force is not employed under Chapter VI, no direct demands on a state’s manpower are made by such decisions. At this stage of the constitutional development of the international community it is indispensable that an investigation and peaceful resolution of disputes can take place which is not impeded by the threat of the veto. The procedures provided for in Chapter VI also come close to judicial forms of dispute settlement; here, a unilateral veto of any one state appears to be especially out of place. Finally, a modification of the Charter in this direction would meet the original American ideas as embodied in the draft submitted to the President on December 29, 1943. In any community, the question of membership should be an affair of the entire group. Accordingly, recommendations regarding the admission of members, as well as those regarding the suspension from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership should be excluded from the veto. [336] As far as Chapter VI recommendations and resolutions with respect to admission are concerned, the two aforementioned proposals once had a powerful advocate. In a speech delivered in April 1949 before the General Assembly, the U.S. Representative to the UN recalled “that the United States is on record as favoring a liberalization of the voting procedure of the Security Council through elimination by whatever means that may be appropriate of the unanimity requirement with respect to applications for

506

3  “ The most productive time ”

membership and to matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter”. In 1948, the U.S. Representative had declared that China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States were prepared to refrain from applying the right of veto with regard to the admission of new members. As regards recommendations or decisions on measures to be taken to give effect to a judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice (Article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter), it has convincingly been argued that the applicable voting procedure has to be determined according to the operative part of a given draft resolution. If the intended measures fall within the ambit of Chapter VI of the Charter, Article 27, paragraph 3 in fine applies, and a party to a dispute must abstain from voting. If, on the other hand, the Council, to give effect to a judgment, deems it necessary to take measures of the kind provided for in Chapter VII, in particular measures involving the use of armed force, the permanent members have the right of veto. It accordance with this distinction, it is suggested that, as part of a reform of Article 27 of the Charter, the veto should be excluded in the case of recommendations of the Council according to Article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter which do not entail Chapter VII measures. Next, the veto should not be applied anymore to the recommendation for the appointment of a Secretary-General by the General Assembly. Such reform would constitute a far-reaching step because a successful work of the Secretary-General depends almost entirely on whether he or [337] she is supported by the permanent members. But, as Professor Lauterpacht has remarked, “[t]he privileged position of the Great Powers does not lend itself to extensive interpretation”. To the contrary, it has to be interpreted as narrowly as possible according to what exceptions to the principle of the equality of states can be justified with a view to the common good. To follow this line of thought means to restrict the right of veto to a small range of decisions under the Charter even if this may cause difficulties. As regards the appointment of the Secretary-General, the subjection of the recommendation to the veto has in the past not always promoted a harmonious choice, and neither did it guarantee a fruitful relationship between the Secretary-General and the permanent members during his term of office. A majority of the Security Council should also be able to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion. The Security Council has only once requested an opinion (the Namibia case). Looking for an explanation, Professor Bowett has pointed to the problematic attitude of the permanent members of the Council towards the ICJ: Two of the permanent members – the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China – have never used the Court in any contentious dispute. France, since the Nuclear Tests case, has essentially boycotted the Court. And at least since the Nicaragua case, the USA has shown some ambivalence towards it…. The Council’s preference for “political” solutions, without the benefit of the Court’s assistance on legal questions, is one of the more regrettable features of the UN’s record. The permanent members should not be allowed to prevent the Council from seeking legal advice. It seems unlikely that a majority of Council members would “abuse” such facilitated way to the Court. If, however, the ICJ is of the opinion that the question posed is not a “legal question”, or that a majority simply tries to get in the Hague what

3  “ The most productive time ”

507

it cannot achieve in New York, it may refuse to give an opinion since it is accorded a large amount of discretion by Article 65, paragraph 1 of the Statute. [338] The improvement of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly has been a major issue in the reform debate. While there are good arguments for not diluting the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the scarce opportunities which the Charter offers for interaction between the two organs in that field should not be obstructed by a use of the veto. Equally, there is no reason to subject decisions requesting assistance from ECOSOC to the veto (see Article 65). Further above, we underlined the importance of the application of standards of procedural fairness, which are direct emanations of the rule of law. The Charter itself provides, under certain circumstances, for the participation of member states, which do not sit on the Council, and non-member states in the discussions of the Council (see Articles 31 and 32). In order to ensure this participation, which is essential for the readiness of states to comply with the resolutions of the Council, the veto should not apply to the respective decisions. Eventually, a majority of the Security Council should be enabled to establish subsidiary organs (Article 29). While all the foregoing explanations deal with decisions providing for positive action by the Council, more recent practice has drawn attention to a phenomenon which has been termed the “reverse veto”. This veto “does not block the Security Council from authorizing or ordering an action but, rather, blocks it from terminating or otherwise altering an action it has already authorized or ordered”. Professor David Caron has shown that Council practice, in particular with regard to the termination of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and Iraq, “stand[s] for the proposition that Council actions must be terminated by subsequent Council action” – to which the veto applies. This practice is in line with the Charter which, not setting out any special voting procedure for a termination or modification of actions, implies that a resolution remains in force until it is revoked by the Council. [339] Considering the principles and concepts relevant to constitutional reform, which we have addressed above, there seems to be no convincing reason for this specific use of the veto. We do not see why a state should be accorded a right unilaterally to prevent the Council from terminating or modifying an action previously taken by it, provided the modification does not burden states with new obligations and responsibilities. In particular, the concept of checks and balances, understood as a means of protecting members of the international community against unconstitutional acts by the Council, cannot be referred to in the case of a decision discontinuing an action. The reverse veto is also detrimental to the Council’s effectiveness, and thereby to the achievement of the goals proclaimed by the Charter, because it tends to make more difficult an agreement on initial action of the Council. If the non-permanent members have to reckon with the fact that it will not be possible to discontinue an action against the will of just one permanent member, they will think twice before supporting a respective decision. As Professor Caron stated, “the voting procedure to terminate or modify an action influence[s] the content, and even likelihood, of the actions taken”. By the way, this remark describes well the general effect of the right of veto. For these reasons, a Charter reform should generally exclude from the scope of the veto decisions providing for a termination or modification of actions already initiated.

508

3  “ The most productive time ”

In the absence of an amendment to the Charter, the Council could agree “to incorporate in any resolution taking a decision a modified voting procedure for future use in terminating the action taken”. According to the character and significance of the action, such a clause could require different numbers of affirmative votes to terminate or modify a resolution, but not unanimity of the permanent members. Professor Caron suggests that the required number should be high so as to prevent political maneuvering by the state at which the initial resolution is directed. Alternatively, the Council may include in a resolution a clause defining the day on which the resolution will automatically cease to apply. [340] It is fully realized that the foregoing proposals, or at least some of them, will encounter firm resistance on the part of the present permanent members. They may, however, be reminded of a statement by the United States Representative to the UN of 1949: To insist on the exercise of the veto regardless of its effects on the organized international community and to reject any efforts to regulate its application under the Charter, in the light of experience, is to stand in the way of effective progress by the United Nations.

4 Momentum and deadlock: Discussions in the Open-ended Working Group after the Razali proposal, 1998-2008 4.1 Statements by UN organs and officials and Framework Documents 4.1.1 23 November 1998, UN General Assembly, Resolution 53/30, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [without reference to a Main Committee (A/53/L.46)] The General Assembly, Mindful of Chapter XVIII of the Charter of the United Nations and of the importance of reaching general agreement as referred to in resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,1 determines not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, without the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the Members of the General Assembly. 66th plenary meeting 23 November 1998 4.1.2 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/ CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex IV [9] I. Introduction In this paper, the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group has made an attempt to list proposals and issues, previously raised in the Working Group or in the General Assembly, as the members of the Bureau have understood them, regarding items 2, 3 and 4 of the programme of work: decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; and periodic review of the enlarged Security Council. The Bureau is well aware that this paper may not cover all current proposals and issues in cluster I, and that many suggestions can be added. It is the hope of the Bureau that a conference room paper of this kind, being developed as the debate in the Group moves forward, will be helpful to the efforts to identify areas where agreement may be possible; where further consultations are needed; and

1  → 3.1.2. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_005

510

4 Momentum and deadlock

where no agreement may now seem possible. It could also be seen as an instrument to engage even more delegations in the discussion of major cluster I issues. II. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council In last year’s report from the Open-ended Working Group, the following was stated under general observations: In the context of the discussion of the Working Group, the question of the enlargement of the Security Council implies the consideration of the question of the veto. The question of the veto is an issue of concern to all Member States, and has been widely commented upon during previous sessions of the Working Group. The following list of suggestions made during those sessions may facilitate references in the continued discussion of this issue: Suggested options: (1) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained as today. [oral statements] (2) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such [10] commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 1]2 (3) The permanent members of the Security Council should commit themselves, individually or collectively, not to resort to the veto during a given period of time (moratorium). [oral statements] (4) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.a]3 (5) The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XV]4 (6) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949,5 entitled “Decisions deemed procedural”, updated as necessary. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.b]6

2  1998, → 3.1.16. 3  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 4  24 August 1998, → 4.4.4.4. 5  See UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 6  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

4 Momentum and deadlock

511

(7) The following decisions have been suggested to be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III): (a) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (i) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (ii) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (iii) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; (b) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (c) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (d) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; (e) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (f) Decisions taken under Article 40 relating to provisional measures; (g) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 6]7 (8) Resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for [11] adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 7] (9) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.c]8 (10) The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 3]9 (11) The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 8] (12) Paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 9] (13) The Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 10] (14) The Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption 7  1998, → 3.1.16. 8  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 9  1998, → 3.1.16.

512

4 Momentum and deadlock

of a decision that has received the required majority. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 12] (15) The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 11] B. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council If and when it is agreed that the Council be expanded, there will also be a need to consider the number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council. That includes a consideration of whether the present action threshold of 60 per cent (9 votes out of 15) should be maintained. III. Expansion of the Security Council A. Last year’s report In last year’s report from the Open-ended Working Group, the following was stated under general observations: In order to strengthen the role and function of the Security Council, one way is to ensure a more equitable representation of the membership of the United Nations in that organ, in accordance with the sovereign equality of States and other relevant provisions of the Charter, and to make its work more transparent. [12]  A more equitable representation in the Security Council may be obtained by increasing the number of its members, taking into account the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations. The number of members of an enlarged Security Council should be from 20 to 26 as a minimum. B. Total size of the enlarged Security Council Suggested options: (1) No more than 20 to 21 members; (2) 23 to 25 members; (3) 24 members; (4) Not less than 26 members; (5) Any other option. [A/53/47, annex IX, para. 2]10 C.  Increase in the permanent membership (including issues of extension of the veto to the new permanent membership and permanent regional representation) Suggested issues: (1) Increase in permanent membership: (a) Number of new permanent seats; (b) Distribution of new permanent seats; (c) Rotational arrangements for new permanent seats; (d) Procedure for designation of new permanent seats; (e) Extension of the veto to new permanent members; (2) No increase in permanent membership. D. Increase in the non-permanent membership Suggested issues: 10  15 June 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex IX.

4 Momentum and deadlock

[13]

513

(1) Number of new non-permanent seats; (2) Distribution of new non-permanent seats; (3) Procedure for designation of new non-permanent seats.

IV. Periodic review of the enlarged Security Council A. Last year’s report In last year’s report from the Open-ended Working Group, it was stated that the scope and modalities of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council should be further considered by the Working Group. The following list of suggestions made during previous sessions may facilitate references in the continued discussion of this issue. Suggested options: (1) A periodic review could be an important element in facilitating efforts towards reaching general agreement on the issues within the mandate of the Working Group. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section A, para. 1]11 (a) The first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent periodic reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section B, para. 4] (b) One solution would be to undertake the periodic review at a time to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section B, para. 4] (c) The periodic review should automatically be included on the agenda of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section B, para. 5] (d) The review process should be concluded within two years. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section B, para. 5] (e) The scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 6] (f) The review process should also take into account the question of underrepresentation as well as over-representation of any region on the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 6] (g) In order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 7] (h) Countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 7] (i) The periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 8] 11  25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

514

4 Momentum and deadlock

(j) The veto should be discussed only during the periodic review. If the veto were to be extended to the new permanent members they would agree not to [14] exercise their right until the review takes place. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 9] (k) The time leading up to the first review could be used to prepare for a more consolidated arrangement which should include recommendations on the veto rights of the original permanent members and that of the new permanent members with a view to bridging the gap between them. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section C, para. 9] (l) The review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section D, para. 10] (2) A review process would be unnecessary. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, section A, para. 3] 4.1.3 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/ CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VI*1 [33] I. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council (1) The members of the Security Council shall make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 2]12 (2) The permanent members of the Security Council shall make statements, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 3]13 (3) The Security Council should explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 c (ii)]14 (4) The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XV]15 (5) The existing permanent members would state, individually or collectively, in writing, that they would commit themselves to exclude the use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3.b]16

12  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 13  Ibid. 14  1998, → 3.1.13. 15  See UN Doc. A/AC.274/1998/CRP.11, UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XV. For explanation of the use of bold face in this document, see original footnote 1, at the end of the document. 16  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

4 Momentum and deadlock

515

(6) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.a]17 (7) In the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, the permanent members should accompany that decision with an explanation of such action. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 4]18 (8) The introduction of an obligation for a State to explain to the General Assembly why it is vetoing a resolution would make it more difficult to do so and [34] thus bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more responsibly. [A/AC.247/2000/CRP.4]19 (9) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The permanent members should always provide a written justification whenever they exercise the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 2]20 (10) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification, which could be considered legally binding. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 2]21 (11) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. I]22 (12) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 1]23 (13) The General Assembly should adopt a declaration expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. The declaration should also contain recommendations

17  Ibid. 18  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 19  31 March 2000, → 4.4.4.8. 20  1998, → 3.1.14. 21  1998, → 3.1.16. 22  1998, → 3.1.14. 23  1998, → 3.1.16.

516

4 Momentum and deadlock

to the Council aimed at curtailing, limiting or discouraging the use of the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 5]24 (14) The General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, would make specific recommendations aimed at reducing areas where the veto can be applied. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3.a]25 (15) To discourage the use of the veto, the General Assembly should decide to urge the original permanent members of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 4.a]26 (16) The permanent members shall generally be guided by the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 194927 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 5]28 (17) The Security Council or the General Assembly should provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter). [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26.b (ii)]29 [35] (18) The Security Council or the General Assembly should update the annex to Assembly resolution 267 (III), containing a list of decisions deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26.b (i)]30 (19) General Assembly resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 7]31 (20) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III), entitled “Decisions deemed procedural”, updated as necessary. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.b]32 (21) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. A list of decisions of the Security Council deemed procedural should be developed, inter alia, through the revision of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III). [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 4]33 (22) Paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 9]34 (23) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. In lack thereof, clear criteria 24  1998, → 3.1.14. 25  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 26  1997, → 3.1.10. 27  See UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex. 28  1998, → 3.1.16. 29  1998, → 3.1.13. 30  Ibid. 31  1998, → 3.1.16. 32  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 33  1998, → 3.1.14. 34  1998, → 3.1.16.

4 Momentum and deadlock

517

as to which matters are of a procedural nature should be developed. Decisions referred to as being of a procedural nature could be based on the following criteria: (a) All decisions adopted in application of provisions that appear in the Charter under the heading “procedure”; (b) All decisions concerning the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Security Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations; (c) All decisions related to the Security Council’s internal functioning and the conduct of its business; (d) All decisions that bear a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria; (e) Certain decisions instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 4]35 (24) The following decisions have been suggested to be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III):36 (a) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (i) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (ii) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (iii) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; [36]  (b) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (c) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (d) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; (c) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (f) Decisions taken under Article 40 of the Charter relating to provisional measures; (g) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 6]37 (25) The Security Council should explore further the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26.c (i)]38 (26) The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting 35  Ibid. 36  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 37  1998, → 3.1.16. 38  1998, → 3.1.13.

518

4 Momentum and deadlock

a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 3]39 (27) A high-level working group should consider the question of the veto and submit any agreed recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as it is able, if possible prior to the adoption of Charter amendments. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 5]40 (28) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4.c]41 (29) The Charter should be amended so that Article 4, paragraph 2, and Articles 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting the application of the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 a (iv)]42 (30) Pending the ultimate elimination of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two [or three] permanent members concur in its exercise. [A/50/47, annex XV, para. IV.C.3]43 (31) Current efforts to limit the use of the veto, as stipulated in the Charter (Chapter VI), should continue to be encouraged as they reflect the consensus that is currently emerging in international relations. The number of vetoes required to block action should be increased. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 33.e]44 (32) The Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption of a decision that has received the required majority. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 12]45 (33) The Charter should be amended so that a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal that has achieved the required majority. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26.a (ii)]46 [37] (34) Time limits should be established on the right of the veto, which, by its nature, should not be perpetual. In the year 2030, approximately 85 years will have passed since the occurrence of the events that justified its creation. The permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the concept that their right to the veto cannot be eternal and should commit themselves to discussing its abolition in that year or another close to it, to be determined by mutual agreement, or should indicate the conditions required for them to accept the abolition of the veto at a given time. [A/52/47, annex XVII]47 (35) The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through 39  1998, → 3.1.16. 40  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 41  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 42  1998, → 3.1.13. 43  3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28. 44  29 September 1994, → 3.4.2.10. 45  1998, → 3.1.16. 46  1998, → 3.1.13. 47  26 June 1998, → 4.4.2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

519

amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 8]48 (36) The Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 10]49 (37) The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 11]50 (38) Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination. [A/51/47, annex XI, para. 1.4]51 (39) The exercise of the veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 6.c]52 (40) The veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 6]53 B. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council (1) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.B, para. 28]54 (2) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 20: 12; in a Council of 21: 13; in a Council of 23 or 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold could also be considered. [A/52/47, annex X, section II, para. 9;55 also in annex XI, section II, para. 1356] [38] II. Expansion of the Security Council A. Total size of the enlarged Security Council (1) There should be an increase in the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 members, based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 3.d;57 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 7;58 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 2859]

48  1998, → 3.1.16. 49  1998, → 3.1.16. 50  1998, → 3.1.16. 51  27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44. 52  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7, Annex XIII in UN Doc. A/53/47. 53  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6, Annex X in UN Doc. A/53/47. 54  1998, → 3.1.13. 55  1998, → 3.1.14. 56  1998, → 3.1.16. 57  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6, Annex X in UN Doc. A/53/47. 58  10 July 1998, → 4.3.1. 59  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14 and 3.3.37.

520

4 Momentum and deadlock

(2) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. [A/53/47, annex XIII, appendix, para. 2;60 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 261] (3) Option I: 20 Option II: 21 Option III: 23 Option IV: 24 Option V: 25 Option VI: 26 Option VII: at least 26 [A/52/47, annex XIX, section I]62 (4) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to at least 26. [A/52/47, annex XXI, appendix, para. 2]63 (5) Increase the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 24. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1.a]64 (6) The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 7]65 (7) The size of the reformed Security Council should be from 24 to 26. [A/51/47, annex IX, para. 2]66 B.  Increase in the permanent membership (including issues of extension of the veto to the new permanent membership and permanent regional representation) (1) New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as the current permanent members. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 3.a;67 also in A/52/47, annex XX, para. 3;68 also in A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 469] (2) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment or limitation of its use by the current permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 1]70 (3) The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 2] (4) Candidates for permanent membership should indicate their willingness to become new permanent members of the Security Council without the veto. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 4] [39] (5) New permanent members should agree not to exercise their veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 5] 60  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7, Annex XIII in UN Doc. A/53/47. 61  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 62  1998, → 3.1.17. 63  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 64  1997, → 3.1.10. 65  27 March 1997, → 3.3.35. 66  1997, → 3.1.12. 67  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 68  1998, → 3.1.18. 69  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 70  1998, → 3.1.18.

4 Momentum and deadlock

521

(6) Decision on the extension of the veto to the new permanent members should be taken once the new permanent members of the Security Council have been elected. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 6] (7) A high-level working group of the General Assembly should be established to consider the extent to which the veto should be extended to new permanent members. During this interim period the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto and the concurring vote of a determined number of new permanent members (for example four out of five) will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 7] (8) A high-level working group shall consider the extent to which the veto right is extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXII, para. 3] (9) During an interim period, the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto right. During that period, the concurring vote of at least four out of five new permanent members will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and are taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XXII, paras. 4-5] (10) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats. These seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of African States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the Organization of African Unity (OA U) and subsequent elements which might improve those criteria. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2.a;71 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2.a72] (11) In the case of an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, Asia should be allocated two permanent seats. These two seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of Asian States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation, the modalities for which will be discussed in the context of a working group to be established for that purpose. [A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 3]73 (12) Five new permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following patterns: (i) One from the developing States of Africa; (ii) One from the developing States of Asia; (iii) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two from industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1.b]74 (13) Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 8]75

71  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 72  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 73  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 74  1997, → 3.1.10. 75  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

522

4 Momentum and deadlock

(14) In the event of an increase in the number of permanent Security Council seats, a permanent seat with full privileges will be allocated to the Group of Arab States. [40] This seat would rotate among the Arab States in accordance with the usual practice in the League of Arab States. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4.b]76 (15) The number of permanent members should be increased by five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of permanent members by five, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (i) One to the developing States of Africa (note: OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States); (ii) One to the developing States of Asia; (iii) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two to industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 3]77 (16) Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional considerations prior to the election by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 4]78 (17) Permanent seats should be granted to Germany and Japan. The enlargement of the Council should also ensure a wider representation for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex X, section II, para. 9]79 (18) The establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundation of the United Nations. The current permanent membership of five should remain the same. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 1]80 (19) Africa should be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 34]81 (20) There should be an increase from five to ten in the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on a regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. [A/50/47, annex XI]82 (21) If the membership of the Security Council is increased to 20, two members could be permanent and three could be non-permanent with a longer term. If the 76  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 77  1997, → 3.1.12. 78  1997, → 3.1.12. 79  12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13. 80  2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26. 81  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5. 82  17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22.

4 Momentum and deadlock

523

membership is increased to 22, three members could be permanent and four could be non-permanent with a longer term, and so forth. [A/50/47, annex XI]83 (22) A new subcategory of financial permanent membership should be introduced whereby individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial contributions to the Organization’s budget. [A/50/47, annex XV, section IV.C.I, para. 23]84 (23) Two alternative models are proposed. In the first model: (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other; and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America, already included [41] under (a)). In the second model: (a) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members; the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the United States; (b) there would be three financial permanent members, including the United States. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.A, paras. 28-29]85 (24) In political and economic context, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are regions of developing countries. These three regions require permanent representation. It is also conceivable that the industrialized countries are an identifiable region. Japan and Germany are in that group. It is proposed that each developing region be allocated two seats. Each seat will clearly represent countries of the region and not purely that of a country. A regional mechanism will decide on how the seats are to be allocated. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section II, paras. 7-9]86 (25) The permanent membership should be increased by five new seats. Three new permanent seats should be for developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Two new permanent seats should be for industrialized countries. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 8]87 (26) Two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council should be created to include Germany and Japan. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, section V.A, paras. 7-8]88 C. Increase in the non-permanent membership (including the possibility of an increase, for the time being, only in this category of membership) (1) If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, only in the non-permanent category. [A/53/47,

83  Ibid. 84  3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 85  Ibid. 86  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 87  3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII. 88  11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23.

524

4 Momentum and deadlock

annex X, para. 5;89 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 10;90 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 2991] (2) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2.b;92 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2.b93] (3) Any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Group of Eastern European States by the allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXIII]94 (4) Four new non-permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from States of Africa; (ii) One from States of Asia; (iii) One from States of Eastern Europe; (iv)  One from States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex II]95 (5) In accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Group of Arab States requests the allocation to the Group of at least two nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4.a]96 [42] (6) The number of non-permanent members should be increased by four, five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of non-permanent members by four, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the States of Africa (note: in case the addition of five seats being the decision, the additional seat should be allocated to the States of Africa); (b) One to the States of Asia; (c) One to the States of Eastern Europe; (d) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex IX, part A, section II, para. 5]97 (7) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 2]98 89  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 90  10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 91  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14. 92  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7, UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 93  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 94  May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1. 95  1997, → 3.1.10. 96  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 97  1997, → 3.1.12. 98  2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26.

4 Momentum and deadlock

525

(8) Some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Organization’s purposes, should be allowed to participate more frequently as members of the Council. [A/50/47, annex VIII, para. 1]99 (9) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between 6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be legible for immediate re-election. The other 10 nonpermanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms. [A/50/47, annex XI, para. 1]100 (10) There could be nine to 11 non-permanent members. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.B, para. 31]101 (11) With eight new permanent members and five existing, and 10 existing nonpermanent members, the membership would alone total 23; and there should be seven new non-permanent members making a total of 30 members. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section IV, para. 18]102 (12) While care should be taken not to impair the efficiency of the Security Council, an enlargement of the Council by five new permanent seats as suggested should be complemented by an enlargement with a number of new nonpermanent seats in order to maintain a reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Council and to enhance further the representativity and the equitable geographical distribution of its membership. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 12]103 (13) If two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight, which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for non-permanent members could be distributed as follows: (a) Four (4) seats for States of Asia and Africa; [43]  (b) Two (2) seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; (c) One (1) seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; (d) One (1) seat for the regional group of East European countries. The creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three or four States (for a total of 24 to 32 States) would enable countries that make a substantial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities and the financing of the Organization, and countries that represent the majority of the

99  100  101  102  103 

2 8 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19. 17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII.

526

4 Momentum and deadlock

world’s population, to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, paras. 8-9]104 III. Periodic review of the enlarged Security Council (1) A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 5]105 (2) In the event that any rotational arrangements were adopted, the lists of rotating countries could be reviewed during the periodic review process. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country had managed to honour its obligations and met the increased responsibilities stemming from the rotational agreement. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 2;106 also in annex XXVI, para. 2107] (3) The first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. One solution would be to undertake the periodic review to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 4;108 also in annex XXVI, para. 4109] (4) The periodic review should automatically be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process should be concluded within two years. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 5;110 also in annex XXVI, para. 5111] (5) The scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation as well as overrepresentation of any region on the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 6;112 also in annex XXVI, para. 6113] (6) The periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 7;114 also in annex XXVI, para. 8115] (7) In order to facilitate the solution of the present reform process, the veto should be discussed only during the periodic review. In this respect two aspects 104  105  106  107  108  109  110  111  112  113  114  115 

1 1 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23. 29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

4 Momentum and deadlock

527

have been mentioned. Firstly, if the veto were to be extended to the new permanent members, they would agree not to exercise their right until the review took place. Secondly, [44] the time leading up to the first review could be used to prepare for a more consolidated arrangement, which should include recommendations on the veto rights of the original permanent members and that of the new permanent members with a view to bridging the gap between them. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 8;116 also in annex XXVI, para. 9117] (8) The review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 9;118 also in annex XXVI, para. 10119] (9) A review process would be unnecessary. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 3]120 (10) In order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would either: (a) Need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a twothirds majority of the membership of the United Nations; (b) Continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a twothirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 7]121 (11) The threshold level for decision on the extension of new permanent members should be upgraded to as near as possible to the level applied during initial elections, namely, at least the two-thirds majority of all members of the United Nations. This upgrade will be all the more necessary if periodic review is genuinely intended as a mechanism to ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in the increase of permanent membership by providing the general membership with a reasonable opportunity to replace some or all new permanent members. The upgraded level of majority required for the extension of new permanent members during the review period can be incorporated into the new provisions of the Charter to be created with respect to the periodic review of the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXVII]122 Original footnote *1 Please note that items which also appeared in document A/AC.247/2000/CRP.2 (see annex IV) are marked in bold type.

116  20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 117  25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 118  20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 119  25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 120  Ibid. 121  Ibid. 122  25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVII.

528

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.1.4 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/ CRP.2/Rev.2 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VIII [46] I. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council (1) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained as today. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)] (2) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained without amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (3) Any attempt to restrict or curtail the veto rights of the permanent members would not be conducive to the reform process. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG, referring to document S/1999/986123] (4) The proposals regarding limitations of the rights of the veto, found in the 1948 addresses to the Interim Committee by representatives of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, should be considered. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) On the basis of Article 108 of the Charter, any curtailment of the right of the veto should be made through Charter amendment. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (6) The members of the Security Council shall make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 1]124 (7) The permanent members of the Security Council shall make statements, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 2]125 (8) The Security Council should explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (c) (ii)]126 (9) The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XV]127 [47] (10) The existing permanent members would state, individually or collectively, in writing, that they would commit themselves to exclude the use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3 (b)]128 123  17 September 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/986. 124  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 125  Ibid. 126  1998, → 3.1.13. 127  24 August 1998, → 4.4.4.4. 128  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

4 Momentum and deadlock

529

(11) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (a)]129 (12) In the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, the permanent members should accompany that decision with an explanation of such action. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 4]130 (13) The introduction of an obligation for a State to explain to the General Assembly why it is vetoing a resolution would make it more difficult to do so and thus bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more responsibly. [A/AC.247 /2000/CRP.4]131 (14) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The permanent members should always provide a written justification whenever they exercise the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 2]132 (15) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification, which could be considered legally binding. [A/52/47, annex XI, section LA, para. 2]133 (16) New permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto de facto, even if they have it de jure. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (17) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 1]134 (18) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 1]135 (19) The General Assembly should adopt a declaration expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s 129  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 130  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 131  31 March 2000, → 4.4.4.8. 132  1998, → 3.1.14. 133  1998, → 3.1.16. 134  1998, → 3.1.14. 135  1998, → 3.1.16.

530

4 Momentum and deadlock

decision-making process. The declaration should also contain recommendations to the Council aimed at curtailing, limiting or discouraging the use of the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 5]136 [48] (20) The General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, would make specific recommendations aimed at reducing areas where the veto can be applied. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3.a]137 (21) To discourage the use of the veto, the General Assembly should decide to urge the original permanent members of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 4 (a)]138 (22) The permanent members shall generally be guided by the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949139 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 5]140 (23) The Security Council or the General Assembly should provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter). [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (b) (ii)]141 (24) The Security Council or the General Assembly should update the annex to Assembly resolution 267 (III), containing a list of decisions deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (b) (i)]142 (25) General Assembly resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 7]143 (26) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III), entitled “Decisions deemed procedural”, updated as necessary. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (b)]144 (27) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. A list of decisions of the Security Council deemed procedural should be developed, inter alia, through the revision of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III). [A/52/47, annex X, section 1.A, para. 4]145 (28) Paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 9]146

136  1998, → 3.1.14. 137  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 138  1997, → 3.1.10. 139  See UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 140  1998, → 3.1.16. 141  1998, → 3.1.13. 142  Ibid. 143  1998, → 3.1.16. 144  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 145  1998, → 3.1.14. 146  1998, → 3.1.16.

4 Momentum and deadlock

531

(29) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. In lack thereof, clear criteria as to which matters are of a procedural nature should be developed. Decisions referred to as being of a procedural nature could be based on the following criteria: (a) All decisions adopted in application of provisions that appear in the Charter under the heading “procedure”; (b) All decisions concerning the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Security Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations; (c) All decisions related to the Security Council’s internal functioning and the conduct of its business; (d) All decisions that bear a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria; [49]  (e) Certain decisions instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision. [A/52/47, annex XI, section LA, para. 4]147 (30) The following decisions have been suggested to be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III):148 (a) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (i) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (ii) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (iii) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; (b) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (c) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (d) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; (e) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (f) Decisions taken under Article 40 of the Charter relating to provisional measures; (g) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XI, section LA, para. 6]149 (31) The Security Council should further explore the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares. [A/52/47, annex III, section VLA, para. 26 (c) (i)]150

147  Ibid. 148  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 149  1998, → 3.1.16. 150  1998, → 3.1.13.

532

4 Momentum and deadlock

(32) The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 3]151 (33) A high-level working group should consider the question of the veto and submit any agreed recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as it is able, if possible prior to the adoption of Charter amendments. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 5]152 (34) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (c)]153 (35) The Charter should be amended so that Article 4, paragraph 2, and Articles 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting the application of the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (a) (iv)]154 (36) Pending the ultimate elimination of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two [or three] permanent members concur in its exercise. [A/50/47, annex XV, para. IV.C.3]155 [50] (37) Current efforts to limit the use of the veto, as stipulated in the Charter (Chapter VI), should continue to be encouraged as they reflect the consensus that is currently emerging in international relations. The number of vetoes required to block action should be increased. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 33 (e)]156 (38) The Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption of a decision that has received the required majority. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 12]157 (39) The Charter should be amended so that a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal that has achieved the required majority. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (a) (ii)]158 (40) Time limits should be established on the right of the veto, which, by its nature, should not be perpetual. In the year 2030, approximately 85 years will have passed since the occurrence of the events that justified its creation. The permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the concept that their right to the veto cannot be eternal and should commit themselves to discussing its abolition in that year or another close to it, to be determined by mutual agreement, or should indicate the conditions required for them to accept the abolition of the veto at a given time. [A/52/47, annex XVII]159 151  1998, → 3.1.16. 152  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 153  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 154  1998, → 3.1.13. 155  3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28. 156  29 September 1994, → 3.4.2.10. 157  1998, → 3.1.16. 158  1998, → 3.1.13. 159  26 June 1998, → 4.4.2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

533

(41) The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 8]160 (42) The Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 10]161 (43) The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XI, section B, para. 11]162 (44) Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination. [A/51/47, annex XI, para. 1.4]163 (45) The exercise of the veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 6 (c)]164 (46) The veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 6]165 (47) In the context of Article 108 of the Charter, any curtailment of the veto power necessarily entails an amendment to the Charter. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of OEWG] B. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council (1) Once agreement is reached on expanding the Council, the number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council should remain at [51] around the present action threshold of 60 per cent. The exact proportion of Council members necessary to initiate action will need to reflect the new composition of the Council. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (2) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.B, para. 28]166 (3) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 20: 12; in a Council of 21: 13; in a Council of 23 or 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold could also be considered. [A/52/47, annex X, section II, para. 9;167 also in annex XI, section II, para. 13168] 160  1998, → 3.1.16. 161  Ibid. 162  Ibid. 163  27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44. 164  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 165  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 166  1998, → 3.1.13. 167  1998, → 3.1.14. 168  1998, → 3.1.16.

534

4 Momentum and deadlock

II. Expansion of the Security Council A. Total size of the enlarged Security Council (1) There should be an increase in the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 members, based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 3 (d);169 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 7;170 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 28171] (2) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. [A/53/47, annex XIII, appendix, para. 2;172 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2173] (3) Option I: 20 Option II: 21 Option III: 22 Option IV: 23 Option V: 24 Option VI: 25 Option VII: 26 Option VIII: At least 26 [A/52/47, annex XIX, section I;174 amended in written proposal submitted during May 2000 session of OEWG] (4) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to at least 26. [A/52/47, annex XXI, appendix, para. 2]175 (5) Increase the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 24. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (a)]176 (6) The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 7]177 (7) The size of the reformed Security Council should be from 24 to 26. [A/51/47, annex IX, para. 2]178 [52] (8) The size of the reformed Security Council should include both new permanent and new non-permanent members, both from developed and developing countries. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (9) The enlargement of the Council should include representatives of both industrialized and developing countries. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (10) In case of expansion of the Council under any formula, the current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not be altered to the detriment of the non-permanent seats. [written proposal submitted during June 2000 session of OEWG]

169  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 170  10 July 1998, → 4.3.1. 171  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14 and 3.3.37. 172  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7, UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 173  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 174  1998, → 3.1.17. 175  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 176  1997, → 3.1.10. 177  27 March 1997, → 3.3.35. 178  1997, → 3.1.12.

4 Momentum and deadlock

535

B.  Increase in the permanent membership (including issues of extension of the veto to the new permanent membership and permanent regional representation) (1) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both permanent and non-permanent membership. New permanent membership should include both industrialized and developing countries. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (2) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (3) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates both from developing countries and industrialized countries. Five new permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: – One to the developing States of Africa; – One to the developing States of Asia; – One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; – Two to industrialized States. [written proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (4) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the non-permanent membership only. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG)] (5) There should be no new permanent members. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (6) There should be one permanent seat for the European Union. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (7) New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as the current permanent members. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 3 (a);179 also in A/52/47, annex XX, para. 3;180 also in A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 4181] (8) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment or limitation of its use by the current permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 1]182 [53] (9) The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 2] (10) Candidates for permanent membership should indicate their willingness to become new permanent members of the Security Council without the veto. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 4] (11) New permanent members should agree not to exercise their veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 5]

179  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 180  1998, → 3.1.18. 181  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 182  1998, → 3.1.18.

536

4 Momentum and deadlock

(12) Decision on the extension of the veto to the new permanent members should be taken once the new permanent members of the Security Council have been elected. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 6]183 (13) A high-level working group of the General Assembly should be established to consider the extent to which the veto should be extended to new permanent members. During this interim period the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto and the concurring vote of a determined number of new permanent members (for example four out of five) will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 7]184 (14) A high-level working group shall consider the extent to which the veto right is extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXII, para. 3]185 (15) During an interim period, the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto right. During that period, the concurring vote of at least four out of five new permanent members will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and are taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XXII, paras. 4 and 5]186 (16) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats. These seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of African States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequent elements which might improve those criteria. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (a);187 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (a)188] (17) In the case of an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, Asia should be allocated two permanent seats. These two seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of Asian States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation, the modalities for which will be discussed in the context of a working group to be established for that purpose. [A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 3]189 (18) Five new permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following patterns: (i) One from the developing States of Africa; (ii) One from the developing States of Asia; (iii) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two from industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (b)]190 [54] (19) Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and

183  1998, → 3.1.18. 184  Ibid. 185  22 April 1998, → 4.2.1.1.1. 186  Ibid. 187  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 188  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 189  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 190  1997, → 3.1.10.

4 Momentum and deadlock

537

Caribbean. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 8]191 (20) In the event of an increase in the number of permanent Security Council seats, a permanent seat with full privileges will be allocated to the Group of Arab States. This seat would rotate among the Arab States in accordance with the usual practice in the League of Arab States. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4 (b)]192 (21) The number of permanent members should be increased by five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of permanent members by five, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (i) One to the developing States of Africa (note: OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States); (ii) One to the developing States of Asia; (iii) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two to industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 3]193 (22) Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional considerations prior to the election by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 4]194 (23) Permanent seats should be granted to Germany and Japan. The enlargement of the Council should also ensure a wider representation for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex X, section II, para. 9]195 (24) The establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundation of the United Nations. [A more equitable solution would be to increase non-permanent seats only, preferably to rotate on a regional basis. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 1;196 amended orally during June 2000 session of OEWG]] (25) Africa should be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 34]197 (26) There should be an increase from five to 10 in the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on a regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. [A/50/47, annex XI]198 191  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 192  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 193  1997, → 3.1.12. 194  Ibid. 195  12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13. 196  2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26. 197  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5. 198  17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22.

538

4 Momentum and deadlock (27) If the membership of the Security Council is increased to 20, two members could be permanent and three could be non-permanent with a longer term. If the membership is increased to 22, three members could be permanent and four could be non-permanent with a longer term, and so forth. [A/50/47, annex XI]199 (28) A new subcategory of financial permanent membership should be introduced whereby individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial [55] contributions to the Organization’s budget. [A/50/47, annex XV, section IV.C. l, para. 23]200 (29) Two alternative models are proposed. In the first model: (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other; and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America, already included under (a). In the second model: (d) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members; the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the United States; (e) there would be three financial permanent members, including the United States. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.A, paras. 28 and 29]201 (30) In political and economic context, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are regions of developing countries. These three regions require permanent representation. It is also conceivable that the industrialized countries are an identifiable region. Japan and Germany are in that group. It is proposed that each developing region be allocated two seats. Each seat will clearly represent countries of the region and not purely that of a country. A regional mechanism will decide on how the seats are to be allocated. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section II, paras. 7-9]202 (31) The permanent membership should be increased by five new seats. Three new permanent seats should be for developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Two new permanent seats should be for industrialized countries. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 8]203 (32) Two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council should be created to include Germany and Japan. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, section V.A, paras. 7 and 8]204 (33) The question of the possible extension of the veto to any new permanent members of the Security Council should be considered at the end of the process of agreeing the reform package. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (34) Any proposal to establish new permanent members based upon the criteria of “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” or “developing countries”

199  Ibid. 200  3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 201  3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 202  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 203  3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19, UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII. 204  11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23.

4 Momentum and deadlock

539

should clearly and unequivocally provide a definition for such notion. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after June 2000 session of OEWG] C. Increase in the non-permanent membership (including the possibility of an increase, for the time being, only in this category of membership) (1) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates both from developing countries and industrialized countries. Four new non-permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: – One to States of Africa; – One to States of Asia; [56] – One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean; – One to States of Eastern Europe. [written proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (2) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (3) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the non-permanent membership only. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (4) When additional non-permanent seats are distributed, no national or regional group should be discriminated against [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat in the reformed Security Council. [written proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (6) If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, only in the non-permanent category. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 5;205 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 10;206 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 29207] (7) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (b);208 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (b)209] (8) Any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Group of Eastern European States by the allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXIII]210 (9) Four new non-permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from States of Africa; (ii) One from States of Asia; 205  206  207  208  209  210 

2 8 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14. 29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1.

540

4 Momentum and deadlock

(iii) One from States of Eastern Europe; (iv)  One from States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex II]211 (10) In accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Group of Arab States requests the allocation to the Group of at least two nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4.a]212 (11) The number of non-permanent members should be increased by four, five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of non-permanent members by four, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the States of Africa (note: in case the addition of five seats being the decision, the additional seat should be allocated to the States of Africa); (b) One to the States of Asia; (c) One to the States of Eastern Europe; [57] (d) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex IX, part A, section II, para. 5]213 (12) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 2]214 (13) Some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Organization’s purposes, should be allowed to participate more frequently as members of the Council. [A/50/47, annex VIII, para. 1]215 (14) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between 6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate reelection at the end of their terms. [A/50/47, annex XI, para. 1]216 (15) There could be nine to 11 non-permanent members. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.B, para. 31] (16) With eight new permanent members and five existing, and 10 existing nonpermanent members, the membership would alone total 23; and there should be seven new non-permanent members making a total of 30 members. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section IV, para. 18]217 211  1997, → 3.1.10. 212  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 213  1997, → 3.1.12. 214  2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26. 215  28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19. 216  17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 217  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19.

4 Momentum and deadlock

541

(17) While care should be taken not to impair the efficiency of the Security Council, an enlargement of the Council by five new permanent seats as suggested should be complemented by an enlargement with a number of new nonpermanent seats in order to maintain a reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Council and to enhance further the representativity and the equitable geographical distribution of its membership. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 12]218 (18) If two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight, which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for nonpermanent members could be distributed as follows: (a) Four (4) seats for States of Asia and Africa; (b) Two (2) seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; (c) One (1) seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; (d) One (1) seat for the regional group of East European countries. The creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three or four States (for a total of 24 to 32 States), would enable countries that make a [58] substantial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities and the financing of the Organization, and countries that represent the majority of the world’s population, to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, paras. 8 and 9]219 (19) No new individual permanent seats such as those established in 1945 should be created because they are contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of States. For the time being, the increase should take place only in the non-permanent category or by means of regional rotation modalities as agreed by consensus by the respective regional groups. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of OEWG] III. Periodic review of the enlarged Security Council (1) A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 5]220 (2) A review process would be unnecessary. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 3]221 (3) The issue of periodic review is premature until the matter of reforming the Security Council is resolved. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (4) A review process would not be necessary as long as any new permanent members are not added to the Security Council. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (5) In the event that any rotational arrangements were adopted, the lists of rotating countries could be reviewed during the periodic review process. The 218  219  220  221 

3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII. 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23. 29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

542

4 Momentum and deadlock assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country had managed to honour its obligations and met the increased responsibilities stemming from the rotational agreement. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 2;222 also in annex XXVI, para. 2223] (6) The first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. One solution would be to undertake the periodic review to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 4;224 also in annex XXVI, para. 4225] (7) The issues within the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group should be subject to periodic review, which should take place every 10 to 15 years. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (8) The periodic review should automatically be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process should be concluded within two years. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 5;226 also in annex XXVI, para. 5227] (9) The scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation as well as over-representation of any [59] region on the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 6;228 also in annex XXVI, para. 6229] (10) The periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 7;230 also in annex XXVI, para. 8231] (11) In order to facilitate the solution of the present reform process, the veto should be discussed only during the periodic review. In this respect two aspects have been mentioned. Firstly, if the veto were to be extended to the new permanent members, they would agree not to exercise their right until the review took place. Secondly, the time leading up to the first review could be used to prepare for a more consolidated arrangement, which should include recommendations on the veto rights of the original permanent members and that of the new permanent members with a view to bridging the gap between them. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 8;232 also in annex XXVI, para. 9233]

222  223  224  225  226  227  228  229  230  231  232  233 

2 0 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

4 Momentum and deadlock

543

(12) The review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 9;234 also in annex XXVI, para. 10235] (13) In order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would either: (a) Need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations; (b) Continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a twothirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 7]236 (14) The threshold level for decision on the extension of new permanent members should be upgraded to as near as possible to the level applied during initial elections, namely, at least the two-thirds majority of all members of the United Nations. This upgrade will be all the more necessary if periodic review is genuinely intended as a mechanism to ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in the increase of permanent membership by providing the general membership with a reasonable opportunity to replace some or all new permanent members. The upgraded level of majority required for the extension of new permanent members during the review period can be incorporated into the new provisions of the Charter to be created with respect to the periodic review of the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXVII]237 4.1.5 2000, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto; expansion of the Security Council; periodic review of the enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/ CRP.2/Rev.3 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex XI*1 [82] I. Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council (a) Proposals not necessarily requiring Charter amendment (1) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained as today. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)] (2) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained without amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (3) Any attempt to restrict or curtail the veto rights of the permanent members would not be conducive to the reform process. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG, referring to document S/1999/996238] (4) The proposals regarding limitations of the rights of the veto, found in the 1948 documents to the Interim Committee by representatives of China (A/AC. 18/13),239 234  235  236  237  238  239 

2 0 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVII. 23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. 14 January 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/13.

544

4 Momentum and deadlock

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.18/17),240 and the United States of America (A/AC.18/41),241 should be considered. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) New permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto de facto, even if they have it de jure. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (6) The introduction of an obligation for a State to explain to the General Assembly why it is vetoing a resolution would make it more difficult to do so and thus bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more responsibly. [A/AC.247/2000/CRP.4]242 (7) The Security Council or the General Assembly should update the annex to Assembly resolution 267 (III),243 containing a list of decisions deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (b) (i)]244 (8) The Security Council or the General Assembly should provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter). [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (b) (ii)] (9) The Security Council should further explore the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (c) (i)] [83] (10) The Security Council should explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (c) (ii)] (11) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 1]245 (12) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The permanent members should always provide a written justification whenever they exercise the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 2] (13) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. A list of decisions of the Security Council deemed procedural should be developed, inter alia, through the revision of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III). [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 4] (14) The General Assembly should adopt a declaration expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. The declaration should also contain recommendations 240  10 February 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/17. 241  10 March 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/41 Corr.1. 242  31 March 2000, → 4.4.4.8. 243  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 244  1998, → 3.1.13. 245  1998, → 3.1.14.

4 Momentum and deadlock

545

to the Council aimed at curtailing, limiting or discouraging the use of the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, section I.A, para. 5] (15) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 1]246 (16) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification, which could be considered legally binding. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 2] (17) The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 3] (18) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. In lack thereof, clear criteria as to which matters are of a procedural nature should be developed. Decisions referred to as being of a procedural nature could be based on the following criteria: (a) All decisions adopted in application of provisions that appear in the Charter under the heading “procedure”; [84]  (b) All decisions concerning the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Security Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations; (c) All decisions related to the Security Council’s internal functioning and the conduct of its business; (d) All decisions that bear a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria; (e) Certain decisions instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 4]247 (19) The permanent members shall generally be guided by the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 5]248 (20) The following decisions have been suggested to be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III):249

246  1998, → 3.1.16. 247  1998, → 3.1.16. 248  Ibid. 249  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1.

546

4 Momentum and deadlock

(a) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (i) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (ii) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (iii) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; (b) Decisions to call upon the parties· to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (c) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (d) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; (e) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (f) Decisions taken under Article 40 of the Charter relating to provisional measures; (g) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 6]250 (21) General Assembly resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.A, para. 7]251 (22) The members of the Security Council shall make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 1]252 [85] (23) The permanent members of the Security Council shall make statements, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 2] (24) In the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, the permanent members should accompany that decision with an explanation of such action. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 4] (25) A high-level working group should consider the question of the veto and submit any agreed recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as it is able, if possible prior to the adoption of Charter amendments. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 5] (26) The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XV]253

250  1998, → 3.1.16. 251  Ibid. 252  21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1. 253  24 August 1998, → 4.4.4.4.

4 Momentum and deadlock

547

(27) The General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, would make specific recommendations aimed at reducing areas where the veto can be applied. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3 (a)]254 (28) The existing permanent members would state, individually or collectively, in writing, that they would commit themselves to exclude the use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3 (b)] (29) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (a)] (30) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III), entitled “Decisions deemed procedural”, updated as necessary. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (b)] (31) To discourage the use of the veto, the General Assembly should decide to urge the original permanent members of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 4 (a)]255 (b) Proposals requiring Charter amendment (1) The exercise of the veto could be confirmed by two thirds of the vote of the members of the General Assembly. [oral proposal at July 2000 session of OEWG] (2) The veto should be completely eliminated [oral proposal at July 2000 session of OEWG] (3) In the context of Article 103 of the Charter, any curtailment of the veto power necessarily entails an amendment to the Charter. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of OEWG] [86] (4) The veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 6]256 (5) The exercise of the veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 6 (c)]257 (6) The Charter should be amended so that a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal that has achieved the required majority. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (a) (ii)]258 (7) The Charter should be amended so that Article 4, paragraph 2, and Articles 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting the application of the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.A, para. 26 (a) (iv)]259 (8) The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through 254  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 255  1997, → 3.1.10. 256  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 257  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 258  1998, → 3.1.13. 259  Ibid.

548

4 Momentum and deadlock

amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 8]260 (9) Paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. [A/52/47, annex XI, section L.B, para. 9)] (10) The Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 10] (11) The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XI, section L.B, para. 11] (12) The Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption of a decision that has received the required majority. [A/52/47, annex XI, section I.B, para. 12] (13) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (c)]261 (14) Time limits should be established on the right of the veto, which, by its nature, should not be perpetual. In the year 2030, approximately 85 years will have passed since the occurrence of the events that justified its creation. The permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the concept that their right to the veto cannot be eternal and should commit themselves to discussing its abolition in that year or another close to it, to be determined by mutual agreement, or should indicate the conditions required for them to accept the abolition of the veto at a given time. [A/52/47, annex XVII]262 (15) Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination. [A/51/47, annex XI, para. 1.4]263 (16) Current efforts to limit the use of the veto, as stipulated in the Charter (Chapter VI), should continue to be encouraged as they reflect the consensus that is currently emerging in international relations. The number of vetoes required to block action should be increased. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 33 (e)]264 [87] (17) Pending the ultimate elimination of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two [or three] permanent members concur in its exercise. [A/50/47, annex XV, para. IV.C.3]265 B. The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Security Council (1) Once agreement is reached on expanding the Security Council, the number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Council should remain at around the present action threshold of 60 per cent. The exact proportion of Council members necessary to initiate action will need to reflect the new composition of the Council. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] 260  1998, → 3.1.16. 261  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 262  26 June 1998, → 4.4.2.1. 263  27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44. 264  29 September 1994, → 3.4.2.10. 265  3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28.

4 Momentum and deadlock

549

(2) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. [A/52/47, annex III, section VI.B, para. 28]266 (3) If the present action threshold is maintained at approximately the present level (60 per cent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 20: 12; in a Council of 21: 13; in a Council of 23 or 24: 14; in a Council of 25: 15; and in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold could also be considered. [A/52/47, annex X, section II, para. 9;267 also in annex XI, section II, para. 13268] II. Expansion of the Security Council A. Total size of the enlarged Security Council (1) The size of the reformed Security Council should enable the inclusion of both new permanent and new non-permanent members, both from developed and developing countries. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG; amended at July 2000 session of OEWG] (2) The size of the reformed Security Council should only include new nonpermanent members based on the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution. [oral proposal at July 2000 session of OEWG] (3) In case of expansion of the Council under any formula, the current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not be altered to the detriment of the non-permanent seats. [written proposal submitted during June 2000 session of OEWG] (4) Option I: 20 Option II: 21 Option III: 22 Option IV: 23 Option V: 24 Option VI: 25 [88] Option VII:  26  Option VIII: At least 26 [A/52/47, annex XIX, section I;269 amended in written proposal submitted during May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) There should be an increase in the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 members, based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 3 (d);270 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 7;271 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 28272]

266  1998, → 3.1.13. 267  1998, → 3.1.14. 268  1998, → 3.1.16. 269  1998, → 3.1.17. 270  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 271  10 July 1998, → 4.3.1. 272  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14 and 3.3.37.

550

4 Momentum and deadlock

(6) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. [A/53/47, annex XIII, appendix, para. 2;273 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2274] (7) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to at least 26. [A/52/47, annex XXI, appendix, para. 2]275 (8) Increase the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 24. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (a)]276 (9) The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 7]277 (10) The size of the reformed Security Council should be from 24 to 26. [A/51/47, annex IX, para. 2]278 B.  Increase in the permanent membership (including issues of extension of the veto to the new permanent membership and permanent regional representation) (1) Any proposal to establish new permanent members based upon the criteria of “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” or “developing countries” should clearly and unequivocally provide a definition for such notions. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after June 2000 session of OEWG] (2) There should be no new permanent members. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (3) There should be one permanent seat for the European Union. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (4) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both permanent and non-permanent membership. New permanent membership should include both industrialized and developing countries. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (6) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates both from developing countries and industrialized countries. Five new permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: – One to the developing States of Africa; [89] – One to the developing States of Asia; – One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean;  – Two to industrialized States. [written proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (7) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the non-permanent membership only. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] 273  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 274  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 275  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 276  1997, → 3.1.10. 277  27 March 1997, → 3.3.35. 278  1997, → 3.1.12.

4 Momentum and deadlock

551

(8) The question of the possible extension of the veto to any new permanent members of the Security Council should be considered at the end of the process of agreeing the reform package. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (9) The enlargement of the Council should include representatives of both industrialized and developing countries. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (10) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats. These seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of African States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequent elements which might improve those criteria. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (a);279 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (a)280] (11) New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as the current permanent members. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 3 (a);281 also in A/52/47, annex XX, para. 3;282 also in A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 4283] (12) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment or limitation of its use by the current permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 1]284 (13) The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 2] (14) Candidates for permanent membership should indicate their willingness to become new permanent members of the Security Council without the veto. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 4] (15) New permanent members should agree not to exercise their veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 5] (16) Decision on the extension of the veto to the new permanent members should be taken once the new permanent members of the Security Council have been elected. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 6] (17) A high-level working group of the General Assembly should be established to consider the extent to which the veto should be extended to new permanent members. During this interim period the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto and the concurring vote of a determined number of new permanent members (for example four out of five) will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XX, para. 7] [90] (18) In the case of an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, Asia should be allocated two permanent seats. These two seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of Asian States itself, in accordance 279  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 280  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 281  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 282  1998, → 3.1.18. 283  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 284  1998, → 3.1.18.

552

4 Momentum and deadlock with a system of rotation, the modalities for which will be discussed in the context of a working group to be established for that purpose. [A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 3]285 (19) A high-level working group shall consider the extent to which the veto right is extended to new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXII, para. 3]286 (20) During an interim period, the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto right. During that period, the concurring vote of at least four out of five new permanent members will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and are taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XXII, paras. 4 and 5]287 (21) Five new permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following patterns: (i) One from the developing States of Africa; (ii) One from the developing States of Asia; (iii) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two from industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (b)]288 (22) Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates· for permanent seats. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 8)]289 (23) In the event of an increase in the number of permanent Security Council seats, a permanent seat with full privileges will be allocated to the Group of Arab States. This seat would rotate among the Arab States in accordance with the usual practice in the League of Arab States. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4 (b)]290 (24) The number of permanent members should be increased by five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of permanent members by five, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (i) One to the developing States of Africa (note: OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States); (ii) One to the developing States of Asia; (iii) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) Two to industrialized States. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 3]291 (25) Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional considerations prior to the election by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex IX, section II, para. 4]292

285  27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 286  22 April 1998, → 4.2.1.1.1. 287  Ibid. 288  1997, → 3.1.10. 289  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 290  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 291  1997, → 3.1.12. 292  1997, → 3.1.12.

4 Momentum and deadlock

553

(26) Permanent seats should be granted to Germany and Japan. The enlargement of the Council should also ensure a wider representation for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex X, section II, para. 9]293 [91] (27) The establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundation of the United Nations. [A more equitable solution would be to increase non-permanent seats only, preferably to rotate on a regional basis. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 1;294 amended orally during June 2000 session of OEWG] (28) Africa should be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 34]295 (29) There should be an increase from five to 10 in the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on a regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. [A/50/47, annex XI]296 (30) If the membership of the Security Council is increased to 20, two members could be permanent and three could be non-permanent with a longer term. If the membership is increased to 22, three members could be permanent and four could be non-permanent with a longer term, and so forth. [A/50/47, annex XI]297 (31) A new subcategory of financial permanent membership should be introduced whereby individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial contributions to the Organization’s budget. [A/50/47, annex XV, section IV.C.I, para. 23]298 (32) Two alternative models are proposed. In the first model: (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other; and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America, already included under (a)). In the second model: (d) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members; the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the United States; (e) there would be three financial permanent members, including the United States. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.A, paras. 28 and 29]299 293  12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13. 294  2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26. 295  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5. 296  17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 297  Ibid. 298  3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 299  Ibid.

554

4 Momentum and deadlock

(33) In political and economic context, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are regions of developing countries. These three regions require permanent representation. It is also conceivable that the industrialized countries are an identifiable region. Japan and Germany are in that group. It is proposed that each developing region be allocated two seats. Each seat will clearly represent countries of the region and not purely that of a country. A regional mechanism will decide on how the seats are to be allocated. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section II, paras. 7-9]300 (34) The permanent membership should be increased by five new seats. Three new permanent seats should be for developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Two new permanent seats should be for industrialized countries. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 8]301 [92] (35) Two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council should be created to include Germany and Japan. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, section V.A, paras. 7 and 8]302 C. Increase in the non-permanent membership (including the possibility of an increase, for the time being, only in this category of membership) (1) No new individual permanent seats such as those established in 1945 should be created because they are contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of States. For the time being, the increase should take place only in the non-permanent category or by means of regional rotation modalities as agreed by consensus by the respective regional groups. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of OEWG] (2) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates both from developing countries and industrialized countries. Four new non-permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: – One to States of Africa; – One to States of Asia; – One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean; – One to States of Eastern Europe. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (3) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (4) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the non-permanent membership only. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG] (5) When additional non-permanent seats are distributed, no national or regional group should be discriminated against. [oral proposal at May 2000 session of OEWG]

300  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 301  3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII. 302  11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23.

4 Momentum and deadlock

555

(6) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat in the reformed Security Council. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (7) If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, only in the non-permanent category. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 5;303 also in A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 10;304 also in A/51/47, annex XI, para. 29305] (8) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (b);306 also in A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (b)307] (9) Any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Group of Eastern European States by the [93] allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXIII]308 (10) Four new non-permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from States of Africa; (ii) One from States of Asia; (iii) One from States of Eastern Europe; (iv) One from States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex II]309 (11) In accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Group of Arab States requests the allocation to the Group of at least two nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. [A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, section A, para. 4.a]310 (12) The number of non-permanent members should be increased by four, five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of non-permanent members by four, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the States of Africa (note: in case the addition of five seats being the decision, the additional seat should be allocated to the States of Africa); (b) One to the States of Asia; (c) One to the States of Eastern Europe; (d) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [A/51/47, annex IX, part A, section II, para. 5]311 (13) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, 303  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 304  10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 305  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14. 306  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 307  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29. 308  May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1. 309  1997, → 3.1.10. 310  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 311  1997, → 3.1.12.

556

4 Momentum and deadlock should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly. [A/51/47, annex XIII, section 2]312 (14) Some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Organization’s purposes, should be allowed to participate more frequently as members of the Council. [A/50/47, annex VIII, para. 1]313 (15) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between 6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate reelection at the end of their terms. [A/50/47, annex XI, para. 1]314 (16) There could be nine to 11 non-permanent members. [A/50/47, annex XV, section V.B, para. 31]315 (17) With eight new permanent members and five existing, and 10 existing nonpermanent members, the membership would alone total 23; and there should be [94] seven new non-permanent members making a total of 30 members. [A/50/47, annex XVI, section IV, para. 18]316 (18) While care should be taken not to impair the efficiency of the Security Council, an enlargement of the Council by five new permanent seats as suggested should be complemented by an enlargement with a number of new nonpermanent seats in order to maintain a reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Council and to enhance further the representativity and the equitable geographical distribution of its membership. [A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 12]317 (19) If two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight, which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for non-permanent members could be distributed as follows: (a) Four (4) seats for States of Asia and Africa; (b) Two (2) seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; (c) One (1) seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; (d) One (1) seat for the regional group of East European countries. The creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three or four States (for a total of 24 to 32 States), would enable countries that make a substantial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities and the financing of the Organization, and countries that represent the majority of the

312  313  314  315  316  317 

2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26. 28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19. 17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII.

4 Momentum and deadlock

557

world’s population, to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. [A/50/47, annex XVIII, paras. 8 and 9]318 III. Periodic review of the enlarged Security Council (1) The issue of periodic review is premature until the matter of reforming the Security Council is resolved. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (2) A review process would not be necessary as long as any new permanent members are not added to the Security Council. [oral proposal at June 2000 session of OEWG] (3) The issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group should be subject to periodic review, which should take place every 10 to 15 years. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau during May 2000 session of OEWG] (4) A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 5]319 (5) In the event that any rotational arrangements were adopted, the lists of rotating countries could be reviewed during the periodic review process. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country had managed to honour [95] its obligations and met the increased responsibilities stemming from the rotational agreement. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 2;320 also in annex XXVI, para. 2321] (6) The first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. One solution would be to undertake the periodic review to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 4;322 also in annex XXVI, para. 4323] (7) The periodic review should automatically be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process should be concluded within two years. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 5;324 also in annex XXVI, para. 5325] (8) The scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation as well as over-representation of any region on the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 6;326 also in annex XXVI, para. 6327] 318  319  320  321  322  323  324  325  326  327 

1 1 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23. 29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

558

4 Momentum and deadlock (9) The periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 7;328 also in annex XXVI, para. 8329] (10) In order to facilitate the solution of the present reform process, the veto should be discussed only during the periodic review. In this respect two aspects have been mentioned. Firstly, if the veto were to be extended to the new permanent members, they would agree not to exercise their right until the review took place. Secondly, the time leading up to the first review could be used to prepare for a more consolidated arrangement, which should include recommendations on the veto rights of the original permanent members and that of the new permanent members with a view to bridging the gap between them. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 8;330 also in annex XXVI, para. 9331] (11) The review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members. [A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 9;332 also in annex XXVI, para. 10333] (12) A review process would be unnecessary. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 3]334 (13) In order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would either: (a) Need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations; (b) Continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a twothirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 7]335 (14) The threshold level for decision on the extension of new permanent members should be upgraded to as near as possible to the level applied during initial elections, namely, at least the two-thirds majority of all members of the United Nations. This upgrade will be all the more necessary if periodic review is genuinely intended as a mechanism to ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in the [96] increase of permanent membership by providing the general membership with a reasonable opportunity to replace some or all new permanent members. The upgraded level of majority required for the extension of new permanent members during the review period can be incorporated into the new provisions of the Charter to be created with respect to the periodic review of the enlarged Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XXVII]336

328  329  330  331  332  333  334  335  336 

2 0 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVII.

4 Momentum and deadlock

559

Original footnote *1 The order of the proposals in this paper does not signify any priority, preference or importance. 4.1.6  8 September 2000, UN General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration I. Values and principles 1. We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, at the dawn of a new millennium, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. 2. […] 3. We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which have proved timeless and universal. Indeed, their relevance and capacity to inspire have increased, as nations and peoples have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent. […] VIII. Strengthening the United Nations 29. We will spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for pursuing all of these priorities: the fight for development for all the peoples of the world, the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease; the fight against injustice; the fight against violence, terror and crime; and the fight against the degradation and destruction of our common home. 30. We resolve therefore: […] – To intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects. […] 4.1.7 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council: The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex IV [9] Introduction In the programme of work adopted by the Open-ended Working Group on 5 February 2001, “Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto” is the first item to be discussed under cluster I issues. The issue of the veto as a voting instrument is one of the questions the Working Group needs to address in order to facilitate the process of reaching general agreement. To facilitate discussion in the Working Group, the Bureau intends to submit conference room papers on issues to be discussed under clusters I and II. The present document is the first of these papers. In order to build on the work done during previous sessions, it is based on annex XI, section A (a), of document A/54/47.337 This paper does not, for the time being, deal with proposals requiring Charter amendment 337  → 4.1.5.

560

4 Momentum and deadlock

as presented in section (b) of the above-mentioned annex XI. This does not in any way preclude their being discussed at a later stage. The Bureau suggests that the discussion focus on the principal elements in the suggestions, as laid out in section III of the paper. I. Suggestions, with reference to the veto, in annex XI to the report of the Open-ended Working Group of 25 July 2000 (A/54/47),338 that would not require amendment of the Charter […] [13] […] II. Grouping of suggestions according to their similarities A. Suggestions intended to leave the veto in its present form Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of Annex XI (A (a)): (1) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained as today. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (2) The veto as a voting instrument should be maintained without amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Working Group] (3) Any attempt to restrict or curtail the veto rights of the permanent members would not be conducive to the reform process. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Working Group, referring to document S/1999/996339] B. Suggestions intended to preclude or limit exercise of the veto Suggestions relating to the scope of the veto (A) What constitutes “procedural” matters, in terms of Article 27, paragraph (2), of the Charter, should be established by an updating of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III)340 and should be applied by the Security Council. Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (7) The Security Council or the General Assembly should update the annex to Assembly resolution 267 (III), containing a list of decisions deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (b) (i)]341 (8) The Security Council or the General Assembly should provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Article 27, para. 2, of the Charter). [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (b) (ii)]342 (13) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in the decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. A list of decisions of the [14] Security Council deemed procedural should be developed, inter alia, through the revision of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III). [A/52/47, annex X, sect. I.A, para. 4]343

338  → 4.1.5. 339  23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. 340  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1. 341  → 3.1.13. 342  → 3.1.13. 343  → 3.1.14.

4 Momentum and deadlock

561

(18) A legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter in decisionmaking of the Security Council should be formulated. In lack thereof, clear criteria as to which matters are of a procedural nature should be developed. Decisions referred to as being of a procedural nature could be based on the following criteria: (a) All decisions adopted in application of provisions that appear in the Charter under the heading “procedure”; (b) All decisions concerning the relationship between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, or by which the Security Council seeks the assistance of other organs of the United Nations; (c) All decisions related to the Security Council’s internal functioning and the conduct of its business; (d) All decisions that bear a close analogy to decisions included under the above-mentioned criteria; (e) Certain decisions instrumental in arriving at or in following up a procedural decision. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 4]344 (19) The permanent members shall generally be guided by the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 5]345 (20) The following decisions have been suggested to be deemed procedural, in addition to those contained in the annex to resolution 267 (III): (f) All decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, including: (iv) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to resort to peaceful means of conflict resolution; (v) Decisions on mediation efforts and measures of preventive diplomacy; (vi) Decisions calling for gathering of information or for the dispatch of observers to ascertain facts; (g) Decisions to call upon the parties to a conflict to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law; (h) Decisions on procedural matters related to consultations with troopcontributing countries; (i) Decisions on the timing and modalities of submitting the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; (j) Recommendations of the Security Council made in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter; (k) Decisions taken under Article 40 of the Charter relating to provisional measures; [15] (l) Decisions adopted on the basis of implementing Article 50 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 6]346

344  → 3.1.16. 345  → 3.1.16. 346  → 3.1.16.

562











4 Momentum and deadlock (21) General Assembly resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 7]347 (30) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III), entitled “Decisions deemed procedural”, updated as necessary. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (b)]348 (B) Permanent members of the Security Council should commit themselves not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. The General Assembly should urge permanent members not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (11) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex X, sect. I.A, para. 1]349 (15) The permanent members of the Security Council, collectively or individually, should commit themselves, in a legally binding manner, not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use beyond actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such commitments should be incorporated into the rules of procedure of the Security Council. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 1]350 (31) To discourage the use of the veto, the General Assembly should decide to urge the original permanent members of the Security Council to limit the exercise of their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex II, para. 4 (a)]351 Other suggestions (A) Permanent members of the Security Council should make a unilateral or collective commitment not to resort to the veto. Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (5) New permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto de facto, even if they have it de jure. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Working Group] (10) The Security Council should explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (c) (ii)]352 (B) If a veto is cast, there should be an explanation of the reasons for the veto.

[16]  If a veto is cast, an explanation of the reasons for the veto should be provided to the General Assembly. 347  → 3.1.16. 348  → 4.4.4.3. 349  → 3.1.14. 350  → 3.1.16. 351  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.5 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex II. 352  → 3.1.13.

4 Momentum and deadlock

563

Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (6) The introduction of an obligation for a State to explain to the General Assembly why it is vetoing a resolution would make it more difficult to do so and thus bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more responsibly. [A/AC.247/2000/CRP.4]353 (12) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The permanent members should always provide a written justification whenever they exercise the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, sect. I.A, para. 2]354 (16) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification, which could be considered legally binding. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 2]355 (24) In the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, the permanent members should accompany that decision with an explanation of such action. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 4]356 (C) Permanent members of the Security Council should exercise restraint in resorting to the veto, i.e.:  Every endeavour should be made to arrive at consensus decisions in the Security Council so that the veto need not be used  A veto should be exercised only when the question is of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole  If a veto is used, a written explanation of the reason for the veto should be given and also provided to the General Assembly Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (16) The permanent members of the Security Council should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter and in accordance with the norms of international law. The veto should be exercised only when permanent members consider the question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole. To state upon what factual and legal ground the permanent members consider this condition to be present, they should always provide a written justification, which could be considered legally binding. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 2]357

• • •

353  → 4.4.4.8. 354  → 3.1.14. 355  → 3.1.16. 356  → 4.4.4.1. 357  → 3.1.16.

564

4 Momentum and deadlock

(26) The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General [17] Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XV]358 (29) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (a)]359 Suggestions of a more general nature Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI (A (a)): (4) The proposals regarding limitation of the rights of the veto, found in the 1948 documents submitted to the Interim Committee by representatives of China (A/AC.18/13),360 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.18/17)361 and the United States of America (A/AC.18/41),362 should be considered. [Oral proposal at May 2000 session of the Working Group] (9) The Security Council should further explore the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares. [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (c) (i)]363 (14) The General Assembly should adopt a declaration expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. The declaration should also contain recommendations to the Council aimed at curtailing, limiting or discouraging the use of the veto. [A/52/47, annex X, sect. I.A, para. 5]364 (17) The Security Council should introduce a practice whereby a permanent member would be able to cast a negative vote without such a vote constituting a veto when the member so declares. This would be similar to the current practice concerning the abstention, non-participation or absence of a permanent member in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 3]365 (22) General Assembly resolution 267 (III), with its updated annex and any agreed additional decisions deemed procedural, should be recommended 358  → 4.4.4.4. 359  → 4.4.4.3. 360  14 January 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/13. 361  10 February 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/17. 362  10 March 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.18/41 Corr. 1. 363  → 3.1.13. 364  → 3.1.14. 365  → 3.1.16.

4 Momentum and deadlock

565

to the Security Council for adoption and incorporation into its rules of procedure. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.A, para. 7]366 (23) The members of the Security Council shall make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 1]367 (25) A high-level working group should consider the question of the veto and submit any agreed recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as it is able, if possible prior to the adoption of Charter amendments. [A/52/47, annex XIV, para. 5]368 [18] (27) The General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, would make specific recommendations aimed at reducing areas where the veto can be applied. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3 (a)]369 (28) The existing permanent members would state, individually or collectively, in writing, that they would commit themselves to exclude the use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 3 (b)]370 III. Principal elements in the suggestions A. Suggestions intended to leave the veto in its present form The veto in its present form should be maintained. B. Suggestions intended to preclude or limit exercise of the veto Suggestions relating to the scope of the veto (a) What constitutes “procedural” matters, in terms of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter, should be established by an updating of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) and should be applied by the Security Council. (b) Permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. (c) The General Assembly should urge permanent members not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. Other suggestions (a) Permanent members of the Security Council should make unilateral or collective commitments not to use the veto. (b) Permanent members of the Security Council should exercise restraint in resorting to the veto, i.e.: Every endeavour should be made to arrive at consensus decisions in the Security Council so that the veto need not be used A veto should only be exercised when the question is of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole If a veto is used, a written explanation of the reason for the veto should be given and also provided to the General Assembly

• • •

366  → 3.1.16. 367  → 4.4.4.1. 368  → 4.4.4.1. 369  → 4.4.4.3. 370  → 4.4.4.3.

566

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.1.8 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Decision-making in the Security Council: The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, Addendum, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex V [19] I. Suggestions with reference to the veto, in annex XI to the report of the Open-ended Working Group of 25 July 2000 (A/54/47),371 that would require amendment of the Charter […] [20] […] II. Grouping of suggestions according to their similarities A. Suggestion that the veto be eliminated Such a suggestion is contained in the following paragraph of annex XI, section I.A (b): (2) The veto should be completely eliminated. (oral proposal at the July 2000 session of the Working Group) B.  Suggestions that Article 27 of the Charter should define more clearly where a veto is permissible Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, section I.A (b): (9) Paragraph 2 of Article 27.2, pertaining to decisions on procedural matters, should be redefined. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.B, para. 9]372 [21] (10) The Charter should be amended to provide, as part of the voting mechanism of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, for a reference to the veto with all its specific criteria. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.B, para. 10]373 C. Suggestion that any curtailment of the veto requires Charter amendment Such a suggestion is contained in the following paragraph of annex XI, sect. I.A (b): (3) In the context of Article 103 of the Charter, any curtailment of the veto power necessarily entails an amendment to the Charter. [written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of the Working Group] D. Suggestions that the veto be initially curtailed with a view to later elimination (a) Suggestions of a general natur Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, sect. I.A (b): (5) The exercise of the veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. [A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 6 (c)]374 (15) Use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual elimination. [A/51/47, annex XI, para. 1.4]375 (b) Suggestions of a specific nature Limitation of veto to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, sect. I.A (b): 371  → 4.1.5. 372  → 3.1.16. 373  → 3.1.16. 374  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 375  → 3.4.3.44.

4 Momentum and deadlock

567

(4) The veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. [A/53/47, annex X, para. 6]376 and (8) The Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto would apply only to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia, through amendments to Articles 4, 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.B, para. 8]377 (7) The Charter should be amended so that Article 4, paragraph 2, and Articles 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting the application of the veto. [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (a) (iv)]378 and (13) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter. [A/52/47, annex XVI, para. 4 (c)]379

[22] E. Suggestions that more than one negative vote (of permanent members) be required for a veto Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, sect. I.A. (b): (6) The Charter should be amended so that a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal that has achieved the required majority. [A/52/47, annex III, sect. VI.A, para. 26 (a) (ii)]380 (12) The Charter should be amended so that at least two negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council would be required to prevent the adoption of a decision that has received the required majority. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.B, para. 12]381 (16) Current efforts to limit the use of the veto, as stipulated in the Charter (Chapter VI), should continue to be encouraged as they reflect the consensus that is currently emerging in international relations. The number of vetoes required to block action should be increased. [A/50/47, annex IV, para. 33 (e)]382 (17) Pending the ultimate elimination of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two [or three] permanent members concur in its exercise. [A/50/47, annex XV, para. IV.C.3]383 F. Suggestions that a veto be subject to General Assembly action Such suggestions are contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, sect. I.A (b):

376  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 377  → 3.1.16. 378  → 3.1.13. 379  → 4.4.4.3. 380  → 3.1.13. 381  → 3.1.16. 382  → 3.4.2.10. 383  → 3.2.3.23.

568

4 Momentum and deadlock

(1) The exercise of the veto could be confirmed by two thirds of the vote of the members of the General Assembly. (oral proposal at the July 2000 session of the Working Group) (11) The Charter should be amended to provide for suspension of the veto on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly. [A/52/47, annex XI, sect. I.B, para. 11]384 G. Other suggestions The suggestions in annex XI, sect. I.A (b), also contain the following general suggestion: (14) Time limits should be established on the right of the veto, which, by its nature, should not be perpetual. In the year 2030, approximately 85 years will have passed since the occurrence of the events that justified its creation. The permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the concept that their right to the veto cannot be eternal and should commit themselves to discussing its abolition in that year or another close to it, to be determined by mutual agreement, or should indicate the conditions required for them to accept the abolition of the veto at a given time. [A/52/47, annex XVII]385 [23] III. Principal elements in the suggestions I. The veto should be eliminated II. Article 27 of the Charter should define more clearly where a veto is permissible III. Curtailment of the veto (a) Any curtailment of the veto requires Charter amendment (b) The veto should be initially curtailed, with a view to later elimination (i) Suggestions of a general nature The veto should be initially curtailed with a view to eventual elimination (ii) Suggestions of a specific nature a. Limitation of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter – relevant articles of the Charter to be appropriately amended b. More than one negative vote (of permanent members) to be required for exercise of a veto c. Exercise of a veto to be subject to General Assembly action 4.1.9 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Expansion of the Security Council: total size of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/ CRP.2/Add.2 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VI [24] I.  Suggestions contained in annex XI, section II.A, of the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/54/47)386 concerning the question of the total size of an enlarged Security Council […] [25] […] 384  → 3.1.16. 385  → 4.4.2.1. 386  → 4.1.5.

4 Momentum and deadlock

569

II. Grouping of suggestions according to similarities A. Suggestions in numerical terms (4) Option I: 20 Option II: 21 Option III: 22 Option IV: 23 Option V: 24 Option VI: 25 Option VII: 26 Option  VIII: At least 26 [A/52/47, annex XIX, sect. I;387 amended in written proposal submitted during May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (5) There should be an increase in the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 members, based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. [See A/53/47, annex X, para. 3 (d);388 see also A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 7,389 and A/51/47, annex XI, para. 28390] (6) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to 26. [See A/53/47, annex XIII, appendix, para. 2;391 see also A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2392] (7) The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to at least 26. [See A/52/47, annex XXI, appendix, para. 2393] (8) Increase the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 24. [See A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (a)]394 (9) The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25. [See A/51/47, annex III, para. 7]395 (10) The size of the reformed Security Council should be from 24 to 26. [See A/51/47, annex IX, para. 2]396 The following paragraph was included in annex XI, section II.C, of the report: (17) With eight new permanent members and five existing, and 10 existing non-permanent members, the membership would alone total 23; and [26] there should be seven new non-permanent members making a total of 30 members. [A/50/47, annex XVI, sect. IV, para. 18]397 B. Other suggestions as to total size (1) The size of the reformed Security Council should enable the inclusion of both new permanent and new non-permanent members, both from developed and developing countries. [Oral proposal at May 2000 session of the Open-ended 387  → 3.1.17. 388  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 389  → 4.3.1. 390  → 3.2.1.3.14 and 3.3.37. 391  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 392  → 3.2.2.3.29. 393  → 4.2.2.3.1. 394  → 3.1.10. 395  → 3.3.35. 396  → 3.1.12. 397  → 3.2.2.3.19.

570

4 Momentum and deadlock

Working Group; amended at July 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (2) The size of the reformed Security Council should only include new nonpermanent members based on the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution. [Oral proposal at July 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (3) In case of expansion of the Council under any formula, the current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not be altered to the detriment of the non-permanent seats. [Written proposal submitted during June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] III. Principal elements of suggestions A. Suggestions in numerical terms (i) Membership in the reformed Security Council should be: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, at least 26 [See A/52/47, annex XIX, sect. I;398 amendment in written proposal submitted during May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] B. Other suggestions (i) Size of reformed Security Council should enable inclusion of new permanent and new non-permanent members from developed and developing countries. (ii) A reformed Security Council should only include non-permanent members on the basis of sovereign equality and equitable geographical distribution. (iii) Current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not in a reformed Security Council be altered to the detriment of non-permanent seats. 4.1.10 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper: Increase in the permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/ Add.3 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VII [27] I.A.  Suggestions contained in annex XI, section II.B, of the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/54/47)399 concerning the increase in the permanent membership in the expanded Security Council […] [31] […] I.B. Suggestion contained in annex XI, section II.B, of the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/54/47)400 concerning the veto […] [32] […] II. Groupings of suggestions according to similarities A. Suggestions of a general nature (1) Any proposal to establish new permanent members based upon the criteria of “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” or “developing countries” should clearly and unequivocally provide a definition for such notions. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group]

398  → 3.1.17. 399  → 4.1.5. 400  → 4.1.5.

4 Momentum and deadlock

571

(2) There should be no new permanent members. [Oral proposal at the June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (3) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both permanent and non-permanent membership. New permanent membership should include both industrialized and developing countries. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (5) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (7) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the nonpermanent membership only. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] The following suggestion is to be found in annex XI, section II.C. (7)  If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, only in the non-permanent category. [See A/53/47, annex X, para. 5]401 B. Suggestions for allocation of permanent seats having regard to regions Allocations among regions (6) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates from both developing countries and industrialized countries. Five new permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the developing States of Africa; (b) One to the developing States of Asia; (c) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; [33] (d) Two to industrialized States. [Written proposal at the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (9) The enlargement of the Council should include representatives of both industrialized and developing countries. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (21) Five new permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following patterns: (a) One from the developing States of Africa; (b) One from the developing States of Asia; (c) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) Two from industrialized States. [See A/51/47, annex II, para. 1 (b)]402 (22) Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats. [A/51/47, annex III, para. 8]403 401  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 402  → 3.1.10. 403  → 3.2.1.1.54.

572

4 Momentum and deadlock

(24) The number of permanent members should be increased by five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of permanent members by five, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the developing States of Africa (note: OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States); (b) One to the developing States of Asia; (c) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) Two to industrialized States. [See A/51/47, annex IX, sect. II, para. 3]404 (25) Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional consideration prior to the election by the General Assembly. [See A/51/47, annex IX, sect. II, para. 4]405 (26) Permanent seats should be granted to Germany and Japan. The enlargement of the Council should also ensure a wider representation for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. [See A/51/47, annex X, sect. II, para. 9]406 (29) There should be an increase from five to 10 in the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on a regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. [See A/50/47, annex XI]407 (32) Two alternative models are proposed. In the first model: (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other; and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of [34] America, already included under (a)). In the second model, (d) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members: the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the United States; (e) there would be three financial permanent members, including the United States. [See A/50/47, annex XV, sect. V.A, paras. 28 and 29]408 (33) In the political and economic context, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are regions of developing countries. These three regions require permanent representation. It is also conceivable that the industrialized countries are an identifiable region. Japan and Germany are in that group. It is proposed that each developing region be allocated two seats. 404  → 3.1.12. 405  → 3.1.12. 406  → 3.2.1.3.13. 407  → 3.2.2.2.22. 408  → 3.2.3.23.

4 Momentum and deadlock

573

Each seat will clearly represent countries of the region and not purely that of a country. A regional mechanism will decide on how the seats are to be allocated. [See A/50/47, annex XVI, sect. II, paras. 7-9]409 (34) The permanent members should be increased by five new seats. Three new permanent seats should be for developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Two new permanent seats should be for industrialized countries. [See A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 8]410 The following suggestion is to be found in annex XI, section II.C. (17) With eight new permanent members and five existing, and 10 existing non-permanent members, the membership would alone total 23, and there should be seven new non-permanent members making a total of 30 members. [See A/50/47, annex XVI, sect. IV, para. 18]411 Allocation of permanent seats to a particular region or a particular grouping of States (3) There should be one permanent seat for the European Union. [Oral proposal at the June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (10) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats. These seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of African States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequent elements which might improve those criteria. [See A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (a);412 see also A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (a)413] (18) In the case of an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, Asia should be allocated two permanent seats. These two seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of Asian States itself, in accordance with a system of rotation, the modalities for which will be discussed in the context of a working group to be established for that purpose. [See A/52/47, annex XXI, para. 3]414 (23) In the event of an increase in the number or permanent Security Council seats, a permanent seat with full privileges will be allocated to the Group of Arab States. This seat would rotate among the Arab States in accordance with the usual practice in the League of Arab States. [See A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, sect. A, para. 4 (b)]415 [35] (28) Africa should be allocated no fewer than two permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. [See A/51/47, annex IV, para. 34]416

409  → 3.2.2.3.19. 410  3 July 1996, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex XVII. 411  → 3.2.2.3.19. 412  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 413  → 3.2.2.3.29. 414  → 4.2.2.3.1. 415  → 3.2.2.3.30. 416  → 3.1.11.

574

4 Momentum and deadlock

C. Suggestions for allocation of permanent seats having regard to financial contributions (31) A new sub-category of financial permanent membership should be introduced whereby individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial contributions to the Organization’s budget. [A/50/47, annex XV, sect. IV.C.1, para. 23]417 (32) Two alternative models are proposed. In the first model: (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other; and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America, already included under (a)). In the second model, (d) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members: the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in the case of the United States; (e) there would be three financial permanent members, including the United States. [See A/50/47, annex XV, sect. V.A, paras. 28 and 29]418 III. Principal elements of suggestions419 [37] I. Suggestions of a general nature concerning the expansion of the Security Council and the veto A. Enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent membership 1. There should be enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent membership, taking into account industrialized or developed and developing countries. 2. The concepts “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” and “developing countries” should be defined. 3. A reformed Security Council should provide for a category of permanent membership based on substantial contributions to the United Nations. B. Question of the veto 1. Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered at the end of agreement on the reform package. 2. New permanent members should have the same prerogative and powers of current permanent members. 3. Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment of veto use by the current permanent members. 4. The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. 5. New permanent members should: (a) Indicate willingness to be permanent members without the veto. (b) Agree not to exercise the veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. 417  → 3.2.3.23. 418  → 3.2.3.23. 419  The following part is taken from a corrigendum: UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.3/ Corr.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VIII.

4 Momentum and deadlock

575

[38] 6. A decision on the extension of the veto to new permanent members should be taken once they have been elected. 7. A high-level working group should consider the question of the extension of veto to new permanent members. 8. During the interim period, new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto, and the concurring vote of a specified number (e.g., four out of five) will be required for Security Council decision on matters that are not procedural under Chapter VII of the Charter. II. Total size of the enlarged Security Council The enlarged Security Council should consist of: 20 members 21 “ 22 “ 23 “ 24 “ 25 “ 26 “ 26 “ at least 30 “ at least III. Increase in permanent membership Allocation of permanent seats having regard to regions Allocation among regions 1. Each developing region to be allocated two (regional) seats. Regional mechanism to determine allocation of seats within region. 2. As regards permanent regional representation, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection, prior to election by the General Assembly. 3. Five additional permanent seats, designated by two-thirds majority vote in General Assembly, preferably on a regional basis, taking account of equitable geographical distribution and capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. 4. Five additional permanent seats: (a) One to developing States of Africa; (b) One to developing States of Asia; (c) One to developing States of Latin America and Caribbean; (d) Two to industrialized States. Germany and Japan proposed as two industrialized States. [39] Allocation to one particular region or to one group of States or to particular countries 1. The two permanent seats for Africa, allotted by decision of Group of African States in accordance with rotation system of OAU. 2. Two permanent seats for Asia, allocated by decision of Asian Group in accordance with system of rotation to be established by a working group formed for the purpose. 3. One permanent seat for the European Union. 4. A permanent seat for the Group of Arab States, the seat to rotate among Arab States in accordance with the practice of League of Arab States.

576

4 Momentum and deadlock

Allocation of permanent seats having regard to financial contributions 1. One additional permanent seat to five regional groups (except Western European and others), present five permanent members unchanged. Two additional financial permanent members. 2. Each of the five regional groups would have two permanent seats, with present five permanent members (except United States) to be included in their regional groups. Three additional financial permanent members (including United States). 3. Five additional permanent seats: (a) One to each regional group in United Nations (except Western European and others); (b) Two additional financial permanent members. 4.1.11  2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper, Increase in the non-permanent membership of the expanded Security Council, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.4 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex IX I.  Suggestions contained in annex XI, section II.C, of the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/54/47)420 concerning the increase in the nonpermanent membership of the expanded Security Council […] [43] […] II. Groupings of suggestions according to similarities A. Suggestions of a general nature 1. Increase only or for the time being only in the non-permanent category (1) No new individual permanent seats such as those established in 1945 should be created because they are contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of States. For the time being, the increase should take place only in the non-permanent category or by means of regional rotation modalities as agreed by consensus by the respective regional groups. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau after the June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (4) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the nonpermanent membership only. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (7) If there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, only in the non-permanent category. [See A/53/47, annex X, para. 5;421 see also A/52/47, annex XXXI, para. 10,422 and A/51/47, annex XI, para. 29423] 2. Consideration at the same time, or in parallel, of increase in permanent and non-permanent categories (2) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates from both developing countries

420  → 4.1.5. 421  28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 422  → 4.2.1.3.2. 423  → 3.2.1.3.14.

4 Momentum and deadlock

577

and industrialized countries. Four new non-permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: (i) One to States of Africa; (ii) One to States of Asia; (iii) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) One to States of Eastern Europe. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (3) Enlargement in the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership should be considered together. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] 3. Reasonable balance between number of permanent seats and number of nonpermanent seats (18) While care should be taken not to impair the efficiency of the Security Council, an enlargement of the Council by five new permanent seats as suggested should be complemented by an enlargement with a number of new non-permanent seats in order to maintain a reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats on the Council and to enhance further the representativity and the equitable geographical distribution of its membership. [See A/50/47, annex XVII, para. 12]424 [44] B. Suggestions as to allocation of non-permanent seats 1. Allocation of non-permanent seats among regions (5)  When additional non-permanent seats are distributed, no national or regional group should be discriminated against. [Oral proposal at the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (6) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat in the reformed Security Council. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (2) Enlargement of the Security Council should take place in both categories, the permanent category and the non-permanent category, in parallel, taking into account candidates from both developing countries and industrialized countries. Four new non-permanent seats should be distributed according to the following pattern: (i) One to States of Africa; (ii) One to States of Asia; (iii) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean; (iv) One to States of Eastern Europe. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (6) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat in the reformed Security Council. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] 424  → 3.2.1.1.35.

578

4 Momentum and deadlock



(10) Four new non-permanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from the States of Africa; (ii) One from the States of Asia; (iii) One from the States of Eastern Europe; (iv) One from the States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [See A/51/47, annex II]425 (12) The number of non-permanent members should be increased by four, five or six. In the event that it is decided to increase the number of nonpermanent members by four, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern: (a) One to the States of Africa (note: in the event that it is decided to add seats, the additional seat should be allocated to the States of Africa); (b) One to the States of Asia; (c) One to the States of Eastern Europe; (d) One to States of Latin America and the Caribbean. [See A/51/47, annex IX, part A, sect. II, para. 5]426 (19) If two additional seats for permanent members of the Security Council are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight, [45] which would make a total of 18 non-permanent members. The additional seats for non-permanent members could be distributed as follows: (a) Four (4) seats for States of Asia and Africa; (b) Two (2) seats for the regional group of Latin American and Caribbean countries; (c) One (1) seat for the regional group of Western European and other countries; (d) One (1) seat for the regional group of Eastern European countries. The creation of eight non-permanent seats, each of which would rotate among three or four States (for a total of 24 to 32 States), would enable countries that make a substantial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities and the financing of the Organization and countries that represent the majority of the world’s population to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. [See A/50/47, annex XVIII, paras. 8 and 9]427 2.  Allocation of non-permanent seats to a particular region or a particular group of States (8) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. [See A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 2 (b);428 see also A/51/47, annex XII, para. 2 (b)429] (9) Any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Group of Eastern 425  → 3.1.10. 426  → 3.1.12. 427  → 3.2.2.2.23. 428  29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 429  → 3.2.2.3.29.

4 Momentum and deadlock

579

European States by the allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. [See A/52/47, annex XXIII]430 (11) In accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, the Group of Arab States requests the allocation to the Group of at least two non-permanent seats on the Security Council. [See A/51/47, annex VIII, appendix, sect. A, para. 4.a]431 C. Suggestions that some Member States should serve more frequently as nonpermanent members (13) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly. [See A/51/47, annex XIII, sect. 2]432 (14) Some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Organization’s purposes, should be allowed to participate more frequently as members of the Council. [See A/50/47, annex VIII, para. 1]433 (15) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between six and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a [46] simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms. [See A/50/47, annex XI, para. 1]434 III. Principal elements of suggestions A. Suggestions of a general nature 1. No new permanent seats and enlargement only of non-permanent membership in Security Council. If no agreement on enlargement of other categories of membership, enlargement for the time being only in nonpermanent category. 2. Enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent categories should be considered together, taking into account candidates both from developing and industrialized countries. 3. Reasonable balance should be preserved between the number of permanent seats and non-permanent seats in a reformed Security Council.

430  → 4.2.1.3.1. 431  → 3.2.2.3.30. 432  → 3.2.2.2.26. 433  → 3.2.2.2.19. 434  → 3.2.2.2.22.

580

4 Momentum and deadlock

B. Allocation of non-permanent seats having regard to regions Allocation of non-permanent seats among regions 1. Each regional group to be allocated at least one additional non-permanent seat in reformed Security Council. 2. In a reformed Security Council, there should be four non-permanent seats: one for Africa; Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; and one for Eastern Europe. 3. A reformed Security Council should contain eight additional non-permanent seats, as follows: (a) Four seats for Asia and Africa; (b) Two seats for Latin America and the Caribbean; (c) One seat for Western and Others; (d) One seat for Eastern Europe. Allocation of non-permanent seats to a particular region or to a particular group of States 1. In a reformed Security Council, Africa should be allotted five non-permanent seats. 2. In a reformed Security Council, Eastern Europe should be allotted one additional non-permanent seat. 3. In a reformed Security Council, the Arab States should be allotted two nonpermanent seats. [47] C. Some Member States to serve more frequently as non-permanent members 1. States with strength and influential international relations and capacity and the will to make a significant contribution to the Organization should be allowed to participate more frequently as members of the Council. 2. Reformed Security Council to have five additional (long terms, between 6 and 12 years) non-permanent seats, to be chosen by General Assembly. Retiring members eligible for immediate re-election. 3. For a reformed Security Council, there should be 10 additional non-permanent seats, each seat to be filled consecutively, for two-year terms each, by three States, making a total of 30 eligible States for the 10 additional non-permanent seats, the 30 States to be selected by the General Assembly. 4.1.12 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Conference room paper, Question of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.5 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex X [48] I. Suggestions contained in annex XI, section III, of the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/54/47)435 concerning the question of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council […] [50] […] II. Groupings of suggestions according to similarities A. Scope and necessity for periodic review Such a suggestion is contained in the following paragraphs of annex XI, section III, of the above-mentioned report: 435  → 4.1.5.

4 Momentum and deadlock

581

(1) The issue of periodic review is premature until the matter of reforming the Security Council is resolved. [Oral proposal at the June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (2) A review process would not be necessary as long as any new permanent members are not added to the Security Council. [Oral proposal at June 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (3) The issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group should be subject to periodic review, which should take place every 10 to 15 years. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] (4) A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security. [See A/53/47, annex XIII, para. 5]436 (5) In the event that any rotational arrangements were adopted, the lists of rotating countries could be reviewed during the periodic review process. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country had managed to honour its obligations and met the increased responsibilities stemming from the rotational agreement. [See A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 2,437 and annex XXVI, para. 2438] (8) The scope of the review process should be comprehensive in order to address all aspects of reform, including the status of new permanent members as well as the question of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation as well as overrepresentation of any region on the Council in both permanent and nonpermanent categories. [See A/52/47, annex XXV,439 para. 6, and annex XXVI, para. 6440] (9) The periodic review should not cover the rights and obligations held by the original five permanent members. [See A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 7, and annex XXVI, para. 8441] (12) A review process would be unnecessary. [See A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 3]442 B. Timing of review (3) The issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group should be subject to periodic review, which should take place every 10 to 15 years. [Written proposal submitted to the Bureau during the May 2000 session of the Open-ended Working Group] [51]

436  437  438  439  440  441  442 

29 July 1999, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.7 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI.

582

4 Momentum and deadlock

(6) T  he first review should take place 10 to 20 years after the conclusion of the present reform exercise. There should be subsequent reviews thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. One solution would be to undertake the periodic review to coincide with the expiration of the tenure of members of those regions opting for regional rotational arrangements. [See A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 4,443 and annex XXVI, para. 4444] (7) The periodic review should automatically be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The review process should be concluded within two years. [See A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 5,445 and annex XXVI, para. 5446] C. Decision-making in course of a review (11) The review process should not be subject to the use of the veto by the original permanent members and/or the new permanent members. [See A/52/47, annex XXV, para. 9,447 and annex XXVI, para. 10448] (13) In order to retain their status, countries having been elected as new permanent members of the Council would either:  (a) Need to secure, at the review process, the support of at least a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations;  (b) Continue as permanent members unless otherwise decided by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the United Nations. [See A/52/47, annex XXVI, para. 7]449 (14) The threshold level for decision on the extension of new permanent members should be upgraded to as near as possible to the level applied during initial elections, namely, at least the two-thirds majority of all Members of the United Nations. This upgrade will be all the more necessary if periodic review is genuinely intended as a mechanism to ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in the increase of permanent membership by providing the general membership with a reasonable opportunity to replace some or all new permanent members. The upgraded level of majority required for the extension of new permanent members during the review period can be incorporated into the new provisions of the Charter to be created with respect to the periodic review of the enlarged Security Council. [See A/52/47, annex XXVII]450 III. Principal elements of suggestions A. Scope and necessity for periodic review 1. A periodic review of structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary. 2. Review of the Security Council is unnecessary.

443  444  445  446  447  448  449  450 

20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 20 May 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXV. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 5 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.13/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVI. 25 June 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.18 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXVII.

4 Momentum and deadlock

583

3. If there are no additional permanent members, a review would not be necessary. 4. Issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group should be subject to periodical review every 10 to 15 years. [52] 5. Review process should take into account all aspects of reform: status of new permanent members, question of veto, accountability and representation of regions in the Council. 6. Review should not cover original five permanent members. B. Timing of review 1. Review should take place every 10 to 15 years. 2. The first review should take place every 10 to 20 years after current reform exercise, and thereafter every 10 to 12 or 15 to 20 years. 3. Review should be automatically included in agenda of the General Assembly and concluded within two years. C. Decision-making in course of a review 1. Review should not be subject to the veto. 2. Continuance of new permanent members would be dependent on support of two-thirds majority of United Nations membership. 3. New permanent members should continue unless otherwise decided by two-thirds majority of United Nations membership. 4.1.13 2001, Bureau of the OEWG, Principal elements of the suggestions contained in annex XI of the report of the Working Group (A/54/47) concerning the expansion of the Security Council: Revised summary, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/ CRP.5/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XII [56] I. Introduction The attention of the Bureau has been drawn to the fact that at the outset it was not clear that document A/AC.247/2001/CRP.5451 was intended to “cover” only the “principal element sections” of documents A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.2-4452 with reference to section II (Expansion of the Security Council) of annex XI of the report of the Working Group (A/54/47).453 In other words, document A/ AC.247/2001/CRP.5 does not cover the principal element sections of documents A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2 and Add.1 with reference to section I (Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto) of annex XI of the report. Accordingly, the Bureau has prepared the present revision in order to take into account the suggestions relating to the veto that are to be found in section II of annex XI of the report.

451  2001, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.5 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XI. 452  2001, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.1 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex V, → 4.1.8; 2001, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.2 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VI, → 4.1.9; 2001, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.3 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex VII, → 4.1.10; 2001. For Add.4, see UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.2/Add.4 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex IX. 453  → 4.1.5.

584

4 Momentum and deadlock

II. Suggestions of a general nature concerning the expansion of the Security Council and the veto A. Enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent membership 1. There should be enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent membership, taking into account industrialized or developed and developing countries. 2. The concepts “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” and “developing countries” should be defined. 3. A reformed Security Council should provide for a category of permanent membership based on substantial contributions to the United Nations. B. Question of the veto 1. Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered at the end of agreement on the reform package. 2. New permanent members should have the same prerogative and powers of current permanent members. 3. Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment of veto use by the current permanent members. 4. The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. [57] 5. New permanent members should: (a) Indicate willingness to be permanent members without the veto;  (b) Agree not to exercise the veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. 6. A decision on the extension of the veto to new permanent members should be taken once they have been elected. 7. A high-level working group should consider the question of the extension of veto to new permanent members. 8. During the interim period, new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto, and the concurring vote of a specified number (e.g., four out of five) will be required for Security Council decision on matters that are not procedural under Chapter VII of the Charter. C. Enlargement only in non-permanent membership 1. There should be enlargement only in non-permanent membership. 2. If there is no agreement on enlargement of other categories of membership, there should only be, for the time being, enlargement of the non-permanent membership. 3. For the time being, there should be an increase only in the non-permanent category or by means of regional rotation modalities, as agreed by consensus by the respective regional groups. 4. States with strength and influence in international relations and the capacity and the will to make a significant contribution to the purposes of the United Nations should participate more frequently in the Council. III. Total size of the enlarged Security Council The enlarged Security Council should consist of: 20 members 21 ”

4 Momentum and deadlock

585

22 ” 23 ” 24 ” 25 ” 26 ” 26 ” at least 30 ” at least [58] IV. Increase in permanent membership Allocation of permanent seats having regard to regions Allocation among regions 1. Each developing region to be allocated two (regional) seats. Regional mechanism to determine allocation of seats within region. 2. As regards permanent regional representation, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection, prior to election by the General Assembly. 3. Five additional permanent seats, designated by two-thirds majority vote in General Assembly, preferably on a regional basis, taking account of equitable geographical distribution and capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. 4. Five additional permanent seats: (a) One to developing States of Africa; (b) One to developing States of Asia; (c) One to developing States of Latin America and Caribbean; (d) Two to industrialized States. Germany and Japan proposed as two industrialized States. Allocation to one particular region or to one group of States or to particular countries 1. Two permanent seats for Africa, allotted by decision of Group of African States in accordance with rotation system of OAU. 2. Two permanent seats for Asia, allocated by decision of Asian Group in accordance with system of rotation to be established by a working group formed for the purpose. 3. One permanent seat for the European Union. 4. A permanent seat for the Group of Arab States, the seat to rotate among Arab States in accordance with the practice of League of Arab States. Allocation of permanent seats having regard to financial contributions 1. One additional permanent seat to five regional groups (except Western European and others), present five permanent members unchanged. Two additional financial permanent members. 2. Each of five regional groups would have two permanent seats, with present five permanent members (except United States) to be included in their regional groups. Three additional financial permanent members (including United States). 3. Five additional permanent seats: (a) One to each regional group in United Nations (except Western European and others); (b) Two additional financial permanent members.

586

4 Momentum and deadlock

[59] V. Increase in non-permanent membership A. Allocation of non-permanent seats having regard to regions Allocation of non-permanent seats among regions 1.  Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat. 2. There should be four additional non-permanent seats, as follows: (a) One for Africa; (b) One for Asia; (c) One for Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) One for Eastern Europe; 3. There should be eight additional non-permanent seats, as follows: (a) Two seats for Africa; (b) Two seats for Asia; (c) Two seats for Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) One seat for Western Europe and others; (e) One seat for Eastern Europe. Allocation of non-permanent seats to one particular region or to one group of States 1. There should be five non-permanent seats for Africa. 2. There should be one additional seat for Eastern Europe. 3. There should be two non-permanent seats for the Arab group of States. B. Some States to participate more frequently as non-permanent members 1. There should be five additional (long terms, 6 to 12 years) non-permanent seats to be chosen by the General Assembly, with retiring members eligible for re-election. The other 10 non-permanent seats would continue as at present. 2. If there are eight new non-permanent seats (additional to the present 10 nonpermanent seats), each seat could “rotate” among three or four States, enabling (24 to 32) countries that make substantial contribution to peacekeeping activities and United Nations financing and represent the majority of the world’s population to assume greater responsibility in implementing the Charter. 3. There should be 10 additional non-permanent seats, to be allocated between 30 States selected by the General Assembly: three States for each seat, and each of the three States to serve a two-year term. 4.1.14 9 September 2002, UN Secretary-General, Report “Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change”, UN Doc. A/57/387 I. Strengthening the United Nations […] A. What we have achieved 3. Fortunately, an institution to serve the peoples of the world does not have to be built from the ground up. The United Nations exists, not as a static memorial to the aspirations of an earlier age, but as a work in progress – imperfect, as all human endeavours must be, but capable of adaptation and improvement. […] B. What more should be done […]

4 Momentum and deadlock

587

Stalled process of Security Council reform 20. The Open-ended Working Group established by the General Assembly to examine the reform of the Security Council has been at work for nearly a decade. Yet it seems that agreement on a formula that would allow an increase in Council membership is still eluding Member States. In the eyes of much of the world, the size and composition of the Security Council appear insufficiently representative. The perceived shortcomings in the Council’s credibility contribute to a slow but steady erosion of its authority, which in turn has grave implications for international peace and security. Thus, no reform of the United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council. At the same time, it is important to remember that authority derives also from the capacity to take prompt and realistic decisions, and from the will to act on them. A reform process that consisted only of an increase in membership would be unlikely to strengthen the Council in this vital respect. […] 4.1.15  2003, Bureau of the OEWG, Revised conference room paper, Principal elements of proposals concerning (a) decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto, (b) expansion of the Security Council, and (c) the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2003/ CRP.2/Rev.1 = UN Doc. A/57/47, Annex VI [43] I. Introduction This conference room paper is a revised version of the conference room paper issued as document A/AC.247/2003/CRP.2.454 The paper seeks to identify principal elements of the proposals contained in sections I, II and III of annex XI to the report of the Working Group to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session (A/54/47)455 and incorporates subsequent proposals made by members of the Working Group. II. Principal elements of proposals made with reference to “Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto” A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Council 1. Proposals not necessarily requiring Charter amendment (a) Proposals to leave the veto in its present form The veto in its present form should be maintained. (b) Proposals to preclude use of the veto or to curtail use of the veto (1) Permanent members of the Council should exercise restraint in resorting to the veto. (2) Every endeavour should be made to arrive at consensus decisions in the Council so that the veto need not be used. (3) A veto should only be exercised when the question is of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole. (4) If a veto is used, a written explanation of the reason for the veto should be given and also provided to the General Assembly. (5) Permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. 454   UN Doc. A/AC.247/2003/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/57/47, Annex IV. 455  → 4.1.5.

588

4 Momentum and deadlock

(6) The General Assembly should urge permanent members not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter. (7) What constitutes “procedural” matters, in terms of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter, should be established by an updating of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III)456 and should be applied by the Council. [44] (8) Permanent members of the Council should make unilateral or collective commitments not to use the veto. 2. Proposals requiring Charter amendment (a) Proposals to eliminate the veto The veto should be eliminated. (b) Proposals to curtail the veto (1) Article 27 of the Charter should define more clearly where a veto is permissible. (2) The veto should be initially curtailed with a view to eventual elimination. (3) Limitation of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter – relevant Articles of the Charter to be appropriately amended. (4) More than one negative vote (of permanent members) to be required for exercise of a veto. (5) Exercise of a veto to be subject to General Assembly action. B. Number of affirmative votes required for decisions in an enlarged Council (1) The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Council should remain, as at present, around 60 per cent. (2) If 60 per cent of affirmative votes is required for decision, then the number of votes required in an enlarged Security Council would be as follows: In a Council of 20, it would be 12; In a Council of 21, it would be 13; In a Council of 24, it would be 14; In a Council of 25, it would be 15; and In a Council of 26, it would be 16. (3) The relative number of non-permanent-member votes required for decisions in an enlarged Security Council should be increased. (4) In considering the issue of number of affirmative votes required for a decision in an enlarged Council, there should be no distinction between the votes of permanent members and those of non-permanent members. [45] III. Principal elements of proposals made with reference to “Expansion of the Security Council” A. Proposals of a general nature 1. Proposals for enlargement of Council in permanent and non-permanent membership (1) Enlargement of the Council should enable inclusion of both new permanent members and new non-permanent members from developed/industrialized and developing countries. (2) The concepts “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” and “developing countries” should be clearly defined. 456  14 April 1949, UN Doc. A/RES/267(III), Annex, → 2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

589

(3) Enlargement in permanent and non-permanent membership should be considered together. (4) The current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not be altered to the detriment of the non-permanent seats. (5) A reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats should be maintained and would enhance the representativity and equitable geographical distribution of the Council. 2. Proposals for enlargement of Council in non-permanent membership only, for the time being If there is no agreement on enlargement of other categories of membership, there should only be, for the time being, enlargement of the non-permanent membership. 3. Proposals for enlargement of Council in non-permanent membership only (1) There should be enlargement only in non-permanent membership. (2) An enlarged Council should only include additional non-permanent members based on the principle of sovereign equality of States, and equitable geographical distribution. B. Proposals of specific numbers for enlargement of Council 1. Specific numbers proposed The enlarged Council should consist of: 20 members 21 members 22 members 23 members 24 members 25 members [46] 26 members 30 members 2. Range of numbers proposed The enlarged Council should be: From 15 to 24 From 24 to 26 No greater than 25 At least 26 C. Increase in the permanent membership of the Council 1. Proposals for permanent seats for: a particular region, a particular group of States or particular countries (1) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats according to decisions of the Group of African States. (2) A permanent seat should be allocated for the Group of Arab States, the seat to rotate among Arab States in accordance with the practice of the League of Arab States. (3) Two permanent seats should be allocated to Asia for decision of the Asian group in accordance with the system or rotation to be established by a working group formed for the purpose. (4) One permanent seat should be allocated for the European Union.

590

4 Momentum and deadlock

(5) T  here should be two new permanent seats created for Germany and Japan as industrialized States. 2. Proposals for enlargement of permanent membership of the Council (1) Five additional permanent seats: designated by two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly – preferably on a regional basis, taking account of equitable geographical distribution and capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. (2) Five additional permanent seats: – One to developing States of Africa; – One to developing States of Asia; – One to developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean; – Two to industrialized States. (3) Each developing region to be allocated two (regional) seats. Regional mechanism to determine allocation of seats within region. As regards permanent regional representation, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection, prior to election by the General Assembly. [47] D. Extension of the veto to new permanent members 1. Question whether the veto should be extended (1) New permanent members should have the same prerogative and powers of current permanent members. (2) The veto should not be extended to new permanent members. (3) New permanent members should: (a) Indicate willingness to be permanent members without the veto; (b) Agree not to exercise the veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place. 2. When should question of extension of the veto to new permanent members be considered? (1) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered at the end of agreement on the reform package. (2) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment of veto use by the current permanent members. (3) A decision on the extension of the veto to new permanent members should be taken once they have been elected. (4) A high-level Working Group should consider the question of the extension of the veto to new permanent members. During the interim period, new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto and the concurring vote of a specified number (e.g. four out of five) will be required for Security Council decision on matters not procedural under Chapter VII of the Charter. E. Increase in non-permanent membership 1. Reference in proposals to general criteria for enlargement of non-permanent membership (1) Increase in non-permanent membership should take into account candidates from developing countries and industrialized States. (2) When additional non-permanent seats are distributed, no national or regional group should be discriminated against.

4 Momentum and deadlock

591

(3) R  etiring non-permanent members of the Council should be eligible for immediate re-election. 2. Allocation of non-permanent seats among regions (1)  Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional nonpermanent seat. [48] (2) There should be an increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories. There should be four additional non-permanent seats as follows: One for Africa; One for Asia; One for Latin America and the Caribbean; One for Eastern Europe. (3) Four new non-permanent members should be elected as follows: One for Africa; One for Asia; One for Eastern Europe; One for Latin America and the Caribbean. 3. Allocation of non-permanent seats to one particular region or to one group of States – There should be five non-permanent seats for Africa. – There should be one additional seat for Eastern Europe. – There should be two non-permanent seats for the Group of Arab States. 4. Some States to participate more frequently as non-permanent members (1) There should be five additional (long-term, 6 to 12 years) non-permanent seats to be chosen by the General Assembly, with retiring members eligible for reelection. The other 10 non-permanent seats would continue as at present. (2) If two additional seats for permanent members are created, the number of nonpermanent members should be increased by eight as follows: Two seats for Africa; Two seats for Asia; Two seats for Latin America and the Caribbean; One seat for Western Europe and other; One seat for Eastern Europe. If there are eight new non-permanent seats (additional to the present 10 non-permanent seats), each seat could “rotate” among three or four States, enabling (24 to 32) countries that make a substantial contribution to peacekeeping activities and United Nations financing and represent the majority of the world’s population to assume greater responsibility in implementing the Charter. (3) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of those seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on, and four consecutive years off, the Council. [49] Those 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly. (4) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between

592

4 Momentum and deadlock

6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate reelection. The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms. (5) States with strength and influence in international relations and the capacity and the will to make a significant contribution to the purposes of the United Nations should participate more frequently in the Council. IV. Principal elements of proposals made concerning the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council A. Scope and necessity for periodic review 1. A periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary. 2. A review of the Security Council is unnecessary. 3. If there are no additional permanent members, a review would not be necessary. 4. Issues within the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group should be subject to periodical review every 10 to 15 years. 5. The review process should take into account all aspects of reform: status of new permanent members, question of the veto, accountability and representation of regions in the Security Council. 6. The review should not cover the original five permanent members. B. Timing of review 1. A review should take place every 10 to 15 years. 2. The review should be automatically included in the agenda of the General Assembly and concluded within two years. C. Decision-making in the course of a review The review should not be subject to the veto. 4.1.16 23 September 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 2-4 […] We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw that the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish. So they drew up rules to govern international behaviour, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good. Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed. And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more important than the Security Council itself. In my recent report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration,457 I drew 457  8 September 2000, → 4.1.6.

4 Momentum and deadlock

593

attention to the urgent need for the Council to regain the confidence of States and of world public opinion – both by demonstrating its ability to deal effectively with the most difficult issues and by becoming more broadly representative of the international community as a whole as well as the geopolitical realities of today. […] As for the composition of the Council, which has been on the agenda of the Assembly for over a decade, virtually all Member States agree that the Council should be enlarged, but there is no agreement on the details. I respectfully suggest to you, Excellencies, that in the eyes of your peoples the difficulty of reaching agreement does not excuse your failure to do so. If you want the Council and the Council’s decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the developing world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency. […] History is a harsh judge: it will not forgive us if we let this moment pass. For my part, I intend to establish a high-level panel of eminent personalities to which I will assign four tasks: first, to examine current challenges to peace and security; second, to consider the contribution which collective action can make in addressing these challenges; third, to review the functioning of major organs of the United Nations and the relationship between them; and fourth, to recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations, through reform of its institutions and processes. The panel will focus primarily on threats to peace and security. But it will also need to examine other global challenges, in so far as these may influence or connect with those threats. […] 4.1.17 23 March 2004, Bureau of the OEWG, Reference paper: Five points proposed for consideration by the informal meeting of the Working Group, UN Doc. A/58/47, Annex II [9] 1. With a view to facilitating dialogue in the Open-ended Working Group, established by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,458 the Bureau proposed, and it was agreed, that an informal exchange of views should proceed on the basis of the following five points: Size of an enlarged Security Council Question of regional representation Criteria for membership Relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council Accountability. 2. This reference paper has been prepared as a starting point for the discussion by the Open-ended Working Group on issues raised in the areas the five points address, in the more than a decade of debate on Security Council reform. Drawing on previous discussions in the Open-ended Working Group, the paper provides, in brief, background data on some of the ideas and issues that have shaped the debate over the years, but does not take a position on them. As such, the paper is intended to be solely a basis for encouraging Member States to engage in a

• • • • •

458  → 3.1.2.

594

4 Momentum and deadlock

constructive exchange of views and ideas on the subjects, with a view to determining where there are points of agreement sufficient to advance the process. I. Size of an enlarged Security Council 3. Discussion on the size of an enlarged Security Council has typically raised many issues, but two in particular. The first concerns the optimum number of Member States of an enlarged Council. Here, proposals put forward by Member States have varied, although not considerably. The specific numbers proposed start at 20 but none exceeds 30. Member States proposing a size range have also remained in the 20-30 range, suggesting, for example, an enlarged Council of 15-24 and 24-26. Additionally, those proposing an upper limit for membership of an enlarged Council have also remained in the 20-30 range, proposing, for example, numbers “no greater than 25”. In suggesting numbers, many underscored that an important consideration was to maintain the “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of the Security Council. 4. The second issue concerns the representative nature of the Security Council. The membership of the Security Council is not reflective of the current membership of the United Nations. The view has been generally expressed that a more [10] representative membership would enhance and strengthen the Council, particularly in respect of the authority of its decisions and action. 5. Member States may wish to focus dialogue on the expansion, size and representative character of an enlarged Security Council, bearing in mind the various issues that have been raised in this context. II. Question of regional representation 6. Specific proposals have been made over the 10-year period for principle of equitable geographical distribution to be taken fully into account in determining the membership of the Council. This matter has been the subject of many specific proposals. In the non-permanent membership category, numbers ranging from one to five seats have been proposed for: All current regional groups The African, Asian and Latin American and Caribbean regions Eastern and Western Europe The Group of Arab States. 7. Regional representation has also been taken into account in proposals put forward in respect of possible new permanent members of the Council. These have included the allocation of one to two new permanent seats to: Regional groups The developing regions The developing States of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean Industrialized States The group of Arab States Asia The European Union. 8. Member States may wish to consider how best to meet the standard of equitable geographical distribution and the representations of various regions on an expanded Security Council.

• • • • • • • • • • •

4 Momentum and deadlock

595

III. Criteria for membership 9. The Charter of the United Nations sets out, in Article 23, the criteria for the election of Member States as non-permanent members of the Security Council. Election to the Council has proceeded in line with Article 23. 10. In the course of the discussion of reform of the Security Council, it has been proposed that a number of further considerations/criteria should be kept in view in respect of non-permanent membership of the Council, for example:  Expansion of the non-permanent category should take into account both developing countries and industrialized States  No State or regional group should be discriminated against in respect of nonpermanent membership of the Council [11]  Retiring non-permanent members should be eligible for immediate re-election  Countries that make a substantial contribution to peacekeeping activities and financing of the United Nations and represent the majority of the world’s population should assume greater responsibility in implementing the Charter. 11. Proposals/considerations put forward in respect of a possible new permanent membership category include: Equitable geographical distribution Capacity to contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations. 12. Member States may wish to exchange views on matters that might be taken into account in respect of criteria for Security Council membership, bearing in mind that Article 23 of the Charter regulates this matter. […] V. Accountability 17. Views have been exchanged on the matter of the accountability of the Security Council, particularly in the context of resolution 55/2 on the Millennium Declaration.459 However, no proposal dealing specifically with the matter of [12] accountability has been made during the more than 10 years in which Security Council reform has been discussed. 18. In addition to Article 24 of the Charter, discussions on the working methods and transparency of the Security Council would have touched upon accountability issues. Member States may wish to hold further dialogue on this issue. 19. The debate on Security Council reform clearly shows that there are no straightforward solutions to this issue. The Bureau has therefore prepared the present reference paper for the consideration of Member States. The Bureau hopes that the paper would stimulate dialogue on the five points that would be beneficial in moving the process forward and assisting Member States in making progress in this important exercise in which we have been engaged for more than a decade.

• • • • • •

459  → 4.1.6.

596

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.1.18 2004, OEWG, Chairman’s summary of discussions, UN Doc. A/58/47, Annex IV460 [20] 1. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council held a series of informal consultations on 19 February, 11, 23 and 26 March and 5 to 8 and 19 April 2004. 2. The Working Group focused its discussions in the informal consultations on the following five topics outlined in a reference paper dated 23 March 2004 (see annex II). Size of an enlarged Security Council Question of regional representation Criteria for membership Relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council Accountability The Working Group subsequently discussed a sixth topic: The use of the veto Topic 1 Size of an enlarged Security Council 3. There was a widespread convergence of views in favour of an increase in the membership of the Security Council. With the increase in the membership of the Organization from 51 in 1945 to 191, the composition of the Council should reflect current realities. 4. It was noted there were 11 members of the Security Council and 51 Member States at the birth of the United Nations in 1945. Council membership at that time represented 21.56 per cent of the membership of the Organization, or a ratio of one Council member to every five Member States. 5. In 1963, when the Council was enlarged to 15 members and the total United Nations membership was 112, Council membership represented 13 per cent, or a ratio of one Council member to every 8 Member States. Today, with a total membership of 191 Member States, the Council represents 7.85 per cent of the United Nations membership or a ratio of 1 Council member to every 12.5 Member States. Some delegations considered that an expanded Security Council should reflect similar proportions and ratios to those of 1963 (i.e., that the Council should represent 13 per cent of the Organization or a ratio of one Council member to every 8 Member States). 6. A majority of those speaking in favour of an expanded Security Council proposed numbers ranging from 24 to 26 members, which would involve an increase of between nine and 11 members. An enlarged Council of 20 to 23 or 27 members was also suggested. 7. It was emphasized that the question of the size of the Council could not be addressed without considering the question of new permanent members. A view was [21] also expressed that a decision on the size of an expanded Council should result from the process of identifying new members, rather than the other way around. 8. Many speakers expressed support for an increase in the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. A number of delegations proposed that certain Member States from the industrialized and developing countries should assume permanent seats in an enlarged Council.

• • • • • •

460  In the 58th session, the President of the General Assembly Mr. Julian Robert Hunte (Saint Lucia) served as Chairperson of the Working Group.

4 Momentum and deadlock

597

9. Other delegations held the view that if there was no consensus among regional groups regarding candidates for permanent membership, Council expansion should only take place in the non-permanent category. Other delegations held the view that Council expansion should only take place in the non-permanent category. Since the developing countries were underrepresented in the Council, their increased membership in the non-permanent category would promote greater representativity. 10. Several delegations also expressed the view that any enlargement of the Security Council should take into account the ratio of permanent to non-permanent members. It was suggested that this ratio should be 1:3 or 1:4. 11. The efficiency and effectiveness of an enlarged Security Council was also highlighted as an important factor in Council expansion. It was pointed out that efficiency and effectiveness must be overriding concerns in connection with Security Council reform in general and with enlargement in particular. 12. Different interpretations of the terms “efficiency” and “effectiveness” were offered. It was suggested that the two terms should be read together. The effectiveness of the Council would benefit from an enlargement that would make the Council more representative. Other speakers questioned whether efficiency and effectiveness were directly related to the size of the Council, while still others expressed the view that efficiency and effectiveness were already lacking in the Council’s current configuration. 13. Several delegations raised the question of the veto, reiterating the need to curtail its use, including by restricting the right of veto to resolutions under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and/or by abolishing it. Other delegations drew attention to the question of the prerogatives and powers that should be afforded to any new permanent members. Some speakers expressed the view that new permanent members should have the same rights and obligations as current permanent members, while others felt that new permanent members should not be given the veto power. Topic 2 Question of regional representation 14. Some delegations again commented on topic 1. Many delegations expressed support for an increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership categories, stressing the increase in the general membership of the United Nations and taking into account new economic and political circumstances. Some delegations also proposed specific industrialized and developing Member States for permanent seats in an enlarged Security Council. 15. Regarding topic 2, some delegations were of the view that if consensus was not reached among regional groups on new permanent members, the increase in Council membership should be confined to the less controversial non-permanent category. It [22] was pointed out that developing countries, in particular, were underrepresented in the Council, and that an expansion of the non-permanent category would bring greater representivity. Other delegations held the view that Council expansion should only take place in the non-permanent category. Some delegations asserted, on the other hand, that certain regions were overrepresented on the Council in its current composition. 16. Regarding possible new permanent Council seats to be allocated to regional groups, some delegations were of the opinion that it was for each regional group to decide which State should represent the group. Others suggested that the General Assembly should make the determination on new permanent members.

598

4 Momentum and deadlock

17. All five current regional groups in the United Nations were mentioned during the discussion in relation to an enlarged Security Council. Additionally, proposals were made for other groupings to be represented. Views were also expressed on some specific aspects of groupings. Some delegations were of the view that the system of regional groups now in place did not reflect current geopolitical realities. 18. Specific comments were made on the meaning of the term “regional representation” in the course of the discussion. Some delegations expressed the view that the terms “regional representation” and “equitable geographical distribution” were identical and were therefore interchangeable. These delegations expressed preference for the use of the latter term. 19. Others delegations understood the term “regional representation” to be different from the concept of “equitable geographical distribution” contained in article 23.1 of the Charter. They indicated that the Charter did not make reference to “regional groups”, questioned the meaning of the term “regional representation” and cautioned against its use. Proposals were made for representation of the Middle East and the Pacific in an enlarged Security Council. Some delegations also suggested that, as the Arab Group had proposed several years ago, that Group should have one permanent seat or two non-permanent seats on the Council. 20. Some delegations considered the Western European and Other States Group and the Eastern European States Group to be anachronistic given the increasingly close institutional linkages between western and eastern Europe. 21. Some delegations were of the view that regional representation should be based on the current system of regional groups. It was also proposed that there might be an expansion in the numbers of permanent seats for industrialized States and developing States as categories. It was proposed, in that regard, that two permanent seats might be for industrialized States and three permanent seats for developing countries, and that these seats might be allocated on the basis of equitable geographical representation. 22. The notion of “regional representation” was challenged by some delegations in respect of membership of the Council. A number of delegations were of the view that the non-permanent members of the Council, although elected on a regional basis, did not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of Security Council, they should have a global role and an obligation to the international community as a whole. 23. The view was also expressed that given the growing importance of regional organizations in dealing with matters of international peace and security, they should [23] be permitted increased participation in the decision-making process of the Security Council. 24. Some delegations suggested that permanent seats might be established for regional groups, and that Member States of such groups might hold their seats on a rotational basis similar to the system of rotation practised by the African Group and Arab States. A number of delegations stressed that if rotation was applied within a group, it should be ensured that no country in that group was excluded. 25. Some delegations contended that, since each region had its own characteristics, the rotation model could perhaps function for certain regional groups, while not being applicable to other regional groups. A number of delegations were of the view that the idea of rotating permanent membership of the Security Council needed to be further explored.

4 Momentum and deadlock

599

26. It was pointed out by some delegations that Article 23 of the Charter set the basic criteria for Council membership. The following criteria were cited: the ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, as well as respect for equitable geographical distribution. It was argued by some delegations that objective and universally acceptable criteria had yet to be worked out to define and measure the capabilities of States relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. 27. Proposals were made to add criteria to those mentioned in Article 23, such as the level of financial contribution to the United Nations, size of population, standing and role at the regional level, size of military forces, contributions to peacekeeping operations, as well as accountability. Some argued that smaller countries could also contribute essential ideas that may prove even more effective for international peace and security. 28. On the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness, some delegations emphasized that expansion of the Security Council could achieve the goal of legitimacy, without limiting the effectiveness. Limited membership had not achieved efficiency nor had it met expectations on the maintenance of international peace and security. It was considered that expansion would not have a negative impact on effectiveness and efficiency. Other delegations expressed the view that adding new permanent members would not contribute to making the Security Council efficient. 29. Commenting on the veto, some delegations stressed the importance of abolishing this privilege of the permanent members. They contended that resorting to veto power had undermined the authority and functioning of the Security Council. They also pointed out that the veto was exercised on the basis of national interest and not in the interest of the generality of the membership. 30. Some speakers stated that they were opposed to the veto for reasons of principle. Notwithstanding, were there to be new permanent members, they should be given the same privileges as existing permanent members. Other delegations stressed that were there to be new permanent members, no new veto powers should be given. A number of delegations stated their strongly held belief that Security Council members should be accountable to the general membership of the United Nations. [24] Topic 3 Criteria for membership 31. The discussions on the topic of criteria for Security Council membership took as a point of departure Article 23.1 of the Charter. Opinions on the interpretation and applicability of Article 23.1 to criteria for Council membership differed. 32. It was the view of some delegations that the wording of Article 23.1 was fair and reasonable in setting out criteria for membership in the Security Council. They contended that the idea of reform was to give greater representation to developing countries, and not to go beyond the principles established in Article 23.1. Other delegations were of the opinion that Article 23.1 no longer accurately reflected the demands and obligations placed on Council members and that other criteria should be added, if necessary by amending Article 23.1 to accommodate the interests of developing countries. Some suggestions were put forward on other criteria that might be included for membership in the Council.

600

4 Momentum and deadlock

33. The question was raised as to whether Article 23.1 was also applicable to permanent members or to non-permanent members only. Some speakers were of the view that Article 23.1 clearly identified the criteria for non-permanent members, and was therefore applicable to non-permanent members only. Others asserted that Article 23.1 was applicable to permanent members as well, since both categories of members ought to be judged against the same criteria. They cited, in particular, the contribution of a State to the maintenance of international peace and security which could involve material, human and financial contributions. It was also pointed out Article 23.1 was so worded because at the time that the Charter was drafted, no consideration was given to the possibility of permanent members other than those referred to in the article. 34. Most speakers interpreted Article 23.1 as having two different criteria – the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization; and equitable geographical distribution. Some delegations, however, stressed that the criteria set out in Article 23.1 should be considered together and not separately. This interpretation would enhance the prospects of smaller States to be elected to the Security Council, irrespective of the size of its population or economic power, because all Member States would be treated equally in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality. 35. Regarding equitable geographical distribution, the view was expressed that this was the one criterion that was clearly applied in practice, given that the allocation of seats to the regional groups was regulated by a General Assembly resolution. Some delegations were critical of the current practice, contending that the current distribution of seats in the Security Council was not equitable and that Article 23.1 did not provide for a mechanism to reflect changes in regional groups. There was also an appeal to reach a common understanding on the interpretation of the criteria stipulated in Article 23.1, since there were no regional groups when the Charter was adopted. 36. There was broad agreement that the criterion of Article 23.1, “contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and the other purposes of the organization”, was open to interpretation, and different interpretations were advanced in this connection. The view was expressed that financial contributions were the most important and scarce asset for the United Nations, and was of [25] paramount importance as an objective criterion. Further, financial contributions to the United Nations could be measured in a way that would create two different perspectives – in absolute numbers or in per capita contribution. Other delegations expressed that view that the Security Council must not be composed of economically powerful States only. Some stated that financial contribution should not be overstressed to justify the expansion of permanent seats. 37. Some delegations expressed the view that the term “contribution” could not be measured in financial terms only. Several other and broader ways of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security were mentioned. These included: the size of military force necessary to maintain peace; financial strength; adherence to the Charter and Security Council and Assembly resolutions; and peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also stated that the criteria of “contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security” were difficult to evaluate objectively, and as a result, had not been applied consistently in practice.

4 Momentum and deadlock

601

38. A number of delegations pointed out that the records of smaller countries’ membership in the Security Council indicated that they could make substantial contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. Smaller countries had indeed contributed in such ways, in particular by playing a mediating role, advancing respect for international law and providing models for the peaceful settlement of disputes. 39. It was argued, during the course of discussions, that it would not be possible to reach consensus on new criteria, given the conflicting viewpoints on this issue. The opinion was also expressed that new criteria were not likely to gain agreement among permanent members of the Security Council. 40. Notwithstanding, ideas were advanced for establishing new criteria for membership of the Security Council. Elements suggested for consideration as criteria included: peacekeeping contributions; contribution to the United Nations budget; population; size; political and economic power and potential; stability of economic system; military force; reduction of military expenditures; eradication of poverty; promotion of education; and influence of civilization. Some delegations pointed out that the principles of non-use of force in international relations, respect for international law, promotion of human rights, and contribution to humanitarian assistance, were the most effective ways of contributing to international peace and security. 41. Some delegations stressed that members of the Security Council should have a clear sense of responsibility, which should not be disassociated from accountability. It was considered to be necessary to develop a system of accountability on the part of the Member States elected to the Security Council. Regarding implementation of Security Council decisions, some delegations stated that permanent members bore foremost responsibility in this area, and their current obligations should be studied. 42. It was proposed in the discussions that Article 23.2 should be amended in order to allow for immediate re-election of Member States to the Security Council. However, other delegations preferred maintaining the current formulation of the Article, in order to better ensure rotation of membership among Member States to the Security Council. Some delegations argued that such an amendment would create a new category of non-permanent members, which they considered would be counterproductive. [26] Topic 4 Relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council […] [28] Topic 5 Accountability […] [29] 61. Some delegations held the view that an increase in the membership in the Security Council was also a critical component in improving accountability, as this would increase the representivity of the Council. A number of delegations were emphatic in their view that a correction of the imbalances in the Council – with new members in both the permanent and non-permanent categories – would confer on the Security Council the necessary legitimacy and make it more accountable, representative and responsive.

602

4 Momentum and deadlock

62. Other delegations emphasized that expansion of the Security Council should only involve elected members, as permanent members were immune from accountability for their actions; only through the electoral process could members of the Security Council be held accountable to the general membership. It was proposed to establish a system of periodical review to evaluate both permanent and non-permanent members, in order to increase accountability. […] [30] […] 67. Various delegations expressed the view that the use of the veto by the permanent members decreased the Council’s accountability to the wider United Nations membership. Some delegations maintained, further, that new permanent members of the Security Council should not be invested with veto power. […] Topic 6 The use of the veto 69. To assist in the consideration of this topic, the Chairman arranged for a note on the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to be circulated to members of the Working Group (see annex I.). Delegations expressed appreciation to the Chairman for circulating the note, stressing that the use of the veto was an important and integral part of the discussions on reform of the Security Council. 70. Numerous delegations expressed the view that the veto was anachronistic, discriminatory and undemocratic. They maintained that the actual use and threat of using the veto represented a complete erosion of the principles of transparency and accountability in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council. 71. It was considered by many speakers that the use of the veto created two categories of membership in the Security Council, despite the principle of sovereign equality contained in Article 2.1 of the Charter. The view was expressed that in no other United Nations body was the principle of sovereign equality violated so regularly in such an institutionalized way. 72. Some delegations pointed out that as important – or more important – than the exercise of the veto were the “informal”, “silent”, “pocket” vetoes or threat of the use of the veto that occurred in informal consultations of the Security Council. As a result, the Security Council failed at times to even consider certain issues. Many delegations expressed the opinion that due to the indiscriminate use of the veto, the Security Council failed to discharge its obligations. [31] 73. Many delegations emphasized that the veto should be used for the benefit of all Member States of the United Nations. However, on many occasions, the veto had been used to protect national interests. Some delegations were of the view that permanent members of the Security Council utilized the veto only on issues they considered to endanger their own perception of threats to world peace. 74. One delegation expressed the view that the veto continued to fulfil a useful function in ensuring decision-making in the Security Council, and that it still had a role to play in maintaining international peace and security. The veto should, however, be used with restraint and in accordance with the Charter. It was also said that the long-term consequences of changing the veto should be considered. Another delegation pointed out that permanent members did not use the veto whenever there was

4 Momentum and deadlock

603

a problem and that abstention by permanent members should be considered in any examination of the use of the veto. 75. Many delegations were of the view that a “voluntary moratorium” or self-restraint with regard to the exercise of veto could not be considered as an option that would enhance the democratization process of the Security Council. The opinion was also expressed that any solution to the veto should be institutional, functional and permanent. 76. Many delegations reflected on how the veto was created. They noted that the veto was meant for Chapter VII issues and that its purpose was to promote collective interests. This objective, however, was considered to have been forgotten. Many delegations called for the abolition of the veto. A number of delegations stated that for the time being it seemed impossible to expect modification of the veto in the Charter. Thus, they suggested the curtailment of the use of the veto preparatory to its complete elimination. 77. A number of proposals were made concerning the use of the veto. They included enhancing the responsibility and accountability of the permanent members of the Security Council regarding the use of the veto; that permanent members should agree to refrain from exercising the veto right except where the issue was of vital importance, and to submit a written explanation when the veto was used; and the establishment of an obligation for the elected members of the Security Council to share information on the formal and informal use of the veto. 78. It was also proposed that the veto should not be abused but should be used with utmost restraint, particularly in authorizing force or implementing sanctions; permanent members should commit to not using the veto when a decision was supported by majority of Security Council members; the use of the veto should be limited to Chapter VII issues only; the veto should not be used on procedural issues; and the veto should not be used on recommendations of the Security Council made according to Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97. 79. It was further proposed that it should be possible to overrule the veto by a twothirds majority vote in the General Assembly under the “Uniting for peace” formula (General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950) and under a progressive interpretation of Article 24.1. Some delegations stated that though the General Assembly should be enabled to exercise that power, the threshold for the use of such power should be very high. They believed that the existence of such a power would serve as a useful deterrent against the exercise of the veto. It was also [32] proposed that the possibility of overruling the veto within the Security Council by an affirmative number of votes in an expanded Security Council should be studied. 80. On the issue of whether to grant the veto to possible new permanent members of the Security Council, some delegations objected to any discrimination between new and old permanent members on the ground that this would create an unwanted third category of members. They stressed that any new permanent members of the Council should have the same privilege as current permanent members. 81. Other delegations stated that extending the right of veto to a larger number of States might lead to a larger number of problems. They did not think that the reform of the Security Council should take place by increasing the permanent membership. Those delegations were of the view that new permanent members would perpetuate

604

4 Momentum and deadlock

the unequal relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council and that more veto-wielding members would not make the Security Council more democratic, representative or accountable. 4.1.19 1 December 2004, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, UN Doc. A/59/565 of 2 December 2004461 […] XIV. The Security Council 244. The founders of the United Nations conferred primary responsibility on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council was designed to enable the world body to act decisively to prevent and remove threats. It was created to be not just a representative but a responsible body, one that had the capacity for decisive action. The five permanent members were given veto rights but were also expected to shoulder an extra burden in promoting global security. Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations established that membership in the Council as a whole was explicitly linked not just to geographical balance but also to contributions to maintaining peace and security. 245. Since the Council was formed the threats and challenges to international peace and security have changed, as has the distribution of power among members. But the Security Council has been slow to change. Decisions cannot be implemented just by members of the Security Council but require extensive military, financial and political involvement by other States. Decisions taken and mandates given have often lacked the essential components of realism, adequate resources and the political determination to see them through. The Secretary-General is frequently holding out a begging bowl to implement Security Council decisions. Moreover, the paucity of representation from the broad membership diminishes support for Security Council decisions. 246. Since the end of the cold war, the effectiveness of the Council has improved, as has its willingness to act; but it has not always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively in the face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility. The financial and military contributions to the United Nations of some of the five permanent members are modest compared to their special status, and often the Council’s non-permanent members have been unable to make the necessary contribution to the work of the Organization envisaged by the Charter. Even outside the use of a formal veto, the ability of the five permanent members to 461  The members of the panel were appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, following the announcement in his speech in the General Assembly on 23 September 2003 (UN Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 2-4). The panel was chaired by Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand. The other members were: Robert Badinter (France), João Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian Qiqian (China), Salim Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and Brent Scowcroft (United States).

4 Momentum and deadlock

605

keep critical issues of peace and security off the Security Council’s agenda has further undermined confidence in the body’s work. 247. Yet recent experience has also shown that the Security Council is the body in the United Nations most capable of organizing action and responding rapidly to new threats. 248. Thus, the challenge for any reform is to increase both the effectiveness and the credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its capacity and willingness to act in the face of threats. This requires greater involvement in Security Council decision-making by those who contribute most; greater contributions from those with special decision-making authority; and greater consultation with those who must implement its decisions. It also requires a firm consensus on the nature of today’s threats, on the obligations of broadened collective security, on the necessity of prevention, and on when and why the Council should authorize the use of force. 249. We believe that reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles: (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically – specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council; (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. 250. The Panel believes that a decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify – and perhaps bring to resolution – a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. 251. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify respectively as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. 252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

606

Regional area Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas Totals model A

4 Momentum and deadlock

No. of States

Permanent seats (continuing)

Proposed new permanent seats

Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)

Total

53 56

0 1

2 2

4 3

6 6

47 35

3 1

1 1

2 4

6 6

191

5

6

13

24

253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and nonrenewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

No. of States

Permanent seats (continuing)

Proposed four-year renewable seats

Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)

Total

Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas

53 56

0 1

2 2

4 3

6 6

47 35

3 1

2 2

1 3

6 6

Totals model B

191

5

8

11

24

Regional area

254. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions. 255. The Panel was strongly of the view that no change to the composition of the Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future. Therefore, there should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in para. 249 above) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. 256. Neither model involves any expansion of the veto or any Charter modification of the Security Council’s existing powers. We recognize that the veto had an important

4 Momentum and deadlock

607

function in reassuring the United Nations most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. 257. We propose the introduction of a system of “indicative voting”, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. Under this indicative vote, “no” votes would not have a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force. The second formal vote on any resolution would take place under the current procedures of the Council. This would, we believe, increase the accountability of the veto function. […] 4.1.20 2005, Bureau of the OEWG, Informal summary on the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group on cluster II issues, UN Doc. A/59/47, Annex II [6] I. Introduction 1. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council met in one formal and four informal sessions, from Monday, 14 February, to Wednesday, 16 February 2005. During the informal sessions, the Working Group took up the following six cluster II issues, as proposed by the President of the General Assembly in his letter of 10 February: (a) Accountability, in particular the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, including reports of the Council to the Assembly; (b) The relationship between the Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations; (c) Consultations with troop-contributing countries; (d) Questions concerning the work of sanctions committees, including Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations; (e) Subsidiary organs of the Security Council; (f) The question of the use of the veto. […] [11] […] VIII. The question of the use of the veto 20. There were different views as to the relevance of this topic for the discussions of cluster II: some delegations stated the view that this question had an exclusive relevance for cluster I and should thus not be discussed under cluster II. Others maintained that the use of the veto was part of the existing working methods of the Security Council and should therefore be addressed under cluster II. Those of the view that this topic indeed belonged to cluster II expressed the view that the veto should be limited in its use with a view to its eventual elimination. Other delegations stated that the elimination of the veto was not a realistic proposition.

608

4 Momentum and deadlock The view was also expressed that the veto should be used with utmost restraint and that its use should be limited to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was also suggested that the use of the veto be changed in such a manner that it could be overruled either by a specific number of positive votes of Security Council members or by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. It was also suggested that if a veto is used, an explanation of the reasons for the veto should be given to the Assembly. Some delegations commented on the recommendation made by the High-level Panel that a system of “indicative voting” should be introduced, whereby members of the Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action,*1 which to their mind required further discussion. Reference was also made to the recommendation of the High-level Panel that permanent members should pledge themselves, in their individual capacities, to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.*2 The view was also expressed, however, that unilateral commitments from permanent members on the use of the veto were, generally speaking, not a viable option to address the issue.

Original footnotes *1 See A/59/565 and Corr.I, para. 257. [2 December 2004, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, → 4.1.19]. *2 Ibid., para. 256. 4.1.21 21 March 2005, UN Secretary-General, Report “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, UN Doc. A/59/2005 I. Introduction: a historic opportunity in 2005 1. Five years into the new millennium, we have it in our power to pass on to our children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous generation. We can have global poverty and halt the spread of major known diseases in the next 10 years. We can reduce the prevalence of violent conflict and terrorism. We can increase respect for human dignity in every land. And we can forge a set of updated international institutions to help humanity achieve these noble goals. If we act boldly – and if we act together – we can make people everywhere more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental human rights. 2. All the conditions are in place for us to do so. In an era of global interdependence, the glue of common interest, if properly perceived, should bind all States together in this cause, as should the impulses of our common humanity. In an era of global abundance, our world has the resources to reduce dramatically the massive divides that persist between rich and poor, if only those resources can be unleashed in the service of all peoples. After a period of difficulty in international affairs, in the face of both new threats and old ones in new guises, there is a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to base collective action. And a desire exists to make the most farreaching reforms in the history of the United Nations so as to equip and resource it to help advance this twenty-first century agenda. 3. The year 2005 presents an opportunity to move decisively in this direction. In September, world leaders will come together in New York to review progress made since the United Nations Millennium Declaration,*1 adopted by all Member States in

4 Momentum and deadlock

609

2000. In preparation for that summit, Member States have asked me to report comprehensively on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. I respectfully submit that report today. I annex to it a proposed agenda to be taken up, and acted upon, at the summit. […] A. The challenges of a changing world 6. In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders were confident that humanity could, in the years ahead, make measurable progress towards peace, security, disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance. They called for a global partnership for development to achieve agreed goals by 2015. They vowed to protect the vulnerable and meet the special needs of Africa. And they agreed that the United Nations needed to become more, not less, actively engaged in shaping our common future. 7. Five years later, a point-by-point report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration would, I feel, miss the larger point, namely, that new circumstances demand that we revitalize consensus on key challenges and priorities and convert that consensus into collective action. […] B. Larger freedom: development, security and human rights […] 14. I have named the present report “In larger freedom” to stress the enduring relevance of the Charter of the United Nations and to emphasize that its purposes must be advanced in the lives of individual men and women. The notion of larger freedom also encapsulates the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand. […] C. The imperative of collective action […] 21. We also need agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. As the world’s only universal body with a mandate to address security, development and human rights issues, the United Nations bears a special burden. As globalization shrinks distances around the globe and these issues become increasingly interconnected, the comparative advantages of the United Nations become ever more evident. So too, however, do some of its real weaknesses. From overhauling basic management practices and building a more transparent, efficient and effective United Nations system to revamping our major intergovernmental institutions so that they reflect today’s world and advance the priorities set forth in the present report, we must reshape the Organization in ways not previously imagined and with a boldness and speed not previously shown. […] D. Time to decide 23. At this defining moment in history, we must be ambitious. Our action must be as urgent as the need, and on the same scale. […] […] V. Strengthening the United Nations 153. In the present report, I have argued that the principles and purposes of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, remain as valid and relevant today as they were in 1945, and that the present moment is a precious opportunity to put them into practice. But while purposes should be firm and principles constant, practice and organization

610

4 Momentum and deadlock

need to move with the times. If the United Nations is to be a useful instrument for its Member States and for the world’s peoples, in responding to the challenges described in sections II to IV above it must be fully adapted to the needs and circumstances of the twenty-first century. It must be open not only to States but also to civil society, which at both the national and international levels plays an increasingly important role in world affairs. Its strength must be drawn from the breadth of its partnerships and from its ability to bring those partners into effective coalitions for change across the whole spectrum of issues on which action is required to advance the cause of larger freedom. 154. Clearly our Organization, as an organization, was built for a different era. Equally clearly, not all our current practices are adapted to the needs of today. That is why Heads of State and Government, in the Millennium Declaration, recognized the need to strengthen the United Nations to make it a more effective instrument for pursuing their priorities. […] B. The Councils 165. Its founders endowed the United Nations with three Councils, each having major responsibilities in its own area: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. Over time, the division of responsibilities between them has become less and less balanced: the Security Council has increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its permanent members but has seen that authority questioned on the grounds that its composition is anachronistic or insufficiently representative; the Economic and Social Council has been too often relegated to the margins of global economic and social governance; and the Trusteeship Council, having successfully carried out its functions, is now reduced to a purely formal existence. 166. I believe we need to restore the balance, with three Councils covering respectively, (a) international peace and security, (b) economic and social issues, and (c) human rights, the promotion of which has been one of the purposes of the Organization from its beginnings but now clearly requires more effective operational structures. These Councils together should have the task of driving forward the agenda that emerges from summit and other conferences of Member States, and should be the global forms in which the issues of security, development and justice can be properly addressed. The first two Councils, of course, already exist but need to be strengthened. The third requires a far-reaching overhaul and upgrading of our existing human rights machinery. Security Council 167. By adhering to the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States recognize that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree to be bound by its decisions. It is therefore of vital importance, not only to the Organization but to the world, that the Council should be equipped to carry out this responsibility and that its decisions should command worldwide respect. 168. In the Millennium Declaration, all States resolved to intensify their efforts “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects” (see General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 30). This reflected the view, long held by the majority, that a change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical

4 Momentum and deadlock

611

realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also need to be made more efficient and transparent. The Council must be not only more representative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed. Reconciling these two imperatives is the hard test that any reform proposal must pass. 169. Two years ago, I declared that in my view no reform of the United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council. That is still my belief. The Security Council must be broadly representative of the realities of power in today’s world. I therefore support the position set out in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565)462 concerning the reforms of the Security Council, […] […] Original footnote *1 General Assembly resolution 55/2. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, → 4.1.6]. 4.1.22 21 March 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/PV.83, pp. 1-4 […] Mr. President, thank you for allowing me to present to the Assembly, in person, the five-year progress report that it requested from me on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration.463 The main message of that report is that the aims of the Declaration can be achieved, but only if you, the Member States, are willing to adopt a package of specific, concrete decisions this year. Some of these decisions are so important that they need to be taken at the level of heads of State and Government. It is therefore very fortunate that your heads of State and Government have agreed to come here for a summit meeting in September. I am giving you my report six months ahead of that meeting so that your Governments have ample time to consider it. My hope is that world leaders, when they arrive here in September, will be ready to take the decisions that are needed, and I hope they will adopt them as a package. […] The cause of larger freedom can be advanced only if nations work together; and the United Nations can help only if it is remoulded as an effective instrument of their common purpose. […] In the final part of the report, on “Strengthening the United Nations”,464 I set out proposals for making this Organization the instrument through which all its Members can agree on the strategies outlined in the first three parts and help each other to implement them. This reflects my long-held view that, in order to do its job, the United Nations must be brought fully into line with today’s realities. It can and must be a 462  1 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 463  → 4.1.6. 464  → 4.1.14.

612

4 Momentum and deadlock

representative and efficient world organization, open and accountable to the public as well as to Governments. I start with proposals for the revitalization of the General Assembly, to which the Millennium Declaration rightly assigned a central position as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations, but which in recent times has suffered from declining prestige and has not made the contribution that it should to our activities. I am asking heads of State or Government to reverse this by instructing representation to adopt at the sixtieth session a comprehensive package of reforms, by resolving to focus the Assembly’s agenda on major substantive issues of the day and by establishing mechanisms through which it can engage fully and systematically with civil society, as recommended by the Cardoso report (A/58/817).465 I then recommend a system of three councils, covering respectively international peace and security, economic and social issues and human rights. This reflects the priorities set out in the earlier parts of the report, on which I believe there is broad consensus. The first two of those councils already exist, of course, but they need to be strengthened. The third requires a far-reaching overhaul and upgrading of our human rights machinery. First, I urge Member States to make the Security Council more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today. This important issue has been discussed for too long. I believe Member States should agree to take a decision on it – preferably by consensus, but in any case before the summit – making use of one or another of the options presented in the report of the High-level Panel (A/59/565).466 And I suggest that the renewed Security Council should make clear in a resolution the principles by which it intends to be guided when deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force. […] 4.1.23 16 September 2005, UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome […] Security Council 152. We reaffirm that Member States have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acting on their behalf, as provided for by the Charter. 153. We support early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. We commit ourselves to continuing our efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end of 2005. […]

465  1 1 June 2004, UN Doc. A/58/817. 466  1 December 2004, → 4.1.19.

4 Momentum and deadlock

613

4.1.24 20 April 2006, OEWG, Closing remarks by the Vice-Chairpersons, UN Doc. A/60/47, Annex II467 […] [7] Main points of the debate Introduction […] Case for Security Council reform Broad support was heard for Security Council reform, across the board, among all groups. The 2005 World Summit Outcome provided a guideline.468 According to one delegation, non-action was not an option. Some were more specific in stating that action should be taken during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. Although “reform fatigue” was mentioned, no one expressed fear that continued discussion on Security Council reform would overshadow or jeopardize other reform efforts. Indeed, some argued that successful Security Council reform would facilitate progress on other reform issues. The opinion was expressed that reform, both on enlargement and working methods, should take place with the broadest possible agreement. There was still discussion on how broad. Some did not exclude the use of a vote, others did. A discussion was held on the relationship between enlargement and working methods. Some favoured a comprehensive approach. Others deemed the two issues separable and of a different nature: enlargement was an event requiring Charter amendment, whereas the reform of working methods was a continuous process. [8] Enlargement of the Security Council There was still a great deal of commonality in thinking on the need for enlargement. Catch phrases that were widely used made reference to the need to make the Council more representative, the need to increase the legitimacy of Council decisions, and the need to better reflect geopolitical realities, geopolitical diversity, balance of power and global stability. The commonality in thinking was all the more so because the Security Council was assuming a bigger role, with more authority, a wider range of subjects and an expanded interpretation of international peace and security. All of those demands required increasing the legitimacy of the Council. In that regard, some also mentioned the issue of encroachment by the Security Council on the competences of the General Assembly. The increased effectiveness of the Council was a goal shared by all. Neverthe­less, the modalities of enlargement remained under debate. Some made the case that only the expansion of the number of permanent members would change the dynamics in the Council, would really change things. Others repeated their opposition to anything permanent. Different definitions of permanent were discussed, including permanent member with a veto, permanent

• • • • • • • • • • •

467  In the 60th session, the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Jan Eliasson (Sweden), served as Chairperson of the Working Group. Ambassadors Paulette Bethel (Bahamas) and Franciscus Antonius Maria Majoor (Netherlands) served as Vice-Chairpersons. 468  16 September 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, → 4.1.23.

614

4 Momentum and deadlock

members without a veto and permanent seats for regions. The notion of renewable seats was also mentioned. Several countries indicated the necessity to take into account the position of small States in any enlargement model. Concretely, the sponsors of the various draft resolutions repeated the features of their respective proposals. Some delegations mentioned the need to look at alternative ideas but no concrete new ideas were presented. There were, however, indications of flexibility. Working methods of the Security Council There was broad recognition of the necessity to adapt the working methods of the Security Council. […] [9] […] On the veto The issue of the veto was mentioned separately. A number of delegations underlined that it continues to be a crucial issue, both with regard to enlargement and to working methods. Opinions ranged from altogether abolishing the veto to limiting its use. The debate showed that it remained a point of divergence. Future work […]

• • • • • •

4.1.25 19 April 2007, Report of the facilitators469 to the President of the General Assembly on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex II I. Introduction The question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council was first introduced on the agenda of the United Nations in 1979, during the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. At its forty-eighth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/26, of 3 December 1993,470 by which it decided to establish the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. However, after more than a decade of intensive discussions on this important matter, both in the General Assembly and within the Open-ended Working Group, no concrete result has thus far been achieved. At the 2005 World Summit, stressing the need to complete Security Council reform – as an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – Heads of State and Government expressed support for early reform of the Security Council, in 469  The five facilitators appointed by the President of the General Assembly on 8 February 2007 were Mr. Ali Hachani, Permanent Representative of Tunisia; Mr. Andreas D. Mavroyiannis, Permanent Representative of Cyprus; Ms. Mirjana Mladineo, Permanent Representative of Croatia; Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, Permanent Representative of Chile; and Mr. Frank Majoor, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands. See the introduction to the present document, para. 5. 470  → 3.1.2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

615

order to make it more representative, efficient and transparent and to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy of its decisions. On 11 December 2006, in opening the plenary debate on Security Council reform, the President of the General Assembly stated that after many years of inconclusive debate the time had come to make a realistic assessment of the whole issue and to be prepared to look at this matter with a fresh and open mind, if the General Assembly were to make substantial progress.471 Against this backdrop, in her letter dated 24 January 2007, the President of the General Assembly invited the membership to start consultations on five key issues, namely: categories of membership; the question of the veto; the question of regional representation; the size of an enlarged Security Council; and the working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Subsequently, on 8 February 2007, the President of the General Assembly appointed five facilitators in their individual capacity to assist her during the consultation process on the five above-mentioned issues: Mr. Ali Hachani, the Permanent Representative of Tunisia; Mr. Andreas D. Mavroyiannis, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus; Mrs. Mirjana Mladineo, the Permanent Representative of Croatia; Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile; and Mr. Frank Majoor, the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands. The President of the General Assembly mandated the five facilitators to conduct open, transparent and inclusive consultations, with a view to making the most accurate possible assessment on the state of play on Security Council reform, for the purpose of establishing the appropriate process that would enable the General Assembly to fulfil the challenging task of reforming the Council. Furthermore, the President requested the five facilitators to prepare a consolidated report on the result of their work, in order to allow the membership to have an informed follow-up discussion on the way forward. From 20 to 23 February 2007, the facilitators held a series of six informal meetings. The facilitators also convened an informal interactive panel discussion on 13 March 2007. These informal meetings, which took place in the framework of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, provided the Member States with opportunities to have a comprehensive discussion on all related aspects of the reform of the Council while focusing on each of the five aforementioned main issues identified by the President of the General Assembly. In addition, the five facilitators conducted, separately and jointly, wide-ranging consultations and met with individual States and various groups of States. These contacts also allowed them to interact with delegations that did not participate in the openended informal meetings and thus to take the fullest possible account of the views of all Member States. The purpose of the present report is to provide the President of the General Assembly with the outcome of the consultations the facilitators carried out over the past three months. The report includes a descriptive appendix, which gives an account 471  See UN Doc. A/61/PV.72, p. 2.

616

4 Momentum and deadlock

and assessment of the views expressed by Member States on the different issues under consideration, and a more analytical part providing a number of notions on the way to move the process forward. The appendix chiefly contains the evaluations of each facilitator responsible for his/her respective theme. The section “Notions on the way forward” reflects the common views of the facilitators. The facilitators hope that Member States will, in the next stage of the process, give special attention to the “Notions on the way forward” presented in this report. II. Notions on the way forward As stated above, the facilitators, guided by the President of the General Assembly, undertook an inclusive process of consultations to elicit an accurate reflection of the positions and suggestions of the membership on the main questions regarding Security Council reform. Based on those consultations and on the assessments contained in the appendix to the present report, the set of notions of reform presented below may serve as a framework for results-oriented negotiations, a process over which Member States should have collective ownership. The objective of the facilitators was to map out what seems most feasible at this stage, so that Member States themselves might proceed to work out all possible configurations guided by the notions identified below as prospective ways of moving forward. 1. Security Council enlargement is an integral part of the United Nations reform process. Member States consider that the United Nations reform would be incomplete without meaningful Security Council reform. Maintaining the status quo is not acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Member States that feel that the current situation should be improved. 2. Flexibility is key in order to move forward on Security Council reform; but flexibility must be effectively shown and shared by all concerned. A significant number of Member States tend to agree that an ideal solution may not be possible at this stage and believe that it may be more reasonable to consider the best possible substantial solution for now. 3. The positions of the major interest groups, well known to the membership for some time, are not likely to be fully realized at this stage. It was encouraging that, in order to move forward with the process, and despite the reiteration of initial positions, flexibility was displayed in the form of willingness to explore a viable compromise solution. 4. The General Assembly should choose a Security Council reform formula that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by the membership, and in any case well above the required majority in the General Assembly, including the acquiescence by the current permanent members of the Council, bearing in mind the ratification process of any amendment to the Charter of the United Nations as stipulated in its Article 108. 5. Any achievable solution must address the concerns of the wide majority of States Members of the United Nations aimed at enhancing their access, both in terms of increasing their chances to serve as members of the Security Council and by being more intensively involved with its work while not members. The second element was a particular source of concern for small States and for those which have an item inscribed on the Council’s agenda. 6. Enlargement and working methods need to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. They are closely linked and reform will be incomplete without either one.

4 Momentum and deadlock

617

However, in any scenario, continued efforts should be made to improve the working methods. 7. Expansion needs to be based both on the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the United Nations as well as equitable geographical distribution, as stipulated in the Charter. Maintaining the current regional groups, any enlargement should address the underrepresentation of developing countries as well as small States. The wide diversity in the membership of the Organization might be taken into account. 8. Under the present state of affairs, Member States, while retaining their initial positions, may wish to explore new and emerging ideas concerning a transitional approach to Security Council reform. A transitional approach assumes an intermediary arrangement and should have as an integral component a mandatory review to take place at a predetermined date. Within the transitional approach there are different options and variations that Member States may wish to further explore. The negotiable elements include the content and duration of the intermediary arrangement and the nature of the review. Issues on which Member States will not agree in the negotiations would have to be deferred to the review. Consequently, at this stage, none of the stakeholders have to give up their original positions. 9. As regards categories, the transitional approach, without prejudice to the prospect of creating new permanent seats, could explore the creation of new nonpermanent seats as well as an intermediate category. Member States may wish to consider, inter alia, the following variations on an intermediate category: Extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, including the possibility of recall. Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but with the possibility of re-election. The length of the terms as well as the re-election modalities should be decided in negotiations. Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but without the possibility of re-election. The length of the term should be decided in the negotiations. Non-permanent two-year seats with the possibility of immediate re-election. 10. Regarding the veto, some Member States favour and some oppose its elimination; some demand and some oppose its extension. Therefore, as a definitive solution might not be feasible at this stage, Member States may wish to address this question within the framework of the review. In the meantime, Member States may wish to consider forms of limitation in the use of the veto. These might include, among others: Ways of enhancing accountability for the use of the veto. Limitations of the scope of application of the veto. Individual or collective pledges to refrain from its use in certain instances. 11. Regarding regional representation, in the sense of Member States representing regional views, the notion of accountability, both in the election process and while serving in the Council, might be explored. To take this aspect into account, the following ideas could be considered: Future candidatures to the Security Council could be proposed directly by Member States or through regional consensus, it being understood that the final decision is to be taken by the General Assembly through the election process as set out in the Charter.

• • • • • • • •

618

4 Momentum and deadlock

Elected members of the Council should be deemed, if they so wish, to also rep• resent, through internal arrangements, the views of the groups to which they

belong while continuing to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 12. As regards the question of the expansion of the size of the Security Council, Member States may decide to consider the following options: A limited expansion, believed to be supported by those Member States particularly concerned about the efficiency of the Council. A large expansion, believed to be supported by those Member States particularly concerned about the Council’s representativity. A medium-size expansion that could reconcile the concerns of those who argue for an efficient Council with the views of those who underscore its representativity. A limited expansion in a first stage and a further expansion in the framework of the review. 13. Any reform scenario should enhance access for non-Security Council members by improving the working methods of the Council. Since any enlargement will only modestly improve the chances of individual Member States to become a member of the Council, better access for non-Council members is deemed an essential and integral part of a reform package. At the same time, improvement of the working methods can be seen as a continuous, dynamic process. At this stage, Member States may wish to consider the following options: Establishment of a mechanism ensuring that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request in private meetings of the Council (more vigorous implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter) and expansion of consultation and cooperation with regional organizations and countries in the region, not only in thematic, public meetings, but also in private meetings. Creation of additional opportunities for non-Council members whose interests are specially affected to be heard in the work of the subsidiary bodies; in case of resolutions that call into being far-reaching obligations of Member States, an extended consultation process could be established. Implementation of consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations; troop-contributing countries and, as appropriate, host countries to be invited to private meetings of the Security Council at which the mandate of a peacekeeping operation is discussed. Increase in the transparency of the Council’s work by: encouraging formal adoption of rules of procedure, stimulating thematic reports by the Council for discussion in the General Assembly and ensuring regular consultations between the Presidents of the principal organs on the implementation of the respective mandates, in accordance with the Charter. III. Conclusions The present report represents the honest evaluation of the facilitators of the state of affairs on Security Council reform. It reflects months of extensive and inclusive consultations, at which the facilitators carefully listened to the views and concerns of Member States. The facilitators have tried to make a fair assessment, as contained in the appendix, of the different aspects related to the reform.

• • • •

• • • •

4 Momentum and deadlock

619

On the basis of the consultations and the assessment, the facilitators have prepared the above notions that Member States might want to further discuss in order to explore feasible solutions for the way forward, aimed at facilitating tangible progress on a key and integral component of United Nations reform. As such, an attempt has been made to identify new and emerging ideas that might be worth exploring. At the same time, as stressed before, the facilitators underline that Member States may wish to pursue other options. The options identified here are not necessarily exhaustive. The facilitators trust that their report will contribute to productive further discussions in which Security Council reform can be brought to a next stage. This could include an agreement on a negotiating process that is conducive to timely decisionmaking. The facilitators believe that there is a path forward that Member States could build on towards meaningful negotiations, taking advantage of the current momentum. The reform process ahead needs to continue to be all-inclusive and transparent. Appendix: Assessments on clusters Categories of membership The issue of categories of membership proved to be one of the key issues in the entire process. One of the main purposes of the facilitation was to explore whether innovative ideas heard during consultations could help to reconcile existing positions, with a view of advancing the process. The following views were expressed during consultations: A large group of States continued to call for the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership (permanent and non-permanent seats). A group of States, while defending an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories, is proposing that any new permanent seats holders enjoy all prerogatives of permanent members, including the veto right in the event that it is maintained. Another group of States reiterated its position of seeking the creation of a category of membership that is of a permanent character but, at least initially, without exercising the veto. Addition of new non-permanent seats is also proposed by this group. A group of States reiterated its position of accepting enlargement only in the category of non-permanent seats, while considering that no initial positions should be pre-empted for any future discussions of the issue. The creation of only nonpermanent seats is also considered by a group of States as a possible fallback position in case no other satisfactory solution is found. Some Member States encouraged the exploration of a sort of an “interim” or “transitional solution” based on a longer-term renewability of seats. Likewise, other Member States expressed their readiness to explore a solution that would move the process ahead while enjoying broad acceptance. Some delegations, especially from small States, expressed the view that any solution should enhance their aspiration to serve on the Security Council. A large number of delegations expressed the view that in any expansion there is a need for ensuring a strengthened representation of developing countries and small States. A number of delegations stressed the need to take into account the wide cultural diversity within the international community. Some delegations expressed their wish to have the question of categories and the other issue-areas ascertained through a “questionnaire” addressed to Member States.

• • • • •

• • •

620

4 Momentum and deadlock

The notion of accountability, both at the time of election (Article 23.2 of the • Charter of the United Nations) and while serving in the Council (Article 24.2

of the Charter) has been addressed by delegations in relation with categories of membership: A group belonging to a specific region is of the view that that region would be responsible for the selection of its representative States in an enlarged Council, which would be accountable to it. Other Member States expressed the view that accountability could be ensured through a process of “challenge” within a review mechanism. Signals of flexibility were shown during the consultations: despite the reiteration of initial positions, readiness for some flexibility was expressed by the main groups, especially on the question of permanency: Delegations defending permanency would accept to submit the status of any new permanent seats to challenge. Delegations contesting permanency would admit the possibility for a number of States to be members of the Council for a longer period of time than that initially envisaged in the Charter. Members of a group of States, although remaining firm in their initial positions, expressed readiness to refer any new proposed elements regarding Security Council reform to their highest political authorities at the earliest possible opportunity. The question of the veto Given the sui generis character of the veto, the extent of Member States’ flexibility and the scope of possible veto reform were explored through extensive bilateral consultations with a cross-regional sample incorporating small, medium-sized and large States, States having items on the agenda of the Security Council and the States currently holding the veto. Member States addressed the issue on two levels: ideal and attainable reform. The veto was criticized on various grounds by a significant majority of Member States, many of which also relayed a perception that its elimination is not realistic at this stage. Trends regarding the veto included the restriction of its use, prevention of its extension, resignation from its reform at this stage and extension of it to all permanent members so long as it exists. In terms of restricting the veto, suggestions included limiting the instances where it can be used (for example to exclude instances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), establishing criteria for when and in which situations the veto can be used, formalizing explanations for the use of veto, limiting the scope of application of the veto (either restricting it to Chapter VII decisions or disallowing its use in Chapter VI decisions), restricting its use to only vital issues, barring the veto where a permanent member is a party to a conflict, changing its weight (for example requiring two negative votes to reject a draft resolution), overruling it and placing a cap on the total number of negative votes that can be cast by a permanent member. Member States considered that extension of the veto presupposes agreement on the addition of new permanent members. Permanent members themselves did not rule out extending the veto, depending on the number of prospective new permanent members and which those would be. Their position ranged from offering qualified support to the draft resolution of the Group of Four (G-4) to being ready to add one or

• • • • •

4 Momentum and deadlock

621

two new members to the group of five permanent members (P-5) and extending the veto to a representative from a region currently without it. Among States in support of expansion in permanent and non-permanent members, three tendencies were identifiable: (a) the veto is a tool for inaction that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the Council and should not be extended to new permanent members; (b) extension of the veto, in principle, accompanied by a commitment not to use it until a future review; and (c) automatic extension of the veto to new permanent members. The second option gathered the most support, inter alia, because it was also expressed as a fallback position by many States supporting options one and three. For those supporting extension of the veto at this stage, the second option would provide future prospect to that end, while for those supporting non-extension of the veto the second option would satisfy their position now without pre-empting the eventual settlement of the issue. The general perception of the permanent members regarding the veto, despite nuances regarding certain aspects of the issue, is that the veto is at the core and is the sustaining force of the system of collective security. It is considered to be inherently different from other elements discussed in the reform process as it is the result of a political understanding that pre-dates the Charter and thus could not be reformed by the wider membership. Its reform could only be governed by the same historical rationale that initially brought it into being as a tool of restricting the scope of the collective security system according to their major policy considerations. Permanent members recognized that the wider membership had concerns regarding the veto but did not consider that it was misused; rather, they insisted that the veto is exercised with restraint. However, they did not exclude the prospect of finding ways among themselves to appease those concerns, including, for most of them, through: (a) a voluntary commitment in this respect; or (b) an oral understanding that permanent members would agree to a non-legally binding statement once the reform process has been agreed upon. Despite nuances, permanent members alluded to the limits of what could be agreed vis-à-vis the veto. The abolition or modification of the veto would not be ratifiable through a Charter amendment. This includes legally binding regulation of the veto or General Assembly guidelines on how to exercise it. The involvement of the Assembly in matters falling within what permanent members consider to be exclusive competence of the Security Council is not amenable, nor is explanation of the use of veto before the Assembly (the P-5 consider that the two organs stand on an equal footing). Most permanent members based their acceptance of enlargement and other reform of the Council on preserving the essence of their veto power. The limited span between what the current holders of the veto could accept and what the wider membership is seeking prompted Member States to contemplate the option of bypassing substantial veto reform at this stage while maintaining strong preference for the veto to be explicitly included on the agenda of a possible future review. The latter requires further exploration, as there does not seem to be across-theboard agreement on it. The assessment of the facilitators is that, although desirable for the majority of Member States, veto reform alone might not be the single factor that will seal or break the reform deal at this stage, provided that the rest of the reform package will be substantial.

622

4 Momentum and deadlock

States that have thus far insisted on new permanent members obtaining the same rights and privileges as the incumbents, including the veto, were frequently mentioned as key to the process of Security Council reform. Such States, when consulted, reiterated their official collective position but appeared to be willing to consider alternatives on condition that those would be concrete and sufficiently attractive. While these States did not rule out the prospect of a provisional solution, it was quite clear that no definitive views could be provided by them on this level of consultation at this stage. Member States which addressed the use of the veto as a source of non-action on the part of the United Nations expressed varying views on whether and how this could be remedied. The mechanism created through General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950472 was accepted as an alternative by some but deemed either ineffective and/or undesirable by others. No concrete suggestions were suggested on how the Assembly might exercise a subsidiary role in those instances where the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is not exercised because of a veto. Member States did, however, stress that the Assembly should do more to fully exercise its competencies under Articles 10 to 12 of the Charter, including by examining matters of peace and security, and calling on the Council to take relevant action. This could exhort the Council to take action on a situation, provide the viewpoint of the wider membership to the Council on a particular issue and contain the veto through input that would deter its use. The awareness by the Council of the pronouncement of the Assembly on a certain issue would make it difficult for the Council to subsequently ignore the collective will of the international community and be silent on account of a veto. In the above consultations it transpired that one pragmatic option concerning veto reform at this stage is the possibility of a pledge by the permanent members to exercise the veto with restraint. While this would not amount to a legally binding measure, some Member States have indicated that this would have an impact in practical terms. It was reasoned that indirect limitation/regulation of the veto and the influence of permanent members could be achieved to some degree through the cumulative impact of reform. It was also suggested that enlargement itself amounts to a de facto limitation of the power of the veto because permanent members will constitute less than 25 per cent of the Security Council and the responsibility to block action through veto will be substantially heavier. As the veto is viewed as synonymous with the influence, of the permanent five members, it is particularly pertinent to note that the enhanced presence and voting might of members other than the permanent five is believed by many to limit the influence of permanent members on decision-making, including decision-making that is exclusively power balance driven. Lastly, it was suggested that the power stemming from possession of the veto (implicit veto) would diminish if the Council operated in a manner that allowed for less pressure to be exerted on nonpermanent members. Question of regional representation There seemed to be a common understanding that the Security Council in its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical realities and thus needs to be adequately rebalanced: 472  See UN Doc. A/RES/337(V).

4 Momentum and deadlock

623

he majority of delegations were of the view that the rebalancing of the Security • TCouncil needs to be based on “the contribution to the maintenance of interna-

tional peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization”, as well as on equitable geographical representation, as stipulated in Article 23 of the Charter. Nevertheless, some delegations pointed out that additional objectives and measurable criteria had yet to be worked out to define the necessary capabilities of States relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. Proposals included the level of financial contribution to the United Nations, population, regional role and standing, size of military forces and contributions to peacekeeping operations. In the course of the discussion there seemed to be a twofold understanding of the term “regional representation”: Some delegations identified the term “regional representation” as identical to the “equitable geographical distribution” as contained in Article 23.1 of the Charter. Other delegations expressed the view that the term “regional representation” should be understood as the regional seat leading to regional accountability. They argued that the notion of regional representation, in the sense of Member States representing regional views, could be explored further. Different options were suggested, such as candidatures to be proposed directly by Member States or through regional consensus, it being understood that the final decision is to be taken by the General Assembly through the election process as set out in the Charter. Another suggestion was that members of the Council should be deemed, if they so wish, to also represent the views of regional groups to which they belong while continuing to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. However, a wide number of delegations felt that, at this stage, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, although proposed on a regional basis, could not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of the Council, they should have a global accountability and an obligation to the international community as a whole. In addition, many delegations were of the view that the concept of regional seats, given the different character of each regional group as well as the existing differences in their internal working procedures, was not feasible at this stage. Although the composition of the existing regional groups was challenged as not accurately reflecting geopolitical realities, there seems to be a wide understanding that the restructuring of the current system is not realistic. The majority is thus still of the view that the principle of the equitable geographic distribution should be exercised through the existing structures. Nevertheless, opinions varied on how to amend the situation, in particular with respect to defining the underrepresented. The discussion brought out several interpretations within the category of the underrepresented. Accordingly, the underrepresented were classified in the following manner: Within the existing group arrangements, there was a general feeling that Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented. Some opined that the Group of Eastern European States was also underrepresented.

•

• •

• •

•

624

4 Momentum and deadlock

here was also a broad understanding that small and developing countries are • Tunderrepresented as a general rule. In addition, some delegations pointed out

that small and developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented in particular. Some delegations were of the opinion that there was a need for an enlarged Security Council to represent all cultures, religions and civilizations. In that respect, although various political organizations were mentioned as candidates for a Council seat, the majority of delegations argued it would contradict the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations and therefore proposed that their legitimate concerns should be accommodated through other means. Bearing in mind the inseparable links between the “regional representation” cluster and those of “Size” and “Categories of membership”, it might prove to be very difficult to devise any workable solution prior to the agreement on the number of seats to be distributed. However, since it can be argued that the notions of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution constitute the fundamental elements of any future fair and just solution, they should be taken into account as a general principle during deliberations as well as at the early stages of the eventual future negotiations on size and categories. Size of an enlarged Security Council During consultations, Member States agreed with an enlargement in the size of the Security Council. No Member State opposed expansion. Below, are some of the main opinions expressed by Member States in the consultations: The size of an enlarged Security Council cannot be judged in isolation from other conditioning issues, such as equitable regional representation and the categories of membership. Determining the size of an enlarged Council was guided, for example, by the aspirations of regions to be satisfied with their representation, rather than a theoretical number decided a priori. Opinions as to the size of an enlarged Security Council vary. Many Member States gave specific preferred numbers, while others expressed the view that they are open to suggestions, some of them provided that additional considerations are taken into account. Some Member States expressed that among the main criteria that ought to be considered in determining the size of an expanded Security Council are equitable geographical distribution, enhanced credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. A number of delegations added criteria such as the financial and diplomatic contributions to the United Nations and respect for democracy and human rights. Others preferred to adhere solely to the criteria enunciated in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, i.e. “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”. The “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of an enlarged Security Council were considered by some delegations, in particular, but not only, permanent members of the Council, as paramount elements for a Council that is supposed to act swiftly in the face of crises. Other delegations argued that efficiency does not necessarily

•

• • •

•

4 Momentum and deadlock

625

result from a reduced size and that efficiency (or efficacy) could ultimately improve by enlargement in more representative higher numbers. Some Member States lamented the current configuration of regional groups, as not representative of like-minded States, but agreed, as most members did, that it would not be advisable to revisit existing regional groups, notwithstanding the wish expressed by some that an expanded Security Council should consider seats for small States or States of particular cultures and civilizations. A significant number of Member States, both developed and developing, from different regions, believe that the size of an expanded Security Council should remedy the underrepresentation of developing countries, particularly from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. A number of delegations, while stressing that the Security Council should properly represent current world reality, expressed their desire to see an adequate correlation between the number of members in the Council and the membership of the General Assembly. They pointed out that the ratio between the Council and the general membership of the United Nations was 21 per cent in 1945 (a ratio of 1:5), 13 per cent in 1965 (a ratio of 1:8) and less than 8 per cent (a ratio of 1:13) at the present time. A limited expansion of seats has been advocated by Member States on grounds of efficiency and agility of the Security Council to confront crises. Other Member States favour a larger expansion of seats based on the representativity of the Council. In the view of some Member States, an increase in the number of seats, even if solely in the non-permanent category, would entail a rebalancing of the power structure within the Security Council. More members would require new higher proportions of votes to approve resolutions, as the weight percentage of permanent members would decline. While some Member States addressed the question of size from the perspective of a one-time expansion, some Member States felt that a review conference should revisit the issue of size in the context of a transitional approach. Despite the fact that views on the exact size of an expanded Security Council differ among Member States, they do not seem irreconcilable. Working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […]

• • •

• • • •

4.1.26 26 June 2007, Mr. Heraldo Muñoz and Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Report to the President of the General Assembly on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex IV I. Introduction 1. On 22 May 2007, the President of the General Assembly appointed Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile and Mr. Christian Wenaweser, the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein (hereinafter referred to as “the authors”),

626

4 Momentum and deadlock

to conduct consultations with the membership on how to move the process forward, in formats they deem useful. The President asked the two Permanent Representatives to use the report of the five facilitators of 19 April 2007 (see annex II)473 as the basis for those consultations and to report back on the outcome before the end of June 2007. 2. Moreover, in view of their significant contribution to the deliberations on Security Council reform, the President of the General Assembly asked the facilitators appointed on 8 February 2007474 to continue to advise her on this important matter. II. Background 3. The present report is submitted in accordance with the mandate contained in the above-mentioned letter of 22 May 2007. In keeping with this mandate, and building upon the momentum created by the report of the five facilitators, the authors of the present report have conducted inclusive and extensive consultations. In this context, they approached existing groups – those that have taken a position on Security Council reform in the past as well as others – and thus reached out to the membership in the course of their consultations. In addition, they also held numerous bilateral talks. 4. The authors of the report also benefited from the views offered during the informal plenary meetings held on 3 and 4 May 2007 and from the insight provided by the facilitators advising the President of the General Assembly. 5. Throughout this most recent stage of consultations, many Member States have reiterated that Security Council reform is an integral part of the ongoing United Nations reform process and that United Nations reform would be incomplete without a meaningful reform of the Council. In this regard, the status quo is not acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Member States. There is thus a continued strong commitment to Security Council reform in accordance with paragraphs 152 to 154 of the outcome document of September 2005 (resolution 60/1).475 6. Furthermore, Member States underscored that to move forward on Security Council reform, flexibility had to be effectively shown and shared by all concerned. Such flexibility would imply a concrete commitment to find the widest possible political agreement. 7. Both in the report of the facilitators and in the informal plenary meetings it was made clear that those who have taken distinct positions on Security Council reform in the past still maintain those positions. This report is thus without prejudice to positions expressed by Member States in the past and in particular to the proposals on Security Council reform submitted in the past by the Group of Four (G-4) (A/59/L.64),476 the “Uniting for consensus group” (A/59/L.68)477 and the African Group (A/59/L.67).478 The same applies to the proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5), which dealt exclusively with the working methods of the Council (A/60/L.49).479

473   UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex II, → 4.1.25. 474  → 4.1.25. 475  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23. 476  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 477  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 478  14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 479  17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18.

4 Momentum and deadlock

627

8. The consultations have reaffirmed that at this stage of the process, the positions of the major interest groups from the past are unlikely to be fully realized. Therefore, as stated in the report of the five facilitators, under the present state of affairs, Member States, including those supporting the above-cited draft resolutions, while retaining their initial positions, may be open to explore further a transitional approach to Security Council reform. At present, there is considerable interest in and openness to the transitional or intermediary approach; nevertheless, a deeper understanding is needed to advance the process. This report is intended to assist in such a possible exploration. III. The intermediary approach 9. The positions taken in the past have revealed stark differences of opinion on a number of issues such as size of an enlarged Security Council, the veto and on whether new permanent seats should be created. The intermediary approach, as outlined in the report of the five facilitators, is intended to reconcile those positions to the extent possible and is therefore, by definition, a compromise. At the same time, it is not meant to reflect a lowest common denominator, but rather a possible solution that is at the same time politically sustainable and framed in a manner that is flexible enough to allow the membership to take further reform steps in the future. It is clear that the goal of any proposal on Security Council reform should be to find the formula that garners the strongest possible agreement of the membership, preferably expressed through support exceeding the legally required two-thirds majority, thus facilitating an early entry into force of the necessary Charter amendments. 10. Such a solid political majority will have to take into account the interests and concerns of all major interest groups and States, including of those which do not fully subscribe to any of the proposals submitted in the past. This includes small States which emphasize their particular interest in the issue of working methods, in particular the aspect of access to information and decision-making within the Council, to which those which have an item inscribed on the Council’s agenda also attach particular importance, as well as enhancing their possibility of serving on the Council. 11. A transitional approach assumes an interim arrangement and should have as an integral component a mandatory review to take place at a predetermined date to review and assess the adequacy of this arrangement. Issues on which Member States will not agree in the negotiations would have to be deferred to the review. IV. Notions for discussion 12. In paragraph 8 of the report of the five facilitators, it states that: “Member States … may wish to explore new and emerging ideas concerning a transitional approach to Security Council reform”. It goes on to say that “within the transitional approach there are different options and variations that Member States may wish to further explore”. The following notions are intended to assist Member States in such a further exploration of a transitional approach, if they so wish. Size and categories of membership 13. The size of an expanded Security Council depends on striking an adequate balance between the general satisfaction about the geographical representation of the Council, in particular in terms of the representation of developing countries and of small States, and the desire to maintain its efficient functioning. In their consideration of the size of the Council, States may want to examine the linkages between the size and the scope of the review clause and to address the issue of access of States that are

628

4 Momentum and deadlock

not members of the Council to its decision-making process in the context of the discussions concerning the improvement of the working methods. 14. The intermediary approach entails the creation of a category of membership not currently provided for under the Charter. Within the intermediary or transitional approach, Member States may wish to consider, inter alia, creating extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, up to the review; extended seats for a longer period than the existing non-permanent seats with the possibility of re-election; or extended seats for a longer term than the existing nonpermanent seats but without the possibility of re-election. 15. Any of these options can be combined with enlargement in the regular nonpermanent category, in accordance with Article 23.2 of the Charter. 16. The options in size range from a limited to a large expansion, a decision that could be adopted either in one step or in stages – that is, a given number at first and a further expansion in the review. 17. The length of time for which the seats would be extended would have to be considered together with their re-election modalities, as appropriate, and the geographic distribution of the new seats. This constitutes an essential negotiable issue and is also tied to the review. Elections of new members 18. Member States may wish to consider the modalities for electing members in the new category of seats. While such elections would have to be held in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, States may want to consider whether the elections for additional seats and the regular two-year seats should take place simultaneously. Furthermore, Member States may wish to add a provision that would prevent countries from presenting candidatures for both the new category and the traditional non-permanent category at the same time or within short intervals. Veto 19. Within the intermediary approach, States may want to examine the question of rules concerning the exercise of the veto, including forms of limitation of its use, possibly in the framework of a decision on working methods. Given that none of the options under the intermediary approach entail the creation of new vetoes, this possibility would, under any of the options, be left for consideration in the course of a review. The use of the veto is linked to the issue of working methods and to categories of membership and the review. Regional representation 20. As regards regional representation, States may wish to reflect on the notions presented in the report of the five facilitators in their possible further consideration of an intermediary approach. This issue is linked, in particular, to the question of size and composition. Review 21. A review clause may open the way to take further reform steps in the future. Within an intermediary approach, special weight must be given to a review clause. Such a review must be mandatory and take place after a specified number of years following the entry into force of Charter amendments related to Security Council reform. It is also indispensable that the scope of the review be clearly defined. 22. While the review plays a central role in the consideration of an intermediary approach, further changes to any aspect of the composition of the Security Council

4 Momentum and deadlock

629

will require a separate decision by the General Assembly on a further amendment of the Charter and a separate ratification process. 23. The central role of a review clause is linked to all other aspects of Security Council reform, and in particular to those aspects on which Member States will not agree in negotiations. These might include the question of the creation of permanent seats, including the question of the veto, the creation of additional non-permanent seats in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the Charter and the further consideration of arrangements regarding the use of non-concurring votes by permanent members of the Council in accordance with Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter. The review should also entail undertaking a comprehensive reassessment of the Council, including its composition and working methods. Working methods 24. There is general agreement on the great importance of working methods. Enlargement and working methods need to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner, and reform would be incomplete without either one. The complementary nature of the two areas of Security Council reform is generally recognized, within which the possibility of advancing independently on the two aspects is also put forward. The different nature of the two aspects of reform, with only enlargement requiring a Charter amendment, has to be taken into account in this regard. The issue of working methods is linked to the review, the veto and the size of an enlarged Council, in particular through enhancing the access of non-members to the decision-making process of the Council. V. Future steps 25. A large number of Member States expressed the view that the President of the General Assembly has established favourable conditions for the advancement of a process of negotiations among Member States. Delegations expressed the view that instead of further consultations, the next stage should consist of negotiations. 26. While the continued leadership of the President of the General Assembly will be essential, substantive input from Member States will be indispensable in order to take the discussions to the next stage, that is, intergovernmental negotiations, with a view to continuing to move forward, so as to achieve further concrete steps at the sixtysecond session of the General Assembly. 27. Future negotiations would need to be conducted on the basis of a text containing concrete elements on all the negotiables identified in the present report. Member States should have primary ownership of such a process. 28. This report is intended to enable tangible progress through which Security Council reform can be brought to a next stage that could include, in concrete terms, an agreement on an intergovernmental negotiating process as the only way to move forward. 29. Flexibility must be effectively shown and shared by all concerned in a process that would need to continue to be all-inclusive and transparent. There have been years of discussions, without substantial results. The time has come to bring the process closer to decision-making. It is therefore important that the current momentum be maintained in order to develop a common understanding conducive to the attainment of Security Council reform. 30. This report represents a genuine effort of the two authors to fulfil the mandate given to them by the President of the General Assembly in her letter of 22 May. It thus brings to an end their work under this mandate.

630

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.1.27 17 September 2007, UN General Assembly, Decision 61/561, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters480 At its 109th plenary meeting, on 17 September 2007, the General Assembly, recalling its previous relevant resolutions and decisions, having considered the report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, which was established pursuant to its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,481 on its deliberations during the sixty-first session of the Assembly,*23 bearing in mind the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, adopted by Heads of State and Government,*24 in which they resolved to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, and recalling the 2005 World Summit Outcome of 16 September 2005,*25 in which Heads of State and Government expressed support for early reform of the Council and recommended that the Council continue to adapt its working methods: (a) Took note of the report of the Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly;*23 (b) Noted with appreciation the Chairperson’s initiative to stimulate an active discussion relating to the comprehensive reform of the Security Council by the Working Group; (c) Urged the Working Group to exert efforts during the sixty-second session, aimed at achieving general agreement among Member States in the consideration of all issues relevant to the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council; (d) Decided that the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council should be considered during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly so that further concrete results may be achieved, including through intergovernmental negotiations, building on the progress achieved so far, particularly at the sixty-first session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States; (e) Also decided that the Working Group should continue its work, taking into account the progress achieved during the forty-eighth to sixty-first sessions of the General Assembly and drawing on the experience of the sixty-first session, as well as the views to be expressed during the sixty-second session, and also taking into consideration the discussion on the process of implementation of the 2005 World Summit Outcome;*25 ( f ) Further decided that the Working Group should submit a report to the General Assembly before the end of its sixty-second session, including any agreed recommendations. Original footnotes *23 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/61/47). [2007]. 480  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its sixty-first session, Volume III, 23 December 2006-17 September 2007, UN Doc. A/61/49 (Vol. III), p. 137. 481  → 3.1.2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

631

*24 See resolution 55/2. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, → 4.1.6]. *25 See resolution 60/1. [16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, → 4.1.23].

4.1.28 9 June 2008, Report of the Vice-Chairpersons482 to the President of the General Assembly on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/62/47, Annex I I. Introduction Since the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council held its last session, in April 2008, the four Vice-Chairpersons of the task force designated by the President of the General Assembly have consulted extensively with the membership. The purpose was to reach out to all Member States, through their regional groups, major interest groups or individually, and to listen to their recommendations on how to move forward at this stage of the process of Security Council reform. Many Member States have reaffirmed their original positions, while some have evolved or refined their stands, including through public statements at the highest political levels (see section III). All have expressed their disposition to enter into intergovernmental negotiations, some expressing the view that their preferred positions could lead to compromise options, but as an outcome of the eventual negotiations. In general terms, there continues to be a common understanding that the Security Council in its current composition does not reflect international reality and thus needs to be adequately rebalanced. The status quo with regard to the composition of the Security Council is at present judged to be unrealistic. Both the expansion of the Council and the reform of its working methods are seen as important to the wide membership of the Organization. In addition, reform of the Council is considered to be an integral part of the overall United Nations reform process. II. Framework and modalities Numerous Member States have expressed their desire to clarify the framework and the modalities that would guide the eventual process of intergovernmental negotiations; that is, there is a demand by some to clarify the rules of the eventual negotiations. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 48/26,483 the Open-ended Working Group is the forum for the consideration of all issues pertaining to Security Council reform, including the identification of the negotiables in order to move forward to intergovernmental negotiations. In its decision 61/561,484 the Assembly urged the Working Group to exert efforts during the sixty-second session “aimed at achieving general agreement among Member States in the consideration of all issues relevant to the question” of Security Council reform. Whether “general agreement” on this matter is achieved or not, the General Assembly, being a sovereign body, may decide at some point to shift the consideration of the reform process to the plenary meetings of the 482  The report was signed by Mr. Ismat Jahan (Permanent Representative of Bangladesh), Mr. Heraldo Muñoz (Chile), Mr. Roble Olhaye (Djibouti), and Mr. João M. Guerra Salgueiro (Portugal). 483  → 3.1.2. 484  17 September 2007, → 4.1.27.

632

4 Momentum and deadlock

Assembly. It is understood that any decision on Security Council reform should be taken by the Assembly. As far as the modalities are concerned, Member States have insisted upon and agreed that consultations and eventual intergovernmental negotiations should be conducted in an open, transparent and inclusive manner. Such an approach may take the form of further sessions of the Open-ended Working Group, consultations with regional groups and major interest groups and in other informal settings on the understanding that any decision on the matter must involve the entire membership of the General Assembly. The seven principles or pillars proposed by the President of the General Assembly, and widely accepted by Member States, also constitute an integral part of the framework and modalities. While understanding that the seven pillars constitute an integrated whole, for procedural purposes, principles three and four, which state, respectively, that “the way forward ought to be accomplished through an objective and transparent process to first identify the negotiables in order to then move to the intergovernmental negotiations”, and that “the Open-ended Working Group should carry out consultations on the framework and the modalities for intergovernmental negotiations”, should be recalled. The present paper seeks to advance decisively in this sense. III. The present state of play After intense rounds of consultations, the task force has concluded that none of the written contributions offered thus far have gathered sufficient support as a basis for launching intergovernmental negotiations. Despite the apparent progress perceived in the reports of the facilitators to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly (A/61/47, annexes I485 and II486), it should be recalled that the Assembly, in paragraph (d) of its decision 61/561,487 adopted by consensus, stated that “further concrete results may be achieved, including through intergovernmental negotiations, building on the progress achieved so far, particularly at the sixty-first session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States”. Positions among major interest groups have not moved significantly, despite stated expressions of disposition to act with flexibility and a general recognition that Security Council reform would necessarily require compromise. A. Original positions The following options, in summary format, have been presented by regional groups and major interest groups. African Group (A/60/L.41)488 Enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improve its working methods. Grant Africa two permanent seats, including the right of veto, and five non-permanent seats, thus increasing Security Council membership from 15 to 26, with the 11 additional seats to be distributed as follows: (a) two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for African States; (b) two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States; (c) one non-permanent seat for Eastern European States; (d) one permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin 485  486  487  488 

2 0 April 2007, see Annex I in UN Doc. A/61/47. 19 April 2007, → 4.1.25. 17 September 2007, → 4.1.27. 14 December 2005, UN Doc. A/60/L.41.

4 Momentum and deadlock

633

American and Caribbean States; and (e) one permanent seat for Western European and other States. Group of Four (A/59/L.64)489 Increase the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 25 by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members and improve the working methods of the Security Council. The six new permanent members of the Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) two from African States; (b) two from Asian States; (c) one from Latin American and the Caribbean States; (d) one from Western European and other States. The four new non-permanent members of the Security Council would be elected according to the following pattern: (a) one from African States; (b) one from Asian States; (c) one from Eastern European States; (d) one from Latin American and Caribbean States. The new permanent members would not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon the framework of a review conference. Uniting for consensus (A/59/L.68)490 The Security Council would be expanded to 25 members, including the present five permanent members of the Security Council. The 20 non-permanent members of the Security Council would be elected according to the following pattern: (a) six from African States; (b) five from Asian States; (c) four from Latin American and Caribbean States; (d) three from Western European and other States; (e) two from Eastern European States. Each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified above, would decide on arrangements among its members for immediate re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements would also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation and would also improve the working methods of the Council. Small Five States (A/60/L.49)491 Focused on working methods of the Security Council, this proposal invites the Council to consider the following measures to further enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness: More substantive exchanges of views among the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council; The Security Council should explore ways to assess the extent to which its decisions have been implemented; The subsidiary bodies of the Security Council should include in their work, on a case-by-case basis, non-members with strong interest and relevant expertise; A permanent member of the Security Council using its veto should explain the reason for doing so; The Security Council should ensure that all Member States are fully and promptly informed of all developments regarding its missions;

• • • • •

489  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 490  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 491  17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18.

634

4 Momentum and deadlock

order to facilitate the integration of newly elected members of the Security • InCouncil, the Secretariat should prepare and disseminate a detailed briefing packet

on the procedures, practices and work of the Council. Transitional approach Under the present state of affairs, Member States, while retaining their initial positions, may wish to explore new and emerging ideas concerning a transitional approach to Security Council reform. A transitional approach assumes an intermediary arrangement and should have as an integral component a mandatory review to take place at a predetermined date. Within the transitional approach there are different options and variations that Member States could further explore. As regards categories, the transitional approach, without prejudice to the prospect of creating new permanent seats, could explore the creation of new non-permanent seats as well as an intermediate category. Member States may wish to consider, inter alia, the following variations of an intermediate category: Extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, including the possibility of recall; Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but with the possibility of re-election. The length of the terms as well as the re-election modalities should be decided in negotiations; Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year term, but without the possibility of re-election. The length of the term should be decided in negotiations; Non-permanent two-year seats with the possibility of immediate re-election. B. New inputs and reaffirmed views Uniting for Consensus (5 March 2008)492 Uniting for Consensus welcomes the seven principles of the President of the General Assembly and “well-considered efforts to launch an effective ‘joint venture’ of all Member States in order to advance the process aiming at a Security Council reform”. It proposes to “reach general agreement on an ‘intermediate’ solution to Security Council reform on the basis of the variations outlined in paragraph 9 of the report of the five facilitators at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, and encompassing both the enlargement and working methods of the Council, without prejudice to the declared positions of all States/Groups”. For the next steps: identify “negotiables” and elaborate a paper to serve as a basis for intergovernmental negotiations. African Group (Letter by the Chairman, 20 March 2008)493 Supports the efforts of the President of the General Assembly within the context of the Open-ended Working Group and welcomes the seven principles laid out by the President.

• • • • • • • •

492  Letter dated 5 March 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN addressed to the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/62/47, Annex II, pp. 22-23. 493  Letter dated 20 March 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Cape Verde to the UN addressed to the President of the General Assembly, see Annex II in UN Doc. A/62/47, p. 21.

4 Momentum and deadlock

635

the decision of the Assembly of the African Union (31 January• 2Following February 2008)494 Permanent Representatives in New York have been directed

“to participate in the intergovernmental negotiations on the basis of Ezulwini Consensus495 and Sirte Declaration”.496 Continued readiness to work and cooperate with the President of the General Assembly, addressing both the framework and modalities, which “could lead to intergovernmental negotiations that take into account the positions and aspirations of various stakeholders and lead to the widest possible agreement”. Organization of the Islamic Conference (Final communiqué of the eleventh session of the Islamic Summit Conference, 13 and 14 March 2008)497 The Conference reaffirmed its decision that any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Muslim Ummah in any category of membership in an expanded United Nations Security Council will not be acceptable to the Muslim world. The Conference requested the open-ended contact group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on United Nations reform and expansion of the Security Council at United Nations Headquarters in New York to continue to closely coordinate the positions of its Member States in order to promote the comprehensive reform of the Security Council and ensure the equitable representation of those countries in any categories of the enlarged Security Council in proportion to their membership of the United Nations. The efforts at restructuring the Security Council should not be subjected to any artificial deadline and a decision on this issue should be made by consensus. Draft presented by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus (20 March 2008)498 Aims at giving a sense of direction for the future, on the basis of the reports of the facilitators and other progress achieved during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. “While the legitimate positions officially tabled in 2005 are retained by their proponents, their lack of potential realization at this juncture has pointed to an apparent willingness to negotiate on the basis of achieving intermediate reform through the identification of the highest common denominator at this stage.” For the purpose of achieving such intermediate reform, the scope of the negotiations would be narrower, focusing on points of convergence in the short-term rather than divisive elements. The Security Council shall be enlarged to [22] members with different options of distribution of seats and categories. “The election of Member States in all new seats will be subject to regular election procedures by two-thirds majority at the General Assembly in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

• • •

• • • • • •

494  See Assembly A/AU/Dec. 184(X); Assembly of the African Union, Tenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/DRAFT/Dec. 171-191(X). 495  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 496  5 July 2005 → 4.2.2.3.29. 497  → 4.2.3.15. 498  Draft proposal, UN Doc. A/62/47, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21.

636

4 Momentum and deadlock

Reform should include mandatory review after a fixed period of time, the exact • “duration of which must be determined before the reform comes into force and

will form an integral part of the reform package.” In addition to the enlargement, the General Assembly could simultaneously recommend concrete improvements of Security Council working methods, including those contained in S/2006/507.499 Joint Summit declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France (27 March 2008)500 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France will act to reform the United Nations Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. In the same spirit of adapting institutions to the new realities of the world, the Security Council should be reformed to ensure that it better represents the world of today, while remaining capable to taking the effective action necessary to confront today’s security challenges. Reform of the Security Council, both its enlargement and the improvement of its working methods, must therefore succeed. Reaffirm the support for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for permanent membership, as well as for permanent representation for Africa on the Council. The United Kingdom and France regret that negotiations towards this goal remain in deadlock and are therefore ready to consider an intermediate solution. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than those of elected members and those terms would be renewable at the end of an initial phase; it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones. The United Kingdom and France will work with all their partners to define parameters of such a reform. Security Council reform requires a political commitment from Member States at the highest level. The United Kingdom and France will work in this direction in the coming months with a view to achieving effective reform. Other perspectives of the permanent five members Despite a diversity of views among the permanent five member States regarding Security Council reform, there are some common elements that have been repeated to the task force or that have been expressed by high-level officials of their respective Governments. All five permanent members have stated that the formula for increased membership of the Security Council should be based on a wide agreement and should not be divisive. China stresses the notion that any reform on the Council must be based on a “serious compromise”. Likewise, the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, stated recently: “The United Nations Security Council needs to be reformed on the basis of broad consensus between the United Nations member countries. We value Germany’s commitment to looking for compromise solutions in this respect that would not cause division within the organization” (Berlin, 5 June 2008).501 In the view

• •

• • • •

499  19 July 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/507. 500  → 4.2.2.2.15. 501  Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders.

4 Momentum and deadlock

637

of the United States, “no significant portion of the membership [should be] alienated by the result of [Security Council reform]” (statement by the United States Deputy Permanent Representative, Open-ended Working Group, 10 April 2008). Several members of the permanent five believe that the Open-ended Working Group is the appropriate forum to discuss the topics related to Security Council reform. China supports greater participation by small and developing countries in an enlarged Security Council. Some permanent members have insisted that Security Council expansion must be realistic or “modest” as regards size. According to the United States, “only a modest expansion will ensure the Council’s continued effectiveness” (10 April 2008). Some permanent members have underlined the importance of the qualifications contained in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations for countries wishing to become members of the Council. The United States believes that “candidates for the longer-duration, whether intermediate seats or permanent members, must demonstrate a higher level of global leadership”; at the same time, it has insisted that any reform of the Council must be accompanied by increased effectiveness of the entire United Nations system. Some permanent members feel strongly that working methods of the Security Council is a matter that should be addressed by the Council itself, as a principal organ of the United Nations, and permanent members have reaffirmed their opposition to any Security Council reform that would “tamper” with the veto right of the permanent members of the Council. IV. No reform option It should be recalled that deliberations aiming to reform the Security Council began in January 1994 and that, although the Working Group has made progress, particularly during its sixty-first session, positions as summarized above remain far apart. Moreover, a sense of frustration surrounds the negotiations at present stage. We could eventually conclude, therefore, that there is simply not sufficient common ground to move the process forward towards fruitful intergovernmental negotiations. Member States should keep in mind that the present deadlock could culminate, in practical terms, in an indefinite postponement of the Security Council reform effort (even though the Open-ended Working Group might continue to meet). Moving the process forward would require political willingness to compromise by engaging in intergovernmental negotiations based on sufficient elements to seek an agreed solution as the outcome. V. Shifting the paradigm Recent consultations have shown that the main source of disagreement has centered on the category of seats. There are a number of Member States, as described above, which assert that an expanded Security Council should include new permanent members, accompanied by new non-permanent members, while others argue that the Council should be expanded solely through new non-permanent seats, eventually renewable. Such a polarized discussion led, during the facilitation process in the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, to the suggestion that Member States might wish to consider a transitional or intermediary approach, including the creation of extended seats of various durations as a compromise option. However, many Member States have argued that such option could be the eventual outcome of an intergovernmental negotiation.

638

4 Momentum and deadlock

Instead of continuing along this track, Member States may wish to approach eventual negotiations from a timeline perspective; that is, to identify what may be achievable in the short term, during the remaining part of the sixty-second session, or during the sixty-third session, and what would be left could be revisited in a number of years through a mandatory review (in 10, 12 or 15 years, for example). Hence, no preferred position would be excluded a priori, no Member State or group would be obliged to forgo its position from the outset, but, with a sense of compromise, an effort would be made to negotiate reform that would be achievable at the earliest possible date. That solution would keep avenues open to all preferred options to be reconsidered at an agreed moment in the future. Thus, Member States may wish to address which of the negotiables, basically the five key issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto, the question of regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council, and the working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, may be fully or partially resolved in a short timespan or may have to be postponed for the mandatory review. For example, if an impasse should arise on the delicate question of the extension of veto in the short-term negotiations, it would be reasonable to refer it to the review. A meaningful review would seem to require an intervening period of between 10 to 15 years to allow for ratification and evaluation. At that time, the membership should be able to evaluate the Council’s performance against the backdrop of structural trends in peace and security. The single defining characteristic of the timeline approach is the scheduling of a mandatory review, where the achievable arrangement would be evaluated and could be reshaped into a more permanent one, in the light of past experience. VI. Towards intergovernmental negotiations Security Council reform is at a crossroads. In order to move forward, compromise is needed – and the clock is running. The present report has outlined the negotiables and options that Member States may wish to consider with a view to intergovernmental negotiations. We are convinced that a “big bang”, an all-encompassing solution, is not possible, and that only a realistic approach that allows agreement on what is achievable in the near term, without excluding any preferred option to be revisited at an agreed time through a mandatory review, is the way to move forward. It should be noticed that despite differences, Member States agree on a number of issues. For example, all Member States and interest groups have favoured an improvement in the working methods of the Security Council (if Member States were to agree on the launching of intergovernmental negotiations, they could use as a basis the working methods section of the report of the facilitators of 19 April 2007).502 Member States also seem to agree that Security Council expansion should contemplate additional non-permanent seats, in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the Charter, in particular to accommodate the needs of small States (while it has also been suggested, through the Forum of Small States, that a provision should be considered which would prevent countries from presenting candidatures for both the new category, assuming a transitional approach, and the existing non-permanent category at the same time or in short intervals). 502  → 4.1.25.

4 Momentum and deadlock

639

Lastly, in order to contribute to moving the process forward, in the following Annex we have listed specific options on the category of seats, as well as their distribution, and the size of an enlarged Council, which Member States may want to consider. […] Appendix Since differences remain on the category of seats and the size of an expanded Security Council, Member States may wish to consider the following options: 1. Twenty-two Members – of the seven new seats: Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Western European and Others Group, and One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Eastern European Group [and, on a rotating basis, to the Latin American and Caribbean Group]. 2. Twenty-three Members – of the eight new seats: Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Western European and Others Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Eastern European Group [and, on a rotating basis, to the Latin American and Caribbean Group]. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. 3. Twenty-four Members – of the nine new seats: Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Western European and Others Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Eastern European Group [and, on a rotating basis, to the Latin American and Caribbean Group]. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

640

4 Momentum and deadlock

4. Twenty-five Members – of the 10 new seats: Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Western European and Others Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Eastern European Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. 5. Twenty-six Members – of the 11 new seats: Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. Two [extended or permanent] seats will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. One [extended or permanent] seat will be allocated to Member States of the Western European and Others Group. Two non-permanent seats will be allocated to Member States of the African Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Eastern European Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Asian Group. One non-permanent seat will be allocated to Member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group. Evidently, Member States may wish to consider an expansion of the Security Council that would add up to less than 22 members (no Member State or regional group has proposed a larger number than 26), taking into consideration factors such as work effectiveness and representation as well as the elements listed in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

4.1.29 15 September 2008, UN General Assembly, Decision 62/557, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters503 At its 122nd plenary meeting, on 15 September 2008, the General Assembly, recalling its previous resolutions and decisions relevant to the question of equitable 503  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its sixty-second session, Volume III, 23 December 2007-15 September 2008, UN Doc. A/62/49 (Vol. III), p. 106 et seq.

4 Momentum and deadlock

641

representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, mindful of Chapter XVIII of the Charter of the United Nations and of the importance of reaching general agreement as referred to in its resolutions 48/26 of 3 December 1993504 and 53/30 of 23 November 1998505 and in its decision 61/561 of 17 September 2007506 on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, as well as the ratification process of any amendment to the Charter as stipulated in its Article 108, and taking note of the seven principles presented by the President of the General Assembly to serve as guiding principles for the advancement of the Security Council reform:*1 (a) Took note of the report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council on its work during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly;*2 (b) Noted with appreciation the Chairperson’s initiative and efforts in the process of a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, as well as the work done by the Vice-Chairpersons; (c) Decided, building on the progress achieved thus far, in particular during its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, to continue immediately to address, within the Open-ended Working Group, the framework and modalities in order to prepare and facilitate intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. The Chairperson of the Open-ended Working Group would present the results of those consultations to an informal plenary session of the General Assembly, no later than 1 February 2009; (d) Also decided, taking into consideration the results achieved so far in the Open-ended Working Group, and building on the progress achieved thus far, in particular during its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, to commence intergovernmental negotiations in informal plenary of the General Assembly during its sixty-third session, but not later than 28 February 2009, based on proposals by Member States, in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States; (e) Further decided that the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations would be as follows: (i) The positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other groupings of Member States; (ii) The five key issues: categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Security Council and working

504  → 3.1.2. 505  → 4.1.1. 506  → 4.1.27.

642

4 Momentum and deadlock

methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly; (iii) The following documents: report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly;*3 Assembly decision 61/561;507 and the report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-second session of the Assembly;*4 ( f ) Decided that the Open-ended Working Group should continue to exert efforts during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly aimed at achieving general agreement among Member States in the consideration of all issues relevant to the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, taking into account the progress achieved during the forty-eighth to sixty-second sessions of the Assembly; (g) Also decided that the Open-ended Working Group should submit a report to the General Assembly before the end of its sixty-third session, including any agreed recommendations. Original footnotes See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 51st meeting (A/62/PV.51), and corrigendum. [14 November 2007]. *2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/62/47). [2008]. *3 Ibid., Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/61/47). [2007]. *4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/62/47). [2008]. *1

4.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 4.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion in the existing categories of seats 4.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 4.2.1.1.1 22 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXII, p. 61 Proposals on decision-making in the Security Council and the veto right, submitted by Germany, dated 22 April 1998: voting rights of the new permanent members Germany proposes that reform of the Security Council take into consideration the following elements: − All members of the Security Council should make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process; − Permanent members of the Security Council should make a statement, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter, that they will generally be guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949508 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural and that, in the event of any veto of a draft 507  17 September 2007, → 4.1.27. 508  → 2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

643

resolution of the Security Council, they should accompany that decision with a formal explanation of such action; − A high-level working group shall consider the extent to which the veto right is extended to new permanent members; − During an interim period, the new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto right; − During that period, the concurring vote of at least four out of five new permanent members will be required to arrive at a Security Council decision on matters which are not procedural and are taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. 4.2.1.1.2 22 March 1999, Germany, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] [M]y delegation feels that the process aimed at limiting the scope of the veto can be significantly strengthened by counterbalancing the present P5 with a new generation of permanent members. This new generation could bring sweeping changes to the culture and inner workings of a club that has been exclusive for more than fifty years, provided, of course, that the two generations could meet on an equal footing, i.e. with no discrimination between old and new permanent members. New permanent members without the veto right would at best be considered junior partners by the old members. They would thus not be in a position to change the practices of the “inner circle” from within. One might ask, of course, if more permanent members with the same status as the old ones would not simply mean even more cases of vetoes being cast. My delegation firmly holds that the opposite would happen: With more permanent members there would also be more peer pressure against using the veto right. We may also safely assume that the new generation of permanent members would be more critical towards the veto right. In addition, my delegation has submitted a number of proposals concerning the voting rights of new permanent members, which can be found in Annex XXII509 of the report in front of us. It suggests, inter alia, an interim period with limited special voting rights and the establishment of a high-level working group to continue to examine the issue. […] 4.2.1.1.3 23 March 1999, India, Mr. Pal, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group510

[…] The Council in any case acts mostly to set up, maintain or discontinue peacekeeping operations. Since the Charter never contemplated the modality of a peacekeeping operation, it has given the Council no special prerogatives on this matter. The General Assembly is not debarred from taking these functions on itself if the threat or the use of the veto hamstrings the Security Council. In negotiations on the Charter, the P-5 gave three broad reasons for insisting on the veto: unanimity between them was essential for world peace, enforcement action could not be taken against one of them, and the veto would reflect the present distribution of military and industrial power. We had pointed out last year that none of 509  22 April 1998, → 4.2.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.2. 510  → 4.4.3.2 for India’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

644

4 Momentum and deadlock

these three reasons currently obtain, if they ever did. The veto has not prevented the world being divided into rival blocs or continual violence in the form of proxy wars. Enforcement action has never been contemplated against any permanent member. And, finally, the poles of industrial and military power have shifted. In fact, if the study on the veto which Egypt requested is ever conducted, it should consider whether Article 23.1 refers to the countries now known as the P-5, and which have the veto. In 1945, China was the Republic of China, no longer a member of the UN. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has ceased to exist. France was an empire, with several of its overseas territories represented in the French parliament; that France too does not exist. Neither is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the British Empire. Permanent membership and the veto were given to five countries that between them controlled most of the world. The character and national identity of four out of the five have changed completely; they are not the countries who were accorded permanent status. The question can legitimately be asked, on what grounds do they continue to retain these privileges? The answer of course is that the veto protects the veto. If the veto was needed to keep peace between the permanent five, that reason too disappeared soon after the UN was set up. Three out of the five became members of a military alliance, NATO, which continues in place. A fourth has recently entered into a strategic partnership with that alliance, and it has also formed a strategic partnership with the fifth permanent member. This brotherhood of the anointed should not need the veto among themselves. In fact, the operation of NATO gives the lie to the claim that effective action on security issues can only be ensured through the veto. We understand that in NATO rules of consensus obtain. In theory, every member has a veto. This has not prevented NATO from being a particularly effective security organisation. The functioning of the NATO in effect proves that size is not a barrier to efficiency, nor is a limited veto essential for effective functioning. The P-5 claim that in the post cold war period they have been much more responsible in the use of the veto. However, as others have pointed out, it is the threat of the use of the veto that has continued to be rampant, and since the threat is held out in closed meetings, there is never any accountability. The threat of the veto gives the P-5 absolute power without responsibility. It has led to a series of steps which are completely undesirable, undemocratic, and subversive of the UN: a) It has forced the UN to discontinue action, as in Somalia, when the majority wished the peace keeping operation to continue, and when continuation might have saved many lives. b) It has prevented action, as in Rwanda, permitting genocide to take place. c) It has forced action of interest only to a permanent member, as in the mid-90s, when a PKO was set up in the western hemisphere under the threat that otherwise a PKO in Africa would be vetoed. d) It has permitted completely illegal action by P-5 members outside the control of the UN, as in the operation of the no-fly-zones in Iraq. e) Most importantly, it has completely marginalised the UN. Kosovo and the DRC illustrate the point. In neither is the UN in a position to do much. However, in the DRC, countries invited by the legitimate government to help it against subversion

4 Momentum and deadlock

645

have had to come to the Security Council to place their positions on record and to seek its understanding. In Kosovo, three out of the P-5 contemplate military action, without any reference to the Council, against the government of a member state. They do not come to the Council for two reasons; firstly, they know they are immune from criticism and, secondly, they know that, because of the veto which the other two wield, they will not get a Council imprimatur for their actions. […] Lastly, on the actual use of the veto. Several speakers have referred to the latest use of the veto as an example of unacceptable misuse in pursuit of a national agenda. While this is true, it misses the point that more often than not the Council operates, or is prevented from operating, under the threat of the use of a veto. What is truly interesting is that the developed country members of the P-5 have managed to keep their vetoes covert, a clear reflection of the preponderance of the weight of developed countries in the Council. They have managed to get their way in informal consultations, and have not therefore had to use the veto in public. The most recent use of the veto, in fact, highlights the urgent need to broaden the permanent membership of the Council to make it more representative. In this we agree with the points made yesterday by the German PR.511 Clearly, new permanent members would only be able to influence balanced decisions if they carried the same clout as the present P-5. Therefore, if we cannot get rid of the veto, the best we can do is to dilute it by extending it to new permanent members. […] 4.2.1.1.4 22 June 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. A. Granovsky, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group512 […] [T]he Kosovo crisis settlement under the aegis of the UN and with the central role of the Security Council, achieved with great difficulty, will help to learn appropriate lessons from the past and restore the relevant role and prestige of the Council. Finding a truly viable formula of Security Council enlargement which is based on the broadest possible agreement, including support on the part of all five permanent members of the Security Council is to serve this purpose. An important factor for the enhancement of the Security Council’s efficiency is to ensure its more balanced and representative make-up. While proceeding firmly from the point that the enlarged Security Council should not exceed 20-21 members, we confirm our principal position that the major precondition for a just fulfillment of this task is to ensure adequate representation of the Latin America, Africa and Asia in the enlarged Security Council being endowed with status equal to that of other new members of the Security Council. In view of this, for instance the Russian Federation considers India a strong and worthy candidate for a Permanent membership seat in the Security Council should it be decided to enlarge the Council in both categories. […]

511  22 March 1999, → 4.2.1.1.2. 512  → 4.3.2 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

646

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.1.1.5 30 September 1999, Qatar, Sheikh Al-Thani, UN Doc. A/54/PV.18, pp. 4-8 […] We are also convinced of the need to reform the United Nations and to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its bodies and agencies. Similarly, it is incumbent upon us, the States Members of the Organization, to assume our political responsibility and respect our moral and financial commitments to it. Furthermore, in this context, we support the idea of expanding the Security Council to make it more democratic and representative of the international community in the modern world. We also support the idea of expanding the permanent membership of the Council so as to ensure greater universal representation on it. […] 4.2.1.1.6 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9513 […] [Lithuania] retains flexibility for the common goal. The fundamental component of that position is a search for compromises which are achievable on all topics, even the most difficult. Lithuania identified areas of achievable compromises and offered possible solutions, including enlargement of both categories of membership, the size of the Security Council, the review mechanism, regional rotation, the veto and everything else. In short, Lithuania, inter alia, supports these elements: a Security Council enlarged to around 24 members, enlargement in both categories, new permanent seats for industrialized and developing countries, regional rotation for those regions that agree on the concept, effective review, further and constant democratization and “transparentization” of the Security Council’s methods of work, and the curtailment and eventual abolition of the veto.514 […] 4.2.1.1.7 16 December 1999, India, Mr. Sharma, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 21-23 […] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is the single largest group of Member States, with 114 members, continues to be unrepresented in the permanent members’ category. This anomaly needs to be corrected. NAM should also have an enhanced presence in the non-permanent category. […] Another point that bears reiteration is that any increase in permanent membership should be guided by objective, and not subjective, selective or arbitrary criteria. The manner of selection of all new permanent members should be uniform. The General Assembly is the forum which should elect new permanent members. There should be no constraint on the role or authority of the General Assembly in this regard. All new permanent members should be designated together. On the question of periodic review of an enlarged Security Council, we believe that such an exercise would inherently promote greater accountability and responsibility among members of the Council and should have universal application. […]

513  → 4.4.2.2 for Lithuania’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 514  Lithuania confirmed this position on 17 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 25-27.

4 Momentum and deadlock

647

4.2.1.1.8 16 December 1999, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.82, pp. 17-18515

[…] If we are to make progress, we will need to identify those areas in which the United Nations membership can reach general agreement. The responses to your questionnaire confirmed that a significant majority of Member States support expansion in both categories of membership. This seems to the United Kingdom a sensible point from which to start. One of the most important arguments for enlargement is to achieve better representation on the Council for developing countries. Better representation has to include permanent seats. As we have said before, my delegation supports permanent membership for Japan and Germany, and we believe three other new permanent seats should be created for non-industrialized countries. This is not to ignore other important questions. The working methods of the Council need to be improved. The Council’s working group on procedures has been particularly active in this area. This year has seen some important changes, with provision, inter alia, for non-members to participate in Council meetings on a wide range of subjects. We will need to ensure that further improvements, which are integral to a workable, satisfactory reform package, move in step with our efforts to enlarge the Council. 4.2.1.1.9 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27516 […] But we should not lose sight of the fact that a real improvement in the way the Council conducts its business will be possible only if its composition is made more equitable and representative. Equitable representation can come about only through an enlargement of both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent. While the total membership of the Council does not reflect adequate representation of developing countries, it is precisely in the permanent category that this imbalance is even more clear and inequitable. Any expansion that maintains or aggravates the present imbalance would discriminate against developing countries and fail to meet the requirement of equitable representation. Brazil also does not favour the creation of new categories of membership in the Security Council. We therefore rule out the paradoxical idea of permanent rotating seats. […] We also hold the view that a reform package should include some curtailment of the veto power. The ideal is to advance towards the gradual elimination of the veto. As a first step, it should be strictly limited to matters covered under Chapter VII of the Charter. Nevertheless, the question of the veto should not hold back a possible agreement on the increase in the membership. This could be facilitated if, while enjoying de jure veto rights, new permanent members would commit themselves not to use them. This brings me to my final remark, on periodic review. As a confidence-building measure to promote convergence of views in other areas, we should endeavour to reach 515  → 4.4.4.6 for the United Kingdom’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 516  → 4.3.5 for Brazil’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

648

4 Momentum and deadlock

an early agreement on a specific number of years after which the reform would be reviewed. This would make it clear that, by reforming the composition of the Council, we are trying to democratize it in a world in transition and that the door remains open for future adjustments. […] 4.2.1.1.10  16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 30-31517

[…] The sixth and last observation the French delegation would like to make is that as to the substance, France’s well-known position remains unchanged. France remains in favour of an increase in the number of members of the Security Council in the two existing categories, permanent and non-permanent. France is in favour of permanent seats for Germany and Japan, but also for three countries of the South. It supports the creation of new non-permanent seats. We think that so as not threaten the ability of the Council to act rapidly and effectively, the increase in the number of non-permanent members must be reasonable. In this context, we have indicated that the total number should remain less than 25 but should be greater than 21. We favour new permanent members having the same prerogatives as the current permanent members. While we are ready to work on any formula that would make general agreement possible, we see no hope for coming to an agreement on changing, by an amendment of the Charter or other means, the rights of current permanent members, rights which France exercises, however, in a responsible and restrained manner. […] 4.2.1.1.11 20 December 1999, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 13-14518 The United States strongly supports the ongoing effort to strengthen the Security Council and enable the Council to enhance its ability to respond efficiently and effectively to the challenges and opportunities of the new millennium. Council reform will help ensure that the Council more accurately reflects the world’s current political, economic, and security situation. A reformed Council, viewed as more representative by the UN’s member states, will enjoy enhanced legitimacy as it exercises the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security conferred by the UN Charter. […] The United States believes that the inability of the Open Ended Working Group to reach agreement on a framework for Council reform is not the result of disagreement over any one particular element of the overall reform issue, nor is it the result of any one member’s national position. Likewise, we do not believe that a change in any individual country’s position would suddenly yield a clear path to consensus. There are still a number of unresolved issues and mutually incompatible national and regional bloc positions. We think attempting to identify a single source for the lack of 517  → 4.4.1.3 for France’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 518  → 4.3.8 for the United States position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

649

consensus is fruitless and counter-productive, and serves only to distract the attention of the Working Group from its real and important work. Without repeating our national position in detail, the United States remains committed to expanding the size of the Council and supports the inclusion of Japan, Germany, and representative states from the African, Asian, and Latin American regional groups as permanent members. […] 4.2.1.1.12 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.85, pp. 17-18519

[…] The Russian Federation continues to believe that the number of members in an enlarged Security Council should not exceed 20 or 21. We are still convinced that exceeding that limit would have a negative impact on the efficiency of the Council’s activities. Within that limit we are open to discussion of any proposals on membership categories for an enlargement of the Council. Our principal position remains unchanged: the enlargement in either membership category should include both industrialized nations and developing countries, and both groups must be ensured the same status. We are convinced that this is absolutely indispensable for maintaining an overall balance in international relations to uphold the principles of a multipolar world order. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) actions in the Kosovo crisis only strengthened our firm belief that there is no alternative to such an approach to Security Council enlargement. In this context, for instance, the Russian Federation considers India a strong and worthy candidate for permanent membership in the Security Council should it be decided to enlarge the Council in both categories. There are also strong candidates from Latin America and Africa. In principle, the Russian Federation does not object to the idea of States occupying new permanent positions on the basis of rotation. Provided that such a formula gains the necessary support, the specific modalities for its application should be considered by the relevant regional groups. As for extending the right of veto to possible new permanent members, a decision in that regard should be taken only after the concrete composition of the enlarged Security Council has been agreed upon. […] 4.2.1.1.13 20 December 1999, Hungary, Mr. Erdös, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 4-5 […] Hungary has on several occasions already had the opportunity, both on behalf of our country and as a member of the group of 10 countries, to present its position on this matter. First of all, the composition of the Security Council should reflect the changes that have taken place in the world. We favour an increase in the number of members in both categories. We do not know currently what the specific parameters of such an action would be, but the discussions that we will hold on this matter within the Working Group should guide us towards a rational solution. What we know, however, is that in 519  → 4.3.9 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 4.4.1.4 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

650

4 Momentum and deadlock

addition to a certain number of new non-permanent members, the presence of new permanent members of the Security Council representing Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean alongside the industrialized countries could serve to strengthen the democratic nature, credibility and prestige of the body. Secondly, with regard to the extremely delicate subject of the right of the veto – and bearing in mind certain insurmountable realities – we favour limiting its use. Of course, we are flexible as to the modalities to be selected for this purpose. We believe, for reasons of principle, that the old or new status of permanent members should not make any difference in this respect. A number of different proposals have been put forward regarding the reform of the Security Council. Among these proposals we find interesting the view that the number of permanent seats on the Council should be expanded to ensure equitable geographic representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, and the idea that the representation of these regions can be accomplished by rotation within each regional group. […] 4.2.1.1.14 20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9520 I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that are Members of the United Nations: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and my own country, Guyana. […] In order to address this anachronism, CARICOM has always called for the democratization of the Council. In this regard, we fully subscribe to the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that calls for expansion in the non-permanent category. At the same time, we have frequently stated that if general agreement could be found on expansion within the category of permanent members, this would be acceptable to us, provided that there is an adequate balance between the industrialized and developing nations. In terms of numbers, if expansion takes place within both categories of membership, CARICOM would consider a total membership of 26 – the figure advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement – ideally balanced. Thus, one may conceive of two additional industrialized countries and four or five developing countries as new members within the permanent membership category, with the remaining seats being allocated to non-permanent members. However, as we have said, should such an agreement not be possible, we would be content to have an expansion of non-permanent membership. As for the proposals to allocate seats on a rotational basis, CARICOM has already expressed its willingness to consider this option as a means of resolving the issue of numbers, but would stress that any decision on this matter should be ultimately left to the discretion of individual regions. […] 520  → 4.4.3.10 for CARICOM’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

651

It goes without saying that an amendment to the Charter and concurrent change in the membership of the Security Council could prove more acceptable if accompanied by the creation of a review mechanism. CARICOM feels that it would be of great merit to develop this proposal in a manner that would allow this body to comprehensively revisit the composition of the Council – say, every 15 years – in the light of possible changing circumstances and the needs of the international community. […] 4.2.1.1.15 20 December 1999, Mongolia, Mr. Enkhsaikhan, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 12-13521

[…] With respect to the question of expansion of the membership of the Council, we believe that there is an agreement in principle to expand it so as to reflect the objective changes in international relations since 1945, including the realities of power and the democratization of international relations. Therefore Mongolia believes that expansion should take place in both categories, non-permanent and permanent. In this respect we reiterate our support for the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, as reflected in the Durban document.522 We also believe that the expansion should ensure that small States, which constitute the vast majority of the membership, are duly represented and their interests reflected. […] 4.2.1.1.16 8 September 2000, India, Mr. Vajpayee, UN Doc. A/55/PV.7, p. 28 […] In the last half-century, the world has changed, as has the international order. But these changes are not reflected in the structure of the Security Council, which will continue to have a rather special role to play in the new century. Therefore, it is necessary that the Security Council should be more representative of the new realities. India is ready to play its role in an expanded Security Council. […] 4.2.1.1.17 16 November 2000, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, pp. 2-4

[…] The need for Security Council reform is more pressing today than it was seven years ago, when the Open-ended Working Group was established to look at the modalities for change. When the Council was last enlarged, in 1965, the United Nations had fewer than 120 members. Today it has 189, and over 30 of those have joined in the last 10 years. It is essential that the Security Council be made more representative of this membership: the membership on whose behalf it acts and whose full confidence it needs when meeting its primary responsibility for international peace and security. It must also work in as transparent a manner as possible, allowing for extensive consultation with non-members as well as with troop contributors and with individuals or organizations with relevant expertise. It must, at the same time, retain the necessary efficiency to 521  → 4.4.3.11 for Mongolia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 522   Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X.

652

4 Momentum and deadlock

tackle the many and complex conflict situations on its agenda in a timely and effective manner. […] However, as many speakers are noting in this debate, far less progress has been made on the equally important issue of Council enlargement. The Open-ended Working Group worked hard on a conference room paper on cluster I issues during the fifty-fourth session.523 This usefully set out the options and encouraged a more focused debate. As a result, the Vice-Chairmen have set out a number of useful general observations in a further conference room paper annexed to the Working Group’s report.524 In that paper they have identified several areas of general agreement, including on the principle of enlarging both categories of membership. Many States confirmed their support for that principle at the Millennium Summit and in the opening week of this session of the General Assembly, and yet more have done so thus far in this debate. It is also clear that there is broad agreement that expansion must include both developed and developing States. I take this opportunity to reiterate the United Kingdom’s full support for these two fundamental principles, which will underpin any final agreement on enlargement. […] 4.2.1.1.18 17 November 2000, Thailand, Mr. Jayanama, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 2-4525

[…] First of all, on the question of the size and composition of the Security Council, which is known as cluster I, the crux of the issue is: Should expansion take place in both permanent and non-permanent categories, and if so how many new seats should there be and from where? There is already general agreement that the Council should be expanded. The Secretary-General himself drew attention to this when he mentioned in his millennium report526 that: Based on the distribution of power and alignments in 1945, the composition of the Council today does not fully represent either the character or the needs of our globalized world. (A/54/2000, para. 44) Thailand fully associates itself with that remark and believes that expansion should involve both permanent and non-permanent categories, with the proviso that new permanent members should include developing countries. While attaching importance to the principle of equitable geographical representation, we are also of the view that new permanent members should have the ability and desire to share and make substantive contributions, financially and politically, to the United Nations. By this criteria, we see that Japan is a worthy candidate to be a new permanent member. Nevertheless, before we move ahead on this issue, we need to ask the following

523  See, e.g., the documents of 2000, → 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.1.4 and 4.1.5. 524  25 July 2000, UN Doc. A/54/47. 525  → 4.4.4.10 for Thailand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 526  27 March 2000, UN Doc. A/54/2000, p. 8.

4 Momentum and deadlock

653

question: Do current proposals offer equitable and practical solutions on the new composition? […] 4.2.1.1.19 31 October 2001, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, p. 15527 […] As the President of the Republic indicated on 7 September 2000 at the Security Council meeting held at the level of heads of State and Government,528 France supports an enlargement of the Council in both categories of membership – permanent and non-permanent. That expansion must include developed countries and allow for better representation of developing countries. France’s consistent position is guided by the need to bear in mind the emergence of new powers and to enable the Security Council to continue to play its role in full. It is therefore based on the idea of better representativeness of the Security Council, while preserving the indispensable efficiency of its work. France is therefore prepared to consider an increase of five permanent seats for two industrialized countries and three developing States representing major regions of the world: Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. With respect to the enlargement of the Council, France believes that Germany, Japan and India could occupy permanent seats. France could also accept an increase of four non-permanent seats to be allocated respectively to the African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean and Central and Eastern European Groups. […] 4.2.1.1.20 14 October 2002, Germany, Mr. Schumacher, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 20-21

[…] We can only warn against proposals apparently aiming at interim solutions, such as increasing only the number of non-permanent seats and thereby restricting the great regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean – and to a certain extent even Asia – to non-permanent seats forever. Interim solutions are makeshift solutions, and makeshift solutions are bad solutions. They run counter to the expressed will of our heads of State and Government in the Millennium Declaration: “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects”.529 While we understand the desire to breathe life into a rather deadlocked reform debate, we believe that heading in the wrong direction would, in the end, only cement forever the present state of affairs. Germany would, therefore, not be able to support such a proposal. […] 4.2.1.1.21 14 October 2002, Philippines, Mr. Yuchengco, UN Doc. A/57/PV.28, pp. 11-13

[…] Regarding the agenda item on the reform of the Security Council, the Philippines is committed to promoting agreement on measures aimed at achieving a more open 527  → 4.4.4.14 for France’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 528  7 September 2000, UN Doc. S/PV.4194, pp. 8-10. 529  8 September 2000, → 4.1.6.

654

4 Momentum and deadlock

and transparent decision-making process in the Security Council, as well as on finding an acceptable compromise on the expansion in the number of permanent and nonpermanent members of the Council. […] 4.2.1.1.22 15 October 2002, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 7-9 […] The Security Council is reaching out even to civil society, as shown by the Arria-formula meetings held at the request of non-governmental organizations and of representatives of groups concerned by the conflicts of which the Council is seized. These informal meetings have been particularly useful inasmuch as they provide additional information to the members of the Council on key issues. This increased openness should also be reflected in the composition of the Security Council itself. As the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dominique de Villepin, recalled in his statement here on 12 September,530 France would like to see the Council become more representative through an expansion of its composition in both categories – permanent and non-permanent. France particularly supports the aspirations of Germany, Japan and India to become permanent members. This desirable expansion of the Security Council should benefit the developed countries and make possible better representation of developing countries. We should, however, bear in mind the emergence of new Powers and also enable the Security Council to continue to discharge its mandate under the Charter. […] 4.2.1.1.23 23 September 2003, France, Mr. Chirac, UN Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 14-17 […] The primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security rests with the Security Council. It is therefore essential to its legitimacy that its composition reflect the state of the world. It must be expanded to include new permanent members, because the presence of major countries is necessary. France, naturally, is thinking of Germany and of Japan, but also of some leading countries of Asia, Africa and America. We also need new elected members, to make the Council even more representative. With the decisive impetus of the five permanent members, we all need to resume discussions, mindful of the general interest. Such reform should be accompanied by a strengthening of the Council’s authority. It is the Council that should set the bounds with respect to the use of force. No one can claim the right to use force unilaterally and preventively. Conversely, in the face of mounting threats, States must be assured that the Council has at its disposal the appropriate means of evaluation and of collective action, and that it has the will to act. […] 4.2.1.1.24 14 October 2003, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 21-22

[…] Reform of the Security Council must be geared towards strengthening the potential of this key organ for the sake of effective implementation of its terms of reference as enshrined in the Charter. We are sympathetic to the concerns of many delegations 530  12 September 2002, UN Doc. A/57/PV.3, pp. 27-30.

4 Momentum and deadlock

655

over the slow pace of progress in reforming the Security Council – reform that would allow the membership of that organ to better reflect current international realities. We also believe that given the deep disagreement among States on that specific issue, work must be done step by step and cautiously. As President Vladimir Putin of Russia said at the opening of the present General Assembly session, “… we should be guided above all by the broadest possible agreement on all aspects of the expansion of the Council …” (A/58/PV.11).531 We must not allow a split in the United Nations to occur over this issue, which is so important to many States and the entire Organization. Russia is prepared to continue with the painstaking work of overcoming differences of opinion, primarily on the key aspect of the future composition of the Security Council. We are open to any constructive proposals regarding the expansion of the membership in all categories, on the understanding that any increase should include both developed and developing States, which must be accorded equal rights and assigned equal duties. In this context, the Russian Federation believes that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, as well as a State representing Africa, would be worthy candidates for any additional permanent seats as might be created in the Security Council. That approach would ensure an adequate balance of interests among the members and strengthen the trend towards consensus within the Council. […] 4.2.1.1.25 14 October 2003, Ukraine on behalf of the GU(U)AM Group, Mr. Kulyk, A/58/PV.31, pp. 1-2532

[…] With regard to the substance of Security Council reform, we hold the position that both categories of membership – permanent and non-permanent – should be expanded. However, equitable geographical distribution of non-permanent seats on the Security Council is a principle to which we attach special significance. Any comprehensive reform proposal must take into account the interests of every regional group. With respect to the idea of creating new permanent seats on the Council, we continue to maintain that countries which are able and willing to take greater responsibility – including financial – for maintaining international peace and security and which enjoy the necessary international authority and support at both the regional and global levels may receive permanent member status. […] 4.2.1.1.26 17 October 2003, United Kingdom, Mr. Parry, UN Doc. A/58/PV.36, pp. 9-10

[…] We should all be looking for further pragmatic and easily implementable ideas that can both improve the quality and effectiveness of the Council’s work and that are useful to the wider membership of the United Nations as well. But beyond improvements to the way the Council operates, the United Kingdom believes that an enlargement of the Council is overdue if it is to become more 531  25 September 2003, pp. 4-6. 532   GU(U)AM was founded in 1997 with a view to develop cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Uzbekistan joined the group in 1999 but withdrew again in 2005.

656

4 Momentum and deadlock

representative of the modern world. We therefore support enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent membership. We have long supported permanent membership for Germany and for Japan; we regard India and Brazil as obvious candidates from Asia and Latin America; and we support permanent representation from Africa. […] 4.2.1.1.27 21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement […] 3. The Security Council must reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st century. It must be representative, legitimate and effective. It is essential that the Security Council include, on a permanent basis, countries that have the will and capacity to take on major responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. There also has been a nearly four-fold increase in the membership of the United Nations since its inception in 1945, including a sharp increase in the number of developing countries. The Security Council, therefore, must be expanded in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, including developing and developed countries as new permanent members. 4. Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, based on the firmly shared recognition that they are legitimate candidates for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, support each other’s candidature. Africa must be represented in the permanent membership in the Security Council. We will work together towards realizing a meaningful reform of the United Nations, including that of the Security Council, together with other Member States. […] 4.2.1.1.28 24 September 2004, South Africa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Zuma During the course of the current 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, a number of countries have correctly called for the speedy finalisation of the discussion to restructure the United Nations Security Council. In this context, many African countries and others outside our Continent have inquired about the willingness of South Africa to serve as a Permanent Member of the restructured United Nations Security Council. On behalf of our Government, I would like to confirm that South Africa is ready to assume this responsibility. Our Government and People fully understand the immense responsibilities that would attach to this high position. We are ready to respond to this challenge, fully sensitive to the need to respect the interests and aspirations of all countries and peoples, and the imperative to build an equitable and humane global order. 4.2.1.1.29 26 September 2004, Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs On Friday, 24 September 2004, South Africa announced its readiness to serve as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council and thereby serve the people of Africa and the world.533

533  Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, → 4.2.1.1.28.

4 Momentum and deadlock

657

Since the announcement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and President Thabo Mbeki’s remarks on the matter, a number of articles speculating on the motives for our announcement and countries that may support South Africa in this regard have appeared in the media. Speculation on such a sensitive matter is both unfortunate and regrettable. It reflects the views of the authors and their sources and not the information at the disposal of government. The government disassociates itself from this speculation. South Africa wishes to reaffirm that its announcement in this regard is a consequence of current debates in the United Nations regarding the restructuring of the Security Council and a response to many African countries and others outside our Continent who have inquired about the willingness of South Africa to serve as a Permanent Member of the restructured Security Council. Africa has always been convinced of the need for two permanent seats in a restructured Security Council. Accordingly, our announcement does not represent competition against any other African country or countries. South Africa will continue to work with the Continent to ensure the outcome of this process is in the best interests of the people of Africa and the world. In this context, South Africa reiterates that it stands ready to serve as a Permanent Member of the restructured United Nations Security Council fully sensitive to the need to respect the interests and aspirations of all countries and peoples, and the imperative to build an equitable and humane global order. 4.2.1.1.30 27 September 2004, Philippines, Mr. Romulo, UN Doc. A/59/PV.11, pp. 14-17

[…] Any reform should also recognize that a country like Japan deserves to be considered for a seat as a permanent member. […]

4.2.1.1.31 27 September 2004, Jordan, Mr. Muasher, UN Doc. A/59/PV.12, pp. 11-15 […] Jordan supports the principle of increasing membership in both permanent and rotating seats in order to make the Council more representative of the United Nations membership. […] 4.2.1.1.32 30 September 2004, Maldives, Mr. Jameel, UN Doc. A/59/PV.17, pp. 3-5 […] The complexity and magnitude of ever-developing global challenges demand that a reformed United Nations be assigned the central role in dealing with them. While those reforms should cover the entire United Nations system and its bodies, the focus is once again justly being drawn to the urgency of the need to restructure the Security Council, making the Council more reflective of the realities of the present-day world and more representative of the capacity and commitment of Member States to contribute to international peace and security. It is disappointing, though, that no common view has emerged on that issue. We feel that we should go ahead with the enlargement of the Security Council, both in the permanent and non-permanent categories and including in that enlargement countries such as Japan and other Member States that have the

658

4 Momentum and deadlock

capacity and the commitment to serve as permanent members and that would represent the wider membership of the present-day United Nations. […] 4.2.1.1.33  11 October 2004, Thailand, Ms. Laohaphan, UN Doc. A/59/PV.25, pp. 23-25

[…] In principle, my delegation is of the opinion that the current world climate warrants an expansion of the Security Council through an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members, given that the United Nations membership has expanded almost fourfold since the Organization’s inception in 1945. However, the expansion of the Council should also take into account issues of manageability and efficiency. The 191 Members of the Organization need greater representation in the Security Council. But such representation needs to be equitably distributed in the geographical allocations of Member States, including both developed and developing countries, so as to reflect the world in microcosm. In the light of the existing diversified opinions on how the membership of the Security Council should be expanded, my delegation wishes to echo the statement made by the Thai Foreign Minister during the general debate two weeks ago, calling for priority to be given to the establishment of a set of relevant criteria for membership before considering the admission thereto by names or number.534 In other words, before membership is granted, new members of the Security Council must fulfil a certain established set of criteria – for example, the ability and the commitment to discharge their responsibilities in safeguarding international peace and security and in upholding the Council’s significant authority, which must be exercised with the utmost care and responsibility. Given that the primary role of the Security Council is to safeguard global peace and security, the ability to perform that function to any degree – for example, by contributing troops and financial resources for peace operations – could become an essential factor. […] 4.2.1.1.34  12 October 2004, Mongolia, Mr. Choisuren, UN Doc. A/59/PV.26, pp. 13-15535

[…] Mongolia shares the view that the composition of the Security Council should better reflect current world realities. My delegation wishes to stress that enlargement is not a goal in itself. The need for enlargement arises from the necessity to ensure the right balance of representation in this important body as well as the credibility of its decisions. As stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the United Nations Charter: [The] Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

534  27 September 2004, UN Doc. A/59/PV.12, pp. 15-18. 535  → 4.4.3.21 for Mongolia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

659

The Security Council thus represents all Members. Yet, over the past 59 years, the ratio of that representation has decreased by a factor of 2.7 compared to what it was at the time of the Organization’s inception. The issue is therefore how to ensure that the composition of the Security Council duly reflects the current realities of the general membership. Mongolia supports a just and equitable enlargement of the Security Council through an increase in the number of both permanent and elected seats, with the representation of developing and developed countries ensured. It is hard to understand why Africa and Latin America do not have any permanent seats in the Council. Likewise, I do not think that it is just or right that Asia – home to more than half of the world’s population – has only one permanent seat. Why should Japan, whose contribution to the United Nations budget exceeds that of four current permanent members combined, be denied a permanent membership? My delegation is of the view that, in selecting additional permanent members, a package approach could be adopted, including criteria such as geographical distribution, a genuine commitment to the goals and objectives of the United Nations, and a capacity to contribute substantially to the maintenance of international peace and security. In that respect, Mongolia supports the legitimate aspirations of countries such as Japan, Germany and India, which are willing and able to shoulder greater responsibility in pursuit of international peace, security and development. The composition of the Security Council should be small enough to work effectively and large enough to duly represent the current United Nations membership. […] 4.2.1.1.35 27 January 2005, Germany, Mr. Pleuger, Informal Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change536

[…] We have to ask ourselves what we want to achieve with Security Council reform, and which model best serves these aims. In our view, reform of the Council must aim at creating a more effective Council, a more representative Council, a more legitimate Council, and a Council more willing to adapt its working towards more transparency and towards more accountability and methods to take the views of non-Council members on board and better cooperate with other UN organs. We are convinced that these aims are served best by following the approach of Model A537 proposed by the Panel, and by implementing the recommendations of the Open-Ended working group regarding cluster 2, the Security Council working methods. Model A would change the Council’s structure to mirror the world of today, as opposed to that of 1945. And only by including the regions of the South in the permanent membership will they be able to influence the work of the Security Council on an equal footing. Also, to enhance the Security Council’s effectiveness, the most important contributors should be included among the permanent members. […]

536  → 4.2.1.3.15 for Germany’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 537  2 December 2004, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, → 4.1.19.

660

4 Momentum and deadlock 4.2.1.1.36 22 June 2005, United States of America, Ms. Patterson, USUN Press Release #119 (05)538

[…] Security Council Reform There should be no lingering doubts: the United States is open to Security Council reform and expansion, including the addition of new permanent members. We continue to support Japan for a permanent seat, with its significant contributions to all aspects of the UN, Japan has clearly earned it. We recognize that the world of 2005 is not that of 1945. Security Council reform, therefore, should take account of the challenges likely to face the international community in the 21st century and look at how the Council should be reconfigured to meet those challenges. Because Security Council expansion will have far-reaching implications, we believe that a criteria-based approach is the best way to measure a country’s readiness for membership. Criteria might include GDP, population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism record, and geographic balance. We look forward to hearing the views of others on appropriate criteria. Candidates for the UNSC should be supremely well qualified and should meet these criteria. […] 4.2.1.1.37 6 July 2005, Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine, Draft resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.64539 Security Council reform The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48/26 of 3 December 1993540 and 53/30 of 1 December 1998,541 Recognizing the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing also the functions and powers of the General Assembly on matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security as contained in the Charter, Recalling Article 15 (1) of the Charter, and recognizing the need for closer cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, Noting that the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the work of the Security Council will be enhanced by its improved representative character, its better ability to discharge its primary responsibility and to carry out its duties on behalf of all members,

538  → 4.3.17 for the United States position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 539  This draft is based on a G4 draft resolution of 8 June 2005. On 7 November 2011, Japan declared on behalf of the G4: “The proposal contained in our comprehensive 2005 draft resolution remains valid.” 540  → 3.1.2. 541  → 4.1.1 (adopted on 23 November 1998).

4 Momentum and deadlock

661

Reasserting the purposes and principles of the Charter, and recalling that, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, every Member State has pledged to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter”, Stressing that the permanent members of the Security Council bear a special responsibility both to uphold the principles of the Charter and to give their full support to the Organization’s actions to maintain international peace and security, Recalling, in this regard, its resolutions 55/235542 and 55/236543 of 23 December 2000, as updated by resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003,544 on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Acknowledging that there are many ways for Member States to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining that members of the Security Council should be elected with due regard to their record of various contributions to this end and also to equitable geographical distribution, as noted in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, as well as for their demonstrated commitment to and observance of international norms, Acknowledging also that security and development are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that development is an indispensable foundation of collective security, Aiming at the expansion of the membership of the Security Council to better reflect contemporary world realities, thereby shaping a balance of forces capable of enhancing the Council’s responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States, in particular developing countries, and ensuring the adoption of improved working methods, Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Security Council to improve its working methods, Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, which began its work in January 1994, Seeking in particular to enhance the transparency of the Security Council and the participation of non-members of the Council in its work, Bearing in mind the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 adopted by Heads of State and Government,545 in which they resolved, in respect of reform of the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, Taking into account the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”,546 in particular the recommendation to take a decision on Security Council reform before the summit of the General Assembly to be held in September 2005. Size and composition 1. Decides: (a) That the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to twenty-five by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members; 542  See UN Doc. A/RES/55/235 (dated 30 January 2001). 543  See UN Doc. A/RES/55/236 (dated 29 January 2001). 544  See UN Doc. A/RES/58/256 (dated 11 February 2004). 545  → 4.1.6. 546  21 March 2005, → 4.1.21.

662

4 Momentum and deadlock

(b) That the six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) Two from African States; (ii) Two from Asian States; (iii) One from Latin American and Caribbean States; (iv) One from Western European and Other States; (c) That the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from African States; (ii) One from Asian States; (iii) One from Eastern European States; (iv) One from Latin American and Caribbean States; Election procedure for new permanent members 2. Invites interested States to inform the members of the General Assembly that they are prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council and to submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly within one week of the adoption of the present resolution; 3. Decides: (a) To proceed, as soon as possible but in any case no later than twelve weeks after the adoption of the present resolution, by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot, to the designation of the States that will be elected to exercise the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council, according to the pattern described in paragraph 1 (b) above, it being understood that if the number of States having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining seats until six States obtain the required majority to occupy the six seats; (b) That only candidates registered in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall be eligible; (c)547 That the date for the election of the new permanent members according to subparagraph 3 (a) above shall be determined by the President of the General Assembly; 4. Decides, without prejudice to paragraph 3 above, to apply the rules of procedure of the General Assembly to the election of the new permanent members of the Security Council; Veto 5. Decides: (a) That the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members; (b) That the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review mandated under paragraph 7 below; Amendment of the Charter of the United Nations and review 6. Decides: (a) That, no later than two weeks after the designation of States elected to serve as new permanent members of the Security Council, a resolution containing amendments to 547  This paragraph was not included in the G4 draft resolution of 8 June 2005.

4 Momentum and deadlock

663

the Charter of the United Nations arising from the decisions taken in paragraphs 1 and 3 above will be submitted in order to be adopted at the earliest possible time, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter; (b) That the resolution will include amendments to Articles 27 (2) and (3), 108, and 109 (1) and (2) of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of 14 of 25 members of the Security Council for a decision, and to reflect, consistent with paragraph 5 (b) above, the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members has not been decided; 7. Decides also to review the situation created by the amendments referred to in paragraph 6 above fifteen years after their entry into force; Working methods […] 4.2.1.1.38 11 July 2005, Lithuania, Mr. Šerkšnys, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 19-20 […] Lithuania has chosen to co-sponsor the draft resolution of the group of four548 with a view to making the Security Council more transparent and democratic in its working methods and more representative in terms of present and future global realities. We are not saying that the draft is perfect. But for us, it is the only viable draft on the table, one enabling the composition of the Security Council to reflect the actual growth in the United Nations membership over the years and giving the Council added legitimacy by increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent members. In fact, the draft offers improvements to all regions, including the regional group comprising the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, which has seen its membership almost double over the past decade or so and which has witnessed some of the most dramatic and impressive political and economic transformations in recent years. Most importantly, the draft offers a decent chance to improve the representation of developing countries on the Security Council, including by adding new permanent seats. We believe that the developing world of Africa, Asia and Latin America should be eligible for permanent seats. We do not quite see how perpetuating a reality dating back to 1945 by keeping the number of permanent seats unchanged can improve the Council’s ability to respond more effectively to the challenges of the twenty-first century. Permanent membership is a privilege. But, first and foremost, it confers a great responsibility to contribute significantly and systematically to international peace and security. We have therefore consistently welcomed the proposals to give an opportunity to countries that have the resources, the capacity and the will to make a particularly meaningful contribution to the work of the Security Council to participate in its decision-making on a continuous and permanent basis. Notably, by introducing a review clause, the draft resolution provides for the real possibility of further adjusting and adapting the Security Council to constantly changing international realities, making sure that the new permanent members make good on their word. The review clause would enable us all, collectively, to weigh the actions and contributions of Council members objectively and honestly against our collective expectations for better security and for peace and to address their delivery with regard to these expectations. […] 548  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

664

4 Momentum and deadlock 4.2.1.1.39 12 July 2005, United States of America, Ms. Tahir-Kheli, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.112, pp. 9-10

[…] I want to reiterate that the United States supports expansion of the Security Council. We have on several occasions expressed our strong support for Japan’s candidacy for permanent membership. We anticipate that other countries will qualify for permanent or semi-permanent membership, and we have proposed criteria to that end. As Secretary Rice has noted, we recognize that 2005 is not 1945. But Security Council reform alone will not address the most pressing problems of the Organization, nor will proposals to alter the Council garner the support needed to amend the Charter absent broader reform. Regardless of timing, we will oppose any proposal that would make the Council less effective than it is today. And we will oppose calling for votes on proposals that do not command the breadth of support necessary to be put into practice. Let me be as clear as possible: the United States does not think any proposal to expand the Security Council – including one based on our own ideas – should be voted upon at this stage. It is important that all understand that while we disagree with this resolution,549 the nations that have put it forward are our friends. We reiterate our willingness to work with them and with other countries in the effort to achieve Security Council enlargement via a plan that is supported by the vast majority of United Nations Members and which results in a stronger, more effective Security Council, in the context of overall reform of the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, the timing and substance of the proposed resolution does not accomplish those ends. Let me share with the Assembly some of the reasons that have led my Government to the position that it cannot support the draft resolution. First, moving to a vote on this or any other draft resolution involving Security Council reform is bound to be divisive at this stage. The Charter of the United Nations is designed in such a way that reform of the Security Council requires broad consensus, and that is as it should be. We do not yet know the actual number of countries that might vote in favour of the draft resolution, but we do know that world opinion is still greatly divided on this issue. While there is, in our view, broad consensus regarding the need for Security Council expansion, major differences exist regarding what kind of expansion should occur. In addition to the proposal before us, the African Union has initiated action to introduce its own draft resolution. Although the African Union draft resolution550 may contain a number of points in common with the draft resolution under consideration, there are differences, many of them significant. We understand the aspirations of African nations, the vast majority of which did not enjoy independence when the United Nations was created in 1945, to serve on the Security Council. We also know that a group of countries that have joined together as Uniting for Consensus have put forward a draft resolution551 that proposes a very different formula for Security Council

549  6 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.1.1.37. 550  14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 551  21 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

4 Momentum and deadlock

665

enlargement. In short, while we see valuable elements in each of those efforts, it is clear that, as yet, there is no broad-based agreement. Secondly, Security Council expansion requires amendment of the Charter. Under Article 108 of the Charter, expansion of the Security Council requires lengthy constitutional processes in many nations, including my own. In our system, for example, the support of two thirds of the United States Senate is needed to pass an amendment to a treaty. We need to prepare the way carefully to ensure that whatever we vote for in this body will gain the requisite support of Member States required by the Charter during the ratification process. A vote to lock in a particular mode of Security Council expansion at this stage would interfere with our ability to shape a proposal later that would stand a reasonable chance of securing the requisite ratifications from Member State legislatures. In that regard, I would note that this is not a partisan issue in my country or in many others. Whether Democrats or Republicans, United States Senators – like officials of our executive branch – will be looking to see whether Security Council enlargement is part of a broader package of needed reforms and whether it makes the Council more or less effective in discharging its important duties. Thirdly, the search for a broad consensus should be based on agreement on criteria. Security Council expansion is necessary and will have far reaching consequences. We all recognize that the world has changed profoundly in the 60 years since the Charter was signed and this Organization was created. The founders struggled with some of the same issues we face today in applying the principles that they enshrined in the Charter. Their example is instructive today. Instead of choosing between a body that was representative but too large and unwieldy to deal with emerging security situations, or one that was efficient at the expense of representativeness, they created a system with multiple bodies with different roles. To deal with security, they formed a body of countries with the demonstrated capability to contribute to international peace and security. To ensure worldwide representation, they created the General Assembly. The only responsible way to approach Security Council expansion is to ensure, as did the founders, that those nations accorded permanent seats meet appropriate criteria for the tremendous duties and responsibilities that they will assume. The founders did not arbitrarily pick a number for permanent membership and then try to forcefit countries into those slots. Instead, they asked which States had the demonstrated capacity to contribute substantially to international peace and security. I have mentioned before the criteria that, in our view, define the qualifications for permanent membership: size of economy and population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping operations, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, and nonproliferation and counterterrorism records. Geographic also needs to be taken into consideration. We are prepared to consider other proposals for appropriate criteria, but we are committed to following the basic principles that have served us all so well. Fourthly, efficiency is essential. The Security Council has been an effective body, and it is more relevant today than ever. One of the first principles of reform should be to do no harm. Once we have reached consensus on new permanent members, we should consider some expansion of the non-permanent membership that maintains representativeness, but without making the Council so large that it becomes ineffective.

666

4 Momentum and deadlock

In closing, I ask all countries to again very carefully consider the draft resolution before us and to ask this critical question: does the draft resolution serve to strengthen the United Nations? We believe that it does not. We will work with other Members to achieve the enlargement of the Security Council, but only in the right way and at the right time. We urge the Assembly, therefore, to oppose this draft resolution and, should it come to a vote, to vote against it. 4.2.1.1.40 12 July 2005, Czech Republic, Mr. Kmoníček, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, p. 14 We consider ourselves a real reform-minded country and we have no vested interest in the reform, except one – the better functioning of the whole United Nations system. […] The problem of Security Council reform will be as divisive as it is now and as it was before the dialogue. The division of opinion on this question is natural; the stakes are too high, and it is one of the clear signs of the health of democracy that opinion can be diverse. Voting on such an issue is the most obvious way of resolving it. My country, being one of the sponsors of the model submitted by the group of four,552 has been reiterating its position for many years now. The proposal reflects our decadelong position on reform of the Security Council that would enlarge its numbers in both categories. On the issue of the veto, we believe that this proposal mirrors our support for its use to be voluntarily limited. Whatever opinion on the proposed new shape of the Security Council one may have, one thing is obvious. The new composition of the Council goes hand in hand with the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century. Let us be realistic. That is the way for the United Nations to stay relevant. 4.2.1.1.41 12 July 2005, Samoa, Mr. Elisaia, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 18-19 […] For two afternoons now, we have been debating the draft resolution submitted by the group of four,553 and we have heard some modifications made to it. We have been briefed about the Uniting for Consensus draft resolution,554 and we have been informed of the African Group’s decision,555 as well as a few variations of the same. What the promoters of those draft resolutions and proposals have in common is their claim that their particular model will greatly enhance the chances of a leastdeveloped-country island State such as Samoa becoming a non-permanent member of the Security Council sometime in future. While statistically that may be the case, the possibility of such noble intentions being realized will continue to remain elusive, if current regional group voting practices are anything to go by. I have said informally in the past – and I will say so again now – that if the General Assembly decides, out of the goodness of its heart, to allocate a seat specifically for the Pacific Islands Forum Group, then, and only then, will Samoa have a fighting chance 552  553  554  555 

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30.

4 Momentum and deadlock

667

of serving on the Security Council. But how can we aspire to such a status when we cannot take up lesser challenges within the United Nations because of our resource constraints? […] Samoa’s support for the group of four draft resolution is firmly rooted in our unequivocal support for the enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. We remain convinced that an expansion of the Council is both necessary and desirable to mirror present-day realities and to enhance its effectiveness and its legitimacy. Our support for an enlarged Security Council, to include Japan and Germany because of their valuable contributions to the international community, is a matter of record at the United Nations, and we took that stance nine years ago at the fifty-first session of the General Assembly. The group of four draft resolution therefore provides what is perhaps the only real avenue within the foreseeable future for Samoa to give effect and expression to its stated position. 4.2.1.1.42 12 July 2005, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 27-30 […] Our critics say that since the reform that we are proposing is likely to be vetoed by some of the permanent five, it is a fruitless dead end. We believe that a decision taken thrice by the General Assembly through a two-thirds majority cannot be politically vetoed. It is not a dead end, but a barrier that has to be broken through so that, from the dead end that it has almost reached, the General Assembly is resurrected and revitalized as the most powerful universal body of the United Nations. Our critics add that their reform model is better because it would be ratified by the permanent five. Precisely for that reason, it would be worse for the General Assembly. In a discussion with friends from the African Union a few weeks back, I quoted a nineteenth-century thinker who favoured radical reform – reform that is permitted by reason and not permitted by the police. Our critics offer us reform that is permitted by the police and not permitted by reason. Their logic is incomprehensible. President Truman spoke of the noble purposes of the United Nations. But as the records of the Potsdam Conference show, he also inaugurated the cold war. No wonder, therefore, that it is our critics who ultimately praise Caesar. We continue to bury him. It is quite clear that our critics therefore continue to support the dominance of the current power structure. They speak of the ethics of the United Nations and of national elections, on which the group-of-four countries hardly require any lessons. According to those critics, permanent members with the veto, permanent members without the veto and non-permanent members would constitute three unmanageable and in fact unequal tiers, but the continued dominance of the permanent five and the proposed 20 non-permanent members would form one happy, equal family. According to that logic, the small States that co-sponsored our resolution do not know their own interests. A small State elected once in 40 years is represented, but a small State that benefits from increased policy and political space and that participates every day in the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council does not get any representation or benefit at all, according to their logic. An election after which the

668

4 Momentum and deadlock

record of non-permanent members is not examined is accountability, but a stringent review holding new permanent members accountable is lack of accountability. Most astonishing of all is the complete reinterpretation of the African Union (AU) summit. Not providing for one more non-permanent seat makes the proposal of the group of four556 totally incompatible with AU positions,557 but denying both permanent seats to the AU makes the Uniting for Consensus proposal558 fully compatible. The group of four is saying that the question of the veto should be discussed after 15 years; the AU is saying that it should be discussed now. But our critics say that the AU is not really committed to the veto at all – that it does not really want the veto, but something entirely different. That, surely, is to reinterpret the Ezulwini Consensus559 and the AU summit and to claim to know the minds of the African Union better than the Union itself. Moreover, if continued presence is proposed – I am not very good at citing statistics, and probably not as good at mathematics as the members of Uniting for Consensus – then the arithmetical effect on other seats would be much worse, even arithmetically, than that of the proposal of the group of four. One need not reiterate that, in any case, the political effect would be much worse, because there would not be increased policy or political space, and there would not be participation in the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. One of the Uniting for Consensus countries also “warned” the group of four. We are at a loss to know whether that was a friendly indication of a danger to be avoided or a threat to be heeded. Anyway, that completely unselfish and fruitful travesty of logic is dressed up as a total absence of national ambition and as total concern for the welfare of the general membership. […] 4.2.1.1.43  21 July 2005, United States, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mr. Burns, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee On United Nations Reform […] Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words about Security Council reform. Many nations have expressed the view that the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful body, should be enlarged from its current composition of 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members to become more representative of today’s world. We have stated consistently that while we are open to considering expansion proposals, the primary purpose of Security Council reform should be to make the Council more effective. The Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent Persons560 did not endorse a specific plan on this highly-charged issue but proposed instead two options: (1) increasing 556  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 557  7-8 March 2005, Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 558  21 July 2010, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 559  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 560  1 December 2004, → 4.1.19.

4 Momentum and deadlock

669

the number of both permanent and non-permanent members; or (2) enlarging the Council with new non-permanent members only, albeit with a new category of nonpermanent membership that has a longer term than the current two year term and which allows members to run for re-election. Japan, Germany, Brazil and India, known as the Group of Four or G-4, have put forward an enlargement proposal based on the first option that would give them, together with two African nations, permanent seats. The G-4 has indicated that they would like to have a vote by the General Assembly on the resolution in the coming weeks. This G-4 proposal would need to receive a yes vote of two-thirds of UN members if it is to move to the next phases, the selection of the new permanent members, and the adoption of a resolution for amending the UN Charter, with ratification of the amendment by two-thirds of UN membership, including ratification by all permanent Security Council members. For the United States, this would require Senate advice and consent. The G-4 proposal is opposed by a number of countries, including the U.S. We do not think it is timely to support any proposal until broader consensus is reached. Recently, other proposals for Security Council reform have been put forward, including one by the African Union. We have engaged in a dialogue with the G-4 and with the other permanent members of the Security Council. I met personally with my counterparts from both groups. We continue our strong support for a permanent seat for Japan, have expressed our openness to Security Council expansion, and proposed our own criteria-based approach as a constructive way to measure a country’s readiness for a permanent seat. Such criteria could include: GDP, population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism record, and geographic balance. We have said that we can support adding two or so new permanent members based on those criteria. In addition, we would endorse the addition of two or three additional non-permanent seats, based on geographic selection, to expand the Council to 19 or 20. We feel that the G-4 resolution is highly divisive. Obtaining wide support for Security Council reform is critical if the reform is to succeed in revitalizing the United Nations. Clearly, as well, a resolution that enjoys a broad base of support stands a better chance of General Assembly adoption. We also want our friends to understand that while Security Council reform is an important issue, we cannot let discussion on expansion divert our attention from, and delay action on, other important, more urgently-needed UN reforms. It is our conviction that no single area of reform should be addressed to the exclusion of others. The Secretary has communicated this to UNSYG Annan and to her counterparts. As such, we do not think any proposal to expand the Security Council – including one based on our own ideas – should be voted upon at this stage. If the G-4 puts its resolution for a vote, we will vote against it and are urging others to do the same. Closing In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore that United Nations reform is a very high priority for Secretary Rice and for this Administration. The UN has been, and continues to be, a critical element of U.S. foreign policy. We cannot, however, change the UN for the sake of change alone. We want reforms that will make the United Nations more effective and bring it closer to the vision it created for itself almost 60 years ago,

670

4 Momentum and deadlock

while simultaneously preparing it and its member countries for the new challenges of the 21st century. 4.2.1.1.44 10 November 2005, United States of America, Mr. Bolton, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 3-5

[…] I mention a few of the vital issues before the Security Council today to emphasize a point. Discussions of reform and expansion of the Council must emphasize the need to strengthen – not weaken – the Council’s ability to act. The Security Council has under way a comprehensive review of its working methods and procedures and continues to take important steps to improve its efficiency. We believe that, as clearly stated in the Charter, the Security Council alone will determine its own working methods and procedures. To that end, however, we fully welcome ideas and contributions from other Member States. The United States will continue to be a full participant in the Open-ended Working Group. Based on the work of this Group, the Council has already developed a series of procedures and practices to provide increased access and information on items being considered by the Council, including through briefings, Journal notices and the use of new information technology. […] The United States supports an expansion of the Security Council that can contribute to its strength and effectiveness, and is open to various options to realize such a reform. Earlier this year, the United States made a specific proposal for a modest expansion of the Council by adding a combination of permanent and non-permanent members. We stand by that proposal and are open to suggestions of other countries. As Secretary Rice has said, “We want that important body to reflect the world as it is in 2005, not as it was in 1945” (A/60/PV.9, p. 9). We must also ensure that new permanent members are supremely qualified to undertake the tremendous duties and responsibilities they will assume. In our view, qualified nations should meet criteria in the following areas: size of economy and population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping operations, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, non-proliferation and counterterrorism records, and equitable geographic balance. We have long supported a permanent seat for Japan. We hope very much that Japan will be able to take a permanent seat at the earliest possible opportunity. And we believe that developing countries deserve greater representation on this body. As I have already noted, particular emphasis should be placed on criteria for membership. And those Member States that most clearly meet those criteria should be allowed to serve on the Council, even where there is a disagreement over other candidates. The United States is prepared to engage fully in an effort to find a proposal that allows for agreement on expansion of the Council. However, too large an expansion would risk making it unable to quickly address challenges to international peace and security. However, we will not support a return to any of the three proposals introduced at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Simply put, in those past attempts we bit off more than we could chew. The debate in the Hall in July only

4 Momentum and deadlock

671

highlighted deep divisions among Member States and paralysed the overall reform effort. We believe it would be a mistake to return to that discussion. Because Security Council expansion requires amendment of the Charter – which requires approval by two thirds of the membership and by the five current permanent members, in accordance with their own respective constitutional procedures – we need to prepare the way carefully to ensure that whatever approach we adopt can and will gain the requisite support of Member States during the ratification process. It is important that any proposal contribute to the effectiveness of the Security Council. Proposals that do not command the breadth of support necessary to be put into practice should be reconsidered. The United States takes its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council very seriously. History has shown that the Council, working together and with the full cooperation of all Member States, can reverse aggression, contribute to the expansion of freedom and maintain peace and security for the benefit of us all. 4.2.1.1.45 10 November 2005, Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 22-23

[…] Despite the fact that I have already expressed Jordan’s position on the question of Security Council reform, a matter without which the comprehensive reform of the United Nations cannot be completed, I would like to renew our commitment to the necessary expansion of Security Council membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and our support for the draft resolution561 that was submitted to the General Assembly last August562 on that reform and expansion. […] 4.2.1.1.46 11 November 2005, Cuba, Mr. Reyes Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 18-20563

[…] The Security Council should be expanded to include new permanent and nonpermanent members. The new permanent and non-permanent members joining the Council as part of this expansion should receive the same prerogatives as current permanent members. The basic objective of this expansion should be to correct the underrepresentation of developing countries in the Council’s membership. Cuba believes that two or three countries from Africa, two or three countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, and two or three developing countries from Asia should join the Council as permanent members, with the same powers as current members, including the veto. […]

561  30 July 2004, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/58/L.67/Rev.1. 562  5 August 2004, UN Doc. A/58/PV.93, pp. 2-4. 563  → 4.4.3.23 for Cuba’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

672

4 Momentum and deadlock 4.2.1.1.47 5 January 2006, Brazil, Germany and India, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.46564

[…] Election procedure for new permanent members The General Assembly […] 3. Decides: (a) To proceed, as soon as possible but in any case no later than twelve weeks after the adoption of the present resolution, by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot, to the designation of the States that will be elected to exercise the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council, according to the pattern described in paragraph 1 (b) above, it being understood that if the number of States having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership, new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining seats until six States obtain the required majority to occupy the six seats; (b) That only candidates registered in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall be eligible; (c) That the date for the election of the new permanent members according to subparagraph 3 (a) above shall be determined by the President of the General Assembly; […] Amendment of the Charter of the United Nations and review 6. Decides: (a) That, no later than two weeks after the designation of States elected to serve as new permanent members of the Security Council, a resolution containing amendments to the Charter of the United Nations arising from the decisions taken in paragraphs 1 and 3 above will be submitted in order to be adopted at the earliest possible time, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter; […] 4.2.1.1.48 20 July 2006, Qatar, Mr. Al-Nasser, UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, pp. 13-15 […] Security Council reform is long overdue. With its present composition, the Council cannot reflect the political and geographical reality of our world, as it did in 1945. The number of United Nations Member States has risen from 51 in 1945 to 192 at present. That steady increase underlines the importance of transforming this very important body and making it more representative of today’s world, through the increase and expansion of its permanent and non-permanent membership, particularly from among the ranks of the developing countries. That would increase the possibility for all Member States to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 564  This draft is based on the draft resolution of 6 July 2005, UN Doc. A/59/L.64, → 4.2.1.1.37. The passages in bold face are those that were changed in comparison to UN Doc. A/59/L.64. On 7 November 2013, Japan declared on behalf of G4 in UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, p. 9: “The proposals contained in our comprehensive 2005 draft resolution (UN Doc. A/60/L.46) remain valid.”

4 Momentum and deadlock

673

security and to fulfil their Charter commitments. It would be a fount of great determination and confidence on the part of all Member States, and it would be a first step towards completing the reform of the United Nations. […] 4.2.1.1.49 12 December 2006, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, pp. 7-13565 […] One of the leading lights of the doctrine of simply adding to the non-permanent membership and of having renewable elections, and so forth, mentioned at great length the problems of the Security Council and the problems with peace and security in the world today, and yet felt that simply by adding renewable non-permanent seats we could solve those problems. He referred at great length to the problem of the usurpation of the authority of the General Assembly, yet felt that adding non-permanent members could address that. If that is the case, why have non-permanent members not mitigated those problems so far? Why have they not been able to check usurpation? So let us not simply have reform for the sake of reform. Similarly, in looking at an interim solution, we should consider whether such a solution would actually address the fundamental problems of the correlation of power, oligarchy and accountability. Otherwise, the interim solution would again be simply reform for the sake of reform. It would give the illusion of change without any real change, and leave all of the real problems unaddressed. Indeed, it might even make them worse. […] 4.2.1.1.50 12 December 2006, France, Mr. Lacroix, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, p. 28 […] I turn now to Security Council reform. As members know, France is committed to comprehensive reform, with regard both to its composition and to its working methods. On the latter, its working methods, it must be said that real progress has been made this year. Thus, the presidential note (S/2006/507)566 adopted last July after several months of collective hard work made it possible to make progress on a certain number of specific subjects, although they have not yet all been addressed. Among them I would highlight increased transparency in the work of the Security Council and of its subsidiary bodies, the degree of consultation with States concerned in regional crises and the importance of involving regional organizations. France believes, however, that reform of the United Nations and of the Security Council would be incomplete without expansion of the Council. Here, opposition to change is not an option. Given that the Council’s Charter responsibilities demand that it intensify its activities, we must enhance its authority by adapting its composition to the realities of today’s world. Expanding the Council’s composition would also enable it to be more effective, because the implementation of its decisions requires increasing human, financial and logistical commitment on the part of the international community. For its part, France continues to support the plan submitted last year by the Group of Four,567 which we believe is best able to meet the challenges, particularly through 565  → 4.4.3.25 for India’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 566  19 July 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/507. 567  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

674

4 Momentum and deadlock

an expansion in both membership categories. In that context, we continue to fully support the aspirations of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil to become permanent members and Africa’s demand to have its rightful place in such reform. […] 4.2.1.1.51 14 September 2007, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1568 Security Council reform process The General Assembly, Reaffirming the aims and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind the United Nations Millennium Declaration*1 of 8 September 2000 adopted by heads of State and Government, in which they resolved to, inter alia, intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, Recalling the resolve of world leaders, reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome*2, to support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of overall efforts to reform the United Nations in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy and implementation of its decisions, Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, which began its work in January 1994, Aiming to expand the membership of the Security Council to better reflect contemporary world realities, thereby enhancing the Council’s responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States, in particular developing countries, including island and small States, and ensuring the adoption of improved working methods, Commending the President of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly for her efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, Urges the President-elect of the sixty-second session of the General Assembly to take immediate steps to facilitate results-oriented intergovernmental negotiations, taking into account all options and elements, including, in particular, the following elements for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, so as to adopt an outcome, preferably before the end of 2007: Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories Greater representation of the developing countries, including island and small States Representation of the developed countries and those with transition economies reflective of contemporary world realities Comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the Security Council Equitable geographical distribution Provision for a review.

• • • • • •

568  The draft resolution was withdrawn by its sponsors and not put to a vote in the General Assembly.

4 Momentum and deadlock

675

Original footnotes *1 See resolution 55/2. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, → 4.1.6]. *2 See resolution 60/1. [16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, → 4.1.23]. 4.2.1.1.52 12 November 2007, United States of America, Mr. Khalilzad, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 12-13

[…] Regarding Security Council reform, we believe that expansion of the Council must ensure that its ability to respond with agility, credibility and efficacy to threats to international peace and security is preserved. Qualified candidates for permanent membership must have demonstrated their ability to act as responsible stakeholders in responding to global challenges to peace and security. They must also maintain a strong commitment to democracy, human rights and non-proliferation and provide substantial peacekeeping or financial contributions to the United Nations. Those requirements suggest only a modest expansion of the Council. As President Bush said in his address to the General Assembly (see A/62/PV.4),569 the United States continues to support Japan’s candidacy for permanent membership. Other nations should be considered as well, although we have not made any decisions about which other countries might qualify. The United States does not have a specific proposal for Council expansion. Despite our openness to the prospect of expansion, we have noted that persistent differences among Member States’ positions have prevented previous proposals from garnering widespread support. We therefore look forward to reviewing new proposals to achieve a modest expansion of the Council that are capable of achieving broad-based support. […] 4.2.1.1.53 13 November 2007, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/62/PV.49, pp. 14-16 […] My delegation sincerely believes that reforming the Security Council remains central and should become part and parcel of the entire United Nations reform process if the United Nations is to remain a credible and effective Organization. The Council must be reformed to reflect the geopolitical realities of the modern world. While we recognize the difficulties we face, we sincerely believe that the reforms should be comprehensive and include the expansion of its membership in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories, the issue of veto, and its decision-making process. Similarly, the issues relating to the working methods and their transparency, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly are equally important areas that need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. […] 4.2.1.1.54 13 November 2007, Philippines, Mr. Davide, UN Doc. A/62/PV.50, pp. 14-15 […] Thirdly, on the issue of enlargement, my delegation fully supports the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership, based on equitable geographic 569  25 September 2007, UN Doc. A/62/PV.4, pp. 8-11.

676

4 Momentum and deadlock

distribution reflecting the geopolitical realities of today. The United Nations must truly be the world’s model for a fully functioning participatory democracy. It would be a contradiction in principle and in practice and a travesty of justice if the membership of the Security Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations given the important task of maintaining peace and security, did not reflect the prevailing context of its existence. We hope that, at the very least, general agreement among Member States can be achieved on this issue during this session. […] 4.2.1.1.55 14 November 2007, Mongolia, Ms. Enkhtsetseg, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 6-7570 […] My country believes that there should be a just and equitable expansion of the Security Council in both its permanent and non-permanent membership categories, ensuring due representation for both developing and developed countries. Expansion in the permanent-member category should address the dichotomy in the Council’s composition as well as today’s geopolitical realities. Factors such as a country’s global outreach and its economic and political weight must therefore be taken into consideration. After all, permanent membership is not only a privilege; it is also a heavy responsibility. Mongolia thus supports the aspirations of Japan, Germany and India, which are willing and, we believe, well positioned to serve as new permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, Africa and Latin America should be adequately represented on the Council. […] 4.2.1.1.56 18 November 2008, United States of America, Mr. Wolff, UN Doc. A/63/ PV.53, pp. 23-24

[…] The United States is open to a modest expansion of the Security Council. Only an expansion of relatively small size will preserve the Council’s ability to respond quickly, effectively and credibly to threats to international peace and security. That ability is essential for the Council to discharge its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it must guide our discussions on any Council expansion. The United States believes that qualified candidates for Security Council permanent membership must have demonstrated their ability to act as responsible stakeholders in addressing global, not just local or regional, challenges to peace and security. They must maintain strong commitments to democracy, human rights and non-proliferation and provide substantial peacekeeping or financial contributions to the United Nations. As we have stated in the past, we believe Japan is qualified for permanent membership on those grounds, and we are willing to consider other nations as well. Although the Charter is clear on the two-thirds requirement for amendment of the Charter, we continue to believe that it is politically wise and important to achieve the broadest possible support for Council expansion to ensure that no significant portion of the membership is alienated by the result and that it constitutes an 570  → 4.2.2.4.3 for Mongolia’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

677

improvement over the status quo. For that reason, we are pleased that decision 62/557571 includes the political goal of a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States. Achieving the widest possible political acceptance will greatly ease the ratification process by Member States, including by all of the permanent members of the Council. […] 4.2.1.1.57 18 November 2008, Brazil, Mr. Tarragô, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 20-21 […] […] Some believe, and others want us to believe, that true democracy would come to the Council through an increase in the number of non-permanent members only. But simply adding non-permanent members to the Council would not solve the problem of the loss of its representativeness and of the legitimacy of its decisions, which has been observed over the years. It would only accentuate the present imbalances. Therefore, the Council must necessarily count on the permanent contribution of countries whose presence in the international scene has become more decisive in the building and implementation of the required decisions. Brazil favours the expansion of the organ in both categories: of permanent and nonpermanent members. Democratic reforms in the Council are only possible through the addition of permanent members committed to making it more transparent and accountable. With the clout that permanent membership can bring – fully legitimized by a very demanding electoral and ratification process in the General Assembly – such new members can be effective agents of change. They will do so through the vote and the persuasion of other permanent Council members. To restrict reform to the mere addition of non-permanent members, though purportedly democratic, is in fact a way to preserve the status quo, since those members, by definition, can only contribute to the decision-making process for a limited period of time. Worse still, it would distort even more the proportion in the Council between permanent and non-permanent members. As they say in French, plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose. This is neither what the world needs nor what the majority of Member States wants. Another important aspect of the meaningful reform we need relates to the nature of an expanded Security Council. We want it to be both more representative and more effective than today. In order to achieve such goals, balancing the composition is crucial. On the one hand, we need a more diverse set of countries and, on the other, we need a larger core group of countries prepared and willing to take up the accrued responsibilities associated with the task of maintaining international peace and security. That can be done through the kind of reform proposed by Brazil and many others from all regions, including small States. Small States, unlike what some would like us to believe, know very well what they will gain: improved representation in and better access to the Council. With genuine reform, not only will they be more likely to be elected as non-permanent members but they will also have partners in the Council in their efforts for more participation. […]

571  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

678

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 4.2.1.2.1 23 September 1998, Italy, Mr. Dini, UN Doc. A/53/PV.11, p. 19-22 […] But the stalemate continues on the issue of enlarging the Council. The Italian Government will be willing to support any reasonable formula, provided that it does not prejudice the eventual establishment of a common European seat on the Council, distance Italy from the other principal industrial countries or increase the number of countries that are “more equal” than others, transforming the majority of Member States from protagonists into mere spectators. […] 4.2.1.2.2 19 February 1999, Italy, Mr. Fulci, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] Since the beginning of this exercise, Italy has made clear its opposition to the creation of new, fixed permanent seats. We have explained the reasons for this position over and over again. Allow me to recapitulate them once more: 1. First, in the words of the President of the Republic of Italy, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, in his statement to the General Assembly in April 1996: “A simple enlargement of the current Olympus could diminish the interest of the excluded, giving them the dangerous feeling of being marginalized, of being transformed into mere spectators.”572 2. Another major reason for our opposition to new, fixed permanent seats concerns the future of the European Union. Two members of the EU have been permanent members of the Security Council since 1945. To add a third member from the EU countries would clearly not move in the direction of more cohesion and more unity in the pursuit of a European common foreign and security policy, which should follow logically and naturally the introduction of a common European currency. Here I echo and subscribe to what Amb. Petrella of Argentina and Amb. Tello of Mexico said in their statements yesterday. May I add that to give more visibility in the United Nations to the European Union as such – possibly in the future Security Council – remains one of the main goals of Italian foreign policy, with the full blessing and support of the Italian Parliament. 3. Third, the greatest difficulty by far that one can foresee in the expansion of permanent members is the selection of the few, new privileged ones, in the absence of any established criteria to this end. Some have proposed that new permanent members should be elected by a vote in the General Assembly. But given the intensity, acrimony, and expense already common to elections of Member States to mere two-year terms on the Council, what kind of poisonous competition, what kind of repercussions can we expect from the election of permanent members from different geographic regions? Let us not underestimate the severe, adverse consequences of such a process on relations within individual regional groups and among member states. 4. Fourth, to me new fixed permanent members would mean to exempt them in perpetuity per saecula saeculorum, as our Colombian colleague, Prof. Andres Franco, put it so wryly yesterday – from the requirement of democratic elections, and to exempt them from accountability to the General Assembly. The Security Council would become even more elitist and less democratic than it is now. 572  3 April 1996, UN Doc. A/50/PV.103, pp. 3-4.

4 Momentum and deadlock

679

As our Mexican colleague, Amb. Manuel Tello, said so eloquently: “In the past decade we have witnessed a strengthening of a trend towards democracy, not towards oligarchy. Exercising democracy means reducing inequality. Exercising democracy means eliminating privileges, not giving them to more selected few.” In fact, to create new members more equal than others would completely disregard the preamble of the UN Charter, which solemnly proclaims the equal rights of all nations large and small. To create new permanent members without the veto would mean dividing the entire UN membership up into a three or four caste system. Furthermore, to create new permanent members, discriminating between industrialized and developing countries, would reintroduce a categorization, a contraposition from the past, which we hope is gone forever. 5. Fifth, the countries that have laid claim to new fixed, permanent seats – and their supporters – argue that they represent new realities, that they are global powers, or in the latest definition, that they are “new global realities.” Not so, Mr. President. These countries have been global realities since at least the beginning of the century (as are others represented in this room). They have long been on the map of the major nations with global reach. Their fortunes have ebbed and flowed with the tides of history, and will continue to do so. What is truly new in the post-World War II era is not the emergence of a few global powers. What is new is the fact that nearly ninety former colonies have become fullfledged independent, sovereign States thanks mainly to the process of decolonization. These countries must be recognized, by far, as the emerging new realities of the world in which we live. 6. Sixth, claims to permanent seats by some industrialized nations seem to be based mainly on economic power. But let me mention what our former colleague from Malta, Ambassador Joseph Cassar, now a Professor at St. John’s University, recently wrote in this regard: “Arguments portraying economic strength as a criterion to justify claims to permanent membership are hazardous. Economic strength is neither static nor permanent.” What if in the near future, other countries, other States were to become (and some have already become) economically stronger than current permanent members? Would these other States also be entitled to permanent seats because of their economic strength? And would current permanent members with diminished economic power have to give up their seats? 7. Seventh and last, who is to say that adding new permanent members – increasing the circle of the privileged from 5 to 7 or even 10 – would really enhance the role of the Council in maintaining international peace and security? It is a known fact that the current Council is dominated by the permanent members. Do we really want to make this dominance overwhelming and irreversible? […] 4.2.1.2.3 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2573 […] As for the first – an increase in the number of permanent members – Argentina considers that there is no legal basis in some States’ claim to become permanent members other than the crude rationale of power. […] 573  → 4.2.2.3.13 for Argentina’s support of regional seats, and 4.4.3.12 for Argentina’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

680

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.1.2.4 16 November 2000, Spain, Mr. Arias, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 9-10 […] I would recall that President Chavez Frias of Venezuela also referred in his statement to the Millennium Summit574 to the need to do away with the veto. Even so, we know that this wish is somewhat illusory, since those who have the veto are not likely to renounce it, even partially. We also know that the condition of permanent membership is intrinsically linked to the power of veto. Bearing this in mind, we must ask ourselves an obvious question: Are we ready to grant this huge, potentially paralysing power, to a new handful of States just because we enjoy excellent relations with them? Are we aware of the significance in the year 2000, 55 years after the last World War, of increasing the number of permanent members on the basis of dubious criteria and of granting them this all-embracing prerogative that could weaken any resolution? In the year 2000, this is going too far. The veto is a crucial element of the reform and, in particular, of the enlargement of the Security Council. In the twenty-first century, when Member States are in an uproar over the issue of curtailing the current veto power, it would seem strange, to say the least, that we would grant it to a new group of countries. Apart from acting paradoxically, we would be establishing a new class of privileged States and thus doing a disservice to the United Nations. […] 4.2.1.2.5 16 November 2000, Canada, Mr. Heinbecker, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 14-16

[…] Secondly, we should no longer regard the Open-ended Working Group as a forum for a handful of members to insist that we accord them the privilege of individual permanent seats on the Council as well. Permanent is a long time. None of us can know what the future holds. As well, adding vetoes would only make the Council more sclerotic. It would be the diplomatic equivalent of pouring cement into the United Nations motor. The veto, or the threat of the veto, is omnipresent. Five vetoes already impair the good functioning of the Council. How would adding five more vetoes help? And whom would it help? The Organization is, after all, according to Article 2 of the Charter, “based on … the sovereign equality of all its members”. […] 4.2.1.2.6 16 November 2000, San Marino, Mr. Filippi Balestra, UN Doc. A/55/ PV.65, pp. 41-42

[…] San Marino also considers that the “quick fix” would represent only an approximate solution. It would freeze an organization that should, on the contrary, reflect the political, social and economic changes of the world. We are aware of the fact that there are countries that, because of their contributions to or their influence on international affairs, believe they are entitled to play a more active role in the Security Council. Even assuming that their claims are legitimate, we are convinced that their being entrusted with the privilege of permanent membership is not the right answer. Permanency and the veto run counter to the basic principles upon which modern international society is organized. 574  8 September 2000, UN Doc. A/55/PV.8, pp. 36-38.

4 Momentum and deadlock

681

Furthermore, an increase in the permanent members of the Security Council would constitute a dangerous precedent that would be applicable to other organs of the United Nations system. This would compromise the principle of equality among States. In my country’s view, any enlargement should equitably address the interests of all Member States, correcting the current imbalances, and the regional groups should continue to play a basic role in the allocation of Security Council seats to their members. Democratic election in the General Assembly should also remain as a conditio sine qua non for becoming a member of the Security Council. […] 4.2.1.2.7 14 October 2003, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 13-14 […] Nevertheless, some proposals claim that the solution is to create new permanent members. Some propose increasing the number of permanent members, with new members having the same rights as current members; that is to say, with the privilege of the veto. They argue that some countries aspiring to that category of membership in fact contribute more to the Organization and are more powerful, than some of the permanent members that obtained the privilege of the veto in 1945. Others, being more resigned – or more realistic – would be happy with a permanent seat without the privilege of the veto. Should that idea prevail, we would have a Security Council with three classes of members, much like passengers on a plane. Some – the five permanent members – would travel first class. Others – permanent members without the right of the veto – would travel in business class. Lastly, nonpermanent members would travel in coach. Can that classification stand up to the test of legitimacy and equity? Could the peoples of the United Nations referred to in the preamble to the Charter trust an organization based on such new inequalities? […] 4.2.1.2.8 14 October 2003, Italy, Mr. Spatafora, UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, pp. 17-19 […] Moreover, let us be clear that any enlargement of the Security Council, regardless of the composition it assumes, will be limited in number. The figure generally mentioned is between 20 and 25 or 26 members. With a higher number of members, the Security Council would not be effective and efficient. What would result, it should be clear to all Member States, would be a zero-sum game. If we increase the number of permanent members, there will be less room for the rest of the membership who agree to the non-permanent seats. We would give, let us suppose, to five Member States, who would become permanent members, and thereby take away from what the remaining Member States have the right to expect regarding the possibility for them to offer a direct contribution to shape the Security Council’s actions and policies. […] 4.2.1.2.9  11 October 2004, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.24, pp. 22-23575

[…] It is therefore time to move forward with Security Council reform. Switzerland supports an increase in the membership of the Council to strengthen the legitimacy of its 575  → 4.4.4.15 for Switzerland’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

682

4 Momentum and deadlock

decisions and their implementation by Member States. The composition of the Security Council should better reflect changes that have occurred since the Organization was founded. A greater role should be allocated to the developing countries, where the greatest number of people live, and better account should be taken of the particular financial and material support that certain countries provide to the United Nations system. My country is in favour of expanding the Security Council, but it is against creating new seats that have veto power. We are against it because the current exercise of the veto is not democratic, but also because it would affect the Council’s ability to act. […] 4.2.1.2.10 24 June 2005, Costa Rica, Note verbale addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, UN Doc. A/59/856

[…] Annex to the note verbale dated 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations system The present working paper is an effort to examine the possible effects of Security Council enlargement, in the Permanent Member category, on the opportunities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system. It primarily concentrates on what is commonly known as the ‘Cascade Effect’ and its collateral impact on the possibilities and opportunities of the broader membership to be elected to various United Nations organs. The purpose of this paper is not to call into question the status or the privileges enjoyed by the current Permanent Members, although that is an issue that might deserve consideration in its own right, but only to sound a note of warning regarding the Cascade Effect as it would relate to any future enlargement in the Permanent Member category. Costa Rica believes that it is necessary to seriously examine this issue, as any extension of the Cascade Effect could potentially affect the sense of collective ownership which necessarily underlies the United Nations. The Cascade Effect arises from the structural political and legal advantages that Permanent Members enjoy as a result of their permanency in the Security Council. In some cases, these electoral advantages are enshrined in legal norms, such as the requirement that judges to the International Court of Justice be simultaneously but separately elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In other cases, they arise from collateral political influence, such as the customary practice that every Permanent Member is entitled to have at least one national appointed at the Under-Secretary-General level in key departments of the United Nations. The statistical evidence presented below proves that Permanent Members in the Security Council have generally enjoyed continuous membership in all the key organs and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations system and have had the added benefit of having nationals continuously appointed to the most senior staff positions. The limited exceptions are mostly confined to the transitional period regarding the representation of China (1960s and early 1970s) and to the adoption of voluntary rotation arrangements within the European Union (late 1990s). For the broader United Nations membership, the Cascade Effect has a tangible negative impact. By excluding, de iure or de facto, a certain number of seats from those

4 Momentum and deadlock

683

available for open election and rotation, or appointment by the Secretary-General in the case of senior posts, the Cascade Effect substantially reduces the opportunities of Member States or their nationals to serve in various United Nations organs. For all intents and purposes, Permanent Members of the Security Council displace all other Member States from seats and posts that should, respectively, be open to democratic election by Member States or appointment by the Secretary-General. The precise impact of the Cascade Effect on each seat varies in relation to the total number of seats available for election in each organ. Similarly, it varies on each post in relation to the total number of posts to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Therefore, although comprehensive in its grasp, the Cascade Effect can manifest itself differently in each case. When considering the expansion of the Security Council and, in particular, the possible creation of new Permanent Members, it is necessary to examine whether new Permanent Members would enjoy the advantages that arise from the Cascade Effect. Without proper safeguards to correct the legal and political factors that give rise to it – for example, a firm binding commitment otherwise, – the Cascade Effect will, in all likelihood, extend its asphyxiating grasp on the opportunities and possibilities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system. Statistical Findings The Cascade Effect is a rather understudied phenomenon, although its ramifications can be felt throughout the United Nations system. There have been few previous attempts to examine it (probably the most notable, albeit confined to an analysis of the 1984-1993 period, was submitted by Argentina during UNGA49 in 1995 and circulated as part of document A/49/965),576 and not a single attempt that comprehensively extrapolates its full force and scope since 1946. Therefore, to fill in that void, the following analysis seeks to demonstrate, on a case by case basis, and in quantitative and comparative terms, the full force and scope of the Cascade Effect since 1946 and its probable future effects if there is an enlargement in the Permanent Member category. For simplicity, the working paper takes enlargement in the Permanent Member category to mean 6 new additional Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A of the High-Level Panel Report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”577 and the “In Larger Freedom” Report578 by the Secretary-General. This should not be construed, in any way, as an endorsement of Model A. 1. Economic and Social Council and Subsidiary Bodies 1.1 Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1961-1971), Permanent Members have served continuously on the ECOSOC since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947. Of all the elective organs within the United Nations Systems, the ECOSOC is one organ where the Cascade Effect is most evident.

576  1 8 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12. 577  1 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 578  21 March 2005, → 4.1.21.

684

4 Momentum and deadlock

Presence of the permanent members in the ECOSOC PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France United States Russian Federation United Kingdom China

1946-2005 1946-2005 1947-2005 1947-2005 1946-1960, 1972-2005

100.0% 100.0%  98.3%  98.3%  81.7%

Of the 54 seats in the ECOSOC, 5 [9.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 90.7% to 79.6% of the seats. 1.2 Commission on Human Rights [CHR] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1964-1981), and just 4 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Human Rights since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947. Presence of the permanent members in the CHR PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United States United Kingdom China

1946-1976, 1978-2005 1947-2005 1947-2001, 2003-2005 1947-1978, 1980-1990, 1992-2005 1947-1963, 1982-2005

98.3% 98.3% 96.7% 95.0% 68.3%

Of the 53 seats in the CHR, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats. 1.3 Commission on Narcotic Drugs [CND] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1970-1985), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs since its creation in 1946. Presence of the permanent members in the CND PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States China

1946-2005 1946-2005 1946-2005 1946-2005 1946-1969, 1986-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  73.3%

685

4 Momentum and deadlock

Of the 53 seats in the CND, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats. 1.4 Commission on Population and Development [CPD] With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1981, while another Permanent Member has not been a member since 2001), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Population and Development since its creation in 1947. Presence of the permanent members on the CPD PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United States United Kingdom China

1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-2001 1947-1967, 1982-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  93.2%  78.0%

Of the 47 seats in the CPD, 5 [10.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 89.4% to 76.6% of the seats. 1.5 Committee for Program and Coordination [CPC] With the exception of one Permanent Member that began to serve in 1987, all Permanent Members have served continuously in the Committee for Program and Coordination since its creation in 1973 or immediately after in 1974. Presence of the permanent members on the CPC PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

United Kingdom France Russian Federation United States China

1973-2005 1974-2005 1974-2005 1974-2005 1987-2005

100.0%  96.9%  96.9%  96.9%  62.5%

Of the 34 seats in the CPC, 5 [14.7%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [32.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 85.3% to 67.6% of the seats. 1.6 Commission on Social Development [CSoD] With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve in 1965 and between 1969-1988, another Permanent Member has not served since 1983), Permanent

686

4 Momentum and deadlock

Members have served continuously on the Commission on Social Development since its creation in 1947. Presence of the permanent members on the CSoD PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United States China United Kingdom

1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-1964, 1966-1968, 1989-2005 1947-1982

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  64.4%  61.0%

Of the 46 seats in the CSoD, 5 [10.9%] seats have been affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats. 1.7 Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD] All Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Sustainable Development since its creation in 1993. Presence of the permanent members on the CSD PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

China France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States

1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Of the 53 seats in the CSD, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats. 1.8 Commission on the Status of Women [CSW] With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1972 and between 1977-1979, while another did not serve between 1987-1996), and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on the Status of Women since its creation in 1947.

687

4 Momentum and deadlock Presence of the permanent members on the CSW PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

Russian Federation France United States China United Kingdom

1947-2005 1947-1983, 1985-2005 1947-1994, 1996-2005 1947-1963, 1965-1967, 1973-1976, 1980-2005 1947-1986, 1997-2005

100.0%  98.3%  98.3%  84.7%  83.1%

Of the 45 seats in the CSW, 5 [11.1%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [24.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 89.9% to 75.6% of the seats. 1.9 Statistical Commission With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1969-1986), and just 3 one to three-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Statistical Commission since its creation in 1947. Presence of the permanent members on the Statistical Commission PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

United Kingdom Russian Federation United States France China

1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-1981, 1984-2005 1947-1980, 1982-1997, 2001-2004 1947-1967, 1984-2003

100.0% 100.0%  96.6%  91.5%  67.8%

Of the 24 seats in the Statistical Commission, 5 [20.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [45.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 79.2% to 54.2% of the seats. 2. UN Funds and Programmes Executive Boards and Councils 2.1 United Nations Development Programme Executive Board [UNDP] With just 4 one-year gaps and 1 two-year gap, Permanent Members have served continuously in the UNDP Executive Board since its creation in 1994. Presence of the permanent members on the UNDP Executive Board PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

China United States Russian Federation France United Kingdom

1994-2005 1994-2005 1994-1995, 1997-2005 1994-1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2003 1994-1995, 1997-1999, 2002-2004

100.0% 100.0%  90.0%  60.0%  60.0%

688

4 Momentum and deadlock

Of the 36 seats on the UNDP Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats. 2.2 United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council [UNEP] Permanent Members have served continuously on the UNEP Governing Council since its creation in 1973. Presence of the permanent members in the UNEP PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

China France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States

1973-2005 1973-2005 1973-2005 1973-2005 1973-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Of the 58 seats on the UNEP Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats. 2.3 United Nations Human Settlements Programme Governing Council [UN-Habitat] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1989), Permanent Members have served continuously on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council since its creation in 1977 or immediately after in 1978. Presence of the permanent members in the UN-Habitat PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States China

1977-2005 1978-2005 1978-2005 1978-2005 1989-2005

100.0%  96.4%  96.4%  96.4%  58.6%

Of the 58 seats on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats. 2.4 United Nations Children’s Fund Executive Board [UNICEF] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1958 and then did not serve between 1974-1979), and just 4 one to two-year gaps, Permanent Members have served in the UNICEF Executive Board since its creation in 1946.

689

4 Momentum and deadlock Presence of the permanent members on the UNICEF Executive Board PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

Russian Federation United States France United Kingdom China

1946-2005 1946-2005 1946-1996, 1998-1999, 2001-2005 1946-1996, 1998-2000, 2003-2005 1958-1973, 1980-2005

100.0% 100.0%  96.7%  95.0%  70.0%

Of the 36 seats on the UNICEF Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats. 3. International Court of Justice [ICJ] With one exception (nationals of one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1984), nationals of Permanent Members have served continuously in the International Court of Justice since 1946. Judges in the ICJ are elected by the Security Council and the General Assembly in separate but simultaneous elections. Presence of the permanent members on the ICJ PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

France

J. Basdevant A. Gross G. Ladreit de Lacharrière G. Guillaume R. Abraham S.B. Krylov S.A. Golunsky F.I. Kojevnikov V.M. Koretsky P.D. Morosov N.K. Tarassov V.S. Vereshchentin Sir Arnold McNair Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice Sir Humphrey Waldock Sir Robert Jennings Dame Rosalyn Higgins G.H. Hackworth P.C. Jessup H.C. Dillard R.R. Baxter S.M. Schwebel T. Buergenthal Hsu Mo V.K. Wellington Koo Ni Zhengyu Shi Jiuyong

Russian Federation

United Kingdom

United States

China

CONTINUITY 1946-1964 1964-1984 1982-1987 1987-2004 2004-2005 1946-1952 1952-1953 1953-1961 1961-1970 1970-1985 1985-1994 1995-2005 1946-1955 1955-1960 1960-1973 1973-1981 1982-1995 1995-2005 1946-1961 1961-1970 1970-1979 1979-1980 1980-2000 2000-2005 1946-1956 1957-1967 1985-1994 1994-2005

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

 66.0%

690

4 Momentum and deadlock

Of the 15 seats on the ICJ, 5 [33.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [73.3%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 66.7% to a mere 26.7% of the seats. 4. UN Specialized Agencies 4.1 Food and Agriculture Organization Council [FAO] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972) and 1 one-year gap, Permanent Members have served in the FAO Council consecutively since its creation in 1947. The Russian Federation is not included for it is not a member of FAO. Presence of the permanent members on the FAO PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France United States United Kingdom China

1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-1955, 1957-2005 1947-1948, 1973-2005

100.0% 100.0%  96.5%  73.1%

Of the 49 seats on the FAO Council, 5 [10.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [22.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 89.8% to 77.6% of the seats. 4.2 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors [IAEA] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1984), Permanent Members have served continuously on the IAEA Board of Governors since its creation in 1957. Presence of the permanent members on the IAEA PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States China

1957-2005 1957-2005 1957-2005 1957-2005 1984-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  42.6%

Of the 35 seats on the IAEA Board of Governors, 5 [14.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [31.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 85.7% to 68.6% of the seats.

691

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.3 International Civil Aviation Organization Council [ICAO] With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1972 while another did not serve until 1974), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948. Presence of the permanent members on the ICAO PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

United Kingdom United States France Russian Federation China

1947-2005 1947-2005 1948-2005 1972-2005 1974-2005

100.0% 100.0%  98.2%  57.1%  53.6%

Of the 36 seats on the ICAO Council, 5 [13.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 86.2% to 69.4% of the seats. 4.4 International Maritime Organization Council [IMO] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1975) and just 2 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Maritime Organization since its creation in 1959. Presence of the permanent members on the IMAO PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France United Kingdom United States China

1959-2005 1959-2005 1959-2005 1975-81, 1983-87, 1989-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  63.0%

Of the 40 seats on the IMO Council, 5 [12.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [27.5%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 87.5% to 72.5% of the seats. 4.5 International Telecommunications Union Council [ITU] With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1990-1993 and has not served since 2003), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Telecommunications Union since its creation in 1947.

692

4 Momentum and deadlock

Presence of the permanent members on the ITU PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

China France Russian Federation United States United Kingdom

1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-2005 1947-1989, 1994-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  86.6%

Of the 46 seats on the ITU Council, 5 [10.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats. 4.6 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since its creation in 1997 or immediately after in 1998. Presence of the permanent members on the OPCW PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

China France United Kingdom United States Russian Federation

1997-2005 1997-2005 1997-2005 1997-2005 1998-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  88.8%

Of the 41 seats on the OPCW Executive Council, 5 [12.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [26.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 87.8% to 73.2% of the seats. 4.7 World Health Organization Executive Board [WHO] With two exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972 and then from 1986-1989 and another that did not serve between 1951-1957) and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948. Presence of the permanent members on the WHO PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

United States France United Kingdom Russian Federation China

1947-2005 1948-2001, 2003-2005 1947-1999, 2001-2004 1948-1950, 1958-2005 1947-48, 1973-76, 1978-85, 1990-2005

100.0%  94.8%  94.8%  86.2%  50.0%

693

4 Momentum and deadlock

Of the 32 seats on the WHO Executive Board, 5 [15.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [34.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 84.4% to 65.6% of the seats. 4.8 World Meteorological Organization Executive Council [WMO] With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1973 and another did not serve until 1979), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization since its creation in 1951. Presence of the permanent members on the WMO PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

France Russian Federation United States China United Kingdom

1951-2005 1951-2005 1951-2005 1973-2005 1979-2005

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  60.7%  50.0%

Of the 37 seats on the WMO Executive Council, 5 [13.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [29.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 86.5% to 70.3% of the seats. 4.9 International Labor Organization Governing Body [ILO] The continuity of the Permanent Members in the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization is guaranteed as they hold non-elective seats as “states of chief industrial importance”. This status only extends to 5 other Member States. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case. 5. General Assembly Subsidiary Bodies 5.1 General Committee By virtue of resolution 33/138 of 1978, 5 of the 21 Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly are representatives of the Permanent Members and thereby members of the General Committee. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case. 5.2 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [ACABQ] With one exception (nationals from one Permanent Member did not serve between 1952-1971) and several minor gaps (2 one-year gaps, 6 three-year gaps, 1 four-year gap, and 1 five-year gap), nationals from Permanent Members have served continuously on the ACABQ since its creation in 1946.

694

4 Momentum and deadlock

Presence of the permanent members on the ACABQ PERMANENT MEMBER

TERMS

CONTINUITY

Russian Federation United States France United Kingdom China

1946-2005 1946-1996, 2000-2005 1946-1983, 1987-1989, 1993-1995, 1997-2002 1946-1980, 1984-1986, 1991-1993, 1999-2004 1946-1951, 1972-1998, 2002-2005

100.0%  94.9%  84.7%  78.0%  61.1%

Of the 16 seats in the ACABQ, 5 [31.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [68.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 68.7% to 31.3% of the seats. 6. United Nations Secretariat Permanent Members have customarily had one or more nationals serving in the most senior positions within the United Nations, typically at the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level. Moreover, at times several nationals from a single Permanent Member have monopolized the most senior positions within a particular department, and at times a Permanent Member has traded off one department for another, as is evidenced in part by the following (this is not a comprehensive or exhaustive listing): Presence of the permanent members on the UN Secretariat PERMANENT MEMBER

DEPARTMENT HEADS

TERMS

China

Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self Governing Territories Victor Hoo Chi Tsai 1946-1953 Department of General Assembly Affairs and predecessors Victor Hoo Chi Tsai 1954-1961 Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors Victor Hoo Chi Tsai 1962-1972 Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization Tang Ming-chao 1972-1978 Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors Bi Jilong 1979-1984 Xie Qimei 1985-1990 Ji Chaozhu 1991-1992 Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors Ji Chaozhu 1992

695

4 Momentum and deadlock PERMANENT MEMBER

DEPARTMENT HEADS

TERMS

Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors Ji Chaozhu 1993-1995 Jin Yongjian 1996 Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services Jin Yongjian 1997-2001 Chen Jian 2001France

Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors Henri Laugier 1946-1950 Guillaume Georges-Picot 1951-1954 Philippe de Seynes 1955-1974 Gabriel van Laetham 1974-1978 Jean-Louis Ripert 1978-1990 Antoine Blanca 1989-1992 Jean-Claude Milleron 1993-1996 United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General Antoine Blanca 1992-1993 Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] Bernard Miyet Jean-Marie Guehenno

Russian Federation

1997-2000 2000-

Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors Constantin E. Zinchenko 1949-1952 Ilya S. Tchernychev 1953-1954 Anatoly F. Dobrynin 1958-1959 Georgy P. Arkadev 1960-1961 Evgeny D. Kiselev 1962 Vladimir P. Suslov 1963-1964 Alexei E. Nesterenko 1965-1967 Leonid N. Kutakov 1968-1972 Arkady N. Shevchenko 1973-1977 Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors Mikhail D. Sytenko 1978-1980 Viacheslav A. Ustinov 1981-1986 Vasiliy S. Safronchuk 1987-1991 Vladimir Petrovsky 1992-1993 United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General Vladimir Petrovsky 1993-2002 Sergei Ordzhonikidze 2002-

United Kingdom

Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors Sir Arthur David K. Owen 1946-1954

696 PERMANENT MEMBER

4 Momentum and deadlock DEPARTMENT HEADS

TERMS

United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General Sir Arthur Rucker 1953 Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors Sir Humphrey Trevelyan

1958

Department of Management [DM] and predecessors Andrew A. Stark 1968-1970 Horatio K. Matthews 1971-1972 Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors Sir Brian Urquhart 1974-1986 Marrack I. Goulding 1986-1992 Department of Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessors Marrack I. Goulding 1993-1996 Sir Kieran Prendergast 1997-2005 Department of Safety and Security David Veness

2005-

Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet Mark Malloch Brown 2005United States

Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet Andrew W. Cordier 1946-1961 Department of Management [DM] and predecessors Byron Price 1946-1953 Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors Ralph J. Bunche 1955-1970 Department for Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessor F. Bradford Morse 1972-1975 William B. Buffum 1976-1986 Joseph Verner Reed 1987-1988 Ronald I. Spiers 1989-1991 Department of Management [DM] and predecessors Dick Thornburgh 1992 Melissa Wells 1993 Joseph E. Connor 1994-2002 Catherine Bertini 2003-2005 Christopher Bancroft Burnham 2005-

The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect on appointments at the most senior level, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, cannot be easily ascertained.

4 Momentum and deadlock

697

4.2.1.2.11 11 July 2005, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 20-22579 […] Today we have before us a draft resolution580 that proposes a model and a specific methodology for Council reform. It is the result of many months of work by its authors to make the proposal known and to take into account the suggestions and views of Member States. While acknowledging those efforts, Switzerland considers that three important questions should be dealt with more clearly. First, Switzerland is opposed to granting the right of veto to new permanent members. We joined the United Nations two and a half years ago, following a referendum of the Swiss people that sent a clear and undisputed message from all of the political forces that our people distrusted and were opposed to all privileges, in particular the right of veto. In adapting the Security Council to the new international realities, we must avoid strengthening its anachronistic aspects. The draft resolution introduces welcome restrictions, but it still contains ambiguities, which should be removed. Secondly, with regard to the review clause in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, Switzerland supports the proposal that has just been put forward by the representative of Sweden581 aimed at facilitating a genuine periodic review of the composition of the Security Council by Member States. The decision to add new permanent members to the Security Council would be easier if the Member States had the ability to periodically express their views on its composition. If necessary, by means of a vote representing a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, they should have the possibility to replace newly elected permanent members whose contribution to the achievement of the Organization’s objectives were no longer seen to be in keeping with the expectations of the large majority of Member States. That adjustment, which may appear to be somewhat theoretical, is important to the extent that it tones down the idea of permanency, a notion that causes considerable problems for a significant number of States. […] 4.2.1.2.12 11 December 2006, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/61/PV.72, pp. 15-17582

[…] Switzerland remains committed to expanding the Council – an expansion that we believe would make the Council’s work more representative and enable it to respond better to contemporary geopolitical realities. But such an expansion should not jeopardize the Council’s capacity to respond promptly and effectively to threats that weigh upon international peace and security. In fact, safeguarding the Council’s efficiency is just as important as enlarging its membership. Thus, enlargement should focus on a reasonable and manageable increase in the number of seats. In this context, we reiterate our conviction that enlargement should not lead to granting the right of 579  → 4.4.4.16 for Switzerland’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 580  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 581  11 July 2005, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 17-18. 582  → 4.2.2.2.5 for Switzerland’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

698

4 Momentum and deadlock

veto to other Council members, as that would only overburden the decision-making process. […] 4.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 4.2.1.3.1 May 1998, Hungary on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.15 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXIII, p. 62 Joint position paper of the States members of the Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership in the Security Council: the matter of allocation of one additional non-permanent seat for this Group in the enlarged membership of the Security Council […] 1. The States members of the Group of Eastern European States, eligible for nonpermanent membership of the Security Council, attach great importance to the issue of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. 2. It is the strong common position of these Member States that any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Group of Eastern European States by the allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. 3. In support of their view, these Member States wish to emphasize the fact that, since 1991, the Group of Eastern European States has more than doubled its membership and that its present 21 States members constitute more than 10 per cent of the total United Nations membership. 4.2.1.3.2 10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74583 Letter dated 10 July 1998 transmitted by Egypt in its capacity as coordinator of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries: paragraphs related to the reform of the Security Council, which appeared in the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries [original paragraphs 53 through 65] held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, on 19 and 20 May 1998 1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation comprehensively reviewed discussions on the reform and restructuring of the Security Council, in the light of the position papers adopted by the Movement on 13 February 1995584 and 20 May 1996,585 the negotiating paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries dated 11 March 1997,586 the decisions of the Cartagena Summit,587 the twelfth Ministerial Conference 583  → 4.3.1 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 4.4.3.1 for the Movement’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 584  → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14 (dated 18 September 1995). 585  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII. 586  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex V. 587  18-20 October 1995, The Final Document of the Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17.

4 Momentum and deadlock

699

held in New Delhi from 7 to 8 April 1997588 and those adopted on this matter at the Ministerial Meeting in New York on 25 September 1997.589 2. In conformity with the New Delhi declaration590 regarding the necessity of attaining general agreement, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of Delegation reaffirmed their determination that any resolution with amendment implications for the Charter of the United Nations must be adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, as referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. 3. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation recalled that discussions in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council have shown that, while a convergence of views has emerged on a number of issues, important differences still exist on many others. They noted that the Open-ended Working Group has resumed its discussions and underlined the need for the Movement to maintain its unity and solidarity on this critical issue. They reaffirmed that the Movement should, in the ensuing negotiations, continue to pursue directives given by the Cartagena Summit and contained in the Movement’s position papers. The Movement would be guided by the considerations set out in paragraphs 4 through 8 below in approaching the issue of Security Council reform in discussions at the United Nations. 4. Both reform and expansion of the Security Council should be considered as integral parts of a common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution, as well as the need for transparency, accountability and democratization in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, including its decision-making process. 5. The Non-Aligned Countries are grossly under-represented in the Council. This underrepresentation should, therefore, be corrected by enlargement of the Security Council, which should enhance the credibility of the Council, to reflect the universal character of the world body and to correct existing imbalances in the composition of the Security Council in a comprehensive manner. 6. The extent, nature and modalities of the expansion of the Security Council should be determined on the basis of the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. There shall be no partial or selective expansion or enlargement of the membership of the Security Council to the detriment of the developing countries. Attempts to exclude the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries from any enlargement in the membership of the Council would be unacceptable to the Movement. […] 8. The negotiation process should be truly democratic and transparent, and negotiations on all aspects should be held in all cases, in an open-ended setting. 9. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reaffirmed that efforts to restructure the Security Council shall not be subject to any imposed time-frame. While recognizing the importance of treating this issue as a matter requiring urgent 588  → 3.2.1.3.14 (dated 27 June 1997). 589   Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, see UN Doc. A/52/447-S/1997/775 (Letter dated 1 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the Secretary-General). 590  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14.

700

4 Momentum and deadlock

attention, no effort should be spared not to decide this issue before general agreement is reached. 10. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reaffirmed the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries proposal that if there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place for the time being, only in the nonpermanent category. […] 12. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation underlined the need for a coherent and coordinated approach by the Movement in the ensuing discussions in the Open-ended Working Group. Mindful of the importance of reaching general agreement, as reflected, inter alia, in General Assembly resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,591 they called for fuller discussions of various proposals submitted to the Working Group. 13. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation stressed the importance of enhancing the transparency of the Security Council through the improvement of its working methods and its decision-making process. They called on the Open-ended Working Group to agree on and the General Assembly to recommend specific and substantive measures to be implemented by the Security Council based on the measures proposed in the negotiating paper of the Movement on cluster II issues.592 They also urged the Security Council to institutionalize such measures and stressed that a commitment to institutionalize them should be an element of a package agreement on the reform of the Security Council. 4.2.1.3.3 25 September 1999, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Paek Nam Sun, UN Doc. A/54/PV.14, pp. 6-10

[…] The Security Council should be reformed in such a way as to have all regions equally represented in its composition and to ensure full transparency in all of its activities. In this regard, we oppose under any circumstances the permanent membership of a defeated nation that has not liquidated its past crimes. We are of the view that the proposal put forward by member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement593 to first increase non-permanent seats, which is relatively easy to agree upon at this stage, deserves sincere consideration. […] 4.2.1.3.4 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 23-24594

[…] […] Croatia believes that only enlargement in both categories of membership will introduce a difference into the operation of the Council that will indeed make a difference in terms of the existing imbalances and inequities.595 In turn, this will have a 591  → 3.1.2. 592  30 April 1997, → 3.4.3.43. 593  10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 594  → 4.4.2.4 for Croatia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 4.4.3.6 for Croatia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 595  Croatia confirmed this position on 7 April 2005 in UN Doc. A/59/PV.88, pp. 6-7.

4 Momentum and deadlock

701

positive impact on its lack of credibility and eroding legitimacy – and therefore, yes, on its very effectiveness. Regarding possible rotation in the permanent posts, we feel that it is entirely up to the regions to come up with their own arrangements, provided that each Member State consents to such an arrangement of its own free will. We hold that five new permanent seats should be created, out of which two should be allocated to the industrialized countries and three to developing countries. We believe that responsible involvement in international affairs at the regional and global level, as well as the demonstrated capacity and willingness to shoulder related duties, including financial ones, should be an important selection criterion. Regarding the allocation of non-permanent seats, we hold that out of four such seats one should go to Africa, one to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean and one to the Eastern European region. […] 4.2.1.3.5 16 December 1999, Czech Republic, Mr. Galuška, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 25-26596

[…] As to the size and composition of the Security Council, we believe that current global realities would be most appropriately reflected through the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories. Our choice would be five additional permanent seats and four or five additional non-permanent seats, including one for Eastern Europe. We respect the option of rotating the permanent seats of specific regions, but no country or region should be forced into such a scheme. […] 4.2.1.3.6 20 December 1999, Belarus, Mr. Sychov, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 15-16 […] The position of the Government of Belarus on the questions of Security Council reform is sufficiently clear. Above all, without prejudice to the effectiveness of that organ, we need to ensure equitable geographic representation of Governments in the new structure of the Council, including representatives of the Eastern Europe Group. Undeniably, the developing countries, especially those in Africa, require equitable and adequate representation in the Council’s membership. To this end, we assume that any expansion should occur in both categories of Council membership. […] 4.2.1.3.7  20 December 1999, Georgia, Mr. Chkheidze, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 9-10597

[…] We believe that the Security Council should be enlarged with the addition of both permanent and non­-permanent members. We support the enlargement of the permanent membership of the Council through the addition of two industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, which are major contributors to global peace, security and development. We also support the addition of four non-permanent seats to provide equitable geographic representation in the Council. These would include 596  → 4.4.4.7 for the Czech Republic’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 597  → 4.3.11 for Georgia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

702

4 Momentum and deadlock

countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. These changes would increase the Council’s legitimacy, authority and capacity. […] In our view, proper reform of the structure and working methods of the Security Council requires that the expansion of the non-permanent membership of the Council be approached only together with the enlargement of the Council’s permanent membership. We also believe that a review of the use of the veto should be an integral part of the whole package of the reform of the Security Council. In our view, it is an absolute necessity that present and new permanent members of the reformed Council have equal power. […] 4.2.1.3.8 16 November 2000, Belarus, Mr. Ling, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 35598 […] First, any expansion of the Security Council must be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. Secondly, the attainment of the broadest possible agreement on the entire package of reforms must not be subject to any predetermined time-frames. […] Fourthly, additional seats in the permanent member category must be allocated to the countries of three developing regions – namely, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Fifthly, in the absence of general agreement on the expansion of the permanent member category, expansion should take place in the non-permanent member category only, taking into account the interests and needs of all regional groups without exception. […] 4.2.1.3.9 16 November 2000, Romania, Mr. Ducaru, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 39-40 […] The Romanian delegation has had several opportunities to present its position on this matter at the highest level. Allow me to express some thoughts on what credible reform of the Council would entail. First, the two categories of members should be increased, so that the Security Council better reflects changes in the world. There should be new non-permanent members, including some from Eastern Europe, and the new permanent members should include representatives of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, sitting side by side with industrialized countries. This would reinforce the prestige and the democratic nature of the Council. The parameters of such an enlargement must be set in such a way as to assure the best possible representation in the Council, without undermining its efficiency. […] 4.2.1.3.10 17 November 2000, Ecuador, Mr. Alemán, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 11-12 […] […] Above all, we must bear in mind that the United Nations now has 189 Members, and this calls for wider participation in the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security so that it can be more representative of the 598  → 4.3.14 for Belarus’ position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

703

international community, especially the developing countries, as well as more democratic and transparent in its negotiations and decision-making. It is from this perspective that Ecuador has participated in the Open-ended Working Group on reform of the Security Council in the important effort to reach a compromise on the question of the increase in the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. However, despite the fact that seven years have been devoted to these negotiations, it appears that the time has now come to give some thought to the need for a new approach to our negotiations and to pay greater attention to proposals formulated by various groups, in particular the Non-Aligned Movement, so that if no agreement can be reached on the category of permanent members for the time being, there should be an increase in the number of non-permanent members. […] 4.2.1.3.11 17 November 2000, Bulgaria, Mr. Sotirov, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, p. 24599 […] Bulgaria has repeatedly expressed its views on the various aspects of the reform in the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group. Regarding the enlargement of the Security Council, Bulgaria shares the view that it should encompass both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent, this being a more adequate way of reflecting the sweeping changes in the world since the end of the Second World War. The addition of five additional permanent seats and a similar number of non-permanent seats, bringing the total number of Security Council members to the mid-twenties, would restore balance and add more credibility and legitimacy to Security Council decisions. It is Bulgaria’s firm conviction that equitable geographical distribution is a solid basis and criterion for Security Council enlargement. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to maintain the authority and enhance the effectiveness of this principal United Nations body. Therefore, we would favour an expansion that took into account both the increased United Nations membership and the increased role and political and economic potential of certain States, such as Germany and Japan, that could assume the responsibilities of permanent members. Since the membership of the Eastern European regional group has doubled during the last decade, Bulgaria considers that one of the additional non-permanent seats should be allocated to this group, bringing to two the total number of non-permanent seats belonging to our region in an expanded Council. […] 4.2.1.3.12 18 June 2001, Pakistan, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XVIII, p. 172 Letter to the United Nations addressed to the Bureau of the Working Group, containing a proposal by Pakistan The United Nations was created on the basis of sovereign equality of States. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, certain countries managed to acquire an exalted status on the Security Council with permanent membership and veto power. Any reform process must be aimed at removing the existing imbalance and inequality in the membership of the Security Council. 599  → 4.4.4.12 for Bulgaria’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

704

4 Momentum and deadlock

However, given the present realities, this may not be practical. In order, therefore, to make the Security Council more participatory, representative, equitable and effective, the expansion should take place only in the non-permanent category. A decision on the increase in the non-permanent category must be taken through general agreement among the membership of the United Nations. The non-permanent category should be enlarged to accommodate new members on the basis of geographical distribution to be elected by the General Assembly for a fixed term. While there may be different proposals on the number of new elected members, one suggestion could be to enlarge the Security Council corresponding to the size of the Economic and Social Council to ensure the widest possible representation of Member States. 4.2.1.3.13 31 October 2001, Republic of Korea, Mr. Sun Joun-yung, UN Doc. A/56/ PV.35, pp. 10-11

[…] The Republic of Korea supports the view that an increase only in non-permanent seats is a viable option for the time being, if we are unable to reach an agreement on expansion. This enlargement could be achieved by allowing more seats to be elected for regular terms, thereby making the Council more democratic and accountable. […] 4.2.1.3.14 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14600 […] With regard to the issue of the enlargement of the Security Council, Slovakia considers increasing the number of members in both categories to be the best way to make the Security Council correspond to the realities of the international community. The failure to reach an agreement on enlargement in both categories should not, however, necessarily preclude the endeavours to reach agreement on enlargement in at least one category. […] We share what seems to be a clear majority view – namely, that it is important to reflect major changes in the international system in this way. The Group of Eastern European States, whose membership has more than doubled over the last 10 years, should not be omitted in the enlargement process of the Security Council. […] 4.2.1.3.15 27 January 2005, Germany, Mr. Pleuger, Informal Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change601

[…] Model B,602 in contrast, would in essence not change the structure of the Security Council. It would maintain the structure established in 1945 which we feel is now outdated. And it would deny the developing countries of the South permanent seats and adequate influence in the Security Council.

600  → 4.3.16 for Slovakia’s position on the size of the Security Council, and → 4.4.4.13 for Slovakia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 601  → 4.2.1.1.35 for Germany’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 602  2 December 2004, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, → 4.1.19.

4 Momentum and deadlock

705

With regard to the Panel’s suggestion to reform the regional groups for the purpose of Security Council elections, let me say that we doubt whether this will be helpful in our discussion. We heard of very strong reservations from more than one regional group and we particularly understand the concern of the Eastern European Group in this respect. We sympathize with its endeavour to secure a better regional representation in Security Council elections. Moreover, any reform of the regional groups is a highly contentious issue that would take several years to resolve. This discussion would defeat our purpose of reaching a decision this year. […] 4.2.1.3.16 28 February 2005, Group of Eastern European States, Annex to the letters from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/723 1. The States members of the Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership of the Security Council thoroughly analysed the recommendations concerning the enlargement of the Security Council contained in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change, entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”.603 2. These Member States wish to emphasize that the two models for the enlargement of the Security Council, as presented by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change, do not meet their expectations. 3. These Member States further emphasize that existing regional groups should be maintained. 4. These Member States reiterate their view, stated in the joint position paper of May 1998 (see A/52/47, annex XXIII),604 that any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council. These Member States wish to emphasize the fact that, since 1991, the Eastern European Group has more than doubled its membership. 5. These Member States fully support the need to reform the Security Council in order to make it more representative and effective and are confident that the legitimate interests of the Eastern European Group will be fully taken into account in this process. 4.2.1.3.17 7 April 2005, Ukraine on behalf of the GU(U)AM Group, Mr. Kuchinsky, UN Doc. A/59/PV.88, pp. 21-23605

[…] The GUUAM Group associate itself with the statement delivered by the Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States606 on the issue of the reform of the Security Council. The allocation of at least one additional non-permanent seat to the Eastern 603  Ibid. 604  → 4.2.1.3.1. 605   GU(U)AM was founded in 1997 with a view to develop cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Uzbekistan joined the group in 1999 but withdrew again in 2005. 606  6 April 2005, UN Doc. A/59/PV.85, p. 19.

706

4 Momentum and deadlock

European Group, whose composition has more than doubled in the last 15 years, is an important precondition for our support of any reform proposal. We appreciate very much the statement made today by the representative of Germany,607 in which he clearly supported the position of the Eastern European States. In line with the position of the Secretary-General, we call for greater involvement in the Security Council’s decision-making process by those countries contributing most to the Organization in military, diplomatic and financial terms. […] 4.2.1.3.18 11 July 2005, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23608 […] Latvia is a sponsor of the draft resolution609 in the belief that it opens the way to a workable and balanced model for Security Council reform. We strongly support the creation of new permanent seats. The Council needs to be better equipped with diplomatic, financial and, if necessary, military means to address the evolving security challenges that we all face. We believe that the continuity and stability provided by permanent seats can only enhance the overall effectiveness of the Security Council. Latvia notes that the draft resolution offers greater opportunities for all the regional groups to share in the work of the Security Council. We particularly welcome the creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the group of Eastern European States, which has grown considerably in recent years. As a region where numerous States have recently achieved peaceful transition from totalitarian rule to democracy, we can make a constructive contribution to the work of the Security Council. We also welcome the inclusion of a review process in the draft resolution and the shelving of the question of the veto. […] 4.2.1.3.19 11 November 2005, Slovenia, Mr. Kirn, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 6-7610 […] Finally, I cannot but reiterate Slovenia’s position reflecting our commitment to comprehensive Security Council reform. We continue to believe that the increasing volume and scope of the Council’s activities prompt us to recognize the need to adapt the Security Council’s membership in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, as well at its methods of work, including the right to the veto, in order that the Council may efficiently address the geopolitical realities of today’s world. As we have continuously advocated for the past year, the Eastern European region should not be left out when the number of non-permanent seats are increased. Slovenia will therefore continue to support efforts to enlarge the Council in both its permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. […]

607  7 April 2005, UN Doc. A/59/PV.88, pp. 16-18. 608  → 4.3.18 for Latvia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 609  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 610  Slovenia confirmed this position on 14 November 2007 in UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, p. 2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

707

4.2.1.3.20 11 November 2005, Belarus, Mr. Dapkiunas, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 7-8 […] Key elements of the position of Belarus on this issue continue to be expansion of representation of developing countries in the Council, as well as the granting of one additional non-permanent seat to the Eastern European regional group. […] 4.2.1.3.21 12 December 2006, Belarus, Mr. Yaroshevich, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, pp. 16-17 At the outset, the delegation of Belarus welcomes the statement made by the representative of Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.611 […] The delegation of Belarus reiterates its position on the need for deep reform of the composition of the Security Council. In our opinion, the enlargement of the Security Council by including developing countries should be a key element of the reform. We also believe that an additional seat in the Security Council should be allocated to the Eastern European Group. […] 4.2.1.3.22 12 December 2006, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/61/PV.75, pp. 19-20 […] We believe membership should be expanded in both the permanent and nonpermanent categories. In our view, a number of Member States – such as Germany, Japan, India and Brazil – are well equipped and qualified to assume the responsibilities of a long-term presence on the Security Council. Having said that, we believe the right of the veto should not be extended further, and that its current use could be made more transparent to the wider membership. […] The proposals of the Group of Four,612 which we have supported, evidently are not acceptable to a broad majority; nor, for that matter, have any other proposals for enlargement garnered enough support. Now is the time for all Member States, in particular the aspirants to new permanent seats, to propose and consider new and more viable ideas. Latvia will consider all new models for enlargement that may lead to an expansion of the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and nonpermanent categories within a reasonable time frame. Our hope is for sincere, constructive efforts among Member States to finally achieve a breakthrough on reform in the coming year. 4.2.1.3.23  21 February 2007, Group of Eastern European States, Ms. Tiina Intelmann (Estonia), Statement in the Open-ended Working Group613 I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the Eastern European Group eligible for non-permanent membership of the Security Council. 611  11 December 2006, UN Doc. A/61/PV.72, pp. 5-7. 612  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 613  This position was confirmed in a letter dated 29 January 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the UN on behalf of the member states of the Group of Eastern European States, addressed to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Ambassador Zahir Tanin.

708

4 Momentum and deadlock

[…] Better representation of the broader membership of the whole United Nations as well as equitable geographic representation should be the fundamental principles guiding the enlargement of the category of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. The Member States of the Eastern European Group eligible for nonpermanent membership of the Security Council would reiterate their view, stated in the Joint position paper in May 1998 (UN document A/52/47)614 and February 2005 (A/59/723)615 that any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Security Council. Let me also recall the fact that, since 1991, the Eastern European Group has more than doubled its membership, including by the most recent admission of Montenegro to the UN. […] 4.2.1.3.24 13 November 2007, United Kingdom, Mr. Sawers, UN Doc. A/62/PV.49, p. 12

[…] As the British Foreign Secretary said in this Hall during this year’s general debate (see A/62/PV.9),616 international institutions need to reflect the world today, and not the world as it was. Reform of the United Nations in all its aspects, including the Security Council, is pivotal to progress. The status quo on United Nations reform is neither sustainable nor satisfactory. That includes the Security Council. The United Kingdom therefore welcomes the prospect of intergovernmental negotiations, as agreed by the Assembly in September. These would build on developments realized under the stewardship of the former President of the General Assembly. We look forward to a detailed proposal from the current President of the Assembly in the weeks ahead on the basis for taking negotiations forward. On the substance of reform, the United Kingdom seeks a Security Council that is more representative of today’s world, yet no less effective or capable of taking the tough decisions needed in the face of the many threats to peace and international security that the Council deals with. To that end, we support permanent membership for Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, and permanent representation from Africa. As my Prime Minister, Mr. Gordon Brown, said in a speech in London last night, Long-term, but now also interim, options must be examined to reform a United Nations Security Council – whose permanent members do not include Japan, India, Brazil, Germany, or any African country – to make the Council more representative, more credible and more effective.617

614  → 4.2.1.3.1. 615  → 4.2.1.3.16. 616  27 September 2007, pp. 45-48. 617  12 November 2007, Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech.

4 Momentum and deadlock

709

The United Kingdom is not wedded to a single model of Council reform. We believe the membership should seek as much common ground as we can. That will require some flexibility. We should be open to considering an interim solution if that would break the deadlock. […] 4.2.1.3.25 24 September 2008, Slovenia, Mr. Türk, UN. Doc. A/63/PV.7, pp. 17-20 […] If you asked me to identify the key policy requirement for the United Nations today with a single concept – and in one word – my answer would be this: we live at a time requiring transformation. Transformation should be the key idea of policy making to guide United Nations action. The United Nations should look to policies with a transformational potential and capable of producing transformational effects in a not-too-distant future. Obviously, that ambitious and general proposition begs further questions. Is the United Nations capable of generating social, political and economic transformation? Does the United Nations of today know what is the main area for the needed strategic transformation? What needs to be done, by way of transformation, in the most sensitive area of United Nations mandate, in the area of maintenance of international peace and security? Allow me to address these questions one by one. […] My third question relates to the maintenance of international peace and security and the necessary transformation in that area. Allow me to state right at the outset that there is a serious need for transformation of the existing institutions in the field of international security. […] The progress made so far has established a degree of confidence in the capacity of the international security structures and their key players to cooperate and, even more, to work in partnership for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it appears that the confidence developed thus far is still fragile and that the remnants of the cold war mentality are still in existence. Further efforts are therefore needed. Those efforts, in my opinion, involve two basic sets of tasks. The first set of tasks relates to development of partnerships to address the key security issues, in particular those in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and several regions of Africa. […] The second set of tasks is equally urgent. Immediate consideration has to be given to transformation of the existing security structures. Reform of the Security Council is long overdue. Incremental improvements of its working methods, while welcome, are far from sufficient. The time is ripe for changes in the Council’s structure. I believe that the membership of the Security Council should be expanded in three directions. First, there should be six additional permanent members from every region of the world. Secondly, there should be an additional category of non-permanent members with a more frequent rotation, six in any particular composition of the Security Council, and they should be elected in accordance with a formula to be determined by the General Assembly and alternate every second two-year term. Thirdly, the remaining eight nonpermanent members would be elected in accordance with the principle of equitable geographic distribution. […]

710

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 4.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 4.2.2.1.1 11 July 2005, Sweden, Mr. Lidén, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 17-18 […] Sweden notes the various draft resolutions presented to us. We sympathize with the aspirations of the group of four in expanding their representation on the Council. We have some concerns regarding two aspects of their draft,618 as we want to see a Security Council that is more legitimate, effective and accountable. First, we fully support the recommendation of the Secretary-General not to expand the veto power. Our preference is to limit the use of veto and to promote a veto-free culture. Introducing new veto rights, even if circumscribed as in the current group of four draft, would in our view not be a step in the right direction. […] Secondly, we welcome a review-clause, but would like to see it further strengthened and made periodic. Such review could take into account criteria relevant to the obligations of Council members to contribute to international peace and security. Fulfilling these criteria would add legitimacy for continued permanent status. Thus, we would prefer to see an explicit mechanism, which makes it possible for other member states to review the performance of the new permanent members and with the support of a 2/3 majority replace them if they fail in their responsibilities. It should not be easy to replace a new permanent member, but it should be possible without going through the full procedure of changing the Charter. […] 4.2.2.1.2 12 July 2005, United Kingdom, Mr. Emyr Jones Parry, UN Doc. A/59/ PV.112, pp. 19-20

[…] The British Government welcomes this debate on the important issue of Security Council reform. We have supported the expansion of membership of the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories for some time. An enlarged and strengthened Security Council will be more representative of the membership of the United Nations and better able to meet the challenges of today’s world, and, even with the proposed expansion, the ratio of Security Council to General Assembly members will be no more than it was 60 years ago. We also want a Council which is more transparent, engages better with other United Nations bodies and consults more effectively with the wider membership. This greater openness will enable the Council better to perform its Charter responsibilities. The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, underlined the United Kingdom’s longstanding position in his address to the Assembly last September619 – a position in favour of permanent membership for India, Brazil, Germany and Japan. The United Kingdom also supports permanent membership for Africa. The United Kingdom will therefore vote in favour of this draft resolution.620 But it needs to be clear that the United Kingdom has never believed that the extension of the veto beyond the current five permanent members is a necessary feature of expanded 618  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 619  23 September 2004, UN Doc. A/59/PV.8, pp. 33-36. 620  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

4 Momentum and deadlock

711

permanent membership, nor would it be in the wider interests of the United Nations. The United Kingdom will therefore cast its positive vote with this in mind and will carefully scrutinize the necessary amendments to the United Nations Charter in due course. Reforming the Security Council is an important aspect of adapting the United Nations to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. But it is only one aspect. […] 4.2.2.1.3 11 November 2005, Sweden, Mr. Lidén, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, p. 24 […] Sweden believes that, on the one hand, the Security Council should be expanded, allowing stronger representation from Africa, Asia and Latin America. On the other hand, the Security Council must be an effective body that can act quickly and in a transparent way. We therefore believe that the veto power should not be extended to new members. […] 4.2.2.1.4 14 December 2007, Iceland on behalf of the Nordic Countries, Mr. Hannesson, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] As previously stated, we are open to the idea of an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent category. In order to go forward, we are ready to assess interim solutions that would allow testing various models as long as they contain a clear review-clause. We strongly believe that the veto power should not be extended and would like to see a veto free culture be promoted in the Council. […] 4.2.2.1.5 10 April 2008, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group621

[…] 4 The “Overarching Group” draft622 is new, so allow me to comment on it. Let me first thank the drafters for taking the initiative in their personal capacities. It is no easy task compiling and reconciling views on Security Council reform so they should be admired for their courage. The draft generally covers elements of the G4623 and UfC624 positions, as well as several possible “intermediate” possibilities. Insofar as it is a compilation, this could be a useful start. However, the draft also has some important omissions. If we agree that this document is to serve as a basis for negotiations, our sense is that the draft must also address these omissions. 5 First, there is no mention of what to do about the veto for new permanent members, should we decide to go down that route. This is a significant omission. The right of the veto was born of a different era. It was a privilege conferred on the five victorious powers from the Second World War to secure their participation in the UN. The situation today is different. While Singapore supports expansion in the permanent and non-permanent categories, we oppose granting the veto to new permanent members. 621  → 4.2.2.2.16 for Singapore’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 622  20 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21. 623  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 624  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

712

4 Momentum and deadlock

Extending the veto will complicate and perhaps even paralyse decision-making in the Council. That said, we recognize that the P5 will not give up their right to veto. But we should not add to the problem by further complicating UNSC decision-making. The broader point is that it may be better to address this question of the veto upfront, rather than to put it aside and court disagreement later. […] 4.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats 4.2.2.2.1 21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.68625 Reform of the Security Council The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 1991A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963,626 by which it decided to amend the Charter of the United Nations to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from six to ten, on the basis of the increase in the membership of the United Nations since 1945, Recalling the various reports of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, established by its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,627 Stressing the urgent need to improve the working methods of the Security Council in accordance with the various issues discussed within the Open-ended Working Group, in particular the question of transparency in decision-making; accountability; fairer opportunities of participation of Member States; better access to information by all Member States and restrictions on the veto power with a view to its eventual elimination, Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000*1 and taking note of the report of the Secretary-General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”,*2 in particular its assessment of the interlocking nature of security, development and human rights, and reaffirming that the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, can only be achieved through the full implementation of the mandates contained in the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development*3 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (“Johannesburg Plan of Implementation”),*4 among other development commitments, Mindful of primary responsibility conferred by the Charter of the United Nations on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and that in carrying out its duties the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the United Nations, 625  → 4.4.3.22 for these states’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 626  → 2.11. 627  → 3.1.2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

713

Mindful also of the importance of strengthening the institutional balance and interrelationship among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council within the scope of the comprehensive reform of the United Nations, Considering that joint efforts by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council are needed in order to attain solutions to global problems and threats in an integrated and constructive manner, Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced, Recognizing that contemporary world realities, in particular the substantial increase in membership of developing countries since 1963, requires an expansion of the Security Council, in the non-permanent category, in order to ensure fairer opportunities of participation for all Member States, Reaffirming that any expansion of the Security Council should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable, Convinced that periodic elections and re-elections are the strongest means to promote real accountability, allow for frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation of the Member States in the Security Council, Recalling its resolution 53/30 of 23 November 1998,628 Recognizing the importance of reaching the broadest possible agreement on all major issues, including Security Council reform, as decided in resolution 59/291 of 15 April 2005, Recalling Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, Amendments to Article 23 1. Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term, according to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 below; 2. Decides, in view of the above, to adopt the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations; 3. Decides that Article 23, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter of the United Nations will read as follows: 1. “The Security Council shall consist of twenty-five Members of the United Nations. France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other Members of the United Nations to be nonpermanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.” 2. “The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the 628  → 4.1.1.

714

4 Momentum and deadlock

increase of the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five, five of the retiring members shall continue for one more year. Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.” Distribution of seats 4. Decides that, in order to implement paragraph 3 above, the twenty nonpermanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States; Limits to re-election and role of geographical groups 5. Recommends that each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified in paragraph 4 above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation; Majority required for Security Council decisions 6. Decides to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council;*5 Working methods 7. Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner, including in particular: (a) Restraint on the use of the veto; […] Ratification of amendments to the Charter 10. Calls upon Member States to ratify the amendments set out above, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by September 2007; 11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtyfirst regular session a report on the status of the process of entry into force of these amendments to the Charter. Original footnotes See resolution 55/2. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, → 4.1.6]. *2 A/59/2005. [21 March 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, → 4.1.21]. *3 See Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.A.7), chap. I, resolution 1, annex. *4 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 and corrigendum), chap. I, resolution 2, annex. *5 Regarding paragraph 3 of Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended. *1

4 Momentum and deadlock

715

4.2.2.2.2 26 July 2005, Canada, Mr. Rock, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 1-3 […] Canada is honoured to introduce draft resolution L.68.629 The objective of this Resolution is to achieve the fairest and most democratic approach to the complex and controversial question of Security Council enlargement, while seeking the broadest possible consensus on how to proceed. Let me begin, Mr. President, by explaining why Canada is introducing this resolution. First, while we recognize the importance of Security Council reform, we want to see it achieved without unduly dividing the membership, particularly at a time when we must come together on the even more important agenda we will place before leaders in September. It will not serve our larger purpose if we are left divided after choosing among resolutions that favour a few, leaving fissures and factions as we pick winners and losers, once and for all. Draft resolution L.68 represents an effort in good faith to avoid such an all or nothing showdown. It would add no permanent members to the Council, but rather would create new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which member states should sit in those seats, and for how long. This approach would permit us to achieve all of the major objectives for Security Council reform, while preserving an environment conducive to broad agreement in September, and cooperation in the years ahead. Secondly, Canada sincerely believes that the accession of additional permanent members to the Security Council is not in the best interests of the United Nations, and is not in the best interests of the overwhelming majority of its member states. Let me emphasize at once, Mr. President, that our purpose is not to oppose the aspirants, but rather to support a principle: that widening the permanent circle for the few who seek special status, no matter how worthy their candidacies, would make the Security Council less accountable for its conduct, more remote from the membership and less representative of the world’s regions. Let me now describe the outcome that Canada favours. Draft resolution L.68 would enlarge the Council to 25 seats, with 20 of those seats to be elected for two year terms. It would distribute elected seats equitably among the regions. It would allow for consecutive re-election. And it would leave to each region the decision about arrangements for both the rotation of the seats and the duration of each member state’s period on the Council. Why do we prefer this approach, Mr. President? There are five reasons. First, it is democratic. At a time when so many of us promote democratic principles of governance, is it not essential that we reflect those same principles in our own governance: in the crucial decision about which member states will serve on the UN’s most powerful body? Is it not fundamental that where regions are accorded a permanent presence, those who serve on the Council must manifestly hold the continuing confidence of their regional colleagues, tested and expressed at intervals that the regional members consider appropriate? And what is more basic to the very notion of democracy than elections: not once and forever, in which power shifts permanently

629  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

716

4 Momentum and deadlock

to the office-holder, but periodically, so that authority remains with the electors, and holding the office is seen as a privilege, not a right. After all, Mr. President, in a democratic system, the electorate – in this case, the member states – must have the authority to choose their representatives. I know of no democracy in which a single election is sufficient to entitle the winner to remain in office in perpetuity. Secondly, the approach provided for in Draft resolution L.68 makes the Council more accountable to member states. Permanence is the polar opposite of accountability. Permanence produces positions that reflect national perspectives. Permanence claims the power of the office as of right, and forevermore. Draft resolution L.68 takes a different approach. It accepts that there will be no change in the permanent five. But it does not expand the permanent class beyond those named in 1945. And it draws on more contemporary values in proposing an enlarged council in which membership is earned, by winning and keeping the confidence of your peers. Apart from being sound in principle, the accountability that is inherent in this approach is also more likely to produce a Security Council in which regional and global concerns predominate over national interests. Thirdly, our Resolution provides for a flexible allocation of Council seats. In a changing world, with its dynamic regions, it is surely unwise to lock into place arrangements that reflect today’s circumstances, when tomorrow may confront us with very different needs. The very process of change that has made Council reform desirable argues for a flexible, not a fixed solution, for that process of change is never-ending. And who can say what changes will come in the decades ahead? For that reason, Resolution L.68 allows each regional group to adjust the allocation of seats among its members, depending on the needs of a particular time and on the capacity of certain of its members to serve in the interests of all. But there is another aspect of this Resolution’s flexibility that should be stressed. It allows for repeated terms of different aggregate length among the elected seats permanently allocated to each region. Let me illustrate the value of that asymmetrical approach with an example. Draft resolution L.68 permanently accords Africa 6 seats on the Security Council. The African Group has made it clear that it wants to have two representatives on the Council who will be there for the long term. Our resolution empowers the African Group to identify two of its members who will represent the region for as long a period as that group decides. Since the decision about re-election would belong to the members of the African Group, they would have the authority to make those two member states continuous members of the Security Council. The result would be that the region would have permanent seats, and the members of the regional group could decide that some of those seats would be held continuously by certain of their members. The balance of the seats set aside for Africa could be held for periods of a duration to be determined by the region. That asymmetrical arrangement illustrates how the flexibility of the approach proposed in this Resolution can be made to serve the specific interests of each particular group. Fourthly, draft resolution L.68 provides for fairness, by creating the possibility that a greater number of member states could rotate through the seats allocated to each region. None of the seats created by our resolution would be set aside for a chosen few.

4 Momentum and deadlock

717

All twenty of the elected seats would be available to member states in an Organisation of equal sovereign members, there should be no second class countries. Our resolution would give every state a voice. Fifth, and finally, Mr. President, draft resolution L.68 provides for meaningful and effective Security Council reform without forcing divisive and potentially damaging votes on the General Assembly, as individual states vie for special status. Each of the other resolutions before the Assembly provides for new permanent members of the Council. But if either one of those Resolutions were to be adopted, that would only be the beginning of a contentious and competitive process. How much time would be needed, how many secret ballots would be cast, what tensions and pressures would be created, during the inevitable subsequent steps? The approach that draft resolution L.68 puts before you would entail a single initial vote of the Assembly, with subsequent elections that would implement the choices of regional groups. It is precisely because structural change in this institution is so difficult to achieve that it has been so rarely attempted. There have been but a handful of occasions in the sixty year history of the United Nations when member states have been called upon to make defining decisions about its format and its future. And yet, there is a sense among many of us that this is such a moment. A rare opportunity to make significant change to the UN’s most significant body. When such historic decisions are made – choices that will have profound effects for generations to come – it is necessary that they be made wisely, that they be made based on principle, that they reflect our shared values and that they advance our common purpose. In this case, and measured against that standard, Canada believes that the wiser course – the principled course – is clear. It is to choose the option that is consistent with our shared values of democracy, of accountability, of flexibility and of fairness. We believe that draft resolution L.68 meets that test. Canada will support it, and we respectfully urge other member states to do the same. 4.2.2.2.3 26 July 2005, Colombia, Ms. Holguín, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 4-6630 […] We believe that the draft resolution631 has important strengths. It is flexible, democratic, open and participatory in character. It also has a regional emphasis that is unique in this debate. This proposal would avoid increasing the differences in the multilateral system. Colombia was one of two countries to vote against establishing the veto when the Organization was founded, in 1945. We have never believed in privileges. That same position is reflected in draft resolution L.68. Our conviction has not changed, and the dynamics of today’s world reaffirms our principled position. We are not at present overcoming a world war. If the world is in any sense evolving, it is towards the plurality of multilateralism, with 191 Member States that have diverse and dynamic national and regional realities. Our development needs are not met by creating new Powers by virtue of a vote at the United Nations, a vote that might lead to deep internal confrontation in the Organization and that would benefit no one. 630  → 4.4.2.10 for Colombia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 631  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

718

4 Momentum and deadlock

[…] In many cases, States with greater familiarity with and understanding of specific situations are small and medium-sized countries, where there is greater geographical and cultural closeness and affinity. Their understanding of the world is different from that of a country of another region with different dynamics. We want a United Nations where the opinions of all are taken into account and respected. We want a United Nations where we can all decide on multilateral issues. We want a United Nations without paternalism or handouts. We want a United Nations without dependence, selectivity or arbitrariness – a United Nations that makes the principle of the sovereign equality of States a reality. We want a United Nations that gives priority to everyone’s needs and where everyone sees that his or her opinions are taken into account. We want a United Nations where every State, regardless of its political, military or economic power, can contribute to decision-making. We want a United Nations that serves everyone and works for the development and stability of all peoples. Our vision of Security Council reform is in line with that thinking: a Council that is representative of regional dynamics, a Council whose composition is flexible in response to global changes and to the realities of power in every historical period, a Council that does not perpetuate privileges. We remain convinced that the veto must be eliminated and, if that is impossible, that it must not be extended for any reason. The Uniting for Consensus proposal envisages a 25-member Security Council with 20 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms, with the possibility of reelection depending on the decisions of each regional group. That is intended to give meaning to regional representation and to make the countries in the Council feel involved with the rest of the membership in carrying out their functions. […] 4.2.2.2.4 26 July 2005, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 6-8 […] Pakistan fully supports the introductory statement made so eloquently on behalf of the sponsors by Ambassador Allan Rock of Canada.632 The Permanent Representative of Canada outlined the major merits of our draft resolution. My delegation also had the opportunity, during our statement in the General Assembly on 11 July,633 to explain the proposal. Let me briefly recapitulate the virtues of our draft resolution. First, it is fair and equitable. It adheres to the principle of sovereign equality and will not discriminate between Member States. Secondly, it will increase the Council’s representativeness. The majority of the Members of the United Nations are small and medium-sized States. Our proposal will double the chances of 186 countries to secure membership in the Council. Thirdly, it will enhance accountability, through the mechanism of periodic elections and re-elections. Those States that seek Council membership to represent regions or groups will remain periodically answerable to those regions and groups, as well as to the General Assembly. 632  26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.2. 633  See UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 7-10.

4 Momentum and deadlock

719

Fourthly, our proposal is simple. It proposes direct approval of a Charter amendment rather than a complex and uncertain three-stage process. Fifthly, our proposal is realistic. Since it accommodates the interests and positions of all Member States, it is more likely to secure eventual ratification. As I have mentioned before, the greatest virtue of the draft resolution submitted by Uniting for Consensus is its flexibility. It can accommodate, through variable geometry, the aspirations and interests of the majority of the membership, including regional groups such as the African Union (AU). We have taken full note of the proposal submitted by the African Union in document A/59/L.67.634 I would like to submit that our resolution and that submitted by the AU are fully compatible. Both proposals are based on the principle that each region would be in a position to construct its own architecture for representation on the Security Council. The African Union has called for two permanent seats for Africa with full rights. We see the African demand as qualitatively different from the call in the group of four’s draft resolution635 for six new permanent members. Permanent members do not represent their regions, only themselves. The group of four countries are seeking permanent membership for themselves, not for their regions. The AU has indicated that the two permanent seats it is seeking would represent Africa and “act on its behalf”. The African Union would also select its own representatives for those permanent seats. If the AU chooses two countries to represent it continuously – in other words, permanently – against those two seats, that would be possible under the Uniting for Consensus resolution. If the African Union decides that three, four, five or more countries should occupy those two seats by rotation, that too could be accommodated under our proposal. The additional benefit of our proposal is that the AU would retain the power to ensure accountability on the part of those States that will represent it on the Council. Our proposal could also ensure representation of all the subregions of Africa. The six nonpermanent seats for Africa under our proposal could enable it to fulfil the desire for equitable representation of each of its five subregions. We fully understand Africa’s desire to possess the same rights as other regions. As we understand it, Africa is seeking this right – the right of veto – on behalf of the entire African region, not for one or two States. My delegation believes that ways and means can be developed under the Uniting for Consensus proposal to provide Africa with the collective ability to uphold its interests in a reformed Security Council. Another commonality between the position of Uniting for Consensus and that of the African Union is our shared desire to achieve a result based on the broadest possible agreement. We value the Sirte summit’s emphasis on solidarity and unity. We believe that such solidarity and unity must be upheld not only within the AU, but within the general membership of the United Nations. Since our proposal is based on a regional approach, it can also accommodate the interests of subregions such as the Arab League, the Caribbean Community and Central America. The larger number of elected seats that would be available under our 634  1 4 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30. 635  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

720

4 Momentum and deadlock

proposals could be appropriately distributed within each region to ensure the representation of subregions as well as other political groupings, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Through the provision for immediate re-election, our proposal could also offer the possibility of long-term and even continuous membership for some States if they are nominated for that purpose by their respective regions. Thus, the group of four could hope to realize its aspirations if it has regional support. Yet there are two important differences between the group of four’s approach and our proposal: first, we preserve the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter, and secondly, we ensure that through periodic elections, any country seeking to represent its region would continue to be accountable to the general membership through the process of such elections. That is indeed the essence of democracy. […] 4.2.2.2.5  11 December 2006, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/61/PV.72, pp. 15-17636

[…] Switzerland remains committed to expanding the Council – an expansion that we believe would make the Council’s work more representative and enable it to respond better to contemporary geopolitical realities. But such an expansion should not jeopardize the Council’s capacity to respond promptly and effectively to threats that weigh upon international peace and security. In fact, safeguarding the Council’s efficiency is just as important as enlarging its membership. Thus, enlargement should focus on a reasonable and manageable increase in the number of seats. In this context, we reiterate our conviction that enlargement should not lead to granting the right of veto to other Council members, as that would only overburden the decision-making process. We continue to favour enlargement based on objective criteria, which would include elements such as a Member State’s size and population, its financial contributions to the United Nations system, its troop contributions to peacekeeping operations or the active role it has played over the years in the United Nations. Countries meeting those criteria should have a chance to qualify for a sustained presence in the Security Council. But the presence should be linked to a strong mechanism for ensuring accountability, either in form of a periodic review or the need for re-election. From this perspective, we welcome the ideas of an intermediary or incremental solution that would go beyond the models that have been officially proposed to date. In this respect, the creation of an appropriate framework for formal negotiation would be welcome. We must not forget that the great majority of States Members of the United Nations have little hope of serving on the Council. If they do, it is for only a short period of time. Countries lacking the necessary resources may never be able to join it. To preserve the ability of such countries to interact in a meaningful way with the Council, Switzerland, together with Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein and Singapore – its partners in the socalled “small five group” (S5) – has been urging improvement of the Council’s working 636  → 4.2.1.2.12 for Switzerland’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

721

methods as an important means of making the Council’s work more transparent, accountable and inclusive. […] 4.2.2.2.6 11 December 2006, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 3-6 […] The concept of long-term membership should not become a guise for a permanent presence. However, Pakistan remains open to the idea of immediate re-election, whose modalities would need to be determined according to the size and structure of any model while ensuring overall balanced representation of geographical groups and other subregional and political constituencies. […] 4.2.2.2.7 8 February 2007, Panama, Mr. Arias, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] El gobierno de Panamá comparte las propuestas para aumentar el número de miembros permanentes en el Consejo. De hecho, ya ha expresado su simpatía por las aspiraciones de algunos países que han manifestado interés en ello. Por el otro lado nuestro Gobierno también reconoce la legítima aspiración del grupo africano de incrementar su representatividad en la composición del Consejo. En este contexto, y teniendo en cuenta el estado de las discusiones que la Asamblea General ha tenido hasta el momento sobre este tema, y en función de buscar una opción que concilie las preocupaciones y los intereses de los Estados que se han expresado sobre esta materia, Panamá propone una modalidad de ampliación con las siguientes características: 1. A efectos de permitir una mejor representación en el Consejo, el número de miembros se aumentaría en 6 para un total de 21. 2. Tomando en cuenta el principio de la distribución geográfica equitativa y las discusiones sostenidas sobre el tema, los seis nuevos puestos serían distribuidos de la siguiente forma: uno para América Latina y el Caribe, uno para Europa Occidental y Otros Estados, dos para Asia y dos para África. CON ELLO Se respeta el principio de distribución geográfica sin que ello sea el elemento determinante en su ampliación. 3. A efectos de dar participación más prolongada y estable a los países que por su nivel de desarrollo y su compromiso con la institución se lo merecen los seis nuevos miembros serían elegidos para un periodo de cinco años, con derecho a reelección consecutiva. 4. Por último, cualquiera de los países que fuesen elegidos por cuatro veces consecutivas como miembro del Consejo adquirirían, POR ESE SOLO HECHO, la calidad de Miembro Permanente. En cuanto al derecho al veto se refiere, Panamá considera que esta es una institución cuya razón de ser dejó de existir. De allí que lejos de ampliarlo, el mismo debe irse limitando hasta su total eliminación. Más aun, Panamá no comparte de posición de aquellos que sostienen que el derecho al veto es inherente a la calidad de miembro permanente. Consecuentemente, en opinión de Panamá, de surgir nuevos miembros permanentes bajo la fórmula antes propuesta, estos no deberán adquirir derecho de veto. […]

722

4 Momentum and deadlock 4.2.2.2.8 22 February 2007, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] 3. While Singapore has voiced support for the G4 proposals,637 it is clear that these ideas on expansion have not garnered sufficiently wide consensus. The fact that the OEWG is meeting in informal consultations is recognition of this. The discussion today on “Categories of Security Council membership” inevitably touches on the notion of “interim solutions”. Several ideas have been bandied about, including the possibility of renewable seats, longer-term seats, and accountability for new permanent members. There are many variations, none of which have yet garnered broad consensus or been discussed comprehensively. For instance, the delegation of Panama has proposed a rather innovative model for expansion which has yet to be fully discussed in the OEWG.638 4. My delegation is willing to keep an open mind on the various proposals. That said, we have some concerns about “interim solutions”. Speaking frankly, any “interim solution” should not be geared to simply accommodating the interests of large states. Small states should not find themselves at a disadvantage. Please allow me to elaborate. 5. First, having renewable or longer term seats essentially means creating a new category between the current permanent and non-permanent seats. Our concern is that small states will get the short end of the stick if countries are allowed two bites of the cherry, i.e. if larger countries are able to run for such semi-permanent seats, as well as the existing two-year non-renewable seats. In practice, this means that a state that loses in the semi-permanent category could easily run in the non-permanent category in the following election. Larger countries would have the resources to mount such back-to-back campaigns and “flip-flop” between categories. This would be to the detriment of small states, which make up the majority of the UN membership. Many small states have never served even a single term in the Council since becoming members of the UN. 6. Whatever interim solution we discuss must not therefore work to the detriment of the small states in the UN. I emphasise this point because too often, and especially in the case of UNSC reform, we seem to be looking for ideas and solutions that meet only the concerns of the larger states. In this regard, I would like to recall what Ambassador Munir Akram said a few days ago when he noted the important and constructive contributions from small states during their stints as non-permanent members of the UNSC. 7. One idea which may address this concern is to introduce a fairly lengthy “timebar” for countries that run for any one category. That is, once a country decides to run for say a semi-permanent or renewable seat, and irrespective of the outcome of that election, they would be precluded from running in the other category (the current two-year non-permanent seats) for say 6 years. I have mentioned as an example a 6 year timebar. But, it could very well be slightly longer or slightly shorter. This would work both ways. A candidate for the category of a two-year non-permanent seat should likewise be barred for say 6 years from running for a semi-permanent or renewable 637  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 638  8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7.

4 Momentum and deadlock

723

seat, irrespective of whether it wins or loses the election. Member states and potential candidates can then make choices in line with their ambitions. This would have the practical effect of narrowing the pool of candidates vying for either category of nonpermanent seats, thus giving many small countries a slightly better chance at serving in the Council. 8. Second, assuming that there is agreement eventually for some countries to become new permanent members (immediately or after an “interim” process), there remain concerns about accountability. Some have asked if new permanent members, once anointed, would behave any differently. One way to address these concerns is to inject accountability into the equation. The G4 have talked about this as have others. I assume that this should not pose any problem given that countries aspiring to become permanent members claim to want to make the Council more representative and to represent the interests of the wider membership. For example, there could be a vote say every X number years whereby a new permanent member could “lose” its permanent status if a majority of the membership vote against it. The G4 have previously indicated that this could be the case if two-thirds of the UN membership vote to strip a new permanent member of its permanent status.639 I have also heard some argue that it should only take a simple majority rather than a two-third majority to “evict” a new permanent member if it fails the accountability test. This is an important detail which would need further discussion. […] 4.2.2.2.9 19 July 2007, Germany, Mr. Matussek, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] We stress once more that a clear majority of the membership supports enlargement of the number of both permanent and non-permanent seats. We also stress our belief that the model proposed by the G4640 provides for the most comprehensive reform. We realize, however, that today we find ourselves in a situation where an intermediary approach may be the only way forward. It may be the only way forward. It may not be the ideal course, but where every other path is blocked, those who are committed to progress must consider this option. Germany wants reform and is prepared to embrace feasible options, provided they bring about real change in the Council and leave the door open to more comprehensive reform. […] 4.2.2.2.10 12 November 2007, Argentina, Mr. Argüello, UN Doc. A/62/PV.47, p. 23 […] The intermediary approach, which might last 10, 15 or 20 years, would make it possible to increase the membership and the participation of all categories of countries and would, in particular, ensure effective access by small States to the Security Council. I wish to mention the importance of both rotation and increasing the regional factor, as much in terms of election methods – including the accountability involved in re-election – as in terms of coordinating positions. We must advance at the regional level, increasing confidence and cooperation without being divided by hegemonies or 639  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 640  Ibid.

724

4 Momentum and deadlock

power politics. An intermediary way also provides an opportunity for the five permanent members to heed the voices of the great majority, which wants to improve the working methods of the Council, controlled today by a small group of countries. […] 4.2.2.2.11 12 November 2007, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 4-6 […] My delegation reaffirms its support for the transitional approach, with an increase in the number of non-permanent seats and the possibility of re-election, provided it does not lead to a de facto permanent membership through repeated re-election. […] 4.2.2.2.12 12 November 2007, Canada, Mr. McNee, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 27-29641 […] Canada believes that the Council’s legitimacy would be enhanced by increasing its membership to include a broader representation of the world’s regions. My delegation understands the wish of some Member States to have regular access to Security Council membership, and for this reason we are open to the consideration of elected renewable terms in the context of negotiations on enlargement. […] 4.2.2.2.13 14 December 2007, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, Statement in the Openended Working Group642

[…] In substance, we don’t have to reinvent the wheel. The two facilitators’ reports, which were the product of long, comprehensive and all-inclusive consultations, have outlined a possible way forward.643 Switzerland still believes that the intermediary approach with a mandatory review could form the nucleus of a possible compromise. The following key elements for negotiations, or negotiables as some like to say have been identified: size, category, regional representation, modalities of election, review, working methods and the veto. With the exception of the veto, Switzerland will show flexibility on these issues. As we are at the beginning of a process, we nevertheless wish to inform you of our current thinking on some of them: […] 1.  Veto: this question is pertinent if we were to create new permanent seats. Should this be the case, it is Switzerland’s longstanding position that an expansion should not lead to new vetoes, neither now nor in the future. 2.  Category: we are convinced that the creation of a third category of long-term renewable seats is a reasonable way to bridge our differences. The duration of these long-term renewable seats would be subject to negotiations. The selection of such new members should be based on objective criteria.

641  → 4.4.4.20 for Canada’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 642  → 4.3.20 for Switzerland’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 643  2007, → 4.1.25, 4.1.26.

4 Momentum and deadlock

725

3.  Modalities for elections: we consider the modalities for elections to be part of the negotiations as well. If a third category of seats is created, it will be important to us that a time-ban will prevent candidates from “flip-flopping”. 4. Review: a mandatory review should take place after a predetermined number of years following the entry into force of the charter amendment. It will be crucial that the review not come too soon as we should have enough time to gain experience with the new format. […] 4.2.2.2.14 20 March 2008, Cyprus on behalf of the members of the Overarching Group, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 24-28644 Letter dated 20 March 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly Following the meeting in December 2007, of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, you requested the membership to establish an overarching process in order to produce a draft text that could form the basis for negotiations to reform the Security Council. We very much concurred with you at that time, as we do now, that a concrete draft proposal is necessary for Member States to engage in negotiation and for the negotiation itself to be focused and result-oriented. Moreover, we have noted that the membership is, in principle, amenable to advancing to the next stage of the process, which is intergovernmental negotiations. In the period that followed the last meeting of the Working Group, a group of drafters, acting in their personal capacity, have attempted to produce a draft that identifies the negotiable in a single draft proposal to enable the Member States to negotiate on that basis. Concurrently, an overarching group, comprised of a number of Member States from all regions and stakeholder groups, was established to exchange views and its input allowed the drafters to produce a draft of a wide and diverse nature. The draft (see enclosure), was never intended to be an exhaustive compilation of all ideas and positions put forward thus far. Rather, its objective was to reflect those elements that require negotiations, on the basis of pragmatism and feasibility. At the same time, the intention was to build on the report of the facilitators and other progress achieved during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly and to give a sense of direction for the future. We consider that all groups of States should be able to recognize some of their core positions in the draft. As for those elements of their position that are not reflected therein, I should like to stress that these are not considered non-legitimate or void, or that the positions and concerns of Member States and of regional groups have been disregarded. We are cognizant that these are retained by their proponents and that they have the right to pursue them in any negotiation. It should be noted that the enclosure attempts to clarify the context in which this effort has been made before proceeding to outline any suggested elements. In attempting to identify the negotiables for reform (indicated through brackets in the draft), it has not been the intention of the drafters to prejudice the outcome of a 644  → 4.4.4.21 for the Overarching Group’s position on informal restrictions on the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

726

4 Momentum and deadlock

possible negotiation or to pre-empt the engagement of anyone in the process. We are convinced that the enclosed draft can be tolerated by everyone to the extent that it could form a basis for negotiations without preconditions. We were reassured in this conviction when the draft was presented to a number of States participating in the overarching group referred to above. It is also our hope that the proposal will be found useful in determining the shape and form that this process will take from now on. It has been our experience that the traditional United Nations method of conducting negotiations in various configurations, both formal and informal, as required, would be the best way to achieve a compromise. I am at your disposal for any further clarifications that might be needed, as well as to discuss the issue with you more generally. (Signed) Andreas D. Marvoyiannis Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations Enclosure Introduction Since 2005, the main claims regarding the enlargement of the Security Council could be broadly represented as follows: adding permanent members with veto; adding new permanent members without veto; and adding seats for more non-permanent members. These positions have not proved reconcilable thus far and have warranted alternative thinking, which began to be elaborated by the five facilitators appointed by the President of the General Assembly at its sixty-first session, through their report of 20 April 2007.645 While the legitimate positions officially tabled in 2005 are retained by their proponents, their lack of potential for realization at this juncture points to an apparent willingness to negotiate on the basis of achieving intermediate reform, through the identification of the highest common denominator at this stage. Affording serious consideration to this emerging approach neither amounts to nor entails relinquishing any claims. Rather, its attempt is to improve current representation on the Security Council, without sacrificing, but ideally improving its effectiveness. As such, for the purpose of achieving such intermediate reform, the scope of the negotiations would be narrower, focusing on points of convergence in the short-term rather than divisive elements. By engaging in negotiations to determine what is feasible in terms of Security Council reform, States are not bound by any outcome, nor does their involvement imply that the parameters of those negotiations represent, at any time, their ideal or preferred reform. What is sought at this point is an inclusive negotiation in good faith in order to achieve progress. Elements for Security Council enlargement 1. The Security Council shall be enlarged to [22] members. 2. Of these seven new seats: (a) Two will be allocated to member States of the African Group, and two will be allocated to member States of the Asian Group; (b) One will be allocated to member States of the Latin American and Caribbean Group; 645   UN Doc. A/61/47, Annex II, → 4.1.25.

4 Momentum and deadlock

727

(c) One will be allocated to member States of the Western European and Others Group; (d) One will be allocated to member States of the Eastern European Group. 3. The election of member States in all new seats will be subject to regular election procedures by two-thirds majority at the General Assembly in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter. 4.1. [The seats allocated under subparagraphs [a-d] [a-e] of paragraph (2) above could, in principle, be filled by the member States elected thereon, for the entire duration of intermediate reform.]*1 4.2.1. [However, at [five-year] intervals, any member State may challenge the incumbent(s) [from its own regional group] that is (are) serving in long-term seat(s) under paragraph 4.1. If this challenge is backed by the majority of the members of that regional group, and subsequently,] by a [simple] majority in the General Assembly, the seat(s) will re-open to election and all members of that regional group, including the incumbent(s), shall be eligible.]*2 or 4.2.2. [However, at [five-year] intervals, any member State may challenge the incumbent(s) [from its own regional group] that is (are) serving in long-term seat(s) under paragraph 4.1. In such an event, the seat(s) will re-open to election and all members of that regional group, including the incumbent(s), shall be eligible.]*1 4.3. [Member States elected under paragraph 2 (a)-(d) above shall be permanent members of the Security Council.]*1 4.4 [Member States elected to fill these seats will be able to serve for a [five] year period and [be eligible for re-election] [not be eligible for re-election].]*1 4.5 [Member States elected to fill these seats will be able to serve for a two year period and [be eligible for re-election] [not be eligible for re-election].]*1 5. [The seat allocated under paragraph 2 (e) will be a regular two-year non-permanent seat.] 6. [At least half of the total number of seats of each regional group after enlargement (excluding the P5) will continue to be regular two-year non-permanent seats.] 7. Reform should include mandatory review after a fixed period of time, the exact duration of which must be determined before the reform comes into force and will form an integral part of the reform package. A mandatory review conference to consider the provisions set out in the paragraphs above will take place [15-years] after these provisions have entered into force. These provisions will remain in place until a decision amending them has come into force. The provisions are without prejudice to the process leading up to, the negotiations during, or the decisions made at the review conference. Elements for working methods […] Original footnotes Options 4.1, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are mutually exclusive. *2 Options 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are mutually exclusive and apply only with respect to option 4.1. *1

728

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.2.2.15 27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration […] 1. United Kingdom and France share a common analysis of the organisation of the 21st century international order and proposals for a more effective international governance. […] International Institutions Together we will work to forge an effective international system to meet 21st century challenges and to engage our international partners and multilateral organisations in the process. Our shared priorities are to shape the global institutions required to promote global economic prosperity; to protect the environment and tackle climate change; and to safeguard our global security. The UK and France will act: […] To reform the UNSC, which has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. In the same spirit of adapting institutions to the new realities of the world, the UNSC should be reformed to ensure that it better represents the world of today, while remaining capable of taking the effective action necessary to confront today’s security challenges.  Reform of the UNSC, both its enlargement and the improvement of its working methods, must therefore succeed. We reaffirm the support of our two countries for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for permanent membership, as well as for permanent representation for Africa on the Council.  We regret that negotiations towards this goal remain in deadlock and are therefore ready to consider an intermediate solution. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than those of the current elected members and those terms would be renewable; at the end of an initial phase, it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones.  We will work with all our partners to define the parameters of such a reform.  UNSC reform requires a political commitment from the member states at the highest level. We will work in this direction in the coming months with a view to achieving effective reform. […]

•

4.2.2.2.16 10 April 2008, Singapore, Mr. Menon, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group646

[…] 4 The “Overarching Group” draft647 is new, so allow me to comment on it. Let me first thank the drafters for taking the initiative in their personal capacities. It is no easy task compiling and reconciling views on Security Council reform so they should be admired for their courage. The draft generally covers elements of the G4648 and

646  → 4.2.2.1.5 for Singapore’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 647  20 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21. 648  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

4 Momentum and deadlock

729

UfC649 positions, as well as several possible “intermediate” possibilities. Insofar as it is a compilation, this could be a useful start. However, the draft also has some important omissions. If we agree that this document is to serve as a basis for negotiations, our sense is that the draft must also address these omissions. […] 6 Second, the proposal tends to come across as catering to the interests of the medium and larger powers, and not the interests of small states. As I stated a minute ago, Singapore’s position has always been that we support expansion in the permanent and non-permanent categories. But in this proposal, most of the seat allocation permutations – permanent, long-term, intermediate renewable – cater to the interests of the larger and medium powers. In fact, the only region that seems guaranteed a traditional two-year non-renewable seat is the Eastern European Group. This is very different from the proposals that were on the table before – all of which had a significant number of traditional non-permanent seats for all regions. We need to have more of these traditional non-permanent seats to cater to the needs of small countries, which are not about to contend for longer or renewable seats, let alone permanent seats. In this regard, there should be additional non-permanent seats for all regions and not just one region. As drafted, there seems little regard for the interests of small states, who make up the majority of the UN membership. 7 Third, with respect to the intermediate approach, I wonder what happened to the proposal to prevent countries from flip-flopping between the regular two-year seats and the proposed renewable seats? My delegation referred to this idea many times last year. Several other delegations also expressed support for this idea. The point is that there should be a fairly lengthy time-bar to prevent countries from flip-flopping between categories and getting two bites of the cherry, assuming that an intermediate approach is adopted. Once a country decides to run for a seat in the “intermediate” category, and irrespective of the outcome of that election, it should be precluded from running for a traditional non-permanent seat for a number of years, let us use 3-5 years as an indicative period. A candidate for the traditional non-permanent category would likewise be barred for running for an intermediate category seat for the same period. Member states should make clear choices in line with their ambitions. Without such restrictions, large countries will have “two bites of the cherry”. It is only larger countries that have the resources to “flip-flop” and run consecutive (or even concurrent) campaigns. […] 4.2.2.2.17 18 November 2008, France, Mr. Delacroix, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, pp. 14-15 […] How do we proceed after so many years of discussions? First, we must bear in mind that the necessary expansion of the Security Council must be aimed at strengthening its authority and effectiveness. That is why we are in favour of an expansion of the Council in its two categories of membership, with Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as new permanent members and permanent representation for Africa.

649  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

730

4 Momentum and deadlock

During the many debates on the topic, a great majority of delegations have expressed clear support for an expansion of the Security Council in its two categories of membership – permanent and non-permanent. That point is important and must not be forgotten. The second important point is that we must acknowledge that, to date, none of the proposals for final reform has gained the approval of two thirds of the Member States of the General Assembly, a legal requirement well known to all. That is why the idea of interim reform to overcome the current impediments is finding growing support. As is known, France and the United Kingdom have expressed their readiness to consider an interim solution that, without prejudice to the end result, would enable us to move forward. Specifically, we are open to considering an interim solution that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the current elected members, which would be renewable. At the end of the initial phase, it could be decided to make those seats permanent. That option should duly be taken into account as part of the intergovernmental negotiations, in accordance with paragraph (e) of decision 62/577 of 15 September.650 In general, my delegation believes that we should promptly and fully consider the specific options within the framework of the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations. We believe that the decision adopted by the General Assembly on 15 September is clear and important. […] 4.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 4.2.2.3.1 27 January 1998, Bahrain on behalf of the Group of Arab States, A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.2 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXI, p. 60 Letter dated 27 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for the month of January 1998 addressed to the President of the General Assembly In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for January 1998, I have the honour to address you in your capacity as Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. On 12 December 1997, the Chairman of the Group of Arab States for that month addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Group of Asian States for the same month enclosing a four-point working paper as a contribution from the Arab States members of the Group of Asian States to that Group’s endeavours on the question of Security Council reform. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the working paper. I should like to bring to your attention the fact that the points which appear in the working paper are the result of intensive meetings held by the Group of Arab States and represent the position of both States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and Arab Ministers for foreign Affairs.

650  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

4 Momentum and deadlock

731

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its appendix circulated to the States members of the Working Group, since Arab delegates will raise this issue during the deliberations of that Group. (Signed) Jassim Buallay Ambassador Permanent Representative Chairman of the Group of Arab States Appendix 1. The composition of the Security Council should be democratized to reflect the increase in the number of States Members of the United Nations. 2. The membership of the Security Council should be expanded to at least 26. 3. In the case of an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, Asia should be allocated two permanent seats. These two seats will be allotted to countries by a decision of the Group of Asian States itself in accordance with a system of rotation, the modalities of which will be discussed in the context of a working group to be established for that purpose. 4. New permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as current permanent members. Ultimately, the permanent members should also be nominated by their respective regions and elected by the General Assembly. Such periodic elections of permanent members of the Security Council will, in the final analysis, ensure that the decisions of the Council are less subject to the strictly national interests of its various members. 4.2.2.3.2 8-10 June 1998, Senegal on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.16 and Corr.1 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXIV, p. 63 Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the procedure for rotation of the two permanent seats claimed by Africa AHG/Dec.6 (XXXIV): decision on the procedure for rotation of the two seats claimed by Africa in the expanded Security Council*1 The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at its thirty-fourth session in Ouagadougou from 8 to 10 June 1998, Considering its declaration AHG/Dec.3 (XXXIII) of 4 June 1997 on the reform of the Security Council, Having reviewed the report on the follow-up to that declaration submitted by the Group of African States in the United Nations and the proposals contained therein, Decides to adopt the following procedure for rotation of the two permanent member seats claimed by Africa in the expanded Security Council: (i) Nomination of candidates in each of the five African subregions; (ii) Preparation of a list of candidates based on the names thus submitted; (iii) Establishment of a pool from which the Heads of State and Government will choose two candidates to fill the two seats. The two candidates must come from two different subregions to be designated by the Heads of State and Government; (iv) Adoption of the same procedure when selecting African candidates for subsequent selections in the remaining subregions;

732

4 Momentum and deadlock

(v) Determination by the Heads of State and Government of the duration of the mandate of the two candidates elected as permanent members of the expanded Security Council. Original footnote *1 Translation by the United Nations Secretariat. The official Organization of African Unity text was not available. 4.2.2.3.3 16 December 1999, South Africa, Mr. Kumalo, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 11-12

[…] South Africa supports the well-known African position that a legitimate Security Council must be more representative in regional terms and must include at least two African permanent members. We wish to state further that the new members in a reformed Security Council should share the same rights and privileges as current ones. […] 4.2.2.3.4 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18651 […] […] Likewise, I wish to reaffirm our attachment to the common African position claiming for Africa the allocation of two rotating permanent seats with the same prerogatives enjoyed by the other permanent members, as well as some additional non-permanent seats. We feel that the principle of rotation, which has always been invoked and respected whenever the issue of seats for Africa has been raised, is the most democratic and fair way of securing credible representation, accepted by all in the Security Council, for Africa. […] 4.2.2.3.5 16 December 1999, Argentina, Mr. Petrella, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 23-24 […] It is, therefore, very interesting that under your initiative, we are beginning to consider specifically the creation of regional seats. The clearest case of this is the European Union. With a unified currency, with unified political, economic and foreign policies, with defined borders and now with the planned military deterrence force of its own, it is obvious that a regional seat is a logical necessity and consequence. In other words, if somewhat more than 25 per cent of the gross global product, not to mention the enormous cultural and historic wealth of Europe, is oriented towards a regional seat, this is a message, it seems to me, on which we must all reflect. […] 4.2.2.3.6 16 December 1999, Italy, Mr. Fulci, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 25-27 […] Furthermore, as Europe becomes economically and politically more integrated, the idea of a European Union presence in the Security Council is steadily gaining ground in many quarters. I was delighted to hear our colleague from Argentina just mention 651  → 4.3.4 for Algeria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 4.4.3.5 for Algeria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

733

this. Should not this new reality – the “European reality” – be accounted for in the reform? […] 4.2.2.3.7  16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of the Southern African Development Community, Mr. Andjaba, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, p. 5652 It gives me great pleasure to speak on the agenda item 38, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, on behalf of the States members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Swaziland, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and my own country, Namibia. […] SADC fully subscribes to the Harare Declaration653 of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), to the effect that Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats and five nonpermanent seats in the expanded Council and that two permanent seats for Africa will be allocated to countries by a decision of the Africans themselves, in accordance with a system of rotation based on the current established criteria of the OAU. […] 4.2.2.3.8 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7654 […] On the question of reforming of the Security Council, the voice of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement cannot be ignored, since they represent fully 80 per cent of this Organization’s membership. While their interests in expanding and reforming the Security Council cannot be set aside, the demands of the African and Arab States must also be heeded. They have drafted working papers agreed upon at ministerial summit meetings and conferences, in which they seek to enhance their contribution to reactivating the United Nations and all its bodies. Moreover, the demands of Asian and other States cannot be ignored. Their interests have been clearly expressed in their formal statements on Security Council reform and expansion. The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes once again to reaffirm the positions we have reiterated throughout the various phases of the debate. We wish in particular to reaffirm our commitment to the positions expressed by the Group of Arab States in two letters, the most recent of which is dated 2 February 1998. Both of these stress the following: First, the composition of the Security Council must be truly democratic and reflect the increase in the number of States Members of the Organization. […] Thirdly, if permanent membership of the Security Council is to be increased, the Group of Arab States demands a fully fledged permanent seat, to be rotated among Arab States based on the criteria used within the Group, as well as within the framework 652  → 4.4.2.3 for the Southern African Development Community’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 653  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21. 654  → 4.3.7 for Syria’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 4.4.3.9 for Syria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

734

4 Momentum and deadlock

of consultations with the African and Asian Groups of States, to which all members of the Arab Group belong. […] 4.2.2.3.9 20 December 1999, Kenya, Mr. Mbaya, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 19-20 […] My delegation is of the view that any reform of the Security Council should take into account the diverse character of the United Nations membership and consequently reflect an equitable geographical representation. It is a serious anomaly, for example, that Africa, with 53 member countries, has no permanent seat on the Council, even though the continent provides nearly one third of the United Nations membership. Africa’s position on the reform of the Security Council was formulated by the heads of State at the 1993 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Cairo, where they categorically called for the expansion of the Security Council by at least 11 seats. My delegation fully supports this position655 and reiterates that Africa must have two permanent and five non-permanent seats in the Council. […] 4.2.2.3.10 20 December 1999, Ghana, Mr. Osei, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 7-8 […] In this connection, we wholly subscribe to the Non-Aligned Movement’s statement on all aspects of the question of an increase in the membership of the Council,656 complemented by the African position, as expressed in the Harare Declaration of June 1997.657 Africa’s claim to at least two permanent seats should be adequately addressed, since it is the largest regional group in the Organization. This apart, we also endorse the Non-Aligned Movement proposal658 that a periodic review of the structure and functioning of the Security Council is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to the maintenance of peace and security. […] 4.2.2.3.11 20 December 1999, Zimbabwe, Mr. Muchetwa, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 19-20

[…] While it is true that in 1945 most colonial States – a large number of them in Africa – had their interests looked after by the colonizing States, the situation is no longer the same today. Most of those colonial States are now independent and Members of the United Nations. It is therefore quite apparent that representation in the Security Council should reflect this new dispensation. My delegation supports the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that in reforming the Security Council the veto must be curtailed.659 We are aware that it is not easy to try to reduce a special privilege when the concurrence of those that enjoy the privilege is required. However, we believe that, if those wielding the power of veto in the 655  29 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 656  See, e.g., the statements of 13 February 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14, and of 18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6. 657  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21. 658  See, e.g., the statement of 13 February 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5. 659  18-20 October 1995, → 3.4.2.17; 27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44; 10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

735

Security Council are unwilling to have the veto curtailed, the new permanent members in the Security Council must enjoy the same prerogatives as those exercised by the current permanent members. In that connection, we would like to reiterate what was stated at the 1997 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit on the question of the Security Council. Africa expects two permanent seats, whose occupancy will be decided by the Africans themselves on a rotational basis, and three non-permanent seats. This, we believe, is a reasonable demand, for in 1945, when the United Nations was formed, five permanent seats were created out of a total membership of about 50. Today, however, there are 53 African States, which were not accommodated when the United Nations was being set up. […] 4.2.2.3.12 16 November 2000, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/55/PV.64, pp. 12-14 […] With regard to the enlargement of the Council, which is just as controversial, a broad majority has clearly spoken out on the need to remedy the current imbalance and the lack of representativity in the Council’s structure by ensuring a more balanced and fairer geographic representation and by strengthening the participation of developing countries. The Council does not reflect the political changes that have taken place at the international level over the past decades, just as it no longer represents universality and the plurality of its mandates. This lack of representation leads to a loss of the Council’s legitimacy and credibility; hence the need to review its composition and its size. In this respect, I would like to stress that any formula which would exclude the interests of the developing countries would be counter-productive and certainly unacceptable. Here my delegation reiterates its support for the specific proposals made by the Non-Aligned Movement,660 and in particular that relating to an increase in the number of Council members, which we hope will be studied and receive all due consideration. In this context, the Non-Aligned Movement, while recognizing the difficulty of achieving agreement on the category of permanent members, and with concern to promote a prompt reform of the Council, proposes that enlargement should be limited for the moment to the non-permanent category. For the United Nations to remain in harmony with a rapidly changing world, the reform of the Council should relate to questions where an area of common interest can be most easily found. I would stress at this stage that any enlargement of the Security Council should lead to increased representation for Africa, the region which has the greatest number of Member States and which has no permanent representative in the Council. This need is underscored by the fact that the majority of questions that the Council is dealing with today relate to developing countries in general and African countries in particular. The position of Africa on the reform of the Council was formulated by the African heads of State and Government in 1997 at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Harare,661 where they solemnly requested the enlargement of the Council to 11 seats, the allocation of two permanent seats on a representative rotational basis, with the same prerogatives as those of the other permanent members, and two non-permanent 660  See, e.g., the statements of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14; 18-20 October 1995, → 3.2.1.3.6; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14 and 3.3.37; and 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2 and 4.3.1. 661  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21.

736

4 Momentum and deadlock

seats to be shared between African States, according to criteria and methods agreed by the Africans themselves. In the same vein, my delegation feels that a reformed Council, composed of at least 26 members, would be more representative and be able to work with the desired efficiency. […] 4.2.2.3.13 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2662 […] The new non-permanent-member seats to be created should continue to be filled on the basis of the criteria established in Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter: their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution. We think that regional groups should decide how those new seats will be distributed among their member States. As a whole, this procedure has been efficient, and therefore it should be maintained. Regional distribution allows the small countries a greater opportunity to accede to positions within the system of the Organization, compared to the situation if the General Assembly decided the distribution without regional considerations that take rotation into account. […] 4.2.2.3.14 16 November 2000, Colombia, Mr. Franco, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 37 […] We have all agreed on the need to reform the Council in order to make it more representative, democratic, transparent and responsible to the other Member States. In this regard, we are convinced that the success of this aspiration will depend on preserving, in all aspects of reform, the principles of the sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical representation. We must not lose sight of the fact that the final shape of reform would be disappointing if the inequalities of representation were to be magnified, on the one hand, between developed and developing countries and, on the other, among the developing countries themselves. In order to avoid such inequalities, it is necessary for the regional Groups to participate in the allocation of regional seats to their members. Each region has its own dynamics and formulas for participation and it is clear that there is no formula that can be applied universally to all regions. […] 4.2.2.3.15  16 November 2000, Nigeria, Mr. Mbanefo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 46-48663

[…] Other criteria, such as emerging regional players and centres of economic power, may also be taken into consideration. In this regard, Nigeria unequivocally supports the position of the Organization of African States (OAU), which calls for the allocation of two permanent seats for Africa in an enlarged Security Council.664 How can the United Nations continue to justify a situation in which Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Council? Africa, with its 53 Member States, collectively constitutes almost one third of the entire membership of the United Nations. We 662  → 4.2.2.3.13 for Argentina’s support of regional seats, and 4.4.3.12 for Argentina’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 663  → 4.4.4.9 for Nigeria’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 664  8-10 June 1998, → 4.2.2.3.2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

737

therefore believe that a decision by the OAU to seek two permanent seats for Africa in a reformed and expanded Council cannot be ignored. On the related question of the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, Nigeria supports the curtailment of its use by the permanent members of the Council. We even support its abolition if it is the consensus of the international community. However, if the veto is to be retained in its present form, it is the view of my delegation that it should be extended to new permanent members of the Council. Denial of the veto to new permanent members in an enlarged Security Council will not only be discriminatory, but it will also create two different classes of permanent membership and a situation that does not promote cohesion and stability in the Council. […] 4.2.2.3.16 17 November 2000, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 7-8665

[…] In that context, Africa – which represents not only the majority of Member States but also the majority of the issues debated in the Council – should be better represented in both categories of Council membership. The anomalous situation in which Africa is not among the permanent members of the Security Council must be put right in the interest of equity, justice and the Organization’s credibility. In the new millennium, Africa should not merely be the object of Security Council resolutions; it should be a responsible participant in the maintenance of international peace and security. My delegation takes this opportunity to reaffirm that peace is the business of us all – large and small, rich and poor – and that lasting peace can be attained only by pooling the efforts of all members of the international community. Moreover, my delegation is convinced that more involvement and greater responsibility for African countries in the maintenance of international peace and security, through membership of the Security Council, would promote the spread of a culture of peace throughout the continent. In the light of those considerations, my delegation endorsed the June 1997 Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)666 on reform of the Security Council. That Declaration calls for democratization and equitable geographical distribution in an enlarged Security Council, and expansion of the Council to a total of 26 members in both categories of membership, of which Africa would be allocated at least two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats. We also remain committed to the position of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement as stated at their 1998 Durban summit.667 […] 4.2.2.3.17 17 November 2000, Tunisia, Ms. Achouri, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 14-15 […] Moreover, my country still endorses Africa’s position, which we believe is legitimate and justified in more than one way. Africa is calling for two permanent rotating 665  → 4.4.3.13 for Madagascar’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 666  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21. 667   Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, 29 August to 3 September 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X.

738

4 Momentum and deadlock

seats with the same privileges enjoyed by permanent members, as well as two additional non-permanent seats. We believe that Africa’s permanent representation on the Council has become essential. In addition to the fact that African countries make up roughly one fourth of the membership of the Organization, most of the problems being dealt with by the Council relate primarily to the African continent. We therefore believe that African representation in the Council, especially on a permanent basis, will strengthen the Council’s capacity to better understand the specific nature of the challenges in African zones of conflict and tension and to respond to them more effectively and appropriately. Let me recall also that my country is committed to supporting the candidatures of Germany and of Japan for permanent seats on the Security Council. We are convinced that we should agree on a final formula that would take account of the interests of all Member States. […] 4.2.2.3.18 31 October 2001, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 21-22

[…] This anomaly must be done away with through an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of seats – permanent and non-permanent – on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and in the framework of an adequate balance between North and South and between developing and industrialized countries. Africa, which represents one quarter of the membership, must have at least two additional permanent and two additional non-permanent seats in a reformed Security Council. […] 4.2.2.3.19 1 November 2001, Sudan, Mr. Bakhit, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 9-10668 […] My delegation has expressed its position on Council reform in its active participation in the work of the Open-ended Working Group, through the statement of the President of Sudan at the Millennium Summit669 and through the statements of the Foreign Minister during recent sessions of the General Assembly.670 It is a position fully in line with that of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement on the importance of reforming the Council in its two categories of members – permanent and non-permanent – within the framework of equitable geographic representation. This reform would make the Council more representative of the wider membership of the United Nations, improve its working methods and make the Council’s decisionmaking more democratic and more transparent. I will not reiterate this position in detail here, but I affirm once more that it is important to consider Council reform and the expansion of its membership as an integral part of a whole, comprehensive package. Sudan supports the African position, which calls for two non-permanent seats to be allocated according to the principle of rotation followed by the Organization of African Unity.671 Africa requires particular 668  → 4.4.2.7 for Sudan’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 669  8 September 2000, UN Doc. A/55/PV.7, pp. 11-12. 670  19 September 2000, UN Doc. A/55/PV.23, pp. 22-27. 671  8-10 June 1998, → 4.2.2.3.2.

4 Momentum and deadlock

739

consideration regarding Council membership by taking into account the types of conflict Africa is experiencing. Most of the Security Council agenda relates to Africa. This requires intensive African representation in the Security Council, especially among permanent and non-permanent members. This will strengthen the Council’s ability to deal with African conflicts and find valid solutions to them. 4.2.2.3.20 15 October 2002, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 4-6672 […] We should also recall that a large majority of Member States believe that the expansion should involve permanent as well as non-permanent members. If that proposal were adopted, we could then move on to the distribution between permanent and non-permanent members. That distribution should be pursued, and if possible, completed by representatives of the geographic groups at the current session. If we want a “Directoire” that is more democratic and more representative of international reality, we must also agree on the criteria for enlargement. During the meetings of the Working Group on Security Council Reform, my delegation suggested some reference points that we would do well to reconcile, since, as a matter of principle, if we are still negotiating, it is because we have not yet reached agreement. We could make the following suggestions for criteria, but it is not a complete list: first, geographical representation – the golden rule of our Organization; secondly, economic significance and financial contributions of the countries. Japan and Germany fall into that category. Thirdly, the human magnitude of highly populated countries; I repeat, highly populated; fourthly, the use of systems of rotation, such as the one requested by Africa, which is also claiming two permanent seats. Fifthly, we should take identities and cultures into account. The complexity of today’s world requires that. Our enlarged Council should unite Western, Buddhist, African, Arab-Muslim, Latin American, Japanese and Hindu civilizations; and, as I said, my list is not exhaustive. Those rules, then, should apply to permanent members, who would all have the same rights. The negotiations on the non-permanent members should be even simpler, since we already have practices that are well established and accepted by all. […] 4.2.2.3.21 14 October 2003, South Africa, Ms. Ndhlovu, UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, pp. 8-9

[…] South Africa supports expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of Council membership, with new members having equal sovereign status with existing members in those categories. As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the African Union, South Africa has actively participated in the Group. South Africa supports the call by the large majority of Member States for the reform process to be transparent and give due consideration to equitable geographic representation in the context of a package of reforms that would not disadvantage developing countries. Arguments have been put forward that the size of the Council can be increased only slightly from the current 15, because the Council should not become cumbersome 672  → 4.4.3.18 for Tunisia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

740

4 Momentum and deadlock

and unable to respond rapidly to crises. Our experience with the Security Council has shown us that its credibility in dealing with crises was not an issue of size, but that credibility emerged when there was a sense of transparency, legitimacy, representativity and accountability in the its deliberations and actions. Similarly, we found that the size of the Council was not the basis for its slow reactions or even its failure to act. More often, it was the use or the threat of use of the veto, as well as a lack of political will on the part of individual powerful States, that often frustrated the will of the majority of Council Members and, indeed, of the majority of United Nations Members. In this regard, the question of the veto remains a contentious one in the debate on Council reform. When we examine the record of the use of the veto, it becomes clear that we cannot continue to have situations in which individual Member States serve their own narrow national interests while ignoring the overwhelming voice of the international community. […] 4.2.2.3.22 14 October 2003, Syria, Mr. Mekdad, UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, pp. 21-22673 […] Reform of the Security Council and increasing its membership should be an integral part of a joint comprehensive endeavour, in which due consideration would be given to the principle of equal sovereignty among nations and equitable geographical representation, as well as to achieving transparency, responsibility and democracy in the working methods of the Security Council, including its decision-making process. Expansion of the Council membership in both permanent and non-permanent categories must ensure equitable representation for developing countries, in accordance with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement. In that connection, we wish to mention that the Arab Group has always emphasized at previous consultations the need for a permanent seat to be allocated to the Arab countries, as part of any future reform process. Arab countries, supporting expansion of the Council membership, should have one permanent seat, to be filled on a rotating basis and in keeping with the procedures adopted by the League of Arab States. Two non-permanent seats should also be allocated to Arab countries, to be filled on a rotating basis, as is the current practice. The Council membership should be expanded to include 26 members. Discussing reform of the Security Council and increasing its membership prompts us to attach special importance to the working methods of the Council, which is no less important an issue than is expansion of the Council. […] 4.2.2.3.23 29 January 2004, European Parliament resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (2003/2049(INI)), P5_TA(2004)0037674 The European Parliament, – having regard to the follow-up to the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations “We the Peoples: the role of the UN in the 21st century”; to the Millennium

673  → 4.4.3.19 for Syria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 674  → 4.4.3.20 for the European Parliament’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same resolution.

4 Momentum and deadlock

741

Declaration of 2000675 and to the UN communication “A Vision of Partnership: the United Nations and the European Union” and the UN Secretary-General’s reports on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration of 31 July 2002, and of 2 September 2003*1, – having regard to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendations on the United Nations at the turn of the century*2, on the relations with the United Nations*3 and on the reform of the United Nations*4, – having regard to the guidelines adopted at the Göteborg European Council, of 15-16 June 2001, on EU/UN cooperation and the agreements reached at the EU General Affairs Council of 11-12 June 2001, and the External Relations Council of 21-22 July 2003, – having regard to the EU Council commitment to reinforce the role of the European Union in international organisations and in particular the UN*5, – having regard to its resolution of 16 May 2002 on the European Union/United Nations partnership (development and humanitarian affairs)*6, – having regard to the Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 20-21 June 2003 and the reports presented on Conflict Prevention, the Fight against Terrorism, and A Secure Europe in a better World, – having regard to the Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism” (COM(2003) 526), – having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure, […] L. noting, in this regard, that achieving the institutional reforms launched through the UN Millennium Declaration on the structure, composition and decisionmaking process of the Security Council, as well as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other UN bodies, are prerequisites for a more efficient United Nations, […] Enhancing the EU’s role in a reinforced UN […] 6. Is of the opinion that the EU Constitution will have a positive impact on the improvement of relations between the EU and the UN; believes it will also reinforce the effectiveness of the EU’s action within the UN, contributing, therefore, to give a boost to the UN in its central role to stand for and implement ‘effective multilateralism’ in global governance, global security, and global respect of human rights; further considers that the EU should play a more active role in the reform of the UN’s internal structure; […] 9. Notes that the success of global governance, in the face of the challenges posed by growing globalisation and interdependence, can only be based on an effective and fair multilateral system unequivocally anchored in the United Nations, and will depend on: – reinforcing the role of the UN as proposed in its Millennium Declaration, in particular by moving ahead with the reforms needed to equip it for the new 675  8 September 2000, → 4.1.6.

742

4 Momentum and deadlock world situation, by improving the representativeness, the structure, the rules governing the decision-making process and effectiveness of the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, ECOSOC and, if necessary, through the establishment of an Economic, Social and Environmental Security Council, and re-adjusting the Trusteeship Council,

[…] – strengthening and ensuring a successful outcome to the plans to reform the United Nations, with emphasis on implementation of the Millennium Declaration and the Secretary-General’s proposals to strengthen the organisation; […] 10. Notes the report of the UN Working Group on Security Council reform*7 of 20 June 2003 and its recommendations, as well as the UN Secretary General’s reports to the 57th and 58th General Assemblies on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration; expresses its interest in actively contributing to the high-level Panel appointed by the UN Secretary-General to examine the challenges to peace and security, to consider the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges, review the functioning of the major organs of the UN and the relationship between them, and recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations through reform of institutions and processes*8; […] 12. Urges EU Member States to reach, with utmost urgency, agreement on the institutional reform of the UN system, in the light of the upcoming EU personality, and of the following principles: – increasing the composition of the Security Council (permanent and nonpermanent members), which should better reflect the current situation in the world, including the European Union, as a permanent member, as soon as its legal personality is recognised, as well as a supplementary permanent seat for each of the following regions: Africa, Asia and Latin America, – improving the decision-making process of the Security Council by replacing the current veto system by a system of double veto (veto only relevant if by 2 permanent members) and only in the cases referred to in chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression); […] 19. Stresses that enhancing the EU’s role within the UN will demand: […] – reinforcing the debate among EU institutions on UN issues, with a view to jointly agreeing on the political sectors where the EU should have a front-runner role in the definition of the UN politics, such as the articulation of the UN with other international organisations (e.g. NATO), the relations between security, development, environmental and humanitarian policies; and developing and promoting EU values, in particular democracy and respect for human rights within the framework of UN activity; […] – defining a European Union common position on the reform of the United Nations system; […]

4 Momentum and deadlock

743

– ensuring, for the areas under UN activity, the implementation, in due time and form, of Article 19 of the Treaty of the Union not only in terms of information, but also of coordination, as well as of all interinstitutional agreements adopted by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (e.g. interinstitutional agreements on CFSP/ESDP and on budgetary discipline), and eventually amending Article 19 of the EU Treaty in order to establish uniform representation of the EU within bodies of the United Nations and other international institutions; – reinforcing the coordination mechanisms of Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP), with a view to ensuring that the EU Members of the Security Council (permanent members and non-permanent members) have clear information on the EU position on the issues being dealt with in the Security Council; – working towards a more efficient and cohesive Common Foreign and Security Policy through a more pro-active role for the EU in areas relating to international, political, security and human rights issues; […] 20. Looks to the EU actively to participate in reforming and further developing the UN; takes the view that, in the event of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity within the meaning of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, it must be possible for the United Nations to be authorised to intervene rapidly; considers in this connection that the possibility must be created of circumventing the veto of a permanent member of the Security Council should an independent body endowed with legitimacy under international law (for instance, the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court) establish that there is an imminent danger of the abovementioned crimes being committed; […] Original footnotes *1 UN SG Report to the 57th session of the UN General Assembly A/57/270, 31 July 2002 and UNSG Report to the 58th session of the UN General Assembly A/58/323, 2 September 2003 both on the Implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, → 4.1.6]. *2 CoE PA recommendation 1476 (2000) *3 CoE PA recommendation 1411 (1999) *4 CoE PA recommendation 1367 (1998) *5 EU General Affairs Council of 18-19 February 2002. *6 OJ C 180 E, 31.7.2003, p. 538. *7 Report of the Open-Ended Working Group, on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council of 20 June 2003 (57th UN General Assembly, supplement 47 – A/57/47). *8 UN Secretary-General’s address to the UN General Assembly of 23 September 2003 and decision of the UN Secretary-General announced on 4 November 2003 appointing the members of the Panel and confirming the terms of its mandate.

744

4 Momentum and deadlock 4.2.2.3.24 23 September 2004, Austria, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, UN Doc. A/59/PV.8, pp. 27-30

[…] I fully subscribe to the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union,676 which expressed the position of the European Union regarding the various global and regional challenges we face today. I would like to emphasize a few additional points from our own perspective. […] Austria, like many other countries, is concerned about the growing gap between the Council’s current composition on the one hand, and the changing political, economic and social reality of the community of nations on the other. It is essential to enlarge and balance the membership of the Security Council, as well as to increase its transparency. In order for all peoples to identify with its decisions, we must ensure that the Security Council is a body that truly reflects the diversity of the world’s cultures and regions by an improved representation of regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. As you know, Sir, it is my personal vision that, in the longer term, the European Union should also be represented in the Security Council. I pointed out during the general debate last year that that would be the logical consequence of further European integration in the field of common foreign and security policy. […] 4.2.2.3.25 24 September 2004, Egypt, Mr. Aboul Gheit, UN Doc. A/59/PV.10, pp. 17-21

[…] […] I should like clearly to state Egypt’s position, which is based on our membership in the Group of African States and the fact that we have the honour to coordinate the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) working group on this issue. Egypt hopes that the deliberations on this subject will result in both reform of the Council and expansion of its membership. The United Nations and the international community as a whole will not gain much if the process is limited to expanding the Council’s membership without truly improving its working methods so that it can better represent the general membership of the Organization and have greater capacity to maintain international peace and security. Egypt is fully committed to the Declaration of the 1997 Harare Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),677 which affirmed Africa’s right to two permanent seats and three non-permanent seats on an expanded Security Council. We are also committed to the positions of the Non-Aligned Movement with regard to increasing the membership of the Council to at least 26 member States.678 Such an expansion could be confined to the non-permanent category should the expansion of both membership categories prove difficult. What about the composition of the Council? We call for guaranteed representation of all cultures and civilizations in an expanded Security Council on the basis of the current geographical distribution in the United Nations. We believe that the Council will not be able to effectively carry out its duties in the maintenance of international 676  2 1 September 2004, UN Doc. A/59/PV.3, pp. 27-30. 677  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21. 678  18 September 1995, → 3.3.14; 27 June 1997, → 3.3.37; 10 July 1998, → 4.3.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

745

peace and security unless it is more aware of the nature and circumstances prevailing in all societies and of the cultural and historical heritage on which they base and formulate their policies. Here, we must reaffirm the legitimate right of more than 1 billion Muslims and more than 300 million Arabs to be represented in the Council on an equal footing with those who represent other cultures and civilizations. In that context, I wish to recall the significant contributions made by Egypt at the regional and international levels and its central role in the African, Arab and Islamic spheres. Also noteworthy is Egypt’s role in the Middle East and among developing and emerging economies. As a founding Member of the United Nations, Egypt has made well-known contributions to the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Organization and to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Egypt also played a pivotal role in establishing the League of Arab States, the OAU, the African Union, NAM and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In addition, I wish to recall that Egypt possesses the components of a regional Power in its comprehensive sense, be it economic, military or human. Egypt also enjoys social and political stability. Its diplomatic outreach is among the largest, and over the years it has developed strong international ties throughout the world. Egypt has in the past expressed its conviction that it is eminently qualified to assume the responsibility of a permanent seat in an expanded Security Council, on the basis of the Harare Declaration. We reiterate that the considerations to which I referred demonstrate that Egypt is clearly eligible, and has the capacity, to take on the responsibilities of membership of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter. We believe that such membership could be based on a system of rotation with our African brothers, whereby we would fill the additional seats that would be allocated to our continent, in accordance with any newly established status in the Council and with the geographic distribution as would be worked out by the United Nations. 4.2.2.3.26 7-8 March 2005, African Union Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 7th Extraordinary Session 7-8 March 2005 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) THE COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON THE PROPOSED REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS: “THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS” […] e) The Security Council On the Security Council, the African Union: Recalling that, in 1945, when the UN was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position; Convinced that Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose;

746

4 Momentum and deadlock

Conscious of the fact that the Harare Declaration679 has made significant impact on the world community and has thus been fairly reflected in the proposed UN Security Council Reforms, adopted the following position: 1. Africa’s goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council, which is the principal decision-making organ of the UN in matters relating to international peace and security. 2. Full representation of Africa in the Security Council means: ii. not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto; iii. five non-permanent seats. 3. In that regard, even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council. 4. The African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council. 5. The question of the criteria for the selection of African members of the Security Council should be a matter for the AU to determine, taking into consideration the representative nature and capacity of those chosen. 4.2.2.3.27 14 April 2005, European Parliament, Resolution on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities, P6_TA(2005)0132

[…] Parliament’s view on the Union’s role in certain multilateral organisations […]

43. Expresses the view that the Union as a whole should, in particular, play a major role within the United Nations system, that the EU should in the future be guaranteed a seat in the UN’s Security Council, as the most genuine expression of a true and effective common foreign policy, and that the Union should support United Nations reform alongside the proposals included in the report from the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change;680 […] 4.2.2.3.28 9 June 2005, European Parliament, Resolution on the reform of the United Nations, P6_TA(2005)0237 The European Parliament, – having regard to its resolution on EU-UN relations of 29 January 2004*1, – having regard to the report ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’ by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 1 December 2004,681

679  27 June 1997, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21. 680  2 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 681  → 4.1.19 (dated 2 December 2004).

4 Momentum and deadlock

747

– h  aving regard to the report ‘Investing in development: a practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals’ by the UN Millennium Project of 17 January 2005, – having regard to the report ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ by the Secretary-General of the UN of 21 March 2005,682 – having regard to Rule 103(2) of its Rules of Procedure, […] Reformed institutions for greater representativeness and efficiency […] 22. Is convinced that the central elements guiding the reform of the Security Council must be the strengthening of its authority, the truly representative nature of all geographic areas, legitimacy, effectiveness and its primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security; is convinced of the need to change the composition of the Security Council in a way that takes into account the changed state of the international system as well as current geopolitical realities, by increasing the number of developing countries in the Council, by ensuring that its members are willing and able to act when action is needed, and by employing more effective and transparent working methods; considers that the two proposals (Models A and B) by the High-level Panel adequately reflect such better representation, although other reform proposals are also possible, and emphasises that an EU seat in the UN Security Council remains the aim for the EU as soon as the political, constitutional and legal conditions for such a seat are met; 23. Takes note of the proposal to extend the composition of the UN Security Council by adding new seats for each regional group, including ‘Europe’; expresses the view that in this context the appropriate solution that would be coherent with the European Constitutional Treaty, which creates a legal personality for the Union and a European Minister for Foreign Affairs, would be to allocate an additional permanent seat to the EU; calls on the Member States seriously to consider this proposal in order to enhance Europe’s influence in the world through a coherent and efficient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); 24. Considers, however, that in any case, irrespective of the procedure for reform chosen, some of the additional seats for ‘Europe’ should be allocated to the EU as such; in this context, calls on the EU Council to establish the appropriate mechanism to designate the EU Member States who will carry out their mandate as EU representatives in close coordination with the other EU Member States, the High Representative for the CFSP or the future Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Commission and the European Parliament until the conditions for an EU seat are met; 25. Fully supports the proposal of the RHP [Report of the High-level Panel] to introduce a mechanism of indicative voting in the Security Council, whereby members could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action, ‘no’ votes not having a veto effect, nor the final vote having any legal force, but increasing the accountability of the veto function; […] 682  → 4.1.21.

748

4 Momentum and deadlock

45. Strongly calls on the EU Member States to support without delay the proposals for reform outlined by the RSG [Report by the Secretary-General]683 following on from the RHP, to make all possible efforts to implement these reforms in the appropriate areas and to provide the necessary means for that purpose in collaboration with EU institutions; […] Original footnote *1 OJ C 96 E, 21.4.2004, p. 79 4.2.2.3.29 5 July 2005, African Union, Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.2 (V) WE, the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union, meeting in the Fifth (5th) Ordinary Session of our Assembly in Sirte, Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 4 to 5 July 2005; – Reaffirming our strong commitment to the Ezulwini Consensus;684 – Convinced of the need for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations System which takes into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the United Nations Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance; – Conscious of the need, within this process of reform, to ensure Africa’s legitimate rights to a fair and equitable geographical representation; – Recognizing that all the regions of the world must in this new era of globalization, endeavour in a spirit of solidarity to build a world of peace, security, justice, good governance and sustainable development; – Persuaded that the reform of the United Nations should be all-inclusive and encompass all components of the United Nations System, including the General Assembly and the Security Council; Are determined to ensure the success of the Ezulwini Consensus that clearly spells out the Common African Position on “sustainable development, collective security, conflict prevention and the conditions for the use of force, as well as the institutional reform of the UN”, notably: – the allocation of two (2) permanent seats to Africa with all the privileges, including the right of veto, and five (5) non-permanent seats on the Security Council; – strengthening the leadership of the United Nations General Assembly to enable it to fully play its role as the most representative and democratic organ of the United Nations System and world parliament; – strengthening the UN General Secretariat in the sense of greater efficiency and increased representation for Africa; – the establishment of a Peace Building Commission for the consolidation of peace as recommended by the Secretary General of the United Nations; – granting ECOSOC the status of a central coordination mechanism for the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations System and its subsidiary

683  2 1 March 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005, → 4.1.21. 684  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

4 Momentum and deadlock

749

organs in the economic, social and cultural domains with a view to enabling it to better discharge its role in attaining the MDGs; – the establishment of a new Human Rights body, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly based in Geneva, to replace the Human Rights Commission with the same composition on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, and with a new non-selective and less politicized mandate, while confirming the universality and indivisibility of human rights; – the democratization of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Reiterate, to this end, our commitment to preserve Africa’s unity and solidarity in the selection, by the African Union, of its representatives in the Security Council to act in its name and on its behalf. Authorize consequently, the submission of a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly reflecting the Common African Position. Done in Sirte, on the 5th of July, 2005 ASSEMBLY OF THE AFRICAN UNION, Fifth Ordinary Session, 4-5 July 2005, Sirte, Assembly/AU/Resolution 1 (V). RESOLUTION ON THE UNITED NATIONS REFORM: SECURITY COUNCIL The General Assembly: REAFFIRMING the aims and objectives of the UN Charter; RECOGNIZING that the international community has welcomed proposals for the reform of the UN as contained in the report of the UN High-level Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change”685 and the UN Secretary-General’s report entitled “In Larger Freedom – Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all”;686 AWARE of the positive reactions of various regions, groups and individual countries to the proposals contained in the two reports, as reflected in the “Draft Outcome Document” released by the President of the General Assembly in June 2005; NOTING Africa’s common position as contained in the “Ezulwini Consensus”; CONVINCED that the three categories of freedom, namely “freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity” are essential for both developed and developing societies and indispensable for peace and stability of the world; CONSCIOUS that these freedoms can only be upheld and protected by the world community through an effective management of the current UN system; TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the need to strengthen UN institutions in order to enhance the efficiency of the organization, especially its principal organs and, in particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council; EMPHASIZING the need to strengthen the General Assembly which should be made to function effectively as the main deliberative and representative organ of the United Nations; COGNISANT of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter; STRESSING the need to consider the views of all Member States on this all-important issue of the reform of the Security Council with a view to bringing to fruition, ideas which have been the subject of several debates over the years; 685  2 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 686  21 March 2005, → 4.1.21.

750

4 Momentum and deadlock

ACKNOWLEDGING the need for the Security Council to reflect present world realities and be more responsive to the aspirations of all Member States of the UN; bearing in mind the undeniable fact that in 1945, when the UN was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and, as a result, Africa remains to this day the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council, which is the primary organ of the UN on matters of international peace and security; MINDFUL of the need to ensure Africa’s effective representation in the Security Council like all the other regions of the world; REALISING the need to engage fully all regions of the world in the work of the UN and to enlist their support for the progress of humanity; Resolves to: 1. enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improve on its working methods; 2. accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as the current permanent members, including the right of veto; 3. grant Africa two permanent and five non-permanent seats in the Security Council and increase its membership from fifteen to twenty-six with the eleven (11) additional seats distributed as follows: Permanent Members Two from Africa Two from Asia One from Latin American and Caribbean States One from Western European & Other States Non-Permanent Members Two from Africa One from Asia One from Eastern European States One from Latin American & Caribbean States 4. amend the UN Charter accordingly. 4.2.2.3.30 14 July 2005, Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.67687 Reform of the Security Council The General Assembly, Reaffirming the aims and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing that the international community has welcomed proposals for the reform of the United Nations as contained in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled “A more secure world: our shared 687  For technical reasons, this UN document was reissued on 18 July 2005 and appears in this form in the UN database.

4 Momentum and deadlock

751

responsibility”688 and the report of the Secretary-General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”,689 Aware of the positive reactions of various regions, groups and individual countries to the proposals contained in the two reports, as reflected in the draft outcome document for the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to be held in September 2005, released by the President of the Assembly in June 2005, Noting the common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus,690 Convinced that the three categories of freedom, namely, freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity, are essential for both developed and developing societies and indispensable for the peace and stability of the world, Conscious that these freedoms can be upheld and protected by the world community only through an effective management of the current United Nations system, Taking into account the need to strengthen United Nations institutions in order to enhance the efficiency of the organization, especially its principal organs and, in particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council, Emphasizing the need to strengthen the General Assembly which should be made to function effectively as the main deliberative and representative organ of the United Nations, Cognizant of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, Stressing the need to consider the views of all Member States on this all-important issue of the reform of the Security Council with a view to bringing to fruition ideas that have been the subject of several debates over the years, Acknowledging the need for the Security Council to reflect present world realities and be more responsive to the aspirations of all States Members of the United Nations, bearing in mind the undeniable fact that in the year 1945, when the United Nations was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and that, as a result, Africa remains to this day the only continent without a permanent seat in the Council, which is the primary organ of the United Nations addressing matters of international peace and security, Mindful of the need to ensure Africa, like all the other regions of the world, effective representation in the Security Council, Realizing the need to engage fully all regions of the world in the work of the United Nations and to enlist their support for the progress of humanity, Resolves to: (a) Enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improve on its working methods; (b) Accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as those of the current permanent members, including the right of veto; (c) Grant Africa two permanent and five non-permanent seats in the Security Council and increase its membership from fifteen to twenty-six with the eleven additional seats to be distributed as follows: 688  2 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 689  21 March 2005, → 4.1.21. 690  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

752

4 Momentum and deadlock

(i) Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for African States; (ii) Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States; (iii) One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States; (iv) One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States; (v) One permanent seat for Western European and other States; (d) Amend the Charter of the United Nations accordingly. 4.2.2.3.31 10 November 2005, Nigeria on behalf of the African Group, Mr. Wali, UN Doc. A/60/PV.47, pp. 14-15

[…] Africa considers the reform of the Security Council to be fundamental not solely to the entire reform process of the United Nations to which we are committed, but also to the realization of the primary objective of the maintenance of international peace and security, in consonance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is in that context that African leaders at the highest level of Government adopted, at their Summit in Sirte, Libya, on 5 July 2005, the Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations,691 which unambiguously states Africa’s position on the matter. I wish to recall that Africa’s contributions to the various processes that led to the September 2005 world summit692 were influenced by that position. Africa’s call for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council aimed at making it more representative and transparent is based on our assessment that such a reform would enhance the legitimacy of its decisions and the representativity of its membership. For us, such reform should not be limited to expanding the Council in the permanent and non-permanent categories; it should also include improving the Council’s working methods to make it more effective and efficient, strengthening the transparency of its procedures, improving its functioning and its decision-making process and ensuring greater involvement in its work. We therefore consider the present session of the General Assembly a historic opportunity to take decisions that will ensure that reform of the Security Council leads to its democratization, transparency and accountability. Reform should also enable us to comprehensively redress the injustice against developing countries, especially those in Africa. Africa can therefore neither associate itself with nor support any initiative, however conceived, that seeks a partial approach to Security Council reform. Such an approach, in our assessment, would run counter to the decisions of our leaders and to the wishes of the broad majority of the United Nations members. I wish to reiterate once again Africa’s call for Security Council reform through equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Council. Lest there be any doubt, Africa’s representation means no fewer than two permanent seats, with all the prerogatives and privileges attached thereto, as well as five non-permanent seats. Indeed, Africa has a clear position and a clear understanding regarding what permanent seats would mean and entail for the continent. I therefore have the honour to inform the Assembly that that position was reaffirmed in the latest decision reached by African leaders at their Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on 31 October 2005. […] 691  → 4.2.2.3.29. 692  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

4 Momentum and deadlock

753

4.2.2.3.32 10 November 2005, Algeria, Mr. Benmehidi, UN Doc. A/60/PV.47, pp. 20-22

[…] In that light, I turn now to the question of equitable representation on the Security Council. My delegation associates itself fully with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Nigeria on behalf of the African Group.693 […] My delegation would like here to reaffirm its commitment to the specific proposals on substantive issues made by countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, reflecting a determination to strengthen the representativity and effectiveness of the Security Council. Clearly, such Security Council reform is by nature comprehensive, as it applies both to the Council’s working methods and to its expansion. Here, we take note of the laudable efforts of a number of delegations to submit a draft resolution on improving the working methods of the Security Council. Africa’s approach to Security Council reform, as set out in last session’s draft resolution A/59/L.67,694 reflects African aspirations as set forth in the Ezulwini Consensus695 and as reaffirmed in the Sirte Declaration696 and at the fifth Extraordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, held in Addis Ababa on 31 October 2005: we aspire to a Security Council that is better adapted to contemporary realities. Africa requests two permanent seats, with the same privileges and prerogatives enjoyed by current permanent members, including the veto, and five non-permanent seats. In due course, the African Union will, in a spirit of solidarity and unity, take a decision on the modalities for the apportionment of the seats to which it is entitled, pursuant to the Sirte Declaration. At the same time, we reaffirm our willingness and our desire to work with all delegations to make progress on Security Council reform. […] 4.2.2.3.33 11 November 2005, Ghana, Mr. Effah-Apenteng, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 9-10

[…] On the reform of the Security Council, my delegation reaffirms its commitment to the African position in all its aspects, as eloquently articulated at the 47th plenary meeting by my Nigerian colleague on behalf of the African Group.697 Let me stress the need to rectify the existing historical injustice against Africa reflected in the Council’s present structure and composition. We would like to caution against the real danger of adopting half-baked solutions, where the legitimate demands of some are shortchanged in a bid to arrive at any form of agreement. Therefore, we do not favour procedural tactics essentially aimed at blocking any serious attempt at comprehensive reform of the Security Council. As recently reaffirmed at the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa on 31 October 2005, 693  10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31. 694  14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30. 695  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 696  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 697  10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31.

754

4 Momentum and deadlock

Africa is demanding not less than two permanent seats, with all the existing prerogatives and privileges of such membership, as well as two additional non-permanent seats. Any Security Council reform package that seeks to exclude any of the elements of the principles of democracy, sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical representation would not be tenable. […] 4.2.2.3.34 21 September 2006, Sierra Leone, Mr. Berewa, UN Doc. A/61/PV.15, pp. 23-24

[…] As a Member State deeply committed to the African position on United Nations reform, my delegation would like to urge the reform of the Security Council to move faster so that our continent can take its rightful place in the United Nations organ that is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Obviously, the Security Council can never be the just, democratic and representative body that it should be if Africa, with 53 Member States in the United Nations, does not have permanent representation proportional to its size. […] 4.2.2.3.35 11 December 2006, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 6-8 […] In this sense, the candidate selection processes at the regional level would have greater validity and political support, as equal opportunity of access to Security Council seats would be guaranteed. Furthermore, a greater number of non-permanent members would make the Council truly representative of the diverse realities and continuous changes that are taking place across the world. […] 4.2.2.3.36 26 September 2007, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mugabe, UN Doc. A/62/PV.7, pp. 20-23

[…] Once again, we reiterate our position that the Security Council as presently constituted is not democratic. In its present configuration, the Council has shown that it is not in a position to protect the weaker States, who find themselves at loggerheads with a marauding super-Power. Most importantly, justice demands that any Security Council reform should redress the fact that Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat and veto power in the Security Council. Africa’s demands are known and enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus.698 […] 4.2.2.3.37 12 November 2007, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/62/PV.47, pp. 18-21 […] In this context, I would like to stress once again that Egypt will not abandon the lofty interests of Africa in order to achieve narrow national goals. Our vision for permanent membership is clear. It is based on the conviction that a permanent member without a veto right is merely a non-permanent member in the Security Council for an extended term – or forever. We believe that permanent membership without a veto will not change the balance or structure of power in the Security Council and will not 698  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

4 Momentum and deadlock

755

accomplish the objective of protecting and defending African interests in the Council. Our perspective is based on the fact that Africa legitimately deserves to have no less than two permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats. Furthermore, we do not believe that the veto issue should be considered within reform of the working methods, which should concentrate only on promoting the transparency and accountability of the Security Council when it addresses the interests of Member States. […] 4.2.2.3.38 12 November 2007, Pakistan, Mr. Akram, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 24-27 […] Since, under any proposed scheme for Council expansion, new seats will be allocated to the regions, the countries of these regions should be able to determine the nature of representation on those seats. It is not for one or more major powers to determine such representation. Furthermore, equitable geographical distribution envisaged in Article 23 of the Charter would make little sense if a seat allocated to a region were to be occupied permanently by one country. That is why we respect and understand Africa’s position. Africa’s demand for “permanent seats” is for the entire region and is therefore different from other proposals that seek permanent membership for individual States. As we understand it, against the two empowered seats which are sought by Africa, representation on the Council could be from two or, through rotation, by a larger number of African states, under arrangements to be made by Africa itself. Africa would thus retain the power to ensure accountability on the part of those states which would represent it and act on its behalf on the Council. The African model of regional representation, if it is applied to all regions, appears to be an approach that may help to evolve agreement on Security Council reform. Using the African model, other regions could also be enabled to decide their own arrangements for representation of their respective regions on the Council. […] 4.2.2.3.39 14 November 2007, Italy, Mr. Spatafora, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 8-12 […] If it is true that we need new permanent members in order to balance or restructure the power within the Security Council, what puzzles me is that the United States – for example, Ambassador Khalilzad,699 and, as we have heard, President Bush,700 speaking in this General Assembly – and other permanent members seem to favour expansion of the number of permanent members. However, the rationale behind the increase is presumably to curtail their power. Either the P5 members that support expansion have not understood the rationale, as has been explained by Ambassador Sen,701 or they are masochists. Or, perhaps, something is wrong in what Ambassador Sen and other representatives have been saying. In fact, the situation is exactly the contrary. It may seem a paradox – and we do not have time now to elaborate further on this point – but, if one wants to strengthen the P5 influence within the Security Council, what you have to do is just enlarge it with new permanent members without veto power. To understand my line of thought, let us recall how the Roman Empire expanded and strengthened itself. In facing the 699  1 2 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.52. 700  25 September 2007, UN Doc. A/62/PV.4, pp. 8-11. 701  13 November 2007, → 4.2.2.4.2.

756

4 Momentum and deadlock

challenges from the provinces, the Empire strengthened itself by co-opting them, by integrating them. And you, Mr. President, you come from the region and you understand very well and know the history of the region very well; you understand how the Roman Empire strengthened itself. We can also read Marguerite Yourcenar’s Memoirs of Hadrian to see it. From the generals, who were co-opted at the top, to the prisoners, who were given Roman citizenship, all the while staying prisoners, all were co-opted. In fact, today, for the P5 and the Security Council to have new members without the veto is a very clever that strengthens influence. There is a great advantage in having to deal always with the same members. There can be a lot of trade-offs with a member that cannot block you because it has no veto power, but will, at the same time, inevitably tend to behave as a fellow member of the same privileged “boardroom”. Let us not mix permanent membership, which implies veto power and can, indeed, make a difference in the balance of power in the Security Council, with the permanent presence of a member that has a seat without veto power. Ambassador Sen’s scenario is as follows: if you want to contain or curtail the powers of the P5 in order to have a “different” Security Council, then you should not settle for anything less than permanent members with veto power. Here, we can also understand the rationale behind the African position as it was presented so passionately this morning by the Permanent Representative of Uganda, Mr. Butagira.702 What we will have, if we have an expansion without veto power, is simply a strengthening of the P5 club. Let us be blunt. We will have more members that will benefit from the cascade effect, a point that has been so forcefully highlighted by the Permanent Representative yesterday of Costa Rica, Ambassador Urbina,703 and before him, Ambassador Ugarte, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica.704 As an alternative to new permanent members with veto power, if you really want to shift the balance of power within the Security Council, may be something else is needed, something different from what Ambassador Sen and other distinguished representatives have advocated. I do not like very much the idea of containment, because it goes a bit against my thinking. I prefer not to go against somebody but to build together with somebody. I prefer to say that we really want to make the Security Council more representative of today’s geopolitical realities. Let me now recall, as I have done in the past, in 1945, in Dumberton Oaks in Washington D.C., the idea of “regional seats” was suggested. Among those advocating regional seats – in 1945, more than 60 years ago – were Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Philippines and Uruguay. The Egyptian delegate, Badawi Pasha, was among the most vocal in favour of regional seats. At that time, the big Five flatly rejected the notion of regional seats, because they were potentially very dangerous as a counterbalance to their power. Today, in the last twenty years, what is the reality that we have in front of us? It is regional organizations, regional ownership and regional empowerment. This is what we have to address and we have to see how to address this within the context of the reform that we have been discussing for twenty, thirty, forty, fifty years. […]

702  1 4 November 2007, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 3-5. 703  13 November 2007, UN Doc. A/62/PV.50, pp. 20-21. 704  2 October 2007, UN Doc. A/62/PV.14, pp. 26-28.

4 Momentum and deadlock

757

4.2.2.3.40 18 November 2008, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, p. 16-19 […] In this regard, I would like to associate my remarks with the remarks made by the Permanent Representative of Mauritius, Chair of the African Group for the month of November,705 stressing the African common position, as outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus706 and the Sirte Declaration,707 calling for no less than two permanent seats, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right to veto, and for two additional non-permanent seats. […] 4.2.2.3.41 18 November 2008, Tunisia, Mr. Mansour, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 9-10 […] Tunisia continues to support energetically the position of the African Union, as reflected in the African common position708 on the question of Security Council reform. […] 4.2.2.3.42 19 November 2008, Spain, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo, UN Doc. A/63/PV.55, pp. 19-21

[…] Concerning the issue of regional representation, we are convinced of the need to give regional groups a greater role in designating and endorsing their Council candidatures, ensuring appropriate subregional representation in each of them. We also favour the establishment of mechanisms that would guarantee the representation of transregional groups, such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including through arrangements among the regional organizations concerned. […] 4.2.2.3.43 19 November 2008, South Africa, Mr. Sangqu, UN Doc. A/63/PV.55, pp. 27-28

[…] As for my delegation, we are on record as supporting the African position as espoused in the Ezulwini consensus.709 […] 4.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 4.2.2.4.1  9 February 1999, Singapore, Mr. Mahbubani, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] Let me quickly mention in passing another seemingly ingenious solution that has been proposed to us: the concept of semi-permanent members of the UN Security Council. This can take two forms: either some new members become permanent members without the veto (which effectively makes them semi-permanent since they can then be removed against their will under the terms of the UN Charter) or some new members are rotated from a select few in each regional group. Theoretically, we 705  18 November 2008, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, pp. 11-12. 706  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 707  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 708  14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30. 709  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

758

4 Momentum and deadlock

have no problem with rotation. In today’s UN Security Council, all non-permanent members are rotated among all of us. But, as a small state, we have serious problems with selective rotation. Effectively, we will be demoted from second-class members of the UN to third class members. Please do not ask us to voluntarily demote ourselves to third class status, in any form or manner. […] 4.2.2.4.2 13 November 2007, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/62/PV.50, pp. 8-13 […] One of the leading lights of Uniting for Consensus also mentioned the problems, the double standards, the non-analytical reports, the closed-door sessions, the lack of coordination with the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, and so on.710 To our mind, that criticism is unfair. Members of the Assembly may ask why I am indulging in paradox. It is unfair because he is saying, on the one hand, “This is what is wrong with the Security Council”, and, on the other hand, that the solution is more non-permanent members, or more non-permanent members who could be re-elected, precisely those members that have not been able to check all of this. In other words, that representative is simply expressing, to use his own words, “great dissatisfaction”. But he is quite satisfied to live with that dissatisfaction. He is quite satisfied with the euphonious sound of what the representative of another Member State said, about continuously criticizing the Security Council, year after year, making the same criticism, quite satisfied with the annual ritual of this debate, in which one has one’s say and goes home. On the other hand, there are those who argue in favour of a new principle of trying out something new, of electing members within the group of permanent members who would then be held accountable for restoring and maintaining the Charter balance, for preventing encroachment, and for improving working methods, and who would be held accountable through repeated review mechanisms. The criticism made by those who criticize the Security Council from that position is surely at least to that extent fair, because they are proposing a way forward, a way out. The same leading light of Uniting for Consensus said that there should be representation, but no representation among the permanent members; that there should be checks and balances, but nothing to check or balance the permanent members; that there should be democracy. Here I was reminded of Lycurgus, the great lawgiver of the Spartans, who, when somebody asked him “Why do you not set up a democracy?”, responded “Why do you not first set up a democracy in your own home?” Because democracy, like charity, really begins at home. But, even if we take this principle of democracy, another member of Uniting for Consensus said that democracy did not mean leaving the winner in all perpetuity.711 However, he forgot address himself to this question: does democracy mean leaving the untrammelled power of a few also for all perpetuity, or should something be done about it? Similarly, another member of Uniting for Consensus said that there must be continual elections and that, since non-permanent members are elected, that was the 710  1 2 November 2007, Pakistan, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, p. 24. 711  12 November 2007, Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 8-9.

4 Momentum and deadlock

759

only way of ensuring accountability.712 The point is, I would be the first to agree, that elections are a necessary condition. But surely they are not an assumed condition of accountability. Are the non-permanent members accountable? And if so, to whom? Do even the regional groups, which can put forward clean slates, always find the non-permanent members accountable? Does the Non-Aligned Movement find all its members accountable? Therefore, accountability is something much more than simply elections. Elections are necessary, of course. That is why I am saying that those who are elected to be among the permanent members have to be subjected to repeated reviews through a self-sustaining review mechanism. They also have to be subjected, possibly through some amendments to Chapter II, to the right of recall, the oldest democratic principle. But we cannot simply say “Let us go on with some kind of short-term interim model – short-term in terms of the number of years that a member serves – or purely the expansion of non-permanent membership”, and expect to change the state of affairs in any manner whatsoever. That is the entire crux of the issue, which does not mean that we are not prepared to look at all models. One member of Uniting for Consensus said that we should not mention anything that would prejudge the final outcome, and then went on to contradict himself by saying that we should have expansion only in the non-permanent category.713 We are not doing that; we are saying “Let us see how we can take elements of every model that has so far been presented and see how, on this basis, we can negotiate”. I shall come to this subsequently to explain in further detail what this would really imply. The thing is this: we have a situation in which the Security Council truly has become not very satisfactory in what it does. It has reached a point at which certain reform of the Council becomes very necessary in itself. There used to be in the Council a time when the content went beyond the phrase, but today the phrase goes beyond the content. There was a time when its reach was beyond its grasp, but today its grasp is more than its reach. There was a time when the substance was more than style; today, the style is more than substance. […] 4.2.2.4.3 14 November 2007, Mongolia, Ms. Enkhtsetseg, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 6-7714

[…] My delegation supports the creation of additional non-permanent seats, which would reflect the changes in the Organization’s membership in recent decades and would give small States greater opportunities to serve on the Council. In the same vein, my delegation does not support proposals to amend Article 23 of the Charter. The provision that retiring members of the Security Council shall not be eligible for immediate re-election has been instrumental in ensuring the rotation of Council members and the election of more countries to the Council than otherwise would have been the case. Needless to say, smaller States have been the main beneficiary of this rule. 712  12 November 2007, Canada, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 27-29. 713  12 November 2007, Colombia, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 4-6. 714  → 4.2.1.1.55 for Mongolia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

760

4 Momentum and deadlock

I would like to add that we find objectionable any proposals that entertain ideas of establishing a third tier of membership in the Security Council. We believe that it would result in the devaluation and sidelining of the existing category of nonpermanent members, and is not, as such, in the best interest of small States. […] 4.2.2.4.4 10 April 2008, India, Mr. Sen, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group

[…] Without expansion of permanent membership the real problems cannot even begin to be addressed: P-5 decisions being binding on 6.5 billion people who have no voice or representation; non implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter; access of small states and SIDS to the subsidiary bodies; a gradual change in political culture including on the use of veto. An interim model will simply add to numbers without addressing the issues. It would be reform for the sake of reform, like art for art’s sake. The interim model claims to be for greater representation but there would be no representation among permanent members; it argues for checks and balances but there would be nothing to check or balance these; by merely adding to numbers it would make the Security Council unwieldy without making it more effective; it would be the worst of both worlds. Above all the interim model does not empower Africa and the developing countries generally. Of course we understand that existing permanent members are comfortably seated at the horse shoe table and it is always little uncomfortable to move closer together to make room for new arrivals. Therefore the interim solution is not a solution but a problem, not a structure but gerrymandering; talking of overarching groups, it is not an arch for throwing bricks in the air and hoping that they will hold like a rainbow. It is an attempt to deny developing countries permanent membership. The structure of the Security Council is given. A comprehensive reform means that one has to expand each category and reform the working methods. Negotiations should be on detail only not on the structure which is already given. In this sense, the position of the African Union is logical. One may then ask where does flexibility and compromise come in? Firstly, as stated, on details – expand by how many members, whether with veto etc.; secondly, on integrating the minority into the majority view to the extent possible – by expanding permanent members through an initial election and subsequently making continued permanent membership subject to a review or even challenges, properly formulated. Let me briefly comment on the paper submitted by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus.715 There is only a single reference to expansion in permanent and nonpermanent categories and these are subject to being interpreted as alternatives because of unclear wording. At present two thirds of the UN membership are developing countries. Within the increase to 22 that is proposed, the ratio would change from 8 out of 15 to 12 out of 22: in short the proportion will remain almost constant. Just as the model does not give greater representation to developing countries, there is no reference to small states or to the concerns of Small Island Developing States such as greater access. Delinking working methods from expansion in the permanent category would reduce the new working methods proposed to a dead letter. Only two 715  20 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21.

4 Momentum and deadlock

761

additional seats are proposed for Africa which would mean that Africa would continue to be discriminated in the revised Council. The formulation on challenges is also neither equitable nor balanced. We can go along with the paper submitted by Cyprus to start negotiations provided that the Task Force carries out these improvements. […] The draft text sent by the PR of Cyprus appears to be focussing mainly on reaching an intermediate / interim option and this perspective resonates throughout the text. The possibility of expansion in permanent membership appears to be an afterthought and an aside. The assertion in the text about ‘apparent willingness to negotiate on the basis of achieving intermediate reform’ remains untested. Proposed reform of the working methods is also limited. Attempts by a minority group to limit intergovernmental negotiations to only the intermediate option are unacceptable. This goes against the view of the overwhelming majority that genuine expansion and reform of the UNSC requires expansion in both permanent and non-permanent membership categories. […] 4.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 4.2.3.1 16 December 1999, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 32-33716 […] Yet the mere fact that a Member State is a major financial contributor to the Organization or happens to be influential in other ways does not mean that the tangible recognition of that contribution or of that influence ought to be a permanent seat on the Security Council, the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not, therefore, exclude the possibility that in other areas of the Organization it may be appropriate for disproportionately large contributions to warrant some right of more significant participation in the appropriate financial bodies. For example, the largest financial contributors to the United Nations may need to play a larger role in overseeing the way the Organization spends its money. What I do exclude, however, is that seats on the one organ whose decisions are binding on all other Member States, the one organ which is responsible for the most vital and therefore most volatile of our interactions, should be allocated on the basis of a Member’s financial contribution to the Organization. In my delegation’s view, membership of the Security Council can be determined only through election by one’s peers, chosen in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 23 of the Charter. […] 4.2.3.2 20 December 1999, Turkey, Mr. Vural, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 21-22 […] A patchwork solution, a partial remedy, cannot be a cure. Adding a few members, some of them on the strength of their financial contributions and some on the basis of regional recognition, cannot render the Council more democratic and representative. It cannot enhance the sense of responsibility that wider participation would provide. […] 716  → 4.4.3.8 for Canada’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

762

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.2.3.3 16 November 2000, Yemen, Mr. Al-Adoufi, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 41 […] Reform of the Council; fair and equitable representation of the Organization’s membership; equality among States; transparency in the Council’s working methods; expansion of the Council’s membership to reflect the increase of the number of States Members of the United Nations – especially among the developing countries – in both categories of membership; the need to curtail the right of veto; definition of the relationship between the Council and other organs; working methods and transparency are all issues on which we must reach agreement. It is clear that such agreement currently does not exist. Among those proposals made in 1997 was one on which agreement might have been reached, but it was not the only proposal likely to make its way through long and difficult negotiations. A majority decision could not be reached on that proposal. We understand that Japan and Germany aspire to permanent membership of the Council, but we would refer to the papers submitted by the Arab and the non-aligned countries on this issue, which call for equal representation. The United Nations must set an example of such equality and partnership. There is a promising trend under way to advocate equality in international relations, but it will require political will if the international community is to find a solution to the ever-changing situation at the dawn of the new century. […] 4.2.3.4 17 November 2000, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 34-35 […] Russia’s position on this issue is a consistent and principled one. We proceed from the premise that the enhanced effectiveness and authority of the Security Council in world affairs should be the final goal of its reform. Otherwise, the Security Council would simply be unable to react promptly to acute threats to regional and global stability. We reaffirm the importance of maintaining a compact Security Council. We consider it of prime importance that the renewed Council be a representative and balanced organ through the inclusion of new members, from industrially developed countries and influential developing States alike, pursuing independent foreign policies. Without that, it would be impossible in the Council to strike the necessary balance of power reflecting the tasks of building a multipolar world. In this context, the Russian Federation considers India, for instance, to be a strong and worthy candidate for permanent membership in the Security Council should it be decided to enlarge the Council in both categories. It is important patiently to bridge the gap between the United Nations Member States and to expand the area of agreement, including on the key issue of the potential composition of the Security Council. The issue of categories in which that organ should be enlarged – whether this can be accomplished by adding new members, permanent and non-permanent alike, or through an increase in the number of non-permanent members only – remains one of the major stumbling blocks in the search for an optimum formula for the renewal of the Council. On this issue, our position is flexible and we are ready to support any commonly accepted decision to that

4 Momentum and deadlock

763

end. We believe that such an approach is particularly conducive to establishing an atmosphere in which agreement can be achieved and has advantages over enforcing the positions of some to the detriment of the interests of others. […] We cannot ignore the criticism occasionally addressed to the permanent members, blaming the five for the sluggishness of the reform process. In our opinion, the answer to these unsubstantiated attacks was given in a politically important statement, issued on 7 September on behalf of the heads of State and Government of the five permanent members,717 whereby the commitment to fostering a more transparent and broadly representative Security Council in order to enhance its effectiveness was reaffirmed. […] 4.2.3.5 31 October 2001, Russian Federation, Mr. Ordzhonikidze, UN Doc. A/56/ PV.34, pp. 16-17 […] Russia’s position on the substance of the issue of Security Council reform is well known. As always, we remain open to constructive proposals concerning the categories of membership within which the Council should be enlarged. The Council’s existing decision-making procedure ensures an appropriate balance of the interests of its members and contributes to reaching consensus on issues under consideration; this is essential if the Council’s work is to be effective. We continue to hold the firm and principled position that there should be no derogation from the prerogatives and powers of the current permanent members of the Council, including their right of veto. Unjustified criticism of the institution of the veto stirs up unnecessary emotions and in no way facilitates the achievement of desired agreement on the parameters of reform. It is important to keep the Security Council as compact as possible to ensure needed efficiency and viability. We believe that priority should be given to determining the optimal makeup of the Council rather than to considering the quantitative aspects of its enlargement. We have repeatedly stressed that enlargement must embrace both developed and developing States. That is important if we are to ensure that the Council’s membership is balanced. Here, we consider India, for example, a strong and worthy candidate for permanent membership of the Security Council should it be decided to enlarge the Council in both categories. There are strong candidates in other regions as well. […] 4.2.3.6 14 October 2002, China, Mr. Zhang Yishan, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 21-22718 […] Allow me now to make some observations on the reform of the Security Council. In the more than 50 years since its inception, the number of Members of the Organization have grown from 51 to 191, the majority being developing countries. As humankind 717  7 September 2000, UN Doc. S/PV.4194. 718  China confirmed this position on 14 October 2003 in UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, p. 14; on 6 April 2005 in UN Doc. A/59/PV.85, p. 23; on 20 July 2006 in UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, p. 8; and on 12 November 2007 in UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 10-11.

764

4 Momentum and deadlock

steps into the twenty-first century, the challenges it faces have become ever more complex. While undertaking the sacred mission of maintaining international peace and security, adapting to new situations to better meet new challenges, the Council should keep pace with the progress of time and carry out appropriate and necessary reforms. The primary task of reform should be to redress the lack of balance in the Council’s present composition, so that representation of the developing countries could be increased on a priority basis, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution. This is the aspiration of many Member States, as well as the common understanding of the majority of Member States. […] The reform of the Council affects the direct interests of all States. The complexity of contradicting interests requires a gradual process of reaching a broad consensus, based on serious study and in-depth deliberations. There cannot be any ‘quick fix’. In dealing with this important issue, it is necessary for us to have not only a sense of urgency but also, and even more so, patience and wisdom. At present, the Open-ended Working Group remains the appropriate forum for this discussion. 4.2.3.7 16 October 2002, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/57/PV.31, pp. 22-23 […] Nevertheless, there are many hot spots that remain as sources of instability in the world. The situation in the Middle East is still far from being resolved; the Iraq and Cyprus problems also remain unresolved; there are persistent problems on the African continent. Hence, the good deal of hard work that remains requires great efforts, first and foremost through the political will of States to comply strictly with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, one of which establishes the key role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and stability. Even this brief and far from exhaustive enumeration of the tasks facing the Security Council clearly demonstrates how right the Secretary-General was to say that Security Council reform, as an integral part of the extensive process of renewal and improvement of the Organization, should ensure not just the preservation, but the strengthening of the Council’s capacity to effectively exercise its powers under the United Nations Charter. Resolving this issue will be decisive for the future role of the United Nations in world affairs. It is for precisely that reason that the Russian Federation has so consistently sought the broadest possible agreement, ideally a consensus, on a possible formula for expansion of the Security Council. The overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations share that approach. In keeping with that position, we are ready to continue our painstaking efforts to reconcile the serious differences that still divide States, particularly on the key issue of the future composition of the Security Council. Russia still believes that effective work by the Security Council should ensure an adequate balance of interests and strengthen the trend towards reaching consensus within the Council. In order to ensure the necessary efficiency and viability of the Security Council, it is extremely important to preserve the compactness of its composition, since an excessively large membership could negatively affect the quality and effectiveness of its efforts.

4 Momentum and deadlock

765

We remain open to constructive proposals regarding the categories within which Council membership might be increased, on the understanding that any expansion should embrace both industrially developed and developing countries, which should be given equal rights and obligations. That is important if the work of the Council is to be objective and balanced. We are convinced that ideas leading to infringement of the prerogatives and powers of the current permanent members of the Security Council, including the right of veto, are counterproductive. Unjustified criticism of the institution of the veto only fuels unnecessary emotions, and does not contribute to the achievement of the agreement we seek on the parameters for reform. The issue of giving the veto power to new permanent members of the Security Council may be discussed only when there is agreement on the specific composition of the membership of an enlarged Security Council. […] 4.2.3.8 17 October 2003, Yemen, Mr. Mubarez, UN Doc. A/58/PV.36, pp. 4-5 […] The decisions of the Security Council and the right of veto have called into question the Council’s credibility in general and its decision-making process in particular. In our view, that process is anachronistic. Hence the concern of the Working Group, which has offered a number of recommendations – including the interesting and valuable proposals put forward by the delegation of Malaysia719 – aimed at improving the Council’s working methods. Reform needs to be comprehensive, involving more than the expansion of the membership. The voting process needs also to be addressed, within a specific and practical context. We have been discussing this for a decade now, and we have failed to reach agreement. We have been receptive to any opinions and proposals that might result in adequate Security Council reform that is acceptable to its members, but such reform must be comprehensive and integrated so that it includes equitable geographical representation, transparency, the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations and democracy in the Council’s working methods. We and the rest of the Arab Group have always striven to conform to the provisions of the Charter. These oblige us, in expanding the Council, to ensure equitable geographical representation and to include States that have shown particular interest in and have contributed to international peace and security, such as Japan and Germany. […] 4.2.3.9  28 September 2004, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Final Communiqué of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, UN Doc. A/59/425-S/2004/808, p. 17 […] 56. The Meeting called for evolving common perceptions and agreed approaches to address both the new and existing threats to international peace and security in the context of multilateralism. In this regard, while underscoring that the process of UN reform should not take place at the expense of UN principles, the Meeting emphasized 719  See, e.g., the statement of 3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.29.

766

4 Momentum and deadlock

the need for cooperative multilateralism to pursue and promote UN Charter principles. The Meeting reiterated the OIC’s stance in support of the principle of the United Nations reform, including the expansion of the Security Council’s membership, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and taking into consideration the principles of sovereign equality of all States and the need to ensure equitable geographic distribution. It also called for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects so as to make it more democratic, representative, transparent and accountable. The Meeting declared that any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries. […] 4.2.3.10 7 June 2005, China, Position Paper720 Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms […] IV. Strengthening the UN […] 3. The Security Council − The reform of the Security Council is multifaceted covering such important issues as enlarging the Council’s membership, increasing efficiency and improving working methods. The reform of the Security Council should apply the following principles. − The reform should be conducive to enhancing the authority and efficiency of the Council and strengthening its capacity to deal with global threats and challenges. − Increasing the representation of developing countries should be given priority. Developing countries, who account for more than two thirds of the UN membership, are seriously underrepresented on the Security Council. This situation must be reversed. − More countries, the small and medium-sized ones in particular, should be given more opportunities to enter the Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process. − The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different cultures and civilizations taken into consideration. − All the regional groups should, first of all, reach agreement on reform proposals concerning their respective regions. The principle of regional rotation advocated by some countries also merits attention and consideration. − Adhering to the principle of achieving consensus through consultation is in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter. Its purpose is to accommodate the interests of all parties, especially the small and medium-sized countries. Only decisions thus made can win the broadest trust and support. China opposes the approach to set a time limit for the Council reform or force a vote on a consensus lacking proposal. […]

720  China confirmed this position on 11 July 2005 in UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 13-14, and on 10 November 2005 in UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 2-3.

4 Momentum and deadlock

767

4.2.3.11 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8721 […] The Russian Federation is prepared to support any reasonable option for Security Council expansion if it is based on the broadest possible agreement within the United Nations. We believe that such an agreement would entail support for a decision more substantial than simply the legally required two-thirds vote. Voting in the General Assembly should not cause a split among Member States and thereby weaken, rather than strengthen, the United Nations and its Security Council. That, we are convinced, would be in no one’s interests. In that connection, those who advocate the swift adoption of concrete decisions on such an important issue as Security Council reform have a serious responsibility. In order to avoid harmful consequences for the future of the Organization, they should thoroughly calculate all the positive and negative aspects of their move and provide a sober estimate of the real level of support they enjoy. […] 4.2.3.12 12 July 2005, Indonesia, Ms. Asmady, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 20-21 […] In the draft resolution proposed by the group of four,722 the allocation of additional seats to each region is based merely on geographical distribution, with each region being allocated a certain number of seats. Consequently, the formulation proposed would mean six new permanent and four new non-permanent members. That geographical approach, in our view, runs the risk of over-representation of some regions and underrepresentation of others. Although the draft resolution before us does not single out any country in particular, it is obvious that the developing countries have diminished opportunities to be represented proportionally. Thus there is a danger of creating an inequitable Security Council. Moreover, there is no indication that the criteria for an expanded membership are either specific or appropriate. In this regard, since the initiation of deliberations on Security Council reform more than a decade ago, Indonesia has always maintained that it is important to establish clear and objective criteria when determining candidacies for membership. In line with the role and authority of the Council, Indonesia would like to emphasize that criteria to determine expanded membership should include, among others, a country’s contribution to peace-making and peacekeeping, as well as a role in regional peace and stability. To that, we must add commitment to cooperation for peace and security in the world, which would encompass support for efforts for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and combating terrorism. Furthermore, a country’s attributes in demographic terms and its strong commitment to democracy and human rights merit consideration. We must also acknowledge that the concept of peace and security has evolved and must recognize important elements of cultures and civilizations. In fact, this concept 721  → 4.3.19 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 4.4.1.9 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 722  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

768

4 Momentum and deadlock

is being approached and evaluated from the perspective of a potential clash of civilizations. Those immutable factors can no longer be ignored. It is therefore clear that without an agreement that would take into account such undeniable realities, any formulation to determine new members of the Security Council that is based merely on geographical distribution would lead only to an inequitable Security Council. Thus, it would have the potential to create an unacceptable imbalance in representation, especially from the perspective of cultures and civilizations. In this context, we would like to stress that, as is already widely known, Asia consists of 56 countries; more than 50 per cent of the world’s population inhabit the region. Equally important, it is home to a variety of cultures and civilizations, including Islamic civilizations. Unfortunately, the current trend is towards underrepresentation for Asia. For that reason, any decision on the expansion of Security Council membership will be inappropriate if the realities prevailing in Asia are not fully taken into account. […] 4.2.3.13 22 September 2005, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Choe Su Hon, UN Doc. A/60/PV.20, pp. 26-29 […] The Security Council should be reformed on the basis of the principle of ensuring the full representation of the non-aligned and developing countries, which make up the overwhelming majority of Member States. We should never tolerate the permanent membership of Japan, which refuses to liquidate its past crimes against other countries, distorting its history of aggression and driving the regional situation towards confrontation. […] 4.2.3.14 10 November 2005, New Zealand, Ms. Banks, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 25-26723 […] We believe that any expansion of the Council must include Japan. […] 4.2.3.15 14 March 2008, Organization of the Islamic Conference, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 32-35 Resolution No. 11/11-P(IS) on reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council The Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Islamic Ummah in the 21st Century), held in Dakar, Republic of Senegal, from 6 to 7 Rabiul Awal I429h (13-14 March 2008), Recalling all Resolutions adopted by the Islamic Summit and Foreign Ministers Conference on the subject; Also recalling previous OIC resolutions, in particular Resolution 17/34-P724 adopted at the Thirty-fourth Session of the ICFM in Islamabad from 15-17 May 2007;

723  → 4.4.2.11 for New Zealand’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 724  In OIC/ICFM-34/2007/POL/RES/Final, pp. 35-38.

769

4 Momentum and deadlock

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs No. 115 to 121 of final communiqué of the Annual Coordination Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member States at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 2 October 2007;725 Recalling also paragraphs 64 to 75 of the Final Document of XII NAM Summit in Durban adopted on 3 September 1998,726 the paragraphs related to the Security Council reform in the Declaration adopted at the thirty-second Session of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held in Harare in June 1997727 as well as in the Working Paper of the Arab Group adopted by the Arab Foreign Ministers in New York on 29 September 1997; Mindful of the objectives and principles enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, especially the objectives of promoting Islamic solidarity among Member States and strengthening their capacity to safeguard their security, sovereignty and independence; Reaffirming that the United Nations is an indispensable and irreplaceable global mechanism for the promotion of a shared vision of a more secure and prosperous world, and has the central role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation; Stressing the significant importance of multilateralism in addressing the common threats and challenges facing the common destiny of humankind in our increasingly interconnected and globalizing world; Rejecting the dominant interventionist paradigm and tendencies which constitutes a real threat to the world community and maintenance of international peace and security; Stressing that any reform of the United Nations, including Security Council reform, should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter; Rejecting any preventive and pre-emptive action in international relations as a clear violation of international law; Affirming also the importance of regular consultations with OIC Member States to advance their interests in this process; Emphasizing the importance of transparency and all-inclusiveness of deliberations on United Nations reform; Stressing that the OIC’s demand for adequate representation in the Security Council is in keeping with the significant demographic and political weight of the OIC Member States, which bears particular importance, not only from the perspective of increased efficiency, but also to ensure the representation of the main forms of civilization in the Security Council; Reaffirming its principled position that any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council; 1. Affirms the importance of the ongoing process of United Nations reform and stresses that the OIC Member States have a direct and vital interest in determining .

725  In OIC/ACM-NY/2007/FC/Final, pp. 15-16. 726   Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, 29 August to 3 September 1998, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 727  27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21.

770

4 Momentum and deadlock

the outcome of United Nations reform, therefore calls on all OIC Member States to actively and effectively take part in the United Nations Security Council reform process, in accordance with the relevant declarations, statements and resolutions issued by the OIC. […] 3. Reaffirms the irreplaceable role of the United Nations and the necessity of ensuring the equal participation of all Member States in its activities, in a transparent and multilateral manner, guided by the United Nations Charter and founded on universally recognized principles. 4. Underlines the need, in United Nations reform, for evolving common perceptions and agreed approaches to address both the new and existing threats to international peace and security in the context of multilateralism. 5. Stresses that the United Nations Security Council reform must be comprehensive in all its aspects and have to take into account the views of its membership, including that of the OIC Member States. 6. Emphasizes the importance of enhancing the transparency, accountability, representativeness and democratization of the Security Council through the improvement of its working methods and legitimacy of its decision-making process. 7. Supports the expansion of the Security Council’s membership, in accordance with the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, sovereign equality of all States, equitable geographic distribution and adequate representation of major civilizations. […] 11. Emphasizes that the process of United Nations reform should evolve on the basis of all relevant inputs, particularly that of the OIC Member States’ view points and concerns. […] 13. Emphasizes the necessity of representation of major civilizations in the United Nations Security Council and, taking into account the fact that the OIC is the largest institution after the United Nations, which brings together one-fifth of the world population. 14. Reaffirms its decision that any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an extended Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World. 15. Underlines the significant importance of achieving the expansion of United Nations Security Council with the broadest possible agreement, through initiation of constructive negotiation between all United Nations Member States, based on the points of convergence such as the need to enlarge the Council, to increase the representation of developing countries, and to improve the working methods and transparency of the Council’s work; and stresses in that regard the importance of further constructive consultations between all United Nations Member States to agree on a common basis and framework for further progress. […] 17. Reaffirms that both reform and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, including the question of the veto, should be considered as integral parts of a common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution.

4 Momentum and deadlock

771

18. Further reaffirms that efforts at the restructuring of the Security Council shall not be subjected to any artificial deadlines, and that a decision on this issue should be made by consensus. 19. Reaffirms the resolve of the Member States to continue contributing actively and constructively to the consideration of the United Nations reform. 20. Requests the OIC open-ended Contact Group on United Nations Reform and Expansion of the Security Council at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to continue to closely coordinate the positions of the OIC Member States promoting the comprehensive reform of the Security Council on the above basis and to ensure equitable representation for OIC countries in any category in the enlarged Security Council in proportion to their membership of the United Nations. 21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon to the 12th Islamic Summit Conference. 4.2.3.16 18 November 2008, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 3-4 […] In the work of the Council it is essential to maintain a reasonable balance between transparency and effectiveness, with the understanding that the main purpose is to build up the Council’s potential to meet its Charter prerogatives to maintain international peace and security. In that context, Russia, as a permanent member of the Council, advocates increased effectiveness of its work, including by giving the Council a more representative character. However, attempts in that regard must not affect the Council’s effectiveness. That is one of the main issues in our approach to the matter of Council reform. Russia’s position in that regard is well known. We favour preserving a compact Council composition and are convinced that it would be counterproductive to bring in ideas that would infringe upon the prerogatives of the Council’s current permanent members, including its veto institution. We also fully support the notion that the formula for Council reform must ensure the broadest possible support by Members of the Organization, at any rate, by more than the legally required two-thirds majority of the votes in the General Assembly. The proposed reform models still do not enjoy predominant support in the United Nations. An attempt to sell those plans by bringing them to a vote would inevitably polarize the General Assembly. Even if one of the drafts did garner the two thirds of the votes required by the Charter, the Council would hardly become more authoritative in the eyes of the minority who disagreed, which would certainly include some influential States. Therefore, the significance of a formally more representative Council would be cancelled out by its diminished prestige in international affairs. That would be unacceptable. […] 4.2.3.17 18 November 2008, China, Mr. Liu Zhenmin, UN Doc. A/63/PV.54, pp. 17-18728 […] The two topics that are being debated at this meeting, the work of the Council and the reform of the Council, are closely related. The work of the Council has reflected 728  China confirmed this position on 13 November 2009 in UN Doc. A/64/PV.46, p. 5.

772

4 Momentum and deadlock

the challenges faced by that body, but, at the same time, has exposed the problems therein. Those issues can only be addressed through necessary and visible reform. The Security Council must adapt to the current international situation, which has changed profoundly. The first major change can be seen in this Hall. Over the past 60 years, the membership of the United Nations has expanded close to fourfold and a large number of small and medium-size developing countries have joined the United Nations and become the major force of the United Nations family. This reality has also changed the political environment of the United Nations system. At the same time, regional organizations, as well as regional cooperation, have greatly progressed and have become one of the major characteristics of post-war international relations. Regional methods for maintaining international peace and security, which were envisioned in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, have become a reality and are a pillar of multilateralism. Equally important is the fact that, although there exist some unreasonable and unjust phenomena in international relations, democratization and rule of law have become an irresistible historical trend. Multilateral cooperation has become a natural choice of States to cope with common challenges. Faced with this profound change in the international situation, people have all the more reason to question the logic of keeping the structure of the Security Council the same for decades. They have good reason to request that the Security Council increase its size, democracy and transparency and to expect a reformed Council to serve them better. China firmly supports the implementation of necessary and reasonable Council reforms. The primary issue of this reform is, I will say once again, to find a balance in its representation, including geographic, by increasing its membership. Any reform should give priority to increasing the representation of the developing countries, especially the African countries. Only by so doing can the long-term structural defect of the Security Council be corrected. I would like to reiterate here that any reform plan that does not have the potential support of the African countries will not have the support of China. Reform of the Council must reflect internationally accepted standards of democratization and the rule of law. The reform should ensure that smaller countries will have increased opportunities to participate in the Council’s decision-making in a more substantive way and make the smaller countries truly feel that the Security Council is an institution committed to helping them solve problems. […]

4.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 4.3.1 10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74729 Letter dated 10 July 1998 transmitted by Egypt in its capacity as coordinator of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries: paragraphs related to the reform of 729  → 4.2.1.3.2 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 4.4.3.1 for the Movement’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same document. The position of the

4 Momentum and deadlock

773

the Security Council, which appeared in the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries [original paragraphs 53 through 65] held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, on 19 and 20 May 1998 1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation comprehensively reviewed discussions on the reform and restructuring of the Security Council, in the light of the position papers adopted by the Movement on 13 February 1995730 and 20 May 1996,731 the negotiating paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries dated 11 March 1997,732 the decisions of the Cartagena Summit,733 the twelfth Ministerial Conference held in New Delhi from 7 to 8 April 1997734 and those adopted on this matter at the Ministerial Meeting in New York on 25 September 1997.735 2. In conformity with the New Delhi declaration736 regarding the necessity of attaining general agreement, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of Delegation reaffirmed their determination that any resolution with amendment implications for the Charter of the United Nations must be adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, as referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. 3. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation recalled that discussions in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council have shown that, while a convergence of views has emerged on a number of issues, important differences still exist on many others. They noted that the Open-ended Working Group has resumed its discussions and underlined the need for the Movement to maintain its unity and solidarity on this critical issue. They reaffirmed that the Movement should, in the ensuing negotiations, continue to pursue directives given by the Cartagena Summit and contained in the Movement’s position papers. The Movement would be guided by the considerations set out in paragraphs 4 through 8 below in approaching the issue of Security Council reform in discussions at the United Nations. […] 7. Increase in the membership of the Security Council should be by not less than 11 members, based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States. […]

Cartagena Summit was reaffirmed by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban from 29 August to 3 September 1998, see UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 730  → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14. 731  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII. 732  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex V. 733  18-20 October 1995, The Final Document of the Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 734   UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.10 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex XI, → 3.2.1.3.14. 735  Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, UN Doc. A/52/447-S/1997/775 (Letter dated 1 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the Secretary-General). 736  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14.

774

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.3.2  22 June 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. A. Granovsky, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group737 […] An important factor for the enhancement of the Security Council’s efficiency is to ensure its more balanced and representative make-up. While proceeding firmly from the point that the enlarged Security Council should not exceed 20-21 members, we confirm our principal position that the major precondition for a just fulfillment of this task is to ensure adequate representation of the Latin America, Africa and Asia in the enlarged Security Council being endowed with status equal to that of other new members of the Security Council. […] 4.3.3 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9738 […] In short, Lithuania, inter alia, supports these elements: a Security Council enlarged to around 24 members, […]. 4.3.4 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18739 […] [M]y delegation fully endorses the position of the Non-Aligned Movement advocating an increase in the Council membership by not less than 11 members. […] 4.3.5 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27740 […] The question of the total size is of paramount importance. A Council with more equitable representation will not be possible unless we contemplate a figure in the mid-20s.741 […] 4.3.6 16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 30-31742 […] We think that so as not threaten the ability of the Council to act rapidly and effectively, the increase in the number of non-permanent members must be reasonable. In this context, we have indicated that the total number should remain less than 25 but should be greater than 21. […]

737  → 4.2.1.1.4 for the Russian Federation’s nomination of India for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 738  → 4.2.1.1.6 for Lithuania’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.4.2.2 for Lithuania’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 739  → 4.2.2.3.4 for Algeria’s support of regional seats, and 4.4.3.5 for Algeria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 740  → 4.2.1.1.9 for Brazil’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.4.3.7 for Brazil’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 741  Brazil confirmed this position on 16 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 27, and on 31 October 2001 in UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, p. 11. 742  → 4.2.1.1.10 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 4.4.1.3 for France’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

775

4.3.7 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7743 […] The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes once again to reaffirm the positions we have reiterated throughout the various phases of the debate. We wish in particular to reaffirm our commitment to the positions expressed by the Group of Arab States in two letters, the most recent of which is dated 2 February 1998. Both of these stress the following: […] Secondly, the membership of the Security Council must be increased to no fewer than 26 members. In other words, no fewer than 11 new members must be added. This is fully consistent with the position set forth by the Non-Aligned Movement. […] 4.3.8 20 December 1999, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/54/ PV.85, pp. 13-14744 […] We remain unconvinced that a Council expanded beyond 21 members would retain its ability to function efficiently and effectively. We will oppose any expansion that threatens the ability of the Council to carry out its responsibilities under the Charter. The gravity of those responsibilities is simply too great to risk compromising the Council’s ability to meet them. […] 4.3.9 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 17-18745 […] The Russian Federation continues to believe that the number of members in an enlarged Security Council should not exceed 20 or 21. We are still convinced that exceeding that limit would have a negative impact on the efficiency of the Council’s activities. Within that limit we are open to discussion of any proposals on membership categories for an enlargement of the Council. […] 4.3.10  20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9746 I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that are Members of the United Nations: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and my own country, Guyana. 743  → 4.2.2.3.8 for Syria’s support of regional seats, and 4.4.3.9 for Syria’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 744  → 4.2.1.1.11 for the United States nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 745  → 4.2.1.1.12 for the Russian Federation’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 4.4.1.4 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 746  → 4.2.1.1.14 for CARICOM’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.4.3.10 for CARICOM’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

776

4 Momentum and deadlock

[…] In terms of numbers, if expansion takes place within both categories of membership, CARICOM would consider a total membership of 26 – the figure advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement – ideally balanced. […] 4.3.11 20 December 1999, Georgia, Mr. Chkheidze, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 9-10747 […] With regard to the size of the reformed Security Council, our position is that the number of members of the reformed Council should be in the low twenties. […] 4.3.12 3 April 2000, United States of America, Mr. Holbrooke, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] Years ago, the U.S. showed its commitment to Security Council reform by taking the lead in the initial expansion of the Council. Further, we have long advocated permanent seats for Japan and Germany – a position we have stated since the 1970’s. In the mid-90’s, we said we would be amenable to three additional seats for Asia, Africa, and Latin America, bringing the total number of seats on the Security Council to 20 or 21. Today, on the basis of our extensive consultations with many nations, I want to announce that the U.S. is now prepared to consider proposals that would result in a slightly larger number of seats than 21. But, I also wish to stress that as we proceed to discuss this issue, our position will still be based on our fundamental principle: any change in the Security Council should contribute to a more effective Council. Our deliberations should be limited only by that – our shared desire and common need to have as the final outcome a Council that is above all reformed and strengthened, not merely expanded. […] 4.3.13 5 April 2000, United States of America, Department of State UN Security Council Expansion Fact sheet released by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State U.S. Objective: The U.S. is committed to expanding the Security Council in a way that strengthens its capacity and effectiveness, and enhances its representative character without detracting from its working efficiency. Current Structure: […] New Members: The U.S. supports the granting of permanent seats for Japan and Germany and is prepared to accept three additional permanent seats for developing nations from the regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The U.S. favors regional groups deciding if the seat allocated to their region would be filled on a rotating basis or held by a single nation. The U.S. on April 3, 2000,748 announced its willingness to consider reasonable proposals for an expanded Council that would result in a slightly larger number of seats than 21, providing that the new composition would contribute

• •

747  → 4.2.1.3.7 for Georgia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 748  → 4.3.12.

4 Momentum and deadlock

777

to a more effective Council and be based on broad UN consensus, including the principal regional states. Veto: […]749 Status of Deliberations: The UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform, created seven years ago, continues to debate the process for increasing membership of the Council and examining ways to improve the Council’s working methods. Significant differences remain among UN member states on the best course for Security Council expansion. In contrast to the U.S. position, many UN members support large increases in the Council’s membership; some UN members also favor the adoption of severe limits on the veto rights of the permanent members of the Council.

• •

4.3.14 16 November 2000, Belarus, Mr. Ling, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 35750 […] Thirdly, the membership of the Security Council in both categories should be increased by at least 11. […] 4.3.15 18 June 2001, Pakistan, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/55/47, Annex XVIII, p. 172 Letter to the United Nations addressed to the Bureau of the Working Group, containing a proposal by Pakistan The United Nations was created on the basis of sovereign equality of States. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, certain countries managed to acquire an exalted status on the Security Council with permanent membership and veto power. Any reform process must be aimed at removing the existing imbalance and inequality in the membership of the Security Council. However, given the present realities, this may not be practical. In order, therefore, to make the Security Council more participatory, representative, equitable and effective, the expansion should take place only in the non-permanent category. A decision on the increase in the non-permanent category must be taken through general agreement among the membership of the United Nations. The non-permanent category should be enlarged to accommodate new members on the basis of geographical distribution to be elected by the General Assembly for a fixed term. While there may be different proposals on the number of new elected members, one suggestion could be to enlarge the Security Council corresponding to the size of the Economic and Social Council751 to ensure the widest possible representation of Member States. 4.3.16 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14752 […] The total number of the Council’s members should not exceed 25. The Slovak Republic is convinced that a 25-member Council will be sufficiently representative and, at the same time, able to preserve its operational flexibility. […] 749  → 4.4.1.5. 750  → 4.2.1.3.8 for Belarus’ position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 751   ECOSOC has 54 members (Art. 61 (1) UN Charter). 752  → 4.2.1.3.14 for Slovakia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 4.4.4.13 for Slovakia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

778

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.3.17 22 June 2005, United States of America, Ms. Patterson, USUN Press Release #119 (05)753 […] Security Council Reform […] On the basis of such criteria, we would consider supporting the addition of two or so new permanent members and two or three additional non-permanent seats, allocated by region, to expand the Council to 19 or 20. These seats would ensure geographic balance. We are also prepared to consider longer-term renewable seats. […] 4.3.18 11 July 2005, Latvia, Ms. Silkalna, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23754 […] As to concerns that a Security Council of 25 would be too large, we consider that the proposed size better reflects the current size of the United Nations membership. A Security Council of 25 members need not be less efficient than the current one, provided that the working methods of the Council are revised. […] 4.3.19 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8755 […] First, the task is to increase the Council’s effectiveness and to provide for more balanced Council membership by including major and influential developing countries. At the same time, making the Security Council more representative must not undermine its effectiveness. That is why we advocate preserving the Council’s compact size and insist that the membership of an expanded Security Council not exceed a reasonable size – say, 20-plus members. […] 4.3.20 14 December 2007, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group756 […] 5. Size: we believe that the Council should maintain its ability to act promptly and effectively upon threats to international peace and security. Therefore, an expansion should be relatively small. […]

753  → 4.2.1.1.36 for the United States nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 754  → 4.2.1.3.18 for Latvia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 755  → 4.2.3.11 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 4.4.1.9 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 756  → 4.2.2.2.13 for Switzerland’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

779

4.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 4.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 4.4.1.1 24 March 1999, Russian Federation, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group757 The Russian delegation has on many occasions extensively outlined its position on the issue of [the] veto. Discussion on this question, as well as on all aspects of this Working Group’s mandate should proceed with a view to preserving and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council which has under the Charter the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. It is in accomplishing this task that we perceive the main goal of the process of the enlargement of the Council and improvement of its working methods. Broad experience gained through the Council’s activity convincingly attests to the fact that the Charter provisions governing the scope and application of the veto are crucial to its ability to function effectively and to arrive at balanced and sustainable decisions. Moreover, these Charter provisions facilitate the subsequent implementation of such decisions. That is why Russia continues to firmly oppose any restriction or curtailment of the veto, be it through amendment to the Charter or otherwise. This position coincides with the approach of other permanent members of the Council and presents an objective reality which needs to be duly taken into account, whether someone likes it or not. Fully recognising its responsibilities under the Charter as a permanent member of the Council, Russia will continue to make every effort to achieve consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. This is our principal position that we consistently hold on to. As to granting the right of veto to possible new permanent members of the Security Council we still maintain our view that the issue should be given a substantial consideration after the «personal» composition of an enlarged Council shall be agreed upon. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to reaffirm our support for the moves to really improve the Council’s working methods, including reasonable enhancement of its transparency. We view this endeavour as an integral part of the package which represents the mandate of the Working Group. Indeed, much has been done by the Security Council in this respect in the recent years and it continues to be done so. We remain keen to continue a constructive work within the Council and the Working Group, being mindful that any proposal to alter the Security Council’s working methods and its procedures should be invariably calibrated against the same pivotal criterion of preserving and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council. 4.4.1.2 23 September 1999, China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America, UN Doc. S/1999/996 Statement by the ministers for foreign affairs of the five permanent members of the Security Council following a meeting with the Secretary-General […] 757  Source: Global Policy Forum. Unofficial translation from the Russian.

780

4 Momentum and deadlock

3. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for reforming the Security Council, with a view to broadening its representation and preserving and enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. They also emphasized that any attempt to restrict or curtail their veto rights would not be conducive to the reform process. […] 4.4.1.3 16 December 1999, France, Mr. Dejammet, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 30-31758 […] We favour new permanent members having the same prerogatives as the current permanent members. While we are ready to work on any formula that would make general agreement possible, we see no hope for coming to an agreement on changing, by an amendment of the Charter or other means, the rights of current permanent members, rights which France exercises, however, in a responsible and restrained manner. […] 4.4.1.4 20 December 1999, Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 17-18759 […] An inevitable prerequisite for such agreement is the maintenance by the incumbent permanent members of the Security Council of their current status. We flatly reject the thesis that basic principle of the Charter – the concurring votes of the five permanent members – leads to a virtual paralysis of the Council. That thesis distorts reality and plays into the hands of those who advocate the use of military force, sidestepping the Security Council, whether under humanitarian or any other pretexts. The veto has proved to be an irreplaceable tool to ensure that the Council’s work is coordinated and that it is able to arrive at balanced decisions within its framework.760 […] 4.4.1.5 5 April 2000, United States of America, Department of State UN Security Council Expansion Fact sheet released by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State […] Veto: The U.S. has not taken a position on the veto for any proposed new permanent members, and believes this issue should only be addressed once the structure of an expanded Council is determined. We are firmly opposed to any changes to the veto held by the current permanent members. […]

•

758  → 4.2.1.1.10 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 4.3.6 for France’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 759  → 4.2.1.1.12 for the Russian Federation’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, and 4.3.9 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 760  Russia confirmed this position on 17 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, pp. 34-35; on 16 October 2002 in UN Doc. A/57/PV.31, pp. 22-23; on 14 October 2003 in UN Doc. A/58/ PV.30, p. 21; and on 10 November 2005 in UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, p. 12.

4 Momentum and deadlock

781

4.4.1.6 16 November 2000, United States of America, Mr. Cunningham, UN Doc. A/55/PV.64, pp. 25-26 […] […] And, although we realize that many Members favour limitations to or elimination of the veto, we continue to believe that the veto has real value in helping the Council maintain international peace and security and is integral to the Charter and to the United Nations itself. We will continue to oppose any effort to limit it. Focusing on limiting or eliminating the veto is self-defeating and will serve only to preclude progress. We should all remember that the current Council structure has served the international community well and continues to do so. No doubt, it can be improved. The Council has, in fact, already taken important steps to improve transparency and adopt its working methods to today’s needs. These efforts will continue. The difficult work of reform of the Security Council will not be concluded quickly, but it can be concluded well, through compromise on representation, coupled with an absolute determination not to compromise on our fundamental objective to maintain and enhance the Council’s effectiveness.761 […] 4.4.1.7 14 October 2002, United States of America, Mr. Siv, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 10-11 […] It will come as no surprise that we will continue to oppose efforts to limit or eliminate the veto. These initiatives only serve to stifle progress on the important task ahead of us. The veto remains an essential element of the Council’s ability to maintain international peace and security. […] 4.4.1.8 16 October 2002, Russian Federation, Mr. Gatilov, UN Doc. A/57/PV.31, pp. 22-23762 […] We are convinced that ideas leading to infringement of the prerogatives and powers of the current permanent members of the Security Council, including the right of veto, are counterproductive. Unjustified criticism of the institution of the veto only fuels unnecessary emotions, and does not contribute to the achievement of the agreement we seek on the parameters for reform. […] 4.4.1.9 12 July 2005, Russian Federation, Mr. Denisov, UN Doc. A/59/PV.112, pp. 7-8763 […] Moreover, in the event of a decision to expand the Security Council in both categories, we believe that the right of the veto should not be granted a priori before the list 761  The United States confirmed this position on 21 September 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.27, p. 11. 762  → 4.2.3.7 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 763  → 4.2.3.11 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 4.3.19 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

782

4 Momentum and deadlock

of new permanent Security Council members is determined. We reaffirm the Russian Federation’s unwavering position that any dilution of the status of the five current permanent members – first and foremost, of the right of the veto – is categorically unacceptable. On the basis of that overarching position, and guided by its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia will continue to advocate reaching the necessary agreement. 4.4.1.10 20 July 2006, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, pp. 4-5 […] We are ready to conscientiously consider any possible sensible approach to expanding the membership of the Security Council, if it is based on the broadest possible agreement within the United Nations, beyond the legally required two-thirds majority of members of the General Assembly. A key element continues to be the need to increase the effectiveness of the Council and to provide it with a more representative character, but not at the expense of its effectiveness, since it is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for that reason that we advocate maintaining a limited membership of the Council. We are convinced that it would be counterproductive to limit the prerogatives of the current permanent members of the Security Council, including the right of veto. […] 4.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 4.4.2.1 26 June 1998, Chile, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.19 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVII, p. 54 […] Proposal on the issue of the veto Time limits should be established on the right to the veto, which, by its nature, should not be perpetual. In the year 2030, approximately 85 years will have passed since the occurrence of the events that justified its creation. The permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the concept that their right to the veto cannot be eternal and should commit themselves to discussing its abolition in that year or another close to it to be determined by mutual agreement, or should indicate the conditions required for them to accept the abolition of the veto at a given time. […] 4.4.2.2 16 December 1999, Lithuania, Mr. Jusys, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 8-9764 […] There are at least three reasons why the veto should be abolished. First, it is undemocratic in principle under all circumstances. Secondly, it has been abused and used in cases irrelevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. Thirdly, even if used as prescribed by the Charter, the veto has hardly helped the peace worldwide; rather, it has cost lives, as in the case of Rwanda. […]

764  → 4.2.1.1.6 for Lithuania’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.3.3 for Lithuania’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

783

4.4.2.3 16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Mr. Andjaba, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, p. 5765 […] SADC believes that the exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. […] 4.4.2.4 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 23-24766 […] Croatia favours the abolition of the veto. If, however, this is not possible, as a fallback position we support the use of the so-called double veto. In the interim, Croatia holds that all permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. Some permanent members, though, may choose to pursue a course of conduct by which they would demonstrate their awareness of the widely shared views regarding the unpopularity of the veto and thereby show their respect for the democratic majority that holds such views. […] 4.4.2.5 20 December 1999, Pakistan, Mr. ul-Haque, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 9-11 […] The issue of veto is, therefore, intrinsically linked to the reform and expansion of the Security Council. Pakistan believes that the veto power is undemocratic and archaic. It was acquired by a few Member States at the time of the framing of the Charter, when they were basking in the glory of a great victory. However, history is witness to the fact that the veto has invariably been used to protect the political or strategic interests of the veto-wielding Powers. Permanent members have used or threatened to use the veto to block Council decisions on innumerable occasions. The veto has never been used and, by its very nature, can never be used, to promote solutions to problems. […] 4.4.2.6 16 November 2000, Kenya, Mr. Kuindwa, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 28-29 […] […] We also believe that the veto power should be progressively curtailed and eventually eliminated. 4.4.2.7 1 November 2001, Sudan, Mr. Bakhit, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 9-10767 […] As for the right of veto, my delegation renews its position, the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, calling for abolition of the veto. That could be done gradually, starting by restricting that right, which some permanent members use in the Security Council for their narrow national interests, without taking into consideration the wider United Nations membership, on whose behalf the Security Council acts. […]

765  → 4.2.2.3.7 for SADC’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 766  → 4.2.1.3.4 for Croatia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 4.4.3.6 for Croatia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 767  → 4.2.2.3.19 for Sudan’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

784

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.4.2.8 14 October 2002, Costa Rica, Mr. Stagno, UN Doc. A/57/PV.27, pp. 11-12 […] Costa Rica favours an increase in the membership of the Security Council to make possible the greater representation of developing countries in that organ. However, an increase in the Council’s membership is only a secondary and subsidiary aspect of the reform and revitalization process. The regulation, limitation and eventual elimination of the veto must be the main goal of the reform process. The existence of the veto right as a unilateral privilege is in itself an affront to the basic principles of justice. That unjustifiable and anti-democratic privilege has paralyzed the Council and has contributed substantially to the erosion of its legitimacy. […] 4.4.2.9 16 December 2002, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/57/PV.32, pp. 6-8 […] Brazil favours a curtailment of the veto, with a view to its gradual elimination. As a first step, the veto should be limited to decisions taken under chapter VII of the Charter. […] 4.4.2.10 26 July 2005, Colombia, Ms. Holguín, UN Doc. A/59/PV.115, pp. 4-6768 […] Colombia was one of two countries to vote against establishing the veto when the Organization was founded, in 1945. We have never believed in privileges. That same position is reflected in draft resolution L.68.769 Our conviction has not changed, and the dynamics of today’s world reaffirms our principled position. We are not at present overcoming a world war. If the world is in any sense evolving, it is towards the plurality of multilateralism, with 191 Member States that have diverse and dynamic national and regional realities. Our development needs are not met by creating new Powers by virtue of a vote at the United Nations, a vote that might lead to deep internal confrontation in the Organization and that would benefit no one. In many cases, States with greater familiarity with and understanding of specific situations are small and medium-sized countries, where there is greater geographical and cultural closeness and affinity. Their understanding of the world is different from that of a country of another region with different dynamics. We want a United Nations where the opinions of all are taken into account and respected. We want a United Nations where we can all decide on multilateral issues. We want a United Nations without paternalism or handouts. We want a United Nations without dependence, selectivity or arbitrariness – a United Nations that makes the principle of the sovereign equality of States a reality. We want a United Nations that gives priority to everyone’s needs and where everyone sees that his or her opinions are taken into account. We want a United Nations where every State, regardless of its political, military or economic power, can contribute to decision-making. We want a United Nations that serves everyone and works for the development and stability of all peoples.

768  → 4.2.2.2.3 for Colombia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 769  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

785

Our vision of Security Council reform is in line with that thinking: a Council that is representative of regional dynamics, a Council whose composition is flexible in response to global changes and to the realities of power in every historical period, a Council that does not perpetuate privileges. We remain convinced that the veto must be eliminated and, if that is impossible, that it must not be extended for any reason. […] 4.4.2.11 10 November 2005, New Zealand, Ms. Banks, UN Doc. A/60/PV.48, pp. 25-26770 […] We remain concerned that Council action on some issues has not been possible because of the use of a single veto or a silent veto. There were several occasions in the past year when delays or complete inaction occurred despite overwhelming international support in favour of the Council taking action. We regret the situation and once again would like to put on record our unequivocal opposition to the veto, both with respect to current permanent members of the Council and any potential future members. […] 4.4.2.12 8 February 2007, Panama, Mr. Arias, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group771 […] En cuanto al derecho al veto se refiere, Panamá considera que esta es una institución cuya razón de ser dejó de existir. De allí que lejos de ampliarlo, el mismo debe irse limitando hasta su total eliminación. […] 4.4.2.13 14 November 2007, Qatar, Mr. Al-Khater, UN Doc. A/62/PV.51, pp. 12-13 […] Qatar remains convinced that the right of veto should be abolished and, if that is impossible, it should not be expanded for any reason whatsoever. We must not pretend that the United Nations can remain relevant and important and at the same time be a club for the few. It is regrettable – and we must state it explicitly – that the political will that is necessary to move from conceptual discussion regarding reform to actual reform is still lacking. […] 4.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 4.4.3.1 10 July 1998, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.21 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXXI, pp. 73-74772 Letter dated 10 July 1998 transmitted by Egypt in its capacity as coordinator of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries: paragraphs related to the reform of 770  → 4.2.3.14 for New Zealand’s position on the inclusion of Japan in a reformed Security Council, presented in the same statement. 771  → 4.2.2.2.7 for Panama’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 772  → 4.2.1.3.2 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position focusing on an expansion in the nonpermanent category, and 4.3.1 for the Movement’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

786

4 Momentum and deadlock

the Security Council, which appeared in the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries [original paragraphs 53 through 65] held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, on 19 and 20 May 1998773 1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation comprehensively reviewed discussions on the reform and restructuring of the Security Council, in the light of the position papers adopted by the Movement on 13 February 1995774 and 20 May 1996,775 the negotiating paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries dated 11 March 1997,776 the decisions of the Cartagena Summit,777 the twelfth Ministerial Conference held in New Delhi from 7 to 8 April 1997778 and those adopted on this matter at the Ministerial Meeting in New York on 25 September 1997.779 2. In conformity with the New Delhi declaration780 regarding the necessity of attaining general agreement, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of Delegation reaffirmed their determination that any resolution with amendment implications for the Charter of the United Nations must be adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly, as referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. 3. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation recalled that discussions in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council have shown that, while a convergence of views has emerged on a number of issues, important differences still exist on many others. They noted that the Open-ended Working Group has resumed its discussions and underlined the need for the Movement to maintain its unity and solidarity on this critical issue. They reaffirmed that the Movement should, in the ensuing negotiations, continue to pursue directives given by the Cartagena Summit and contained in the Movement’s position papers. The Movement would be guided by the considerations set out in paragraphs 4 through 8 below in approaching the issue of Security Council reform in discussions at the United Nations. 4. Both reform and expansion of the Security Council should be considered as integral parts of a common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution, as well as the need for transparency, accountability and democratization in the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, including its decision-making process. […] 773  The position of the Cartagena Summit was reaffirmed in the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 774  → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14. 775  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII. 776  See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/51/47, Annex V. 777  18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 778  → 3.2.1.3.14. 779  See Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, UN Doc. A/52/447; S/1997/775 (Letter dated 1 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the Secretary-General). 780  27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14.

4 Momentum and deadlock

787

11. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation reaffirmed the proposal of the Movement that the veto should be curtailed, with a view to its elimination, and that the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 4.4.3.2 23 March 1999, India, Mr. Pal, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group781 […] As others have said, the veto will not go away. We have to see how its pernicious use can be tempered. Several ideas have been put forward, by the Non-Aligned Movement and others. These should be seriously considered. One further option is to consider the modality followed in some legislatures where the executive has a veto power which the legislature can override, even if only to seek a reconsideration. The GA should have some such powers, perhaps exercised through a very high threshold. At the very least, Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter need to be interpreted better in practice, the first more liberally, the second more narrowly. The GA does have a role under Article 11.2 on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Irrespective of Article 12, recent practice has often been for many issues to be brought concurrently to both GA and Council. The DRC is an immediate example, where the GA will meet today after the Council met last week. The SG’s report on the causes of conflict in Africa was considered by both Council and GA. The GA asked the SG for a report on Cambodia, which he has chosen to submit to both Council and GA. The lines have therefore been blurred. Therefore, when the Council undermines its own legitimacy through the irresponsible use of the veto or is prevented from acting by the threat of its use, the GA should be able to step in. The Council in any case acts mostly to set up, maintain or discontinue peacekeeping operations. Since the Charter never contemplated the modality of a peacekeeping operation, it has given the Council no special prerogatives on this matter. The General Assembly is not debarred from taking these functions on itself if the threat or the use of the veto hamstrings the Security Council. […] 4.4.3.3 23 March 1999, Slovakia, Mr. Tomka, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] There are several successful examples when the efforts and initiatives generated by the Security Council brought eventually peace or created conditions for peace to be reached in some troubled places on the earth. However, recent developments, in connection with the issues like those of Iraq, Kosovo or very recently of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the Republic of Macedonia, are starting again to raise questions of whether the Security Council, even in an era of relative peace, can operate as it is supposed to do over a prolonged period. Can the veto really serve the noble task envisaged for the Security Council in the UN Charter? How could the veto possibly contribute to a collective security system at the beginning of the 21st century? The most disturbing aspect about the veto is the absence of any legal mechanism ensuring that the veto can not be exploited for 781  → 4.2.1.1.3 for India’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

788

4 Momentum and deadlock

pursuing limited national interests at the expense of the cause of peace and security. Apparently, the very substance of the whole current concept of the veto prevents any such mechanism from being found and even to be feasible. Unfortunately, national interests do not always correspond to global interests of the international community. Although it may seem that the veto is not exercised as often as in the past, its invisible form is constantly present at informal consultations of the whole. It is no secret that the core of the decision-making of the Security Council takes place within the framework of these consultations which are always behind the closed door. A mere indication of disagreement of any of the permanent members means a shift in the course of discussion or drafting a resolution thus casting a permanent shadow over the decision-making process. Moreover, the current scope of application of the veto raises a number of concerns of legal nature. The Rules of Procedure of the Security Council failed to clarify the scope of application of the veto over the last decades and therefore remain still “Provisional”. As the course of recent events suggests, it is the veto and its permanent threat which makes the Security Council paralysed instead of being able to take effective action on behalf of the Member States. Unfortunately, this may lead to the erosion of the authority of the Security Council and consequently of its central role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations can not afford to let it happen and retreat on its policy because there is simply no other alternative to the concept of collective security as it is embodied in the UN Charter. The modern world dominated by forces of globalisation, which further bolster mutual interdependence in all respects, needs a supreme security authority with an unquestioned credibility. There can hardly be real reform of the Security Council without looking appropriately into the current concept of the veto. The scope of application of the veto should be, as a first step, limited to the actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To this effect, we support the following measures to be taken: – the veto should not be applied to recommendations made by the Security Council to the General Assembly under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the UN Charter; – the General Assembly should, in exercising the authority conferred upon it by Article 10 of the Charter, recommend to the Security Council which matters are to be deemed procedural on the basis of the Annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949,782 updated as necessary; – the Security Council should amend its Rules of Procedures accordingly and thus to fix their current provisional character; – the permanent members of the Security Council should, whenever having exercised the veto, provide a formal explanation in writing of such act which would be subsequently issued as an official UN document. […] 4.4.3.4 21 September 1999, Sweden, Ms. Lindh, UN Doc. A/54/PV.7, pp. 32-34 […] The use of the veto, or even the threat of its use, hampers the work of the Council. We support the proposal that as a first step the right of veto should be limited to decisions 782  → 2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

789

on enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. We would also like to see the five permanent members agreeing on a moratorium on the use of the veto. […] 4.4.3.5 16 December 1999, Algeria, Mr. Baali, UN Doc. A/54/PV.81, pp. 16-18783 […] The right of veto is at the very heart of the issue of Security Council reform and very obviously represents one of the most complex and controversial issues that the Working Group on the restructuring of the Council will have to address. Indeed, since our Organization was founded, the outrageous prerogative represented by the right of veto has aroused much controversy, argument and opposition. It was clear almost from the outset that this right is consistent neither with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, nor with the spirit of healthy cooperation among them, nor, above all, with the concern of the Organization to prevent conflicts or contribute to their settlement. The fact is that, in the framework of the reform process that our Organization is undertaking at all levels, the existence of the veto stands as one of the political and legal constraints to these reforms, particularly the democratization of the working and decision-making methods of the Council. Today, many are speaking out against the preservation of this instrument on the grounds that it is anachronistic, antidemocratic and contrary to the principle of the legal equality of States on which our Organization is founded and which underpins the very system of international relations. Others might argue that, since the end of the cold war, recourse to the right of veto has become rare and that it is therefore no longer a threat. Nothing, however, could be more fallacious, because, by the mere fact that it exists and that all sides are aware of its existence, the veto can, at worst, be used and, at best, subtly or brutally brandished as a deterrent weapon. For that reason alone, the veto is open to condemnation and must be fought. For all these reasons, my delegation endorses the position taken by the Non-Aligned Movement,784 which aims to restrict the right of veto and ultimately to eliminate it entirely. Moreover, this position is shared by an even broader majority that believes that recourse to the veto should be confined to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 4.4.3.6 16 December 1999, Croatia, Ms. Grčić Polić, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 23-24785 […] Croatia favours the abolition of the veto. If, however, this is not possible, as a fallback position we support the use of the so-called double veto. In the interim, Croatia holds that all permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. Some permanent members, though, may choose to pursue a course of conduct by which

783  → 4.2.2.3.4 for Algeria’s support of regional seats, and 4.3.4 for Algeria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 784  27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44. 785  → 4.2.1.3.4 for Croatia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 4.4.2.4 for Croatia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

790

4 Momentum and deadlock

they would demonstrate their awareness of the widely shared views regarding the unpopularity of the veto and thereby show their respect for the democratic majority that holds such views. […] 4.4.3.7 16 December 1999, Brazil, Mr. Fonseca, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 26-27786 […] We also hold the view that a reform package should include some curtailment of the veto power. The ideal is to advance towards the gradual elimination of the veto. As a first step, it should be strictly limited to matters covered under Chapter VII of the Charter.787 Nevertheless, the question of the veto should not hold back a possible agreement on the increase in the membership. This could be facilitated if, while enjoying de jure veto rights, new permanent members would commit themselves not to use them. […] 4.4.3.8 16 December 1999, Canada, Mr. Fowler, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 32-33788 […] The two aspects of the veto that we have been examining – the scope of existing permanent members’ veto rights and the question of whether any possible new members would also have the veto – have achieved far different results in our deliberations. I am confident that there exists general agreement today that the scope of the veto ought indeed to be limited to Chapter VII actions. There is no such agreement, even among those States that favour expansion in both categories of Council membership, to extend any veto power to any new permanent member. […] 4.4.3.9 20 December 1999, Syria, Mr. Wehbe, UN Doc. A/54/PV.85, pp. 5-7789 […] We believe that the use of the veto must be limited and rationalized as a first step towards the elimination of that right. In this regard, my delegation wonders about the logic behind the use of the veto in the case of a draft resolution before the Council that has received 14 out of 15 votes in favour. Would the use of the veto be in line with the principles of democracy, equality and just representation? Would it be in line with the interests of the United Nations and the achievement of peace, security and justice in the world? On this basis, we believe that the veto right must be rationalized, because there is no need to use it when a draft resolution before the Security Council obtains majority support without hegemony exercised by any party. We reconfirm once again the

786  → 4.2.1.1.9 for Brazil’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.3.5 for Brazil’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 787  Brazil confirmed this position on 16 November 2000 in UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, p. 27; on 31 October 2001 in UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, p. 11; and on 16 October 2002 in UN Doc. A/57/ PV.32, p. 7. 788  → 4.2.3.1 for Canada’s position on the allocation of seats on the basis of financial contributions, presented in the same statement. 789  → 4.2.2.3.8 for Syria’s support of regional seats, and 4.3.7 for Syria’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

791

position of the Non-Aligned Movement and of many other States on the question of the veto. […] 4.4.3.10 20 December 1999, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Ms. Elliott, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 8-9790 I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that are Members of the United Nations: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and my own country, Guyana. […] In regard to the veto, CARICOM has consistently made it clear that it is anachronistic and anti-democratic and should therefore be abolished. But given the political realities that we must face, we are prepared to consider, for the time being, a restriction of its use to issues falling under Chapter VII. Moreover, in the belief that there should be no discrimination between permanent members – be they old or new – we believe that this privilege should be extended to any new entrants in this category. […] 4.4.3.11 20 December 1999, Mongolia, Mr. Enkhsaikhan, UN Doc. A/54/PV.86, pp. 12-13791 […] Mongolia believes that the veto should ultimately be abolished and that as a first step it should be curbed and restricted to Chapter VII of the Charter. In this respect my delegation would like to reiterate its support for the proposal to require a State that has vetoed a draft resolution to explain to the General Assembly its reasons for doing so. This, I believe, would be a step towards increasing the Council’s accountability to the general membership. […] 4.4.3.12 16 November 2000, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 1-2792 […] As far as the right of veto is concerned, our position is moderate and realistic. We are not suggesting that the five permanent members should immediately abandon their privileges. We know that they will not do it. What we seek is ways to limit this privilege for a period of time until its final elimination is negotiated. We regard as interesting the proposals to limit it during that interim period to cases involving the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. […]

790  → 4.2.1.1.14 for CARICOM’s position supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.3.10 for CARICOM’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 791  → 4.2.1.1.15 for Mongolia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 792  → 4.2.1.2.3 for Argentina’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 4.2.2.3.13 for Argentina’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

792

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.4.3.13 17 November 2000, Madagascar, Mr. Bakoniarivo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 7-8793 […] The right of veto is among the most complex and controversial questions in the exercise of restructuring the Security Council. Many oppose retaining a tool which is viewed as anachronistic, undemocratic and contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States, on which the Organization is based. As the United Nations is guarantor and trustee of universal values, its organs, especially the Security Council, must provide a reliable benchmark for democratic principles. My delegation is by no means unaware of the political considerations inherent in the right of veto, but we believe that it is essential and urgent to rethink the way it is used, in the light of its negative impact on the Council’s ability to play its Charter role. The use of the veto should be limited to action under Chapter VII of the Charter, pending its complete abolition. In the view of my delegation, the proposal by which a State would be obliged to explain to the General Assembly why it had vetoed a draft resolution deserves careful consideration by the Working Group. […] 4.4.3.14 19 July 2001, Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2001/CRP.7, Annex XIX UN Doc. A/55/47, pp. 173-174 Letter by the Permanent Mission of Egypt addressed to the Bureau of the Working Group, containing a statement delivered at the second session of the Working Group, on 16 March 2001. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has established a well-known position concerning different issues of Security Council reform, hence we are not merely repeating that position. Rather, we deem it necessary to state clearly our assessment of the progress achieved thus far. While limiting our comments to the scope of the agenda of the group this week, we would like to emphasize the following: 1. It is highly regrettable that little progress has been achieved with regard to Security Council reform despite the continuous efforts of the vast majority of Member States. 2. It is an indisputable fact that such lack of progress was caused by the absence of political will of a small number of Member States that never came up with any constructive proposals to help the process move forward. Indeed, it is that lack of political will that should be blamed not the working methods of the Open-ended Working Group, which fall in line with the usual working methods of all working groups of the General Assembly. 3. There is a general agreement on the need for a coherent and coordinated approach to render the Security Council efficient and capable of addressing universal challenges. Such an agreement cannot be held hostage to the narrow interests of a handful of members ignoring the common interests of the general membership. 4. As for the substance of the issue, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries underlines the interlinkage between clusters I and II. Both reform and expansion of the Security Council should be considered as integral parts of a comprehensive package. 5. While addressing decision-making in the Security Council, the Movement was not far from reality. While setting elimination of the veto as its ultimate goal in this regard, 793  → 4.2.2.3.16 for Madagascar’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

793

the Movement views, as an interim measure, a gradual approach by starting with the curtailment of the veto. 6. There is a lot that can be said concerning measures of curtailment. Some of these measures were introduced by the Working Group of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and were contained in document A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9.794 What needs to be stressed at this juncture is that such curtailment measures should be discussed, agreed to, then institutionalized and should not, by any means, be left to self-restraint or self-imposed moratoria. On the contrary, we believe that the commitment to institutionalize those measures should be an element of a package agreement on the reform of the Security Council. 7. While the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries believes that the veto is an important component of the reform process, we further believe that reforming the veto is not the only effort needed. 8. In this regard, other issues need to be addressed effectively, such as the need for a transparent and more responsible, democratic and representative Security Council. In this regard it is regrettable to notice that closed meetings of the Council remain the common practice, when they should, and were meant to be, the rare exception. 9. Article 24 of the Charter calls upon the Security Council to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Underlining this stipulation, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regrets that adherence to the spirit of that article remains questionable. 10. Responding to the different views expressed this week, and to the Bureau’s request for concrete proposals regarding suggestions contained in document A/AC.247/2001/ CRP.2,795 the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries proposes the deletion of all references to suggestions intended to leave the veto in its present form. We believe that those suggestions cannot be of any use to the reform process. 4.4.3.15 31 October 2001, Argentina, Mr. Listre, UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 5-7 […] The veto is an institution at variance with the principle of the sovereign equality of States and in flagrant contradiction with the democratic principles that the Council itself promotes in the settlement of disputes under its consideration. From the many debates held over the years, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of States want the elimination of the veto or, at the very minimum, its restriction. Only a very small minority remains attached to maximalist positions and rejects any modification of the veto whatsoever. That same minority states that, since the end of the cold war, the veto has seldom been used; that the question of the veto is not an important one at this stage of the reform process; and that we can therefore deal with it later. But why, then, if the question of the veto is so irrelevant, is there such tremendous resistance to changing it? From our recent experience in the Security Council, we have learned that, even though the veto has not been used very much in recent years, the threat of its use – the so-called pocket veto – has had almost the same counterproductive effects as the veto itself. The “pocket veto” is used more frequently than the permanent members would 794  27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 795  → 4.1.7.

794

4 Momentum and deadlock

like to admit. On more than one occasion, the negotiation of a draft resolution has been aborted or delayed, or the text changed substantially, because of the mere threat of a veto. Obviously, Argentina is clearly against the veto. We think that it is necessary to limit its scope, as the first step towards its eventual elimination. For the time being, a reasonable limitation of the veto may be to restrict its application exclusively to Chapter VII issues, in which case the permanent members would have to explain to the General Assembly their reasons for having cast the veto. In our opinion, these limitations must be established through amendments to the Charter. A political commitment is not enough of a legal guarantee. Even a unilateral legal declaration cannot prevail over the principle of the supremacy of Charter provisions, in accordance with Article 103. […] 4.4.3.16 31 October 2001, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, pp. 19-20 […] Fifthly, the issue of the veto must be addressed as an integral part of the reform package. In this regard, Tunisia supports the Non-Aligned Movement’s position796 that we should limit the use of the veto to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. It goes without saying that it is crucial that the permanent members of the Security Council have a positive and constructive attitude on this issue. In the expansion of the number of permanent members, one sole veto should not be allowed to bring Council’s decisions to a halt. […] 4.4.3.17 1 November 2001, Romania, Mr. Niculescu, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, pp. 1-2 […] With regard to the veto, which remains the most sensitive issue, we have no problem with its use by future permanent members. We are aware of some concerns expressed by various Member States and the ideas they put forward, ranging from total abolition of the veto to a restriction of its scope and application to no change whatsoever. From our viewpoint, the veto remains an essential tool to ensure that the Security Council can preserve international peace and security. Romania considers periodic reviews of the structure and functioning of the Security Council as an important part of our reform exercise. We consider that 15 years would be a reasonable timeframe to assess the performance of the reform package. […] 4.4.3.18 15 October 2002, Tunisia, Mr. Mejdoub, UN Doc. A/57/PV.30, pp. 4-6797 […] I will now say a few words on the veto. If we were to reread the declarations made over the last few years to the Working Group on Security Council Reform, we would be struck by the moral and political considerations urging unity of the Council and the unilateral or collective commitment not to make use of the veto, or even urging moderation. That nonsense has no legal validity. In law, a door is either open or closed. The veto either exists or it does not exist. We are not such dreamers as to believe, at this stage of international relations, that the veto can be completely eliminated. However, 796  10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1. 797  → 4.2.2.3.20 for Tunisia’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

795

we do believe that we could make the situation more acceptable by requiring at least three permanent members to oppose a resolution. But we must do away with the single veto. We must do away with the single veto. […] 4.4.3.19 14 October 2003, Syria, Mr. Mekdad, UN Doc. A/58/PV.31, pp. 21-22798 […] Democracy in international relations has became more urgent than ever in a world in which communications networks, relations, ties, interests and disadvantages have gone beyond regional and local frameworks. The veto power is one of the most pronounced manifestations of the absence of democracy in international relations. If it is true that any organization in the world needs to strive to achieve stability, then justice should be its guiding source, in keeping with the relationship between justice and law in any legal system. Based on that same concept, and in keeping with the resolutions of the Non-Aligned Movement adopted at its summits and conferences, the use of veto should be restricted, with the long-term aim of its elimination, as it has been proven that international peace and security have been greatest victims of the veto. It has been abused and has become a tool for discrimination, not only between countries, but also in the implementation of United Nations resolutions, including of the Security Council itself. Therefore, it is important now to establish controls and criteria to avert the arbitrary use of veto. […] Discussing reform of the Security Council and increasing its membership prompts us to attach special importance to the working methods of the Council, which is no less important an issue than is expansion of the Council. This requires the establishment of controls and criteria, emphasized by summits of the Non-Aligned countries, in a way that ensures non-use of the veto in an arbitrary manner and that strengthens democracy and transparency in decision-making and that ensures implementation of Security Council resolutions in a more balanced and equitable way, without resorting to double standards. […] 4.4.3.20  29 January 2004, European Parliament resolution on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations, (2003/2049 (INI)), P5_TA(2004)0037799 The European Parliament, […] Enhancing the EU’s role in a reinforced UN […] 12. Urges EU Member States to reach, with utmost urgency, agreement on the institutional reform of the UN system, in the light of the upcoming EU personality, and of the following principles: […]

798  → 4.2.2.3.22 for Syria’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 799  → 4.2.2.3.23 for the European Parliament’s support of regional seats, presented in the same resolution.

796

4 Momentum and deadlock

– improving the decision-making process of the Security Council by replacing the current veto system by a system of double veto (veto only relevant if by 2 permanent members) and only in the cases referred to in chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression); […] […] 20. Looks to the EU actively to participate in reforming and further developing the UN; takes the view that, in the event of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity within the meaning of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, it must be possible for the United Nations to be authorised to intervene rapidly; considers in this connection that the possibility must be created of circumventing the veto of a permanent member of the Security Council should an independent body endowed with legitimacy under international law (for instance, the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court) establish that there is an imminent danger of the above-mentioned crimes being committed; […] 4.4.3.21 12 October 2004, Mongolia, Mr. Choisuren, UN Doc. A/59/PV.26, pp. 13-15800 […] Historical evidence clearly proves that the veto power has been used more often in defence of the national interests of the permanent members than for the sake of a common cause, and has thus become one of the main impediments to the effectiveness of the work of the Council. In that regard, a comprehensive review of the veto power should be one of the first priorities. We believe that the proposals offered by some delegations on limiting the veto power to matters under Chapter VII deserve our close attention. The veto could be replaced gradually by consensual decision-making. […] 4.4.3.22  21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.68801 Reform of the Security Council The General Assembly, […] Stressing the urgent need to improve the working methods of the Security Council in accordance with the various issues discussed within the Open-ended Working Group, in particular the question of transparency in decision-making; accountability; fairer opportunities of participation of Member States; better access to information by all Member States and restrictions on the veto power with a view to its eventual elimination, 800  → 4.2.1.1.34 for Mongolia’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 801  → 4.2.2.2.1 for these states’ support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

797

[…] Working methods 7. Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner, including in particular: (a) Restraint on the use of the veto; […] 4.4.3.23 11 November 2005, Cuba, Mr. Reyes Rodríguez, UN Doc. A/60/PV.49, pp. 18-20802 […] There cannot be a genuine reform of the United Nations without a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, an organ where the principle of the sovereign equality of States is institutionally and flagrantly violated on a daily basis. It will not be possible to restore the rule of international law or make the Organization truly democratic as long as the Council exercises totalitarian powers. Nor will the Council recover its credibility and the legitimacy of its decisions as long as the super-Power continues to impose its will by the force of arms and the use of its money for blackmail. We have often reaffirmed that the veto should be eliminated. But even after achieving the elimination of that unjust privilege, nothing will change if the reform leaves untouched the unacceptable, aggressive conduct and the hegemonic ambition of the world’s most powerful country in terms of military and economic power, or fails to address the logic of domination and pillage that governs the essential processes of the international economic and financial system, disarmament and the precarious, temporary equilibrium of international security schemes. That set of factors prevents the majority of Council members from exercising their will and inhibits the General Assembly in its exercise of the considerable powers assigned to it by the Charter so that it can tackle the important challenges arising from the world’s political, military and financial situation. Therefore, until the ultimate objective of eliminating the veto can be achieved, it is necessary, as a first step in that direction, to limit the veto’s use to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 4.4.3.24 30 May 2006, Non-Aligned Movement, Final Document, NAM Doc. NAM/ MM/COB/8 […] D. Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, and other Matters Related to the Security Council […] 43.6. The objectives of reform of the Security Council, which should be addressed in a comprehensive, transparent and balanced manner, are as follows: (a) to ensure that the agenda of the Council reflects the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries, in an objective, rational, non-selective and non-arbitrary manner; 802  → 4.2.1.1.46 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

798

4 Momentum and deadlock

(b) to ensure that the enlargement of the Council, as a body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, would lead to a more democratic, more representative, more accountable and more effective Council; (c) to democratise the decision-making process of the Council, including by limiting and curtailing the use of the veto with a view to its eventual elimination and, in this context, the concept of voluntary “self-restraint” is insufficient and cannot be considered as an option. Additional options that could be considered include, inter alia:  Limiting the exercise of the veto right to actions taken by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.  The possibility of overruling the veto within the Council by an affirmative vote of a certain number of Member States, commensurate with the size of an expanded Council.  The possible overruling of the veto by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure and under progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the Charter; (d) to ensure that the Rules of Procedure of the Council, which have remained provisional for more than 50 years, are formalised in order to improve its transparency and accountability. […]

• • •

4.4.3.25 12 December 2006, India, Mr. Sen, UN Doc. A/61/PV.74, pp. 7-13803 […] This resolution – 267 (III)804 – mentions, as I said, the question of the veto. Certainly, many Members have talked about the principle of the veto, which is an important principle. It is said that although the devil is in the details, we have to examine everything in detail, minutely and with some fineness. What is the problem of the veto? Essentially – at least according to all the discussions that I heard yesterday and today in this Hall – it is either a problem of quantity, of immediately giving the veto to more countries, or a problem of quality, of how to place restrictions on the veto that would ensure that it is used to further the principles of international law and the interests of the international community, and not simply to further individual national interests. Is that not really the problem? And if it is, can any restrictions be placed on the veto? There are those who believe and say that the veto has never been amended. The short answer is that the veto has been amended. The only thing is, it has been amended through an informal process and therefore through something that remains legally infirm. The Charter clearly speaks of the concurring votes of all of the permanent members. If we read the Charter commentaries of 1946, we find that abstention was treated as a veto. But that is not the case today. So what we have is the formless amendment of the principle of the veto. The problem is that that kind of amendment is actually a form of lawmaking through lawbreaking, because the Charter can be amended only through a formal process that is set out in Articles 108 and 109; it cannot simply be

803  → 4.2.1.1.49 for India’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 804  General Assembly Res. 267 (III) of 14 April 1949, → 2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

799

formlessly amended by the permanent members. But that is what has happened. The downside is that the General Assembly cannot challenge as legally invalid a decision by the Security Council with an abstention by one of the permanent members because of the principle of estoppel – because it has been accepted for so long. Juridically speaking, the Assembly cannot even insist on continuing this practice, because the permanent members can go back to the earlier interpretation at any time they choose, without any legal hindrance. Therefore, we have to see how restrictions can be placed on the veto. I believe that the United States Constitution – to which I have already referred – also contains some very fundamental ideas concerning this question, because it stipulates that a presidential veto can be overridden by the Congress. Here, perhaps we could look at special majorities in the Security Council or the General Assembly that could override a Council veto. Then again, we have this fundamental tension in the Charter between maintaining peace and security – saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, as the famous phrase goes – and actually defending individual rights. The Security Council is very quick to include matters involving individual rights on its agenda, but without completing the logic of it, even though it is wrong to bring matters that really amount to a formless amendment of Article 39, of what constitutes a threat to peace and security. There have been other such amendments, such as the amendment to Article 29, which empowers the setting up of subsidiary bodies, but through which legal tribunals have been set up. Here, quite clearly, the Security Council simply does not have the legal power, so it cannot give such power to a tribunal. The Council is a body for implementing the law on peace and security, for being a firefighter on peace and security, not for making laws. The Security Council puts individual rights on its agenda, but it is not willing to work to the full the paradigm of individual rights, where there is no place for the veto. The veto was not set up within the paradigm of individual rights. So here again is the question of restriction. Other restrictions on the right of the veto are possible. In particular, if we look at Oppenheim’s extremely authoritative International Law: A Treatise, it clearly says that if a permanent member were to use the veto to prevent a Charter amendment for which well above a two-thirds majority of the membership has voted – and which is therefore in the interests of the international community – that would be an abuse of the veto. It would be illegal, because it would be not using the veto to further the interests of the international community. Therefore, even a veto on this kind of amendment is subject both to restriction and to legal challenge. […] 4.4.3.26 18 November 2008, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/63/PV.53, pp. 15-16 […] Colombia believes that the Council should be able to avail itself of more democratic decision-making mechanisms. My country reiterates its historic opposition to the veto and believes that any reform of the Council would be incomplete without a thorough examination of options to curtail its use with a view to eventually abolishing it. In that regard, an initial option would be restricting its use to situations pertaining to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Another possibility would be to establish a mechanism to reduce or neutralize the use of the veto or to increase the threshold required for it to take effect. […]

800

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 4.4.4.1 21 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/ 1998/CRP.8 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XIV, p. 50 Proposals on decision-making in the Security Council and the veto right, submitted by Germany, dated 21 April 1998: voting rights of the existing permanent members Germany proposes that reform of the Security Council take into consideration the following elements: – The use of the veto is a matter of general concern. Reform and expansion of the Security Council call for a thorough examination of the issue; – The members of the Security Council shall make every effort to seek consensus in the Council decision-making process; – The permanent members of the Security Council shall make statements, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter; – The permanent members shall be generally guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949805 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural; – In the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, the permanent members should accompany that decision with an explanation of such action; – A high-level working group should consider the question of the veto and submit any agreed recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as it is able, if possible prior to the adoption of Charter amendments. 4.4.4.2 22 April 1998, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XXII, p. 61806 […] − Permanent members of the Security Council should make a statement, either individually or collectively, that the veto will be exercised in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter, that they will generally be guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949807 regarding which matters should be deemed procedural and that, in the event of any veto of a draft resolution of the Security Council, they should accompany that decision with a formal explanation of such action; […] 4.4.4.3 25 June 1998, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.17 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XVI, pp. 52-53 Proposals on decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto 1. Following the recent deliberations in the Open-ended Working Group and the presentation by the Bureau of a revised conference room paper (CRP.10/Rev.1)808 on

805  → 2.1. 806  → 4.2.1.1.1 for Germany’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 807  → 2.1. 808  → 3.1.16.

4 Momentum and deadlock

801

decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto, our group has made the following observations: − The overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States support curtailment of the use of the veto through amendments of the Charter of the United Nations; − Most States have indicated that they would prefer the use of the veto to be restricted to Chapter VII; − The existing permanent members do not appear willing at present to accept any Charter-based limitation of their veto powers. Nor do they appear willing to make a political commitment to restrict the use of the veto to Chapter VII; − General agreement on a comprehensive reform package is unlikely to be achieved without an understanding on the future scope and application of the veto; − Given concerns of Member States about the current scope and application of the veto, agreement on its possible extension to new permanent members may depend on the willingness of the existing permanent members to accept restrictions on its use. 2. The group believes that steps to curtail the scope and application of the veto should be part of a global approach to the reform of the Security Council. We are conscious of the views and arguments presented on this issue, ranging from total abolition of the veto or, at least, a radical curtailment of its scope and application, to no change whatsoever. While we consider that Charter-based changes to the use of the veto remain an essential objective to be pursued, we have sought to provide some practical suggestions in the proposal set out below. We would emphasize that these fall short of the fuller demands of many delegations, including those belonging to our group. They have as a common element that no amendment to the Charter would be required. 3. The group suggests the following approach: (a) The General Assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, would make specific recommendations aimed at reducing areas where the veto can be applied; (b) The existing permanent members would state, individually or collectively, in writing, that they would commit themselves to exclude the use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. 4. The group, therefore, proposes that the General Assembly, in exercising the authority conferred upon it by Article 10 of the Charter, recommend that: (a) The permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole, should exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into account the interest of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case, in writing, on what ground they consider that condition to be present; (b) The veto should be excluded in respect of matters contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949,809 entitled Decisions deemed procedural, updated as necessary; (c) The veto should be excluded in respect of recommendations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations. 809  → 2.1.

802

4 Momentum and deadlock

5. The group proposes that further consideration be given to issues on which the veto should not apply, such as: − Gathering of information and ascertaining facts; − Calls on parties to settle disputes by peaceful means; − Entrusting the Secretary-General with certain tasks in dispute Settlements; − Calls on the parties to a conflict to respect human rights and international humanitarian law; − Steps undertaken by the Secretary-General to mediate and prevent conflicts; − The dispatch of United Nations observers to observe and report to the Security Council. 4.4.4.4 24 August 1998, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN Doc. A/ AC.247/1998/CRP.11 = UN Doc. A/52/47, Annex XV, p. 51 The veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council: Supplement paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of section I.A of document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.10810 with the following text: The permanent members of the Security Council should endeavour not to resort to the veto or to the threat of its use. They should exercise the veto in a manner consistent with their responsibilities under the Charter. The General Assembly should adopt a declaration encouraging Security Council members to make every effort to seek consensus in the Council’s decision-making process. 4.4.4.5 22 March 1999, Japan, Mr. Satoh, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] As we all know, the responsibility and privilege of the veto constitutes a defining element distinguishing the permanent members from non-permanent members. The discussion of the veto by this Working Group is particularly relevant inasmuch as we are addressing the question of expanding both categories of membership. On this occasion, I would like to restate Japan’s basic position on the question of the veto. First, the use of the veto by any State to further its parochial national interest is unacceptable. My delegation strongly believes that the decisions of the Council are most effective when its members seek to make decisions by consensus. In this connection, my delegation shares the view that permanent members should state that in exercising the veto they will be guided by the annex to resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949811 regarding matters that should be deemed procedural, and that they should be required to offer a formal explanation whenever they cast the veto on a draft Security Council resolution. Second, the principle of equality among all permanent members, both existing and new, must be taken seriously. Any discrimination in status between the new and existing permanent members must be avoided. Finally, it is my delegation’s view that it may be realistic to expect that the question of the veto will not be resolved until the very final phase of negotiations. At the same time, 810  → 3.1.14. 811  → 2.1.

4 Momentum and deadlock

803

we believe that a package of reforms cannot be finalized unless we address the question of the veto. Therefore, my delegation regards favorably the suggestion made by some countries to set up a high-level group of persons to consider this issue. We believe that by taking this approach we can avoid the danger that an impasse on the veto question might prevent progress on the other aspects of Security Council reform. […] 4.4.4.6 16 December 1999, United Kingdom, Mr. Greenstock, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 17-18812 […] Allow me to say a word on the voting rights of the existing permanent members of the Council. The United Kingdom believes that these are essential, both to the authority of the Security Council and to its ability to function effectively. They ensure that its decisions will be implemented with resolve and determination. The United Kingdom is therefore firmly opposed to any restrictions on these rights. However, we recognize fully our responsibilities under the Charter and are committed to working for consensus in the Council wherever possible, as this year’s events have shown. We will continue to exercise our voting rights with restraint, in a manner consistent with our obligations under the Charter. We are ready to participate in further discussion of this subject. […] 4.4.4.7 16 December 1999, Czech Republic, Mr. Galuška, UN Doc. A/54/PV.82, pp. 25-26813 […] As to the question of the veto, we continue to favour some reduction of areas where the veto can be applied, possibly through individual commitments by permanent members, and other steps which do not necessarily require Charter amendments, as suggested in a proposal of 25 June 1998.814 […] 4.4.4.8 31 March 2000, Germany, UN Doc. A/AC.247/2000/CRP.4 = UN Doc. A/54/47, Annex VII, p. 45 Letter dated 31 March 2000, concerning the introduction of an obligation to explain the use of a veto During the March deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group, it was suggested that Germany submit in writing its proposal on the introduction of an obligation to explain the use of a veto. I am glad to provide you with our proposal. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, addressed the General Assembly on 22 September 1999 on this subject. He said: According to the Charter, the Security Council acts with the mandate and on behalf of all United Nations Member States. But hitherto they have not been entitled to 812  → 4.2.1.1.8 for the United Kingdom’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 813  → 4.2.1.3.5 for the Czech Republic’s position focusing on an expansion in the nonpermanent category, presented in the same statement. 814  → 4.4.4.3.

804

4 Momentum and deadlock

learn why a State has exercised its right of veto. This is not only neither democratic nor transparent, but also makes it easier for States to veto a draft resolution unilaterally for national rather than international interests. The introduction of an obligation for a State to explain to the General Assembly why it is vetoing a draft resolution would make it more difficult to do so and thus bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more responsibly. Why should not the General Assembly assume more responsibility in future, too?815 We think that we can in this way pragmatically approach the veto reform, which a significant majority of United Nations Member States have demanded. As a complete abolition of the veto is not realistic, most Member States favour limiting the use of the veto. In making its proposal, Germany took into consideration the pragmatic approach taken by a group of reform-oriented Member States, the “group of ten”, namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. In June 1998 they submitted a number of practical proposals to reform and limit the use of the veto which would not require Charter amendments.816 Asking permanent Security Council members to justify their actions might make it more difficult for them to cast a veto. In an ideal scenario, they might even refrain from using the veto altogether. We could thus have a more democratic use of the veto without having to change the Charter. I should like to request you to circulate this letter as a conference room paper, thus making it available to all members of the Open-ended Working Group. […] 4.4.4.9 16 November 2000, Nigeria, Mr. Mbanefo, UN Doc. A/55/PV.65, pp. 46-48817 […] On the related question of the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, Nigeria supports the curtailment of its use by the permanent members of the Council. We even support its abolition if it is the consensus of the international community. However, if the veto is to be retained in its present form, it is the view of my delegation that it should be extended to new permanent members of the Council. Denial of the veto to new permanent members in an enlarged Security Council will not only be discriminatory, but it will also create two different classes of permanent membership and a situation that does not promote cohesion and stability in the Council. In order to forestall any abuses of the exercise of the veto, if the veto is retained, it may be necessary for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution reminding the permanent members that they are acting on behalf of the United Nations as a whole. They should therefore exercise the veto only when they consider the question to be of vital importance, taking into consideration the interests of the United Nations as a whole, and should state in each case in writing on what grounds they consider that condition to be present. […]

815  See UN Doc. A/54/PV.8, pp. 11-15. 816  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 817  → 4.2.2.3.15 for Nigeria’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

805

4.4.4.10 17 November 2000, Thailand, Mr. Jayanama, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 2-4818 […] Secondly, on the decision-making process of the Council, to the overwhelming membership of the United Nations the heart of the problem is in what form the veto should be modified and whether new permanent members should be accorded veto power. With the sole exception of the permanent five, Member States find the veto and its present practice outdated and unacceptable, as it runs counter to the democratic character of the United Nations. On this issue, we should ask why the permanent five need to retain their veto power in the present form. […] As to the issue of the veto, it is a question of recognizing and modernizing one’s moral and political responsibility. Responsibility here means that those who have the veto should demonstrate their willingness to limit their use of it. Indeed, this responsibility is implicit in the Charter when it speaks of the Security Council as an organ which acts on behalf of all of us. In fact, most of us are realistic enough to accept that the abolition of the veto may not be feasible at this stage, but many of us entertain the hope that the permanent five would at least pledge publicly to use the veto only in regard to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. This could be a major breakthrough in moving the overall process forward. This magnanimous decision will not only collectively enhance the permanent five’s moral and political standing, but also lay down the basis for denying the veto to new permanent members should we agree to have them. […] 4.4.4.11 17 November 2000, Costa Rica, Mr. Niehaus, UN Doc. A/55/PV.66, pp. 10-12 […] No member of the Security Council should act exclusively on the basis of its own national interests. It is unacceptable for this organ to become a foreign policy instrument for its members. It is not acceptable for the Security Council to ignore situations that demand its attention, on the pretext that some of its members are involved in these situations or that these members do not have a national interest in the region. True reform of the Security Council requires that this organ become, in the future, much more fair, equitable and impartial. For this reason, we believe that we must place limits on the exercise of veto rights. […] 4.4.4.12 17 November 2000, Bulgaria, Mr. Sotirov, UN Doc. A/55/PV.67, p. 24819 […] With regard to the veto powers of the permanent members, we believe that under the present conditions, it is essential that the use of these powers be curtailed in order for the Security Council’s work in facing the new challenges of the twenty-first century to be effective. Bulgaria shares the view that this curtailment can be achieved without introducing amendments to the Charter. Permanent members of the Security Council, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the Organization as a whole, should limit the exercise their veto right. A number of exclusion clauses for the application 818  → 4.2.1.1.18 for Thailand’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 819  → 4.2.1.3.11 for Bulgaria’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement.

806

4 Momentum and deadlock

of the veto may be agreed upon and applied. It is encouraging in this respect that during the debates in the Working Group, the aspirant countries have joined their voices to the appeals for a more restricted use of the veto. […] 4.4.4.13 31 October 2001, Slovakia, Ms Novotná, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, pp. 12-14820 […] The new international situation has created fresh opportunities for unity in the Security Council and for a cooperative approach to its decision-making. In this regard, Slovakia considers that the problem of the threat of the veto remains the issue of central importance. The Slovak Republic can accept the right of veto being extended to new permanent members of the Security Council, but at the same time we would want to see concerted action to reduce the role of the veto.821 The permanent members should be strongly encouraged to minimize their use of it. They should now be able to do what the General Assembly requested 55 years ago: to agree among themselves on limiting the number of situations in which the veto may be used, and also to agree which issues should be defined as procedural. And, as a part of the future amendments of the Charter, the right to exercise the veto could perhaps be excluded for a number of specific situations. The right of veto should be restricted to decisions on matters taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. As regards the decision-making process, the Slovak Republic considers it possible in a 25-member Council for decisions to be taken by a majority of 15 votes. […] 4.4.4.14 31 October 2001, France, Mr. Levitte, UN Doc. A/56/PV.35, p. 15822 […] We are attached to the right of veto, as recognized by the Charter. Its use cannot be regulated or constrained by pre-defined criteria. At the same time, France believes that the Security Council must be able fully to exercise the primary responsibility entrusted to it by the Charter, in particular in situations of serious violations of international humanitarian law that threaten international peace and security. For the permanent members, that would entail a responsible use of their right of veto. […] 4.4.4.15 11 October 2004, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.24, pp. 22-23823 […] The expansion of the Security Council is the most visible and the most frequently discussed aspects of Council reform, but it is not the only aspect that needs to be taken into account. Switzerland attaches great importance to reforms – perhaps less dramatic, but equally essential – in the functioning of the Security Council. Important improvements could be undertaken without any formal revision of the Charter. First, with regard to the exercise of the veto, my country has called for greater 820  → 4.2.1.3.14 for Slovakia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 4.3.16 for Slovakia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 821  Slovakia confirmed this position on 16 October 2002 in UN Doc. A/57/PV.32, pp. 13-14. 822  → 4.2.1.1.19 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 823  → 4.2.1.2.9 for Switzerland’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

4 Momentum and deadlock

807

restraint here. Any abuse of the veto affects the credibility of the United Nations and increases the already widespread feeling in certain regions of the world that double standards are sometimes being used. Furthermore, to the extent that the veto is a kind of privilege, could one not expect people who use the veto to explain that use in the General Assembly after the event? Would it not be a means for a State concerned to have its position better understood by the international community? […] 4.4.4.16 11 July 2005, Switzerland, Mr. Maurer, UN Doc. A/59/PV.111, pp. 20-22824 […] Today we have before us a draft resolution825 that proposes a model and a specific methodology for Council reform. It is the result of many months of work by its authors to make the proposal known and to take into account the suggestions and views of Member States. […] As far as the working methods of the Security Council are concerned, all Member States have had the opportunity to examine the proposals that Switzerland submitted in a document distributed to all missions on 27 April 2005. The draft resolution before us today partly takes into consideration the recommendations that Switzerland feels particularly strongly about. However, it does not address three concerns that we also consider to be of particular importance. First, it should no longer be possible for the current permanent members to exercise their right of veto when the Council is called upon to act on cases of genocide, large-scale massacres, ethnic cleansing, or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law. That proposal, which was warmly received during our informal debates since January, should have no trouble being accepted and finding a consensus. […] 4.4.4.17 3 November 2005, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution on the working methods of the Security Council The General Assembly […] Stressing the special responsibility of the Permanent Members of the Security Council to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter and to give their full support to the actions of the Organization aimed at maintaining international peace and security, […] Emphasizing the need for further measures to ensure accountability, transparency, inclusion, representation and legitimacy of the work of the Security Council, with a view to further enhancing its effectiveness, Reaffirming its support for early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of the overall effort to reform the United Nations, as stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,826

824  → 4.2.1.2.11 for Switzerland’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 825  6 July 2005, UN Doc. A/59/L.64, → 4.2.1.1.37. 826  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

808

4 Momentum and deadlock

Acknowledging that efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council promote a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, including the increase in its membership, 1. Invites the Security Council to consider the measures contained in the annex to the present resolution in order to further enhance inclusion, transparency, accountability and legitimacy of its work with a view to strengthening its effectiveness; 2. Further invites the Security Council to report to the General Assembly, by the end of its 60th session, on action it has taken pursuant to consideration of the present resolution. Annex Measures on Working Methods suggested for consideration by the Security Council Relationship with the General Assembly and other principal organs […] Implementation of decisions […] Subsidiary bodies […] Use of the veto 13. A Permanent Member using its veto should explain the reason for doing so to the General Assembly within five working days after the relevant resolution was rejected in the Security Council. 14. No Permanent Member should cast a non-concurring vote in the sense of Art. 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Operations mandated / carried out by the SC […] Integration of new Members […] 4.4.4.18 17 March 2006, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.49 Improving the working methods of the Security Council The General Assembly, […] Emphasizing the need for further measures to ensure the accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness of the work of the Security Council, with a view to further enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness, Reaffirming its support for early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of the overall effort to reform the United Nations, as stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,827 Acknowledging that efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council promote a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, including the increase in its membership, 1. Invites the Security Council to consider the measures contained in the annex to the present resolution in order to further enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness; 2. Further invites the Security Council to report to the General Assembly, by the end of its sixtieth session, on action it has taken pursuant to its consideration of the present resolution. 827  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

4 Momentum and deadlock

809

Annex Measures on working methods suggested for consideration by the Security Council […] Use of the veto 13. A permanent member of the Security Council using its veto should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is rejected in the Council and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document to all Members of the Organization. 14. No permanent member should cast a non-concurring vote in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. […] 4.4.4.19 11 December 2006, Costa Rica, Mr. Urbina, UN Doc. A/61/PV.73, pp. 2-3 […] Before I conclude, I should like to draw the Assembly’s attention to the power of the veto, which we believe has lost much of the original purpose for which it was conceived. This instrument, which was justifiable at its inception, requires that it be used responsibly in the global village in which we live today. The veto cannot be the last resort of special interests to the detriment of overall interests. Nor can it be a mechanism that leads to inaction. Above and beyond a thorough debate on this issue, we would like to emphasize today the need for urgent reform that eliminates, or at least effectively limits, the use of the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights. […] 4.4.4.20 12 November 2007, Canada, Mr. McNee, UN Doc. A/62/PV.48, pp. 27-29828 […] We also strongly believe that the veto has no place in deliberations on situations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and we urge the five permanent members to commit themselves to voluntarily restrict its use in those situations, which shock the conscience of humanity. […] 4.4.4.21 20 March 2008, Cyprus on behalf of the Overarching Group, UN Doc. A/62/47, pp. 24-28829 […] Elements for working methods […] (f) Appealing to permanent members of the Security Council to ascertain that war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity would not be committed and that other irremediable negative developments would not occur as a result of blocking Security Council action, […]

828  → 4.2.2.2.12 for Canada’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 829  → 4.2.2.2.14 for the Overarching Group’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

810

4 Momentum and deadlock

(k) A permanent member of the Security Council using its veto should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is rejected in the Council and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document to all Members of the Organization.

4.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 4.5.1  1999, Terence O’Brien, Electoral Group Reconfiguration and Present Day Realities, in: Ramesh Thakur (ed.), What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century: Report of a seminar held by the International Peace Academy and the United Nations University, 26 March 1999, New York, USA; United Nations University, pp. 30-39830 […] [35] […] Reconfiguring the Electoral Groups The need to enhance the sense amongst countries of equivalence of benefits from multilateralism (the “diffuse reciprocity” mentioned earlier) requires that stakeholding in the integrity of the UN system be constantly nourished. This should be driven less by lofty moral considerations of equity than by sheer hard-nosed interest on the part of the great and the small. One area where the legitimacy of the system can be enhanced, and distortions produced by time corrected, is in the configuration of the UN electoral groups that operate at UN Headquarters. Reconfiguration should have the following aims: To improve the prospects for all members that desire the opportunity to play an equitable part in, and make an equitable contribution to, problem-solving in the UN system; To achieve this through expansion of the number of electoral groups, and by reducing the size of each electoral group, to reinforce prospects for rotational equity and, therefore, the legitimacy of the system. The purpose should not be to set up new groups with avowedly political purpose that would substitute for allegiances already established through other groups (fashioned on a basis of geography, of interest or of sheer capacity) which operate inside or outside the UN multilateral system. The G77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the European Union, the G8 group of industrialized states, the G15 group of developing countries, the Cairns Group, the Australia Group, the New Agenda Coalition, and so on and so forth would, continue, of course, to operate and command the support of those involved in each case. The central purpose of the new electoral grouping would be improvement of essential legitimacy in the UN system.

• •

830  Copyright 1999 by the United Nations University. Published by the United Nations University. Reproduced with the permission of the United Nations University.    Terence O’Brien (*1936) is a former New Zealand diplomat. He was Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva (1980-83), to the European Community in Brussels (1983-86), and to the UN in New York (1990-93). In 1993 he was appointed Founding Director of the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies, and served as the Centre’s director until his retirement in 2001. He has written and lectured widely on international and regional relations, security affairs and New Zealand foreign policy.

4 Momentum and deadlock

811

A Model for Change The basis of geographical coherence is the foundation of the present arrangements within the New York-based electoral groups. That foundation should be retained, but improved. Smaller electoral groups might enhance a sense of homogeneity amongst members, although that should not be exaggerated and is not the purpose of reconfiguration. Essential realities of power will endure. But control based solely, or largely, on a hierarchy of power should be moderated or, at least, lend an essential legitimacy through [36] the purpose of differently configured electoral groupings. The strategic purpose of consolidating UN legitimacy is, of course, to enhance multilateral diplomacy and thereby the lateral skills of persuasion and negotiation. In the model proposed by this contribution, one guiding principle has been that the electoral groups should desirably all be more or less the same size in membership. Thus, in the composition and configuration suggested below, it is proposed that the UN membership be divided among nine electoral groups of plus or minus twenty countries each. There is nothing magical or incontrovertible about the figure nine. Eight groups with slightly more members, or seven with even more, or, alternatively, ten with fewer could equally be considered as the basis for proceeding. Likewise the nomenclature employed to describe the groups (for example Eurasia, Mediterranean-Gulf, North Europe, South Europe, etc.) is illustrative, not definitive. Better geographical descriptions are, almost certainly, possible, and positioning of individual countries inside various groups could be improved. This proposition is a first cut, intended to provoke ideas and improvements to the basic suggested model. (The proposed electoral groupings are shown in the table.) It is important to underline that the suggested group breakdown is not particularly novel, nor revolutionary. There is precedent. To serve the aim of ensuring equitable geographical representation in the composition of the UN staff complement, the UN Secretariat itself employs a geographical grouping formula of Member States. It divides UN members into seven groups – Africa, Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and North America and the Caribbean. The size of each group ranges disparately from 53 (Africa) down to 14 (North America and Caribbean), and in this one regard is different from the idea for an electoral group formula advanced here. But the essential purpose, which is to reinforce equity, and therefore legitimacy, is not too different. The equitable staffing formula is validated by relevant UN General Assembly resolutions.13 Group reconfiguration is not an end itself. It is necessary to demonstrate how it could contribute to consolidating legitimacy through greater equity in the UN. Potentiality of the Model: UN Security Council One particular potentiality for the proposed model of reconfiguration here lies, it is suggested, in the contribution it could make to moving ahead on the profoundly complex issue of the reform of the composition of the Security Council. Reality suggests that progress on that issue is never likely to be swift if it continues to involve a difficult full-frontal process of proposing, debating, negotiating and selecting which countries deserve permanent status,14 and how many new non-permanent places should be created. Initially, a more oblique approach involving reconfiguring the electoral groups as suggested could impart momentum to the whole business of giving. [37]

812

4 Momentum and deadlock

Table: Proposed electoral groupings 1 EURASIA (21) Afghanistan India Russia* Armenia Iran Seychelles Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Sri Lanka Bangladesh Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Belarus Maldives Turkmenistan Bhutan Nepal Ukraine Georgia Pakistan Uzbekistan

2 ASIA-PACIFIC (25) 3 MEDITERRANEAN-GULF (19) Australia Lao PDR Marshall Is. Algeria Lebanon Sudan Brunei Malaysia ROK Bahrain Libya Syria Cambodia Mongolia Samoa Egypt Morocco Tunisia China* Myanmar Singapore Iraq Oman Turkey DPRK New Solomon Is Israel Qatar UAE Fiji Zealand Thailand Jordan Saudi Yemen Micronesia Philippines Vanuatu Kuwait Arabia Indonesia Palau Viet Nam Japan PNG

4 NORTH EUROPE (19) Netherlands Iceland Belgium Norway Czech Rep Ireland Poland Denmark Latvia Liechtenstein Slovak Rep Estonia Sweden Lithuania Finland Germany Luxembourg UK* Hungary

5 SOUTH EUROPE (20) Monaco France* Albania Portugal Andorra FRY Romania Greece Austria San Italy BosniaMacedonia Marino Herz Slovenia Bulgaria Malta Moldavia Spain Croatia Cyprus

6 NORTH AFRICA (23) Mauritania Eritrea Benin Burkina Ethiopia Niger Nigeria Gambia Faso Sao Tome/ Cameroon Ghana Prin. Guinea Cape Guinea Verde Senegal Bissau CAR Sierra Liberia Chad Leone Mali Cote Togo d’Ivoire Eq. Guinea

7 SOUTHERN AFRICA (23) South Africa Lesotho Angola Botswana Madagascar Swaziland Tanzania Malawi Burundi Uganda Comoros Mauritius Mozambique Zaire Congo Zambia Namibia Djibouti Zimbabwe Rwanda Gabon Somalia Kenya

8 AMERICAS (19) Argentina Ecuador Panama El Salvador Paraguay Bolivia Guatemala Peru Brazil Honduras Uruguay Canada USA* Mexico Chile Colombia Nicaragua Venezuela Costa Rica

9 CARIBBEAN (16) Antigua/ Dominican St Kitts/ Nevis Rep Barb Bahamas Grenada St Lucia St Vincent/ Barbados Guyana Gren Haiti Belize Suriname Jamaica Cuba Trinidad/ Dominica Tobago

* Permanent Security Council member

[38] the UN Security Council an eventual structure relevant to the world as it exists. It would constitute a first constructive step. The contribution of the reconfigured electoral system, on the basis of the nine groups suggested here, would rest on the following foundations: The five permanent seats would remain as at present; A decision to allocate two non-permanent seats to each of the nine groups except the smallest group (the Caribbean), which would receive one seat: the number of non-permanent seats would therefore be 9 × 2 − 1 = 17 which would give a Security Council of 22 seats in total; the UN Charter would require amendment accordingly; Each of the nine groups would be extended unique discretion, however, to decide the length of tenure on the Security Council for each successful non-permanent

• • •

4 Momentum and deadlock

813

candidate from amongst its number; that provision would require a (simple) Charter amendment that permitted a non-permanent member to succeed itself; When declaring their candidature, each prospective candidate would declare to their Group with a two seat entitlement the length of tenure that it sought; the Group could decide to agree to the request as presented or to a different length of tenure for different candidates, taking into account considerations of equity, etc. As an example, the group could agree to extend a longer tenure to one of its candidates (8-10 years) and shorter tenure to the other (1-2 years); the prospect for some degree of semi-permanent status would be opened in this way; The power of veto would not be extended, but the prospective semi-permanent presence of powerful non-veto wielding states (particularly if they are large UN financial contributors) would clearly influence the incidence of the veto in the Council; The group candidates would still require General Assembly endorsement by a two-thirds majority; but the practice of a contested slate of candidates should have been obviated. The overall consequence of such change would be to underpin the Security Council with a sturdier, more pluralist foundation. The extra power extended to the electoral groups to decide length of tenure would nurture, but not demand, some greater accountability by successful Council members to the group. It would also enlarge nonpermanent member experience of the UN Security Council and its workings, which is a central requirement for a more effective and representative Security Council. Reconfiguration of electoral groups in the ways suggested here would not be the last word in itself on Council reform. The formalization of a new and larger Council, with an expanded team of permanent members, would still one day require eventual decision. But as a means to circumvent the present stalemate, the ideas here would take things forward, over an interim period at least, in a constructive achievable direction. [39] Conclusion The ideas in this contribution are intended to promote debate. The thrust behind the proposals of this paper are, however, fashioned precisely to produce a win-win outcome, in the sense that all countries should be advantaged under such a proposed scheme. Put in another way, no opportunity for any country, or group of countries, is promoted under the proposed formula at the expense of another country, or group of countries. As suggested, variants of the formula proposed are envisageable. The essential requirement is that the political decision to investigate the scope, and outline, of electoral group reconfiguration be taken by the UN General Assembly; and that practical work be then promptly organized to produce recommendations for Member State decision. The ideas may have some particular relevance to the consideration (by the open-ended group) of UN Security Council reform.

•

• •

814

4 Momentum and deadlock

4.5.2 2000, David Annoussamy, Recasting the Security Council, in: Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, pp. 538-546831 […] [541] […] So it is imperative to make arrangements to render the institution as representative as possible. The first question to be adverted to is what should be the basis of representation. For that purpose we have to bear in mind the powers and responsibility of the Security Council, viz. to maintain world peace and international security, if necessary by use of armed forces. The decision of the Security Council should have therefore the support of the vast chunk of the world might and the country targeted should not have any temptation to resist it. III. NORMS FOR REARRANGEMENT Then the first idea which occurs to the mind is to give weightage to the military importance of nations. This has to be discarded for several reasons. First this would be a premium to armaments and run counter to the ultimate aim of general disarmament. Secondly, it would not be easy to assess the military capability of the nations. Thirdly, a country may possess sophisticated arms but not be in a position to put them effectively to use. Lastly, a country might have accumulated arms but its economy may not enable it to sustain a war. Russia is now a good illustration of the point: its Gross National Product (GNP) has been estimated to be less than the assets of eight top Japanese banks. The second yardstick which offers itself for consideration is population. This yardstick appears at first sight legitimate. But unfortunately this is not very much relevant for the purpose of the Security Council. Even in olden days mere number was not a decisive factor in war operations. Nowadays a decision taken by a majority of poor and highly populated nations cannot be executed if it meets with the resistance of economically and militarily powerful nations. This leads us to think of the GNPs, as the basis. This is a good indicator of economic power and consequently of military potentialities. It takes into account the population also to some extent: if we consider two countries having the same per capita income, the one having a larger population will have necessarily a higher GNP. But the GNPs as they are available now do not appear to reflect the real economic strength. For instance, statistics show the GNP per capita is 80 dollars in Mozambique whereas it is 28870 dollars in Luxembourg. Such a disparity cannot simply exist in fact and leads irresistibly to the conclusion that there is something wrong in the calculation of GNP as effected now. Every one who has been in the United States of America knows that one dollar is not worth in the United States of America what it is worth in India when converted into rupees. [542] This anomaly is due to the bizarre manner in which the exchange rate gets fixed. This is not the place to expatiate on that point. Let us only remember that the high value of certain currencies is mainly due to the fact that their high technology 831  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi. – David Annoussamy (*1927) is an Indian legal scholar and a former judge in different positions including Chief Justice of Madras High Court (the high court of the Indian State of Tamil Nadu). After retirement, he served as Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal and Chairman of the State Commission for Consumer Disputes Redressal. His main fields of study are French and Indian law.

4 Momentum and deadlock

815

articles, especially arms, are overrated by the countries producing them on account of high demand. So the GNP as it is calculated does not reveal exactly the respective economic might of countries. However, it offers an objective basis which with some correction may provide a workable yardstick which could be improved in the course of time. Prima facie two corrections appear absolutely necessary. The first one is to calculate the GNP with the help of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as worked out by the International Monetary Fund. We shall call it for the purpose of convenience GNP/PPP. The conventional GNP is arrived at in evaluating a country’s production in local currency and converting the amount so arrived at in dollar as per the prevailing exchange rate. The GNP/PPP is arrived at in valuing the goods and services of each country at the price prevailing for them in the United States of America and making the total. This method though not perfect gives certainly a better picture of the ability of nations to contribute for the task of the Security Council. The second correction relates to arms. The ultimate aim is an unarmed world. However, we cannot at this stage prevent nations from fabricating arms nor can we prevent nations from exporting them as long as there are nations ready to spend their foreign currency on arms. However, it is essential to take all steps to prevent a country from taking advantage of its arms exports to get a bigger say in the Security Council. So the value of arms exported should be deducted from the GNP of the nation concerned, for our purpose. IV. MODE OF APPLICATION OF THE YARDSTICK With the above two corrections and others which may be found necessary, the GNP/ PPP may be a yardstick worth being tried. Let us now find out how this yardstick may be put to application for the purpose of filling the seats in the Security Council. The radical solution would consist of allotting votes to the states proportionately to their share in the world GNP/PPP. But disparity between States is now too high. The extreme cases are represented by Sao Tome et Principe (Africa) with 66 million dollars as GNP and Japan with 5174816 million dollars, if we exclude the United States of America not involved in the election process, being a permanent member. So if strict proportion is applied small states will have practically no say and they will not accept the change. Further, such a [543] course will constitute a complete departure from the principle of one nation one vote. Such a drastic solution has no chance of success. It is therefore necessary to devise a solution which takes into account the existing constraints and still makes the Security Council as representative as possible. I shall venture to indicate a tentative scheme on that line. The GNP/PPP of the world divided by twenty-eight, the contemplated number of seats, will give something like 1160 billion dollars. That much will be required by a country or a group of countries in order to qualify for a seat. Germany, Japan, India and Italy will get a seat each on their own strength. They will be excluded from the election process like the permanent members who have their seats secured. The remaining seats i.e., nineteen, may be filled up by election on regional basis. For that purpose the rest of the world may be divided into regions smaller than as present and consisting of countries having more or less the same interest and the same perception of world problems. Seats may be allotted to the regions proportionately to the total GNP/PPP of the region. In each region each state will have one vote as at present. Their voting

816

4 Momentum and deadlock

power will be in general higher than now, since for each seat the number of voting states will be reduced to half. This solution respects the vested right of permanent members and also the principle of one nation one vote. Within these constraints it attempts to realise a better representativity of the Security Council. It can be improved upon or a better solution can be found to make sure that in the unfolding future the Security Council represents always as accurately as possible the forces spread all over the world. That is the first essential step to reform the Security Council. V. THE EVIL OF VETO POWER The next complaint about the Security Council is the veto power which, however, vests in permanent members. In order to better appreciate it let us trace its origin. The big five who were united in their effort to fight the Axis powers had in mind their divergence of interest and outlook in the pre-War period and felt rightly that they may not agree on the management of the world after the war. The strife was apparent between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers led by the United States of America. Each side was suspicious of the other’s hegemonic aspirations. They were not confident that problems could be settled by discussion and compromise. They apprehended that a solution detrimental to their interest and their influence in the post-War period may be imposed on them by the majority. They were even apprehensive of onslaught on their political and economical system by the other side. So, each one wanted to have a final [544] say on matters coming before the Security Council and therefore they colluded to secure the veto power for permanent members. When the club of five thus arrogated to themselves the exorbitant power of veto other members acquiesced; what counted at that juncture was the military feats and the five were adorned with fresh laurels. The other members appear to have felt honoured to be associated with them and failed to examine the proposal with critical mind and foresight. They rested content with the assurance given that recourse to veto would be exceptional. But in fact the Security Council was practically paralysed by this veto power which was profusely used in the post-Second World War period. By their haughtiness and intransigence the permanent members have prevented the Security Council from delivering the goods and led the Security Council alienating the rest of the world. There was an appalling waste of time and energy in the Security Council debating at length problem after problem though it was well known that the matter would end by a veto. In the year 1950*1 the General Assembly by way of a resolution decided to take over the problems which got blocked in the Security Council, either suo moto or upon a majority resolution of the Security Council. After a long period of low profile action the Security Council started working with a semblance of normalcy only from the year 1990 upon the eclipse of the Soviet Union. The previous scenario may repeat again at the instance of one member or the other and the Security Council may relapse into ineffectiveness. This ill-conceived right of veto is obviously much against the interest of the world at large. It is also repugnant in principle to democratic norms. One cannot conceive that in a body representing the whole world a single state enjoys the power to decide ultimately the issue! Of course, decisions of the Security Council implying sooner or later a military intervention cannot be decided by a simple majority arraying one half of the world

4 Momentum and deadlock

817

against the other, generating thereby a world war. Even the majority of 3/5 provided now is not sufficient for measures involving military operations. One can think of different levels of majority according to the nature of the decisions which the Security Council may be led to take: investigation, recommendation, economic blockade, military operation. One can go even a step further and give the members [545] a number of votes proportionate to their might, viz. their GNP/PPP. Thus, the United States of America will get 6 votes, Japan 4 votes and Germany 2 votes. This will be a proper substitute to veto power. Thus, each nation would have the satisfaction of having been given the opportunity of throwing its full weight in support of the decision advocated by it. Of course, their financial contribution to the world body will have to be proportionate to this enhanced right of vote. With such measures or the like obnoxious veto power has to be done away with. VI. CONCLUSION The Security Council does not fulfil the obligation cast on it, on account of its unrepresentative character and the veto power. Important decisions are taken by nations acting singly or in conclave outside the Security Council. In order to have an effective peace keeping body it is necessary to recast the Security Council. Diplomats and intellectuals all over the world who are committed to the ideals of the United Nations owe a duty to the world. They have to elaborate and to disseminate the outlines of a solution which would make the Security Council fully responsive to world security problems and fully capable to tackle them. Such a solution should be thrown open to a world wide debate. As a part of such an exercise the following steps are suggested: To raise the number of elected members of the Security Council to twenty three. To admit to the Security Council all states having one twenty-eight of the world GNP/PPP. To distribute the remaining seats to regions smaller than the present ones, proportionately by the GNP/PPP of the regions. To continue in each region the practice of one nation one vote. To scrap the veto power of permanent members. To adopt in the Security Council a right of voting proportionate to GNP/PPP of the nations represented by the member of the Security Council. In order to get through any change in the present arrangement a majority of two-thirds of members and the consent of the ex-big five are necessary. Small states constituting more than one-third of the members will frown upon any attempt to representation to the Security Council based on economic strength. But if such representation is coupled with expansion of the Security Council and a better distribution of seats as contemplated, their influence on decision-making will increase. [546] The big five will not like to part with the exorbitant power of veto they enjoy now. But they will do well in assessing the results of the veto power during the past fifty years for themselves and for the rest of the world for which they have accepted to be guardian angels. If through veto power each one of them has avoided some harm for itself, have not others through the same power prevented it to reap many benefits? Is it not better to renounce elegantly the historical sequel of veto power than being stripped of it by circumstances? These are the questions they should advert to in the light of the principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations.

• • • • • •

818

4 Momentum and deadlock

Original footnote *1 The Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950 resolved that the General Assembly shall have the right to make recommendations to the Members for collective measures, including the use of force when the Security Council fails to exercise its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security because of lack of uniformity among the permanent members. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (New York, 1951) pp. 193-95, at p. 194. 4.5.3 2000, Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council, in: Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 319-399832 […] [341] […] IV. A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE IS PROPOSED: THE FORMULA When the best elements of the above recommendations are synthesized as to permanent membership and modified as to veto power, the following structure emerges for a reformed Security Council. This model realizes only a modest increase in membership, thereby preserving its “efficiency and effectiveness,” ameliorates the perceived hierarchy of developed versus developing states, limits the proliferation of veto [342] possibilities, and increases the Council’s representativeness, thus further legitimizing its decisions: Recommendations as to permanent membership and veto power Term and Veto Power

Member

Permanent Seats with Substantive Veto Power 1. China 2. Russia 3. United States Permanent Regional Rotating Two-Year Seats with Substantive Veto Power

Europe a. France b. Germany c. United Kingdom

Permanent Regional Rotating Two-Year Seats with Procedural Veto Power

1. Latin America a. Brazil b. Mexico c. Argentina or Chile 2. Africa a. South Africa b. Egypt c. Nigeria or Kenya 3. Asia a. India b. Japan c. Indonesia or Pakistan

832  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the author. – Michael J. Kelly holds the Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in Law at Creighton University School of Law in Omaha, Nebraska. He is president of the U.S. National Chapter of the Association international de

4 Momentum and deadlock

819

Under this formula, the goal of diversity among UNSC permanent members is dramatically achieved on several levels: ethnic, cultural, religious, and geographic. Moreover, power is preserved completely for three of the current five permanent members (China, Russia, and the United States) and partially, without diminution of the veto, for the other two (France and Britain). Additionally, the new veto right granted to new permanent regional rotating members is less powerful than the traditional substantive veto, thereby assuring that new members accede to the Council with “a veto power,” but not one that would increase the number of substantive veto possibilities. Indeed, the number of members that can exercise the substantive veto at any one time is reduced from five to four. [343] A. Reconfiguration of the Veto Power The problem of veto proliferation*1 that would likely result from an expansion of the Security Council is minimized under this author’s proposal to create a “procedural veto.” The procedural veto is one by which the permanent members for Latin America, Africa and Asia may veto an item just as one of the other permanent members may do with its substantive veto. However, when the procedural veto is cast (or the assent withheld, to use proper terminology), the matter is not automatically dead. Instead, it is referred to a special session of the General Assembly for consideration. A majority vote in the Assembly after brief debate, either for or against the matter without possibility of amendment, will then determine the matter’s future.*2 From a practical standpoint, the procedural veto then may become a substantive veto in some cases, especially on matters that directly affect developing countries – which are represented by the permanent regional rotating UNSC members who would be casting such a veto. However, judicious use of such a power must be encouraged, just as it must with those who wield the substantive veto.*3 Realistically, usage will rise and fall with whichever country happens to occupy the rotating seat for two years and whichever national interests happen to coincide with the thrust of the proposed action. A corollary benefit of this device is that it handily meets the goal of increased involvement by the General Assembly.*4 […] [346] The rotating nature of the regional permanent seats therefore offers the best compromise to the question of who should occupy those seats, and the most efficient form of participation from diverse nations. In fairness, it should be made clear that those countries selected to rotate through the permanent regional seats would not be allowed to also occupy a non-permanent regional rotating seat during the four-year period they are not filling the permanent seat.*5 Possible nuances that could alter the above formula for increased variety in representation may include: (1) the selection of four instead of three states to rotate through each permanent regional seat; (2) the conversion of seat rotation from a two-year to a one year commitment; or (3) the establishment of four regional security councils, composed of the states that rotate through the permanent regional seats and that consult with the occupier of each seat for that region when questions of Chapter VII use of force authorization arise. […] [356] […] C. Addition of Non-Permanent Members Beyond the proposed seventeen-member Security Council, it will likely be politically necessary to add more non-permanent seats to the [357] Council in order to gain   droit pénal. His research and teaching focuses on the fields of international and comparative law and Native American law.

820

4 Momentum and deadlock

the General Assembly’s acceptance of this article’s plan to reconfigure the permanent seats. Indeed, India’s ambassador to the U.N. has asserted that an expansion of both non-permanent and permanent seats is required.*6 The United States has stated that it would ultimately find a Council of twenty members or more acceptable.*7 Consequently, if three or four more non-permanent seats were added, a Council of twenty or twenty-one states would become reality.*8 The question then becomes, on what basis would these three new seats be allocated? The traditional method of apportionment for the ten current non-permanent seats is by regional representation through General Assembly election. Each state elected to a non-permanent seat, whether it is to represent Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America or another region, gets a two-year term in that seat and is automatically ineligible to serve again immediately.*9 The three new states could be apportioned within this existing regional distribution, adding an extra seat for East Asia for example, based on population or some other criteria. Alternatively, the three new seats could be filled as “at large” positions on a worldwide basis. Such a mechanism of universal suffrage has already been suggested by the U.N. permanent representative for New Zealand.*10 In practice, this would mean that, in addition to the seven permanent seats and the ten non-permanent regional seats, there would be three seats filled by states elected from the world at large, whose constituency during their term of election would be truly global. Original footnotes Fassbender, [Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective. The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998] at 255. *2 Several methods for General Assembly consideration present themselves. The most democratic method would be for the entire assembly to vote on the resolution. Alternatively, a special standing committee could be formed, representing a regional and developmental cross-section of perhaps twenty percent or twenty-five percent of the total members, that would vote on the resolution. Of course such a committee would have to continually remain “in session” in New York during the period when the rest of the Assembly is in recess. Finally, a hybrid approach could be adopted, whereby the whole Assembly would immediately take up the matter if it comes down while the Assembly is in session, but automatically refer it to the special standing committee if the resolution is presented for consideration while the Assembly is in recess. *3 Paul Lewis, U.N. Panel Proposes Expanding Security Council to 24 Members, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1997, at A13 (noting that the General Assembly President urges the permanent members to limit their use of the veto to Article VII issues). *4 Caron, [David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 American Journal of International Law 552-88 (1993)] at 575. *5 This mechanism would allow smaller countries more opportunity to occupy the existing non-permanent seats on the UNSC. U.N. Assoc. Canada, Roundtable on Security Council Reform, available at (last visited Mar. 2, 2000). *6 Common Ground program No. 9928 (radio broadcast, July 13, 1999), available at (last visited Dec. 4, 2000). In an interview with Keith Porter of the Stanley Foundation, Ambassador Kamlesh *1

4 Momentum and deadlock

821

Sharma said that “unless there is an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members that gives an expression to the aspirations and perspectives of the developing world, you will not have the voice of the Security Council carrying either balance or conviction.” Id. *7 See discussion supra section III(A). *8 A twenty-one member Council would be more mathematically balanced in that it would consist of fourteen non-permanent members and seven permanent members, reflecting the two to one ratio that currently exists. *9 Bailey, [Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Oxford: Clarendon, 3rd ed. 1998] at 142-43, 152-53. *10 U.N. Press Release GA/9688 (Dec. 16, 1999); Roundtable [see footnote *5 above], this mechanism would allow smaller countries more opportunity to occupy the existing non-permanent seats on the UNSC. 4.5.4  December 2001, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report “The Responsibility to Protect”833 [47] 6. The Question of Authority […] [49] […] The Security Council’s Role – and Responsibility 6.13 Because the prohibitions and presumptions against intervention are so explicitly spelled out in the Charter, and since no “humanitarian exception” to these prohibitions is explicitly provided for, the role of the Security Council becomes of paramount importance. There are a number of questions that can reasonably be asked about its authority and credibility, and we address them below: its legal capacity to authorize military intervention operations; its political will to do so, and generally uneven performance; its unrepresentative membership; and its inherent institutional double standards with the Permanent Five veto power. There are many reasons for being dissatisfied with the role that the Security Council has played so far. 6.14 But all that said, the Commission is in absolutely no doubt that there is no better or more appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for human protection purposes. It is the Security Council which should be making the hard decisions in the hard cases about overriding state sovereignty. And it is the Security Council which should be making the often even harder decisions to mobilize effective resources, including military resources, to rescue populations at risk when 833  © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2001 as represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Published by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. At the UN Millennium Assembly in September 2000, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be established as a response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s challenge to the international community to endeavour to build a new international consensus on how to respond in the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The Commission was launched by the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 14 September 2000. It was co-chaired by the former Canadian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General. Further members of the Commission were Gisèle Côté-Harper, Lee Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos, Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein and Ramesh Thakur.

822

4 Momentum and deadlock

there is no serious opposition on sovereignty grounds. That was the overwhelming consensus we found in all our consultations around the world. If international consensus is ever to be reached about when, where, how and by whom military intervention should happen, it is very clear that the central role of the Security Council will have to be at the heart of that consensus. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work much better than it has. […] [51] Legitimacy and the Veto 6.19 A common theme in a great many of the Commission’s consultations was the democratic legitimacy of the fifteen-member Security Council, which can hardly claim to be representative of the realities of the modern era so long as it excludes from permanent membership countries of major size and influence, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Security Council was also variously claimed to be neither answerable to the peoples of the world, nor accountable to the plenary General Assembly nor subject to juridical supervision and scrutiny. There is no doubt that reform of the Security Council, in particular to broaden and make more genuinely representative its composition, would help in building its credibility and authority – though not necessarily making the decision making process any easier. But this is not a debate into which this Commission need enter for the purposes of this report. 6.20 An issue which we cannot avoid addressing, however, is that of the veto power enjoyed by the present Permanent Five. Many of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto, or threat of its use, as likely to be the principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis. As has been said, it is unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern. Of particular concern is the possibility that needed action will be held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or more of the permanent members – a situation that has too frequently occurred in the past. There is another political problem. Those states who insist on the right to retaining permanent membership of the UN Security Council and the resulting veto power, are in a difficult position when they claim to be entitled to act outside the UN framework as a result of the Council being paralyzed by a veto cast by another permanent member. That is, those who insist on keeping the existing rules of the game unchanged have a correspondingly less compelling claim to rejecting any specific outcome when the game is played by those very rules. 6.21 For all these reasons, the Commission supports the proposal put to us in an exploratory way by a senior representative of one of the Permanent Five countries, that there be agreed by the Permanent Five a “code of conduct” for the use of the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member, in matters where its vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution. The expression “constructive abstention” has been used in this context in the past. It is unrealistic to imagine any amendment of the Charter happening any time soon so far as the veto power and its distribution are concerned. But the adoption by the permanent members of a more

4 Momentum and deadlock

823

formal, mutually agreed practice to govern these situations in the future would be a very healthy development. Political Will and Performance 6.22 The Commission recalls the Secretary-General’s warning that “If the collective conscience of humanity … cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice.” If the Council – and the five permanent members in particular – fail to make the Council relevant to the critical issues of the day then they can only expect that the Council will diminish in significance, stature and authority. [52] 6.23 While the Council has from time to time demonstrated a commitment and a capacity to fulfill this responsibility, too often it has fallen short of its responsibilities, or failed to live up to expectations. Sometimes this has been the result of a sheer lack of interest on the part of the five permanent members. Sometimes it has been because of anxiety about how a particular commitment would play in domestic politics. Often in the past, it has been the result of disagreements among the five permanent members on what if any action should be taken. Increasingly, it has resulted from a reluctance on the part of some key members to bear the burdens – especially the financial and personnel burdens – of international action. 6.24 It is especially important that every effort be made to encourage the Security Council to exercise – and not abdicate – its responsibility to protect. This means, as Article 24 of the Charter requires, prompt and effective engagement by the Council when matters of international peace and security are directly at issue. And it means clear and responsible leadership by the Council especially when significant loss of human life is occurring or is threatened, even though there may be no direct or imminent threat to international peace and security in the strict sense. 6.25 The UN exists in a world of sovereign states, and its operations must be based in political realism. But the organization is also the repository of international idealism, and that sense is fundamental to its identity. It is still the main focus of the hopes and aspirations for a future where men and women live at peace with each other and in harmony with nature. The reality of human insecurity cannot simply be wished away. Yet the idea of a universal organization dedicated to protecting peace and promoting welfare – of achieving a better life in a safer world, for all – survived the death, destruction and disillusionment of armed conflicts, genocide, persistent poverty, environmental degradation and the many assaults on human dignity of the 20th century. 6.26 For the UN to succeed, the world community must match the demands made on the organization by the resources given to it. The UN has the moral legitimacy, political credibility and administrative impartiality to mediate, moderate and reconcile the competing pulls and tensions that still plague international relations. People continue to look to the UN to guide and protect them when the tasks are too big and complex for nations and regions to handle by themselves. The comparative advantages of the UN are its universal membership, political legitimacy, administrative impartiality, technical expertise, convening and mobilizing power, and dedication of its staff. 6.27 The UN represents the idea that unbridled nationalism and the raw interplay of power must be mediated and moderated in an international framework. It is the centre for harmonizing national interests and forging the international interest. Only the UN can authorize military action on behalf of the entire international community,

824

4 Momentum and deadlock

instead of a select few. But the UN does not have its own military and police forces, and a multinational coalition of allies can offer a more credible and efficient military force when robust action is needed and warranted. What will be increasingly needed in the future are partnerships of the able, the willing and the well-intended – and the duly authorized. […] 4.5.5 6 December 2003, Parag Khanna, One More Seat at the Table, The New York Times, National edition, p. A15 Summary by the editor: In this Op-Ed article, the author, an Indian American specialist in international relations and, at the time he wrote this piece for The New York Times, a Global Governance Fellow at the Brookings Institution, suggested to make the composition of the Security Council both more democratic and more friendly to the United States by continuing to have the United States, Russia and China as permanent members, and by including as such members Japan, “the largest aid and reconstruction donor”, and India, “a crucial ally in the war on terror as well as potential contributor of troops”. With Japan and India, the United States could work around Chinese intransigence and outweigh Russian opposition in a stronger UN which could extend American influence while also making unilateral action by the US unnecessary. The author further proposed to replace the French and British permanent seats with one such seat for the European Union, to be occupied by the EU member state holding the Union’s rotating presidency. Permanent seats, Mr. Khanna wrote, should also be allocated to the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States, and the African Union, each of them represented by their members on a rotating basis. A more prominent role for regional organizations would result in deepened diplomacy within them as they work toward common positions. In order to make the Security Council more effective, the author considered it necessary to relinquish the veto power of the permanent members in favor of majority voting. “No step”, he wrote, “could more greatly contribute to restoring American credibility internationally than a reaffirmation of the commitment to work with, rather than around, a reformed and stronger United Nations.” 4.5.6 2005, Kemal Derviş, A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform, Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C.834 […] […] [58] […] Reforming the Security Council In his speech inaugurating the UN General Assembly in 2003, Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized all that has been achieved under the UN’s longstanding structure, 834   Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the author and the Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.    Kemal Derviş (*1949) is a Turkish economist and politician, and former head of the United Nations Development Programme (2005-09). He earned his bachelor and master’s degrees in economics from the London School of Economics and his PhD from Princeton University. He is currently senior advisor at the Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University, and senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program of the Brookings

4 Momentum and deadlock

825

but also acknowledged that “we must decide whether it is possible to continue on [this] basis…. or whether radical changes are needed…. And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more important than the Security Council.” For the Security Council to impart new strength and effectiveness to global governance in the political and security sphere, radical reform is needed so that council decisions be perceived to be much more legitimate than they are today, thereby commanding greater support from public opinion worldwide as well as from the community of nation-states. Numerous global governance reform proposals have been put forth for the United Nations, but until recently the discussion concerning Security Council reform has focused on increasing the number of countries or phasing out the Permanent Five veto.*1 Larger and important countries such as India, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Brazil come to mind when one thinks about enlargement of the UN Security Council. Nigeria and South Africa are obvious sub-Saharan Africa candidates. But, then, what about Mexico as another very important Latin American country, and Egypt, a historical leader among Arab countries, or Pakistan, which claims a seat [59] in the council as a leading “Islamic” nation, particularly if India obtains a permanent seat? While simply adding new members may be a solution that follows the path of least resistance – the old members stay and some new ones are happy to gain seats – it is unlikely to solve the fundamental problems of the Security Council. A larger and more unwieldy Security Council is unlikely to solve the underlying problem of legitimacy. Indeed, if new permanent members were given veto power, the chances of paralysis would increase further, while if they were added without veto power, a new council may be perceived as less legitimate than the old one: there would be countries of roughly equal importance as permanent members, with some having the veto power, while others would not. Reform thus should be based on moving toward a system of weighted votes and universal participation that involves all countries, but under which the weights in the voting scheme also reflect the actual size, ability to act, and importance of the participating nation-states. Instead of individual veto rights, supermajorities would be required for the most important decisions. For cross-border military interventions, for example, the supermajority required could be four-fifths of the weighted votes. For other matters that require a majority for a binding decision, that proportion might be three-fifths. Using these criteria, the 2003 invasion of Iraq would have required a four-fifths majority decision, while a decision on the continued application or termination of sanctions would have required a three-fifths majority. Use of military force in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would all have required four-fifth majorities. In short, the ways in which the Security Council could promote peaceful means to resolve a dispute would all require three-fifth majorities. For example, appointing an UN mediator to negotiate a peaceful ending of a conflict would require three-fifths of Institution. Past positions include adjunct professor, Columbia University (2009-15), member of the Turkish Parliament (2002-05) and minister of economic affairs of Turkey (2001-02). Further, he held various high-ranking World Bank positions and taught economics at Princeton, Bilkent and Middle East Universities.

826

4 Momentum and deadlock

the weighted votes, as would recommendations of new states for UN membership as well as the resolution that recognized the Iraqi Governing Council. Currently, both military action and economic sanctions are classified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whereas other dispute settlement techniques come under Chapter VI. One could identify decisions requiring a four-fifths majority as those coming under Chapter VII, and decisions requiring three-fifth majorities as those coming under Chapter VI. It would probably be better, however, to require a larger supermajority for actual military intervention than that required for the application of economic sanctions as suggested above. [60] Reform efforts should not be deterred simply because it is probably not possible to find a perfect weighting scheme for Security Council votes that all members would accept as optimal. The same could be said for any voting scheme or electoral law at a national or regional level. There are no perfect or ideal schemes, but rather schemes that are accepted and considered legitimate by large majorities of participants – which is precisely what should be the goal at the global level. The proposal described below is based on a long-run, “steady-state” vision of the Security Council, although the exact voting strengths are based on recent data and would change over time. Transition formulas most certainly would be required – and might actually be desirable – to get the Security Council from where it is today to where it should be in the long run. Moreover, any reasonable proposal must include adjustment mechanisms that allow a given structure to evolve over time. Perhaps the most serious weakness built into the United Nations at the time of its creation was institutionalizing “ownership” of the veto power in a way that reflects the world of 1945, without any practical provision for change. What is proposed below is a long-term vision toward which the system should progress. However difficult it may appear to realize this vision, not achieving fundamental progress toward much greater legitimacy will lead to huge problems. It is also important to add that it is informed citizens of all countries that should make the decisions on reform, not just bureaucracies that may want to perpetuate existing arrangements which provide bureaucratic advantages to a few without really being in either the national or global interest. Under the reform arrangement, each country would be weighted by four factors reflecting relative importance in the international system: population, GDP, financial contributions to funding global goods, and military capability. The latter could ideally evolve into a proxy for potential contribution to peacekeeping. The weights would have to ascribe relative importance to these four factors. As an illustration, the weighted vote of India, WINDIA, would be as follows: WINDIA = a1 (Pi) + a2 (GDPi) + a3 (Bi) + a4 (Mi) Here, a1 to a4 are agreed weights identical for all countries and adding to one; Pi is the share of India’s population in the world total; GDPi is the share of Indian GDP in the world total; Bi is the share India contributes to the global public goods budget; and Mi is India’s share of global military capability. The population share is relatively straightforward to [61] compute, although a decision would have to be taken whether residents or nationals are to enter the formula, but the other three factors involve more difficult measurement decisions.*2

4 Momentum and deadlock

827

Taking for the moment nominal GDP at constant 1995 US dollars, contributions to the UN budget as a proxy for contributions to the funding of global public goods, and military spending in nominal dollars as a proxy for military capacity, and setting a1 = a2 =a3 = a4, India’s weighted vote (WINDIA) would be WINDIA = 5.162 percent. The voting powers that result from such a scheme must have two essential characteristics: they must appear reasonable and appeal to the public demand for legitimacy, and they must be acceptable to the nation-states that would have to agree to the reform. The process of moving toward such a reform would involve global interaction between civil society, political parties, and opinion leaders, as well as negotiations between sovereign states. After agreement is reached on the weighting scheme and measurement issues, the question would remain as to how to organize participation on the Security Council, given that participation of all states in General Assembly style meetings would be impractical. For Security Council meetings to operate effectively and allow for discussion and debate, membership should consist of a manageable number of countries representing, at any one time, the world community. The practice of having some members as permanent and others as rotating members has advantages and could be combined with the reformed voting system. One possible compromise arrangement would have the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, India, and Japan as permanent members. Other countries [62] would be members of constituencies, i.e., groups of countries that would elect one or more representatives. The constituency categories would have representatives for Other Europe, Other Asia, Africa, the Arab League, and Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada. Each of these constituencies could have up to three elected seats on the Security Council, depending on the total weight and the number of countries the constituency represents. Occupation of these seats would rotate every two years, not unlike the current practice. What would be different, however, is that each member of the Security Council so elected would “own” a share of the weighted regional vote determined by the votes received during the biannual elections in that constituency. Table 3.1 describes a possible grouping of countries in the world by regional constituencies and the weight each country and constituency would carry in the total, using the weights and principles discussed above. The weights should be updated every five years to take into account changes in the underlying variables such as population and GDP. Appendix table 3.1 presents a comprehensive list by country and constituency of all UN members’ weights under Security Council arrangement proposed here, and weights computed based on recent data. It is important to always remember that these weights will change over time. Table 3.1 shows that the United States and the European Union, because of their overall weight, would each have de facto veto power for decisions requiring a fourfifths majority. In other words, the Security Council could not sanction a cross-border military intervention if either the United States or the European Union did not agree. However, neither could individually block a decision requiring a three-fifths majority, although together they could. Other members would have to combine to reach the blocking majority on decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. For example, even together, Russia and China could not have blocked Security Council clearance for intervention in Kosovo. They would have needed votes from other constituencies to reach a 20 percent share of the vote.*3 The developing

828

4 Momentum and deadlock

Table 3.1 Permanent and constituency member voting strengths on proposed UN Security Council Factors determining voting strength (% of total)a Countries Permanent members (6 seats) EU and official candidates (28)b United States Japan China India Russian Federation Constituencies (8 seats) Other Asia (40) Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (35) Arab league (21) Africa (43) Other Europe (19)

Result

Contribution to Military global public Population GDP Capacity Weighted Vote goods budget 0.37 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.004 0.01

0.09 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.02

0.31 0.27 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.01

0.27 0.40 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02

26.0 23.2 10.9 7.5 5.2 1.6

0.05 0.08

0.18 0.09

0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04

9.0 7.4

0.02 0.005 0.03

0.05 0.10 0.02

0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03

3.4 3.2 2.5

a. The actual weighted vote would be revisited every 5 years to reflect underlying changes in the determining factors. b. Numbers in parentheses are the number of countries represented in that constituency. Notes and sources: Contribution to global public goods budget is the member contribution to the UN regular budget for 2004. Population is that of member states in 2001, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, and the CIA Factbook. GDP is that of 2001 in constant 1995 US dollars, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Military capability is based on military expenditure in 2001 in constant 1998 US dollars, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

[63] countries as a group would have more than the 20 percent needed to veto decisions that require a fourth-fifths majority. The weights in table 3.1 should not be considered only from the point of view of which action could be blocked by 20 percent of the votes. Even though the United States and European Union could individually block a decision requiring a four-fifths majority and together block a decision requiring a three-fifths majority, they could not force either type of decision without securing some form of support from elsewhere in the world. [64] Consider the case of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Economic measures to be enforced by the Security Council could have been determined by a positive vote from the United States, the European Union, and Japan (23.2 + 26.0 + 10.9 = 60.1 percent). For military intervention, however, 19.9 more percentage points would have been required. These could have come, for example, from such constituency representatives as Other Asia, Latin America, and the Arab League.

4 Momentum and deadlock

829

Permanent Members Although the proposed Security Council would have a mixture of permanent members and non-permanent members representing multicountry constituencies, the actual distinction between the types of members would not be as sharp as it is today. The arrangement proposed here would assign one seat to Other Europe, two seats to Other Asia, two seats to Latin America and the Caribbean and Canada, two seats to Africa, and one seat to the Arab League. Adding these eight seats to six permanent seats would lead to a Security Council of 14 members – a manageable size that would allow for real discussion and productive meetings. Being a permanent member would of course still be desirable, but it would be less advantageous than it is now because permanent members would no longer have a right to veto just by virtue of their permanence. Some non-permanent members representing their constituencies would have voting powers close to or even exceeding that of some of the permanent members. In terms of permanent seats, the proposal here, because it is long term in nature, unites the 25 European Union members as of May 2004 with the three official candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) expected to become members in the near future.*4 The European Union would need an internal mechanism to determine how the EU representative would vote on the UN Security Council – one possibility would be to use the qualified majority voting (QMV) formula that is foreseen in the draft EU constitution for a range of issues, and which requires 65 percent of the EU population and 55 percent of the member states for approval of measures. The draft constitution does not, however, include foreign and security policy decisions as those to be agreed on by the QMV, retaining instead unanimity in the foreign policy and security areas. For the Security Council reform proposed here to be workable, the EU would [65] have to agree to use the QMV formula in the context of Security Council votes, otherwise a single member could force the union to abstain within the reformed Security Council, which would be absurd. If the European Union could not agree on at least some form of QMV for purposes of Security Council decisions, EU representation could be rearranged in a way similar to the other multicountry constituencies. However, employing the QMV model for Security Council votes would not imply the complete unification of EU countries’ foreign and security policies. EU members could continue to manage their bilateral relations and defense policies individually. The only requirement would be a binding mechanism to determine a common vote on the Security Council. Some European Union countries appear already to support a limited move toward joint decision making in global governance. The Social Democrats essentially agreed in their pan-European platforms to such unification of EU representation in global institutions, and many members of the right-of-center European Popular Party share this view. There is also strong support for such “unification” of EU representation in global institutions among citizens in many EU countries. The proposal would mean that France and the United Kingdom would lose their individual veto powers, whereas Germany would not gain that power. In terms of what might be called the “global democracy” aspect of legitimacy, it is quite clear that none of these three countries should have an individual veto power, since each has less than 1.5 percent of the world population. Their individual economic and military weights also are insufficient to justify an individual veto right.

830

4 Momentum and deadlock

As part of the European Union, however, it would seem entirely reasonable for them to share in the EU’s veto right over decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. The EU would have to acquire legal personality as foreseen in its proposed constitution, not just in the context of the United Nations. That having been resolved, the role of Europe in a reformed United Nations would reflect the current European reality, as opposed to that of 1945.*5 It would also, incidentally, allow for a significant economy of resources for EU countries – a positive development that, unfortunately, might well face purely bureaucratic resistance. [66] The United States, with more than 23 percent of the overall vote under the proposed arrangement, could by itself block all decisions requiring a four-fifths majority. Given US economic and military might, any global governance system in the political and security sphere that does not give this power to the United States would be unworkable and have no chance of being accepted. In addition, the US population is much larger than that of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined, and is close to twice that of Japan or Russia. Thus the proposed reform would be entirely compatible with US concerns while also enabling the United States to be a global leader in an international system with greater legitimacy and that allows for real participation and common decision making. The United States would be the only individual nationstate with a veto on decisions requiring a four-fifths majority, and the US vote would be roughly equal in weight to the vote of the European Union, despite the fact the EU population is much larger and overall European Union GDP exceeds that of the United States, because the proposal takes military capability into account. Russia would remain a permanent member, to some degree because of its remaining military strength. It is also likely that if there is indeed continued socioeconomic stabilization, GDP will likely increase rapidly given Russia’s size and natural resources – assuming the country remains socially and economically stable – increasing Russia’s weight in the system. Russia does not have grounds to insist on retaining its individual veto power, however, which is a remnant of conditions in what is now a distant past. If Russia itself were to continue to have a blocking majority, legitimacy would require the same for, at the very least, China, India, Japan, and Brazil, complicating the working of the reformed council and multiplying the chances for the kind of stalemates so damaging to the UN system in the past. Russia’s voting weight in the total would likely benefit from a more comprehensive definition and measurement of military capability than the preliminary one used here, which is simply based on military expenditures. This requires a more detailed and careful quantitative analysis that is beyond the scope of this book. China, India, and Japan are, by order of magnitude, larger players in the international system than any other individual country with the exception of the United States. Thus, they should be permanent members under the reform arrangements. However, because the proposed system would [67] essentially rely on qualified majority voting, these countries individually would not have veto power over decisions requiring either four-fifths or three-fifths majorities. However, China’s and India’s respective weights would increase over time, and having India and Japan permanently join the Security Council would remedy today’s unreasonable status quo and greatly enhance the council’s legitimacy worldwide. Another country with a major individual role in the international system is Brazil, which conceivably could be included as a permanent member. However, Brazil’s

4 Momentum and deadlock

831

individual weight, 2.17, is much smaller than the weights of what would be the two new permanent council members, Japan and India. Instead, Brazil would play a leading role in the Latin American constituency, as explained below. Constituencies and Non-permanent Members In addition to the six permanent members discussed above, the new Security Council would have eight non-permanent members representing various, essentially regional, constituencies. Other Europe would have one seat, Other Asia two, Latin America and the Caribbean and Canada two, the Arab League one, and Africa two. The computed weights, not the number of seats, would determine voting power – in other words, under the proposed arrangement it is the weights that are more fundamental to the nature of governance than the number of seats. Nonetheless, the number of seats would also have some importance, since, irrespective of their voting power, countries would want to participate in Security Council meetings. Take, for example, Other Asia, including such countries as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as small states like Vanuatu and Brunei. These countries would form a regional constituency and elect two representatives every two years to sit on the Security Council. These two non-permanent members would each own a share of the regional vote, which could be determined by the amount of support they obtained during constituency elections. Let us assume, as an example, that Thailand, Indonesia, and New Zealand put forward their candidatures for non-permanent seats for a given two-year period. Let us further assume that in the ensuing constituency election, Thailand gets 30, Indonesia 50, and New Zealand 20 percent of the weighted votes. As a result, Indonesia and Thailand would become non-permanent members for the next two years. [68] To how much of the regional vote should they be entitled? The most reasonable of various formulas that might be considered would be one where Indonesia gets 62.5 percent of the regional weighted vote, and Thailand 37.5 percent, reflecting their relative success in the constituency vote, with the votes that went to New Zealand distributed proportionally to that success. This is a formula often used in national elections when there are threshold levels that parties must reach to enter parliaments. The votes that went to parties that did not reach these thresholds get distributed to those parties that made it past the post. In principle, each constituency could decide what rules it would want to use, including whether or not countries could be re-elected for more than one term, or particular rotation arrangements. The details matter less than respect for the overarching principles as well as for giving some allowance for rules and arrangements that best suit the specific circumstances of particular constituencies. Similar practices now in effect for the boards of the Bretton Woods institutions have functioned remarkably well. The result of the proposed arrangement would be a Security Council with six permanent and eight non-permanent members, but one where all countries of the world would be represented. The council would meet at the head of state or government level at least once a year, perhaps during the September meetings of the United Nations in New York.*6 The other meetings would continue to be held in New York with the participation of the “permanent representatives” (ambassadors) to the UN. It may be desirable, however, to introduce specific internationally accepted criteria for membership on the UN Security Council in terms of career experiences, seniority, etc. The

832

4 Momentum and deadlock

total number of 14 members would allow for efficient and productive meetings. The UN Security Council would have wide ranging powers to set up particular subcommittees, to open certain meetings to civil society and the press, to hold entirely closed meetings, and to raise funds for security-related purposes. A new UN Security Council along the lines proposed above would represent a quantum leap in terms of the council’s legitimacy worldwide and would open the way for a more powerful global governance mechanism in the security and political sphere. Growing to some degree out of existing arrangements, the proposed scheme would preserve a certain amount of continuity, yet reflect the world of the 21st century and the challenges faced today rather than those faced almost 60 years ago in what was a very different world. [69] Weighting Quality of Democracy […] [70] […] Appendix A, table 2 outlines a variant of the proposed weighting system for the new Security Council that would employ the Freedom House Index to measure domestic freedoms as one of the weighting factors.*7 835 An alternative approach would be to move toward a system which sets certain basic democratic standards that would have to be met in order for a country to qualify for membership in international institutions, not unlike what the European Union requires of countries that want to join the union. 835  The following table is an excerpt of Appendix A, Table 2 (“country-by-country voting strengths on the proposed UN Security Council, adjusted for quality of democracy”, p. 251 et seq. of the original text). The excerpt only includes the envisaged permanent members and “constituencies”. Countries

Permanent members (6 seats) EU and official candidates (28) United States Japan China India Russian Federation Constituencies (8 seats) Other Asia (40) Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (35) Arab League (21) Africa (43) Other Europe (19)

Freedom House index

1 1 7 2 5

Weighted vote

26.028 23.2325 10.9191  7.5094  5.1623  1.5951

Transformed Freedom House index

Weighted vote adjusted for democracy

1.5 1.5 0.5 1.3 0.8

29.855 26.857 12.6226  2.8936  5.3046  1.0244

 9.0029  7.4144

 7.2742  7.5370

 3.4135  3.1808  2.5420

 1.5655  2.4615  2.6045

Notes and sources: Democracy variable is the Political Rights Index from the Freedom House Index, “Freedom in the World 2004,” . For other variables, see sources for appendix table 1.

833

4 Momentum and deadlock

Transition Phase The reforms necessary to put in place a reasonable and balanced alternative to the current but outdated UN Security Council arrangement would require a transition phase during which the existing Permanent Five nations would retain some of their special status, perhaps in the form of greater voting weight than the formula that represents the ultimate reform objective. Current permanent council members could, for example, retain their individual veto power for a period of years while the new system would be phased in. The existing veto power could remain “superimposed” on the new weighted voting scheme for a number of years, perhaps a decade. The existing Permanent Five might also agree to restrict the use of their vetoes to a narrower range of decisions. Reform may in fact be easier to achieve if the old Permanent Five have a strong say in exactly how the weights proposed above would be computed. In addition, it might be reasonable for each of those nations to get an upfront 2 percentage point allocation in voting strength – in addition to the weight derived from the four-factor formula – for a longer transition period of, say, 20 years. In other words, the whole world, including the current [71] Table 3.2 Permanent and constituency member voting strengths in transition phase of proposed UN Security Council

Countries

Permanent members (6 seats) EU and official candidates (28)b United States Japan China India Russian Federation Constituencies (8 seats) Other Asia (40) Latin America, Caribbean, and Canada (35) Arab league (21) Africa (43) Other Europe (19)

Factors determining voting strengtha (% of total)

Result

Contribution to global public goods budget

Population

GDP

Military Capacity

Weighted Vote

0.37 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.004 0.01

0.09 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.02

0.31 0.27 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.01

0.27 0.40 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02

27.4 22.9 9.8 8.8 4.6 3.4

0.05 0.08

0.18 0.09

0.07 0.08

0.06 0.04

8.1 6.7

0.02 0.005 0.03

0.05 0.10 0.02

0.01 0.01 0.02

0.06 0.01 0.03

3.1 2.9 2.3

a. The actual weighted vote would be revisited every 5 years to reflect underlying changes in the determining factors. b. Numbers in parentheses are the number of countries represented in that constituency. Notes and sources: Contribution to global public goods budget is the member contribution to the UN regular budget for 2004. Population is that of member states in 2001, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, and the CIA Factbook. GDP is in constant 1995 US dollars, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Military capability is based on military expenditure in constant 1998 US dollars, from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

834

4 Momentum and deadlock

Permanent Five, would share 90 percent of the total votes according to the proposed formula, and the Permanent Five would get an additional equal allocation of the remaining 10 percent in recognition of their previous status. Table 3.2 shows what Security Council voting strength would look like at the beginning of the 20-year transition period.*8, 836 [72] As discussed earlier, the EU countries would have to resolve among themselves how to organize their shared Security Council vote both in the transition phase and in the longer term. The transition arrangement would be particularly important for the Russian Federation, where current GDP may be unnaturally low because of the country’s difficult transition from communism. Since the voting weights in the base formula would be revised every five years to reflect changes in the four factors determining voting weight, it is likely that the Russian Federation would increase its basic weight over the 20-year transition period. That transition thus would recognize Russia’s special circumstances and work toward an equitable outcome for that nation. The type of UN reform discussed in this chapter will be difficult to achieve politically even with a transition phase. The governance of reform must be accompanied by serious internal management reforms. Maintaining the current status quo will also be very difficult, however, because it is blatantly unfair and does not work. For all those who do believe that very worrisome security problems are awaiting the world as a whole, reform is in fact unavoidable. The world must face up to the need for a serious reform of global security arrangements. The proposals outlined above reflect arrangements that could work and may become acceptable, given some transition measures. No doubt other, somewhat different proposals could also constitute substantial progress. What is certain is that the Permanent Five cannot simply pretend that the veto they gave themselves will be accepted forever in its current form. One cannot set up an organization or a structure of governance at some point in history and expect that it remain unchanged forever. Insisting on the status quo is equivalent to undermining the United Nations as an instrument of global governance and peace. The security of all, including the security of Permanent Five citizens, depends on a strong and legitimate UN Security Council, able to enforce international law and champion the peaceful resolution of disputes. The concluding chapter of this book attempts to outline the political dynamics that could lead to UN reform of the type presented above. [245] Appendix A: Voting Strengths of a Proposed UN Security Council*a [omitted] Table 1. Country and constituency voting strengths on proposed UN Security Council [251] Table 2. Country and constituency voting strengths on proposed UN Security Council, adjusted for quality of democracy Table 3. Country and constituency voting strengths in transition phase of proposed UN Security Council Original footnotes *a Note that as the weights change over time, the resulting weighted vote could also change. 836  For Appendix A, Table 3 (“voting strengths of countries and constituencies in the transition phase on the proposed UN Security Council”), see p. 257 et seq. of the original text.

4 Momentum and deadlock *1

835

A notable exception is Schwartzberg (2003) [Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ‘Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations Reform’, 9(1) Global Governance 81-114], who proposed a weighted voting scheme for the General Assembly (and possibly for the Security Council) in order to reform the existing “unrealistic” one nation, one vote system and end the council veto. Schwartzberg (2004) [Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting, New York/The Hague: Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement] elaborates on his earlier proposal, with greater emphasis on the Security Council. [For a later and “definite” version of Schwartzberg’s proposal, published in 2013, → 5.5.3]. While Schwartzberg’s approach is somewhat similar to that proposed in this chapter, the factors determining the weighting are different and lead to different voting strengths. Falk and Strauss (2001) [Richard Falk & Andrew L. Strauss, ‘Toward Global Parliament’, 80(1) Foreign Affairs 212-20] have proposed a world parliament made of civil society, which in the future may be associated with the UN General Assembly. Kennedy and Russet (1995) [Paul Kennedy & Bruce Russet, ‘Reforming the United Nations’, 74(5) Journal of Foreign Affairs 56-71] proposed an increase in the number of both permanent and rotating members of the Security Council, and a restriction of the veto to questions of war and peace, as the founders intended. For a detailed list of major proposals, see the Global Policy Forum website at . *2 Any quantitative measure used in the calculation of such a weighting scheme will be somewhat controversial. For GDP, one has to decide whether to use purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP or nominal GDP. A more serious problem is military capability. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 use military expenditures as a rough measure of military capability, but a more sophisticated index of military power could be calculated by combining military spending and capitalization (a measure of spending on equipment) that reflects military power with spending on military forces capable of peacekeeping operations. Ideally, this measure over time should come to reflect the potential to contribute to peacekeeping operations – for example, the military component of the Commitment to Development Index compiled by the Center for Global Development/ Foreign Policy measures the contributions of 21 wealthy countries to peacekeeping and forcible humanitarian intervention missions endorsed by international bodies. But the weights must also reflect the balance of power in the international system. In sum, careful analysis would be needed in order to establish weights that address a wide range of concerns from moral dilemmas to a realistic reflection of the power balance. *3 Kagan (2004, chapter 8) [Robert Kagan, ‘Renewing US Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, 83(2), pp. 65-88] examines how Security Council action was blocked on Kosovo and compares European attitudes to US action without council authorization in Kosovo to the debate on US intervention in Iraq, again without council authorization. *4 Alternatively, the three candidate countries could be included in Other Europe. *5 Some claim it is unrealistic to ask France and the United Kingdom to give up their veto, even as part of a medium-term vision. And yet, if one were to ask any reasonable panel of experts or well-informed citizens whether the UK and France are likely to retain their vetoes, say in 2020, the answer would be no. Somehow we have to get from today to 2020! *6 Note that there is no such meeting for the current UN Security Council. *7 Appendix A, table 2 focuses on the political rights element of the Freedom House Index, which measures countries using a scale from this 1-7 (the higher the number,

836

4 Momentum and deadlock

the more antidemocratic the regime). According to the index, the advanced Western democracies and Japan get a 1, China a 7, India a 2, and Russia a 5. For the appendix, the scale was linearly transformed to a 1.5-0.5 point scale (half being worst), and the existing weighted votes were multiplied by the transformed Freedom House Index. Later these weights were scaled so that the total of all countries’ weights would add up to 100 percent. Table 2 in the appendix was prepared following a suggestion of Francis Fukuyama. *8 See appendix A, table 3 for country-by-country voting strengths on the proposed Security Council at the beginning of the 20-year transition period. 4.5.7 April 2005, Antonio Missiroli, The UN Security Council Needs Fewer Europeans and More EUrope, The International Spectator, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 41-47837 […] [45] […] Size matters, and a 15-strong UNSC is already a sub-optimal set-up. True, the prevailing mood in the General Assembly now seems to be in favour of some expansion of the Security Council. But if EU members want (more) “effective” multilateralism, they should be consistent and demand that the Security Council not grow in number. After all, they should know by now that moving from 15 to 25 is no recipe for more effective decision-making. And the matter is not just functional, it is also substantial: in fact, would a 25-strong UNSC make the promotion of human rights or the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction any easier? Curiously enough, this is a worry shared by both the US and Russia. But there is more. Currently, European membership on the UNSC amounts to onethird of the entire body: two permanent and three non-permanent members. How credible, how fair is all this for a bloc of 500 million in a world of more than 6 billion people? On top of that, the three non-permanent members elected every other year by the General Assembly for a two-year stint are drawn from two distinct regional “caucuses”: “Western European and others” (WEOG, two seats) and “Eastern European” states (EUREST, one). This, too, hardly reflects the realities of the post-Cold War era. From January 2006 onwards, alongside Britain and France, Europe will be represented by Greece, Denmark and Slovakia. All five are EU members: indeed, the enlarged EU already encompasses most of what was once “Eastern Europe”, either as full or prospective members. This is why the time may be ripe for a bold and, inevitably, unilateral move by the Europeans: one also capable of overcoming the evident sterility of the traditional demand for a “single EU seat” on the UNSC – legally not enforceable (at any rate, allowing “regional organisations” into the Security Council would open up a Pandora’s box worldwide), strenuously opposed by Britain and France, and often only rhetorically endorsed by most other EU members – while keeping the door open for a more 837  Reprinted with permission of Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, England. – Antonio Missiroli (born 1955) is an Italian journalist, researcher, lecturer and policy adviser. He has written articles and books on EU foreign and security policy, EU enlargement, EU institutions and comparative politics. He was the Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris (2012-2017). Since 2018, he is NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges.

4 Momentum and deadlock

837

comprehensive reform at a later stage, if and when agreement is reached inside the other regional groups as well. Fewer but better Why not come forward, then, with a common European position whereby, sooner rather than later, a new group or “caucus” called “EU and others” takes only two nonpermanent seats? Let us see how this could be devised. [46] First, the General Assembly would fill one such seat every year (presently, it votes on even years for the two WEOG seats, on odd years for the EUREST one). By doing so, the new “caucus” would always have a “senior” and a “junior” member on the Security Council, although the time served by either should not necessarily create an internal hierarchy. Second, the election should preferably be uncontested (“clean state” in UNSC jargon): that is, the “caucus” would agree in advance on the candidate country for the given two-year stint and “endorse” it officially with a view to the General Assembly vote. There would be no competition and, ideally, the nominated country would receive a sort of mandate from the others. Third, even if the “caucus” were to decide to nominate a non-EU country (a candidate or just a neighbour, from Norway to Turkey or Ukraine), there would always be at least one EU non-permanent member on the Security Council, thus preserving the principle of having the EU as such more or less formally represented in the meetings. Fourth, the extra seat made available by “Europe” at large could then be assigned to the “Asia and Africa” grouping, currently endowed with five overall, thus bringing about a much more “fair geographical distribution” of seats on the Council, as set down in Art. 23 of the UN Charter, and one that is more in line with the demographic (and arguably also economic) realities of the 21st century. Finally, such a move would not require any change in the UN Charter: a simple revision of UNSC Resolution 1991 (1963) would suffice.*1 As the experience of past reform attempts has shown a contrario, this would enormously facilitate its possible enforcement. What’s in it for the EU members? To start with, such a “sacrifice” would demonstrate that Europeans are serious and consistent about “effective multilateralism”, efficiency and effectiveness, legitimacy, and also fair representation, so much so that they are ready to give up on the in-built majority they potentially enjoy on the [47] UNSC with the Americas. This, in turn, would help dispel the mistrust that especially African countries feel vis-a-vis a Western-dominated UNSC, and arguably facilitate other reforms within the organisation. It may even come to constitute an example and precedent for other continental “caucuses”. Such an opening could also have beneficial effects on the EU proper. It would not undermine the status of Britain and France, thus softening their ingrained opposition to any change in the way in which the EU acts within the UNSC framework. It would, however, put some much-needed pressure on them. If all European countries (“EU and others”) can agree on who should represent them and give them a sort of political mandate – including reporting lines and consultation procedures: in other words, a proper “code of conduct” – it would become increasingly difficult for the two EU

838

4 Momentum and deadlock

permanent members to go it alone and openly diverge from positions in the formulation of which they had been involved at some stage. […] Original footnote *1 Until 1963, only 11 members sat on the UNSC. Resolution 1991-XVIII, adopted on 19 December 1963, was divided into two parts: the first one raised the overall number of Security Council members to 15 and was ratified ex Art. 108 of the Charter. The second listed the geographic distribution of seats for non-permanent members in the enlarged UNSC (five to Africa and Asia, two to Latin America, two to WEOG and one to EUREST): as such, it did not constitute an amendment to the Charter and, therefore, was not submitted to ratification ex Art. 108. [UNGA Res 1991 (XVIII), → 2.11]. 4.5.8 May 2005, Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyoruk, Security Council Reform Models: Models A and B, Italian (Regional) Proposal, Blue and Green Models and A New Model C, New York: Center for UN Reform Education (Special Paper No. 4)838 [2] The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s well-intended effort to enlarge the Security Council may be in danger. A Group of Four (G4) Japan, Germany, Brazil and India are each campaigning for permanent seats and they each have evoked regional objectors. For example, Chinese citizens are protesting vigorously Japan’s bid for a permanent seat. Small and medium states are also worried about the proposed enlargement models, which, if implemented, could reduce their opportunities to be represented on the Council. Even so, a “Heads of State” summit of world leaders is due to tackle Security Council enlargement this September. Annan is backing the two models proposed by a highlevel panel last December, namely Model A or Model B; “or any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model.”839 The high level panel recommended no change at the present time in the status of the five permanent members, but noted that “under any reform proposal, there should be no

838  Reproduction of this paper courtesy of the Center for UN Reform Education, New York. – Walter F. Hoffmann (1924-2014) was a member of World Peace Through Law, founder of the Campaign For UN Reform, and Executive Director of the World Federalist Association in Washington, DC. He was also very active at the Center for UN Reform Education where he served as an Executive Director. In 1992, he was appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to serve on the U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations. A lawyer in private practice for more than 30 years, he served as chair of the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of the American Bar Association, and as chair of the International Organizations Section of the American Society of International Law. At the time he co-published this paper, he was an Adjunct Professor at Ramapo College of New Jersey. – Ayca Ariyoruk was a research fellow at the Center for UN Reform Education (2005-06) and subsequently a senior policy associate at the United Nations Association of the USA (until 2010). 839  2 December 2004, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/5652, → 4.1.19.

4 Momentum and deadlock

839

expansion of the veto.” The panel calls for a complete review of the membership of the Council – both permanent and non-permanent members – in the year 2020. This paper reviews the reform options made available to the member states including the Green and Blue Models recently put forward by the Uniting for Consensus movement; the regional model proposed by the Italian government, and introduces Model C, a product of a study conducted by one of the authors. Model A and Model B Model A proposes the addition of six new permanent seats without the veto: two for Africa; two for Asia and the Pacific; one for Europe; and one for the Americas; plus three more non-permanent seats. Model B proposes no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable term seats; two each for Africa; Asia and the Pacific; Europe; and the Americas; plus one additional non-permanent seat. Model A and B expands the Council to 24. The problem with Model A is that it creates six new permanent seats which will be difficult to change in 2020, particularly since each new holder of a permanent seat will probably contend that it should have a veto power similar to the original five members. The major problem, however, with both Models A and B is that both have scrapped the customary regional groupings that the General Assembly has used since 1965 to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council (five seats for Asia and Africa, two for Latin America; one for Eastern Europe and two for Western Europe and Other States). [3] Instead the panel has substituted four new continental groupings; (1) Combining all of Asia with all of the island countries in the Pacific, (2) combining Eastern and Western Europe, (3) combining North and South America, and (4) only keeping Africa as one continent. A rough population comparison of these new continental groupings (the Americas – 857 million; Europe – 727 million; Africa – 835 million; Asia and the Pacific – 3 billion, 836 million) indicates a gross population disparity between Asia and the Pacific compared to the three other continental groupings. Italian Proposal (Regional Model) and Blue and Green Models The regional model proposed by the Italian government and Blue and Green Models proposed by Uniting for Consensus Movement, rejected the continental groupings and opted instead for the existing regional groupings on which non-permanent members have been elected since 1965. The model proposed recently by the Italian government, maintains the current regional groupings (Asia, Africa, Western Europe and Other Groups, Eastern Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean) and assigns ten new permanent seats (without veto) to the regions, not to individual states. Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, Permanent Representative of Italy explained to the General Assembly (May 2, 2005) that the Italian Model envisions a “true” regional seating as opposed to seats regionally assigned but occupied nationally. According to the Italian Model*1, each regional group would have the “operational management” of the seats and that each region would define principles and mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances to prevent national occupation of the seats and ensure regional representation. The main shortcoming of the Italian model lies in its implementation. Current member states

840

4 Momentum and deadlock

do not readily have the capacity to manage a Security Council seat regionally. Maybe only through regional organizations can that capacity be developed (for instance EU could manage the seat for the Western Europe), but not every country can readily be represented by a regional organization (for example, in Asia there are few regional groups and not all of Europe is part of EU). Shortly after the Italian proposal, Uniting for Consensus, an unlikely coalition of countries who are united by a common view point which opposes expanding the Security Council in permanent category (Model A), put forward the Blue and Green Models for discussion. In terms of size and balance, the Green Model is the same as Italian’s regional model; it divides the Council into five regional groups, and expands the Council with ten new seats. The difference is that the seats in Green Model are assigned to individual states, not to the regional groups and that they are not [4] permanent. The Green Model is also the most similar to the Council’s current composition; it uses the same five regional groupings, it doesn’t create a new tier, instead expands the Council’s current two-year category by adding ten more seats. According to the Green Model, the 20 non-permanent seats in the two-year category are all open to re-election and that each region may evolve ad hoc criteria for re-election/rotation of its allocated seats. Currently, the states that occupy the two-year seats cannot be eligible for immediate re-election. How does the Green Model differ from Model B? Green Model avoids the creation of a “third category” of four-year renewable terms as proposed in Model B. Blue Model, a variation of Model B, creates a third category of seats with longer terms (3 or 4 years) and expands the two-year term category by adding 2 or 3 seats. It is flexible on the term length and on the re-election of the longer-term seats. Blue Model meets the interests of the larger countries by creating longer-term seats and at the same time addresses the concerns of smaller countries by expanding the two-year category. This is not possible in Model B, because continental groupings limit the allocation of more seats to smaller states, especially in Europe. One shortcoming of Blue and Green Model is their reliance on the old regional groupings. The five existing regional groupings in the Security Council are sometimes being criticized because three of the five veto powers are from Europe, and ensuring seat allocation to smaller states in both Western and Eastern Europe results in an a more Euro-centric composition. A New Model C Instead of the continental groupings and the old regional groupings, a New Model C suggested by Professor Hoffmann, divides Asia and the Pacific into two regions, namely the Pacific Rim countries (U.S., Canada, Japan, the Philippines, the states other than China along the East Asian coastline, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island States) with China plus South and Southwest Asia constituting the remainder of the Asian region. This way, the New Model C gives greater recognition to the heavily populated states of Asia. Model C also offers a creative solution to a problem shared by Model A and B; that is how to parcel out the permanent seats in Model A or the eight renewable four-year terms in Model B without causing great political rancor from the large states in each region which are not selected. Model C suggests that the answer to the problem may lie in the suggestion made more than a decade ago by Professor Louis Sohn for “dual

4 Momentum and deadlock

841

seating”*2 of two States with the first State’s ambassador sitting in the seat the first two [5] years and alternating with the ambassador from the second State every two years thereafter with close consultation between the two States. Models A and B also fail to provide sufficient representation for the states that have been the top contributors in each region for UN peace operations. Instead of relying on their election to non-renewable two-year terms, Model C suggests rewarding top troop and other personnel contributors (including military and civilian police) to peace and state building operations with a four-year term, which would encourage other states to make the sacrifice of people so essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. (If two states are relatively close in the amount of personnel they have contributed in the past two years, then those two states could share a four-year term.) A possible Model C for a 25 member Council might then look like this: Europe – three permanent members (UK, France, Russia), one eight-year term possibly shared initially by Germany and Italy, and one four year term, either Ukraine or Sweden, for the current top peace operation contributor. Pacific Rim – one permanent member (U.S.), one eight-year term, possibly shared initially by Japan and Australia; one four year term for Canada, the current top peace operation contributor; and two two-year non-renewable seats. South and Southwest Asia – one permanent seat (China), one eight-year term, possibly shared initially by India and Indonesia; one four-year term for the current top peace operation contributor either Pakistan or Bangladesh; and two two-year non-renewable seats. Latin America & the Caribbean – no permanent member, one eight-year term possibly shared initially by Brazil and Mexico; one four year term for the current top peace operation contributor, Uruguay; and two two-year non-renewable seats. Africa – no permanent member, one eight-year term, possibly shared initially by Nigeria and South Africa, (perhaps later by Egypt and Ethiopia); one four year term for the current top peace operation contributor, Ghana; and three twoyear non-renewable seats. The states listed above in Model C, are nothing more than suggestions. Each region should make its own choices with respect to the states that are the top contributors to the UN mandated peace operations and also to the states that are viewed as leaders in their respective regions. Contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, diplomatic activities in support of UN objectives and mandates; and among developed countries, achieving the internationally recognized level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for Official Development Assistance (ODA) should all be considered as important criteria of leadership. Each region should be free to change its selections every eight years for the 8-year terms and every four years for the 4-year term. Model C has two serious shortcomings; 1) Through ‘dual seating’ rotating states will be on the Council technically but would not each have a vote, 2) Determination of the [6] top troop and personnel contributors for each region may face obstacles from less populated countries who are making significant sacrifices proportionally. According to Professor Hoffmann, Model C has the advantage of having more flexibility in integrating the support and assistance of more major powers in each region through the use of dual seating; of giving greater recognition to the heavily populated states of South Asia; and of ensuring a more effective Council because it rewards the top UN peace operation contributors in every region with a four-year term. […]

842

4 Momentum and deadlock

[6] MODELS PROPOSED BY THE HIGH LEVEL PANEL*3 MODEL A (December 2004) […] MODEL B (December 2004) […] [8] UNITING FOR CONSENSUS PROPOSALS Blue Model (April 2005)

Region

No. of States

Current

Expansion (Non-Permanent)

Elected Seats as % Total of Regional Permanent Non-Permanent Longer-Term 2 years Groups*4

Asia

 54

1

 2

2

1

 6

 9.4

Africa

 53

0

 3

2

1

 6

11.3

GRULAC

 33

0

 2

2

0

 4

12.1

WEOG

 29

3

 2

1 (or 2)

0

 6

11.5

Eastern Europe

 22

1

 1

1*5

 3

 9.5

Total

191

5

10

10

25

10.8 (overall)

Green Model (April 2005) Regional No. of Area States

Non-Permanent Permanent

Current

Expansion

Elected Seats as % Total of Regional Groups

Asia

 54

 1

 2

 3

 6

 9.4

Africa

 53

 0

 3

 3

 6

11.3

GRULAC

 33

 0

 2

 2

 4

12.1

WEOG

 29

 3

 2

 1

 6

11.5

Eastern Europe

 22

 1

 1

 1

 3

 9.5

Total

191

5

10

10

25

10.8 (overall)

843

4 Momentum and deadlock [9] ITALIAN PROPOSAL Regional Model (April 2005)

Region

No. of States

Current National Seats

EXPANSION Regional Seats

Permanent

Non-Permanent

(Permanently assigned to Regional groups)

Total

Asia

 54

1

 2

 3

 6

Africa

 53

0

 3

 3

 6

GRULAC*6

 33

0

 2

 2

 4

WEOG*7

 29

3

 2

 1

 6

Eastern Europe

 22

1

 1

 1

 3

Total

191

5

10

10

25

SPECIAL PAPER PROPOSAL The New Model C (May 2005)

Regional Area Africa

Permanent No. of Seat States (Continuing)  53

0

EXPANSION Four-year Two years seats TOTAL Two states term for troop (nonsharing one & personnel renewable) eight-year term contributors 1

1

 3

 5

South Asia

 29

1

1

1

 2

 5

Europe

 47

3

1

1

 1

 6

Pacific Rim

 29

1

1

1

 2

 5

Latin America & the Caribbean

 33

0

1

1

 2

 4

Total

191

5

5

5

10

25

Original footnotes *1 For more regional proposals see A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform by Kemal Dervis (2005) [→ 4.5.6] and Regional Representation as a Basis for Security Council Reform by Joseph E. Schwartzberg (2004) [cf. the later version of 2013 of this proposal, → 5.5.3]. *2 The concept of “dual seating” was originally presented by Professor Louis Sohn, former president of The American Society of International Law, at a conference organized by The Hague Academy of International Law at The Hague in July 1992. [Louis B. Sohn, Modernizing the Structure and Procedure of the Security Council, in: René-Jean Dupuy (ed.), Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité, Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992 = The Development of the Role of the Security Council: Workshop,

844

4 Momentum and deadlock

The Hague, 21-23 July 1992. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, pp. 385-397, → 3.5.5.] *3 Model A and B as proposed by the Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (source A/59/565) [2 December 2004, → 4.1.19.] *4 The percentage of members of each regional group that would sit on the Security Council excluding Permanent Members. For example, the Asian Group, excluding China, has 53 countries and would hold five elected seats: 5 ÷ 53 = 9.4%. Likewise, the Overall percentage is the total number of elected seats (20) divided by the total number of Member States, excluding Permanent Members (186): 20 ÷ 186 = 10.8%. *5 Longer-Term or Non-Permanent open to further discussion. *6 Group of United Nations Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), used to elect member states to main UN bodies. *7 Western European Other Groups (WEOG) is a regional group within the United Nations, used to elect member states to main UN bodies. 4.5.9 1 February 2006, Walter Hoffmann, A Competing Model: A Security Council with 20 Members, New York: Center for UN Reform Education (U.N. Reform Watch No. 8)840 […] What are the characteristics of a model that might stand a chance of gaining wider support? First, it would need to keep the council compact, consisting of no more than 20 members; second, it would avoid opposition from regional rivals by not expanding the number of permanent seats; third, it would accommodate Japan, the second largest contributor to the U.N. budget and a U.S. ally; fourth, it would ensure more representation from the developing world. The following plan, called Model X, enlarges the council to 20 members by adding five four-year renewable term seats; two fouryear renewable seats for Africa, two for Asia, and one for the Americas and the Pacific. It would be up to each region to decide whether the terms of the states occupying these special seats should be renewed. Considering Europe’s over representation in the permanent seats of the current council, Model X does not give Europe an additional four-year renewable term. Model X has kept in mind the possibility that the European Union may claim a permanent seat in lieu of United Kingdom and France. Any model that enlarges the council must also be accompanied by assurances that would improve the working methods of the council, by making it more accountable, transparent, and inclusive. Previous Plans During the summer of 2005, three main proposals were debated. The most heavily promoted one came from the so called Group of Four, G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. It enlarged the council to 25 and granted permanent seats to the four sponsors, plus two unnamed African countries. That was not well received by G4’s regional rivals, including China, and also by the United States which has been consistent in voicing opposition to a council consisting of more than 20 members. Canada and eleven other 840  Reproduction of this paper courtesy of the Center for UN Reform Education, New York. For information about the author, see footnote 838 above.

4 Momentum and deadlock

845

countries, including Pakistan and Italy, opposed expansion of the permanent category and proposed a 25-member council with 10 additional rotating seats. The African Union put forward a competing 26-member-council plan, demanding veto powers for their new permanent seats, plus one additional rotating seat. At the African Union summit on October 28, 2005, African countries refused to drop their demand for veto powers and no compromise agreement was reached with the G4 states. The Model X difference The primary difference with model X is that it envisions a more compact council by adding only five new seats as opposed to the 9 or 11 new members, proposed by previous models. Another major difference can be found in the way Model X groups the member states. It moves the Pacific countries from the highly populated Asia to the Americas, thereby ensuring more balanced representation from each continental region; accordingly Africa, Asia, Europe, Americas and the Pacific would each have five seats. In 1965, there were only 111 member states; today there are 191. Of the 80 that were added after 1965, eleven new states came from the Pacific and nine came from the Caribbean portion of the Americas. Model X is similar to Model B841 and the Blue Model in that it creates a new renewable category to accommodate the member states who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily or diplomatically. [See Special Paper No. 4 for more info on Model B and the Blue Model].842 This category, allowing re-election by the continental regions assures representation without freezing any particular state in a permanent seat and allows other heavy-contributing states to rotate into the four-year term at a later date. While many member states have indicated a preference to stay with the 1965 electoral divisions that have been used for electing members to the non-renewable two year terms, Model X re-arranged these for three reasons; first it built on the concept of four continental groupings, set forth by the High Level Panel; second it combined Western and Eastern Europe to reflect the unification of the two Europes after the end of the cold war; and finally by moving Pacific states from Asia to the Americas, it ensured a more balanced representation among the continental regions. One cannot improve the structure of the Security Council to reflect the current state of world affairs, by using the electoral grouping method the General Assembly developed in 1965. The ten existing two year non-renewable terms, for example, may be allocated by Model X as follows; Africa (one seat each for East Africa, West Africa, and the Sahara); Asia (one seat each for East Asia and West Asia); Europe (one seat each for East Europe and West Europe); Americas and Pacific (one seat for South America, one seat for North and Central America jointly, and one seat for the Pacific states). […]

841  2 December 2004, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, → 4.1.19. 842  8 May 2005, Walter Hoffman & Ayca Ariyoruk, Security Council Reform Models: Models A and B, Italian (Regional) Proposal, Blue and Green Models and A New Model C, → 4.5.8.

846

4 Momentum and deadlock

Model X December 2005 (To view the list of states in Model X electoral groupings, visit Center’s web site at ) Electoral Group

Number Current Two year terms New Four-year Total Council of States Permanent Seats Non-renewable renewable terms Members

Africa

 53

0

 3

2

 5

Asia

 43

1

 2

2

 5

Europe

 47

3

 2

0

 5

Americas and Pacific

 48

1

 3

1

 5

Total

191

5

10

5

20

4.5.10 19 April 2006, Walter Hoffmann, Model Duo: Could “Dual Seating” Break the Deadlock on Security Council Reform?, New York: Center for UN Reform Education843 […] The Model Duo discussed in this paper, builds on the concept of dual seating and expands the council from 15 to 21 members. By assigning two separate non-contiguous six-year terms to the electoral regions, more regional powers could be accommodated. That is important for three reasons: 1) It strengthens the support in each region for the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, thereby making the Security Council more effective. 2) It increases the number of states participating in council decisions, thereby making the council more representative. 3) It may allow the inclusion of the powers in each region that contribute most to the United Nations financially and militarily and also can represent the more populous state in each region. By way of example for discussion purposes only, the following is a possible scenario of expansion according to the dual seating model: In East Asia, Japan can run for a six-year term alone, since it is the second largest contributor to the U.N. budget. For the remaining six year term in East Asia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines could team up for a shared council seat. In South Asia, a six-year term could be shared by India and Indonesia, or later Pakistan and Bangladesh could exchange diplomats. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina could run for the first six-year term; Mexico and Colombia could run for the second six-year term. In Western Europe and Other States, the first six-year term could be shared by Germany and Italy; the second six-year term could be shared by Canada and Australia. In Eastern Europe, the first six-year term could be occupied by Ukraine and Poland, and the second six-year term could be shared by Czech Republic and Romania. In Africa, Nigeria and South Africa or later Egypt and Algeria could each pair for shared six-year seats. This model would allow the representation of 24 different countries in two six-year terms (over a period of 12 years). 843  Reproduction of this paper courtesy of the Center for UN Reform Education. For information about the author, see footnote 838 above.

847

4 Momentum and deadlock

Despite the provision for two separate non-contiguous shared six-year terms, the important Charter amendment required is to increase the Security Council from 15 to 21 members. The shared six-year terms would not affect the ten two-year nonrenewable terms, which would continue to be elected by the current electoral groups as at present (five each year for a two-year non-renewable term). The concept of dual seating may be a way to break the apparent impasse blocking Security Council reform. The big advantage of dual seating is that it gives many more medium-sized regional powers the opportunity to share a longer term seat instead of having to wait their state’s turn for a two year seat which they may never get. It also offers an incentive for countries to seek regional partners, pool resources, and work together. The result can make the council more representative without compromising its effectiveness. THE MODEL DUO Number of States

Asia

54

Permanent

1

Two years, Non-permanent, non-renewable 2

Expansion: Shared 6 year terms (2008-14 and 2014-20), non-renewable 2

Total

5

Africa

53

3

1

4

GRULAC

33

2

1

3

Western Europe and Other States

29

3

2

1

6

Eastern Europe

22

1

1

1

3

191

5

10

6

21

Total

4.5.11 8 June 2007, Hans Köchler, Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International Democracy, Lecture delivered at the International Seminar on “Reforming the United Nations: Democracy, Justice and Security in the Age of Globalization” organized by the Center for the Study of Federalism, Turin, Italy844 […] (II) A possible reform alternative? The alternative proposal we have in mind revolves around the notion of permanent membership in the Security Council. We are, however, well aware that what we outline here is only a blueprint that will need to be worked out in more detail; we are also mindful that the absence of a balance of power in global affairs (including intergovernmental 844  Reproduction of this lecture courtesy of Hans Köchler. This text was reprinted in: Giovanni Finizio & Ernesto Gallo (eds.), Democracy at the United Nations: UN Reform in the Age of Globalisation. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 263-75. For information on the author, see Part 3, footnote 513 above.

848

4 Momentum and deadlock

relations at the level of the UN) constitutes an additional, and formidable, obstacle to any serious reform effort.*1 What we envisage, in essence, is a kind of transformation of the concept of permanent membership that would bring the veto provision closer to the democratically more acceptable obligation of seeking democratic consensus and would eventually, at some future stage, make non-permanent membership obsolete. Initially, we have outlined this proposal at the final meeting of the European research network on “The Political Theory of Transnational Democracy” at the University of Cambridge (29 March 1996).*2 The main principle guiding our considerations at the time was that the veto should be made less of a “dictatorial” tool and come closer to a kind of requirement (or obligation) to integrate all regions of the globe into the decision-making process in the Security Council.*3 The reform measure envisaged by us could make the Council the cornerstone of a future multipolar balance of power which alone can be the basis of legitimacy for an intergovernmental organization that is expected to be universal and democratic at the same time (an ideal which, originally, was proclaimed in the Charter’s Preamble).*4 It goes without saying that any such measure would still imply an amendment to the Charter, i.e. would require the consent of the existing permanent members. In one basic sense, however, it might be more realistic than earlier proposals that concentrated on the “game of names and numbers” (of permanent and non-permanent members): the proposal does not provide granting the veto “privilege” to additional nation states who could be perceived, by the existing permanent members, as competitors in the global game for power and influence over the Council’s decisions. What does such a paradigm change in terms of permanent membership entail? What specific Charter amendments would be required? The gist of our (admittedly idealistic) proposal can be characterized as follows: First of all, “permanent membership” will have to be redefined on the basis of regional representation. The concept, thus redefined, would not relate to an individual country (nation state), but to a region. This new category of permanent membership would imply the representation of a group of countries according to specific procedures to be agreed upon among member states. Membership of regions, not of nation states, would indeed be a novel feature of the international system; it would give concrete shape to the Charter’s guiding principle of “equitable geographical distribution” that sets out the participation of non-permanent members in the Council (Art. 23 [1]), thus making it a universal guideline for participation in the work of the Council. It is obvious that this kind of realignment (or restructuring respectively) of membership will be easier to realize where homogenous regional organizations already exist – as in the cases of the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States, or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A question that has to be paid attention to in this context will be (a) the overlapping of regions (areas) covered by some of those entities and (b) the different nature of some of those entities’ “mission statements” (as regards their political, ethnic, or religious goals, as expressed in their statutes, or a combination of those). Where such structures do not yet exist, Charter reform, as a basic measure, should include a “definition of regions” for the purpose of representation in the Security Council. This will not necessarily entail, at first instance, the creation of partly supranational structures such as that of the European Union.*5

4 Momentum and deadlock

849

The rationale of introducing this new category of permanent membership may be explained by reference to the following doctrinary stipulations and administrative arrangements: (a) The membership will be collective (whereby this new category will ideally phase out, or make obsolete, the membership of individual states unless otherwise specified); (b) Within each region (grouping of states in whichever constitutional form) the seat will rotate in alphabetical order and within a set time frame (an arrangement that could be worked out similarly to the procedures applied for the rotating EU presidency and in conformity with each entity’s specific structure or according to unified procedures to be defined in a reformed UN Charter); (c) Each sitting member will co-ordinate its voting behavior with the members of the group according to the procedures of the respective entity (where such regulations exist) or, alternatively, on the basis of unified rules to be written into the Charter (similar to what is alternatively proposed under [b]); (d) In cases where a country has de facto the “weight” of a region and also geographically can be categorized as one, such a country may have its own permanent seat (which, of course, would require a special Charter provision). As regards the present permanent members, this might, first and foremost, apply to the People’s Republic of China and also to the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Republic of India (Indian Union). However, such a provision – which may, in doctrinal terms, compromise the key principle of “regionalization” – will have to be carefully considered. Whatever the technicalities of such a realignment finally may be (should it ever be considered within the United Nations fora), the “regionalization” of Security Council membership would be able to eliminate existing imbalances and definitely put an end to the overrepresentation of the European region (resulting from the permanent membership of the United Kingdom and France both of whom, anyway, are no great powers anymore). A common European seat in the Security Council, which has been contemplated since the 1990s,*6 would fit very well into this more cooperative, less étatistic, scheme of international organization.*7 The devil rests in the detail, however. We must not overlook the enormous challenge posed by the aim of “dividing” the globe according to a balanced regional model. Such a measure will definitely require a kind of new constitutional consensus among the present members of the United Nations – lest such a comprehensive and farreaching reform move would trigger a new and almost insurmountable identity crisis of the organization. Furthermore, such an initiative must not be left to the five permanent members “at whose discretion” and “under whose watch” virtually all reform efforts have failed so far; it should rather be a joint undertaking of the real “international community,” not merely of the traditional “Western allies” (who all too often have hijacked this term [international community] to justify their claim to represent the entire mankind). Historical experience teaches us that major constitutional rearrangements of this kind almost never happen in times of peace, but as a consequence of major upheaval (as the emergence of the League of Nations after World War I and of the United Nations Organization after World War II have demonstrated). In defiance of mankind’s experience with realpolitik and the dicta of political realism, we dare to express the idealistic

850

4 Momentum and deadlock

expectation that the awareness of the crisis brought about by the now obvious failure of unilateralism – with the very real danger of global anarchy resulting from it – will make the community of states (including the permanent members of the Security Council) more amenable to such a restructuring and redistribution of executive power within the United Nations than otherwise would be the case. The crisis triggered by the invasion of Iraq*8 and the rather sudden collapse of the project of a “New Middle East”*9 are signs on the wall that are detectible at least to those who are familiar with the history of hegemonial power. Should the “powers that are” (the nation states) not be able to seize the moment, responding to the concerns of their peoples – and should the organization’s “reinvention”*10 by means of redefining the concept of permanent membership (as part of a major project of Charter reform) prove impossible, there will simply be no way to avoid the refounding of the United Nations Organization – by means of creating an entirely new normative framework of international organization.*11 A further procedural measure will have to be considered in such a major restructuring effort as envisaged by us. Ideally, the veto provision itself, albeit in the form of a unanimity requirement among equal members (as envisaged in the above reform proposal), should also be transformed into the requirement of what in the UN-newspeak is called a “supermajority”*12 (for instance of three quarters of the total votes of the new “regional” – or more precisely: regionally defined – permanent members).*13 This provision will be of crucial importance should certain very large states be considered as “regions” in themselves. The actual replacement of unanimity by supermajority will in itself be the decisive step in the paradigm change from an absolutely posited notion of sovereignty to a less absolutist understanding of the state as subject of international law within a co-operative framework, something which is indispensable should the democratization of international relations ever take hold within the UN system.*14 If such a large-scale – and admittedly extremely ambitious – reform proposal should ever be undertaken, one will also have to deal with procedural issues within each region: namely, how a cohesive position on the often highly controversial issues that are on the agenda of the Security Council can realistically be achieved. The inability, so far, of the European Union to develop a cohesive foreign policy (demonstrated, in all its helplessness, to the entire world in the course of the Iraq crisis of 2003) has made us aware of the intricacies of intra-regional co-ordination even where rather advanced mechanisms are in place. Clear and unambiguous procedures will have to be worked out as to how instructions are to be given to the rotating representative of a regional grouping in the Council, whereby those regulations may be set either autonomously within each regional entity or according to unified standards to be provided for in the procedural rules of a reformed Security Council. It is absolutely essential that all these “technicalities” be tackled in detail should the great vision of the Security Council as “house of the regions” ever materialize. […] Original footnotes

*1 For a general assessment of

the implications of the unilateral power structure for the international system see the author’s paper: “The Precarious Nature of International Law in the Absence of a Balance of Power,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), The Use of Force

4 Momentum and deadlock

851

in International Relations. Challenges to Collective Security. Studies in International Relations, XXIX. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2006, pp. 11-19. *2 For details see Hans Köchler, The United Nations and International Democracy. The Quest for UN Reform. Published on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the International Progress Organization. Studies in International Relations, XXII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1997. *3 Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia had, in his original considerations, something similar in mind: “… what we would have, if some of our ideas are accepted, is a permanent presence of a region or subregion without ‘permanentizing’ one particular country.” (1994 Conference on Security Council Reform) [Ambassador Razali Ismail, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, Global Policy Forum]. *4 The “Peoples of the United Nations,” in promulgating the Charter in 1945, had committed themselves “to reaffirm faith … in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small …”. *5 On the complex interrelation of intergovernmental, transnational and supranational elements in the case of the European Union as the “paradigmatic” regional entity (for which “collective membership” has been contemplated in the Security Council) see the author’s analysis: “The European Constitution and the Imperatives of Transnational Democracy,” in: Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. IX (2005), pp. 87-101. *6 See, inter alia, Dimitris Bourantonis and Konstantinos Magliveras, “The Enlargement of the UN Security Council: Reflections from the Current Debate,” in: Politics, Vol. 22 (1), 2002, pp. 24-30; esp. pp. 28 f. *7 On the debate over Security Council reform in connection with reform efforts within the European Union see now also: Daniele Marchesi, The EU and the Reform of the UN Security Council. Assessing the Impact on CFSP. Draft version, 6.05.2007, EUSA Conference, Montreal, 17-19 May 2007, at . *8 On the legal and political implications of this war of aggression and its ramifications within the global system see the author’s documentation: Hans Köchler, The Iraq Crisis and the United Nations: Power Politics vs. the International Rule of Law, Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2004. *9 For details see, inter alia, Trudy J. Kuehner, “A New Middle East? A Report of FPRI’s History Institute for Teachers,” in: The Newsletter of FPRI’s Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2005), Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA, at . *10 Tad Daley and David Lionel have emphasized the aspect of “reinvention” and brought the urgency of far-reaching, comprehensive reform to the point: “If humanity wants to avoid some of the cataclysmic scenarios that are all too easy to conjure today, we must try to envision much more dramatic changes in our global public policymaking processes – changes that will bring a much larger transformation in representation, legitimacy, accountability and universality.” Daley and Lionel, “Reinventing the United Nations,” in: Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 83, No. 9 (September 2006), pp. 33-39, at 36. *11 See also the author’s considerations in: “Quo Vadis, United Nations?,” in: Law Review, Polytechnic University of the Philippines, College of Law, May 2005, pp. 49-65; esp. Chapter IV, pp. 61 ff.

852

4 Momentum and deadlock

*12

The term was initially used, albeit in a somewhat different meaning, in the phrasing of voting provisions for the Special Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Khmer Rouge trials”). Cf. Hans Köchler, Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads, Vienna/New York: Springer, 2003, pp. 123 ff. *13 On a supermajority formula for the Council, phasing out the veto provision, see also Daley and Lionel, “Reinventing the United Nations” [footnote *10 above], p. 36. *14 Cf. Hans Köchler (ed.), The United Nations and International Democracy. Vienna: Jamahir Society for Culture and Philosophy, 1995. 4.5.12 2008, Harald Müller, Wie kann eine neue Weltordnung aussehen? Wege in eine nachhaltige Politik [Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future], Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, pp. 262-264845 Summary by the editor: The author proposes a reform of the Security Council according to which the states represented in the Council should permanently represent a clear majority of the world population, and at the same time all regions of the world, and thus also represent the cultural diversity of the world. A permanent seat for India, Japan and Brazil would be reasonable, as well as one such seat for the European Union, instead of the two seats nostalgically held by the two «garden gnomes» Great Britain and France who Germany wants to join as a third and tallest «garden gnome». For Africa, the author holds, the most reasonable solution would be a rotation of two permanent seats among three states, namely South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. Such rotations would also be possible for other states, for instance for Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela as bigger Latin American countries, or for Indonesia, Pakistan and South Korea in Asia. If Africa insists to have a permanent seat without rotation, it must agree on a candidate. As long as it does not do so, rotation is the best alternative. Rotation means that a state leaves the Security Council only for two years, and returns after that time for a period of four years. Thus, the state in question is in the Council for most of the time. The other UN members know that the state will return to the Council after its two-year «sabbatical», and the permanent members know it as well. That improves the status of the state even in the time in which it does not belong to the Council. The likelihood to be involved in informal consultations during that time is high because many important questions keep the Council busy for more than two years. So designed, the Council would have seven permanent members and three rotating seats. In addition, there could be twelve non-permanent seats in order to achieve a broader regional representation also in that category of membership. Since the EU would be represented by one common seat, the at least three non-permanent seats usually allocated to EU members would be given to other states. Thus, the Security Council would definitely 845  The book appeared in an English translation in 2009: Harald Müller, Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future, London: Haus Publishing, 2009.    Harald Müller (*1949) is Professor Emeritus of Political Science with a focus on international relations and peace and conflict research at the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany. From 1996 until 2015, he was the director of the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK). He has been an expert in disarmament and security policy issues in different national and international bodies, advising, inter alia, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

4 Momentum and deadlock

853

become more representative. However, that alternative requires that France and Great Britain give their liberal-cosmopolitan heritage priority, rather than their nationalistic tradition. According to the author, the new permanent and «semi-permanent» members do not necessarily need the veto. On the other hand, the veto power of the «old permanent» members can probably not be abolished because the present P5 will not be ready voluntarily to renounce it. But what can reasonably be expected from them is that they justify a particular veto. That the P5 are not even willing to fulfil that minimal demand demonstrates the shocking degree of irresponsibility of those states which, at the same time, arrogantly invoke that responsibility for their privileges. That should no longer be tolerated by the other members of the United Nations. Instead, they should continue, together with civil society, a policy of «shaming» towards the P5 until the five are ready to compromise. As a last resort, a veto can be overrun with the «Uniting for Peace» procedure. However, the General Assembly should use that possibility only cautiously because the veto power does have a meaning. It shall prevent that vital interests of a major power are violated. In case of such a violation, dangerous situations arise. If the Security Council is enlarged to have a total membership of twenty-two states, the present quorum of nine votes (of fifteen in total) is likely to be raised to fifteen. There is a chance that a greater number of permanent or semi-permanent members will challenge the annoying practice of the P5 first to seek an agreement among themselves, and then to present that agreement to the other members of the Council according to the motto «it’s sink or swim». If the P5 believe that they can simply maintain their primacy, it is advisable to create alliances which present draft resolutions supported by a greater number of Council members. After a short phase of confrontational meetings probably a more cooperative mode of operation will prevail. 4.5.13 May 2008, James Paul and Céline Nahory, “To contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security …”: The Case for Democratic Reform of the Security Council, in: Critical Currents – Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Occasional Paper Series, No. 4: The Quest for Regional Representation: Reforming the United Nations Security Council, pp. 29-38846 […] [35] […] Enlargement is not an effective route to better representation Member states often argue that added members will make the Council ‘more representative’. But this is only marginally the case. Adding members adds more states, with their own state interests. Such members only weakly ‘represent’ their region or their state type (poor, island, small, etc.), since there is no system of accountability. 846  Reproduction courtesy of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden. – James A. Paul (*1941) served as the Executive Director of the Global Policy Forum (GPF) from its foundation in 1993 through the end of 2012. He was a prominent figure in the NGO advocacy community at the UN and a well-known speaker and writer on the UN and global policy issues. He earned a B.A. from Harvard College, an M.A. from Oxford University and his Ph.D. from New York University in 1975 with a specialty in comparative politics. In his early career, Paul was lecturer and then assistant professor of political science at Empire State College of the State University of New York. Between 1995 and 2010, he frequently served as chair or vice chair of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council. Céline Nahory studied at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in

854

4 Momentum and deadlock

Instead, they act primarily on the basis of their own national interest. If they are large regional hegemons, they may seek to increase their hegemony at the expense of other regional states. If they are states involved in civil conflict, they may seek to block Council re-medial action (Rwanda notoriously sat on the Council during the 1994 genocide) with negative effects on many neighbours. And if they are small and weak states, they may be exposed to great power pressure, bowing often to threats or blandishments and voting according to the interests of the mighty, not the interests of regional neighbours and friends. The question of regional representation The idea of regional representation goes back to 1945, when the United Nations Charter was being negotiated in San Francisco. Countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Egypt then supported the idea of including regional representation.*1 But because such a concept was seen as threatening the power of the future permanent members, the idea was dropped.*2 In April 2007, a report of five facilitators appointed by the President of the General Assembly to push the process forward identified the question of regional representation and accountability as a key step towards a more representative Council.*3 The docu- [36] ment reported that in the view of many delegations, elected members should represent not only their state’s interests but also the views of the regional group to which they belong, in order to enhance access and input from non-Council members. Regional organisations of states such as the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU) are leading in this direction. While the EU has developed furthest,*4 other regional bodies may evolve, including a proposed South American Union of Nations (UNASUR). In its 2005 ‘Ezulwini Consensus’,847 the AU adopted a regional approach to the question of its membership in the Council.*5 The AU made clear that the African demand for representation was for the entire continent, not for just one or two countries. The AU declared it would itself determine the criteria and be responsible for the selection of its representatives. But many member states are sceptical about regional seats, though, seeing them as impractical at present, due to the different levels of cohesion of the regional groups and their varied internal working methods. Still, many agree that the concept of regional representation is worth exploring, as a way towards an eventual agreement on Security Council reform. Suggestions for representation through more effective regionalism Informal regional arrangements fit into the existing structures to provide a better form of representation on the Council, as a prelude to regional seats. Regional groups can pool resources and policy coordination and take steps to make regionally elected states far more responsive to regionally agreed policy. Each region could have its own secretariat in New York that could strengthen its own elected members and promote common policies, with no Charter revision required.   Geneva. She was a Senior Advisor to GPF and, from 2001 to 2007, GPF’s Security Council Program Coordinator in New York, organizing and participating in more than 300 meetings of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council. 847  7-8 March 2005, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII), → 4.2.2.3.26.

4 Momentum and deadlock

855

This would help small and poor nations to enlarge their capacity and enhance their ability to participate in the Council on a strong footing. A small state with only three or four diplomats on its Council team suffers from a huge disadvantage compared to members with teams of 20 or more.*6 The same small state, supported by a number of experts from a permanent regional secretariat, would magnify its capacity. The regional secretariat would also give elected members access to institutional memory of the Council, narrowing the great advantage now held by the P-5. To further strengthen regional ties, member delegations could also include diplomats from other regional countries. Brazil and Argentina have already exchanged diplomats during Council [37] terms. Other states could act likewise. But real progress can only take place if stronger regional states give up their hopes of permanent seats. When these states realise that progress depends on common action with their neighbours, they can promote common interests and not theirs alone. Towards restriction of the veto and other special privileges Reform of the Council must seek to restrict (and eventually eliminate) the veto, but this obviously cannot be done in the near future through Charter revision, which itself is subject to the veto process. Instead, states must mobilise pressure and persuasion to get P-5 members to limit their veto use, especially the threatened or ‘hidden veto’ that casts a shadow over the Council’s proceedings at all times. If all the aspirant states abandon their quest for permanency, they can provide major diplomatic muscle in this veto-restriction effort, along with support for a regional approach to membership. The veto should be immediately ended in such cases as decisions on the admission of new members to the UN, election of the Secretary-General and other cases rarely touching on core P-5 interests. Similarly, the 187 states outside the P-5 club should make joint efforts to limit other special P-5 privileges, such as claims on high Secretariat posts and seats on the International Court of Justice. Eventually, in the more distant future, permanency itself should be negotiated into well-deserved oblivion and the oligarchy eliminated once and for all. […] Original footnotes Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. 11 (New York: United Nations Information Organizations, 1945), p. 291; “Egyptians Seek Larger Councils”, New York Times, 25 April 1945; “Small Nations Seek to Expand Security Council Membership”, Washington Post, 29 April 1945. *2 See for example “Small States Denied Voice in Policing of World”, Washington Post, 13 May 1945; James B. Reston, “Delegates of U.S. Map Plan to Keep Regional Powers”, New York Times, 13 May 1945. *3 “Report of the facilitators on the consultations regarding the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”, 19 April 2007, UN doc. A/61/47, Annex II. [→ 4.1.25.] *4 See for instance Peter Schmidt, “A Complex Puzzle – The EU’s Security Policy and UN reform”, International Spectator, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (1994), pp. 53-66. – The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) of 7 February 1992 stipulates: “Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their *1

856

4 Momentum and deadlock

functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter” (Article 19 of the Consolidated Version). The last half-sentence of the provision, however, may be seen as a loophole for preserving the special status for France and Great Britain towards their fellow EU members. *5 “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus”, African Union, Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary Session (7-8 March 2005), AU doc. Ext/EX.CL/2(VII). [→ 4.2.2.3.26.] *6 For size of missions in the Security Council (number of professionals on staff) in the years 1994 to 2005, see . 4.5.14 May 2008, Richard Hartwig, Squaring the Circle: A Regional/Economic Proposal for Reform of the United Nations Security Council, in: Critical Currents – Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Occasional Paper Series, No. 4: The Quest for Regional Representation: Reforming the United Nations Security Council, pp. 41-75848 […] [44] […] Here we advocate radical UNSC reform through what we call the Regional/Economic Proposal (REP). It is an exercise in constitution-building or political architecture. This proposal suggests that representation in the Security Council may be determined by objectively balancing the three claims of legitimacy, power/wealth and mutual advantage. It envisions a UNSC composed of 10 geographic Regions. Each Region would be headed by an anchor country, or by co-anchor countries. A Region’s UN representative could only vote on a particular issue if supported by countries representing 60 per cent of its population and 60 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product at purchasing power parity – GDP(PPP). This is the 60/60 rule. In emergency situations, only anchor and co-anchor countries would have the vote. There would be no veto power. Regions with at least 18 per cent of the combined GDP(PPP) of all Regions would receive two UNSC votes each on a permanent basis. This would currently give both Northern America and Europe two votes, with the other Regions having one vote each. East Asia (China, including Hong Kong, and North Korea*1) will probably qualify for two votes by 2020, if not before. According to the World Factbook, East Asia currently has 16 per cent of the GDP(PPP) of all 10 world Regions.*2 The composition of the Regions would be subject to revision by the UNSC, with General Assembly approval, every 20 years. […] [51] […] Geographic regions Our suggestion is that geographic Regions, rather than countries, be represented on the Security Council. Representation by regions has been proposed before, but not [52] in this form.*3 In the REP (Regional/Economic Proposal), representation would be based on 10 geographic Regions (with a capital ‘R’): Northern America, Latin America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Northern Eurasia, Southern Asia, Eastern Asia,

848  Reproduction courtesy of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden. – Richard Hartwig is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University in Kingsville, Texas, where he was a member of the political science department from 1993 through 2015. In 2008, when he wrote this proposal, he was a visiting fellow at the School of Social Sciences in the Faculty of Arts of the Australian National University in Canberra.

4 Momentum and deadlock

857

Southeastern Asia and The Pacific.*4 The UNSC would thus have 10 permanent members. There would be no veto power. Only countries with a minimum of 4 million people or a GDP(PPP) of at least 40 billion constant US dollars would be allowed to participate in the UNSC Regions. The role of the smaller countries in the General Assembly would continue as it is. The legal principle of the sovereign equality of nations would not be affected in this sense. The 4 Million People/40 Billion Dollar GDP(PPP) Rule is designed to include small but in- [53] fluential countries such as Costa Rica and Norway. It would exclude the microstates, to keep the operation of the UNSC from becoming excessively complex and slow. However, countries reaching and maintaining the thresholds of 4 million people or USD 40 billion GDP(PPP) for two consecutive decades – in constant dollars – could be added to the Regions. The REP uses the concept of anchor and co-anchor countries.*5 The anchor countries would correspond to the permanent members of the current Security Council. Anchor countries would be inextricably linked to a particular Region. An anchor country (or federation-like organisation) would be one that has more than half of the total size points of all participating countries in its Region. Size points, as described below, are determined by a formula weighting a country’s population and GDP – measured in terms of PPP. The anchor countries (one of them a regional supranational organisation) would be the United States, the European Union, China, India, Russia, and Japan. There would be co-anchor countries in Regions that do not have a dominant country, again chosen by a combination of population and GDP(PPP). Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Southeastern Asia, and Middle East Regions would all have co-anchor or rotating co-anchor countries. The determination of co-anchor and rotating co-anchor countries is somewhat more complicated. Population and GDP may be compared by arbitrarily assigning one point for each 10 million people and one point for each US$40 billion GDP(PPP) in constant 2006 dollars.*6 We will call this the Egyptian Standard, since this ratio weights population and gross domestic product approximately equally in Egypt – with GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity. By this measure, Egypt would receive 8.0 points for population and 8.4 points for GDP(PPP).*7 Measured in these terms, Pakistan is the largest country in Middle East Region with 27 size points – a size point being a combination of the points for population and GDP(PPP).*8 Turkey*9, Iran and Egypt would follow with 23, 21.5, and 16 points respectively. Only countries with a minimum of 15 size points would be eligible for co-anchor status.*10 As noted above, there would be one large anchor country (a regional supranational organisation, in the case of Europe) in six of the Regions. The Permanent Representatives of the US, the EU, China, India, Japan and Russia, would preside as UNSC Chairs of their Regions most – or all – of the time (see Table [54] 1).*11 There would be rotating ‘A’ and ‘B’ seats on the UNSC for co-anchor countries in the other Regions. Brazil and Mexico would co-anchor the Latin America Region most of the time, with Argentina and Colombia filling in for shorter periods. South Africa and Nigeria would co-anchor the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt would alternate for specified numbers of years as co-anchors of the Middle East Region. Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam would alternate in the two co-anchor positions in Southeastern Asia. Japan would be the anchor country in The Pacific as long as it has over 50 per cent of the size points of this

858

4 Momentum and deadlock

Region. Japan currently has 57 per cent of the size points of participating countries in its Region. Should it fall below 50 per cent in two consecutive census periods, a decade apart, it would become permanent co-anchor in the A seat. South Korea, Canada and Australia would then alternate as co-anchors in the B seat. A specific example of how the above would work is as follows: Middle East Region countries with at least 15 size points would be divided into ‘A’ and ‘B’ groups. Each group would have approximately the same number of size points. Pakistan (27 points) and Egypt (16 points) would alternate in the A seat. This grouping has a total of 43 size points. Iran (21.5 points) and Turkey (23 points) would alternate in the B seat. These countries have a total of 44.5 size points. The total numbers of size points in each grouping should be as similar as possible. Years as co-anchor countries would be allocated in proportion to the percentage of size points a country has in its group. Pakistan and Egypt respectively have 63 per cent and 37 per cent of the size points in group A. This is approximately a five to three ratio. Consequently, Pakistan would serve as co-anchor for five years in the A seat, followed by Egypt for three years. In the B seat, Iran and Turkey would serve identical three-year terms because their size point scores are similar (21.5 and 23.1 respectively). Table 1 includes the results of applying this procedure in the four (possibly five) Regions without a dominant anchor country.*12 It would seem preferable for the existing organisations in Regions with co-anchor countries to determine the precise rotations, that is to say which countries would be on the UNSC in a particular year. (In the case of The Pacific, a regional organisation would need to be created.) Under normal conditions, UNSC co-anchor positions would confer more status than real power. The voting power of countries within Regions would be based upon their populations and GDP(PPP) – consistent with the 60/60 rule. Co-anchor status would not confer additional voting power. Anchor and co-anchor countries would be designated at the time of the UN Charter reform. Every decade thereafter, a country could present a claim for co-anchor status based upon an objective formula such as that described above. [55] Table 1 Proposed Regions in UN Security Council with Permanent Chairs and Rotations of Countries Co-Chairing Regions Region

‘A’ Seat Co-Chair/s

‘B’ Seat Co-Chair/s

Sub-Saharan Africa

Permanent Chair

South Africa

Nigeria

Latin America

Brazil

Mexico (5 yrs) Argentina (3 yrs) Colombia (2 yrs)

Indonesia (6 yrs) Thailand (2 yrs)

Bangladesh (3 yrs) Philippines (3 yrs) Vietnam (3 yrs)

Pakistan (5 yrs) Egypt (3 yrs)

Iran (3 yrs) Turkey* (3 yrs)

Northern America Eastern Asia Southeastern Asia

United States China

Southern Asia

India

Middle East

859

4 Momentum and deadlock Region

Permanent Chair

‘A’ Seat Co-Chair/s

‘B’ Seat Co-Chair/s

Europe Northern Eurasia The Pacific

European Union Russia Japan

(Japan)**

(South Korea [4 yrs])** (Canada [4 yrs])** (Australia [2 yrs])**

* Assuming that Turkey joins Middle East Region. Should Turkey join Europe Region, Pakistan, Iran and Egypt would serve as rotating anchors of Middle East Region for four, three, and two and a half years respectively. ** If Japan’s size points should drop below half of the total of its Region, it would become permanent co-anchor of The Pacific in the A seat. South Korea, Canada and Australia would rotate as co-anchors in the B seat. Japan currently has 57 per cent of the total size points of its Region.

[56] Operations of the Security Council might be disrupted if an anchor or co-anchor country – Nigeria, Pakistan, or Indonesia, for example – were to disintegrate politically. A mechanism would need to be established whereby the next largest country in a Region could temporarily take the place of the failed state. This might be accomplished by means of an 80 per cent UNSC vote, ratified by a two-thirds majority of the UN General Assembly.*13 Composition of geographic Regions For practical reasons, the Security Council Regions should correspond as closely as possible to geographic forms and pre-existing organisational units. However, exceptions will sometimes be necessary for political reasons. Northern America Region consists only of the United States and Puerto Rico, which has Commonwealth status with the former. Canada and Mexico are not included.*14 Other English-speaking areas of the Americas may be incorporated if they achieve the minimum size at some point. Latin America Region includes Mexico, Central America and the non-English-speaking countries of the Caribbean and South America. The most comprehensive international organisation in the Americas is the Organization of American States (OAS).*15 The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa Region would generally be those nations of the African Union located south of the Sahara desert.*16 Europe Region would include all the 27 members of the European Union, plus Norway, Switzerland and countries surrounded by the EU: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.*17 Turkey’s Regional affiliation is currently indeterminate. Europe Region could be represented in the UNSC by a future EU ambassador to the UN;*18 alternatively, Europe could be represented by the Permanent Representative of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency at a given time. Northern Eurasia would consist largely of the countries of the former Soviet Union, minus those that have chosen to affiliate themselves with the EU or may wish to join Middle East [57] Region. Russia would be the anchor country and dominant power. Southeastern Asia would include the larger countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, plus Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Southern Asia would probably include only India and Nepal. Eastern Asia would consist of China and North Korea, Mongolia being too small in population and GDP(PPP)

860

4 Momentum and deadlock

to participate at the present time. The Pacific would include Japan, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Regional affiliation of Taiwan, which is not currently a member of the UN, is indeterminate.*19 Finally, the Middle East would encompass the Muslim countries from Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east to Algeria and Morocco in the west. It would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – and possibly Sudan and Eritrea. (Turkey might join the Middle East or Europe. Israel might join Europe or even Northern America.) Many of the countries in Middle East Region are presently members of the League of Arab States.*20 The estimated 2007 population of each of the proposed Regions is indicated in Table 2. This Table also lists the estimated 2006 GDP of the Regions, measured in terms of PPP.*21 We believe that PPP is a more useful measure of wealth than real exchange rates. Real exchange rates are volatile in the short run and may be affected by portfolio preferences, price bubbles and monetary shocks.*22 They also underestimate the economic level of people in subsistence economies and of countries without fully convertible currencies. For example, in January 2006, The Economist magazine’s Big Mac Index indicated that the Chinese Yuan was 59 per cent undervalued.*23 Measuring wealth in terms of real exchange rates would thus have undervalued the size of the Chinese economy. US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton adopted this position in March 2006 when he proposed [58] that the dues of UN member states be based upon PPP calculations.*24 Ideally, the size of Regional populations would be roughly equivalent. Regional populations do not differ greatly between Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Southeastern Asia is somewhat larger. Eastern Asia and Southern Asia are necessarily much larger, given the enormous populations of China and India. Northern Asia, comprised primarily of member countries of the former Soviet Union, has the second smallest population size of any Region. This also seems unavoidable. In spite of their relatively small populations, the countries formerly comprising the Soviet Union constitute a huge, distinct, geopolitical area with an impressive natural resource base. Russia is recovering economically from its disastrous decline in the 1990s. It remains an important country with a large supply of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia is currently a permanent member of the UNSC and it is unlikely to agree to any reform that would seriously diminish its status. Northern America is the third smallest Region in terms of population – in part because Mexico has been placed in Latin America and Canada in The Pacific. However, as of 2006 Northern America was the second richest Region and the US had the world’s strongest military forces. The Pacific has the fewest people of any Region. However, since it includes Japan, its economy is the fourth largest of any Region. It is also geographically extensive, given the huge land areas of Canada and Australia. It would be preferable for the Regions to be equivalent in terms of wealth as well as population. But this is not the nature of the modern world. Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest Region, should be represented on the UNSC because of its population of over 680 million people, because the large number of states makes it powerful in the General Assembly (which has to ratify any Charter changes), and because of its special needs. Africa can cause the world a great deal of trouble if its needs are not addressed. Finally, the composition of the Regions is necessarily affected by political considerations, both outside and inside the UN. Externally, it is desirable to place countries

861

4 Momentum and deadlock

with histories of conflict with each other in different Regions. Consequently, India and Pakistan are separated – as are China and Japan; Japan and most of the countries of Southeastern Asia; Somalia and Ethiopia; and the United States and Mexico. In some cases, however, this does not seem possible – for example, Japan and South Korea. Within the UNSC, it seems desirable to separate the US from Canada and Mexico, and India from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, because the smaller countries in each pairing would always be outvoted by the larger countries of their Region. If the smaller countries were not separated from the dominant countries in these Regions, they would not be likely to support the reform proposal, and for good reasons. As of now, Canada, Australia and South Korea would not have the opportunity to serve as co-anchors of The Pacific Region. They would only be able to serve as coanchors if Japan’s total size points (currently 57 per cent) were to fall to less than half of that of the Region as [59] Table 2 Population and GDP(PPP) of Proposed Regions in the UN Security Council Region

Chairs/Co-Chairs

Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigeria South Africa Brazil Mexico Argentina Colombia United States China Indonesia Bangladesh Thailand Philippines Vietnam India Turkey Iran Pakistan Egypt European Union Russia Japan

Latin America

Northern America Eastern Asia Southeastern Asia

Southern Asia Middle East

Europe Northern Eurasia The Pacific Total of Regions: World Total:

Population 680,000,000

GDP (USD billions, PPP) 1,453

551,000,000

4,808

305,000,000 1,329,000,000 746,000,000

13,136 10,519 3,282

1,159,000,000 661,000,000

4,205 3,525*

520,000,000 274,000,000 239,000,000 6,464,000,000 6,602,000,000

13,836 2,543 7,392 64,700 65,960

Source: World Factbook, updated 15 November 2007. Estimated population figures for July 2007; 2006 GDP(PPP) estimates. Only countries or entities with populations of over 4 million or GDPs (PPP) of over USD 40 billion are included. Taiwan (not a UN member) is not included. Turkey is provisionally included with the Middle East. Puerto Rico is counted with Northern America. Hong Kong is included in China/East Asia. * With Turkey, Sudan and Eritrea included in the Region.

862

4 Momentum and deadlock

[60] a whole. If this were to happen, Japan would become permanent co-anchor of The Pacific in seat A, while South Korea, Canada and Australia would alternate as co-anchors in seat B.*25 It should be noted that co-anchor status in the Security Council would be a mixed blessing, which South Korea, Canada and Australia would not necessarily aspire to. They might not want to be directly involved in a potential conflict between China and Japan. It should be noted that for many years, Mexico did not attempt to claim one of the two-year Latin American seats on the current UNSC because it wanted to avoid a conflict with the US. Such a conflict did materialise when Mexico and Chile served on the Council immediately prior to the latest Iraq War.*26 If Canada, Australia and South Korea did not have co-anchor status in The Pacific, they would be free to apply for membership in another Region in the future. In theory, Russia could lose its anchor status in Northern Eurasia at some point. Like Japan, its population is declining relative to that of other countries in its Region. In practice, however, this will not happen. Some Northern Eurasian countries with Islamic identities may decide to join the Middle East, thus increasing Russia’s percentage of the Regional population. A country such as Georgia, currently in conflict with Russia, might ask to join Europe. The Regional location of the Ukraine might also change. Finally, Russia has a high percentage of the GDP(PPP) of its Region (currently 69 per cent), which will keep its size points up relative to the other countries. Voting in the Security Council In all but emergency situations, a Region could only vote in the Security Council if its representative could meet the 60/60 requirement on a given issue. A Region would be required to demonstrate that its position was supported by the UN ambassadors of countries representing 60 per cent of its population and 60 per cent of its GDP (see Table 3 and Figure 3). The mechanics would be simple. The Chair of a Region would announce the countries in his/her Region that support a particular motion and a computer would instantly calculate the percentages.*27 GDP would be measured for each country at the beginning of each decade in terms of PPP.*28 In practical terms, this would mean that the US, China, the EU and India would always be guaranteed an independent vote. Russia, which had only 51 per cent of the population of its Region as of 2007, would require a coalition partner or two to reach the required 60 per cent. Japan, which had 53 per cent of the population and 57 per [61] cent of the GDP(PPP) of its Region, would likewise need a coalition partner or two in order to cast a vote.*29 The form of the decision-making process would be that of a mini-UNSC in each Region, with the UN representatives of anchor or co-anchor counties conferring with their colleagues prior to a vote. Brazil, for example, would need to form a coalition on a particular issue with Mexico and Argentina (or several other countries) in order to reach the 60 per cent level for both population and GDP in its Region. Japan would also need to negotiate on many matters. Similarly, there are no dominant countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or Middle East Regions (see Table 3). In five Regions, the 60/60 rule would provide a powerful incentive for countries to negotiate and compromise. Otherwise, these Regions would be unable to cast a UNSC vote on many issues. Article 24(1) of the Charter requires that the Security Council be able to take ‘prompt and effective’ action to maintain international peace and security. In emergency

863

4 Momentum and deadlock

situations, the 60/60 rule/requirement might unduly delay UNSC action. We thus propose that the Council be authorised to declare an emergency by procedural vote.*30 In an emergency, each anchor country of a Region could cast one vote. Each co-anchor country of a Region could cast half a vote. Under Article 27(2) of the Charter, nine of 15 votes (60 per cent) are required for a decision on procedural matters. The REP would similarly require a 60 per cent UNSC vote to declare an emergency under procedural rules.*31 Seventy per cent of the total votes by anchor and co-anchor countries would be required for the UNSC to take action in an emergency situation. At first glance, the 60/60 rule may seem onerous and complicated. In fact, however, it would probably improve the normal functioning of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. The 60/60 rule would serve the function of interest aggregation between states – particularly in the four Regions without a single, dominant country. It would also make the Council more representative of the UN membership as a whole. China would be more likely to accept an anchor seat on the Council for Japan, its historical enemy, because the independent influence of Japan on the UNSC would be limited by its need to negotiate its normal-condition votes with South Korea, Australia, Canada or Papua New Guinea. However, Japan might also accept the plan because it would gain a key UNSC role in the large and important Pacific Region, which is a major improvement over its current UNSC status. Finally, the 60/60 rule would strengthen the affiliated regional organisations (OAS, League of Arab States, African Union, ASEAN, etc.) and link them more firmly to the world organisation.*32 [62] Table 3 Population and GDP(PPP) of Anchor and Co-Anchor Countries as % of Regions*33; Regions as % of World Population and GDP(PPP) Anchors & Regions Nigeria South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Brazil Mexico Argentina Colombia Latin America United States Northern America China Eastern Asia Indonesia Bangladesh Philippines Vietnam Thailand Southeastern Asia India Southern Asia Turkey*34 Pakistan

Population 20% of Region 7% 11% of all Regions 35% of Region 20% 7% 8% 9% of all Regions 99% of Region 5% of all Regions 98% of Region 21% of all Regions 31.5% of Region 20% 12% 11% 9% 12% of all Regions 97.5% of Region 18% of all Regions 11% of Region 25%

GDP(PPP) 13% of Region 40% 2% of all Regions 34% of Region 24% 13% 8% 7.5% of all Regions 99.5% of Region 20.5% of all Regions 99.5% of Region 16% of all Regions 29% of Region 10% 14% 8% 18% 5% of all Regions 99% of Region 6.5% of all Regions 18% of Region 12%

864 Anchors & Regions Iran Egypt Middle East European Union Europe Russia Northern Eurasia Japan The Pacific

4 Momentum and deadlock Population 10% 12% 9% of all Regions 95% of Region 8% of all Regions 51% of Region 4% of all Regions 53% of Region 4% of all Regions

GDP(PPP) 17% 9.5% 5.5% of all Regions 94.5% of Region 22% of all Regions 69% of Region 4% of all Regions 57% of Region 11.5% of all Regions

World Factbook, updated 15 November 2007. 2007 population and 2006 GDP(PPP) estimates. [63] Changing Regional membership One of the keys to our proposal lies in the membership of the 10 Regions. The basic rule is that anchor countries must remain in their original geographic groupings. The same rule should apply to co-anchor countries as well, although an exception might be made in the case of Turkey, which might shift between Europe and the Middle East. As indicated earlier, however, some countries may not wish to participate in the organisation of their geographic Region. Israel, for example, might not wish to participate in the representative organisation of the Middle East Region, which would be largely defined by its Muslim identity. Having been admitted to the General Assembly’s Western European and Others Group (WEOG), though on a temporary basis, Israel may wish to join Europe Region. The UNSC and the General Assembly would have to agree to such requests and should do so only in exceptional cases. Historical enemies with continuing animosities should affiliate with different Regions. This is necessary to facilitate the internal negotiation process in the Regions prior to votes in the Security Council. Japan and China have thus been placed in different UNSC Regions, although they are in close geographical proximity. The same is true for India and Pakistan or Somalia and Ethiopia. Eritrea might join either the Middle East or the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. However, given its longstanding conflict with Ethiopia, the former might be the better choice. It might be argued that the world’s largest Muslim country would want to affiliate with its co-religionists in the Middle East Region. We cannot speak for the Indonesians themFigure 3 Security Council voting in the regional/economic proposal 1. Regions which initially have 18 per cent or more of the total GDP(PPP) of all world Regions permanently have two votes each. All other Regions have one vote each. 2. The distribution of UNSC votes will be re-visited at the beginning of each decade. A Region will be granted two votes one decade after it achieves and then maintains the 18 per cent GDP(PPP) level. 3. Under normal procedures, a Region may cast a vote only if constituent countries with 60 per cent of the Region’s population and 60 per cent of the Region’s GDP(PPP) support a particular position on an issue.

4 Momentum and deadlock

865

4. Sixty per cent of the Regions may declare an emergency by procedural vote with only anchor and co-anchor countries participating. 5. In an emergency, the 60/60 rule will no longer apply. Anchor countries will cast their Region’s vote or votes. Co-anchor countries will divide the vote or votes of their Regions. 6. A 70 per cent vote will be required for the Council to approve military action. [64] selves, but several factors point to a preference for Southeastern Asia. These include geographic location, current membership in ASEAN, and the fact that a permanent or semi-permanent co-anchor position in the latter Region would seem preferable to sharing power with many other countries in the Middle East. Finally, the integrity of the reform proposal itself would be threatened if Indonesia were to refuse to affiliate with Southeastern Asia. […] Original footnotes *1 For ease of reference, we always use ‘North Korea’ when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is meant, and ‘South Korea’ when the Republic of Korea is meant. *2 Extrapolations from figures published by the Asian Development Bank indicate that China’s GDP(PPP) may be substantially less than this. See Eduardo Porter, ‘China Shrinks’, New York Times, 9 December 2007. *3 In 1997, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) argued that permanent UNSC members should be periodically nominated by their respective regions and should be elected by the General Assembly (‘Harare Declaration’, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/ CRP.11, 27 June, 1997). [27 June 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.11 in UN Doc. A/51/47, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21]. In ‘UNSC Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century,’ Security Dialogue, 3:3, 2000, pp. 273-72, Justin Morris argues against the OAU proposal on the grounds that (1) it would be difficult to formulate prompt and effective regional positions on security issues, and (2) the regional delegate state or states might act in their own interest(s) rather than in the interest of their region. Our proposal would meet these objections. Winston Churchill proposed a system of regional UNSC representation in 1953. Afoaku and Ukaga’s ‘Democratic Enlargement Model’ includes ‘proportional representation of regional groupings of UN member countries on the basis of population and land mass’. *4 Northern America would not include Canada or Mexico. Professor Schwartzberg [in: Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting, New York/The Hague: Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement, 2004] suggested the name ‘Eurasia’. The ultimate criterion for the name of a Region is acceptability to the countries involved. *5 The term ‘anchor country’ is also used by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). There it refers to those countries ‘that have a vitally important political and economic status within their regions, which gives them a crucially important part to play in the development and security of their region and in resolving global issues’. These countries are identified as those that account for more than 20 per cent of the GDP of their region. See on-line dictionary World of Words of GTZ, .

866

4 Momentum and deadlock

*6 It might be desirable to leave the decision as to the number of points allocated for population and GDP(PPP) for the members of each Region to determine, since GDP varies so much by Region. *7 The statistics are from the World Factbook, updated on 15 November 2007. *8 S = P/10 + G/40 where S = number of size points; P = number of millions of people in the population of a country; and G = number of billions of constant dollars of GDP(PPP). *9 This assumes that Turkey will join Middle East Region rather than Europe. *10 Colombia, which currently has 13.8 size points, is included here because it will soon reach the 15 point level. *11 Having a UNSC seat for the European Union would require a specific provision in a revised UN Charter. Though the EU is a supranational organisation, it is important for member states to preserve central elements of their sovereignty, including (at least for the foreseeable future) their separate membership in the world organisation. *12 Figures in the World Factbook (updated to 15 November 2007) yield size points for the remaining rotating anchor and co-anchor countries as follows: Latin America: Brazil, 60.4; Mexico, 39.5; Argentina, 19.5; Colombia, 13.8; Southeastern Asia: Indonesia, 47.1; Bangladesh, 23.4; Thailand, 21.4; Philippines, 20.4; Vietnam, 14.1; The Pacific: Japan, 118.2; South Korea, 34.8; Canada, 32.8, Australia, 18.9; Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, 19.1; Nigeria: 18.3. *13 Such a transition was effected without Charter revision when Russia took over the membership rights (including the Council seat) of the Soviet Union end of 1991. Twenty years earlier, the Beijing government assumed the seat previously occupied by the Taipei government in the UN organs in the name of China as a whole. *14 One might argue that Mexico should be included in the Northern America Region because it is part of the continent, because it is a founding member of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and because it would increase the relatively small population of Northern America Region. However, Mexico is historically and culturally part of Latin America and Mexican nationalism has largely been generated in opposition to the US. It seems preferable for Mexico to join the Latin America Region for political reasons. This would help to balance the influence of Brazil in the Region and it would increase Latin America’s population and economic weight. It would also make the decision-making process within Northern America less contentious. Canada would presumably not be happy in Northern America Region because it could always be outvoted by the United States, given its comparatively small population and GDP(PPP). *15 A South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) is still in the planning stage. *16 The regional affiliations of the Sudan and Eritrea are currently indeterminate. *17 Kosovo will be included if it becomes a UN member. *18 The European Community presently has observer status in the General Assembly, like other intergovernmental organisations. A single legal personality for the EU will be achieved only with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007. This would greatly enhance the role of the EU as an actor on the global stage, but it would not create a new state. A specific modality for the representation of the EU (or comparable regional, supranational organisation) will be required. *19 Taiwan, despite a number of attempts to attain membership, remains outside the UN. The vast majority of the international community accepts the ‘One China, Two Systems’ formula in which Taiwan is considered part of China. Since 1 January 2002,

4 Momentum and deadlock

867

Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization as the ‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)’. The WTO membership register puts the entity at a rather unusual place in the alphabet: ‘… Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Tanzania …’. One might find a similarly creative solution when placing the territory in the REP system. *20 All of the members of the League of Arab States that meet the minimum size requirement except Mauritania and possibly Sudan, would likely affiliate with Middle East Region. Schwartzberg [see footnote *4 above] suggests that the formerly Soviet Islamic republics of Central Asia, and Azerbaijan, might also wish to affiliate with Middle East. *21 The Economist magazine’s Big Mac Index is a simple example of PPP. The Index measures the price of a standard good – in this case a hamburger – in a wide variety of countries. *22 Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle’, Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (June 1996): p. 647. Rogoff writes that ‘real exchange rates (nominal exchange rates adjusted for differences in national price levels) tend toward purchasing power parity … at a rate of roughly 15 percent per year.’ Ibid. *23 14 January 2006, p. 102. *24 According to Bolton: ‘The point about purchasing power parity is that it’s not an effort to put the US in a better position or to put somebody else in a worse position. It’s an effort to say, “How do we really capture the strength of economies in the real world, how do we find a better way to reflect that reality in setting the UN assessment rate?”’ Warren Hoge, ‘Bolton Presses for New Method of Calculating Dues at the U.N.’, New York Times, 29 March 2006, . *25 An earlier, unpublished draft of this article recommended the creation of a Coalition of Temporary Members (CTM), to function alongside the Regions. Countries that were unhappy with their Regions, for whatever reason, could join the CTM for periods of five or 10 years. The CTM would also include 10 countries chosen by the UN General Assembly, as at present. Anchor or co-anchor countries would not be eligible. This might be a way to deal with the Taiwan problem, since CTM membership would not imply full membership in the UN. The CTM would not have a vote under emergency conditions. *26 Both Mexico and Chile declined to support the US position on the invasion of Iraq. *27 Although independently developed, the 60/60 rule is similar to James Yunker’s proposal for voting in a world parliament, to be called a Union Chamber of Representatives. See Rethinking World Government, New York: University Press of America, 2005, pp. 160166. Richard Hudson’s ‘Binding Triad’ scheme is also similar in some respects. Ibid., pp. 184-185. *28 PPP figures from the World Factbook are used here. However, the sources for recent PPP data, including the World Bank tables, may vary substantially. *29 If the Ukraine were to join Europe Region, Russia would satisfy the 60/60 requirement by itself and would thus have an automatic vote. *30 The author is indebted to Professor Frank Klingberg for this suggestion. *31 Only anchor and co-anchor countries would be eligible to vote under procedural rules.

868

4 Momentum and deadlock

*32 Masayuki Tadokoro advocates a weighted voting system in ‘A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council’, in Bruce Russett, ed., The Once and Future Security Council, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 119-134. He writes: ‘A big advantage of a weighted voting system is that it would transform the all-or-nothing kind of voting power (one vote or no representation, regular vote or veto) of member states into a continuous value. It therefore would enlarge a scope of bargaining among member states.’ (p. 128) *33 Taiwan has been omitted as a non-member of the UN and as regionally indeterminate. *34 Assuming that Turkey joins the Middle East Region

5 On a road to nowhere? The Intergovernmental Negotiations, 2009-2019 5.1 Statements by UN organs and officials, Framework Documents, Elements of Convergence, and Elements of Commonality 5.1.1 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Report “Implementing the responsibility to protect”, UN Doc. A/63/677 The present report responds to one of the cardinal challenges of our time, as posed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome:1 operationalizing the responsibility to protect. […] […] 61. While the first and enduring responsibility resides with each State to meet its obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, when it manifestly fails to do so the Secretary-General bears particular responsibility for ensuring that the international community responds in a “timely and decisive” manner, as called for in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome. For my part, I recognize that, as noted in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in a similar context (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), the Secretary-General has an obligation to tell the Security Council – and in this case the General Assembly as well – what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear. The Secretary-General must be the spokesperson for the vulnerable and the threatened when their Governments become their persecutors instead of their protectors or can no longer shield them from marauding armed groups. Within the Security Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter. I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual understanding to that effect. Across the globe, attitudes have changed in important ways since Cambodia, Rwanda and Srebrenica, raising the political costs, domestically and internationally, for anyone seen to be blocking an effective international response to an unfolding genocide or other high-visibility crime relating to the responsibility to protect. All Member States, not just the 15 members of the Security Council, should be acutely aware of both public expectations and shared responsibilities. If the General Assembly is to play a leading role in shaping a United Nations response, then all 192 Member States should share the responsibility to make it an effective instrument for advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect expressed so clearly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome.

1  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_006

870

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.1.2 18 May 2009, Overview of the first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, UN Doc. A/63/960, pp. 25-28 1. It is in strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during the successful 19 February 2009 launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in the informal GA plenary on Security Council reform, that the Chair, under the auspices of the President, provides this overview of the first round. […] 12. The principal options have been laid out below in paragraphs 14-17, incorporating the main thrust of the productive exchanges of the first round. […] 14. Composition a. Size i. Low-twenties ii. Mid-twenties b. Categories of membership i. Enlargement in both current categories of membership, permanent and nonpermanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; nature of review or challenge). ii. Enlargement in a new category of extended seats and in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; length of terms [3-15] of extended seats; possibility of re-election to extended seats; nature of review or challenge; provisions to prevent “flip-flopping”*1). iii. Enlargement only in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; possibility of re-election; nature of review or challenge). c. Regional representation i. Addition of seats to current regional groups, giving due consideration to the criterion of equitable geographical distribution through an emphasis on the underrepresented regional groups, particularly Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States and, also, on the Group of Eastern European States (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups). ii. Addition of seats to current regional groups specifically with a view to ensuring the representation of small and medium­sized states and of all cultures, religions and civilizations (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups). 15. Functions and powers a. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 16. Voting a. Veto i. Reform of the current veto (negotiable: formalizing explanations for the use of the veto; limiting the instances where it is used). ii. Extension of the veto to any new permanent members (negotiable: commitment not to use the veto until a future review). iii. No extension of the veto to any new permanent members.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

871

17. Procedure a. Working methods […] 18. In order to sustain the considerable momentum generated by Member States over the course of the first round, new steps forward are imperative in the second round. As an overwhelming number of Member States have emphasized, within a more comprehensive consideration of Security Council reform, the achievement of decisive progress demands an explicit exploration of the connections between the key issues, with a view to further unlocking convergence potential. A nexus connecting both the five key issues to each other and, in the same vein, connecting a substantial mass of positions and proposals to each other, is the concept of review or challenge. The widely raised prospect of a reassessment of any arrangement by means of a review or challenge puts each and every component and the entirety of the reform in a different light. […] Original footnote *1 Provisions to prevent countries from presenting candidatures for both the new category and the current non-permanent category at the same time or in short intervals. 5.1.3 14 September 2009, UN General Assembly, Decision 63/565, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters2 A At its 105th plenary meeting, on 14 September 2009, the General Assembly, recalling its previous resolutions and decisions relevant to the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, in particular its decision 62/557 of 15 September 2008,3 having considered the report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, which was established pursuant to its resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993,4 on its deliberations during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly,*1 bearing in mind the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, adopted by Heads of State and Government,*2 in which they resolved, in respect of reform of the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, and recalling also the 2005 World Summit Outcome of 16 September 2005,*3 in which Heads of State and Government expressed support for early reform of the Council and recommended that the Council continue to adapt its working methods: (a) Took note of the report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council on its work during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly; 2  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its sixty-third session, Volume III, 25 December 2008-14 September 2009, UN Doc. A/63/49 (Vol. III), p. 146 et seq. 3  → 4.1.29. 4  → 3.1.2.

872

5 On a road to nowhere ?

(b) Noted with appreciation the Chairperson’s initiative to stimulate an active discussion relating to the comprehensive reform of the Security Council by the Working Group, as well as the work done by the Vice-Chairperson; (c) Decided to convene the Working Group during the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly if Member States so decide; (d) Decided to include in the agenda of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly an item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. B At its 105th plenary meeting, on 14 September 2009, the General Assembly decided to immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session as mandated by General Assembly decision 62/557 of 15 September 2008,5 building on the progress achieved during its sixty-third session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, while noting with appreciation the initiative and efforts of the President of the General Assembly and the Chairman on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council in the process of a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. […] Original footnotes *1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-Third Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/63/47). [2009]. *2 See resolution 55/2. [8 September 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, → 4.1.6]. *3 See resolution 60/1. [16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, → 4.1.23]. 5.1.4 13 January 2010, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin, Letter to the Permanent Missions with annexed “G4/South Africa letter” of 23 December 2009 […] Following our productive first exchange of the fourth round on 8 and 9 December 2009, during which Member States collectively embraced the modus operandi as outlined in my November 16 letter, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to early reform of the Security Council. The second exchange of the fourth round, announced in my letter of 16 November 2009, will take place on January 19. Member States are encouraged to on that day, after reflecting on their own and their peers’ positions, make the most out of the second exchange by defining the areas of convergence between these positions and proposals in light of all the interconnected five key issues. Such areas of convergence can serve as beacons lighting the path towards prompt membership-driven decision-making on Security Council reform. 5  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

873

In addition, I would like to bring to your attention the attached letter, which I received on 23 December 2009 and which at that date bore no less than 138 signatures. I am grateful to Member States for this letter as well as others received, which demonstrate active and constructive engagement in the process. As a Chair impartial to any of the positions yet partial to progress, I will carefully study the appeal contained in said December 23 letter, as well as all other input received, as we move towards a text-based fifth round. As I said in my opening statement of 8 December 2009: “Through a process of real negotiation, we should arrive at a combination of elements that, in the words of 62/557,6 can garner the widest possible political acceptance. Of course, no such solution has ever appeared out of thin air, there is always a paper trail.” […] Signed: Zahir Tanin […] Annex7 23 December 2009 Excellency, The General Assembly decided in its decision 63/5658 to immediately continue the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at the 64th session, building on the progress achieved during the 63rd session as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States. The General Assembly resumed the intergovernmental negotiations on 8 December 2009. We would like to request you, in your capacity as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, to present to Member States, before the second exchange of the 4th round, a text with options to serve as a basis for negotiations, reflecting the progress achieved in the intergovernmental negotiations at the informal plenary during the 63rd session, as manifested in the Note by the President of the General Assembly A/63/960, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States. This would enable the informal plenary of the General Assembly to immediately embark upon negotiations on the basis of such a text, in order to identify areas of convergence and to find a solution that can garner the widest possible support among Member States. […] This letter has been signed by the following Member States. Additional signatures may be forthcoming. […]

6  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 7  As of 4 January 2010, 138 countries had signed this letter, including 30 African countries. Of the Permanent Five, only France and the UK had signed. No member state known to be a member of the Uniting for Consensus group had endorsed the letter. On 13 January 2009, that group also wrote to Mr. Zahir Tanin, saying that they were open to “a document for the continuation of intergovernmental negotiations”. See Lydia Swart, Reform of the Security Council: 2007-2013, in: Center for UN Reform Education, Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013, New York 2013. 8  14 September 2009, → 5.1.3.

874

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.1.5 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 1. Categories of membership Decides that the Security Council shall consist of […]: 1.1 [… favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council.] [This means the allocation of no less than two permanent seats for Africa, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership to be extended to all permanent members, and of a total of 5 non-permanent seats; with the selection of all such representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election.]*1 1.2 [Longer term seats Alternative options for duration of terms: (A) A term of from three to five years without possibility of immediate reelection; or (B) A term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council.] [Regular non-permanent seats. Seats for a two-year term without the possibility of immediate re-election …] [Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats. Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]*2 1.3 [The Security Council shall consist of [fifteen] thirty one Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republic] Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [and] the United States of America and eight others to be elected as herein set forth, shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect eighteen members of the United Nations to be nonpermanent members of the Security Council….] [… The first new permanent members shall serve for a term of five years. After the expiration of such a term the regional groups shall decide among themselves which member states in their groups shall succeed the retiring member and which shall enjoy full permanent status. Should any group be unable to do so, the successor will serve for a term of five years, which shall be the scheme until the region shall have decided on the member states in the region to serve as full permanent member.] [The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years.] [A retiring non-member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.]*3 1.4 [… enlargement is necessary both in the categories of permanent and nonpermanent members.] [The General Assembly should elect a total of twelve members into the category of “non-permanent members with more frequent rotation”. The members thus elected would serve every second two-year term within a period of twelve

5 On a road to nowhere ?

875

years. This means that there would be six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation in any given composition of the Security Council. They would be eligible for re-election every twelve years. After twelve years the General Assembly would review the system and elect the next group of members to serve within this category.] [The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be twenty-five: Five current permanent members, six new permanent members, six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation and eight other non-permanent members.] [The amendment to the Charter related to the enlargement of the Security Council would need to include a review clause allowing for a comprehensive review of the new system. This review would be conducted twelve years after the entry into force of the amendment.]*4 1.5 [… favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership in the Security Council.] [… calls for the establishment of a category of non-permanent membership in the Security Council explicitly for Small Island Developing States.]*5 1.6 [… enlarge the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council.]*6 1.7 [… favours the expansion, both in the category of permanent members and nonpermanent ones] [… will not support any partial or selective expansion, nor any increase in the Council’s membership to the detriment of developing countries.] [… does not favour the creation of new categories of members.] [The new members of the Security Council, including the new permanent ones, should enjoy the same rights and powers as current members of this organ.] [… would not be opposed to the immediate re-election of non-permanent members.]*7 1.8 [Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent membership.] [Provision for a review.]*8 1.9 [… six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8/10]*9 years …] [Candidates for seats created pursuant to … above shall not be eligible to serve as non-permanent members in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter for the following [8/10] calendar years.] [[16/20] years after the first elections held in accordance with paragraph 4 above, the General Assembly shall review the situation created by the entry into force of the Charter amendments contained in the Annex to the present resolution. The review shall include consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category, including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council.*10]*11 1.10 [In a situation when positions … remain polar, one can advance in the negotiation process only by searching for a compromise. In these circumstances we believe it possible to look closer at the “interim model” as one of the options.]

876

5 On a road to nowhere ?

[So far we only have some general understanding of what the “interim model” is. If Member States opt for this particular variant of the Security Council enlargement, they would have to agree on its modalities.]*12 1.11 [… supports the expansion of Security Council in both permanent and nonpermanent membership.] [Due to the lack of consensus on this point, we believe that there is a need for preliminary progress along an interim path with the aim of the increasing of new permanent members.] [… a transitional interim formula … could be implemented for a period of fifteen years, with a subsequent mandatory new round of evaluations. These assessments would be carried out through a review clause process.]*13 1.12 [… support an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of members.] [With a view to breaking the deadlock in the negotiations, … support a pragmatic intermediate solution that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into permanent seats.] [Issues we need to consider during this UNGA include: the duration of the intermediate period, the size and composition of the Council during this phase, and the modalities of entry into force.]*14 1.13 [Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term …] [Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.]*15 1.14 [… adding six permanent and four non-permanent members.] [Decides also to review the situation created by the amendments … fifteen years after their entry into force.]*16 1.15 [… support for the expansion of the Security Council in both categories on the premise that the members of the Security Council contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to the other purposes of our Organization and that the principle of equitable geographical distribution be respected in conformity with Article 23 of Chapter V of the United Nations Charter.] [If our effort to reform were to lead us towards “the intermediate model”, … would support it, if it were the wish of the highest number of Member States. Since such a solution would de facto establish a third category of members with longer and renewable mandates along with a review clause to be determined in order to address among other issues, the question of veto, it will be necessary to take into account the special interests of small States.] [… In the context of the “intermediate solution”, the States that will be candidates for the new seats, whose mandate would be longer (8 to 10 years) (third category of membership) should not be allowed to be candidates to a non-permanent seat as currently defined in Article 23, with a two-year mandate.]*17

5 On a road to nowhere ?

877

1.16 [Member States are still seriously divided on the issue of “category”, with no general agreement reached on any solution so far. Member States still need to engage in patient consultations to seek a solution that accommodates each other’s interests and concerns.]*18 1.17 [… favors the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council …]*19 1.18 [… open to the idea of enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent category.] [On the idea of an interim solution creating a third category of seats … ready to assess interim solutions that would allow for the testing of various models as long as they contain a clear review clause.]*20 1.19 [… the only realistic way is to expand the non-permanent category first.]*21 1.20 [The regular elections in the Security Council make it accountable and accessible where membership is earned as a privileged responsibility and not granted as a permanent right.]*22 1.21 [The Security Council will be composed of twenty-five (25) members of the United Nations chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotating character, with the same rights and obligations established by the Charter.] [The members of the Security Council will be chosen by a period of 4 years. The exiting members will not be eligible for the subsequent period.]*23 1.22 [… reaffirms its commitment to the 2005 UfC platform as contained in A/59/L.68. In an effort to move the negotiation forward … presents the following as a possible compromise option …] [Create longer-term seats*24 and expand current two-year term seats. For instance, 7 longer-term seats and 3 two-year regular seats can be added to the current 15 seats.] [Conduct comprehensive review on the reform 10 to 15 years after the entry into force of the reform including the composition and the working methods of the Security Council.]*25 1.23 [… support to the G4 proposal …] [… remains committed to an enlargement of the Council with both permanent and non-permanent members.] [… ready to look at other solutions that would allow for the testing of various models, which could garner wide-spread support among members, provided they contain a clear review-clause.]*26 1.24 [… open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific, rather than regionally-based.] [For any new permanent members, the criteria for selection should begin with the same criteria for non-permanent membership laid out in Article 23 of the Charter, namely that due regard shall be specifically paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization.]*27

878

5 On a road to nowhere ?

2. The question of the veto Decides: 2.1 [… veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto as a matter of common justice;]*28 2.2 [A permanent member casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document.] [Permanent Members should commit themselves to not casting a nonconcurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.] [Permanent Members of the Security Council, when casting a negative vote, could state that this is not a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter.]*29 2.3 [Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: – Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio] [Options on the question of the veto: – Abolition of the veto. – Limitations in respect of the scope of the veto: inter alia, application of the veto only on Chapter VII-related matters.]*30 2.4 [Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.] [Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.] [Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 or article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The concurrence shall not, however, be required in matters involving genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, as well as on recommendations under Articles 4(2), 5, 6, 94(2) and 97 and on a matter under Article 96(1). The negative vote of a permanent member in the exercise of its veto power must be explained.] [A negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, cast on decisions covered by the immediately preceding paragraph, maybe be overturned or set aside by a vote of an absolute majority of the General Assembly in regular or emergency special session, or by the Security Council itself by a vote of two-thirds of its members …]*31 2.5 [The new permanent members elected to the Security Council following resolution …, will not be considered as part of the concurring majority of permanent members required in paragraph 3) of article 27 of the Charter.]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

879

[The concurring vote of the permanent members required in para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter will only apply to the original permanent members of the Security Council. /the existing permanent members prior to resolution …] [The newly elected permanent members of the Security Council (resolution …) will have no veto power and they will not be considered for the purpose of para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter.]*32 2.6 [The reform of the Security Council … should aim at limiting and curtailing the use of the veto with a view to its elimination.]*33 2.7 [… democratise the decision-making process of the Council, including by eliminating the undemocratic and anachronistic privilege of the veto.] [Taking into account that it would not be realistic to achieve the elimination of the veto at this point, its use should at least be immediately limited and curtailed.] [Additional actions regarding the veto should be implemented, inter alia: – Overruling the veto within the Council by an affirmative vote of a certain number of Member States, commensurate with the size of an expanded Council, – Overruling the veto by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure and under progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the Charter.] [The concept of voluntary “self-restraint” in the use of the veto is insufficient and should not be considered as an option.] [As long as the veto is not eliminated, the new permanent members shall be entitled to exercise it on an equal footing as the current permanent members, without establishing selective or discriminatory criteria]*34 2.8 [… in the course of the negotiations we should talk not about prohibiting or restricting the use of the veto right by the existing Permanent Members of the Security Council – their prerogatives should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform – but rather about extending this right to the possible new Permanent Members of Security Council … Therefore, a detailed discussion of the veto can begin at a later stage of negotiations, after a new composition of the Security Council is defined.]*35 2.9 [… eliminate the use of veto …] [… in order not to paralyze the negotiation process … a commitment should be made to initial evaluation of limiting the use of veto, beginning with recognition of a rule that has already been established within the organization’s Charter … The third paragraph of Article 27 imposes limitations upon permanent members whereby they are unable to vote when they are parties to a dispute pertaining to decisions associated with Chapter Six of the Charter, which concerns to pacific settlement of disputes, and decisions in relation to the third paragraph of Article 52, which also pertains to pacific settlement of disputes.] [… it is also important to reach consensuses whereby precise limits upon use of veto can be established, with elimination of the possibility of applying veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross human rights violations.] [… establish new working methods for voting formulas so that the number of votes needed to approve Council resolutions shall be changed. Under the third paragraph of Article 27, nine votes are currently needed, and the five permanent members should be included among those votes.]

880

5 On a road to nowhere ?

[… one formula that could be evaluated is that, during the voting and in order for a veto to be effective, there should be a requirement for two permanent members to be making use of the veto simultaneously, and, in this way, an interpretation that the use of the veto reflects national interests should be avoided.]*36 2.10 [… to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council;*37] [Restraint on the use of the veto.]*38 2.11 [… the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members;] [… the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review….]*39 2.12 [… favor putting an end to the undemocratic privileges derived from the use of veto. However and while we reach the necessary conditions for the elimination of the veto power … supports the extension of it to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent), regulating and limiting its use to specific cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, we favor the requirement of two concurrent negative votes to prevent the adoption of a Council decision.]*40 2.13 [… encouraged permanent members of the Council to restrict their use of the veto and abstain from using it in certain situations. We have also called for greater accountability by members using their veto powers. We remain open to proposals limiting the scope and application of the veto based on voluntary commitment by permanent members.] [… the right of the veto should not be extended to new members regardless of category.]*41 2.14 [The decisions of the Security Council on all other questions will be made by the affirmative vote of fifteen (15) members: but in decisions made by virtue of Chapter VI and of paragraph 3 of Article 52, the party in a controversy will abstain from voting.] [Regarding the articles relating to reform to the United Nations Charter, it is proposed that all forms of veto be eliminated, and that be an sovereign attribution under equal conditions for all Member States of the United Nations:]*42 2.15 [Limit the use of veto.]*43 2.16 [… not extending veto powers to additional members – regardless of category….] [… the veto should be restrained and permanent members should abstain from using it in certain situations – not least R2P situations.]*44 2.17 [We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure. In view of the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to new permanent members could be adopted.]*45 3. Regional representation Decides that the members of the Security Council shall be elected accordingly: 3.1 [… a reform that will ensure Africa’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council, taking into account the

5 On a road to nowhere ?

881

principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system;] [… selection of all … representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election;] [… allocation of no less than two permanent seats for Africa …] [… allocation … of a total of five non-permanent seats [for Africa]]*46 3.2 [… any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership of the expanded Security Council.] [… any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World.] [… increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Security Council.] [… increase the representation of developing countries …]*47 3.3 [… the Arab States … demanded a permanent Arab representation in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership of the Security Council …]*48 3.4 [Longer-term … seats allocated to the regional groups, as follows: Africa, Asia, Asia/Africa (on a rotational basis), Group of Latin America and Caribbean States, Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group (on a rotational basis)] [Regular non-permanent seats … as follows: Small States*49, Medium-sized States*50, Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern European Group.] [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*51 3.5 [… emphasize that existing regional groups should be maintained.] [… any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council.]*52 3.6 [… The General Assembly shall elect … non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical or balanced regional distribution. The new permanent members of the Security Council shall be composed of two each for the African, the Asian, and the Latin American and the

882

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Caribbean Groups of States and one each for the Eastern European Group and the Western European and Other States group of states … The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. The additional eight non-permanent members shall be composed of two each for the Africa, the Asian and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups of States, and one each for the Eastern European and Western European and other States group … The regional groups, through consultations, must ensure that the additional seats for non-permanent members of the Security Council allotted to them shall be fairly, justly and equitably rotated among the member states in each group …]*53 3.7 [… the following distribution of additional permanent seats: Two for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean and one for Western European and Others Group.] [Six among these [non-permanent] members [with more frequent rotation] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Eastern European group and three from the Western European and others group. The sequence of rotation would need to be determined by the General Assembly.] [Four among these [non-permanent] members [elected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical distribution] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Western European and Others Group and one from Eastern European Group.]*54 3.8 [… supports the legitimate aspirations of the African Group of countries in this regard.]*55 3.9 [… support for the increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council.]*56 3.10 [The main objective of the expansion of the Council should be to rectify the current insufficient representation in that organ of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.] [Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean must be included.]*57 3.11 [The distribution of seats must reflect the change in composition of the UN membership, and address the non-representation of some regions in the permanent membership category and the under-representation of developing countries in both membership categories.]*58 3.12 [The following six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8 / 10]*59 years: – two from African States, – two from Asian States, – one from Latin American and Caribbean States, – one from western European and Other States.]*60 3.13 [… promoting options for equitable geographic distribution that can increase possibilities of presence for our region, as well as contributing to the objective of achieving more frequent participation in the Council … believes that geographic distribution reflects the spirit of the Charter, which takes individual and

5 On a road to nowhere ?

883

sovereign states into consideration under the principle of the sovereign equality of all members.]*61 3.14 [… reaffirm the support … for the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for new permanent seats, along with representation for Africa among the permanent members of the Security Council.]*62 3.15 [… the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States.] [… each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified … above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation;]*63 3.16 [Insofar as regional representation is concerned, our position is that this concept signifies equitable geographical distribution.] [… the six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: Two from African States; Two from Asian States; One from Latin American and Caribbean States; One from Western European and Other States;] [… the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: One from African States; One from Asian States; One from Eastern European States; One from Latin American and Caribbean States;]*64 3.17 [Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially that of African countries … The reform should be conducive to give more countries, small and medium-sized countries in particular, more opportunities to serve in the Security Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process.] [New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration.]*65 3.18 [… support an expansion that addresses the under-representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Security Council, with members in both categories.]*66 3.19 [The composition of the Council should better reflect the current configuration of the membership of the United Nations, including developing states and smaller states …] [While equitable geographic representation remains an important principle in the distribution of non-elected seats among regional groups, we should not forget that the Charter pays special regard to the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization …]

884

5 On a road to nowhere ?



[We maintain that only States can be members of the Security Council. We encourage States to consult with other members of their regional group and to ensure broad respect for the decisions of the Council. But it remains an open question how States could represent entire groups …] [The under-representation of African and Latin-American and Caribbean countries must be redressed. An enlargement should also take into account smaller states …]*67 3.20 [The composition of the Security Council should be expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-Aligned and developing countries.] [If the permanent category were expanded, new seats should be given to African region and other developing countries as the first priority. A country like Japan refusing the settlement of extra-large past crimes by all means should be off the list.]*68 3.21 [… the equitable geographical distribution should be ensured by addressing the historical injustice with certain regions.] [… the opportunity for Member States to serve on the Security Council must be enhanced, particularly for groups which have been traditionally underrepresented, such as small and medium States and Africa.]*69 3.22 [… chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotating character …]*70 3.23



Region

Permanent

Longer-Term*

Two-Year Term

Africa

0

2

4

6

Asia

1

2

3

6

GRULAC

0

2

2

4

WEOG

3

1

2

6

EEG

1

0

2

3

Total

5

7

13

25

* Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable. [Maintain existing five regional groups.]*71

Total

3.24 [… including both developing and developed countries as new permanent members] [It is important to ensure that any reform takes full account of the need to give small states an opportunity to participate in the work of the Security Council.]*72 3.25 [Decisions about new permanent members will be made primarily on the basis of a member’s country-specific qualifications.]*73 4. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods Decides that the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to: 4.1 [… a more representative and inclusive Council should consist of a total of 26;]*74 4.2 [The exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regions, taking into account equitable geographical distribution.]*75 4.3 [… shall consist of [fifteen] thirty one Members of the United Nations]*76

5 On a road to nowhere ?

885

4.4 [The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be twenty-five….]*77 4.5 [… not less than 26 members.]*78 4.6 [… shall be increased from fifteen to [xx*79].]*80 4.7 [… should not exceed a reasonable level of low twenties.]*81 4.8 [… increasing the number of Security Council members to a “mid-twenties” level….]*82 4.9 [… shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term …]*83 4.10 [… increased from 15 to 25 …]*84 4.11 [… supports a Council expanded into the twenties at most.]*85 4.12 [The Council should be enlarged to an extent that will enable it to fully redress the imbalance in its structure and increase the representation of developing countries.]*86 4.13 [… bring the size of the Council to approximately 26 members.]*87 4.14 [… supports a balanced enlargement with a total number of members in the mid-20s.]*88 4.15 [… a total number of the enlarged council members should be no less than 26.]*89 4.16 [… propose an increase to 25 members …]*90 4.17 [Increase the size of the Security Council from 15 to around 25 states.]*91 4.18 [… a number of members somewhere in the mid-twenties would be suitable.]*92 4.19 [… we are prepared to support only a modest expansion.]*93 Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council through: […] 5. Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly Calls for improving the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly through: […] Original footnotes *1 African Group, see Annex pp. 1-5. *2 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *3 Philippines, see Annex pp. 63-82. *4 Slovenia, see Annex pp. 83-85. *5 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), see Annex pp. 86-88. *6 Uruguay, see Annex pp. 89-90. *7 Cuba, see Annex pp. 95-101. *8 L.69 Group, see Annex pp. 102-103. *9 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middle ground and would be subject to negotiation. *10 It is understood that the GA will simultaneously decide on a set of measures dealing with the working methods of the Council. This can either be done in a separate part of the resolution or in a stand-alone resolution that is adopted at the same time as the resolution dealing with the enlargement of the Council.

886 *11

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Liechtenstein, see Annex pp. 104-107. Russian Federation, see Annex pp. 108-111. *13 Peru, see Annex pp. 112-114. *14 United Kingdom and France, see Annex pp. 115-118. *15 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *16 G-4, see Annex pp. 124-129. *17 Principality of Monaco, see Annex pp. 130-134. *18 Peoples’ Republic of China, see Annex pp. 135-137. *19 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp. 138-143. *20 Norway, see Annex pp. 144-147. *21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 148-150. *22 Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *23 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp. 157-170. *24 Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable. *25 Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 171-174. *26 Denmark, see Annex pp. 175-178. *27 United States of America, see Annex pp. 179-180. *28 African Group, see Annex pp. 1-5. *29 S-5, see Annex pp. 16-47. *30 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *31 Philippines, see Annex pp. 63-82. *32 Uruguay, see Annex pp. 89-90. *33 Non-Aligned Movement, see Annex pp. 91-94. *34 Cuba, see Annex pp. 95-101. *35 Russian Federation, see Annex pp. 108-111. *36 Peru, see Annex pp. 112-114. *37 Regarding paragraph 3 of Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended. *38 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *39 G-4, see Annex pp. 124-129. *40 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp. 138-143. *41 Norway, see Annex pp. 144-147. *42 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp. 157-170. *43 Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 171-174. *44 Denmark, see Annex pp. 175-178. *45 United States of America, see Annex pp. 179-180. *46 African Group, see Annex pp. 1-5. *47 Organization of the Islamic Conference, see Annex pp. 6-15. *48 Arab Group, see Annex pp. 48-52. *49 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Easter European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group. *50 Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council. *51 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *12

5 On a road to nowhere ? *52

887

Eastern European Group, see Annex pp. 59-62. Philippines, see Annex pp. 63-82. *54 Slovenia, see Annex pp. 83-85. *55 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), see Annex pp. 86-88. *56 Non-Aligned Movement, see Annex pp. 91-94. *57 Cuba, see Annex pp. 95-101. *58 L.69 Group, see Annex pp. 102-103. *59 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middle ground and would be subject to negotiation. *60 Liechtenstein, see Annex p. 104-107. *61 Peru, see Annex pp. 112-114. *62 United Kingdom and France, see Annex pp. 115-118. *63 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123 and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *64 G-4, see Annex pp. 124-129. *65 People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp. 135-137. *66 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp. 138-143. *67 Norway, see Annex pp. 144-147. *68 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 148-150. *69 Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *70 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp. 157-170. *71 Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 171-174. *72 Denmark, see Annex pp. 175-178. *73 United States of America, see Annex pp. 179-180. *74 African Group, see Annex pp. 1-5. *75 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *76 Philippines, see Annex pp. 63-82. *77 Slovenia, see Annex pp. 83-85. *78 Cuba, see Annex pp. 95-101. *79 The question of creation of new non-permanent seats in the sense of article 23 of the UN Charter is not addressed in these elements, cf. OP 3, which serves as a placeholder for the scenario where additional two-year seats are created. *80 Liechtenstein, see Annex pp. 104-107. *81 Russian Federation, see Annex pp. 108-111. *82 Peru, see Annex pp. 112-114. *83 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *84 G-4, see Annex pp. 124-129. *85 Principality of Monaco, see Annex pp. 130-134. *86 People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp. 135-137. *87 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see Annex pp. 138-143. *88 Norway, see Annex pp. 144-147. *89 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 148-150. *90 Plurinational State of Bolivia, see Annex pp. 157-170. *91 Republic of Korea, see Annex pp. 171-174. *92 Denmark, see Annex pp. 175-178. *93 United States of America, see Annex pp. 179-180. *53

888

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.1.6 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.1), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 1. Categories of membership Decides that the Security Council shall consist of […]: […] 1.2 [The preservation of the democratic principle lies at the heart of the legitimacy of any reform of the Security Council. The discipline of regular elections is irreplaceable in ensuring an accountable, accessible Security Council, one in which membership is earned as a privileged responsibility, not granted as a permanent right.]*1 [Longer term seats Alternative options for duration of terms: (A) A term of from three to five years without possibility of immediate reelection; or (B) A term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council.] [Regular non-permanent seats. Seats for a two-year term without the possibility of immediate re-election …] [Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats. Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]*2 [Regular non-permanent seats … as follows: Small States*3, Medium-sized States*4, Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern European Group.]*5 [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*6 […] 1.13 [… supportive of the compromise platform put forward by Columbia and Italy … committed to achieving a negotiated solution to the reform of the Security Council …] [Recognizing that contemporary world realities, in particular the substantial increase in membership of developing countries since 1963, requires an expansion of the Security Council, in the non-permanent category, in order to ensure fairer opportunities of participation for all Member States, Reaffirming that any expansion of the Security Council should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable, Convinced that periodic elections and re-elections are the strongest means to promote real accountability, allow for frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation of the Member States in the Security Council.]*7

5 On a road to nowhere ?

889

[Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term …] [Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.]*8 […] 1.25 [Reaffirming that any expansion of the Security Council should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable.] [Amendments to Article 23 Decides, in view of the above, to adopt the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations; Decides that Article 23, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter of the United Nations will read as follows: 1. The Security Council shall consist of twenty-five Members of the United Nations. France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five, five of the retiring members shall continue for one more year.]*9 2. The question of the veto Decides: […] 2.3 [Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: – Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio] [Options on the question of the veto: – Abolition of the veto. – Limitations in respect of the scope of the veto: inter alia, application of the veto only on Chapter VII-related matters.*10]*11 [… comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]*12 […] 2.10 [… to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council;*13]

890

5 On a road to nowhere ?

[Restraint on the use of the veto]*14 [… with a view to its eventual elimination]*15 […] 2.18 [Decides to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council.]*16 […] 3. Regional representation Decides that the members of the Security Council shall be elected accordingly: […] 3.4 [Longer-term … seats allocated to the regional groups, as follows: Africa, Asia, Asia/Africa (on a rotational basis), Group of Latin America and Caribbean States, Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group (on a rotational basis)]*17 [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*18 [To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council] [comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council]*19. […] 3.15 [Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced]*20 [… the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States.] [… each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified … above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation;]*21 [taking into account equitable geographical distribution]*22 […] 3.26 [Distribution of seats  Decides that, in order to implement paragraph 3 above, the twenty nonpermanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States;] [Limits to re-election and role of geographical groups  Recommends that each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified in paragraph 4 above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group;

5 On a road to nowhere ?

891

those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair sub-regional representation;]*23 4. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods Decides that the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to: […] 4.2 [The exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regions, taking into account equitable geographical distribution.]*24 [comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council]*25 […] 4.12 [The Council should be enlarged to an extent that will enable it to fully redress the imbalance in its structure and increase the representation of developing countries.]*26 [The enlargement should also maintain an appropriate ratio in the numbers of Council members from different categories]*27 […] Original footnotes Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *2 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *3 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Eastern European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group. *4 Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council. *5 Moved from paragraph 3.4 as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *6 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *7 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *8 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *9 Inserted as per Pakistan letter dated 14 May 2010. *10 Amended as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *11 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *12 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *13 Regarding paragraph 3 of Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended. *14 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *15 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *16 Inserted as per Pakistan letter dated 14 May 2010. *17 Elements moved to paragraph 1.2 as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *18 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *19 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *20 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *21 Canada and Mexico, see Annex pp. 119-123 and Pakistan, see Annex pp. 151-156. *1

892

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*22

Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. Inserted as per Pakistan letter dated 14 May 2010. *24 Italy and Colombia, see Annex pp. 55-58. *25 Inserted as per Uniting for Consensus letter dated 19 May 2010. *26 People’s Republic of China, see Annex pp. 135-137. *27 Inserted as per letter from the People’s Republic of China dated 20 May 2010. *23

5.1.7 27 August 2010, Second Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.2), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin […] 1.26 a. [… favors expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council. This means the allocation of one permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership to be extended to all permanent members and a total of 4 non-permanent seats for GRULAC.] b. [… does not support the idea of having a transitional interim formula for the reform of the Security Council]*1 […] 2.19 a. [… to eliminate the use of the veto, but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the Security Council]*2 […] 3.27 a. [… strongly believes that the reform of the Security Council must ensure the Latin America and the Caribbean’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council.] b. [On the other hand,… underscores the importance of the respect for the principle of rotation in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council in order to ensure a democratic access for small countries to the Council.]*3 […] 4.6 [… shall be increased from fifteen to [xx]]*4 […] 4.19 a. [… is flexible in supporting an increasing the total number of Security Council between 25 and 31 members.]*5 […] Original footnotes Inserted as per El Salvador letter dated 8 March 2010. *2 Inserted as per El Salvador letter dated 8 March 2010. *3 Inserted as per El Salvador letter dated 8 March 2010. *4 Deleted as per Liechtenstein request during informal plenary on 16 June 2010. *5 Inserted as per El Salvador letter dated 8 March 2010. *1

5 On a road to nowhere ?

893

5.1.8 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Zahir Tanin 1. Categories of membership Decides that the Security Council shall consist of […]: 1.1 Enlargement in both current categories, permanent and non-permanent 2-year seats, with all the prerogatives and privileges of current permanent members [… favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council.][… no less than two permanent seats for Africa, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership to be extended to all permanent members, and of a total of 5 non-permanent seats; with the selection of all such representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election.]*1 [… favours the expansion, both in the category of permanent members and non­­ permanent ones.][The new members of the Security Council, including the new permanent ones, should enjoy the same rights and powers as current members of this organ.][… would not be opposed to the immediate re-election of nonpermanent members.]*2 [… favors the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council …][… favor putting an end to the undemocratic privileges derived from the use of veto. However and while we reach the necessary conditions for the elimination of the veto power…. supports the extension of it to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent), regulating and limiting its use to specific cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, we favor the requirement of two concurrent negative votes to prevent the adoption of a Council decision.]*3 [… favors expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council. This means the allocation of one permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership to be extended to all permanent members and a total of 4 non-permanent seats for GRULAC.]*4 [… favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership in the Security Council.]*5 1.1.1… with provision for a review [Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent membership.][Provision for a review.]*6 1.1.2… new permanent members will not exercise veto until decided upon in review [… adding six permanent and four non-permanent members.][Decides also to review the situation created by the amendments … fifteen years after their entry into force.][… the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members;][… the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review …]*7

• • •

• • • •

894

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1.1.3… with the addition of a third category of seats and review clause [… enlargement is necessary both in the categories of permanent and nonpermanent members.][The General Assembly should elect a total of twelve members into the category of “non-permanent members with more frequent rotation”. The members thus elected would serve every second two-year term within a period of twelve years. This means that there would be six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation in any given composition of the Security Council. They would be eligible for re-election every twelve years. After twelve years the General Assembly would review the system and elect the next group of members to serve within this category.][The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be twenty-five: Five current permanent members, six new permanent members, six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation and eight other non-permanent members.][The amendment to the Charter related to the enlargement of the Security Council would need to include a review clause allowing for a comprehensive review of the new system. This review would be conducted twelve years after the entry into force of the amendment.]*8 1.2 Enlargement in both current categories, permanent and non-permanent 2-year seats, but not with the prerogatives and privileges of current permanent members [… enlarge the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council.] [The newly elected permanent members of the Security Council (resolution …) will have no veto power and they will not be considered for the purpose of para. 3 of Article 27 of the Charter.]*9 [… open to the idea of enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent category.] [… the right of the veto should not be extended to new members regardless of category.]*10 [remains committed to an enlargement of the Council with both permanent and non­permanent members.][… not extending veto powers to additional members – regardless of category.]*11 [… open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific, rather than regionally-based.][We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure.]*12 [… expansion in both categories offers potential to address the fundamental shortcoming of Council …][… does not support the creation of any new veto rights.]*13 [… supports the expansion of Security Council in both permanent and nonpermanent membership.] [… eliminate the use of the veto …]*14 [support expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of members.]*15 [… support for the expansion of the Security Council in both categories on the premise that the members of the Security Council contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to the other purposes of our Organization and that the principle of equitable geographical distribution be respected in conformity with Article 23 of Chapter V of the United Nations Charter.]*16 1.3 Enlargement in non-permanent 2-year category only [Regular non-permanent seats. Seats for a two-year term without the possibility of immediate re-election …]*17

•

•

• • • • • • • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

895

term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be • [Aeligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the con-

secutive period served on the Council.][Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats. Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]*18 [Regular non-permanent seats … as follows: Small States*19, Medium-sized States*20, Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern European Group.] [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*21 [… the only realistic way is to expand the non-permanent category first.]*22 [Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent members as determined by Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two-year term …]*23 [Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.]*24 [Amendments to Article 23 Decides, in view of the above, to adopt the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations; Decides that Article 23, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter of the United Nations will read as follows: 1. The Security Council shall consist of twenty-five Members of the United Nations. France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five, five of the retiring members shall continue for one more year.]*25 1.4 Enlargement in intermediary/intermediate/interim/longer term/third category [… will not support any partial or selective expansion, nor any increase in the Council’s membership to the detriment of developing countries.][… does not favour the creation of new categories of members.]*26 [… does not support the idea of having a transitional interim formula for the reform of the Security Council]*27 [In a situation when positions … remain polar, one can advance in the negotiation process only by searching for a compromise. In these circumstances we believe it possible to look closer at the “interim model” as one of the options.][So far we only have some general understanding of what the “interim model” is. If Member States opt for this particular variant of the Security Council enlargement, they would have to agree on its modalities.]*28

• • • •

• • •

896

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1.4.1… with review clause [Longer term seats: Alternative options for duration of terms: (A) A term of from three to five years without possibility of immediate reelection; or (B) A term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council.][Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats. Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.]*29[Regular non-permanent seats … as follows: Small states*30, Medium-sized States*31, Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern European Group.][Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*32 [Create longer-term seats*33 and expand current two-year term seats. For instance, 7 longer-term seats and 3 two-year regular seats can be added to the current 15 seats.] [Conduct comprehensive review on the reform 10 to 15 years after the entry into force of the reform including the composition and the working methods of the Security Council.]*34 [The Security Council shall consist of [fifteen] thirty one Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republic] Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [and] the United States of America and eight others to be elected as herein set forth, shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect eighteen members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council …][… The first new permanent members shall serve for a term of five years. After the expiration of such a term the regional groups shall decide among themselves which member states in their groups shall succeed the retiring member and which shall enjoy full permanent status. Should any group be unable to do so, the successor will serve for a term of five years, which shall be the scheme until the region shall have decided on the member states in the region to serve as full permanent member.][The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years.][A retiring non-member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.]*35 [… six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8/10]*36 years …][Candidates for seats created pursuant to … above shall not be eligible to serve as non-permanent members in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter for the following [8/10] calendar years.] [[16/20] years after the first elections held in accordance with paragraph 4 above, the General Assembly shall review the situation created by the entry into force of the Charter amendments contained in the Annex to the present resolution. The review shall include consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category, including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council.*37]*38 [With a view to breaking the deadlock in the negotiations,… support a pragmatic intermediate solution that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into

•

• •

•

•

5 On a road to nowhere ?

897

permanent seats.] [Issues we need to consider during this UNGA include: the duration of the intermediate period, the size and composition of the Council during this phase, and the modalities of entry into force.]*39 [Due to the lack of consensus on this point, we believe that there is a need for preliminary progress along an interim path with the aim of the increasing of new permanent members.][… a transitional interim formula … could be implemented for a period of fifteen years, with a subsequent mandatory new round of evaluations. These assessments would be carried out through a review clause process.]*40 [If our effort to reform were to lead us towards “the intermediate model”, … would support it, if it were the wish of the highest number of Member States. Since such a solution would de facto establish a third category of members with longer and renewable mandates along with a review clause to be determined in order to address among other issues, the question of the veto, it will be necessary to take into account the special interests of small States.][… In the context of the “intermediate solution”, the States that will be candidates for the new seats, whose mandate would be longer (8 to 10 years) (third category of membership) should not be allowed to be candidates to a non-permanent seat as currently defined in Article 23, with a twoyear mandate.]*41 [On the idea of an interim solution creating a third category of seats … ready to assess interim solutions that would allow for the testing of various models as long as they contain a clear review clause.]*42 [… ready to look at other solutions that would allow for the testing of various models, which could garner wide-spread support among members, provided they contain a clear review-clause.]*43 [… the middle ground which could garner widest possible acceptance and move things forward is the ‘intermediate approach’][… with a clear review mechanism occurring within 15 to 20 years of the intermediate model coming into force.][… possibility of future reform involving an expansion in permanent members … could be addressed in the examination of the ‘review’ concept …][… supports creating a new category of ‘elected’ council seats without veto rights.][… duration of the terms, the re-election arrangements and other arrangements, could be explored and negotiated further.][There should not be any ‘flip-flop’ position when a member states choses its term seat.]*44 1.5 Abolishment of the permanent category [The Security Council will be composed of twenty-five (25) members of the United Nations chosen by the General Assembly according to geographically equitable distribution of rotating character, with the same rights and obligations established by the Charter.][The members of the Security Council will be chosen by a period of 4 years. The exiting members will not be eligible for the subsequent period.]*45 1.6 General statements relating to categories of membership [The preservation of the democratic principle lies at the heart of the legitimacy of any reform of the Security Council. The discipline of regular elections is irreplaceable in ensuring an accountable, accessible Security Council, one in which membership is earned as a privileged responsibility, not granted as a permanent right.]*46 [… supportive of the compromise platform put forward by Columbia [as contained in A/59/L.68]*47 and Italy … committed to achieving a negotiated solution to the

• •

• • •

• • •

898

5 On a road to nowhere ?

reform of the Security Council …][Recognizing that contemporary world realities, in particular the substantial increase in membership of developing countries since 1963, requires an expansion of the Security Council, in the non-permanent category, in order to ensure fairer opportunities of participation for all Member States. Reaffirming that any expansion of the Security Council, in the non-permanent category should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable. Convinced that periodic elections and re-elections are the strongest means to promote real accountability, allow for frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation of the Member States in the Security Council.]*48 [Member States are still seriously divided on the issue of “category”, with no general agreement reached on any solution so far. Member States still need to engage in patient consultations to seek a solution that accommodates each other’s interests and concerns.]*49 2. The question of the veto Decides: 2.1 The right of veto as it relates to enlargement 2.1.1 Right of veto given to new permanent members [… veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto as a matter of common justice;]*50 [without establishing selective or discriminatory criteria]*51 [… in the course of the negotiations we should not talk about prohibiting or restricting the use of the veto right by the existing permanent members of the Security Council – their prerogatives should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform – but rather about extending this right to the possible new permanent members of the Security Council … Therefore, a detailed discussion of the veto can begin at a later stage of negotiations, after a new composition of the Security Council is defined.]*52 2.1.1.1 … new permanent members will not exercise veto until decided upon in review [… the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members;][… the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members has been decided upon in the framework of the review….]*53 2.1.2 Right of veto not given to new permanent members [We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure.] [In view of the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to new permanent members could be adopted.]*54 [… the right of the veto should not be extended to new members regardless of category.]*55 [The new permanent members elected to the Security Council following resolution …, will not be considered as part of the concurring majority of permanent members required in paragraph 3) of Article 27 of the Charter.][The concurring vote of the permanent members required in para. 3 of Article 27 of the Charter will only apply to the original permanent members of the Security Council. /the

•

• •

• •

• •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

899

existing permanent members prior to resolution …][The newly elected permanent members of the Security Council (resolution …) will have no veto power and they will not be considered for the purpose of para. 3 of Article 27 of the Charter.]*56 2.1.3 Right of veto given to all members of the Security Council [… favor putting an end to the undemocratic privileges derived from the use of veto. However and while we reach the necessary conditions for the elimination of the veto power … Supports the extension of it to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent)]*57 2.2 Current veto structure and prerogatives of current permanent members to remain intact*58/elimination/limitation/restriction of the use of the veto (statements and proposals) 2.2.1 Statements related to keeping current veto structure and prerogatives of current permanent members intact*59 [We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure.] [In view of the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to new permanent members could be adopted.]*60 [… in the course of the negotiations we should talk not about prohibiting or restricting the use of the veto right by the existing permanent members of the Security Council – their prerogatives should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform – but rather about extending this right to the possible new permanent members of Security Council … Therefore, a detailed discussion of the veto can begin at a later stage of negotiations, after a new composition of the Security Council is defined.]*61 2.2.2 Statements related to elimination/limitation/restriction of the use of the veto [The reform of the Security Council … should aim at limiting and curtailing/ restricting the use of the veto [with a view to its [eventual*62] elimination.*63]*64 [Taking into account that it would not be realistic to achieve the elimination of the veto at this point, its use should at least be immediately limited and curtailed.]*65 [Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council (…), including in particular: [Restraint on the use of the veto]]*66 [… encouraged permanent members of the Council to restrict their use of the veto and abstain from using it in certain situations. We have also called for greater accountability by members using their veto powers. We remain open to proposals limiting the scope and application of the veto based on voluntary commitment by permanent members.]*67 [The concept of voluntary “self-restraint” in the use of the veto is insufficient and should not be considered as an option.]*68 [Limit the use of veto.]*69 2.2.3 Elimination of the right of veto [… democratize the decision-making process of the Council, including by eliminating the undemocratic and anachronistic privilege of the veto.]*70 [… it is proposed that all forms of veto be eliminated, and that be an sovereign attribution under equal conditions for all Member States of the United Nations.]*71 [The reform of the Security Council … should aim at limiting and curtailing/ restricting the use of the veto [with a view to its [eventual*72] elimination.*73]*74

•

• •

• •

• • • • • • •

900

5 On a road to nowhere ?

on the question of the veto: Abolition of the veto.][… comprehensive • [Options reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council.] 75 *

2.2.4 Two vetoes are necessary to veto [Furthermore, we favor the requirement of two concurrent negative votes to prevent the adoption of a Council decision.]*76 [… one formula that could be evaluated is that, during the voting and in order for a veto to be effective, there should be a requirement for two permanent members to be making use of the veto simultaneously, and, in this way, an interpretation that the use of the veto reflects national interests should be avoided.]*77 2.2.5  Permanent member casting negative vote could state this isn’t nonconcurring vote [Permanent Members of the Security Council, when casting a negative vote, could state that this is not a non-concurring vote in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter.]*78 2.2.6 Veto should not be permitted on matters relating to SG election, R2P, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, etc. [… the veto power of permanent member of the Council should not be used in the case for appointment of the UN Secretary-General.]*79 [… the veto should be restrained and permanent members should abstain from using it in certain situations – not least in R2P situations.]*80 [… it is also important to reach consensus whereby precise limits upon use of veto can be established, with elimination of the possibility of applying veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross human rights violations.]*81  [Permanent members should commit themselves to not casting a nonconcurring vote in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.]*82 [The concurrence shall not, however, be required in matters involving genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, as well as on recommendations under Art. 4(2), 5, 6, 94(2) and 97 and on a matter under Art. 96(1).]*83 [… regulating and limiting its use to specific cases under Chapter VII of the Charter.]*84 2.2.7 Use of veto only applicable on Chapter VII matters [Limitations in respect of the scope of the veto: inter alia, application of the veto only on Chapter VII-related matters.]*85 2.2.8 Abstention from voting by party to a dispute/ Art. 52, para. 3 [Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters/questions shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 or Article 52, a party to a dispute/controversy shall abstain from voting.]*86 [… The third paragraph of Article 27 imposes limitations upon permanent members whereby they are unable to vote when they are parties to a dispute pertaining to decisions associated with Chapter Six of the Charter, which concerns

• • • • • • • • •

• • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

901

to pacific settlement of disputes, and decisions in relation to the third paragraph of Article 52, which also pertains to pacific settlement of disputes.]*87 2.2.9 Rules to overturn/overrule a veto [… adding a fourth paragraph to Article 27 to read thus: [A negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, cast on decisions covered by the immediately preceding paragraph, maybe be overturned or set aside by a vote of an absolute majority of the General Assembly in regular or emergency special session, or by the Security Council itself by a vote of two-thirds of its members …]]*88 [Additional actions regarding the veto should be implemented, inter alia: – Overruling the veto within the Council by an affirmative vote of a certain number of Member States, commensurate with the size of an expanded Council, – Overruling the veto by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure and under progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24(1) of the Charter.]*89 2.2.10 Formalize explanations for use of veto [The negative vote of a permanent member in the exercise of its veto power must be explained.]*90 [A permanent member casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document.]*91 2.3 Amendment of decision-making procedure in case of an enlargement of the Council [Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.][Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.]*92 [… to amend also Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 109, paragraph 1, of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Security Council;*93]*94 [… establish new working methods for voting formulas so that the number of votes needed to approve Council resolutions shall be changed. Under the third paragraph of Article 27, nine votes are currently needed, and the five permanent members should be included among those votes.]*95 [Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio]*96 3. Regional representation Decides that the members of the Security Council shall be elected accordingly: 3.1 Selection criteria for new members: 3.1.1 … according to equitable geographical distribution [Insofar as regional representation is concerned, our position is that this concept signifies equitable geographic distribution.]*97 [… the equitable geographical distribution should be ensured by addressing the historical injustice with certain regions.]98

• •

• • • •

• •

• •

902

5 On a road to nowhere ?

chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable dis• [… tribution of rotating character …] 99 promoting options for equitable geographic distribution that can increase • [… possibilities of presence for our (Latin American) region, as well as contribut*

ing to the objective of achieving more frequent participation in the Council … believes that geographic distribution reflects the spirit of the Charter, which takes individual and sovereign states into consideration under the principle of the sovereign equality of all members.]*100 [… support an expansion that addresses the under-representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Security Council, with members in both categories.]*101 [The under-representation of African and Latin-American and Caribbean countries must be redressed.]*102 [… strongly believes that the reform of the Security Council must ensure the Latin America and the Caribbean’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council.]*103 [underrepresentation from Asia & Africa in the Council’s composition must be corrected]*104 [… supports the legitimate aspirations of the African Group of countries in this regard.]*105 [… support for the increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council.]*106 [… a reform that will ensure Africa’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council, taking into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system;]*107 [… the Arab States … demanded a permanent Arab representation in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership of the Security Council …]*108 [… any increase in the non-permanent membership of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council.]*109 [New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration.]*110 [… the opportunity for Member States to serve on the Security Council must be enhanced, particularly for groups which have been traditionally underrepresented, such as small and medium States and Africa.]*111 [The distribution of seats must reflect the change in composition of the UN membership, and address the non-representation of some regions in the permanent membership category and the under-representation of developing countries in both membership categories.]*112 [… expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-aligned and developing countries.][If the permanent category were expanded, new seats should be given to African region and other developing countries as the first priority.]*113

• • • • • • • • • • •

• •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

903

3.1.2 … according to development status [… increase the representation of developing countries …]*114 [… including both developing and developed countries as new permanent members.]*115 [The composition of the Council should better reflect the current configuration of the membership of the United Nations, including developing states and smaller states …]*116 [The main objective of the expansion of the Council should be to rectify the current insufficient representation in that organ of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.]*117 [Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially that of African countries …]*118 [The composition of the Security Council should be expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-aligned and developing countries.]*119 [… calls for establishment of a category of non-permanent membership in the Security Council explicitly for Small Island Developing States.]*120 [The distribution of seats must reflect the change in composition of the UN membership, and address the non-representation of some regions in the permanent membership category and the under-representation of developing countries in both membership categories.]*121 [… expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-aligned and developing countries.][If the permanent category were expanded, new seats should be given to African region and other developing countries as the first priority.]*122 3.1.3 … according to civilization or religion [… any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership of the expanded Security Council.][… any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World.]*123 [New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration.]*124 3.1.4 … according to demography (size of the Member State) [On the other hand, … underscores the importance of the respect for the principle of rotation in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council in order to ensure a democratic access for small countries to the Council.]*125 [The reform should be conducive to give more countries, small and mediumsized countries in particular, more opportunities to serve in the Security Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process.]*126 [It is important to ensure that any reform takes full account of the need to give small states an opportunity to participate in the work of the Security Council.]*127 [An enlargement should also take into account smaller states.]*128 [… the opportunity for Member States to serve on the Security Council must be enhanced, particularly for groups which have been traditionally underrepresented, such as small and medium States and Africa.]*129

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

904

5 On a road to nowhere ?

non-permanent seats … as follows: Small States 130, Medium-sized • [Regular States 131, Africa, Asia, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, Eastern *

*

European Group.][Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*132 3.1.5 … according to contribution to international peace and security [Decisions about new permanent members will be made primarily on the basis of a member’s country-specific qualifications.][For any new permanent members, the criteria for selection should begin with the same criteria for non-permanent membership laid out in Article 23 of the Charter, namely that due regard shall be specifically paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization.]*133 [… The General Assembly shall elect … non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical or balanced regional distribution.]*134 [While equitable geographic representation remains an important principle in the distribution of non-elected seats among regional groups, we should not forget that the Charter pays special regard to the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization …]*135 3.2 Specific proposals of allocation of seats 3.2.1 Allocation of new seats in case of enlargement with non-permanent members: Africa (3), Asia (3), GRULAC (2), WEOG (1), Eastern Europe (1) [Distribution of seats. Decides that, in order to implement paragraph 3 above, [the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States;]]*136 3.2.2 Allocation of new seats in case of enlargement in both categories 3.2.2.1 Non-permanent: Africa (1-3), Asia (1-2), Eastern-Europe (1), GRULAC (1), WEOG (0-1) [… the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: one from African States; one from Asian States; one from Eastern European States; one from Latin American and Caribbean States;]*137 [… allocation … of a total of five non-permanent seats [for Africa]]*138 [The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. The additional eight non-permanent members shall be composed of two each for the Africa, the Asian and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups of States, and one each for the Eastern European and Western European and other States group …]*139 [Four among these [non-permanent] members [elected on the basis of equitable distribution] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and

•

• •

•

• • • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

905

the Caribbean, one from Western Europe and others group and one from Eastern European Group.]*140 [Non-Permanent seats (+5): Africa 1, Asia 2, GRULAC 1, WEOG 0, Eastern Europe 1.]*141 3.2.2.2 Permanent: Africa (≥2), Asia (2), GRULAC (1-2), WEOG (1), Eastern-Europe (0-1) [… allocation of no less than two permanent seats for Africa …]*142 [appreciates merit in increasing Council’s membership … with the understanding that Asia and Africa … are each allocated at least four additional seats.]*143 [The new permanent members of the Security Council shall be composed of two each for the African, the Asian, and the Latin American and the Caribbean Groups of States and one each for the Eastern European Group and the Western European and Other States group of states …]*144 [Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean must be included.]*145 [… the six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: two from African States; two from Asian States; one from Latin American and Caribbean states; one from Western European and Other States;]*146 [… the following distribution of additional permanent seats: two for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean and one for Western European and Others Group.]*147 [Permanent seats (+6): Africa 2, Asia 2, GRULAC 1, WEOG 1, Eastern Europe 0.]*148 3.2.2.3 Permanent members – support for/opposition to specific countries [… reaffirm the support … for the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for new permanent seats, along with representation for Africa among the permanent members of the Security Council.]*149 [… support to the G4 proposal …]*150 [A country like Japan, refusing the settlement of extra-large past crimes by all means should be off the list.]*151 3.2.3 Allocation of new seats in case of enlargement in intermediary/intermediate/interim/longer term/third category: Africa (2-3), Asia (2-3), GRULAC (1-2), WEOG (1-2), Eastern Europe (1) [Six among these [non-permanent] members [with more frequent rotation] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Eastern European group and three from the Western European and others group. The sequence of rotation would need to be determined by the General Assembly.] [Four among these [non-permanent] members [elected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical distribution] would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Western European and Others Group and one from Eastern European Group.]*152 [The following six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8/10]*153 years: two from African States, two from Asian States, one from Latin American and Caribbean States, one from WEOG.]*154

• • • • • • • • • • •

•

•

906

5 On a road to nowhere ?

seats allocated to the regional groups, as follows: • [Longer-term … Africa, Asia, Asia/Africa (on a rotational basis), Group of Latin America and

Caribbean States, Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group (on a rotational basis)]*155

Regions and proposed seats Region

Permanent

Longer-term*

Two-year term

Total

Africa

0

2

4

6

Asia

1

2

3

6

GRULAC

0

2

2

4

WEOG

3

1

2

6

EEG

1

0

2

3

Total

5

7

13

25

*Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable.*156

3.3 Role of regional groups in selection [… selection of all … representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election;]*157 [… increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Security Council.]*158 [Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.]*159 [the regional groups, through consultations, must ensure that the additional seats for non-permanent members of the Security Council allotted to them shall be fairly, justly and equitably rotated among the member states in each group …]*160 [… each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified … above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group; those arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair subregional representation;][taking into account equitable geographical distribution]*161 3.4 General statements [Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced.]*162 [We maintain that only States can be members of the Security Council. We encourage States consult with other members of their regional group and to ensure broad respect for the decisions of the Council. But it remains an open question how States could represent entire groups …]*163 [Maintain existing five regional groups.]*164 4. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods 4.1 Size Decides that the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to: 4.1.1 Size of an expanded Council (modest, low/mid-twenties, 25, 26, 31) A [more representative and inclusive*165] Council shall consist of:

• • • • • • • •

•

5 On a road to nowhere ?

907

– [a total*166/between*167/not less than*168/not exceed*169/​approximately*170] [25*171/26*172/31*173] members – [low twenties*174/mid-twenties*175/into twenties at most*176/a modest expansion*177] 4.1.2 General statements relating to the size of the Council [The exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regions, taking into account equitable geographical distribution]​[comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council]*178 [The Council should be enlarged to an extent that will enable it to fully redress the imbalance in its structure and increase the representation of developing countries.][The enlargement should also maintain an appropriate ratio in the numbers of Council members from different categories]*179 4.2 Working methods […]

• •

Original footnotes *1 Para 1.1a, b of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *2 Para 1.7a, d, e of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *3 Para 1.17a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143) Para 2.12a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143) copied into this para. *4 Para 1.26a of rev2 (El Salvador). *5 Para 1.5a of rev2 (CARICOM, annex pp. 86-88). *6 Para 1.8a, b of rev2 (L.69 Group, annex pp. 102-103). *7 Para 1.14a, b of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124-129). Para 2.11a, b of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124129) copied into this para. *8 Para 1.4a, b, c, d of rev2 (Slovenia, annex pp. 83-85). *9 Para 1.6a of rev2 (Uruguay, annex pp. 89-90). Para 2.5c of rev2 (Uruguay, annex pp. 89-90) copied into this para. *10 Para 1.18a of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). Para 2.13b of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147) copied into this para. *11 Para 1.23b of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). Para 2.16a of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178) copied into this para. *12 Para 1.24a of rev2 (USA, annex pp. 179-180). Para 2.17a of rev2 (USA, annex pp. 179180) copied into this para. *13 Para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *14 Para 1.11a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). Para 2.9a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114) copied into this para. *15 Para 1.12a of rev2 (United Kingdom and France, annex pp. 115-118). *16 Para 1.15a of rev2 (Principality of Monaco, annex pp. 130-134). *17 Para 1.2c of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *18 Para 1.2b, d of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *19 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa, 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Eastern European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group.

908

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*20 Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council. *21 Para 1.2b, d, e, f of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). Moved as per UfC letter of 14 February 2011. *22 Para 1.19a of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *23 Para 1.13c of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123). Para 4.8 of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156) included in this para. *24 Para 1.13d of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123 and Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *25 Para 1.25b of rev2 (Pakistan). *26 Para 1.7b, c of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *27 Para 1.26b of rev2 (El Salvador). *28 Para 1.10a, b of rev2 (Russian Federation, annex pp. 108-111). *29 Para 1.2b, d of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *30 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Eastern European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group. *31 Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council. *32 Para 1.2b, d, e, f of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *33 Regarding the longer-term seats, the length of the term is negotiable. *34 Para 1.22b, c of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174). *35 Para 1.3a, b, c, d of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *36 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middle ground and would be subject to negotiation. *37 It is understood that the GA will simultaneously decide on a set of measures dealing with the working methods of the Council. This can either be done in a separate part of the resolution or in a stand-alone resolution that is adopted at the same time as the resolution dealing with the enlargement of the Council. *38 Para 1.9a, b, c of rev2 (Liechtenstein, annex pp. 104-107). *39 Para 1.12b, c of rev2 (United Kingdom and France, annex pp. 115-118). *40 Para 1.11b, c of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *41 Para 1.15b, c of rev2 (Principality of Monaco, annex pp. 130-134). *42 Para 1.18b of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *43 Para 1.23c of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). *44 Para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *45 Para 1.21a, b of rev2 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, annex pp. 157-170). *46 Para 1.2a of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). Para 1.20a of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156) included in this para. *47 Para 1.22a of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-1 74) moved to this para. *48 Para 1.13a, b of rev2 (UfC). Para 1.25a of rev2 (Pakistan) moved to this para. *49 Para 1.16a of rev2 (People’s Republic of China, annex pp. 135-137). *50 Para 2.1a of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5), para 2.19a of rev2 (El Salvador). *51 Para 2.7e of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *52 Para 2.8a of rev2 (Russian Federation, annex pp. 108-111). *53 Para 2.11a, b of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124-129). *54 Para 2.17a of rev2 (United States of America, annex pp. 179-180).

5 On a road to nowhere ? *55 Para 2.13b of

909

rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147), 2.16 of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175178). Para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *56 Para 2.5a, b, c of rev2 (Uruguay, annex pp. 89-90). *57 Para 2.12a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143). *58 Inserted as per Russian letter dated 14 February 2011. *59 Inserted as per Russian letter dated 14 February 2011. *60 Para 2.17a of rev2 (United States of America, annex pp. 179-180). *61 Para 2.8a of rev2 (Russian Federation, annex pp. 108-111). *62 Para 2.10e of rev2 (UfC). *63 Para 2.9a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *64 Para 2.6a of rev2 (NAM, annex pp. 91-94), para 4.30e of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123), para 2.10b of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156), para 2.10e of rev2 (UfC), para 4.41a of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *65 Para 2.7b of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *66 Para 2.10b/4.30f of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123), para 4-41a of rev2 (Pakistan). *67 Para 2.13a of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *68 Para 2.7d of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *69 Para 2.15a of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174). *70 Para 2.7a of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *71 Para 2.14b of rev2 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, annex pp. 157-170). *72 Para 2.10e of rev2 (UfC). *73 Para 2.9a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *74 Para 2.6a of rev2 (NAM, annex pp. 91-94), para 4.30e of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123), para 2.10b of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156), para 2.10e of rev2 (UfC), para 4.41a of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *75 Para 23b, e of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *76 Para 2.12a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143). *77 Para 2.9e of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *78 Para 2.2c of rev2 (S-5, annex pp. 16-47). *79 Para inserted per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *80 Para 2.16b of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). *81 Para 2.9c of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *82 Para 2.2b of rev2 (S-5, annex pp. 16-47). *83 Para 2.4d of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *84 Para 2.12a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143). *85 Para 2.3b of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *86 Para 2.4c of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82), Para 2.14a of rev2 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, annex pp. 157-170). *87 Para 2.9b of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *88 Para 2.4f of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82) Para 5.5e of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). Moved from chapter 5 of rev2. *89 Para 2.7c of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *90 Para 2.4e of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *91 Para 2.2a of rev2 (S-5, annex pp. 16-47). Para from Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010 also copied into this para. *92 Para 2.4b of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82).

910 *93 Regarding paragraph 3 of

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended. *94 Para 2.10a of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123, Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156), Para 2.18a of rev2 (Pakistan). *95 Para 2.9d of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *96 Para 2.3a of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *97 Para 3.16a of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124-129). *98 Para 3.21a of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *99 Para 3.22a of rev2 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, annex pp. 157-170). *100 Para 3.13a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114). *101 Para 3.18a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143). *102 Para 3.19d of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *103 Para 3.27 of rev2 (El Salvador). *104 Para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *105 Para 3.8a of rev2 (Caribbean Community (CARICOM), annex pp. 86-88). *106 Para 3.9a of rev2 (NAM, annex pp. 91-94). *107 Para 3.1a of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *108 Para 3.3a of rev2 (Arab Group, annex pp. 48-52). *109 Para 3.5b of rev2 (Eastern European Group, annex pp. 59-62). *110 Para 3.17b of rev2 (People’s Republic of China, annex pp. 135-137). *111 Para 3.21b of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *112 Para 3.11a of rev2 (L.69 Group, annex pp. 102-103). *113 Para 3.20a, b of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *114 Para 3.2d of rev2 (Organization of the Islamic Conference, annex pp. 6-15). *115 Para 3.24a of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). *116 Para 3.19a, d of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *117 Para 3.10a of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *118 Para 3.17a of rev2 (People’s Republic of China, annex pp. 135-137). *119 Para 3.20a of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *120 Para 1.5b of rev2 (Caribbean Community (CARICOM), annex pp. 86-88). Moved from chapter 1 of rev2. *121 Para 3.11a of rev2 (L.69 Group, annex pp. 102-103). *122 Para 3.20a, b of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *123 Para 3.2a, b of rev2 (Organization of the Islamic Conference, annex pp. 6-15). *124 Para 3.17b of rev2 (People’s Republic of China, annex pp. 135-137). *125 Para 3.27b of rev2 (El Salvador). *126 Para 3.17a of rev2 (People’s Republic of China, annex pp. 135-137). *127 Para 3.24b of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). *128 Para 3.19d of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *129 Para 3.21b of rev2 (Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *130 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from Eastern European Group; 6 are from Western European and Others Group. *131 Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

911

*132 Para 12b, d, e, f of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). Moved as per UfC letter of 14 February 2011. *133 Para 3.25a of rev2 (USA, annex pp. 179-180). Para 1.24b of rev2 (USA, annex pp. 179180). Moved from chapter 1. *134 Para 3.6a of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *135 Para 3.19b of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *136 Para 3.26a of rev2 (Pakistan), para 3.15b of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123 and Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156). *137 Para 3.16c of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124-129). *138 Para 3.1d of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *139 Para 3.6c of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *140 Para 3.7b of rev2 (Slovenia, annex pp. 83-85). *141 Para inserted as per Kazakhstan letter dated 15 February 2011. *142 Para 3.1c of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *143 Para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010 p. 3. *144 Para 3.6b of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *145 Para 3.10b of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101). *146 Para 3.16b of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124-129). *147 Para 3.7a of rev2 (Slovenia, annex pp. 83-85). *148 Para inserted as per Kazakhstan letter dated 15 February 2011. *149 Para 3.14a of rev2 (United Kingdom and France, annex pp. 115-118). *150 Para 1.23b of rev2 (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178) moved from chapter 1 of rev2. *151 Para 3.20b of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *152 Para 3.7b, c of rev2 (Slovenia, annex pp. 83-85). *153 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middle ground and would be subject to negotiation. *154 Para 3.12a of rev2 (Liechtenstein, annex p. 104-107). *155 Para 3.4a of rev2 (UfC). *156 Para 3.23a of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174). *157 Para 3.1b of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *158 Para 3.2c of rev2 (Organization of the Islamic Conference, annex pp. 6-15). *159 Para 3.4b of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). *160 Para 3.6d of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82). *161 Para 3.15c of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123 and Pakistan, annex pp. 151156). Para 3.26b (Pakistan). Para 3.15d (UfC). *162 Para 3.15a of rev2 (UfC). *163 Para 3.19c of rev2 (Norway, annex pp. 144-147). *164 Para 3.23b of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174), para 3.5a of rev2 (Eastern European Group, annex pp. 59-62). *165 Para 4.1a of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *166 Para 4.1a of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5). *167 Para 4.19a of rev2 (El Salvador). *168 Para 4.5a of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101) and para 4.14a of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150). *169 Para 4.6a of rev2 (Russian Federation, annex pp. 108-111).

912

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*170

Para 4.12a of rev2 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143), para 4.16a of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174), inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010 pp. 3). *171 Para 4.4a of rev2 (Slovenia, annex pp. 83-85); para 4.8a of rev2 (Canada/Mexico, annex pp. 119-123, and Pakistan, annex pp. 151-156); para 4.9a of rev2 (G-4, annex pp. 124129), para 4.16a of rev2 (ROK, annex pp. 171-174), para 4.15a of rev2 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, annex pp. 157-170). *172 Para 4.1a of rev2 (African Group, annex pp. 1-5); para 4.5a of rev2 (Cuba, annex pp. 95-101); para 4.12a of rev2 (Venezuela, annex pp. 138-143); para 4.14a of rev2 (DPR Korea, annex pp. 148-150), para inserted as per Indonesia letter dated 13 December 2010. *173 Para 4.3a of rev2 (Philippines, annex pp. 63-82) and para 4.19a of rev2 (El Salvador). *174 Para 4.6a of rev2 (Russian Federation, annex pp. 108-111). *175 Para 4.7a of rev2 (Peru, annex pp. 112-114); para 4.13a (Norway, annex pp. 144-147); para 4.17a (Denmark, annex pp. 175-178). *176 Para 4.10a of rev2 (Principality of Monaco, annex pp. 130-134). *177 Para 4.18a of rev2 (USA, annex pp. 179-180). *178 Para 4.2a of rev2 (Italy/Colombia, annex pp. 55-58). Para 4.2b of rev2 (UfC). *179 Para 4.11a, b of rev2 (People’s Republic of China). 5.1.9  10 December 2013, Advisory Group appointed by the President of the General Assembly,9 Non-paper, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. John W. Ashe 1. Categories of membership*1 a. Enlargement in both existing categories, permanent and non-permanent. b. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (x) years to be converted into permanent seats*2, as well as enlargement in the non-permanent category.*3

9  On 22 October 2013, the President of the General Assembly (68th session), Mr. John W. Ashe (Antigua and Barbuda), distributed a letter to the Permanent Missions announcing the reappointment of Mr. Zahir Tanin as chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, and the establishment of an “Advisory Group” to himself, composed of the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, Mr. Benedicte Frankinet, Brazil, Mr. Antonio Patriota, Liechtenstein, Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Papua New Guinea, Mr. Robert Aisi, San Marino, Mr. Daniele Bodini, and Sierra Leone, Mr. Vandi Chidi Minah. In his letter, the President explained that “[t]he Group is advisory in nature. It does not have a negotiating role. Its purpose is to produce a basis for the start of the Intergovernmental Negotiations that reflects the ideas put forward in the negotiations so far, and also identifies available options.”    The report of the Advisory Group was circulated by the President on 10 December 2013, with the explanation that “as per my request, members of the Advisory Group have provided me with a set of ideas pertaining to the negotiations […]. These ideas […] are intended to be an instrument to assist in the organization of the IGN, while ensuring that GA decision 62/557 [15 September 2008, → 4.1.29] remains the continued basis for the IGN process. As such, the attached Non-Paper is neither a negotiating text nor a replacement of any existing document.” The Permanent Representative of San Marino, Mr. Daniele Bodini, disassociated himself from the Non-Paper in a memorandum also circulated by the President of the General Assembly on 10 December 2013.

913

5 On a road to nowhere ?

c. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (8-12) years that are immediately renewable, without prejudice to the possibility of enlargement in the non-permanent category.*4 d. Enlargement through the creation of a new category of seats of (3-5) years, as well as enlargement in the non-permanent category. e. Enlargement in the non-permanent category only: i. With the possibility of immediate re-election. ii. Without the possibility of immediate re-election. 2. The question of the veto*5 2.1 In relation to enlargement: a. Extension of the veto to the new permanent members. b. Extension of the veto to the new permanent members, subject to a moratorium on its use for 15 years.*6 c. No extension of the veto. d. Abolition of the veto. 2.2 In relation to the use of the veto: a. Limit the use of the veto: i. Not to be used to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. ii. To Chapter VII matters. b. Require non-concurring votes by two permanent members to block a Council decision. 3. Regional Representation*7 The charts below reflect how the various models proposed under 1. would affect regional representation. Furthermore, cross-regional suggestions have also been made as regards: (a) permanent Arab representation in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership; (b) adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership. Regional representation under models 1.a and 1.b Regional representation under models 1.a and 1.b existing perm. seats

new perm. seats

existing non- new nonperm. seats perm. seats

TOTAL (perm + non-perm)

Africa

0

2

3*

1 or 2

2+4 = 6 or 2+5 = 7

Asia-Pacific

1

2

2*

1

3+3 = 6

EEG

1

0

1

1

1+2=3

GRULAC

0

1

2

1

1+3=4

WEOG

3

1

2

0

4+2=6

SIDS

0 or 1 5

6

10

4, 5 or 6

25, 26 or 27

*Five seats are allocated to the African and Asia-Pacific Group, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1991A (XVIII). In practice three of these seats are allocated to the African Group, two to the Asia-Pacific Group.

914

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Regional representation under model 1.c

Africa

existing perm. seats

new category existing nonof seats perm. seats

new nonperm. seats

TOTAL (perm + long + non-perm)

0

2

(x)

0+2+3=5

3*

Asia-Pacific 1

2

2*

(x)

1+2+2=4

EEG

1

0

1

(x)

1+0+1=2

GRULAC

0

1

2

(x)

0+1+2=3

WEOG

3

1

2

(x)

3+1+2=6

5

6

10

(x)

21 + (x)*8

(x) The proposal is neutral as to whether seats in the non-permanent category are added, which are therefore referred to as “(x)”. The Eastern European Group has asked for an additional nonpermanent seat under any enlargement model. Regional representation under model 1.d existing perm. seats

new category existing nonof seats perm. seats

new nonperm. seats

TOTAL (perm + med. + non-perm)

Africa

0

1.5**

3*

1

0 + 1.5 + 4 = 5.5

Asia-Pacific

1

1.5**

2*

1

1 + 1.5 + 3 = 5.5

EEG

1

0.5***

1

1

1 + 0.5 + 2 = 3.5

GRULAC

0

1

2

1

0+1+3=4

WEOG

3

0.5***

2

0

3 + 0.5 + 2 = 5.5

Small States

1

1

Medium size States

1

1

6

26

5

5

10

** The proposal allocates one seat to Asia/Africa, which has been distributed evenly amongst both groups for reference purposes only. *** One seat rotates between EEG and WEOG, resulting in an average of 0.5 seats for each region. Regional representation under model 1.e existing perm. seats

existing non-perm. new non-perm. seats seats

TOTAL (perm + non-perm)

Africa

0

3*

3

0+6=6

Asia-Pacific

1

2*

3

1+5=6

EEG

1

1

1

1+2=3

GRULAC

0

2

2

0+4=4 3+3=6

WEOG

3

2

1

5

10

10

25

5 On a road to nowhere ?

915

4. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council*9 4.1 The Security Council membership shall be increased from fifteen to (x)*10 members. 4.2 Measures on working methods are limited to challenges arising from the enlargement of the Council. The following list serves as a placeholder. Some of the measures listed below can be decided at the same time as enlargement, while others require work to be done thereafter. This work must be concluded at the time of entry into force of the amendments at the latest. a. Majority required for decision-making: The majority required for decisionmaking in an enlarged Council is to be reflected in the necessary Charter amendments (Art. 27 (2) and 27 (3)). […] 6. Cross-cutting issues 6.1 Amendments to the Charter All enlargement models require a General Assembly resolution, to be adopted in accordance with resolution 53/30 of the General Assembly,10 containing amendments to the Charter. These amendments are subject to ratification and enter into force in accordance with Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter. Charter provisions subject to amendments are Articles 23, 27, and 109. Enlargement under models 1.b to 1.e (a single General Assembly resolution) The Charter amendments resulting from enlargement are annexed to the General Assembly resolution. Elections take place once the amendments have entered into force. Enlargement under model 1.a (two General Assembly resolutions) A General Assembly resolution deciding on enlargement is followed by the election of the new permanent Members by the General Assembly. The Charter amendments are adopted thereafter in a second General Assembly resolution. 6.2 Review clause*11 Elements to be considered in connection with a possible review clause include: a. Scope i. A limited review covering certain aspects of Security Council reform.*12 ii. A comprehensive review, covering all aspects of Security Council reform.*13 b. Timing i. The review takes place after a specified number of years.*14 ii. A review is provided for, but without decision on its timing. Original footnotes *1 This section is linked to the question of the veto, regional representation; and size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council. *2 The conversion would take place unless otherwise decided in the framework of the review, cf. in 6.2.a.i. *3 For the purposes of this non-paper, “the non-permanent category” refers exclusively to the existing non-permanent seats. *4 To be combined with a provision that States running for such a new category seat are barred from running for a seat in the non-permanent category, at least for the length of term of a new category seat (“flip-flop clause”). 10  23 November 1998, → 4.1.1.

916 *5 This

5 On a road to nowhere ? section is linked to size and working methods of the Council.

*6 A further decision in this regard would have to be made in the context of

the review, cf. 6.2.a.i. *7 This section is linked to categories of membership, size and working methods of the Council. *8 A decision on adding new seats in the non-permanent category could be part of the review, cf. 6.2.a.ii. *9 This section is linked to categories of membership and the question of the veto. *10 Cf. charts in section 3. *11 Most enlargement models provide for review clauses, while in some cases they do not offer specifics on scope and timing. *12 Applicable e.g. to 1.a. *13 Applicable e.g. to 1.e. *14 Proposals include either a fixed number of years (15) or a relation of the timing of the review with the length of a terms of a new category of seats (e.g. 2x). 5.1.10 8 July 2014, Assessment of the Intergovernmental Negotiations following the conclusion of the 10th round by the Chair, Mr. Zahir Tanin, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. John W. Ashe Chair’s Assessment [of the] 10th Round [of the] Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform Background of the 10th round The proactive tone und momentum in the 10th round of Intergovernmental Negotiations was set early on by the initiative of the President of the 68th General Assembly to establish an Advisory Group. The appointment by President Ashe of the distinguished Ambassadors from Belgium, Brazil, Liechtenstein, Papua New Guinea, San Marino and Sierra Leone generated constructive momentum for this 10th round. The efforts of five of the members of the Advisory Group culminated in the production of a non-paper, transmitted to me in a letter from the President dated the 10th of December 2014 [sic; however, the correct year is 2013].11 This letter also included a Memorandum from the Ambassador of San Marino, who disassociated himself from the production of the Non-Paper, expressing hesitation about the group’s procedure. Rather than devising a Non-Paper, he suggested that the Advisory Group should instead advise the President on a new methodology for the way forward. Although the reactions of Member States to the paper and to the procedure for its drafting were mixed, the Non-Paper itself provides a clear overview of the main positions of Member States under each of the five key issues contained within General Assembly decision 62/557.12 Although it does not attempt to be a comprehensive or exhaustive list of positions, the strength of the Non-Paper lies in its concise nature, clear recognition of the interconnections between the five key issues and the helpful way in which it presents complex data such as positions on regional representation. Some have expressed concern that the Non-Paper does not reflect the nuances within positions. To address this concern, States may find it helpful to view the 11  → 5.1.9. 12  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

917

Non-Paper in conjunction with Rev3,13 which retains the full positions and language of Member States. Despite my appeal to Member States to benefit from the Non-Paper by using it as a basis for further discussion within the context of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, a common understanding of its use has yet to be reached. Consultations Following the distribution of the Non-Paper and prior to the beginning of our meetings this round, I conducted broad political outreach through consultations to gauge the membership’s collective readiness for a progressive agenda for this session, to build greater trust and to strengthen engagement ahead of the upcoming meetings. Over the course of these consultations, States made clear that the 68th General Assembly offered an opportunity to progress towards a results-oriented outcome, especially following the President of the General Assembly’s proactive steps. They also highlighted their expectation that all sides demonstrate genuine flexibility, recognised the importance of text-based negotiations and urged for the avoidance of repetition. Based on the input I received over the course of these consultations, I sent a letter to all Member States in which I outlined a set of six meetings based on General Assembly decision 62/557, which I hoped would provide the opportunity for interactive debate and movement from repetition to more meaningful exchanges. The six thematic meetings of the 10th round 1. On the topic of categories of membership During our first discussion which was on the topic of categories of membership on the 13th of March, 44 Member States spoke, seven of which spoke on behalf of groupings representing a large number of other delegations. There was general agreement on the need to enlarge the Council; however the variations on how to do so remained numerous. The main areas discussed included the possibility of enlarging the Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories, enlargement in the non-permanent category only, and enlargement in a new category of seats with various options related to term length and a new focus on immediate re-election. Additionally, while holding varying primary positions on reform, some States also noted the possibility of further exploration of intermediate options. A much debated subject within our discussions related to whether or not the Chair should share an evaluation of the quantity of support for positions on categories of membership. In addition to recognising that support for the different variations of expansion seems to remain largely unchanged,*1 I believe that quantifying support based on numbers of those delegations that spoke during the 10th round is not an adequate measure upon which I can base an accurate judgement, particularly as the Intergovernmental Negotiations takes place in the format of informal plenary. Moreover, in order to make progress it is imperative for the Chair to do his utmost to ensure an atmosphere conducive to reform, build political will and keep all Member States engaged in the process. 13  23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8.

918

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Discussions revealed the common understanding that an expanded Council should accommodate those States that desire a more substantial role on the Council. Different views exist, however, as to whether this would entail the creation of new permanent seats or longer term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election. Despite diverse opinions on permanent membership, all Member State positions show openness to different variants of non-permanent expansion as an integral part of a reformed Council.*2 To this end, an increased focus by Member States on commonalities could be useful to achieve progress. Debates on this issue were not limited to different expansion models; important points were also raised on the subject of categories. For example, Member States indicated that the power held by permanent members extends beyond their seats in the Council.*3 States also suggested that the criteria listed in Article 23 of the Charter for the selection of non-permanent members could also be applied when selecting possible new permanent members,*4 and raised general concerns in regards to the effectiveness of an enlarged Council. 2. On the question of the veto During our 19th of March meeting on the question of the veto, 36 delegations spoke, six of which spoke on behalf of groups representing a large number of other delegations. At the meeting, delegations focused on two main areas: veto in relation to enlargement and issues which relate to the use of veto. In terms of the veto as it relates to enlargement, many delegations suggested an inseparable link between permanent seats and the right of veto. Some raised the concern that not granting potential new permanent members veto privileges would divide the Council’s permanent membership into different classes. To this end, some delegations recommended that new permanent members have full use of the veto, while others suggested a 15-year moratorium on the use of the veto by new permanent members until a review of the reform takes place. Alternatively, other delegations expressed concern that extending veto privileges to potential new permanent members would only compound perceived existing problems within the Council. In this regard, many delegations offered examples of recent incidents in which they felt the use of the veto prevented the Council from discharging its duties in accordance with the Charter. Most of the delegations that held this view envisioned an enlargement without the creation of further permanent seats and thus no additional veto powers, though others envisioned new permanent seats without veto. Numerous delegations also recognised that the threat of use of veto has a significant power over the Council’s decision making. There was a prevailing sense that the veto is anachronistic and should be abolished. However, many delegations also emphasised that this may not be practical due to the ratification process required. As a result, many delegations focused their discussions on the ways in which the use of the veto could be altered in a reformed Council. Delegations suggested that because any enlargement requires a Charter amendment, it would be valuable to use such an opportunity to also redefine decision-making procedures, and in this regard Member States suggested changes related to veto procedure. For example, States suggested that veto would entail the non-concurring votes of two or more permanent members to block a Council decision, or that permanent

5 On a road to nowhere ?

919

members could cast a non-concurring vote that is not considered to be a veto. A new regional veto option was also raised; this would block action if Council members from the region under discussion, acting on the basis of regional consensus, all voted against the action. Member States also suggested changing practices related to the use of veto, for example, limiting its use only to Chapter VII decisions*5 or prohibiting its use on Chapter VI related matters.*6 There was an adamant call from a large number of delegations that veto should not be used to block Council action aimed at responding to or preventing genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.*7 3. On the topic of regional representation In our 1st of April meeting on regional representation, 37 delegations spoke, seven of which spoke on behalf of groupings representing a large number of other delegations. Along with delegations presenting a variety of detailed proposals on the numbers and distribution of seats to specific regions, there was general agreement that enlargement should enhance regional representation on the Council, particularly in a way that would ensure that unrepresented or underrepresented regions are adequately taken into account. A number of States recognised the increasing role that regional groups and organisations play in international relations and the growing participation of regional organisations in international peace and security. This was also coupled with the recognition that there has been a change in both the balance of regions and the composition of the United Nations membership since the last reform decision in 1963.14 States also discussed the distinction between the Charter stipulated distribution of regional seats through “equitable geographic distribution” and enhanced “regional representation” on the Council. Member States also debated the potential for cross regional representation to include factors such as size, development status of a Member State or specifically the inclusion of Arab States and the Islamic Ummah. While States broadly recognised the potential for cross regional groups to add significant value to the Council’s work, some delegations suggested that assigning specific seats for these criteria would create a situation in which groups would be eligible for multiple seats at one time. They suggested that alternatively, these factors could be taken into consideration within regional groups. In connection to this, States suggested that the current ‘Arab swing seat’*8 could provide an example of how to ensure the inclusion of cross regional groupings in a reformed council. Many States emphasised that permanent members on the Council serve in a national capacity rather than on behalf of a region, as per their recognition by name in Article 24 of the Charter. As a result, it was suggested by some that any new permanent seats should be country specific and not allocated to a region. Some delegations also reasoned that any new regional seat should be open to all members of that region. A few delegations took the opportunity to mention the possibility of the European Union having a greater role in a reformed Council. 14  17 December 1963, → 2.11.

920

5 On a road to nowhere ?

4. On the topic of the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council During the meeting on the 11th of April on the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council, 45 delegations spoke, seven of which spoke on behalf of groupings representing a large number of other delegations. On the issue of size, States widely agreed that the exact size of an enlarged Council will depend directly on the model chosen. However, while some outlying positions remain, there seemed to be an agreement among many delegations that the size of an enlarged Council should be in the mid to upper 20s. Many delegations took this opportunity to note the increased size of the membership of the United Nations since the last reform decision in 1963 and the implications this has on the Council’s representativeness today. There was widespread agreement that any enlargement in the Council should not hamper its efficiency. Many delegations listed a variety of national parliament and bodies in the international system comprised of over 25 members including the General Assembly, that are able to effectively make decisions. These delegations highlighted that efficiency within a reformed Council is achievable, irrespective of size, through appropriate working methods. On the issue of working methods, remarks fell into two categories: first, the effects of Council enlargement on working methods, and second, working methods in relation to the Council’s current composition and in general. Within the first category, many delegations warned that if the current arrangements for the rotating Council presidency remain the same in an enlarged Council of more than 24 members, each of the two-year non-permanent members may not have the opportunity to hold the presidency during their term on the Council. However, States who raised this issue did not cite it as a reason to constrict the enlargement of the Council to fewer than 24 members. Instead, they highlighted the need to adjust working methods related to the selection of the Council’s presidency. Delegations also noted that increasing the size of the Council would necessitate changes in the Council’s daily administration. […] As discussed in the question of veto, delegations also recognised that a reformed council would require amendment of the Charter’s provisions on decision making majorities, but that exact numbers would depend on the size of the agreed upon enlargement. […] […] 5. On the topic of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 6. On the topic of cross-cutting issues At the final meeting held on the 8th of May on the topic of cross-cutting issues, 52 Member States spoke, seven of which spoke on behalf of groupings representing a large number of other delegations. Member States took this opportunity to further clarify their positions. Discussions also elucidated some important cross cutting issues related to reform. These included Charter amendments that could be required for reform and the manner in which

5 On a road to nowhere ?

921

these amendments would be initiated in the General Assembly, either through a single resolution with an annex or through a series of resolutions and elections. Numerous delegations also spoke strongly in favour of the inclusion of a clause which would provide for a review with a clear scope at a set moment following the implementation of the Charter amendment. General assessment of the 10th Round There were a number of recurring themes throughout the meetings. The loudest and clearest was the continual emphasis on the need for reform. Delegations provided a variety of reasons, including the need to address current underrepresentation in the Council, to bridge the disconnect between the Council’s composition and contemporary realities and to help the Council carry out its mandate more effectively. There was also a sense of foreboding that the relevance of the Council and the United Nations could be undermined without reform. There were also numerous procedural discussions about the various texts available to Member States. Some impressed the idea of using the Non-Paper as a working document and narrowing down the options within it. Others disagreed with this approach and envisioned moving back to working with Rev215 to come to an acceptable abridged version. These delegations remarked that they did not consider the Non-Paper to be on par with Rev2, which they deem to be the only consensus document. However, other delegations countered this argument, noting that Rev2 does not include their most up to date positions and expressing concerns that moving back to Rev2 would amount to ignoring their positions. While some Member States were hesitant about the use of the Non-Paper during discussions, the main positions they outlined on each of the five key issues closely matched positions reflected in the Non-Paper. At all five meetings, many delegations used the texts on the table to illustrate their positions. Those that used the President of the General Assembly’s Non-Paper were able to illustrate positions with particular clarity, as it allowed them to identify their positions by chapter and section number. This was particularly helpful during discussions to better articulate complex issues such as regional representation where numerical formulations can be quite complex. Those who used Rev2 as a reference point were prevented by its structure from providing the same level of detail and precision. From the discussions in this round, I have observed that while some groups are still hesitant to use Rev3, there has been no dispute about the accuracy of its content. If positions have changed or if States wish to omit past submissions, specific edits can be sent to my office in writing. Like the Intergovernmental Negotiations itself, which is a Member State driven process, Rev3 is built solely on Member States’ positions. The inclusion of new proposals from this round in Rev3 is also crucial to ensuring they are on equal footing with existing proposals. Member States also raised the possibility of having measurable results by or concluding negotiations in 2015 in recognition that the Intergovernmental Negotiations is

15  27 August 2010, Second Revised Negotiations Text (Rev.2), → 5.1.7.

922

5 On a road to nowhere ?

not an open ended process. Some delegations raised hesitations about artificial deadlines while others expressed concern about “artificial delays”. All delegations recognised the interconnected nature of the five key issues. This allowed us to organise meetings efficiently by discussing one issue at a time without losing a focus on all five key issues as a whole. It was also emphasised that in the end, overall reform does not have to stem from only one proposal but could instead encompass elements from many. Member States also discussed the procedure of the Intergovernmental Negotiations itself; it seemed at times that procedural concerns overshadowed substantive discussions. These discussions included the production of a summary by the Chair, the greater need for flexibility from all delegations, the need to strictly adhere to General Assembly decision 62/557 and various thoughts on the speed and the length of negotiations. Some States likened this process to others at the United Nations; however, others argued that the Intergovernmental Negotiations is a very different process and should be treated as such. Other delegations expressed frustration about the lack of progress in the absence of what they consider “real negotiations”. There was also a series of exchanges as to whether a consensus agreement on reform should be reached or if voting in the General Assembly with a minimum of two thirds in favour would be sufficient. While there was wide recognition that the best possible outcome in any negotiation is consensus, practically our discussions in the Intergovernmental Negotiations are guided by General Assembly decisions 62/557*12 and a potential vote in the General Assembly would fall under the mandate of General Assembly resolution 53/30.*13 Neither of these two requires an agreement by consensus on reform issues. With this in mind, reaching a decision by two thirds majority vote in the General Assembly is already a sizable task. The way forward Modest but significant steps towards reform have been taken over the last five years of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Member States have put many hours into carefully crafting statements and positions; they have been active in their attendance and instrumental to the re-emergence of true interaction between delegations at our meetings within this 10th round. In response to the call of Member States, we moved from talking to text-based negotiations in the form of the various revisions to the negotiation text. We now also have the Non-Paper from which to draw inspiration. Until Member States decide that the Intergovernmental Negotiations process has reached the limits of what it can achieve, our focus should be on how to reinvigorate the process and plot a clear path towards much desired reform. Although the Intergovernmental Negotiations remain one of the most difficult and protracted negotiations within the United Nations, as one Member State highlighted in this round, we “should not be imprisoned by the difficulty of the process.” As we conclude this round and look to the future, I would suggest to Member States two courses of action: 1. This round of negotiations has revealed a strong desire to reinvigorate Security Council reform in a way that takes stock of our collective efforts thus far and generates high-level support. To this end I respectfully suggest a high-level audit of endeavors to achieve early reform of the Security Council, in particular through the Intergovernmental Negotiations, for the consideration of world leaders

5 On a road to nowhere ?

923

during a high-level event at the General Debate of the 70th General Assembly, 10 years after the World Summit Outcome Document, in which world leaders tasked us to deliver an early reform of the Security Council. The audit would consist of an objective summary of the process to raise high-level political awareness of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, both in terms of its achievements and its limits in a neutral way. It is my suggestion to Member States that the audit should be drafted by an independent political figure, to be selected by the Secretary-General or the President of the General Assembly in consultation with the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. This audit would not prejudice continuing efforts within the Intergovernmental Negotiations process or initiatives by Member States; rather it would complement efforts and provide momentum in the lead up to the 70th General Assembly. 2. As I outlined previously in my 25th of July 2012 letter and as a logical evolution of our text based process, we cannot move forward without a commonly agreed concise working document. This round and the addition of the Non-Paper has clarified that the greatest challenge to our text based process is not the lack of a text, it is the lack of agreement on the texts on the table. A true indicator of progress within the Intergovernmental Negotiations process was the shift to text based negotiations. Rev3, with its “user friendly guide”, was our first step towards a concise working document. However, we cannot be satisfied simply with this; in order to achieve our goals we must continue to work towards basing our negotiations on an agreed text. Member States need to engage with, build upon, edit or entirely rework the available texts in order to allow for negotiations that are characterised by give and take. As Member States move towards the celebration of the 70th year of the United Nations, they are faced with a tremendous opportunity for achieving much needed reforms. To facilitate further progress, I humbly suggest that Member States make these recommendations actionable, by including the consideration of the aforementioned recommendations within this agenda item for the 69th General Assembly. It is my hope that through these recommendations, with the support of the Member States, we will build upon the achievements of the last six General Assembly sessions and move forward to a new phase of reform. Original footnotes *1 As noted in my letter of 25th July 2012. *2 This is not to say that Member States would be satisfied with Council reform that simply entails adding extra two-year non-permanent seats, as was the case of the last reform agreement in 1963. *3 For example, some delegations noted the common practice of holding positions for the nationals of permanent members within the United Nations system such as on the bench of the International Court of Justice or high ranking positions within the Secretariat. *4 Article 23 of the United Nations Charter states that non-permanent members shall be elected by the General Assembly with “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.”

924

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*5 Chapter VII pertains to actions with respect to threat to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. *6 Chapter VI pertains to the pacific settlement of disputes. *7 While it is outside the mandate of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, many delegations expressed support for, an interest in exploring further, the French initiative for a voluntary code of conduct on the use of the veto by the Council’s permanent members [24 September 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.5, → 5.4.4.11.], which draws from a recommendation which was made by The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 [2 December 2004, → 4.1.19.] *8 An informal agreement exists that one Security Council seat is reserved for an Arab State. This is facilitated within the Asia-Pacific and African regional groupings who take turns every two years to provide an Arab candidate, ensuring their continued representation. *12 General Assembly decision 62/557 requires “a solution that can garner the widest possible acceptance by Member States.” [15 September 2008 → 4.1.29.] *13 General Assembly resolution 53/30 states, “The General Assembly, Mindful of Chapter XVIII of the Charter of the United Nations and of the importance of reaching general agreement as referred to in resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993 [→ 3.1.2.], determines not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, without the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the Members of the General Assembly.” [1 December 1998, → 4.1.1 (adopted 23 November 1998).] 5.1.11 26 March 2015, Framework Document, Annex to a letter dated 27 March 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Courtenay Rattray, and “Speaking Points” of 26 March 2015 Issues of categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. a) Categories of membership Permanent members – a total of (…)*1 seats – The People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America – [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats …]  Non-permanent members with a two-year term – a total of (…) seats – [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for seats …] [Any new category …] – [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats …] b) Regional representation: […] c) (i) The size of an enlarged Security Council – a total of (…) seats (ii) Working methods of the Council […] d) The question of the veto […]

• • • • • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

925

e) Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly: […] […] Any other related matters*2: […] Speaking Points by Ambassador E. Courtenay Rattray, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform Interactive Briefing Session, 26th March 2015 Speaking points only – no written statement The Approach The approach I intend to undertake is underpinned by two primary principles: ◯ 1) That this will be a Member centric process.  While also recognising that there will be certain points at which I will need to use my executive authority as Chair to guide the process. ◯ 2) My fidelity to General Assembly decision 62/557.16  This is a consensus agreement that not only lays out the basis for the IGN but also our commitment to seek a solution through negotiations.  The approach will have several stages in the remaining months of the 69th General Assembly. First Phase: The framework document. ◯ Can serve as a base for us to build a workable negotiation text.  Will represent the full range of Member States views on five key issues of the IGN’s mandate. ◯ This document is a starting point from which we will move forward together in building a text. For the first stage, Member States will take this framework document and populate it with their own positions. ◯ I will provide Member States 3 weeks to provide inputs as you may need to coordinate with groupings or capitals. ◯ The final date for submission to my office will be the 16th of April. ◯ Submissions should be provided as a Microsoft Word document to email address: [email protected] The inputs received will then be assembled and circulated to Member States in their entirety. ◯ Technical updates can then be made to address any omissions or errors in the way Member States positions are reflected. Second Phase:  Week-long interactive dialogue sessions of back to back meetings. These interactive dialogue sessions will allow Member States to fully explore each other’s positions ◯ Not intended to pit one proposal against another in an adversarial manner. Opportunity for delegations to ask questions of each other and explore the practicalities of positions in an interactive manner.

• • • •

• •

• • • •

16  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

926

5 On a road to nowhere ?

◯ This will be the first discussion of its kind in the IGN. ◯ I intend to also actively participate in these discussions. ◯ Hope that it will provide a greater sense of clarity to the range of positions which exist, and to identify any areas of convergence or overlap. Third Phase: From these exchanges we will be well placed to embark on a process of condensing the document to turn into a true negotiation text. ◯ This text will still contain the universe of Member States positions, but be concise, workable and represent a solid foundation for negotiations. While there are a number of ways in which to approach the work of condensing the document, as Chair I will need to use my authority to take a “form of executive action on behalf of all Members” in order to shape a concise and workable text. This will be done via extensive consultations with Member States. ◯ Let me be clear, my role in the condensing process does not negate my commitment to a Member centric approach. How will this process be different from what we have attempted in the past? ◯ ‘Process’ is key. What I have devised is a full process rather than a single step. ◯ It begins with a framework document that attempts to move beyond the divisions that surrounded previous texts.  It has been developed in a way which will collect Member State positions in a logical and workable manner. ◯ Having a workable document will, as outlined in 62/55717 ensure that the basis of our process and discussions are the substantive positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other groupings of Member States. I intend to move forward with this approach in a deliberate and structured manner with consultations at every step of the way. I understand the methodical pace of this approach may not satisfy everyone. ◯ However, this structured approach is our best chance to build a document upon which we can have true negotiations.  One in which Member States can really engage with each other on different positions and proposals.  Not talking past each other and repeating serial statements. It is my hope that all Member States will engage in this process in good faith with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner. What do I expect to receive from Member States in three weeks time? ◯ Member States are to return to me this open-ended framework document populated with their positions by completing the blank spaces provided by the latest 16th April 2015. ◯ A key part of this exercise is also to provide an opportunity for Member States to re-fresh their positions or present new positions in light of the debates we have had over the past years in the IGN.  However, if positions remain the same, I would still like to receive them, but placed in the format of the framework document.

• • •

• •

•

•

17  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

927

◯  For all submissions I request only the very core of your positions within the framework.  Rev2 and Rev3 have a lot of narrative and rationale surrounding positions.  While these aspects are very important to understanding the positions of Member States, this sort of language does not belong in what we hope to eventually shape into a workable negotiation text. After six years of discussions in the IGN, I am confident that we all have a clear understanding of these rationales. Additionally, Rev2 and Rev3 still remain on the record for the reference of Member States.   I want to receive proposals themselves not the basis on which they are created. The Framework Document As you will notice in the framework document, the five key issues contained in 62/557 are listed as a heading at the top of the document and dealt with in a comprehensive and interrelated manner underneath. ◯  This reflects the inter-connections between the five key issues.  Looking at these issues as a whole and recognising their inter-connections will be vital to reaching a comprehensive solution. Let me make clear where the five key issues are represented within the document: ◯  Section a) is Categories of membership ◯  Section b) is Regional representation ◯  Section c) is Size of an enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council. ◯  Section d) is the question of the veto ◯  Section e) is the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly I will now go through the framework document with you step by step to make clear what should be included in each section. ◯  It is not necessary that you fill in every blank space.  For example, if your positions have not yet envisioned a total size because that will depend on the number of seats created under each category, or you have no specific proposals on working methods, it is fine to leave these spaces blank. ◯  This is an exercise to create a working document, which fleshes out the full range of possible solutions rather than proposing any one particular model. Let me make clear this is not intended to be a numerical exercise. ◯  I will not be using the submissions to determine levels of support for various positions. ◯  My intention is solely to gather information at this stage within a format that can assist us to eventually structure a workable, concise [text] within a format based on GA decision 62/557. To help keep the document clear and succinct, I encourage Member States to submit proposals as a group or with likeminded States. ◯  If this is not possible I am happy to receive individual proposals if they differ from group positions. I also encourage Member States to use the next three weeks to continue to consult with each other and seek out convergences in your positions. […]

• •

• • •

• • •

928

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Original footnotes *1 “(…)” denotes a space intended for numerical values whereas “[…]” is intended for the inclusion of text. *2 Placeholder for Member States who may wish to address other related matters necessitated by enlargement. 5.1.12 5 May 2015, Framework Document As Populated by Member States, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Courtenay Rattray, to the President of the General Assembly Issues of categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. a) Categories of membership: Permanent members – a total of (G4 – 11, Georgia – 10-11, L.69 – 11, Liechtenstein – 5, Slovakia – 10, Australia – up to 11, African Group – 11, Hungary – not more than 11, Belgium and Luxembourg – 11) seats*1 a.1 [The Republic of China (People’s Republic of China), France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Russian Federation), The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The United States of America [(2 from Africa) (2 from Asia) (1 from GRULAC) (1 from WEOG)] (L.69) a.2 [… supports expansion of permanent members.]*2 (Dominican Republic) a.3 [… expansion in the permanent category with developed and developing countries adequately represented.]*3 (Brunei Darussalam) a.4 [Expand the permanent category of membership …]*4 (Singapore) a.5 [… enlargement of the Council in the permanent category of membership.] (Croatia) a.6 [… enlargement in the permanent category of membership.]*5 (Monaco) a.7 [Any increase in permanent membership should be accompanied by an expansion in non-permanent membership] (Australia) a.8 [Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and permanent African representation] (France) a.9 [… increase in the permanent categories of members and non-permanents.]*6 (Peru) a.10 [… endorses the enlargement of the Security Council in the category of permanent members …]*7 [The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. Therefore, the increase in such categories should mostly stem from developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.] [At least two developing countries from Africa, two from Asia and two others from Latin America and the Caribbean should enter the Council as new permanent members.] (Cuba) a.11 [… membership should be enlarged in the permanent category …]*8 (Latvia) a.12 [no less than two permanent seats for Africa] (African Group) a.13 [Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and permanent African representation] (UK) a.14 [… increase in the Permanent members of the Security Council …]*9 (Chile) a.15 [The Security Council should be expanded in the permanent category …]*10 (Viet Nam)

5 On a road to nowhere ?

929

a.16 [… expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council …]*11 (Hungary) a.17 […6 new permanent members: 2 from Africa, 2 from Asia, 1 from GRULAC, 1 from WEOG]*12 (Belgium and Luxembourg) a.18 [… open to considering increase in permanent members …]*13 (Netherlands) [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats …] a.19 [Upon adoption of a comprehensive framework resolution on Security Council reform, interested Member States prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council would submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will then proceed, as soon as possible, at a date to be determined by the President of the General Assembly to the election of the six new permanent members, by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly will be applied to the election of the new permanent members.] [The criteria of Article 23 (1) should also apply to the election of the new permanent members: “due regard shall be paid, in the first instance to their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.] (G4) a.20 [Permanent Members should be elected by the UN General Assembly, by the 2/3 vote.] (Georgia) a.21 [Having in mind the importance of these elections … should require broader support than regular elections for the non-permanent seats.] (Croatia) a.22 [Decision on the basis of consensus or the largest possible majority in the GA.] (Serbia) a.23 [Upon adoption of the framework resolution on UNSC reforms by the General Assembly, member states desiring to assume permanent membership shall submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will then proceed, at a date to be determined by the PGA, for the election of new permanent members of the Security Council, by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot.] [As per established practice, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly will be applied to the election of the new permanent members.] [While electing new permanent members, the General Assembly would also consider the criteria of Article 23 (1) to the election of the new permanent members: “due regard shall be paid, in the first instance to their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.”] (L.69) a.24 [The form of the election process would depend on the outcome of discussions] [… it is for the whole UN membership to designate new permanent members …]*14 (France) a.25 [… consensual/unanimous endorsement of the regional group + respective decision/acclamation of the UN General Assembly.]*15 (Slovakia) a.26 [The election process of new members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly.] (Peru)

930

5 On a road to nowhere ?

a.27 [The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. It must not expand by default. The enlargement of the Security Council should not be partial or selective, nor should it imply an increase in the number of members to the detriment of developing countries. The main increase for such categories should be in the number of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.]*16 (Cuba) a.28 [The selection of Africa’s representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election.] (African Group) a.29 [The manner in which new permanent members are chosen would depend on the outcome of discussions about the scope of enlargement.] [… it is for the UN membership to designate new permanent members …]*17 (UK) a.30 [Election by the General Assembly by a vote of no less than two third of the Members of the General Assembly with due consideration to the requirements of Article 23 (1)] (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) a.31 [Election by the General Assembly …]*18 (Belgium and Luxembourg) Non-permanent members with a two-year term – a total of (Montenegro – 16, G4 – 14/15, Georgia – 14-15, L.69 – 16, Liechtenstein*19 – 10 (or more), France – moderate expansion, Slovakia – 15, Australia – up to 15, Cuba – 15 at least, African Group – not less than 15, UK – moderate expansion, Hungary – not more than 16, Belgium and Luxembourg – 14/15) seats a.32 [… proceed first with the issue of enlargement of non-permanent seats.]*20 (DPRK) a.33 [… supports the expansion of non-permanent members.]*21 (Dominican Republic) a.34 [… expansion in the non-permanent category with developed and developing countries adequately represented.]*22 (Brunei Darussalam) a.35 [Expand the non-permanent category of membership …]*23 (Singapore) a.36 [… at least 1 newly added non-permanent seat should be attributed to the Eastern European Group, other seats to be attributed to the regional groups.] (Georgia) a.37 [… enlargement of the Council in the non-permanent category of membership.] (Croatia) a.38 [… additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group (EEG).]*24 (Poland) a.39 [… enlargement in the non-permanent category of membership.]*25 (Monaco) a.40 [… increase in the non-permanent categories of members.]*26 (Peru) a.41 [… endorses an enlargement in the number of non-permanent seats.] [New nonpermanent seats should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current non-permanent members, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established.] (Cuba) a.42 [… membership should be enlarged in the non-permanent category …]*27 (Latvia) a.43 [with a total of 5 non-permanent seats for Africa] (African Group) a.44 [… increase in the Non-Permanent members of the Security Council.]*28 (Chile)

5 On a road to nowhere ?

931

a.45 [The Security Council should be expanded in the non-permanent category …]*29 (Viet Nam) a.46 [… enlargement of the non-permanent membership of the Council …]*30 (Hungary) a.47 [4/5 from Africa, 3 from Asia, 2 from EEG, 3 from GRULAC, 2 from WEOG] (Belgium and Luxembourg) a.48 [… open to considering increase in non-permanent members  …]*31 (Netherlands) [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats …] a.49 [Elected by the General Assembly, in accordance with standard procedure.] (Montenegro) a.50 [The election process for non-permanent members will follow current practices.] (G4) a.51 [The non-permanent Members of the UNSC should be elected by the UNGA …] (Georgia) a.52 [Decision on the basis of consensus or the largest possible majority in the GA] (Serbia) a.53 [The election process for non-permanent two-year term seats will remain unchanged.] (L.69) a.54 [… we should take into account the (i) aspirations of those countries whose contribution to the work of the Organization is undisputed (ii) financial contributions to the UN budget, as well as and (iii) participation in peacekeeping operations with the UN Security Council mandate.]*32 (Poland) a.55 [… it is for the whole UN membership to … elect all non-permanent members.]*33 (France) a.56 [… current rules of procedure for the election of non-permanent members should apply]*34 (Slovakia) a.57 [The election process of new members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly.] (Peru) a.58 [… the election process should follow current practices.]*35 (Paraguay) a.59 [… would not oppose to immediate re-election of non-permanent members] (Cuba) a.60 [The selection of Africa’s representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election] (African Group) a.61 [… it is for the UN membership to … elect all non-permanent members.]*36 (UK) a.62 [Election process for non-permanent seats remain unchanged] (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) a.63 [Current election system is efficient.] (Hungary) a.64 [In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from 15 to maximum 25/26, 2 of the 4/5 additional non-permanent members shall be chosen for a term of one year.] (Belgium and Luxembourg) [Any new category …] a.65 [… remains open for this option, if negotiations can lead to the compromise between groups with opposing views on new permanent membership.] (Montenegro)

932

5 On a road to nowhere ?

a.66 [Six additional members elected to serve, on a permanent basis, for renewable terms of [8/10] years.]*37 (Liechtenstein) a.67 [… open for discussion on a new category of membership, provided it does not compromise the effectiveness of the UNSC decision making, creates opportunity (maybe for an interim period) for those Member States that wish to assume higher responsibility; and provides an acceptable platform for regional leading member states to do so if endorsed by the regional group.] (Slovakia) a.68 [… open to the possibility of establishing an intermediate category of members with a long mandate, which could eventually become permanent members. This can be considered as a constructive evolution formula.] (Peru) a.69 [… does not favor the creation of new categories or sub-categories of member States. New categories would intensify current differences and would motivate division among members of the Security Council in lieu of contributing to more effective operation thereof. For instance, the accession of new permanent members without the right to veto would result in a new category, which is not supported …] (Cuba) a.70 [One rotating seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions … election process for a new seat, same as currently pertains to non-permanent seats] (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) a.71 [Should it find consensus … does not exclude an interim solution, where a new category of seats is created for longer periods than two years that can also be immediately renewable.] (Hungary) a.72 [… open to considering intermediate solutions …]*38 (Netherlands) [In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats …] a.73 [Elected by the General Assembly, same as with non-permanent members.] (Montenegro) a.74 [… election process to be decided by the rules of procedure, ideally on principle of regional endorsement.]*39 (Slovakia) a.75 [… the election process should follow current practices regarding Non-permanent members.]*40 (Paraguay) b) Regional representation: b.1 [… 6 new non-permanent seats, each regional group would receive one additional non­permanent seat, with the exception of the African group, which would receive two additional non-permanent members …]*41 (Montenegro) b.2 [The six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: Two from African Member States; Two from Asia-Pacific Member States; One from Latin American and Caribbean Member States; One from Western European and Other Member States; The four/five new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: One/Two from African Member States; One from Asia­Pacific Member States; One from Eastern European Member States; One from Latin American and Caribbean Member States; Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of non-­permanent members to adequate and continuing representation

5 On a road to nowhere ?

b.3

b.4

b.5

b.6

b.7

b.8 b.9 b.10

b.11

933

of small and medium size Member States, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Member States should also make full use of the possibility of crossregional arrangements to ensure that the diversity of the General Assembly membership is adequately reflected in the Council.] (G4) [Creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the EEG.] [Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of nonpermanent members to adequate and continuing representation of small and medium size Member States, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS).] (Estonia) [It is very important to increase the representation of Non-Aligned Movement member states and other developing countries.] [The overall process of discussions on the reform should be a process to guarantee and convince that all UN member states could be represented and included in an equal and democratic manner in the deliberations of international peace and security issues.]*42 (DPRK) [… supports the ownership representation.] [… comprehensive reform that privileges the representation of small states that never had had the opportunity to serve in this important organ due to its current structure.] (Dominican Republic) [… more balanced geographical representation to reflect the expansion of UN Membership since the last reform in 1963.] [… need to address the nonrepresentation and under­representation of some regions in the permanent and non-permanent category e.g. African region and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).] (Brunei Darussalam) [Increase representation of under-represented regional groups in the UNSC as this will help improve the legitimacy and accountability of the UNSC.] [Small States must always be represented in the Council … If the Council’s composition does not include a small state, at least one of the existing Council members will be appointed as a representative for small states in consultation with the members of the Forum of Small States.]*43 (Singapore) [2 seats should be attributed to the EEG. Other places to be distributed according to the established practice.] (Georgia) [… one additional seat for the East European regional group in the non-permanent category.] [… greater African representation in the Council] (Croatia) [Equitable geographical representation to the benefit of small and developing countries and regional and other specific groups …] [… at least one additional seat in the category of non-permanent member for the Eastern European regional group] (Serbia) [… additional seats be elected by the General Assembly as follows: (a) Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for African States; (b) Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asia-Pacific States; (c) One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States; (d) One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States; (e) One permanent seat for Western European and other States; (f) One non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) across all regions. Regional groups shall coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for small developing states in the non-permanent category.] (L.69)

934

5 On a road to nowhere ?

b.12 [… additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group (EEG) … should be however, a part of a broader reform of geographical distribution.]*44 (Poland) b.13 [The six additional seats with terms of [eight/ten] years shall be distributed as follows: I. Two from African States, II. Two from Asian States, III. One from Latin American and Caribbean States, IV. One from Western European and other States …)*45 (Liechtenstein) b.14 [… one additional non-permanent seat should be allocated to the EEG.] [… an enhanced role of African countries in the Council.][Any potential enlargement should not diminish the chances of small states to be represented on the Council.] (Lithuania) b.15 [… supports the current practice of States’ candidature.] (Monaco) b.16 [… do not support proposals for regional representation on the Security Council as this would be at odds with the fundamental tenets of the UN Charter, which makes clear that admission to the UN is extended to individual states.] (France) b.17 [… African continent should be better represented in the reformed UNSC, if possible in both categories of membership (or in the new one), provided that countries of the African Group express their wish to do so] [… should there be a decision to increase the number of the non-permanent members, that the representation of the EEG should be duly respected and reflected (increase by 1)] [Close the gap between regional groups – improve rotations] [Increase the presence of Africa in the UN] [Increase the presence of Arab countries] [Increase the presence of the AP group of states] [Increase the presence of the EEG countries] [Introduce representation of “small states” (optional).]*46 (Slovakia) b.18 [Appropriate geographic balance across the full membership of the Council. To better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities, including greater representation from Asia, Africa and Latin America] (Australia) b.19 [The Security Council composition should reflect an equitable regional representation.] [… broadening the participation of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Africa]*47 (Peru) b.20 [… implementation of geographical criteria in order to allow all regions to have an adequate presence within the enlarged Council.] (Paraguay) b.21 [Any change in the Security Council composition should be based on the existing regional groups.] [The reform should envisage increased representation in the Council of developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.] [The Eastern European Regional Group should be provided with one additional non-permanent seat.]*48 (Ukraine) b.22 [The current composition of the Security Council does not reflect geopolitical realities, for which it needs to be balanced. Developing countries are underrepresented in the Council. The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in such body.]*49 (Cuba) b.23 [The enlargement should ensure equitable geographical distribution of both permanent and non-permanent seats reflecting current political realities.] [… allocation to the EEG of at least one additional non-permanent seat in the

5 On a road to nowhere ?

935

enlarged Security Council.]*50 [Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of non-permanent members to adequate representation of small and medium size Member States.] (Latvia) b.24 [A reform that will ensure Africa’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council: taking into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system.] (African Group) b.25 [… do not support proposals for regional representation on the Security Council as this would be at odds with the fundamental tenets of the UN Charter, which makes clear that admission to the UN is extended to individual states.] (UK) b.26 [… supports the regional representation on an enlarged Security Council …]*51 (Chile) b.27 [Additional members of the enlarged Council, including permanent and nonpermanent seats, should be allocated in such a manner that would ensure equitable representation in the Council.] [Increase in the membership of the Council for each region should correspond to their respective proportion in the membership of the United Nations.] (Viet Nam) b.28 [Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Africa; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Asia; Expansion in nonpermanent category for Eastern European; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for GRULAC; Expansion in permanent category for WEOG; One rotating seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions.] (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) b.29 [The enlargement of the Security Council shall be guided by the principles of Article 23 of the Charter, based on the equitable geographical representation of the regional groups.] [… requests a second non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.]*52 (Hungary) b.30 [Any enlargement of the Security Council should take into account the concerns of small and medium-sized Member States, including the Small Island Developing States (SIDS).] [Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of non-permanent members to adequate and continuing representation of small and medium-sized Member States on the Security Council.] (Belgium and Luxembourg) b.31 [In particular the African Group should be better represented in a reformed Security Council.] [Small and medium sized countries should continue to be adequately represented in the Council.] (Netherlands) c) (i) The size of an enlarged Security Council – a total of (Montenegro*53 – 21, G4 – 25/26, Dominican Republic – 24-25, Brunei Darussalam*54 – 25-26, Georgia – 25, Serbia – up to 25, L.69 – 27, Liechtenstein – 21 (or more), France – mid-20s, Slovakia – 25, Australia*55 – 21-26, Peru*56 – mid-twenties, Cuba*57 – not less than 26, African Group – not less than 26, Hungary – not more than 27, Belgium and Luxembourg – maximum 25/26) seats*58,*59,*60,*61 (ii) Working methods of the Council: […]

936

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d) The question of the veto: d.1 [… voluntary veto restraint in situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.]*62 (Montenegro) d.2 [Member States should be invited to continue discussions on the use of the veto in certain circumstances.] [The new permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. However, the new permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held fifteen years after the coming into force of the reform.] [Amendments to the Charter shall reflect the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members will be decided upon in the framework of a review.] (G4) d.3 [… regulation of the use of veto by the permanent members of the Security Council who would voluntarily and collectively undertake not to use the veto where a mass atrocity has been ascertained.]*63 (Estonia) d.4 [… the elimination of the veto. However, in order not to obstruct the SC reform … would support that the issue to be revised in 10 years.] (Dominican Republic) d.5 [The veto should be used with maximum restraint with its eventual elimination.] (Brunei Darussalam) d.6 [New permanent members should not be accorded the right to veto …]*64 [Permanent Members of the Council should commit themselves to not using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.] [If Permanent Members insist on casting a veto that blocks such action, they should produce alternative proposals that will end such atrocities or clearly explain to all UN Member States why they are prepared to see the continuation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council Document.] [Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring, when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution before the Council, that such a negative vote shall not constitute a veto in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter.] (Singapore) d.7 [All Permanent Members should have the veto right.] [The veto right should be restricted under the following circumstances: a) The decision of the UNSC aims at preventing crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide; b) The Permanent Member is involved in the conflict under consideration and, therefore, cannot exercise his rights impartially. Relevant, procedural regulations should be elaborated to this end.] (Georgia) d.8 [… adopting a Code of Conduct to govern the use of the veto]*65 (Croatia) d.9 [The veto should be abolished. So long as it exists, it should be extended to all new members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto.] (L.69) d.10 [… adopt a code of conduct …]*66 (Poland) d.11 [… the question of the veto would be addressed as part of the review [16/20] years after the first elections in the new category of seats the General Assembly …] (Liechtenstein) d.12 [Permanent members should undertake to abstain from the use of veto in the cases of massive human rights violations, genocide, crimes against humanity,

5 On a road to nowhere ?

937

and war crimes. A voluntary code of conduct to this effect would be welcome.] [Consider requiring two negative votes, not one, by permanent members to make veto effective.] (Lithuania) d.13 [… self-regulation of the use of the veto by the permanent members.] (Monaco) d.14 [We would not oppose extension of the veto to new permanent members if the candidates to such permanent membership were to pursue such an extension.] (France) d.15 [Status of permanent member of the UNSC is both a privilege and a responsibility – including the right of veto. All countries being considered as potential permanent members and countries that have the ambition to be considered should have the ability to carry all the responsibility that comes with UNSC duties and be able to prove in deeds that they do deserve it and are ready to take up this responsibility.] (Slovakia) d.16 [… the veto should not be extended to new permanent members]*67 [The initiative on restraint of the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocity deserves close attention and ambitious follow-up, and could be taken forward independently of broader Security Council reforms.] (Australia) d.17 [The veto is an exception to the principle of equal sovereignty among States, and it should be progressively eliminated.] [… the exercise of the veto should be circumscribed to decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter] [… its use should be restrained in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.] [… as a previous step towards the elimination of the veto, in case a permanent member decides to exercise it, its decision must be explained and properly sustained in a public session of the Council.] [… the decision-taking process in the Council should be reformulated. Currently, non­procedural decisions require unanimity of the five permanent members, while this requirement can be reduced to the affirmative vote of two of them.] (Peru) d.18 [… the total elimination of the veto. To this end, it is in favor of its progressive elimination.] (Paraguay) d.19 [Member States should aim to phase out of the veto. As a first step, the permanent members of the Security Council should voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in case of mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale.] [Should the veto be used in other cases, the permanent member resorting to it has to be invited to explain the reason for this action, in particular with regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and to circulate a copy of the explanation as a Council document.] [The veto should not in any case be used for blocking the Council’s action in the event of aggression against a UN Member State.] [The permanent members should recommit themselves to the Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter obliging a party to a dispute to abstain from voting.] (Ukraine) d.20 [New permanent members should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current permanent members, including the right to veto, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established.] [It is indispensable to eliminate the veto immediately for being an anachronistic and undemocratic privilege.] [While its elimination is attained, other mechanisms should be implemented in order to limit its use to the extent possible.] (Cuba)

938

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d.21 [The discussions on the use of the veto in certain circumstances should be continued. Proposals made by some Member States on a voluntary code of conduct regulating the use of the veto in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide certainly merit positive consideration.] (Latvia) d.22 [… the veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of veto as a matter of common justice.] (African Group) d.23 [There should be no expansion of the veto to new permanent members.] (UK) d.24 [… does not support the extension of the veto to the new members of an enlarged Security Council.] (Chile) d.25 [The use of the veto should be restricted to only measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.] (Viet Nam) d.26 [Support the abolition of the veto. However, in the event of its retention, new permanent members should also have the right to veto. There should be no distinction between permanent members.] [While the veto is in existence, efforts must be made to limit its use to Chapter VII and also in the instance of the most serious crimes of international concern, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, etc.] [Permanent members should explain non concurrent votes to the wider UN membership.] (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) d.27 [… supports all initiatives facilitating timely and decisive action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocities, including those calling for voluntarily agreeing to refrain from using the veto.] (Hungary) d.28 [… New permanent members should not exercise their veto right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held 15 years after the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter.]*68 [… code of conduct for the voluntary limitation of the use of the veto right in situations involving mass atrocity crimes. More generally, all Member States should commit to support timely action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.]*69 (Belgium and Luxembourg) d.29 [… aim to minimize the use of the veto … regulate the use of the veto.]*70 (Netherlands) […] Original footnotes *1 DPRK – “It is yet premature to specify the issue of this category of membership. Discussions on the issues of membership are now in the initial stage, and even if the issues of categories is agreed, there will be a next step to be considered in the modalities and procedures for selection and election.” Annex pg. 8. *2 The Dominican Republic – “The Dominican Republic supports the expansion of the Security Council in both categories: Permanent and non-Permanent members” Annex pg. 10.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

939

*3 Brunei Darussalam – “Supports the expansion in both permanent and nonpermanent categories with developed and developing countries adequately represented.” Annex pg. 12. *4 Singapore – “Expand the UNSC in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership to better reflect current geopolitical realities.” Annex pg. 14. *5 Monaco – “Monaco supports an enlargement in both categories of membership.” Annex pg. 36. *6 Peru – “Peru supports an increase in both categories of members: permanent and non-permanents.” Annex pg. 43. *7 Cuba – “Cuba endorses the enlargement of the Security Council in the categories of permanent members and non-permanent members.” Annex pg. 50. *8 Latvia – “Security Council membership should be enlarged in both categories – permanent and non-permanent.” Annex pg. 62. *9 Chile – “… but consider that at this point, establishing exact numbers or procedures might limit States’ negotiation ability. Chile remains flexible on the number of new seats” Annex pg. 70. *10 Viet Nam – “The Security Council should be expanded in both categories of permanent and non-permanent members with a view to ensuring democracy, representativeness and effectiveness of the Council and the adequate representation of developing countries in both categories, commensurate with their proportion in the membership of the United Nations.” Annex pg. 73. *11 Hungary – “Hungary supports the possible expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council which shall be guided by the principle of equitable geographical representation, and shall reflect the political and socio-economic changes that took place in the last half century.” Annex pg. 80. *12 Belgium and Luxembourg – “Election by the General Assembly of 6 new permanent members: 2 from Africa, 2 from Asia, 1 from GRULAC, 1 from WEOG” Annex pg. 84. *13 Netherlands – “The Kingdom of the Netherlands is looking for common ground with regards to categories of membership. It is open to considering both an increase in permanent members and non-permanent members as well as intermediate solutions.” Annex pg. 86. *14 France – “New members to the Security Council should be picked so as to make it more broadly representative of the modern world. Still, it is for the whole UN membership to designate new permanent members and to elect all non-permanent members.” Annex pg. 37. *15 Slovakia – “In the event of possible expansion …” Annex pg. 38. *16 Cuba – “If the category of permanent members is not expanded and only the number of non-permanent seats increases, the gap between permanent and nonpermanent members will widen, along with the disparity in the representation of developed and developing countries, the Council will become even less representative and consequently, less legitimate or effective.” Annex pg. 50. *17 UK – “New members to the Security Council should be picked so as to make it more broadly representative of the modern world. Still, it is for the whole UN membership to designate new permanent members and to elect all non-permanent members.” Annex pg. 69. *18 Belgium and Luxembourg – “Election by the General Assembly of 6 new permanent members: 2 from Africa, 2 from Asia, 1 from GRULAC, 1 from WEOG” Annex pg. 84.

940

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*19 Liechtenstein – “The Liechtenstein Model, as previously submitted on 26 February 2010, provides flexibility on the creation of additional non-permanent seats.” 10 (or more) Annex pg. 30. *20 DPRK – “Since enlarging non-permanent seats will be more agreeable, it could be a way forward …” Annex pg. 8. *21 The Dominican Republic – “The Dominican Republic supports the expansion of the Security Council in both categories: Permanent and non-Permanent members” Annex pg. 10. *22 Brunei Darussalam – “Supports the expansion in both permanent and nonpermanent categories with developed and developing countries adequately represented.” Annex pg. 12. *23 Singapore – “Expand the UNSC in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership to better reflect current geopolitical realities.” Annex pg. 14. *24 Poland – “… Our position stems from the fact that the membership of the EEG has increased from 9 to 23 countries, as a result of disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia.” Annex pg. 28. *25 Monaco – “Monaco supports an enlargement in both categories of membership.” Annex pg. 36. *26 Peru – “Peru supports an increase in both categories of members: permanent and non-permanents.” Annex pg. 43. *27 Latvia – “Security Council membership should be enlarged in both categories – permanent and non-permanent.” Annex pg. 62. *28 Chile – “Determining exact numbers or procedures might limit States’ negotiation ability. Chile remains flexible on the number of new seats.” Annex pg. 70. *29 Viet Nam – “The Security Council should be expanded in both categories of permanent and non-permanent members …” Annex pg. 73. *30 Hungary – “Hungary supports the enlargement of the non-permanent membership of the Council in order to provide more opportunity to regional and sub-regional groups to be represented continuously in the Council” Annex pg. 80. *31 Netherlands – “The Kingdom of the Netherlands is looking for common ground with regards to categories of membership. It is open to considering both an increase in permanent members and non-permanent members as well as intermediate solutions.” Annex pg. 86. *32 Poland – “Reform of the UNSC is necessary, since the composition of this body does not reflect the realities of the modern world. In the case of increasing the number of members of the Council …” Annex pg. 28. *33 France – “New members to the Security Council should be picked so as to make it more broadly representative of the modern world. Still, it is for the whole UN membership to designate new permanent members and to elect all non-permanent members.” Annex pg. 37. *34 Slovakia – “In the event of possible expansion …” 15 Annex pg. 38. *35 Paraguay – “Paraguay supports the expansion of the Security Council in order to adequately reflect the current composition of the UN membership and the geopolitical realities as well as to represent the interest of all Member States in the maintenance of international peace and security.” “In the event of possible expansion …” Annex pg. 44. *36 UK – “New members to the Security Council should be picked so as to make it more broadly representative of the modern world. Still, it is for the whole UN membership to

5 On a road to nowhere ?

941

designate new permanent members and to elect all non-permanent members.” Annex pg. 69. *37 Liechtenstein – “‘On a permanent basis’ refers to the fact that Member States could continue to hold these seats as long as they continue to be re-elected.” Annex pg. 30. *38 Netherlands – “The Kingdom of the Netherlands is looking for common ground with regards to categories of membership. It is open to considering both an increase in permanent members and non-permanent members as well as intermediate solutions.” Annex pg. 86. *39 Slovakia – “In the event of possible expansion …” Annex pg. 38. *40 Paraguay – “In the event of possible creation of a new category …” Annex pg. 44. *41 Montenegro – “for the reason to correct the historical injustice done to this continent. The Eastern European Group has seen the number of its members more than doubled in the last 20 years. Therefore it deserves one more non-permanent seat in the reformed Security Council.” Annex pg. 1. *42 DPRK – “The overall process of the discussions on the reform should be a process to guarantee and convince that all UN member states could be represented and included in an equal and democratic manner in the deliberations of international peace and security issues. In other words, the Security Council reform should be the process driven by all member states based on the consensus in a transparent manner. Since the purpose of the Security Council reform is to realize the democratization of the UN system, reform discussions and negotiations should not be swayed by the individual purposes and interests of any specific group or country. Any move to pursue the reform issue by a simple majority or by setting an artificial timetable cannot reflect fully and democratically the viewpoints and positions of all member states and rather will ignite differences and conflict of opinions. The DPRK expresses its deep concern about the approach taken by Japan. Our concern is that Japan pretends to have a permanent seat on the enlarged Security Council, as if there were already an agreement on extending the permanent seats on the Security Council. Moreover, Japan is the enemy state and defeated state that occupied Asian countries and committed huge crimes against humanity during the Second World War which were the cause and motivation for the creation of the United Nations, and Japan is the only country that has not fully and convincingly made recognition, apology and compensation for its crimes up to this moment, 70 years since the foundation of the United Nations. Japan is too ambitious and impatient in the deliberations on reform and this stems from its sinister and impudent purpose of burying its past crimes and the disgrace of the enemy state through this process.” Annex pg. 8. *43 Singapore – “… as they make up more than two-thirds of the UN membership.” Annex pg. 14. *44 Poland – “… Our position stems from the fact that the membership of the EEG has increased from 9 to 23 countries, as a result of disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia.” Annex pg. 28. *45 Liechtenstein – “… the Liechtenstein Model leaves open the possibility of the creation of additional two-year non-permanent seats in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter, and does not specifically address the number or distribution of any such seats.” Annex pg. 30.

942 *46 Slovakia – “If

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Member States decide to consider the option how to increase inclusivity and equality of Member States by enabling chances of small member states to be elected to the UNSC, Slovakia will support such a motion.” Annex pg. 38. *47 Peru – “Peru favors an increase in the number of members of the Security Council in order to make it more democratic and representative, in particular …” Annex pg. 43. *48 Ukraine – “Any increase in the non-permanent membership of the SC should ensure an enhanced representation of the Eastern European Group by the allocation to the said Group of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council (A/59/723).” Annex pg. 47. *49 Cuba – “The fact that developing countries are not properly represented in the Security Council undermines its own interests, authority and credibility.” Annex pg. 50. *50 Latvia – “Due to considerable increase of the Eastern European Group (EEG) membership (since 1991 the EEG has more than doubled its membership), any enlargement of the Security Council should ensure an enhanced representation of the EEG by the …” Annex pg. 62. *51 Chile – “… with the goal of promoting consensus within the General Assembly.” Annex pg. 70. *52 Hungary – “Hungary does not reject, a priori, other supplementary models based on other criteria. If other categories are accepted the necessary adjustments in regional representation has to be carried out.” Annex pg. 80. *53 Montenegro – “… a total of 21 seats would be the most optimal solution for the size of the reformed Council. Montenegro remains open for few additional seats, if there can be an agreement reached about new permanent seats or new category of membership.” Annex pg. 1. *54 Brunei Darussalam – “mid-twenties” 25-26 Annex 12. *55 Australia – “Important that Council remains at workable size” 21-26 Annex pg. 42. *56 Peru – “In order to reflect an equitable regional representation, the reformed Council membership should be enlarged to a number of members in the ‘mid-twenties’” Annex pg. 43. *57 Cuba – “With this number, the proportion between the members of the Security Council and the Member States of the United Nations would approach the proportion there was at the time the Organization was founded.” Annex pg. 50. *58 Viet Nam – “The Size of the Council should ensure the aforementioned criteria for categories of membership and regional representation.” Annex pg. 73. *59 UK – “We support an enlarged Security Council to a level that will not negatively impact upon its effectiveness and ability to carry out its responsibilities as set out in the Charter.” Annex pg. 69. *60 The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago – “… reserve their position on the additional and total numbers in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of a reformed Council.” Annex pg. 76. *61 Netherlands – “The Security Council should be expanded in order to make it more broadly representative. At the same time, expansion of the UN Security Council should not hamper its effectiveness.” *62 Montenegro – “Within the well-known realities that characterize this issue, Montenegro supports the French proposal …” Annex pg. 1. *63 Estonia – “Supporting the French initiative …” Annex pg. 14.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

943

*64 Singapore – “… as it would complicate decision making in the Council.” Annex pg. 14. *65 Croatia – “Croatia welcomes the French initiative …” Annex pg. 21. *66 Poland – “We are aware of the importance of the principle of the right of veto of the permanent members of the Council. However, we should also take into account changes in the global international order, taking place right before our eyes. That is why recent proposals to reform the right of veto, including the French proposal to adopt a code of conduct in this respect, are interesting and worth discussing.” Annex pg. 28. *67 Australia – “Consistent with Australia’s historical opposition to the veto …” Annex pg. 42. *68 Belgium and Luxembourg – “An extension of the veto right to new permanent members would have a negative impact on the efficiency of the Security Council …” Annex pg. 84. *69 Belgium and Luxembourg – “We support the French proposal of a …” Annex pg. 84. *70 Netherlands – “In our reform efforts we should aim to minimize the use of the veto. We support the French initiative that aims to regulate the use of the veto.” Annex pg. 86.

5.1.13 31 July 2015, “Text to form the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the Security Council”, Annex to a letter from the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Sam K. Kutesa Issues of categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. a) CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP a.1 Permanent Members a.1.1. The Republic of China (People’s Republic of China), France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Russian Federation), The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The United States of America i. … with no additional permanent seats: Ireland, Liechtenstein, Panama ii. … plus additional permanent seats: (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Latvia, Malaysia, Monaco, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam iii. … plus [x] additional permanent seats: Slovakia [5]; Georgia [5-6]; African Group, Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [6]; Australia, Hungary [up to 6] iv. … plus Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and permanent African representation: France, Kazakhstan, Romania, UK a.1.2. No less than two permanent seats for Africa. African Group a.1.3. Endorses the enlargement of the Security Council in the category of permanent members. At least two developing countries from Africa, two from Asia and two others from Latin America and the Caribbean should enter the Council as new permanent members. Cuba

944

5 On a road to nowhere ?

a.1.4. It is yet premature to specify the issue of this category of membership … In the event of possible expansion of permanent membership, Japan is totally unqualified to be a permanent member of the expanded Security Council under any circumstances since Japan still denies to liquidate its inhumane war crimes committed against a number of Asian countries during World War II, which placed Japan under the term of an enemy state in the Charter of the United Nations.*1 DPRK a.1.5. Not convinced by arguments for an increase in the number of permanent seats. Bringing in new permanent members would seem to carry the risk of perpetuating many of the deficiencies of current arrangements. Ireland In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for additional permanent seats a.1.6. Upon adoption of a comprehensive framework resolution on Security Council reform, interested Member States prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council would submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will then proceed, as soon as possible, at a date to be determined by the President of the General Assembly to the election of the six new permanent members. G4, L.69, Czech Republic a.1.7. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly will be applied to the election of the new permanent members. G4, L.69, Czech Republic a.1.8. Election of new permanent members by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot. Belgium and Luxembourg, (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Georgia, Monaco a.1.9. The criteria of Article 23 (1) should also apply to the election of the new permanent members: “due regard being specifically paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic a.1.10. Having in mind the importance of these elections they should require broader support than regular elections for the non-permanent seats. Croatia a.1.11. Decision on the basis of consensus or the largest possible majority in the General Assembly. Serbia a.1.12. Expansion of permanent seats by consensual/unanimous endorsement of the regional group and respective decision/acclamation of the United Nations General Assembly. Slovakia a.1.13. The selection of Africa’s representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election. African Group a.1.14. The election process of new members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly. Peru

5 On a road to nowhere ?

945

a.1.15. The manner in which new permanent members are chosen would depend on the outcome of discussions on the scope of enlargement. It is for the United Nations membership to designate new permanent members. France, UK a.2 Non-permanent members with a two-year term a.2.1. Current two-year non-permanent seats (10) i. … plus additional non-permanent seats: (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Dominican Republic, France*2, Latvia, Malaysia, Monaco, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, UK*3, Viet Nam ii. … plus [x] additional non-permanent seats: Czech Republic [4]; G4, Belgium and Luxembourg, Georgia [4-5]; Australia [up to 5]; Ireland, Kazakhstan, Slovakia [5]; African Group [not less than 5]; Hungary [not more than 6]; L.69, Montenegro [6] a.2.2. A total of 5 non-permanent seats for Africa. African Group a.2.3. The number of non-permanent members for a term of two years should increase to 15 at least. Cuba a.2.4. Proceed first with the issue of enlargement of non-permanent seats. DPRK In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for additional two-year non-permanent seats a.2.5. Additional two-year non-permanent members will be elected by the General Assembly, in accordance with the current standard procedure for nonpermanent seats. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Monaco, Montenegro, Paraguay, Slovakia a.2.6. The election process of new non-permanent members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly. Peru a.2.7. It is for the United Nations membership to elect all non-permanent members. France, UK a.2.8. The selection of Africa’s representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election. African Group a.2.9. Member States should take into account the (i) aspirations of those countries whose contribution to the work of the Organization is undisputed (ii) financial contributions to the United Nations budget, as well as and (iii) participation in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations Security Council mandate. Poland a.2.10. New non-permanent seats should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current non-permanent members, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established. Cuba a.2.11. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from 15 to maximum 25/26, 2 of the 4/5 additional non-permanent members shall be chosen for a term of one year. Belgium and Luxembourg

946

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Possible re-election of two year non-permanent seats a.2.12. Not opposed to immediate re-election of non-permanent members. Cuba a.2.13. It is for consideration whether countries holding two-year term seats would be free to stand again for a second term on completion of their first. It is also for consideration whether at the end of the second term they might be required to step down for a number of years before standing again. Ireland a.3 New Category of Seats a.3.1. Remains open for this option, if negotiations can lead to the compromise between groups with opposing views on a new permanent membership. Montenegro a.3.2. Does not favor the creation of new categories or sub-categories of Member States. New categories would intensify current differences and would motivate division among members of the Security Council in lieu of contributing to a more effective operation thereof. For instance, the accession of new permanent members without the right to veto would result in a new category, which is not supported. Cuba Longer Term Non-Permanent Seats a.3.3. Six additional members elected to serve, on a permanent basis, for renewable terms of [8/10] years.*4 Liechtenstein a.3.4. Non-permanent members with an eight-year term – a total of 6 seats. Ireland a.3.5. Should it find consensus, does not exclude an interim solution, where a new category of seats is created for longer periods than two years that can also be immediately renewable. Hungary In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats a.3.6. Elections to fill the six seats with terms of [8/10] years shall be held after entry into force of the required Charter amendment and simultaneously with the regular elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Candidates for seats above shall not be eligible to serve as non-permanent members in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter for the following [8/10] calendar years. Liechtenstein a.3.7. It is for consideration whether countries holding eight-year term seats would be free to stand again for a second term on completion of their first. It is also for consideration whether at the end of the second term they might be required to step down for a number of years before standing again. Ireland Transitional Permanent Seats a.3.8. Open for discussion on a new category of membership, provided it does not compromise the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council decision making, creates opportunity (maybe for an interim period) for those Member States that wish to assume higher responsibility; and provides an acceptable platform for regional leading Member States to do so if endorsed by the regional group. Slovakia a.3.9. Open to the possibility of establishing a category of members with a long mandate, which could eventually become permanent members. This can be considered as a constructive evolution formula. Peru In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats a.3.10. Election process to be decided by the rules of procedure, ideally on the principle of regional endorsement. Slovakia

5 On a road to nowhere ?

947

Gradual Removal of Categories a.3.11. The very nature of membership “categories” does not correspond to the democratic institution that we are trying to perfect. In the long run, we would like to see there are no membership categories, just as is the case in all the other United Nations bodies. By the United Nations Centennial in 2045, we envision a Security Council consisting of 24 members, all on equal standing, elected for three-year terms, with the opportunity for consecutive re-election. Considering the commitments well into the 2030’s as already acquired by some Member States in terms of their candidacy under the current membership structure of 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members on a two-year rotation. The final composition of the Security Council will be phased in over two stages. The first stage, beginning in 2017 and ending in 2030, introduces five semipermanent seats which entail a tentatively indefinite tenure without the right to veto, to accommodate the G4 and one member of the African Group; one additional non-permanent seat each for the Eastern European Group and the Arab States, and two for the Small Island Developing States. The second stage introduces three-year election cycles beginning in 2030 for all positions in the Security Council. Measures to ascertain the re-election of the P5 until the United Nations Centennial in 2045 should be discussed and incorporated. Panama Description of an election process for any type of new category of seats a.3.12. To be elected by the General Assembly, with the same procedure as the current non-permanent members. Montenegro a.3.13. The election process should follow current practices regarding non-permanent members. Paraguay b) REGIONAL REPRESENTATION b.1. Appropriate geographic balance across the full membership of the Council. To better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Dominican Republic, Latvia, Peru, Viet Nam b.2. The current composition of the Security Council does not reflect geopolitical realities, for which it needs to be balanced. Developing countries are underrepresented in the Council. Cuba b.3. Need to address the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in the permanent and non-permanent category; this will help improve the legitimacy and accountability of the United Nations Security Council. Brunei Darussalam, Singapore b.4. A reform should guarantee that all United Nations Member States are represented and included in an equal and democratic manner in the deliberations of international peace and security issues. DPRK b.5. A reform that will ensure Africa’s legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council: taking into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system. African Group b.6. Supportive of a reform which will ensure Africa’s fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council. Brunei Darussalam, Croatia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia

948

5 On a road to nowhere ?

b.7. Emphasize the necessity of one new non-permanent member seat for the Eastern European Member States that are considerably underrepresented in the Security Council. Czech Republic b.8. Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Africa; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Asia; Expansion in nonpermanent category for Eastern European; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for GRULAC; Expansion in permanent category for WEOG. (The Bahamas Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago) b.9. The enlargement of the Security Council shall be guided by the principles of Article 23 of the Charter, based on the equitable geographical representation of the regional groups.*5 Hungary b.10. Any change in the Security Council composition should be based on the existing regional groups. Ukraine b.11. Broader reform of geographical distribution. Poland b.12. Implementation of geographical criteria in order to allow all regions to have an adequate presence within the enlarged Council. Paraguay b.13. Close the gap between regional groups and improve rotations. Slovakia b.14. Increase in the membership of the Council for each region should correspond to their respective proportion in the membership of the United Nations. Viet Nam b.15. Do not support proposals for regional representation on the Security Council as this would be at odds with the fundamental tenets of the United Nations Charter, which makes clear that admission to the United Nations is extended to individual states. France, UK Cross-Regional Arrangements b.16. Member States should also make full use of the possibility of cross-regional arrangements to ensure that the diversity of the General Assembly membership is adequately reflected in the Council. G4 b.17. Small states must always be represented in the Council. If the Council’s composition does not include a small state, at least one of the existing Council members will be appointed as a representative for small states in consultation with the members of the Forum of Small States. Singapore b.18. Regional groups shall coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for small developing states in the non-permanent category. L.69 b.19. Any enlargement of the Security Council should take into account the concerns of small and medium-sized Member States, including the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Belgium and Luxembourg, Netherlands b.20. Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of non-permanent members to the adequate and continuing representation of: i. Small Member States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia ii. Medium Size Member States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, Estonia, Latvia, Netherlands iii. Small Island Developing States (SIDS): G4, Brunei Darussalam, Estonia b.21. Increase the presence of Arab countries. Slovakia

5 On a road to nowhere ?

949

b.22. It is very important to increase the representation of Non-Aligned Movement Member States and other developing countries. DPRK b.23. Expansion should see more seats for the developing countries and equitable geographical representation in the enlarged membership, in both categories. Malaysia b.24. Expansion in the permanent and non-permanent category with developed and developing countries adequately represented. Brunei Darussalam b.25. Equitable geographical representation to the benefit of small and developing countries and regional and other specific groups. Serbia b.26. The reform should envisage increased representation in the Council of developing countries from Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. Ukraine b.27. The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. Therefore, the increase in such categories should mostly stem from developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. It must not expand by default. The enlargement of the Security Council should not be partial or selective, nor should it imply an increase in the number of members to the detriment of developing countries. The main increase for such categories should be in the number of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba b.29. Distribution of seats in the case of expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent seats b.29.1 New/ Additional permanent seats to be distributed as follows: i. African States: African Group*6 [no less than 2]; Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69*7, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [2] ii. Asia-Pacific States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [2] iii. Latin American and Caribbean States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1] iv. Western European and Other States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1] b.29.2 Additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows: i. African States: Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]; Belgium and Luxembourg, G4 [1-2]; African Group [no less than 2]; L.69 [2] ii. Asia-Pacific States: Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1] iii. Eastern European States: G4, L.69, Belgium and Luxembourg, Croatia*8, Czech Republic, Georgia*9, Hungary*10, Kazakhstan, Latvia*11, Romania*12, Slovakia*13 [1] iv. Latin American and Caribbean States: G4, L.69, Belgium and Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1] v. Western European and Other States: Kazakhstan [1]

950

5 On a road to nowhere ?

vi. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) across all regions: (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)*14, L.69 [1] b.29.3 At least two developing countries from Africa, two from Asia and two others from Latin America and the Caribbean should enter the Council as new permanent members. Cuba Range of Proposals in b.29 Current non- Additional nonCurrent New/Additional permanent permanent Total permanent permanent seats* seats seats seats African States

0

2

3

1-2**

6-7

Asia-Pacific States

1

2

2

1

6

Eastern European States

1

0

1

1

3

Latin American and Caribbean States

0

1

2

1

4

Western European and Other States

3

1

2

0-1

6-7

Cross regional: Small Island Developing States

0

0

0

0-1

0-1

5

6

10

4-7

25-28 seats

*Also note: Submission b.29.3 **Also note: African Group [no less than 2]

b.30. Distribution of seats in the case of creation of longer term non-permanent seats b.30.1 New longer term non-permanent seats with a term length of [8 Ireland or 8/10 Liechtenstein] years to be distributed as follows: i. African States: Ireland, Liechtenstein [2] ii. Asia-Pacific States: Ireland, Liechtenstein [2] iii. Latin American and Caribbean States: Ireland, Liechtenstein [1] iv. Western European and Other States: Ireland, Liechtenstein [1] b.30.2 Additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows: vii. African States: Ireland [2] viii. Asia-Pacific States: Ireland [1] ix. Eastern European States: Ireland, Liechtenstein [1] x. Latin American and Caribbean States: Ireland [1] b.30.3 Leaves open the possibility of the creation of further two-year non-permanent seats in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, and does not specifically address the number or distribution of any such seats. Liechtenstein (Denoted by [x] in the below table)

951

5 On a road to nowhere ? Range of Proposals in b.30 Current Current New longer permanent non-permanent term nonseats seats permanent seats

Additional Total two year nonpermanent seats

African States

0

3

2

2 or [x]

7 or [x]

Asia-Pacific States

1

2

2

1 or [x]

6 or [x]

Eastern European States

1

1

0

1

3

Latin American and Caribbean States

0

2

1

1 or [x]

4 or [x]

Western European and Other States

3

2

1

0 or [x]

6 or [x]

5

10

6

5 or [x]

21-26 or [x] seats

b.31. Distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats under any expansion model b.31.1 Distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats in the event of any expansion model regardless of the distribution of potential additional permanent or any new category of seats i. African States: [2] Montenegro ii. Asia-Pacific States: [1] Montenegro iii. Eastern European States: [1] Estonia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine iv. Latin American and the Caribbean States: [1] Montenegro v. Western European and Other States: [1] Montenegro b.32. Distribution of seats during the gradual removal of categories b.32.1 By 2030 (first stage) the Security Council will retain the current structure of seats along with the addition of semi-permanent category of seats with a tentative indefinite tenure to be distributed as follows: i. African States: [1] ii. Brazil, Germany, India, Japan: [4] And additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows: iii. Eastern European States: [1] iv. Arab States: [1] v. Small Island Developing States: [2] b.32.2 By 2045 (second stage) the composition of the Security Council will amount to a single category of three-year electable seats to be distributed as follows: i. African States: [4] ii. Arab States: [1] iii. Asia-Pacific States: [5] iv. Eastern European States: [3] v. Latin American and Caribbean States: [3] vi. Small Island Developing States: [2] vii. Western European and Other States: [6]

952

5 On a road to nowhere ?

b.32.3 The proposed distribution of member seats takes into account the various other proposals on the table, as well as the proportion of countries in each region of the world, giving greater representation to developing countries, and bearing in mind that a few countries overlap groupings. Panama c) THE SIZE OF AN ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL AND WORKING METHODS OF THE COUNCIL c.1. Size of an Enlarged Security Council c.1.1 A total of (21-27) seats Montenegro*15 [21]; Liechtenstein [22 or more]; Australia*16 [21-26]; Panama [24]; Serbia [up to 25]; Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovakia [25]; G4, Brunei Darussalam*17 [25-26]; Belgium and Luxembourg [maximum 25-26]; Romania [25-27]; Ireland, Kazakhstan [26]; African Group, Cuba*18 [not less than 26]; Hungary [not more than 27]; L.69 [27]; France, Peru*19 [mid-twenties] c.1.2 The Security Council should be expanded in order to make it more broadly representative. At the same time, expansion of the Security Council should not hamper its effectiveness and ability to carry out its responsibilities as set out in the Charter. Netherlands, UK c.2. Working Methods of the Council Working Methods Impacted by Enlargement c.2.1 Working methods of the enlarged Council should be conducted so as to help facilitate a more transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Security Council as a whole. Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Ireland, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia Votes Required for Decision Making c.2.2 An affirmative vote of [14/15 G4 / 15 L.69] from a total of [25/26 G4 / 27 L.69] members of the enlarged Security Council will be required for a decision. c.2.3 An expanded Security Council would maintain the same proportionality of 60% for voting purposes i.e. decisions would be adopted by the affirmative vote of 15 members. Panama c.2.4 The majority required for decision-making in an enlarged Council is to be reflected in the necessary Charter amendments (art. 27 (2), 27 (3) and 109 (1)). Hungary, Liechtenstein […] Privileges of Permanent Membership c.2.8 Review of the privileges enjoyed by the permanent members outside the Security Council (e.g. membership in bodies such as ECOSOC and ICJ, practice of distributing senior positions within the United Nations system). Liechtenstein […]18 d) THE QUESTION OF THE VETO d.1. [The new permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. Georgia] [New permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision on the matter has 18  c.2.9-c.2.47 refer to decision-making in subsidiary bodies, secretariat capacity, and other issues related to working methods.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d.2.

d.3.

d.4. d.5. d.6.

d.7.

d.8. d.9. d.10. d.11. d.12.

953

been taken during a review, to be held fifteen years after the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter. Czech Republic] Amendments to the Charter shall reflect the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members will be decided upon in the framework of a review. Belgium and Luxembourg, G4 The veto should be abolished. So long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of the veto. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), L.69, Dominican Republic The veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto as a matter of common justice. African Group New permanent members should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current permanent members, including the right to veto, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established. Cuba We would not oppose extension of the veto to new permanent members if the candidates to such permanent membership were to pursue such an extension. France Status of the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is both a privilege and a responsibility – including the right of veto. All countries being considered as potential permanent members and countries that have the ambition to be considered should have the ability to carry all the responsibility that comes with United Nations Security Council duties and be able to prove in deeds that they do deserve it and are ready to take up this responsibility. Slovakia The new permanent members should also be accorded veto power so as to contribute towards a more balanced and representational decision-making process, particularly if it is agreed that all regions would be represented in the Security Council. Malaysia The veto should not be extended to new permanent members of an enlarged Security Council. Australia, Chile, Ireland, Singapore, UK On the basis of the principle of sovereign equality of all the United Nations Member States as enshrined in the Charter, no state should be granted the special privilege to exercise the veto power. Philippines Member States should be invited to continue discussions on the use of the veto in certain circumstances. G4 The question of the veto would be addressed as part of the review [16 / 20 years] after the first elections in the new category of seats by the General Assembly. Liechtenstein Voluntary Limitation/ Restraint of the Use of the Veto Permanent members of the Council should voluntary and collectively commit themselves to not using their veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending situations involving mass atrocity crimes. Belgium and Luxembourg, Estonia, Ireland, Ukraine

954

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d.13. Permanent members of the Council should voluntary and collectively commit themselves to not using their veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending: Genocide Czech Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Singapore, Ukraine; War crimes Czech Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Singapore, Ukraine; Crimes against humanity Czech Republic, Lithuania, Singapore, Ukraine; Ethnic cleansing Czech Republic, Montenegro; Massive human rights violations Lithuania d.14. Supports all initiatives facilitating timely and decisive action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocities, including those calling for voluntarily agreeing to refrain from using the veto. Hungary d.15. If permanent members insist on casting a veto that blocks action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity they should produce alternative proposals that will end such atrocities or clearly explain to all United Nations Member States why they are prepared to see the continuation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council Document. Singapore d.16. Support a code of conduct for the voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by permanent members. Belgium and Luxembourg, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland d.17. Proposals made by some Member States on a voluntary code of conduct regulating the use of the veto in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide certainly merit positive consideration. Latvia d.18. Support proposals for a code of conduct among the P5 regarding their use of the veto in the Security Council as a first step towards a process of reviewing the veto power of permanent members. Philippines d.19. More generally all Member States should commit to support timely action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Belgium and Luxembourg d.20. Self-regulation of the use of the veto by the permanent members. Monaco d.21. The veto should be used with maximum restraint with its eventual elimination. Brunei Darussalam d.22. Should aim to minimize the use of the veto. Netherlands d.23. Supports an adjustment of the veto right based on consensus of the current permanent members, taking into consideration the needs of the Council for faster action, greater involvement in conflict prevention and increasing efficiency. Romania d.24. The initiative on restraint of the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocity deserves close attention and ambitious follow-up, and could be taken forward independently of broader Security Council reforms. Australia Mandatory Restriction of the Use of the Veto d.25. The use of the veto should be restricted in cases which would block Council action aimed at preventing or ending: Crimes against humanity Georgia, Kazakhstan, Peru; War crimes Georgia, Kazakhstan; Ethnic cleansing Georgia; Genocide Georgia, Kazakhstan, Peru;

5 On a road to nowhere ?

955

Systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Peru d.26. The use of the veto should be limited to only measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Peru, Viet Nam d.27. Relevant procedural regulations should be elaborated to restrict the veto right of permanent members who are involved in a conflict under Security Council consideration. Georgia d.28. The veto should not in any case be used for blocking Council action in the event of aggression against a United Nations Member State. Ukraine d.29. The permanent members should recommit themselves to Article 27 (3) of the United Nations Charter obliging a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. Ukraine Abolition of the Veto d.30. Support abolition of the veto. However, in the event of its retention, new permanent members should also have the right to veto. There should be no distinction between permanent members. While the veto is in existence, efforts must be made to limit its use in instances of the most serious crimes of international concern, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, etc. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago) d.31. Abolishment of the use of the veto in conformity with the principle of sovereign equality as envisaged in the Charter. Nevertheless, we continue to call for a restraint in the use of veto powers especially in cases of international crimes of the most serious nature such as in instances of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Malaysia d.32. It is indispensable to eliminate the veto immediately for being an anachronistic and undemocratic privilege. Until its elimination is attained, other mechanisms should be implemented in order to limit its use to the extent possible. Cuba d.33. The veto is an anachronistic tool, belonging in a period of our past history. Regardless of which membership formula we end up using for the Security Council, our aim should be to eliminate the veto. Until we reach the stage of full abolishment of the veto, we should continue to strive for it not to be used, especially in humanitarian situations. As an ethical statement, the P5 should refrain from using the veto when their national interest is involved. Panama d.34. Member States should aim for phasing out of the veto. Ukraine d.35. The veto is an exception to the principle of sovereign equality among States, and it should be progressively eliminated. Peru d.36. Supports the total elimination of the veto. To this end, in favour of its progressive elimination. Paraguay d.37. In general, favour the abolition of the veto. Ireland Explaining the Use of a Veto d.38. Permanent members should explain non concurrent votes to the wider United Nations membership. (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)

956

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d.39. In a public session of the Council. Peru d.40. In particular with regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and to circulate a copy of the explanation as a Council document. Ukraine Veto Trigger Mechanism d.41. Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring, when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution before the Council, that such a negative vote shall not constitute a veto in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter. Singapore d.42. The decision-taking process in the Council should be reformulated. Currently, non-procedural decisions require unanimity of the five permanent members, while this requirement can be reduced to the affirmative vote of two of them. Peru d.43. The exercise of the veto should be regulated so as to prohibit such power being the sole discretion of its holder to unjustly overrule the wishes of the majority. Call for a modified veto system whereby a minimum of three votes should be made a prerequisite to block a resolution. Malaysia e) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] f) Any other related matters: Review f.1. [The situation created by the amendments to the Charter would be reviewed L.69] [15 Belgium and Luxembourg, G4 / 10-15 (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)] years after their entry into force. f.2. [16 / 20] years after the first elections in the new category of seats the General Assembly shall review the situation. The review shall include consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category, including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council. Liechtenstein f.3. A review clause that will allow Member States to carry out periodic revisions of the decisions made under this process. Paraguay f.4. It is expected that the issue of membership expansion and working methods of the Council would continue to be debated in the future, which may require regular review of these two issues. As such, a review mechanism is recommended. Malaysia The Process of Charter Amendments f.5. Upon adoption of a comprehensive framework resolution and following the elections of the new permanent members, a resolution containing necessary amendments to the Charter would be submitted to the General Assembly in order to be adopted [at the earliest possible time G4/ no later than twelve weeks. L.69] f.6. The Charter amendments necessary would be annexed to a General Assembly Resolution. Elections to fill the six seats with terms of [8/10] years shall be held after entry into force of the required Charter amendment and simultaneously

5 On a road to nowhere ?

f.7.

f.8. f.9. f.10.

957

with the regular elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Liechtenstein Should make a distinction between those measures which need the amendment of the Charter and those recommendations or proposals that do not require such action. In our view the zero draft of the General Assembly resolution should consist of two chapters: The first chapter should contain the Charter amendments. The second chapter should consist of the decision of the General Assembly (e.g. On relationship of the Security Council and General Assembly) and the recommendations for the Security Council (e.g. Rules of Procedure). Hungary General Points The reform of the Security Council must not be a postponed or ignored goal. A real reform of the United Nations will not be possible without a true reform of the Security Council. Urgent practical actions are a must. Cuba Reform is a complex matter and hopes that the broadest possible consensus can be achieved to move the process forward. Brunei Darussalam Any decision taken on reform should have the widest possible support of Member States and at the very least, be in keeping with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 53/30.19 (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)

Original footnotes *1 DPRK – “It is yet premature to specify the issue of this category of membership. Discussions on the issue of categories are now in the initial stage, and even if the category issue is agreed, there will be a next step to be considered in the modalities and procedures for selection and election.” “Japan still denies to liquidate its inhumane war crimes committed against a number of Asian countries during World War II, which placed Japan under the term of an enemy state in the Charter of the United Nations. The DPRK expresses deep concern at the approach taken by Japan. Our concern is that Japan acts as if she must occupy a permanent seat of the enlarged Security Council, taking as if there is already an agreement on enlargement of permanent seats of the Security Council. Moreover, Japan is the enemy state and defeated state that had occupied Asian countries and committed huge crimes against humanity during the Second World War which were the cause and motivation for the creation of the United Nations, and Japan is the only country that has not fully and convincingly made recognition, apology and compensation for its crimes up to this moment, 70 years since the foundation of the United Nations. Japan is too ambitious and impatient in the deliberations of the reform and this stems from its sinister and impudent purpose to bury forever its past crimes and the disgrace of enemy state through this process.” *2 France – “moderate expansion” *3 UK – “moderate expansion” *4 Liechtenstein – “‘On a permanent basis’ refers to the fact that Member States could continue to hold these seats as long as they continue to be re-elected.” 19  23 November 1998, → 4.1.1.

958

5 On a road to nowhere ?

*5 Hungary – “Hungary does not reject, à priori, other supplementary models based on

other criteria. If other categories are accepted the necessary adjustments in regional representation has to be carried out.” *6 African Group – The African Group proposes an additional 6 permanent seats and not less than 5 additional two-year non-permanent seats. However, they have only specified the distribution of 2 permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats for Africa leaving the rest open to further consideration. *7 L.69 – The L.69 Group welcomes the appreciation of the C.10 towards the L.69 submission and in this regard, the L.69 Group reaffirms its support and alignment with the Common African Position. *8 Croatia – While Croatia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration. *9 Georgia – While Georgia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats; they have assigned 1 additional two-year non-permanent seat to the Eastern European Group and leaves additional permanent and non-permanent seats to be distributed according to the established practice. *10 Hungary – While Hungary supports up to 6 additional permanent and not more than 6 non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration. *11 Latvia – While Latvia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration. *12 Romania – While Romania proposes additional permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, as well as additional non-permanent seats, they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration. *13 Slovakia – While Slovakia supports 5 additional permanent and 5 additional non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional nonpermanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration. *14 The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago – “Reserve their position on the additional and total numbers in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of a reformed Council.” *15 Montenegro – “Montenegro remains open for a few additional seats, if there can be an agreement reached about a new permanent or new category of membership.” *16 Australia – “Important that Council membership remains at a workable size” 21-26 *17 Brunei Darussalam – “mid-twenties” 25-26 *18 Cuba – “With this number, the proportion between the members of the Security Council and the Member States of the United Nations would approach the proportion there was at the time the Organization was founded.” *19 Peru – “In order to reflect an equitable regional representation, the reformed Council membership should be enlarged to a number of members in the ‘mid-twenties’.” […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

959

Annex Submissions from Member States to the Framework Document20 […] Letters from Member States21 People’s Republic of China pg. 101-10622 Russian Federation pg. 107-11023 Lao People’s Democratic Republic pg. 111-113 United States of America pg. 11424 Arab Group pg. 115-12125 Uniting for Consensus pg. 122-12326 […] 5.1.14 14 September 2015, UN General Assembly, Decision 69/560, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters27 At its 104th plenary meeting, on 14 September 2015, the General Assembly, on the proposal of its President:*1 (a) Decided to reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council; (b) Also decided to immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at its seventieth session, as mandated by Assembly decisions 62/557 of 15 September 2008,28 63/565 B of 14 September 2009,29 64/568 of 13 September 2010, 65/554 of 12 September 2011, 66/566 of 13 September 2012, 67/561 of 29 August 2013 and 68/557 of 8 September 2014, building on the informal meetings held during its sixty-ninth session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States reflected in the text and its annex circulated by the President of the General Assembly in his letter dated 31 July 2015,30 while welcoming the active engagement, initiatives and intensive efforts of the President of the General Assembly, including the selection of “United Nations reform” as one of the main areas of focus for the sixty-ninth session of the Assembly, and 20  These are the individual letters and statements sent by the Permanent Missions to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, the contents of which were included in the document. 21  The positions of the groups and member states articulated in the following letters were not included in the body of the document, but presented in an annex to the text. 22  8 April 2015, → 5.2.3.9. 23  14 April 2015, → 5.2.3.10. 24  16 April 2015, → 5.2.2.1.7. 25  1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.3.17. 26  1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25. 27  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its sixty-ninth session, Volume III, 30 December 2014-14 September 2015, UN Doc. A/69/49 (Vol. III), p. 265. 28  → 4.1.29. 29  → 5.1.3. 30  → 5.1.13.

960

5 On a road to nowhere ?

noting with appreciation the active role and concrete efforts of the Chair undertaken in a consultative manner with a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council; (c) Further decided to convene the intergovernmental negotiations at its seventieth session, building on the work undertaken during the sixty-ninth session; (d) Decided to convene the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council during the seventieth session of the General Assembly, if Member States so decide; (e) Also decided to include in the agenda of the seventieth session of the General Assembly an item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. Original footnote *1 A/69/L.92 (11 September 2015, second reissue 13 September 2015). 5.1.15 17 May 2016, Elements of Convergence on Two Key Issues of Security Council Reform: The Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and the Size of an Enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Ms. Sylvie Lucas […] Size of an enlarged Council An enlarged Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership” and “regional representation”, and with the total size ensuring a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. (This would entail amendments to Article 23 (1) and 23 (2) of the Charter.) Working methods of the Council Majority required for decision-making: Decisions of an enlarged Council should be made by an affirmative vote of approximately 60% of its members*1, in line with the existing ratio, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership”, “regional representation” and “the question of the veto”. the number of affirmative votes required should be in line with the current practice*1, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership”, “regional representation” and “the question of the veto”. (This would entail amendments to Article 27 (2), 27 (3) and to Article 109 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations.) […]

•

• •

Original footnote *1 Examples: – If an enlarged Council consists of 21 members, 13 votes (61.9%) would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 22 members, 13 votes (59.09%) would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 23 members, 14 votes (60.86%) would be required

5 On a road to nowhere ?

961

– If an enlarged Council consists of 24 members, 14 votes (58.33%) would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 25 members, 15 votes (60%) would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 26 members, 16 votes (61.54%) would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 27 members, 16 votes (59.25%) would be required In each case, the number of votes coming closest to 60% has been identified. 5.1.16 11 July 2016, Elements of Convergence on Two of the Five Key Issues of Security Council Reform: The Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and Size of an Enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council, Annex to a letter from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Ms. Sylvie Lucas […] Size of an enlarged Council An enlarged Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership” and “regional representation”, and with the total size ensuring a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. (This would entail amendments to Article 23 (1) and 23 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations.) Working methods of the Council Majority required for decision-making: the number of affirmative votes required should be in line with the current practice*1, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership”, “regional representation” and “the question of the veto”. (This would entail amendments to Article 27 (2), 27 (3) and to Article 109 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations.) […]

•

•

Original footnote *1 Examples: – If an enlarged Council consists of 21 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 22 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 23 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 24 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 25 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 26 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 27 members, 15 votes would be required 5.1.17 27 July 2016, UN General Assembly, Decision 70/559, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters31 At its 113th plenary meeting, on 27 July 2016, the General Assembly, on the proposal of its President: 31  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its seventieth session, Volume III, 24 December 2015-13 September 2016, UN Doc. A/70/49 (Vol. III), p. 257 et seq.

962

5 On a road to nowhere ?

(a) Decided to reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council; (b) Also decided to immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, as mandated by Assembly decisions 62/557 of 15 September 2008,32 63/565 B of 14 September 2009,33 64/568 of 13 September 2010, 65/554 of 12 September 2011, 66/566 of 13 September 2012, 67/561 of 29 August 2013, 68/557 of 8 September 2014 and 69/560 of 14 September 2015,34 building on the informal meetings held during its seventieth session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, reflected in the text and its annex circulated on 31 July 2015,35 and using the elements of convergence circulated on 12 July 201636 to help to inform its future work, while welcoming the active engagement, initiatives and intensive efforts of the President of the General Assembly, and noting with appreciation the active role and concrete efforts of the Chair undertaken in a consultative manner with a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council; (c) Further decided to convene the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council during the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, if Member States so decide; (d) Decided to include in the agenda of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly the item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. 5.1.18 31 March 2017, Elements of Convergence, Commonalities and Issues for Further Consideration: Food for Thought for the 3rd IGN Session GA71 (3-4 April 2017), Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari I. Elements of convergence – IGN GA70 The document “Elements of convergence” circulated on 11 July 201637 (presented below within “…”) focuses on two main issues: 1) The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly; and 2) The size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council. To the elements of convergence identified by IGN GA70 on the two clusters mentioned above, we add some issues for further consideration and encourage colleagues to further contribute. Relationship between the Council and the General Assembly […] 32  33  34  35  36  37 

→ 4.1.29. → 5.1.3. → 5.1.14. → 5.1.13. → 5.1.16. → 5.1.16.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

963

Size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council A) Size of an enlarged Council An enlarged Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership” and “regional representation”, and with the total size ensuring a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. (This would entail amendments to Article 23 (1) and 23 (2) of the Charter.) B) Working methods of the Council Majority required for decision-making: Decisions of an enlarged Council should be made by an affirmative vote of approximately 60% of its members, in line with the existing ratio, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership”, “regional representation” and “the question of the veto”. (This would entail amendments to Article 27 (2), 27 (3) and to Article 109 (1) of the Charter.) […] II. Issues for further consideration related to the elements of convergence identified by IGN GA70 A) The relationship between the SC and the GA […] B) Size of an enlarged Council One element of convergence identified by IGN GA70 is: “Ensuring the holding of the Presidency of the enlarged Council by non-permanent members (NPM) at least once during their tenure”. From an arithmetic point of view, it seems that this can be feasible in a SC with a maximum of 24 members, if the NPM term will remain of 2 years (24 months). At least two P5 have made clear that limiting the enlargement of the SC to a total number of “low 20th” is a red line. III. Commonalities identified during the IGN GA71 sessions on 6-7 February and 7-8 March 2017 The following general commonalities and commonalities related to the other three clusters (categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation) have been identified during the two first IGN GA71 sessions, on 6-7 February and 7-8 March 2017: 1. General commonalities a) There is widespread agreement that the reform of the United Nations Security Council is in the interest of Member States and the United Nations system as a whole. b) The reform of the Security Council is a Member States driven process. c) The objective of the reform is to make the Council more accountable, transparent and inclusive for everyone, while preserving and enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. d) To improve prospects for reform, a continued and enhanced engagement is of utmost importance. e) All five clusters are strongly interconnected and therefore negotiations should be based on the principle: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

964

5 On a road to nowhere ?

2. Commonalities on categories of membership a) Expansion in the category of non-permanent members is accepted by all Member States. b) The Security Council’s expansion in other categories (permanent and/or longerterm members, and/or transitional options) remains a subject for negotiations. 3. Commonalities on the question of veto All five clusters are interconnected. The question of veto is seen particularly in connection with the working methods and the categories of membership. 4. Commonalities on regional representation a) Member States are desirous to strengthen the voice of underrepresented regions and groups. b) Ensuring a fair equitable geographical distribution should be reflected in an expanded Council’s membership. c) Member states consider that an expansion of the SC shall be made while ensuring the balance between accountability, democracy, representativeness and effectiveness in the Council’s activity. d) There is a common understanding that developing countries, including African countries, should be better represented in the Security Council, having in mind that almost three quarters of the Council’s agenda are devoted to African issues. IV. Issues for further consideration related to the three clusters discussed on 6-7 February and 7-8 March 2017 1. General a) The text and its annex circulated by the PGA with his letter of 31 July 2015 remains a reference for the IGN. b) The most divisive opinions on the Council’s reform persist particularly on three clusters: a) categories of membership; b) the question of the veto; c) regional representation. 2. Categories of membership a) The UN Charter mentions only two categories (permanent and non-permanent), but the GA decision 62/55738 refers to “categories of membership” without specifying them, which leaves to the member states to decide if additional categories may be created. b) During previous IGN sessions member states expressed preference for one or more of the following options: – Enlargement of the SC with only non-permanent seats; – Enlargement of the SC with both permanent and non-permanent seats; – Enlargement of the SC with non-permanent seats and create a new category of longer-term seats with the possibility of re-election; – The option for “de facto” permanent seats, should a member state continuously be re-elected by its peers; – The “transitional option” (review clause). c) Categories of membership need to be discussed in close connection with regional representation in the SC. 38  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

965

3. The question of veto a) More in-depth discussions are needed to clarify with how many more rights of veto the SC will still be functional and how the extension of veto would strengthen the SC’s efficiency. b) During previous IGN sessions, the following ideas were raised: – Abolish the right of veto; – If new permanent members are approved: the veto right will be expanded to all permanent members; or new permanent members will not benefit from the veto right, which will be kept only by the current P5; or the veto right will be extended to new permanent members only after a reviewing period; – Progressive restrain of the use of veto and abolition of it after a number of years for all SC members; – Voluntarily refrain to use the veto right in cases of mass atrocities, crimes against humanity or genocide, in accordance with the ACT Code of Conduct39 and / or the French-Mexican initiative;40 – The veto issue to be discussed in connection with the SC working methods, because although the veto may not be, strictly speaking, a working method, it has a significant impact on the working methods of the SC. 4. Regional representation a) How to ensure a better ratio between the number of SC members and GA members? The ratio was 1:8 in 1945, and is 1:19 in 2017 (P5 excluded). b) How to ensure a balanced ratio between the number of SC non-permanent members and number of countries in regional groups (P5 excluded)? Currently, the ratio is 1:27 for Asia-Pacific, 1:22 for EEG, 1:18 for Africa, 1:17 for GRULAC and 1:13 for WEOG. c) Regional representation needs to be discussed in close connection with the size of the SC. d) The question of whether a country represents only itself in the SC, or its region, or the whole of UN membership needs to be clarified. e) Equal attention has to be paid to the equitable representation of small states. f) In an enlarged Security Council, how to ensure an appropriate balance between the principles of efficiency, transparency, accountability and geographical distribution of the SC, in accordance with art. 23 para. 1 of the UN Charter? (“The GA shall elect … non-permanent members of the SC, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”).

• • •

39  2 3 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 40  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21.

966

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.1.19 7 June 2017, Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration: Food for Thought on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters, IGN GA71 Session, 12-13 June 2017, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari […] Following the IGN GA71 meetings of 6-7 February, 7-8 March 2017, 3-4 April 2017 and 8-9 May 2017, the following commonalities and issues for further consideration related to all five key issues have been identified: I. Commonalities 1. General a) The reform of the United Nations Security Council is in the interest of Member States and the United Nations system as a whole. b) The reform of the Security Council is a Member States driven process. c) The objective of reform is to make the Council more “broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions” (as stipulated by “the World Summit Outcome Document”41). d) Member States consider that reform of the Security Council shall “ensure a transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council” (as mentioned in the elements of convergence of 12 July 201642). The principles of democracy and representativeness shall also be taken into consideration. e) To improve prospects for early reform, a continued, substantive and enhanced engagement is of utmost importance. f) Member States are working together, although expressing different views on substance, in order to move the IGN process forward. g) The reform of the Security Council should reflect the reality of the contemporary world. h) All five key issues are strongly interconnected and therefore negotiations should be based on the principle: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. 2. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council a) The reform of the Security Council should lead to an expansion of the Council and therefore certain areas of working methods need to be addressed as a result of expansion. b) In line with the elements of convergence identified during the IGN GA70, Member States consider that an enlarged Security Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats. c) Member States acknowledged the linkages to ensuring an increase in membership that would allow for equitable representation, as well as cross-regional balances, while maintaining the effective and operational character of the Council. 41  1 6 September 2005, → 4.1.23. 42  → 5.1.16 (circulated on 11 July 2016).

5 On a road to nowhere ?

967

4. Categories of membership Whereas in an enlarged SC, the expansion of the category of 2-year term nonpermanent members is in principle accepted by all Member States, however, the Security Council’s expansion in other categories (permanent, longer term seats and transitional options) remains to be decided through negotiations by the Member States. 5. The question of veto Except the fact that the question of veto is a key element of the SC reform, no commonalities have been currently identified in relation to the question of veto. 6. Regional representation a) The enlargement of the Council should serve to improve the representation of underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups. b) Ensuring a fair equitable geographical distribution should be reflected in an expanded Council’s membership. c) The developing countries, particularly African countries should be better represented in the Security Council. d) Due attention has also to be paid to the equitable representation of small states, including SIDS and other cross regional groups. II. Issues for further consideration The list of issues for further consideration is not an exhaustive one. 1. General a) Although many member states express a desire to move to the next phase, a large variety of opinions on the Security Council’s reform persist particularly in relation to the following three clusters: categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation. b) Might contributions of Member States to the maintenance of peace and security be reflected in the duration of their presence in the Council? 2. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Council a) In line with the element of convergence identified during the IGN GA70 referring to “ensuring the holding of the Presidency of the enlarged Council by non-permanent members (NPM) at least once during their tenure”, concrete ways for holding the rotating presidency in an enlarged Security Council need to be examined. b) When discussing the size of the Security Council, Member States expressed different views on how to ensure a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. Ensuring such a balance is also an element of convergence identified by the IGN GA70. 4. Categories of membership a) The UN Charter mentions only two categories (permanent and non-permanent), but the GA decision 62/55743 refers to “categories of membership” without specifying them, which leaves to the member states to decide if additional categories may be created. b) During discussions in IGN GA71 and in previous IGN sessions, Member States expressed preference for one or more of the following options: 43  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

968

5 On a road to nowhere ?

– Enlargement of the SC with both permanent and 2-year term non-permanent members; – Enlargement of the SC with 2-year term non-permanent members and create a new category of longer-term seats with the possibility of re-election; – The “transitional option”. c) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five key issues, categories of membership might be discussed in parallel with regional representation, the size of the Security Council and the question of veto. d) How to accommodate the options mentioned at II.4.b. in an enlarged Security Council? 5. The question of veto a) More in-depth discussions are needed to explore how the veto impacts the work and the effectiveness of an enlarged Security Council. b) During discussions in IGN GA71 and in previous IGN sessions, the following options were mentioned: – If new permanent members are approved: the veto might be expanded to all permanent members; or new permanent members might not benefit from the veto, which will be kept only by the current P5; or the veto might be extended to new permanent members after a reviewing period. – Progressive restraint / abolition of veto. – Voluntarily refrain to use the veto in cases of mass atrocities. – Not altering the current arrangements with respect to the veto. 6. Regional representation a) What might be the appropriate ratio between the number of SC members and GA members? b) What might be the appropriate ratio between the number of SC non-permanent members and number of countries in regional groups? c) Would it be appropriate to examine the ratio between the number of SC nonpermanent members and the number of permanent members? d) The question of whether a country represents only itself in the SC, or its region, or the whole of UN membership needs further clarifications. UN Charter, Article 24, para. 1: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” e) In an enlarged Security Council, how to reflect the increasing role of regional groups and regional organizations in international relations, particularly in the fields of peace and security? f) Further clarification is needed on the role of regional groups in selecting new members. g) Further clarification is needed on the concepts of “equitable geographical distribution” and “regional representation”. h) More in-depth discussions are needed to clarify if in an enlarged SC crossregional representation might be based on criteria such as country size, ethnicity and religion, climate vulnerability and development level, as requested by some Member States.

• • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

969

i) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five clusters, regional representation might be discussed in parallel with the size of the SC and categories of membership. j) In seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States for an enlarged Security Council, how to make consistent the principles listed in paragraph I.1.d. with art. 23.1. of the UN Charter which refers to “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”? 5.1.20 23 June 2017, Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Dr. Ion Jinga and Mr. Mohamed Khaled Khiari […] Following the IGN GA71 meetings of 6-7 February, 7-8 March 2017, 3-4 April 2017, 8-9 May 2017 and 12-13 June 2017, the following commonalities and issues for further consideration related to all five key issues listed by Decision 62/55744 have been identified: II. Commonalities 1. General a) The reform of the United Nations Security Council is in the interest of Member States and the United Nations system as a whole. b) The reform of the Security Council is a Member States driven process. c) The objective of reform is to make the Council more “broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”, as stipulated by “the World Summit Outcome Document”.45 d) Member States consider that reform of the Security Council shall “ensure a transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council”, as mentioned in the elements of convergence of 12 July 2016.46 e)  To improve the prospects for early reform, a continued, substantive and enhanced engagement is of utmost importance. f) Although expressing different views on substance, Member States are driving the IGN process forward together, in accordance with the usual practices and procedures of the General Assembly. g) The reform of the Security Council should reflect the realities of the contemporary world. h) All five key issues are strongly interconnected and therefore negotiations should be based on the principle: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

44  1 5 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 45  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23. 46  → 5.1.16 (circulated on 11 July 2016).

970

5 On a road to nowhere ?

i) The IGN process should build on the work done in previous years, so that convergence will increase gradually, with a view to garner the widest possible political acceptance. 2. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council a) The reform of the Security Council should lead to an expansion of the Council and therefore certain areas of working methods need to be addressed as a result of expansion. b) In line with the elements of convergence identified during the IGN GA70, Member States consider that an enlarged Security Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats. c) Member States acknowledged the need to ensure an increase in membership that would allow for equitable representation, as well as cross-regional balances, while maintaining the effective and operational character of the Council. d) Member States attach great importance to adapting the Security Council working methods to any increase in its membership, in order to ensure a transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council. 4. Categories of membership In an enlarged SC, the expansion of the category of 2-year term non-permanent members is accepted by all Member States as part of a comprehensive Security Council reform. The Council’s expansion in other categories (permanent, longer term seats, transitional options) remains to be agreed through negotiations by the Member States. 5. The question of veto The question of veto is a key element of the SC reform. 6. Regional representation a) The enlargement of the Council should serve to improve the representation of underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups. b) A fair and equitable geographical distribution should be ensured in an expanded Council’s membership. c) Due attention has to be paid to the equitable representation of developing countries, including small states. d) Africa should be equitably represented in a reformed Security Council. III. Issues for further consideration The list of issues for further consideration is not an exhaustive one. 1. General a) Although a large variety of opinions on the Security Council’s reform persist, particularly in relation to the following three clusters: categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation, many member states express a desire to move to the next phase. b) Taking into account art. 23.1 of the UN Charter, should contributions of Member States to the maintenance of peace and security be reflected in the duration of their presence in the Council? c) More discussions are needed on how to take into account the principles of democracy and representation in pursuing the objective of a more democratic SC. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

971

3. Size of an enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council […] b) When discussing the size of the Security Council, Member States expressed different views on how to ensure a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. Ensuring such a balance is also an element of convergence identified by the IGN GA70. c) The appropriateness of the ratio between the number of SC non-permanent members and the number of permanent members could be examined. 4. Categories of membership a) The UN Charter mentions only two categories (permanent and non-permanent), but GA decision 62/557 refers to “categories of membership” without specifying them, which leaves it to the member states to decide if additional categories may be created. b) During discussions in IGN GA71 and in previous IGN sessions, Member States expressed preference for one or more of the following options, in a reformed Security Council: – Enlargement of the SC with both permanent and 2-year term non-permanent members; – Enlargement of the SC with 2-year term non-permanent members and creation of a new category of longer-term non-permanent members with the possibility of re-election; – Enlargement of the SC with 2-year term non-permanent members. c) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five key issues, categories of membership might be discussed in parallel with regional representation, the size of the Security Council and the question of veto. d) The possibility of accommodating the options mentioned in III.4.b. in an enlarged Security Council could also be explored. 5. The question of veto a) More in-depth discussions are needed to explore how the veto impacts the work and the effectiveness of an enlarged Security Council. b) During discussions in IGN GA71 and in previous IGN sessions, the following options were mentioned: – If new permanent members are approved: the veto might be expanded to all permanent members; or new permanent members might not benefit from the veto, which will be kept only by the current P5; or the veto might be extended to new permanent members after a reviewing period. – Progressive restraint / abolition of veto. – Voluntarily refrain from the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes. 6. Regional representation a) What might be the appropriate ratio between the number of SC members and GA members? b) What might be the appropriate ratio between the number of SC non-permanent members and number of countries in regional groups? c) The question of whether a country represents only itself in the SC, or its region, or the whole of UN membership needs further clarifications. UN Charter,

• • •

972

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Article 24, para. 1: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” d) In an enlarged Security Council, how to reflect the increasing role of regional groups and regional organizations in international relations, particularly in the fields of peace and security? e) Further clarification is needed on the role of regional groups in selecting new members. f) In relation with equitable representation, further clarification is needed on the concepts of “equitable geographical distribution” and “regional representation”. g) More in-depth discussions are needed to clarify questions pertaining to crossregional representation in an enlarged SC. h) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five clusters, regional representation might be discussed in parallel with the size of the SC and categories of membership. i) In seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States for an enlarged Security Council, ways should be sought to ensure consistency between the principles listed in paragraph II.1.d. with art. 23.1. of the UN Charter which refers to “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”? 5.1.21  14 June 2018, Revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Kaha Imnadze and Ms. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh47 […] Following the IGN GA72 meetings of 1-2 February, 27-28 February, 27-28 March, 1-2 May and 6-7 June 2018, the following updates were made to the commonalities and issues for further consideration related to all five key issues listed by Decision 62/557:48 II. Commonalities 1. General a) The reform of the United Nations Security Council is in the interest of Member States and the United Nations system as a whole. b) The reform of the Security Council is a Member States driven process. c) The objective of reform is to make the Council more “broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”, as stipulated by “the World Summit Outcome Document”.49

47  This version appears to be identical with the one circulated by the President of the General Assembly on 23 March 2018. 48  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 49  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

973

d) Member States consider that reform of the Security Council shall “ensure a transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council”, as mentioned in the elements of convergence of 12 July 2016.50 e)  To improve the prospects for early reform, a continued, substantive and enhanced engagement is of utmost importance. f) Although expressing different views on substance, Member States are driving the IGN process forward together, in accordance with the usual practices and procedures of the General Assembly. g) The reform of the Security Council should reflect the realities of the contemporary world. h) Member States acknowledge the legitimate aspirations of African countries to play their rightful role on the global stage. i) All five key issues are strongly interconnected and therefore negotiations should be based on the principle: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. j) The IGN process should build on the work done in previous years, so that convergence will increase gradually, with a view to garner the widest possible political acceptance. 2. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council The reform of the Security Council should lead to an expansion of the Council and therefore certain areas of working methods need to be addressed as a result of expansion. Size of an enlarged Council a) An enlarged Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussion of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership” and “regional representation”, and with the total size ensuring a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. (This would entail amendments to Article 23 (1) and 23 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations.) Working Methods of the Council a) Majority required for decision-making: the number of affirmative votes required should be in line with the current practice*1, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership”, “regional representation” and “the question of veto”. (This would entail amendments to Article 27 (2) and 27 (3) and to Article 109 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations.) b) While recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Council towards keeping its working methods under consideration in its regular work, with a view to ensuring their effective and consistent implementation, the Security Council should be invited to consider the following measures in light of the increase in its membership: ◯  Adapting its working methods to ensure transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council, ◯  Adapting the working methods of its subsidiary organs, 50  → 5.1.16 (circulated on 11 July 2016).

974

5 On a road to nowhere ?

◯  Ensuring the full participation of all members of the Security Council in its

work, including the holding of the presidency of the enlarged Council by nonpermanent members at least once during their tenure, ◯  Undertaking a revision of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure to reflect these measures and further considering the formal adoption of its rules of procedure. 4. Categories of membership In an enlarged SC, the expansion of the category of 2-year term non-permanent members is accepted by all Member States as part of a comprehensive Security Council reform. The Council’s expansion in other categories (permanent, longer term seats, transitional options) remains to be agreed through negotiations by the Member States. 5. The question of veto The question of veto is a key element of the SC reform. 6. Regional representation a) The enlargement of the Council should serve to improve the representation of underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups. b) An increase in membership should allow for fair and equitable representation as well as cross regional balances, while maintaining the effective and operational character of the Council. c) Due attention has to be paid to the equitable representation of developing countries, including small states, as well as Small Island Developing States and Arab States. d) Africa should be equitably represented in a reformed Security Council. III. Issues for further consideration The list of issues for further consideration is not an exhaustive one. 1. General a) Although a large variety of opinions on the Security Council’s reform persist, particularly in relation to the following three clusters: categories of membership; the question of the veto, regional representation, many member states express a desire to move to the next phase. b) Taking into account Article 23.1 of the UN Charter, the degree to which Member States’ contributions to the maintenance of peace and security should be reflected in the duration of their presence in the Council remains to be further explored. c) More discussions are needed on how to take into account the principles of democracy and representation in pursuing the objective of a more democratic SC. d) In seeking to improve the working practice of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council Reform, possible ways of enhancing the institutional memory and working methods of the IGN need to be further discussed. 2. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly Further ways to enhance the accountability of an enlarged Council to the UN membership and to increase the transparency of the Security Council’s work in relation to the General Assembly have to be explored. 3. Size of an enlarged Council and Working Methods of the Council a) In line with the element of convergence referring to “ensuring the holding of the Presidency of the enlarged Council by non-permanent members (NPM) at least

5 On a road to nowhere ?

975

once during their tenure”, concrete ways for holding the rotating presidency in an enlarged Security Council need to be examined. b) When discussing the size of the Security Council, Member States expressed different views on how to ensure a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. Ensuring such a balance is also an element of convergence. c) The appropriateness of the ratio between the number of SC members and GA members as well as the number of SC non-permanent members and the number of permanent members could be examined. 4. Categories of membership a) The UN Charter mentions only two categories (permanent and non-permanent), but GA decision 62/557 refers to “categories of membership” without specifying them, which leaves it to the member states to decide if additional categories may be created. b) During discussions in IGN GA72 and in previous IGN sessions, Member States expressed preference for one or more of the following options, in a reformed Security Council: – Enlargement of the SC with both permanent and 2-year term non-permanent members; – Enlargement of the SC with 2-year term non-permanent members and creation of a new category of longer-term non-permanent members with the possibility of re-election; – Enlargement of the SC with 2-year term non-permanent members. c) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five issues, categories of membership might be discussed in parallel with regional representation, the size of the Security Council and the question of veto. d) The possibility of accommodating the options mentioned in III.4.b. in an enlarged Security Council could also be explored. 5. The question of the veto a) More in-depth discussions are needed to explore how the veto impacts the work and the effectiveness of an enlarged Security Council. b) During discussions in IGN GA72 and in previous IGN sessions, the following options were mentioned: – If new permanent members are approved: the veto might be expanded to all permanent members; or ◯  ◯  new permanent members might not benefit from the veto, which will be kept only by the current PS; or ◯  the veto might be extended to new permanent members after a reviewing period. – Progressive restraint – Abolition of veto, however some Member States argue that as long as it exists it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council including any potential permanent members from Africa – based on the common African position reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus51 adopted by the African Union in March 2005. 51  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

976

5 On a road to nowhere ?

– Voluntarily refrain from the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes. Initiatives in this regard include the “Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities” presented by France and Mexico52 during then 70th session of the GA and the “Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group.53 6. Regional representation a) The appropriate ratio between the number of SC non-permanent members and number of countries in regional groups needs further deliberations. b) The question of whether a country represents only itself in the SC, or its region, or the whole of UN membership needs further clarifications. UN Charter, Article 24.1: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” c) Member States expressed diverging views on the possibility of reflecting the increasing role of regional groups and regional organizations in international relations, particularly in the fields of peace and security. d) Further clarification is needed on the role of regional groups in selecting new members. e) The African Union reserves the right for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council, based on its criteria for selection, as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus. f) In relation with equitable representation, further clarification is needed on the concepts of “equitable geographical distribution” and “regional representation”. g) More in-depth discussions are needed to clarify questions pertaining to crossregional representation in an enlarged SC especially for small states, Small Island Developing States and Arab States. h) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five clusters, regional representation might be discussed in parallel with the size of the SC and categories of membership. Africa’s demand for equitable representation is inseparably linked to categories of membership and the question of the veto as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus. i) In seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States for an enlarged Security Council, ways should be sought to ensure consistency between the principles listed in paragraph II.1.d. with Article 23.1. of the UN Charter which refers to “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”. j) During discussions in IGN GA72 and in previous IGN sessions, some Member States expressed different views with regard to the distribution of additional seats among the regional groups. Many Member States stressed the close interconnectedness between these demands for regional representation and the 52  3 0 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 53  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

977

categories of membership as well as the question of the veto. Views included, but are not limited to: In case of expansion of non-permanent seats, including with a longer term, some Member States proposed: African States: 3 longer-term seats; Asia-Pacific States: 3 longer-term seats; Eastern European States: 1 two-year term seat; Latin American and Caribbean States: 2 longer-term seats; Western European and Other States: 1 longer-term seat; Small States, including Small Island Developing States [SIDS]: 1 two-year rotating seat across all regions. In case of expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats, some Member States proposed: New/ Additional permanent seats: for African States: no less than 2 or 2; Asia-Pacific States: 2; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1; Arab States: 1. Additional two-year non-permanent seats: for African States: no less than 2, 1, 1-2, 2; Asia-Pacific States: 1; Eastern European States: 1; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1; Small Island Developing States [SIDS] across all regions: 1; Arab States across regions: proportionate representation. In case of creation of longer term non-permanent seats, some Member States proposed: New longer term non-permanent seats with a term length of 8 or 10 years to be equitably distributed among African States: 2; Asia-Pacific States: 2; Latin America and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1. Additional two-year non-permanent seats: for African States: 2; Asia-Pacific States: 1; Eastern European States: 1; Latin America and Caribbean States: 1.

•

• •

• •

Original footnote *1 Examples: – If an enlarged Council consists of 21 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 22 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 23 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 24 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 25 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 26 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 27 members, 15 votes would be required 5.1.22 29 June 2018, UN General Assembly, Decision 72/557, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters54 At its 104th plenary meeting, on 29 June 2018, the General Assembly, on the proposal of its President:

54  Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its seventy-second session, Volume III, 25 December 2017-17 September 2018, UN Doc. A/72/49 (Vol. III), p. 188.

978

5 On a road to nowhere ?

(a) Decided to reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council; (b) Also decided to immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at its seventy-third session, as mandated by Assembly decisions 62/557 of 15 September 2008,55 63/565 B of 14 September 2009,56 64/568 of 13 September 2010, 65/554 of 12 September 2011, 66/566 of 13 September 2012, 67/561 of 29 August 2013, 68/557 of 8 September 2014, 69/560 of 14 September 2015,57 70/559 of 27 July 201658 and 71/553 of 19 July 2017, building on the informal meetings held during its seventy-second session and on the revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration, circulated on 14 June 2018,59 as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, reflected in the text and its annex circulated on 31 July 2015,60 and using the elements of convergence circulated on 12 July 201661 and the elements of commonality and issues for further consideration circulated on 27 June 201762 to help to inform its future work, while welcoming the active engagement, initiatives and intensive efforts of the President of the General Assembly, and noting with appreciation the active role and concrete efforts of the Co-Chairs undertaken in a consultative manner with a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council; (c) Further decided to convene the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council during the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, if Member States so decide; (d) Decided to include in the agenda of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly the item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. 5.1.23 29 January 2019, Statement by the President of the General Assembly, Mrs. Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters Today, we begin work again on one of the most complex processes before the General Assembly: the question of equitable representation on, and increase in, the membership of the Security Council and related matters. It is a question that the Assembly has addressed for over two decades, and that has occupied Member States for much longer than that. But it remains urgent. This week Member States have been commemorating the victims of the Holocaust. It was in the aftermath of this incomparable tragedy that the United Nations was 55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62 

→ 4.1.29. → 5.1.3. → 5.1.14. → 5.1.17. → 5.1.21. → 5.1.13. → 5.1.16. → 5.1.20.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

979

formed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and it is on the fulfilment of this promise, perhaps more than any other, that people judge the Organization. The Charter confers on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As such, the ability of the Council to effectively discharge this responsibility is, in the eyes of many, indelibly linked to the credibility of the UN as a whole. When the Security Council fails, the United Nations fails – and people lose faith in multilateralism. When the Council succeeds, it is a victory for the UN and for the rules-based international system. So the question of Security Council reform is not a theoretical one. It must not become an exercise in going through the motions. Behind every item on the Council’s agenda there are lives at stake. The people of the world are watching us. We must not disappoint them. I am grateful to Ambassador Lana Zaki Nusseibeh of the United Arab Emirates and Ambassador Christian Braun of Luxembourg for having agreed to serve as Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. I am confident that they will ably steer the process and I have no doubt that you will all extend your full support and cooperation to them, as the pressure for concrete results grows ever greater. And rightly so. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Kaha Imnadze of Georgia for his invaluable contribution to this process. It is now over 25 years since the Open-Ended Working Group was formed. Intergovernmental negotiations began more than a decade ago. And still, the composition of the Security Council continues broadly to reflect the world as it was in 1945, save for the increase in non-permanent seats agreed half a century ago. A lot has changed since then, to put it mildly. Member States have repeatedly called for a Security Council that reflects current political realities. You have called for the Council to be more representative, efficient and transparent – not just for the sake of it, but to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. This is arguably more important now than ever. Progress this year is critical. Many Member States feel that we have reached a “make or break” point. Many have expressed frustration at the lack of progress. Others are concerned that the intergovernmental negotiations may not be the appropriate forum for advancing Security Council reform. I am aware of the sensitivities that are involved, and of the differences that persist. However, I firmly believe in the power of dialogue, and in the ability – and diplomatic skill – of Member States to make meaningful progress in the coming months. While there are still areas of great divergence, there is also much on which Member States agree. We can build on the progress made so far if we act in a spirit of goodwill and compromise, with political will, courage and resolve, as well as flexibility and constructiveness. This will require a credible process within the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations that Member States have full confidence in, from beginning to end. This means inclusivity – every country’s view counts and every country must have ownership of the process, regardless of its size. It means also transparency. A clear timeline with dates and sufficient time for planning purposes will be extremely useful. And it means accountability and continuity. Our work should be guided by lessons learned and best practices.

980

5 On a road to nowhere ?

As I stated during the interactive dialogue with candidates to the Presidency of the General Assembly in May 2018, the extent to which this is achieved, and the pace and progress, is up to you – the Member States. This is an intergovernmental process. I will do my utmost to support you, while you are in the driving seat. I encourage continued interaction between the main negotiating blocs to seek further areas of convergence and to reassess their positions, bearing in mind that the clock for reform is ticking. The people of the world are watching, and they want results. Today’s debate provides an opportunity for Member States to express their views and expectations for the process. I will exert every effort to facilitate your work, and to enable an open and sincere discussion as we seek to advance our shared aspiration of reforming the Security Council. 5.1.24  7 June 2019, Revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, Annex to a letter from the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, Mr. Christian Braun and Ms. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh, to the Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the UN63 […] Following the IGN GA73 meetings of 29-30 January, 25-26 February, 4-5 April, 1-2 May and 29-30 May 2019, the following updates were made to the revised commonalities and issues for further consideration related to all five key issues listed by Decision 62/557:64 II. Commonalities 1. General a) The reform of the United Nations Security Council is in the interest of Member States and the United Nations system as a whole. b) The objective of reform is to make the Council more “broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”, as stipulated by “the World Summit Outcome Document”.65 c) The reform of the Security Council should reflect the realities of the contemporary world, especially the increased representation of developing countries, small and medium sized states. d) There is growing support by Member States for the legitimate aspirations of African countries to play their rightful role on the global stage including through 63  Paras. 2 and 4 of this letter of 7 June 2019 read: “Following the meetings of the IGN held during the 73rd session, we have the honour of enclosing herewith the final version of the document entitled ‘Revised elements of commonality […]’. This document was circulated to the membership informally on 30 May 2019 and has now been updated with small editorial changes. […] The document attached to this letter is a continuation of the IGN outcome documents produced during the 70th, 71st and 72nd session of the GA and further draws on elements of the document that was the outcome of the 69th session of the GA.” For a critical discussion of the document, and the process in which it came about, in the plenary of the General Assembly on 25 June 2019, see UN Doc. A/73/PV.92. See also the statement by the co-chair of the IGN, Ambassador Braun, of 25 June 2019, → 5.1.26. 64  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 65  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

981

an increased presence in the Security Council, as a priority, to redress the historical injustice against Africa. e) The reform of the Security Council is a Member States driven process. f) Reform of the Security Council shall ensure a transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Council. Furthermore, the principle of democracy remains an important principle in Member States’ efforts to reform the Council. g) To improve the prospects for early reform, a continued, substantive and enhanced engagement is of utmost importance. h) Although expressing different views on substance, Member States are driving the IGN process forward together, in accordance with the usual practices and procedures of the General Assembly. i) All five key issues are strongly interlinked and therefore negotiations should be based on the principle: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. j) The IGN process should build on the work done in previous years, so that convergence will increase gradually, with a view to garnering the widest possible political acceptance. 2. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Security Council and Working Methods of the Council The reform of the Security Council should lead to an expansion of the Security Council and therefore certain areas of working methods need to be addressed as a result of expansion. Size of an enlarged Security Council – An enlarged Security Council should consist of a total of members in the mid20s, within an overall range of 21-27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussion of Member States on the key issues of categories of membership and regional representation, and with the total size ensuring a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council. (This would entail amendments to article 23 (1) and 23 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations.) Working Methods of the Security Council – Majority required for decision-making: the number of affirmative votes required should be in line with the current practice*1, with the exact number of votes required to emerge from the discussions of Member States on the key issues of categories of membership, regional representation and the question of veto. (This would entail amendments to article 27 (2) and 27 (3) and to article 109 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations.) […] 4. Categories of membership In an enlarged Security Council, the expansion of the category of 2-year term nonpermanent members is accepted by all Member States as part of a comprehensive Security Council reform. The Council’s expansion in other categories (permanent, longer term seats, transitional options) remains to be agreed through negotiations by Member States. 5. The question of veto The question of veto is a key element of Security Council reform.

982

5 On a road to nowhere ?

6. Regional representation a) Enlargement of the Security Council should serve to improve the representation of underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups. b) An increase in membership should allow for fair and equitable representation as well as cross regional balances, while maintaining an effective and operational character of the Council. c) Due attention has to be paid to the equitable representation of developing countries, small states, Small Island Developing States and Arab States. d) Africa should be equitably represented in a reformed Security Council. III. Issues for further consideration The list of issues for further consideration is not an exhaustive one. 1. General a) Taking into account article 23 (1) of the UN Charter, the degree to which Member States’ contributions to the maintenance of peace and security should be reflected in the duration of their presence in the Security Council remains to be further explored. b) Member States continue to discuss how to take into account the principles of democracy and representation in pursuing the objective of a more democratic Security Council. c) There is overwhelming support by the majority of Member States for the Common African Position. d) Although a large variety of opinions on the Security Council’s reform persist, particularly in relation to the following three clusters: categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation, many Member States express a desire to move to the next phase. e) In seeking to improve the working practice of the IGN, possible ways of enhancing the institutional memory and working methods need to be further discussed. 2. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] 3. Size of an enlarged Security Council and Working Methods of the Council a) The appropriateness of the ratio between the number of Security Council members and General Assembly members as well as the number of non-permanent members and the number of permanent members continues to be discussed. b) In line with the element of convergence referring to the Presidency of the Security Council concrete ways to ensure non-permanent members hold the rotating presidency at least once during their tenure remain to be determined. c) While there is a convergence on the need to ensure a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council, Member States continue discuss different methods to ensure this. d) There is a need to regularly review the working methods of an enlarged Security Council and to adjust them as appropriate. 4. Categories of membership a) Member States express their preference for one or more of the following options, in a reformed Security Council: – Enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and 2-year nonpermanent categories;

5 On a road to nowhere ?

983

– Enlargement of the Security Council with 2-year term non-permanent members and creation of longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate reelection; – Enlargement of the Security Council with 2-year term non-permanent seats. b) The UN Charter currently specifies only two categories (permanent and nonpermanent), but GA decision 62/557 refers to “categories of membership”. The question of whether the creation of longer-term non-permanent seats, or possible permanent members without veto would classify as the creation of a new category or not remains to be explored. c) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five key issues, categories of membership might be discussed in parallel with regional representation, the size of the Security Council and the question of veto. 5. The question of veto a) More in-depth discussions are needed to explore how the veto would further impact the work and the effectiveness of an enlarged Security Council. b) The following options in regards to the veto are being discussed by Member States: – In the case of enlargement of the Security Council in the permanent category: Extension of the veto to all permanent members; or ◯  ◯  No extension of the veto; or ◯  Extension of the veto to be decided on in the framework of a review. – Progressive restraint. – Abolition of the veto. – Opposition in principle to the veto, with the caveat that as long as it exists, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council including any potential permanent members from Africa – based on the common African position reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus adopted by the African Union in March 2005. – Voluntarily refrain from the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes. Initiatives in this regard include the “Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities” presented by France and Mexico during the 70th session of the GA*2 and the “Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”*3 by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group. 6. Regional representation a) The appropriate ratio between the number of non-permanent members and the number of countries in regional groups continues to be discussed. b) The question of whether a country represents only itself in the Council, its region, or the whole of UN membership is being further clarified. Member States’ views on this issue differ depending also on the category of membership in question. The UN Charter, in article 24(1) states: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” c) Member States express diverging views on the possibility of reflecting the increasing role of regional groups and regional organizations in international relations, particularly in the fields of peace and security.

984

5 On a road to nowhere ?

d) Further clarification is needed on the role of regional groups in selecting new members. e) The African Union reserves the right for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council, based on its criteria for selection, as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus.66 Candidates would then be considered for election by the General Assembly. f) In relation with equitable representation, further clarification is needed on the concepts of “equitable geographic distribution” and “regional representation”. g) In relation to cross-regional representation, there are diverging views whether the allocation of new seats will be on the basis of the currently constituted regional groups or whether they should be reserved for cross-regional representation. h) More in-depth discussions are needed to clarify questions pertaining to crossregional representation in an enlarged Security Council especially for small states, Small Island Developing States and Arab States. i) While bearing in mind the close connections between all five clusters, discussions on regional representation will impact the discussions on the size of the Security Council and categories of membership. For example, Africa’s demand for equitable representation is inseparably linked to categories of membership and the question of the veto, as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus. j) In seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States for an enlarged Security Council, ways should be sought to ensure consistency between the principles listed in paragraph II.1.d. with article 23 (1) of the UN Charter which refers to “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”. k) Members States express different views with regard to the distribution of additional seats among the regional groups. Many Members States stress the close interconnectedness between adequate regional representation and the categories of membership as well as the question of the veto. Views include, but are not limited to: – In case of expansion of non-permanent seats, including with a longer term, some Member States proposed: African States: 3 longer-term seats; Asia-Pacific States: 3 longer-term ◯  seats; Latin American and Caribbean States: 2 longer-term seats; Western European and Other States: 1 longer-term seat; Eastern European States: 1 two-year term seat; Small States, including Small Island Developing States [SIDS]: 1 two-year rotating seat across all regions. – In case of creation of longer term non-permanent seats, some Member States proposed: ◯  New longer term non-permanent seats with a term length of 8 or 10 years to be equitably distributed for: African States: 2; Asia-Pacific States: 2; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1. ◯  Together with additional two-year non-permanent seats: for African States: 2; Asia-Pacific States: 1; Eastern European States: 1; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1. 66  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

985

– In case of expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats, some Member States proposed: ◯  New/ Additional permanent seats for: African States: no less than 2 or 2; Asia-Pacific States: 2; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1; Arab States: 1. ◯  Additional two-year non-permanent seats for: African States: no less than 2, 1, 1-2, 2; Asia-Pacific States: 1; Eastern European States: 1; Latin American and Caribbean States: 1; Western European and Other States: 1; Small Island Developing States [SIDS] across all regions that contain SIDS: 1; Arab States across regions: proportionate representation Original footnotes: Examples: – If an enlarged Council consists of 21 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 22 members, 12 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 23 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 24 members, 13 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 25 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 26 members, 14 votes would be required – If an enlarged Council consists of 27 members, 15 votes would be required *2 A/68/PV.5 [30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21]. *3 A/70/621 [23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25]. *1

5.1.25 24 June 2019, UN General Assembly, Decision 73/554, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters67 May I take it that the General Assembly, 1. Decides to reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council; 2. Also decides to immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session, as mandated by Assembly decisions 62/557 of 15 September 2008,68 63/565 B of 14 September 2009,69 64/568 of 13 September 2010, 65/554 of 12 September 2011, 66/ 566 of 13 September 2012, 67/561 of 29 August 2013, 68/557 of 8 September 2014, 69/560 of 14 September 2015,70 70/559 of 27 July 201671 and 71/553 of 19 July 2017 and 72/557 of 29 June 2018,72 building on the informal meetings held during its seventy-third session and on the revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration, 67  Adopted by the General Assembly in its 92nd plenary meeting, as proposed by the President. See UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, p. 2. To be published in Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its seventy-third session, UN Doc. A/73/49. 68  → 4.1.29. 69  → 5.1.3. 70  → 5.1.14. 71  → 5.1.17. 72  → 5.1.22.

986

5 On a road to nowhere ?

circulated on 7 June 2019,73 as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, reflected in the text and its annex circulated on 31 July 2015,74 to help inform its future work; 3. Welcomes the active engagement, initiatives and intensive efforts of the President of the General Assembly, and notes with appreciation the active role and concrete efforts of the Co-Chairs undertaken in a consultative manner with a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council; 4. Decides to convene the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council during the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly, if Member States so decide; 5. Decides to include in the agenda of the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly the item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. 5.1.26  25 June 2019, Statement by the Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Christian Braun, in the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.92, pp. 12-13 It is my pleasure to speak today on behalf of the co-Chairs of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform for this seventy-third session.75 […] As co-Chairs, we feel that the outcome of this session, namely, a substantive revision of the document on elements of commonality and issues for further consideration, has gently nudged the needle for reform forward. We welcome its inclusion in decision 73/554,76 just adopted by consensus. However, it is certain that any successes during this session can only be attributed to the work and engagement of Member States, and we again thank them all for the support extended to us. Today we close a somewhat difficult session of the intergovernmental negotiations, which saw Member States divided both on process as well as on substance. Some turbulence is certainly to be expected on an issue that is so protracted, complex and vital to the future of the Organization. However, a reform that enjoys the widest possible political acceptance will be achieved only through greater dialogue, exchanges and genuine political will from Member States. We should not shy away from truly interactive discussions, even when they become difficult. While the intergovernmental negotiations process certainly has inherent flaws, only increased engagement will create the necessary conditions to build convergence among all Member States. On that note, I would like to commend the effort made by many groups this session to reach out to each other outside our formal intergovernmental negotiations meetings. Such kinds of informal interactions and discussions will be vital to the continuing success of the intergovernmental negotiations process. 73  → 5.1.24. 74  → 5.1.13. 75  The two co-chairs were Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh, Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates, and Ambassador Christian Braun, Permanent Representative of Luxembourg. 76  → 5.1.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

987

The document entitled “Revised elements of commonality and issues for further consideration”77 directly builds on the work of the previous session, as well as encapsulating the work of the seventieth and seventy-first sessions. We saw the continuation as a valuable step in and of itself. The simple fact that this year’s intergovernmental negotiations did not start from scratch should not be underestimated. As members will recall, our first meeting in January presented us with polarized views on the potential conduct of work for the session. However, Member States managed to forge consensus around taking the document from last year forward and using it as a basis for our discussions this year. That is a clear demonstration of political will for continuity in this process. We hope that the document will be of use in future sessions. We recognize that today’s document is not perfect, or for that matter complete. Indeed, we have clearly heard diverging views on how the document can be improved. However, we believe that it represents good incremental progress, resulting directly from our discussions and interactive dialogue on all key issues, and work that is ready to be picked up again next year. The document reflects several new areas of convergence in the views of Member States, particularly in the areas of the Council’s working methods and the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. That identification of further areas on which we can all agree is positive but also highlights that a greater focus now needs to be placed on building bridges regarding the remaining key issues of reform. We also saw existing diverging positions further clarified, which is an important step towards bringing positions closer together, including on the question of cross-regional representation in the Council, and differing views on categories of membership. And, very importantly, within the document the African position is now incorporated in a more nuanced way than before, reflecting the increasing support for Africa’s aspirations expressed among the broader membership. As the intergovernmental negotiations continue, given the importance of the topic at hand, in the coming years Member States may also wish to consider the desirability of establishing formalized continuity mechanisms and an institutional memory for the intergovernmental negotiations in order to improve our work. […]

5.2 Statements by member states regarding the composition of the Security Council 5.2.1 Statements regarding an expansion of the Council in the existing categories of seats 5.2.1.1 Statements supporting additional permanent seats (possibly with the right of veto) 5.2.1.1.1 4 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations78 […] Some say that the addition of permanent members contravenes key Charter principles such as:

•

77  7 June 2019, → 5.1.24. 78  → 5.2.2.4.1 for Brazil’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement.

988

5 On a road to nowhere ?

a. Equal sovereignty of States This is not and cannot be the case, unless one is willing to argue that the Charter itself is internally contradictory, since it establishes both the principle and the existence of permanent members. b. Equitable geographical distribution Again, the increase in the number of permanent members does not contradict such principle unless one is willing to argue that the Charter is internally contradictory, since it establishes both the principle and the existence of permanent members itself. Some say the addition of permanent members is undemocratic The argument fails to consider that: a) the establishment of new permanent members would be achieved through the democratic exercise of the vote in the General Assembly, “the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations” (Outcome Document 2005,79 paragraph 149); b) any resolution reforming the Council would require an amendment to the Charter, which, in turn, implies complying with the most stringent voting requirements in the Charter (2/3 of the Members); and c) such amendment to the Charter would have to be ratified by an equally stringent margin, the attainment of which is in itself the indication of the wide support of the membership. Increase in the number of non-permanent members only ◯  Since eliminating the mismatch between the composition of the SC and today’s political realities requires expanding the group of permanent members, adding only non-permanent members would actually mean leaving the “status quo” untouched, which is rejected by the vast majority of members, including Brazil. ◯  Reducing such mismatch also requires taking into account one key development at the UN since 1945 which is the dramatic expansion of the membership. To address such aspect, we also need to increase the number of non-permanent members. […]

•

•

5.2.1.1.2 4 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations80 […] 1. France supports expansion of the Council in the two categories of members, permanent and non-permanent. The admission of new States to the status of permanent member is necessary for several reasons: – Consideration should be given to the emergence of new powers who have the willingness and capacity to assume significant responsibilities. – Not creating new permanent seats would enlarge the gap between the composition of the Security Council and the reality of the contemporary world. – Those able to make a significant contribution (politically, financially, or militarily) to the United Nations’ maintenance of international peace and security should be able to fully utilize their capacities with a mandate corresponding to their size (demographically, economically and politically). 79  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23. 80  Original in French. → 5.2.2.2.2 for France’s support of an intermediate reform with nonpermanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. France confirmed this position on 12 November 2009 in UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 16-17.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

989

– The relationship between the permanent members and the non-permanent members is an essential factor to the efficiency of the Council: the permanent members ensure continuity in the Council’s work. Imbalance between the two categories of members could have negative effects on the Council’s efficiency. In the case of an expanded Security Council, we support the accession to permanent membership of Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, and Africa. This also raises the question of including an Arab country among the permanent members of the Security Council. […] 5.2.1.1.3 11 June 2009, France, Mr. Lacroix, Intergovernmental Negotiations81 Dear Mr. President, Thank you for organizing this new meeting aimed at negotiating Security Council reform in accordance with your proposal and your letter of June 8. Concerning France, I would like to specify the following key points relating to the composition of the Security Council: The United Nations Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Its format and methods ensure its effectiveness. However, Security Council reform is essential in order for it to remain effective and, at the same time, strengthen its legitimacy in a world that is different to what it was in 1945. In order to better represent the realities of today’s world, Security Council Reform must be carried out for both categories of members: permanent and non-permanent. It must take into account the emergence of new powers that possess the willingness to assume the responsibility of a permanent seat in the Security Council and that are, in line with the United Nations Charter, able to make a significant contribution to the Council’s international peacekeeping and international security actions. In this respect, we support the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status. We also support an increased presence of African countries within the Security Council, in particular among its permanent members. There is also the question of the presence of an Arab State as part of the permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, the expansion of the Security Council should not be carried out to the detriment of the effectiveness of its actions and its credibility as the main organ responsible for international peace and security. The Security Council must therefore be kept to a reasonable size. […] 5.2.1.1.4 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18 […] Mongolia’s stance on the reform of the Security Council is well known. We have consistently stood for a just and equitable enlargement of the Council by increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent members while ensuring due representation for developing and developed countries. Our position on enlargement in both categories is guided by, and based on, a legislative and Charter-defined composition, political considerations that reflect the change in the balance of power, and the 81  → 5.2.2.2.5 for France’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

990

5 On a road to nowhere ?

principles of justice and equality to ensure greater and enhanced representation for developing world. My delegation shares the view of the majority of Member States that the veto right is anachronistic and needs to be reviewed and limited, with the ultimate objective being its abolition. However, as long as it exists, it must be extended to new permanent members so as not to create a new category of Council membership. We also support the clearly expressed position of aspirants regarding the establishment of a voluntary moratorium on the use of the veto until the proposed review process takes place. On the issue of regional representation, the solution ought to be fair and just. We attach great importance to the criterion of equitable geographical distribution, with an emphasis on non- and underrepresented groups, in particular those of Africa, Asia and Latin American and Caribbean. My delegation also attaches particular importance to ensuring the representation of small States in the Security Council. Based on its position with regard to categories and regional representation, my delegation would prefer an enlarged Council to comprise 24 or 25 members, with 6 new permanent members and 4 or 5 additional non-permanent members. We strongly believe that in order to make the necessary breakthrough in our negotiations, we need primarily to decide on the categories of Security Council enlargement. We share the view that the overwhelming majority of Member States have expressed, in no uncertain terms, regarding their preference for increasing the membership in both the current categories. We expect that the composite text of the chair that has been proposed will reflect that reality. […] 5.2.1.1.5 19 January 2010, France, Mr. Araud, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] 2. In principle, we support an expansion in the two categories of members. This is, without doubt, one element of convergence in our discussions. Security Council reform must in fact take into account the emergence of new powers that are willing to assume the responsibility of a permanent seat in the Security Council and that are, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, able to make a significant contribution to the Council’s actions in the maintenance of international peacekeeping and security. With this in mind, we support the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status. We also support an increased presence of African countries within the Security Council, in particular among its permanent members. There is also the question of the presence of an Arab State as part of permanent members of the Security Council. 3. Unfortunately, there is still a very real risk – that we deeply regret – that Security Council reform could be blocked, as last year’s debates demonstrated. In order to avoid this deadlock, we support the pragmatic option of an intermediate reform, as proposed by the President of the Republic of France and the British Prime Minister.82 This intermediate reform could include the creation of a new category of seats, with a longer term than that of the current elected members. At the end of this intermediate phase, it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones. 82  27 March 2008, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

991

We are ready to work with all of our partners to determine the parameters of this intermediate reform which should be examined in detail during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, when we hope to make significant progress. […] 5.2.1.1.6 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-9983 PROPOSALS OF CUBA ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  INTRODUCTION The reform of the Security Council cannot continue to be a postponed and disregarded objective. There cannot be a true reform of the UN until a genuine reform of the Security Council does not take place. We are at a key moment regarding this issue, which demands immediate practical actions. We do not favour the establishment of artificial deadlines, which hinder the normal development of a negotiation process. But neither do we endorse dilatory manoeuvres aimed at continuing delaying the achievement of concrete results. It would be tantamount, in practical terms, to perpetuating the status quo of the Security Council. Standing by and postponing indefinitely the reform of the Security Council is not an acceptable option for Cuba. Cuba supports a reform process of the Security Council that is based on a full and comprehensive approach, addressing all substantive issues relating, inter alia, to the question of the categories of membership, size, regional representation, the Council’s working methods and decision-making process, including the question of the veto.  SIZE OF AN ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL Cuba favours a broad increase in the membership of the Security Council, with not less than 26 members. This increase should include both categories of members, and developing countries should have the bulk of this number. The objective should not be to increase the membership for the sake of it, but rather address the unjustifiable under-representation of developing countries in the Council.  CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP Cuba favours the expansion, both in the category of permanent members and nonpermanent ones. Cuba will not support any partial or selective expansion, nor any increase in the Council’s membership to the detriment of developing countries. The main expansion in both categories must be carried out in the number of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean must be included. We consider that increasing only the number of non-permanent seats would cause the huge gap existing between permanent and non-permanent members to widen even more. It would enhance the disproportion between the representation of developed Countries and that of developing countries within the Council. Increasing only the number of non-permanent seats would make the Council to be an even less representative organ, and hence less legitimate and effective.

•

•

•

83  → 5.4.3.7 for Cuba’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

992

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Cuba does not favour the creation of new categories of members. Instead of contributing to the better functioning of the Council, new categories would enhance the existing differences and spur division among the members of the Security Council. The new members of the Security Council, including the new permanent ones, should enjoy the same rights and powers as current members of this organ. Cuba would not be opposed to the immediate re-election of non-permanent members.  THE QUESTION OF THE VETO […]  QUESTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATION The Security Council in its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical realities and needs to be rebalanced. African, Asian and Latin American and the Caribbean States are underrepresented. The main objective of the expansion of the Council should be to rectify the current insufficient representation in that organ of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The fact that developing countries are not properly represented in the Security Council undermines the very interests of the Council, its authority, and credibility. […]

• •

5.2.1.1.7 22 February 2010, L.69 Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 103 L.69 Group proposal for text-based negotiations on reform of the UN Security Council The L.69 Group requests that the negotiating text to be presented by the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations include the following elements: 1. Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent membership. [In 1963-65, the non-permanent membership of the UNSC was increased but did not result in any real change in its decision making process, which continued to reflect the realities of 1945. Since then, the world has undergone seminal changes and it is imperative that the UNSC reflect contemporary world realities. This requires an expansion in its permanent and non-permanent membership, both to account for the increased UN membership and to enhance its legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness.] 2. Equitable geographical distribution. [The distribution of seats must reflect the change in composition of the UN membership, and address the non-representation of some regions in the permanent membership category and the under-representation of developing countries in both membership categories.] 3. The question of the veto. 4. Improved relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA. [This should, inter alia, address improved reporting by the UNSC, regular consultations between the UNSC and the UNGA bodies, and strict adherence to their respective mandates.] 5. Comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the UNSC. [This should, inter alia, address the issue of enhanced access and transparency to non-members, full implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, and

5 On a road to nowhere ?

993

involvement of Troop Contributing Countries in decision making on all aspects of peacekeeping operations.] 6. Provision for a review. 5.2.1.1.8 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom, Joint position on reform of the Security Council, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 11784 UK/French position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council The United Kingdom and France wish to pursue their efforts to ensure that the Security Council is more representative of today’s world while at the same time preserving its capacity to take the steps required to cope with the problems of security posed by the 21st century. The United Kingdom and France support an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of members. The United Kingdom and France reaffirm the support of their two countries for the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for new permanent seats, along with representation for Africa among the permanent members of the Security Council. With a view to breaking the deadlock in the negotiations, the United Kingdom and France support a pragmatic intermediate solution85 that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into permanent seats. It is the belief of the United Kingdom and France that the intermediate solution should be considered further. We are pleased to note that the idea of an intermediate solution has gained increasing support from UN Member States. The United Kingdom and France are ready and willing to work with all partners to define the parameters of such an intermediate reform as they emerge through the course of the negotiations. They expect significant progress during the 64th UNGA. Issues we need to consider during this UNGA include: the duration of the intermediate period, the size and composition of the Council during this phase, and the modalities of entry into force. 5.2.1.1.9 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-11486 Position of Peru on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and others matters related to the Council I. Categories and Size Peru supports the transformation of the Security Council into a body that is more transparent, representative, and democratic, reflecting the realities of the 21st Century.

84  France and the United Kingdom confirmed this position on 11 November 2010 in UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, p. 20. 85  27 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.15; 4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.2.2. 86  → 5.3.7 for Peru’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.3.8 for Peru’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

994

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Peru supports the consensus in relation to the need for expansion, and, with respect to this point, it supports the expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent membership. In this regard, when the context of the current international order is taken into account, Peru is reiterating its belief in the need to incorporate new permanent members with the objective of properly adapting the Council to new realities. Due to the lack of consensus on this point, we believe that there is a need for preliminary progress along an interim path with the aim of the increasing of new permanent members. […] Peru believes that a transitional interim formula with these characteristics could be implemented for a period of fifteen years, with a subsequent mandatory new round of evaluations. These assessments would be carried out through a review clause process. This would allow longer-term decisions to be adopted for enabling creation of the most fair and reasonable balance, thereby reflecting the various positions expressed by the Member States. II. Veto […] III. Regional Representation Peru is promoting options for equitable geographical distribution that can increase possibilities of presence for our region, as well as contributing to the objective of achieving more frequent participation in the Council. In relation to proposals submitted in this regard, Peru believes that geographical distribution reflects the spirit of the Charter, which takes individual and sovereign states into consideration under the principle of the sovereign equality of all members. […] 5.2.1.1.10 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 14287 Proposals of the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM […] 2. Regarding regional representation, Venezuela will support an expansion that addresses the under-representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the Security Council, with members in both categories. We firmly believe that the new membership will bring innovative approaches from a sociological and historical perspective of each region, which will contribute to restoring the legitimacy of the Security Council in fulfilling its responsibilities as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, within a framework of full respect for the principles of international law. […]

87  → 5.3.9 for Venezuela’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.3.10 for Venezuela’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

995

5.2.1.1.11 4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-17888 Position of Denmark on Reform of the United Nations Security Council Denmark remains firmly committed to a comprehensive Security Council reform. It is an essential component of the overall reform of the United Nations. Progress is needed to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the whole UN organization. To do so the Security Council must reflect the realities of today’s world. The ultimate goal is a reform which is comprehensive and which increases the Council’s ability to discharge its mandate under the Charter. Danish support to the G4 proposal remains unchanged.89 […] Categories of Membership Denmark remains committed to an enlargement of the Council with both permanent and non-permanent members. In order to move forward Denmark is, furthermore, ready to look at other solutions that would allow for the testing of various models, which could garner wide-spread support among members, provided they contain a clear review-clause. The Question of Veto […] Question of Representation The present composition of the Security Council does not reflect the realities of today. The Security Council must continue to play a decisive role in the promotion of peace, security, human rights and democracy. To do so more effectively broader representation is needed. Denmark supports expansion by increasing the number of permanent members and non-permanent seats, and by including both developing and developed countries as new permanent members. The goal is to enhance the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of Security Council decisions. Effectiveness in the sense that the collective pressure to adhere to Security Council decisions would increase. Small states form the majority of the membership of the United Nations. It is important to ensure that any reform takes full account of the need to give small states an opportunity to participate in the work of the Security Council. All countries, regardless of size, should continue to have the opportunity to serve as members of the Council and give their contribution to stability and security. This is crucial for achieving the common goal of enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of this important body, and thereby also its efficiency. […]

88  → 5.3.11 for Denmark’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.4.6 for Denmark’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 89  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

996

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.1.1.12 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin pp. 145-14690 Positions of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform Introduction 1. Norway supports a comprehensive Security Council reform. The Security Council needs to be reformed to better reflect the world community of the 21st century. It is an essential component of the overall United Nations reform, and progress is needed to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the whole organization. Reforming the Security Council is an enormous undertaking that will require flexibility and willingness to compromise from all Member States. Norway is willing to start negotiations in an open and constructive manner. The process should be open, flexible and inclusive. Our objective remains to find solutions that will bolster the legitimacy of the Council and enhance respect for and compliance with its decisions, while at the same time maintaining the Council as an effective forum for decision-making. 2. The task for us now is not to question the need and purpose of reform but to act and deliver on the unanimous commitment in the form of concrete solutions at the earliest possible time. The urgent task now is to begin substantive negotiations and to seek to achieve tangible results. We are determined to engage constructively in the substantive negotiations to attain a concrete outcome during the current session. Categories of membership 3. Norway remains open to the idea of enlargement in both the permanent and nonpermanent category. On the idea of an interim solution creating a third category of seats that has often been raised in our discussions, Norway is ready to assess interim solutions that would allow for the testing of various models as long as they contain a clear review clause. 4. Smaller states form the majority of the membership of the United Nations. In accordance with the basic principles of universal representation in the UN, serving on the Security Council is and should remain a privilege for all member states. Regional representation 5. The composition of the Council should better reflect the current configuration of the membership of the United Nations, including developing states and smaller states. Broad representation from all regions of the world lends legitimacy to the Security Council. With elected members from all regions, the Council can make informed decisions and ensure broad support for its decisions among all Members of the United Nations. 6. While equitable geographic representation remains an important principle in the distribution of non-elected seats among regional groups, we should not forget that the Charter pays special regard to the contribution of Members States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organization. Many smaller states make significant contributions to the United Nations, out of all proportion to their size. 7. We maintain that only States can be members of the Security Council. We encourage States to consult with other members of their regional group and to ensure broad 90  → 5.3.13 for Norway’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.4.7 for Norway’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

997

respect for the decisions of the Council. But it remains an open question how States could represent entire groups. We note that several groups are united in their demand for greater representation, but that there is no agreement as to which States could best represent them. Reforming the Security Council requires broadening its legitimacy among all Member States. We must ensure the proper representation of those countries which have so far been underrepresented, but without undermining the sovereign equality of all member states. […] 5.2.1.1.13 8 November 2010, United States, President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India

[…] Indeed, the just and sustainable international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate. That is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member. […] 5.2.1.1.14 8 November 2011, France, Mr. Briens, UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, p. 16 […] Much progress has been made since we began the intergovernmental negotiation process in 2009 led by Ambassador Tanin. That progress was made thanks to the efforts of the facilitator, the successive Presidents of the General Assembly and the Member States. We have succeeded in identifying elements of convergence that we could explore further, for example, concerning enlargement of the Council in the two categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent. We are duty-bound now to be bold and to move to the heart of the matter. Out of respect for the work already accomplished, standing still or moving backwards is not an option. The requirements are straightforward and unchanged. Reform of the Security Council must take on board the emergence of new Powers that have the will and the capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of permanent membership of the Security Council and which are, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, in a position to make an important contribution to Council action in the maintenance of international peace and security. In that context, France supports permanent membership for Germany, Brazil, India and Japan, as well as representation for the countries of Africa. The matter of representation for the Arab countries is also on the table. Beyond that, France’s position has not changed. We stand ready, as do many States of goodwill in this Assembly, to work actively to break the deadlock and overcome the principled positions. That could involve considering an interim solution in accordance with a proposal that was made jointly three years ago by the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.91 The modalities and parameters of that solution are not set in stone or predetermined; they must result from negotiations among the Member States. The reform must not be allowed to fall off our priority agenda, because if it does, it will stay off it indefinitely. Alongside the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations 91  27 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.15.

998

5 On a road to nowhere ?

on Security Council reform, it is within the powers of the President of the General Assembly to give new impetus to the discussions. Getting Member States to negotiate in a genuine manner is a matter of shared political will. The guidelines that the President of the General Assembly gives us will be crucial to that end. Far-reaching reform of the Security Council, which could take place after a transition period, will require audacity and perseverance. France stands ready to make our contribution and provide our support to this objective. 5.2.1.1.15 2012, L.69 Group, Draft Resolution92 The General Assembly, Reaffirming the aims and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling its resolutions 48/26 of 3 Dec 199393 and 53/30 of 1 Dec 199894 as well as its decisions 61/561 of 17 Sept 200795 and 62/557 of 15 Sept 2008,96 Taking into account the need to strengthen UN institutions in order to enhance the efficiency of the organization, especially its principal organs and, in particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council, Emphasizing the need to strengthen the General Assembly which should be made to function effectively as the main deliberative and representative organ of the UN, Cognizant of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the UN, Recalling the resolve of world leaders, reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome,97 to support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of overall efforts to reform the UN in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy and implementation of its decisions, Aiming to expand the membership of the Security Council to better reflect contemporary world realities, thereby enhancing the Council’s responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States, in particular developing countries, including Small Island Developing and other small developing states, and ensuring the adoption of improved working methods, Bearing in mind the undeniable fact that in the year 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented, Resolves (1) Categories of membership To enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories (2) The question of the veto That the new permanent members shall have the same prerogatives and privileges of those of the current permanent members, including the right of veto (3) Regional Representation That additional seats be elected by the General Assembly as follows:

92  Source: Center for UN Reform Education. 93  → 3.1.2. 94  → 4.1.1 (adopted 23 November 1998). 95   UN General Assembly Decision 61/561, → 4.1.27. 96  → 4.1.29. 97  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

999

a) Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for African States with the African Group being responsible for the nomination of Africa’s representatives b) Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States c) One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States d) One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States e) One permanent seat for Western European and other States f) One non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions Regional groups shall coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for small developing states in the non-permanent category (4) Size of an enlarged Council and working methods To increase the size of the Security Council membership from fifteen to twenty-seven and recommends to the expanded Security Council to continue to adapt its working methods […] (5) Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] Amendments Resolves, following the elections as stipulated in paragraph 3 above, to amend the Charter of the UN no later than twelve weeks from the adoption of this resolution Review Resolves to provide for a review 5.2.1.1.16 21 February 2012, India, Mr. Singh Puri, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] Words have meaning. Uniting for Consensus sounds impressive. It is relevant, therefore, to ask as to who or which countries are uniting and for what kind of consensus? These are very important countries in their own right and we need to understand why they chose to unite for a consensus that essentially calls for maintenance of the status quo, i.e., an expansion only in the non-permanent categories with different categories with slightly shorter or longer term non-permanent seats. […] This is what the UFC is doing to your process. This is a group of very influential countries, perhaps one and a half dozen altogether who are intellectually very agile. I heard three of them here today. The Permanent Representative of Italy, who starts with saying that you should not conduct a straw poll.98 Then I heard the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea99 followed thereafter by my very dear friend, the Permanent Representative of Mexico say the same thing: We should not have a straw poll, we should not have a vote. I am in your hands Mr. Chairman. We need to find a way of moving forward. When the short resolution was introduced by the G4,100 which has now, as I keep saying, 85 signatories – and we have two more today and another 50 countries in the pipeline. 98  21 February 2012, Statement by Ambassador Ragaglini. 99  21 February 2012, Statement by Ambassador Shin. 100  Spring 2011, Draft Framework Resolution, which provided that “the reform of the Security Council shall include enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improvement of its working methods”.

1000

5 On a road to nowhere ?

So, we were told no, no! This is a divisive way. We should not go down that road. Alright, we say let us have a discussion. Let us not put it to a vote yet. But, how are we to proceed? We, those who want expansion in both categories, the demandeurs of expansion in both categories, have been accused of being divisive. So much so that one of my distinguished colleagues from the UfC accused us of diplomatic harassment. Another one, who is an even closer friend of mine, said the G4 proposal101 is a zero sum in nature with 4 winners and 184 losers. We were able to expose that arithmetic. Everybody would be a gainer because there will be more seats for Small Island Developing States, for smaller developing countries and others. I think we need to be very clear about what we are saying. We were told that a particular conference was organized in a capital which you attended Mr. Chairman, and there were a large number of countries. When we saw the composition of that, we found that 31 signatories to the short resolution calling for expansion in both categories had attended that meeting! So, there goes the argument about large numbers! The other one is that two-thirds majority is narrow. Now, this is more worrying because this two-thirds requirement is prescribed in the Charter. And the word “narrow” has been put in the words of the then PGA. This is even more worrying because the PGA derives his position from the Charter and the Charter prescribes two-thirds as the number required in case you want a vote to change the Charter. Alright, what do we do in case we do not want to go down that road? Can we then agree here and now on a method whereby, if you do not conduct a straw poll, can you at least be allowed to take a sense of the house after these five meetings and then come up with a proposal which we should agree to consider. Can we at least agree to that? If not, then the question arises as to what are we to do? I think the only way of empirically verifying whether party A is right or party B is right is to test their strength through a vote. […] 5.2.1.1.17 15 November 2012, Jamaica on behalf of the L.69 Group, Mr. Wolfe, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 6-7102

[…] I have the honour to speak on behalf of the group of countries that sponsored draft resolution A/61/L.69/Rev.1103 six years ago. The L.69 group brings together a diverse group of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific that are united by a common cause, that is, to achieve lasting and comprehensive reform of the Security Council. The group is strongly united in its firm conviction that expansion in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories of membership of the Security Council is needed in order to better reflect contemporary world realities and achieve a more accountable, representative and transparent Security Council. […] 101  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. See also footnote 100 above. 102  → 5.3.16 for the L.69 group’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. The L.69 Group confirmed this position in a letter to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations of 9 January 2013. 103  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1001

Thirdly, our group has also been able to enhance convergences with other likeminded groups, in particular the African Group. The L.69 and the Committee of 10 of the African Union have been collaborating closely on the convergences between them with regard to comprehensive reform. Let me reiterate today that the L.69 group acknowledges the African Common Position.104 We are of one mind in stressing that the reform we envisage is far-reaching and intended to ensure that the Council’s structure and its way of doing business is fundamentally changed so as to make it reflective of current geopolitical realities. On each of the five key issues of Security Council reform there exist clear convergences. In the view of the L.69 group, the convergences are as follows. First, the Security Council must be enlarged in both the permanent and the nonpermanent categories. Secondly, the new permanent members should have the same prerogatives and privileges as those of the current permanent members, including the veto. Thirdly, additional seats in an expanded Council should include permanent members from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean region as well as from the Western European and other States. There should be additional non-permanent seats from Africa, Asia, the Eastern European Group, Latin America and the Caribbean region, as well as one non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions. Further, regional groups should coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for small developing States in the non-permanent category. […] 5.2.1.1.18 25 February 2013, Caribbean Community, Draft Resolution105 The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48/26 of 3 Dec 1993106 and 53/30 of 1 Dec 1998107 as well as its decisions 61/561 of 17 Sept 2007108 and 62/557 of 15 Sept 2008,109 Cognizant of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the UN, Recalling the resolve of world leaders, reflected in the 2005 World Summit Outcome,110 to support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of overall efforts to reform the UN in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy and implementation of its decisions, Aiming to reform the Security Council to better reflect contemporary world realities, thereby enhancing the Council’s responsiveness to views and needs of all Member

104  2 9 September 1994, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21; 8-10 June 1998, Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, → 4.2.2.3.2; 7-8 March 2005, The Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 105  Source: Center for UN Reform Education. 106  → 3.1.2. 107  → 4.1.1 (adopted 23 November 1998). 108   UN General Assembly Decision 61/561, → 4.1.27. 109  → 4.1.29. 110  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

1002

5 On a road to nowhere ?

States, in particular developing countries, including Small Island Developing and other small developing States, and ensuring the adoption of improved working methods, Bearing in mind the undeniable fact that in the year 1945, when the UN was formed, several developing countries of the world, including Africa, were not represented, Resolves (1) Categories of membership To enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories (2) The question of the veto That the new permanent members shall have the same prerogatives and privileges of those of the current permanent members, including the right of veto (3) Regional Representation That additional seats be elected by the General Assembly as follows: a) Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for African States with the African Group being responsible for the nomination of Africa’s representatives b) Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States c) One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States d) One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States e) One permanent seat for Western European and other States f) One non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions Regional groups shall coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for Small Island Developing States in the non-permanent category (4) Size of an enlarged Council and working methods To increase the size of the Security Council membership from 15 to 27 and recommends to the expanded Security Council to continue to improve its working methods […] (5) Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly […] Amendments Resolves, following the elections as stipulated in paragraph 3 above, to amend the Charter of the UN no later than twelve weeks from the adoption of this resolution Review Resolves to provide for a review 5.2.1.1.19 7 November 2013, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 28-29111 […] As members know, France’s requirements for reform have not changed. The reform of the Council must take into account the emergence of new Powers that are willing and able to assume the responsibilities of a permanent presence on the Security Council and that are, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, able to make a significant contribution to the work of the Council. It is in that context that France supports an expansion in both categories of membership and supports in particular the candidacy of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as permanent members 111  → 5.4.4.14 for France’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1003

of the Security Council and an increased presence of African countries, including among the permanent members. […] 5.2.1.1.20 8 November 2013, Portugal, Mr. Moura, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 15-17112 […] The original structure of the Security Council, with permanent and non-permanent members, has not changed. Could it be different? Hardly, since the structure results directly from the Charter of the United Nations that we have all ratified, entrusting the permanent members with a specific guardian role concerning any modification of its provisions. No reform of the Council can avoid it. The need for ratification of any Charter modification by the permanent members leads us to the pragmatic conclusion that both categories of permanent and non-permanent members are here to stay. Under that assumption, in our view the only way to make the Council more representative is to increase both categories of its membership. Moreover, to find the right balance in the representation of the Council as a whole, we must examine the composition of each category, give all regional groups due participation in the permanent category, which is still not the case, and ensure broader participation and representation in the non-permanent category. In the 1960s, the General Assembly opted to increase membership in the non-permanent category only. We were then 115 members, but five decades later, with 193 members, we can no longer accept increasing its seats again in only one membership category, thereby reinforcing even further the existing correlation. We should aim at an increased membership in both categories if we want to achieve equitable representation on the Council as a whole. […] Thirdly, the notion of permanent membership is tightly linked with the very notion of civility. It is as inherent to the category of permanent membership as rotation is to non-permanent seats, which should allow as many States as possible the opportunity, if they so wish, to serve on the Council. Fourthly, proposals to increase the membership in both categories have been gathering increased support among delegations. While differences still exist, increasing convergencies related to the issue have been identified in the course of the recent round of intergovernmental negotiations in the form of several proposals on the table, including the African position. Let us move forward and build on those convergencies. That should not prevent us from focusing when the time comes. However, if divergencies persist, we will continue our efforts to build an even larger common ground in the future. In conclusion, the reform of the Security Council cannot be delayed time and time again. As recently stated by my Minister for Foreign Affairs in the general debate, It is increasingly difficult to justify why countries such as Brazil and India are not permanent members of the Security Council. (A/68/PV.18, p. 39)113

112  → 5.2.2.4.3 for Portugal’s position against new categories of seats, presented in the same statement. 113  28 September 2013.

1004

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Moreover, we are of the strong view that Africa absolutely deserves permanent representation on the Security Council. Africa must be treated with justice and in a way that reflects its size, its economic growth and its weight in today’s world. […] 5.2.1.1.21 8 November 2013, Guatemala, Ms. Bolaños Pérez, UN Doc. A/68/PV.49, pp. 2-3

[…] On that point, we would like to reiterate our position, namely, that we support an expansion in the number of members in both categories. We think that this expansion can be up to five permanent members and five additional elected members. Thus we would have a Council with 10 permanent members and 15 elected members. We would not insist that the new permanent members have all the prerogatives of the current permanent members, although we would not oppose this. At the same time, we would not insist that the five current permanent members renounce their privileges under the Charter of the United Nations.[…] 5.2.1.1.22  25 September 2014, G4, Joint Press Statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries on the margins of the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly

[…] 4 – The G4 countries reiterated their commitment as aspiring new permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as their support for each other’s candidatures. They also reaffirmed their view of the importance of developing countries, including from Africa, to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of an enlarged Council. 5 – The Ministers emphasized their readiness to further reach out to reform-oriented member states in order to discuss models of an enlarged Security Council in the permanent and non-permanent categories. In this context, they commended Japan’s initiative to host an outreach meeting with other UN member states, with attendance from participants with a wide range of views on the reform issue in July 2014. They recognized the need for greater involvement of civil society, the media and academia on the discussions about the reform of the Security Council and recalled the seminars hosted by Brazil, India and Japan to broaden the debate on the urgency of reforming the body. […] 5.2.1.1.23 26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum […] 4. The Ministers underscored the urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the global institutions of political and economic governance. In this context, they stressed that the UN Security Council must be enlarged in both permanent and non-permanent categories in order to better reflect present day realities and to make it more representative, legitimate, efficient and effective. Noting that the year 2015 is the 70th anniversary of the United Nations and the 10th year following the collective mandate of the Leaders at the 2005 World Summit calling for an early reform of the UN Security Council, the Ministers agreed to intensify their cooperation for a decisive conclusion next year on reforming the Security Council with the addition of new permanent and non-permanent members.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1005

They expressed full support for each other’s candidature for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council. […] 5.2.1.1.24 12 November 2014, Malaysia, Mr. Haniff, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 3-4114 […] Malaysia’s positions on the issue of Security Council reform have been consistent. Allow me to briefly summarize those positions, which we will expand further during the next round of the intergovernmental negotiations. We firmly believe that there is a need for an expansion in the Council’s membership and a better geographical representation, in particular for regional groupings underrepresented in the Council. The expansion of both categories, permanent and non-permanent, would be crucial in strengthening the role and representativeness of the Council. An increase in non-permanent seats would allow more Member States to be elected to the Council and would increase the frequency for Member States to serve in the Council, thus providing for more inclusiveness in the Council’s decision-making process. […] We believe that if all regions are represented by permanent members, then the new permanent members should also be accorded the right to veto, so as to contribute towards a more balanced and representational decision-making process. […] 5.2.1.1.25 30 October 2015, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 8-9115 […] France’s position on this issue is well known. We want the Security Council to take into consideration the emergence of new Powers that have the resolve and ability to shoulder the responsibility of a permanent presence in the Security Council and that are, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, able to make an important contribution to the work of the Council. To that end, France supports the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as permanent members of the Security Council, as well as a reinforced presence of African countries as permanent and non-permanent members. […] 5.2.1.1.26 30 October 2015, United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 13 […] The compilation text compiled by Ambassador Rattray116 is a good start, and we look forward to building on that work in the year ahead. The United Kingdom’s own position on Security Council reform is clear. We support permanent representation for Brazil, India, Germany and Japan and permanent African representation. When considering the overall size of a reformed Council we must not reduce the Council’s ability to act decisively when called upon to address threats to international peace and security. 114  → 5.4.3.12 for Malaysia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 115  France confirmed this position on 7 November 2016 in UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 15-16, and on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 2-3. → 5.4.4.26 for France’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 116  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

1006

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The United Kingdom will continue to advocate for reform from within the Security Council so that it remains fit for purpose in the twenty-first century. We are proud to have been the first permanent member of the Council to sign up to the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct117 for the Security Council. In doing so, we have sent a clear message: the United Kingdom will never vote against a credible Security Council draft resolution that seeks to prevent or respond to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. I hope all Security Council members, both present and future, will join us in making that pledge. […] 5.2.1.1.27 30 October 2015, Brazil, Mr. De Aguiar Patriota, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 17-18

[…] There is an emerging consensus that the United Nations needs to update its governance mechanisms and establish a renewed commitment to searching for solutions through more effective cooperative efforts in the field of promoting peace and security. At a time when we face the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War and the number of civilian victims of armed conflicts worldwide continues to increase, we cannot afford to allow the Security Council to have its authority eroded, bringing discredit on the entire United Nations. If our goal is to have a more functional Security Council, perpetuating the geo­ political status quo by an expansion restricted to the non-permanent category is not an option. Brazil firmly believes that the only way to ensure a more efficient and democratic Security Council is through an expansion that includes new permanent members. Let us recall that there are entire regions of the world that are absent from the permanent member category, Africa being a case in point, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. […] 5.2.1.1.28 30 October 2015, Japan, Mr. Okamura, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 19-20118 I would like to associate myself fully with the statement delivered earlier by Ambassador Harald Braun of Germany on behalf of the Group of Four (G-4) countries.119 Allow me to start by drawing attention to decision 69/560,120 which Member States adopted by consensus last month. This was not just another technical, business-asusual decision. It was the decision to formally recognize the text and its annex circulated by the President of the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, His Excellency Mr. Sam Kutesa, on 31 July121 of this year as the basis for intergovernmental negotiations. […] Although the text may not be as concise and operational as my delegation initially called for, I accept it because it is a product of everyone. I believe that is why Member States adopted by consensus decision 69/560 to roll over the text to this session of the General Assembly as the basis for text-based negotiations. Japan supports 117  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 118  → 5.4.4.29 for Japan’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 119  30 October 2015, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 7-8. 120  14 September 2015, → 5.1.14. 121  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1007

the new Chair in moving the process forward towards actually launching text-based negotiations. […] I understand there are some Member States that argue that we should greatly enhance the representation of developing countries but support only the expansion of non-permanent seats or the creation of a new category. I would like to ask those Member States for their views. What is their answer to the aspiration of our African friends, without having them as permanent members, considering what our African friends call the “historical injustice done to Africa”? Do they think that the legitimate aspiration expressed by our African friends can be met by their argument? […] 5.2.1.1.29 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 1-2122 […] […] That expansion must take place in both categories of members and basically, the increase should be among members from developing countries. The fundamental goal must be to overcome the unjustifiable lack of representation of developing countries in the Security Council. The new members of an expanded Council, both permanent and non-permanent, should have the same duties and prerogatives that current members enjoy, including the veto, if that cannot be eliminated. Cuba would not be opposed to the possibility of the immediate re-election of non-permanent members. Cuba is not in favour of the creation of new categories of members, because that could further deepen existing differences and encourage division in the body. […] 5.2.1.1.30 9 March 2016, India, Mr. Akbaruddin, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] As highlighted by Ambassador Rambally, PR of St. Lucia and Spokesperson of the L.69 Group, a large number of Member-States including the two largest Groups Africa and L.69 as expressed in paragraphs d.2, d.3 and d.4 are of the view that the veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must enjoy all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto. There are other individual national submissions where similar views have been espoused. Madam Chairperson listening to submissions providing recent examples of the use of the veto we tend to forget the broader record of 70 years. This historical record is illustrative of why many States approach the veto the way they do today. Let me provide a few facts and figures in this regard: Since the creation of the Security Council in 1946 till today, 317 vetoes were cast and as result in total 230 draft resolutions or parts thereof have been vetoed. In effect 10% of the 2271 resolutions adopted till date have been vetoed. Of these 317 vetoes as many as 59 vetoes, or 18% were to block applications for membership to the UN. Vietnam’s application was vetoed 9 times, Italy’s 6 times, Japan, Sri Lanka, Portugal, Ireland, Republic of Korea and Jordan 4 times, Austria and Finland 3 times, and Nepal, Libya, Laos and Cambodia 2 times and Angola, Bangladesh, Kuwait,

• •

122  Cuba confirmed this position on 7 November 2016 in UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 21-22. → 5.3.20 for Cuba’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.2.9 for Cuba’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1008

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Mauritania, Mongolia and Spain 1 time each. We see that these Member-States are now significant participants in maintaining international peace and security rather than threats to international peace and security as was perceived by one permanent member or other when they vetoed their initial applications for membership. 64 vetoes, or 20%, were on organizational matters, not on issues of peace and security, and of these, 43 vetoes were used to block nominees for the Secretary General. This was before the entire process of selection of the Secretary General by the Security Council became translucent and indeed colourful with the use of coloured straw polls. Over 130 vetoes were cast in the proxy wars that the developing world was dragged into. The veto was used as many as 130 times in matters relating to situations of proxy wars involving developing countries; for instance, 22 vetoes were cast on Namibia alone. No less than 56 vetoes were cast to block resolutions against the apartheid regime in South Africa (and Southern Rhodesia). In the vast majority of cases, vetoes were cast by a permanent member alone and only 33 resolutions were rejected as a result of two or more concurring vetoes. As if the use of the veto within the Security Council was not enough we have seen the expansion of the veto to the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, e.g., the Sanctions Committees. In these bodies the veto has been extended to all 15 members of the Committees who can block, or object or place on hold any request of a Member State, thereby in effect killing the proposal on grounds that consensus is required. As the well-known idiom goes, ‘if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it is a duck.’ Yes, Madam Chair we have by a procedural stratagem expanded the veto to all members of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council far from restraining its use. Given the history of such use of the veto, it is not surprising that a significant number of Member-States in paragraphs d.30 to d.33 of the text circulated by the former PGA call for abolition of the veto or, if this is deemed not possible, limiting or curtailing its use to the extent possible. We also note that a large number of Member-States in 12 paragraphs d.12 to d.14 and d.16 to d.24 support voluntary restrictions on the use of veto in situations such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and gross human rights violations. […] Our own national position has been and remains that the veto should as long as it exists be extended to new permanent members. As a measure of flexibility and willingness for compromise, the use of the veto can be deferred till the Review Conference. The African Union (and this is understandable) does not wish to defer its use. The difference, we see, is one of a degree than one of a kind. […] We have witnessed again today, like in the last two IGN Meetings that significant convergence among positions of Member-States exists. We see that there is a school of thought that says that restrictions should be placed on the use of the veto. There are of course linguistic variations as well as differences of nuances and stresses. The common elements of this school of thought, however, can be clearly identified and consolidated together. There is another school of thought that says that no restrictions can be placed on the use of veto. For them, history stopped in 1945. To them, all subsequent changes:

• • • • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1009

the vast expansion in membership, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid triumphs, the march of freedom; the growth of equality; all have not happened and should not be taken into account. Multilateralism means nothing; plurilateralism is the order of the day. The majority may not like it; so much the worse for the majority. Madam Chairperson, the issue of veto is important but then we cannot allow the veto to have a veto over the process of the Council’s reform itself. I would therefore request you to consolidate the text on the basis of convergence reached on issues so far, while also delineating the divergence and contrarian view of some and task Member-States to build further on the consolidated and shortened text. In this endeavour, you can count on our full support. […] 5.2.1.1.31 7 November 2016, Saint Lucia on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. Rambally, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 3-4

[…] Our group is bound by the firm conviction that expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of the Security Council is imperative to better reflect contemporary world realities and to achieve a more accountable, representative, transparent and, above all else, a more relevant Security Council. With the complex challenges facing our world today, that need is both major and urgent. […] We very much welcome the newly formed Group of Friends on Security Council Reform, of which the L.69 group is a member. The Group of Friends will work together with the aim of accelerating the negotiations process for meaningful reform of the Council based on three principles: early or urgent reforms, text-based negotiations and the expansion of both categories of membership. We welcome other Member States that want to join the Group on the basis of its principles. […] 5.2.1.1.32 7 November 2016, Germany on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Braun, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 6-7

[…] Those facts lead to a profound conclusion: real, text-based negotiations must begin now, in the intergovernmental negotiations at the seventy-first session. We therefore request that the co-Chairs use the text of the existing framework document123 and its annex as a basis for negotiations in the intergovernmental negotiations. The aim should be to condense that text step by step and to create a workable document in the course of this session of the Assembly. In that regard, we very much welcome the newly founded Group of Friends on Security Council Reform. Representatives at the ministerial or senior official level of Member States belonging to reform-oriented groups – including the Committee of Ten, the Caribbean Community, the G-4 countries and the L.69 group – and representatives of Nordic and Eastern European countries, as well as France and the United Kingdom, all met in New York on 21 September in the margins of the General Assembly to discuss the issue of Security Council reform. They underlined that 11 years after the 2005 World Summit, when all Heads of State and Government unanimously called for an early 123  5 May 2015, → 5.1.12.

1010

5 On a road to nowhere ?

reform of the Security Council, it was high time to finally move forward. They agreed to work together with the aim of accelerating the negotiating process for a meaningful reform of the Council. The Group of Friends is based on three principles: early reform, text-based negotiations and expansion in both categories of seats. They welcome other Member States joining the group based on those goals. […] 5.2.1.1.33 7 November 2016, United Kingdom, Mr. Rycroft, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 10 […] The United Kingdom therefore welcomes all efforts to move this debate forward, including the establishment of the Group of Friends. When we consider Security Council reform, we must of course be mindful of the need to ensure its effectiveness and make sure that this is never compromised. Too great an increase in size risks a cumbersome and slow decision-making process, undermining the Council’s ability to respond appropriately and quickly to issues of international peace and security. With so many challenges before us, that is a risk we cannot take. By the same token, we cannot allow the issue of the veto to slow our progress on expansion of the Council. The United Kingdom has not vetoed a resolution for over 25 years, and we would do so only in the most exceptional circumstances. We are a proud signatory of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group’s code of conduct,124 and we are committed to never voting against a credible draft resolution on preventing or ending a mass atrocity. Sadly, we have seen others wield their veto through narrow self-interest to the significant detriment of the Security Council’s reputation and indeed its responsibility to those who so desperately need our help. For these reasons, we believe that a modest expansion in the permanent and nonpermanent categories, an increase that balances representation with effectiveness, is the approach that we should collectively pursue. Members will be aware of our support for permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside permanent African representation. British Prime Minister Theresa May is today in India discussing that very issue with Prime Minister Modi. Our support is steadfast, and I look forward to working through all available avenues to reach the more representative and more effective Council that we seek. 5.2.1.1.34 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 22-23125

[…] Peru reiterates once again its conviction that in order to bring the Security Council into step with current realities, it is indispensable to incorporate new members – permanent as well as non-permanent – in order to promote fairer and more equitable regional representation. My delegation wishes to underscore that the enlargement should be carried out with moderation in order to remedy the imbalance in the composition of the Council, while at the same time safeguarding its effectiveness. In that 124  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 125  Peru confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 7-8. → 5.2.2.2.32 for Peru’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.4.38 for Peru’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1011

regard, we believe it essential to stress the need for increasing the seats reserved for our regions, which should no longer shunted aside. […] 5.2.1.1.35 7 November 2016, Georgia, Ms. Agladze, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 2-3 […] Along with other countries and groups of countries, Georgia submitted its own proposal on the reform of the Security Council, which has been included in the framework document.126 Our proposal covers all five aspects of the reform. We support the reform of the Security Council in terms of its equitable representation and enlargement, and the expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, which will increase the legitimacy, authority and credibility of the Council. Our particular priority is the allocation of two seats to the Group of Eastern European States, so that we have better regional representation and parity in the Council. While being open to further consultations, at this stage we see the future Security Council as being comprised of up to 25 members. Furthermore, we stand for the inclusion of smaller States in decision-making in order for the basic international law principle of sovereign equality between nations to be more explicitly reflected at the core of the international security architecture. However, as we have previously noted, we believe that equitable representation should not be an end in itself. A meaningful reform should also imply reform of the use of the veto, the working methods and the decision-making principles of the Security Council, as well as greater accountability to the General Assembly. We further believe that there must be more openness in the work of the Council, so that its deliberations are made in a more transparent and democratic manner. […] 5.2.1.1.36 7 November 2017, Japan on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Bessho, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 5-6

[…] Lastly, I would like to emphasize that an early reform of the Council is needed in order to make it more legitimate, effective and representative, thereby reflecting the realities of the twenty-first century. In order to achieve that goal, increasing representation in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories is required. There is broad support from Member States for that method of expanding Security Council membership. Its enlargement should consider the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security. It also needs to enhance regional representation in the Security Council by ensuring that the concerns and aspirations of unrepresented or underrepresented regions are adequately taken into account. In particular, the historical injustice that Africa has suffered should be redressed through representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. […] 5.2.1.1.37 7 November 2017, Norway on behalf of the Nordic countries, Ms. Stener, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 8-9

[…] The Security Council must become more transparent, effective, accountable and representative than it is now. That requires reform. An important and desirable step 126  5 May 2015, → 5.1.12.

1012

5 On a road to nowhere ?

forward would be negotiations, based on a text. The Nordic countries support a balanced expansion of the Security Council. The aim must be to better reflect current geopolitical and economic realities and ensure enhanced representation of developing countries, including both permanent and non-permanent seats for Africa. In our view, it is also important to ensure that small States can serve regularly as elected members of the Council. […] 5.2.1.1.38 7 November 2017, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. King, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 9-10

[…] Our group believes that expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership is imperative in order to better reflect the realities of the contemporary world and achieve a more accountable, representative, transparent and, most importantly, relevant Security Council. In that regard, the issue of Africa’s representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories must be addressed by the Assembly in line with the African common position.127 […] 5.2.1.1.39 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17128

[…] I would like to reiterate the support of the Philippines for an enlarged Security Council with an increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent, or elected, members of the Security Council. The Philippines supports the proposal to increase the number of Council members to up to 27. We believe that a broader membership would better reflect twenty-first century geopolitical realities and contribute to the pursuit of the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security. Critical to an enlarged Security Council is the balance in geographical representation, taking into account the size of the populations of regional groups. We must ensure that the Council is the one venue where the voices of all peoples of the world are heard. In that context, I wish to highlight the situation of the Group of Asia-Pacific States. The Group accounts for almost 60 per cent of the total population of all States Members of the United Nations. Moreover, with 54 Member States, it accounts for 28 per cent of the total United Nations membership. In peacekeeping operations all over the world, the Asia-Pacific countries contribute about 40 per cent of the total human resources needed to run those operations. Yet in the Security Council the Group accounts for only 20 per cent of the total number of seats, that is, only three seats – one permanent, two elected – out of the 15 seats. We should address that underrepresentation so as to ensure that the Security Council is truly representative of the interests of the peoples of the world. […] We also support the proposal that the extension of the right of the veto to new permanent Council members will be decided upon in the framework of a review. We 127  14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 128  → 5.3.23 for the Philippines’ position on the size of the Security Council, 5.4.2.13 for the Philippines’ position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 5.4.4.50 for the Philippines’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1013

understand that to mean that the new permanent members shall not exercise the veto until such review is concluded. […] 5.2.1.1.40 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19129 […] My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by Ambassador King of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group130 and wishes to add a few remarks in its national capacity. […] I would also like to reaffirm our principled position concerning the reform of the Security Council on three key issues. Regarding the categories of membership, Mongolia has consistently stood for a just and equitable expansion in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. Our stance in favour of an enlargement of both of the current categories is guided by and based on the composition set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and is reflective of contemporary realities, as well as the principles of justice and equality, in order to ensure the greater and enhanced representation of developing countries, particularly the non- and underrepresented regional groups. […] So long as it exists, the veto power should be extended to all new members in the permanent category of the Security Council, which must enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of the current permanent membership. On the key issue of regional representation, adequate representation of all regions, particularly non- and underrepresented, in both of the categories of the Security Council must be duly considered. The solution should to be fair and just. We therefore attach high importance to the criterion of equitable geographical distribution, with an emphasis on the non- and underrepresented groups, particularly Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States. As to the non-permanent category, strengthening a fair and equitable rotation system within a geographical regional group is an important issue for my delegation. In that respect, my delegation also supports the addition of seats to the current regional groups, specifically with a view to ensuring the representation of small developing States. […] 5.2.1.1.41 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 8-9131

[…] In the opinion of the Cuban delegation, the expansion of the categories should consist of an increase in the number of new permanent members from two African countries, two developing countries in Asia and two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. We feel that the number of non-permanent members should be increased to a total of at least 15 members. The new permanent members must have exactly the same prerogatives and rights as the current ones do, without establishing 129  → 5.4.2.14 for Mongolia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 5.4.3.13 for Mongolia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 130  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.38. 131  → 5.3.25 for Cuba’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

1014

5 On a road to nowhere ?

selective or discriminatory criteria. Cuba declares that the obsolete and undemocratic right of the veto must be abolished. If it is not eliminated immediately, the new permanent members must also have that prerogative. If the representation of developed and developing countries in the Council is not expanded, the Council will become even less representative and therefore, less legitimate and effective. Cuba is not in favour of the creation of new categories or subcategories of members. New categories would increase existing differences and stimulate division among the members of the Council, instead of contributing to its better functioning. […] 5.2.1.1.42 7 November 2017, United Kingdom, Mr. Hickey, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 27-28132

[…] When we consider Security Council reform, we must be mindful of the need to ensure that its effectiveness is never compromised – too great an increase in size risks a cumbersome and slow decision-making process, thereby undermining the Council’s ability to respond appropriately and quickly to issues of international peace and security. With so many challenges before us, that is a risk we cannot take. […] For those reasons, we believe that a modest expansion in the permanent and nonpermanent categories – an increase that balances representation with effectiveness – is the approach that we should collectively pursue. Members will be aware of our support for permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside permanent African representation. That support is steadfast, and we look forward to working through all available avenues in order to reach a more representative and effective Security Council. 5.2.1.1.43 25 September 2018, Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Joint press statement United Nations Security Council Reform 1. On 25 September 2018, H.E. Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, Minister for External Affairs of India hosted H.E. Mr. Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, Foreign Minister of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Heiko Maas, Federal Foreign Minister of Germany, and H.E. Mr. Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at a meeting of the G-4 countries, during the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. 2. The G-4 Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism. G-4 Ministers stressed that adapting the United Nations to the contemporary needs of the 21st century necessarily required reforming the Security Council. They stressed the need to safeguard the legitimacy and credibility of this UN organ which deals with international peace and security. 3. The G-4 Ministers reviewed progress towards this goal at the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) and discussed pathways to reform of the United Nations Security Council. In this context, they noted with concern that next year would mark 40 years since the inscription of the item “Question of equitable representation on and 132  → 5.4.4.58 for the United Kingdom’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1015

increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council” on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979 and yet substantial progress had not yet been achieved. They recalled the 2005 World Summit where all the Heads of State and Government had unanimously supported the “early reform” of the Security Council as an essential element of the overall effort to reform the United Nations. Despite an overwhelming majority of UN member states supporting Security Council reform, the IGN has not produced substantive progress over the 10 years since its launch in 2009. The G-4 Ministers emphasized the need to revitalize process of the Security Council reform, and they tasked their respective officials to consider the way forward to advance the reform. 4. The G-4 Ministers reaffirmed the need for an early reform of the Council including the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership to enhance its legitimacy, effectiveness and representativeness. The Ministers agreed that the current composition of the Council does not reflect the changed global realities and they stressed that Security Council reform is essential to address today’s complex challenges. As aspiring new permanent members of a reformed Council, the Ministers reiterated their commitment to work to strengthen the functioning of the UN and the global multilateral order as well as their support for each other’s candidatures. […] 9. The Ministers emphasized that the G-4 will intensify dialogue with other Member States, especially the like-minded countries and groups to achieve meaningful progress in the upcoming IGN session. In this regard, they expressed support for reflecting the African Common Position as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus133 and the Sirte Declaration134 in text-based negotiations on Security Council reform in the 73rd session. The Ministers reiterated their support for Africa’s representation in both the permanent and non-permanent membership of a reformed and expanded Security Council. […] 5.2.1.1.44 27 September 2018, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum […] The United Nations and Security Council Reform […] 9. The Ministers underscored that no reform of the United Nations will be complete without the reform of the Security Council, including through the expansion of its membership in both permanent and non-permanent categories, in order to ensure adequate representation of developing countries. They affirmed that such a reform is critical for the Council to be able to adequately respond to global challenges. They expressed full support for each other’s candidatures for permanent seats in a reformed and enlarged UN Security Council. The Ministers welcomed the reform proposals of UN Secretary General and encouraged him to address the need for reform in other areas, including ensuring adequate geographical representation in the Secretariat, especially at higher levels, reviewing the funding and backstopping arrangements for special political missions, and strengthening the role of regional commissions. 133  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 134  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

1016

5 On a road to nowhere ?

10. The Ministers emphasized that achieving progress in the ongoing Inter Governmental Negotiations is essential in order to ensure meaningful reform of the UN Security Council. Towards this end, the Ministers called for commencement of text based negotiations in the IGN at the earliest. […] 5.2.1.1.45  20 November 2018, India on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Akbaruddin, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 8-9

[…] The views of the Group of Four on Security Council reforms are well-established. The Group of Four supports the early reform of the Council, and we seek expansion of both the permanent and the non-permanent categories of membership to enhance the Council’s legitimacy, effectiveness and representativeness. We also desire an improvement in its working methods. It is our conviction that this sentiment is indeed shared by a broad majority of States Members of the United Nations, including several of the groups on whose behalf representatives spoke earlier, namely, the Group of African States,135 the Caribbean Community,136 the Group of Arab States,137 the L.69 group and a vast number of individual States. […] Words now need to be followed by actions if we wish to achieve credible progress at the current session. After a decade of discussions, it is time to normalize the intergovernmental negotiations process. We need to begin negotiations in the same way as we have begun other intergovernmental processes. For that to happen, certain steps need to be taken. Allow me to elaborate. […] Thirdly, the intergovernmental negotiations should operate under normal rules of procedure, like all other General Assembly processes. At the General Assembly, we carry out our work through give-and-take negotiations, focused on a document, with the co-Chairs or facilitators acting as agents for facilitating dialogue. At the General Assembly, all a naysayer can do is, at worst, to cast a negative vote. What we have seen in the past couple of years is no credit to any of us. Naysayers cannot be allowed to cast a dark shadow over the entire membership and hold the overwhelming majority back. Some among us cannot be permitted to hold the entire process hostage by bending the rules of negotiations. If we permit that, we run the risk of breaking the process beyond repair. […] 5.2.1.1.46 20 November 2018, Iceland on behalf of the Nordic countries, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, p. 11 I am speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and my own country, Iceland. […] The Nordic countries support a balanced expansion of the Security Council. The aim must be to better reflect the current global political and economic realities and to 135  2 0 November 2018, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, → 5.2.2.3.32. 136  20 November 2018, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, → 5.2.3.19. 137  20 November 2018, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, → 5.2.2.3.31.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1017

ensure increased representation of developing countries, including both permanent and non-permanent seats for Africa. In our view, it is also important to enable possibilities for small States to participate in the decision-making process of the Security Council as elected members. […] 5.2.1.1.47 20 November 2018, France, Mrs. Gueguen, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 15-16138

[…] France’s position on the substance of reform is consistent and well known. We hope that the Council will take into account the emergence of new Powers that have the desire and capacity to assume the responsibility of a permanent seat in the Security Council and that are in a position to make a significant contribution to the Council’s work, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this regard, France supports the candidacy of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as permanent members of the Security Council, and endorses increasing the presence of African countries among the permanent and non-permanent members. This essential change is overdue. […] 5.2.1.1.48 20 November 2018, Congo, Mr. Balé, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 26-28 […] As we all know, the enlargement of the Council is linked to the issue of increasing the number of members of the Council in both categories of membership. If the principle of increasing the number of Council members is unanimously agreed on, my delegation must conclude that opting to expand both categories of its membership would be the best way to reflect equity, representativeness and regional balance. In this regard, the Congo supports assigning two members in the permanent category and an additional two members in the non-permanent category to Africa. Africa’s proper representation on the Council would merely redress the historical injustice to which Africa has always been subjected. It is barely conceivable that an Africa of some 1.2 billion souls, including 54 States Members of the Organization and with estimates projecting that its population will double by 2050, is underrepresented at this high level of decision-making. We should also not forget that in the current context, the majority of Council decisions are relevant to Africa. The Congo welcomes the growing support and backing from several groups of States and stakeholder groups for ensuring that Africa is represented in the permanent membership. But the question of the veto, which is closely tied to the status of permanent membership on the Council, remains one of the greatest challenges of the intergovernmental negotiations. However, if we accept Africa’s representation with permanent membership in order to remedy the existing injustice, failing to recognize the privileges that come with that status, including the power of the veto, would merely continue the injustice to which it has been subjected. For the principle of equality to be meaningfully implemented, it would be wise to extend the veto privilege to all States designated permanent members of the Security Council. There can be no other option, unless we agree to outright abolition of the veto for all permanent members 138  → 5.4.4.66 for France’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1018

5 On a road to nowhere ?

of the Council, as set forth in the Common African Position outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus.139 […] 5.2.1.1.49 20 November 2018, United Kingdom, Mr. Allen, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, p. 28140

[…] When we consider Security Council reform, we must always ensure that the Council’s effectiveness is not compromised. Too great an increase in size risks a cumbersome and slow decision-making process, undermining the Council’s ability to respond appropriately and quickly to issues of international peace and security. With the enormous and grave challenges before us, that is a risk we simply cannot afford to take. […] For those reasons, we believe that a modest expansion in the permanent and nonpermanent categories, an increase that balances representation with effectiveness, is the approach we should collectively pursue. Member States must work together in a flexible and creative manner to find areas of convergence so that we can finally make progress on this issue. Members will be aware of our support for permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside permanent African representation, in order to better reflect the realities of the world we face today. That support is steadfast, and I look forward to working through all available avenues to reach the more representative and effective Council that we seek. […] 5.2.1.2 Statements opposing additional permanent seats with the right of veto 5.2.1.2.1 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations141 […] 6. Pakistan supports increase in the non-permanent members only. We are opposed to any increase in individual or national permanent members for the following reasons: i) Permanent membership is contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of states. ii) Increase in permanent members runs counter to the very principles and objectives of reform. Many of the problems that we want to address through reform are attributed to the permanent members. Enlarging the oligarchy will increase these problems. It will make the Council less democratic, less representative, less transparent, less effective and less accountable. Because of time limit, I am circulating with my remarks some additional points in this regard for member states consideration. iii) Increase in national permanent membership is unrealizable. In fact this is the issue that has blocked progress so far despite wide consensus in favour of reform. It has created divisions in regions. It has weakened the reform effort, 139  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 140  → 5.4.4.67 for the United Kingdom’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 141  → 5.2.2.2.3 for Pakistan’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.2.2.3.2 for Pakistan’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1019

also enabling the existing permanent members to preserve the status quo. The P-5 have rejected the extension of veto. Some of the aspirants are prepared to become permanent members without veto thus contradicting their claims of counter-balancing the P-5. Adding new permanent members will continue to be difficult. This is where a genuine compromise was required. This was the main conclusion of the Facilitators reports (A/61/47),142 of which you have listed excerpts in your letter of 2nd March. 7. Caution must be exercised in referring to a broad and generic category of permanent membership. Several proposals of different nature have been made, for example: – permanent members with veto; – permanent members without veto; – permanent members with veto in abeyance till a review is held; – permanent members or seats for developed and/or developing world; – seats of permanent nature envisaged in some interim solutions; – permanent seats allocated to regions or groups of states (with or without rotation); – permanent representation for regions or groups of states with rotation; – permanent seats, allocated to a particular region or group of states, with a regional/group mechanism to determine the modalities for representation such as allocation of seats to member states within the region and possibility of selection by the region. 8. In terms of representation, in any expansion, each permanent seat added on a national basis will be a permanent blow to the chances for the rest of the membership to become member of the Council. […] 11. There are several proposals for expansion in the non-permanent member category: – First, is to increase the number of regular 2-year non-permanent seats. It can improve representation based on equitable geographical distribution, addressing in particular the under-represented regions and groups. [Resolution 48/26143 recognized the need to review the membership of the Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the UN especially of developing countries]. 2-year seat is the most equitable and fair option by any comparison, mathematical calculation or mode of representation. It is nondivisive and the easiest course of action. There is broad consensus around this option. No one opposes it. It continues to be our preference. – Other proposals have been advanced to provide flexibility and innovation in how representation under non-permanent category could be made more responsive to the various positions, including the possibility of more frequent or longer representation on the Council by those who consider they have the capacity and the qualifications for that. These proposals include: Allowing immediate re-election; Increasing the term from the present 2 years to – number of years; Various combinations of the above two (so-called intermediate options);

• • •

142  1 9 April 2007, → 4.1.25. 143  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2.

1020

5 On a road to nowhere ? are questions whether these proposals should apply to all or only some • There of the additional non-permanent seats, and whether they should also apply

to the 10 existing non-permanent seats; […] 14. We are conscious that no option for frequent or longer-term presence can be as equitable and fair as the regular 2-year seats. Our flexibility on this is therefore at a cost. However, we cannot continue to hold out this offer if there is no flexibility from the other side to reach a reasonable compromise. Therefore let me say that in case of no agreement on other options or categories of membership, our fall back will be the NAM fallback position144 i.e. expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category. 15. It should also be kept in mind that the nature of expansion is linked to the size of expansion. Therefore, the smaller the expansion, the lesser would be the possibility to provide for more frequent representation through re-election or longer term. 2-year seats have to be given priority in any expansion. […] ANNEX Permanent Membership versus principles and objectives of reform UN Charter principles 1. Reform should conform fully to the basic principles of sovereign equality of states and equitable geographical representation. Proposals for permanent membership on national basis contravene the principle of sovereign equality. This unequal treatment of member states is unlikely to garner the widest possible acceptance of the membership. Representation 2. A reformed Council should be broadly representative of the general membership. It should take into account equitable geographical distribution. The new composition should also ensure adequate representation of sub-regional as well as other important political and inter­regional groups such as the League of Arab States and the OIC. In particular, the expansion in Council’s membership should ensure greater representation of developing countries and small and medium sized countries, which form the bulk of the UN membership and also largely account for the increase in the UN membership over the last 4 decades. Adequate representation of regional and sub-regional groups and other political groups and different forms of civilization will impart legitimacy to the Council’s decisions. The best way to guarantee wider representation of the UN membership on the Council is through non-permanent seats, rotation and regional representation. National permanent membership is contradictory to the objective of broader representation. Legitimacy 3. The seekers of permanent membership argue that Council’s decisions will have more legitimacy if new permanent members are added. This is a fallacious argument. The legitimacy of the Council’s decisions is derived from the Charter. It has no direct relation to the composition of the Council at any point of time. The legitimacy of the 144  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1021

Council’s decisions will, however, improve if the Council becomes more transparent, democratic and accountable and broadly representative of the general membership. Adding a few permanent members will also alienate other important countries and would affect the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Democratic reform 4. There is general agreement that the Council needs to be more democratic in its composition and decision making process. However, some reform proposals, in particular on enlargement, are in essence un-democratic. Some proponents of democratic reform are fundamentally opposed to the notion of periodic elections and accountability. Permanent membership is counter to the precepts of democracy. It is a vestige of the past, an anomaly which should not be exacerbated. Permanent membership, in its two main characteristics, i.e. permanency and veto, flouts the principles of sovereign equality, democracy and accountability. No democratic system entitles the winner of a single election to remain in office forever. The notion of permanency is the biggest and natural obstacle to accountability. 5. The vast majority of the current UN membership had no choice regarding the existence of five permanent members in 1945. Today, they do have a choice. They cannot be expected to choose to anoint additional states with special privileges and to accept for themselves a second-class status in the Organization. Accountability 6. The accountability of the Security Council to the general membership flows from the Charter. In order to enhance accountability, the Council has to be more democratic. Unfortunately, permanent members of the Council are not answerable to the general membership for their performance or actions. The permanent members represent their own interests, not the interests of any regional groups. The elected or non-permanent members on the other hand owe their tenure in the Council to their election by the General Assembly, and are therefore subject to accountability and peer review. The best way to increase the accountability of the Council to the General Assembly is therefore to increase the role and authority of the latter in determining the representatives on the Council. This could only be done through a system of period elections and fair rotation. An increase in the number of non-permanent seats would therefore enhance the accountability of the Council. On the other hand, increase in the permanent category, even though elected by the General Assembly, would not enhance accountability, as it would only be a one-time process and new permanent members, once elected, will not be further answerable to the general membership. Effectiveness and transparency 7. How reform of the Council would enhance its effectiveness is not clearly defined. Many believe that the Council is an effective organ. Others, however, believe reform could increase the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness. Effectiveness of the reformed Council is often related to its size. Those arguing for limited expansion consider that a large Council could become unwieldy and lose its effectiveness. Others do not consider that a larger Council might necessarily become less effective. 8. Some member states argue that the influence of the current permanent members can only be countered by adding new permanent members. Only this, they claim, can bring about the real reform of the Council, including an improvement in its working methods. This too is fallacious. Veto-less permanent members would not be in

1022

5 On a road to nowhere ?

a position to wield the same influence on Council’s decision making as the existing permanent members. Individual permanent members represent only their national interests, not the interests of their respective regions. So their weight would be less. And once the new permanent members are part of the elite club, there will be less zeal for reform. There is no reason to believe that new permanent members will change the power structure of the Council, its decision-making or transparency. In fact a larger number of permanent members would further aggravate the exclusive and elitist culture of the Council. At present, the Council has to reconcile the positions of the 5 permanent members. An enlarged Council with additional permanent members will need to reconcile the interests and positions of 10-11 permanent members rendering decision-making more non-transparent and cumbersome and thereby affecting Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy. 5.2.1.2.2 17 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations145 Switzerland has expressed its view on the veto extensively during informal consultations; let me just summarize the key points of our thinking as follows: – We recognize that in the special circumstances of World War 2 and its aftermath when the Charter was drafted, and in view of negative experiences with the League of Nations, the veto has been introduced as a tool to ensure buy-in from big powers into a multilateral security system. We do not contest the historical significance of the veto or the honorable intentions of the drafters of the Charter. – Yet, we do not believe that these historical circumstances persist today. It is our strong opinion therefore, that additional seats, eventually added in the course of this reform phase, must not come with a veto attached. In our view, the question of the veto can be discussed during the review, with other issues unresolved during the present phase of reform. – We disagree with those who, not least for tactical reasons, would like to see vetoes attached to new seats in order to be in a better negotiating position to abolish all the vetoes at a later stage: walking with more vigor in the wrong direction rarely makes you end up in the right place. […] – When Switzerland joined the UN eight years ago, the question of the veto was an issue of domestic debate during referendum. The Swiss government committed itself to engage against any extension of the veto and for a more restricted use. There is no question that the Swiss voters remain fiercely opposed to the veto, which is seen primarily as an impediment to international action than a tool to facilitate engagement of the international community. Too vivid, too numerous and too recent are all those examples where the Council failed to act because one or the other power exerted or announced the use of the veto. – For all these reasons, we will oppose any extensions of the veto for whatever reasons they are brought forward in the upcoming negotiations. While we are flexible on all other issues of SC reform, we are not with regard to the veto. A reform with an 145  → 5.4.4.2 for Switzerland’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1023

extension of veto rights to new seats is unlikely to be ratified by the Swiss electorate. We will therefore oppose it during negotiations. 5.2.1.2.3  24 March 2009, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] 3. In this context, the substantial under-representation of certain regions, Africa and Asia and the GRULAC, most notably, needs to be redressed as a priority. While we concede representation has to do with more than mere numbers or ratios, it certainly should be one clear indicator of where a region stands in terms of establishing its presence on the Security Council. My delegation would like to underscore the fact that Asia deserves enhanced representation at the Council, whether in light of the number of its members, its actual contribution to the UN by various standards, or its capacity and readiness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. 4. Under-representation of Africa is a problem which my delegation has consistently emphasized throughout our deliberations. The concerns of Africa are especially pertinent considering that the Council devotes a substantial part of its work to issues on Africa, and in this regard, Africa’s under-representation needs to be rectified in a manner that best addresses the concerns and interests of African States. 5. Another important aspect of regional representation is regional accountability. When it is up to each region to select Members to fill the seats allocated to that region, those who are chosen need to be motivated to bear in mind the interests of the whole region. This is an essential element of the concept of regional accountability, and it can best be reinforced by periodic elections. 6. Periodic elections will serve the Membership by reinforcing the democratic principles we all strive to achieve at the regional level. Council members would be subject to performance and contribution reviews to determine if any additional term should be granted. Single elections that allow the winners to remain on the Council in perpetuity run contrary to true democratic reform, and will not enable the Council to rise to the challenges of reflecting the ever-changing international political realities. We have witnessed a plethora of unforeseen and unprecedented global crises such as the financial crisis on top of traditional threats to international peace and security, which compelled the corresponding emergence of a wide range of new players. If we commit ourselves to the rigidity of additional permanent membership, we risk losing the flexibility necessary to reflect these evolutions in the composition of the Security Council. It is in this vein that my delegation supports the addition of periodically elected nonpermanent seats only. 5.2.1.2.4 2 September 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] One argument frequently used by those who advocate expansion of the Council in both categories is that only an increase in the permanent seats would be tantamount to real or genuine reform. We kindly but strongly disagree. Adding another four or five permanent members is least likely to change the way the Council operates. On the contrary, it would further reinforce some of the methods and practices of the Council that this reform process is intent on changing. It is no coincidence that those countries

1024

5 On a road to nowhere ?

that desire permanent status also argue that the new permanent members should enjoy the same rights and privileges that the current permanent members have, including the veto right. Since the current permanent members would not agree to relinquish their veto rights, then, should we consider extending the veto rights to the new permanent members as well? Isn’t one of the main objectives of the Council reform to limit the use of veto, and not to spread it? […] 5.2.1.2.5 13 November 2009, Bolivia, Mr. Solón-Romero, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 24-25146

[…] As for increasing the number of permanent members, Bolivia believes that expansion is necessary, as we have stated in the three previous rounds of negotiations. However, that expansion should apply to one category alone. There should be 25 members without privileges, without permanent membership and with the same rights and responsibilities. That would thus meet the need to restore the balance of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council, in accordance with the principles of the Charter. […] 5.2.1.2.6 11 November 2010, Italy, Mr. Ragaglini, UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 16-17 […] If we add new permanent members now – say four or five – in addition to further non-permanent members, what shall we do in 10, 15 or 20 years’ time when other Countries will be ready to assume greater responsibility? Shall we add other permanent members applying the same logic? Will we end up with a Council of 30 to 35 members? […] 5.2.1.2.7 21 September 2011, Argentina, Ms. Fernández, UN Doc. A/66/PV.11, pp. 24-28

[…] We do not agree on the need to expand the number of permanent members; on the contrary, we believe that the permanent member category should be eliminated. The right to veto also should be eliminated, as it really prevents the Security Council from carrying out the true functions that it had in the bipolar world in which it was originally conceived. At that time, the right to veto was necessary, because in that bipolar world, with the fear of a nuclear holocaust, that right gave to Council members the balance necessary to ensure the security of humankind. Today, that balance is broken. Permanent seats and the right to veto are not about defending security or universal stability; rather, they are often about the position of Council members exercising their right. […] 5.2.1.2.8 30 October 2015, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 14 […] One of our greatest privileges is the right to vote, in particular for the elected members of the Security Council. The Council, at the core of the United Nations system, 146  → 5.4.2.3 for Bolivia’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1025

needs to become more democratic, accountable and efficient. That is why San Marino seeks an enlarged – with elected members only – and geographically balanced Council. I am sure that under Ambassador Lucas’s stewardship the Council reform process will be predictable and transparent and involve great interaction among the Member States. I hope that at the end of this new round of negotiations we will reach a compromise solution among all Member States, from the five permanent members to a small country like ours. I am afraid that there will be a terrible mistake if this attempt brings us to a divisive vote. An issue of this importance needs to find a solution with the consensus of a very large majority. […] 5.2.1.2.9 7 November 2016, Republic of Korea, Mr. Oh Joon, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 14147

[…] At the outset, my delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group.148 […] The numerous protracted conflicts – from Syria to Yemen, Libya and Iraq, as well as in the Sahel and the Great Lakes region – all point to the need for a Security Council that is effective, accountable and transparent. The unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises that we face today adds to the urgency of the Security Council reform. The Republic of Korea believes that reform must take place in a way that will allow the Security Council to better address the challenges of international peace and security, which cannot be accomplished using the outdated concepts of permanency and veto. Increasing non-permanent membership through periodic elections is the only logical way to achieve this aim. Expanding the number of elected members alone will bring a better balance to the Security Council, thereby improving its work. Expanding permanency would not allow the Council to effectively address global challenges. […] At the same time, however, we recognize the aspirations of some Member States to make greater contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. To accommodate such aspirations, the Republic of Korea, along with other members of the Uniting for Consensus group, has advocated establishing a new category of longer-term re-electable seats, details of which can be negotiated. […] 5.2.1.2.10 7 November 2016, Turkey, Mr. Begeç, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 23149 We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group.150 The following are additional remarks in my national capacity. […] 147  → 5.4.4.36 for the Republic of Korea’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 148  7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5. 149  → 5.4.2.10 for Turkey’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 150  7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5.

1026

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Permanent membership and the veto mechanism are the obvious targets for reform. It is therefore difficult to understand why Member States, rather than rectifying the situation, are seeking to consolidate permanent membership and the veto mechanism. Increasing the number of permanent members and the ratio of those with veto power to those without it will simply make matters worse. Additionally, we do not know how the introduction of new permanent members or veto powers would enhance the accountability of the Council. Likewise, we do not know what mechanism would be used for assessing the performances of those countries after they become Council members. We are advocating for a meaningful and principled reform that would bring about a more democratic, representative, effective, transparent and, above all, accountable Council. We believe that this can only be achieved by increasing the number of elected members of the Council. For those aspiring to a longer term in service of the maintenance of international peace and security, we, the UfC Group, propose longer-term seats with the possibility of re-election. We are pleased to see that there is increasing support for the intermediate approach as a compromise solution. […] A more equitable representation of the regional groups and a fair system of rotation, including enhanced opportunities for underrepresented groups, is a must in a reformed Council. The working methods and the relationship with the General Assembly are no less important matters, as they determine the daily dynamics of the system. […] 5.2.1.2.11 7 November 2017, Pakistan, Ms. Lodhi, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 23-24 Pakistan aligns itself with the statement delivered by Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group.151 […] Over the years, we have become accustomed to hearing a litany of complaints from a handful of delegations about the slow pace of reform. They argue that the intergovernmental negotiations process has become a means to perpetuate the status quo, rather than a vehicle of change; and that in time the process has become an end in itself. Taken at face value, that view has merit, but we cannot but marvel at those delegations for liberally blaming others when the responsibility for the impasse lies squarely on them. These countries seek a privileged and unequal status for themselves, anchored in power politics, which is in sharp contradiction to the democratic spirit of our times. Even more telling, while they remain firmly wedded to their positions, they ask others to be flexible. It is equally disingenuous for them to invoke the majority principle in seeking membership of the Council, when they deny the same principle to the larger membership of the United Nations when they are being held to account. It is not a lack of will on the part of the many, but a lack of will on the part of a few that remains the most persistent stumbling block in the way of achieving a more representative, transparent, accountable and effective reform of the Security Council.

151  7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1027

Decision 62/557152 lays the overarching framework and mandate for intergovernmental negotiations – a membership-driven process with the aim of achieving comprehensive reform on the five equally important and interlinked issues, which are to be facilitated in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, with the objective of achieving the widest possible political acceptance on the part of the membership. Those are not just noble aspirations, but agreed parameters for reform. Yet what we have seen, unfortunately, is the repeated tendency by some to sidestep consensus through quick fixes and procedural manoeuvres. Such attempts not only turn the process into a majority-minority calculus and undermine mutual trust, but they also betray a lack of common understanding over the fundamentals of the issue. Seeking to introduce a text into such a chasm will not bridge our differences, it will accentuate them. We would be better served by not chasing such a chimera. What is required is not to set artificial deadlines, but instead, to heed the call for flexibility and readiness to find common ground. The Uniting for Consensus group has lived by that ideal, calibrating its position to reflect the interests and aspirations of all Member States – small, medium-sized and large. It is time for others to show the same spirit of compromise and the same spirit of flexibility. Pakistan’s views on Security Council reform are well known. We are firmly opposed to the creation of new permanent seats, as they are contrary to the universally agreed principles of democracy, accountability and transparency. After all, permanent membership remains at the core of much that is flawed about the existing Security Council. It is therefore counter-intuitive, in our view, to advocate an expansion in the Council as a means to address its inherent dysfunctionalities. That could, at best, be a measure to promote the self-serving interests of a few who deride the permanent membership as an anachronism, yet stand ready to embrace it in the same breath. It cannot become the rationale for a well-meaning and comprehensive reform effort. An enlarged permanent membership of the Security Council would also compromise its efficiency and effectiveness. At a time when growing and complex challenges to global peace and security warrant firm and clear action by the Security Council, an enlarged permanent membership, operating on the basis of the least common denominator, would erode the standing of the Council and not strengthen its role, as some would have us believe. On the other hand, expansion in the non-permanent category of membership, based on equitable geographic distribution and a system of fair rotation, a solution that my country favours, is both fair and just and is supported by all Member States and groups. That should serve as a natural point of departure for any reform of the Security Council. It also speaks to the imperative of reflecting contemporary realities. As contemporary realities are tied to the present, how can a permanent status be bestowed upon a transitory, impermanent state. That inconsistency can be answered only by longerterm non-permanent seats with possible re-election. Similarly, an expansion in the non-permanent category will foster a wider and fairer rotation within regional groups. What is needed are seats for the regions, not seats merely claimed on their behalf. 152  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

1028

5 On a road to nowhere ?

On the issue of regional representation, we fully respect the Common African Position, which voices the demand of an entire continent, as being inherently different from the demand for permanent seats in pursuit of narrow national ambitions. […] 5.2.1.2.12 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.43, pp. 3-4153

[…] We endorse the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/72/PV.41).154 […] In that same vein, we cannot leave aside the issue of the veto. So far, the use of the veto has undermined the Council’s credibility in its decisions and has curtailed the responsibility to protect those most vulnerable, as well as its ability and effectiveness in ensuring global peace and security. […] For these reasons, Costa Rica believes that the privilege of the veto should not be extended to any new members of the Council, as we believe that it generates inequality, restricts decision-making and causes immobility, thus having a negative impact on the Council’s effectiveness. As a result of the foregoing, we have repeatedly respectfully appealed to countries to move away from positions that focus on increasing the category of permanent members with veto rights, which we consider contrary to the call for democracy, alternation and transparency, which we all want. That is why we invite the Assembly to consider an intermediate position that would allow us to finally address the discussions on the points of convergence that, until now, we have been identifying and on which we are convinced that we can continue to build. […] 5.2.1.2.13 27 February 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] All Member States seem to share the goal of a more representative, democratic, accountable, transparent and effective Council. These principles are meant to underpin a reform leading to a new Security Council that will enjoy greater legitimacy and authority. Therefore, each of these principles should be thoroughly taken into account when we think about how we are willing to shape our new Security Council. Last year’s document affirms that “More discussions are needed on how to take into account the principles of democracy and representation in pursuing the objective of a more democratic Council”.155 This paragraph suggests that we agree to have a more democratic Council, but we need to jointly define “more representative” and “more democratic”. Let me then start by touching upon these two concepts: What do we mean by a more representative Council? The enlargement of the Security Council is intended to make it more representative. But a more representative Council requires more than an increase in seats; 153  → 5.2.2.2.41 for Costa Rica’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.4.60 for Costa Rica’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 154  7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 6-7. 155  23 June 2017, → 5.1.20.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1029

representativeness entails much more than a merely quantitative issue. The UfC group is firmly convinced that “more representative” means more inclusive, offering increased opportunities for all Member States to be seated periodically in the Council. According to the UN Charter, and in their own words, permanent members represent themselves alone. Expansion in the number of such members would thus do nothing to increase the representation of all others. In this regard, let me add that the UfC acknowledges the clear difference between the pursuit of new national permanent seats and the African call for enhanced regional representation. Our response is equally clear: Africa should become the best represented regional group through a democratic reform of the Security Council. UfC distributed details of its compromise proposal to the IGN last year: they show that our support for an increased African representation is clear and on the record.156 In tomorrow’s discussion we would be interested to hear how adding more of the current variety of permanent seats – excluding access to other Member States – could possibly produce a more representative Council. How would adding permanent seats make the Council more accountable to the regional groups and how would the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly be strengthened? This leads me to the second principle: What do we mean by a more democratic Council? While we all agree that we deserve a more democratic Council, there seems to be disagreement on to what extent. The UfC answer is unequivocal: we want a more democratic Council, consistent with the spirit of our times. This applies not only to the principle of democracy, but to all five principles we have recalled. In our view, a democratic reform would further enhance the legitimacy and authority of the Council. And since periodic elections and rotation are key elements of any democratic system, we are convinced that a reform centered on non-permanent elective seats is the only formula that can have a positive and credible impact on the legitimacy and authority of the Security Council. Can we agree that more permanent members – not subject to periodic elections – would not make the Council more democratic? Is the UN membership ready to recognize the legitimacy of new Council members without requiring periodic accountability? Speaking of accountability: What do we mean by a more accountable Council? We believe it is essential to have a Council that is more accountable to the wider membership, and that the new members of a reformed Council should earn their seat as a responsibility and not as a granted privilege. Accountability can only be enhanced with all new Council members being held to account for their performance through periodic elections by the General Assembly. This is the definition of accountability. While many of the arguments and questions related to this principle overlap the principles of representation and democracy, I wish to focus on a specific point: the right to vote of all Member States. Can we agree that elections are the primary instrument through which all Member States, especially smaller and developing Countries, can be heard on an equal footing and with equal dignity? Are Member States ready to give up their right to vote in this vital domain of the maintenance of international peace and

156  8 May 2017, → 5.2.2.3.23.

1030

5 On a road to nowhere ?

security? And if members come to regret relinquishing their say in such a vital domain, what recourse would they then have? Let me now move to the fourth principle: What do we mean by a more transparent Council? Here, I’d rather go straight to our questions: can we agree on the key role that has been traditionally played by the ten elected members to improve the transparency of the Council’s work and decision-making? If so, we should concur that a more favourable ratio of non-permanent to permanent members would improve the Council’s working methods, increase the transparency of its decision-making, and present a democratic challenge to the veto. How would new veto powers improve the Council’s transparency? And finally: What do we mean by a more effective Council? We are convinced that a reform centered on non-permanent members would foster a new dynamic between elected and existing permanent members within the Council, contributing to improved decision-making, transparency, working methods and, ultimately, to the effectiveness of the Council. However, one of the main arguments often evoked in favor of expanding the category of permanent seats is that the Council’s effectiveness would increase. The UfC strongly disagrees with this view, for at least two reasons: first, we believe that a Council more adaptable to the constant changes in the world’s political and economic landscape would also be a more effective Council; thus, enhancing the right of the membership to decide and adjust the Council’s composition on a regular basis would increase the Council’s effectiveness. Second, we fail to see how, after more than 70 years of experience, adding new vetoes can still be considered the right solution for a more effective response of the Council to the threats to international peace and security. Why should a more democratic and representative Council be considered less effective in carrying out its tasks? Would the expansion of permanent seats truly make the Council more adaptable to a changing global scenario? How would a larger number of vetoes and a higher ratio of permanent versus non-permanent members make the Council more responsive to international crises? […] 5.2.1.3 Statements focusing on an expansion of the Council in the non-permanent category 5.2.1.3.1 26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Ms. ‘Utoikamanu, Statement in the Open-ended Working Group […] I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) comprising: Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and my own country, the Kingdom of Tonga. […] Given this situation, Mr. President, allow me to outline very briefly our views, as small island states, on what we expect to see from a reformed Security Council. First and foremost, we seek a Security Council that has an improved working method. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1031

Second, we seek a Security Council that provides a fair chance for all states to serve in the Council. A reform that prevents member states from serving in more than any one category (that is, a better opportunity to serve). Big or small, North or South, East or West; we can all, in differentiated measure, contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. We therefore seek a Security Council more broadly representative of the 21st century. Third, we seek a Security Council that will have an increase in non-permanent seats for small states so that all small states, given the unique challenges we face, are given an equitable chance to serve in a reformed Council. […] 5.2.1.3.2 16 July 2009, Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh Final Document (adopted by the Heads of States and Governments at the 15th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement), NAM Doc. NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 92

[…] E. Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, and other Matters Related to the Security Council 66. The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed and underscored the validity and relevance of the Movement’s principled positions concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council, in particular the directives of the Movement adopted during its 11th,157 12th,158 13th159 and 14th160 Summits, and which have been reflected in the Movement’s position and negotiating papers, and the decisions of the Ministerial Conferences and Meetings […] 5.2.1.3.3 16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 86 On the Issue of Categories of Membership CARICOM favours expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership in the Security Council, and supports the legitimate aspirations of the African Group of countries in this regard. Further, CARICOM:

157  18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17. 158  Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/ CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 159  Thirteenth Conference of Head of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 20 February to 25 February 2003. See UN Doc. A/57/759-S/2003/332, Annex I. 160  Fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Havana, Cuba, from 11 September to 16 September 2006. See UN Doc. A/61/472-S/2006/780, Annex I.

1032

5 On a road to nowhere ?

recognizes that Small Island Developing States comprise one-fifth of UN membership, but are seldom represented among the membership of the Security Council, and have limited access to its deliberation; recognizes further that the historical exclusion and limited access of Small Island Developing States has deprived the Security Council of valuable perspectives and innovative approaches to the maintenance of international peace and security; stresses the importance of ensuring that Small Island Developing States have greater access to the Security Council and are consistently represented among the nonpermanent membership; and calls for the establishment of a category of non-permanent membership in the Security Council explicitly for Small Island Developing States. […] 5.2.1.3.4 4 March 2010, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 149-150161 Position Paper of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the UN Security Council Reform […] Specific Proposals […] Since the agreement on the permanent category enlargement is unlikely due to serious confrontation among members, the only realistic way is to expand the nonpermanent category first. If the permanent category were expanded new seats should be given to African region and other developing countries as the first priority. A country like Japan refusing the settlement of extra-large past crimes by all means should be off the list. The DPRK reiterates its firm position of rejecting any reform proposal presupposing Japan’s permanent membership. Improving the Security Council working methods is an integral part of the reform process and therefore, needs surely achieved. For a genuine Security Council reform, we should set it as the ultimate reform goal to ensure fairness and transparency in the Security Council activities. 5.2.1.3.5 11 November 2010, Belarus, Mr. Kolontai, UN Doc. A/65/PV.49, pp. 3-4 […] Belarus is keen to see the Security Council reform leading to a more balanced, more equitable distribution of the Council’s power. We support the increase in the number of Council members by giving additional seats to all regional groups. We draw attention to the underrepresentation of the Eastern European Group among the non-permanent 161  → 5.3.10 for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1033

membership. We affirm our position on the need to expand the representation of that group of countries among the Council’s non-permanent members. […] 5.2.1.3.6 7 November 2013, Belarus, Mr. Lazarev, UN Doc. A/68/PV.47, pp. 22-23 […] We support expanding the Council’s membership by providing all regional groups with additional seats on the Council. We draw attention to the underrepresentation of the Eastern European Group among non-permanent member States of the Council. We reiterate the position of Belarus that our Group of countries should be given an additional non-permanent seat on the Council. […] 5.2.1.3.7 12 November 2014, Maldives, Mr. Waheed, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 13-15 […] The membership of the Council is an increasingly flawed reflection of the world today. Half of the Members of the United Nations are small States, yet the vast majority of small States have never been elected. Small island developing States (SIDS) represent one fifth of the United Nations membership, yet 78 per cent have never gained a seat on the Security Council. We can begin to correct this flawed picture with one simple step: establishing a SIDS-specific seat on the Council. SIDS are an established, cohesive group that share unique challenges. We are nations that are small, isolated and particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. Yet climate change is fundamentally an issue of international security and stability that the Security Council must confront. The Maldives raised that issue during the Arria formula meeting of the Security Council on the subject of security dimensions of climate change, in 2013. The Maldives has great expectations for a day when the Security Council will formally address the long-term security threats that affect low-lying States, such as ours and many others, that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. That day may not come soon, and it may not come soon enough, unless the Security Council has equitable representation, inclusive of those States most affected by climate change, particularly SIDS. The designation of a SIDS-specific seat is based on the principled position of the Maldives that an expanded membership should reflect the true nature of the United Nations. Because the Security Council lacks diverse perspectives, it is unable to meet the diverse needs of the international community, especially the developing world. But a change in membership is not possible without addressing the prohibitive cost of running a campaign that deters or prevents smaller States from securing a seat on the Council. Security Council seats must not be a prize won by the highest bidder. Instead, States must be elected on principles of equality and representation. All States Members of the United Nations must be able to compete on an equal footing and have an equal chance. […] The vast majority of States have spoken here today: the Security Council is in urgent need of reform. No small island developing State should be held back from its rightful place in the world order, for global security affects the small with the greatest measure. Nations should not be judged on the size of their populations, nor on the might of their armies, but on the strength of their resolve to further peace and security for all.

1034

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.1.3.8 30 October 2015, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Talbot, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 3-4162 […] CARICOM maintains a principled advocacy for expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. The role and security of small States are key factors for CARICOM. In this context, we have proposed the inclusion of a special seat for Small Island Developing States in the reformed Security Council. The region’s support for the inclusion of Africa and other developing countries in the permanent category of membership remains unwavering. […] 5.2.1.3.9 30 October 2015, Poland, Mr. Winid, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 22163 […] The United Nations is made up of regional groups of different sizes. All of them advocate their equitable representation on the reformed Council. We firmly believe that the ambitions of the Group of African States, as well as the Asian, Pacific and Latin American countries, are equally justified. But being a member of the Group of Eastern European States – the smallest among the regional groups but at the same time one that has also witnessed a noticeable increase over the last decades – we would like to repeat our call for an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group. […] 5.2.1.3.10 30 October 2015, Romania, Mr. Jinga, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 19-20164 […] […] Romania stands firmly for the increased representation of the Group of Eastern European States and believes that at least one additional non-permanent seat should be allocated to that Group in the future architecture of the Security Council. 5.2.1.3.11 30 October 2015, Maldives, Ms. Naeem, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 23-24 […] SIDS continue to face growing security concerns that range from transnational organized crime to piracy and the effects of climate change. The Maldives raised those issues at the Security Council’s Arria Formula meeting on the security dimensions of climate change in 2013 and in its open debate on the security concerns of small island developing States in July (see S/PV.7499).165 While we welcome such initiatives as useful, productive and essential to recognition of the vast array of security concerns that Member States face, we must ensure that the momentum they generate is not lost. We must ensure that concrete steps are taken, including the designation of a SIDS-specific seat. An expanded membership must reflect the diverse nature of the Member States that make up the Organization. It

162  → 5.4.2.8 for CARICOM’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 163  → 5.4.4.32 for Poland’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 164  → 5.4.4.34 for Romania’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 165  30 July 2015, UN Doc. S/PV.7499, pp. 45-46.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1035

is precisely because the Security Council lacks diverse perspectives that it is unable to meet the diverse needs of the international community. A diverse membership of this principal organ of the United Nations will be achieved only when we give paramount importance to the principles of equality and representation. That is especially true when it comes to Security Council election campaign finances. In recent years, the Assembly has seen Council seats reduced to trophies, bought at exorbitant costs by those privileged enough to have the financial ability to do so. A discussion on membership should appropriately address the fact that Member States do not compete on an equal footing, because when it comes to membership in that privileged organ, we have been unwillingly relegated to a caste and class system that is in desperate need of overhaul. […] 5.2.1.3.12 7 November 2016, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 12-13166 […] Like other Member States, the Maldives is of the view that the comprehensive reform and expansion of the Security Council are essential to making it democratic in composition, effective in decision-making and accountable to the general membership. We believe that Council reform should transcend current global power politics and that its decisions should reflect the collective will of the general membership. Reform should not only be based on contemporary realities but should also take into account the outcome of the Council’s decisions. Making the Security Council more representative and balanced and its work more effective and transparent, especially with regard to its decision-making process, is vital if the United Nations is to be adapted to the global realities of the twenty-first century. Such reform should be implemented in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. […] During the Assembly’s general debate, my delegation underlined the importance of having a fair and equitable opportunity to serve (see A/71/PV.21).167 The Maldives believes that the expansion of the Council’s membership is essential for the Council’s continued legitimacy and relevance. We believe that the membership of the Security Council should come from both developing and developed countries, including small States, and that such membership should reflect the United Nations diverse membership. That is why the Maldives is seeking election to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the term 2019-2020. This is the first time that my country has presented its candidature for a Security Council seat since it became a Member of the Organization 51 years ago. We believe that every country, regardless of size and might, must have the opportunity to serve, because we believe that it is not the size but the will to contribute that makes a difference, and because, moreover, we believe that the opportunity to serve must be based on intent, resolve, fairness and the principle of representation. The Maldives is eager to see a contemporary Security Council that is more representative and influential and that reflects the changes that have taken place in recent years. […]

166  → 5.4.4.35 for the Maldives’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 167  24 September 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.21, pp. 19-22.

1036

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The Maldives remains committed wholeheartedly to the reform process and calls for flexibility and the widest possible political acceptance in proceeding with the negotiations. We must be united in taking forward the intergovernmental negotiations and finding a solution that is acceptable to all. It is our earnest hope that consensus is achieved in that vein. The Maldives is a firm believer in the principles enshrined in the Charter. We are a staunch supporter of democracy, the rule of law, equality and justice. We believe in the purposes for which the United Nations was founded, and we believe that the world needs such an organization today more than ever. […] 5.2.1.3.13 7 November 2016, Latvia, Mr. Mažeiks, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 5168 […] In our view, Council reform should ensure equitable geographic distribution of both permanent and non-permanent seats, thereby reflecting the current political realities. That would include allocating at least one additional non-permanent seat to the Group of Eastern European States. Due consideration should also be given to the adequate representation of small and medium-sized Member States. […] 5.2.1.3.14 7 November 2016, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mr. Kim In-ryong, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 8-9

[…] The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea calls for the Security Council’s comprehensive reform so as to reflect today’s demands. It outlines its principled position as follows. First, Council reform should be directed towards ensuring impartiality, objectivity and democracy. Although more than 70 years have passed since the establishment of the United Nations, the Security Council, which consists of only 15 States, is unable to represent the interests of all 193 Member States. Security Council reform should be undertaken with a view to rejecting the high-handedness, arbitrariness and double standards of one specific country, which must be considered to be a blatant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter, which proclaims the sovereignty and equality of all countries. Secondly, the composition of the Council should be based on the principle of ensuring the full representation of member States of the Non-Aligned Movement and other developing countries. Since such States form the majority of the membership of the United Nations, it cannot be a matter of debate that they should be represented accordingly in the Security Council. As we have seen during the intergovernmental negotiation process on Security Council reform, the prospects for enlarging the Council’s permanent membership are not good, owing to the seriously divided views of Member States. Under those circumstances, a preferable and viable solution for redressing the Council’s unbalanced structure would be to begin by enlarging the category of non-permanent members. Thirdly, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea believes that Japan’s efforts to become a permanent member of the Security Council are an affront 168  Latvia confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 20-21. → 5.4.4.42 for Latvia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1037

to the conscience of humankind and the United Nations. A country notorious for its war crimes, Japan invaded numerous Asian countries, committed the wholesale slaughter of peoples, looted and set fires indiscriminately, and, in particular, committed the crime of sex slavery, which is an egregious crime against humanity. Before participating in negotiations on Security Council reform, Japan should reflect upon its crimes and compensate the victims in good faith in order to regain the trust of the international community. […] 5.2.1.3.15 7 November 2016, Slovakia, Mr. Ružička, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 9-11169 […] My country supports the expansion of both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent, and we are also very keen to discuss the possibility of a third type of membership, provided that it meets two goals, namely, representation and efficiency. Membership in the Security Council, especially permanent membership, is not only a privilege, but also, and more importantly, a responsibility. The majority of our Member States have already been Security Council members. We took our membership as a responsibility. It was not our goal to get into the Security Council; the goal was to contribute to solving the most serious issues of the day. We support the enlargement of the Council and call for better representation therein of the Group of African States and for an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States. Taking all the pluses and minuses into account, we should be more attentive to the voices of the small and medium-sized Member States, because in the overall competition they are sometimes at a disadvantage in competing for a seat. So we have to find the appropriate mechanisms. The majority of new Member States since 1990 are small Member States. One might ask, what is their contribution? My answer is simple. We have representatives of every single Member State in the highest positions in the United Nations system, and we very much value and appreciate their contributions to the work of the system. […] 5.2.1.3.16 7 November 2016, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 11-12170 […] While Ukraine is open to discussing all new approaches to Security Council reform, we particularly welcome initiatives aimed at streamlining the negotiation process and making it more pragmatic and results-oriented. […] We are ready to participate actively in the negotiations during the current General Assembly session. Ukraine supports all steps, whether procedural or substantive, that can lead to progress in that area, which is long overdue. We are convinced that the proposals and positions reflected in the framework document circulated on 31 July 2015171 continue to constitute a solid basis for further negotiations. As for the Group of Eastern European States, I would like to underline that any increase in the non-permanent

169  → 5.4.4.43 for Slovakia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 170  → 5.4.4.44 for Ukraine’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 171  → 5.1.13.

1038

5 On a road to nowhere ?

membership of the Security Council should ensure enhanced representation of the Eastern European States. […] 5.2.1.3.17 7 November 2016, Canada, Mr. Bonser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 13-14172 Canada aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/71/PV.42).173 […] Secondly, on the issue of representativeness, Canada strongly believes in expanding the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council. In doing so, we need to be mindful of the historical under-representation of Africa and small island and developing States. Increasing the number of non-permanent seats would ensure a broader representation of the world’s regions and add to the Council’s legitimacy. Thirdly, on the issues of democracy, transparency and accountability, Canada firmly believes that the holding of regular elections is the essential mechanism for ensuring Council accountability before the General Assembly. It is also based on the conviction that there are ways of making the Council more representative without conferring special rights on a few member States. […] 5.2.1.3.18 7 November 2016, Hungary, Ms. Bogyay, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 16-17174 […] Hungary continues to support the enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. As a guiding principle, enlargement must continue to be based on regional groups and must be guided by their equitable representation. In that spirit, Hungary reiterates its call for a second non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States, which is a request that is part of any enlargement model. There are different and legitimate national views when it comes to Security Council reform. The only way to cater to those interests, while agreeing on the much-needed reform itself, is through meaningful consultations. We should be moving forward with substantial text-based negotiations. Hungary is looking forward to receiving proposals from the co-Chairs on a relevant work programme and a schedule for the negotiating sessions. […] 5.2.1.3.19 7 November 2017, Slovakia, Mr. Mlynár, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 27-28 […] The position of my delegation on the possible review of the membership of the Security Council is consistent and well documented. Slovakia supports the expansion of membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and calls for an increase to no more than 25, representing geographical balance. The new members of the Council should, as a principle, have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current ones. I wish to underscore that a reformed Council should include one additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States. […] 172  → 5.4.4.45 for Canada’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 173  7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5. 174  → 5.4.4.46 for Hungary’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1039

5.2.1.3.20 7 November 2017, Slovenia, Ms. Bavdaž Kuret, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 3-4175

[…] On more concrete issues, Slovenia is in favour of expanding the membership of the Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. When it comes to the category of elected or non-permanent members, we believe that enlargement would enable a higher rate of rotation and greater democratic representation in the Security Council. In this regard, Slovenia places high priority on the allocation of an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States. In the past 25 years, the number of members of the Group of Eastern European States has doubled, but its representation in the Security Council has remained unchanged – one permanent and one non-permanent seat. We also support additional seats for African States. […] 5.2.1.3.21 7 November 2017, Maldives, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 5-7 […] Since 1979, the Maldives has maintained a consistent position on the reform of the Security Council. The number of permanent members on the Council must be increased. At the time of its inception in 1945, the United Nations had fewer members. Most countries in this Hall were not independent then. But now we are. And we are here to stay. And we deserve our say. We must make the permanent membership – those holding the veto power – more representative. We believe that every continent must have at least one permanent seat, reflecting the political and the economic realities of our time. The principle of equal geographical representation must be the underlying principle of our work as we try to find a feasible formula for going forward in the intergovernmental negotiations. Revising the number and the composition of the permanent seats is only one aspect of the reform. A more important dimension must be to increase the number of non-permanent seats. We believe that the membership of the Security Council should come from both developing and developed countries, including small island developing States, so as to reflect the diversity of the United Nations membership. That is the spirit of the formula devised in the Charter, which sets out two criteria: first, the contribution of Members to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization and, secondly, equitable geographical distribution. Let us consider the first element. Every country can bring diversity. Every country can offer unique perspectives. While traditional concepts of security still constitute an important dimension, non-traditional emerging threats are increasingly gaining traction across the world. Those threats include pandemics, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, the impacts of climate change, the scarcity of and associated competition over resources such as food, water and fuel, and other development challenges. Those are the new challenges to international peace and security. Those are the new frontiers of security. In order for the Security Council to be able to reach those frontiers, we need a diversity of viewpoints and experiences that can assist us in addressing such diverse challenges. There is therefore a need to redefine old yardsticks for measuring 175  → 5.4.4.51 for Slovenia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1040

5 On a road to nowhere ?

contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. We may be small, but we have strength in our shoulders and grit in our bones to carry the lofty ideals and aspirations that define this Organization. Diverse members that can contribute to such new, non-traditional understandings of peace and security must be included. It is our firm belief that every country deserves an opportunity to serve. The second criterion – equitable geographical distribution – is the cornerstone of the United Nations. Every country, be it mighty or tiny, rich or poor, deserves to be heard and have a say. Yet, that is largely not the case. That imperative is significantly more valid in the Security Council, where every country must be heard. While new threats are redefining our conception of security and how we approach international peace, the countries that suffer the most are not represented. The Maldives, for example, was the 117th country to join the United Nations. Of the 116 that joined before us, 104 have already served on the Security Council. After half a century, we have not had the opportunity to do so, as is the case with nearly all small island developing States. We believe that larger countries, especially those that have served on the Council, have a moral and, indeed, a Charter-based obligation to ensure that small countries, especially those that have not served before, get a fair chance. We believe that every country is determined to serve, determined to make its contribution in its own way to the maintenance of international peace and security and determined to uphold the principles of the United Nations. And one may ask, what is stopping those countries? In theory, every country has the same opportunity to compete. Any country can put forward its candidature, run in the election and participate in the competition. But, I ask the Assembly whether the competition is fair anymore. For small States, it is not fair. The competition is tough. It is expensive. If a country wishes to undertake an effective campaign for a seat on the Security Council, that country is expected to spend enormous amounts of money and resources in order to secure votes. Even when a country chooses to not adopt such campaign practices, it is forced to do so in order to overcome perceptions about the country’s capacity, about the country’s drive or passion, or about the country’s seriousness. Countries that cannot afford to spend a fortune on their campaign for the Security Council lose out. We believe that that is most certainly why only eight small island developing States have managed to secure a seat on the Council since the establishment of the United Nations. Small countries can no longer campaign on an equal footing. That means that countries that need to be heard and countries that can bring unique perspectives and fresh, new ideas never end up on the Council. Equitable geographical distribution increasingly looks like a principle with a financial price tag. The Maldives can and will change that. We hope to get elected to the Council for the term of 2019-2020 in the election to be held in June 2018. If elected, the Maldives will, in collaboration with our partners, build a reservoir of hope, trust and credibility that will redefine the ordering principle in multilateral diplomacy, transforming it into an order in which right will become might. Yet, that can happen only if the General Assembly joins hands in upholding the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations. We urge the General Assembly and individual Member States to uphold the principles that they agreed to when they signed up for the United Nations. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1041

5.2.1.3.22 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24176 […] My delegation is ready to discuss all the proposals already put forward by delegations during previous rounds of negotiations, so that we can identify those that might receive major support in the General Assembly and the Security Council. […] I will not go into all the details of our position, since it is well known and duly reflected in the framework document. Yet, as a current elected member of the Security Council and as a country that has experienced at first hand the shortcomings of the Council’s existing working methods and format, which directly influence its record in safeguarding international peace and security, Ukraine deems it necessary to reiterate our position on several important aspects of Council reform. First, increasing the representative character of the Security Council is one of the top priorities. Yet it should not be an obstacle to, or in any way delay, reaching agreement on other areas of the Council’s reform or the practical implementation of such reform. Secondly, we strongly believe that any formula for the Council’s enlargement should include the provision of an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States, whose membership has more than doubled in size in the past decades. We are encouraged that, during our intergovernmental negotiation discussions, several groups of States, not only the Eastern European Group, have clearly expressed their support for that approach. We are therefore of the view that the addition of one more non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group in an expanded Council should be considered as one of the commonalities as far as regional representation goes. We also support the idea that equitable geographical distribution should be reflected in an expanded Council’s membership. My delegation is convinced that any change in the Security Council’s composition should be based on the existing regional groups of Member States. At the same time, we think that there is merit in exploring the option of allocating a non-permanent seat in the future Council to the small island developing States. […] 5.2.1.3.23 8 November 2017, Poland, Mr. Radomski, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 2-3177 […] Proceeding from the areas of convergence identified in the last session’s foodfor-thought paper, we remain committed to striving towards the enlargement of the Security Council so that it becomes more reflective of the realities of today’s world. All regional groups should be given a voice in discussions and decisions of vital importance. In this context, we continue to support the proposal for an additional seat in the Security Council for the Group of Eastern European States – the Group that saw its membership grow the most in recent decades. […]

176  → 5.4.2.16 for Ukraine’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 5.4.4.55 for Ukraine’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 177  → 5.4.4.59 for Poland’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1042

5 On a road to nowhere ? 5.2.1.3.24 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations178

[…] 9. On the matter of inter linkages between the clusters, CARICOM wishes to note the following. i. The reform of the Security Council that our region envisages would see a Council on which the various regions of the world are equitably represented and one that provides greater opportunity for the participation of developing countries – Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in particular. In order to achieve this, CARICOM believes that both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership need to be expanded. […] ii. On this note, CARICOM advocates that any reform of the Council should address the representational gap that exists, given that the Council as currently configured is not reflective of the UN today. Entire regions are unrepresented in the permanent category and underrepresented in the non-permanent category. We believe that any reform must address this deficit and wish to reiterate our support for the African position in particular. CARICOM holds firmly to the view that we must right the wrong against our African brothers and sisters in any future reform of the Security Council. iii. CARICOM also continues to advocate for a rotating seat for [SIDS] across all regions given the vulnerabilities, perspectives and peculiarities that these States have and the contribution that they can make towards the maintenance of international peace and security. iv. Any expansion in the permanent category of membership raises questions about the use of the veto and while CARICOM supports its ultimate abolition, we believe that so long as it is retained its use should be extended to any new permanent member. […] 5.2.1.3.25  5-6 April 2018, Non-Aligned Movement, Baku Final Document (adopted by the Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan), NAM Doc. NAM 2018/CoB/Doc.1 […] Chapter I: Global Issues […] United Nations: Institutional Reform […] E. Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, and other Matters Related to the Security Council 119. The Ministers reaffirmed and underscored the validity and relevance of the Movement’s principled positions concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council, in particular the directives of the Movement adopted during its 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th Summits,179 which have been reflected in 178  → 5.3.27 for CARICOM’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.4.64 for CARICOM’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 179  For references, → 5.2.1.3.2.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1043

the Movement’s position and negotiating papers, and the decisions of the Ministerial Conferences and Meetings, as follows: 119.1. The Movement, while noting with appreciation efforts undertaken, notes with concern the lack of concrete results in the intergovernmental negotiations in the informal plenary of the General Assembly on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Council, based on General Assembly decisions 62/557,180 63/565,181 64/568, 65/554, 66/556, 67/561, 68/557, 69/560,182 70/559,183 and 71/553 and notes that the negotiations have shown that while a convergence of views has emerged, major differences still exist, and while there have been some improvements made to the working methods of the Council, they have not satisfied even the minimum expectations of the general membership of the UN, leaving much room for improvement; 119.2. In this context, the Ministers reiterated that General Assembly Decision 62/557 is and shall continue to be the basis of Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Security Council reform; 119.3. Reform of the Security Council should be comprehensive, addressing all substantive issues relating, inter alia, to the question of the membership, regional representation, the Council’s agenda, its working methods and decision-making process, including the veto, and should garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States in line with the provisions of the Charter and relevant General Assembly decisions particularly 62/557; […] 119.7. The reform of the Security Council should be addressed in an early, comprehensive, transparent and balanced manner, without delay and without setting artificial deadlines. It should ensure that the agenda of the Council reflects the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries, in an objective, rational, non-selective and non-arbitrary manner; 119.8. The enlargement of the Council, as a body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the reform of its working methods should lead to a democratic, more representative, more accountable and more effective Council; […] 119.10. The Ministers acknowledge the historical injustices against Africa with regard to its representation in the Security Council and expressed support for increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council. The Ministers took note of the African common position as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus184 and the Sirte Declaration;185 […]

180  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 181  14 September 2009, → 5.1.3. 182  14 September 2015, → 5.1.14. 183  27 July 2016, → 5.1.17. 184  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 185  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

1044

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.2 Statements regarding new categories of seats 5.2.2.1 Statements supporting permanent seats without the right of veto 5.2.2.1.1 13 November 2009, United States of America, Mr. Wolff, UN Doc. A/64/ PV.45, p. 18 […] As we stated during the first three rounds of these negotiations and will continue to elaborate in more detail in those negotiations, the United States supports expansion of the Security Council. Such expansion, however, should neither diminish the Council’s effectiveness nor its efficiency. Let me briefly summarize key elements of my Government’s position. The United States is open in principle to a limited expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members. In terms of categories of membership, the United States strongly believes that any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific in nature. In determining which countries merit permanent membership, we will take into account the ability of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the United Nations. As we have previously stated, the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Security Council by a Charter amendment that changes the current veto structure. To enhance the prospects for success, whatever formula emerges for an expansion of Council membership should have in mind Charter requirements for ratification. We remain committed to a serious, deliberate effort, working with other Member States, to find a way forward that both adapts the Security Council to current global realities and enhances the ability to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of the new century. 5.2.2.1.2 16 February 2010, Uruguay, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 89-90

[…] I have the honor to address you in reference to your letter dated 5th February 2010, in your capacity of Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform, in order to convey to you once more the position of Uruguay on the question of the extension of the so called “veto power” to any new permanent members to be elected in a reformed Security Council. Since any concrete text proposal will be contingent with the solution to the reform process, and the creation of new permanent seats in the reformed Security Council, Uruguay would like to reiterate its position that no new permanent member should have “veto power”, since this power violates the principle of equal rights of nations as well as the principle of sovereign equality contained in Article II of the Charter of the United Nations. Please find attached a working example of the text that Uruguay will propose should an option to enlarge the permanent and non permanent membership of the Security Council (an option that Uruguay supports), be agreed upon. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1045

VETO The new permanent members elected to the Security Council following resolution …, will not be considered as part of the concurring majority of permanent members required in paragraph 3) of article 27 of the Charter. The concurring vote of the permanent members required in para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter will only apply to the original permanent members of the Security Council. / the existing permanent members prior to resolution … The newly elected permanent members of the Security Council (resolution …) will have no veto power and they will not be considered for the purpose of para. 3 of article 27 of the Charter. […] 5.2.2.1.3 5 March 2010, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 180 U.S. Position The United States is committed to finding a way forward with other Member States on Security Council reform that preserves and strengthens the Council’s effectiveness and efficiency so as to enhance its ability to carry out its mandate and meet the challenges of the new century. The United States is not linking Security Council reform to other aspects of UN reform. We view both as important and will pursue them in tandem. The U.S. position on the five key issues that form the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations follows: Categories of membership: We are open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific, rather than regionally-based. For any new permanent members, the criteria for selection should begin with the same criteria for non-permanent membership laid out in Article 23 of the Charter, namely that due regard shall be specially paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization. The question of the veto: We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure. In view of the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to new permanent members could be adopted. Regional representation: Decisions about new permanent members will be made primarily on the basis of a member’s country-specific qualifications. Size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council: In order to preserve and strengthen the Council’s effectiveness and efficiency, we are prepared to support only a modest expansion. We are not open to a change to Article 30 of the Charter. The Council’s working methods should be determined by the Council. […]

1046

5 On a road to nowhere ? 5.2.2.1.4 11 November 2010, United States of America, Ms. DiCarlo, UN Doc. A/65/ PV.49, p. 18186

[…] As we stated during the first five rounds of the negotiations and will continue to discuss in the current round, the United States believes that the long-term viability of the Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the twenty-first century. We support expansion of the Council in a way that will diminish neither its effectiveness nor its efficiency. Let me briefly summarize key elements of my Government’s position. The United States is open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members. We strongly believe that any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific in nature. In assessing which countries merit permanent membership, the United States will take into account the ability of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the United Nations. As we stated in our national security strategy earlier this year, my Government is committed to engaging emerging Powers in the international architecture. The United States supports a Security Council membership that upholds human rights and the rule of law at home and abroad, and makes significant contributions to the implementation of Security Council decisions, especially through their enforcement, as well as financial, personnel, and political support. As we have previously stated, the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Security Council that changes the current veto structure. We remain committed to a serious, deliberate effort, working with other Member States, to find a way forward that both adapts the Security Council to current global realities and enhances its ability to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of the new century. 5.2.2.1.5 15 November 2012, United States of America, Ms. DiCarlo, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 9-10

[…] The Security Council first met in January 1946, under Australia’s presidency. At that time, former Secretary of State and first United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Edward Stettinius, Jr., said that the General Assembly, inter alia, was responsible for building the kind of world in which lasting peace will be possible, and that the Security Council must see to it that the peace is kept. Nearly 67 years later, the members of the Council remain dedicated to that mission. As the world’s principal body for dealing with global security cooperation, the Council needs to reflect the realities of the new century. We recognize that various groups of Member States have presented proposals to add both permanent and nonpermanent members, and also to add veto-wielding members. The United States is open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members, but we strongly believe that any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific in nature. Moreover, the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Security Council that changes the current veto 186  The United States of America confirmed this position on 8 November 2011 in UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, pp. 22-23.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1047

structure. Given that up to now no proposal has enjoyed consensus among us in the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, we must continue to roll up our sleeves and discuss the way forward together. […] 5.2.2.1.6 12 November 2014, United Kingdom, Sir Lyall Grant, UN Doc. A/69/ PV.49, pp. 15-16

[…] The United Kingdom’s position on Security Council reform has not changed. The United Kingdom supports new permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside permanent African representation. We also support an expansion in the number of non-permanent seats. […] Disagreement around whether or not to extend the veto right has proved one of the key obstacles to making any progress on Security Council reform. A priority for all of us must be to ensure that any reform does not reduce the Council’s capacity to effectively deal with threats to international peace and security. In that context, the United Kingdom does not support the extension of veto rights to new permanent members. We note with interest the French initiative for voluntary Permanent Five veto restraint187 and welcome the valuable debate it has sparked. We have been appalled by the cynical way in which the veto has been used since 2011 to enable the perpetuation of mass atrocities and war crimes by the Syrian regime. We cannot envisage circumstances in which the United Kingdom would use its veto to block an appropriate response to a mass atrocity or other major crisis. But to be meaningful, this initiative would, of course, require the united support of all the permanent members of the Council. It is important that arguments on contentious issues such as the veto be heard, but we also need to be careful to ensure that the range of different and opposing views around the veto do not distract us from the important task of broadening the membership of the Council to ensure that it is a better reflection of the modern world. […] 5.2.2.1.7 16 April 2015, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, p. 114

[…] The United States would like to furnish the following points in response to your March 26 request for input on our views on Security Council reform: The United States is open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must take into account the ability and willingness of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the United Nations. We believe that consideration of new permanent members must be country-specific in nature. We remain opposed to any alteration or expansion of the veto. […]

•

187  24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11.

1048

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.2.1.8 28 September 2015, Chile, Ms. Bachelet Jeria, UN Doc. A/70/PV.14, pp. 3-4 […] Chile has strengthened the role it plays in the multilateral system. In 2014 and 2015 we have served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. In the light of that experience, we wish to reaffirm our belief in the need to reform the Council by increasing the number of its permanent members and by reducing the use of the veto, at the very least in cases involving crimes against humanity. Such a reform is necessary, reflecting the considerable change and progress seen in the multilateral system, and it would undoubtedly confer greater legitimacy on that most important organ of the United Nations. […] 5.2.2.1.9 7 November 2016, United States of America, Ms. Sison, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, p. 11188 […] The United States remains open to all manner of negotiations within the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations, so long as they help us arrive at the broad consensus necessary to reach agreement on Council reform. Reflecting on last year’s intergovernmental negotiations, while our joint efforts towards convergence were serious and certainly commendable, it was also clear how carefully we would need to proceed for us all to endorse a common approach. But whatever the eventual path of the negotiations, we must ensure that they enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council and allow us to more effectively address the pressing challenges to international peace and security. Ultimately, we recognize that for reform to be successful, our decisions must enjoy the broadest possible consensus. In order to achieve that, the United States will support reasonable proposals for modest expansion of the Council, in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. Any consideration of which countries merit future permanent membership must take into account their ability and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to their ability to exercise the heavy responsibilities that come with Security Council membership. We remain opposed to any expansion or alteration of the veto. […] 5.2.2.1.10 7 November 2016, Singapore, Mr. Gafoor, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 25-27189 […] My delegation is ready to engage constructively and committed to making genuine progress in the intergovernmental negotiations. I wish to provide a brief recap of Singapore’s position on the question of Security Council reform. We support expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership to make the Council more representative and inclusive. But we also believe that any reform of the Security Council must go beyond just increasing the number of seats. Reform should make the Council more accountable, transparent and inclusive for everyone, not just for aspirants to permanent membership. That is an important issue for many small States, as we do not have many opportunities to serve in the Security Council. 188  The United States confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 1-2. 189  → 5.4.4.39 for Singapore’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1049

We therefore attach great importance to improving the working methods of the Council. We have made a number of practical proposals to enhance the transparency and accountability of the Security Council. Of note, we have joined many countries to support limiting the use of the veto by the P-5. We do not support extending the veto to new permanent members, as we do not think additional vetoes will enhance the effectiveness of the Council to respond to threats to peace and security. We hope that the thirteenth intergovernmental negotiations process will take these proposals up when it resumes its work later this year. As we start a new round of negotiations, I would like to make some general points. […] We also welcome the recent establishment of the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform, which includes, we note, the participation of two P-5 members. […] 5.2.2.1.11 7 November 2016, Chile, Ms. Sapag Muñoz de la Peña, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.43, p. 22190

[…] Regarding the categories of Security Council membership, we stress that we must expand both the permanent and non-permanent categories so that the Council can be a truly representative body that reflects the new geopolitical realities and can address the situations on its agenda appropriately. At the same time, we recognize the progress that has been made since the last reform of the Council. We reiterate our position that the expansion of the category of permanent members does not mean an extension of the right of veto. […] 5.2.2.1.12 7 November 2016, Uruguay, Ms. Sande, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 22-23 […] Uruguay has opposed and continues to oppose conferring the privilege of veto power on any new permanent members resulting from the reform. Uruguay’s position goes back to the very moment when the Organization was established at the San Francisco Conference. The delegation of Uruguay underlined the need to not have differences of prerogatives or rights among the members of the Security Council, while accepting that those countries that had borne the greatest burden of the war would have seats on the Security Council – not indefinitely, but for a period of time considered prudent. […] 5.2.2.1.13 20 November 2018, United States of America, Mr. Hunter, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, p. 23

[…] In this coming session, we look forward to addressing the topic, as outlined by our co-Chairs, of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. We have been very clear that the United States approaches those negotiations with four core objectives in mind.

190  Chile confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, p. 1. → 5.4.4.47 for Chile’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1050

5 On a road to nowhere ?

First, we support a modest expansion of the Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. Consideration of any new permanent membership must take into account the ability and willingness of candidates to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It must also take into account their willingness to exercise the responsibilities that come with Security Council membership. That includes an enhanced financial responsibility as well. Secondly, the United States opposes any change to the veto. Any expansion or alteration of the veto is a red line for the United States. Thirdly, the United States remains open to any form of negotiation within the intergovernmental negotiations framework – whether text-based or otherwise – as long as that format allows for broad consensus. Wide agreement across the intergovernmental negotiations is the only way that reform will ultimately succeed. Finally, we seek an effective and efficient Security Council. The United States will support only those reforms that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council and advance the Council’s core mandate of addressing challenges to inter­ national peace and security. We remain committed to a process that achieves the right reforms, rather than to a fixed timeline for those reforms. […] 5.2.2.2 Statements supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semipermanent seats 5.2.2.2.1 3 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations The key points of our thinking on categories of membership are: The question of SC reform has been deadlocked for too long, and this is basically due to opposing positions on categories of membership. We therefore, and with others, strongly believe, that we need options that can build bridges between the different established positions. The intermediary solution could be such an option. It could include the creation of a third category of seats. These would be extended non-permanent seats with a possibility of immediate re-election. The length of the term as well as the re-election modalities would be subject to negotiation. Important for us is the fact that candidates for the new extended seats should meet certain objective criteria (such as size and population, contribution to UN military and civilian personnel and financial contributions and strong capacity to contribute to overall Peace and Security efforts). Let me join the ambassadors of Singapore and Liechtenstein by saying that running simultaneously for both extended seats and regular non-permanent seats should not be allowed. A member state having lost an election should not run in the other category for a certain period of time (no “flip-flopping”). An integral component of such an intermediary proposal would be the often mentioned mandatory review at a predetermined date. This review would include the following issues: (i) number of seats; (ii) possibility of re-election; (iii) length of the terms; (iv) right of veto; (v) length of the time ban for election in the other category of non-permanent membership. The transitional arrangement should be sufficiently long to allow for at least one re-election of the extended non-permanent seats (e.g. a minimum of two terms). In short: we believe that the advantages of an intermediary solution are the following: It could bridge the differences between different opposite positions;

• • • • •

• •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1051

enable important states to have an extended presence in the Council; protect the interests of small and medium-sized Member States by applying a time ban; defer the question of the veto and other delicate issues to the time of the review; allow for a more equitable geographical representation and not prejudge the final outcome of the reform effort. 5.2.2.2.2 4 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations191 […] 2. In order to achieve reform of the Security Council, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposed on March 27, 2008,192 we support the option of an intermediate reform that would temporarily provide for seats with terms longer than two years and immediately renewable. At the end of this initial phase (that could last 15 to 20 years), a review conference should evaluate the impact of the reform and the necessity of completing the first phase of reform. We see many advantages to this solution: – It allows for the experimentation and trial of different solutions for improved representation in the Council. – It could be based on the existing regional approach: the equitable geographical distribution prescribed by Article 23 of the Charter, the number of seats determined by existing regions (or regional groups). – It avoids the immediate establishment of new permanent seats, without preventing their eventual creation. – It doesn’t require an increase in the Council’s size that would be excessive. These are the reasons why we hope this solution will garner broad support. It shows our willingness to move forward, and to find a simple and practical solution as soon as possible. […] 5.2.2.2.3 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations193 […] 11. There are several proposals for expansion in the non-permanent member category: – First, is to increase the number of regular 2-year non-permanent seats. It can improve representation based on equitable geographical distribution, addressing in particular the under-represented regions and groups. [Resolution 48/26194 recognized the need to review the membership of the Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the UN especially of developing countries]. 2-year seat is the most equitable and fair option by any comparison, mathematical calculation or mode of representation. It is nondivisive and the easiest course of action. There is broad consensus around this option. No one opposes it. It continues to be our preference.

191  Original in French. → 5.2.1.1.2 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 192  Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15. 193  → 5.2.1.2.1 for Pakistan’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.2.2.3.2 for Pakistan’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 194  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2.

1052

5 On a road to nowhere ?

– Other proposals have been advanced to provide flexibility and innovation in how representation under non-permanent category could be made more responsive to the various positions, including the possibility of more frequent or longer representation on the Council by those who consider they have the capacity and the qualifications for that. These proposals include: Allowing immediate re-election; Increasing the term from the present 2 years to – number of years; Various combinations of the above two (so-called intermediate options); There are questions whether these proposals should apply to all or only some of the additional non-permanent seats, and whether they should also apply to the 10 existing non-permanent seats; 12. As a demonstration of flexibility, Pakistan and other members of the Uniting for Consensus, are open to considering these possibilities to work for feasible and equitable options. Having considered the views of many countries in particular the concerns expressed by small states, we think that it will be prudent to leave the 10 current non-permanent seats untouched. Options for re-election and longer term could be considered on some of the new non-permanent seats to provide for fair rotation and opportunities for representation for all. The remaining should be regular 2 year seats. Balance could be attained between accountability, enhanced representation and equitable geographical distribution. It is obvious that seats providing for frequent or longer-term representation will have to be regional, not individual or national seats. The regions may then determine appropriate mechanisms for rotation, re-election and a reasonable tenure so as to accommodate the aspirations and interests of their members. Of the non-permanent seats to be added in any expansion, we would be willing to consider that a certain number would be regional seats of this kind, providing for longer term or more frequent presence. Also in deference to the concerns expressed by many states, we would need provisions to avoid flip-flop between various categories. In allocation of new seats to regions, preference will be given to under-represented regions of Africa, Asia and GRULAC. Representation of cross-regional groups such as OIC/Arab group will need to be accommodated through appropriate arrangements such as sharing of seats between Asia and Africa on rotation basis. 13. Let me make it clear that any ideas whether for permanent or interim solutions that provide for longer term or re-election or their combination, which would in effect amount to “permanence” are not acceptable to us. 14. We are conscious that no option for frequent or longer-term presence can be as equitable and fair as the regular 2-year seats. Our flexibility on this is therefore at a cost. However, we cannot continue to hold out this offer if there is no flexibility from the other side to reach a reasonable compromise. Therefore let me say that in case of no agreement on other options or categories of membership, our fall back will be the NAM fallback position195 i.e. expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category. 15. It should also be kept in mind that the nature of expansion is linked to the size of expansion. Therefore, the smaller the expansion, the lesser would be the possibility to

• • • •

195  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, UN Doc. A/49/965, → 3.2.1.3.5.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1053

provide for more frequent representation through re-election or longer term. 2-year seats have to be given priority in any expansion. […] 5.2.2.2.4 24 March 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] Turkey remains steadfast in its belief that the most effective way to uphold and further enhance the principle of “regional representation” is through increasing the number of regular two-year non-permanent seats at the Council and allocating them to the inherently under-represented groups which I have just mentioned. Such an approach would allow a significant number of member states to be represented at the Council from a given geographical region over an extended time period. Having said that, in the spirit of compromise and flexibility, we are also ready to further explore the idea of an intermediate approach, whereby longer-term nonpermanent seats could be established and allocated on a regional basis. This would permit longer or more frequent presence at the Council for those countries that may qualify through elections at the General Assembly. We believe that such an approach could also increase the level of regional representation at the Council. […] 5.2.2.2.5 11 June 2009, France, Mr. Lacroix, Intergovernmental Negotiations196 […] In order to break this current deadlock and to be more certain of achieving Security Council reform, we support the option of an intermediate reform, as proposed by the French president and the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, on March 27, 2008.197 This solution could include the creation of a new temporary category of seats, with a longer term than that of the current elected members, and this term would be renewable. At the end of the initial phase, it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones. Such a solution would make possible to test the parameters of a Security Council reform during an intermediate phase. This is why we hope that this solution will garner the broadest support. In any event, it demonstrates our determination to move forward and to find a simple and pragmatic solution as quickly as possible. 5.2.2.2.6 12 June 2009, Switzerland, Ms. Grau, Intergovernmental Negotiations198 […] Let me thank you for your commitment and guidance during the first round of these informal negotiations and for the letter dated 18 May 2009 with the overview document.199 The overview document made a precious contribution to the start of the second round which shall take the discussions on SC reform an important step 196  → 5.2.1.1.3 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 197  27 March 2008, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15. 198  → 5.3.2 for Switzerland’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 199  Letter dated 18 May 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform (Overview of the first round attached), → 5.1.2.

1054

5 On a road to nowhere ?

forward. As we understand it, the document is what its name says: an overview. I therefore don’t want to comment the elements listed in paras. 14 to 18 where we may have diverging views on some details. As I understand, the overview is without prejudice to the positions of the delegations. Let me briefly comment on today’s topics: size, categories of membership and regional representation: […] With regard to the categories of membership, the situation has been deadlocked for far too long. This is why we are strongly advocating a bridge-building position between the polarised camps which could be found in an intermediate solution. It would allow States to have an extended presence in the Council, while protecting the interests of small and medium-sized Member States by applying a time ban. These extended nonpermanent seats could include the possibility of immediate re-election. The length of the term as well as the re-election modalities would be subject to negotiation. Candidates for these new seats should meet objective criteria such as size and population, contributions to UN peacekeeping and an active role within the UN. Running simultaneously for extended seats and regular non-permanent seats (“flip-flopping”) should not be allowed and a mandatory review at a predetermined date would be an integral component of this model. With regard to regional representation, it is obvious that enlargement of the Security Council must better reflect current geopolitical realities and therefore enhance the Council’s representativity. This means that in particular developing countries will need to enjoy greater representation on the Council. […] 5.2.2.2.7 3 September 2009, Italy, Mr. Terzi di Sant’Agata, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] 1. We have great reservations about the idea of a temporary reform, that is to say, an interim or transitional approach, if it is in reality aimed at establishing de facto new national permanent seats. For at least two reasons: a) Many of the transitional approaches that we have heard in the past few months seem to be actually aimed at establishing new national permanent members in a deceptive guise. To give a concrete example, we cannot accept a transitory model that provides for seats of a duration that is identical to that of the model itself; or that at any rate contains formulas for re-election that would lead to the same outcome as a permanent seat; b) Our concern stems also from the vagueness of the so-called review clauses to which the advocates of such approaches refer. The history of the UN Charter review conference, which was never held despite article 109 of the Charter, is an illustrious precedent. The issue of review, which is essential to any intermediate solution, requires a thorough examination. 2. By the same token, intermediate approaches that are actually aimed at promoting partial solutions would also be unacceptable. We reiterated this point on September 1: a piecemeal approach to reform would not lead to a renewed Security Council but rather to something ill defined, less representative, less effective, and more susceptible to major imbalances within the Council. 3. Our interest is instead in a crossroad for different views. A solution that contains elements from the various models that can be shared. In this sense, the platform that

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1055

we presented last April, together with the distinguished Permanent Representative of Colombia, Ambassador Blum, made an effort in this direction,200 first and foremost through the proposal to create new seats with longer terms. […] 5.2.2.2.8 3 September 2009, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] 8. My delegation believes that the intermediary solution should reconcile concerns and interests of different groups in a consensus-based manner. We propose that the intermediary solution incorporate longer term seats in its composition. 9. As for the duration of the term of these longer term seats, we feel that a term of 3-5 years seems to be adequate. At the same time, the term should not be excessively long so as to result in the creation of de facto permanent members, which undermines our objective of ensuring accountability through periodic election. 10. We could explore how many consecutive re-elections should be allowed to Member States occupying these longer term seats in order to strike a balance between the need for continuity and preventing a virtual monopoly. […] 5.2.2.2.9 3 September 2009, Turkey, Mr. Apakan, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] Turkey continues to believe that the most effective way to enhance the accountability and effectiveness of the Council is through increasing the number of regular two-year non-permanent seats and allocating them to the underrepresented groups. However, we also understand that there are different viewpoints among the membership on this suggestion. And thus, we are ready to map out new ideas and suggestions, which might bridge the differences and hopefully provide us with sufficient common ground to reach a consensus. After all, the Council reform could only materialize through mutual understanding and common ground. It is in this spirit that our Delegation has agreed to consider the intermediate approach, whereby longer-term non-permanent seats could be established and allocated on a regional basis. […] Having said all that, we also have to make sure that these longer-term seats would not turn into de facto permanent seats and thus we should put in place the necessary mechanisms to prevent this possibility. In this regard, re-election requirement is first to come to mind as an effective guarantee against such an eventuality. Moreover, these longer-term seats could be allocated to specific geographical groups and may be allowed, through re-elections, to rotate among different Member States within these groups. Such an arrangement could also help us to redress the persistent problem of under-representation of certain regions. Thus, our understanding of the intermediate approach is not too far apart from the Ezulwini consensus201 that is built on the principle of regional representation. 200  2 0 April 2009, Statement by Colombia and Italy on Security Council reform, reissued on 21 January 2010 as a position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6. 201  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

1056

5 On a road to nowhere ?

In short, it seems to us that the intermediate approach has the potential to render the Council more democratic, pluralistic and accountable. […] 5.2.2.2.10 13 November 2009, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 1-2202 […] My delegation associates itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement by the Permanent Representative of Egypt (see A/64/PV.43).203 […] Colombia recognizes the aspirations of some States that seek to become permanent members of the Council and have expressed the desire to contribute to the work of the Council and to the maintenance of international peace and security beyond the non-renewable two-year term. The intermediate option, which my delegation has discussed on previous occasions, could be a viable option to enable some States to participate without compromising our guiding principles. An increase in the number of non-permanent seats with the possibility of re-election, or the creation of new, extended-term seats, is a formula for convergence that could bring together positions that to date have opposed each other. […] 5.2.2.2.11 21 January 2010, Uniting for Consensus Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58204 Security Council reform As Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, I have the honour to submit the following conference room paper, which was presented by the delegations of Colombia and Italy during the intergovernmental negotiations205 and is issued at their request: 1. Since the last amendment of the Charter of the United Nations in 1963, which increased the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council, world realities have continued to change. Adapting the Council’s structure and working methods to these realities is an urgent priority. 2. Any reform of the Security Council should have as its objective the establishment of a more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable Council, one that respects the diversity and pluralism of the contemporary international community. Such a reform would need to pay particular attention to the substantial increase in the number of developing countries within the United Nations membership since the last expansion of the Council, as well

202  → 5.4.3.4 for Colombia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 203  12 November 2009, pp. 5-7. 204  → 5.4.3.6 for the UfC group’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 205  20 April 2009, Statement by Colombia and Italy on Security Council reform, reissued on 21 January 2010 as a position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1057

as the legitimate interests of small and medium-sized States with respect to serving on the Council. 3. The preservation of democratic principle lies at the heart of the legitimacy of any reform of the Security Council. The discipline of regular elections is irreplaceable in ensuring an accountable, accessible Council, one in which membership is earned as a privileged responsibility, not granted as a permanent right. Only an expansion in the number of elected seats can ensure the preservation of that democratic principle; the authority, through it, of the General Assembly; and, ultimately, the long-term legitimacy of reform. 4. The subject of Security Council reform is one of the most contentious issues in the United Nations. The review conference envisaged by Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations never materialized. In the 63 years of its existence, there has been only one successful attempt to change the composition of the Council. The current reform process has been going on for the last 14 years without the reaching of any agreement. Therefore, it is extremely important that the reform of the Council be comprehensive, including an increase in the size of the membership and an improvement in the working methods. I. Categories, terms and mandate Additional seats 1. The exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regions, taking into account equitable geographical distribution. Longer-term seats Seats allocated to the regional groups, as follows: Africa Asia Asia/Africa (on a rotational basis) Group of Latin American and Caribbean States Western European and Others Group/Eastern European Group (on a rotational basis) Alternative options for duration of terms: (a) A term of from three to five years without possibility of immediate reelection; or (b) A term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate reelections. To be eligible to run afresh, Member States will have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council. Regular non-permanent seats Seats for a two-year term without the possibility of immediate reelection, as follows: Small states*¹ Medium-sized States*² Africa Asia Group of Latin American and Caribbean States Eastern European Group 2. Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective regional groups.

•

•

1058

5 On a road to nowhere ?

II. Majority required for Security Council decisions and the question of the veto  Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: – Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio  Options on the question of the veto: […] V. Review mechanism Review after 10-12 years or after 15-16 years, taking into account the terms for the seats Comprehensive reassessment, including the composition and working methods of the Council

• • • •

Original footnotes *1 Population below 1 million, that is, 42 countries, of which 37 have never been elected to the Security Council. Of the 37 never elected: 4 are from Africa; 11 are from the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; 15 are from Asia; 1 is from the Eastern European Group; 6 are from the Western European and Others Group. *² Population between 1 million and 10 million, that is, 71 countries, of which 27 have never been elected to the Security Council. 5.2.2.2.12 9 February 2010, Slovenia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 83 SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM Introduction 1. Ever since the end of the Cold War, it has been evident that the Security Council needs to be changed – both in its composition and in its methods of work. The agenda and the actual work of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform offer evidence of that. While there has been progress in the area of working methods, the second part of the agenda of reform, the enlargement of the Security Council’s membership, has been lagging behind. The need to move ahead in both areas and ideas for enlargement of the Security Council were expressed in a variety of the UN forums in the past years. While there has been some progress in the discussions on the Security Council reform in recent years, there is a need for specific proposals and, finally, decisions. Enlargement of the Security Council is not only a matter of fairness but also the necessary condition for the Council’s effectiveness. In order to satisfy these requirements enlargement is necessary both in the categories of permanent and non-permanent members. Additional Permanent Members 2. There are good reasons to enlarge the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council. They include the need to strengthen the Council’s effectiveness and its representative character. To achieve this it has been proposed that additional six permanent members should be added to the current composition in the Security Council. The present non-paper is inspired by this idea and proposes the

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1059

following distribution of additional permanent seats: Two for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean and one for the Western European and Others Group. Two Groups of Non-permanent Members 3. In the current system non-permanent members rotate with varied frequency. Some members present their candidatures more frequently than others. Some members are elected more frequently than others. More frequent rotation of a number of non-permanent members is a reality. Enlargement of the Security Council offers a possibility to organize this process better, to improve predictability and also to take into account the varying levels of contribution that non-permanent members make to the maintenance of international peace and security. Non-permanent Members with More Frequent Rotation 4. The General Assembly should elect a total of twelve members into the category of “non-permanent members with more frequent rotation”. The members thus elected would serve every second two-year term within a period of twelve years. This means that there would be six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation in any given composition of the Security Council. They would be eligible for re-election every twelve years. After twelve years the General Assembly would review the system and elect the next group of members to serve within this category. Six among these members would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Eastern European group and three from the Western European and others group. The sequence of rotation would need to be determined by the General Assembly. Non-permanent Members to be Elected in Accordance with the Principle of Geographic Representation 5. There should be eight non-permanent members of the Security Council elected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographic distribution. Four among these members would be from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from the Western European and Others Group and one from the Eastern European Group. While this group would be smaller than the current total of ten non-permanent members of the Security Council, the proposed distribution would follow the principle of an equitable geographic representation, keeping in mind the enlargement in other categories of members of the Security Council. Total Number of Seats and the Review Conference 6. The total number of seats of the enlarged Security Council in any given term would be twenty-five: Five current permanent members, six new permanent members, six non-permanent members with more frequent rotation and eight other non-permanent members. This total, together with the combination of the proposed categories of members, would at the same time ensure the representative character of the Security Council and a size which would be sufficiently limited to allow effective work of the Council. 7. The amendment to the Charter related to the enlargement of the Security Council would need to include a review clause allowing for a comprehensive review of the new system. This review would be conducted twelve years after the entry into force of the amendment.

1060

5 On a road to nowhere ? 5.2.2.2.13 26 February 2010, Liechtenstein, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 104-107

[…] Elements for a General Assembly resolution on the enlargement of the Security Council – intermediate model The General Assembly, [preamble] Decides to expand the membership of the Security Council as follows: Part I: Enlargement of the Security Council Size 1. The membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to [xx*¹]. Membership 2. The following six additional members shall be elected to serve on a permanent basis for renewable terms of [8 / 10]*² years: I. two from African States II. two from Asian States III. one from Latin American and Caribbean States IV. one from Western European and Other States 3. [insert paragraph on additional non-permanent members] Elections of the new members 4. Elections to fill the seats created pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above shall be held after the entry into force of the amendments annexed to the present resolution and simultaneously with the regular elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council. The elections shall be held in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure of the General Assembly. 5. Candidates for seats created pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall not be eligible to serve as non-permanent members in accordance with article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter for the following [8 / 10] calendar years. 6. The expanded Council shall take up its work on 1 January of the calendar year following the elections held in accordance with paragraph 4 above. Charter amendments 7. The Charter amendments necessary for the implementation of the present resolution are contained in the Annex to the present resolution and adopted simultaneously. Ratification 8. Member States are called upon to ratify the amendments contained in the Annex to the present resolution, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by … 2010. Review 9. [16 / 20] years after the first elections held in accordance with paragraph 4 above, the General Assembly shall review the situation created by the entry into force of the Charter amendments contained in the Annex to the present resolution. The review shall include consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category, including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council contained in … *³

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1061

[Part II: Working Methods of the Security Council] Annex: Amendments to the United Nations Charter Article 23, paragraph 1: The Security Council shall consist of [xx] members of the United Nations. China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect [yy] other Members of the United Nations to be members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, as well as equitable geographical distribution. Six elected members shall serve on a permanent basis for terms of [8/10] years and be eligible for immediate re-election. [add consequential Charter amendments to articles 27 (2), 27 (3), 109 (1) and (3) updating the respective numbers of affirmative votes required] Original footnotes *1 The question of creation of new non-permanent seats in the sense of article 23.2 of the UN Charter is not addressed in these elements, cf. OP 3, which serves as a placeholder for the scenario where additional two year seats are created. *2 The numbers in square brackets are meant to reflect a middle ground and would be subject to negotiation. *³ It is understood that the General Assembly will simultaneously decide on a set of measures dealing with the working methods of the Council. This can either be done in a separate part of the resolution or in a stand-alone resolution that is adopted at the same time as the resolution dealing with the enlargement of the Council. 5.2.2.2.14 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom, Joint position on reform of the Security Council, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 117 UK/French position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council […] With a view to breaking the deadlock in the negotiations, the United Kingdom and France support a pragmatic intermediate solution206 that could provide for a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into permanent seats. It is the belief of the United Kingdom and France that the intermediate solution should be considered further. We are pleased to note that the idea of an intermediate solution has gained increasing support from UN Member States. The United Kingdom and France are ready and willing to work with all partners to define the parameters of such an intermediate reform as they emerge through the course of the negotiations. They expect significant progress during the 64th UNGA. Issues we need to consider during this UNGA include: the duration of the intermediate 206  27 March 2008, → 4.2.2.2.15; 4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.2.2.

1062

5 On a road to nowhere ?

period, the size and composition of the Council during this phase, and the modalities of entry into force. 5.2.2.2.15 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111207 POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM INTRODUCTION Unfortunately, the four rounds of intergovernmental negotiations on the UN Security Council reform that have taken place failed to significantly narrow the gap of differences between the Member States on the five key issues of the Security Council reform. So far none of the existing models of reforming the Council enjoys prevailing support in the United Nations. In such circumstances we see no other alternative but to continue throughout the current UN General Assembly Session the meticulous work within the intergovernmental talks launched in February 2009. This work should unfold in a calm, transparent and inclusive atmosphere free from any artificial deadlines. It should be aimed at finding a compromise enjoying as wide a support of Member States of the Organization as possible – significantly broader than two thirds of votes of the General Assembly Members. At the current stage it would be counterproductive to prematurely limit the negotiations’ agenda down to one or two models only. The discussion should be led on all options available in the talks. Any attempt to press through any scheme, which does not enjoy widest possible support (preferably consensus), by putting it to vote would inevitably polarize the General Assembly. Even if one of the models gains the necessary 2/3 majority, as required by the Charter, the Council would hardly become more authoritative in the eyes of the “objecting minority”, among which there would have been influential states. CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP In a situation when positions of the two main groups of states – those who support the idea of the UN Security Council’s expansion in both categories and those who do not – remain polar, one can advance in the negotiating process only by searching for a compromise. In these circumstances we believe it possible to look closer at the “interim model” as one of the options. So far we only have some general understanding of what the “interim model” is. If Member States opt for this particular variant of the Security Council enlargement, they would have to agree on its modalities. […]

207  → 5.3.6 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.1.1 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1063

5.2.2.2.16 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-168208 Proposal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for the Reform of the Security Council 1. A single category of membership based on the principle of equality At the end of the first decade of the Twenty-First Century, the maintenance of the system of permanent members and non-permanent members is anachronistic. The establishment of these two categories was the result of the Second World War, after which five countries emerged as the supposed guardians of peace and international security. Sixty-five years later, it is clear that, instead of preserving peace, many of these socalled superpowers have created conflicts and wars in different parts of the world. The maintenance of peace is not and cannot be the product of global gendarmes, but rather of the promotion of social justice, equity, solidarity and respect among States. The existence of two separate categories of membership damages the principle of equality of rights among large and small as established in the United Nations Charter. The existence of permanent and non-permanent members presupposes the existence of countries of primary and secondary importance: of countries that do not need to be elected to serve on the Security Council, and countries whose participation is subject to democratic elections. In the Twenty-First Century, the existence of authoritarian practices inside the United Nations is unacceptable. Those who call themselves defenders and promoters of democracy in the world should be the first to set an example by making themselves subject to the basic principles of democracy within the United Nations. The Plurinational State of Bolivia opposes the establishment of categories of permanent and non-permanent members because it will preserve a discriminatory situation extending only the number of members of the elite category of permanent members. We urge a fundamental reform of the principles of the Security Council by definitively eliminating the category of permanent members in order that all the member states of the United Nations may have the same right to choose and to be chosen to this instance. […] In this respect, we propose to amend Article 23 of the Joint Charter of the United Nations in order that a single category of membership of rotating character might exist on the basis of a geographical equitable distribution: 1. The Security Council will consist of fifteen twenty-five (25) members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics, the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, will be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly will choose other ten Members of the United Nations who will be not permanent members of the Security Council, giving special attention, in the first term (end), to the contribution 208  → 5.3.8 for Bolivia’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.3.9 for Bolivia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1064

5 On a road to nowhere ?

of the Members of the United Nations to the international maintenance of the peace and the safety and to other intentions of the Organization chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotary character, with the same rights and obligations established by the Charter. 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council will be chosen for a period of two four years. In the first selection of the non-permanent members that is celebrated after have increased the number of members of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of four new members will be chosen by a period of one year, existing members will not be eligible for a subsequent period. The text of the amendment to Article 23 would state the following: 1. The Security Council will be composed of twenty-five (25) members of the United Nations chosen by the General Assembly according to a geographically equitable distribution of rotating character, with the same rights and obligations established by the Charter. 2. The members of the Security Council will be chosen for a period of 4 years. The exiting members will not be eligible for the subsequent period. In accordance with the proposed modification of the preceding article, it is proposed that the suppression of the mentions relative to the categories of permanent and nonpermanent members be modified in the following articles: Article 18: 2. The decisions of the General Assembly will be made by a vote of a majority of two thirds of the present voting members. These issues will include: recommendations relative to the maintenance of international peace and security, the choice of non-permanent members of the Security Council, the selection of members of the Economic and Social Council, the selection of members of the Fiduciary Board of Directors in accordance with Clause C, Paragraph 1 of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of Members, the expulsion of Members, issues relating to the functioning of the system of fiduciary administration and budgetary questions. Article 47: 2. The Staff Officer’s Committee will be comprised of the Chief of Staff Officer of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Every Member of the United Nations not represented in the Committee will be invited to join the work of the Committee when the participation of such Member is required. […] 5.2.2.2.17 5 March 2010, Monaco, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 134209 Memorandum on the Security Council Reform Category of membership It is the opinion of the Government of the Principality of Monaco that the Security Council would be more representative and legitimate, and thus more efficient to carry 209  Unofficial translation from the French. → 5.3.12 for Monaco’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1065

out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security if it were expanded to better reflect the geopolitical realities of the XXIst century and the increase of the number of Member States since its last expansion. In this perspective, the Government of the Principality has always expressed its support for the expansion of the Security Council in both categories on the premise that the members of the Security Council contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to the other purposes of our Organization and that the principle of equitable geographical distribution be respected in conformity with Article 23 of Chapter V of the United Nations Charter. […] Intermediate solution As per the intergovernmental negotiations that were held in application of decision 62/557,210 it appears that Member States remain divided on the question of category of membership. If our effort to reform were to lead us towards “the intermediate model”, the Principality of Monaco would support it, if it were the wish of the biggest number of Member States. Since such a solution would de facto establish a third category of members with longer and renewable mandates along with a review clause to be determined in order to address among other issues, the question of the veto, it will be necessary to take into account the special interests of small States. In the current context (permanent/ non-permanent members), Member States can be elected for a term of two years without being eligible for immediate re-election. In the context of the “intermediate solution”, the States that will be candidates for the new seats, whose mandate would be longer (8 to 10 years) (third category of membership) should not be allowed to be candidates to a non-permanent seat as currently defined in Article 23, with a two-year mandate. […] 5.2.2.2.18 12 July 2010, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] In 2005, a reform model developed as a potential compromise that is now known as the intermediate solution. We believe that an intermediate model is the only way out of the current deadlock. It would allow important states to have an extended presence in the Council, while the interests of small and medium-sized states would be protected by applying a time ban. The intermediate solution would include the creation of extended, non-permanent seats with a possibility of immediate re-election. Candidates for these new seats should meet objective criteria, and a mandatory review at a predetermined date would be an integral component of such a model. Furthermore, the transitional arrangement must be sufficiently long to allow for at least one re-election of states that wish to occupy extended non-permanent seats. Switzerland could imagine a model like the one introduced by Liechtenstein in paragraph 1.9 of the text.211 […]

210  1 5 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 211  10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5.

1066

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.2.2.19 9 November 2011, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 5-6 […] After so many years of effort, it is obvious to all of us that this reform can be achieved only through a compromise solution. I believe that the enlargement of the Council from 15 to 25 members is not only necessary, but also achievable. Some of the 10 new seats should be allocated to the existing two-year category and the remainder to a new longer-term category, the details of which we must agree upon. In so doing, we would provide a better chance of representation to medium-sized and small States, as well as to much larger Member States whose contributions to world peace, financial assistance, peacekeeping forces and democratic leadership are very relevant. Those countries rightfully deserve to have a longer-term presence in the Council, but they should be elected from time to time by the General Assembly, not only on the basis of their aspirations but also, and more importantly, on the basis of their merits and performance. I believe that the States that compete for and win Security Council membership in the longer-term category can greatly improve and stimulate the work of the Security Council. We also believe that more equitable representation of the various geographical areas, especially the African continent, must be ensured. Enlarging the Council to a manageable number and creating a new category of longer-term seats will, without a doubt, increase transparency and improve working methods in the decision-making process of that important body of the United Nations. […] 5.2.2.2.20  16 April 2012, Liechtenstein, Mr. Sparber, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] We reiterate our support for the compromise model for the expansion of the Council first proposed by our delegation in 2005.212 This model would add a category of long-term elected seats to the Council, with terms of eight to ten years. States would be allowed to stand for immediate re-election. We also proposed a so-called “flip-flop clause” under which States that unsuccessfully sought election for the longerterm seats would be barred from standing for election for the existing, 2-year seats for the duration of what would have been their term of office. A mandatory review of the mechanism would take place after two terms of the new, long-term seats. We emphasise that this model is not an interim approach to expansion in the two existing categories, but an intermediate approach seeking to bridge the gap between those who favour expansion in the two existing categories and those who want to expand the number of non-permanent seats only. We are pleased that this model has gained momentum in recent years, and suggest that it is worthy of further exploration in the context of these negotiations. […]

212  Reference is probably being made to the model proposed in 2010, → 5.2.2.2.13.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1067

5.2.2.2.21 15 November 2012, Pakistan, Mr. Masood Khan, UN Doc. A/67/PV.39, pp. 1-3

[…] Originally, Pakistan sought expansion only in the non-permanent category. But now Pakistan, along with other members of the Uniting for Consensus group, supports the proposal for long-term seats as explained in the Italy/Colombia proposal.213 The fact is that it is the only compromise proposal on the table. […] 5.2.2.2.22 7 November 2013, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/68/PV.47, pp. 6-7

[…] While Thailand fully supports a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, we are prepared to consider any idea or proposal that seeks to achieve a real reform of the Council. Thailand believes that priority should be given to, among other things, an improvement of the Council’s working methods and its expansion, in order to ensure that the Council can become more effective, transparent and accountable and that its membership reflects the reality of the world in the twenty-first century. My delegation strongly believes that any expansion must be based on an equitable geographical representation. In that connection, we support Africa’s call for more appropriate representation. In spite of all the difficulties, complexities and sensitivities, Thailand remains optimistic about the eventual realization of a reformed Security Council. At the same time, we remain realistic and pragmatic enough to consider all possible options, including the expansion of both categories of membership, as well as the socalled interim or intermediate solutions aimed at ensuring reform in the near future. In that connection, we support the proposal by Ambassador Tanin, Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, to discuss those intermediate options. It is unfortunate that during the ninth round of the negotiations we did not have an opportunity to discuss those options fully. In fact, the idea of introducing a new category of Security Council membership is not new. A report produced by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565),214 also known as the Panyarachun report, was submitted to the General Assembly in 2004. It proposed, inter alia, the possible option of expanding the Council. We believe that those intermediate options should be given serious consideration in the next round of negotiations. […] 5.2.2.2.23 8 November 2013, New Zealand, Mr. McLay, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 17-18215 […] the past two decades of debate have shown that there is no obvious or easy solution to rectifying the democratic deficit that is inherent in the Council’s current composition, and the lack of progress inevitably raises serious questions as to whether 213  2 0 April 2009, Statement by Colombia and Italy on Security Council reform, reissued on 21 January 2010 as a position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6. 214  2 December 2004, → 4.1.19. 215  → 5.4.4.15 for New Zealand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1068

5 On a road to nowhere ?

the Organization is likely in the foreseeable future to agree on any fundamental structural reform of the Security Council. In New Zealand’s view, that democratic deficit will not be fixed simply by adding another group of permanent members, even if that might be considered desirable, or, by extending veto rights. Nor will the deficit be fixed by insisting on the status quo, despite the deep misgivings of some Members regarding any expansion in the category of permanent membership. New Zealand believes we will make progress only if we are willing to explore and even to test solutions that advance the interests of the wider membership and not of just a few. That is why New Zealand has expressed support for an intermediate solution that would offer the Assembly’s more powerful members the prospect of Security Council membership for longer periods – including the possibility of immediate re-election – and that would also expand the number of seats that are held for two-year terms, thus ensuring that smaller States would not be shut out of the Council. While we are certainly willing to consider other ideas, we believe that an inter­ mediate solution of that nature is more likely to secure the support of two thirds of the membership in a vote of the General Assembly, and also to achieve ratification by the same majority – a key Charter requirement that is sometimes overlooked by those who seek to tally votes in support of their respective positions. […] 5.2.2.2.24 12 November 2014, Thailand, Mr. Sinhaseni, UN Doc. A/69/PV.49, pp. 19-21

[…] The only issue that seems to be holding back the much-needed reform of the Security Council is the expansion of the permanent membership. On that issue, Thailand has always been open to all ideas or proposals, including the expansion of both categories of membership or the introduction of so-called interim or intermediate options. We share the view of a number of Member States that reform will be possible only if Member States are willing to be more flexible and prepared to engage in give-and-take negotiations. We are also receptive to the proposal of holding a textbased negotiation. However, before we embark upon drafting any text, all must first agree on the principles for a possible way forward, especially on the most important issue of increasing the number of permanent members. In our view, it will be very difficult to reach consensus on an increase in the number of permanent members, at least in the immediate future, due to the firm opposition of certain Member States that are sceptical of the need to add more permanent seats to the Council. However, that does not mean that such an expansion will be not possible in the long term. Countries that wish to become new permanent members must prove that they have both the capacity and the commitment to strengthening the Council, while the wider membership, on the other hand, should have the right to evaluate whether the addition of new permanent members has any proven merit. Unlike the current five permanent members, which were given permanent seats because of their historical contribution to bringing an end to the Second World War and subsequently establishing a new international organization known today as the United Nations, the new members should be given permanent seats if they can clearly demonstrate their capacity and commitment to maintaining international peace and security. More

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1069

importantly, the expansion of the permanent membership must prove to be useful in enhancing the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness. In order to give the aspiring permanent members the opportunity to demonstrate their capacity and commitment, an interim category of membership should be introduced to allow them to serve on the Council for three to five years, based on conditions and criteria to be established. If they are re-elected for a second term, there could then be a review during or after the second term on the possible expansion of the permanent membership. However, the introduction of such interim seats should not affect the expansion of non-permanent members based on the principle of equitable regional representation. […] 5.2.2.2.25 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 122-123

[…] Furthermore, and as many delegations including the UfC have pointed out, it is imperative to build convergence amongst Member States on the basic principles and criteria of reform. Recognizing that nuances and differences amongst positions of Member States persist, the UfC believes that at this key juncture in the process our efforts should be directed toward developing common understandings and shared approaches that will serve to narrow rather than widen the gap within the membership. The UfC has always engaged constructively in the Inter-Governmental Negotiations on Security Council reform on the basis of Decision n. 62/557.216 Our consecutive proposals of 2005217 and 2010218 underscore our efforts to move the process forward, as well as the flexibility and compromise for which the UfC stands and expects from the rest of the membership. The UfC has also shared innovative ideas on Security Council reform in order to build convergence amongst different views. In 2014 we decided to include in our common position a new category of membership, based on longer term non-permanent seats, with the possibility of an immediate re-election, to allow for fair and equitable representation. At the same time, we continue to support an increase in the number of two-year non-permanent seats, for a Security Council of up to 26 Member States. Any reform of the Security Council should aim to establish a more effective, representative, accountable, transparent and democratic Council. The UfC believes that an expansion limited to elected seats is the only way to achieve it. Elections are irreplaceable in ensuring a democratic Council that is accountable to all Member States on equal footing. Small and Medium-size states, which represent the vast majority of the UN membership, should benefit from a reform outcome that recognizes their right to vote, to have their voice heard on a regular basis, and not on a single unrepeatable occasion. A democratic reform should address the current imbalance in regional representation, in response to the claims and aspirations of African, Asian and Latin American countries. The UfC is also willing to consider arrangements to guarantee 216  1 5 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 217  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 218  21 January 2010, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6.

1070

5 On a road to nowhere ?

adequate representation to other specific categories of countries, which cut across traditional UN regional groups. While considering an abolition of the veto to be ideal, we reiterate our readiness to consider formulas on how to best limit its use. The UfC has been a strong proponent of actions to enhance transparency and effectiveness in the Security Council, and of strengthening the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. For this reason, we continue to believe that improvements in the working methods of the Council remain an integral component of reform. This letter, in its entirety, represents some of the key elements of our position on the process and content of the Security Council reform, which we deem as inseparable. […] 5.2.2.2.26 30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 5-6 […] Our debate needs to be more inclusive, just as the Council we are striving to reform. Similarly, we need full transparency. The intergovernmental negotiations are a membership-driven process, mandated by Assembly decision 62/557.219 We need predictability through a clear agenda, not arbitrary guidance. Member States should be facilitated in their work through timely information and extensive consultation. Each Member State, belonging to any negotiating group, has the right to be adequately informed about the procedure. The past has demonstrated that divisive approaches and initiatives complicate our process even further, distancing us from reaching our commonly shared goal of reform. The UfC group has been tirelessly advocating a deeper discussion of the principles on which the Council’s reform must be based. […] […] We have all been talking for years about the common goal of a more representative, democratic, accountable and effective Security Council, but do we really agree on the meaning of these principles? Let me give a concrete example. Exactly one week ago, most of us attended the launch of a code of conduct supported by more than 100 countries, aimed at limiting the use of the veto and preventing Council inaction, thus making it more effective in the face of heinous international crimes. However, today we will still hear voices in favour of adding new national permanent members, so new veto powers, all while pursuing the same goal of making the Council more effective. […] […] We support an enlargement of the Council up to 26 members, assigning the majority of added seats to Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America. We also understand and heed the call of the Eastern European Group and of cross-cutting groups of States, such as small island developing States, small States and the Arab countries. Secondly, some Member States aspire to play a more prominent role in the Council. The UfC highly values the contribution that these States may offer to the maintenance of international peace and security. No one has asked them to forfeit their willingness to play a greater role in the Council. In fact, our proposal of longer-term seats with the 219  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1071

possibility of immediate re-election was conceived precisely to meet these expectations. Let me clarify: these seats would not be reserved for a select group of countries. All Member States willing to make a bigger contribution to the work of the Security Council would have the right to run for a longer-term seat. Our proposal is democratic in nature. […] 5.2.2.2.27 30 October 2015, Pakistan, Ms. Lodhi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 16-17 […] Pakistan fully associates itself with the statement delivered earlier by the representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group.220 […] A few countries have sought to promote their self-arrogated right to a privileged and unequal status, and they have maintained that rigid position since the process began, about two decades ago. It is that rigidity that is the real reason for our persistent failure to achieve a more democratic, accountable, transparent and effective Security Council. For its part, the Uniting for Consensus group twice revised its proposal, and it remains ready to engage in further dialogue. There is now a great deal of history to these negotiations. But those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it. Two important lessons should be kept in mind. First, quick fixes and procedural manoeuvres have always come to nought, and secondly, no agreements are to be found at the extreme ends of political positions. An honest appraisal of those facts will mark the first meaningful step towards reform of the Security Council. […] Pakistan opposes the creation of new permanent seats, as it is contrary to the universally agreed principles of our time – democracy, accountability and transparency. The Security Council needs to be expanded in the category of elected seats, allowing more representation from Member States. […] Pakistan distinguishes between the demands motivated by selfish ambitions and the collective demand of an entire continent. In that regard, we have always respected and continue to respect the African Common Position. […] 5.2.2.2.28 30 October 2015, Spain, Mr. Díaz de la Guardia Beuno, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, pp. 18-19

[…] We fully endorse the statement delivered earlier by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group.221 I should like to make some additional comments. […] We are eager to see a modern version of the Security Council that is more representative and influential, where we see a reflection of the changes that have taken place in recent years and the ability to adapt itself to future changes. We especially want to see a Council where small States and African countries also can make their voices heard. Spain believes that increasing their presence will help make the Council 220  3 0 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.26. 221  30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.26.

1072

5 On a road to nowhere ?

more representative. But we need much more than that. We also believe that we must increase the possibilities for all Member States to sit on the Council on a periodic basis. The best way to achieve that objective is to increase the number of elected seats, which is a step that would also make the Council a more democratic and accountable body vis-à-vis all the Members of the Organization. Members all know that my country is against creating new permanent seats, for we believe that would not make the Council more representative or effective. On the contrary, we would be creating an exclusive Council rather than a more inclusive one and would be turning our back on the need to make it more democratic and more credible. We need a responsible and effective Council. Those two characteristics go hand in hand. Spain supports the idea of allowing those Member States that want to make a meaningful contribution to the work of the Council to serve on it for longer periods and more frequently. Spain believes in a Security Council based on merit, not privileges. My delegation shares the proposal of the Uniting for Consensus group to create seats of longer duration, as well as the possibility of immediate re-election.222 That formula would make it possible for those States that so wish, and are in a position to do so, to contribute more to the work of the Council. […] 5.2.2.2.29 7 November 2016, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 4-5

[…] I think we are all aware of the frustration felt by Member States owing to the lack of progress in a reform that has been discussed for over 20 years. The Uniting for Consensus countries, as well as influential external observers, have stated that the evidence clearly points to the only true obstacle to reform: the call for an increase in the number of permanent members of the Council – with the veto, without the veto or with a suspended veto. In our view, this is the only reason for the stalemate we have been experiencing in the reform process. In our view, no Member State should be scared of facing elections – certainly not those who own all the means of succeeding and contribute substantially to the work of the Council. That is why we invite all Member States to genuinely commit to reforming the Council, together with Uniting for Consensus countries, in a manner that takes into account all views. There is no Member State in the Hall today that disagrees with the idea of expanding the number of non-permanent seats on the Council. No Member State is against such an increase, which will favour countries belonging to the underrepresented regions of the world. In contrast, a very significant and growing number of Member States has opposed an expanded use of the veto and, rather, supports its limitation. In our view, that is the common ground on which to base the solution that will finally unlock the reform process. We owe this attempt to those who believe in a renewed Organization and therefore in a modern Security Council that is more representative, democratic, accountable, transparent and effective. A more representative and democratic Security Council means offering an equal opportunity to all Member States to serve periodically on the Council itself, as well as enhancing the right of the membership to decide and adapt the Council’s composition 222  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1; 21 January 2010, → 5.2.2.2.11; 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1073

on a regular basis. In line with this perspective, the Uniting for Consensus countries are committed to a reform that increases, rather than reduces, the democratic nature of the Council – a reform that is centred on elective, non-permanent seats in the belief that, in the twenty-first century, this is the only formula that can have a positive and credible impact on the legitimacy and authority of the United Nations body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. I think that there is no need to explain how such a reform would also have a tremendous impact on regional representation, by fostering a wider and fairer rotation within regional groups. In addition, it will create a favourable ratio of non-permanent members to permanent members in the Security Council. Such a change will improve the Council’s working methods, augment its decision-making capacity, present a democratic challenge to the veto and improve the overall relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. Any decision in the near future on the Security Council reform process will require true flexibility and willingness to compromise. Over the years, the UfC Group has tried to capture those new elements emerging from discussions in the intergovernmental negotiations that could bridge the gap with other negotiating groups. In that perspective, the increasing support for what is known as the intermediate approach represents a new factor in the search for a compromise solution and deserves our full attention. The UfC countries are proposing that, in addition to an expansion of nonpermanent seats, a new category of longer-term, non-permanent seats, with the possibility of an immediate re-election, should be established. Those new seats would not be reserved for a selected group of countries; all Member States willing to make a larger contribution to the work of the Council would have the right to contest elections for a longer-term seat on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and a fair system of rotation. Periodic elections would ensure the accountability of the longerterm members. […] 5.2.2.2.30 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/ PV.42, pp. 9-10223

[…] Our own position is well known. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, emphasizes the need to make that organ more representative through the inclusion of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, efforts to this end should not affect the ability of the Security Council to effectively and promptly respond to emerging challenges. Accordingly, we stand for preserving the compact composition of the Security Council. […] We fully support the opinion voiced several times from this rostrum that the process of reforming the Security Council should be owned by all Member States without exception, and that its ultimate formula should enjoy the widest possible support of Member States. If consensus on the issue is impossible, it will be politically necessary to obtain the support of a larger number of States than the legally required minimum of a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. 223  → 5.3.21 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.1.6 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1074

5 On a road to nowhere ?

We strongly believe that Security Council reform cannot be addressed through a purely arithmetical approach by putting various models to the vote in order to obtain the minimum required number of votes. A result reached in this manner would hardly add to the authority and effectiveness of the Security Council, let alone strengthen the unity of the United Nations. It would in fact achieve quite the opposite. We are prepared to consider any reasonable option for the Security Council’s expansion, including the so-called intermediate approach – which is essentially a compromise – provided once again that it is based on the broadest possible consensus within the United Nations. We expect the efforts of the President of the General Assembly and the co-Chairs of the intergovernmental negotiations to be directed at providing the maximum possible support and facilitation for the negotiation process, with the understanding that ownership of the progress remains with Member States. This meticulous work should be conducted in a calm, transparent and inclusive manner without arbitrary or artificial time frames. We must all clearly understand that this is a task where there is no place for deadlines or attempts to address this complex problem with a simple stroke of a pen. In conclusion, let us not forget the most important thing: progress in reforming the Security Council cannot be achieved on the basis of some kind of coordinator’s texts, negotiating documents or other proposals that have not received the approval of all Member States. Previous sessions of the General Assembly have shown the futility and the danger of attempts to force a solution to this reform issue that is not based on consensus. It is equally unacceptable to apply unilateral pressure on the co-Chairs. Progress in Security Council reform will depend solely on the political will of Member States and their willingness to achieve a reasonable compromise. We urge all Member States to follow this fundamental approach. 5.2.2.2.31 7 November 2016, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 14-15224

[…] It is well known that, in the context of discussing the enlargement of the Security Council, Liechtenstein favours the creation of a new category of membership of that body. We propose the creation of six seats with terms of a longer duration than the current non-permanent-seat terms – for example, 8 to 10 years – with incumbents eligible for immediate re-election. This model would enable States to serve and practice permanently on the Security Council if they so wish and, of course, if they are reelected consecutively by the United Nations membership. The creation of new veto rights, viewed with suspicion by many, including us, would be avoided in this model. The model provides flexibility in terms of size, which we believe can be very useful in enhancing the political acceptance of the proposal. If there is a desire among the membership to decide on a relatively small enlargement in the first phase, the model we have proposed can easily lead to a Council of 21 or 22 members with the creation of six long-term renewable seats and possibly an additional traditional two-year seat allocated to the Group of Eastern European States. 224  → 5.4.4.37 for Liechtenstein’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1075

In that case, the option of further enlargement would become a central element of the review process. In any event, a review clause has an essential place in our model, as it is both mandatory and comprehensive. It would be clearly decided that after a determined period of time – perhaps 16 or 20 years – the General Assembly would revisit the question of Security Council reform and that all aspects of reform would be on the table in the light of the experience garnered with an enlarged Council. In many ways, the question of the veto is at the heart of the deadlock in Security Council reform in general and in the enlargement of the Council in particular. It is counter-intuitive to many – and we are among the many – to create new veto rights. A majority of the membership is formally in favour of the abolition of the veto, especially in a situation where the veto and the threat of the use of the veto is one of the biggest obstacles for the effective performance of the Security Council on a daily basis, as witnessed most recently on 8 October, when the Council was unable to adopt a resolution on the situation in Aleppo, Syria, due to a veto that was cast. […] 5.2.2.2.32 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 22-23225

[…] Because of the different approaches to the integration of new permanent members, my country proposes that, as an interim measure until consensus is reached, there should be an intermediate category in which non-permanent members of the Security Council could serve terms of over two years and be indefinitely re-elected to serve consecutive terms. […] 5.2.2.2.33 7 November 2016, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 27-28226 […] Elitist privileges and the arbitrary promotion of the interests of a few can undermine the principle of collective decision-making needed to resolve conflicts justly and in a coherent and sustained manner. The Council membership should therefore be governed by democratic principles and effective practices. Indonesia envisages that in the long run there will be no segregation in the Council membership and the division between permanent and non-permanent categories will eventually cease to exist. We also believe that developing countries, especially emerging nations, which are demonstrating their prowess in democracy, economic matters, development and peace and security – particularly those that have contributed troops to peacekeeping operations – should be given more responsibility in the Council as active agents for helping to resolve ongoing conflicts and emerging threats. Their experiences would bring new perspectives to the Council’s decision-making while enriching the quality of its working methods and actions. It would also make for broader participation in Council actions, which is critical. 225  Peru confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 7-8. → 5.2.1.1.34 for Peru’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.4.38 for Peru’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 226  → 5.4.4.40 for Indonesia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1076

5 On a road to nowhere ?

[…] We recognize that the strong and divergent views of a number of States on the present categories of membership are a key factor hindering progress on reform. We have therefore expressed support for an intermediate approach on this issue, as we believe that an intermediate approach has the potential to garner the broadest possible political acceptance and move things forward. In that regard, my delegation will be willing to consider all proposals on an intermediate approach with an open mind. […] 5.2.2.2.34 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 1-2227

[…] Secondly, Thailand firmly believes that the Council membership should be expanded to reflect the plurality and evolving realities of the United Nations membership. Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of the Council, as well as strengthening its effectiveness, is a core objective of Security Council reform. A key element in achieving those goals lies in an enlarged Council with equitable geographical representation in its membership. […] Thirdly, on areas where there are still divergences among Member States, Thailand would like to contribute its views for the upcoming session of the intergovernmental negotiations. On categories of membership, we reaffirm our view that an interim category of membership should be introduced, whereby aspiring members could be re-elected immediately for a second term. A review would then be conducted during or following the second term of the possible expansion of permanent members based on an established set of conditions and criteria. That process could help Member States to make an informed decision on the issue. We also invite Member States with similar ideas on an interim category to work together to come up with concrete requirements, criteria and parameters. […] 5.2.2.2.35 3 April 2017, New Zealand, Mr. van Bohemen, Intergovernmental Negotiations228

[…] During our recent term as an Elected Member of the Security Council, we were acutely aware of the challenges which too often result in poor performance by the Council. Some of these challenges flow directly from the framework set out for the Council in 1945. New Zealand opposed the veto at the San Francisco conference. The experience of the ensuing 70 years, in particular, the last two, has reinforced our view that the veto is a major impediment to the effective functioning of the Council. But the veto is not the only structural problem of the Council. It is also clear that the membership arrangement established in 1945, and adjusted in 1965, does not adequately represent today’s geographic realities. 227  → 5.3.22 for Thailand’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.4.41 for Thailand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 228  → 5.4.4.48 for New Zealand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1077

We are pleased that a clear point of convergence is that the Council should be expanded to include new members to address the current membership imbalance. As the “Food for Thought” paper229 acknowledges “equitable geographic distribution” is one of the considerations set out in Article 23. So too is the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security. This is why New Zealand has been ready to see a small expansion in the number of Permanent Members, if there were to be agreement for an expansion. However, it is obvious from the many years of discussions that we are a long way from agreement on the number and identity of new Permanent Members. That is why New Zealand has pledged support to an intermediate solution, which we believe provides an achievable pathway for a more representative Council that can command the respect of the wider UN membership. We support an expansion in the number of the existing non-permanent seats to 14, alongside six new “intermediate” seats without the veto. These positions would enjoy an extended term of up to five years. Longer term seats would be open to contest by a self-selected group of larger countries wanting to serve longer than a two year term, with the possibility of immediate re-election. […] 5.2.2.2.36 7 November 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Lambertini, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 6-7

[…] Over the years, the Uniting for Consensus group has consistently pointed out that the main roadblock to reform is the demand for an increase in the number of permanent members on the Council. At the same time, we have offered a compromise solution consisting of longer-term non-permanent members with the possibility of an immediate re-election, coupled with a more equitable distribution of seats among regional groups. Longer-term seats would fulfil the legitimate desire of some Member States to make a greater contribution to the work of the Council. That reform model would enhance regional representation as follows. Africa would constitute the largest group on the reformed Council, while the Asia-Pacific region would have the highest percentage increase and the representation of both Latin America and Eastern Europe would double. Our proposed distribution would also enable cross-regional groupings such as the Group of Arab States to have greater, more stable representation. At the intergovernmental negotiations meeting on 8 May230 we distributed a chart with a breakdown of our regional representation proposal. […] Our initiative is the fruit of an inclusive vision that we are firmly convinced would bring about a more representative, democratic, accountable, transparent and effective Council. So we were taken aback by the opposition that some delegations expressed last year to the principles of democracy and representation. On the one hand, it revealed the true underlying reasons for the current stalemate. On the other, it showed us how urgently we need a serious discussion of the principles underpinning Security Council reform. Without clarity on what we are aiming for, we will never reach our destination. We expect Member States to finally be given the opportunity to engage in 229  3 1 March 2017, Elements of Convergence, → 5.1.18. 230  8 May 2017, → 5.2.2.3.23.

1078

5 On a road to nowhere ?

just such a discussion during this session, paving the way for the next steps before us, including text-based negotiations. Last year the whole United Nations membership agreed that – and I quote the coChairs’ final document, The intergovernmental negotiations process should build on the work done in previous years, so that convergence will increase gradually with a view to garnering the widest possible political acceptance.231 This document enables us to say unequivocally that all Member States agree with the idea of expanding the number of non-permanent seats on the Council. All Member States agree that such an increase should favour countries belonging to the underrepresented regions of the world. To that, we should add that a significant and growing number of Member States are opposed to an expansion of the veto and indeed support limitations on its use. If we are to truly build on the work of previous years, then the middle ground for a compromise solution leading to Security Council reform can be mapped out only on the basis of these three broad areas of agreement. They are the pillars of our new Council, which we all want to reflect the reality of the contemporary world. But the reality of the twenty-first century is constantly evolving, with new regional actors and new global challenges continuing to emerge in a changing reality to which the Council must constantly adapt. There is no better guarantee of that adaptability than regular elections, which would also make the Security Council more democratic, accountable and inclusive by offering all Member States, rather than a select few, the opportunity to make a greater and more frequent contribution to the Council’s work. After almost 25 years of focusing on demands for new permanent seats, which would benefit only a handful of Member States, it is high time to give a concrete chance to all Member States and offer real prospects to the groups of States and regions of the world that are underrepresented on the Council. We see no possibility that adding new vetoes could make a new Council more effective, more responsive to international crises or better able to cope with today’s global challenges. The Uniting for Consensus group stands ready to cooperate with you, Mr. President, with the new intergovernmental negotiations co-Chairs and the whole membership to advance this process, with the common goal of increasing the Council’s legitimacy in the eyes of both the general membership and international public opinion, thereby enhancing its authority and, ultimately, its effectiveness. We are willing to redouble our efforts to achieve reform without delay, building on the many existing convergences among Member States to arrive at a comprehensive reform of the Security Council that will garner the broadest possible consensus by enlarging the Council with new elected members and a more balanced and equitable representation of regional groups.

231  See, e.g., the statements of 7 June 2017, → 5.1.19, and of 23 June 2017, → 5.1.20.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1079

5.2.2.2.37 7 November 2017, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 12-13232

[…] As is well known, we have suggested an enlargement model that we hope could provide a middle ground in the discussion, adding long-term Council seats of eight to ten years with the possibility of immediate re-election. The other main elements of our proposal are no new veto powers, a strong review clause and a flip-flop clause that bars Member States that have lost an election for long-term seats from running for short-term seats. […] 5.2.2.2.38 7 November 2017, Thailand, Mr. Plasai, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 11-12233 […] In our view, three aspects are key to the reform of the Security Council. First, there seems to be a broad convergence of views on the merits of expanding the membership of the Council, whether through the expansion of both of the existing categories or through the introduction of interim or intermediate options. We reiterate our idea, presented in November 2014,234 of an interim category of membership. Accordingly, aspiring permanent members would have the opportunity to prove themselves and immediately stand for re-election for a second term. If they are re-elected, a review could be conducted on the possible expansion of permanent members based on conditions and criteria to be established. In line with views expressed by other Member States, we agree that the size of the reformed Council should be in the mid-twenties. However, any expansion must take into account a greater and a more equitable regional representation, as well as the varying sizes of regional groups. It must also reflect the plurality and evolving realities of the United Nations membership. […] 5.2.2.2.39 7 November 2017, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.42, pp. 14-15235

[…] My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by Ambassador Lambertini of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group. The UfC initiative responds to the principles of resolution 62/557236 because it was formulated in good faith. It is a proposal of commitment to attaining a Security Council that is more representative, transparent, democratic, effective and accountable. The UfC has shown great flexibility and transparency so as to achieve the greatest levels of agreement possible among the membership of the Organization. Our proposal is inclusive, since it seeks to provide opportunities to all Member States and regions, particularly those that are underrepresented in the current configuration of the Security Council, such as Africa. The UfC proposal even addresses 232  → 5.4.4.49 for Liechtenstein’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 233  → 5.4.4.52 for Thailand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 234  12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.2.24. 235  → 5.4.4.53 for Mexico’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 236  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

1080

5 On a road to nowhere ?

the ambitions of some States that legitimately wish to take on greater responsibility in the Security Council. In this context, I would like to invite the General Assembly to reflect on the following points, in the hope that they will also be useful for the work to be carried out by the co-Chairs of the new session of intergovernmental negotiations. First, reforming the Security Council is a great responsibility that must not be taken lightly, nor approached in a fragmented or partial manner. It is in our hands to improve the capabilities of the Council so that it functions according to the expectations of contemporary international society. We must avoid preserving the status quo, but we must also avoid a meaningless reform that satisfies individual political aspirations, granting privileges in perpetuity to some States based on simple short-term reasons and to the detriment of the collective interest. That is the worst possible scenario, one we must not let play out. Secondly, a Security Council with more privileged permanent members contradicts democracy, equality and inclusion. Increasing the number of permanent members goes against the need to reform the Council to make it more democratic, equal and efficient. We seek greater inclusion in the Organization, more rotation among countries in decision-making – not more privileges granted in perpetuity to selected States. […] Fourthly, expanding the category of elected members – the non-permanent members – is the only issue on which all the regional groups and negotiators agree. We must focus comprehensively on this aspect of reform, in addition to the working methods that I mentioned earlier, rather than concentrating on or even trying to impose views on the issues that divide us. The proposal of the Uniting for Consensus group to create only new long-term non-permanent seats with re-election should be a solution that satisfies the ambitions of States seeking broader participation in the Council. This method is the only solution to reform, and not accepting that is to block progress. Fifthly, we regret that some negotiating groups in the previous session have, absurdly, called into question democracy and representativeness. The lack of progress in the negotiations process is very frustrating, but even more disheartening is the notion that in order to move forward, we must set aside principles agreed on as the basis for the reform of the Security Council. Sixthly, the lack of agreement on the central elements on which the reform should be based is a core impediment to beginning negotiations on a text imposed by a purported majority. Mexico will not support the start of negotiations on a text that recommends privileges in perpetuity for some States. We are sure that the expertise and skill of the new co-Chairs will guide our work without losing sight of that guiding principle. I reiterate Mexico’s support for achieving that end. 5.2.2.2.40 7 November 2017, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 17-18237 […] Furthermore, Indonesia is open to the exploration of all proposals that embrace an intermediate approach with regard to categories of members with the addition of a clear review mechanism. In our view, such an approach has the potential to garner the widest possible political acceptance and move things forward. 237  → 5.4.4.54 for Indonesia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1081

We firmly believe that today’s many complex and multidimensional global challenges cannot be met unless the various regional perspectives are also reflected in the Council’s decision-making. The concerns and aspirations of the developing world and the majority of its citizens should be reflected adequately. Without detailing our position on regional representation, which has been presented on many occasions, we support the addition of at least four non-permanent seats each for Asia and Africa, along with additional seats for Latin America and the Caribbean as well. […] 5.2.2.2.41 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/ PV.43, pp. 3-4238

[…] We endorse the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/72/PV.41).239 […] It is on that foundation that we build our position, reflected in what was expressed by the representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/72/ PV.41), which proposes an increase in the number of seats in the Security Council, but only in the category of non-permanent members, with the option of long-term seats with the possibility of immediate re-election and greater regional representation. In this way, the African people would have the greatest number of seats. It would also provide greater opportunities for participation for smaller countries and small island States. We believe in the need to create the conditions that would allow all States Members of the United Nations to have an equal opportunity to participate within the Council. […] As a result of the foregoing, we have repeatedly respectfully appealed to countries to move away from positions that focus on increasing the category of permanent members with veto rights, which we consider contrary to the call for democracy, alternation and transparency, which we all want. That is why we invite the Assembly to consider an intermediate position that would allow us to finally address the discussions on the points of convergence that, until now, we have been identifying and on which we are convinced that we can continue to build. […] 5.2.2.2.42 20 November 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, Mrs. Zappia, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 9-11

[…] The General Assembly needs to properly address the request of Africa to correct its underrepresentation on the Council. The General Assembly must consider the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific and Latin American regions and grant them a more equitable representation. Arab countries are asking for a more proportionate and more stable representation than the swing seat they currently have.

238  → 5.2.1.2.12 for Costa Rica’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.4.60 for Costa Rica’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 239  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36.

1082

5 On a road to nowhere ?

We should listen to the call of over 60 countries – mainly small States and small island developing States – that have never had the opportunity to serve on the Council and will rarely have the opportunity to do so without proper reform. We should also heed the appeal of the 23 Eastern European countries that wish to obtain one more seat, thereby increasing their chances of serving on the Council. In calling attention to those appeals and in a true spirit of flexibility, the UFC group has brought to the table the most detailed and comprehensive proposal, trying to take the demands of all negotiating groups into consideration. Our proposal is the result of many adjustments made over the years in response to feedback from the various rounds of negotiations. Our proposal is to create new, longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election and to increase the number of two-year non-permanent seats, coupled with a more equitable distribution of seats among regional groups. The longer-term seats would fulfil the legitimate desire of some Member States to make a greater contribution to the work of the Council and, at the same time, foster a fairer system of rotation. The Security Council would consist, then, of 26 members. That would include 21 non-permanent seats, assigned as follows: six seats for the Group of African States, three of which would be longer-term seats; five seats for the Group of Asia-Pacific States, three of which would be longer-term seats; four seats for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, two of which would be longer-term seats; three seats for the Group of Western European and other States, one of which would be a longerterm seat; two seats for the Group of Eastern European States; and one seat reserved for small island developing States or small States. The latter would be a rotating seat, which would not prevent them from running within their regional group, but would instead be an additional way for them to gain access to the Security Council. […] We should not aim to enlarge the small circle of permanent members, but rather to give all Member States – even the smallest ones – a greater chance to contribute to finding solutions for the maintenance of peace and security. Concerning the veto, we fail to see how the addition of new vetoes would make a new Council more effective and more responsive to international crises. For many years, the UFC group has pointed to the main obstacle to reform, namely, the demand for an increase in the number of per­manent members. After 25 years of focusing only on demands for new permanent seats, which would benefit just a handful of Member States, it is high time to give a concrete chance to all Member States. It is high time to offer real prospects to the groups of States and regions of the world that are underrepresented on the Council. […] 5.2.2.2.43  29 January 2019, Liechtenstein, Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Inter­ governmental Negotiations240

[…] We are certainly concerned about the state of this process on Security Council reform and we are also concerned about the state of the Security Council more generally

240  → 5.4.4.65 for Liechtenstein’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1083

speaking, because we would not agree that the Council has in recent years proven to be effective at carrying out its work. At a time when we are discussing in the corridors, in think tanks, sometimes in our meetings at the UN, about the need to strengthen multilateralism, it would be extremely important to have as effective a Council as possible. We have not had that for a number of years now. I think it is safe to say that we have been in this stalemate essentially for a decade or so. At some point, we have started to call the process we find ourselves in a negotiation, but we have in fact never started to negotiate. We are still discussing the parameters of what a negotiation could look like. […] We certainly fail to understand how a negotiation can be based on anything but a text. We all know that what we are trying to do has to result in amendments to the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations cannot be amended orally. At some point we need to have a text and we believe it is possible to have that text. […] We are among those who, and again I want to echo what my colleague from Singapore has said, do not believe that enlargement and reform of the Council are identical things. We attach very high importance to the working methods of the Security Council, to the way the Council interacts with the rest of the membership in terms of its inclusion, transparency and accountability. In recent years, we have in fact invested more time in that part of Council reform than in enlargement because we believe it is the more promising aspect of the reform. That being said, we obviously support enlargement. We have a Security Council that does neither represent the geopolitical realities of today, nor the membership of the United Nations. I come from a region – Europe – that is massively overrepresented in the Security Council. Others in the room, for example our colleagues from Africa, and others, are certainly seriously underrepresented. This is in and of itself a strong incentive for the enlargement of the Council and we are committed to it as a goal of the reform, which is why we have put forward our own ideas on how the Council could be enlarged. In fact, I agree with our colleague from Russia, who said that there is no guarantee that an enlarged Council is automatically a more effective Council. We think that this is the crux and in a way the center of our discussion, even though it is not usually talked about in this way, is in fact the existence of the veto. We cannot enlarge the Council effectively without addressing the veto and I think this is reflected very clearly in the diverging views that have been put forward by different groups before. We are among those who believe quite strongly that creating new vetoes will not do anything to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council, given the problem that the existence, use, and threat of the veto is posing to the Council’s work on a daily basis. This does not mean that we do not understand and support the aspirations of those who want to play a larger role. We believe that they are entitled to do so and that we should find a solution under which states have the possibility to serve permanently on the Security Council de facto without having a permanent seat as currently enshrined in the Charta of the United Nations. We have long advocated for a model of long term renewable seats, which would make precisely that possible. We have also dedicated years on how to safeguard the interest of small states in particular, as will be easy to understand, since we are one of the smallest members of the United Nations. We are happy to talk about that in a separate discussion as well.

1084

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Having no new veto rights is a crucial and essential element for us in SC enlargement, which should, however, also be accompanied by measures that address the practice, the use and the application of the veto that will continue to exist. We are willing to accept that, not because we think it is a particularly good feature of the Charter of the United Nations, but simply because we are realistic enough to say that we do not think it can be changed, given that the Charter can only be changed with the consent of the permanent members. […] 5.2.2.3 Statements supporting regional seats 5.2.2.3.1 14 February 2009, Philippines, Specific reform proposals concerning equitable representation on and increase of membership in and on working methods of the Security Council241 […] II. ON ENLARGEMENT OF MEMBERSHIP THROUGH INCREASE IN BOTH CATEGORIES – PERMANENT AND NON-PERMANENT – BASED ON EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHIC OR REGIONAL ALLOCATION IN VIEW OF THE INCREASE OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN FROM THE ORIGINAL 51 STATES IN 1945 TO 192 NOW At present the officially recognized Regional Groups for purposes of, inter alia, candidatures and designations of Regional Chairmen on a monthly basis are the groups of (1) African States, (2) Asian States, (3) Eastern European States, (3) Latin American and Caribbean States, and (5) Western European and Other States. Sadly enough, the fifth group is not based on natural geographic profile. These following increases of seats are proposed: 1. Non-Permanent Member category African Group – two Asian Group – two Eastern European Group – one Latin American & Caribbean Group – two Western European Group & Other States – one 2. Permanent Member category African Group – two Asian Group – two Eastern European Group – one Latin American & Caribbean Group – two Western European Group & Other States – one Each region must see to it that the seats allotted to it must be equitably rotated to ensure that all Member States therein would have the opportunity to be elected to the Security Council. The additional Non-Permanent member seats shall be elected for a term of two years. The additional Permanent Member seats shall be elected for a term of five years, and shall have no veto power. All New Permanent and New Non-Permanent members and their successors shall not be eligible for immediate reelection. 241  → 5.4.3.1 for the Philippines’ position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1085

In view of the foregoing, Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations should be amended accordingly. There should likewise be a corresponding amendment to Article 27 thereof on the voting. […] 5.2.2.3.2 4 March 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Haroon, Intergovernmental Negotiations242 […] 8. In terms of representation, in any expansion, each permanent seat added on a national basis will be a permanent blow to the chances for the rest of the membership to become member of the Council. 9. On the other hand regional representation ensures broader participation. The African position, which is the result of consensus, is a position taken for and on behalf of the region, and is thus different from those who seek seats for themselves. That is why we have expressed our understanding and respect for the African common position and we are ready to explore how this regional approach can be a basis for similar arrangements in other regions. 10. There are other positions which we also support such as the Arab demand for permanent “representation” of which the essential element is the sharing of the seat by the members of the group through “rotation”.243 The OIC demand, also on behalf of the group, is for adequate representation in any expansion of the Security Council. It is not a demand for any individual country. Seats allocated to the OIC will be available for all members through a system of rotation. […] 5.2.2.3.3  31 March 2009, Italy, Mr. Terzi di Sant’Agata, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] On EU representation We propose the creation of a seat to be rotated between WEOG and the Eastern European Group to facilitate the institutional access of the European Union to the Security Council. Here, too, the idea is to seat on a rotational basis a country that, rather than simply representing its own national interests, would represent the whole of the EU. And I would like to make some observations on what I heard at our last meeting in this regard. The European Union is a political, institutional, economic and monetary reality. Everyone knows the role that the EU plays in the General Assembly and its influence on the positions taken by the Security Council. We believe, however, that there is a big gap between what the EU is already doing in various UN fora and what it could be doing in the Security Council. […] 5.2.2.3.4 25 September 2009, Kenya, Mr. Odinga, UN Doc. A/64/PV.8, pp. 27-30 […] The Security Council, in particular, must be enlarged and made more democratic and representative of current day reality. Part of the enlargement must include permanent, veto-bearing seats for Africa.

242  → 5.2.1.2.1 for Pakistan’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.2.2.2.3 for Pakistan’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 243  See, e.g., the statement of 9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30.

1086

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The world can no longer continue to marginalize a continent that is home to nearly one billion people. That is wrong in principle, but even more, it is wrong in practice. We cannot find sustainable solutions to our challenges when such a large part of humanity is given so little voice and role in that quest for peace. […] 5.2.2.3.5 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 5-9244 […] I would like to associate myself with the statement to be made by the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group245 and to highlight a few additional significant points concerning the Security Council reform process. The African common position, as outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus246 and the Sirte Declaration,247 adopted by consensus and reiterated by African leaders at all consecutive African summits, demands, among other things, no fewer than two permanent seats, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right to the veto, and two additional non-permanent seats. It has to be stressed here that Africa is opposed in principle to the right of veto, but it is also of the view that as long as the veto exists, as a matter of common justice it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council. As the veto right continues to be the central issue in the expansion process that aims to enhance good international governance, Africa continues to believe that expansion in the non-permanent category alone is not an option, as it will not change the power structure of the Council nor correct the historical injustices to Africa. The same applies to increasing the number of permanent members without granting the new permanent members the same veto granted to the current permanent members, pending the full elimination of the veto. It is therefore essential to rapidly rectify the serious historical injustices to Africa because of the fact that it is not represented in the category of the permanent membership of the Security Council, nor represented by an adequate number of seats in the non-permanent category, and because of the negative impact of the continuation of the current situation on the Council’s ability to deal effectively with many of the conflict situations around the world, particularly on the African continent. […] Egypt continues to believe that the veto is the cornerstone in the process of the reform of the Security Council. The African demand for the elimination of the veto in its entirety is closely tied to its demand to grant the same veto rights to the new African permanent members in the Council until its elimination, in full application of the principle of equality between current and new permanent members. […] By all means, any enlargement in the size of the Security Council should take into consideration the African demands for larger representation in both categories of the membership in the Council. It should also achieve a balanced representation of all regional groups. That is why Africa is demanding no less – I repeat, no less – than two

244  → 5.3.3 for Egypt’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.3.3 for Egypt’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 245  12 November 2009, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 9-11. 246  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 247  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1087

permanent seats. The final number will be decided on the basis of how many permanent seats will be allocated to other regional groups. Regarding regional representation, Egypt believes that some elements of the concept may be reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus, which states that the African Union should be responsible for the selection of its representatives in the Security Council, based on criteria to be determined by that organization and taking into consideration the representative nature and capacity of those chosen. However, Egypt deems it appropriate that we discuss the application of this concept in all regions, not only in Africa, and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter covering the procedures for election of new members of the Security Council by the General Assembly. […] On the way forward, Egypt reiterates the African position that the transitional or intermediary approach is not acceptable. This approach does not respond to the African demands encompassed in the African common position, as it is not based on expansion in permanent seats, but on extended seats without the prerogatives and privileges of the permanent seats, particularly the veto right. In practice this means expansion in the number of non-permanent seats for larger or shorter durations. We believe that this approach lacks clarity and requires further clarification. Egypt supports increasing the representation of the developing countries and small States in the Security Council, as was enshrined in 1993 in General Assembly resolution 48/26.248 I will omit the details from this statement. […] 5.2.2.3.6 12 November 2009, Pakistan, Mr. Sial, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 8-9 […] The concept of equitable geographical distribution would make little sense if a seat allocated to a region were to be occupied permanently by one country. That is why we respect and understand Africa’s position. Africa’s demand for permanent seats is for the entire region and is therefore different from other proposals that seek permanent membership for individual States. As we understand it, of the two empowered Council seats which are sought by Africa, two or, through rotation, a larger number of African States could be represented, under arrangements to be made by Africa itself. Africa would thus retain the power to ensure accountability on the part of those States that would represent it and act on its behalf on the Council. […] 5.2.2.3.7 8 December 2009, Philippines, Annex V to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 79-82 RESOLUTION INCREASING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MAKE IT MORE DEMOCRATIC AND REPRESENTATIVE THROUGH A BALANCED AND EQUITABLE REGIONAL REPRESENTATION IN BOTH CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP The General Assembly, Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is unbalanced and inequitable, 248  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2.

1088

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the General Assembly logically makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus attaining and ensuring a more adequate, just and equitable geographic or regional representation of both permanent and non-permanent members, thereby making it a more democratic and more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter, Recognizing the recommendations made by the Open-Ended Working Group and the various proposals discussed and deliberated on during the informal meetings of the plenary on the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations the following amendments to Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations: Article 23 1. The Security Council shall consist of [fifteen] THIRTY ONE Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republic] RUSSIAN FEDERATION, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [and] the United States of America and EIGHT OTHERS TO BE ELECTED AS HEREIN SET FORTH, shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect EIGHTEEN members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical OR BALANCED REGIONAL distribution. 2. The NEW PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWO EACH FOR THE AFRICAN, THE ASIAN, AND THE LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN GROUPS OF STATES, AND ONE EACH FOR THE EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER STATES GROUP OF STATES. THE FIRST NEW PERMANENT MEMBERS SHALL SERVE FOR A TERM OF FIVE YEARS. AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF SUCH TERM THE REGIONAL GROUPS SHALL DECIDE AMONG THEMSELVES WHICH MEMBER STATES IN THEIR GROUPS SHALL SUCCEED THE RETIRING MEMBER AND WHICH SHALL ENJOY FULL PERMANENT STATUS. SHOULD ANY GROUP BE UNABLE TO DO SO, THE SUCCESSOR WILL SERVE FOR A TERM OF FIVE YEARS, WHICH SHALL BE THE SCHEME UNTIL THE REGION SHALL HAVE DECIDED ON THE MEMBER STATES IN THE REGION TO SERVE AS FULL PERMANENT MEMBER. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. THE ADDITIONAL EIGHT NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWO EACH FOR THE AFRICAN, THE ASIAN AND THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN GROUPS OF STATES, AND ONE EACH FOR THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER STATES GROUP. [In] The first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from [eleven to] fifteen TO THIRTY ONE, SHALL BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ELECTIONS OF THE REST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THIS ARTICLE. A retiring non-member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1089

THE REGIONAL GROUPS, THROUGH CONSULTATIONS, MUST ENSURE THAT THE ADDITIONAL SEATS FOR NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALLOTTED TO THEM SHALL BE FAIRLY, JUSTLY AND EQUITABLY ROTATED AMONG THE MEMBER STATES IN EACH GROUP. 3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the first day of September 2011. 5.2.2.3.8  12 January 2010, League of Arab States, Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Oman to the UN addressed to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin The League of Arab States Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations […] The Arab Group stresses the need to include in the negotiating document all positions and proposals submitted by Member States, including Arab States. It should be noted that the Arab States – members of the League of Arab States – demanded a permanent Arab representation in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership of the Security Council. This position was expressed in the letter dated June 13, 2008 addressed by the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group, and was included as annex II of the report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council (A/62/47).249 It should be recalled here that Arab Member States represent 11% of the total UN membership. […] 5.2.2.3.9 12 November 2010, Sudan, Mr. Elshareef, UN Doc. A/65/PV.50, pp. 8-9 […] My delegation associates itself with the statements delivered at the 48th meeting by the representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group,250 and by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).251 […] My country wishes to reiterate Africa’s established position for the allocation of two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats on the Security Council to Africa, based on the importance of the continent, which has 53 Member States. […] 5.2.2.3.10 11 May 2011, European Parliament resolution on the EU as a global actor: its role in multilateral organisations, P7_TA(2011)0229 The European Parliament, […] The EU’s role in the UN system […] 249  See UN Doc. A/62/47, Annex II, p. 37. 250  11 November 2010, UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 11-13. 251  11 November 2010, → 5.2.3.5 and 5.4.2.4.

1090

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The UN Security Council (UNSC) 20. Stresses the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council, on the basis of the first ever negotiation text and widespread support for UNSC reform, in order to achieve greater clarification on the UNSC’s competences in relation to other UN bodies and a review of the UNSC’s working methods; underlines, furthermore, the need to reinforce the UNSC’s legitimacy, regional representation and effectiveness and to create a more cohesive position among EU Member States on these issues; 21. Reiterates the view, in keeping with the purposes of the Lisbon Treaty in enhancing EU foreign policy and the role of the EU in global peace, security and regulation, that an EU seat in an enlarged UNSC remains a central, long-term goal of the European Union; calls on the VP/HR [Vice-President of the Commission/ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy] to take the initiative to develop a common position of the Member States to that end; suggests, in order to achieve that goal in the future, working on prior coordination of positions in the Council of the EU on the introduction of new members of the UNSC and reform of the UNSC’s decisionmaking towards the possible use of a super-qualified majority; 22. Calls on the VP/HR [Vice-President of the Commission/ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy], in her capacity as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, to seek common EU positions on issues to be decided in the UNSC in order to have such positions implemented through joint voting practice; encourages the VP/HR, the EEAS and the EU Member States to play a more active role in establishing cooperation mechanisms aimed at ensuring that EU Member States that sit on the UNSC defend common EU positions therein; 23. Invites EU Member States with seats on the UNSC to keep other EU Member States adequately informed of their positions and activities and to share information about developments in the UNSC with other EU Member States; welcomes the newly established practice whereby a representative of the EU is generally invited to attend most scheduled UNSC deliberations and participate with some limited right to speak at the UNSC; […] 5.2.2.3.11 8 November 2011, Algeria, Mr. Benmehidi, UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, p. 20252 […] Algeria aligns itself with the statements made earlier by the Permanent Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement253 and by the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group.254 Algeria reiterates its commitment to the aspirations of Africa as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus255 and the Sirte Declaration,256 asking for no fewer than two permanent seats for Africa with all rights and prerogatives related to that category of membership, including the veto, as well as two additional non-permanent seats. In our view, enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent categories should be 252  Algeria subsequently confirmed this position. See, e.g., the statement of 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 7-8. 253  8 November 2011, UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, pp. 2-4. 254  8 November 2011, UN Doc. A/66/PV.51, pp. 5-6. 255  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 256  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1091

understood in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and should include the veto. That position aims at correcting the historical injustice that makes Africa the only continent that is not represented in the permanent category. […] 5.2.2.3.12 9 November 2011, Sudan, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 27-28 […] Fourthly, and lastly, with respect to the enlargement of the Council, we wish to stress that it is important for any enlargement to be based on the principle of equitable geographic representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of Council membership. In that context, we support the position of the African Union set out in the Ezulwini Consensus257 and the Sirte Declaration258 that any expansion of the non-permanent membership category alone is an unacceptable option, for it would neither change the composition and power balance of the Council nor eliminate the historic injustices inflicted on Africa. Besides, expansion of the non-permanent membership category alone would be tantamount to deforming, not reforming, the Security Council. 5.2.2.3.13 21 February 2012, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, Intergovernmental Negotiations The UFC Initiative […] – I would also like to associate Egypt’s remarks with the Statement delivered by the Representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group, and make the following additional remarks: –  First: The UFC Members have exerted efforts in organizing meetings in Rome and Mexico aiming at achieving a much needed compromise solution that could garner the widest possible political acceptance. Egypt believes that the most important outcome of the Rome Conference was the reconfirmation by a majority of member states “to correct, first of all, the historical injustice done to the African continent”, taking into account that it is subject to 70% of the Council’s decisions, but at the same time under-represented in its membership. – However, the mere reference to the special case of Africa or expressions of sympathy for the historical injustice that the Continent is still suffering from is simply not enough. – In this regard, and despite repeated attempts by the G4 to get closer to the African Common Position as enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus259 and the Sirte Declaration,260 we did not see attempts by the UFC to get closer to the African Group. I appreciate the wish of the UFC to coordinate with the C.10. – I recall here the consecutive meetings that the G4 and the African Group held in the headquarters of the African Union in 2005 resulting in narrowing down the differences to only the Veto issue, and the meeting held in London in August 2005 and followed by the Abuja Meeting, and we have not seen any similar meetings with the UFC. 257  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 258  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 259  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 260  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

1092

5 On a road to nowhere ?

–  With regard to the Italy/Colombia proposal,261 I wish to make the following comments concerning substance: 1– Categories of membership: the proposal calls for increase in the nonpermanent membership of the Security Council only, and creating a new type of longer term seats for a term from 3 to 5 years without possibility of immediate re-election, or a term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections – meaning a maximum term of 6 years provided two successful consecutive re-elections – which clearly reflects UFC’s opposition to expansion in the permanent category, and thus does not meet the African demands for at least 2 permanent seats and 5 non-permanent seats in the expanded Security Council. And let me repeat that the Ezulwini Consensus is aiming at changing the power structure of the Security Council, and to affect the decision making process. We need to have an African institutional memory in the Security Council, not only for the current permanent members. 2– Size and Regional Representation: Egypt strongly believes that a balanced regional representation should be closely linked to the size of the enlarged Security Council. Therefore, we share in principle the idea reflected in the UFC proposal262 that the exact number of seats will depend on the total size of the expansion and the distribution of those seats among various regional groups, taking into account equitable geographical distribution. One of the strong points in the UFC position is the representation of small states, but is it based on demographic factors only (less than one million of population)? And what about the developing countries? This is the reason why Africa’s demand for no less than two permanent seats, including the veto right, along with two additional non-permanent seats, should be read in a sense that Africa might demand more permanent seats if it feels that other regions smaller in number are getting more seats than their ratio of representation in numbers that would include the current permanent members and the new permanent members. On the other hand, the UFC proposal refers to: “Arrangements for representation in respect of the seats, including re-election and rotation, should be decided by the respective Regional Groups”. This appears in the first look to be consistent with the African Common Position regarding the concept of Continent-Specific seats. However, when the Ezulwini Consensus stated that the African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council and determining the criteria for such selection, it meant that Africa will select its representatives for the permanent and non-permanent categories without prejudice to or contradiction with article 23 of the Charter which will continue to govern the election process in the General Assembly. I must agree with Italy that electoral process guarantees accountability and democracy, but why don’t we apply it to all Permanent Members old and new. 261  20 April 2009, Statement by Colombia and Italy on Security Council reform, reissued on 21 January 2010 as a position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6. 262  21 January 2010, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1093

3– The Question of the Veto: The Italy/Colombia proposal introduced two options for the use of the Veto: abolition of the Veto or limitation in respect of the scope of the Veto to be only applicable on Chapter VII related matters. The first option responds to the African Common position on this issue, as Africa believes that the Veto should be abolished. However, as long as the Veto continues to exist, even if it is restricted in some cases (as it is proposed in the second option), Africa insists that the Veto should be fully extended without limitation to all new permanent members of the enlarged Security Council as a matter of common justice and in order to avoid creating two categories of permanent members, some of them with full-fledged Veto and the others with limited scope of Veto power. This is one of the major differences between the UFC position and the African Common position, which is also the same major difference between the African Common position and the G4263/L.69264 draft resolution that speaks about permanent seats without Veto. […] 5.2.2.3.14 15 November 2012, Egypt, Mr. Khalil, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 4-6 […] Despite that fact, Africa remains unrepresented in the permanent category and underrepresented in the non-permanent category of the Security Council compared to all other regions. The African Common Position, as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus,265 does not seek to impose national political interests. It aims at achieving the legitimate aspirations of a whole continent that includes 54 countries. We aim to rectify the historical injustice inflicted on Africa with respect to its representation in the Security Council. Enhanced representation of the developing countries in the Security Council has been one of the fundamental pillars of the reform process since the adoption of resolution 48/26.266 Egypt stresses the need to duly take into account the position of the members of the League of Arab States, who are demanding a permanent seat for the Arab Group in any future expansion in the category of permanent membership in the Council.267 We also stress the need to take into account the position of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is demanding adequate representation of the Muslim world in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council.268 […] 5.2.2.3.15 15 September 2013, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Mr. İhsanoğlu, Speech at the International Affairs Institute: “Future of the OIC, Its Role and Challenges in the Muslim World”

[…] And I also think OIC in the UN should acquire a new position. Now the OIC group in the UN, and this is my last point, Mr. Chairman, the OIC now is the biggest voting bloc. 263  Spring 2011, Draft Framework Resolution. 264  2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15. 265  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 266  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2. 267  See, e.g., the statements of 9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30; 10 May 2010, → 5.1.5; and 23 February 2011, → 5.1.8. 268  See, e.g., the statements of 28 September 2004, → 4.2.3.9; 14 March 2008, → 4.2.3.15; 10 May 2010, → 5.1.5; and 23 February 2011, → 5.1.8.

1094

5 On a road to nowhere ?

And this has been experienced by everybody and I think, aids to the prominence of OIC. During the first reconsideration of the reform in the UN, I think there should be a seat for OIC in the Security Council. Because if you look to the structure of the Security Council of today, you have the P5 (Permanent Five) and there are representatives of different civilizations, different cultures, political powers, of course, but you won’t find representative of more than 1.6 billion people of Muslim world. Meanwhile, when you look to the other 10 non-permanent members, you will find that 4 countries have always been from the Asian and African groups and are always among the members of the Security Council. And I think the status acquired by the EU in 2011 in UN should also be acquired by the OIC. The EU has acquired a new status, where they can involve, propose items on agenda and speak in the General Assembly on behalf of the member countries. Well, some can argue that there is a difference between the structure of the EU and that of the OIC, but I think that we should keep in mind that we have to develop our position there. […] 5.2.2.3.16 8 November 2013, Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Mr. Aisi, UN Doc. A/68/PV.49, pp. 11-12

[…] The Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) believe that there has to be reform in both categories of membership in the Council, but any reform, including all the components of decision 62/557,269 must garner the widest possible support from the entire United Nations membership. However, the negotiations must commence forthwith and be guided by decision 62/557. All the issues covered in the decision should be in a document, along with all the viable options mentioned so far. Those options should then be subjected to a series of robust and genuine negotiations in that process. We must avoid another series of discussions, to which we have all become accustomed. In her recent statement to the Security Council during the open debate on working methods, the Permanent Representative of Singapore made the salient point that [t]he reality is that small island States are unlikely to obtain a permanent seat in whatever new configuration might emerge from an overall reform of the Council in the future (S/PV.7052 (Resumption 1), p. 15).270 It is probably equally true to reiterate that many other States may not even have the capacity to serve under any configuration of the Council. However, that should not preclude the possibility that some of the small States may indeed have the capacity to serve. Many of the Pacific Small Island Developing States currently serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world. While Fiji provides the largest numbers, some of our smallest members, such as Palau, are also participants in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Thus, the Pacific SIDS continue to fulfil their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that aspects of the third key issue of decision 62/557, relating to regional representation, present an alternative option where small and very small States might be better catered to in terms of membership on a rotating basis within United Nations 269  1 5 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 270  29 October 2013, UN Doc. A/PV.7052 (Resumption 1), pp. 15-16.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1095

regional groups. We see this issue currently emerging in various regional groups, but on an ad hoc basis. Above all else, the principal reason for the Pacific SIDS to remain in this debate is that, like all the United Nations reform issues we have all committed to, it is a fundamental issue of governance. […] 5.2.2.3.17 1 May 2015, Group of Arab States, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, p. 115-121

[…] With reference to the letter of the President of the General Assembly dated 27 March 2015, circulating your letter end its annexes (“Framework Paper” and speaking points),271 wherein you have requested providing you with the positions of Member States on the question of Security Council reform in respect of the five Key Issues at the reform. In this regard, I am pleased to write to Your Excellency on behalf of the Arab Group, and would like to indicate the following: The Arab Group reaffirms that the Intergovernmental Negotiations is the only forum for reaching an agreement on the expansion of membership and reform of the Security Council. In accordance to General Assembly Decision 62/557,272 establishing the basis of the negotiations, and affirming its ownership by member states. This is in addition to the importance of the interconnectedness of all substantive issues of the negotiations, and their having common elements. This proves the futility of seeking partial solutions, and stresses the essentiality of reaching a comprehensive solution for the reform of the Security Council, according to General Assembly Decision 62/557, that shall enjoy the widest political acceptance, in order to preserve the unity of the general membership of the Organization. The Arab Group also wishes to emphasize that the Intergovernmental Negotiations is based on positions and proposals by the Member States, as stipulated by General Assembly decision 62/557, which was unanimously adopted. Therefore, any streamlining of the positions and proposals of the Member States concerning the expansion of the membership and the reform of the Security Council should be agreed upon by all the states and groups that presented the proposals. There is a need to reach an agreement first, concerning the principles and criteria that will govern the negotiations relating to the five issues stipulated by General Assembly Decision 62/557, before embarking on any drafting process that entails the merging of positions and proposals of Member States, with a view to achieve the highest level of clarity concerning the procedural issues before moving along to the following phase of substantive aspects. Hence, the position of the Arab Group is the same, as listed in the compiled negotiating text (Rev.2),273 demanding a permanent Arab representation in any future expansion of the permanent seats category in the Security Council. 271  26 March 2015, → 5.1.11. 272  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 273  The Arab Group’s position did not change between the discussions on the original negotiating text in 2010 and those on the second revised negotiation text (“Rev.2”), cf. subsection 5.1.7.

1096

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The Arab Group also stresses the importance of taking into account the appropriate representation of all geographic and regional groups in the Security Council. Here we would like to point out that the Arab Group represents a population of about 350 million people, and comprises 22 Member States, equivalent to 12% of the entire UN membership, and despite of this, the Arab Group is not represented in the category of states with permanent seats in the Council. Therefore, we would like to emphasize that the size of an enlarged Security Council need to have the geographic and regional groups appropriately represented in both categories of its membership. Since, enhancing and developing the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, to bring about greater effectiveness and transparency in its work, has become necessary. Therefore, agreeing on permanent rules of procedure, instead of the provisional ones, that has been used for decades, must be considered, as well as, increasing the number of sessions the Security Council holds, that are open to all Member States. Furthermore, a role must be found for concerned states in the process of decision making on issues of concern addressed by the Council. Such sessions should provide genuine opportunities for the participation of the general membership in the ongoing debates of the Security Council. The number of closed sessions and consultations must be reduced to a minimum level, thus, holding such sessions become extraordinary. The resolutions and statements under discussion by the Security Council, must also become available to, and consulted with the concerned states, in addition to the participation of those states in the discussion of issues in the Security Council that concern them, in accordance with Article 31 of the UN Charter. The arbitrariness in the use of the veto right by the five permanent members of the Council, has contributed in many cases to undermining the credibility of the decisionmaking process in the Council. It also led in some cases, to paralyzing and preventing the Security Council from discharging its primary responsibilities, in taking appropriate measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of the veto by the permanent members over the past years, has reflected the keenness of these stales to use the veto right to defend their own narrow national interests or the interests of their allies. The Arab Group also affirms the need to deal with the veto right issue from a comprehensive perspective, that includes all the key issues, according to General Assembly Decision 62/557, and the need for this issue to remain part and parcel of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. […] 5.2.2.3.18 30 October 2015, African Union, Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 2-3274

[…] Going forward, the African Union Committee of Ten on Security Council Reform remains actively engaged in holding consultations with all member States, delegations and groups and remains open to new ideas and new initiatives on the question of reform of the Security Council. It is common knowledge that the Common African Position has gained momentum and continues to receive support in these deliberations for Africa’s legitimate claim for permanent membership in the Security Council, 274  → 5.4.2.7 for the African Union’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1097

and to correct its under-representation in the non-permanent category. Our claim is based on an historical injustice, and we hope that it will be addressed without further delay. Further delay continues to perpetuate the injustice and also prevents Africa from taking its rightful place in the Security Council. […] On the question of whether the African position is a take-it-or-leave-it position, we prefer to reserve our comments on this issue in the format of formal negotiations, which we hope will commence soon. Any permanent seat that we are awarded, of course, will be held in accordance with the Charter. Our permanent seats and nonpermanent seats will of course rotate as per the usual practice. […] 5.2.2.3.19 30 October 2015, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 6-7 […] [S]eventy years after the establishment of the United Nations and with the change in international realities, it is extremely important to make progress in reforming the Council, in the context of the unanimity of Member States on the need for change. However, we must not seek a hasty solution on which there is no consensus, nor must we have a deadline that would block a comprehensive solution to reform. […] The position of the members of the League of Arab States on Security Council reform is to ask for permanent Arab representation on the Council, enjoying all prerogatives when the Security Council is expanded. We would ask for proportional representation for Arab States with respect to non-permanent membership. […] 5.2.2.3.20 7 November 2016, Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Union, Mr. Sumah, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 2-3

[…] At the outset, I would like to reiterate the commitment of Africa to this very important issue and look forward to working with you, Sir, and engaging the membership in building a consensus that is in concurrence with decision 62/557275 and favourable to the common African position, succinctly articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus276 and Sirte Declaration.277 […] Given the changing international landscape, we believe that the obsolete composition and the absence of adequate representation of an entire region is a deficiency that risks compromising the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions. In this vein, we call for an expansion of the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council, as well as the granting to the new members of all of the prerogatives and privileges of permanent members, including the right of the veto – if it continues to exist. The need to correct the grossly unjust scenario suffered by a continent comprising 54 countries and accounting for 70 per cent of the work of the Council is fundamental and long overdue. In pursuit of that objective, we remain committed to building alliances with diverse interest groups and Member States on the basis of the Common African Position, with a view to bringing about the reform of the Security Council. It must also be borne in 275  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 276  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 277  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

1098

5 On a road to nowhere ?

mind that, in the business of maintaining international peace and collective global security and contributing to peacekeeping operations, Africa, like the rest of the world, continues to pay the ultimate price – which is by no means quantifiable in material or monetary terms. Africa’s demand for at least two permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats is a matter of common justice. Africa has the right to have an equal say in decision-making on issues of international peace and security, and in particular those that concern our continent, which is why we continue to demand our rightful place in the maintenance of peace and security. 5.2.2.3.21 7 November 2016, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 5-6

[…] The position of the members of the Arab Group is that there should be a permanent seat and a non-permanent seat for the Arab States on the Security Council. […] 5.2.2.3.22 7 November 2016, Egypt, Mr. Moustafa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 16-17 […] We reaffirm that Egypt is firmly committed to the Common African Position as set forth in the Ezulwini Consensus278 and the Sirte Declaration,279 which are the only points of reference to have been reaffirmed in successive African summits, and which include a comprehensive vision on Security Council reform, including the matter of the veto. We are satisfied by the increased support for the Common African Position, which we consider to be clear evidence that the world is aware of the importance of redressing the historic injustice committed against the African continent. The African continent still lacks its well-deserved permanent representation in the Council and equitable representation in the elected-member category that would enable Africa to advance its views on the Council’s work in general and on the African items on the Council’s agenda in particular, keeping in mind that these items occupy most of the Council’s agenda, which in turn affirms the legitimacy of the continent’s demands. This year, Egypt has been honoured to be a member of the Security Council, holding one of the three non-permanent seats allocated to Africa. We are currently the only Arab member of the Council and have acquired much experience throughout this year. This experience has confirmed some of our long-held convictions, but we have also learned some lessons, which we would like to share with the Assembly. First, no real Security Council reform is possible without addressing the structural imbalance represented by the monopoly of the permanent five on the work of Council, due to their exclusive right to the use of the veto. This reaffirms the soundness of the Common African Position, which calls on principle for the elimination of the veto. However, until the veto is eliminated, all new permanent members of the Council should enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership. Secondly, any proposal on partial reform of the Security Council, for example, on the expansion of the permanent category without a comprehensive reform of the veto, would not lead to true and fair reform. Actually, it would add to the current structural 278  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 279  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1099

imbalance that plagues the Council. Indeed, such a reform would serve the interests of just a handful of Member States. Thirdly, when the permanent members obtained the special privilege of the veto, stemming from the historical situation at the time of the establishment of the United Nations, the effectiveness of other members in the Council depended on their ability to defend the interests of their geographical groups, which reaffirms that the reform should be based on the principles of democracy, transparency and accountability. It also proves once again the soundness of the African Common Position, as it reaffirms the point of regional representation as the main key issue in the reform process. […] 5.2.2.3.23 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] On behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, I wish to thank you for convening this fourth meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, focusing on the linkages between the issues of regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and categories of membership. We welcome this opportunity, since our group believes that a discussion of the nature of added seats is integral to our consideration of both the size of and regional representation on an expanded Council. According to the elements of convergence identified last year,280 an enlarged Council should consist of a total number of members in the mid-twenties. During the meeting held in April, the UfC group reiterated its support for a compromise solution, which could see an increase of up to eleven additional seats, for a total number of twenty-six Security Council members. However, our support would be contingent on the nature of these additional seats, and only if all of these seats are non-permanent. Similarly, the nature of additional seats is inseparable from the very definition of regional representation, since – as UfC and others highlighted during the March meeting – enhancing regional representation cannot be achieved by expanding permanent membership. With regard to the commonalities on regional representation included in the Food for Thought paper,281 the UfC group agrees that “ensuring a fair equitable geographical distribution should be reflected in an expanded Council’s membership.” But for the UfC, a more representative Council means much more than the general notion of enlarging its membership. We strongly believe that any new seat being sought on behalf of a region must remain available to all members of that regional group. In other words, regional representation is contingent on periodic elections, possibility of rotation, and fair geographical distribution. These are key-elements to ensuring a meaningful implementation of this concept. To this end, I wish to recall the compromise proposal offered by the UfC for a new Security Council consisting of twenty-six members with the following regional distribution of the twenty-one non-permanent members, including those with a longer term: – 6 seats to the African group, which would amount to 29% of elected members and 100% increase in African regional representation on the Council; 280  See, e.g., the statements of 17 May 2016, → 5.1.15, and of 11 July 2016, → 5.1.16. 281  31 March 2017, Elements of Convergence, → 5.1.18.

1100

5 On a road to nowhere ?

– 5 seats to the Asia-Pacific group, 24% of elected members and 150% increase in Asia-Pacific regional representation; – 4 seats to the Latin America and Caribbean group, 19% of elected members and 100% increase in GRULAC regional representation; – 3 seats to the Western European and Others group, 14% of elected members and 50% increase in WEOG regional representation; – 2 seats to the Eastern European group, 9% of elected members and 100% increase in Eastern European regional representation; – 1 seat to rotate among existing regional groups, reserved for Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) and Small States, which is 5% of elected members and entirely new. With regard to the rotating seat, I also wish to reiterate that it would not prevent SIDS and Small States from running for a seat within their regional group; it would instead be an additional way for them to gain access to the Security Council. In terms of regional representation, Africa would become the first group in the reformed Council; Asia-Pacific would have the highest percent increase; while Latin America and Eastern Europe would double their representation. This distribution would also allow an increased and more stable representation to cross-regional groupings, such as the Arab group. […] All Member States agree that it is high time for a reform leading to a new Security Council that enjoys greater legitimacy and authority. This can be done by building a reformed Security Council based on legitimacy, engagement and responsibility, not privilege. It can be done by making the most of this Organization’s unique resource: its universal membership. We need an inclusive and consensual reform – bringing together ideas and assets of all Member States. Proposals envisaging an increase in permanent members would only make our Council more exclusive rather than inclusive, and many acknowledge that such an approach is the main reason for the lack of progress so far in the reform process. While our original proposal of expanding the 2-year non-permanent seats is still on the table, for the sake of making progress, the UfC has shown flexibility and readiness to work on a compromise solution based on new longer term non-permanent seats with the possibility of an immediate re-election. A more representative Security Council means offering greater opportunity to all Member States to serve periodically on the Council. An increase in non-permanent members would foster an improved dynamic between elected and existing permanent members within the Council, contributing to decision-making, inclusiveness, transparency, and to the representativeness of the Council. After almost 25 years debating the creation of new permanent members, it is time to give a concrete chance to this reform process by exploring alternative and compromise approaches, and offer real prospects to those groups of States and regions of the world under-represented in the Council. In this way, we will increase the Council’s legitimacy in the eyes of both the general membership and the international public opinion, thus enhancing its authority and, ultimately, its effectiveness. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1101

5.2.2.3.24 17 May 2017, African Union, Communiqué of the Malabo Consultative Summit of the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government 1. The African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on UN reforms held its Fourth Consultative Summit on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council, in Malabo, Republic of Equatorial Guinea on 17 May 2017. The Summit was hosted by H.E. Mr. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea; under the chairmanship of H.E. Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and Coordinator of the AU Committee of Ten; H.E. Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of Congo; H.E. Dr. Hage G. Geingob, President of the Republic of Namibia, and H.E. Mr. Edgar Chagwa Lungu, President of the Republic of Zambia. 2. Other Heads of State and Government were represented as follows: […] 3. The Heads of State and Government in their deliberations reviewed twelve years of activities of the C-10 on the reform of the UN Security Council. They noted the continued support for the Common African Position by UN Member States but emphasized that African Countries should stay united on the reform of the Security Council, speak with one voice and unequivocally support the Common African Position in terms of allocating two seats in the Permanent Category with all its prerogatives and privileges including the Right of Veto, and two additional seats in the Non-permanent category of the Security Council. They further expressed concern that the dividend of all Africa’s effort as well as that of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in advocating for a comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council remains minimal, disappointing and frustrating. In this regard, they decided as follows: a. The Common African Position as espoused in Ezulwini Consensus282 and the Sirte Declaration283 is the only viable option to redress the historical injustice done to the African Continent. The reform of the UN Security Council should be comprehensive in accordance with Decision 62/557 of the UN General Assembly.284 b. Stressed the critical importance for heightened engagement with the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. c. Instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the C-10 to come up with a proposed DECISION on a progressive approach for advancing the Common African Position on UN reform process, to be tabled at the AU Assembly in July 2017. Reflecting on the present geopolitical realities in terms of Africa’s numerical strength, growing economic power, population dynamics and increasing role at multilateral fora and the urgent need for equitable representation at the Security Council, it is evident that Africa deserves a place in the Permanent Category of the United Nations Security Council with all the prerogatives and privileges including the right of Veto, as well as two additional Non-permanent seats. In this regard, no other Interest Group/Member State can challenge the Common African Position in terms of its legitimacy. […]

282  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 283  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 284  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

1102

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.2.3.25 5 July 2017, European Parliament recommendation to the Council concerning the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, P8_TA(2017)0304 The European Parliament, […] 1. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council: […] EU and reform of the UN system […] (bj) to actively support a comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council on the basis of a broad consensus in order to better reflect the new world reality and to more effectively meet present and future security challenges; to support the long-term goal of the EU having a seat on a reformed UN Security Council; to urge UN Security Council members to refrain from using their right of veto in cases where crimes against humanity are being committed; to promote the revitalisation of the work of the UN General Assembly, and improved coordination and coherence of the action of all UN institutions, which should enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, capacity and representativeness of the system in order to respond more quickly to global challenges; […] 5.2.2.3.26 7 November 2017, African Union, Mr. Sumah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 2-4

[…] We cannot talk about the size of an enlarged Security Council without talking about the categories of membership, since enlargement of the Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories will definitely affect its size. Also, the size of an enlarged Council will affect the cluster on equitable regional representation. In other words, in order to correct the current imbalance in the Security Council, we must enlarge its size, which must also take into account the need to redress the protracted historical injustice done to Africa in terms of representation in the Council. That therefore explains the need for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, as opposed to a piecemeal and/or intermediate procedural reform of the Council. Considering the present international landscape, it is unacceptable that Africa is the only continent not to be represented in the permanent category of Council membership, while it is also underrepresented in the non-permanent category. We will therefore continue to demand the allocation of no less than two permanent seats to Africa, with all the prerogatives and privileges of the permanent members, and a total of five non-permanent seats. The selection of such representatives will be done by our regional organization, the African Union, which has enviable credentials in selecting its candidates to serve in multilateral organizations, including the United Nations. That demand, which is a continent-wide aspiration, is aimed at ensuring Africa’s right to fair and equitable geographical representation on the Security Council. The need to adhere to that demand and to address the grossly unjust scenario is fundamental. A delay would mean further perpetuating and compounding the existing injustice and, concomitantly, denying the region its rightful place in the major decision-making

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1103

organ of the Organization. We are therefore pleased that a considerable number of Member States support the enlargement of the Security Council to reflect equitable regional representation. Our continued participation in this debate is firmly rooted in our commitment to the Common African Position, articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus285 and the Sirte Declaration.286 We remain firmly convinced that the Common African Position continues to enjoy the broadest support of the majority of the membership and that it remains a viable option in the reform process. Africa therefore continues to urge all interest groups and stakeholders and the wider United Nations membership to demonstrate their commitment to correcting the historical injustice by concretely supporting the African position, which will clearly lead to reforming the Council so that it can become a more inclusive, democratic and effective organ. […] 5.2.2.3.27 7 November 2017, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Almunayekh, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 4-5

[…] The position of the Group of Arab States with regard to the reform of the Security Council is well-known, namely, that its member States are asking for permanent Arab representation, as well as proportional representation in the non-permanent member category. Ultimately, the Arab Group is committed to participating constructively in the next round of intergovernmental negotiations with a view to reaching consensus that will allow us to comprehensively and effectively reform the Security Council. 5.2.2.3.28 7 November 2017, Nigeria, Mr. Nurudeen, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 25-26 I wish to reiterate the fact that Nigeria aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Chairs of the Group of African States287 and the L.69 group,288 respectively (see A/72/PV.41). Let me, however, make a few remarks in my national capacity. […] Nigeria and other emerging nations continue to demonstrate the capacity to add value to the work of all the organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. For that reason, we must now commit ourselves to accelerating the long-overdue reforms of the Council. They will no doubt make the Council more equitable, more inclusive, efficient, transparent and more effective. Nigeria believes that a reformed Security Council with expanded permanent membership would benefit from the unique experiences and capacities that regional representatives could bring to bear on its work. […] We would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that African Union position on the entire subject of Security Council reform, to which we adhere very strongly. […] For that reason, we wish to underscore the overriding need to ensure that the interests of Africa continue to be advanced and safeguarded. African States have offered a coherent, practical and persuasive blueprint for the Council’s reform. We have come up with 285  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 286  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 287  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26. 288  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.38.

1104

5 On a road to nowhere ?

our Common Position, which asserts the right of our continent, which has for so long been marginalized, to be fully represented in the Council, just we recognize the legitimate aspirations of other regions to be represented. […] 5.2.2.3.29 7 November 2017, Ghana, Ms. Pobee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 26-27289 […] My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/72/ PV.41).290 […] Ghana, like many other delegations, attaches great importance to the issue of equitable representation on the Security Council, and over the years it has called for the enlargement of the Council’s membership, in line with the African Common Position as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus.291 We are committed to efforts to make the Council, a vital organ of the United Nations, more broadly representative, efficient and transparent so that we can enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy in the implementation of its decisions. […] 5.2.2.3.30 8 November 2017, Algeria, Mr. Bessedik, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 7-8 […] We will therefore continue to demand the allocation of no less than two permanent seats to Africa, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, as well as a total of five non-permanent seats. The issue of the selection of such representatives should not be instrumentalized by some stakeholders; it is a sovereign decision for the African Member States to make. I would remind the Assembly that the African Union has its own competent mechanisms mandated to select candidates to serve in multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations. […] 5.2.2.3.31 20 November 2018, Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab States, Mr. Alotaibi, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 2-3 I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Arab States on agenda item 124 concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. […] After two decades of negotiations aimed at expanding the membership of the Security Council and improving its working methods, during which there have been several initiatives and stances taken by numerous States and groups of States, including the Arab Group, it is now important that we move forward with the process of Security Council reform. That can be achieved through consensus-based solutions that are supported with broad acceptance by Member States. However, we do not

289  → 5.4.4.57 for Ghana’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 290  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26. 291  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1105

necessarily have to act hastily in setting a time frame for the process, as that would undermine a comprehensive, genuine and real reform. […] We face several challenges with regard to Security Council reform, particularly the veto power and the arbitrary use of that power by certain permanent members of the Security Council. In many cases, that arbitrary use has harmed the credibility of the decision-making process within the Council, and has sometimes made the Council unable to shoulder its responsibility to take the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. The veto power of the permanent members of the Council has been used in recent years to protect their national interests or those of their allies. In that regard, I regret to note that the majority of cases in which the veto power was used, particularly over the past three decades, concerned issues relating to the Arab region. The overall and major goal of Security Council reform and the expansion of its membership are to ensure that all geographical and regional groups are fairly and proportionately represented within an expanded Security Council. In that regard, it is important to recall that the Arab Group represents nearly 350 million people from 22 countries, which constitutes around 12 per cent of the United Nations membership. In addition, much of the Security Council’s work and many of the items on its agenda concern the Arab region. The Arab Group should therefore be fairly and equitably represented within an expanded Security Council, so that we can express and convey the Arab perspective in the Council and thereby ensure the legitimacy and credibility of its resolutions. Moreover, the Arab Group calls for full-fledged permanent Arab representation in the permanent membership category in an overall expanded Council. Fair and equitable geographical representation also requires Arab representation in the nonpermanent membership category in the expanded Council. […] 5.2.2.3.32 20 November 2018, Sierra Leone on behalf of the Group of African States, Mr. Kai-Kai, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 3-5 I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of African States. […] The urgent need for the comprehensive reform of the Security Council cannot be overemphasized. It is important to keep in mind that 1.2 billion of the world’s population of 7.5 billion people are African and that they continue to contribute their fair share to maintaining world peace and security. About 70 per cent of the decisions made at the Security Council ultimately affect those 1.2 billion Africans. Almost one-fifth of the world’s population is therefore asking why it is excluded from the permanent category of the Security Council. In addition, most of the issues discussed in the Security Council are related to Africa. In view of that, the continent must be in a position to effectively participate in the decision-making processes of all the organs of the United Nations. The Common African Position on Security Council reform, as articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus292 and the Sirte Declaration,293 is well known to the Assembly. 292  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 293  5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations, → 4.2.2.3.29.

1106

5 On a road to nowhere ?

However, for the purposes of clarity and precision, let me reiterate that Africa demands no less than two permanent seats, with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto, and five non-permanent seats. Although Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that, for as long as it exists and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council. Our call for the immediate redress of the African demand for the equitable representation of Africa in the Security Council continues to garner broad support from States Members of the United Nations. In particular, the previous co-Chairs of the intergovernmental negotiations recorded in the outcome of the seventy-second session that Member States acknowledged the legitimate aspirations of African countries to play their rightful role on the global stage. That development further reinforces the credibility and viability of the Common African Position on the reform of the Security Council. It not only builds on the broad support that our position continues to garner but also signifies that the Common African Position remains unchallenged in its claim to redress the historical injustice resulting from Africa not being represented in the permanent category and being underrepresented in the non-permanent category of the Security Council. That is a welcome development on which we will continue to build until we achieve a reform that recognizes Africa and gives the continent its rightful place in global governance at the United Nations. […] 5.2.2.3.33 20 November 2018, Morocco, Mr. Hilale, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 17-18 […] Africa is the only region not represented in the permanent-member category of the Security Council. That historical injustice against Africa should impel all of us to rectify the situation. That can be done by ensuring adequate African representation in the permanent-membership category and strengthening Africa’s presence in the category of non-permanent members. Indeed, the African request is clear. It should have no fewer than two permanent seats, with all their prerogatives and privileges, including the right of veto – if that continues to exist – and five non-permanent seats. We are pleased with the consensus among Member States on certain issues, including Africa’s position on the Security Council and the redress of the historical injustice done to the continent. In that regard, I wish to reiterate that Morocco, which subscribes to the Common African Position espoused in the Ezulwini Consensus,294 supports the fair and equitable representation of Africa in both categories of seats, as previously described. It will then be up to Africa to decide on its representatives in the reformed Security Council. Similarly, the absence of permanent representation for the Arab countries, despite the fact that they, like the Group of African States, are extremely involved in the issues that the Security Council deals with, is highly unfortunate. A permanent Arab seat, with all of its prerogatives, as well as adequate representation in the category of nonpermanent members, would make it possible to meet the legitimate demands of the Group of Arab States. […] 294  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1107

5.2.2.4 Statements opposing new categories of seats 5.2.2.4.1 4 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations295 […] Intermediate/interim reform ◯ Since several models/ideas were presented as “intermediate” reforms, such term has become too equivocal and has lost its utility. Rather, we have to refer to specific ideas/proposals. ◯ If by such term, one only means the creation of a third category of members, such as longer-term seats – and therefore not the expansion of the category of permanent members – we see the same problem we detect in the proposal to only expand the non-permanent category. Only a reform that increases the group of permanent members will adjust the Council to the political realities of the 21st century and ensure its long-term legitimacy and viability. ◯ If by such term, one has in mind a reform by which the reform to be adopted is reviewed in a given number of years, we could support it. In fact, from this perspective, the G-4 original proposal296 contains an element of an interim reform.

•

5.2.2.4.2 24 March 2009, Brazil, Ms. Viotti, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] The following main interpretations seem to have been given to the expression “regional representation”: a. “equitable geographical distribution”; b. allocation of one or more seats to a specific regional group which would be occupied in rotation by Member States from that group; c. allocation of one or more seats to regional institutions; and d. allocation of one or more seats to groups which, although interregional, share a religion or belongs to the same civilization. In considering the suitability of these interpretations in the context of Security Council reform, we must recall a few basic features of the Charter: 1. All Council members, permanent and non-permanent alike, are States and States only; 2. National candidatures as non-permanent members are submitted on a regional basis in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution provided for in Article 23 of the Charter. This does not mean, however, that they are elected by their regions, legally represent them as a whole or any other of its members or are politically accountable exclusively to their regional groups. Rather, non-permanent members are elected in their national capacity by the whole membership and are accountable to all Member States. 3. Obviously, this does not prevent or discourage non-permanent Members to consult with their regional groups and partners and even agree on policies to be pursued in the Council. Brazil, for example, whenever in the Council, has maintained a constant dialogue with GRULAC and strived to bring a Latin American and Caribbean perspective to the deliberations of the Council. We intend to do so in the biennium 2010/2011, if elected. But even then, legally and politically speaking, we will be representing but ourselves. 295  → 5.2.1.1.1 for Brazil’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 296  6 July 2005, Draft resolution, → 4.2.1.1.37.

1108

5 On a road to nowhere ?

4. Therefore, under the Charter, there is no such a thing as “regional representation” in the Security Council, if by such term one understands that either a State legally represents its geographical group or its members or if formal representation is to be given to regional institutions. In Brazil’s view, such basic features of the Charter must be fully preserved, under the penalty of introducing further and unnecessary complexity in the process of the Security Council. If, for example, one believes that a “regional dimension” should be introduced to the Council, difficult questions may arise. I would mention only two. In the case, for example, of a seat given to regional institutions, would any of such institutions as currently organized be prepared to credibly and timely formulate and maintain policies on all issues of the Security Council agenda and fully discharge all responsibilities associated with membership in the Council? In the simpler alternative of a regional seat occupied in rotation by individual States belonging to the regional group, would the incumbent speak and take up responsibilities on its own behalf or on behalf of the States of the region? In the latter case, how would the UN ensure the accountability of the States represented? These questions and many others point to the fact that bringing a “regional dimension” to the Council would likely have far-reaching legal and political consequences for the very nature and operation of the Council. Depending on what one understands as a “regional dimension” in the Security Council, we could be weakening the UN and the Council as an Organization made of sovereign States and even questioning their role and preeminence. For the reasons above, we believe that, in order to avoid further confusion, one should not speak of “regional representation” but of “equitable geographical distribution”. […] 5.2.2.4.3 8 November 2013, Portugal, Mr. Moura, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 15-17297 […] Secondly, when addressing such enlargement, one should be cautious in order to maintain an appropriate balance and equitable representation in the non-permanent category. For medium-size and small States – which, I note, constitute the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations – that is of crucial importance. Any proposal that would reserve a number of those seats for certain States for long-term mandates would substantially hinder the access of many of the other States to serving on the Council. That is something we are not inclined to accept. Creating a new category of seats would aggravate the already existing division among permanent and non-permanent members by including an intermediate category of semi-permanent members. In our view, that would neither serve the wider membership nor help the Security Council in its work, and would in fact result in a less representative and effective body. […]

297  → 5.2.1.1.20 for Portugal’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1109

5.2.2.4.4 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, Mr. Akbaruddin, Intergovernmental Negotiations

[…] There have been various suggestions of expansion that propose the ‘so called’ intermediate models whose main feature is immediate re-election of non-permanent members with a longer term as a solution. It is worth recalling that these proposed features are not new. They were sought to be introduced in the UN Charter and were discarded then. For example, an effort was specifically mounted to amend the Dumbarton Oaks draft with a proposal for non-permanent membership for 8 years. It was termed as ‘semi-permanent membership’. It was discussed in detail in Committee 1 of Commission III dealing with parts of the Charter related to the Security Council’s Structure and Procedure. On May 14, 1945 it was rejected by an overwhelming majority. Subsequently, just two days later, an effort was made to provide for opportunities for re-election of non-permanent members on completion of their 2 year terms. These efforts too were rejected outright by all except two members. In short, the idea that underpins these models is to use a well-known colloquialism – old hat. It is not only old hat but a hat that has been declined by a huge majority to be worn and has been long discarded. In our view, the proposal for expansion only in non-permanent category, old or new, is afflicted with the following problems: It does not provide any checks or balances to the current issues related to the imbalances between the permanent members and the non-permanent members. It would not empower Africa or other developing countries. It would mean introduction of a new category and addition of numbers without making the Council either accountable or effective. That accountability can come about only by having new permanent members elected and subject to stringent review. As many small states have repeatedly pointed out that these intermediate models merely enhance the chances of more resourceful middle states to contest in both the ‘so called semi-permanent’ and the non-permanent category thereby further reducing the chances of small states to serve on the Council. In short, expansion of non-permanent membership is a solution which adds to the size without addressing the malaise that afflicts the Council. […] There are some who have conflated and confused regular elections to the Council with accountability. Ensuring a perpetual campaign mode is not the best form of accountability. Is the current Council more accountable than it was in pre-1965 period because it has twice the number of elected non-permanent members? It is incorrect to think that the accountability of the Council will increase merely with more nonpermanent members. In fact, it will leave the real problems of co-relation of power and accountability to fester. Alternately can we not consider addressing this issue of accountability through a different approach? New permanent members can be democratically elected through an appropriate initial election process and subjected to mandatory and detailed review process after a specific time-period to ensure accountability. This will ensure that our proposals are within the Charter formats familiar to all rather than along discarded paths.

• • • •

1110

5 On a road to nowhere ?

On the issue of Regional representation, the G4 position is that the basis of the UN Charter is that States represent themselves in the UN’s organs including the Security Council. However, in any increase in the membership due regard is to be paid to equitable geographical distribution. This would mean that there needs to be balance in the number of non-permanent members from various regional groups taking into account the membership of each of the regional groups that we have organised ourselves into. The distribution of non-permanent membership from various regions over the passage of time is no longer reflective of equitable geographical distribution. For example, in the Asia-Pacific group there are 53 states vying for 2 non-permanent seats, while in the WEOG group there are 26 members in the pool vying for 2 seats. The Permanent Representative of Panama has on many occasions painstakingly outlined how the current regional distribution of non-permanent seats is no longer equitable.298 For example, while for the Asia-Pacific group, the ratio is 1:26.5, for WEOG it is 1:13. Any expansion needs to address this as also representation of small and medium size Member States, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Member States should also make full use of the possibility of cross-regional arrangements to ensure that the diversity of the General Assembly membership is adequately reflected in the Council. […] The question of the veto has been addressed by many from differing perspectives. The G4 approach is that the problem of the veto is not one of quantity (of extending it immediately to new permanent members) but of quality – of introducing restrictions. Our position is imbued with this spirit. While the new permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members they shall not exercise the veto until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review. The issue of veto is important but we should not allow it to have a veto over the process of Council reform itself. […] 5.2.2.4.5 8 November 2017, Portugal, Mr. Duarte Lopes, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 5-6

[…] With regard to Security Council reform, Portugal believes that the process should be inclusive, transparent and comprehensive, and result from a wider consensus, not just the two thirds of the General Assembly required by the Charter of the United Nations. Among other provisions, Portugal deems important that consideration be given to increasing the numbers of both the permanent and non-permanent members. In our view, and in order to reinforce inclusiveness without affecting efficiency, the expansion of the number of seats for potential new permanent members should not include the right to the veto. We also believe that the creation of any additional category, other than the existing permanent and non-permanent members, would not contribute to the effectiveness of the decision-making process. The reform of the Security Council should also include continuous improvement of its working methods. Portugal has been an advocate of this objective, in 2012, as a non-permanent member of the Council and Chair of the 298  See, e.g., the statements of 8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7, and of 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1111

Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, as well as through the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group. As the United Nations organ with greater responsibilities in the area of international peace and security, the Security Council needs reform that reflects the realities of the world today. As my Prime Minister recalled in this year’s general debate (see A/72/PV.8),299 Portugal believes that the African continent should be adequately represented in both categories, and with regard to other continents, we believe that Brazil and India are two unavoidable examples. In implementing the rotation principle, we also have to ensure opportunities for small and medium-sized countries. We hope that this exercise will constitute an opportunity to narrow our focus on what can unite us, build broader common ground and make further efforts towards a comprehensive consensus. […] 5.2.3 Statements in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats 5.2.3.1 25 May 2009, Organization of Islamic Conference, Resolution No. 20/36-POL of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the reform of the United Nations and expansion of UN Security Council’s membership The Thirty-Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Session of Enhancing Islamic Solidarity), held in Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic from 28 Jamadul Awal – 1 Jamadul Thani 1430 H (23-25 May 2009); Recalling all Resolutions adopted by the Islamic Summit and Foreign Ministers Conference on the subject; Also recalling previous OIC resolutions, in particular Resolution 17/34-P300 adopted at the Thirty-fourth Session of the ICFM in Islamabad from 15-17 May 2007; resolution 19/35-P301 adopted at the Thirty fifth Session of the CFM held in Kampala from 18-20 June 2008, and resolution 11/11-P (IS)302 adopted at the Eleventh OIC Summit at Dakar from 13-14 March 2008; Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs No. 145 to 152 of final communiqué of the Annual Coordination Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member States at the UN Headquarters in New York on 26 September 2008;303 Recalling also paragraphs 64 to 75 of the Final Document of XII NAM Summit in Durban adopted on 3 September 1998,304 the paragraphs related to the Security Council reform in the Declaration adopted at the 32nd Session of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held in Harare in June 1997305 as well as in the Working Paper of the Arab Group adopted by the Arab Foreign Ministers in New York on 29 September 1997; 299  20 September 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.8, pp. 19-22. 300  In Doc. OIC/ICFM-34/2007/POL/RES/Final, pp. 35-38. 301  In Doc. OIC/CFM-35/2008/POL/RES/Final, pp. 46-50. 302  → 4.2.3.15. 303   OIC/ACM-08/FC/Final. 304   Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.6 = UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 305  27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29 and 3.4.2.21.

1112

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Mindful of the objectives and principles enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, especially the objectives of promoting Islamic solidarity among Member States and strengthening their capacity to safeguard their security, sovereignty and independence; Reaffirming that the United Nations is an indispensable and irreplaceable global mechanism for the promotion of a shared vision of a more secure and prosperous world, and has the central role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation; Stressing the significant importance of multilateralism in addressing the common threats and challenges facing the common destiny of humankind in our increasingly interconnected and globalizing world; Expressing grave concern over the policies which have prevented the UN Security Council from performing its main duty based on justice and thus undermining its credibility; Rejecting the dominant interventionist paradigm and tendencies which constitutes a real threat to the world community and maintenance of international peace and security; Stressing that any reform of the United Nations, including Security Council reform, should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter; Rejecting any preventive and pre-emptive action in international relations as a clear violation of international law; Affirming also the importance of regular consultations with OIC Member States to advance their interests in this process; Emphasizing the importance of transparency and all-inclusiveness of deliberations on UN reform; Stressing that the OIC’s demand for adequate representation in the Security Council is in keeping with the significant demographic and political weight of the OIC Member States, which bears particular importance, not only from the perspective of increased efficiency, but also to ensure the representation of the main forms of civilization in the Security Council; Reaffirming its principled position that any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council; 1. Affirms the importance of the ongoing process of UN reform and stresses that the OIC Member States have a direct and vital interest in determining the outcome of UN reform, therefore calls on all OIC Member States to actively and effectively take part in the UN Security Council reform process, in accordance with the relevant declarations, statements and resolutions issued by the OIC. […] 3. Reaffirms the irreplaceable role of the United Nations and the necessity of ensuring the equal participation of all Member States in its activities, in a transparent and multilateral manner, guided by the UN Charter and founded on universally recognized principles. 4. Underlines the need, in UN reform, for evolving common perceptions and agreed approaches to address both the new and existing threats to international peace and security in the context of multilateralism.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1113

5. Stresses that the UN Security Council reform must be comprehensive in all its aspects and have to take into account the views of the United Nations membership, including that of the OIC Member States. 6. Emphasizes the importance of enhancing the transparency, accountability, representativeness and democratization of the Security Council through the improvement of its working methods and legitimacy of its decision-making process. 7. Supports the expansion of the Security Council’s membership, in accordance with the relevant UNGA resolutions, sovereign equality of all States and adequate representation of major civilizations. […] 11. Emphasizes that the process of United Nations reform should evolve on the basis of all relevant inputs, particularly that of the OIC Member States’ view points and concerns. […] 13. Expresses its deep concern that the issues pertaining to the threats of clash, militarism and the propensity to use force have to be assessed and properly addressed and emphasizes that in addressing a new consensus on collective security the concept of dialogue, particularly the need to the paradigm of “dialogue among civilizations”, already approved by the UN General Assembly as the most efficient means to tackle the growing threat of clash, should be given the high priority. 14. Emphasizes the necessity of representation of major civilizations in the UN Security Council and, taking into account the fact that the OIC is the largest institution after the United Nations, which brings together one-fifth of the world population. 15. Reaffirms its decision that any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an extended Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World. 16. Underlines the significant importance of achieving the expansion of UN Security Council with the broadest possible agreement, through initiation of constructive negotiation between all UN Member States, based on the points of convergence such as the need to enlarge the Council, to increase the representation of developing countries, and to improve the working methods and transparency of the Council’s work; and stresses in that regard the importance of further constructive consultations between all United Nations Member States to agree on a common basis and framework for further progress. 17. Welcomes in this regard the start on intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters in the informal plenary of the General Assembly from 19 February 2009. 18. Notes that the position of the OIC on the reform of the Security Council has been reiterated and conveyed by the OIC Chair to the chair of the negotiations process through his letter of 23 April 2009, and requests the Permanent Representatives of the OIC countries in New York to promote and advance the OIC position in the negotiations. […] 20. Reaffirms that both reform and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, including the question of the veto, should be considered as integral parts of a

1114

5 On a road to nowhere ?

common package, taking into account the principle of sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution. 21. Further reaffirms that efforts at the restructuring of the Security Council shall not be subjected to any artificial deadlines, and that a decision on this issue should be made by consensus. 22. Reaffirms the resolve of the Member States to continue contributing actively and constructively to the consideration of the United Nations reform. 23. Requests the OIC open-ended Contact Group on UN Reform and Expansion of the Security Council at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to continue to closely coordinate the positions of the OIC Member States promoting the comprehensive reform of the Security Council on the above basis and to ensure equitable representation for OIC countries in any category in the enlarged Security Council in proportion to their membership of the United Nations. 24. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon to the 37th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 5.2.3.2 25 September 2009, Organization of Islamic Conference, Final Communique of the annual coordination meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member States, United Nations Headquarters New York, OIC/ACM-09/ FC/Final, pp. 27-29 […] UN REFORM 175. The Meeting supported a comprehensive reform of the United Nations Organization to respond to the challenges facing humanity. The Meeting reiterated the need for evolving common perceptions and agreed approaches to address both the new and existing threats to international peace and security in the context of multilateralism. The Meeting also reiterated the OIC’s stance in support of the principle of the United Nations reform, including the expansion of the Security Council’s membership, in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, and taking into consideration the principles of sovereign equality of all States and the need to ensure equitable geographic distribution. 176. The Meeting emphasized that the question of reform and expansion of the UN Security Council continues to be the primary preoccupation of the UN membership, including all OIC Member States for whom this is a matter of direct and vital interest. It, therefore, called on its Member States to actively and constructively take part in the UN reform process in accordance with the relevant declarations, statements and resolutions issued by the OIC. It emphasized the importance of a comprehensive reform enhancing the transparency, accountability, representativeness and democratization of the Security Council, through the improvement of its working methods and legitimacy and effectiveness of its decision-making process. The Meeting reaffirmed its principled position that any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of the OIC Member States in any category of membership of the expanded Security Council. 177. The Meeting highlighted that in the current era of regional blocks, the OIC is the largest institution after the United Nations, which brings together one-fifth of the world population. The OIC’s demand for adequate representation in the Security Council is

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1115

in keeping with the significant demographic and political weight of the OIC Member States, which bears particular importance, not only from the perspective of increased efficiency, but also to ensure the representation of the main forms of civilization in the Security Council. It therefore reaffirmed its decision that any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of membership in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic World. 178. The Meeting also stressed an increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Security Council. It also recognized that there was wide support for increasing the number of non-permanent members in the Security Council. 179. The Meeting took note of the progress made in the discussions on Security Council reform during the 63rd Session of the General Assembly, guided by the President of the General Assembly. The Meeting underlined that the reform of the Security Council must be achieved with the broadest possible agreement. In this context, and keeping in view the continuing divergent positions among UN Member States on important aspects of Security Council reform, the Meeting stressed the importance of further constructive consultations between all UN Member States to agree on a common basis and framework for further progress, without imposing any time limits or pushing divisive votes. In that regard, it called for building upon the points of convergence such as the need to enlarge the Council, to increase the representation of developing countries, question of the veto and to improve the working methods and transparency of the Council’s work. 180. The Meeting rejected any efforts to abuse the Security Council as a tool to pursue certain political and national agendas and stressed on the importance of nonselectivity and impartiality in the work of the Council. 181. The Meeting, by rejecting the interventionist tendencies and unilateral preemptive action in international relations as a real threat to the world community, stressed that the UN Security Council should act in full transparency and accountability and expressed grave concern over the policies which have prevented this body from performing its main duty based on justice and thus undermined its credibility. It stressed that the UNSC should be accountable for its unlawful decisions as well as its repeated failures with regard to issues related to the Muslim Ummah. […] 5.2.3.3 13 November 2009, Maldives, Mr. Mohamed, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 28-29306 […] In that regard, comprehensive reform of the Security Council lies at the heart of our larger efforts at revamping an international structure that came into being more than 60 years ago. For the United Nations to continue on its path of progress towards becoming a more effective institution, the Security Council must be expanded and restructured to reflect today’s geopolitical realities. The Maldives is of the view that the inclusion of both India and Japan in any future composition of the Security Council remains an important and fundamental aspect of future reform, providing a key mechanism for the effective functioning of the Security Council in the twenty-first century. […] 306  The Maldives confirmed this position on 15 November 2012 in UN Doc. A/67/PV.39, pp. 24-25.

1116

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.3.4 4 March 2010, China, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 136-137 Position of China on the Security Council Reform […] China firmly supports necessary and reasonable reform of the Security Council to enhance its authority and efficiency, strengthen its capacity to respond to global threats and challenges and enable it to better discharge its responsibilities entrusted by the Charter of the United Nations. Security Council reform is multifaceted covering not only issues such as enlarging the Council’s membership and strengthening representation, but also increasing efficiency and improving working methods. Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially that of African countries, so as to enable developing countries to play a greater role in the Security Council. The reform should be conducive to give more countries, small and medium-sized countries in particular, more opportunities to serve in the Security Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process. Member States are still seriously divided on the issue of “category”, with no general agreement reached on any solution so far. Member States still need to engage in patient consultations to seek a solution that accommodates each other’s interests and concerns. Expansion of the Security Council to an appropriate size holds the key to giving most developing countries and small and medium-sized countries greater access to the work of the Security Council. On the issue of size, the legitimate concerns of developing countries should be taken seriously. The Council should be enlarged to an extent that will enable it to fully redress the imbalance in its structure and increase the representation of developing countries. The enlargement should also maintain an appropriate ratio in the numbers of Council members from different categories. New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration. Some countries advocate regional rotation, and some other countries maintain that Security Council members should be more representative and reflective of the interests of the region where they are from. These propositions merit our attention and consideration. China has all along adopted a positive attitude towards improvement of the working methods of the Security Council. It is necessary for the Council to continue to take stock of its experience and best practices, increase transparency of its work, and heed and respect the views of Member States. China supports strengthening coordination and cooperation between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations clearly defines the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These two principal organs should discharge their respective responsibilities entrusted by the Charter of the United Nations and complement each other. Security Council reform bears on the immediate interests of all Member States. Any solution or reform model should enjoy general agreement among Member States. The five clusters of key issues concerning Security Council reform are interrelated,

• • • •

• • • •

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1117

and should not be addressed in isolation. It is imperative to stick to the approach of “a package solution”. The “piecemeal” or “step-by-step” approach is not conducive to accommodating the interests and concerns of Member States. […] 5.2.3.5 11 November 2010, Non-Aligned Movement, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt), UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8 […] The Movement believes that the reform of the Security Council should be addressed in a comprehensive, transparent and balanced manner, in order to reflect the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries alike. Reform should also aim at limiting and curtailing the use of the veto with a view to its ultimate elimination. The enlargement of the Security Council, as the body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the reform of its working methods, should lead to a more democratic, more representative, more accountable and more effective Council. In that context, the heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement acknowledged the historical injustices against Africa with regard to its representation in the Security Council and expressed support for increased and enhanced representation of the African continent in a reformed Security Council. Moreover, they took note of the common African position as reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus307 and the Sirte Declaration.308 […] 5.2.3.6 9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 22-23309 […] We are convinced that the issue of Security Council reform cannot be resolved only arithmetically, by putting various models for voting together and arriving at a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. We need to be able to strengthen this international Organization. Certain countries and groups of States want only to expand their support base for their initiatives, so in that context we believe that the formula for Security Council reform should have the maximum consensus-based support of the Organization. It is politically necessary to ensure the support of many more Member States than is legally required by the stipulation regarding a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. We are prepared to consider any logical variation and all compromise solutions if they are broadly supported by the United Nations. At the same time, the level of progress made so far means that we have not been able to devise a universal formula for Security Council reform that would garner broad-based support. The approaches taken by Member States are quite divergent. In those circumstances, there is no alternative but to work patiently to narrow the gap between negotiating positions.

307  7-8 March 2005, → 4.2.2.3.26. 308  5 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.29. 309  → 5.3.15 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.1.3 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1118

5 On a road to nowhere ?

We will continue to support the intergovernmental negotiations held under Ambassador Tanin’s chairmanship. We firmly believe that this task should be carried out peacefully, transparently and inclusively, without setting any artificial time limits. In conclusion, I should like to say that a successful reform of the Security Council will depend on the political will of Member States and the willingness to find a compromise solution. 5.2.3.7 15 November 2012, China, Mr. Wang Min, UN Doc. A/67/PV.39, pp. 14-15 […] China supports the Security Council in enhancing its authority and efficiency through appropriate and necessary reform so as to better implement the mandate of maintaining international peace and security entrusted to it under the Charter. The Council should give priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, in particular African countries, on the Council. Security Council reform should be conducive to more opportunities for more countries – especially small and medium-sized countries, which constitute the majority of the United Nations membership – to take part in meetings and to participate in the Council’s decision-making. […] 5.2.3.8 28 October 2013, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Mr. İhsanoğlu, UN Doc. S/PV.7050, pp. 3-6 […] Many of the issues on the agenda of the Security Council relate to the Muslim world, and the OIC is naturally seized of them. That fact demonstrates the importance of having strong links of cooperation and coordination between the OIC and the United Nations in order to benefit from global and local approaches to addressing those issues. At the same time, I would like to emphasize the need of expediting the reform of the Security Council by promoting its transparency, accountability, adequate representation and full democratization so as to enable it to play its full role in the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Our principled position is that any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation for OIC member States in any category of membership, given that our organization represents 57 member States and 1.6 billion people. […] 5.2.3.9 8 April 2015, China, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 101-106 […] With reference to the informal briefing session of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform on March 26th, 2015 and your letter dated that day,310 I would like to reiterate China’s position on Security Council reform and make the following points regarding the framework document and the broad approach contained in your letter. According to decision 62/557311 adopted by the General Assembly as well as the consensus of Member States, the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council 310  2 6 March 2015, → 5.1.11. 311  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1119

reform should be driven by Member States, and the positions of Member States should form the basis of the Negotiations. However, these principles and consensus are not reflected in your framework document and the broad approach. Security Council reform bears on the common interests of all Member States and the long-term interests of the United Nations. Any solution or reform model should enjoy general agreement among Member States. The five clusters of key issues concerning Security Council reform are interrelated. The position of Member States on these key issues embodies intrinsic and logical interconnections between these key issues. Hence such position should not be disintegrated nor should its integrity be compromised. Without the mandate or consent from Member States, the positions of Member States should not be simplified, nor the options for Negotiations be reduced, otherwise the very basis for the Negotiations would be altered. China has taken an active and constructive part in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform. We expect the Chair of this mechanism to earnestly uphold the membership-driven principle and to work in an open, inclusive and transparent manner. The position of China on Security Council reform has been reflected in the Rev.2 Document,312 a compilation of positions of Member States submitted by the former Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform. Based on the above position, China will not populate the framework document you have disseminated. I herewith enclose the Position of China on the Security Council Reform. It is expected that this position be fully respected in its entirety and not disintegrated in any way. […] Position of China on the Security Council Reform China firmly supports necessary and reasonable reform of the Security Council to enhance its authority and efficiency, strengthen its capacity to respond to global threats and challenges, and enable it to better discharge its responsibilities entrusted by the Charter of the United Nations. Security Council reform is multifaceted, covering not only issues such as enlarging the Council’s membership and strengthening representation, but also increasing efficiency and improving working methods. Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, especially that of African countries. The reform should enable more countries, the small and medium sized countries in particular, gain more opportunities to take turns to serve in the Security Council and participate in its decision making process. Member States are still seriously divided on the Security Council reform. No general agreement has been reached on any solution so far. Member states still need to engage in patient consultations to find a solution that accommodates each other’s interests and concerns. New seats of the Security Council should be reasonably distributed. The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different civilizations and cultures taken into consideration. China has all along held a positive attitude towards improvement of the working methods of the Security Council. It is 312  China’s position did not change between the discussions on the original negotiating text in 2010 and those of the second revised negotiation text (“Rev.2”), cf. subsection 5.1.7.

1120

5 On a road to nowhere ?

necessary for the Council to continue to take stock of its experience and best practices, increase transparency in its work, and heed to and respect the views of Member States. China supports the strengthening of coordination and cooperation between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations has clearly defined the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These two principal organs should discharge their respective responsibilities mandated by the Charter of the United Nations and complement each other. Security Council reform bears on the common interests of all Member States and the long-term interests of the United Nations. Any solution or reform model should enjoy general agreement among Member States. The five clusters of key issues concerning Security Council reform are interrelated, and should not be addressed in isolation of each other. It is imperative to stick to the approach of a package solution. The “piecemeal” or “step-by-step” approach is not conducive to accommodating the interests and concerns of Member States. Security Council reform should not be carried out at the expense of the unity of Member States. All member States should remain committed to the intergovernmental negotiations process, adopt a flexible and pragmatic attitude, gradually build mutual trust and meet each other halfway. No solution on which Member States are seriously divided or approach that may cause division among Member States will have China’s support. 5.2.3.10 14 April 2015, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 31 July 2015 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Sam Kutesa, pp. 107-110 […] Pursuant to your request made at the informal meeting on the Security Council reform on March 26, 2015,313 I have the honour to provide herewith Russia’s position on key aspects of this issue, which we believe are inextricably interlinked and cannot be considered separately. The reform of the UN Security Council is one of the most important issues on the agenda of this world organization. In the situation when positions of the main groups of states – those who support the idea of the UN Security Council’s expansion in both categories and those who do not – remain polar, one can advance in the negotiating process only by searching for a compromise. In these circumstances we are prepared to consider any reasonable option of expanding the Security Council including the socalled “intermediate solution”, which is actually a compromise solution, provided that this option enjoys the widest possible consent at the UN. Russia supports broader representation of the developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America on the reformed Security Council. It is important to maintain compact composition of the Security Council in order for it to provide an adequate and prompt reaction to new challenges. The number of members in an enlarged Security Council should not exceed a reasonable level of low twenties. Improvement of the working methods of the Security Council should be done in a transparent way through existing mechanisms, including the Informal Working Group 313  26 March 2015, → 5.1.11.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1121

on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, with a due consideration of constructive ideas of Member States. However, the leading role in this process should belong to the Security Council itself as the only legitimate master of its own procedures and working methods. The prerogatives of the current Permanent Members of the Security Council, including the use of veto, should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform. The intergovernmental negotiations on the UN Security Council reform should proceed in a calm, transparent and inclusive atmosphere free from artificial deadlines. If a consensus on this issue is not possible to achieve, then in any case it will be politically necessary to secure the support by the overwhelming majority of the Member States – a substantially greater number than the legally required two thirds of votes at the General Assembly. […] 5.2.3.11  30 October 2015, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 10-11314 […] First, Thailand belongs to no specific group and has always been open to all ideas and proposals on the expansion of membership of the Security Council, including the expansion of both categories or the introduction of interim or intermediate options. However, settling only the issue of expansion of membership is far from adequate if the overall reform process is to be successful. Any expansion must take into account a greater and more equitable regional representation. Most importantly, it must prove to be useful in enhancing the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness. […] 5.2.3.12 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 11-12 […] Russia recognizes the need to make the Security Council more representative. However, efforts in this area should not have an impact on the Council’s ability to react swiftly and effectively to contemporary challenges. In this context, we are in favour of retaining the compact character of the Council’s composition. The optimal number of members of the Security Council should not exceed 20. That would guarantee for non-permanent members an opportunity to preside over the Council. It would be naïve to claim that the reformed and expanded Council would easily find solutions to the problems that the present Council has failed to address. Political contradictions would not simply disappear, while the work on the texts of decisions would only be further complicated. […] We are convinced that Security Council reform cannot be concluded arithmetically by calculating different models of votes in order to seek the minimal number of votes. A result achieved that way would undoubtedly undermine the authority of the Council and would not strengthen the United Nations. Rather, it would do the opposite. We are therefore prepared to consider any sensible option for expanding the Council, 314  → 5.4.4.27 for Thailand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1122

5 On a road to nowhere ?

including interim provisions and compromise solutions, if it were to enjoy the broadest possible support within the United Nations. […] […] This work should take place in a calm, transparent and inclusive environment without arbitrarily imposed deadlines or frenzied speculation. The matter of reforming any institution, let alone the most important, should not complicate the real work of our Organization, finding responses to the numerous challenges facing humanity today. […] 5.2.3.13 7 November 2016, China, Mr. Liu Jieyi, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 10-11 […] Reforming the Security Council is systematic engineering work involving both the immediate interests of Member States and the long-term development of the United Nations. China is and has consistently been a supporter of an appropriate and necessary reform of the Security Council, advocating that priority be given to the increased representation in the Council of developing countries, particularly African countries, with a view to enabling more of them, especially the small and medium-sized countries that constitute the majority of the United Nations membership, to participate in the work and decision-making of the Council and to play a greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security. […] China hopes that Member States will continue to work constructively in the intergovernmental negotiations and, on the basis of extensive and democratic consultations, will arrive at the broadest possible consensus on the five groups of issues as one package. No artificial deadlines should be set on reform, nor should any immature proposals be imposed. China is ready to work together with all sides to ensure that reform of the Security Council will move in a direction that is in both the common interest of Member States and the long-term interests of the United Nations. 5.2.3.14 7 November 2016, Syria, Mr. Awad, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 23-24 […] My delegation is of the view that the issues of categories of membership and regional representation require further discussion, because, after what we have witnessed, there is the potential to deepen the existing divides in the Security Council in its current structure. Certain countries that have become members of the Council are not politically independent, but rather are pressured by other countries. Those countries are set on satisfying the influential countries, whose agendas they serve at the expense of international legitimacy. The positions advanced by those countries in the Security Council are merely a reiteration of the positions of the super-Powers in that organ. This has impeded the Council from playing its important role in the maintenance of international peace and security. We would like to see an enlargement of the Council, but we must be wary about which countries are to be chosen. When it comes to the election of States to the Security Council, the criteria of neutrality and objectivity must be observed. The Council, in its current structure since its reform in 1965, has not been able to maintain international peace and security. It has become an organ that establishes peacekeeping operations and deploys them to one or another location. The evidence to support this

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1123

thesis lies in the fact that conflicts have doubled in number since the end of the Cold War. That is a true reflection of the Council’s failure to maintain international peace and security, and of its neglect of many acts of aggression, especially the invasions of Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza, as well as the current events in Yemen, where the Council has failed to implement its own resolutions regarding anti-terrorism. […] 5.2.3.15  7 November 2017, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 7-8 […] In conclusion, CARICOM remains committed to the goal of reform of the Security Council as soon as possible. As a group of small island and low-lying coastal developing States, CARICOM believes that small island developing States have a critical stake in the maintenance of international peace and security, and are therefore well positioned to contribute to the work of the Council. We stand ready to work with all Member States for speedy reform of the Council. 5.2.3.16 7 November 2017, China, Mr. Wu Haitao, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 10-11 […] China has always been an active supporter of the rational and necessary reform of the Council and advocates that, as a priority, greater representation and voice in the Council should be given to developing countries, especially the African States. A wider membership, including in particular small and medium-sized countries, which make up the majority of Member States, would enable greater access to the Council, allowing such countries to be involved in its decision-making and play a bigger part in safeguarding international peace and security. The intergovernmental negotiations process is an important avenue through which Member States can exchange views on issues concerning Council reform, deepen their understanding and narrow their differences. The comments, positions and proposals of the broad membership on Council reform form the basis of the intergovernmental negotiations. China supports the co-Chairs in their efforts to perform their functions and fulfil their duties pursuant to decision 62/557,315 adhering to the principle of a Member States-led process and the package approach and encouraging Member States to engage in democratic consultations on the five clusters of key issues in order to achieve the broadest consensus. It is our hope that Member States and the co-Chairs will work hand in hand to contribute constructively to the intergovernmental negotiation process without artificially setting deadlines for the reform, trying to rush immature reform proposals through or launching text-based negotiations before the right conditions are at hand. We should work together to maintain unity among Member States. Together with all parties, China stands ready to advance Security Council reform in a way that serves both the common interest of all Member States and the long-term interests of the United Nations.

315  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29.

1124

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.2.3.17 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 28-29316 […] Our stance on the matter is well known. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, notes the need to make the body more representative, first and foremost by including developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, efforts in that direction must not be allowed to affect the ability of the Council to respond effectively and promptly to emerging challenges. […] The process of reforming the Security Council must be owned by all States without exception, and its ultimate composition should enjoy the widest possible support of Members of the Organization. If consensus cannot be reached on this issue, at least politically speaking, we should ensure the support of a significant number of Member States, more than the legally required two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. We are convinced that the issue of reform of the Security Council cannot be resolved solely by arithmetic by putting any models to the vote in order to obtain the minimum number of votes necessary. A result achieved in that way would hardly enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the Security Council, and would certainly not serve to strengthen the global Organization; rather, it would achieve the contrary. We are ready to consider any reasonable option for expanding the membership of the Security Council, including an interim solution or one of compromise, if it were based on broad consensus within the United Nations. […] 5.2.3.18 1 February 2018, China, Mr. Zhaoxu, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] The intergovernmental negotiations constitute an important platform to advance Security Council reform. Member states attach great importance to the negotiation process and have actively participated in it during which they have engaged in candid exchange of views, acquired a better understanding of each other’s positions and concerns, and maintained the momentum of the reform. The intergovernmental negotiation process has had its twists and turns, but also produced constructive practices. Relevant experience and lessons merit reflection by member states. Practice has shown that respecting the ownership of member states is a fundamental prerequisite to the smooth progress of the intergovernmental negotiations. All the views, ideas and proposals of member states on Security Council reform are parts of the important basis of the negotiations and must be fully respected. In the absence of consensus among member states, attempts to streamline positions of the parties or cut down reform options go against the principle of member states’ ownership and will further complicate the reform process. Artificial reform deadlines, imposition of immature reform proposals or launching text-based negotiations when conditions are not yet ripe will undermine the credibility of the intergovernmental negotiations and do a disservice to the unity among the member states and the healthy development of the negotiations. In the seventy-plus years since its birth, the UN has witnessed its membership grow from 51 to 193. Most of the member states are developing countries and African states 316  → 5.3.26 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.1.8 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1125

account for more than one fourth of the total UN membership. The rise of the developing countries as a group and the ascending power and influence of African states are prominent features of the international relations in the world we live now. The reform of the Security Council should reflect this reality by giving priority to the increase of the representation and voice of developing countries, particularly African countries, supporting African countries’ efforts to rectify historical injustices, fully reflecting the will of regional countries in the decision making of the Security Council and enabling more small-and-medium-sized countries to play a bigger role in maintaining international peace and security. China has always supported rational and necessary reform of the Security Council with the purpose of enhancing the Council’s authority and efficiency and enabling it to better fulfil the duty bestowed on it by the UN Charter and better respond to various new challenges and threats. China hopes that at this session of the intergovernmental negotiations, member states will have extensive, in-depth and democratic consultations on the five clusters in an open, transparent and inclusive manner, and further mutual understanding and trust so as to create conditions for reaching a package solution and the broadest possible consensus. China stands ready to work with all parties to push Security Council reform in a direction that would serve the common interest of the whole membership and the long-term interest of the United Nations. […] 5.2.3.19 20 November 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 5-7 […] Every session that concludes without achieving any of the goals envisaged in the reform process is a stark reminder that the imbalances that exist in the Council will continue to be perpetuated through the maintenance of the status quo. Those imbalances include the exclusion of entire regions – specifically Africa and my own region of Latin America and the Caribbean – from the permanent category of membership. The perpetuation of those imbalances has effectively meant that nearly 50 per cent of the current membership of the United Nations remains excluded from permanent membership of one of its principal organs. […] The perpetuation of the status quo has also meant that the work of the Security Council continues to miss out on the benefit of important perspectives and experience. As you are aware, Madam, CARICOM advocates for a guaranteed presence of small island developing States on the Council. We believe that, given its unique experiences, that group of Member States has important contributions to make to the maintenance of international peace and security. With the continued lack of progress on reform, however, CARICOM’s advocacy has not yet achieved the desired end. […] 5.2.3.20 20 November 2018, China, Mr. Ma Zhaoxu, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 23-24 […] Security Council reform involves the vital interests of all Member States and the long-term development of the United Nations. It bears on the future of the global collective security system and is an important part of the reform of the global governance system. China has always supported a reasonable and necessary reform of the Council.

1126

5 On a road to nowhere ?

It is our consistent view that priority should be given to increasing the representation and voice of developing countries, especially African countries. Reform should enable more Member States, particularly small and medium-sized countries, which account for the majority of the United Nations membership, to be more involved in the decision-making process of the Council and to play a greater role. The only viable way to achieve reform is to pursue decision 62/557317 and the consensus of Member States, while seeking the most widely acceptable package that offers a solution to the five clusters of issues through extensive and democratic consultations within the membership-driven intergovernmental negotiations process. Rather than further the process of reform attempts to set an artificial timeline aimed at rushing through insufficiently developed reform proposals or to arbitrarily launch text-based negotiations when the conditions are not ripe would only undermine unity, while failing to substantially address the underrepresentation of developing countries in the Security Council. The intergovernmental negotiations process is an important platform for Member States to exchange views and reach greater mutual understanding on Security Council reform. It is a credible, transparent and inclusive communication channel. At a time when serious divergences remain on the issue of reform, Member States should continue a frank, thorough and in-depth exchange of views in order to better understand each other’s positions. China expects the intergovernmental negotiations to remain a Member State-driven process aimed at seeking the broadest possible consensus that meets the common interests of all. China will work with all the other parties and continue to play a positive and constructive role towards that end. […] 5.2.3.21 20 November 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Boguslavskiy, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.37, pp. 4-5318 […] Our position is well known. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has noted the importance of making it more representative, especially for developing States in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, the efforts to achieve that should not affect the Council’s ability to respond effectively and efficiently to emerging challenges. In that regard, we are in favour of preserving the compact nature of Security Council membership. Its optimal membership should not exceed the low twenties. […] 5.2.3.22  27 February 2019, Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Polyanskiy, Inter­ governmental Negotiations319 […] It is an established fact, that Russia supports the increase of representation of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the Security Council. These are parts of the globe where the majority of the Earth’s population lives, and 317  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 318  → 5.4.1.10 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 319  → 5.4.1.11 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1127

the Security Council should reflect this. Specifically, I would like to emphasize that we have to right the historical wrong regarding the African continent, the representation of which in the Council reflects neither the modern role of the continent in the global affairs, nor the total number of African states. This is a particularly urgent issue, given that the majority of items on the Council’s agenda have to do with Africa. Everyone who keeps track of the UN SC activities can clearly see that the mechanism is misbalanced in favor of Western countries. In particular, one third of the Council’s members accounts for the European Union, which is basically a relatively small group of countries. It is not even about the population of the European Union, which is only one third of Africa’s population in size (by 2030 this gap is expected to grow). It is about similar positions of the members of this union and their similar tasks to implement joint policy and speak in “one voice”. Here comes a reasonable question: What would the increase in the representation of the EU and the countries of the “historical West” add to the Council? I doubt that it would add diversity that everyone advocates. Therefore, our principal position is to level up the “profile” of developing countries in the Council, because they support the approaches that reflect interests and aspirations of the largest part of the Earth’s population. However, we reiterate that in any event the Council should remain compact. Otherwise, the efficiency and promptness would be impaired. In this regard, we have taken notice of several reform models, some of them have been repeatedly proposed today, that do not correspond to these logical criteria. We are convinced, that the reasonable “membership ceiling” for the Council is low twenties. As for the membership categories, this topic is the most contentious issue on the reform agenda. So far, none of the proposed formulae received the support of the majority of UN Member States. Quite reputable and influential countries took opposing sides. Our firm opinion is as follows: even if we fail to reach a consensus (though it would be preferable), it would be politically reasonable to ensure support of more Member States than the formal two thirds of votes that is usually required. The modalities of expanding permanent membership in the Council are still obscure, that is why we urge you to have a closer look at the “interim model” with an extended presence at the Security Council lasting for more than 2 years. If this idea was implemented, it would satisfy the ambitions of powerful and reputable countries who wish to stay in the Security Council for more than two years. It would also be a compromise in a situation where the positions of the two major groups of countries regarding all membership categories stand in direct contrast: one group would accept extending the Council, the other would not. […]

5.3 Statements by member states regarding the size of a reformed Security Council 5.3.1 7 April 2009, Turkey, Mr. Çorman, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] There is no simple answer to the question of the optimum size of the enlarged Council. In our opinion, a Council consisting of a total of 25 to 27 members, carefully enlarged with additional elected members, could prove to be more democratic, more accountable and more equitably representative. We do not subscribe to the view that an enlarged Council will automatically be less efficient and will not be able to

1128

5 On a road to nowhere ?

act as swiftly. On the contrary, the enhanced accountability, democracy and representation in the Council may well render this body even more efficient and effective. Our delegation remains flexible on this issue and stands ready to favourably consider new proposals. We also see merit in establishing a mandatory review mechanism for the enlarged Council. In this way, the membership could revisit the issue of size in the light of our experiences with the enlarged Council after, for instance, a 10 to 15 year period. […] 5.3.2 12 June 2009, Switzerland, Ms. Grau, Intergovernmental Negotiations320 […] With regard to size, we think that the Security Council should remain reasonably small in order to maintain its effectiveness and efficiency. This means, we would opt for an additional six seats, but could also accept seven, leading us to 21 to 22 seats. […] 5.3.3 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, p. 5-9321 […] Egypt is convinced that the effectiveness of the Council is not linked to the size of the enlarged Council. An enlarged Security Council that includes members that enjoy the confidence and trust of the larger membership of the Organization will definitely constitute the success of our intergovernmental negotiations, and we believe that a Council with at least 26 seats will achieve that goal. […] 5.3.4 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18322 […] Based on its position with regard to categories and regional representation, my delegation would prefer an enlarged Council to comprise 24 or 25 members, with 6 new permanent members and 4 or 5 additional non-permanent members. […] 5.3.5 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-99323 PROPOSALS OF CUBA ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL […] SIZE OF AN ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL Cuba favours a broad increase in the membership of the Security Council, with not less than 26 members. This increase should include both categories of members, and developing countries should have the bulk of this number. 320  → 5.2.2.2.6 for Switzerland’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 321  → 5.2.2.3.5 for Egypt’s support of regional seats, and 5.4.3.3 for Egypt’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 322  → 5.2.1.1.4 for Mongolia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.4.5 for Mongolia’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 323  → 5.2.1.1.6 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.3.7 for Cuba’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1129

The objective should not be to increase the membership for the sake of it, but rather address the unjustifiable under-representation of developing countries in the Council. […] 5.3.6 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111324 POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

[…] SIZE OF AN ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL Russia believes it important to maintain compact composition of the Security Council to provide its adequate and fast reaction to new challenges. For this reason we advocate the idea that the number of members in an enlarged Security Council should not exceed a reasonable level of low twenties. […] 5.3.7 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-114325 Position of Peru on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council I. Categories and Size […] […] Therefore, Peru believes it is appropriate to develop a constructive evolution proposal, which could be achieved by increasing the number of Security Council members to a “mid-twenties” level, thereby developing a fair and equitable geographic distribution so as to project a strengthened image of legitimacy for the Council. This increase in the number of members in any way should not affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council’s work; but rather should strengthen it. […] 5.3.8 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-168326 Proposal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for the Reform of the Security Council […] In relation to the number of members of the Security Council, we propose its extension to 25 members under conditions of equality to give greater participation to the different geographical regions. […]

324  → 5.2.2.2.15 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.1.1 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 325  → 5.2.1.1.9 for Peru’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.3.8 for Peru’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 326  → 5.2.2.2.16 for Bolivia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.3.9 for Bolivia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1130

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.3.9 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 142327 Proposals of the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM […] 3. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela favors the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council, to bring the size of the Council to approximately 26 members. […] 5.3.10 4 March 2010, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 149-150328 Position Paper of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the UN Security Council Reform […] Specific Proposals The composition of the Security Council should be expanded on the basis of a principle of ensuring full representation of the Non-Aligned and developing countries. To achieve this purpose, a total number of the enlarged council members should be no less than 26. […] 5.3.11 4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-178329 Position of Denmark on Reform of the United Nations Security Council […] Size of an Enlarged Council When it comes to the size of an enlarged Council, Denmark finds it important to [find] a proper balance between legitimacy and efficiency. Enlargement should create a more representative Council without decreasing the Council’s ability to deliberate and act. Denmark does not want to a priori define an exact number, but believes that a reformed Council with a number of members somewhere in the mid-twenties would be suitable. […]

327  → 5.2.1.1.10 for Venezuela’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.3.10 for Venezuela’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 328  → 5.2.1.3.4 for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 329  → 5.2.1.1.11 for Denmark’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.4.6 for Denmark’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1131

5.3.12 5 March 2010, Monaco, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 134330 Unofficial translation of the memorandum on the Security Council Reform […] Size The expansion of the Security Council must enable it to become more representative and more efficient while preserving its capacity to react rapidly and in an effective manner. Monaco supports a Council expanded into the twenties at most. […] 5.3.13 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 145-146331 Positions of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform […] Size of an enlarged council and working methods 8. To strengthen the legitimacy of the Council, we must ensure that it will be both more effective and more representative. Simply enlarging the Council without making it more efficient will undermine the legitimacy of the Council. While in serious need of reform, we must not forget that the UN Security Council is one of the main features distinguishing the United Nations from the defunct League of Nations. The League did not primarily fail because of lacking representation and legitimacy, but because of lack of efficiency, authority and capability to protect peace and stability. The purpose of the UN Security Council is to maintain or restore international peace and security. We must be cautions of an increase in membership that might reduce its ability to carry out this supreme responsibility. 9. Norway supports a balanced enlargement with a total number of members in the mid-twenties. The under-representation of African and Latin-American and Caribbean countries must be redressed. An enlargement should also take into account smaller states, which make up the majority of the membership of the United Nations. […] 5.3.14 9 November 2011, San Marino, Mr. Bodini, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 5-6332 […] I believe that the enlargement of the Council from 15 to 25 members is not only necessary, but also achievable. […]

330   Unofficial translation from the French. → 5.2.2.2.17 for Monaco’s support of nonpermanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 331  → 5.2.1.1.12 for Norway’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.4.7 for Norway’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 332  → 5.2.2.2.19 for San Marino’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

1132

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.3.15 9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 22-23333 […] Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is in favour of making that body more representative. However, efforts in that direction should not negatively affect the Council’s ability to rapidly respond to emerging challenges. That is even more important in conflict situations. We are therefore in favour of retaining a compact Security Council membership; we believe that, optimally, it should not have more than 20 members. […] 5.3.16 15 November 2012, Jamaica on behalf of the L.69 Group, Mr. Wolfe, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38, pp. 6-7334 […] I have the honour to speak on behalf of the group of countries that sponsored draft resolution A/61/L.69/Rev.1 six years ago. The L.69 group brings together a diverse group of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific that are united by a common cause, that is, to achieve lasting and comprehensive reform of the Security Council. […] Fourthly, the number of the Council’s members should be expanded to the midtwenties, […]. 5.3.17 7 November 2013, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 18-19 […] Russia has championed making the Security Council a more representative body. However, such efforts should not affect the Council’s ability to respond to emerging crises and challenges rapidly and effectively, all the more pressing today as we witness a growing number of conflicts throughout the world. We are in favour of keeping the Council as it is, namely, compact. Its optimal number should not exceed 20 members. […] 5.3.18 30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, Mr. Cardi, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 5-6335 […] We support an enlargement of the Council up to 26 members, […].

333  → 5.2.3.6 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 5.4.1.3 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 334  The L.69 Group confirmed this position in a letter to the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations of 9 January 2013. → 5.2.1.1.17 for the L.69 group’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 335  → 5.2.2.2.26 for UfC’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1133

5.3.19 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 11-12336 […] Russia recognizes the need to make the Security Council more representative. However, efforts in this area should not have an impact on the Council’s ability to react swiftly and effectively to contemporary challenges. In this context, we are in favour of retaining the compact character of the Council’s composition. The optimal number of members of the Security Council should not exceed 20. That would guarantee for non-permanent members an opportunity to preside over the Council. […] 5.3.20 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 1-2337 […] We are in favour of a substantial increase in the membership of the Security Council, to approximately 25 or 26 States. […] 5.3.21 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 9-10338 […] Our own position is well known. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, emphasizes the need to make that organ more representative through the inclusion of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, efforts to this end should not affect the ability of the Security Council to effectively and promptly respond to emerging challenges. Accordingly, we stand for preserving the compact composition of the Security Council. Its optimum size should not exceed the low twenties. […] 5.3.22 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 1-2339 […] In line with the view expressed by a number of Member States, Thailand reaffirms its view that the size of a reformed Council should be in the mid-twenties. […]

336  → 5.2.3.12 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, and 5.4.1.5 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 337  Cuba confirmed this position on 7 November 2016 in UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 21-22. → 5.2.1.1.29 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.2.9 for Cuba’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 338  → 5.2.2.2.30 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.1.6 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 339  → for 5.2.2.2.34 Thailand’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.4.4.41 for Thailand’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1134

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.3.23 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17340 […] The Philippines supports the proposal to increase the number of Council members to up to 27. We believe that a broader membership would better reflect twenty-first century geopolitical realities and contribute to the pursuit of the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security. […] 5.3.24 7 November 2017, Slovakia, Mr. Mlynár, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 27-28341 […] Slovakia supports the expansion of membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and calls for an increase to no more than 25, representing geographical balance. […] 5.3.25 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 8-9342 […] Cuba advocates that the Council should be expanded to at least 26 members. With that figure alone, the ratio between members of the Security Council and the Member States of the United Nations would be closer to the ratio that it had when the Organization was founded. Cuba will not support any partial or selective expansion, nor any increase in the composition of the members of the Council to the detriment of developing countries. […] 5.3.26 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 28-29343 […] However, efforts in that direction must not be allowed to affect the ability of the Council to respond effectively and promptly to emerging challenges. In that context, we are in favour of maintaining the compact nature of the composition of the Security Council – its membership should not exceed the low twenties. […] 5.3.27  27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations344 […] 9. […] In line with this expectation, CARICOM is broadly supportive of a Council numbering in the mid to upper twenties. […] 340  → 5.2.1.1.39 for the Philippines’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 5.4.2.13 for the Philippines’ position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and 5.4.4.50 for the Philippines’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 341  → 5.2.1.3.19 for Slovakia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 342  → 5.2.1.1.41 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.2.15 for Cuba’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 343  → 5.2.3.17 for the Russian Federation’s position on the representation of developing regions and the reform process, and 5.4.1.8 for the Russian Federation’s position in favour of retaining the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 344  → 5.2.1.3.24 for CARICOM’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 5.4.4.64 for CARICOM’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1135

5.4 Statements by member states regarding the right of veto 5.4.1 Statements in favour of retaining the right of veto 5.4.1.1 2 March 2010, Russian Federation, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 109-111345 POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

[…] QUESTION OF THE VETO Russia believes that in the course of the negotiations we should talk not about prohibiting or restricting the use of the veto right by the existing Permanent Members of the Security Council – their prerogatives should remain intact under any variant of the Council reform – but rather about extending this right to the possible new Permanent Members of Security Council, if and when the UN Member States agree on the Security Council expansion in both categories. Therefore, a detailed discussion of the veto can begin at a later stage of negotiations, after a new composition of the Security Council is defined. Any changes of the status quo concerning the prerogatives of the present Permanent Members of the Security Council including the veto right can turn into an insurmountable obstacle on the way of putting future UN Charter amendments through the national ratification procedures, including in the P5 countries. 5.4.1.2 5 March 2010, United States of America, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, p. 180346 U.S. Position […] The question of the veto: We are not open to a Charter amendment that alters the current veto structure. In view of the Charter requirements, it is unlikely that a Charter amendment extending the veto to new permanent members could be adopted. […] 5.4.1.3 9 November 2011, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/66/PV.52, pp. 22-23347 […] But we cannot accept some of the issues brought up today – regarding the veto power, for example. We also need to remember that the veto is an important 345  → 5.2.2.2.15 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.3.6 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 346  → 5.2.2.1.3 for the United States of America’s support of new permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 347  → 5.2.3.6 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process, and 5.3.15 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

1136

5 On a road to nowhere ?

factor that impels both the permanent and non-permanent members to seek balanced decisions. […] 5.4.1.4 2 September 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, Press Conference on the Security Council’s programme of work348 […] These are two somewhat different issues. On the Security Council Reform – that’s kind of a negotiation which has been there for a long time – we want a historic compromise to be reached between the two main camps: those who want to have new permanent members and those who don’t want to have new permanent members, who advocate a reform with a new category of sort of intermediate option of countries which would be elected for a longer period of time than the current two years for nonpermanent members. At this point, I do not see that historic compromise anywhere near. On limiting the veto, it is a separate initiative – actually, there are two initiatives, the one which is sort of more well-known is a French initiative349 – we are against it. We think that this is not a workable proposition; this is not a workable scheme. You will recall that they suggest that under situations of sort of violations – mass atrocities as they call them – war crimes etc. etc. there should be voluntary commitment by permanent members of the Security Council not to use veto. And there are two main problems, maybe more, with that. First of all, according to their initiative, it would be determined by like 50 members of United Nations or the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the High-Commissioner for Human Rights that in fact there are grave violations or war crimes happening. And of course this is a political world, so 50 members of the United Nations is not difficult to put together to deprive a member of the Security Council essentially of their right to veto. And incidentally, the number is not so important, one can say like 150 members but that would mean that the General Assembly is infringing on the prerogatives of the Security Council, the permanent members of the Security Council. Now, another thing which is extremely important to realize: the problem is not only the situation which you are dealing with but what kind of a proposal you are making to deal with the situation. What is the content of the resolution which is going to be put on the table, and for which a permanent member will not have the right to veto? What if the resolution says that we are going to go ahead and occupy the country and bomb them to the Stone Age for what is happening there? What if mass atrocities are committed by terrorist groups and the government is trying to fight those terrorist groups? So somebody says: ‘Well listen there is mass atrocities and the government is not coping, so let’s go ahead and occupy the country’. You cannot say that every resolution which is proposed in a dire situation of humanitarian need is necessarily a good resolution which is going to resolve the problem and which is not going to be used for some political purposes which have nothing to do with it. So we see it as somewhat of a populist proposal. If France wants to limit its own veto they are welcome but I can tell you that there are some permanent members 348  Transcript by the editor of a video of a press conference held by Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and President of the Security Council for the month of September 2015, on the programme of work of the Security Council in September 2015, . 349  4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1137

of the Security Council – and not just Russia – who understand how important that is as a tool which allows the Security Council to produce balanced decisions and which allows the minority opinion to be reflected in the work of the Security Council. […] And speaking about the veto incidentally: I’m sure some of you are looking at Libya, hoping that in 2011 the veto was used during 1937350 vote. So sometimes absence of veto can produce disaster. Let me also add to be absolutely clear: I do believe that was a good resolution and it was necessary for us to allow the resolution to be adopted at that time. The problem was not with the resolution but with the breach of the resolution. […] 5.4.1.5 30 October 2015, Russian Federation, Mr. Churkin, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 11-12351 […] We are not going to hide the fact that any idea tending to undermine the existing prerogatives of the permanent members, including the right of veto, is unacceptable to us. We recall that this right is an important factor that helps members of the Council to strike balanced decisions. It is also important to understand that the right of veto protects not only the interests of those who enjoy it, but also the interests of the countries of a region that do not have the right of veto but in its absence would be vulnerable to pressure from well-known groups of States. […] 5.4.1.6 7 November 2016, Russian Federation, Mr. Safronkov, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 9-10352 […] Any proposal to curtail the prerogatives of the current permanent members, including the right of the veto, are unacceptable to us. It should be recalled that the institution of the veto is an important factor that encourages Council members to seek balanced solutions. It would be historically and politically incorrect to encroach on that right, and the prerogatives of the current permanent members should therefore not be reviewed. […] 5.4.1.7 7 November 2016, United States of America, Ms. Sison, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 11353 […] We remain opposed to any expansion or alteration of the veto. […]

350  The speaker probably meant Security Council Res. 1973 (2011). 351  → 5.2.3.12 for the Russian Federation’s position on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, and 5.3.19 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 352  → 5.2.2.2.30 for the Russian Federation’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.3.21 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 353  The United States confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 1-2. → 5.2.2.1.9 for the United States support of new permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1138

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.1.8 7 November 2017, Russian Federation, Mr. Filimonov, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 28-29354 Any ideas that would lead to the infringement of the prerogatives of the current permanent members of the Security Council, including the institution of the veto, are unacceptable to us. We must remember that this institution plays a key role in prompting members of the Council to seek balanced solutions. It would be wrong, both from a historical and a political point of view, to encroach on it. […] 5.4.1.9 6 February 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Nebenzia, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 7-8 […] I would also like to mention, since the subject has come up, that the right to the veto does not come under the category of the Council’s working methods. It is rather a cornerstone of the entire architecture of the Security Council, not a privilege but an instrument pledging and guaranteeing the Council’s ability to reach balanced decisions, which are the only decisions that have a high likelihood of being fulfilled as effectively as possible. 5.4.1.10 20 November 2018, Russian Federation, Mr. Boguslavskiy, UN Doc. A/73/ PV.37, pp. 4-5355 […] Our position is well known. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has noted the importance of making it more representative, especially for developing States in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, the efforts to achieve that should not affect the Council’s ability to respond effectively and efficiently to emerging challenges. […] In our view, any ideas that could infringe on the prerogatives of the current permanent members of the Council, including the right of veto, is unacceptable. We have to remember that the power of veto is an important factor driving Council members to make balanced decisions. The use or threat of the use of the veto has often saved the United Nations from becoming involved in questionable enterprises. […] 5.4.1.11  27 February 2019, Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Polyanskiy, Inter­ governmental Negotiations356 […] We draw attention to the fact that some delegations continue their exercise in rhetoric on an advantageous – as they believe – political topic and suggest that the Council’s Permanent Member States should either voluntarily restrict their veto right or abandon it for good. In this regard, I highlight, that for Permanent Members veto right is a great responsibility rather than a prerogative.

354  → 5.2.3.17 for the Russian Federation’s position on the representation of developing regions and the reform process, and 5.3.26 for the Russian Federation’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 355  → 5.2.3.21 for the Russian Federation’s position in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats, presented in the same statement. 356  → 5.2.3.22 for the Russian Federation’s position in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1139

The veto institution has long been the core element of the UN checks and balances system, but not only that. It is also central to the mechanism of collective decisions; it is the element that encourages the Member States to search for compromise. Veto right is the “cornerstone” of the UN architecture. Take it away – and the whole construction would lose its balance. Security Council would turn to a body that churns out decisions, based on questionable or imposed political stance in the global affairs. This stance does not always respect the legitimate interests of all the Member States. Finally, the consent of all the Permanent Members significantly increases chances to address the implementation of new decisions of the Council with due responsibility. […] 5.4.2 Statements in favour of abolishing the right of veto 5.4.2.1  16 March 2009, Caribbean Community, Mr. Wolfe (Jamaica), Intergovernmental Negotiations357 […] Essentially CARICOM’s Position on the Veto is as follows: […] CARICOM adheres to its principled position and long term perspective that the veto is an anachronistic relic of the cold war era which should be abolished. […]

•

5.4.2.2 12 November 2009, Sierra Leone, Mr. Touray, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 9-11 […] One sticky area of concern in the negotiations has been the question of what to do with the veto. Should it be abolished, curtailed or extended? Though there appears to be a preponderance of views in favour of its curtailment and use in some specific instances, there is strong resistance to abolishing it from quarters that now enjoy the privilege exclusively. Again, while there has been resistance to extending the veto, there are those who favour that extension, either immediately or after an agreed period of review. Africa’s position has been that the veto should be abolished as a matter of principle, but if it has to be retained, we favour its extension to all new permanent members as a matter of common justice. We are of the view that more focus should be placed on discussions of the veto in an effort to determine the scope and nature of the type of expansion, in both permanent and non-permanent categories, that would be acceptable to the general membership. […] 5.4.2.3  13 November 2009, Bolivia, Mr. Solón-Romero, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 24-25358 […] Reform of the Security Council goes beyond merely increasing the number of its members and is directly linked to the abolition of the veto, as many Members stated during the three rounds of intergovernmental negotiations. […] 357  → 5.4.3.2 for CARICOM’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 358  → 5.2.1.2.5 for Bolivia’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1140

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The veto is not democratic. It paralyzes the decisions of the Security Council and undermines a fundamental principle on which the United Nations is based: the sovereign equality of all its Members. Therefore, any attempt to supersede that concept through the adoption of norms that are not democratic and that are offensive to the membership and the international community as a whole, threatening the climate of peace among nations, is unacceptable. […] 5.4.2.4 11 November 2010, Non-Aligned Movement, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt), UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8359 […] The Movement believes that the reform of the Security Council should be addressed in a comprehensive, transparent and balanced manner, in order to reflect the needs and interests of both developing and developed countries alike. Reform should also aim at limiting and curtailing the use of the veto with a view to its ultimate elimination. The enlargement of the Security Council, as the body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the reform of its working methods, should lead to a more democratic, more representative, more accountable and more effective Council. […] 5.4.2.5 21 September 2011, Argentina, Ms. Fernández, UN Doc. A/66/PV.11, pp. 24-28360 […] We do not agree on the need to expand the number of permanent members; on the contrary, we believe that the permanent member category should be eliminated. The right to veto also should be eliminated, as it really prevents the Security Council from carrying out the true functions that it had in the bipolar world in which it was originally conceived. At that time, the right to veto was necessary, because in that bipolar world, with the fear of a nuclear holocaust, that right gave to Council members the balance necessary to ensure the security of humankind. Today, that balance is broken. Permanent seats and the right to veto are not about defending security or universal stability; rather, they are often about the position of Council members exercising their right. […] 5.4.2.6 1 October 2012, Ecuador, Mr. Albuja, UN Doc. A/67/PV.20, pp. 24-28 […] In order to be effective and efficient in its work to maintain international peace and stability, the new multilateralism should not uphold the veto power or the existence of an exclusive club, whose members are a small group of countries that decide the system’s future and other measures that affect the remaining countries. The new system would require all countries, as equals, to be equally represented in decisionmaking that affects the international system. It should not allow non-compliance with international standards by some States, but must rather demand strict adherence to

359  → 5.2.3.5 for the Non-Aligned Movement’s position on the representation of the African continent, presented in the same statement. 360  → 5.2.1.2.7 for Argentina’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1141

international law and full respect for international judicial authority as the only way of promoting peaceful coexistence among nations. […] 5.4.2.7 30 October 2015, African Union, Mr. Minah (Sierra Leone), UN Doc. A/70/ PV.43, pp. 2-3361 […] There are several contentious elements on this issue of reform. One concerns the question of the veto. As we have said before and will continue to repeat, Africa’s preferred position is for the abolition of the veto, but if it continues to exist it must be extended to all new permanent members. We call for its abolition but are prepared to work with other delegations to see how there could be a possible limitation on the veto. […] 5.4.2.8 30 October 2015, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Talbot, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 3-4362 […] With regard to the veto, CARICOM continues to call for the elimination of the veto. However, in the event of its retention, we consider that all permanent members of a reformed Security Council should have the same rights and prerogatives. […] 5.4.2.9 30 October 2015, Cuba, Mr. León González, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 1-2363 […] With regard to the veto, Cuba’s views are well known. That antidemocratic and anachronistic privilege should, in our firm belief, be eliminated. […] 5.4.2.10 7 November 2016, Turkey, Mr. Begeç, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 23364 We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group.365 The following are additional remarks in my national capacity. […] Ideally, the veto should be abolished. There is no justifiable explanation as to why certain Council members should have that right and others not. In that respect, we support the initiatives to limit the use of a negative vote in cases of mass atrocities. […] 5.4.2.11 7 November 2016, Ecuador, Mr. Sevilla Borja, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 4-5 […] We are living in a time of searches for consensus, of patient negotiations with a view to reaching shared positions in the Security Council, the only body that can 361  → 5.2.2.3.18 for the African Union’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 362  → 5.2.1.3.8 for CARICOM’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 363  Cuba confirmed this position on 7 November 2016 in UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 21-22. → 5.2.1.1.29 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.20 for Cuba’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 364  → 5.2.1.2.10 for Turkey’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 365  7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29.

1142

5 On a road to nowhere ?

approve the legitimate use of force. Today, in this new stage, we believe that it is possible to find creative and imaginative alternatives to overcome the undemocratic institution of the veto, which is, as I have stated, a remnant of the past. That leads us to the second principle of our vision of change: democratization. Let us recall that the first is modernization. We cannot continue to allow there to be firstclass and second-class States. We cannot improve the overall functioning of the Security Council by giving more States the veto. We must instead employ new working methods, incorporating States from those groups that are inadequately represented and striking a balance in the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. We must aspire to a Security Council that is more democratic in its membership and in its actions by increasing the number of members, making the decision-making process transparent within the limits of the powers conferred on that organ by the Charter, working to eliminate the anachronistic right of the veto and revitalizing the role of the General Assembly as the sole body in the United Nations with universal membership. […] 5.4.2.12  7 November 2016, Panama, Ms. Flores Herrera, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 21-22366 […] With regard to equitable representation, it is imperative that more of the traditionally underrepresented States – especially developing States, African States, island States, States in Latin America and the Caribbean and States in Asia and the Pacific – become active participants in the deliberations and especially in the decisions of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies. With that participatory vision, Panama has proposed a conciliatory, time-based solution to Security Council reform whereby, over a period of from 15 to 30 years, we would transition to a Security Council that by the United Nations hundredth anniversary, in 2045, would be made up of 26 members, all serving on an equal basis and all elected for a term of three years, with the option of consecutive re-election. In brief, Panama shares and supports the approaches of those countries that want to modernize, update and strengthen the Security Council by increasing its membership as an expression of the legitimacy and representativeness of the 193 States and of geographical balance; by increasing participation by States, principally developing countries, in the decision-making process; by getting rid of the veto; and by eliminating special status and exclusive powers within that body, in the interest of the sovereign equality of all its members. […] 5.4.2.13 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17367 […] An equally critical challenge that an enlarged Security Council has to tackle is how to remain effective and efficient. An enlarged Council must be able to act swiftly and 366  Panama confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 21-22. 367  → 5.2.1.1.39 for the Philippines’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 5.3.23 for the Philippines’ position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.4.50 for the Philippines’ position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1143

decisively, with the highest standards of accountability, coherence, transparency and fidelity to the trust accorded to it by the greater United Nations membership. While any expansion could pose challenges to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council, my delegation believes that prioritizing key issues, particularly the reform and improvement of the working methods of the Council, could provide an antidote to any of those concerns. The Philippines also reiterates its view that the veto power has no place in a twentyfirst century Security Council. No Member State should be granted the special privilege to exercise the veto power, as that is in direct contravention of the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States, as enshrined in the Charter. We appreciate that the question of the veto is the most formidable challenge in our work to reform the Security Council. While the abolition of the veto continues to be our aspiration, we should all be prepared to take small steps that will hopefully bring us closer to that goal. […] 5.4.2.14 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19368 […] With respect to the question of the veto, it is our view that the veto should be abolished. […] 5.4.2.15 7 November 2017, Cuba, Ms. Rodríguez Abascal, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 8-9369 […] Cuba declares that the obsolete and undemocratic right of the veto must be abolished. […] 5.4.2.16 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24370 […] I cannot but stress that, for my country, the need for Security Council reform is as high now as ever before. The continued unlawful and aggressive actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, leading to the loss of thousands of lives, have placed into question not only the security of my country but also that of all of Europe. The subsequent inability of the Security Council to react promptly to that aggression because of the use of the right to the veto severely undermines the credibility of the Council and condones the very aggression that the Council was established to rule out. In that regard, we would like to reiterate our firm position on the need to phase out the right to the veto as a major obstacle to the Council’s ability to act effectively in response to challenges to international peace and security. […] 368  → 5.2.1.1.40 for Mongolia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.4.3.13 for Mongolia’s position on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 369  → 5.2.1.1.41 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.25 for Cuba’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 370  → 5.2.1.3.22 for Ukraine’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 5.4.4.55 for Ukraine’s position on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1144

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.2.17 20 November 2018, Cuba, Mrs. Rodríguez Camejo, UN Doc. A/73/PV.36, pp. 25-26 […] The question of the veto is intrinsically linked to the working methods of the Council, particularly the decision-making mechanism. The veto is an anachronistic and undemocratic privilege that must be eliminated. Regarding the membership of the Council, Cuba reiterates that it supports the expansion of that body in the categories of both permanent and non-permanent membership. The main objective of the expansion of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. The main increase in membership should therefore correspond to an increase in the number of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. If the category of permanent membership is not expanded and only the number of non-permanent seats is increased, the existing gap between permanent and non-permanent membership will be further widened, increasing the disproportionate representation of developed and developing countries on the Council. As a consequence, the Council would become even less representative and, thereby, less legitimate and effective. […] 5.4.2.18 20 November 2018, Turkey, Mr. Sinirlioğlu, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 3-4 […] An insistence on increasing the number of permanent members of the Council is the main reason for the lack of progress in the reform process. Yet time and again the discussion on Security Council reform is consumed by efforts to allocate additional permanent seats with the right of veto. Make no mistake about it, permanent membership with the right of veto is the reason we need to reform the Council in the first place. It is the very reason why the Security Council has failed to carry out its mandate and provide timely and adequate responses to crises on many occasions. The Council now serves only the national interests of those who enjoy that privilege. The veto makes the Security Council dysfunctional, unaccountable and undemocratic, which erodes trust in the United Nations and in multilateralism in general. The reform process should look for ways to address the current problems of the Security Council, not exacerbate them. The Council will be more representative and responsive if we increase the number of elected seats and the possibility that all Member States can serve on it. The Security Council will be more accountable if the performance of its members is subject to periodic elections. An improved ratio between the non-permanent and permanent members will improve the decisionmaking process and make the Council more effective. 5.4.3 Statements in favour of formal restrictions of the right of veto 5.4.3.1  14 February 2009, Philippines, Specific Reform Proposals concerning equitable representation on and increase of membership in and on working methods of the Security Council371 […] 371  → 5.2.2.3.1 for the Philippines’ support of regional seats, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1145

III. EXERCISE OF THE VETO POWER Ideally and because of the principle of sovereign equality of all the Member States of the United Nations solemnly enshrined in the preamble and in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, no State should be granted the special privilege to exercise the veto power. But, it would be extremely difficult at this time to abolish outright the veto power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. However, it may now be acceptable to limit the exercise thereof to certain substantive matters, but not to such issues as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, violations of human rights and terrorism. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document372 mentioned the first four of these. Accordingly, paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter may further be amended, by addition (shown in bold italicized capital letters), to read as follows: Article 27 [para. 1] [para. 2] 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmation of vote of nine members including the concerning votes of the permanent members, except IN MATTERS INVOLVING GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ETHNIC CLEANSING AND TERRORISM, WHERE SUCH CONCURRENCE SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED. Provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52 a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. […] V. POWER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO OVERRIDE THE VETO The veto power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council is susceptible to easy abuse or misuse. There have been instances of such abuse on misuse in the past. There can be no question at all that the exercise of the veto power by a Permanent Member renders the Security Council and even the UN helpless and irrelevant. There must be a legal procedure to override the veto. It must be stressed that under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council merely exercises a delegated authority or a part of the sovereignty of each Member State insofar as the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security is concerned. In this regard, the Security Council is an agent of the Member States. As the principal, the Member States through an act in the General Assembly can override or revoke a veto exercised by any Permanent Member of the Security Council. A vote by an absolute majority of the Member States of the General Assembly may be sufficient for the purpose. We may also consider the probable increase of the membership of the Security Council and its equitable regional representation therein, which would thus enhance its representativeness. Thus, it is also logical and acceptable that the Security Council itself should have an internal mechanism to set aside or override a veto cast by a

372  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

1146

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Permanent Member. A vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Security Council may be fixed to override the veto. Accordingly, Article 27 (Voting) of the Charter of the UN may be amended by adding thereto a new paragraph (shown in bold italicized capital letters), denominated as paragraph 4, thus: Article 27 [paras. 1-3] 4. A NEGATIVE VOTE OF A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAST ON DECISIONS COVERED BY THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING PARAGRAPH MAY BE OVERTURNED OR SET ASIDE BY VOTE OF AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF BY A VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ITS MEMBERS. […] 5.4.3.2 16 March 2009, Caribbean Community, Mr. Wolfe (Jamaica), Informal Plenary of the General Assembly on the Question of the Veto […] Essentially CARICOM’s Position on the Veto is as follows: All pertinent proposals and positions advanced by Member States pertaining to the Question of the Veto should be placed on the table for negotiation. There should be a full ventilation of all contending view points on the issue of retention or abolition of the veto. CARICOM adheres to its principled position and long term perspective that the veto is an anachronistic relic of the cold war era which should be abolished. If retained, however, the veto should be granted to all new permanent members with a view to making its power more diffuse. Nevertheless, Member States should be prepared to apply the required political pressure on the P-5 to discourage and forbid the use of the veto in certain specific circumstances, i.e., war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of international law. CARICOM supports the idea of recourse to the relevant mechanism available to the General Assembly, to override the use of the veto, by a qualified majority, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the UNGA. Additionally, we could also contemplate the creation of a mechanism within the Security Council for an override of a veto by a specified majority. […]

• • • • • •

5.4.3.3 12 November 2009, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/64/PV.43, pp. 5-9373 […] Egypt continues to believe that the veto is the cornerstone in the process of the reform of the Council. The African demand for the elimination of the veto in its entirety is closely tied to its demand to grant the same veto rights to the new African permanent members in the Council until its elimination, in full application of the principle of equality between current and new permanent members. The same equality should apply in case the General Assembly decides, within the enlargement process, to restrict the scope of application of the veto in cases that could include crimes against 373  → 5.2.2.3.5 for Egypt’s support of regional seats, and 5.3.3 for Egypt’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1147

humanity, war crimes, genocide, acts of aggression, the cessation of hostilities between belligerent parties and the selection of the Secretary-General. In that case, applying the same principle of equality and common justice, the new permanent members would only be granted the veto with the same restricted scope of usage. […] 5.4.3.4 13 November 2009, Colombia, Ms. Blum, UN Doc. A/64/PV.45, pp. 1-2374 […] My delegation associates itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement by the Permanent Representative of Egypt (see A/64/PV.43).375 […] With regard to the veto, Colombia has opposed that privilege since the creation of the United Nations and has advocated its abolition. We realize that it is a sensitive matter and that discussion of it could delay our deliberations on reform. An in-depth review of the possible alternatives for limiting the arbitrary use of that power, so as to make the decision-making process more democratic, has wide support among Members and could be a starting point. As my delegation has previously expressed, limiting the use of the veto to situations falling under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, creating mechanisms that could reverse or neutralize its application, or tightening the conditions under which it can be used are additional options that deserve serious consideration. 5.4.3.5 8 December 2009, Philippines, Annex I to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 66-68 RESOLUTION ON THE VETO POWER The General Assembly Recalling the solemn reaffirmation in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations of faith in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, Mindful of one of the purposes of the United Nations set forth in article I of the Charter, namely, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, Affirming the principle of sovereign equality of all the Member States enshrined in Article II of the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing that the veto power violates the principles of equal rights of nations large and small, and of sovereign equality, Aware of the dire consequences of the abuse of the exercise of the veto power, and Recalling the various recommendations regarding the veto power presented during the meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of the Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council (A/RES/48/26, 3 Dec. 1993),376 as well as in the informal meetings of the plenary on the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reforms,

374  → 5.2.2.2.10 for Colombia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 375  12 November 2009, → 5.4.3.3. 376  → 3.1.2.

1148

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendments to Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, thus: Article 27 2. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 4. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decision under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. THE CONCURRENCE SHALL NOT, HOWEVER, BE REQUIRED IN MATTERS INVOLVING GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ETHNIC CLEANSING AND TERRORISM, AS WELL AS ON RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 4 (2), 5, 6, 94 (2) AND 97 AND ON A MATTER UNDER ARTICLE 96 (1). THE NEGATIVE VOTE OF A PERMANENT MEMBER IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS VETO POWER MUST BE EXPLAINED. 5. A NEGATIVE VOTE OF A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, CAST ON DECISIONS COVERED BY THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, MAY BE OVERTURNED OR SET ASIDE BY A VOTE OF AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN REGULAR OR EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, OR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF BY A VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ITS MEMBERS. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the first day of September 2011. 5.4.3.6 21 January 2010, Uniting for Consensus group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58377 Security Council reform […] II. Majority required for Security Council decisions and the question of the veto  Majority required for adoption of substantive decisions in an enlarged Security Council, in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: − Present ratio, that is, 3/5 (60 per cent) of the total Security Council membership, or a greater ratio  Options on the question of the veto: − Abolition of the veto − Limitations in respect of the scope of the veto: inter alia, application of the veto only on Chapter VII-related matters […]

• •

377  → 5.2.2.2.11 for the UfC group’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1149

5.4.3.7 18 February 2010, Cuba, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 97-99378 […]

PROPOSALS OF CUBA ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

•

 THE QUESTION OF THE VETO Cuba considers very important to democratise the decision-making process of the Council, including by eliminating the undemocratic arid anachronistic privilege of the veto. Taking into account that it would not be realistic to achieve the elimination of the veto at this point, its use should be at least immediately limited and curtailed. Additional actions regarding the veto should be implemented, inter alia:  Overruling the veto within the Council by an affirmative vote of a certain number of Member States, commensurate with the size of an expanded Council.  Overruling the veto by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure and under progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the Charter. The concept of voluntary “self-restraint” in the use of veto is insufficient and should not be considered as an option. As long as the veto is not eliminated, the new permanent members shall be entitled to exercise it on an equal footing as the current permanent members, without establishing selective or discriminatory criteria. This would be the only way for developing countries to have an actual impact on the Security Council’s dynamics. The entry of new permanent members without the veto would be equivalent to creating a new category of members of the Council, which is not favored by Cuba. […] 5.4.3.8 2 March 2010, Peru, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 113-114379 Position of Peru on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council […] II. Veto Peru’s principled position is to eliminate the use of veto, since this mechanism undermines effectiveness in handling sensitive issues within the Security Council, as well as affecting its legitimacy and contradicting principles that are enshrined in the organization’s Charter, such as the sovereign equality of the Member States. In the same spirit of constructive evolution and in order not to paralyze the negotiation process, Peru believes that, as a first step, a commitment should be made to initial evaluation of limiting the use of veto, beginning with recognition of a rule that

378  → 5.2.1.1.6 for Cuba’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.5 for Cuba’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 379  → 5.2.1.1.9 for Peru’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.7 for Peru’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

1150

5 On a road to nowhere ?

has already been established within the organization’s Charter, as Peru has maintained during earlier rounds. The third paragraph of Article 27 imposes limitations upon permanent members whereby they are unable to vote when they are parties to a dispute pertaining to decisions associated with Chapter Six of the Charter, which concerns to pacific settlement of disputes, and decisions in relation to the third paragraph of Article 52, which also pertains to pacific settlement of disputes. In addition to these opinions, Peru believes that it is also important to reach consensuses whereby precise limits upon use of veto can be established, with elimination of the possibility of applying veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross human rights violations. With respect to this point, it is appropriate to recall the existing consensus among a large majority of Member States that have expressed opinions in this regard. Another aspect linked to the use of the veto, and which aims to strengthen limits upon its use, is to establish new working methods for voting formulas so that the number of votes needed to approve Council resolutions shall be changed. Under the third paragraph of Article 27, nine votes are currently needed, and the five permanent members should be included among those votes. With respect to this requirement, Peru believes that one formula that could be evaluated is that, during the voting and in order for a veto to be effective, there should be a requirement for two permanent members to be making use of the veto simultaneously and, in this way, an interpretation that the use of the veto reflects national interests could be avoided. […] 5.4.3.9 3 March 2010, Bolivia, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 167-170380 Proposal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for the Reform of the Security Council

[…] 2. Suppression of the veto The existence of the veto power for permanent members of the Security Council further exaggerates violations of the principle of equal rights among all States and the exercise of democracy within the United Nations. The veto right constitutes a legal instrument allowing the five permanent members alone to defend and protect themselves from any decision that might affect their interests. This means action by the Security Council is limited to that which pertains to these five permanent members and those countries with which they maintain geopolitical agreements. The existence of the category of permanent members with the right to veto is evidence of the vestiges of colonialism existing within the United Nations. 380  → 5.2.2.2.16 for Bolivia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.3.8 for Bolivia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1151

This fact is even more serious because it affects not only the Security Council, but also any other process of reform to the United Nations, for each one of the 5 Permanent Members has the right to individually veto and block future reforms agreed upon by the other 191 U.N. Member States. In this respect, the Plurinational State of Bolivia proposes the following amendment to paragraph 3 of Article 27: 3. The decisions of the Security Council on all other questions will be adopted by the affirmative vote of nine fifteen (15) members, including the affirmative votes of all the permanent members; but in the decisions made by virtue of Chapter VI and of paragraph 3 of Article 52, the party in a controversy will abstain from voting. The text of the amendment to Article 27 would state the following: 3. The decisions of the Security Council on all other questions will be made by the affirmative vote of fifteen (15) members; but in decisions made by virtue of Chapter VI and of paragraph 3 of Article 52, the party in a controversy will abstain from voting. Regarding the articles relating the reform of the United Nations Charter, it is proposed that all forms of veto be eliminated, and that be a sovereign attribution under equal conditions for all Member States of the United Nations: Article 108: The reforms to the present Charter will enter into force for all Members of the United Nations once they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with respective constitutional procedures by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Article 109: 1. A General Conference could be convened of the Members of the United Nations with the purpose of revising this Charter at the time and place determined by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and for the vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Every Member of the United Nations will have a vote in the Conference. 2. Any modification of the Charter recommended by a vote of two-thirds of the Conference will enter into force upon having been ratified in accordance with respective constitutional procedures by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 3. If such a Conference has not been celebrated previous to the tenth annual meeting of the General Assembly after the Charter enters into force, the proposition of summoning such a Conference will be put onto the agenda of said meeting, and the Conference will be celebrated if the majority of the members of the General Assembly so decide. And seven any members of the Security Council. […]

1152

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.3.10 4 March 2010, Venezuela, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 142-143381 Proposals of the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM […] 3. As a matter of principle, we favor putting an end to the undemocratic privileges derived from the use of veto. However, and while we reach the necessary conditions for the elimination of the veto power, Venezuela supports the extension of it to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent), regulating and limiting its use to specific cases under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, we favor the requirement of two concurrent negative votes to prevent the adoption of a Council decision. […] 5.4.3.11 11 November 2010, Egypt, Mr. Abdelaziz, UN Doc. A/65/PV.48, pp. 5-8 […] In that context and with a view to dealing with the issue of the Security Council reform in a realistic manner, Egypt believes that the negotiations should deal effectively with the veto rights of new and current permanent members together, including the misuse or threat of use of the veto right. That approach would necessitate the serious consideration of restricting the veto right of current and new permanent members to exclude, at a first stage, cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, grave violations to international humanitarian law, cessation of hostilities between belligerent parties and the election of the Secretary-General. That will strengthen the commitment of the permanent members to the international responsibility of the Security Council and of all members of the General Assembly to protect peoples from such heinous crimes, rather than to protect, for political or other considerations, those who commit such crimes. In itself, that would be the maximum manifestation of genuine global governance. […] 5.4.3.12 12 November 2014, Malaysia, Mr. Haniff, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, p. 4382 […] On the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, Malaysia reaffirms our principled position to disagree on its use based on the current structure. The veto should be regulated so as to prohibit it from being used unjustly and against the wishes of the majority. My delegation also joins those who propose restraint in the use of veto powers, especially in cases of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. We believe that if all regions are represented by permanent members, then the new permanent members should also be accorded the right to veto, so as to contribute towards a more balanced and representational decision-making 381  → 5.2.1.1.10 for Venezuela’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.9 for Venezuela’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 382  → 5.2.1.1.24 for Malaysia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1153

process. However, we may need to explore the option that a certain number of vetoes would be required before a resolution is rejected by the Council. […] 5.4.3.13 7 November 2017, Mongolia, Mr. Sukhee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 18-19383 […] With respect to the question of the veto, it is our view that the veto should be abolished. We could also support the restricted use of the veto power in the Security Council, in particular with regard to decisions relating to Chapter VII of the Charter. […] 5.4.3.14 20 November 2018, Ukraine, Mr. Fesko, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 31-32 […] I must stress that in our view, the need for the United Nations membership to reconsider the role of the veto in the work of the Security Council is a major priority. We have all seen too many instances in which permanent members of the Security Council have used the right of veto in direct contravention of their duty to maintain international peace and security. We therefore advocate phasing it out, and we strongly support all initiatives aimed at limiting the veto’s use. At the very least, it should be restricted not only in cases where the Security Council is considering a decision on preventing genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes – as per the French-Mexican initiative384 and the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group385 – but also when a permanent member itself is involved in a conflict or situation being considered by the Security Council and cannot therefore exercise its voting rights impartially owing to a conflict of interest. When a permanent member of the Security Council is a party to a conflict on which the Security Council may be about to adopt a decision, that member’s exercise of the right of veto directly hinders the Council from carrying out its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. We believe that the issue of limiting the ability of a party to a conflict to abuse the right of veto in relevant situations has to be considered during the intergovernmental negotiations and implemented as an integral part of Security Council reform. […] 5.4.3.15 20 November 2018, Malaysia, Mr. Mayong Onon, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 21-22 […] On the question of the veto, Malaysia affirms its call for abolishing its use in its present form. A veto should require a negative vote not from just one permanent member but at least two, supported by three non-permanent members of the Security Council. We support and advocate for the current use of veto to be regulated in situations involving mass-atrocity crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. […]

383  → 5.2.1.1.40 for Mongolia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 384  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 385  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1154

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4 Statements in favour of informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto 5.4.4.1 16 March 2009, France, Mr. Ripert, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] Regarding France’s position, I would like to underline two crucial points: 1. The use of the right of veto by a permanent member of the Security Council is a heavy responsibility, when dealing with issues relating to maintaining international peace and security. We are aware of the Security Council’s particular responsibility in situations pertaining to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or serious and persistent violations of human rights. France has used its veto only 18 times since 1945, and our last use of the veto dates back almost 20 years (December 1989). We used it alone for the last time in 1976. 2. In our view, it is urgent to agree on an intermediate solution. The difficult question of granting the right of veto to other permanent members of the Security Council could and should be resolved at the review conference which we proposed as part of the reform. The question of the right of veto must not block the urgent and necessary reform of the Security Council. 5.4.4.2 17 March 2009, Switzerland, Intergovernmental Negotiations386 […] We are though of the opinion that as part of the WMSC ways should be found to have more transparent and more restricted use of vetoes as they exist today. Two ways seem to us promising to explore: – A permanent member of the SC using its veto should explain the reasons for doing so at the time the relevant draft decision is rejected in the Council. A copy of the explanation should be circulated as a SC document to all MS. A similar practice could also be established for threats of vetoes. – The P5 should agree not to exercise the right of veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and in situations of serious violations of inter­ national humanitarian law. Such provision could also be part of a GA resolution on RTP [the Responsibility to Protect]. […] 5.4.4.3 April 2009, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 37-39 S-5 Elements for Reflection […] Use of the Veto A permanent member casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter should explain the reason for doing so at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document. Permanent members should commit themselves to not casting a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter in the event of genocide,

• •

386  → 5.2.1.2.2 for Switzerland’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1155

crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Permanent members of the Security Council, when casting a negative vote, could state that this is not a non-concurring vote in the sense of article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter.

• […]

5.4.4.4  22 June 2009, Liechtenstein, Mr. Stefan Barriga, Intergovernmental Negotiations […] Allow me a few specific comments on working methods. The non-paper that the S5 distributed a while back387 contains a new measure that would deal with the question of the use of the veto in a constructive way: It would allow any permanent member to cast a negative vote on a proposed Council decision, while stating that such a negative vote should not be understood as a veto, that is, as a non-concurring vote in the sense of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter. This would keep the controversial instrument of the veto squarely in the hands of the P5, while encouraging more serious restraint in its use. Any permanent member could thus express its opposition to a proposed decision through a “No” vote in an explicit and unambiguous manner, while at the same time acknowledging that its opposition is not of such nature as to warrant the blocking of a decision. This could be a useful and not very difficult first step to address the demand for rules governing the use of the veto. […] 5.4.4.5 12 November 2009, Mongolia, Mr. Ochir, UN Doc. A/64/PV.44, pp. 17-18388 […] My delegation shares the view of the majority of Member States that the veto right is anachronistic and needs to be reviewed and limited, with the ultimate objective being its abolition. However, as long as it exists, it must be extended to new permanent members so as not to create a new category of Council membership. We also support the clearly expressed position of aspirants regarding the establishment of a voluntary moratorium on the use of the veto until the proposed review process takes place. […] 5.4.4.6 4 March 2010, Denmark, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 177-178389 Position of Denmark on Reform of the United Nations Security Council […] The Question of Veto Efficiency in an enlarged Council, Denmark believes, must be safeguarded by not extending veto powers to additional members – regardless of category. 387  April 2009, → 5.4.4.3. 388  → 5.2.1.1.4 for Mongolia’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.4 for Mongolia’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 389  → 5.2.1.1.11 for Denmark’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.11 for Denmark’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

1156

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Denmark also holds the view that the use of the veto should be restrained and permanent members should abstain from using it in certain situations – not least R2P situations. […] 5.4.4.7 5 March 2010, Norway, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Mr. Zahir Tanin, pp. 145-147390 Positions of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform […] The question of veto 11. The question of the veto touches upon the sovereign equality of all Member States of the United Nations. While all Member States are sovereign and equal, the permanent Members of Security Council hold special powers, which are denied to non-permanent Members. Norway has consistently encouraged permanent members of the Council to restrict their use of the veto and abstain from using it in certain situations. We have also called for greater accountability by members using their veto powers. We remain open to proposals limiting the scope and application of the veto based on a voluntary commitment by permanent members. In this regard we are encouraged by the decline in recent years in the use of the veto. 12. In order to ensure an efficient Council, we maintain, however, that the right of the veto should not be extended to new members regardless of category. Increasing the number of veto-wielding permanent members would not contribute to the necessary reform of the Security Council. 5.4.4.8 12 November 2010, Republic of Korea, Mr. Park, UN Doc. A/65/PV.50, p. 11 […] Secondly, with regard to the question of the veto, we all know that that peculiar mechanism was put into place in the aftermath of the Second World War to get this institution off and running. In the modern context, if the continued existence of the veto is deemed necessary as a result of the realities of power politics, then at the very least that action must be exercised with utmost restraint, along with timely and adequate explanation of the reasons why it is being invoked. […] 5.4.4.9 14 April 2011, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution391 [General Assembly] Agenda item 115 Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit Improving the working methods of the Security Council The General Assembly, […] 390  → 5.2.1.1.12 for Norway’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.3.13 for Norway’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 391  This text is an amended version of the draft resolutions presented by the S-5 group in 2005 and 2006, → 4.4.4.17 and 4.4.4.18. See also 5.4.4.3.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1157

Stressing the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter and to give their full support to the actions of the Organization aimed at maintaining international peace and security, […] Emphasizing the need for further measures to ensure the accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness of the work of the Security Council, with a view to further enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness, Reaffirming its support for early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of the overall effort to reform the United Nations, as stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,*1 Acknowledging that efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council will help to promote a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, including the increase in its membership, 1. Invites the Security Council to enhance and report on the implementation of the measures contained in its Presidential Note 2010/507; 2. Also invites the Security Council to consider the measures contained in the annex to the present resolution in order to further enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness; 3. Further invites the Security Council to report to the General Assembly, by the end of its sixty-fifth session, on action it has taken pursuant to its consideration of the present resolution. Annex Measures on working methods suggested for consideration by the Security Council […] Use of the Veto The following measures are suggested for consideration by the permanent members of the Security Council: 18. Explaining the reasons when resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so, in particular its consistency with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. A copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document to all Members of the Organisation. 19. Refraining from using a veto to block Council action in situations involving serious allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. 20. Establishing a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring, when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution before the Council that such a negative vote shall not constitute a veto in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter. Original footnote *1 See resolution 60/1. [16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, → 4.1.23.]

1158

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.10 15 May 2012, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Revised Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/66/L.42/Rev.2392 Enhancing the accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council The General Assembly, […] Emphasizing the need for further measures to ensure the accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness of the work of the Security Council, with a view to strengthening its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions, […] Acknowledging that efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council will help to promote a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, including the increase in its membership, Noting that the measures recommended in the present resolution do not require amendments to the Charter of the United Nations and that they are part of an ongoing and dynamic process, […] 2. Also invites the Security Council to consider the measures contained in the annex to the present resolution, in order to further enhance the accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions; […] Annex Recommendations to the Security Council […] Use of the veto The following measures are recommended for consideration by the permanent members of the Security Council: 19. Explaining the reasons for resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so, in particular with regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. A copy of the explanation should be circulated as a separate Security Council document to all members of the Organization. 20. Refraining from using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 5.4.4.11 24 September 2013, France, President François Hollande, UN Doc. A/68/ PV.5, pp. 32-35 […] My message is simple. In any domain, whether international security, nuclear proliferation, development or climate change, the worst threat is inaction, the worst decision is to take no decision, and the worst danger is to not see any. And the United Nations bears the responsibility to act. Each time the Organization appears powerless, 392  This text is an amended version of the draft resolutions presented by the S-5 group in 2005, 2006 and 2011, → 4.4.4.17, 4.4.4.18 and 5.4.4.9. See also 5.4.4.3.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1159

peace is the first victim. That is why I am proposing that the permanent members of the Security Council define a code of conduct such that in cases of mass crimes, they may collectively decide to renounce the right of veto. […] 5.4.4.12 4 October 2013, France, “A Call for Self-Restraint at the U.N.”393 It has taken more than two years and 120,000 deaths in Syria for the United Nations Security Council to finally cease being paralyzed by vetoes and make a decision. France is dedicated to multilateralism and to the organization at its heart, the United Nations; this institution represents the main instrument of global political regulation in favor of peace and security. But a United Nations stalemate that lasts for two years, entailing dramatic human consequences, cannot be accepted by the global conscience. Progress has certainly been made during the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which is currently under way. We have reached an agreement on chemical weapons in Syria and opened the way to a political solution. Discussions on Iran’s nuclear program have recommenced. France has contributed to these advances, specifying conditions for an acceptable resolution in the first case and responding to Iran’s willingness to engage in dialogue in the second. We have also raised the alarm, crucially, with regard to the Central African Republic, mobilized the international community in favor of stability and security in the Sahel, and worked on long-term multilateral issues like climate change and abolition of the death penalty. Yet these positive outcomes cannot hide the fact that, for a long time, the Security Council, constrained by vetoes, was powerless in the face of the Syrian tragedy. Populations were massacred and the worst scenario unfolded as the regime implemented large-scale use of chemical weapons against children, women and other civilians. For all those who expect the United Nations to shoulder its responsibilities in order to protect populations, this situation is reprehensible. France is in favor of a more representative United Nations – in particular, through enlargement of the Security Council – but we are still far from reaching an agreement that would enable such progress. If we do not wish to lose our legitimacy, we must learn from the recent blockages to avoid running into such difficulties in the future. To this end, the French president has submitted an ambitious yet simple proposal to the United Nations General Assembly.394 Our suggestion is that the five permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States – themselves could voluntarily regulate their right to exercise their veto. The Charter would not be amended and the change would be implemented through a mutual commitment from the permanent members. In concrete terms, if the Security Council were required to make a decision with regard to a mass crime, the permanent members would agree to suspend their right to veto. The criteria for implementation would be simple: at the request of at least 50 member states, the United Nations secretary general would be called upon to determine the nature of the crime. Once he had delivered his opinion, the code of conduct would 393  This text was published by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, as an “op-ed contributor” on the opinion pages of The New York Times; see . 394  24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11.

1160

5 On a road to nowhere ?

immediately apply. To be realistically applicable, this code would exclude cases where the vital national interests of a permanent member of the Council were at stake. I am aware that objections of all kinds can be made to this proposal. Let me counter them with a powerful argument: a change such as this, so simple to implement, would allow us to preserve the fundamental credibility of the Security Council, which should be a pillar of peace and stability. It would convey the will of the international community to make the protection of human life a true priority. It would restore the power of discussion and constructive negotiation. It would prevent member states from becoming prisoners of their own principled positions. Is there any other quick, simple and effective way to make progress? I cannot see one. Today we have a window of opportunity. Let us seize it. 5.4.4.13 7 November 2013, United Kingdom, Mr. Grant, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 20-21 […] We note the French proposal on the use of the veto and agree that it is essential that the Security Council act to stop mass atrocities and crimes against humanity.395 For our part, the United Kingdom cannot envisage circumstances where we would use our veto to block action to avert a mass atrocity or to stop crimes against humanity. We will continue to work within the Council to ensure that it meets its responsibilities, as set out in the Charter, and with the wider membership for a reform of the Council that both makes it more representative and enhances its effectiveness. […] 5.4.4.14 7 November 2013, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 28-29396 […] Similarly, France supports efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council, insofar as that involves increasing its transparency and efficiency. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the Assembly of France’s initiative on the voluntary limitation of the exercise of the veto, which has been promoted at the highest level by our President, Mr. François Hollande.397 Our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Laurent Fabius, has also spoken on the subject.398 The limitation of the exercise of the veto would involve the five permanent members of the Security Council voluntarily and collectively suspending their right to exercise the veto when mass atrocities are under consideration. It would thus be a voluntary process – a code of conduct – which would therefore not require a revision of the Charter. It would not in fact be a reform of the Security Council. The criteria for that self-limitation remain to be defined by the permanent members of the Council themselves, who need to consider and agree on practical arrangements for the adoption of such a code of conduct. They must, for example, agree on a definition of mass atrocities. The outcome document of the 2005 World Summit (resolution 60/1)399 and a number of international conventions, including the 395  See, e.g., the statement of 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12. 396  → 5.2.1.1.19 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 397  24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11. 398  4 October 2013, “A Call for Self-Restraint at the U.N.”, → 5.4.4.12. 399  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1161

1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute, can guide us in that respect. They will also need to define the warning mechanism or mechanisms that could trigger such self-limitation. France is considering, for example, the possibility of the Secretary-General playing a central role in that regard, in the spirit of Article 99 of the Charter. France has also proposed that 50 Member States could call upon the Security Council to meet when mass atrocities occur. Those proposals could allow us to start discussions on the subject, in particular with academia. To that end, France is planning to involve all the actors involved in the discussion, including research institutes and non-governmental organizations working on the issue, who could share their thoughts with us in a very useful way. 5.4.4.15 8 November 2013, New Zealand, Mr. McLay, UN Doc. A/68/PV.48, pp. 17-18400 […] Considerations of efficiency and realpolitik do not justify denying elected members an effective voice in Council decision-making. For that reason, we urge permanent members to take a hard look at the way in which they conduct their business. They could do much to assuage concerns about the legitimacy of Council decisions if they were more open and responsive to the views of the wider membership and if they treated elected members of the Council, whose votes are needed for all formal Council decisions, more as partners. In that regard, we particularly welcome the suggestion from the delegation of France that there be a voluntary restriction or code of conduct on the use of the veto (see A/68/PV.46).401 […] 5.4.4.16 12 November 2014, United Kingdom, Sir Lyall Grant, UN Doc. A/69/PV.49, pp. 15-16 […] We note with interest the French initiative for voluntary Permanent Five veto restraint and welcome the valuable debate it has sparked.402 We have been appalled by the cynical way in which the veto has been used since 2011 to enable the perpetuation of mass atrocities and war crimes by the Syrian regime. We cannot envisage circumstances in which the United Kingdom would use its veto to block an appropriate response to a mass atrocity or other major crisis. But to be meaningful, this initiative would, of course, require the united support of all the permanent members of the Council. It is important that arguments on contentious issues such as the veto be heard, but we also need to be careful to ensure that the range of different and opposing views around the veto do not distract us from the important task of broadening the membership of the Council to ensure that it is a better reflection of the modern world. […]

400  → 5.2.2.2.23 for New Zealand’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 401  7 November 2013, → 5.4.4.14. 402  See, e.g., the statement of 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12.

1162

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.17 28 September 2015, Poland, Mr. Duda, UN Doc. A/70/PV.13, pp. 15-18 […] In recent years, the right to veto led on many occasions to a total stalemate of the Council works on the most important security issues. That is why Poland supports the French proposal to adopt a code of conduct for refraining from the use of the veto when members are confronted by the gravest crimes under international law, including the crime of genocide.403 […] 5.4.4.18  28 September 2015, France, President Hollande, UN Doc. A/70/PV.13, pp. 38-41 […] I want to end my speech by saying that the legitimacy of an Organization such as the United Nations rests on its credibility. If the United Nations does not have the capacity to resolve conflicts that have been going on for far too long, if the United Nations cannot resolve tragedies or ease the situation of civilian populations, then our helplessness will condemn us. If we want our Organization – which is celebrating its seventieth anniversary – to have a future worthy of that which the founders imagined, we cannot avoid reform of the United Nations. France calls for the enlargement of the Security Council. France calls for a different representation in the Security Council. France calls for continents to clearly bear responsibility for the world in the framework of the Security Council. France wants the permanent members of the Security Council to no longer resort to the right of veto in cases of mass atrocities. How can we tolerate that the United Nations, even today, remains paralysed when the worst is unfolding? There again, let us lead by example. I pledge here today that France will never use its right of veto in matters involving mass atrocities. The right of veto as it was introduced when the United Nations was founded was not the right to block; it was the right to act. We have to act. We can act. We have been showing that we can for 70 years. Here, today, we can act to settle the tragedies of today and to save the planet tomorrow. Let us act. 5.4.4.19 28 September 2015, Netherlands, King Willem-Alexander, UN Doc. A/70/ PV.13, pp. 44-46 […] Any organization that wants to remain relevant must adapt to new times and circumstances. It is especially important for institutions that stand for shared values and continuity to critically examine their own performance and to ask themselves: “Are our working methods still appropriate?” Without such self-reflection they risk the gradual erosion of their relevance and effectiveness. For the United Nations and the Security Council this has, after 70 years, become an urgent issue. The Security Council needs to be able to act more boldly in the face of large-scale atrocities. Greater restraint in the use of vetoes would help. We warmly welcome France’s initiative in that regard. […] 5.4.4.20 28 September 2015, Chile, Ms. Bachelet Jeria, UN Doc. A/70/PV.14, pp. 3-4 […] Chile has strengthened the role it plays in the multilateral system. In 2014 and 2015 we have served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. In the light of 403  See, e.g., the statement of 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1163

that experience we wish to reaffirm our belief in the need to reform the Council by increasing the number of its permanent members and by reducing the use of the veto, at the very least in cases involving crimes against humanity. Such a reform is necessary, reflecting the considerable change and progress seen in the multilateral system, and it would undoubtedly confer greater legitimacy on that most important organ of the United Nations. […] 5.4.4.21  30 September 2015, France and Mexico, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities404 Open to signature to the members of the United Nations We, the undersigned, Member States of the United Nations, reaffirm that the United Nations were created to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to protect the dignity and worth of the human person as well as the fundamental human rights. We further reaffirm that the Security Council was given the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security by the United Nations Charter. We consider that situations of mass atrocities, when crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale are committed, may constitute a threat to international peace and security and require action by the international community. In that regard, we recall that the Heads of state and government of the United Nations expressed their readiness to “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter” when national authorities fail to protect their populations from genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (World Summit Outcome Document of 2005).405 We therefore consider that the Security Council should not be prevented by the use of veto from taking action with the aim of preventing or bringing an end to situations involving the commission of mass atrocities. We underscore that the veto is not a privilege, but an international responsibility. In that respect, we welcome and support the initiative by France, jointly presented with Mexico, to propose a collective and voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that the permanent members would refrain from using the veto in case of mass atrocities. We express our strong resolve to continue our efforts to prevent and end the commission of mass atrocities.

404  As of 27 March 2017, this statement had 96 supporters, namely the following states: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Comoros, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, and Vanuatu. 405  16 September 2005, → 4.1.23.

1164

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.22 30 September 2015, Costa Rica, Mr. Solís Rivera, UN Doc. A/70/PV.19, pp. 13-17 […] Because human lives are at stake, Costa Rica supports the French proposal to restrict the veto in cases of mass atrocities.406 That proposal dates back to our membership in the Small Five Group and also to efforts spearheaded by Liechtenstein in the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group. The latter Group has made efforts to adopt a code of conduct that would require the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in situations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and to be politically committed to acting promptly and decisively in such situations.407 The opinion of a single permanent member cannot continue to bear more weight than the necessity to save lives. When a permanent member uses, or threatens to use, the veto, in those circumstances, it publicly abandons and disregards the right of victims to justice and peace and undermines international efforts to put an end to impunity. The veto breaches the trust that millions of people have vested in the United Nations as their last hope in such cases as those mentioned. We all agree on the importance of strengthening the rule of law to consolidate the institutions that protect the civilian population to address the root causes of conflicts, to promote accountability and to combat impunity, both nationally and internationally. […] 5.4.4.23 30 September 2015, Norway, Ms. Solberg, UN Doc. A/70/PV.19, pp. 41-43 […] The permanent members of the Security Council have a particular responsibility. Norway urges all States to join the proposed code of conduct to enable the Security Council to act decisively against mass atrocities.408 We support the French initiative to suspend the use of veto in such situations.409 […] 5.4.4.24 20 October 2015, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries, Mr. Skoog, UN Doc. S/PV.7539, pp. 20-22 […] First, limiting the use of the veto would be a key step in enhancing the Council’s ability to respond to global crises. Therefore, we the Nordic countries strongly support the code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes elaborated by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group,410 as well as the Franco-Mexican initiative to restrain the use of the veto.411 We encourage those Member States that have not done so to come forward and support those initiatives. […]

406  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 407  23 October 2015, ACT Code of Conduct, → 5.4.4.25. 408  Ibid. 409  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 410  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 411  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1165

5.4.4.25 23 October 2015, Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, UN Doc. A/70/621-S/2015/978 dated 14 December 2015 Letter dated 14 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (see annex I). The code of conduct was launched on 23 October 2015,412 on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations. It is the hope of the drafters that it will lead to more effective Security Council action to prevent or end genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The code of conduct was elaborated in the framework of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT Group),*1 in consultation with States, civil society and the Secretariat of the United Nations. At its heart, the code of conduct contains a general and positive pledge to support Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – to both prevent or put an end to those crimes. This is complemented by a more specific pledge to not vote against credible draft Security Council resolutions that are aimed at preventing or ending those crimes, which are all well defined in international law. The application of the code of conduct would be triggered by any situation involving those crimes – in other words, when the facts on the ground lead to Security Council action, following an assessment of relevant information by a State committed to the code of conduct. However, the Secretary-General would serve as an important authority to bring such situations to the attention of the Council, and her or his assessment of the situation would carry great weight. As Security Council action in response to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes requires the support of all Council members, the code of conduct is open to receive support from all States. It is currently supported by 107 States; I attach a complete list to the present letter (see annex II). States may still, and are indeed encouraged to, support the code of conduct. I shall be supplementing the present letter periodically with updates of additional supporting States. I request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 122, and of the Security Council. (Signed) Christian Wenaweser Ambassador Permanent Representative

412  In 2013 the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group was launched, expanding upon the work of the “Small Five (S5)” initiative, which aimed to improve the transparency of the Security Council by suggesting that states should explain why the veto has been employed in each situation. Subsequently, the now 25-member ACT group proposed a “Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” in July 2015. On 23 October 2015, the Code of Conduct was officially launched at an event organized by the Foreign Minister of Liechtenstein at UN Headquarters.

1166

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Annex I Code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes We, the Member States of the United Nations listed below, who are currently serving or who may in the future serve as members of the Security Council, Recalling that the members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, Determined to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirming the commitment by the Heads of State and Government of the Members of the United Nations contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document,*a Acknowledging that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes constitute crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, are prohibited under customary international law and can constitute a threat to international peace and security, Welcoming the Human Rights Up Front Action Plan and the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes developed by the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,*b Convinced that, in particular where national or regional mechanisms fail, timely and decisive Security Council action may be necessary to prevent or end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,*c 1. Pledge to support timely and decisive action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; 2. Pledge in particular to not vote against a credible draft resolution before the Security Council on timely and decisive action to end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes; 3. Invite the Secretary-General, making full use of the expertise and earlywarning capacities of the United Nations system, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, to continue to bring to the attention of the Council situations that, in her or his assessment, involve or are likely to lead to genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; 4. Pledge to fully and promptly take into account such an assessment by the Secretary-General; 5. Also invite all other Member States of the United Nations to express their commitment to this Code of Conduct. New York, 23 October 2015 Annex II List of States that support the code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as at 14 December 2015 (107 States)413 […] 413  As of 1 January 2019, the ACT Code of Conduct had been signed by 117 member states and 2 observers, namely: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barduda, Argentina, Australia, Austria,

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1167

Original footnotes *1 The 24 members of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT Group) that support the Code of Conduct are Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. *a General Assembly resolution 60/1, paragraphs 138 and 139, which set out the Responsibility to Protect. [16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, → 4.1.23]. *b See and . *c The term “war crimes” refers in particular to war crimes committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. 5.4.4.26 30 October 2015, France, Mr. Lamek, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 8-9414 […] In the same spirit of reform, France has proposed that the five permanent members of the Security Council voluntarily and collectively suspend the use of their veto in cases of mass atrocities.415 This voluntary step requires no revision of the Charter but a political commitment. France has already made that commitment. The President of the Republic clearly indicated it here in this Hall on 28 September (see A/70/PV.13).416 This is an extremely important decision on behalf of international security, peace and relegitimized and renewed multilateralism. This initiative, which we have put forward together with Mexico, is now supported by some 85 countries. Along the same lines, the code of conduct developed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,417 which France supports, also enjoys very considerable support.418 […] Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Repub­lic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Yemen. 414  → 5.2.1.1.25 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 415  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 416  28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.18. 417  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 418  France confirmed this position on 7 November 2016 in UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 15-16, and on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 2-3.

1168

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.27 30 October 2015, Thailand, Mr. Bamrungphong, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 10-11419 […] Thirdly, we firmly believe that the principle of accountability should guide the work of the Council’s members, permanent and elected alike. The world needs a Council that can act together in a decisive, responsible and timely manner to stop genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Countries on the Security Council, especially the permanent members, have a heavy responsibility to humankind. They must therefore demonstrate greater leadership and political will to take decisive action against such vast scale humanitarian catastrophes resulting from conflicts. For this reason, Thailand supports the two initiatives that are on the table: the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, put forward by France and Mexico,420 and the code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, put forward by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group.421 […] 5.4.4.28 30 October 2015, United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 13422 […] The United Kingdom will continue to advocate for reform from within the Security Council so that it remains fit for purpose in the twenty-first century. We are proud to have been the first permanent member of the Council to sign up to the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct for the Security Council.423 In doing so, we have sent a clear message: the United Kingdom will never vote against a credible Security Council draft resolution that seeks to prevent or respond to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. I hope all Security Council members, both present and future, will join us in making that pledge. […] 5.4.4.29 30 October 2015, Japan, Mr. Okamura, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 19-20424 I would like to associate myself fully with the statement delivered earlier by Ambassador Harald Braun of Germany on behalf of the Group of Four (G-4) countries.425 […] We need to address the most controversial question – the veto. Initiatives put forward, most notably by France426 and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency

419  → 5.2.3.11 for Thailand’s position on the reform process, presented in the same statement. 420  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 421  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 422  → 5.2.1.1.26 for the United Kingdom’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 423  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 424  → 5.2.1.1.28 for Japan’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 425  14 September 2015, → 5.1.14. 426  See, e.g., the statements of 24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11, and of 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1169

group, on restraining its use in situations of mass atrocities427 are receiving growing support. Japan supports both those initiatives. […] 5.4.4.30 30 October 2015, Australia, Ms. Bird, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 20-21 Seventy years ago, at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, and in 1946 as one of the first elected members of the Security Council, Australia argued strongly against the veto. We did so because we saw it as hampering the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Today those same reasons underscore our support for Security Council reform, reform that will ensure that the Council is able to respond to modern realities and uphold its Charter responsibilities transparently, credibly and effectively. […] Australia strongly supports the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct on Security Council action in situations of mass atrocities,428 and the complementary French/Mexican political declaration on veto restraint.429 The strong, almost overwhelming, support from the United Nations membership for those proposals underscores how fundamental this reform is for the proper functioning of the United Nations in advancing international peace and security. […] 5.4.4.31 30 October 2015, Panama, Ms. Flores Herrera, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 21-22 […] The Security Council needs to be revitalized to make it not only more representative but also more effective, transparent and open to accountability to the international community. The recent launch of the code of conduct to restrict the use of the veto in the Security Council430 is an initial step towards that long-awaited reform and begin to rid ourselves of the anachronistic distinctions between permanent and nonpermanent members. Let us resolve to crown this seventieth year of the United Nations with a decision on the reform of the Security Council. Let us not remain stuck in the debate we began more than 20 years ago concerning the urgent need to reform it. […] 5.4.4.32 30 October 2015, Poland, Mr. Winid, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, p. 22431 […] Finally, with respect to the question of the veto power, we wish to welcome the growing number of supporters of the French/Mexican proposal on restraint in its use.432 Poland has also endorsed the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct433 that aims at timely and decisive Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 427  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 428  Ibid. 429  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 430  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 431  → 5.2.1.3.9 for Poland’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 432  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 433  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1170

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.33 30 October 2015, Guatemala, Mr. Orellana Zabalza, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, p. 2-3 […] Given the prevailing paralysis and inertia, the Council is being exposed to a progressive loss of relevance, which causes even greater tension in the prevailing order. That paralysis has, for instance, been increasing with the use or the threat of the use of the veto by the permanent members of Security Council. Rather than encouraging collective defence with arguments that could ensure consensus, the veto has obstructed and diverted common interests and caused division among its members. Furthermore, with the passage of time, we have proven that the concerns with regard to the veto expressed by the majority of delegations during the San Francisco Conference in 1945 remain fully valid, which further justifies a review of the issue. Guatemala wonders whether or not the veto should be allowed, and in particular whether it would be desirable for other States to have the same right within the framework of Council reform. A first step, which we welcome, consists of the initiatives of France and Mexico to restrict the use of the veto434 and the proposed code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.435 We have supported those initiatives and await their implementation.436 […] 5.4.4.34 30 October 2015, Romania, Mr. Jinga, UN Doc. A/70/PV.44, pp. 19-20437 […] I am pleased to underline that, in his address in the general debate at the Assembly’s current session (see A/70/PV.16),438 His Excellency Mr. Klaus Iohannis, President of Romania, reiterated our support for the initiative of France and Mexico439 regarding a collective, voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council on the non-use of the veto when action is needed to prevent or bring to an end situations of mass atrocities and large-scale war crimes. At the same time, Romania is one of the 106 countries that have fully endorsed the draft code of conduct regarding Security Council action with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes,440 submitted on 23 October by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, which is so competently led by Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein. […] 5.4.4.35 7 November 2016, Maldives, Mr. Sareer, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 12-13441 […] Concurrent but separate to the debate on the long-term reform of the Security Council, the current functioning and working methods of the Council are key focus 434  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 435  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 436  Guatemala confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, p. 15. 437  → 5.2.1.3.10 for Romania’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 438  29 September 2015, UN Doc. A/70/PV.16, pp. 16-19. 439  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 440  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 441  → 5.2.1.3.12 for the Maldives’ position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1171

areas for the Maldives, as well. The Maldives strongly supports the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group’s code of conduct pertaining to the Security Council,442 which are key traits that need to be reflected in the Council’s work and in its relationship with the General Assembly. According to the Charter, the Security Council acts on behalf of all the Member States, and the Member States are mandated to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. […] 5.4.4.36 7 November 2016, Republic of Korea, Mr. Oh Joon, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, p. 14443 At the outset, my delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group.444 […] Expanding permanency would not allow the Council to effectively address global challenges. It is in this vein that the Republic of Korea supports the French-Mexican political statement on the suspension of the veto in cases of mass atrocities445 and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group’s code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.446 […] 5.4.4.37 7 November 2016, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 14-15447 […] In many ways, the question of the veto is at the heart of the deadlock in Security Council reform in general and in the enlargement of the Council in particular. It is counter-intuitive to many – and we are among the many – to create new veto rights. A majority of the membership is formally in favour of the abolition of the veto, especially in a situation where the veto and the threat of the use of the veto is one of the biggest obstacles for the effective performance of the Security Council on a daily basis, as witnessed most recently on 8 October, when the Council was unable to adopt a resolution on the situation in Aleppo, Syria, due to a veto that was cast. Given the situation in which we find ourselves resulting from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which means that any change to the existing veto rights must be agreed to by the five permanent members that possess the right, we believe that it is crucial to work on modifications in the use of the veto. The most significant initiative in that respect is, in our view, the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group on mass-atrocity crimes448 that has been frequently referred to in the discussion this morning. The code of conduct, subscribed to by 112 States, is a meaningful political commitment to working in the Security Council 442  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 443  → 5.2.1.2.9 for the Republic of Korea’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 444  7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29. 445  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 446  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 447  → 5.2.2.2.31 for Liechtenstein’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 448  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1172

5 On a road to nowhere ?

to end and prevent atrocity crimes by supporting credible proposals for that purpose and pledging not to vote against such proposals if put forward. We call on all States that have not yet joined the code of conduct to do so expeditiously. We view support for the code of conduct at this point as a prerequisite for Security Council membership, and it is an essential element for us in deciding who we will support in contested elections. We will also continue working with partners inside and outside of the Council towards the active and effective implementation of the code of conduct in the Council’s practice. 5.4.4.38 7 November 2016, Peru, Mr. Tenya Hasegawa, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 22-23449 […] I would also like to stress the issue of the veto. Peru has consistently supported initiatives to limit its use and to ban its use in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and flagrant violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. In that regard, we support the French and Mexican initiative450 on that issue as well as the code of conduct drawn up by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group,451 to which my country belongs.452 […] 5.4.4.39 7 November 2016, Singapore, Mr. Gafoor, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 25-27453 […] First, we need to inject greater urgency into our work. The intergovernmental negotiations in particular must discuss the elephant in the room and address the use of the veto. If we fail to do so, we will relegate the work of the negotiations to irrelevance. Singapore supports the French-Mexican initiative454 calling on the P-5 to voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in cases of recognized mass atrocities. We also support the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group’s initiative on a code of conduct on Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.455 We welcome the fact that two P-5 members support the initiative of the ACT group to restrict the use of the veto in certain circumstances. We think that their leadership on this specific issue is commendable. Clearly, there is a growing momentum and growing urgency in favour of limiting the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. The intergovernmental negotiations must recognize that trend and focus its attention on the important issue in order to make concrete progress. […]

449  → 5.2.1.1.34 for Peru’s support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.2.2.2.32 for Peru’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 450  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 451  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 452  Peru confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 7-8. 453  → 5.2.2.1.10 for Singapore’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 454  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 455  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1173

5.4.4.40 7 November 2016, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 27-28456 […] Indonesia calls for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, which will make it effective, accountable, democratic and representative of contemporary world realities and plurality. Organizations are successful only when they remain true to their fundamental objectives and mandates, and only when they are able to meet the demands placed on them. It is therefore logical to ponder the efficacy of the Security Council structure if that affects the manner in which the Council is governed and if there are problems that prevent the Charter mandate and the United Nations ideals from being fulfilled. One obvious hurdle is the arbitrary use of the veto, which, in the face of mass atrocities, has rendered the Council powerless on too many occasions. The use of the veto goes against the wishes of the majority, while negating democracy. While Indonesia is in principle for the abolishment of the right of the veto in the Council, given the present entrenched realities, it welcomes steps that will strictly regulate its use. We support having a workable mechanism to ensure that the veto will not be used for perverting the cause of humanity and justice. That is why Indonesia supports the initiative on refraining from the use of the veto in situations of mass crimes, as well as the code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Council must stand unconditionally for upholding international justice, human rights law and humanitarian law. […] 5.4.4.41 7 November 2016, Thailand, Ms. Chartsuwan, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 1-2457 […] On the question of the veto, when casting a negative vote, permanent members should always explain to the broader United Nations membership the rationale for such a decision. Moreover, Thailand supports proposals to limit the use of the veto in cases involving mass atrocities.458 Again, the purpose is to ensure accountability and to enhance the transparency of the Council, which acts on behalf of all United Nations Members in the maintenance of international peace and security. […] 5.4.4.42 7 November 2016, Latvia, Mr. Mažeiks, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 5459 […] Furthermore, far too often, the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security, has been unable to prevent conflicts or build peace or stop atrocities. Latvia believes that the United Nations capacity to address the current challenges also depends on the political will to move forward with

456  → 5.2.2.2.33 for Indonesia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 457  → for 5.2.2.2.34 Thailand’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, and 5.3.22 for Thailand’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement. 458  See, e.g., the ACT Code of Conduct of 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25, and the French/Mexican political declaration of 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 459  → 5.2.1.3.13 for Latvia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement.

1174

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Security Council reform. That is long overdue, and we should all aim at strengthening the legitimacy of that important body. That legitimacy very much depends on the actions of the Security Council. Blocking the work of the Council, especially in matters related to mass atrocities, is unacceptable. We believe that discussions on limiting the use of the veto in certain circumstances should be continued. If the Council is to react accordingly, its permanent members should refrain from using the veto in situations of atrocity crimes. Latvia supports that important initiative,460 as well as the code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.461 We also support improvement of the Council’s working methods with a view to increasing transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness in its work, thus enhancing its legitimacy and facilitating the implementation of its decisions.462 […] 5.4.4.43 7 November 2016, Slovakia, Mr. Ružička, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 9463 […] The right of veto granted to the permanent members of the Council is a prerogative enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Slovakia has endorsed the major initiatives464 to promote a culture of zero tolerance at the United Nations in mass atrocity situations, and that effort should continue. Furthermore, we welcome the positive movement towards improving the Council’s relationships with other United Nations bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Commission and regional organizations. Those efforts should also be pursued. […] 5.4.4.44 7 November 2016, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 11-12465 […] My country’s position also remains firm on another quite complex but crucial element of Security Council reform, namely, the question of the veto. The Russian Federation’s gross violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law, which threaten European if not global security, as well as the inability of the Security Council to react promptly to those actions, show the need to phase out the use of the veto. In the meantime, all permanent members of the Council should voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use that instrument in cases of mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts of aggression. In that connection, Ukraine joined the relevant Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group initiative,466 as well as the one presented by

460  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 461  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 462  Latvia confirmed this position on 7 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 20-21. 463  → 5.2.1.3.15 for Slovakia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 464  See, e.g., the ACT Code of Conduct of 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25, and the French/Mexican political declaration of 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 465  → 5.2.1.3.16 for Ukraine’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 466  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1175

France and Mexico,467 and calls upon all United Nations Member States to follow suit. In that regard, I fully concur with what the Permanent Representative of Slovakia just mentioned.468 […] 5.4.4.45 7 November 2016, Canada, Mr. Bonser, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 13-14469 Canada aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/71/PV.42).470 […] First, Canada strongly believes that the effectiveness of the Council should be the overriding objective in the reform process. In that respect, we need to address honestly the issue of the veto and how it is applied. We have all witnessed recent uses of the veto in ways that damage the reputation of the Security Council and infringe upon its effectiveness. Clearly there is broad support for a Security Council that can play its role as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and that does not abuse the veto power. In that respect, Canada supports the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct471 and the French-Mexican political declaration on veto restraint.472 Both offer important opportunities for achieving a reformed and strengthened Security Council that is able to address global crises, especially in obvious cases of mass violations of human rights, deliberate attacks on civilians, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. […] 5.4.4.46 7 November 2016, Hungary, Ms. Bogyay, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 16-17473 […] I also believe that simply enlarging the Council without further reforms in its working methods can only recreate the present problems. Together with 111 countries, Hungary supports the code of conduct474 that constitutes a voluntary pledge not to vote against Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing or ending atrocity crimes. The issue of the veto lies very much at the heart of our negotiations. […] 5.4.4.47 7 November 2016, Chile, Ms. Sapag Muñoz de la Peña, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, p. 22475 […] […] In that regard, Chile reaffirms its commitment to the code of conduct on restricting the use of the veto, promoted by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency 467  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 468  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.43. 469  → 5.2.1.3.17 for Canada’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 470  7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29. 471  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 472  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 473  → 5.2.1.3.18 for Hungary’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 474  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 475  Chile confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, p. 1; → 5.2.2.1.11 for Chile’s support of permanent seats without the right of veto, presented in the same statement.

1176

5 On a road to nowhere ?

group,476 of which we are a member, and also to the joint France-Mexico political declaration.477 […] 5.4.4.48  3 April 2017, New Zealand, Mr. van Bohemen, Intergovernmental Negotiations478 […] During our recent term as an Elected Member of the Security Council, we were acutely aware of the challenges which too often result in poor performance by the Council. Some of these challenges flow directly from the framework set out for the Council in 1945. New Zealand opposed the veto at the San Francisco conference. The experience of the ensuing 70 years, in particular, the last two, has reinforced our view that the veto is a major impediment to the effective functioning of the Council. […] In conclusion, I would like to highlight one aspect of current Council practice that we believe needs urgent attention. It does not need to await agreement on structural reform. The fact of the veto is a problem in itself. So too are the way permanence and the veto have been leveraged to exert influence extending well beyond the protection of vital security interests – the avowed justification for the veto. The veto confers no right to control appointments to the Secretariat – be they the senior appointments the Permanent Members seek for their nationals or the myriad of other positions over which the Permanent Member have presumed to exercise a controlling voice. This level of influence was not part of the Charter compact and needs to be redressed. 5.4.4.49 7 November 2017, Liechtenstein, Mr. Wenaweser, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 12-13479 […] Another key initiative in that respect is the code of conduct on Council action on mass atrocity crimes.480 We had the honour to lead the efforts of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group that led to the code of conduct, which so far has been embraced by 114 States, all of which are committed to taking action to end and prevent atrocity crimes when serving as Council members. They will do so by committing to taking action to that effect and also by not opposing credible proposals suggested in the Council to that end. Recent situations of relevance to this issue include those in Myanmar, South Sudan and Yemen, to name just a few. We have been gratified to see that the Secretary-General has submitted relevant information to the Security Council for action. The Council, however, has been frustratingly slow to respond. We believe 476  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 477  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 478  → 5.2.2.2.35 for New Zealand’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 479  → 5.2.2.2.37 for Liechtenstein’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 480  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1177

that subscribing to the code of conduct is the minimum commitment we should be able to expect from any Council member. In future, therefore, we will support candidatures for the Security Council only from States that have signed the code of conduct. We also call on all States that have not yet done so to join the code of conduct as soon as possible. 5.4.4.50 7 November 2017, Philippines, Ms. Azucena, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 16-17481 […] The Philippines also reiterates its view that the veto power has no place in a twentyfirst century Security Council. No Member State should be granted the special privilege to exercise the veto power, as that is in direct contravention of the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States, as enshrined in the Charter. We appreciate that the question of the veto is the most formidable challenge in our work to reform the Security Council. While the abolition of the veto continues to be our aspiration, we should all be prepared to take small steps that will hopefully bring us closer to that goal. To that end, the Philippines is open to considering ways to rationalize the use of the veto power by the Council’s permanent members. We support the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group’s code of conduct482 and the French-Mexican initiative,483 which spells out exceptions to the right to use the veto power. […] 5.4.4.51 7 November 2017, Slovenia, Ms. Bavdaž Kuret, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 3-4484 […] As a member of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group and a supporter of the French-Mexican initiative,485 Slovenia advocates for a veto restriction in cases of atrocity crimes and for maximum self-restraint in the use of the veto in all other cases. […] 5.4.4.52 7 November 2017, Thailand, Mr. Plasai, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 11-12486 […] Secondly, we are of the view that the right of the veto has been both an important safeguard and an obstacle to the unity of purpose and decisive action of the Council. Thailand continues to support the code of conduct with regard to the use of the veto,487 as elaborated by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group. We also

481  → 5.2.1.1.39 for the Philippines’ support of additional permanent seats with the right of veto, 5.3.23 for the Philippines’ position on the size of the Security Council, and 5.4.2.13 for the Philippines’ position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 482  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 483  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 484  → 5.2.1.3.20 for Slovenia’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 485  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 486  → 5.2.2.2.38 for Thailand’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 487  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1178

5 On a road to nowhere ?

support the French-Mexican initiative488 on the voluntary limit on the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. […] 5.4.4.53 7 November 2017, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 14-15489 […] My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by Ambassador Lambertini of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group.490 […] Thirdly, the reform of the Security Council must not focus solely on expanding membership, but also seriously address the improvement of its working methods, including the decision-making mechanisms such as the responsibility in the use of the veto. The current international moment we are living as well as the historical record are full of reasons for the use of veto to be restricted or withdrawn altogether. The French-Mexican initiative,491 complemented by the proposal of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,492 also shows that most of the States Members of the United Nations want a comprehensive reform of the Security Council so that it does not lose its relevance to the international community. […] 5.4.4.54 7 November 2017, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 17-18493 […] As a practical measure to prevent inaction by the Council in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, Indonesia supports initiatives that seek to regulate the use of the veto.494 We hope that there will be greater focus on that issue in the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations. […] 5.4.4.55 7 November 2017, Ukraine, Mr. Vitrenko, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 22-24495 […] As one of the signatories to the French-Mexican declaration on the restriction of the veto power,496 as well as the related code of conduct,497 we believe that, while abolishing the veto is a long-term objective, all members of the Council – permanent and elected alike – must voluntarily pledge not to vote against draft resolutions in cases of mass atrocities, genocide and crimes against humanity. The same approach should be implemented in cases of war crimes and foreign aggression. That is why it 488  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 489  → 5.2.2.2.39 for Mexico’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 490  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36. 491  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 492  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 493  → 5.2.2.2.40 for Indonesia’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 494  See, e.g., the ACT Code of Conduct of 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25, and the French/Mexican political declaration of 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 495  → 5.2.1.3.22 for Ukraine’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 5.4.2.16 for Ukraine’s position in favour of abolishing the right of veto, presented in the same statement. 496  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 497  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1179

is important, in the course of the Council’s reform, to envisage the responsibility of a party to a conflict to abstain from voting on a Council decision concerning the resolution of that conflict. […] 5.4.4.56 7 November 2017, Qatar, Mr. Al-Khalifa, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 24-25 […] We align ourselves with the statement made by the representative of the Group of Arab States (see A/72/PV.41).498 […] The State of Qatar underscores the interlinkages among all aspects of the negotiations. There are also elements of commonality pursuant to decision 62/557,499 which was adopted by consensus. Any attempt to reform the Security Council will therefore not be successful if it is limited to one aspect and ignores the other aspects. We therefore reiterate that the issue of the right to the veto is a crucial element in the reform of the Council. Experience has shown that it is important that the use of the veto should be limited and that States should refrain from using it in cases of mass atrocities, war crimes, genocide or ethnic cleansing. The arbitrary use of the veto has in many cases undermined the credibility of decision-making within the Security Council. It has also led to the inability of the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and take measures to maintain international peace and security. In that respect, we reiterate our support for the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group and the French-Mexican initiative500 on restraint in the use of the veto in atrocity situations. Those initiatives have been endorsed by more than 120 States, including the State of Qatar. […] 5.4.4.57 7 November 2017, Ghana, Ms. Pobee, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 26-27501 […] My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/72/ PV.41).502 […] With regard to the question of the veto and its impact on the work of an enlarged Council, we would need to critically address that aspect of reform against the background of the current impact on the Council’s effective functioning. In the interim, Ghana continues to support the code of conduct proposed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group503 aimed at preventing veto use in cases of massatrocity crimes. […]

498  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.27. 499  15 September 2008, → 4.1.29. 500  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 501  → 5.2.2.3.29 for Ghana’s support of regional seats, presented in the same statement. 502  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26. 503  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1180

5 On a road to nowhere ?

5.4.4.58 7 November 2017, United Kingdom, Mr. Hickey, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 27-28504 […] By the same token, we cannot allow the issue of the veto to slow our progress on the expansion of the Council. As my Prime Minister made clear in this Hall in September (see A/72/PV.8),505 we are proud to have used the full weight of our diplomacy to ensure that we have not had to exercise our veto in a generation. We are also proud signatories of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group’s code of conduct,506 and we are committed to never voting against a credible draft resolution on preventing or ending a mass atrocity. Sadly, we have seen others wield their veto through narrow self-interest, to the significant detriment of the Council’s reputation and, indeed, its responsibility to those who so desperately need our help. On Syria, such a use of the veto has prevented action against a despicable regime that has murdered its own people with chemical weapons. […] 5.4.4.59 8 November 2017, Poland, Mr. Radomski, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 2-3507 […] We also look forward to continuing discussions on the veto power – the thorniest of issues, but also one that we strongly believe should not be shied away from if further politicization of the veto is to be stopped. The right of veto carries with it enormous responsibility, and its currency is human lives. Any initiative aimed at ensuring its advised application can count on our support. […] 5.4.4.60 8 November 2017, Costa Rica, Mr. Mendoza García, UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, pp. 3-4508 […] We endorse the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group (see A/72/PV.41).509 […] In that same vein, we cannot leave aside the issue of the veto. So far, the use of the veto has undermined the Council’s credibility in its decisions and has curtailed the responsibility to protect those most vulnerable, as well as its ability and effectiveness in ensuring global peace and security. Costa Rica has advocated on multiple occasions for prohibiting the use of the veto, especially in situations involving violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide, in line with the

504  → 5.2.1.1.42 for the United Kingdom’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 505  20 September 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.8, pp. 22-26. 506  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 507  → 5.2.1.3.23 for Poland’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, presented in the same statement. 508  → 5.2.1.2.12 for Costa Rica’s position against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, and 5.2.2.2.41 for Costa Rica’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 509  7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1181

code of conduct proposed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,510 which already has 114 signatories and for which we reiterate our unequivocal support. We also support the French-Mexican initiative.511 […] 5.4.4.61 6 February 2018, Indonesia, Mr. Djani, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 47-48 […] First, the Council should not mirror power statuses, but stand up credibly for the weak and powerless. On far too many occasions, the Council has been impeded by veto in the face of mass atrocities and severe violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. While Indonesia calls for the abolishment of veto rights, considering present entrenched realities, it encourages the Council to consider proposals, such as those presented by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group512 and the French-Mexican initiative.513 The regulation of veto use would, first and foremost, be a great push to elevate Council effectiveness and global credibility. Issues of human rights and humanity, as in the case of mass atrocities that are vetoed for narrow political raisons d’être, are issues that affect the existence of the Security Council in the eyes of many of our stakeholders. Until veto regulation is realized, we support a formal explanation of veto use by the permanent five being circulated to all General Assembly members. […] 5.4.4.62 6 February 2018, Mexico, Mr. Sandoval Mendiolea, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 57-58 […] First of all, I refer to the misnamed right to the veto. The Charter of the United Nations does not contain an explicit veto power for the five permanent members, but rather a voting rule that requires the concurring affirmative vote of the five permanent members. The veto therefore should not be seen as a right or a privilege, but as a responsibility that must be exercised as such. Unfortunately, the use of the veto – so far on approximately 280 occasions where it has been used – has prevented the effective fulfilment of the responsibilities entrusted to this organ. Far from being conducive to defending the collective interest with arguments that facilitate consensus among the members of the Council, the use of the veto has obstructed and derailed the common interest and has encouraged division among members. Abuse of the exercise of the veto is contrary to international law and violates the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, which constitute cardinal principles of international humanitarian law today. In 2015, Mexico and France jointly presented a political declaration514 stating that situations of mass atrocities, when committed on a large scale, specifically crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, can constitute a threat to international peace and security and require action by the international community. In such cases, the Security Council should not be prevented from acting for the use of the veto. The 510  511  512  513  514 

2 3 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21.

1182

5 On a road to nowhere ?

signatories of the declaration – 100 States so far – propose a collective and voluntary agreement among the permanent members, with a view to refraining from the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. The French-Mexican initiative – as well as the code of conduct promoted by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,515 which complements it – seeks to improve the efficiency of the Security Council while fostering a new culture of responsibility and accountability among the permanent members of the Council vis-à-vis the international community, in addition to visibly contributing to the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Council in carrying out its work. We invite the permanent members to follow the example of France, a country that, by promoting this initiative, has shown determination and a deep sense of collective responsibility. We also invite those countries that have not done so to join the French-Mexican initiative, which is still open for signature. […] 5.4.4.63 6 February 2018, Uruguay, Mr. Bermúdez Álvarez, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 59-60 […] My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Switzerland on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,516 of which my country is a member. […] Finally, the question of the veto is the third issue that I wish to address. The existence of the veto is a major obstacle to the work of the Council, which has often been paralysed in cases where its action is imperative in order to be able to respond to the threat or perpetration of atrocities. Uruguay reiterates its commitment to the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group,517 as well as to the French-Mexican initiative on limiting the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocities,518 as we are convinced that the veto should not be used to block Council actions that seek to prevent or eliminate abhorrent crimes committed in complete disregard for human dignity. 5.4.4.64 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ten-Pow, Intergovernmental Negotiations519 […] iv. Any expansion in the permanent category of membership raises questions about the use of the veto and while CARICOM supports its ultimate abolition, we believe that so long as it is retained its use should be extended to any new permanent member.

515  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 516  6 February 2018, UN Doc. S/PV.8175, pp. 28-29. 517  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 518  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 519  → 5.2.1.3.24 for CARICOM’s position focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, and 5.3.27 for CARICOM’s position on the size of the Security Council, presented in the same statement.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1183

We would however like to see its use forbidden in situations of massive violations of international humanitarian law. […] 5.4.4.65 29 January 2019, Liechtenstein, Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Intergovernmental Negotiations520 […] Having no new veto rights is a crucial and essential element for us in SC enlargement, which should, however, also be accompanied by measures that address the practice, the use and the application of the veto that will continue to exist. We are willing to accept that, not because we think it is a particularly good feature of the Charter of the United Nations, but simply because we are realistic enough to say that we do not think it can be changed, given that the Charter can only be changed with the consent of the permanent members. This is why we believe the work on the use of the veto is so important. We have supported the French-Mexican Initiative,521 which was referenced by our colleague from France, and we have advocated for the ACT Code of Conduct,522 which is currently supported by 119 Member States. We very strongly believe that these are key initiatives to really change the collective culture in the work of the Security Council. We are committed to further expanding the number of those who support the ACT Code of Conduct. We will continue our outreach together with our friends and we will work on the implementation of the Code. In parallel, we will continue to work intensely with those who are generally committed to making the Security Council a more efficient and a more effective body. […] 5.4.4.66 20 November 2018, France, Mrs. Gueguen, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, pp. 15-16523 […] As President Macron stated when he addressed the General Assembly in September, our response to crises must not be hindered by Security Council divisions (see A/73/ PV.6). It was in that spirit that France proposed several years ago that the five permanent members of the Council voluntarily and collectively suspend the use of the veto in the event of mass atrocities. This voluntary approach requires only a political commitment, not a revision of the Charter. Today, this initiative,524 which we have implemented jointly with Mexico, is supported by 101 countries. In the same spirit, the code of conduct525 drawn up by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, which France supports, has also attracted a very large number of backers. With this momentum, we urge the other Member States to join us. It is in the common interest of all Member States that the 520  → 5.2.2.2.43 for Liechtenstein’s support of non-permanent seats with longer terms, presented in the same statement. 521  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 522  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 523  → 5.2.1.1.47 for France’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 524  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 525  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25.

1184

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Security Council fulfil its mandate and play its full role, particularly in situations of mass atrocities. The initiatives on the framework of the right of veto, which make for a fairer, more responsible and more effective Council, complement the overall reform of the Council, which France will continue to champion with passion and determination. 5.4.4.67 20 November 2018, United Kingdom, UN Doc. A/73/PV.37, p. 28526 […] By the same token, we cannot allow the issue of the veto to slow our progress on the expansion of the Council. The United Kingdom is proud not to have vetoed a resolution since 1989, and we would only do so in the most exceptional circumstances. We are signatories to the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group527 and committed to never voting against a credible draft resolution on preventing or ending a mass atrocity, and we encourage all permanent and non-permanent members to join us in supporting this initiative. Too often we have seen others wield their veto through narrow self-interest, to the significant detriment of the Council’s reputation and indeed its responsibility to those who so desperately need our help. […]

5.5 Proposals by academics and civil society 5.5.1 1 December 2009, Denis Halliday, The United Nation’s Role in Peace and War, Global Research Public Lecture, Montreal528 […] For a number of years I have been proposing at University and public meetings reform of the Security Council. Discussion to this end in the General Assembly has been ongoing for some 15 years. Changes made have been miniscule and growth of real power has been limited to proposing Germany, Italy and Japan be promoted to Big Boy status. That is ridiculous. Why? Because the Council is already dominated by the North, and I include China in the North. What the Council needs is balance – that is, balance between the North and South. We need the majority of the world’s people to be represented. […]

526  → 5.2.1.1.49 for the United Kingdom’s nomination of specific countries for permanent membership, presented in the same statement. 527  23 October 2015, → 5.4.4.25. 528  Copyright © Denis Halliday, Global Research, 2009. Source: Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization, Montreal, Québec, Canada.    Denis J. Halliday (*1941 in Ireland) spent most of his career with the United Nations in development and humanitarian assistance-related posts both in New York and overseas. From 1994 to 1997, he served as UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management. In 1997, he was appointed head of the UN Humanitarian Program in Iraq. One year later, he announced his resignation from the UN over the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, characterizing them as “genocidal”. Since then, he has been working for various NGOS and peace initiatives. In 2003, he was presented with the Gandhi International Peace Award. He lectured at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania and Trinity College, Dublin.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1185

[…] My view is that Council representation should be Regional, not country and that each Region should select its representative State to sit – five years before turnover to another. And the selected country would speak for, on behalf of the whole – the Region itself. This would seem to require within-region consultation before major decisions – and why not? Consultation might prevent the errors of haste – as in the Council’s approval three days after 9/11 to endorse invading Afghanistan. Thus you can visualise for Central and Latin America, Costa Rica might be selected – small with no military power – but when small Costa Rica speaks on the Security Council – the world would know that Latin America and the Caribbean is speaking. […] Or closer to home, let’s consider North America – Canada, United States and Mexico. One permanent seat – rotating membership. […] The same model would work for Sub-Sahara Africa; North Africa and the Middle East; South East Asia and Australia/NZ; South Asia and so on. Europe – the EU – […] would drop to one rotating permanent seat. With this globally representative system, with the loss or at least reduction of Nuclear Powers and the inclusion of the majority – the countries of the South – I believe we would see different decisions. […] […] [T]he Security Council has been stagnant and is in danger of being set aside unless it becomes representative, and dare I suggest it: democratic – no more veto power – but a new sense of responsibility, supported by the goals but within the constraints of the Charter and international law. No more double standards of approach. […] […] [T]he new expanded Council would need the constraint of majority approval by a revitalised General Assembly, well stocked with civil society representation. […] 5.5.2 14 June 2011, Joan Marc Simon, An EU Seat in the Security Council as a First Step towards a Democratic Organisation of World Security, in: The Federalist Debate, No. 3529 […] Workable short term reform of UNSC In order to work out a realistic short term solution while continuing the discussion on the development of the world regionalism, we should take into account the following factors: Firstly, as discussed above, it is unthinkable that France and the UK will give away their seat in the SC freely. Secondly, it is in the interest of the EU to find an answer to the calls for a more balanced and updated representation of world powers – and the sooner the better because its decline on the global stage is associated with the decline in its bargaining power. Thirdly, that a solution has to be found to accommodate Germany in the new world order especially after the failure of the G4 experience. Fourthly, that outside Europe the perception is that “too many Europeans” 529  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the Centro Einstein di Studi Internazionali (C.E.S.I.), Torino, Italy. Joan Marc Simon studied international affairs at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He was the head of Democracia Global in Barcelona and a member of the World Federalist Movement Council. In 2007-08, he was Secretary-General of the Union of European Federalists.

1186

5 On a road to nowhere ?

are already in the global institutions. And finally that whatever solution is found it is preferable that it doesn’t require amending the UN Charter for it can mean opening the Pandora’s box. Bearing in mind these conditions, a workable short term solution for the EU – and more concretely for Germany – would be to merge the two European regions with rights to nominate non-permanent SC members (western Europe has the right to select 2 non-permanent members and Eastern Europe 1) and merge them into one “EU + others” group but giving only 2 rotating non-permanent seats to this new region. This option would allow the EU to arrange at least 1 of these 2 representatives and hence give priority to Germany so that it could effectively be present in most UNSC negotiations – although without veto right. Moreover, it would decrease the “European” presence in the UNSC – it would have 2 instead of 3 nonpermanent members – which would make this proposal acceptable for other world countries who believe that the European representation should be scaled down. Finally it would give the option to the EU to work better as coordinator of this new “UN grouping”. […] 5.5.3 2013, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Transforming the United Nations system: Designs for a workable world, Tokyo/New York/Paris: United Nations University Press530 [64] Chapter 4: Reform of the Security Council […] Introduction Among the many components of the UN system none is more consequential than the Security Council, whose actions – or failures to act – often seriously affect the welfare of much, if not all, of humankind. Presently, the SC is the only UN organ whose decisions are legally binding. Yet its very legitimacy, dominated as it is by the five permanent, vetowielding members who happened to be on the winning side in the Second World War, is increasingly called into question. It is hardly surprising, then, that this anachronistic and insufficiently representative body has been the object of more recommendations for reform than any other UN entity.*1 SC reform has, in fact, has been under continuous review within the UN General Assembly ever since the GA’s establishment in 1993 of the Open-Ended Working Group 530  Copyright 2013 by the United Nations University. Reproduced with the permission of the United Nations University. Joseph E. (“Joe”) Schwartzberg (1928-2018) was a U.S. American university professor of geography, a writer, peace activist and member of the World Federalist Movement. He taught at the Universities of Pennsylvania (1960-64) and Minnesota (1964-2000). He was the editor and principal author of the much acclaimed Historical Atlas of South Asia (University of Chicago Press 1978, new ed. Oxford University Press 1992). Following his retirement in 2000, Schwartzberg focused more heavily on issues of global governance, working with the World Federalist Association, the World Federalist Institute, the United Nations Association, and the Academic Council on the United Nations System. His respective work is continued by “The Workable World Trust” in St. Paul, Minnesota, an organization established by him in 2014.    Earlier versions of Prof. Schwartzberg’s proposal, all arguing for a restructured Security Council with a system of weighted voting, were published in 2003, 2004 and 2007 (for details, → Select Bibliography, Annex VIII). The 2013 book partly reproduced here was the culmination of his lifetime of thought and research on the United Nations.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1187

on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council.531 Literally scores of reform recommendations have been put forward since that date [65] from countries, independent scholars and think-tanks in all quarters of our planet.*2 Especially important were the two formulations put forward in 2004 by the prestigious High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan the previous year.532 Although these formulations were warmly endorsed by Annan, they, like all previous and subsequent formulae, were deemed to have serious flaws from the perspective of significant blocs of nations and failed to be adopted.*3 The launching platform for this chapter’s discussion of SC reform is an analysis of the decreasing representativeness and legitimacy of the present system with the passage of time. The special and anachronistic privileges of the P-5 powers receive particular scrutiny. I then suggest desiderata for SC membership that would be widely regarded as logical, politically realistic, representative, flexible and fair. With these in mind, I propose replacing the current system with a council composed of representatives of 12 regions, including all UN member nations, in which each regional representative casts an objective mathematically determined weighted vote. Additionally, I explain how SC delegates would be more democratically elected than at present, why the proposed method would conduce to greater meritocracy and legitimacy, how the business of the SC might efficiently be conducted and why the new system would promote greater regional cooperation outside the United Nations. I also discuss a variant of the proposed new system in which UN member nations could, if they chose, be represented simultaneously in two of the 12 regions established. The penultimate section of the chapter takes up the seemingly intractable question of the veto. It suggests ways by which its use can be circumscribed and even phased out altogether. The conclusion briefly recapitulates the merits of the proposal. Declining representativeness of the present system […] [71] Additional shortcomings of the present system and of leading reform proposals*4 Compounding the anachronistic permanency accorded to the P-5 members of the SC is the fact that they alone possess the power of the veto, thereby effectively immunizing them from any meaningful form of UN censure for acts detrimental to others in the global community or offences within their own borders. This special status of the P-5 flies in the face of contemporary power realities and should be terminated. Germany and Japan have surpassed France, the United Kingdom and Russia in economic power, and countries such as India and Brazil are expected to do so shortly. Since nothing that humans create can be said to be [72] permanent, the very word “permanent” should be expunged from the UN Charter. Additionally, the double standard inherent in the P-5 veto privilege diminishes the UN’s moral legitimacy and is increasingly questioned by virtually all non-P-5 nations. Apart from the inequity between the P-5 and other nations, there is inequity within the P-5 itself. A major source of dissatisfaction is the degree to which the present system has privileged first the mainly capitalistic “West” and then the developed global 531  3 December 1993, → 3.1.2. 532  2 December 2004, UN Doc. A/59/565, → 4.1.19.

1188

5 On a road to nowhere ?

“North”. Currently four of the P-5 members are developed nations while only one, China, is still – despite its phenomenal recent growth – a developing power. The Charter’s inflexibility in respect to the P-5 raises important questions relating to possible changes in the political map of the world. When the Soviet Union imploded, the Russian Federation claimed to have inherited its legal mantle and, with it, its SC seat.*5 But what if the ethnically diverse Russian state should itself implode? At what point would a rump P-5 state become too inconsequential to merit permanent SC status? This question applies also to the United Kingdom. Suppose Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were to secede; would one then – following the USSR/Russia precedent – assign an SC seat to England, the UK’s largest remnant? Alternatively, what if both the United Kingdom and France become parts of a future European federation? How would they or the federation then be represented in the SC? Would other potential federations – in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East or elsewhere – become legitimate claimants to an SC seat if Europe’s claim were recognized? The process of selecting non-permanent SC members leaves much to be desired. While subject to a formal vote in the GA, there is typically only one candidate from a given “region” or exactly as many candidates as there are seats to be filled, the candidate nations having been chosen through diplomatic manoeuvring in the corridors of the United Nations or other convenient venues. For candidates from Africa, gentlemen’s agreements provide for loose rotation among willing nations, with little regard for their respective qualifications. And in no regional caucus is there any explicit quantitative basis for choosing among aspiring nominees. To their credit, the Latin American and “Western European and Other” caucuses do, not infrequently, put up more candidates than there are seats to be filled. But even if none of them is viewed favourably by nations from other regions, there is no politically acceptable way to preclude their election. The unrealistic power distribution within the SC is a perennial shortcoming of the present system. I have already discussed the special privileges of the P-5; but, paradoxically, small powers may also exert power [73] out of proportion to their weight in the world beyond the United Nations. In 1984, for example, when SC membership simultaneously included both Malta, with a then population of a quarter of a million (the lowest of any nation in the SC’s history), and India, with its then population of more than 725 million, both nations cast the same unitary vote. Further, in nonveto situations the votes of each non-permanent SC member equalled those of any of the P-5.*6 Despite abundant evidence of the shortcomings of the existing SC system, leading attempts to improve it focus mainly on two questions: which nations are sufficiently important to merit a permanent seat or rotating “semi-permanent” seat (an oxymoron); and whether new permanent members shall enjoy the power of the veto. They ignore the facts that even with as many as 10 new seat holders, almost four-fifths of the world’s nations and a substantial share of the world’s population would remain unrepresented. They fail to consider that for every new permanent member there would be one or more disgruntled “wannabes” or nay-sayers: Pakistan in regard to India, China in respect to Japan, Italy in respect to Germany, Argentina and Mexico regarding Brazil, and South Africa and Egypt in respect to Nigeria (should the latter be anointed). They offer no critique of the ill-considered regional division of the world for purposes of

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1189

choosing representatives. Finally, no proposal has the temerity to call for an end to the unjust entrenched privilege that the veto conveys. Universal weighted regional representation*7 I have noted the incongruity – one might even say absurdity – of a Security Council in which the vote of a very small state such as Malta had the same capability in shaping decisions as India, its fellow non-permanent seat holder in 1984. I have also noted the small size and limited diplomatic capacity of many UN members, 72 (38 per cent) of which had by 2010 yet to serve a single year on the SC. With these considerations in mind, I devised a series of scenarios providing a more rational system of representation. While I regard all of them as superior to the present system, space constraints require that I present here only the two that strike me as the most promising.*8 Both call for a universally representative SC with 12 regional seats, each carrying a mathematically determined weighted vote.*9 Up to four of the regions could be composed of but a single powerful nation, provided that the region meets accepted objective criteria for recognition. The remainder would be assemblages of more or less similar, but not necessarily contiguous, states. Each multinational region would nominate slates of two to five candidates – through processes described below – [74] and from each such slate SC representatives would be elected by the GA. Additionally, each region would devise its own set of decision-making rules by which its representatives would be guided. Two similar proposals are presented, the first allowing nations to be members of only one region, and the second allowing nations to enjoy simultaneous membership in two. Guiding considerations The proposed system is predicated on the following considerations. Given the incapacity of many small nations to function effectively within the contemporary world and frequent SC failure to take note of the views of many nations in its decision-making processes, a system of representation by major world regions would offer many advantages not otherwise attainable. The regions established for representational purposes would be alterable as need arises. Regions should have a population, territorial extent and/or degree of economic importance such that the legitimacy of their representation in the SC will not be seriously questioned. The ensemble of regions must be such as to maximize internal regional homogeneity with regard to multiple factors: culture, religion, language, economic interests and shared historical experience. This will facilitate the region’s speaking with a single majority voice. To the extent practicable, the make-up of any given region should avoid comembership therein of long-standing antagonists. Each multinational region shall establish its own rules of procedure for determining regional policies and guiding its representatives in the SC. Ideally, these rules would include a system of internal weighted voting for the region’s member nations. Ideally, no single nation within a multinational region should have a greater voting weight than that of all the other member nations combined. (Possible exceptions are discussed below.)

• • • • • • •

1190

5 On a road to nowhere ?

nations should have the right to request that their membership be • Individual transferred to another region if that better suits their interest, though without any guarantee that such a request will be honoured.

Initial regional framework and weighting With the above considerations in mind, the entire world would be divided for purposes of SC representation into 12 regions. Those depicted in Figure 4.3 represent my best judgement as to what would prove optimal. This map reflects, to a remarkable degree, regional organizations – e.g. [75] the European Union (EU), the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. – that already exist. Nevertheless, it is merely suggestive; the actual determination would be entrusted to a committee of the UN General Assembly. From time to time, should need arise, the GA would be empowered to recommend alterations in the regional boundaries without resort to amending the UN Charter.*10 Up to four regions might consist of a single nation, provided that it met some predetermined eligibility criterion or criteria. I would suggest that eligibility be contingent on the nation’s having the sum of its percentages of the world’s population and of contributions to the UN budget exceed a threshold of 12 per cent. Should more than four nations exceed this threshold, only the top four would qualify. Given the present scale of assessments, the qualifying nations would be the United States, China, India and Japan, in that order. But if, as recommended, assessments were in strict proportion to GNI, Japan would no longer qualify. Although the GA would establish the initial framework for multinational regions, individual nations would subsequently be allowed to request transfer from one region to another subject to the approval of the region within which membership is sought. Additionally, under the second of my two proposals, they would be allowed to request simultaneous representation in two regions (subject to provisions noted below). Each regional seat holder would cast a weighted SC vote (W) based on the average of three terms, as indicated in the following equation: P + C + 8.33% W = 3 wherein P represents the region’s population as a percentage of the total population of all UN member nations, C represents the region’s total paid contributions to the UN budget as a percentage of the total budget over a specific period (say of five years) and 8.33 per cent is a constant signifying that the global perspective of each of the 12 regions is equally worthy of respect.*11 The validity of the population and contributions terms of the equation is intuitively obvious and has been discussed in relation to recommended reform of the GA. The arguments need not be repeated here. But it is worth recalling that, from a pragmatic perspective, the world’s wealthier countries would have little incentive to accept the proposed new system if there were to be no counterweight to the population term, which privileges populous but relatively poor nations such as China (despite its recent economic surge) and India. An additional pragmatic consideration is that linking voting strength to actually paid contributions, rather than to assessments, ensures that nations would pay what they owe, in that failure [76]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1191

Figure 4.3 Weighted votes of 12 member regions of hypothetical Security Council

[77] to do so would automatically impose on them a future penalty in the form of reduced voting weight. This would eliminate economic blackmail via the withholding of assessed dues that certain countries (most notably the United States) have occasionally resorted to for political purposes. The constant, 8.33 per cent (one-twelfth), calls for comment. It signifies the presumed equal worth of each region’s global perspective. This presumption would, in effect, serve as a pragmatic legal fiction. Although the proposition of equal worth can be neither proved nor disproved, it is akin to the widely accepted legal fiction positing the sovereign equality of nations. An important effect of using the constant is that it narrows the gulf between the weights of the most and least powerful regions and would, presumably, enhance the political acceptability of the system. Required majorities in respect to procedural matters would require total weighted votes exceeding 50 per cent, while decisions on substantive matters would require a two-thirds majority (66.7 per cent) and concurrent approval by regions whose combined populations exceeded 50 per cent of the world’s total. Table 4.1 provides relevant data for each of the 12 regions depicted in Figure 4.3, including number of member countries, which does not enter into the weighting equation but is nevertheless of interest. The weighted regional votes indicated in the last column appear to reflect reasonably the real-world disparities in power and capability from one region to another. The range is from 15.86 per cent for Europe to 4.49 per cent for the Westminster League, a ratio of roughly 3.5:1. Without the constant, [78] 8.33 per cent, in the equation, the range would have been from 19.62 to 2.58 per cent, yielding a ratio of 7.6:1, which would probably prove politically unacceptable to some of the weaker regions.

1192

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Table 4.1 Regions to be represented in proposed UN Security Council Region Africa South of the Sahara Arab League China East Asia Europe India Latin America and Caribbean Russia and Neighbours Southeast Asia United States West Asia Westminster League

No. of UN Members 43 21 1 6 41 1 33 6 12 1 12 15

Population (%) 11.68 5.21 19.79 3.43 7.97 17.25 8.46 3.07 8.97 4.56 8.62 1.02

Total GNI (%) 1.47 2.81 8.61 9.95 31.27 2.33 6.92 2.62 2.53 24.71 2.51 4.27

Weighted vote (%) 7.16 5.45 12.24 7.24 15.86 9.30 7.90 4.67 6.61 12.53 6.49 4.54

Totals

192

100.0

100.0

100.0

A fairer, more workable allocation of power An important consequence of applying the proposed weighted voting formula is that it would establish an SC with a reasonable balance between five regions predominantly within the developed North (i.e. Europe, the United States, East Asia, Russia and the Westminster League), with a combined weight of 45.3 per cent, and seven remaining regions mainly of the global South (roughly the G-77 plus China), with a combined weight of 54.7 per cent. Since binding votes on substantive matters would require a two-thirds majority, the practical effect of this is that on issues on which there is a North-South division of opinion it would be necessary to engage in genuine dialogue between the two cohorts to forge workable compromises. The resultant compromise would have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the global community than many decisions rammed through the present SC at the insistence of one or more of the predominantly Northern P-5. In Chapter 2 I noted the propensity of great powers to resort to bribery and coercion to influence the votes of weak nations in both the GA and the SC. This problem would be obviated with a system of regional voting, in that it would be virtually impossible to bribe or coerce a multinational region. By reducing the present enormous power disparities among actors on the UN stage, the proposed system would enhance the ability of the weak to resist inappropriate pressure from the strong, to be guided by the merits of individual cases and to contribute to the crafting of legitimate resolutions. I comment briefly below on the three single-nation regions and then on the nine multinational regions in descending order of their voting strength. In discussing the latter group, I consider each region’s inclusiveness and coherence, and suggest why certain of its constituent nations might support and others oppose the proposed system.*12 The three single-nation regions Were the proposed system in place (as of 2010), those countries and their voting weights would be the United States (12.52 per cent), China (12.24 per cent) and India (9.30 per cent). Barring the creation of a single federal entity in Europe, changes in

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1193

this set of qualifying countries are unlikely for the foreseeable future in that Japan, the fourth-ranking power, has for some time been on a declining demographic and economic trajectory relative to the world as a whole. [79] In the present SC the United States and China now each cast but one vote out of 15 (6.67 per cent of the total), the same as any other SC member, however weak that member might otherwise be. Thus their greatly enhanced voting strength under the proposed system might prove a sufficiently attractive trade-off to induce them to give up the veto. For India, the relative gain would be even greater. Europe (15.86 per cent) In the present proposal Europe includes all the current EU members, as well as a number of Eastern European countries presently slated to join or likely to become eligible in the near future, four microstates that are in the United Nations but not full EU members, and Israel. It excludes several former republics of the Soviet Union that are grouped with Russia, as well as Turkey. The region is already highly integrated in many respects, and its procedures for consultation and policy formulation might serve as models for other regions. Europe, excluding Russia, usually holds four or five seats on the SC as presently constituted, including the permanent seats of the United Kingdom and France. Arguably, then, Europe has been since the UN’s inception the most overrepresented of all continents. Thus its voting strength as a proportion of the SC total would be reduced considerably under the proposed system. (But that would also be true in virtually all other SC reform proposals put forward in recent years.) Also, as frequently happens, when the European members of the SC vote on different sides of a particular issue, thereby cancelling each other out, the net result is that Europe’s power in the SC may come to little or nothing. (This was the case in voting on the failed SC resolution to take military action against Iraq in 2003.) If, on the other hand, Europe were to speak with a united voice, its power would exceed that of any other region. No other part of the world could so effectively serve as a counterweight to the United States, should the need arise. Latin America and the Caribbean (7.90 per cent) This region includes all the countries of the Americas to the south of the United States. All of its members belong to the Organization of American States, with the exception of Cuba (whose membership is presently suspended); all have had a long colonial past (mainly ending in the nineteenth century); and a great majority of the region’s population speak one of the Romance languages and adhere to Roman Catholicism. The region typically holds two SC seats, and several of its more frequently included member nations would probably initially oppose the relative reduction in power under the proposed system. Brazil might be [80] particularly reluctant to see its hopes for a permanent SC seat thwarted. Nevertheless, as with Europe, the potential for Latin America’s speaking to the traditional great powers with a united voice would likely enhance the region’s ability to play a significant role in world affairs. East Asia (7.24 per cent) This region would be one of several in which a single member nation, in this case Japan, would have a greater population and economic power than all the others (the Republic

1194

5 On a road to nowhere ?

of Korea and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, Nepal and Bhutan) combined. It would also be troubled by long-standing grievances between the two Koreas, as well as between both those nations and Japan. The DPRK, however, would be “an odd-man-out” in any regional group that one can envisage (assuming that China has a seat to itself). And the Republic of Korea and Japan, despite past animosity, carry out extensive two-way trade and, by and large, now live as good neighbours. As for landlocked Mongolia, Nepal and Bhutan – each wedged in geographically between two great powers – regional placement is inevitably problematic. But the fact that each must live within the shadow of China, plus one additional relative political giant, gives them a certain commonality of concern. Finally, all six states of the region have histories in which various forms of Buddhism have been and remain a powerful cultural force. For the region to cohere and function efficiently, it will have to be especially attentive to diplomatic protocol and intra-regional compromise. While the DPRK will probably maintain its policies of political intransigence, Japan, which would presumably be the regional seat holder more often than not, would probably find it advisable not to play too heavy-handed a role in the affairs of the region. Africa South of the Sahara (7.16 per cent) Comprising the 43 nations of Africa that are not members of the Arab League, this region would have the largest number of member states of any of the proposed regions. It would also have the smallest gross regional income. Its members all belong to the African Union, a presently weak body, but one that seeks to emulate the integrative experience of the European Union. The region’s world-view has been strongly shaped by shared historical experience, first with colonialism and then neocolonialism, and their attendant racism and rampant economic exploitation. Given Africa’s leading share of the UN membership, some proponents of an enlarged SC have suggested that Africa as a whole be awarded one fourth or more of the seats, including two permanent seats. It would thus not be easy to persuade African nations (especially Nigeria and South [81] Africa, both aspirants to permanent seats) to settle for a much smaller share of SC voting power. However, questions of prestige aside, if Africa’s nations reflect on their present negligible effectiveness in framing SC decisions to date and their susceptibility to pressures applied by external powers, they might conclude that they would be able to exert greater influence speaking with a common voice than through the voices of a few mainly weak states, each guided by its own political agenda. Southeast Asia (6.61 per cent) This relatively populous region is, arguably, the most culturally and politically diverse of the 12 proposed. Within it are mingled peoples practising Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and numerous tribal religions as well as states with remarkably diverse political and economic traditions derived from European, American and Asian colonial powers. Its constituent nations include several present or recent autocracies, among which are the military oligarchy of Burma/Myanmar (recently relaxing its draconian rule) and the nominally communistic regime of Viet Nam; a number of fledgling democracies, several of which have been especially susceptible to coups d’état (e.g. the Philippines); and a paternalistic welfare state (Singapore) that is like no other in the world. The region, however, is far less

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1195

diverse than Asia as a whole, which the United Nations now uncritically considers a region (sometimes along with and sometimes without Africa) for purposes of representation in the SC and other UN organs. In both area and population, the region is made up mainly by the 10 members of the remarkably successful ASEAN, plus outlying Sri Lanka and the recently independent Timor-Leste. The region has been perennially underrepresented in the SC, usually having either one or no representatives in a given year. (Indonesia’s minimal representation has been especially problematic.) Thus Southeast Asia would likely see itself as an immediate gainer under the proposed new system and, given its strong growth trajectory, might anticipate even greater gains in future decades. West Asia (6.49 per cent) Grouped within West Asia are 12 predominantly Muslim, but non-Arab, nations of Asia from Turkey eastward as far as Bangladesh. Other members include Pakistan and Iran, six former republics of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Maldives. Despite the region’s common faith, its level of political integration is minimal and the modern political antecedents of its constituent nations vary greatly. While all the suggested members are among the 57 states forming the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [82] (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference), there is no organization akin to the Arab League or ASEAN that covers an area corresponding to the whole or a greater part of the region. Save for Pakistan, the region has thus far been poorly represented in the SC, in many years lacking even a single member. Thus its constituent nations would presumably look favourably on the proposed system. Arab League (5.45 per cent) This strategically situated region is coterminous with the present League of Arab States and is marked by a relatively high degree of linguistic, religious and cultural homogeneity. It also shares a legacy of having been subjected to Ottoman and/or Western imperialism. It has from time to time acted in concert on political issues (especially concerning Israel), and for the foreseeable future will have great strategic importance because it accounts for a major share of the world’s production and reserves of petroleum and natural gas. One Arab state normally occupies an SC seat. While the region’s relative power might be seen as being slightly diminished under the proposed system, the loss should not be enough to elicit strenuous objection to change. Russia and Neighbours (4.67 per cent) This region comprises the present Russian Federation and five neighbouring republics that are, or were, participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States and are culturally – though not in all cases geographically – European, namely Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. A special problem in this grouping is that the political, economic and military power of Russia within it is much greater than that of all the other members combined. Despite the dissolution of the USSR, the subsequent kleptocratic turn of the Russian economy and the nation’s remarkable demographic decline, Russia retains a permanent SC seat and remains an important player on the global stage. It seems

1196

5 On a road to nowhere ?

likely, therefore, that it would not be receptive to major changes in the SC’s composition, though other states within the region might well be. But Russia’s attitude might change in the future as its economic recovery continues, thanks to its vast resource endowment in regard to petroleum, natural gas and other strategic minerals, and, most important, its well-educated population. Westminster League (4.54 per cent) The term “Westminster League” was coined by the author to relate to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 12 small island nations of the west- [83] ern Pacific. All but a few of these are parliamentary democracies within the Commonwealth of Nations, established by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, and all but Canada are members of the Pacific Islands Forum. The region’s three principal nations have similar histories of mainly European settlement, primarily English-speaking populations, advanced free-market economies and active and constructive engagement with the United Nations. They also cooperate closely in many global endeavours. While the small West Pacific island nations are culturally quite distinct, they too are mainly Westminster-style democracies, use English as a lingua franca and are under the political tutelage of Australia, New Zealand or the United States. Though sparsely populated and accounting for only 1 per cent of the world’s population (with Canada having not quite half that total), the region collectively accounts for 4.27 per cent of the world’s GNI (more than each of six other regions). Moreover, it coves a seventh of the world’s land area and therefore bears substantial responsibility in preserving global biodiversity and a healthy global ecosystem. Collectively, the region’s members have served a total of 27 years on the Security Council. There is ample reason to suppose that it would see itself as benefiting substantially from the proposed new system of SC representation. Concluding observations Despite divergent aspirations and perspectives, most nations should view favourably the SC reforms proposed here, while others, especially those aspiring to gain permanent or semi-permanent seats (with the notable exception of India), will not. Although certain regions that might appear to be losing relative strength in the SC (e.g. Africa or Latin America) would likely initially oppose the proposed change, dispassionate reflection on the inadequacies of the present system should eventually lead most of their constituent nations to a different view. The vast majority of nations would realize that in most years they are not represented at all, since seat holders predictably act almost exclusively in the interests of their respective home nations rather than in the interests of the regions from which they were selected. Further, nations would realize that, at any given time, some of the 10 non-permanent members that now ostensibly represent them are strongly constrained by considerations of political expediency and reluctant to give offence to great powers on whose good will they largely depend. Thus the collective effectiveness of the non-permanent members tends to be substantially less than it might ideally be. However, under the proposed system of universal representation, every nation would have some voice in the formulation of regional policy and in deciding how to vote on specific issues. [84] Finally, should restructuring the SC form part of a larger package of UN reforms, it would likely be accompanied by measures to strengthen the UN’s overall

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1197

competence so that its ability to be of use to nations of the global South would be greatly enhanced. Surrendering a bit of power in a relatively ineffectual body in anticipation of deriving substantial benefits from a revitalized organization should strike most world leaders as an eminently sensible trade-off. Means of selection, terms and functioning of representatives and alternates The process of selecting SC delegates and alternates under a system of universal regional representation would be somewhat different for single-nation regions and those with multiple members. Each nation in the former set would simply nominate its representative by whatever method its government prescribed (as is the current practice). Multinational regions would, by methods of their own devising, be allowed to nominate between two and five candidates, but with no two from the same country. Additionally, neither males nor females could constitute less than a third or more than two-thirds of the slate of nominees. From these slates, ranked-choice votes of the General Assembly would make the final selections. If no candidate had an absolute majority of the weighted votes cast, the candidate with the lowest total would be eliminated and his/her second place votes would be reassigned to the remaining candidates. The process would continue until one candidate obtained an absolute majority. The candidate with the second-highest total at that point would be designated as the region’s alternate representative and serve in the representative’s stead when needed. Rather than choosing all representatives for concurrent three-year terms, they would serve overlapping three-year terms, with four regional members being chosen each year. Nominations from multinational regions would be made in May or June, to allow time for campaigning up to the actual election in September. (Lobbying for support occurs even now as nations seek the few seats that are actually contested.*13) Terms would commence on the first working day of January in the year following election. Once elected, representatives would be expected to act in the SC on behalf of the entire group of nations they represent. This presumes regular consultation – whether face to face or, more routinely, by electronic means – among the foreign ministries and UN delegates of all the region’s members so as to work out common approaches in regard to issues coming before the SC, as well as frequent and full reporting by representatives to all the constituent nations. Egregious failure to meet these [85] expectations would probably lead to defections from the region and/or rejection of the representative by the region during the next triennial caucus period. Alternatively, the representative might be recalled even earlier by some previously agreed procedure and replaced by his/her alternate. […] [87] […] Representation with overlapping regional membership To this point, the discussion has presumed that each of the world’s nations would have membership in only one of the 12 proposed regions. But numerous nations have significant ties to more than one of the regions outlined in Figure 4.3. […] [88] […] Although a system allowing national affiliations with only one region would be simpler than one in which nations could simultaneously belong to two regions, there is no reason in principle why the latter could not be established. The key to devising a just

1198

5 On a road to nowhere ?

and workable system would be to establish rules whereby a country choosing membership in two regions would have its weight in decision-making divided between the two so [89] that its overall contribution to SC decision-making would be the same as if it were in only one region. […] A final stipulation in respect to any nation with overlapping regional memberships would be that it could be elected to the Security Council as a representative from either of the two regions to which it belonged, but not simultaneously from both. Eliminating the veto As previously emphasized, the anachronistic, morally indefensible veto power in the SC should be terminated, whatever the changes might be in respect to representation. Although an overwhelming majority of UN member nations would presumably support such a reform, its implementation would most likely be forestalled for a time by one or more P-5 powers. Surrender of the veto would require a substantial quid pro quo. In Chapter 2 a workable trade-off was suggested, establishing a veto-free SC in exchange for enhanced voting weights for the P-5 in a reformed and more empowered GA. But there should also be another powerful inducement, namely the certainty that a fairer voting system in both the [90] GA and the SC would enhance the legitimacy of UN decisions and contribute substantially to promoting a more lawful, just and orderly world. If, in a reformed United Nations, all or a great majority of nations were to be meaningfully represented, fewer individuals would conclude that resort to terrorism or revolution was the only effective means of bringing about political change; and those who did, nevertheless, actually engage in violence would find few supporters. But suppose that a bargain cannot be struck to do away with the veto by a single bold act. It might still be eliminated in stages, over a transitional period of, say, up to 15 years. This process could be effected, in part, by gradually increasing the number of P-5 nations whose dissenting votes would suffice to block resolutions that an otherwise qualifying SC majority favoured. Thus one might require two negative P-5 votes for a veto in the first five years of the reform period, three in the following five-year period and so forth. Additionally, there might be a phased narrowing in the range of subjects to which the veto might apply. The first step in this process would be to prohibit a veto by any of the P-5 in a case in which that member was itself a principal party. Subsequently, one might proscribe vetoes regarding egregious violations of human rights conventions, especially regarding genocide and ethnic cleansing.*14 Then one might preclude vetoes of resolutions calling for the use of inspection teams or monitors in situations deemed to present a threat to the peace. Vetoes of resolutions calling for economic sanctions against offending states might be permitted for a somewhat longer period. The last category of resolution on which the veto may be allowed might be resolutions calling for armed intervention in an area of actual or impending military conflict. Finally, any P-5 nation choosing to exercise its veto power over a specific issue should be required to submit to the GA a detailed legal explanation of its reasons for doing so.*15 Summary and conclusions That the Security Council is unfairly constituted is almost universally acknowledged. Although scores of reform proposals have been put forward, most fail to address

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1199

adequately the principal defects of the present system: the anachronistic special privileges of the P-5 (permanent membership and the power of the veto), and the SC’s insufficient representativeness. The proposed SC with 12 regional seats, each with a weighted vote, squarely addresses these shortcomings. It employs a simple mathematical formula that would greatly reduce politically arbitrary factors in the selection of SC representatives. The proposal would allow a small, objec- [91] tively determined number of powerful nations (presently the United States, China and India) to hold SC seats in their own right. The remaining seats would be allocated to multinational regions. The proposal would have two variants, one in which member nations could belong to only one region, and another in which simultaneous membership in two regions would be permissible. In either model, transfer of nations from one region to another would be allowed. Additional reforms would include phasing out the veto and establishing new rules for decision-making utilizing not only the elected SC representatives but also the foreign ministries of all of member nations. Reform will not be easy; but if the United Nations is to rise to the challenges it will confront in the century ahead, it will have to muster the will to correct its most glaring deficiencies. Original footnotes A good overview of the issues involved in respect to the Security Council, along with relevant abstracts from the text of several key documents, is provided by Paul Taylor, Sam Daws and Ute Adamczick-Gerteis (eds.), Documents on Reform of the United Nations, Part VI, “The Reform of the Security Council”, London: Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 415-58. Similar terrain is traversed by W. Andy Knight, “The Future of the UN Security Council: Questions of Legitimacy and Representation in Multilateral Governance”, in Andrew F. Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thurkur (eds.), Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002, pp. 19-38. A perspective rooted in international law, but focusing more on process than on structure, is provided by Benjamin B. Ferencz, New Legal Foundations for Global Survival: Security Through the Security Council, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1994. Also valuable from a legal perspective is Walter Hoffmann, United Nations Security Council Reform and Restructuring, Livingston, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, 1994. For thoughtful cautionary notes see Edward C. Luck, “How Not to Reform the United Nations”, Global Governance 11(4), 2005, pp. 407-414. *2 Capsule summaries of 73 proposals for SC reform over the period 1945-2005 are presented in Manuel Fröhlich, Klaus Hüfner and Alfredo Märker, Reform des UN-Sicherheitsrats: Modelle, Kriterien und Kennziffern, Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, 2005, pp. 19-40. Forty-nine proposals in this listing, which makes no claim to completeness, date from the period 1993-2005. For detailed, regular summaries of the work of the open-ended committee see the website of the Center for UN Reform Education, . *3 For a well-balanced discussion of the history of attempts to reform the SC, with particular attention to current debates, see Bardo Fassbender, “Pressure for Security Council Reform”, in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, pp. 341-55. A more *1

1200

5 On a road to nowhere ?

detailed analysis, written from a legal perspective, is provided by Ingo Winkelmann, “Bringing the Security Council into a New Era”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute, 1997, pp. 35-90. Although Winkelmann’s review may at first appear dated, the recent positions of the more vocal national delegations essentially recapitulate views put forward during the intense debates of the 1990s. *4 Joseph E. Schwartzberg, “Getting It Wrong on Security Council Reform”, paper presented at annual meeting of Academic Council on the United Nations System, Ottawa, 16-18 June 2005, unpublished, provides a detailed discussion. *5 Interestingly, the GA merely “acquiesced” in the post-Soviet assumption of power by the Russian Federation, but at no time took a vote legitimizing it. More tenuously one may assert that the “People’s Republic of China” is not the same nation as the “Republic of China”, designated as one of the P-5. *6 There has, however, not been a single case in the history of the SC when any combination of its non-permanent members has succeeded in blocking a vote on an issue on which the P-5 concurred. *7 Supporting the post-Westphalian approach adopted in this section is Luk Van Langenhove, “Towards a Regional World Order”, UN Chronicle 3, 2004, pp. 12-13 and 33. It asserts (p. 33) the need for a “global forum based on international law that allows world regions to interact with each other and settle their disputes”, and that “The Security Council needs to become a hybrid forum composed of nations that can be considered to be global actors, together with regional organizations that group the other nations into global actors.” *8 For two systems of representation based in large part on self-formed blocs of states see Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting, New York and The Hague, Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement, 2004. In both proposals the number of SC seats would be 18 and the proportion of the world’s population represented in any given year would likely exceed 90 per cent. *9 Among works proposing SC representation by regions or critiquing such proposals are Volker Weyel (ed.), “The Quest for Regional Representation: Reforming the United Nations Security Council”, Critical Currents 4, May 2008, special number (published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation); Kennedy Graham and Tania Felicio, Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council, with a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism, Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2006; Kennedy Graham, “Towards a Coherent Regional Institutional Landscape in the United Nations? Implications for Europe”, Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers No. 1, UNU/College of Europe, Bruges, 2008. *10 [Omitted.] *11 The author experimented with numerous formulae before concluding that the one presented here would yield an optimal set of weights. Regional data for six of these formulae (apart from those calling for equal regional votes) are provided in Joseph E. Schwartzberg, “Regional Representation as a Basis for Security Council Reform”, unpublished draft, November 2004. *12 The judgements that follow may fruitfully be compared with those of many authors represented in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.), Global

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1201

Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005. *13 David Malone, “Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council”, Global Governance 5(1), 2000, pp. 3-23, passim. *14 Ariela Blätter, “The Responsibility Not to Veto”, Minerva 37, November 2010, pp. 47-53, available at , and published by Citizens for Global Solutions in shortened form in The Global Citizen, Fall 2010, pp. 6-7. *15 Paolo Bargiacchi, “Strengthening the Rule of Law as a Means of Reforming the UN Security Council”, in Giovanni Finizio and Ernesto Gallo (eds.), Democracy at the United Nations: UN Reform in the Age of Globalisation, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 275-88. 5.5.4 2012, Richard Butler, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 23-39533 […] [37] […] I have recalled these stories as a way of illustrating how difficult it is to compose a new council. Nevertheless, I am going to make an attempt at a solution because it puts a little flesh on the bones. First, there need to be nine electoral regions rather than the current four. Each electoral region would be able to designate a “Permanent Member”. The identity of that permanent member could itself change. For example, the permanent member from the Latin American and Caribbean group for three years could be Brazil. Following agreement within the regional group, the subsequent three years [38] could see that same seat occupied by Argentina. The nine permanent members would each have a veto defined as follows: for the adoption of any proposition at least seven of them would have to vote in the affirmative. In other words, a proposition could be vetoed if three of them agreed to vote in the negative. In addition to these nine permanent members, each of the electoral groups would be allocated to a number of seats as follows: Western Europe: 2 Eastern Europe: 1 Mediterranean Africa/Arabia: 1 Southern Africa: 2 Central/Southern Asia: 2 North Asia: 1 Southeast Asia and Pacific: 3 North America: 1 Latin America and the Caribbean: 3 533  Reproduction of this excerpt courtesy of the Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs.    Richard William Butler (*1942) was an Australian diplomat and public official. He was Deputy Representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD, Ambassador for Disarmament (Geneva), Permanent Representative to the UN in New York (1992-97), Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission for the disarmament of Iraq (UNSCOM) (1997-99), and Governor of the Australian State Tasmania (2003-04). As Permanent Representative to the UN, he took part in the discussions about a reform of the Security Council.

1202

5 On a road to nowhere ?

The overall outcome would be a Security Council composed of 27 members – nine permanent and eighteen elected. […] 5.5.5 2013, Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, New York: Public Affairs534 […] [239] Proposals for Reform […] We should not underestimate the difficulties of persuading all the major powers of the world to agree to some concrete proposals for reform. Any such proposal will inevitably have winners and losers. Yet plain common sense can tell us a lot about how to reform global institutions, particularly that it would be manifestly absurd to have the five victors of World War II in 1945 remain as the five permanent members of the UNSC in 2015, seventy years after the end of the war. Plain common sense also tells us that in a world where Europe’s share of the global population has shrunk to 8 percent, it would be unjustifiable for Europe to retain 40 percent of the permanent seats of the UNSC, in the form of two individual seats out of five for the UK and France. Europe will have to make way for Asia, Africa, and Latin America to be better represented. To show that some kind of reform formula could open the way for the reform of global institutions, the best place to start is with reforming the hardest – the Security Council. We will never be able to work out a formula that will satisfy either 100 percent of the world’s population or 100 percent of the world’s countries. However, if we can persuade 80 percent of the world’s population or 80 percent of the world’s countries to accept such a formula, we would have taken a major step forward in trying to achieve a global consensus in reforming global institutions. Any such formula should give equal consideration to the three principles for reform spelled out in this chapter. And we have to balance these principles with some elements of common sense, including that the regions currently not represented at all as permanent members of the UNSC, [240] such as Africa and Latin America, will have to be represented. Common sense also dictates that it would be sheer folly to try to evict the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, from permanent membership, even if it does not meet the criteria of population or share of global power rankings. Equally importantly, if we want to have a functional rather than a dysfunctional UNSC, we will have to strictly control the number of veto-wielding permanent seats. On the basis of these criteria, we can suggest a new Security Council with seven permanent members. The US, China, and Russia would retain their historical claims. The UK and France would logically give up their seats to a single European seat representing Europe’s common security and foreign policy. The three remaining seats would 534  Reproduction of the excerpt of this article with the permission of the author and Hachette Book Group. – Kishore Mahbubani (* 1948) is a Singaporean academic and former diplomat. He is currently a senior adviser and professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. From 1971 to 2004 he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. He was the country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and, in that role, President of the Security Council in January 2001 and May 2002.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1203

then be allocated to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It would be fair for Asia to get two out of seven seats since Asia provides 55 percent of the world’s population. Because China and India each have more than one-seventh of the world’s population, it would make logical sense for both to get one seat each out of seven permanent seats. Securing agreement on how to allocate the seven permanent seats would not be difficult to work out. The logical seven candidates would be the EU, US, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Nigeria. Since the “permanent” members of the UNSC enjoy enormous privileges, this quite naturally leads to enormous resentment from those countries that feel they are equally deserving. A simple way to reduce the resentment is to attach significant responsibilities to these enormous privilege. Two such responsibilities are easy to mention. First, while all the permanent members should continue to pay their UN dues on the well-established principles of “capacity to pay,” each permanent member should pay a minimum additional sum to reflect their privileged status. As Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, “Great power involves great responsibility”. Hence, each permanent member should pay a minimum of 5-8 percent of the UN budget. If any of them claim that they are unable to make such a minimum payment (which in real terms would be an inconsequential sum of $206 million a year), they should automatically disqualify themselves for taking on the global responsibilities that a permanent member should take on. Second, the permanent members should also agree to serve as the ultimate “police departments” and “fire departments” of the world in the field of international peace and security. Hence, if genocide [241] were about to break out in Rwanda or Burundi, Sudan or Syria, the new permanent members should see it as their constitutional responsibility to prevent such genocides. The natural resentment of their privileged status will dissipate when it is made clear that permanent members also bear heavy burdens. The other key reason that the UN has not been able to secure agreement on UNSC reform is that for every potential winner in a new formula of allocating new permanent seats, there will be losers. To put it simply, if India gets in, Pakistan will be aggrieved; if Brazil gets in, Argentina and Mexico will be aggrieved; and if Nigeria gets in, South Africa and Egypt will be aggrieved. To solve this problem of “near-losers”: we can create a new category of seven “semipermanent” seats that are open to competition only among a limited number of member states that again qualify on the basis of their relative weight in the three principles already spelled out. This new category would then make all the near-losers winners in the new formula as they would thus have to compete for seats among a limited pool rather than having to compete among the 188 non-permanent member states. If we give equal weight to both share of global population and share of global power, then we could pick out, say, twenty-eight states that might compete for these seven seats. Since each semipermanent member would serve a two-year term, this would give these states a chance to return to the council every eight years instead of having to wait several decades. The current formula of competition among all 188 states has meant that even a relatively heavyweight country like India was kept out of the UNSC for two decades from 1992 to 2011 between its term in 1991-1992 and its term in 20112012. The seven semipermanent seats would help to win over the near-losers. At the same time, since the UN works on the basis of regional groupings, the twenty-eight seats could be allocated on this basis: nine seats for Asia-Pacific, seven seats for Africa

1204

5 On a road to nowhere ?

and Western Europe, four for Latin America, and one for Eastern Europe to reflect their relative weights in the new political order. I have no doubt that there will be some disagreement about how to allocate these semipermanent seats among the regional groups. However, if we use the average of a country’s share of global population and of GDP, we can work out the list of the twenty-eight deserving countries. Table 7.1 lists the countries that could be selected. [242] TABLE 7.1 Selected semipermanent members of the UN Security Council Country

GDP 2010

% of Population % of Share of UN regional Global 2010 Global 2010 global group GDP Popu- GDP and 2010 lation population

JAPAN

$5,488,416,495,785 8.69% 127,450,459 1.85% 5.27%

Asia-Pacific

 4

GERMANY

$3,258,947,368,421 5.16%

81,776,930 1.19% 3.17%

Western European and Others

 5

FRANCE

$2,549,027,263,158 4.04%

65,075,569 0.94% 2.49%

Western European and Others

 7

1.12% 239,870,937 3.48% 2.30%

Global ranking

INDONESIA

$708,026,840,495

Asia-Pacific

 8

UNITED KINGDOM

$2,251,898,461,538 3.57%

62,231,336 0.90% 2.23%

Western European and Others

 9

ITALY

$2,043,639,726,121 3.24%

60,483,385 0.88% 2.06%

Western European and Others

11

MEXICO

$1,035,870,880,242 1.64% 113,423,047 1.65% 1.64%

Latin American 12 and Caribbean

CANADA

$1,577,040,082,218 2.50%

34,126,181 0.49% 1.50%

Western European and Others

13

SPAIN

$1,383,344,736,842 2.19%

46,070,971 0.67% 1.43%

Western European and Others

14

PAKISTAN

$176,869,569,654

KOREA, SOUTH

$1,014,890,141,871 1.61%

0.28% 173,593,383 2.52% 1.40% 49,410,000 0.72% 1.16%

Asia-Pacific

15

Asia-Pacific

17

BANGLADESH $100,357,022,444

0.16% 148,692,131 2.16% 1.16%

Asia-Pacific

18

TURKEY

$731,144,392,556

1.16%

72,752,325 1.06% 1.11%

Western European and Others

19

PHILIPPINES

$199,589,447,424

0.32%

93,260,798 1.35% 0.83%

Asia-Pacific

21

IRAN*1

$331,014,973,186

0.54%

72,289,291 1.07% 0.81%

Asia-Pacific

22

EGYPT

$218,894,280,920

0.35%

81,121,077 1.18% 0.76%

African

23

1205

5 On a road to nowhere ? Country

GDP 2010

% of Population % of Share of UN regional Global 2010 Global 2010 global group GDP Popu- GDP and 2010 lation population

Global ranking

THAILAND

$318,907,879,752

0.51%

24

69,122,234 1.00% 0.75%

Asia-Pacific

VIETNAM

$106,426,845,157

0.17%

86,927,700 1.26% 0.71%

Asia-Pacific

26

SOUTH AFRICA

$363,523,195,188

0.58%

49,991,300 0.73% 0.65%

African

27

POLAND

$469,781,791,045

0.74%

38,183,683 0.55% 0.65%

Eastern European

28

ETHIOPIA

$29,684,016,194

0.05%

82,949,541 1.20% 0.63%

African

29

ARGENTINA

$368,710,961,381

0.58%

40,412,376 0.59% 0.59%

Latin American 30 and Caribbean

COLOMBIA

$288,764,794,424

0.46%

46,294,841 0.67% 0.56%

Latin American 31 and Caribbean

VENEZUELA

$393,807,511,437

0.62%

28,834,000 0.42% 0.52%

Latin American 33 and Caribbean

DR CONGO

$13,109,525,211

0.02%

65,965,795 0.96% 0.49%

African

34

ALGERIA

$161,979,441,019

0.26%

35,468,208 0.51% 0.39%

African

40

TANZANIA

$22,915,004,297

0.04%

44,841,226 0.65% 0.34%

African

43

KENYA

$32,198,151,217

0.05%

40,512,682 0.59% 0.32%

African

45

*1

2010 data unavailable, figures from 2008. Source: Data from World Bank 2010, http://databank.worldbank.org.

Any formula for reform of the UNSC must also win the support of the majority of the UN member states, which mostly comprises relatively small states. They command the largest share of votes in the UN General Assembly. If they do not support a formula for reform, there will be no reform. Hence, all these small states should also get seven elected seats in the revised UNSC. In theory, the 160 remaining states that will have to compete for these seven seats will be seen as “losers”. Currently, they can, in theory, compete for ten non-permanent seats in the UNSC. But in practice, [243] they will be winners. Why? There has never been a level playing field in the competition among all the UN member states. Many of the middle powers, such as Brazil (ten times), Egypt (five times), and Japan (nine times), have served frequently in the Security Council. But small states, such as Singapore (one time), the United Arab Emirates (one time), and Guyana (two times), serve very rarely. The creation of semi-permanent seats for the middle powers may, paradoxically, create more political space for representation by the small states in a new twenty-one-member UNSC. This twenty-one-member council would be superior to the current fifteen member council in many ways. It would enjoy greater “representational” legitimacy since a much larger percentage of the world’s population would be represented in its deliberations. Hence, it would respect the first principle of democracy in its new composition. Also, since geopolitics is also about geography, it would be an obvious improvement to have a permanent member from each of the regional groups. Each region has its own geopolitical dynamics. The permanent member from each region would be under

1206

5 On a road to nowhere ?

pressure to represent that region’s interests. All this could help to promote greater geopolitical stability. Equally importantly, the middle powers of the world, which have hitherto resented their exclusion from the Security Council and which resent the enormous effort they have to put into getting re-elected once a decade or so, would feel happier at the prospect of automatically rejoining the council every eight years. The middle powers would also be winners. The smaller states should also benefit from this new formula since they would not have to compete with the-middle powers for the scarce number of elected seats in the council. […] [244] […] The Advantages of the 7-7-7 Formula In conclusion, let me emphasize one point. The failure of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform to make any progress after twenty years of meeting was not an accident. Several forces worked to ensure its failure. The P5, quite naturally, wanted their privileged status to carry on in perpetuity. Hence, while they paid lip service – and in some cases eloquent lip service – to the need for change, they were privately ecstatic that no change had come. They would be quite happy to see another twenty years of gridlock. Similarly, a whole range of middle powers that saw themselves only as potential losers worked very hard to perpetuate this gridlock. This is why Pakistan and Argentina, Italy and South Korea (to name a few) worked hard to block any kind of change, including (as indicated in Chapter 3) changes in the working methods of the UNSC that could benefit the world as a whole. This was obviously an act of massive irresponsibility. These middle powers were essentially saying, “I don’t care if the world bums. I only care about blocking my bigger neighbor from succeeding”. Such narrow definitions of national interest are one reason that reform of our global order is so difficult. This is why my proposed formula of seven permanent seats, seven semipermanent seats, and seven elected seats is superior to all previous formulas put forward for UNSC reform. It creates winners at all levels, including middle powers that have blocked all UNSC reform ruthlessly. The [245] only real losers will be the UK and France. But they will be compensated in other ways. First, they will give up their permanent seats in favor of a common European seat that they can also participate in (and they can reach a private agreement with their European partners to have a “permanent” presence in a permanent European seat). Second, they will not have to worry about trying to defend the legitimacy of a UNSC that is “frozen” in the old order. France and the UK would gain little by being permanent members of an organization that is progressively losing its legitimacy. The other big advantage of the 7-7-7 formula is that it is dynamic. It can and should be reviewed every ten years. Hence, if the economy of any middle power does exceptionally well and it is qualified to join the group of twenty-eight on the basis of the stipulated criteria, it could well claim a semipermanent seat. This principle of creating mechanisms for constant review and change in major international organizations would represent a major leap forward in human history because all major international organizations, including the UNSC, the IMF, and the World Bank, have hitherto stoutly resisted mechanisms for constant review. Yet as we move into a world of even more rapid changes and major shifts of power, it would be fatal for any international organization not to have mechanisms for constant review. Indeed, provisions for change should be an essential requirement for all international organizations. […]

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1207

5.5.6 2014, James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence, Cambridge University Press535 […] [235] […] Of course, the governments serving on the UNSC all face some degree of accountability to their home countries. Indeed, the benefits that they extract during their UNSC term may serve their domestic audiences. Certainly we expect term-limited members to pursue strategies that maximize their survival chances at home. As argued in Chapter 6, some governments may be able to put the foreign aid that they receive to good use. Democracies may use the foreign aid they receive particularly well. Still, governments ridden with debt may attempt to extract foreign aid that is not well used. The research of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010)536 suggests that the effects may even be systematically pernicious. So, there may be reason to attempt to curtail the practice of trading financial favors for political influence over the UNSC and to design a more accountable UNSC. [236] Note that the quest for foreign aid is not the only reason governments seek elections to the UNSC. Certain governments have domestically driven political incentives that lead them to seek reelection to the UNSC. Japan, Brazil, India, Germany, and other powerful countries have certainly attempted to win election when they can, over and again. They may not be allowed to seek immediate reelection, but they can run for election again after sitting out for a year. These governments seek a powerful voice for their country on the international stage – they are not interested in trading away this political influence for financial favors. To win election, however, these governments must appeal to the countries with the power to elect them – the voters in the UNGA. Of course, if one wants an institution where regional interests win representation, the nexus of election should not be located in the General Assembly but rather in the regions themselves. Not only does the current institutional design of the selection process fail to incentivize to pursue regional interests, it actually isolates the “representatives” from regional pressures by granting the power to elect them to the General Assembly. Hence, we suggest two simple reforms that could begin to address the issue of accountability to regions: 1. Abolish term limits. 2. Let regions elect their representatives. 535  Copyright Cambridge University Press 2014. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. – Since 2018, James Raymond Vreeland is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Previously he taught at Georgetown University (2009-18) and Yale University (1999-2008). He conducts research in the field of international political economy, specializing in international institutions. He has held teaching and research affiliations with a number of universities around the world.    Since 2011, Axel Dreher is Professor of International Economics and Development Economics at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Previously he taught at the University of Konstanz, Germany, the ETH Zurich, and the University of Göttingen, Germany. His research focuses on development economics, globalization, and political economy. 536  Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce/Smith, Alastair, The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership, 54(5) Journal of Conflict Resolution 667-86 (2010).

1208

5 On a road to nowhere ?

Abolishing term limits stands as the more important of our two suggestions. Allowing for reelection represents the key to accountability. The prospect of reelection provides an incentive for UNSC members to serve on the UNSC in such a way as to win the support of other countries during their next campaign. Under the current system, when deciding how to cast a vote on a UNSC proposal, elected UNSC members must weigh their local political concerns against the prospective bribes of foreign aid. We illustrate this logic in the formal model presented in Chapter 2. If there were no term limits, however, governments would also consider how their voting behavior influences their reelection chances. This new consideration would not eliminate the other two, but it would raise a mitigating factor that would make them tenuously accountable to an electorate. This reform would also open the door to accommodate rising powers. With the prospect of reelection, countries that are currently elected the most often (for example, Brazil), would likely win reelection the most often, bringing them closer to permanent status. Now, the continued reelection of these regional hegemons might appear to disenfranchise [237] other countries in their respective regions because these other countries would have less chance of winning election. Regional hegemons could win reelection, however, only if other countries felt they were doing a good job. Unlike true permanent members, they would have to win election regularly, and they could do so only by winning favor with voting countries. Part of the strategy for reelection would entail voting in ways that the electorate endorses. Another part of the strategy would involve doing other good deeds for the electorate – perhaps providing them foreign aid. In an interesting turn, elected UNSC members might stop receiving foreign aid and instead start providing it to their electorate. Indeed, this appears to be part of the story already for rich countries that are elected, such as Japan, Germany, and Canada, according to Malone (2004).*1 Which electorate should choose the representative? This question leads to our second recommendation: Let regions elect their representatives. With term limits abolished, we open the door to accountability but leave open the question of to whom UNSC members should be accountable. As it currently stands, the system guarantees UNSC membership from the African, Asian, Latin American, Eastern European, and the amorphous Western Europe and Others groups. But these groups do not have the final say in selecting their representatives – this power lies in the collective hands of the UNGA. […] [239] […] How can the Security Council accommodate rising powers without alienating their regional rivals? Perhaps a compromise would be to allow for reelection, on the one hand, and greater control at the regional level, on the other. If we allow for regions to fully control the elections (instead of requiring a two-thirds majority of the UNGA), regional rivals and smaller countries would have the means to hold the regional hegemons accountable, or the hegemons would face eviction from office. The hegemons can repeatedly win a high-profile seat on the international stage only if they please their rivals, who might become their power-brokers at the regional level. […] Original footnote

*1 Note that O’Brien (1999: 38) proposes that regional groups should be allowed to decide

on the length of tenure of its representatives, but he does not specify extending them

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1209

through reelection. [Terence O’Brien, Electoral Group Reconfiguration and Present Day Realities, in: Ramesh Thakur (ed.), What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century: Report of a seminar held by the International Peace Academy and the United Nations University, 26 March 1999, New York: United Nations University, → 4.5.1.] On providing foreign aid to win election to international committees, see Vreeland (2011). [James R. Vreeland, Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton Woods – The Swiss-Bloc Case, 6 Review of International Organizations 369-91.] 5.5.7 7 February 2015, The Elders, Strengthening the United Nations537 […] What needs to change? All institutions must adapt to cope with new circumstances – and today’s circumstances are very different from those of 1945. There have been profound shifts of power and wealth in the world since then. Of the 193 member states of the United Nations today, nearly three quarters were not members in 1945 – in a few cases because they had been on the wrong side in the second world war, but in the great majority of cases because at that time they did not yet exist as independent states. Yet the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acting on behalf of all the member states, is still dominated by the same five permanent members that were designated all those years ago, being the five great powers that had just won the war. The governments of those five powers have become so used to their exalted status, which is protected by their ability to veto any change in the Charter, that they think of it almost as their natural right, sometimes forgetting that it is above all a responsibility. They assume that the world will continue to respect their authority, and fail to notice that, year by year, that authority is eroding. The peoples of the global South, especially, do not see themselves adequately represented in the Council. They are therefore more and more inclined to question its authority, and the legitimacy of its decisions. We ignore this threat at our peril. Recalling the wise guidance of our founder, Nelson Mandela, we, The Elders, call on governments to listen to their peoples, and on peoples to insist that their governments make more farsighted decisions. We call on both the existing permanent members of the Security Council and the rest of the membership of the Organization to accept the urgency of strengthening 537  Reproduction of the excerpt of this proposal courtesy of The Elders Foundation, London. For the full text, see .    The Elders are a small independent group of former leading politicians working together for peace, justice and human rights. Initiated by the entrepreneur Sir Richard Branson and the musician Peter Gabriel, the group was founded in 2007 by Nelson Mandela. Its secretariat is in London. At present (2019), Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland, is chair of The Elders, while former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and former Minister of Education of Mozambique Graça Machel are deputy chairs. From 2013 until his death in 2018, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was chair of The Elders.

1210

5 On a road to nowhere ?

the United Nations, and therefore accept also the compromises – sometimes painful ones – that will be needed to make it possible. Our proposals 1. A New Category of Members In principle, the existing permanent members claim to be ready to welcome new ones. But their sincerity has not been tested because the rest of the membership cannot agree on essential points: which countries, and how many, should be new permanent members, and should they, like the existing ones, be given a veto over the Council’s substantive divisions? In the view of many, the use or abuse of the veto is responsible for some of the Council’s most conspicuous failures, when it does not intervene in time, or with sufficient force, to protect the victims of genocide and other comparable crimes. Those states are understandably reluctant to give yet more powers the right of veto. We therefore propose a compromise. Let the states which aspire to permanent membership accept instead, at least for the time being, election to a new category of membership, which would give them a much longer term than the two years served by the non-permanent members, and to which they could be immediately re-elected when that term expires. This would enable them to become de facto permanent members, but in a more democratic way, since it would depend on them continuing to enjoy the confidence of other member states. By making the Council more democratic, this change would increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the world, thereby enhancing its authority and so also making it more effective. This compromise will not be easy for states which aspire to full permanent membership to accept. But we urge them, for the greater good, to set aside for now their larger ambition. If they do, we believe that other member states will be willing to accord them this special status, whereas their chances of achieving full permanent membership in the near or even medium term still seem remote. Half a loaf (and we submit that in its practical effects it would be much more than half) is proverbially better than no bread. And “no bread” in this instance means continuing the present stalemate, at an unacceptable cost to humanity and to innocent human lives. Even so, such a change requires amendment of the Charter, which requires a twothirds majority in the General Assembly and then ratification by two thirds of all UN members, including all five permanent members of the Security Council. This can be done. […] But it will inevitably take some time: all the more reason for starting the process without further delay. Meanwhile, we propose three other changes, which do not require Charter amendment. We believe all three are urgently needed, to make the UN more effective, more authoritative and more efficient in its work of maintaining the peace. They should not wait until this first one has been completed. 2. A Pledge by the Existing Permanent Members As already noted, on too many issues the Security Council is deadlocked by the failure of its permanent members to agree on a course of action, with the result that millions of people are left to suffer while great powers score debating points off each other. As the UN’s founders understood, without the united support of the permanent members, both material and moral, the Council cannot act.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1211

None of us has forgotten the Holocaust, Rwanda, Srebenica, Saddam Hussein’s campaign against Iraq’s Kurds, or the killing fields of Cambodia. No part of the world has been spared these horrors. So the political will must be summoned to prevent, or at least limit, their repetition. We therefore call on the five existing permanent members to pledge themselves to greater and more persistent efforts to find common ground, especially in crises where populations are being subjected to, or threatened with, genocide or other atrocity crimes. States making this pledge will undertake not to use, or threaten to use, their veto in such crises without explaining, clearly and in public, what alternative course of action they propose, as a credible and efficient way to protect the populations in question. This explanation must refer to international peace and security, and not to the national interest of the state casting the veto, since any state casting a veto simply to protect its national interests is abusing the privilege of permanent membership. And when one or more permanent members do feel obliged to cast a veto, and do provide such an explanation, the others must undertake not to abandon the search for common ground but to make even greater efforts to agree on an effective course of action. […] 5.5.8 17 March 2015, Elect The Council, Towards a legitimate and effective UN Security Council, Concept Note, Version 1538 […] We propose a global initiative in which civil society and ordinary citizens use the power of an interconnected world to agitate for a specific set of fair and equitable proposals 538  Reproduction of this paper courtesy of Elect the Council, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa. Elect The Council is an international campaign for the reform of the UN Security Council. The campaign is coordinated by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African non-profit organisation with offices in South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal.    The proposal presented by “Elect The Council” was put forward in several versions. As of 1 July 2019, a sixth version of October 2017 existed (→ 5.5.9). Note the following changes: Version 2 maintained the two-tier system. However, each electoral region should have one five-year and two three-year seats per 22 member countries. The current P5 members would immediately lose their veto power but remain members of the UNSC for 15 years without the need to be elected, and would occupy five of the five-year seats. In the first fiveyear period the vote of each of the P5 would count as three votes, in the second five-year period as two votes. After 15 years, the P5 would need to stand for elections in their respective regions if they wished to remain on the Security Council. – Version 3 was similar to the second. However, it was proposed to provide the P5 with additional voting privileges during the 15-year transition period. Under an Option A, their votes would carry more weight than those of ordinary members of the Council, decreasing in weight over time. Under Option B, a decreasing number of Council members would be required to support a resolution. Both substantive and procedural decisions of the Council would require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. A mandatory review would occur every 30 years. – Version 4 retained all the essential elements of version 3. An important addition was that global powers that exceed a set proportion of the world’s population, economy and defence expenditure would automatically qualify for seats. After the

1212

5 On a road to nowhere ?

to amend the UN Charter. Our goal is to establish a broad-based global partnership of civil society organisations that will work with states to ensure action by two-thirds of the members of the UNGA, including the P5 members, to reform the UNSC in line with the global norm of elected representation. […] SIZE AND DURATION […] In accordance with Article 109 of the UN Charter, we focus our efforts towards a General Conference of UN member states to review the Charter. […] The purpose of the General Conference would be to propose amendments to the current provisions in the Charter contained in Chapter V: The Security Council (articles 23 to 32). These amendments should allow for the establishment of a two-tier system of elected membership (for five and three years respectively), bound to five technical requirements for candidacy, based on the current regions that vote for nonpermanent seats in the UNSC,*1 namely the Eastern European Group (EEG), the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), Africa Group and Asia-Pacific Group. Technically the USA is not a formal member of any bloc, but is an observer on the WEOG group. Proposal new membership UNSC Regional group

Current number of members

Current % of Five-year members elected members on UNSC

Three-year elected members on UNSC

Total members on the UNSC

Africa

54

28.0

2

5

7

Asia-Pacific

53

27.5

2

4

7

EEG

23

11.9

1

2

3

GRULAC

33

17.1

1

3

4

WEOG

30

15.5

1

3

4

8

16

24

Total

193

100

Note that the United States is viewed as part of WEOG in the table above.

The calculation of membership of the UNSC that is proposed by Elect the Council is set out below. It is based on a formula of one five-year member per 24 countries, and double the number of five-year members to be elected for three-year terms, rounded off.*2 This gives a UNSC membership of 24 (similar in total to both option A and B

transition period, the Council would consist of 24 elected countries plus the two or three countries automatically qualifying for membership. – Version 5, presented on 5 May 2017, proposed a transition period of 20 years. During that period, the current P5 would remain members of the Council. Accordingly, the Council would consist of 26 countries because three of the P5 would occupy three of the eight five-year elected seats. The P5 would also be provided with additional voting privileges during that period.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1213

contained in the In Larger Freedom report),539 consisting of 8 countries elected for five years and 16 countries elected for three years. The proposal is for two distinct terms of membership – for three and five years respectively – with the latter group allowing for indefinite re-election.*3 Reasonably, one can also assume that the increased complexity of the global community should require slightly longer terms than the current two-year term of the non-permanent seats in the UNSC. Without prescribing, our hope is that global powers and regional leaders will be re-elected on the five-year ticket, and that the three-year category of membership will allow for flexibility and representativeness. There is no magic or ideal size for the UNSC that would satisfy all – and beyond management theories about the maximum size of committees, the only reasonable benchmark for the size of a reformed Council could be the average size of national cabinets; yet these also vary in size and form. Generally, the P5 argue for a smaller increase in the size of a future Council based on their stated emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency. Many in the developing world, on the other hand, argue for a larger increase in the interests of legitimacy and representation. Neither Africa nor Latin America is currently represented amongst the P5, implying that any effort at equity in representation necessarily involves an increase in numbers. The proposed composition of the Council per region is reflected in Figure 2 below. Figure 2: Seats by voting regions As the number of countries in any of African Group 8 the groups increases or decreases, this will Asia-Pacific Group 8 automatically impact upon the allocation 3 of seats in the UNSC. The result is a simple Eastern European Group yet flexible structure that is representative GRULAC 5 of all regions in an equitable manner and WEOG 5 balances the need for an increase in size (legitimacy) with the need for effectiveness and efficiency. The tentative criteria for countries that are elected for five year are proposed as follows:*4 a. Experience (i.e. deployment) and capacity (i.e. actual engagement) in conflict resolution, peace support operations, humanitarian support and post-conflict resolution; b. In financial good standing with the UN and its agencies; c. Financial contributions to the UN, its agencies and efforts (i.e. above payment of mandatory contributions); d. Respect for open, inclusive and accountable governance, the rule of law and international human rights standards; e. A retiring member will be eligible for immediate re-election. The criteria for countries that are elected for three years will be same, except that countries will not be eligible for immediate re-election.

539  21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, → 4.1.21.

1214

5 On a road to nowhere ?

In line with current practice, elections for both categories should be staggered to allow for continuity. Therefore, based on the proposal for 24 members elected for three and five years, the associated electoral cycle would be as follows: Proposed electoral cycle Year one

Year two

Year three

Year four

Year five Year six

Year seven

Etc.

Elections for 3 year members

5

6

5

5

6

5

5

6

Elections for 5 year members

2

1

2

1

2

2

1

2

Total

7

7

7

6

8

7

6

8

The five regions will expectedly arrange their internal processes for nominations either through a competitive process or some type of restricted system of rotation (since not all countries would qualify or wish to serve on the UNSC). In time, the UN may wish to seek additional financial contributions from members serving on the UNSC through a set formula.*5 […] VOTING Within the UNSC, each elected country will have one vote. Both substantive and procedural decisions within the UNSC will require a two-thirds majority of those attending and voting. Similar to current provisions, parties to a conflict would have the right to be heard but may not vote (if they are serving members of the Council). This initiative therefore includes the abolition of the veto*6 as well as of permanent membership of the UNSC. TRANSITIONARY ARRANGEMENTS The process of transition from the current system to the new would stretch over several years to allow the phasing in of fully elected members in all categories of membership. It would require that the current UNSC continue while ratification at national level proceeds apace; a process that should occur, as part of the UNGA enabling resolution, within one year from the date of the passing of that resolution. Newly elected members would then be phased in as members from the old system are retired, some having agreed to have their terms extended to allow for the transition. […] Original footnotes The formula for regional groups for the purposes of elections to the UNSC is also set out in GA resolution 1991 (XVIII), which was adopted in 1963 and took effect in 1965. Under that resolution, the five seats originally corresponding to the African and Asia-Pacific states were combined. In reality, the candidates for elections for the African (three seats) and Asia-Pacific (two seats) operate separately. *2 Based on double the actual fraction of five-year members, with the result rounded off. Changing the number of countries per elected member on the UNSC to 23 or 25 would change the size of the Council to 25 and 23 members respectively, see annex B. *1

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1215

*3 This draws on the provisions contained in the African Union’s Protocol on its Peace and Security Council, which provides for two categories of two and three-year membership. *4 Although for a different formula, the criteria proposed by the UN report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, are that new members of the UNSC must have contributed ‘most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically’, particularly through contributions to the UN assessed budgets and through participation in mandated peace operations. The other conditions identified in the report are that new members should ‘represent the broader UN membership, increase the demographic and accountable nature of the Security Council, and should not impair its effectiveness.’ UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility (A/59/565), 2 December 2004, par. 24460 [→ 4.1.19]. According to a 2005 statement by the US Department of State, the US is in favour of a ‘criteria-based approach under which potential members must be supremely well qualified, based on factors such as: economic size, population, military capacity, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, contributions to UN peacekeeping, and record on counterterrorism and non-proliferation. We have to look, of course, at the overall geographic balance of the Council, but effectiveness remains the benchmark for any reform.’ U.S. Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective United Nations, U.S. Department of State, 20 June 2005, as cited by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_ Council#cite_note-state2005-56 India has also come out in support of criteria-based approach for any expansion of permanent membership, and came the closest to calling for elections by referring to the democratic deficit in its composition. *5 The current scales of assessments are set out in General Assembly resolution 67/238 Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations, A/RES/67/238, 11 February 2013. *6 The power of the veto is particularly problematic. A P5 member can prevent the adoption of any (non-procedural) UNSC draft resolution not to their liking. Even the threat of a veto may lead to changes in the text of a resolution, or it being withheld altogether (the ‘pocket veto’). As a result, the power of veto often prevents the Council from acting to address pressing international issues and affords the P5 great influence within the UN institution as a whole, including to the selection of the UNSG, as well as any amendments to the UN Charter (Art 108 and 109).

5.5.9 3 October 2017, Elect The Council, Avoiding Crisis: Towards a legitimate and effective UN Security Council, Version 6, Summary Note540 The approach and conclusions of Elect The Council’s proposals are as follows: 1. Not all states can shoulder the same responsibilities in relation to global peace and security. A future UNSC needs to be flexible while reflecting the emerging distribution of power. Long-term forecasts of power indicate a three-tiered global structure 540  Reproduction of this paper courtesy of Elect the Council, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa. → subsection 5.5.8 above for version 1 of the proposal, and footnote 539 above for the changes in the different versions. Version 6 is presented in the form of a “concept note” and a “summary note”, the latter being reproduced here.

1216

5 On a road to nowhere ?

consisting of two (eventually three) global powers (the United States [US], China and then India) with a large gap between these three and other states such as Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Turkey, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France, etc. Most states are much lower down in the power stakes, constituting a third cluster. Elect the Council takes the view that the top tier of global powers must be included in a reformed UNSC. A council without them could be ignored or bypassed. The proposal therefore provides for a category of states that each have 3% of global population and 5% of global gross domestic product (at MER) and which contribute 5% of the UN budget, to automatically qualify to serve on the council while meeting all three criteria. In addition, coalitions of states that collectively meet these criteria could also apply for a global powers seat. These states/coalitions would have enhanced voting powers in the council in that each of their votes would count for three, but they would lose their membership in the electoral regions that currently nominate the non-permanent members for election in the UNGA. They would also not be allowed to vote in the UNGA during the election of other states to the UNSC. Table: Interim and final composition of the UNSC Interim UNSC composition

Final UNSC composition

5 countries elected for 3 years renewable

8 countries elected for 3 years renewable

China, France, Russia, UK, US

2 or 3 global powers and/or coalitions

16 countries elected for 3 years

16 countries elected for 3 years

Total: 26

Total: 26 or 27

2. In a complex world, the UN is increasingly working with and through regional organisations and relies on regional powers to play an important role in their respective geographical space. The proposal therefore provides for a category of regional powers, consisting of states that are elected to serve on the UNSC for an immediately renewable term of three years. Each of the electoral regions that currently nominate the non-permanent members of the UNSC would nominate one regional state for every 22 (rounded off) members. Actual elections would occur as normal within the UNGA (without the participation of global powers/members of global coalitions). 3. A third category of 16 rotational seats completes the composition of the council. Each region would be entitled to elect two states to the UNSC for every 22 (rounded off) members. These seats would not be immediately renewable and states would serve for a three-year term. Global powers and members of global coalitions would also not be allowed to vote in the election of the rotational seats. In this manner, the reformed council would ensure proportional representation of all regions on an equitable basis. Together with the other two categories of seats, a reformed UNSC would therefore consist of 24 elected countries plus two or three global powers or global coalitions. 4. No state would have a permanent seat on the UNSC, and the move to a new configuration would occur over a phased 18-year period. This would mean that the composition and working of the UNSC would follow the unfolding shifts in global power distribution. During the 18-year interim period the current P5 would remain members of the council with enhanced voting rights, but no veto. The council would

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1217

additionally consist of 16 states elected for non-renewable three-year terms (as set out earlier) and five states elected for renewable three-year terms. This is because three of the P5 (China, the UK/France and Russia) already serve in three respective electoral regions. After the interim period the number of states elected for renewable three-year terms would increase from five to eight. 5. The UNSC is the only executive and legislative body entrusted with ensuring international peace and security. States that serve on the council should therefore have the resources, experience and global representation to make a meaningful contribution to peace and security. To this end we propose four minimum requirements. We believe that these criteria are best left to the geographical regions to apply in determining nominations for elections within the UNGA. The criteria are: i. Experience and capacity ii. Financial good standing with the UN and its agencies iii. Willingness to shoulder additional financial contributions to UN efforts on international peace and security, as determined by the UNGA iv. Respect for open, inclusive and accountable governance, the rule of law, international law and international human rights standards 6. Similar to current arrangements, electoral regions would nominate states for the 24 elected seats, but actual voting would occur within the UNGA. This arrangement would allow each region to manage its electoral processes according to its own preferences. 7. By adopting a system of proportional representation an expanded council would more equitably represent different regions, and would restore the legitimacy of the UN and the UNSC. The category of elected regional powers for renewable threeyear terms should help change the dynamic between regional powers and other states in the same electoral college. The proposals would not be affected by changes to the composition of the current geographical regions, or by the establishment of crossregional groups to accommodate the interests of groups such as the Arab Group and Small Island and Development States (SIDS). 8. It is important to create incentives for the P5 to change. In a reformed council, the vote of all elected states would count for one while the vote of global powers/ coalitions would each count for three. During the 18-year transition period the votes of the P5 would initially each count for five (years 1 to 6), then four (years 7 to 12) and eventually three (years 13 to 18). 9. There are many obstacles that could impede progress. We propose that the current UNSC define up to five specific issues that should not attract additional Chapter VII resolutions for a period of 20 years after the adoption of the enabling UNGA resolution to amend the UN Charter, Change to, beyond updates, removal, maintenance or termination of existing decisions. 10. The establishment of a regular review process of the UNSC would create the opportunity for future improvements and avoid a recurrence of the current impasse. A mandatory periodic review of the UNSC every 30 years would therefore be included in the UNGA resolution to amend the UN Charter. 11. In all of the above, the UN Charter would include provisions to ensure the council is not held hostage to procedure by a handful of its members. In this manner, outstanding issues such as the finalisation of the rules of procedure (which are still

1218

5 On a road to nowhere ?

provisional) should be able to proceed apace. The UNGA and the International Court of Justice would serve to break procedural deadlocks as appropriate. 12. These proposals would be contained in a single amendment to the UN Charter. The proposals set out here differ fundamentally from the efforts to find an approach that could appease the P5, as well as aspirants to additional permanent or semi-permanent seats and groupings opposed to any enlargement of the permanent category of seats. It is important to address the incentives to change for different countries and groupings. What possible motivations would lead the P5 or others to move from their current positions? We offer four compelling reasons. The first relates to the need for a legitimate and effective global security management system for a hot, crowded and interdependent world facing multiple challenges, from climate change and migration to nuclear terrorism and pandemics. The second is the need to unlock reform across the entire UN system. The role of the P5 in the UNSC serves as a blockage in an unwieldy UN structure that has become ineffectual and costly. A third motivation is the extent of frustration with the lack of progress. A large number of countries are increasingly convinced that only a step-change in the approach to reform can unlock the current impasse. Elect the Council’s proposals offer such an opportunity. Finally, in the case of the US, China and eventually India, these proposals provide a legitimate and fair recognition of their considerable global influence without repeating the challenges of permanency. Europe, which has benefitted from over-representation on the council for many decades, inevitably needs to accept a more proportional global role, but can retain influence by opting for a collective global powers seat. All regions will benefit from the move towards a proportional system. 5.5.10 June 2018, Adeleke Olumide Ogunnoiki, Reforming the United Nations in the 21st Century: A Discourse on the Enlargement, Democratisation and the Working Methods of the Security Council, International Journal of Advanced Academic Research, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 40-70541,542 […] [62] […] Recommendations Reforming the UNSC is not a once and for all event. It should be carried out from time-to-time as international reality changes. Concerning the second round of the UNSC reform that looks somewhat elusive, the following recommendations should be considered: i) The idea of a Member State having a ‘permanent seat’ for life in the UNSC should be scrapped. In place of this should be that a Member State would remain a

541  The International Journal of Advanced Academic Research () is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution. For the text of the license, which allows to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format, see . Changes to the excerpted text have not been made. 542  Mr. Ogunnoiki is a Nigerian international relations scholar. He is a graduate of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, of the University of Lagos, Nigeria.

5 On a road to nowhere ?

1219

permanent member as long as it is an established or emerging world power to reckon with on the international scene; ii) The permanent seat category should be enlarged from 5 to 10 and, distributed to the five regional blocs in the UN, each getting 2 permanent seats. It would then be left to these blocs to elect 2 Member States respectively to occupy their seats for a uniform number of years (minimum of 5, maximum of 10 years) with or without immediate re-election. By this, the Council would retain its small size for swift decision-making as well as achieve more representation of the broad geographical regions of the world; iii) The eligibility criteria for the aspirants of the proposed additional permanent seats in the UNSC should be based on the distinctiveness of these countries from the Northern and Southern Hemisphere. The Global North should produce permanent members primarily on the basis of their military might and immense financial contribution to the UN budget, while [63] those from the Global South should be based on their population size and troop contribution for UN peacekeeping missions; iv) The right of the permanent members to veto the resolutions of the Council on substantive matters should be retained in a reformed UNSC. However, the scope of its use should be limited in cases of war crimes; v) The groups of countries with similar and feasible draft proposal on the enlargement of the UNSC should work together towards harmonising the content of their proposal. They should when necessary, make a compromise in that regard.

Annex I: Summary of group positions The following summaries aim to provide an overview of the most important positions of the groups considered in the present collection. The intention was not to give a complete and detailed account of the respective groups’ participation in the discussions, but rather briefly to inform the reader about their main positions and significant changes thereto in the course of the reform debate. Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) Launched in May 2013, the ACT group builds upon the work of the “Small 5” (S-5).1 ACT is a cross-regional group of small and mid-sized countries working to improve the accountability, coherence and transparency of the Security Council by improving its working methods.2 The ACT Group promotes the limitation of the veto power of the permanent members in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and developed a “Code of Conduct” in this regard. As of 1 January 2019, the Code of Conduct had 119 supporters.3 Important Proposal 23 October 2015, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, → 5.4.4.25. Members4 The group started with the following members: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania and Uruguay. Until June 2015, Denmark, Ghana, Luxembourg, Maldives, Rwanda, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had also joined the ACT group.

•

African Group / African Union (until 2002: Organization of African Unity, OAU) The African Group of UN member states consists of the member states of the African Union (AU). It represents the 54 African countries in the UN and therefore more than a quarter of all UN member states. Since August 2005, the African Union is also represented by the Committee of the Ten Heads of State and Government (“Committee of Ten”, C10) in the Security Council reform debate.5 The AU is in favour of increasing the 1  Center for UN Reform Education, 21 Member States Launch New Initiative to Improve the Working Methods of the Security Council (12 May 2013). 2  Factsheet of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (June 2015). 3  Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the UN, List of Supporters of the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (as of 1 January 2019); → 5.4.4.25. 4  See footnote 1 above. 5  The C10 represents the five African regions, with two members each from West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, and North Africa (Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia). Sierra Leone serves as chair of the C10. See Lydia Swart, Reform of the Security Council 2007-2013, in Jonas von Freiesleben/Lydia Swart, Governing & Managing Change at the United Nations: © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_007

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1221

number of both permanent and non-permanent seats.6 The group vehemently calls for two permanent seats with all the privileges enjoyed by the present P5, including the right of veto,7 and five non-permanent seats8 for Africa. Furthermore, the AU demands to select itself the states holding these seats.9 The current Ezulwini Consensus (2005) differs from the earlier Harare Declaration (1997) in so far as it does not mention any more the proposal that the two permanent seats be “allotted […] in accordance with a system of rotation”. On the other hand, the statement in the Ezulwini Consensus that “the African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council” also does not bar the way to such a rotation. Africa rejects both the concept of a third category of Council members (“semi-permanent members”) and the proposal for a pool of some 20 countries from which the states represented on the Council would be recruited on a rotational basis.10 According to the AU, a reformed Security Council should have at least 26 members.11 While the AU supports, as a matter of principle, the abolition of the right of veto, it argues that as long as this right exists, it must be extended to all new permanent members.12 Efforts, in particular of the G4, to convince the African states to be more flexible in the veto question have so far been unsuccessful. Important Proposals 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10. 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29, 3.3.36 and 3.4.2.21.

• •

  Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013, Center for UN Reform Education, New York 2013, p. 44. 6  30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14. 7  30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14; 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5 and 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29; 7-8 March 2005, Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32. 8  29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5 and 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29; 7-8 March 2005, Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32. 9  29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5; 8-10 June 1998, → 4.2.2.3.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26. 10  29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.4.1. 11  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 12  30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14; 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.4.2.21; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.2.7; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32.

1222

Annex I: Summary of group positions

June 1998, Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of • 8-10 the Organization of African Unity on the procedure for rotation of the two per-

manent seats claimed by Africa, → 4.2.2.3.2. 7-8 March 2005, “The Ezulwini Consensus”, → 4.2.2.3.26. 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations, → 4.2.2.3.29. 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.67, → 4.2.2.3.30. 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24. Members Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (not a UN Member State), Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

• • • •

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) While the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) first opposed the idea of additional permanent seats,13 it later agreed to an expansion in both existing categories.14 Instead of demanding a seat for its own region, CARICOM supports an additional non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) across all regions.15 The Caribbean states are in favour of a review mechanism.16 In 1999, CARICOM supported a total number of Council members of 26, as advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement, and proposed to fill six to seven of the additional seats with two industrialized countries and four or five developing countries as permanent members. If it was not possible to find agreement on an expansion of the Council membership in both categories, CARICOM would have been content with an expansion in only the non-permanent category.17 In 2013, CARICOM adapted its proposal to one envisioning a Security Council of 27 members with the new seats allocated as follows: Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for Africa (with the African Group being responsible for the nomination of Africa’s representatives); two permanent seats and one nonpermanent seat for Asia; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent 13  1 4 November 1995, → 3.2.3.17. 14  20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14; 16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of CARICOM, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.3.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.8; 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of CARICOM, → 5.2.1.3.24. 15  16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of CARICOM, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.3.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.8; 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of CARICOM, → 5.2.1.3.24. 16  20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 31. July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 17  20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1223

seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; one permanent seat for WEOG; and one non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions.18 In general, CARICOM is open to a Council with a membership of the mid to upper twenties.19 The members of CARICOM demand a limitation of the veto power and pursue the ultimate goal of its total abolition.20 However, as long as the veto exists, CARICOM is in favour of all permanent members having the same prerogatives and privileges.21 CARICOM wants to limit the veto to issues falling under Chapter VII,22 and to forbid the use of the veto when a Council decision pertains to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of international law.23 About half of CARICOM’s members are also supporters of the ACT Code of Conduct. The Caribbean countries further support the idea that a majority of the General Assembly or the Security Council may override a veto.24 In addition, permanent members should explain non-concurrent votes to the wider UN membership.25 Important Proposals 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.17, 3.3.18, and 3.4.2.20. 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14, 4.3.10, and 4.4.3.10. 16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.3.2. 16 February 2010, → 5.2.1.3.3. 25 February 2013, CARICOM, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18. Members Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (not a UN member state), Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

• • • • •

Central American Countries On matters of Security Council reform, the Central American Countries were united for only a short period in the 1990s as a group of six states. (Belize, which geographically also belongs to Central America, is a member of CARICOM and follows the policy of this group, or speaks for itself in the reform debate.) In 1994, the Central American Countries hoped that a reform of the Security Council would lead to a greater participation in the work of the Council of all UN member states, including small states and those that never participated in the Council’s work. In their view, this aim could be achieved by increasing the number of both permanent 18  2 5 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18. 19  14 November 1995, → 3.3.18; 27 February 2018, → 5.3.27. 20  14 November 1995, → 3.3.18; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24. 21  20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.3.2; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.2.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24. 22  20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 23  16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24. 24  16 March 2009, → 5.4.3.2. 25  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

1224

Annex I: Summary of group positions

and non-permanent seats.26 In 1995 and 1996, the six countries stressed the importance of including developing countries in the permanent category,27 even though this category was intended to be gradually eliminated.28 Furthermore, the majority of the new non-permanent seats should be allocated to developing countries, and the ban on immediate re-election (Art. 23 para. 2 of the UN Charter) should be abolished.29 In 1997, the Central American Countries added that a reform should take into account the interests and aspirations of the Latin American and Caribbean region.30 In 1994, the six countries expressed their wish to abolish the right of veto and stressed that this right should not be granted to any state in any circumstance, whether they may be called permanent or semi-permanent members.31 This position was reaffirmed in 1995, when the Central American Countries clarified that the veto should be limited and ultimately abolished.32 In 1996 and 1997, the Central American Countries stated their support for a limitation of the veto to matters dealt with under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a first step towards its final abolition.33 While emphasizing in 1994 and 199534 that the veto should not be extended to new members, the countries refrained from restating this position in 1996 and 1997.35 Important Proposals 14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13. 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7 and 3.4.2.18. 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50. Members Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.

• • •

Eastern European Group (Group of Eastern European States) The states of the Eastern European Group only occasionally presented statements in the name of the whole region. A common position of the states belonging to the group was the call for at least one additional non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe: Any increase in the non-permanent membership should encompass an enhanced representation of the Eastern European region by granting them at least one additional non-permanent seat.36 Important Proposals  May 1998, Joint position paper of the States members of the Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership in the Security Council → 4.2.1.3.1. 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16.

•

•

26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36 

1 4 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6. 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52. 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7. 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52. 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50. 14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13. 13 November 1995, → 3.4.2.18. 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.41. 14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7 and 3.4.2.18. 1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52 and 3.4.3.41; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50. May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1; 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16; 21 February 2007, → 4.2.1.3.23; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1225

Members Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia (until 2019: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Group of Arab States The Group of Arab States, which has the same membership as the League of Arab States, is not one of the five regional groups of UN member states. The Arab states partly belong to the African Group, and partly to the Asia-Pacific Group. In 1998, the Arab states demanded two permanent seats for Asia. They claimed that new permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as enjoyed by the current permanent members, that they should be nominated by their respective regions and be elected by the General Assembly in periodic elections. They further called for expanding the Council membership to at least 26.37 The Arab states claim an adequate representation in the Security Council.38 To that end, they demanded from 1997 until 2015 two non-permanent seats,39 and since 2016 one40 such seat, for the group, as well as one permanent seat with full privileges if the number of permanent members is increased.41 The permanent Arab seat would rotate among the Arab states in accordance with the practice of the League of Arab States.42 Important Proposals 9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.3.17. Members Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (suspended since 2011), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

• • •

Group of Four (G4) The Group of Four, one of the most active and visible groups in the reform discussion, consists of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. The aim of each of these four countries is a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council.43 The four states support each other’s respective candidacy.44 The G4 is in favour of an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership.45 The G4 also supports an African presence 37  2 7 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1. 38  23 February 1994, → 3.2.3.6; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.31. 39  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.3.19. 40  7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.21. 41  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30; 12 January 2010, → 5.2.2.3.8; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.31. 42  9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30. 43  25 September 2014, → 5.2.1.1.22. 44  21 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 25 September 2014, → 5.2.1.1.22. 45  21 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.36; 25 September 2018, → 5.2.1.1.43; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.45.

1226

Annex I: Summary of group positions

in the permanent category of seats.46 The four countries have proposed to enlarge the Security Council by six new permanent and four to five new non-permanent seats. Of the permanent seats, two should be allocated to Africa, two to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean, and one to WEOG. The new non-permanent seats should go to Africa (one to two), Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.47 The Group of Four opposes the idea of new non-permanent seats with longer terms (as advanced, in particular, by the Uniting for Consensus group), because, in their view, adding only non-permanent seats would not solve the imbalance which exists in the current composition of the Council, would not sufficiently empower the developing countries and small states, and would not render the Council more accountable or effective.48 With regard to regional seats, the position of the G4 is that in the system of the United Nations, states represent themselves so that the focus should not lie on regional seats but rather on an equitable geographical distribution of seats.49 When allocating non-permanent seats to regions, the representation of small and medium size member states including SIDS should be taken into account. The Group of Four stresses that new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and rights as the current permanent members, including the right of veto. However, the G4 offered that new members shall not exercise that right in a transitional period, i.e. until a review of a reform of the Council.50 Important Proposals 6 July 2005, Draft resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.64, → 4.2.1.1.37. 7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4. Members Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.

• •

Group of Ten The “Group of Ten” consisted of nine smaller European countries plus Australia which joined for two proposals in 1997 and 1998. The group supported an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories and opposed special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.51 They wished to see a Security Council with no more seats than twenty-five.52 In 1998, the group presented ideas for restrictions of the veto, focusing on what issues should not be subject to the veto.53 Important Proposals 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35. 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

• •

46  2 1 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.36; 25 September 2018, → 5.2.1.1.43. 47  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 48  7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4. 49  Ibid. 50  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4. 51  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 52  27 March 1997, → 3.3.35. 53  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1227

Members Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. GU(U)AM GU(U)AM was founded in 1997 with a view to develop the cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe. Uzbekistan joined the group in 1999 but withdrew again in 2005. The GU(U)AM countries supported enlarging the Security Council in the permanent and non-permanent category.54 They demanded at least one additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.55 Important Proposals 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25. 7 April 2005, → 4.2.1.3.17. Members Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine (and Uzbekistan from 1999 to 2005).

• •

IBSA (India – Brazil – South Africa) Established in 2003, IBSA is a coordinating mechanism between India, Brazil and South Africa.56 IBSA issued only one statement on the reform of the Security Council, in 2014. Otherwise, the three countries spoke individually in the debate, or, in the case of India and Brazil, as members of the Group of Four. South Africa has shared the common African position. It is also a member of the L.69 Group. The three countries are in favour of an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories. They all aspire to a permanent seat, and support each other’s respective candidature.57 Important Proposal 26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23. Members Brazil, India and South Africa.

•

L.69 Group The L.69 Group brings together a diverse set of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and is named after the General Assembly draft resolution A/61/L.69 of 200758 which at the time was also called the “India resolution”.59 The draft resolution sought, in particular, to urge the President-elect of the 62nd session of the General Assembly “to take immediate steps to facilitate results-oriented intergovernmental negotiations”. Although the draft was withdrawn, it contributed to start such negotiations. From 2008 onwards, the L.69 Group became more active as a coalition from the South, with India and St. Vincent

54  14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25. 55  7 April 2005, → 4.2.1.3.17. 56   IBSA website, . 57  26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum, → 5.2.1.1.23. 58  → 4.2.1.1.51. 59  See Swart, footnote 5 above, at 48.

1228

Annex I: Summary of group positions

and the Grenadines acting as its focal points.60 In 2012, the group drafted another resolution aimed at winning the African Group by promising the veto power for new permanent members. That draft also addressed in detail the allocation of new permanent and non-permanent seats (see below). The L.69 Group today describes itself as “a diverse, pro-reform group of developing countries in favour of justice, sovereignty and equity in the reform of the Security Council both in process and in outcome”.61 The group favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing categories62 and demands a greater representation of the developing countries, including island and small states.63 The number of nonpermanent seats should be increased to sixteen, with two new seats for Africa and one new seat each for Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, for the WEOG states, and for Small Island Developing States across all regions.64 In the permanent category, there should be two additional seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one for WEOG. Thus, the total number of seats would be twenty-seven.65 The group further advocates a coordination between regional groups to ensure a regular representation of small developing states in the non-permanent category.66 The 2007 draft called for a “provision for a review” of a reform. The L.69 Group supports an abolition of the veto67 but asserts that if this cannot be achieved, for the time being all permanent members shall enjoy the same prerogatives and privileges, including the right of veto.68 Important Proposals 14 September 2007, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1, → 4.2.1.1.51. 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15. Members69 The group was established when the following states joined as sponsors of the L.69 Draft in 2007: Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands,

• •

60  Ibid., at 49. 61  Statement of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. King, 25 June 2019, UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, p. 5. 62  See, e.g., the statements of 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51; 22 February 2010, Proposal for text-based negotiations on reform of the UN Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.38. 63  See, e.g., the statements of 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51; 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 64  2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 65  2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 66  15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 67  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 68  2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 69  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1229

South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. On 30 November 2015, the spokesperson of the L.69 group declared to represent “a diverse group of 42 developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific, who are united by a common cause”,70 without specifying the respective countries. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) The Non-Aligned Movement is one of the most vocal, and with presently 120 member states also the largest group participating in the Security Council reform debate. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement represent nearly two-thirds of the UN members and 55% of the world population. Membership is concentrated in countries considered to be developing or part of the “Third World”. The Movement is led by a chair that rotates every three years during summit conferences. The positions, mandates and courses of action adopted by the Heads of State or Government or the Ministers of the Movement are articulated and carried out by the political body of the Movement, namely, its Coordinating Bureau (CoB), which is composed of the NAM member states and is based at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. The Coordinating Bureau meets on a monthly basis at the ambassadorial level. The Movement has established different working groups, contact groups, task forces and committees, among them the NAM Working Group on the Restructuring of the Security Council, coordinated by Egypt. NAM holds that any expansion of the Security Council must prominently include the developing countries and countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.71 If agreement cannot be reached with regard to other categories of membership, only the nonpermanent category should be increased for the time being. The Movement supports an enlargement of the Security Council by a minimum of eleven seats.72 NAM has proposed in 1995 to enlarge the Security Council to twenty-six seats, seven of which should be allocated to Asia, seven to Africa, five to Latin America and the Caribbean, four to the WEOG Group, and three to the Eastern European Group. In addition, the Movement is in favour of a periodic review of Security Council membership.73 While NAM has consistently confirmed its adherence to these positions, its most recent statements avoid concrete claims and remain rather vague (with the exception of an explicit “support for increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council”74), which reflects a number of conflicting views in the large NAM group on the representation of regions and individual countries in an enlarged Council. As early as 1992, the Non-Aligned Movement was of the view that the right of veto of the permanent members was undemocratic and therefore had to be reviewed in line with a reform aiming at a democratization of the UN and an increased transparency of the work of its bodies.75 The Movement promotes a curtailment of the veto 70  3 0 October 2015, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 4-5. 71  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5; 18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14; 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 72  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14; 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2. 73  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5. 74  5-6 April 2018, Baku Final Document, → 5.2.1.3.25, para. 119.10. 75  6 September 1992, → 2.23. NAM’s critique of the veto power is, however, much older. See the references in UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII, → 3.4.3.22.

1230

Annex I: Summary of group positions

and its eventual abolition.76 It proposes to limit the veto to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,77 to establish the possibility of overruling a veto by a vote of a certain number of Security Council members, or by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly. It also emphasizes that the veto power should be formally restricted, and that a voluntary limitation is not sufficient.78 Important Proposals 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14. 27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22. 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44. 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24. Members Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, East Timor, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

• • • •

Nordic Countries The Nordic Countries endorse an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories,79 while stressing the importance of ensuring that small states can regularly serve as members of the Council.80 In 1995, they proposed to increase the Security Council by five new permanent seats and underlined that the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members should be maintained.81 In the same year, they also supported an increase in membership to a number in the low twenties,

76  18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.4.2.17; 27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44; 10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1; 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 11 November 2010, → 5.4.2.4; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 77  27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44; 10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1; 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24. 78  30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24. 79  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.46. 80  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37. 81  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1231

preferably 23.82 The five countries are open to an interim solution in order to test new models, as long as it contains a clear review-clause.83 In 2007, the Nordic Countries stressed that the veto should not be extended to new members.84 Instead, it should be limited.85 The Nordic Countries support the Code of Conduct by the ACT Group as well as the Franco-Mexican initiative to restrain the use of the veto.86 Important Proposals 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25 and 3.3.14.  4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, → 3.2.1.2.14, 3.4.3.48, and 3.4.4.5. Members87 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

• •

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, until 2011: Organization of the Islamic Conference) The Organization of Islamic Cooperation represents the interests of the Islamic countries and demands an adequate representation of its member states and the Islamic Ummah in a reformed Security Council.88 The OIC further supports an increased representation of developing countries in the Security Council and an increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Council.89 The SecretaryGeneral of the Organization, Mr. İhsanoğlu, also called for a seat in the Security Council for the OIC as an organization.90 Important Proposals  28 September 2004, Final communiqué of the annual coordination meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (published on 11 October 2004), → 4.2.3.8.  14 March 2008, Resolution of the Islamic Summit Conference on the Reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, No. 11/11-P(IS), → 4.2.3.15.  25 May 2009, Resolution of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the reform of the United Nations and expansion of UN Security Council’s Membership, No. 30/36-POL, → 5.2.3.1.

• • •

82  1 8 September 1995, → 3.3.14. 83  14 December 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.4. 84  14 December 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.4; See also their previous thoughts on this issue of 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.14. 85  4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.48 and 3.4.4.5; 20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24. 86  20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24. 87  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.3.14. 88  28 September 2004, Final communiqué → 4.2.3.9; 14 March 2008, → 4.2.3.15; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 28 October 2013 → 5.2.3.8. 89  10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8. 90  15 September 2013, Speech at the International Affairs Institute by Mr. İhsanoğlu, → 5.2.2.3.15.

1232

Annex I: Summary of group positions

Members Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen. Overarching Group The states participating in the Overarching Group united for one proposal in 2008 with the aim to break the impasse in the Security Council reform debate. The group proposed an intermediate solution with a mandatory review of a Council reform after a fixed period of time. It suggested to enlarge the Security Council to 22 members. Of the seven new seats, two each should be allocated to Africa and Asia. One seat each should be reserved for Latin America and the Caribbean, for the WEOG Group, and for the Eastern European States. The draft proposal by the Overarching Group included several options regarding the time span these seats could be occupied by a single state, and how a holder of such a seat could be challenged by other states.91 According to the draft proposal, the use of a veto should require an explanation by the respective member of the Security Council, a written copy of which should be made available to all UN member states.92 Important Proposal 20 March 2008, Overarching Group, Draft proposal, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21. Members93 Cyprus, Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom.

•

Permanent Five (P5) The “Permanent Five” (P5) is the name with which the five permanent members of the Security Council (as designated in Article 23 of the UN Charter) are addressed collectively. It was first used in the academic literature. The P5 have not participated in the reform discussion as a group, and have not developed a common position on Council reform issues. Instead, each of the permanent members has always expressed its own views. However, in the course of the debate France and the United Kingdom found their views sufficiently similar to occasionally make common statements.94 All P5 have committed themselves to a modest enlargement of the Security Council in

91  20 March 2008, Draft proposal, → 4.2.2.2.14. 92  20 March 2008, Draft proposal, → 4.4.4.21. 93  Jonas von Freiesleben, Member States Discuss Security Council Reform Again: A NeverEnding Process?, Center for UN Reform Education, 16 April 2008. 94  27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, Joint Statement, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.1.8.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1233

order to enhance the representation of developing countries.95 Furthermore, all five in principle hold on to the current structure of the right of veto.96 Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) The first priority of the PSIDS is to improve the working methods of the Security Council.97 Apart from that, they support an increase in both categories of membership of the Council.98 The PSIDS stress that the Security Council should increase the number of non-permanent seats for small states, instead of making it more difficult for them to be elected to the Council.99 Important Proposal  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), → 5.2.1.3.1. Members100 Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

•

Small Five (S-5/S5) The focus of the “Small Five” was the improvement of the working methods of the Security Council. The group was active between 2005 and 2012 and was superseded by the ACT Group. The Small Five proposed to limit the veto in the following way: A permanent member using the veto should explain its use, and a written version of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document. Permanent members should commit themselves to not casting a veto in cases of proposed Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law.101 Additionally, when casting a negative vote, a permanent member should have the option to state that the vote should not be considered as a non-concurring vote in the sense of Art. 27, para. 3 of the Charter.102 Important Proposals  17 March 2006, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.49, → 4.4.4.18.

•

95  23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. See also the individual positions, e.g. for China: 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; for France: 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.29; for Russia: 15 November 1995, → 3.2.3.19; for the United Kingdom: 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8, and for the United States: 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30. 96  For a rare statement of the P5 as a group, see 23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. 97  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1. 98  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1; 8 November 2013, Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.2.3.16. 99  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1. 100  Ibid. 101  17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 15 May 2012, Revised Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.10. 102  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 14. April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9.

1234

Annex I: Summary of group positions

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements • for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.  1 4 April Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft • Resolution,2011,→ 5.4.4.9. 5 May 2012, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Revised • 1Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/66/L.42/Rev.2, → 5.4.4.10.

Members103 Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) The countries of the SADC only issued one statement concerning Security Council reform in the name of the group, namely in 1999. They supported an expansion in both existing categories and fully subscribed to the Harare Declaration, i.e. to the creation of at least two permanent seats for the African continent (shared by African countries in accordance with a system of rotation), and to five non-permanent seats for Africa.104 The countries claimed that the exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. However, if the veto was maintained, it should also be accorded to new permanent members in a reformed Security Council.105 Important Proposal 16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of SADC, → 4.2.2.3.7 and 4.4.2.3. Members106 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

•

Uniting for Consensus (UfC or UFC) The “Uniting for Consensus” group emerged from the so-called Coffee Club. It changed its name to Uniting for Consensus in 2005. Over the years, the group’s membership varied (see below). Its main feature is its strong opposition to new permanent seats and its emphasis on the need for consensus. UFC favours an increase in elected seats.107 In its 2005 proposal, the group suggested to leave the existing five permanent seats as they are and to only increase the number of members in the existing non-permanent category to 20. The regional groups should decide over re-election or rotation patterns for the seats of their regions.108 The second major UFC proposal, presented in 2010, provided for a three-seat-structure, 103  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3. 104  16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7. 105  16 December 1999, → 4.4.2.3. 106  16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7 and 4.4.2.3. Madagascar is also a member of SADC since 2005, but the statement of 1999 predates its accession to the Community. 107  See, e.g., the statements of 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.2.25; 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 27 February 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, → 5.2.1.2.13. 108  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1.

Annex I: Summary of group positions

1235

consisting of the five existing permanent seats, a new category of longer-term seats, and increased regular non-permanent membership. For the longer-term seats, two patterns were suggested, namely a term of three to five years, or a term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. Again, the regional groups were meant to decide about arrangements for re-election and/or rotation.109 The proposal also included special seats reserved for small states and medium-sized states.110 In 2017, the group slightly altered this proposal to include one seat reserved for, and shared by, Small Island and Developing States and small States.111 Since 2015, the group has supported an expansion of the Security Council of up to 26 members.112 The UFC countries support an abolition of the veto or at least a limitation of its scope to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.113 Important Proposals  21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.  21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6. 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.2.25. Members The membership of the Group has varied over the years, but the countries officially supporting UN Doc. A/59/L.68 in 2005 appear to be the core group of members: Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey. In the past, Ghana, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar were also active in the group. China is an active participant during meetings at expert level, and Indonesia attends these meetings as well.114

• • •

109  2 1 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11. This position was reaffirmed afterwards; see, e.g., the statements of 1 May 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.25) and 30 October 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.26). In 2018, the UfC Group advocated “longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election” and an increase of the number of two-year non-permanent seats, “coupled with a more equitable distribution of seats among regional groups” (20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42). 110  21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.3.6. 111   8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42. 112  30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.26 and 5.3.18; 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42. 113  21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.3.6; 26 May 2015, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6. 114  See Swart, footnote 5 above, at 51.

Annex II: Summary of country positions The summaries aim to provide an overview of the most important positions of the countries included in the present collection. The intention was not to give a complete and detailed account of the respective countries’ participation in the discussions, but rather briefly to inform the reader about their main positions and significant changes thereto throughout the reform debate. While the summaries of country positions were primarily based on individual statements made by the respective countries, the positions of the groups of which they were a member could not be disregarded, as this would have led to a fragmentary or even distorted account of the countries’ positions. This is especially true for countries that exhibited a particularly strong affiliation with a certain group or countries that only rarely expressed their individual position. Algeria Algeria is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Algeria did not present an original proposal itself but mainly supported the position of the African Union in recent years. Before the turn of the millennium, it endorsed the proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement to expand the Security Council by at least 11 new seats,1 and stressed the need to increase the number of seats for the African continent in all possible enlargement scenarios.2 In accordance with the African Common Position, Algeria demanded two (rotating) permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa in a reformed Security Council.3 While Algeria was initially opposed to granting the right of veto to new permanent members,4 it later adjusted its view to match the position of the African Union, according to which the veto should be abolished in principle, but that it must be extended to all new permanent members as long as it is retained.5 In addition, Algeria supports a regulation of the veto and a limitation of the subject areas to which it applies.6 Antigua and Barbuda Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1993, Antigua and Barbuda proposed to enlarge the Security Council to a total of 25 members with a composition of eight permanent and 17 rotating members. Developing countries should be assigned four permanent and twelve non-permanent seats. The seats should be allocated in the following way: one permanent member

1  16 December, 1999, → 4.3.4. 2  26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.2. 3  16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.4; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.32; 8 November 2011, → 5.2.2.3.11. 4  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.5. 5  See, e.g., the statements of 8 November 2011, → 5.2.2.3.11. 6  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.5 and 3.4.3.11; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.37. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_008

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1237

and six non-permanent members for Africa; two permanent members and three non-permanent members for Asia; one permanent member and two non-permanent members for Eastern Europe; one permanent member and three non-permanent members for Latin America and the Caribbean; three permanent members and three non-permanent members for the Western European and Other States.7 In 1994, the country underlined that it is important for the Security Council to include small and poor states and not only large and wealthy states.8 In 1996 and 1997, Antigua and Barbuda declared that any expansion should include developing countries and that both the African and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups should be represented.9 Additionally, Antigua and Barbuda supported restricting the use of the veto.10 Subsequently, the twin-island state did not raise any further substantial proposals independently of the Caribbean Community or the Non-Aligned Movement. Argentina Argentina is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.11 Since 1993, Argentina has opposed new permanent seats. Only the non-permanent category should be enlarged.12 Argentina showed its willingness to consider a new category of seats, if there was a consensus to create such a new category.13 In its working paper on the so-called “cascade-effect” submitted in 1995, Argentina illustrated the permanent members’ influence in various UN institutions by filling leading positions with their nationals.14 The country supports the abolition of the permanent membership category altogether15 or the pursuit of an intermediary approach;16 the latter position being in line with the proposals of the Uniting for Consensus group.17 Argentina endorses an abolition of the veto power.18 However, until such elimination is feasible, the veto should be limited to decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter.19 The country considers informal restrictions of the veto insufficient and prefers an amendment of the Charter to guarantee a restriction.20 Nevertheless, Argentina supports the ACT Code of Conduct.

7  For more details see 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 8  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17. 9  7 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.45; 1 October 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.20, pp. 7-10. 10  7 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.45; 1 October 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.20, pp. 7-10. 11  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 12  See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. Argentina subsequently confirmed this position. For a recent statement, see, e.g., 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 28-29. 13  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2. 14  18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12. 15  21 September 2011, → 5.2.1.2.7 and 5.4.2.5. 16  12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.2.10. 17  21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11. This position was reaffirmed later; see, e.g., the statements of 1 May 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.25) and 30 October 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.26). 18  21 September 2011, → 5.4.2.5. 19  16 November 2000, → 4.4.3.12; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.15. 20  31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.15.

1238

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Australia Australia is a member of the “Group of Ten”.21 In 1993, Australia proposed to expand the Security Council to a new total of 20 members,22 but subsequently adjusted the number to 2523 or 26.24 In 1996, Australia suggested an increase in the number of permanent members by five, thereby granting Germany and Japan as well as three developing countries a permanent seat, and further proposed to increase the number of seats in the non-permanent category to 15.25 While it opposed special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries,26 Australia supported removing the ban on re-election.27 According to Australia, new permanent members should not be granted the right of veto.28 Together with nine other countries, Australia drafted a proposal on how to limit the use of the veto.29 Furthermore, Australia strongly supports the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct on Security Council action in situations of mass atrocities,30 and the complementary French/Mexican political declaration on veto restraint.31 Austria Austria is a member of the ACT Group and the “Group of Ten”.32 The country supports a small expansion in both existing categories33 but opposes special rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.34 Austria is in favour of a Security Council with up to 25 members35 and supports the interest of Japan and Germany in serving as permanent members, as well as parallel interests of qualified countries of the South.36 Austria also voiced its support for the creation of regional seats, notably with regard to the European Union.37 Austria advocates a limitation of the veto power, ideally limiting it to actions under Chapter VII, and does not wish to see an increase in the use of this instrument through an expansion of the Council’s permanent membership.38 Together with nine other

21  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 22  20 July 1993, → 3.3.1. 23  27 March 1996, → 3.3.23; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35. 24  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 25  27 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.34. 26  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 27  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2. 28  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 29  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 30  23 October 2015, ACT Group, Code of Conduct, → 5.4.4.25. 31  30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.21. 32  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 33  23 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.10; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.57. 34  18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.4.3. 35  See, e.g., the statements of 13 November 1995, → 3.3.16; 4 December 1997, → 3.3.40. 36  4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.57. 37  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.3.6; 23 September 2004, → 4.2.2.3.24. 38  4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.47.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1239

countries, Austria drafted a proposal on how to limit the veto.39 It also supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Belarus Belarus is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and the Non-Aligned Movement. Belarus initially argued in favour of adding both permanent and non-permanent seats to the Security Council,40 with the consequence that an additional nonpermanent seat should be allocated to each of the existing regional groups, including the Group of Eastern European States.41 In accordance with the Non-Aligned Movement, Belarus proposed that enlargement in both categories should entail at least 11 additional members42 and seats in the category of permanent members should be allocated to the countries of three developing regions, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.43 Belarus repeatedly stressed the importance of expanding the non-permanent category, advocating in particular the addition of another seat for the Eastern European regional group.44 In 1995, Belarus held the view that the right of veto should not be extended to new permanent members and that the veto power and other voting procedures of the Council should be thoroughly examined.45 Belgium Belgium is a member of the “Group of Ten”.46 The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing categories, including new permanent seats for Germany and Japan.47 Belgium opposes special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries48 and prefers a Security Council of 2549 or 2650 members.

39  2 5 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 40  15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.6. 41  15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.3.20; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.1.3.5; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.3.6. Note that, on 15 November 2012, Belarus stated: “We take note of the underrepresentation of the Eastern European Group among the non-permanent members of the Security Council and reaffirm our stated position on enhancing the representation of that Group among the permanent members of the Council” (15 November 2012, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38). However, Belarus never before and never since spoke in favour of a new permanent seat for the Eastern European Group. 42  16 November 2000, → 4.3.14. 43  16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.8; cf. 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.21. 44  15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.8; 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.21; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.3.6. 45  15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8. 46  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 47  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 48  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 49  18 September 1995, → 3.3.14; 27 March 1997, → 3.3.35; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 50  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

1240

Annex II: Summary of country positions

According to Belgium, the veto should be limited.51 New permanent members should not make use of the veto until the question of its extension to new permanent members has been decided upon in a review.52 Belgium encourages the voluntary limitation of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes.53 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Belize Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1993 and 1994, Belize proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 2054 and 2355 seats respectively, including around nine permanent seats.56 These seats should be allocated based on the size of a country’s population and of its financial contributions to the budget of the United Nations. Accordingly, China and India would qualify as permanent members for fulfilling the first criterion, while Japan, Russia and the United States would qualify for fulfilling the second. This proposal also included the possibility for two adjacent states to hold a permanent seat together.57 Permanent seats were intended to become indefinite seats that could be held by a state for as long as it fulfilled the required criteria.58 In 1995, Belize altered its proposal, suggesting a new Security Council of around 33 members, including 10 to 13 permanent seats.59 A similar proposal with two alternatives was issued in 1996, returning to a Council of 20 to 23 seats, which should comprise special reserved seats for countries that contribute a large part of the UN’s funds.60 Belize elaborated on how the idea of shared seats could be organized in 1996.61 Belize supports a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States.62 Since 1996, Belize has not issued any additional proposals independently of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement.63 Belize considers the abolition of the veto desirable but not feasible. Hence, it favours a restriction of its use.64 In 1993, Belize proposed that no permanent member should be able to veto a decision in which the remaining permanent members unanimously

51  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 52  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 53  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 54  4 October 1993, → 3.3.2. 55  13 October 1994, → 3.3.10. 56  4 October 1993, → 3.2.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.8. 57  4 October 1993, → 3.2.3.2. 58  13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.8. 59  18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12 and 3.3.14. 60  3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23. 61  1 February 1996, OEWG, → 3.2.3.20. 62  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 63  The members of the Caribbean Community, including Belize, submitted their positions for the Framework Document (→ 5.1.12) and the 2015 Negotiation Text (→ 5.1.13) as a group under their respective country names and not under the name of the community. However, these positions were recorded in the present work as those of the Caribbean Community, and not as positions of every single state. 64  7 December 1993, → 3.4.3.6; 18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1241

consider it to have a personal interest.65 Alternatively, a minimum of two countries could be required to cast their vetoes in order for it to have an effect on a decision.66 Limiting the veto to areas exclusively under Chapter VII was initially viewed as too restrictive by Belize67 but has found its support in more recent years.68 According to Belize, if the veto is to be retained, new permanent members should enjoy the same rights and obligations as the present ones.69 Belize is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Bolivia Bolivia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1996, Bolivia supported the creation of permanent seats for Germany and Japan as well as one each for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.70 However, the Latin American country later changed its position: It now opposes an extension of permanent membership and even supports the abolition of the permanent category (including the veto) altogether.71 The country prefers longer-term seats elected every four years to the two existing categories. According to Bolivia, the extended Security Council should consist of 25 members.72 Bolivia supports the limitation of the veto73 to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the final aim of its complete abrogation.74 Brazil Brazil is a member of the G4, IBSA and the L.69 Group.75 The country has been in favour of expanding the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category.76 It proposed two additional permanent seats for major industrialized states as well as one for each of the main regions of the developing world.77 Brazil considers itself to be a legitimate candidate for such a permanent seat and also supports, as a member of the G4, the candidacies of Germany, Japan and India.78 As a member of IBSA, Brazil additionally endorses South Africa’s

65  66  67  68  69  70  71 

4 October 1993, → 3.4.3.5. 7 December 1993, → 3.4.3.6; 3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28. 3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28. 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 30 September 1996, → 3.2.1.1.44. 13 November 2009, → 5.2.1.2.5; 3 March 2010, Proposal, → 5.2.2.2.16; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 72  3 March 2010, Proposal, → 5.2.2.2.16; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 73  10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5. 74  30 September 1996, → 3.4.3.30. 75  See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 76  See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.9; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.1.1.57; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.27. 77  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 78  21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27.

1242

Annex II: Summary of country positions

aspirations for permanent membership.79 It favours a size of the Security Council in the mid-twenties.80 Because it believes that only an expansion of the group of permanent members will adjust the Council to the political realities of the 21st century and ensure its long-term legitimacy and viability, Brazil opposes both non-permanent seats with longer terms81 and regional permanent seats, which it does not regard to be feasible.82 Brazil supports a limitation of the veto with the aim of its gradual elimination. It proposes to limit the veto strictly to matters covered by Chapter VII of the UN Charter83 and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Bulgaria Bulgaria is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.84 In Bulgaria’s view, additional permanent seats in the Security Council should be granted to states carrying considerable weight in the international political and economic arena, such as Germany and Japan.85 Enlargement of the permanent membership category of the Council must also include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.86 Furthermore, an additional non-permanent seat should be designated for the Group of Eastern European States, as the group’s membership more than doubled since the 1963 enlargement of the Council.87 Special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established.88 Bulgaria supports enlarging the Security Council to a size of up to 25 members.89 Concerning the veto power, Bulgaria advocates an informal limitation in order to ensure the Council’s effectiveness.90 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Canada Canada is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.91 In its first proposal, Canada supported the idea of enlarging the Security Council in the permanent as well as the non-permanent membership category, and of lifting the ban on immediate re-election for non-permanent members.92 The country showed an early interest in new ideas, such as semi-permanent seats or rotational seats.93 79  26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23. 80  16 December 1999, → 4.3.5; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 81  4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.4.1. 82  29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.4.9; 24 March 2009, → 5.2.2.4.2. 83  16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.9 and 4.4.3.7; 16 December 2002, → 4.4.2.9. 84  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 85  30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.11. 86  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 87  30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.11. 88  27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 89  27 March 1997, → 3.3.35. 90  25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3; 17 November 2000, → 4.4.4.12. 91  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 92  26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 93  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.13.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1243

Subsequently, Canada became opposed to new permanent seats94 and was a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.95 Canada opposes an extension of the veto power to new permanent members96 and supports its restriction to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.97 According to Canada, the permanent members of the Security Council should abstain from using their veto power in cases of proposed Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.98 To this end, Canada endorses the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican proposal.99 Chile Chile is a member of the ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. The country has been in favour of enlarging the Security Council with new nonpermanent members as well as new permanent members (without the right of veto).100 In 1993, Chile supported seats for regional representatives serving longer terms of office.101 While Chile proposed to increase the membership of the Security Council to up to 24 or 25 members in 1993,102 the country later expressed that it remains flexible on the number of new seats and believes that establishing exact numbers or procedures might limit states’ negotiation ability.103 In 1993, Chile argued for a limitation of the right of veto and took the view that its use should be informally restricted.104 In 1998, the country was in favour of setting a time limit after which the veto should be abolished (e.g., the year 2030).105 Furthermore, Chile supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.106 China The People’s Republic of China endorses an expansion of the Security Council by an equitable geographical distribution of additional seats.107 Since 1993, it has emphasized 94  16 December 1999, → 4.2.3.1; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29. 95  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.2. 96  30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.35; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.5. 97  30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.35; 16 December 1999, → 4.4.3.8. 98  12 November 2007, → 4.4.4.20. 99  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.45. 100  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12, 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.11. 101  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.3.1. 102  20 July 1993, → 3.3.1. 103  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 104  23 November 1993, → 3.4.4.1. 105  26 June 1998, → 4.4.2.1. 106  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.47; Chile confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, p. 1. 107  20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.3.7; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.16.

1244

Annex II: Summary of country positions

the importance of increasing the representation of developing countries108 as well as small and medium-sized countries.109 China declared that any reform plan not supported by the African countries will not have China’s backing.110 However, the PRC remained silent on the issues of the number of members of an enlarged Council, or the terms of office of new members. China has constantly underlined the necessity of consensus and patience.111 A quick fix would only cause further imbalance.112 According to China, the different issues of the reform are interrelated and must therefore be kept together; a package solution with the broadest possible consensus should be achieved.113 China opposes any attempt to restrict or curtail the veto power of the present P5.114 Colombia Colombia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Uniting for Consensus Group.115 In 1993, Colombia supported an enlarged Security Council with additional permanent and non-permanent members.116 From 1994 on, however, Colombia has favoured a freeze of the category of permanent members and its gradually elimination, while at the same time supporting an increase in the number of non-permanent members.117 The country endorses the Non-Aligned Movement’s position that the Security Council should be expanded by a minimum of 11 members118 and is a co-drafter of the two drafts of the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group.119 Colombia is open to the possibility of an immediate re-election of non-permanent members120 and supports the creation

108  20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.3.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20. 109  See, e.g., the statements of 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.17; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 1 February 2018, → 5.2.3.18; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20. 110  18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.17. 111  23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20. 112  4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 14 October 2002, → 4.2.3.6; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20. 113  4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.16. 114  23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. 115  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 116  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 117  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.2.5 and 3.2.2.2.9; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 118  4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22. 119  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6. 120  13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.9; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1245

of longer-term seats in line with the UFC position.121 It repeatedly expressed its openness to the creation of regional seats.122 Colombia is in favour of abolishing the veto, or at least restricting it,123 to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.124 It also suggests to replace the veto mechanism, either with a qualified majority or with a weighted vote.125 Another possibility promoted by Colombia is the establishment of a mechanism to reduce or neutralize the use of the veto or to increase the threshold required for a veto to take effect.126 Either way, Colombia opposes the extension of the right of veto to new Council members.127 Colombia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Costa Rica Costa Rica is a member of the ACT Group, the Central American Countries,128 the Small Five129 and the Uniting for Consensus Group.130 Costa Rica initially supported the 2 + 3 solution, which included adding Germany and Japan as well as one country from each developing region as permanent members.131 In 1993, it also suggested that non-permanent seats could be shared between several countries.132 Costa Rica investigated the so-called “cascade effect” and published its statistical findings in 2005.133 The country subsequently changed its position; it became a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.134 It is accordingly opposed to new permanent seats but supports non-permanent seats with longer terms.135 Costa Rica’s main objectives in reforming the Security Council are the regulation, limitation and eventual elimination of the veto.136 It has stressed the need to limit the 121  1 3 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 122  16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.14; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.3.35. 123  13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.12; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22; 18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26; 13 November 2009, → 5.4.3.4; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.4.3.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 124  4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22; 18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10 and 5.4.3.4; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 125  20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2. 126  18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26. 127  20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.12. 128  See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50. 129  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3. 130  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 131  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 24 September 1996, → 3.2.2.1.7. 132  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2. 133  24 June 2005, → 4.2.1.2.10. 134  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 135  See, e.g., the statement of 8 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.12 and 5.2.2.2.41. 136  14 October 2002, → 4.4.2.8.

1246

Annex II: Summary of country positions

use of the veto power in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights.137 Costa Rica also proposed to limit the application of the veto to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.138 The country endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration, and as a member of the respective groups the proposals made by the Small Five and by the ACT Group, respectively, aiming at restricting the use of the veto.139 Croatia Croatia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.140 Croatia is in favour of granting Germany and Japan, as well as one country each from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, a permanent seat. However, in Croatia’s view the term “permanent” should not be taken literally, and the status of new permanent members should be reviewed every ten to fifteen years.141 Four new non-permanent seats should be created and assigned to Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe.142 As a member of the Group of Eastern European States, Croatia especially underlines the importance of an additional non-permanent seat for this region in any scenario of Security Council reform.143 Croatia favours the abolition of the veto power. If this is not possible, the country supports the so-called double veto requirement as a fallback position.144 Narrowing the veto’s scope to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is also advocated by Croatia.145 Croatia supports a code of conduct providing for a voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by the permanent members.146 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Cuba Cuba is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1992, Cuba questioned whether the category of permanent membership and the veto mechanism still adequately reflected present-day realities.147 Subsequently, Cuba expressed its support for an expansion in both categories of membership, proposing that at least two new seats be assigned to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively.148 While initially suggesting an expansion of the Council 137  138  139  140  141  142  143  144  145  146  147  148 

1 1 December 2006, → 4.4.4.19. 20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2. 30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21; 8 November 2017, → 5.4.4.60. 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.50; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.4; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.50. 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.4. 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 16 December 1999, → 4.4.2.4. 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.38. 5 May 2015, Framework document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.2.1. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.46; 18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1247

to up to 23 members,149 Cuba more recently has supported a Security Council with 25 or 26 members in total.150 In 1995, the country suggested to expand the Security Council to 23 members by granting Asia three new seats, Africa two, Latin America and the Caribbean two, and Europe and Others one.151 An altered proposal was put forward in 2010: The membership of the Council should be enlarged to no less than 26 members.152 The enlargement should take place in both categories of membership. Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean ought to be included. The new permanent members of the Security Council should enjoy the same rights and powers as the current members.153 Cuba is opposed to an increase in the number of non-permanent members only,154 and to the creation of a new category of seats. However, it is open to the possibility of immediate re-election of non-permanent members.155 Cuba proposes that the seats of the present permanent members, as well as those of new ones, be periodically subjected to a vote. Hence, if the general membership was unsatisfied with the work of permanent members, it could dismiss them from the Security Council.156 The country favours the abolition of the veto157 but as long as this is not realistic, it supports its limitation.158 A first step, according to Cuba, should be to limit the use of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.159 The country proposes that a veto could be overruled by either an affirmative vote of a certain number of Security Council members, or by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly, using the Uniting for Peace procedure as well as a progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the UN Charter. Cuba regards the concept of voluntary “self-restraint” as insufficient and is opposed to it being considered as an option. In case of a retention of the veto, Cuba endorses its extension to all new permanent members.160 149  150  151  152 

1 8 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5. 18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5; 30 October 2015, → 5.3.20. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5. In 2015, Cuba changed this to “approximately 25 or 26” (30 October 2015, → 5.3.20). 153  18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41. In 2005, Cuba suggested two to three permanent seats for developing countries of these regions (11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.46). 154  20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.17. 155  18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41. 156  20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1. 157   See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3, 18 February 2010, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41; and 20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.17. 158  18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 159  11 November 2005, → 4.4.3.23. 160  18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

1248

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The country favours an enlargement in the non-permanent category first, as it considers an agreement on the expansion of the permanent category to be unlikely.161 However, if the permanent category were to be expanded, North Korea would strongly oppose a Japanese permanent membership.162 The country supports an abolition of the veto power.163 Denmark Denmark is a member of the ACT Group and the Nordic Countries.164 In 1993, Denmark stressed the importance of introducing a rotation system for regional groups.165 Subsequently, Denmark repeatedly argued for an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories,166 with both developing and developed countries as new permanent members.167 Denmark is a supporter of the G4 proposal.168 The country also expressed its openness to other solutions, provided they contain a clear review clause.169 It abstains from designating an exact number of seats, but considers a number in the mid-twenties to be suitable for a reformed Security Council.170 Initially, Denmark was opposed to granting the right of veto to new permanent members.171 In 2005, however, Denmark became a co-sponsor of the G4 draft which entailed an extension of the right of veto to new permanent members, but included an obligation not to use it before a reform has undergone a review.172 Despite its

161  4 March 2010, Position paper, → 5.2.1.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.14. 162  11 October 1995, → 3.2.3.15; 25 September 1999, → 4.2.1.3.3; 22 September 2005, → 4.2.3.13; 4 March 2010, Position paper, → 5.2.1.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.14. 163  11 October 1995, → 3.4.2.16. 164  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 165  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2. 166  18 September 1995, → 3.3.14; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 167  4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 168  10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11. 169  4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11. 170  4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.3.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8. 171  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2. 172  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1249

continued support for the G4 proposal, Denmark explicitly opposes the extension of the veto to new permanent members.173 Denmark has consistently supported restraint in the use of the veto.174 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Ecuador Ecuador is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The country supports the creation of longer-term seats on the Security Council or the possibility of an immediate re-election for non-permanent members.175 Furthermore, Ecuador endorses an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories.176 With regard to the assignment of permanent seats, Ecuador demands that one country from each region of the developing world (Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean) be appointed.177 If no agreement can be reached on the subject of permanent membership, only the number of non-permanent seats should be augmented.178 More recently, Ecuador has focused more on the issue of the right of veto, opposing in particular its expansion to new permanent members.179 Ecuador argues strongly in favour of an abolition of the right of veto.180 According to Ecuador, a restriction of the use of the right of veto, such as the limitation of the veto to cases under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, should only be considered if no consensus in favour of its abolition can be reached.181 Egypt Egypt is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The country supports an enlargement in both existing categories. It also suggested in 1993 to create a new category of seats, which would grant “each region one or more seats without veto power to rotate between the major Powers of that region”.182 While Egypt opposed the extension of the right of veto in 1995,183 it more recently has repeatedly stressed that new permanent members should have the same prerogatives as the

173  4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 174  4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.4.4.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 175  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6. 176  1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.10. 177  1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51. 178  1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.10. 179  For a more recent statement, see 7 November 2016, pp. 4-5. 180  1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.11. 181  1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6. 182  27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.1.8 and 3.2.2.3.3. 183  14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.18.

1250

Annex II: Summary of country positions

present permanent members.184 Egypt is a strong supporter of the African Common Position.185 Egypt has repeatedly announced its readiness to serve as a permanent member.186 Overall, the Security Council should be increased to at least 26 members.187 The country supports a limitation of the veto with the aim of its ultimate elimination, however, as long as the veto is retained, all permanent members should have the same prerogatives and privileges.188 Fiji Fiji is a member of the L.69 Group,189 the Non-Aligned Movement and the Pacific Small Island Developing States.190 In 1993, Fiji emphasized that new permanent members should not have the right of veto and all permanent members should be jointly responsible for most of the financial needs of the Organization’s regular budget, as well as for all its peace-keeping activities.191 Three years later, in 1996, Fiji proposed to increase the number of nonpermanent seats from 10 to 17 by granting four new seats to Africa and Asia, one to Eastern Europe, one to Latin America and the Caribbean and one to Western Europe and Other States. Within those regions, seats should be distributed equally among the existing subregions. Each subregion should decide on the allocation of its seat, however, an equitable rotation system was considered to be a preferable option by Fiji. Additionally, two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan should be created, as well as one each for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.192 Subsequently, Fiji did not raise any further substantial proposals independently of its groups. Fiji was one of the co-sponsors of the L.64 draft in 2005193 and of the L.69 draft in 2007.194 Fiji seeks to abolish the veto. However, taking into account the current realities of international relations, it would support, as an initial step, the proposal that the scope and use of the veto should be limited and apply only to measures taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.195 Moreover, if a permanent member uses the veto power outside the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it should be subject to the right of appeal by another permanent Council member. The final decision would be made in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote.196

184  12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.37; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.40; 12 November 2009, → 5.4.3.3; 21 February 2012, → 5.2.2.3.13. 185  18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.40; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.2.3.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.22. 186  14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.12; 24 September 2004, → 4.2.2.3.25. 187  12 November 2009, → 5.3.3. 188  11 November 2010, → 5.4.2.4; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.22. 189  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 190  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1. 191  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1. 192  1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.53. 193  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 194  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 195  20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.42. 196  1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.42; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.49.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1251

France France supports a moderate increase in the two existing membership categories of the Security Council.197 In 1994, the country announced its support for Japan and Germany as new permanent members.198 In addition, France has supported permanent seats for developing countries.199 With regard to the non-permanent membership, France took a flexible stance, provided that the total number of Council Members would not exceed twenty.200 In subsequent years, the French Republic declared its willingness to compromise, eventually agreeing to an upper numerical limit of twenty-five seats.201 Of the additional seats, five should be permanent.202 France repeatedly held that new permanent members should have the same prerogatives and responsibilities as the existing ones, but also expressed its openness to other formulas.203 In 2001, France made more specific suggestions concerning the allocation of additional seats, endorsing India’s candidacy for a permanent seat while reiterating its support for Germany and Japan. The remaining permanent seats should represent Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, while additional non-permanent seats should be assigned to Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as to Central and Eastern Europe.204 By the time of the 60th session of the General Assembly, France was convinced that Brazil would be the preferable representative for Latin America, leaving only the African seat without a nomination.205 France’s support for a permanent seat for Germany, Japan, India and Brazil has been consistent ever since.206 In 1995, France did not consider regional permanent or semi-permanent seats to find broad support.207 It reiterated its opposition to proposals for regional representation in 2015, asserting that admission to the United Nations was granted to individual states.208 In 2008, France proposed an interim solution in cooperation with the United Kingdom. This solution envisages a new category of seats with longer and renewable mandates.209 197  See, e.g., the statements of 31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.1.19; 23 September 2003, → 4.2.1.1.23; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 11 June 2009, → 5.2.1.1.3; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.19; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25. 198  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.22. 199  See, e.g., the statements of 13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.22; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.29; 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.61. 200  13 October 1994, → 3.3.9; 30 October 1996, → 3.3.33. 201  5 December 1997, → 3.3.42; 16 December 1999, → 4.3.6. 202  16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.10. 203  March 1996, Non-Paper, → 3.2.1.1.32; 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.61; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.4.1. 204  31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.1.19. 205  12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.1.50; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25. 206  See, e.g., the statements of 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.1.50; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.2.17; 8 November 2011, → 5.2.1.1.14; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.19; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.47. 207  13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.4.4. 208  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 209  27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, Joint Statement, → 5.2.1.1.8.

1252

Annex II: Summary of country positions

France maintains that the right of veto of the current permanent members should not be altered.210 Instead of amending the UN Charter, France appeals to the permanent members to voluntarily and collectively suspend their veto power when mass atrocities are under consideration by the Council,211 and has pledged never to use its own veto power in such cases.212 In 2015, France, together with Mexico, proposed a voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that they would refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities.213 France also supports the ACT Code of Conduct. Georgia Georgia is a member of the Eastern European Group and the GU(U)AM countries.214 Georgia supports the addition of new permanent as well as non-permanent members to the UN Security Council. In the category of permanent members, Georgia endorses the candidacies of Germany and Japan. In addition, Georgia promotes the creation of four new non-permanent seats; one each for Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe.215 The number of seats on a reformed council should be in the low twenties216 or at 25.217 Georgia is a co-sponsor of the G4 draft.218 According to Georgia, the right of veto should be restricted in cases where a veto would block Security Council action aimed at preventing or ending crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Furthermore, permanent members should not be able to cast a veto in situations in which they are involved themselves.219 Georgia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Germany Germany is a member of the G4220 and also participated in the Overarching Group.221 Germany announced its aspirations for a permanent seat on the Security Council as early as in 1992.222 Throughout the reform discussion, Germany has endorsed an expansion in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership, 210  See, e.g., the statements of 16 December 1999, → 4.4.1.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.14. 211  24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11; 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12; 7 November 2013, → 5.4.4.14; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.4.66. 212  28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.18. 213  30 September 2015, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, → 5.4.4.21. 214  14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25. 215  20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.7. 216  20 December 1999, → 4.3.11. 217  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13. 218  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 219  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13. 220  See, e.g., the statement of 1 May 2018, Joint Statement by the G4 Countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) delivered by H.E. Ambassador Koro Bessho at the Informal Plenary Meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform. 221   Jonas von Freiesleben, Member States Discuss Security Council Reform Again: A Never-Ending Process?, Center for UN Reform Education, 2008. 222  23 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.2.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1253

consistently presenting itself as a suitable candidate for permanent membership.223 Germany has also supported additional permanent seats for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.224 In 1994, Germany temporarily suggested that if no agreement was possible with regard to permanent seats for these regions, they should be given more non-permanent seats with the possibility of re-election. However, Germany subsequently expressed its opposition to the introduction of semi-permanent seats.225 As a member of the Group of Four, Germany supports the candidacies of Japan, Brazil and India for permanent membership.226 According to Germany, the number of seats on a reformed Security Council should be in the midtwenties.227 In October 1996, the country elaborated on this by stating that “the overall size of a future Security Council should be between 23 and 26, preferably 24”.228 The G4 draft resolution of 2005 envisioned a Council with twenty-five members.229 Germany repeatedly proposed a periodic review clause.230 According to Germany, the right of veto should be gradually limited, and permanent members of the Security Council should formally explain their decision to veto a draft resolution.231 Germany is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. With regard to new permanent members, Germany emphasizes that they should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members. However, they should not make use of their right of veto before the question of its extension has been decided upon in a review.232 Ghana Ghana is a member of the ACT Group, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1993, Ghana proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 25 members, with permanent seats for the Permanent Five, Japan and Germany, as well as two for Africa, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Asia. The 14 non-permanent seats should be distributed in the following way: four to Africa, three to Asia, three to Latin America and the Caribbean, two to Western Europe and two to Eastern Europe.233 Subsequently, Ghana aligned its position with the African Common Position and the Non-Aligned Movement.234

223  224  225  226  227  228  229  230  231  232  233  234 

1 3 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33. 28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.3.14. 21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 10 May 1996, → 3.3.26; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.30. 29 October 1996, → 3.3.30. 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 23 May 1996, → 3.2.1.1.42; 2 July 1996, → 3.2.1.1.43. 21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1; 22 April 1998, → 4.4.4.2; 31 March 2000, → 4.4.4.8. 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33; 23 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.39; 23 May 1996, → 3.4.3.23; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 26 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, → 5.2.2.4.4. 4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9. 5 December 1997, → 3.2.2.3.33; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.10; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.29.

1254

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Ghana endorses a restriction of the veto and suggests to limit it to situations that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter235 or to create the possibility of it being overridden by a set number of votes in the Security Council.236 Ghana supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Guatemala Guatemala is a member of the Central American Countries237 and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1993, Guatemala sought to increase the number of non-permanent seats of the Security Council and to create new permanent seats.238 In 2013, the country reiterated its position and suggested the addition of up to five new permanent in addition to five new non-permanent members.239 Guatemala supports the abolition of the veto240 or its limitation in case of a lack of consensus.241 As a member of the Central American Countries, Guatemala vehemently argued against the extension of the right of veto between 1994 and 1997.242 This is contrary to its initial position in 1993, when Guatemala was opposed to the creation of new permanent seats without the right of veto.243 More recently, Guatemala has not taken a firm stance with regard to the prerogatives of new permanent members.244 It endorses the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative. Hungary Hungary is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.245 Hungary favours an expansion of Security Council membership in the permanent as well as the non-permanent category.246 Permanent seats should be allocated to Germany and Japan, as well as Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.247 The Eastern European Group should be assigned an additional non-permanent seat.248 After initially opposing special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized

235  4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.36. 236  14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.19; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.36. 237  See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50. 238  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 239  8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.21. 240  20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50. 241  20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50. 242  14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50. 243  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 244  8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.21; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.33. 245  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 246  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.46. 247  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 248  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation, Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.46.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1255

countries,249 Hungary is now open to the idea of longer-term seats, provided that such an idea finds consensus.250 The country’s preferred size of a reformed Security Council shifted from between 20 and 25 seats in 1995251 to a maximum of 27 in 2015.252 It supports up to 6 new permanent members as well as a maximum of 6 new nonpermanent members.253 With regard to the right of the use of the veto, Hungary favours limiting its use254 and supports all initiatives facilitating timely and decisive action aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocities by the Security Council, including those calling for the Permanent Five to voluntarily agree on refraining from using the veto.255 As a member of the ACT Group, Hungary supports the group’s Code of Conduct, as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration. India India is a member of the G4, of IBSA, the L.69 Group256 and the Non-Aligned Movement. The country favours an enlargement in both existing categories of Security Council membership.257 India suggests that a set of criteria should be determined according to which countries are selected for permanent membership.258 India believes it deserves a permanent seat, judged against any possible set of criteria,259 and endorses the aspirations for permanent membership of the other three members of the G4.260 As a member of IBSA, India also supports South Africa’s candidacy for permanent membership.261 In India’s view, new permanent members should have the same rights and responsibilities as the present permanent members.262 If it is not possible to abolish the veto power, the best option according to India is to dilute that right by extending it to new permanent members.263 However, such members should not make use of their right of veto before the question of its extension will have been decided upon in a review.264 India also supports the idea that the UN General Assembly is able to override a veto.265 249  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 250  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 251  18 September 1995, → 3.3.14. 252  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 253  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 254  18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.13. 255  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 256  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 257  See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 21 February 2012, Intergovernmental Negotiation, → 5.2.1.1.16. 258  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.19; 27 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8. 259  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.19. 260  21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27. 261  26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23. 262  27 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8; 9 March 2016, → 5.2.1.1.30. 263  23 March 1999, → 4.2.1.1.3. 264  25 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, → 5.2.2.4.4. 265  23 March 1999, → 4.4.3.2.

1256

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Indonesia Indonesia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Indonesia is in favour of adding new permanent members to the Security Council.266 The political and economic weight of developing countries, particularly of those with the largest populations, should be taken into consideration in the enlargement process.267 A Security Council with approximately 26 members is regarded as optimal by Indonesia.268 Because of its potential to garner the broadest possible political acceptance, Indonesia supports an intermediate approach.269 According to Indonesia, any decision on the expansion of Security Council membership is inappropriate if Asia is underrepresented and if the realities prevailing in Asia are not fully taken into account.270 Indonesia opposes the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.271 The country shares the view of many other states that the right of veto should be reviewed regularly272 and eventually eliminated.273 No veto should be permitted in the election of the Secretary-General and permanent members ought to explain the reason for employing the veto at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, with a copy of the explanation being circulated as a Security Council document.274 Indonesia supports the French/Mexican political declaration and the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct. Italy Italy is a leading and a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.275 Initially, Italy promoted an increase in the number of both permanent and nonpermanent members.276 In 1993, the country proposed to create a third category of ten seats for those twenty states which make the greatest contributions to the work of the United Nations. These states would share revolving seats in pairs of two, which would guarantee their semi-permanent presence on the Security Council. Each of them would alternate a two-year term in the Council with a two-year period of absence from it.277 This proposal was adapted in the following years in order to include more countries in the semi-permanent category: now three countries instead of two should share a seat. Each of them would remain for two years on, and for the four following years off the Council. Furthermore, the electoral procedure was progressively refined.278 While Italy in its 1993 proposal had stated that it felt entitled to a permanent seat in the case 266  267  268  269  270  271  272  273  274  275  276  277  278 

2 6 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.40; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.54. 12 July 2005, → 4.2.3.12. 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 26 July 1993, → 3.4.3.3. 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.40; 6 February 2018, → 5.4.4.61. 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 27 September 1991, → 3.2.1.1.1; 24 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.3. 20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8. 29 June 1994, Italy, → 3.2.2.2.8; 2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1257

of an enlargement in the permanent category,279 it subsequently changed this position, opposing both an enlargement in the permanent category280 and an extension of the veto power to new Council members.281 Instead of additional European states as new permanent members, Italy supported a seat for the European Union.282 In 2009, Italy proposed to rotate an EU seat between WEOG and the Eastern European Group, with the elected country representing the interests of the entire EU.283 Italy is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus group284 and has been one of its strongest voices from the beginning. Thus, Italy has continued to endorse the creation of a third category of seats with longer terms,285 and favours an enlargement of the Council to a maximum of 26 members in total.286 From early on in the discussion, Italy opposed an extension of the veto power beyond the present P5.287 Regarding an abolition of the veto as unrealistic, Italy favours a limitation of its use. The country suggested to limit the area of its application or to create a requirement of at least two vetoes to prevent a draft resolution from being adopted.288 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and endorses the France/ Mexico joint political declaration. Japan Japan is a member of the G4. The country favours an increase in both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council.289 It considers itself to be a legitimate candidate for a permanent seat and also supports the aspirations of the other members of the Group of Four to the same end.290 Japan endorses a limitation of the veto power and supports the proposal that a veto must be justified by a Council member using it. With regard to new permanent members, Japan holds that any discrimination in status between existing and new permanent members must be avoided.291 Japan supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct, both of which aim at restraining the veto in cases of mass atrocities. 279  280  281  282 

2 0 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2. 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.7; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20; 19 February 1999, → 4.2.1.2.2. 29 June 1994, → 3.2.1.2.4; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.7. 23 September 1998, → 4.2.1.2.1; 19 February 1999, → 4.2.1.2.2; 31 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.3. Italy had already mentioned the idea of an EU seat in September 1992, → 4.2.1.2.1. 283  31 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.3. 284  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 285  3 September 2009, → 5.2.2.2.7; 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36. 286  30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, → 5.3.18. 287   29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.39; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.1.2.6; 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36. 288  29 June 1994, → 3.4.3.8. 289  See, e.g., the statements of 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.48; 21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27. 290  21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27. 291  22 March 1999, → 4.4.4.5.

1258

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Jordan Jordan is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Small Five.292 In 1993, Jordan supported an increase in non-permanent seats in addition to the creation of permanent seats for Japan and Germany as well as for Asia, Africa and Latin America.293 The country has since been supporting an increase in both existing categories.294 In 1997, Jordan claimed a permanent seat for the Arab Group.295 Jordan is opposed to an unregulated use of the veto power, and as a member of the Small Five and the ACT Group supports its limitation.296 The country also endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 1994, Kazakhstan proposed an enlargement of the Security Council, in the course of which Germany and Japan as well as one representative of the group of developing countries should become new permanent members. In addition, the non-permanent membership of the Council should be increased by including three more states – one each from the three regional groups of developing countries (Asia, Africa and Latin America).297 Kazakhstan was also open to a new category of semi-permanent seats.298 In 2011, Kazakhstan supported an increase in the number of seats in the permanent membership category by six seats; two each for Africa and Asia, and one each for Latin America and the Caribbean and WEOG. The same proposal also included the addition of five new non-permanent seats, to be allocated to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Asia (two seats).299 In 2015, Kazakhstan endorsed the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for permanent membership, alongside permanent African representation.300 The country wants to limit the veto in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide301 and is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Kenya Kenya is a member of the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. The country is in favour of an increased regional representation in both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council and stressed 292  A  pril 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3. 293  26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 294  27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.31; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.45. 295  3 October 1997, → 3.2.2.3.31. 296  17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 23 October 2015, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, → 5.4.4.25. 297  23 March 1994, → 3.2.1.1.16. 298  23 March 1994, → 3.2.2.2.6. 299  23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 300  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 301  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1259

the need for Africa and Latin America to be represented in the permanent category.302 Initially, Kenya stated that it would welcome a regular re-qualification of permanent members by way of a review,303 and that the minimum number of seats in a reformed Security Council should be twenty-five.304 However, in recent years, Kenya has fully endorsed the position of the African Union, which demands an increase in the number of Security Council members to at least 26 as well as the allocation of a minimum of two permanent and five non-permanent seats to Africa.305 Kenya supports the abolition of the veto and suggests to limit it by restricting its use to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by requiring at least two vetoes cast, and by enumerating issues on which the veto cannot be applied.306 Latvia Latvia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. Latvia advocates an expansion of the UN Security Council in both categories of membership.307 The Eastern European country is a co-sponsor of the G4 Draft308 and backs the aspirations of the G4 for a permanent seat.309 Latvia calls for an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States.310 A Security Council with 25 members is viewed as preferable by Latvia.311 With regard to the veto, Latvia holds the view that the right of veto should not be extended, but made more transparent in its current form.312 The country supports the ACT Code of Conduct, which aims at limiting the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the similar France/Mexico joint political declaration.313 Libya Libya is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Libya has supported the African Common Position, which calls for two permanent seats as well as five non-permanent seats for Africa.314 The country also has supported permanent representation of the Arab states in the Security Council.315

302  303  304  305 

1 4 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.24; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.21. 14 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.24; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.10; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.21. 14 October 1994, → 3.3.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.3.17; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.32. 20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.9; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. See also 7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 23-24. 306  29 October 1996, → 3.4.3.33. 307  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 308  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 309  12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.22. 310  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.3.18; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.13. 311  11 July 2005, → 4.3.18. 312  12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.22. 313  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.42. 314  4 October 1991, → 3.4.2.2; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 315  See, e.g., the statement of 7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 14-15.

1260

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Furthermore, the country demanded an abolition of the veto, or at least its restriction.316 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/ Mexico joint political declaration. Liechtenstein Liechtenstein is a member of the ACT Group, and was active in the Small Five Group.317 The principality supported in 1995 a limited increase in the number of members in both existing categories of membership.318 Later, Liechtenstein issued a proposal for long-term seats with renewable terms of eight or ten years with the possibility of immediate re-election. This proposal entailed the creation of six new long-term elected seats which should be allocated as follows: two to Africa, two to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean, and one to Western European and Other States.319 Liechtenstein’s proposal was also open to an additional two-year non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.320 New permanent seats were not envisaged in that proposal.321 According to Liechtenstein, the Security Council should be expanded to have at least twenty-one members.322 In line with the groups to which it belongs, Liechtenstein actively supports a limitation of the veto power323 and proposals seeking to restrict its use, such as the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Lithuania Lithuania is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. Lithuania is in favour of an expansion of the membership in both categories,324 allocating one additional two-year non-permanent seat to the Eastern European Group.325 In 1999 Lithuania proposed to enlarge the Security Council to around 24 members, with new permanent seats for industrial and developing countries,326 reviewing its concrete proposal, made seven years earlier, that the Council could be expanded to

316  2 6 July 1993, → 3.4.2.4. 317  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3. 318  6 October 1995, → 3.2.1.1.27. 319  26 February 2010, Elements for a General Assembly Resolution on the Enlargement of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; also reiterated in 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 320  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.31. 321  26 February 2010, Elements for a General Assembly Resolution on the Enlargement of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.37; 29 January 2019 → 5.2.2.2.43. 322  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.31. 323  17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 22 June 2009 → 5.4.4.4. 324  16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6. 325  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 326  16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1261

include Japan, Germany and India as new permanent members. In addition, Lithuania supports the G4 draft resolution.327 With regard to the veto, Lithuania calls for a curtailment and eventual abolition of the right of veto.328 Permanent members of the Council should voluntary abstain from using the veto in cases of massive human rights violations, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.329 In this regard, the country welcomes the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the requirement of a veto cast by at least two permanent members in order to make the veto effective.330 It also endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Madagascar Madagascar is a member of the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. Madagascar supports the African Common Position331 and that of the Non-Aligned Movement.332 Furthermore, Madagascar is in favour of limiting the use of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until a complete abolition is possible and welcomes the idea that the use of the veto should require an explanation.333 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Malaysia Malaysia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It participated in the Overarching Group.334 In 1992, Malaysia called for an increase in the number of non-permanent seats by eight, three of which should be allocated to Asia, three to Africa, and the remaining two to Latin America.335 A year later Malaysia called for an increase of ten, of which four should be distributed to Asia, four to Africa, and the remaining two to Latin America. Furthermore, the country was prepared to consider the possibility of creating semi-permanent seats without the right of veto that could be held for five or six years.336 In 1996, Malaysia issued an adapted proposal according to which eight new permanent seats should be added to the Security Council, two of which would be occupied by Germany and Japan, while the remaining six seats should be assigned to the three developing regions, namely two each to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. These seats were intended by Malaysia to represent the respective regions, and their allocation to specific states was to be determined by a regional 327  328  329  330  331 

2 8 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.4; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.38. 28 September 1992, → 3.4.3.1; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6. 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 28 September 1992, → 3.4.3.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.16; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.2.3.18; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 332  17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.16. 333  17 November 2000, → 4.4.3.13. 334  von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above. 335  23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1. 336  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2; cf. 23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1.

1262

Annex II: Summary of country positions

mechanism. In addition, Malaysia proposed the creation of seven new non-permanent seats, amounting to a total of 30 Security Council seats.337 More recently, Malaysia supported an expansion of both categories of membership, not further specifying whether the allocation of the additional permanent seats was to be determined by a regional mechanism.338 Malaysia supports an abolition of the veto.339 However, until the veto can be abolished, the country suggests the following measures: firstly, the establishment of general criteria for the identification of actions of a procedural nature, as stated in Art. 27, para. 2 of the Charter; secondly, the identification of questions of “vital importance”, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 267 (III);340 and, thirdly, the introduction of the requirement of a second veto in order to block a decision.341 In 2015, Malaysia even proposed the requirement of a third veto,342 and three years later it suggested that an effective veto should require a negative vote cast by at least two permanent members and supported by three non-permanent members.343 Malaysia further believes that the veto should be restricted in cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.344 If the veto power is maintained, Malaysia agrees to its extension to new permanent members.345 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Maldives The Maldives is a member of the ACT Group, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Maldives has recognized the necessity of enlarging the Security Council in both categories.346 It is strongly of the opinion that small and developing countries should also be able to participate in the global policy process, and demands a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States.347 With regard to new permanent members, the Maldives supports Japan348 and India349 due to their capacities and commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. According to the Maldives, the right of veto is a key issue, which needs to be addressed appropriately.350 Detailed positions towards its abolition, restriction or extension to new permanent members have not been issued by the Maldives, but the 337  3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19. 338  1 2 November 2014, → 5.2.1.1.24. 339  23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1; 20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.11; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018 → 5.4.3.15. 340  14 April 1949, → 2.1. 341  13 November 1995, → 3.4.3.15. 342  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 343  20 November 2018 → 5.4.3.15. 344  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.15. 345  12 November 2014, → 5.4.3.12. 346  23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.5; 9 October 1995, → 3.2.3.13; 30 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.32; 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.53; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.11; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.21. 347  12 November 2014, → 5.2.1.3.7; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.11. 348  30 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.32; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.3.3. 349  13 November 2009, → 5.2.3.3. 350  23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.5.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1263

island state supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Malta Malta was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement until 2004 when it joined the European Union, and is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.351 In accordance with the UFC position, Malta opposes an increase in the number of permanent members.352 Initially, it was open only to a maximum of ten new seats.353 More recently, Malta has aligned itself with the Uniting for Consensus Group and has supported that group’s proposal for the addition of non-permanent seats with longer terms.354 Malta rejects the right of veto and its extension to additional Council members. Initially, it considered the question of the veto to be best solved by its falling into disuse,355 but subsequently changed its opinion to support the proposals of the Non-Aligned Movement and UFC.356 Malta is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Mauritius Mauritius is a member of the African Union, the L.69 Group,357 the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Southern African Development Community. In 1993, Mauritius proposed an expansion-scheme, according to which the Security Council should be enlarged to twenty-one seats with a total of twelve permanent members. The new permanent members were not intended to have veto powers and should be elected in the following way: one from the Americas, two from Western Europe, two from Africa, and two from Asia. The number of non-permanent seats should be reduced to nine.358 Subsequently, Mauritius did not issue any new suggestions but supported the proposals of the groups of which it is a member.359 Mexico Mexico is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.360 The country opposes an increase in the number of permanent members and instead supports the creation of additional non-permanent seats as well as longerterm seats or a more frequent rotation of seats.361 In 1995, Mexico issued a proposal which included a seat that would rotate between Germany and Japan every two years. Another new seat would be shared by the Eastern and Western European countries 351  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 352  13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.9; 26 September 1997, → 3.2.1.3.15; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.30. 353  13 October 1994, → 3.3.11. 354  See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 355  1 November 1996, → 3.4.4.4. 356  See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.4.3.22. 357  14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 358  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1. 359  See, e.g., the statements of 14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30; 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 360  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 361  E.g. 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.10; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.39.

1264

Annex II: Summary of country positions

in the same way. Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean would each be allocated one additional seat.362 In 1996, Mexico raised serious questions about the practicability of regional permanent seats.363 Mexico is a founding member of UFC364 and has supported the group’s proposal for an increase in non-permanent seats with longer terms.365 Since 1993, Mexico has consistently sought to limit the veto.366 In this regard, the country has proposed to exclude actions under Chapters VI, VIII and XXX from the application of the right of veto, and to delete the Charter provisions requiring the permanent members to agree to every Charter amendment.367 In 2015, Mexico, together with France, proposed a voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that they would refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities.368 Mexico is also a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Monaco Monaco is not a member of any group. In 1994, Monaco proposed to increase the number of non-permanent members to twenty and to allocate each region four of the additional seats, with two seats to be held by regional powers for at least five years, and two by other countries for one year only.369 This position was adapted in 1996 when Monaco issued a new proposal: Of the ten new seats, five should be permanent seats, while the other five should constitute a new category of seats with longer terms, namely between six and twelve years. The ten non-permanent members should continue to be elected every two years.370 More recently, Monaco supported long-term seats with terms between eight to ten years.371 The principality is open to an expansion of Security Council membership to a number in the twenties.372 According to Monaco, the veto should be self-regulated by the permanent members.373 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/ Mexico joint political declaration. 362  363  364  365  366  367  368  369  370  371  372  373 

1 8 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.16. 22 April 1996, → 3.2.3.22. 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.39. 20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.3.10; 13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24. 30 September 2015, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, → 5.4.4.21. 20 May 1994, → 3.2.2.2.7. 17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22. 5 March 2010, Memorandum on the Security Council Reform, → 5.2.2.2.17; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 5 March 2010, Memorandum on the Security Council Reform, → 5.3.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1265

Mongolia Mongolia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Mongolia favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing cate­gories374 and supports the aspirations of Germany,375 Japan376 and India377 for permanent seats, as well as permanent membership for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.378 Mongolia is opposed to the creation of a third category of seats and the abolition of the ban on immediate re-election for non-permanent members.379 In 2009, Mongolia proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 24 or 25 members, with six new permanent members and four or five additional non-permanent members.380 Mongolia believes that the veto power should ultimately be abolished and that as a first step it should be restricted to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.381 It also supports the proposal to require a state that vetoed a draft resolution to explain its reasons to the General Assembly.382 In 1993, the country opposed the extension of the veto to new members383 but later changed its view. While still viewing the veto as anachronistic, Mongolia now prefers its extension to new permanent members as long as it continues to exist.384 Mongolia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Netherlands The Netherlands participated in the Overarching Group.385 In 1993, the Netherlands proposed to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council and to allocate each regional group one additional non-permanent seat. One seat in each regional group could be granted an immediate re-election.386 In 2015, the country supported an increase in permanent, non-permanent and long-term seats.387 The Netherlands encourages a voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by permanent members388 and endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration as well as the ACT Code of Conduct.

374  4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.15; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.40. 375  10 October 1995, → 3.2.3.14; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55. 376  10 October 1995, → 3.2.3.14; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55. 377  12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55. 378  12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4. 379  14 November 2007, → 4.2.2.4.3. 380  12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4. 381  20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.11; 12 October 2004, → 4.4.3.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.3.13. 382  20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.11. 383  4 October 1993, → 3.2.2.1.3. 384  12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4 and 5.4.4.5; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.40. 385  von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above. 386  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.1. 387  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 388  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.19.

1266

Annex II: Summary of country positions

New Zealand New Zealand is a member of the ACT Group. In 1993, New Zealand was in favour of increasing the number of non-permanent seats and creating new permanent seats without the right of veto. The country was also open to the abolition of the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members.389 New Zealand supported a limited increase in the number of members of the Security Council, which should not have more than twenty-one seats.390 Twenty years later, New Zealand reaffirmed its opposition to an extension of the right of veto to new members of the Council and underlined its support for an intermediate solution with longer-term seats.391 In 2005, New Zealand declared that any expansion of the Security Council must include Japan.392 In 2017, New Zealand proposed to raise the number of non-permanent members to fourteen, and to add six new longer-term seats without the right of veto, but with extended terms of up to five years as well as the possibility of immediate reelection.393 New Zealand is opposed to the veto, both in terms of current permanent members and future members,394 and supports its abolition and limitation.395 The country backs the French proposal for a voluntary self-restriction of the use of the veto396 and supports the ACT Code of Conduct. Nigeria Nigeria is a member of the African Union, the L.69 Group,397 the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 1992, Nigeria stressed the need to increase the number of permanent members and to establish a permanent representation of Africa, stating that it was qualified to become a permanent member.398 One year later, Nigeria proposed to add two new permanent seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, one for Western Europe and one for Eastern Europe, and to increase the number of non-permanent seats by nine.399 In 1996, the country expressed its opposition to the creation of a third category of seats.400 Nigeria has been a strong supporter of the African Common Position.401 Until the veto is ultimately abolished, Nigeria believes that its use should be rational and selective and confined only to issues arising under Chapter VII of the UN

389  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; the position was reaffirmed on 8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.23. 390  20 July 1993, → 3.3.1. 391  8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.23. 392  10 November 2005, → 4.2.3.14. 393  3 April 2017, → 5.2.2.2.35. 394  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.3.14. 395  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1. 396  8 November 2013, → 5.4.4.15. 397  See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 398  30 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.5. 399  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 400  1 November 1996, → 3.2.2.4.11. 401  16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.15; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31. For a newer statement supporting the African Common Position, see UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 25-26.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1267

Charter.402 If the veto is retained, it should be extended to new permanent members of the Council.403 The country is also in favour of the requirement to explain a veto in written form.404 North Macedonia (until 2019: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) North Macedonia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. North Macedonia supports an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council in both the permanent as well as the non-permanent category. In the nonpermanent category, North Macedonia suggests a total number of 15 seats to be allocated in the following way: five to Africa, four to Asia, two to Western Europe, two to Eastern Europe, and two to Latin America.405 According to North Macedonia, a Security Council reform should go along with a limitation of the use of the veto.406 In this context, North Macedonia proposed a voluntary self-restriction of the permanent members.407 The country is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Norway Norway is a member of the ACT Group and one of the Nordic Countries.408 Norway supports a balanced expansion of the Security Council in both categories of seats.409 In 1996, the country suggested to create five new permanent seats, namely one for Africa, one for Asia, one for Latin America and two for industrialized countries, as well as several additional non-permanent seats.410 According to Norway, the regional groups should decide about the allocation of these seats.411 Although Norway favours an increase in both permanent and non-permanent seats, it is open to an interim solution with a review clause.412 The country supports a balanced enlargement with a total number of Council members in the mid-twenties.413 Norway is opposed to an extension of the right of veto to new members414 and prefers that the current permanent members abstain from their veto rights. It favours a 402  1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.39. 403  1 November 1996, → 3.2.2.3.28; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.15 and 4.4.4.9. 404  16 November 2000, → 4.4.4.9. 405  5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.3.18. 406  5 December 1997, → 3.4.3.52. 407  24 August 1998, → 4.4.4.4. 408  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 409  Cf. the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35; 5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform, → 5.2.1.1.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37. 410  25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35. 411  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.1; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35. 412  5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform, → 5.2.1.1.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 413  5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.3.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 414  5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.4.4.7.

1268

Annex II: Summary of country positions

voluntary self-restraint of the permanent members in their use of the veto.415 To this end, Norway supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the French initiative.416 Pakistan Pakistan is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Uniting for Consensus Group.417 Since 1993, Pakistan has opposed an addition of new permanent seats to the Council.418 The country endorses the Non-Aligned Movement’s focus on an expansion in the non-permanent category.419 In 2001, it proposed an expansion of only the non-permanent membership to the size of the Economic and Social Council, which would mean a total of 54 non-permanent members.420 Pakistan is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group421 and, in line with the group’s position, is open to the interim solution of removing the ban on immediate re-election,422 notwithstanding its preference for regular two-year non-permanent seats.423 As a strong supporter of the Uniting for Consensus Group, Pakistan continues to promote its first proposal of 2001.424 The country also expressed its openness to the creation of regional seats, notably with regard to the representation of the African continent,425 not the European Union.426 Pakistan considers the veto to be undemocratic427 and seeks to formally restrict it with a view to its eventual abolition.428 Panama Panama is a member of the Central American Countries429 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

415  5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.4.4.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 416  30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.23. 417  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 418  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2, 14 October 1994, → 3.2.1.2.6, 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.9, 4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1, 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11. 419  14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.9; 18 June 2001, → 4.2.1.3.12. 420  18 June 2001, → 4.2.1.3.12 and 4.3.15. 421  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1. 422  26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.4; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.2.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.2.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11. 423  4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1. 424  4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11. 425  12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.38; 4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.2; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11. 426  4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.29. 427  20 December 1999, → 4.4.2.5. 428  20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.2.5; 21 July 2005, → 4.4.3.22; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 429  See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1269

Initially, Panama supported an increase in the number of seats of both categories, but opposed the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.430 However, in 2007, it issued a proposal for the addition of six new seats, one of which should be allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean, one to Western European and Other States, two to Asia and two to Africa. These new members would be elected for terms of five years with the possibility of re-election. If a state were to be elected four times consecutively, it would acquire the status of a permanent member.431 In 2015, Panama proposed the following: “By the United Nations Centennial in 2045, we envision a Security Council consisting of 24 members, all on equal standing, elected for three-year terms, with the opportunity for consecutive re-election.” This should be reached in two stages: The first stage would introduce five semi-permanent seats without the right of veto to accommodate the G4 and one African country, as well as one additional non-permanent seat each for the Arab states and the Eastern European Group and two for Small Island Developing States. The second stage would initiate the three-year election cycles for all positions in the Security Council in 2030.432 In 2016, Panama updated its proposal to include a total of 26 seats.433 Panama favours the abolition of the veto and has opposed its extension to new members of any category.434 Until the abolition is feasible, the veto should be limited.435 Panama supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Peru Peru is a member of the ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. Peru supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.436 In 1993, it suggested to create two new permanent seats for countries of global importance and to add one non-permanent seat for each developing region.437 Peru is in favour of establishing an intermediate category of seats with a long mandate, which would eventually become permanent.438 In Peru’s view, a number of Security Council seats in the mid-twenties would enable the Council to have a fair and equitable geographic distribution of seats.439

430  431  432  433  434  435  436 

1 4 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6. 8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7. 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.12. 14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6; 13 November 1995, → 3.4.2.18; 8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7. 8 February 2007, → 4.4.2.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 2 March 2010, Position on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.9; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 437  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6. 438  2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.2.1.1.9; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.9. 439  2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.3.7.

1270

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Peru seeks to eliminate the veto.440 As a first step, it favours a restriction of its use. The country supports the introduction of a double veto requirement and the elimination of the possibility of using the right of veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross violations of human rights.441 According to Peru, the veto should be restricted to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and permanent members should be obliged to explain and properly sustain their decision to exercise the veto in a public session of the Council. Peru further proposes that non-procedural decisions only require affirmative votes by two permanent members instead of all five of them.442 Peru supports the French and Mexican initiative as well as the ACT Code of Conduct. Philippines The Philippines is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 2002, 2004 and 2007, the Philippines expressed its support for an expansion in both categories of seats,443 and endorsed Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership in 2004.444 In its proposal of 2009, which it later reiterated, the Philippines promoted the creation of eight new permanent and eight new non-permanent seats, which should be assigned to the members of the regional groups on a rotational basis with five year terms and no veto powers for new permanent seats, and two year terms for non-permanent seats. The Philippines envisioned two permanent seats for the African Group, two for the Asian Group, two for the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one each for the Eastern European Group and WEOG. Of the new nonpermanent seats, two should be allocated to the African Group, two to the Asian Group, two to the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one each to the Eastern European Group and WEOG.445 After a term of five years, the respective regional group should decide whether a state should enjoy permanent status or whether it should be succeeded by another state. The Philippines proposed this scheme to be pursued until all regions have decided on the respective member states to serve as full permanent members.446 In its more recent statements, the Philippines returned to its original position, supporting an increase in both existing categories of membership.447 The

440  2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.4.3.8; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 441  2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.4.3.8; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 442  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 443  14 October 2002, → 4.2.1.1.21; 27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.30; 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.54. 444  27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.30. 445   14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals concerning Equitable Representation on and Increase of Membership in and on Working Methods of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.3.1; 8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 446  8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7. 447  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1271

country’s upper numerical limit for Security Council membership was thirty-one in 2009,448 and twenty-seven more recently.449 The Philippines opposes the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members until the issue is decided upon in a review.450 Viewing the abolition of the veto as desirable but unlikely,451 the Philippines seeks to limit its use to certain substantive matters, which do not include subjects such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, violations of human rights and terrorism. The country also proposes to provide the General Assembly as well as the Security Council with the power to override a veto.452 The Philippines supports the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct. Poland Poland is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. Poland demands an augmented representation of Eastern European countries in the Security Council,453 namely in the form of one additional non-permanent seat.454 Early in the reform discussions, the country expressed its support for Germany and Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership in the Security Council as well as for an enhanced representation of developing countries in both categories of membership.455 In 1996 and 1997, Poland stated its willingness to expand the Security Council to a number of between twenty-one and twenty-five, respectively.456 The country is a cosponsor of the G4 draft resolution of 2005.457 Poland supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct, both of which aim at restricting the veto. Portugal Portugal is a member of the ACT Group and the “Group of Ten”.458 The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories,459 but opposes the extension of the veto to new permanent members.460 In 1993, 448  8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7; see also 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 449  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39 and 5.3.23. 450  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39. 451  14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals concerning Equitable Representation on and Increase of Membership in and on Working Methods of the Security Council, → 5.4.3.1; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.2.13 and 5.4.4.50. 452  14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals …, → 5.4.3.1; 8 December 2009, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.3.5; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 453  29 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.9; 12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.9; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 454  30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.9. 455  29 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.9; 12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13. 456  29 October 1996, → 3.3.31; 12 June 1997, → 3.3.36. 457  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 458  Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 459  26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.20. 460  8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5.

1272

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Portugal suggested an increase in non-permanent membership by one seat per region. Additional permanent seats should only be granted to countries that are in a position to assume the responsibilities entailed by that status and that could contribute to a reinforcement of the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.461 In 1997, Portugal stated that an essential condition for permanent membership should be the full acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.462 In the same year, the country expressed it support for Germany and Japan’s aspirations for a permanent seat,463 and twenty years later did the same with regard to Brazil and India.464 Portugal opposes special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.465 It is a co-sponsor of the 2005 G4 draft resolution.466 According to Portugal, the upper numerical limit for the size of the Council should be twenty-five.467 Together with nine other states, Portugal proposed several limitations of the use of the veto.468 Qatar Qatar is a member of the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Qatar supports an increase in the number of both permanent469 and nonpermanent members.470 In 1993, the country issued a detailed proposal concerning Security Council reform, which included a rotating European seat to be shared by the three current European permanent members and Germany. Similarly, a rotational seat for Japan and India should be added. Qatar’s proposal envisioned a Security Council with a total of six permanent seats, of which two should be rotational seats for Europe and Asia, and the remaining four should be assigned to the United States of America, China, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, Qatar proposed to extend the number of non-permanent seats to fifteen; regional groups should also be able to hold a nonpermanent seat.471 Qatar wishes the veto power to be curtailed and eventually eliminated.472 The veto should be limited to matters falling under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.473 It should

461  462  463  464  465  466  467  468  469 

2 6 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.31. 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5. 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.4.3; 8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5. 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 27 March 1997, → 3.3.35; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3; 3 October 1995, → 3.2.1.1.26; 30 September 1999, → 4.2.1.1.5; 20 July 2006, → 4.2.1.1.48. 470  27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3; 2 October 1997, → 3.2.1.3.16; 20 July 2006, → 4.2.1.1.48. 471  27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3. 472  18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, Cartagena de Indias Summit, Final Document, → 3.4.2.17. 473  2 October 1997, → 3.4.3.45.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1273

not be expanded for any reason whatsoever.474 The country supports the France/ Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct.475 Republic of Korea The Republic of Korea is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.476 While being opposed to new permanent members,477 South Korea has expressed its openness to the creation of semi-permanent seats.478 With regard to regional seats, however, the country was more critical.479 The Republic of Korea favours a periodic review for all permanent members.480 As a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group,481 the Republic of Korea has consistently promoted the group’s common position.482 The country views the veto as being undemocratic and contrary to the principle of sovereign equality. However, it also believes that an abolition is not feasible for the time being.483 In 1996, Korea supported proposals designed to limit the veto power to Security Council decisions under Chapter VII;484 it subsequently expressed its support for the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct. The Asian country opposes an extension of the veto to new permanent members.485 Romania Romania is a member of the Group of Eastern European States, and participated in the Overarching Group.486 The country favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.487 Romania supports Germany, Japan,488 Brazil and India as candidates for permanent membership, and promotes a permanent African representation.489 It firmly promotes the creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States.490

474  14 November 2007, → 4.4.2.13. 475  7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.56. 476  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 477  See, e.g., the statements of 27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.2.3; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.8; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.2.13; 24 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.3; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9. 478   22 May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.21; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.25; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9. 479  7 May 1997, → 3.2.3.26. 480  26 April 1996, → 3.2.1.2.11. 481  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 482  See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1, and 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9. 483  13 November 1995, → 3.4.3.13. 484  22 May 1996, → 3.4.3.25. 485  27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.2.3; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.8; 26 April 1996, → 3.2.1.2.11. 486  von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above. 487  4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.9. 488  4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9. 489  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 490  30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.10; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

1274

Annex II: Summary of country positions

With regard to the veto, Romania supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration as well as the ACT Code of Conduct, which both aim at restricting the veto informally. Russian Federation Although the Russian Federation belongs to the Group of Eastern European States, that group has consistently participated in the Security Council reform debate as the “Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership of the Security Council”, thereby excluding Russia.491 At the time of the 49th session of the General Assembly, Russia supported the proposal for a limited expansion of the membership of the Security Council, namely up to twenty seats.492 In the ensuing years, Russia agreed to modestly increase the size of the Council, however, not exceeding the low twenties,493 while occasionally returning to its initial preference of a maximum of twenty seats.494 Three sessions later, Russia expressed its openness to a number of specific ideas which were on the negotiation table, such as an expansion of the Council in both categories and the idea of rotating membership, should this be the wish of the respective regional groups, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America.495 Russia stressed that any expansion should include both developed and developing countries.496 Throughout the reform discussions, Russia has expressed its endorsement for the aspirations for permanent membership of Germany,497 Japan,498 India499 and Brazil,500 as well as for a permanent African representation.501 However, more recently Russia has not explicitly expressed its support for the aspirations of the Group of Four. Further, the Russian Federation began to emphasize the need for a consensus-based support of Council reform in the UN.502 Russia also expressed its willingness to discuss an interim solution or intermediate approach.503 The Russian Federation rejects all restrictions of the right of veto of the permanent members, and maintains that the present status of the permanent members must

491  M  ay 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1 and 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16. 492  1 4 October 1994, → 3.3.12; and one session later on 15 November 1995, → 3.3.21. 493  2 March 2010, Non-Paper, → 5.3.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.3.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.21. 494  7 November 2013, → 5.3.17; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.12. 495  See, e.g., the statements of 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60, and 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.12. 496  See, e.g., the statements of 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.3.5; 16 October 2002, → 4.2.3.7; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 497  5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60 and 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 498  5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60 and 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 499  See, e.g., the statements of 22 June 1999, → 4.2.1.1.4; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.3.4; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.3.5; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 500  14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 501  14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24. 502  18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.16; 9 November 2011, → 5.2.3.6. 503  See, e.g., the statements of 2 March 2010, Non-Paper, → 5.2.2.2.15; 14 April 2015, → 5.2.3.10; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.12; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.30; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.17; 27 February 2019, → 5.2.3.22.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1275

remain unchanged.504 The question of extending the veto power to new permanent members should not be discussed until an agreement has been reached with regard to the specific composition of an enlarged Council. Russia therefore called for the discussion on the veto to be postponed to a later stage.505 Russia dismisses the France/Mexico joint political declaration aimed at limiting the veto in cases of mass atrocities.506 Samoa Samoa is a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States.507 In 1993, Samoa supported a limited expansion of the non-permanent category and the addition of new permanent members without the right of veto.508 More recently, it expressed its support for the G4 draft resolution of 2005 and endorsed a permanent seat both for Germany and Japan.509 As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Samoa demands one non-permanent seat for small states.510 Samoa disapproves of the concept that one permanent member can block the Council’s decisions and resolutions511 and therefore is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and a supporter of the France/Mexico joint political declaration. San Marino San Marino is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.512 San Marino strives to improve the access of small states to the Security Council513 and opposes an enlargement in the permanent category of membership.514 The country welcomes the creation of longer-term seats as a third category of membership.515 San Marino is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group516 and has constantly supported the positions of this group.517 San Marino is opposed to the veto, viewing it as contrary to the way modern international society is organized.518 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

504  See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, → 3.4.1.1; 22 May 1996, → 3.4.1.6; 24 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.1.1; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.1.4; 16 October 2002, → 4.4.1.8; 12 July 2005, → 4.4.1.9; 20 July 2006, → 4.4.1.9; 2 March 2010, → 5.4.1.1; 9 November 2011, → 5.4.1.3; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.6; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.1.8; 6 February 2018, → 5.4.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.1.10; 27 February 2019, → 5.4.1.11. 505  2 March 2010, → 5.4.1.1. 506  2 September 2015, Press conference on the Security Council programme of work, → 5.4.1.4. 507  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1. 508  26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2. 509  12 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.41. 510  26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1. 511  26 July 1993, → 3.4.3.3. 512  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 513  14 October 1994, → 3.2.3.11. 514  4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.16; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.6; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.2.8. 515  9 November 2011, → 5.2.2.2.19; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1. 516  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 517  For a recent statement, see 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 15-16. 518  16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.6.

1276

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Singapore Singapore is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and was one of the “Small Five”.519 Throughout the 1990s, Singapore supported an addition of new permanent seats with the right of veto to the Security Council, but suggested a set of criteria the respective states should meet.520 Although it supported the G4 draft resolution of 2005,521 Singapore has opposed the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.522 Singapore initially did not endorse the creation of a new category of semi-permanent seats because this would make small countries third-class countries.523 However, in recent years, Singapore has expressed its openness to new categories of seats. If semi-permanent seats were to be created, Singapore would support a method according to which states would have to commit themselves to the category of seats to which they wish to belong for a certain period of time. This would make it easier for smaller states to obtain a non-permanent seat, as larger states would choose to compete for a semi-permanent seat.524 According to Singapore, small states must always be represented on the Security Council. The country suggests that if the Council does not include a small state, one of the Council members shall be appointed to act as a representative of the small states in consultation with the members of the Forum of Small States.525 In order to minimize a misuse of the veto, Singapore proposed in 1994 that at least two vetoes should be required to block a draft resolution after an expansion of the Council’s permanent membership.526 As a member of the Small Five, Singapore supported the idea of limiting the veto in the cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.527 It has endorsed the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct. Furthermore, Singapore demands an explanation of a use of the veto to all member states.528

519  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3. 520  9 February 1994, → 3.2.1.1.15 and 3.4.3.7; 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 521  22 February 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.8. 522  10 April 2008, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.5; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.10. 523  9 February 1999, OEWG, → 4.2.2.4.1. 524  22 February 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.8; 10 April 2008, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.16. 525  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 526  9 February 1994, → 3.4.3.7. 527  3 November 2005, Draft Resolution of the S-5, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3; for Singapore alone: 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 528  3 November 2005, Draft Resolution of the S-5, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3; for Singapore alone: 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1277

Slovakia Slovakia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States. Slovakia supports an enlargement of the Security Council membership in both the permanent and the non-permanent category.529 The country is also open to discuss the possibility of a third type of membership, provided that this would lead to more representation and efficiency.530 In an enlarged Council, Slovakia demands a better representation of the Eastern European states531 by way of an additional nonpermanent seat for this group.532 Furthermore, the Arab533 and African534 presence in the Security Council should be strengthened. The Slovak Republic favours a maximum of twenty-five members of the Security Council.535 Slovakia views the veto as a crucial issue in the reform of the UN Security Council. Although the right of veto should be extended to new permanent members, its role and application should be reduced. The use of the right of veto should be limited, and Slovakia urges permanent members to provide a formal explanation when exercising it.536 Slovakia supports a limitation of the use of the veto to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as an agreement about what matters are deemed procedural.537 The country promotes a veto culture of zero tolerance in mass atrocity situations. It endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration and is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Slovenia Slovenia is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.538 In 1993, Slovenia advocated a reform of the system of regional groups in order to adapt the Security Council to the contemporary political reality. Like other Eastern European countries, Slovenia has supported an increase in the membership of both categories and emphasized the importance of adequate geographical representation in the Council. It also expressed the view that new permanent members should have a status equal to that of the current permanent members of the Council.539 In later statements, Slovenia actively supported the claim for two regional permanent seats for countries of the African Union, as proposed in the African Common Position.540 529  3 1 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.19. 530  7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15. 531  31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 532  7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.19. 533  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 534  7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15. 535  31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.3.24. 536  23 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.3.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.13; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12. 537  23 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.3.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.13. 538  Cf. e.g. 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 539  24 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.11. 540  30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.22.

1278

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Furthermore, in 2005 Slovenia promoted the allocation of a permanent seat to the Eastern European region in case the number of permanent seats is increased.541 After initially opposing the creation of a third category of seats,542 Slovenia made the following proposal in 2008: There should be six additional permanent members representing all regions of the world. Further, a new category of non-permanent membership with a more frequent rotation should be created, while the remaining members would be elected according to the principle of equitable geographical distribution.543 This idea was further explained in 2010 and 2011.544 More recently, Slovenia, which is still in favour of expanding the Security Council in both existing categories, has advocated the creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group as well as additional seats for Africa.545 Slovenia supports a limitation of the veto.546 As a member of the ACT group and a supporter of the France/Mexico joint political declaration, the country promotes a restriction of the veto in cases of atrocities and encourages maximum self-restraint in the use of the veto in all other cases.547 South Africa South Africa is a member of the African Union, of IBSA, the Southern African Development Community (SADC),548 the L.69 Group549 and of the Non-Aligned Movement. South Africa has not issued an own proposal for Security Council reform. It endorses the African Common Position.550 In 1997, South Africa stated that the number of seats should be at least twenty-six.551 In 2004, the country declared its readiness to serve as a permanent member.552 As a member of IBSA, South Africa endorses the aspirations of Brazil and India for permanent membership.553 With regard to the veto, South Africa claims that it should be extended to new permanent members.554 However, the country has voiced concerns over situations in which individual member states use the veto to serve their own narrow national interests while ignoring the overwhelming voice of the international community.555

541  542  543  544 

1 1 November 2005, → 4.2.1.3.19. 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.4.3; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54. 24 September 2008, → 4.2.1.3.25. 9 February 2010, → 5.2.2.2.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 545  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.20. 546  18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3. 547  7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.51. 548  16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7. 549  See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51. 550  5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.59; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 551  5 December 1997, → 3.3.41. 552  26 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.29. 553  26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23. 554  5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.59; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 555  14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.21.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1279

Spain Spain is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.556 In 1993, Spain supported a limited increase in the number of new permanent members without the right of veto and expressed its openness to an intermediate solution.557 Subsequently, in 1996, the country preferred an expansion only in the non-permanent category and presented ideas for the introduction of semi-permanent seats.558 It became a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group559 and has supported the group’s positions ever since.560 In 2008, the country spoke in favour of establishing mechanisms that guarantee the representation of transregional groups.561 Spain favours a moderate enlargement of the Council to a total of twenty-one to twenty-five members.562 In 1995 and 1996, Spain sought to limit the veto to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.563 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Sudan Sudan is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1993, Sudan supported a permanent seat for the non-aligned states.564 The country has favoured regional seats565 and, in line with the African Common Position, it claims for Africa two permanent seats with the same powers as the current permanent members, as well as five non-permanent seats.566 Sudan is in favour of abolishing the right of veto567 and seeks to restrict its use to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until a final abrogation is possible.568 Sweden Sweden is a member of the ACT Group and one of the Nordic Countries.569 Being in favour of an equitable representation of all regions, Sweden supports an expansion of the Security Council in both categories of membership.570 With regard 556  557  558  559  560 

2 1 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1. 28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19; see also 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.4. 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.28. For a more recent statement supporting the Uniting for Consensus Group, see 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 9-10. 561  19. November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.42. 562  13 November 1995, → 3.3.15. 563  13 November 1995, → 3.2.3.16 and 3.4.3.14. 564  26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7. 565  30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.27. 566  See, e.g., the statements of 1 November 2001, → 4.2.2.3.19; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 12 November 2010, → 5.2.2.3.9. 567  26 July 1993, → 3.4.2.4; 1 November 2001, → 4.4.2.7. 568  5 December 1997, → 3.4.3.51. 569  See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25. 570  18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 22 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.38; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.1.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37.

1280

Annex II: Summary of country positions

to new permanent members, Sweden opposes an extension of the right of veto571 and promotes the installation of a review clause.572 In 1993, Sweden also expressed its openness to new categories of seats, such as intra-regional rotations of members.573 Sweden argues for a gradual limitation of the veto, holding that its use should be formally or informally restricted until the decision-making process of the Security Council is factually veto free.574 As a member of the ACT Group, Sweden endorses the ACT Code of Conduct as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration for an informal restriction of the veto in situations of mass atrocities, crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.575 Switzerland Switzerland is a leading member of the ACT Group and was a member of the “Small Five”.576 The country favours the introduction of a new category of intermediate seats577 and strongly opposes the extension of the veto power to new permanent members.578 Switzerland supports a periodic review579 and suggested that a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly should have the possibility to replace elected permanent members whose contributions to the work of the Organization were no longer fulfilling the expectations of the large majority of member states.580 With regard to size, Switzerland supports a reasonably small Council with an additional six or seven seats, amounting to a total of twenty-one to twenty-two seats.581 As one of the leading members of the Small Five and the ACT Group, the improvement of the working methods of the Council (including the veto) has been a top priority for Switzerland. It therefore asks the veto-wielding powers of the Security Council to explain their use of the veto582 and to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and in situations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.583 Switzerland endorses the ACT Code of Conduct as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration. 571  26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.14; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.2.1.3. 572  22 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.38; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1. 573  26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2. 574  4 December 1997, → 3.4.4.5; 21 September 1999, → 4.4.3.4; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1. 575  20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24. 576  April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3. 577  14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13; 17 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.2; 12 June 2009, → 5.2.2.2.6. 578  See, e.g., the statements of 11 October 2004, → 4.2.1.2.9; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.1.2.12; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13; 17 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.2. 579  11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.2.11; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.2.5; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13. 580  11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.2.11. 581  12 June 2009, → 5.3.2. 582  11 October 2004, → 4.4.4.15; 3 November 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2009, → 5.4.4.2; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 12 May 2012, → 5.4.4.10. 583  11 July 2005, → 4.4.4.16; 3 November 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; 17 March 2009, → 5.4.4.2; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 12 May 2012, → 5.4.4.10.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1281

Syria Syria is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In accordance with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, Syria stresses that an expansion of the Council in both existing categories of membership must ensure an equitable representation for developing countries.584 In 1993, it suggested to grant one permanent seat to each developing region.585 If permanent membership of the Council is increased, Syria demands a permanent seat for the Arab states to rotate among them according to the criteria used within the group.586 Furthermore, two non-permanent seats should also be allocated to the Group of Arab States.587 In 2016, Syria emphasized that the criteria of neutrality and objectivity must be observed when it comes to the election of states to the Security Council.588 With regard to size, Syria supports a Security Council of at least twenty-six members.589 The country strongly supports abolishing the veto or at least restricting its use.590 Thailand Thailand is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but has declared that in the context of Security Council reform discussions it “belongs to no specific group”.591 In 1993, Thailand supported an increase in the number of permanent and nonpermanent members, and expressed its openness to an introduction of other categories of membership.592 In 2000, Thailand reiterated its support for an expansion in the existing categories, endorsing a permanent seat for Japan.593 Thailand is also open to an interim or intermediate solution.594 In 2014, it suggested to introduce longer-term seats that could be transformed into permanent seats if the countries occupying them demonstrated their respective “capacity and commitment”.595 According to Thailand, the numerical size of the Council should be in the mid-twenties.596 With regard to the veto, Thailand suggested that permanent members pledge publicly to use the veto only in regard to actions decided under Chapter VII of the Charter597

584  585  586  587  588  589  590  591  592  593  594  595  596  597 

1 4 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22. 23 November 1993, → 3.2.2.3.4. 23 November 1993, → 3.2.2.3.4; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.8; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22. 14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22. 7 November 2016, → 5.2.3.14. 20 December 1999, → 4.3.7. 23 November 1993, → 3.4.2.7; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.9 and 4.2.2.3.8; 14 October 2003, → 4.4.3.19. 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.11. 23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.3; reiterated on 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.11. 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.1.18. 7 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.22; 12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.2.24; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.34; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.38. 12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.2.24; see also 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.34. 7 November 2016, → 5.3.22; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.38. 17 November 2000, → 4.4.4.10.

1282

Annex II: Summary of country positions

and to explain the rationale behind their decision when casting a veto.598 Thailand supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and ACT Code of Conduct.599 Tunisia Tunisia is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The country supports an enlargement of both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council.600 Tunisia advocates rotating permanent regional representation601 and claims two permanent seats602 and five non-permanent seats603 for Africa, in accordance with the African Common Position. Furthermore, Tunisia endorses permanent seats for Germany and Japan.604 The country also supports the position of the Group of Arab States.605 Tunisia is in favour of an abolition of the veto.606 If an abolition is not possible, the veto power should be limited to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.607 Tunisia also supports the introduction of at least a double veto requirement.608 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Turkey Turkey is a member of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the Uniting for Consensus Group.609 In 1993, Turkey proposed to raise the number of non-permanent seats to fifteen and to establish ten new semi-permanent seats rotating within groups of states according to predetermined objective criteria.610 Although the country later called for an enlargement only in the existing non-permanent category, it has also been open to the possibility of creating longer-term non-permanent seats.611 Turkey opposes an 598  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.41. 599  30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.27; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.52. 600  24 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.13; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.47; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 601  14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.11; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20. 602  14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.11; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; see also 7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11. 603  17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; see also 7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11. 604  30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20. 605  7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11. 606  14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25. 607  14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.16. 608  14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.16; 15 October 2002, → 4.4.3.18. 609  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 610  20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2. For later references to this idea see 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.11, and 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14. 611  24 March 2009, → 5.2.2.2.4; 3 September 2009, → 5.2.2.2.9; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.10; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.18.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1283

increase in the number of permanent members612 or an extension of the right of veto.613 It is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group,614 the proposals of which it has endorsed ever since.615 Turkey has expressed its support for a Security Council with at least twenty-five members.616 Turkey favours an abolition of the veto and supports the initiatives to restrict its use in cases of mass atrocities.617 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. Ukraine Ukraine is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and of the GU(U)AM Group.618 In 1993, Ukraine suggested the creation of a new, third category of membership, with seats being shared by two or three important states from each regional group which would take turns in serving on the Council.619 In 1995 and 1996, Ukraine suggested a Security Council with at least twenty-five members.620 At the same time, Ukraine developed the formula “2+8” for an enlargement of the Council. Two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan should be created,621 along with eight new non-permanent seats. The latter could be distributed as follows: four seats for Asian and African countries, two seats for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, one seat for WEOG, and one seat for the Eastern European countries.622 According to the Ukrainian plan, each of these eight non-permanent seats would rotate among three or four states so that states making a substantial contribution to the financing and peace-keeping activities of the UN, and countries representing the majority of the world’s population, could assume more responsibility in the Security Council.623 Ukraine is a co-sponsor of the G4 draft resolution of 2005.624 It also calls for an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group625 and has recently stated “that there is merit in exploring the option of allocating a non-permanent seat in the future Council to the Small Island Developing States”.626 612  2 September 2009, → 5.2.1.2.4. 613  20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.18. 614  21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. 615   For a more recent statement supporting the Uniting for Consensus Group, see 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.10. 616  18 September 1995, → 3.3.14. For a size of 25-27 seats, see 7 April 2009, → 5.3.1, and for one of 30 seats, see 20 July 1993, → 3.3.1. 617  7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.10. 618  See, e.g., the statement of 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25. 619  27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.2.4. 620  14 November 1995, → 3.3.20; 11 July 1996, → 3.3.28; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.29. 621  14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24. 622  11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24. 623  14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23 and 3.3.28; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24. 624  6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37. 625  Cf. 14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.16; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22. 626  7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22.

1284

Annex II: Summary of country positions

Ukraine seeks to abolish627 or at the least restrict the use of the veto.628 As a first step, permanent members should voluntarily abstain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale.629 The veto should not be permitted in the event of acts of aggression against a UN member state.630 Furthermore, the use of a veto should require an explanation.631 Ukraine is a signatory of the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct.632 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Security Council, participated in the Overarching Group.633 In 1996, the United Kingdom expressed its support for a modest enlargement of the Security Council, endorsing Germany and Japan as new permanent members.634 Three years later, the United Kingdom elaborated its position, stating that an enlargement should aim at achieving a better representation for developing countries in the Council by granting them three permanent seats.635 In 2003, the United Kingdom announced its support for the aspirations of India and Brazil with regard to two of those seats.636 The UK did not propose a specific country for the African seat.637 The support of the United Kingdom for permanent seats for Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and “Africa” has been consistent ever since.638 While the United Kingdom supports a modest expansion in both categories of membership, it has repeatedly emphasized the importance of not compromising the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness.639 Recognizing that the reform process was in a deadlock, the United Kingdom expressed its openness to an interim solution, and together with France suggested the creation of a new category of seats with longer and renewable terms.640

627  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.2.16; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.14. 628  27 August 1993, → 3.4.3.4; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.4.4.3; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.14. 629  31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22. 630  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.44; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.55. 631  5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13. 632  7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.44; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.55. 633  von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above. 634  28 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.37. 635  16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8. 636  17 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.26. 637  See, e.g., the statements of 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.3.24; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.26. 638  For a recent confirmation of this position see 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.42, and 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.49. 639  20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 27 May 1994, → 3.3.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.1.33; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.42; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.49. 640  13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.3.24; 27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom Joint Statement, → 5.2.1.1.8.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1285

The United Kingdom opposes any formal restrictions of the veto power.641 How­ ever, the United Kingdom has been vocal in its support for the ACT Code of Conduct, committing itself not to vote against credible Security Council draft resolutions that seek to prevent or respond to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes.642 The United Kingdom opposes an extension of the right of veto beyond the current permanent members.643 United States of America The United States supports a modest expansion in both categories of membership, and has done so since the issue of Security Council reform was put on the agenda in 1992.644 While the United States initially supported a Japanese and a German permanent seat,645 it later withdrew its endorsement for Germany646 and instead expressed its support for an Indian seat.647 The United States repeatedly emphasized the need for an increase in the representation of Asia, Africa and Latin America, either through an addition of non-permanent648 or of permanent seats.649 The United States also expressed its openness to the possibility of a re-election of non-permanent members on several occasions.650 While in 1997 the United States considered the possibility of creating rotational permanent seats,651 it has since held that an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific, rather than region-based.652 Throughout the 1990’s, the United States insisted on an upper numerical limit of twenty653 to twenty-one654 members. It subsequently agreed to a number slightly higher than 21.655 Recently, the United States has reiterated its support for a moderate expansion of the Council in both categories,656 emphasizing that such an expansion should 641  1 6 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8. 642  7 November 2013, → 5.4.4.13; 12 November 2014, → 5.4.4.16; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.28; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.1.33; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.58; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.4.67. 643  12 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.2; 12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.1.6. 644  See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36; 12 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.52; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.1.1.56; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.2.1.4; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13. 645  20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11; 3 April 2000, → 4.3.12; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13. 646  22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36. 647  8 November 2010, Remarks by the President to Indian Parliament, → 5.2.1.1.13. 648  14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30. 649  17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13. 650  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40; 22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36. 651  17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55. 652  13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.1.1; 5 March 2010, → 5.2.2.1.3; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.1.5; 16 April 2015, → 5.2.2.1.7. 653  13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40. 654  17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11. 655  3 April 2000, → 4.3.12; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13. 656  16 April 2015, → 5.2.2.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

1286

Annex II: Summary of country positions

neither diminish the Council’s effectiveness nor its efficiency, and that permanent membership presupposes the ability and willingness of a country to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.657 In 1978, the United States considered possible a very modest voluntary limitation of the right of veto in certain areas of Security Council work, as defined by the permanent members themselves.658 However, throughout the reform debate since 1992, the country consistently opposed any alteration of the current veto structure, including an elimination or an extension659 of the right of veto.660 Uruguay Uruguay is a member of the ACT Group. The country supports an enlargement of both the permanent and the nonpermanent category but opposes the extension of the veto power to new permanent members.661 Uruguay proposed that the veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly.662 As a member of the ACT Group, Uruguay supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration on limiting the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocities.663 Venezuela Venezuela is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Venezuela favours an enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council and suggests increasing the size of the Council to approximately twenty-six members.664 Venezuela wishes to abolish the veto but supports its extension to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent) until this goal can be achieved. Furthermore, the veto should be limited to specific cases decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A requirement of two vetoes to block a decision should be established.665

657  21 July 2005, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, → 4.2.1.1.43; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.44; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.2.1.4; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13. 658  March 1978, Report from the Carter Administration, → 2.16. 659  7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13. 660  14 November 1995, → 3.4.1.2; 23 May 1996, → 3.4.1.7; 23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2; 5 April 2000, → 4.4.1.5; 16 November 2000, → 4.4.1.6; 5 March 2010, → 5.4.1.2; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13. 661  16 February 2010, → 5.2.2.1.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.12. 662  17 June 1996, → 3.4.3.27. 663  6 February 2018, → 5.4.4.63. 664  4 March 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.10 and 5.3.9; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8. 665  25 September 1991, → 3.4.2.1; 4 March 2010, → 5.4.3.10; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

Annex II: Summary of country positions

1287

Yemen Yemen is a member of the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 1993, Yemen supported an increase in the membership of the Security Council as well as a review of its permanent membership and suggested the inclusion of regional organizations in the non-permanent membership through representation by the current chairperson or president of their supreme organs.666 More recently, Yemen refrained from issuing own proposals, instead aligning itself with the positions of the Group of Arab States and the Non-Aligned Movement. The country acknowledged, however, the aspirations of Germany and Japan to become permanent members.667 Yemen also expressed its support for the abolition of the right of veto.668 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct. Zimbabwe Zimbabwe is a member of the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Southern African Development Community. In 1995, Zimbabwe expressed its wish to abolish the permanent category of membership in the long term and to subject all members of the Security Council to election, admitting that such a proposal would not be able to gain the support of the current permanent members.669 The country claims that Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean should each have at least two permanent seats with the same rights and privileges as held by the present permanent members. Additional non-permanent seats should also be allocated to each of those regions.670 Zimbabwe’s position is in accordance with the African Common Position.671 Zimbabwe supports an abolition of the veto672 or at least a limitation of its use, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which aims to limit the veto to matters decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.673

666  667  668  669  670  671  672  673 

2 7 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3. 16 November 2000, → 4.2.3.3; 17 October 2003, → 4.2.3.8. 27 August 1993, → 3.4.2.5. 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31. 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.23. 5 December 1997, → 3.2.2.3.32; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. 14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.15; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31. 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.34.

Annex III: Table of group positions The following table of group positions wants to give a concise overview of the respective group’s main positions as expressed in the course of the reform discussions. The table does not take account of every detail of a group’s views; it also does not reveal every alteration to these views. The table rather indicates the general views held by a group of states. If a particular group changed significantly its views in the course of the debate, the most recent position was described in the table. The respective group was marked with an asterisk *. In that case, the reader may wish to consult the summaries of positions in Annex I to find information of how the respective views changed.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_009

African Union

2013

Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT)

X

X

X

additional permanent members with the right of veto additional nonpermanent seats permanent sears without veto non-permanent seats with longer terms regional representation 2 for Africa 2 for Africa 26

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for

Veto

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

Members

Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Uruguay 2001 (in Algeria, Angola, Benin, replacement Botswana, Burkina Faso, of the OAU) Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,

Foundation

Group name

Annex III: Table of group positions

1289

Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

African Union (continued)

1973

Foundation

Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (not a UN Member State), Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (not a UN Member State), Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago X

X

X

X

X

X

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for WEOG

1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

2 for Africa 2 for Africa 26

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Members

nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

X

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Mid- to upper twenties

1290 Annex III: Table of group positions

Eastern European Group

Central American Countries*

1994

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama

Members

X

X

X

X

X

adequate representation of developing countries

1 for Eastern Europe

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Foundation

nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex III: Table of group positions

1291

2004

Group of Four (G4)

Group of Arab States

Foundation

Group name

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Brazil, Germany, India, Japan

X

X

permanent with veto X

X

X

25 1 for Brazil, 1-2 for Africa, 1 for Germany, 1 for Asia, 1 for 1 for India, 1 for Japan, Eastern 2 for Africa Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean 1 for Arab 1-2 for ≥26 States Arab States

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Members

Veto retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1292 Annex III: Table of group positions

1997

2003

IBSA

active in 1997 and 1998

Group of Ten

GU(U)AM

Foundation

Group name

Brazil, India, South Africa

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, (Uzbekistan) X

X

X

permanent with veto X

X

X

1 for Brazil, 1 for India, 1 for South Africa

1 for Eastern Europe

≤25

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Members

Veto

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex III: Table of group positions

1293

L.69 Group

2007

Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Members

X

X

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

2 for Africa, 27 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States, 1 for WEOG

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Foundation

nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1294 Annex III: Table of group positions

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

1961

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, DR Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,

Members

X

developing ≥26 countries & countries of the NAM

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Foundation

nonpermanent Permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex III: Table of group positions

1295

Non-Aligned Movement (continued)

Foundation

Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, East Timor, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

X

developing ≥26 countries & countries of the NAM

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Members

nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1296 Annex III: Table of group positions

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

1969

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden

permanent with veto X

X

X

adequate representation of Islamic countries and increased representation of developing countries

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Members

Nordic Countries

Foundation

low twenties, preferably 23

Group name

Veto

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex III: Table of group positions

1297

Overarching Group

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (continued)

2008

Foundation

Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen Cyprus, Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, Romania, United Kingdom The draft left it open for states to discuss the categories of seats

X

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

adequate representation of Islamic countries and increased representation of developing countries

22

Composition of the Security Council Size expansion in new categories of additional additional the existing membership permanent noncategories seats for permanent seats for permanent with veto

Members

nonpermanent Permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

Veto

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1298 Annex III: Table of group positions

1992

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Uniting for Consensus (UfC, UFC)

2005

Small Five (S-5/S5)

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)

Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, Turkey

Composition expansion in new categories of the existing membership categories

X

X

permanent with veto

Foundation Members

X

X

X

X

X

X

nonpermanent permanent without veto nonpermanent longer terms regional repres.

Group name

2 for Africa 2 for Africa

small states

additional additional permanent nonseats for permanent seats for

≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

retention abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex III: Table of group positions

1299

Annex IV: Table of country positions The following table of country positions wants to give a concise overview of the respective country’s main positions as expressed in the course of the reform discussions. The table does not take account of every detail of a country’s views; it also does not reveal every alteration to these views. The table rather indicates the general views held by a state. If a particular state changed significantly its views in the course of the debate, the most recent position was described in the table. The respective state was marked with an asterisk *. In that case, the reader may wish to consult the summaries of positions in Annex II to find information of how the respective views changed.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_010

Australia

Argentina

Antigua and Barbuda

Algeria

Uniting for Consensus Group Group of Ten

African Union, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Caribbean Community, Non-Aligned Movement

additional permanent seats with the right of veto

X

X

additional nonpermanent seats X

X

X

X

X

permanent seats without veto X

X

X

X

X

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan, 3 for developing countries

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

2 for Africa

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent seats with longer terms

expansion in the existing categories

regional representation

Groups

≤25

≤26

Mid- to upper twenties

≥26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

Country

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1301

retention

Non-Aligned Movement G4, IBSA, L.69

Bolivia*

Brazil

Caribbean Community, Non-Aligned Movement

ACT Group, Group of Ten Eastern European Group, Non-Aligned Movement Group of Ten

Belize*

Belgium

Belarus

Austria

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

X

X

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 1 for South Africa, 1 for Africa

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan 2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

1-2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan, adequate representation of Africa, Asia, Latin America Africa, Asia, Latin 1 additional for every America & the group (including 1for Caribbean Eastern Europe)

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

25-27

25

Mid- to upper twenties

≤25/ 26

≥26

≤25

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1302 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

Uniting for Consensus Group ACT Group, Non-Aligned Movement

Non-Aligned Movement, Uniting for Consensus Group

Canada

Colombia

China

Chile

Eastern European Group, Group of Ten

Bulgaria

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

X

X

developing countries, and small and medium-sized countries (category not specified)

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan, and seats for Africa, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Eastern Europe

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≤26

flexible

≤26

≤25

Size retention X

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1303

Non-Aligned Movement

Non-Aligned Movement

Cuba

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Croatia

ACT Group, Central American Countries, Small Five, Uniting for Consensus Group Eastern European Group

Costa Rica

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

X

X

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan, 1 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean 2 for Africa, 2 for developing countries in Asia, 2 for Latin America & the Caribbean strong opposition to Japanese candidacy

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≥26

≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1304 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

African Union, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation L.69, Non-Aligned Movement, Pacific Small Island Developing States

Egypt

Fiji*

Ecuador

ACT Group, Nordic Countries Non-Aligned Movement

Denmark

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent X X X

non-permanent seat for

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

1 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean 2 for Africa 2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of permanent seat for membership

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

27

≥26

midtwenties

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1305

retention

X

Eastern European Group, GU(U)AM

G4, Overarching Group

ACT Group, African Union, Non-Aligned Movement

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

X

permanent without veto X

X

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 1 for Africa 1 for Germany, 1 for 1 for Asia, 1 for Africa, Japan 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean 1 for Brazil, 1 for 1-2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 1 for Japan, 2 for for Latin America & the Africa Caribbean 2 for Africa 2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

expansion in the existing categories

permanent with veto

France

Groups

regional repres.

Country

25

25

25

Size retention X

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1306 Annex IV: Table of country positions

Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Uniting for Consensus Group

Indonesia

Italy

India

Hungary

Central American Countries, Non-Aligned Movement ACT Group, Eastern European Group, Group of Ten G4, IBSA, L.69, Non-Aligned Movement

Guatemala

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

expansion in the existing categories

X

permanent without veto X

X

X

X

additional non-permanent seats for

European Union

1 for Germany, 1 for 1 for Eastern Europe Japan, seats for Africa, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean 1 for Brazil, 1 for 1-2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 1 for Japan, 1 for for Latin America & the South Africa, 1 for Caribbean Africa adequate representation of Asia; at least four non-permanent seats each for Asia and Africa, along with additional seats for Latin America and the Caribbean

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≤26

~26

25-27

≤27

~25

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1307

retention

ACT Group, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Small Five Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Jordan

Kazakhstan

G4

Japan

Groups

permanent with veto

X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

permanent without veto

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 2 for Africa

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 2 for Africa 1 for Arab States

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean

1-2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

expansion in the existing categories regional repres.

Country

≥26

25

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1308 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

African Union, Non-Aligned Movement Eastern European Group

African Union, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Liechtenstein* ACT Group, Small Five

Libya

Latvia

Kenya

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

X

X

X

1 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean 2 for Africa

2 for Africa

additional non-permanent seats for

long-term seats: 2 for 1 for Eastern Europe Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 2 for Africa 2 for Africa, 1 for Arab States

2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≥21

≥26

25

≥26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1309

retention

African Union, Non-Aligned Movement, Southern African Development Community (2005-2009, 2014-present) Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Overarching Group

Madagascar

Malaysia*

Eastern European Group

Lithuania

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

expansion in the existing categories permanent without veto

X

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Brazil, 1 for 1 for Eastern Europe Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan 2 for Africa 2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≥26

~24

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1310 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

Monaco*

Mexico

Mauritius

Malta

Maldives

ACT Group, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Uniting for Consensus Group, Non-Aligned Movement (until 2004) African Union, L.69 Group, Non-Aligned Movement, Southern African Development Community Uniting for Consensus Group

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

X

X

X

X

X

X

additional non-permanent seats for

2 for Africa , 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

2 for Africa , 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

1 for India, 1 for Japan 1 for Small Island Developing States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

twenties

≤26

≥26/27

≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1311

retention

Overarching Group ACT Group African Union, L.69, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Eastern European Group ACT Group, Nordic Countries

Netherlands

North Macedonia Norway

New Zealand Nigeria

Non-Aligned Movement

Mongolia

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

X

X X

1 for Japan 2 for Africa , 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, adequate representation for Africa and Latin America & the Caribbean

additional non-permanent seats for

2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe

2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

midtwenties

25 ≥26/27

24/25

Size

Veto

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1312 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

Portugal

Poland

Philippines*

Peru

Panama*

Pakistan

Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Uniting for Consensus Group Central American Countries, Non-Aligned Movement ACT Group, Non-Aligned Movement Non-Aligned Movement Eastern European Group ACT Group, Group of Ten

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent X

X

X

X

X

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, adequate representation of Africa

long-term seats: 1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, 1 for Africa

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Eastern Europe

1 for Arab States, 1 for Eastern Europe, 2 for Small Island Developing States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≤25

25

≤27

midtwenties

26

≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1313

retention

X

Pacific Small Island Developing States

Samoa

X

(X)

Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Uniting for Consensus Group Eastern European Group, Overarching Group

permanent with veto

Russian Federation

Republic of Korea Romania

Qatar*

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent (X)

X

X

X

X

1-2 for Arab States

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Brazil, 1 for 1 for Eastern Europe Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, permanent representation for Africa 1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, permanent representation for Africa 1 for Germany, 1 for 1 for small states Japan

1 for Arab States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

25

low twenties

≤26

≥26

Size retention X

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1314 Annex IV: Table of country positions

ACT Group, Eastern European Group, Group of Ten African Union, IBSA, Southern African Development Community, L.69 Group, Non-Aligned Movement

Slovenia

South Africa

Slovakia

Singapore*

Uniting for Consensus Group Non-Aligned Movement, Small Five Eastern European Group

San Marino

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

expansion in the existing categories

X

permanent without veto X

X

X

X

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Brazil, 1 for India, 2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Western Europe & Other States

2 for Africa, 1 for Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 1 for Latin America & the Caribbean, 1 for Small Island Developing States

adequate representa- 1 for Eastern Europe tion of African and Arab States in both categories 2 for Africa 1 for Eastern Europe

adequate representation of small states adequate representation of small states

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≥26/27

≤25

≤25

25/≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1315

retention

Syria

Switzerland

Sweden

Sudan

Spain

Uniting for Consensus Group African Union, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation ACT Group, Nordic Countries ACT Group, Small Five Non-Aligned Movement, Group of Arab States, Organization of Islamic Cooperation

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

expansion in the existing categories

X

permanent without veto X

X

X

X

X 2 for Africa

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Arab States, 2 for Arab States equitable representation for developing countries

2 for Africa

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

≥26

midtwenties 21-22

≥26

≤26

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1316 Annex IV: Table of country positions

retention

Turkey

Tunisia

Thailand

Non-Aligned Movement (but stressed nonaffiliation with any group) African Union, Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Uniting for Consensus Group

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

non-permanent

expansion in the existing categories permanent without veto X

X

X

X

1 for Germany, 1 for Japan, 2 for Africa, 1 for Arab States

1 for Japan

additional non-permanent seats for

2 for Africa, 1-2 for Arab States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

25-27

≥26

midtwenties

Size

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1317

retention

X X

X

Uruguay Venezuela

ACT Group Non-Aligned Movement

X

X

United States of America

X X

Eastern European Group, GU(U)AM

permanent with veto

United Kingdom

Ukraine*

non-permanent X

X

X

X

adequate representation of Africa, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean

1 for Brazil, 1 for Germany, 1 for India, 1 for Japan, adequate representation of Africa 1 for India, 1 for Japan, adequate representation of Africa, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean

additional non-permanent seats for

1 for Eastern Europe, possibly 1 for Small Island Developing States

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

~26

low twenties

20-22

Size retention X

X

Veto

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

1318 Annex IV: Table of country positions

Group of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Islamic Cooperation African Union, Non-Aligned Movement, Southern African Development Community

permanent with veto

X

X

X

X

X

X

2 for Africa, 2 for Africa 2 for Asia, 2 for Latin America & the Caribbean

additional non-permanent seats for

≥26

Size retention

Veto

X

X

X

X

X

* The position of this country has significantly changed throughout the course of the reform discussion (see Annex II, summary of country positions). This table represents the country’s latest position.

Zimbabwe

Yemen

non-permanent

Composition of the Security Council new categories of additional membership permanent seats for

permanent without veto

expansion in the existing categories non-permanent longer terms

Groups

regional repres.

Country

abolition formal restrictions informal restrictions

(cont.)

Annex IV: Table of country positions

1319

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states The groups are listed in alphabetical order, and their statements in chronological order, together with a brief description of their respective content. Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) 23 October 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.25 (p. 1165) African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity) 29 September 1994 supporting regional seats, against new categories of seats, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10 (pp. 301, 318 and 395) 27 June 1997 supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.29, 3.3.38 and 3.4.2.21 (pp. 313, 380 and 401) 8-10 June 1998 on the procedure for rotation of the two permanent seats claimed by Africa, → 4.2.2.3.2 (p. 731) 7-8 March 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.26 (p. 745) 5 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.29 (p. 748) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 10 November 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.31 (p. 752) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 30 October 2015 supporting regional seats and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.2.3.18 and 5.4.2.7 (pp. 1096 and 1141) 7 November 2016 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.20 (p. 1097) 17 May 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.24 (p. 1101) 7 November 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.26 (p. 1102) 20 November 2018 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.32 (p. 1105) Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 14 November 1995 on principles with regard to the reform process, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.3.17, 3.3.18 and 3.4.2.20 (pp. 351, 374 and 400) 20 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.14, 4.3.10 and 4.4.3.10 (pp. 650, 775 and 791) 16 March 2009 in favour of abolishing the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.3.2 (pp. 1139 and 1146)

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_011

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states

1321

16 February 2010 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.3 (p. 1031) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 25 February 2013 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.18 (p. 1001) 30 October 2015 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.8 and 5.4.2.8 (pp. 1034 and 1141) 7 November 2017 on the contribution of Small Island Developing States to the reform process, → 5.2.3.15 (p. 1123) 27 February 2018 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.24, 5.3.27 and 5.4.4.64 (pp. 1042, 1134 and 1182) 20 November 2018 on the contribution of Small Island Developing States to the reform process, → 5.2.3.19 (p. 1125) Central American Countries 14 October 1994 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13 (pp. 264 and 397) 13 November 1995 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.7 and 3.4.2.18 (pp. 246 and 400) 1 November 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.52 and 3.4.3.41 (pp. 225 and 429) 4 December 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50 (pp. 229 and 432) Eastern European Group May 1998 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.1 (p. 698) 28 February 2005 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.16 (p. 705) 21 February 2007 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.23 (p. 707) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) European Parliament 29 January 2004 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.3.23 and 4.4.3.20 (pp. 740 and 795) 14 April 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.27 (p. 746) 9 June 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.28 (p. 746)

1322

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states

11 May 2011 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.10 (p. 1089) 5 July 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.25 (p. 1102) Group of Four (G4) 21 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.27 (p. 656) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 January 2006 (without Japan) supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.47 (p. 672) 25 September 2014 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.22 (p. 1004) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.32 (p. 1009) 7-8 March 2017 against new categories of seats, → 5.2.2.4.4 (p. 1109) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.36 (p. 1011) 25 September 2018 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.43 (p. 1014) 20 November 2018 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.45 (p. 1016) Group of Arab States 23 February 1994 on the need for adequate representation of the Arab states, → 3.2.3.6 (p. 335) 9 July 1997 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.30 (p. 315) 27 January 1998 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.1 (p. 730) 12 January 2010 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.8 (p. 1089) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 1 May 2015 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.17 (p. 1095) 30 October 2015 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.19 (p. 1097) 7 November 2016 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.21 (p. 1098) 7 November 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.27 (p. 1103) 20 November 2018 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.31 (p. 1104) Group of Ten 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) GUUAM 14 October 2003 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.25 (p. 655)

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states

1323

7 April 2005 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.17 (p. 705) IBSA 26 September 2014 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.23 (p. 1004) 27 September 2018 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.44 (p. 1015) L.69 Group 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) 22 February 2010 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.7 (p. 992) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 2012 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.15 (p. 998) 15 November 2012 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.17 and 5.3.16 (pp. 1000 and 1132) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.31 (p. 1009) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.38 (p. 1012) Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 6 September 1992 on the review of the use of the right of veto and the membership of the Security Council, → 2.23 (p. 101) 18 September 1995 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14 (pp. 244 and 371) 18-20 October 1995 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.6 and 3.4.2.17 (pp. 245 and 399) 27 March 1996 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.22 (p. 416) 30 April 1997 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.43 (p. 430) 27 June 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44 (pp. 251, 379 and 430) 10 July 1998 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.3.2, 4.3.1 and 4.4.3.1 (pp. 698, 772 and 785) 19 July 2001 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.14 (p. 792) 30 May 2006 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.24 (p. 797) 16 July 2009 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.2 (p. 1031) 11 November 2010 supporting an increased representation of the African continent and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.3.5 and 5.4.2.4 (pp. 1117 and 1140)

1324

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states

5-6 April 2018 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.25 (p. 1042) Nordic Countries 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.25 and 3.3.14 (pp. 199 and 371) 22 April 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.38 (p. 215) 4 December 1997 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.14, 3.4.3.48 and 3.4.4.5 (pp. 239, 431 and 435) 14 December 2007 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 4.2.2.1.4 (p. 711) 20 October 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.24 (p. 1164) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.37 (p. 1011) 20 November 2018 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.46 (p. 1016) Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) (OIC) 28 September 2004 on the need for an adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah, → 4.2.3.9 (p. 765) 14 March 2008 on reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, → 4.2.3.15 (p. 768) 25 May 2009 on reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, → 5.2.3.1 (p. 1111) 25 September 2009 on reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, → 5.2.3.2 (p. 1114) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 15 September 2013 on a seat for the OIC, → 5.2.2.3.15 (p. 1093) 28 October 2013 on the need for an adequate representation of the OIC Member States, → 5.2.3.8 (p. 1118) Overarching Group 20 March 2008 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.22 (pp. 725 and 809) Permanent Five (P5) 23 September 1999 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.2 (p. 779)

Annex V: List of statements made by groups of states

1325

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) 26 January 2009 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.1 (p. 1030) 8 November 2013 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.16 (p. 1094) Small Five (S-5/S5) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) Southern African Development Community (SADC) 16 December 1999 supporting regional seats and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.2.2.3.7 and 4.4.2.3 (pp. 733 and 783) Uniting for Consensus (UfC) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 21 January 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6 (pp. 1056 and 1148) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 1 May 2015 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.25 (p. 1069) 30 October 2015 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.26 and 5.3.18 (pp. 1070 and 1132) 7 November 2016 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.29 (p. 1072) 8 May 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.23 (p. 1099) 27 February 2018 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.13 (p. 1028) 20 November 2018 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.42 (p. 1081)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states The states are listed in alphabetical order, and their statements in chronological order, together with a brief description of their respective content. Algeria 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 16 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.10 (p. 70) 14 November 1979 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, → 2.17 (p. 88) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 26 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and regional seats, → 3.2.2.1.2 and 3.2.2.3.2 (pp. 260 and 299) 13 October 1994 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.5 and 3.4.3.11 (pp. 264 and 409) 30 October 1996 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.37 (p. 427) 16 December 1999 supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.3.4, 4.3.4 and 4.4.3.5 (pp. 732, 774 and 789) 16 November 2000 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.12 (p. 735) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 10 November 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.32 (p. 753) 8 November 2011 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.11 (p. 1090) 8 November 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.30 (p. 1104) Antigua and Barbuda 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) Argentina 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 November 1979 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, → 2.17 (p. 88) 20 July 1993 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.2 (p. 240) 18 September 1995 on the “cascade effect”, → 3.2.3.12 (p. 339) 4 December 1997 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.15 (p. 239) 16 December 1999 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.5 (p. 732)

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004421738_012

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1327

16 November 2000 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting regional seats, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.3, 4.2.2.3.13 and 4.4.3.12 (pp. 679, 736 and 791) 31 October 2001 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.15 (p. 793) 14 October 2003 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.7 (p. 681) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 12 November 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.10 (p. 723) 21 September 2011 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.7 and 5.4.2.5 (pp. 1024 and 1140) Australia 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, supporting nonpermanent seats with longer terms, and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.2.1.1, 3.2.2.2.2 and 3.3.1 (pp. 255, 266 and 365) 3 October 1994 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.4 and 3.4.3.9 (pp. 263 and 408) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25 (p. 199) 27 March 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.34 and 3.3.23 (pp. 211 and 375) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 30 October 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.30 (p. 1169) Austria 23 November 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.10 and 3.3.3 (pp. 187 and 368) 13 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting regional seats, and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.21, 3.2.2.3.6 and 3.3.7 (pp. 197, 302 and 369) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, against new categories of seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25, 3.2.2.4.3, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12 (pp. 199, 319, 371 and 410) 13 November 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.28, 3.3.16 and 3.4.3.16 (pp. 207, 373 and 413) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379)

1328

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

4 December 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on regional rotating membership, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.57, 3.2.3.27, 3.3.40 and 3.4.3.47 (pp. 229, 363, 380 and 431) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 23 September 2004 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.24 (p. 744) Belarus 15 November 1995 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.8 (p. 247) 20 December 1999 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.6 (p. 701) 16 November 2000 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.1.3.8 and 4.3.14 (pp. 702 and 777) 11 November 2005 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.20 (p. 707) 12 December 2006 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.21 (p. 707) 11 November 2010 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.5 (p. 1032) 7 November 2013 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.6 (p. 1033) Belgium 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, against new categories of seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25, 3.2.2.4.3, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12 (pp. 199, 319, 371 and 410) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Belize 4 October 1993 on composite permanent members, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.3.2, 3.3.2 and 3.4.3.5 (pp. 332, 367 and 406) 24 November 1993 on the size of the Security Council, → 3.3.4 (p. 368) 7 December 1993 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.6 (p. 407) 13 October 1994 on redefining the two existing categories of membership and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.3.8 and 3.3.10 (pp. 336 and 369)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1329

18 September 1995 on redefining the two existing categories of membership, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.3.12, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12 (pp. 339, 371 and 410) 1 February 1996 on optional shared seats, → 3.2.3.20 (p. 353) 3 July 1996 on optional shared seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.3.23 and 3.4.3.28 (pp. 357 and 424) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Bolivia 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 30 September 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.44 and 3.4.3.30 (pp. 221 and 424) 13 November 2009 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.5 (p. 1024) 3 March 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, on the size of the Security Council and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.16, 5.3.8 and 5.4.3.9 (pp. 1063, 1129 and 1150) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) Brazil 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 13 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.20 (p. 197) 25 March 1996 against new categories of seats, → 3.2.2.4.7 (p. 323) 29 October 1996 against new categories of seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.4.9 and 3.4.3.32 (pp. 326 and 425) 16 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.9, 4.3.5 and 4.4.3.7 (pp. 647, 774 and 790) 16 December 2002 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.9 (p. 784) 21 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.27 (p. 656)

1330

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 January 2006 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.47 (p. 672) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) 18 November 2008 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.57 (p. 677) 4 March 2009 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and against new categories of seats, → 5.2.1.1.1 and 5.2.2.4.1 (pp. 987 and 1107) 24 March 2009 against new categories of seats, → 5.2.2.4.2 (p. 1107) 30 October 2015 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.27 (p. 1006) Bulgaria 30 October 1996 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.12 (p. 249) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 17 November 2000 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.3.11 and 4.4.4.12 (pp. 703 and 805) Canada 26 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.1.1.7 and 3.2.2.2.3 (pp. 182 and 270) 13 October 1994 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.13 (p. 277) 30 October 1996 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.10, 3.3.34 and 3.4.3.35 (pp. 248, 378 and 426) 4 December 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.17 (p. 254) 16 December 1999 on the allocation of seats on the basis of financial contributions and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.3.1 and 4.4.3.8 (pp. 761 and 790) 16 November 2000 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.5 (p. 680) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 26 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.2 (p. 715) 12 November 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.12 and 4.4.4.20 (p. 724 and 809) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1331

7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.17 and 5.4.4.45 (pp. 1038 and 1175) Chile 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, supporting regional seats, and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.2.1.1, 3.2.2.3.1 and 3.3.1 (pp. 255, 297 and 365) 23 November 1993 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.4.1 (p. 433) 26 June 1998 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.1 (p. 782) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 28 September 2015 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.1.8 and 5.4.4.20 (pp. 1048 and 1162) 7 November 2016 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.1.11 and 5.4.4.47 (pp. 1049 and 1175) China 20 July 1993 on the expansion of the membership of the Security Council, → 3.2.3.1 (p. 328) 14 November 1995 on the representation of developing regions, → 3.2.3.18 (p. 352) 30 October 1996 on the representation of developing regions, → 3.2.3.24 (p. 361) 4 December 1997 on the representation of developing regions, → 3.2.3.28 (p. 363) 23 September 1999 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.2 (p. 779) 14 October 2002 on the representation of developing regions, → 4.2.3.6 (p. 763) 7 June 2005 on the representation of developing regions and special privileged regional rotation for medium-sized countries, → 4.2.3.10 (p. 766) 18 November 2008 on the representation of developing regions and the role of regional cooperation, → 4.2.3.17 (p. 771) 4 March 2010 on the representation of developing regions and special privileged rotation for medium-sized countries, → 5.2.3.4 (p. 1116) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 15 November 2012 on the representation of developing regions and the participation of medium-sized countries, → 5.2.3.7 (p. 1118) 8 April 2015 on the Intergovernmental Negotiation process and the working methods of the Security Council, → 5.2.3.9 (p. 1118)

1332

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

7 November 2016 on the Intergovernmental Negotiation process and the representation of developing regions, → 5.2.3.13 (1122) 7 November 2017 on the Intergovernmental Negotiation process, → 5.2.3.16 (p. 1123) 1 February 2018 on the Intergovernmental Negotiation process and the representation of developing regions, → 5.2.3.18 (1124) 20 November 2018 on the Intergovernmental Negotiation process and the participation of small and medium-sized countries, → 5.2.3.20 (p. 1125) Colombia 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.4.3.2 (pp. 169 and 402) 13 October 1994 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.5, 3.2.2.2.9 and 3.4.2.12 (pp. 235, 276 and 397) 4 December 1997 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.4.2.22 (p. 401) 16 November 2000 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.14 (p. 736) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 26 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.3 and 4.4.2.10 (pp. 717 and 784) 11 December 2006 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.35 (p. 754) 12 November 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.11 (p. 724) 18 November 2008 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.26 (p. 799) 13 November 2009 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.10 and 5.4.3.4 (pp. 1056 and 1147) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) Congo (-Brazzaville) 20 November 2018 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.48 (p. 1017) Costa Rica 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1333

14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.4.3.2 (pp. 169 and 402) 24 September 1996 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.7 (p. 265) 17 November 2000 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.11 (p. 805) 14 October 2002 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.8 (p. 784) 24 June 2005 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.10 (p. 682) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) 11 December 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.19 (p. 809) April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) 30 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.22 (p. 1164) 8 November 2017 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.12, 5.2.2.2.41 and 5.4.4.60 (pp. 1028, 1081 and 1180) Croatia 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 30 October 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.50 and 3.4.3.38 (pp. 224 and 428) 16 December 1999 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.3.4, 4.4.2.4 and 4.4.3.6 (pp. 700, 783 and 789) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Cuba 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 23 November 1992 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.1 (p. 232)

1334

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

20 July 1993 on a periodical review of the current permanent members and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.3.1 and 3.4.2.3 (pp. 328 and 388) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25 (p. 199) 11 November 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.46 and 4.4.3.23 (pp. 671 and 797) 18 February 2010 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.6, 5.3.5 and 5.4.3.7 (pp. 991, 1128 and 1149) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 30 October 2015 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.29, 5.3.20 and 5.4.2.9 (pp. 1007, 1133 and 1141) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.41, 5.3.25 and 5.4.2.15 (pp. 1013, 1134 and 1143) 20 November 2018 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.4.2.17 (p. 1144) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 11 October 1995 on the representation of developing regions and against a permanent seat for Japan, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.3.15 and 3.4.2.16 (pp. 350 and 399) 25 September 1999 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.3 (p. 700) 22 September 2005 on the representation of developing regions and against a permanent seat for Japan, → 4.2.3.13 (p. 768) 4 March 2010 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.1.3.4 and 5.3.10 (pp. 1032 and 1130) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.14 (p. 1036) Denmark 20 July 1993 against additional permanent members with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.2 (p. 232) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 4 March 2010 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.11, 5.3.11 and 5.4.4.6 (pp. 995, 1130 and 1155) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1335

Ecuador 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.2 (p. 266) 1 November 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.51 and 3.4.3.40 (pp. 224 and 429) 17 November 2000 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.10 (p. 702) 1 October 2012 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.4.2.6 (p. 1140) 7 November 2016 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.4.2.11 (p. 1141) Egypt 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 27 August 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting regional seats, → 3.2.1.1.8 and 3.2.2.3.3 (pp. 185 and 300) 14 November 1995 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.12 and 3.4.3.18 (pp. 304 and 413) 30 October 1996 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.24 (p. 311) 24 September 2004 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.25 (p. 744) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 12 November 2007 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.37 (p. 754) 18 November 2008 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.40 (p. 757) 12 November 2009 supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.3.5, 5.3.3 and 5.4.3.3 (pp. 1086, 1128 and 1146) 21 February 2012 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.13 (p. 1091) 15 November 2012 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.14 (p. 1093) 7 November 2016 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.22 (p. 1098) Fiji 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.1 and 3.4.3.2 (pp. 255 and 402) 1 November 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.53 and 3.4.3.42 (pp. 225 and 430) 4 December 1997 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.49 (p. 432) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674)

1336

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

France 16 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.10 (p. 70) 17 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.12 (p. 74) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 13 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.22, 3.2.2.2.12 and 3.3.9 (pp. 197, 277 and 369) 13 November 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and against new categories of seats, → 3.2.1.1.29 and 3.2.2.4.4 (pp. 207 and 319) March 1996 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto and supporting regional seats, → 3.2.1.1.32 and 3.2.2.3.15 (pp. 210 and 306) 30 October 1996 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.46 and 3.3.33 (pp. 222 and 378) 5 December 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.61 and 3.3.42 (pp. 231 and 381) 23 September 1999 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.2 (p. 779) 16 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.10, 4.3.6 and 4.4.1.3 (pp. 648, 774 and 780) 31 October 2001 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.19 and 4.4.4.14 (pp. 653 and 806) 15 October 2002 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.22 (p. 654) 23 September 2003 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.23 (p. 654) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 12 December 2006 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.50 (p. 673) 27 March 2008 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.15 (p. 728) 18 November 2008 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.17 (p. 729) 4 March 2009 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, and supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.1.1.2 and 5.2.2.2.2 (pp. 988 and 1051) 16 March 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.1 (p. 1154) 11 June 2009 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto: and supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.1.1.3 and 5.2.2.2.5 (pp. 989 and 1053) 19 January 2010 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.5 (p. 990) 1 March 2010 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.8 (p. 993)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1337

10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 8 November 2011 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.14 (p. 997) 24 September 2013 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.11 (p. 1158) 4 October 2013 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.12 (p. 1159) 7 November 2013 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.19 and 5.4.4.14 (pp. 1002 and 1160) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 28 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.18 (p. 1162) 30 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.21 (p. 1163) 30 October 2015 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.25 and 5.4.4.26 (pp. 1005 and 1167) 20 November 2018 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.47 and 5.4.4.66 (pp. 1017 and 1183) Georgia 20 December 1999 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.1.3.7 and 4.3.11 (pp. 701 and 776) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.35 (p. 1011) Germany 23 September 1992 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.2 (p. 168) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 13 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and against new categories of seats, → 3.2.1.1.18 and 3.2.2.4.2 (pp. 195 and 318) 28 February 1996 supporting regional seats and against new categories of seats, → 3.2.2.3.14 and 3.2.2.4.5 (pp. 306 and 320) 29 February 1996 against new categories of seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.4.6 and 3.4.3.21 (pp. 321 and 416) 25 March 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.33 (p. 210)

1338

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

23 April 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.39 and 3.4.3.23 (pp. 216 and 419) 10 May 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.41 and 3.3.26 (pp. 218 and 376) 23 May 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.42 and 3.4.3.26 (pp. 218 and 421) 2 July 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.43 (p. 219) 29 October 1996 supporting regional seats and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.2.3.20 and 3.3.30 (pp. 308 and 378) 21 April 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.1 (p. 800) 22 April 1998 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.2 (pp. 642 and 800) 22 March 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.2 (p. 643) 31 March 2000 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.8 (p. 803) 14 October 2002 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.20 (p. 653) 21 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.27 (p. 656) 27 January 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.1.35 and 4.2.1.3.15 (pp. 659 and 704) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 January 2006 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.47 (p. 672) 19 July 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.9 (p. 723) Ghana 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 16 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.10 (p. 70) 4 October 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.9 and 3.4.3.5 (pp. 186 and 406) 14 October 1994 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.4.2.14 (p. 398) 14 November 1995 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.19 (p. 415) 30 October 1996 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.36 (p. 427) 5 December 1997 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.33 and 3.4.3.53 (pp. 317 and 433) 20 December 1999 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.10 (p. 734) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 11 November 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.33 (p. 753) 7 November 2017 supporting regional seats and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.3.29 and 5.4.4.57 (pp. 1104 and 1179)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1339

Guatemala 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.4.2.3 (pp. 169 and 388) 8 November 2013 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.21 (p. 1004) 30 October 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.33 (p. 1170) Hungary 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, against new categories of seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25, 3.2.2.4.3, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12 (pp. 199, 319, 371 and 410) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 20 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.13 (p. 649) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.18 and 5.4.4.46 (pp. 1038 and 1175) India 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 17 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.12 (p. 74) 14 November 1979 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, → 2.17 (p. 88) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.3.1 (pp. 169 and 365) 13 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.19 (p. 196) 27 March 1996 against new categories of seats, → 3.2.2.4.8 (p. 324) 23 March 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.3 and 4.4.3.2 (pp. 643 and 787) 16 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.7 (p. 646) 8 September 2000 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.16 (p. 651)

1340

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

21 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.27 (p. 656) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 12 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.42 (p. 667) 5 January 2006 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.47 (p. 672) 12 December 2006 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.49 and 4.4.3.25 (pp. 673 and 798) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) 13 November 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.2.4.2 (p. 758) 20 April 2008 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.2.4.4 (p. 760) 21 February 2012 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.16 (p. 999) 9 March 2016 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.30 (p. 1007) Indonesia 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 26 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.7 and 3.4.2.4 (pp. 182 and 391) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25 (p. 199) 12 July 2005 on the representation of Asia and the criteria for an expanded membership, → 4.2.3.12 (p. 767) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 7 November 2016 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.33 and 5.4.4.40 (pp. 1075 and 1173) 7 November 2017 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.40 and 5.4.4.54 (pp. 1080 and 1178) 6 February 2018 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.61 (p. 1181) Italy 27 September 1991 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.1 (p. 168) 24 September 1992 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.3 (p. 168)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1341

20 July 1993 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.2 (p. 266) 30 September 1993 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.5 (p. 272) 29 June 1994 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting semi-permanent seats, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.4, 3.2.2.2.8 and 3.4.3.8 (pp. 234, 274 and 408) 13 November 1995 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.7 (p. 235) 1 March 1996 on the representation of the European Union, → 3.2.3.21 (p. 356) May 1996 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.20 (p. 284) 2 July 1997 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.26 (p. 294) 23 September 1998 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.1 (p. 678) 19 February 1999 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.2 (p. 678) 16 December 1999 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.6 (p. 732) 14 October 2003 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.8 (p. 681) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 14 November 2007 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.39 (p. 755) 31 March 2009 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.3 (p. 1085) 3 September 2009 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.7 (p. 1054) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 11 November 2010 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.6 (p. 1024) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) Japan 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.3.1 (pp. 169 and 365) 27 March 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.36, 3.2.2.3.17, 3.3.22 and 3.4.4.2 (pp. 213, 307, 374 and 434) 30 October 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting regional seats, → 3.2.1.1.48 and 3.2.2.3.26 (pp. 223 and 312) 22 March 1999 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.5 (p. 802) 21 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.27 (p. 656) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660)

1342

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

30 October 2015 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.28 and 5.4.4.29 (pp. 1006 and 1168) Jordan 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 26 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.7 (p. 182) 27 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.31 (p. 657) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 10 November 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.45 (p. 671) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) Kazakhstan 23 March 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting semi-permanent seats, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.16, 3.2.2.2.6 and 3.4.2.9 (pp. 193, 273 and 395) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Kenya 14 October 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.24 and 3.3.13 (pp. 198 and 370) 13 November 1995 supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.10, 3.3.17 and 3.4.2.19 (pp. 303, 373 and 400) 29 October 1996 supporting regional seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.21, 3.3.32 and 3.4.3.33 (pp. 309, 378 and 425) 20 December 1999 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.9 (p. 734) 16 November 2000 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.6 (p. 783) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 25 September 2009 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.4 (p. 1085) Latvia 30 October 1996 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.11 (p. 249) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1343

11 July 2005 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.1.3.18 and 4.3.18 (pp. 706 and 778) 12 December 2006 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.22 (p. 707) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.13 and 5.4.4.42 (pp. 1036 and 1173) Libya 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 4 October 1991 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.4.2.2 (p. 388) 26 July 1993 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.3 and 3.4.2.4 (pp. 243 and 391) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) Liechtenstein 6 October 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.27 (p. 206) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 22 June 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.4 (p. 1155) 26 February 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.13 (p. 1060) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 16 April 2012 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.20 (p. 1066) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.31 and 5.4.4.37 (pp. 1074 and 1171) 7 November 2017 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.37 and 5.4.4.49 (pp. 1079 and 1176) 29 January 2019 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.43 and 5.4.4.65 (pp. 1082 and 1183) Lithuania 28 September 1992 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.4 and 3.4.3.1 (pp. 169 and 401)

1344

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

16 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.6, 4.3.3 and 4.4.2.2 (pp. 646, 774 and 782) 11 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.38 (p. 663) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Madagascar 17 November 2000 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.3.16 and 4.4.3.13 (pp. 737 and 792) 31 October 2001 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.18 (p. 738) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) Malaysia 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 23 November 1992 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.1 (p. 240) 20 July 1993 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.2 and 3.4.2.3 (pp. 240 and 388) 1 October 1993 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.4.2.6 (p. 394) 13 October 1994 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.4.2.11 (p. 396) 29 September 1995 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.9 (p. 303) 13 November 1995 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.15 (p. 412) 3 July 1996 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.19 and 3.4.3.29 (pp. 308 and 424) 12 November 2014 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.24 and 5.4.3.12 (pp. 1005 and 1152) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 20 November 2018 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.3.15 (p. 1153) Maldives 14 November 1979 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, → 2.17 (p. 88) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 23 November 1993 on the responsibilities and obligations of permanent members, → 3.2.3.5 (p. 335) 9 October 1995 on the reform process, → 3.2.3.13 (p. 350) 30 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.32 (p. 657) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 13 November 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.53 (p. 675)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1345

13 November 2009 on the inclusion of Japan and India in any future composition, → 5.2.3.3 (p. 1115) 12 November 2014 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.7 (p. 1033) 30 October 2015 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.11 (p. 1034) 7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.12 and 5.4.4.35 (pp. 1035 and 1170) 7 November 2017 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 5.2.1.3.21 (p. 1039) Malta 13 October 1994 on the membership of the Security Council and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.3.9 and 3.3.11 (pp. 337 and 370) 1 November 1996 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.4.4 (p. 435) 26 September 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.15 (p. 253) 4 December 1997 on permanent membership and re-election in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.3.30 (p. 364) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) Mauritius 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.1 (p. 255) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) Mexico 20 July 1993 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.2 (p. 402) 13 October 1994 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semi-permanent seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.2.10 and 3.4.3.10 (pp. 276 and 408) 18 September 1995 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms or semipermanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.14 (p. 278) 13 November 1995 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.16 (p. 279) 22 April 1996 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on rotational seats, → 3.2.1.2.10 and 3.2.3.22 (pp. 237 and 356) 13 May 1996 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.24 (p. 419) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 797) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893)

1346

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

30 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.21 (p. 1163) 7 November 2017 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.39 and 5.4.4.53 (pp. 1079 and 1178) 6 February 2018 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.62 (p. 1181) Monaco 20 May 1994 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.2.2.7 and 3.3.5 (pp. 273 and 368) 17 June 1996 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.22 (p. 289) 5 March 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.17 and 5.3.12 (pp. 1064 and 1131) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) Mongolia 4 October 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.3 and 3.4.3.5 (pp. 262 and 406) 10 October 1995 on the admission of Japan and Germany and the representation of developing countries, → 3.2.3.14 (p. 350) 20 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.15 and 4.4.3.11 (pp. 651 and 791) 12 October 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.34 and 4.4.3.21 (pp. 658 and 796) 14 November 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and against new categories of seats, → 4.2.1.1.55 and 4.2.2.4.3 (pp. 676 and 759) 12 November 2009 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.4, 5.3.4 and 5.4.4.5 (pp. 989, 1128 and 1155) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.40, 5.4.2.14 and 5.4.3.13 (pp. 1013, 1143 and 1153) Morocco 20 November 2018 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.33 (p. 1106) Netherlands 22 September 1992 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.1 (p. 266) 20 July 1993 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.2 (p. 266) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1347

28 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.19 (p. 1162) New Zealand 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.1, 3.3.1 and 3.4.2.3 (pp. 255, 365 and 388) 10 November 2005 on the inclusion of Japan in a reformed Security Council and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.2.3.14 and 4.4.2.11 (pp. 768 and 785) 8 November 2013 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.23 and 5.4.4.15 (pp. 1067 and 1161) 3 April 2017 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.35 and 5.4.4.48 (pp. 1076 and 1176) Nigeria 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 14 November 1979 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Fourth Session, → 2.17 (p. 88) 11 December 1979 proposing to add four non-permanent seats, → 2.18 (p. 89) 30 September 1992 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.5 (p. 169) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 1 November 1996 supporting regional seats, against new categories of seats, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.28, 3.2.2.4.11 and 3.4.3.39 (pp. 313, 328 and 428) 16 November 2000 supporting regional seats and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.3.15 and 4.4.4.9 (pp. 736 and 804) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 10 November 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.31 (p. 752) 7 November 2017 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.28 (p. 1103) The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (since 2019 North Macedonia) 5 December 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.18 and 3.4.3.52 (pp. 254 and 433) 24 August 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.4 (p. 802) Norway 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting regional seats, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.2.2.3.1 (pp. 169 and 297) 25 March 1996 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting regional seats, → 3.2.1.1.35 and 3.2.2.3.16 (pp. 212 and 307)

1348

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

5 March 2010 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.12, 5.3.13 and 5.4.4.7 (pp. 996, 1131 and 1156) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 30 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.23 (p. 1164) Pakistan 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 20 July 1993 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.2 and 3.4.3.2 (pp. 232 and 402) 14 October 1994 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.6 (p. 235) 14 November 1995 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.9 (p. 236) 4 December 1997 against a seat for the European Union, → 3.2.3.29 (p. 364) 20 December 1999 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.5 (p. 783) 18 June 2001 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.1.3.12 and 4.3.15 (pp. 703 and 777) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 26 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.4 (p. 718) 11 December 2006 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.6 (p. 720) 12 November 2007 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.38 (p. 755) 4 March 2009 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and supporting regional seats, → 5.2.1.2.1, 5.2.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.3.2 (pp. 1018, 1051 and 1085) 12 November 2009 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.5 (p. 1086) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 26 May 2010 in First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6 (p. 888) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 15 November 2012 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.21 (p. 1067) 30 October 2015 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.27 (p. 1071) 7 November 2017 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.11 (p. 1026) Panama 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1349

14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on general aspects of the reform, → 3.2.1.1.6 and 3.2.3.1 (pp. 169 and 328) 8 February 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.7 and 4.4.2.12 (pp. 721 and 785) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 30 October 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.31 (p. 1169) 7 November 2016 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 5.4.2.12 (p. 1142) Peru 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 14 December 1979 proposing to add six non-permanent seats, → 2.19 (p. 90) 20 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.6 (p. 169) 2 March 2010 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.9, 5.3.7 and 5.4.3.8 (pp. 993, 1129 and 1149) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.34, 5.2.2.2.32 and 5.4.4.38 (pp. 1010, 1075 and 1172) Philippines 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 14 October 2002 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.21 (p. 653) 27 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.30 (p. 657) 13 November 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.54 (p. 675) 14 February 2009 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.3.1 and 5.4.3.1 (pp. 1084 and 1144) 8 December 2009 supporting regional seats and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, 5.2.2.3.7 and 5.4.3.5 (pp. 1087 and 1147) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2017 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, in favour of abolishing the right of veto, and on informal

1350

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.1.39, 5.3.23, 5.4.2.13 and 5.4.4.50 (pp. 1012, 1134, 1142 and 1177) Poland 23 November 1993 on the effectiveness of the Security Council, on regional representation and on draft resolution A/48/L.28, → 3.2.3.4 (p. 334) 29 October 1996 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.3.9 and 3.3.31 (pp. 248 and 378) 12 June 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.3.13 and 3.3.36 (pp. 250 and 379) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 28 September 2015 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.17 (p. 1162) 30 October 2015 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.9 and 5.4.4.32 (pp. 1034 and 1169) 8 November 2017 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.23 and 5.4.4.59 (pp. 1041 and 1180) Portugal 26 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.7 (p. 182) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 4 December 1997 on the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by permanent members of the Security Council, → 3.2.3.31 (p. 365) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 6 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.37 (p. 660) 8 November 2013 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and against new categories of seats, → 5.2.1.1.20 and 5.2.2.4.3 (pp. 1003 and 1108) 8 November 2017 against new categories of seats, → 5.2.2.4.5 (p. 1110) Qatar 27 August 1993 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 3.2.2.2.4 (p. 270) 3 October 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.26 (p. 206) 2 October 1997 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.3.16 and 3.4.3.45 (pp. 253 and 431) 30 September 1999 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.5 (p. 646) 20 July 2006 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.48 (p. 672) 14 November 2007 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.13 (p. 785)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1351

7 November 2017 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.56 (p. 1179) Republic of Korea 27 August 1993 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.3 (p. 234) 13 November 1995 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.8, 3.2.2.2.15 and 3.4.3.13 (pp. 236, 279 and 411) 26 April 1996 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.11 (p. 237) 22 May 1996 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting nonpermanent seats with longer terms, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.12, 3.2.2.2.21, 3.3.27 and 3.4.3.25 (pp. 238, 289, 377 and 421) 30 October 1996 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, and against new categories of seats, → 3.2.1.2.13, 3.2.2.2.25 and 3.2.2.4.10 (pp. 239, 294 and 327) 6 May 1997 on the proposal of a periodic review for new permanent members, → 3.2.3.25 (p. 362) 7 May 1997 on regional rotational seats, → 3.2.3.26 (p. 362) 31 October 2001 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.13 (p. 704) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 24 March 2009 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.3 (p. 1023) 3 September 2009 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.8 (p. 1055) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 12 November 2010 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.8 (p. 1156) 7 November 2016 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.9 and 5.4.4.36 (pp. 1025 and 1171) Romania 4 October 1993 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 3.2.1.3.4 (p. 243) 24 November 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.12 (p. 189) 16 November 2000 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.9 (p. 702) 1 November 2001 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.17 (p. 794) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 30 October 2015 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.10 and 5.4.4.34 (pp. 1034 and 1170)

1352

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

Russian Federation 14 October 1994 on the size of the Security Council and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 3.3.12 and 3.4.1.1 (pp. 370 and 381) 15 November 1995 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, on the reform process, and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.2.2.18, 3.2.3.19 and 3.3.21 (pp. 281, 352 and 374) 22 May 1996 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 3.4.1.6 (p. 383) 5 December 1997 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.60 (p. 231) 25 March 1999 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.1 (p. 779) 22 June 1999 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.1.1.4 and 4.3.2 (pp. 645 and 774) 23 September 1999 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.2 (p. 779) 20 December 1999 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.12, 4.3.9 and 4.4.1.4 (pp. 649, 775 and 780) 17 November 2000 on the reform process and on permanent membership for India, → 4.2.3.4 (p. 762) 31 October 2001 on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, → 4.2.3.5 (p. 763) 16 October 2002 on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.2.3.7 and 4.4.1.8 (pp. 764 and 781) 14 October 2003 supporting additional permanent seats, possibly with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.24 (p. 654) 12 July 2005 on the reform process, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.2.3.11, 4.3.19 and 4.4.1.9 (pp. 767, 778 and 781) 20 July 2006 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 4.4.1.10 (p. 782) 18 November 2008 on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, → 4.2.3.16 (p. 771) 2 March 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.15, 5.3.6 and 5.4.1.1 (pp. 1062, 1129 and 1135) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 9 November 2011 on the reform process, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.3.6, 5.3.15 and 5.4.1.3 (pp. 1117, 1132 and 1135) 7 November 2013 on the size of the Security Council, → 5.3.17 (p. 1132) 14 April 2015 on various aspects of the reform process, → 5.2.3.10 (p. 1120) 2 September 2015 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.4.1.4 (p. 1136) 30 October 2015 on the reform process and the effectiveness of the Security Council, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.3.12, 5.3.19 and 5.4.1.5 (pp. 1121, 1133 and 1137) 7 November 2016 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.2.2.30, 5.3.21 and 5.4.1.6 (pp. 1073, 1133 and 1137)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1353

7 November 2017 on the representation of developing regions and the reform process, on the size of the Security Council, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.3.17, 5.3.26 and 5.4.1.8 (pp. 1124, 1134 and 1138) 6 February 2018 in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.4.1.9 (p. 1138) 20 November 2018 in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.3.21 and 5.4.1.10 (pp. 1126 and 1138) 27 February 2019 in general support of an expansion of the Council, not specifying a category of seats, and in favour of retaining the right of veto, → 5.2.3.22 and 5.4.1.11 (pp. 1126 and 1138) Samoa 26 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.2 and 3.4.3.3 (pp. 260 and 405) 12 July 2005 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.41 (p. 666) San Marino 14 October 1994 on the representation of small states, → 3.2.3.11 (p. 338) 4 December 1997 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.2.16 (p. 239) 16 November 2000 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.6 (p. 680) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 9 November 2011 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.19 and 5.3.14 (pp. 1066 and 1131) 30 October 2015 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.8 (p. 1024) Singapore 9 February 1994 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.15 and 3.4.3.7 (pp. 191 and 407) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25 (p. 199) 9 February 1999 against new categories of seats, → 4.2.2.4.1 (p. 757) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) 22 February 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.2.8 (p. 722) 10 April 2008 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.2.1.5 and 4.2.2.2.16 (pp. 711 and 728)

1354

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 943) 7 November 2016 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.2.1.10 and 5.4.4.39 (pp. 1048 and 1172) Slovakia 23 March 1999 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.3 (p. 787) 31 October 2001 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, on the size of the Security Council, and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.3.14, 4.3.16 and 4.4.4.13 (pp. 704, 777 and 806) 5 May 2015 in Framework Document, → 5.1.12 (p. 928) 31 July 2015 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13 (p. 843) 7 November 2016 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.15 and 5.4.4.43 (pp. 1037 and 1174) 7 November 2017 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.1.3.19 and 5.3.24 (pp. 1038 and 1134) Slovenia 24 November 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.11 (p. 188) 18 September 1995 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, against new categories of seats, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.25, 3.2.2.4.3, 3.3.14 and 3.4.3.12 (pp. 199, 319, 371 and 410) 30 October 1996 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.22 (p. 310) 27 March 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35 (pp. 227 and 379) 25 June 1998 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.3 (p. 800) 11 November 2005 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.19 (p. 706) 24 September 2008 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category, → 4.2.1.3.25 (p. 709) 9 February 2010 supporting semi-permanent seats, → 5.2.2.2.12 (p. 1058) 10 May 2010 in Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5 (p. 874) 23 February 2011 in Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8 (p. 893) 7 November 2017 focusing on an expansion in the non-permanent category and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.3.20 and 5.4.4.51 (pp. 1039 and 1177) South Africa 14 November 1995 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.13 (p. 305) 5 December 1997 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on the size of the Security Council, → 3.2.1.1.59 and 3.3.41 (pp. 230 and 381)

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

1355

16 December 1999 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.3 (p. 732) 14 October 2003 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.21 (p. 739) 24 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.28 (p. 656) 26 September 2004 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.29 (p. 656) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 14 September 2007 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.1.51 (p. 674) 19 November 2008 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.43 (p. 757) Spain 19 June 1956 proposing the inclusion of an additional item in the Provisional Agenda of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, → 2.2 (p. 39) 12 December 1956 proposing to add two non-permanent seats, → 2.3 (p. 40) 19 December 1956 suggesting a new distribution of the non-permanent seats in an expanded Security Council, → 2.5 (p. 42) 20 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.1 (p. 255) 14 October 1994 on a moderate increase in the membership of the Security Council, → 3.2.3.10 (p. 338) 13 November 1995 on the possibility of a more frequent presence of certain states on the Security Council, on the size of the Security Council, and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.2.3.16, 3.3.15 and 3.4.3.14 (pp. 351, 373 and 411) 28 February 1996 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 3.2.2.2.19 and 3.4.3.20 (pp. 281 and 415) 16 November 2000 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.4 (p. 680) 21 July 2005 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22 (pp. 712 and 796) 19 November 2008 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.42 (p. 757) 30 October 2015 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.28 (p. 1071) Sudan 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 26 July 1993 supporting additional permanent seats with the right of veto, supporting regional seats, and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.1.1.7, 3.2.2.3.2 and 3.4.2.4 (pp. 182, 299 and 391) 30 October 1996 supporting regional seats, → 3.2.2.3.27 (p. 312) 5 December 1997 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 3.4.3.51 (p. 433) 1 November 2001 in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 4.4.2.7 (p. 783) 14 July 2005 supporting regional seats, → 4.2.2.3.30 (p. 750) 12 November 2010 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.9 (p. 1089) 9 November 2011 supporting regional seats, → 5.2.2.3.12 (p. 1091)

1356

Annex VI: List of statements made by states

Sweden 26 July 1993 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 3.2.2.1.2 (p. 260) 21 September 1999 on formal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.3.4 (p. 788) 11 July 2005 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 4.2.2.1.1 (p. 710) 11 November 2005 supporting permanent seats without the right of veto, → 4.2.2.1.3 (p. 711) Switzerland 11 October 2004 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.9 and 4.4.4.15 (pp. 681 and 806) 11 July 2005 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.2.1.2.11 and 4.4.4.16 (pp. 697 and 807) 3 November 2005 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.17 (p. 807) 17 March 2006 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 4.4.4.18 (p. 808) 11 December 2006 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 4.2.1.2.12 and 4.2.2.2.5 (pp. 697 and 720) 14 December 2007 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 4.2.2.2.13 and 4.3.20 (pp. 724 and 778) 3 March 2009 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.1 (p. 1050) 17 March 2009 against additional permanent seats with the right of veto and on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.2.1.2.2 and 5.4.4.2 (pp. 1022 and 1154) April 2009 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.3 (p. 1154) 12 June 2009 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms and on the size of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.6 and 5.3.2 (pp. 1053 and 1128) 12 July 2010 supporting non-permanent seats with longer terms, → 5.2.2.2.18 (p. 1065) 14 April 2011 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.9 (p. 1156) 15 May 2012 on informal restrictions of the use of the right of veto, → 5.4.4.10 (p. 1158) Syria 18 December 1956 proposing to appoint a committee to study the question of amending the UN Charter and to increase the number of non-permanent seats and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council, → 2.4 (p. 42) 16 December 1963 on the expansion of the Security Council in 1963, → 2.10 (p. 70) 23 November 1993 supporting regional seats and in favour of abolishing the right of veto, → 3.2.2.3.4 and 3.4.2.7 (pp. 300 and 394) 7 November 2016 on the reform process, → 5.2.3.14 (p. 1122) Thailand 16 September 1963 requesting the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eighteenth Session, → 2.8 (p. 66) 23 November 1993 on the reform process, → 3.2.3.3 (p. 334) 17 November 2000 supporting additional per