Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa 9781474267625, 9781474267656, 9781474267649

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa Andy DeRoche

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Paperback edition first published 2017 © Andy DeRoche, 2016 Andy DeRoche has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: PB: ePDF: ePub:

978-1-4742-6762-5 978-1-3500-5442-4 978-1-4742-6764-9 978-1-4742-6763-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: DeRoche, Andrew, author. Title: Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and southern Africa / Andy DeRoche. Description: New York : Bloomsbury, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015039195 | ISBN 9781474267625 (hardback) Subjects: LCSH: Kaunda, Kenneth D. (Kenneth David), 1924- | Zambia–Foreign relations–United States. | Zambia–Foreign relations–1964- | Zambia–Politics and government–1964-1991. | United States–Foreign relations–Africa, Southern. | Africa, Southern–Politics and government–20th century. Classification: LCC DT3119 .D47 2016 | DDC 968.94041–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015039195 Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

This book is dedicated to my wife Heather. Thanks for everything, honey!

Contents Preface: Kenneth Kaunda and the United States, 1975–1984 List of Figures Acknowledgments

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Introduction: Kenneth Kaunda and Zambia-United States Relations before 1975 Kaunda Gets Ford’s Attention, 1974–1975 Lessons Learned from Angola, 1975–1976 Henry Kissinger’s 1976 Speech and Kaunda’s Response “You Need to Have Kaunda’s Support”: Kissinger’s 1976 Diplomacy Regarding Rhodesia Too Good to Last: Kaunda’s Relations with the Carter Administration, 1977–1978 Challenges for Kaunda and Carter, 1978–1980 Constructive Engagement and Kaunda’s Crackdown, 1980–1982 Kaunda and Crocker Cooperate on Regional Diplomacy, 1983–1984 Kaunda’s Final Years in Office, 1984–1991 Epilogue: 1996–2014

Notes Bibliography Index

viii ix x

1 7 33 61 85 115 137 163 183 201 227 233 275 284

Preface: Kenneth Kaunda and the United States, 1975–1984 Kenneth Kaunda, who had been Zambia’s president since it attained independence on October 24, 1964, visited the White House on April 19, 1975, for afternoon talks with President Gerald Ford and his powerful secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. During the discussion in the Oval Office, Kaunda detailed the situation in southern Africa, particularly the complicated civil war in Angola. At a formal banquet that evening, Kaunda essentially stated that since the days of John Kennedy the United States had not really had any policy toward Africa. He pulled no punches in encouraging the Ford administration to overhaul Washington’s approach to his part of the world, ruffling the feathers of many in the audience. Nevertheless, Kaunda’s bombshell speech ultimately had its intended consequence, as Ford and Kissinger soon began to pay considerable attention to southern Africa. For Ford’s immediate successors, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, southern Africa remained high on the diplomatic agenda. During nearly a decade, from 1975 until 1984, Kaunda arguably played the most important role among all African statesmen regarding US relations with their continent, and this book thoroughly examines the history of those years and his role. As a mediator and trusted ally, Kenneth Kaunda significantly influenced US policies toward Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa from 1975 to 1984, helping in general to advance the fight against racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

List of Figures Figure I.1 Kenneth Kaunda, Lyndon Johnson, and several advisors at the White House on December 2, 1964. Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Figure 1.1 Kenneth Kaunda talks with Gerald Ford as their wives sit in the background on April 19, 1975, at the White House. Courtesy of the Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Figure 5.1 Kenneth Kaunda plays guitar and sings for Jimmy Carter and guests at a White House banquet on May 17, 1978. Courtesy Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Figure 5.2 Kenneth Kaunda and Jimmy Carter talk privately on the White House patio on May 18, 1978. Courtesy of Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Figure 8.1 Ronald Reagan and Kenneth Kaunda chat by the fire in the White House on March 30, 1983. Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California. Figure 8.2 Kenneth Kaunda, Ronald Reagan, and Vice President George H.W. Bush during a White House lunch on March 30, 1983. Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California. Figure 9.1 Kenneth Kaunda visits with his old friend George H.W. Bush in the White House on June 7, 1989. Courtesy of the George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas.

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23

131

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183

187

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Acknowledgments The idea for this book first came to me in 2003 when Kenneth Kaunda (known by all as KK) visited Colorado, and the project has been strongly encouraged over the years since then by his advisor, Gabriel Banda. Gabriel and KK suggested that I conduct research in Lusaka, an idea that proved valuable not only professionally but also personally for me. Following my first foray into the Zambian National Archive in July 2003, I missed my plane to Zimbabwe; but, with help from Gabriel, I got onto a bus and met my future wife Heather, who was at the time a journalist for the Zambian Daily Mail. Heather has been supportive of my work throughout and also completed some crucial research on Robert McNamara in Lusaka. Archivists in South Africa, Zambia, and the United States have been extremely helpful. I am always amazed by the high quality of assistance one receives when conducting research at such archives. The staffs at the Carter and Johnson libraries, in particular, have been amazing over the past two decades. At my home base in Colorado, Front Range Community College librarian Jeff Wahl helped acquire access to the online Henry Kissinger collections. My work in South Africa would not have been possible (and I may actually have never visited Africa at all) without the friendship of Jackie Grobler and his family. The extremely rich holdings of the United National Independence Party in Lusaka were opened to me and other scholars through the diligent efforts of Giacomo Macola and Marja Hinfelaar. Conferences at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands organized by Jan-Bart Gewald helped me to clarify some of my ideas, and to meet other scholars working on inspiring projects such as David Gordon, Andrew Cohen, Jessica Achberger, and Miles Larmer. Lydia Kangwa interviewed John Mwanakatwe for me and was a dear auntie to Ellen in 2005. My time that year as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Zambia was enriched by the friendship of Webby Kalikiti, as well as many other members of the history department. Thanks to all of my Africanist and Zambian friends and family! At Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations conferences here in the United States as well as other meetings in wonderful cities such as London and Austin, fellow scholars such as Tim Borstelmann, Tom Noer, George White, Carol Anderson, Tim Scarnecchia, Jim Meriwether, Michael Krenn, Carl Watts, Sue Onslow, Will Bishop, and Eric Morgan have provided helpful feedback that has improved my analysis. They and many other participants and audience members in sessions over the past ten years have done much to make this a better book. Tom Zeiler, my mentor since graduate school, continues to be a role model for me as a well-rounded teacher, author, and family man. He suggested that I submit my proposal to Bloomsbury Publishing. Ann Heiss at Kent State University read all of the chapters and sent me useful comments.

Acknowledgments

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My life during the many years that this project has been in the works has been made much richer by my family, especially my wife Heather and our children Ellen and Zeke. When Ellen was born in 2004 the research for this book was just beginning, and when Zeke was born in 2009 about half of the chapters were still to be drafted. In 2010 Ellen had a chance to meet KK, and their conversation was brief but very touching. Our niece Joy, whom we brought from Zambia, joined us in 2011 and has made our household more diverse. The DeRoche family is a living example of positive US-Zambia relations! Thanks also to our many supportive relatives in Zambia, especially Uncle Henry Phiri and Uncle Boniface Mkango, for discussing their memories of the KK era and also sharing my enthusiasm for the Chipolopolo Boys soccer team. My parents Mary and Wayne Corkum have provided so much support to Heather and me and have been superstar grandparents.

Introduction: Kenneth Kaunda and Zambia-United States Relations before 1975

Zambia is a nation in central southern Africa with an area of about 750,000 square kilometers (approximately the size of Texas), bordered by eight other nations including Angola, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.1 Zambia’s population in 2015 was approaching 15 million, with about 2 million people living in the capital city of Lusaka. The economy ranked among the world’s fastest growing, with a 6.5 percent increase in gross domestic product during 2014, the same year it celebrated fifty years of independence.2 Most US citizens probably know very little about Zambia. Because of its strategic location, valuable copper reserves, and the tireless diplomacy of its first president, Kenneth Kaunda, however, historically Zambia occupied a crucial place in US relations with southern Africa, particularly from 1975 to 1984. This book will carefully examine Kaunda’s contributions to US relations with southern Africa during that decade, but first let us briefly consider some background. From 1890 until 1964, Zambia was part of the British Empire and known as Northern Rhodesia. Nationalists in the colony organized in the early 1950s to fight for independence and black voting rights.3 The first key political figure in Northern Rhodesia was Harry Nkumbula, who led the African National Congress (ANC).4 Part of the initial focus of the ANC was resisting the formation of a federation that would join Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, where whites exercised tremendous power in a system resembling apartheid. Regardless of black African opposition, the Rhodesian Federation was formed in 1953, fueling ongoing resistance by the ANC.5 As the confrontation escalated, Nkumbula was assisted by younger activists such as Kenneth Kaunda, who was a teacher and ANC organizer in the colony’s northeastern region. In July 1953, he began the long trip to Lusaka on his bicycle, eventually catching a bus and arriving in August in time for the ANC’s annual conference. Kaunda’s colleagues chose him as the party’s new Secretary General, and over the next few years he began to make a name for himself among Northern Rhodesians and even internationally. Little progress was made in the battle for equality, however, and some ANC members grew impatient with Nkumbula. Both Nkumbula and Kaunda attended the 1958 All African People’s Conference in Accra, Ghana, but Kaunda was more successful in winning support from Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister of Ghana.6 Kaunda and several associates broke away from Nkumbula’s group and founded the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) in October 1958, hoping to rejuvenate the freedom struggle. ZANC was soon banned by the Rhodesian Federation’s government. Kaunda was arrested in March 1959 for convening an unauthorized assembly, and in June he was sentenced to nine months in prison.

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

While he served his jail term in Southern Rhodesia, his comrades formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP) to replace the banned ZANC. The authorities released Kaunda in Lusaka on January 9, 1960, and three weeks later he was elected president of UNIP.7 During these exciting days, Kaunda received an invitation from George Houser of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) to participate in its observation of Africa Freedom Day.8 Kaunda departed from Lusaka on April 10, 1960, and arrived in New York for the festivities, where he first encountered Martin Luther King. The two young leaders shared a belief in non-violence, which Kaunda emphasized during a press conference. They met again a few weeks later when King welcomed his kindred spirit to the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta. A story in the widely read magazine Life showed Kaunda with everyday people in California, Kansas, and North Carolina, as well as standing before the Lincoln Memorial in Washington. The article portrayed him as a patriotic practitioner of democracy and “soft-spoken believer in nonviolence.” Life predicted that he would be the first leader of an independent Zambia.9 This endorsement from Life publisher Henry Luce, a strident anti-Communist, provided instant credibility for the young African nationalist among US voters and politicians concerned about Third World revolutionaries such as Fidel Castro or Ho Chi Minh. Kaunda’s introduction to the United States, therefore, was brief but generally encouraging to both sides. In 1961 the new US president, John Kennedy, hosted Kaunda for an in-depth talk at the White House and impressed him greatly.10 In 1962 Kaunda invited two AfricanAmerican activists, Bayard Rustin and William Sutherland, to coordinate a civil rights march from Tanzania into Northern Rhodesia but canceled the undertaking when the British offered favorable conditions for elections. At year’s end Kaunda joined the new colonial cabinet as minister for local government. US diplomats confidently predicted that he would be the president once Northern Rhodesia gained independence and concluded that the most useful assistance from the United States would be supporting his efforts to expand education. In May 1963, Kaunda spoke with attorney general Robert Kennedy during another friendly visit to the White House. As independence neared the soon-to-be nation of Zambia had very powerful advocates in Washington, but the murder of John Kennedy in November shocked Kaunda and ended his warm personal relationship with top US leaders (until the late 1970s). Kaunda’s UNIP triumphed in the January 1964 elections and he became prime minister. Improving education in Northern Rhodesia was among his top priorities and the United States provided funding and training; but, surprisingly no Peace Corps program was established in Kaunda’s nation during the 1960s. When Zambia attained independence on October 24, 1964, the official US delegation underscored the centrality of the copper mines in US policy. About a month after the ceremony Kaunda met with President Lyndon Johnson, and their brief exchange dashed all hopes that the warm relationship with Kennedy would be replicated. Kaunda’s first impressions of the United States between 1960 and 1964 featured both dreams and disappointments, and he learned that the complicated conglomerate across the Atlantic should be dealt with carefully and without unrealistic expectations.11

Introduction

3

Figure I.1 Kenneth Kaunda, Lyndon Johnson, and several advisors at the White House on December 2, 1964. Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

Heading into their first full year in charge of a newly independent nation, Kenneth Kaunda and his compatriots in the Zambian government hoped to focus on the challenges of development.12 At the same time, they realized that the conflicts in neighboring states such as Rhodesia would complicate their situation. Nonetheless, they opted to lead the fight for racial justice in the region. Doing so in the early years of Zambia’s existence required Kaunda to seek significant external support. Practicing a non-aligned foreign policy, Zambian officials pursued aid from many countries including Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, with limited success. When Rhodesia’s leader, Ian Smith, unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965, the United States participated in UN sanctions against the rebel Smith regime and instituted an airlift to provide fuel for Zambia’s copper mines. Kaunda appreciated the help, but his top advisors such as Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe were extremely disappointed with US policy. Johnson administration officials contended that they were dealing with southern Africa cautiously, but Zambians saw things differently.

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

Viewed from Lusaka, US policy toward the fight for racial justice could be characterized as non-aligned (although not in the traditional sense). US nonalignment in the struggle against racism exasperated black African leaders in the same way that African non-alignment in the Cold War frustrated officials in Washington. With Kaunda at the helm, Zambia played a leading role in supporting the struggle for racial equality in the region, taking a costly stand in circumstances where he did not see neutrality as an option. The Johnson administration at times sympathized with Zambia but dismissed southern Africa as a low priority in the confrontation with communism. Kaunda and his colleagues, meanwhile, feared for their nation’s survival on the racial frontier and desperately needed help but insisted on a non-aligned foreign policy nonetheless.13 During the 1960s, Zambia was important to Americans mainly as a point of racial pride, a source of wealth, or as a small piece in the national security puzzle. In the first years after independence, Zambian leaders looked to the United States for aid and investment and longed for the friendliness of John Kennedy. US officials questioned Kaunda’s maturity, but their own president could be even more irrational. Often the two governments focused on the same issues but reached completely different conclusions. For example, while Zambian officials carefully crafted a policy of non-alignment in spite of escalating regional strife, the CIA worried about communist influence among the nationalist groups. Johnson administration officials often expressed empathy for the Zambians’ plight but did not see the situation with the same sense of urgency. Subtle forms of racism exacerbated this disconnect. Johnson himself acknowledged the complexity of Zambia’s case, but when he asked his advisors for solutions, Secretary of State Dean Rusk only proposed pressuring the British to negotiate. Commitments in Vietnam prohibited the United States from providing anything for Zambia more than a bankrupt policy doomed to failure. To add insult to injury, although the Johnson administration repeatedly rejected Kaunda’s requests, they never hesitated to exploit his precarious position for political or diplomatic gain. The hypocrisy hit a new high when Rusk scolded Zambian leaders for making military spending a top priority in their nation’s budget. Zambian officials did not passively accept this treatment. Partly as a response to US intransigence, Kaunda practiced a bolder non-alignment. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) pledge to build the Tazara railroad (a monumental task which the PRC committed years ahead of schedule) linking Zambia to Tanzania empowered him to be more aggressive. The Zambians resisted superpower hegemony by voting “no” on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They sought nuclear weapons as defense against possible nukes in South Africa, while the United States cooperated with the Soviets to limit the spread of such arms. This example shows that national security considerations can lead countries in such differing circumstances to polar-opposite policies. Furthermore, while the request for nukes and the “no” vote on the NPT struck US officials as naïve or worse, to Zambians such as advisor Mark Chona and Ambassador Vernon Mwaanga these actions epitomized realism.14 Outside observers have a tendency to criticize African nations and their leaders and wonder what went wrong in the decades after independence. It’s too bad, they say, that

Introduction

5

Kaunda swayed from the capitalist path and adopted disastrous socialist policies. The Zambian leader’s decisions certainly deserve careful scrutiny, and there is no question that he made mistakes. However, if we look at the situation from his perspective, we might temper our criticism a bit. To Kaunda, US non-alignment in the struggle against racism was at least as frustrating as his non-alignment in the Cold War was to US officials. He saw a United States going up in flames. The Vietnam War ended Johnson’s reform efforts, and assassins murdered King and Kennedy. Instead of wondering why Kaunda was not more loyal to the West, perhaps it is more appropriate to thank him for not giving up on us completely. Kaunda’s policy of non-alignment can thus be seen as a testament to his deep faith in certain aspects of the US system rather than an abandonment of it in favor of the socialist alternative. As the 1970s dawned, Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda attained the apex of his international prestige. As chair of the Organization of African Unity and host of the 3rd Non-Aligned Conference, he championed the struggle for independence and racial equality in southern Africa. On the other hand, his new counterpart in Washington, Richard Nixon, ranked these issues at the bottom of the US agenda. His indifference toward Africa precluded a summit with Kaunda (who unsuccessfully requested an Oval Office meeting in October 1970) and allowed Congress to overturn sanctions against Rhodesia. He concentrated on managing domestic politics, ending the Vietnam War, and improving relations with the Soviets and the Chinese. The emissaries Nixon sent to southern Africa, such as Secretary of State William Rogers, actually played no significant part in his foreign policy and thus underlined his disdain for the region. While Kaunda faced internal difficulties and as a result eventually endorsed oneparty rule, his efforts primarily remained focused on fighting racism and colonialism. Several black US visitors to Zambia, including singer James Brown and Congressman Charles Diggs, shared Kaunda’s sense of urgency regarding racial issues. Jean Wilkowski, appointed US ambassador to Zambia in late 1972, gradually began rebuilding the damage done to bilateral relations by Nixon’s failure to host Kaunda at the White House two years before.15 Kaunda welcomed the efforts by such like-minded Americans as Wilkowski and Diggs but became increasingly disappointed with the policies of Nixon and his top advisors. In the early 1970s, cultural ties tightened between Zambians and Americans in a number of ways, but diplomacy at the highest level deteriorated due to the different priorities of Nixon and Kaunda.16 Not until the presidency of Gerald Ford, who entered the White House in the aftermath of Nixon’s August 1974 resignation, would Kaunda take on a key role in US relations with southern Africa.

1

Kaunda Gets Ford’s Attention, 1974–1975

In August 1974, Gerald Ford replaced a disgraced Richard Nixon. He inherited a US policy that ranked Africa at the very bottom of the agenda and which had allowed sanctions against the white minority regime in Rhodesia to be overturned. Ford’s top priority was to restore honesty and dignity to the presidency, and that included moving toward more progressive relations with southern Africa. The Zambian government viewed the new US leader with cautious optimism and jumped at the chance to present its concerns to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In September, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda facilitated historic negotiations regarding the independence of Mozambique. This monumental event had been made possible by a coup in Portugal, which drastically altered the calculus of power in southern Africa. South Africa reacted to the changes in Lisbon by expressing interest in cooperating with Zambia to seek a diplomatic solution for Rhodesia. The dramatic détente exercise resulted in the release of nationalist leaders such as Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in November, and then a Unity Accord among all the liberation groups in December. In January 1975, Kaunda contributed to mediation efforts among the three major groups competing for power in soon-to-be independent Angola, another former Portuguese colony unshackled by the coup in Lisbon. The Alvor Accords called for a transitional government consisting of representatives from all three major Angolan parties and Portugal, leading to national elections and independence in November. Unfortunately, heavy fighting broke out among the groups in February, and the unity agreement looked like it had no chance of succeeding. The situation in Rhodesia also appeared grim and, in March, received a serious setback when one of the mostrespected nationalist leaders was assassinated in Lusaka. As April approached, diplomats in Lusaka and Washington made arrangements for an upcoming meeting between Ford and Kaunda. The Zambian ambassador, Siteke Mwale, labored particularly hard to prepare his superiors. He spelled out a very ambitious agenda for Kaunda’s visit to Washington, expressing high hopes for what might be accomplished. On the afternoon of April 19, Kaunda discussed southern African issues thoroughly with Ford in the Oval Office. That evening he delivered a bombshell address that shocked many in attendance, particularly Kissinger and his wife. The results of the Zambian president’s summitry were mixed. While Kaunda’s April 1975 diplomacy did not succeed in meeting all of his government’s goals in the

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

short run, he definitely attracted the attention of Gerald Ford to southern Africa and contributed to a major shift in US policy in the long run.

Mwaanga meets Kissinger After two years of attempting to get top US officials to make southern Africa a higher priority, US ambassador Jean Wilkowski finally witnessed some progress in August 1974. Wilkowski helped schedule an appointment for the Zambian foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. She hoped this meeting would lay the groundwork for eventual White House talks between Kenneth Kaunda and Gerald Ford, thus repairing some of the damage done during the Nixon years.1 Mwaanga appreciated the opportunity to build positive relations with the new Ford administration, which he thought might lead to “elementary American support for the liberation of Southern Africa.”2 Mwaanga and Mark Chona, Kaunda’s special assistant, arrived in Dallas on August 13 and were met by Zambia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Rupiah Banda, who accompanied them to Washington. Mwaanga spent the next few days lobbying members of Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment and thus stop US imports of Rhodesian chrome. On Friday August 16, Mwaanga met Kissinger and gave him a lengthy memo on southern African issues. In general, the Zambian foreign minister intended to convince Kissinger that the roots of the conflicts in southern Africa were racial, not economic or political. The governments of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal had long been oppressing people of color, with US support. If Washington stopped supplying weapons to the racist apartheid regime in Pretoria, he contended, it would be a step toward ending the regional conflict.3 In discussing the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, Mwaanga explained that the Zambian government wanted US assistance in facilitating a peaceful transition to independence. Regarding Rhodesia, he emphasized the importance of repealing the Byrd Amendment. He invited the secretary to visit Lusaka for further talks, and Kissinger agreed “in principle.” After the private meeting, Mwaanga hosted a reception for Kissinger at the Zambian embassy. Overall the Washington trip went well for the Zambian delegation, which according to Mwaanga returned home “feeling much more pleased than when we came.”4

Mozambique Meanwhile, concrete progress was taking place back in southern Africa, where Kenneth Kaunda played a key role in bringing about the September 1974 negotiations for Mozambique’s independence. Kaunda and other Zambian officials, most notably Mark Chona, had been seeking a diplomatic resolution of the conflict since the late 1960s, to no avail.5 However, the April 25 coup in Portugal, which replaced the intransigent regime of Marcello Caetano with a more realistic one led by General Antonio de Spinola, sparked a chain of events that finally ended the long and costly war. The new

Kaunda Gets Ford’s Attention, 1974–1975

9

government in Lisbon, which included progressive socialists such as Foreign Minister Mario Soares, quickly communicated its willingness to engage in peace talks. In early May the Zambian president contacted Spinola and offered to serve as a mediator and host. The first direct interaction between Soares and Samora Machel, the commander of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), occurred in Lusaka on June 5. Soares opened the session by hugging Machel and thereby sending a clear signal that times had changed. The June talks established a conciliatory tone and opened lines of communication between FRELIMO and Lisbon.6 After another escalation of fighting in July and August, the principals reconvened in Lusaka on September 4 for discussions. Kaunda welcomed Soares and Machel back to State House and prepared to leave the room, but both sides insisted that he remain as mediator.7 Over the next few days an agreement was hammered out and announced on September 7. The details included (1) an immediate cease-fire; (2) a transition government consisting of six FRELIMO representatives and three appointed by Lisbon; and (3) an independence date for Mozambique of June 25, 1975.8 The end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, which owed much to Kaunda’s efforts, sent shock waves throughout the southern African region and prompted a flurry of remarkable diplomatic exchanges among Kaunda, South African president John Vorster, and Rhodesian leader Ian Smith. Although ambassador Wilkowski would briefly meet Samora Machel during one of his frequent visits to Lusaka, the United States was not directly involved in the diplomacy which ended the war in Mozambique.9 Understandably, the top priority for the Ford administration during its first month in office was to facilitate a peaceful transition after Richard Nixon’s resignation. By retaining Kissinger as secretary of state and national security advisor, Ford had sent a clear signal that there would be continuity in US foreign relations, and to some extent that was reassuring to people. More importantly, Ford impressed the US public as straightforward and down-to-earth. Ford’s one-month honeymoon ended with the stroke of a pen. On September 8, the day after Kaunda oversaw the agreement regarding Mozambique’s independence, President Ford appeared on national television and signed the document pardoning Nixon for all federal crimes he “committed or may have committed or taken part in” while in office. Ford’s approval rating dropped from 71 percent to 50 percent in less than a week.10 The pardon drew nearly universal condemnation from liberal elements in Congress such as the Black Caucus, with only one African-American representative, Andrew Young (D-GA), supporting Ford’s decision. Young had been a vocal critic of Nixon’s policies, most notably as the author of a 1973 amendment cutting off funds for Portugal’s war in Mozambique, but as a Christian minister he sympathized with Ford’s act of forgiveness. During the next few years Ford came to really appreciate Young, who would play an increasingly important part in US relations with southern Africa.11 Whether they supported or opposed Ford’s pardon of Nixon, the vast majority of Americans was certainly much more interested in domestic issues and had little concern for events in Zambia such as the independence agreement for Mozambique. Ambassador Wilkowski and her associates in the State Department’s Africa Bureau

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

monitored the proceedings with interest but had no direct role. The independence of Mozambique had almost zero impact in Washington in the fall of 1974. In Pretoria, the impact was quite different. White South Africans had long relied on the Portuguese colony for many things. Economically, Mozambique provided crucial ports for South African trade and over 100,000 workers for South African mines. Strategically, a Mozambique under white control acted as a buffer between Pretoria and the black-ruled nations to the north such as Tanzania. The ascendance to power by FRELIMO, previously viewed as radical terrorists, sent shock waves throughout the white population of South Africa, who feared that Mozambique would begin serving as a training ground for African National Congress guerrillas, as well as a base for the forces fighting in Rhodesia. The overall effect of Mozambique’s independence on South Africans has been aptly characterized as “traumatic.”12

Détente Kaunda viewed the independence of Mozambique as an opportunity to advance the causes of peace and racial justice in the southern Africa region, most importantly in Rhodesia. He had little faith in London’s willingness to exercise authority and understood that “the one who was in control of that British colony was in fact John Vorster.”13 Vorster, who had become South Africa’s prime minister in 1966, did not seem at first to be a very likely candidate for cooperation with Kaunda. He had served time in jail during the Second World War because of his support for the Nazis, and during his tenure as Minister of Justice he earned a reputation for brutality. Nevertheless, the Zambian president opted to give diplomacy a chance, and when Vorster proposed that they arrange a secret meeting of envoys, Kaunda concurred. In early July in Paris, Mark Chona met with Marquard de Villiers, an Afrikaner businessman who often played golf with Vorster and had earned his trust as a gobetween. Also present was the head of South Africa’s notorious Bureau of State Security, General Hendrik van den Bergh. Chona gave them a copy of the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, which de Villiers delivered personally to Vorster. Not long after the secret Paris meeting, Chona himself flew to Cape Town for the first of several visits with Vorster.14 Using shuttle diplomacy, Chona helped initiate a period of détente between Zambia and South Africa, and he gained a reputation as the “Kissinger of southern Africa.” He considered his secret talks with the South Africans to be among his greatest contributions to Zambian foreign relations.15 With solid groundwork laid by Chona, more substantive discussions were scheduled. In late September 1974, Mwaanga journeyed to New York for the UN’s General Assembly session. He arranged a meeting in his hotel room with the South African foreign minister, Hilgard Muller. The two nations’ UN ambassadors, Rupiah Banda and Roelof “Pik” Botha, also participated in the negotiation which lasted five hours. They focused on Rhodesia, and the South Africans agreed to help bring about a transition to majority rule; but, Muller expressed concern that a black-ruled Rhodesia might serve as a base for ANC guerrilla activities against his government.

Kaunda Gets Ford’s Attention, 1974–1975

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Mwaanga pointed to the Lusaka Manifesto, which acknowledged that South Africa’s sovereignty put it into a different category than Rhodesia, and therefore meant an escalation of guerrilla activities was not warranted. Sworn to secrecy, the two sides agreed to go forward with their dramatic undertaking to facilitate a solution in Rhodesia.16 Simultaneously, Chona hammered out an agreement with de Villiers and van den Bergh, establishing the necessary conditions for a summit between Kaunda and Vorster, and it was completed on October 8 at State House in Lusaka. Zambia agreed that no guerrilla attacks against South Africa would come from their territory, or from Mozambique, Botswana, or a majority-ruled Rhodesia. South Africa pledged to establish positive relations with Mozambique, remove its helicopters and 2,000 paramilitary police from Rhodesia, and convince Ian Smith to release detained nationalist leaders such as Joshua Nkomo from prison in order to participate in negotiations. De Villiers delivered the remarkable document, entitled “Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa,” to Vorster.17 About a week later, while the agreement remained secret, an editorial in the Johannesburg Star urged Vorster to intervene with diplomacy in Rhodesia to facilitate a peaceful settlement. “We are not suggesting that Mr. Vorster abandon Rhodesia,” opined the editors, “but we do suggest he use his position of unique influence with Mr. Smith to force the pace of constructive change there.”18 Zambian officials noted this positive signal from South Africa and were even more enthusiastic after Vorster addressed Parliament on October 23. The prime minister denounced the violence which had plagued southern Africa for the past decade. He believed that “Southern Africa has come to a crossroads,” and that it must choose between détente on the one hand, and escalation on the other. The price of escalation would be terrible, and so he advocated détente.19

Zambian optimism On October 24, Zambians joyously celebrated their tenth anniversary of independence. After a decade of peace and freedom, the people paused to ponder how far they had progressed. With the economy strong and Kaunda widely popular, it was truly an exciting time in Lusaka. The settlement in Mozambique and prospects for peace in Rhodesia added to the enthusiasm in the air. The superstar songstress from South Africa, Miriam Makeba, headlined the entertainment. A group of specially trained Zambian children born in 1964 stole the show, marching past the dignitaries, singing freedom songs, and performing calisthenics.20 Among this youth group was Gertrude Phiri, who had been born exactly on October 24, 1964. Her brother later recalled how she enjoyed the experience, especially wearing a uniform and visiting State House.21 Over forty nations sent representatives, and among them was the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Donald Easum. A Second World War veteran with a PhD from Princeton, Easum had only been assistant secretary for about six months, but he did have considerable experience as an ambassador in African nations

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such as Burkina Faso. After observing the proceedings in Lusaka and visiting several other nations in the region including Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa, he commented that there was “an air of expectancy in southern Africa.” He sensed that the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto was finally coming to fruition. Regarding US policy, he believed that the Byrd Amendment would soon be repealed and that this would be helpful to the process. He was particularly encouraged by the tone of Vorster’s October 23 speech and hoped to see the South African forces withdrawn from Rhodesia.22 Kaunda also exuded optimism about the South African prime minister’s words. As part of the weekend-long celebration, on Saturday October 26, the University of Zambia awarded him an honorary Doctor of Law degree. During his acceptance address, Kaunda characterized Vorster’s message as the “voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting.” Such praise clearly reflected the remarkable détente process which was underway. During an occasion such as Zambia’s 10th independence, in front of dignitaries from the People’s Republic of China and so many black African nations, it would have been no surprise if Kaunda lambasted Pretoria for its apartheid policy. His panegyric prompted Vorster to reply, “I welcome any initiative which can lead to a de-escalation of violence in Southern Africa.”23 President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique met with Kaunda during the festive weekend, but the tone of their conversations was much more somber. Nyerere and Machel doubted the sincerity of South Africa and questioned Vorster’s motives. Chona attempted to reassure them that the officials in Pretoria truly sought peace in the region. Somewhat reluctantly, they agreed to give Kaunda and Vorster’s détente a chance. They insisted on three conditions regarding Rhodesia: (1) release of all political prisoners, (2) withdrawal of South African forces, and (3) a constitutional conference for the transition to majority rule.24 It took nearly a year for the South African paramilitary to leave Rhodesia, and it would be five years before the Lancaster House conference instituted majority rule. To their great surprise, however, the release of Joshua Nkomo and other Zimbabwean nationalists happened almost immediately.

Rhodesia If the independence of Mozambique was “traumatic” for the South African government, its impact was even more pronounced in Rhodesia. “Whites started to panic,” recalled Abel Muzorewa, a minister and leading activist within Rhodesia. He and other black leaders rejoiced, recognizing that the 700-mile border between Rhodesia and Mozambique could provide crucial entry points for guerrilla soldiers if the war continued.25 In late October, South African foreign minister Hilgard Muller flew into Salisbury for talks with Ian Smith. Muller sensed the seriousness of his mission and somberly requested that Smith agree to release Nkomo and other detained black nationalists for negotiations in Lusaka. “I was able to give him a quick, direct reply,” remembered Smith. Muller then promised that South Africa would provide the transportation for the released prisoners and quickly departed to inform Vorster of Smith’s agreement.26

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A few days later, in early November, Mark Chona visited Rhodesia in order to make final arrangements for the release of leading nationalists. Chona explained to Smith that the Zambian government hoped to foster unity among the various liberation movements. Smith wagged his finger at Chona and remarked: “If you can achieve unity you can come back and cut this finger off.”27 The task would, indeed, be daunting. Blacks in Rhodesia belonged to three primary groups: the African National Congress (ANC), led by Muzorewa; the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), led by Nkomo; and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led since the 1960s by Ndabaningi Sithole. On November 1 matters became even more complicated, because the ZANU executive committee voted to remove Sithole from his leadership position. The committee decided to send Robert Mugabe to Lusaka instead. Mwaanga later described the shocking scene: “I was standing with the President on the State House lawn when the helicopter arrived.” Nkomo and Mugabe emerged, but “There was no sign of Sithole.”28 On November 9 the Zimbabwean nationalists sat down with Kaunda and his Frontline colleagues: Seretse Khama of Botswana, Machel, and Nyerere. Kaunda hoped that his diplomatic initiative would lead to “dismantling the racist and illegal Rhodesia regime.”29 Before any real substantive issues could be discussed, however, the controversy over ZANU leadership had to be addressed. Nyerere was particularly stern with Mugabe about overthrowing Sithole. Mugabe was quickly asked to leave the room and was “virtually put in quarantine” elsewhere in State House.30 Muzorewa and Nkomo were informed about the Zambia-South Africa talks, and the following morning all the Zimbabwean nationalists returned to Rhodesia. A few days later, Sithole was flown into Lusaka to dine with Kaunda and receive a briefing.31 Due primarily to the dispute within ZANU, Kaunda’s proposal for a unity agreement among the three major Zimbabwean organizations was put on hold until the end of the month.32 In early November, while Kaunda and his colleagues met secretly with the Zimbabwean nationalists, the US ambassadors from the southern African region convened in Lusaka. The Times of Zambia noted the gathering, and hoped that it was a sign of an “American awakening.” The editorial condemned past US policy as generally driven by economic motives. Rather than attempt to understand the opinions of black Africans, continued the Times editors, the United States for the most part had viewed southern Africa from a European perspective, and in concrete terms had supported the white minority regimes. The black population of southern Africa was “notable for its absence of millionaires,” and thus it had not been important to the US government. The editorial warned that if Washington did not adopt a new approach more in touch with “the political aspirations of the new nations of Black Africa,” then its policy faced “certain disaster.”33

Visits to the USSR Surprisingly, within six months the Ford administration would forge closer contacts with “Black Africa,” inviting Kaunda for high-level talks at the White House. In November 1974, however, resuscitating détente with the Soviets remained their top

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priority and a summit was arranged. Coincidentally, Kaunda simultaneously visited the Soviet Union. Leading a large official delegation that included Foreign Minister Mwaanga (who had been Zambia’s first ambassador to the USSR), Kaunda arrived in Moscow on November 22. The Times of Zambia had high hopes for this trip. In contrast to its negative assessment of past US policy, the Times lavished great praise on the Soviet Union as the superpower whose development more closely suited the needs of the poor masses of southern Africa. The editors commended the Soviets who “stood on the side of the Zambians in the dark days of the fight against colonialism.”34 In fact, during critical periods such as late 1965 and early 1973, the USSR arguably had been even less helpful to Zambia than the United States. To some degree, evidently, the climate in Lusaka in late 1974 favored sympathy with socialism over historic accuracy. In any case, Soviet president Nikolai Podgorny hosted a “lavish reception” for Kaunda. The leaders engaged in private talks, which Kaunda characterized as “very frank, honest, and friendly,” but there was no substantive breakthrough to report.35 On November 23, while Kaunda spent a second day in Moscow, Ford and Kissinger arrived in Vladivostok for a summit with Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev got along well with Ford, whose straightforward approach differed considerably from Nixon’s. The US proposal called for limiting each side’s bombers and missiles to 2400, and surprisingly the Soviets accepted it. Long discussions on board a train and at a rustic resort resulted in a “framework” for a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). In the days following the Vladivostok summit, Kissinger trumpeted a “conceptual breakthrough.” Critics in Congress quickly pounced on the agreement, however, claiming that it allowed the USSR to retain an advantage. In particular they worried that the treaty would prohibit development of the new Tomahawk cruise missile. SALT II, as it turned out, would not be completed during the Ford presidency. Despite the high hopes of late November, détente with the Soviets had derailed.36

Lusaka talks Meanwhile, after a very friendly meeting with President Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia, Kaunda returned to Zambia to host a historic gathering on Rhodesia. In the first week of December 1974, nationalist leaders Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Sithole (who was once again representing ZANU) flew to Lusaka for an intense week of negotiations. One key item on the agenda was forging unity among the nationalist groups. Kaunda initially proposed that they band together under the leadership of Nkomo, but this idea was shot down by ZANU. In turn, ZAPU rejected the nomination of Sithole. Eventually the parties agreed on Muzorewa as an interim leader until a congress of all the Zimbabwean nationalist parties could be organized. At the December 7 announcement of the Declaration of Unity, Muzorewa proclaimed that he felt like “the tallest man in the world.”37 It certainly seemed like a big step toward a settlement of the ten-year-old Rhodesian conflict. According to Kaunda, “It was hoped, by much of Africa, that this would strengthen the liberation struggle.”38 The reality was more complicated.

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Another set of talks took place simultaneously in Lusaka in early December, between Kaunda and his Frontline colleagues (Nyerere, Machel, and Khama) on one side and Rhodesian and South African representatives on the other. Ian Smith’s cabinet secretary, Jack Gaylard, presented the primary Rhodesian demand for an end to guerrilla activities and a complete cease-fire. The nationalist leaders feared that if they stopped fighting, Smith would refuse to implement reforms. Nyerere upped the ante by insisting on immediate one-person, one-vote democracy in Rhodesia. When informed of this stipulation, Smith objected that sudden majority rule would lower standards. The participants pledged to arrange an all-parties constitutional conference within four months. No agreement had been reached, but Smith nonetheless announced on television on December 11 that the “terrorist” attacks were at an end. The following day found Nkomo, Sithole, and Muzorewa back in Rhodesia, addressing a joyous throng in Highfield, a black township on the outskirts of Salisbury.39 Kaunda’s efforts at détente with Vorster, it seemed, had produced results and have been praised by scholars of Zambian diplomacy as “imaginative” and “courageous.”40 Some commentators in South Africa interpreted the developments in Lusaka more critically, to say the least. The first assessment by John Poorter, editor of the Johannesburg news magazine To the Point, characterized the talks as a “setback” and a “failure,” because no final agreement ending the Rhodesian war had been reached. Poorter predicted a “stepped-up terror war” and an end of détente. He noted that Kaunda had visited Moscow just before the sessions commenced and contended that the Soviets were “likely to have been much more than an observer” in Lusaka.41 The Lusaka talks hosted by Kaunda in December 1974, in hindsight, were certainly not a success overall. The Declaration of Unity among the nationalists brought no real unity. The cease-fire did not hold, and the war instead intensified and raged for five years. The all-parties conference to hammer out details for a more democratic system would not take place until late 1979. While peripheral players such as Nyerere and Vorster may have contributed to the failure, the major factor was that the key parties in the conflict—Ian Smith’s government on one hand, and the Zimbabwe nationalist groups on the other—were not ready to settle. The concrete Soviet influence on the actual events was inconsequential. However, the concern about the potential role of the USSR, as expressed so clearly in the South African media, was very real. Fear of the Russian bear wreaking havoc throughout southern Africa played an even bigger part in the tragedy about to unfold in Angola.

Angola Whereas the April 1974 coup in Portugal opened a relatively clear path to independence in Mozambique, the situation in Angola was extremely complicated. Instead of one dominant liberation movement, such as FRELIMO in Mozambique, three groups competed for power in Angola. Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) maintained headquarters in Zaire and exercised influence in the north. Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) based

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its operation in the south. Agostinho Neto’s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) enjoyed support around the capital, Luanda. Kaunda desperately desired unity among the three groups, believing it was the only way to bring peace to Angola.42 Much was at stake for the people of Zambia, who shared a border with Angola over one thousand kilometers long. According to Kaunda’s key advisor, Mark Chona, the Zambian government “needed to make sure that the independence struggle was not impeded by problems in Angola … The border situation was very serious. We need to see that Angola did not cause more suffering. To continue knowing this one thousand kilometer border was unstable was very unsettling.”43 Economics added to diplomatic and humanitarian motives for stability, because 55 percent of Zambia’s exports in 1974 traversed the Benguala railroad through Angola.44 Kaunda’s closest ties historically had been with Neto, who lived for a while at State House in Lusaka. His MPLA had training camps in Northwestern and Western provinces of Zambia. When the MPLA split into factions, Kaunda brought Neto together with his rivals at a farm on the outskirts of Lusaka in August 1974 and encouraged them to work together.45 After its founding in 1966, members of UNITA also used Zambia as a base of operations. Kaunda withheld recognition of UNITA through 1973, however, and his Defense Ministry carefully observed their activities, partly out of concern that they might collaborate with Zambian rebels under Adamson Mushala.46 Clashes between the MPLA and the FNLA in the second half of 1974 boosted UNITA’s standing in Zambia. In mid-November, Savimbi visited Lusaka for the first time since 1967 and talked at length with Kaunda. He convinced the Zambian president to support a diplomatic effort to form a coalition government of the three major parties in Angola. Savimbi next flew to Kinshasa and reconciled with Roberto and then in early December returned to Lusaka for an “encouraging” discussion with Neto.47 The pieces appeared to be in place for a relatively smooth transition to independence in Angola, and the three leaders agreed to meet in Mombasa after New Year’s Day. Hosted by Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s president, the Mombasa sessions resulted on January 5, 1975, in an agreement to work together among Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi. They reconvened five days later in the resort town of Alvor on the Portuguese coast, joined by representatives of the Lisbon government led by foreign minister Soares. The Alvor Accord signed on January 15 called for a transitional government in Angola in which the provisional presidency would rotate among the three groups, a 12-person cabinet with three representatives from each party and three from Portugal, and a joint military force consisting of 24,000 Portuguese troops and another 24,000 soldiers assembled from the three parties’ armies to enforce a cease-fire. The coalition pledged to organize national elections in October for an assembly which would draft a new constitution, and independence was scheduled for November 11, 1975.48 The transitional government was supposed to be sworn in on January 31, but rather than completely commit to cooperation, each of the three groups continued building up their capabilities for armed conflict. While Savimbi focused on recruiting more soldiers in southern Angola, Neto and Roberto received major boosts from external sources. The Soviet Union had initiated aid to the MPLA with

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$25,000 in 1961, increased it to $145,000 in 1966, and provided $220,000 in 1973. In addition to cash, Soviet aid to Neto’s forces included weapons and food.49 As the MPLA established itself in Luanda and took control of the crucial oil-rich Cabinda province late in 1974, Moscow drafted a plan to provide them with heavy weapons and massive amounts of ammunition. On January 30, 1975, the USSR ambassador in Brazzaville assured Neto’s top lieutenant Jose Eduardo dos Santos that significant support was on the way. The Soviet promises to dos Santos reflected a growing sense of urgency sparked in part by a January 22 decision in Washington to increase US support for Roberto. 50 At least as early as 1961, the CIA paid Roberto a stipend, beginning at $6,000 per year. Roberto’s “salary” increased considerably throughout the 1960s, but as a result of Portuguese complaints it was cut back to about $1,000 per month in 1970. In July 1974 the CIA raised Roberto’s retainer to $10,000 per month. At about this time Jim Potts, head of the African division in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, proposed providing major US assistance to the FNLA, in addition to Roberto’s monthly CIA funding. Covert operations of this nature required approval of Kissinger’s 40 Committee, a top-level board that reviewed all politically sensitive initiatives. Donald Easum, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, opposed Potts’ proposal for major aid to the FNLA and did not forward it to the 40 Committee. In December Kissinger fired Easum, and his interim replacement Edward Mulcahy approved Potts’ initiative. On January 22, the 40 Committee briefly discussed Angola. Concerned about reports of the Soviets sending weapons to the MPLA, intelligence director William Colby suggested $100,000 for UNITA and $300,000 for the FNLA. Colby contended that the Soviet-backed Neto clearly was not Washington’s man and that this small gesture would give the United States some leverage with two other key figures in the transitional government, Savimbi and Roberto. With no explanation, the 40 Committee rejected the money for UNITA but approved the $300,000 for the FNLA.51 This decision did not seem like a big deal in Washington, but it alarmed the Soviets and encouraged Roberto in his determination to fight for total control of Angola. Since the previous summer he also had been receiving support from China, which undoubtedly augmented his confidence, but his major backer remained Zaire’s president Mobutu Sese Seko, who had hosted him in exile for many years and was also related to him through marriage. Buoyed by outside forces, neither Neto nor Roberto adhered to the January 15 Alvor agreement. In February both intensified their preparations for civil war, and during the following month one of the most terrible tragedies of twentieth-century African history exploded. In mid-March, Roberto’s FNLA attacked Neto’s MPLA, hoping to dislodge them from the capital of Luanda.52 In the United States the events in Angola attracted little attention, but a few members of the Congressional Black Caucus followed developments carefully. Charles Diggs (D-MI), chair of the foreign affairs subcommittee on Africa, undertook a factfinding mission in early February to Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. While in Lusaka he discussed the regional situation with Kaunda and met with Neto.53 Upon returning to Washington, Diggs took the lead in opposing the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as the new assistant secretary of state for African affairs. During the senate hearings regarding Davis’ confirmation, Diggs called on his colleague Andrew

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Young (D-GA) for testimony. Young, who had recently visited South Africa, expressed concern about Davis’ service in Chile during the period when Salvador Allende was overthrown.54 Young contended that the rumors and suspicions about possible CIA involvement in the Chilean coup would be enough to hinder US policy toward Africa, where many leaders worried about possible CIA covert operations in their countries.55 Young’s prediction that African officials would criticize the nominee was accurate but did not prevent Davis from being approved as assistant secretary.

Challenges for Zambia in early 1975 In the first few months of 1975, Kaunda and his top advisors hoped for higher level US involvement on African issues such as Angola’s transition to independence; however, they also had a large number of other pressing foreign relations challenges on their agenda. For example, in February Foreign Secretary Mwaanga embarked on a lengthy tour of Asia, featuring a crucial stop in China. During his time in Beijing the Zambian foreign minister enjoyed a friendly dinner with the top US diplomat in the PRC, George Bush, on March 11. The future US president was quite pleased by Mwaanga’s visit, describing it quite thoroughly in his diary. “Nice thing this week,” wrote Bush. Vernon Mwaanga, the Foreign Minister of Zambia, and an old friend of mine from the UN, came to call; a most unusual step in the protocol field, given the big-shot nature of foreign ministers generally. He was relaxed, down to earth, gave us some interesting information about his visit with Zhou Enlai and all in all couldn’t have been nicer. I cabled asking that someone at home acknowledge this and thank him for it.56

In more contentious sessions, he met with his Chinese counterpart and also held a lengthy and intense conversation (as Bush noted) with Zhou en Lai, who was hospitalized at the time. When the Chinese officials severely criticized the Zambian government for negotiating with South Africa, Mwaanga staunchly defended Kaunda’s détente strategy as necessary to bring peace and racial justice to southern Africa. He ranked Zhou among the true “giants of men” with “such a great vision of the world” but felt he simply could not allow such condemnations of Zambian foreign relations to go unanswered. He contended that all wars ended with some negotiations and pointed out that even Zhou himself had negotiated with Japan during the Second World War. Zhou admired Mwaanga’s spirited defense, remarked on his relative youth, and expressed hope that there were many similar young people in Third World countries ready to carry on the struggle after the older generation died.57 The praise from Zhou en Lai meant a lot to Mwaanga, increasing his determination to defend Zambia’s foreign policy. Back in Lusaka, he addressed the Zambian Parliament on March 18, summing up the major developments of the previous six months. He outlined the progress in Rhodesia, where key nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo had been released from prison and agreed to unify under the temporary leadership of Abel Muzorewa. He praised South Africa for constructively contributing to these events

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but clarified that the détente diplomacy had not really been a “dialogue,” which can only occur between friends. The Kaunda government did not accept South African interference in Rhodesia, rejected its control of Namibia, and remained “vehemently opposed to apartheid.” The struggle in southern Africa was far from over. Furthermore, in spite of the steps forward the situation in Rhodesia was in danger of disintegrating. No constitutional conference had yet been arranged nor had the ceasefire really taken hold. Mwaanga blamed Smith for blocking progress and, in particular, assailed his “despicable” arrest and re-incarceration of Sithole in early March. The other nationalists demanded Sithole’s release and threatened to escalate the armed struggle. Mwaanga pledged Zambian support for their ultimatum. The Zambian government preferred negotiations but if need be would play its part to assist the armed struggle. The foreign minister concluded his remarks with firm resolve: “The question is no longer whether there will be change in Southern Africa. The question we must ask ourselves today is WHEN and HOW this change will come. Whichever way this important question is answered, I can assure this House that Zambia will not be found wanting.”58 Mwaanga’s speech correctly predicted many more challenges for Zambian hopes of peace in southern Africa. Any hope for a quick settlement in Rhodesia received a fatal blow on March 18 in Lusaka, when a car bomb killed Herbert Chitepo, a key figure in the ZANU. Chitepo, the first black lawyer in Rhodesia, was widely respected for his legal acumen and was expected to play a central role in the transition to majority rule and the subsequent government. In the weeks following his assassination, Kaunda created a special commission of inquiry. He also arrested over fifty members of ZANU for questioning. The Zambian government honored Chitepo with a full military funeral, attended by over 7,000 people.59 Ambassador Wilkowski had never met Chitepo and worried that her presence could be misinterpreted as official US support for ZANU. Nonetheless she decided to attend “in humanitarian recognition of a man who had fought for a just cause.”60

High hopes for help As April approached, Wilkowski and her Zambian counterpart focused on preparations for an upcoming visit to Washington by Kaunda. Siteke Mwale, Zambia’s ambassador to the United States, worked particularly hard. Mwale, who took over as ambassador during the final months of the Nixon presidency, had thorough knowledge of US politics and society. He had earned a bachelor’s degree from Temple and a master’s degree from UCLA and befriended civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King and Andrew Young.61 In early April he explained Zambia’s diplomatic priorities to the new assistant secretary for African affairs, Nathaniel Davis. A few days later, Kissinger addressed Mwale and all the other African ambassadors in Washington. To the Zambian ambassador’s pleasant surprise, the secretary of state “skillfully admitted that the United States had given Africa a low priority.” He explained that the US government opposed apartheid and favored independence for Namibia. Regarding Rhodesia, he pointed out that the Ford administration supported repeal of the Byrd Amendment.62

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Kissinger’s remarks sounded good, but concrete action would mean much more. Mwale believed that the United States should “immediately” overturn the Byrd Amendment and rejoin the international sanctions against the Smith government. “Through her imports of Rhodesian chrome,” argued Mwale, “the United States has given the Rebel Regime of Ian Smith political solace and economic fiber which have made it possible for the rebellion to continue to survive.” At a time when Zambian officials and others were working together to facilitate sensitive negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia, US participation in the international sanctions was more important than ever.63 In addition to the proposed steps regarding Rhodesia, the Zambian “wish-list” regarding new directions in US policy toward the southern African region was extremely ambitious. The Zambian government desired a “formal commitment” from Washington to assist Namibians in regaining independence from the control by Vorster, the “fascist usurper.” Mwale hoped the United States could pressure Pretoria into removing its paramilitary forces from Rhodesia in a timely fashion. At the same time, he proposed that the United States consider imposing a military and economic embargo against South Africa. In Mozambique, the ambassador advocated significant US financial aid for Machel’s new government, which could give the United States considerable leverage on FRELIMO to ensure economic and political moderation, counterbalancing Soviet influence. He espoused economic help for Angola for similar reasons but recognized that the situation was problematic since the three main parties had historic differences. He acknowledged past US assistance to Roberto’s FNLA and predicted that Washington might “find a fertile field” for additional intervention. Mwale conjectured that the Ford administration could opt to back the party who was friendliest to Gulf Oil’s interests in the Cabinda province.64 Mwale recognized that such a nuanced and complicated approach to southern Africa was asking a lot. The Ford administration’s foreign policy agenda was still unclear, but certainly Africa ranked “very low in the ladder of priorities.” He recommended that in order to foster such initiatives, Zambia appeal to practical US concerns, claiming correctly that African natural resources were becoming quite crucial in the unfolding global economic downturn of the mid-1970s. Already, he noted, Africa was a key supplier of oil and strategic minerals to the United States, and he added insightfully that “its vast resources are still untapped in many areas.” A more progressive and activist US policy toward southern Africa in the short term could pay long-term dividends in the form of increased access to oil, diamonds, platinum, copper, uranium, and so on. Having served for two years on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) staff and for four years as Zambia’s ambassador in the Ivory Coast, Mwale grasped the macroeconomics of Africa quite clearly.65 Furthermore, Mwale understood that while the Ford administration faced troubling economic circumstances in the spring of 1975, his own country’s situation was much more perilous. In his mid-April assessment of Zambia’s top priorities in relations with the United States, Mwale included the “current International Economic and Monetary situation” among the four major issues. He proposed that Kaunda inform his hosts in general terms that the global downturn was hurting Zambia. Mwale expressed optimism about the scheduled conversation between Kaunda and

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World Bank president Robert McNamara, whom he judged “a friend of Zambia.”66 Mwale was in close contact with officials at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and knew that the precipitous decline in copper prices during the past year spelled potential disaster for his nation. It would be extremely beneficial to secure Western assistance to diversify the Zambian economy, and in particular to boost farming and ranching.67 Copper prices had fallen from a high of $3,000 per ton in April 1974 to $1,200 per ton in January 1975, resulting in a mind-boggling fiscal crisis. In 1974, the copper mines provided Kaunda’s budget with over 300 million Zambian kwacha (at a time when the kwacha was roughly equivalent to the British pound). This represented 54 percent of government revenue. Of course as the copper prices plummeted, so did revenue, and by 1977 it actually would reach zero. In terms of balance of payments, Zambia tumbled from a $112 million account surplus in 1973 to a $471 million deficit in 1975, a staggering reversal that also reflected major increases in the cost of oil. From 1974 to 1976, per capita national income declined by 12 percent.68 The short-term effects were bad, but the long-term effects were even worse. The drop in copper prices and simultaneous rise in fuel costs which began in mid-1974 devastated the Zambian mining industry, which “was starved of hard currency and could not take care of normal needs, never mind proper maintenance, replacement, and rehabilitation of its aging plant and equipment.” The result was “a vicious circle of lower copper production at higher cost, followed by lower foreign exchange earnings and greater scarcity of hard currency.”69 Everyday people faced food shortages, long lines for basic commodities, and widespread loss of jobs. As they prepared for the visit to Washington in April 1975, there was no way for Kaunda and his advisors to predict how bad things were going to get over the next few years, but they definitely understood that their economy needed help. Therefore, ambassador Mwale specifically suggested that while in Washington, Kaunda request funding and expert consultants for the development of Zambia’s agricultural industry.70

Kaunda visits Washington, April 1975 From the perspective of Zambian diplomats, the invitation for their president to visit the White House reflected “an unprecedented degree of warmth and excellence” in USZambia relations. The Ford administration seemed willing to listen, a great step forward from “the era of arrogance” when Nixon had snubbed Kaunda in 1970.71 Ambassador Wilkowski had worked hard to help arrange the invitation and viewed it as a chance to help make up for Nixon’s slight. She characterized it as a chance for Ford and Kissinger “to hear firsthand what was happening” in the region “from a heroic father figure and historic independence role model for the liberation leaders in southern Africa.”72 The secretary of state similarly saw the invite as “a sign of respect for one of the pioneers in Africa’s struggle for independence.” Kissinger praised Kaunda for “exuding dignity and inward strength,” and also because he was inspired by “Western anti-colonial ideals” and “America’s Founding Fathers.” Nonetheless, he expected a mostly symbolic visit from which “no major initiatives” would result.73

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Kaunda arrived at Andrews Air Force Base in the late afternoon of Friday, April 18 and spent the night at Blair House. On Saturday morning the Zambian president met with members of the US Congress and with the Reverend Leon Sullivan, who would later become well known for his “Sullivan Principles” for US corporations operating in South Africa. Kaunda next went to the State Department for a short session with Kissinger, who then hosted a luncheon. In an afternoon press conference, he discussed his decision to detain ZANU members after the Chitepo assassination, a move which was being protested by a small group in front of Blair House. He defended his crackdown as a means of quelling tribal animosities among the guerrilla fighters, avoiding a civil war in Rhodesia and bringing unity to the Zimbabwean liberation movement. Kaunda hoped the Ford administration would “come out and clearly state that they are for majority rule—and once stated, to act accordingly.”74 At 3 p.m. President Ford welcomed his Zambian counterpart to the Oval Office, and asked him for his “comments and views on the situation in southern Africa.” Kaunda thanked Ford for the wonderful hospitality and lauded ambassadors Mwale and Wilkowski for helping ensure that US-Zambia bilateral relations were “very good indeed.” He then added, however, that there were problems in the region. Ford commented that he understood Kaunda had “been working with Vorster and others to resolve the situation.” The Zambian leader responded: “As I told Secretary Kissinger, we need your help.” He hoped the Ford administration could pay closer attention to the area and help find solutions, or else “the U.S. could find itself even fighting on the side of the racists.”75 Kaunda recalled that in the Zambian struggle against colonialism, they had not allowed themselves to be “taken over” by communists but had instead maintained neutrality as they achieved independence relatively peacefully. In the former Portuguese territories, the situation had become more complicated because Lisbon’s intransigence necessitated a long war, and most of the concrete support for the freedom fighters had come from communist nations. Kaunda advised Ford and Kissinger to “examine the motivations of the liberation movements” and not necessarily blame them for accepting support from the socialist bloc. Kissinger had asked Kaunda to “speak to FRELIMO” leaders in Mozambique, evidently about their orientation in the Cold War, and the Zambian leader was happy to do so. “They have been helped by China and Russia,” he added, “but they are no-one’s puppets.” Ford acknowledged that it was reasonable for Mozambique to “want to be independent.”76 The United States would soon recognize the FRELIMO government and eventually provide significant aid to them.

Discussing Angola with Ford Shifting the conversation to the most complicated of the former Portuguese colonies, Kaunda summed it up succinctly: “Angola gives us problems.” He mentioned working with Nyerere and Mobutu to find a “practical solution.” Ford then asked if there were three groups fighting for control of Angola. Kaunda replied “yes, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA.” He explained that the leader of UNITA, Jonas

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Savimbi, had not received much support from Zambia in the past but had recently “emerged as someone who could save the situation.” Kaunda contended that the head of the MPLA, Neto, would not accept the FNLA’s leader, Roberto, as the leader of independent Angola, and vice versa. “The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three,” proposed Kaunda.77 With the spotlight turned onto Savimbi as a possible compromise candidate, Kissinger asked ambassador Wilkowski if she knew him. She did and had met for two long talks with him. Wilkowski then characterized Savimibi as “a very impressive leader and quite solid and does not strike me as being self-serving.”78 Kaunda seconded Wilkowski’s assessment, explaining that after many years of virtually ignoring Savimbi, the Zambian leadership had changed their minds in late 1974 during his visits to Lusaka. “All of us in UNIP,” Kaunda continued, “were impressed with Savimbi’s sincerity and his honesty of purpose.” He claimed that Nyerere, Mobutu, and Machel all agreed that Savimbi was worth supporting and could help achieve the goal of a free and peaceful Angola. “He speaks freely and frankly,” Kaunda added, “and together we are working for a solution in Angola.” The Zambian leader warned that if a peaceful settlement was not reached in Angola, then the alternative would be “too ghastly to contemplate,” and Ford agreed that it would be a “disaster.” 79

Figure 1.1 Kenneth Kaunda talks with Gerald Ford as their wives sit in the background on April 19, 1975, at the White House. Courtesy of the Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

President Ford slightly shifted the focus, inquiring about any ideological differences among the Angolan parties. “MPLA and its leader Neto follow the Moscow line,” answered the Zambian president. Kissinger pointed out that the MPLA was also funded by the Soviets. Kaunda then apologized for taking so much of the US president’s time, but Ford insisted he continue. Kaunda carried on his assessment, turning to Portugal’s policy. He recently had talked with Lisbon’s new foreign minister, Ernesto Melo Antunes, who was getting frustrated with Neto for misleading Portugal and adhering to the “communist line.” Kaunda agreed with Melo Antunes about Neto’s problematic insistence on loyalty to communist policies, and this was part of the reason he was backing Savimbi as a compromise leader.80 The US president expressed concern that after so many years under an extreme right-wing leader, Portugal might move too far to the left, but he then returned the conversation to Angola, about which he was obviously very interested. “How soon do you think it will be,” asked Ford, “before the situation in Angola comes to a head?” Kaunda responded that it was difficult to tell until after the elections. “We must see if the scheme of a compromise candidate is accepted,” he added. Kissinger then wondered if Savimbi was “strong enough to govern.” Kaunda answered that Savimbi did not yet know about the compromise proposal and that “we must convince him of the rightness of it.” He pointed out that during recent fighting between the MPLA and FNLA, people in Angola had run to Savimbi’s UNITA for safety, and he believed this was a “good development.” Kaunda hoped to discourage the three factions from establishing firm footholds in defined regions and thereby “unify them more.” 81 Whether the three groups could work together to govern Angola was the crucial challenge, but Kaunda certainly seemed to have high hopes for the compromise which hinged on UNITA’s role. In response to Kissinger’s earlier question, Mwaanga interjected that Savimbi was “not a political lightweight” and that he “had popular support.” Nevertheless, a real danger existed that even if Savimbi won the elections, troops loyal to Neto’s MPLA and Roberto’s FNLA would keep fighting. Kissinger wondered if the other two groups would “disarm if UNITA takes over?” Kaunda responded that there was “need for some ideas on how to form a national army.”82 Once again Ford showed his curiosity by inquiring: “Does Angola have enough raw materials to be self-sufficient?” Kaunda replied that it was a wealthy country. Kissinger chimed in: “It is rich in oil deposits in Cabinda.” He noted that some neighboring states were very interested in Cabinda’s oil but that he did not mean to imply that Kaunda had such a motivation. He then joked about having Wilkowski apologize if Kaunda had been offended. The Zambian president did not comment on Kissinger’s attempt at humor and instead explained that there were two groups fighting for Cabinda’s independence, one supported by Zaire and the other by Congo-Brazzaville. Mwaanga concurred about Cabinda being a serious problem and added that the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA agreed that Cabinda should remain part of Angola. “We in Zambia support that position,” concluded Mwaanga.83 Ford asked one last question on Angola, wondering if the elections would be for both president and Parliament. He fittingly finished his contributions on the subject by stating simply and accurately that “It sounds like a terribly complicated situation.” Kissinger then queried Kaunda about keeping in touch with Savimbi and mentioned

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the oil in Cabinda again. The Zambian president wrapped up the topic by observing that Savimbi had recently held conversations with the French and British governments. The lengthy and detailed discussion of Angola ended with no clear conclusion by Kaunda and no concrete commitment from Ford.84 In his treatment of this Angola discussion in his memoirs, Kissinger credited Kaunda with convincing Ford of the Soviet threat to southern Africa and of thus single-handedly changing “American national policy.” He claimed that during Kaunda’s Washington visit, Angola was his “dominant concern.” Using only a few quotations from the conversation allowed Kissinger to make this case quite convincingly. It was true that Kaunda was worried about Angola and that he described Neto’s MPLA as being supported by Moscow. It was also true that most of his one-hour meeting with Ford focused on Angola, but from a closer look at the transcript it is clear that Kaunda had tried to change the subject at least once, only to have Ford ask more questions. Kissinger himself asked several questions that kept the focus on Angola, too. Kaunda and his advisors were quite concerned about Angola, but it was only one of several major challenges for the Zambian government in the spring of 1974. It seems that Angola was more of a “dominant concern” for the Ford administration than it was for Kaunda and his advisors. By “crediting” Kaunda with making Angola such a high priority, Kissinger very cleverly shifted much of the blame for the subsequent US covert operation and tragic escalation of the fighting in Angola onto Kaunda’s shoulders.85 Kissinger contended that Kaunda wanted the United States to provide money and weapons to Savimbi’s UNITA in order to stop the Soviet-backed MPLA from taking power. In this version of events it was Kaunda’s desire that fighting be intensified so that Savimbi could be in control, no matter the cost. Vernon Mwaanga, Mark Chona, and Siteke Mwale, three of Zambia’s top diplomats, all of whom participated in the April 19 discussion, paint a different picture. When interviewed in 2005, all of them agreed that Kaunda’s top priority was to create a government of national unity and thus bring lasting peace to Angola. According to Mwaanga, the Zambian government hoped that the United States could play a “constructive role” by talking with the Soviets and getting them to stop the flow of heavy weapons to Luanda.86 Chona, who personally had “no use” for Savimbi, emphasized that Kaunda’s reluctance to recognize the MPLA in no way meant that he was “pro-Savimbi.” Rather, it reflected his desire to “apply moral force” to create a unified government and avoid “fratricidal conflict.”87 Mwale believed that Kaunda wanted the United States to “pressure Savimbi into a government of national unity,” because without it “there would be no peace.”88

Discussing other issues with Ford Kissinger’s published version of events omitted all other issues that were covered in the April 19 meeting in the Oval Office, perhaps to underscore his claim that Angola was Kaunda’s top priority. In fact, after the thirty minutes or so spent on Angola, Kaunda pronounced: “Now I should like to talk about Rhodesia.” He explained that the OAU policy was to follow the principles from his 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, seeking racial equality and majority rule through peaceful negotiations first, and then if that

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Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa

approach failed, through armed struggle. He recounted Zambia’s diplomatic successes in talking with Vorster and with the Zimbabwean nationalists. Kaunda believed that South Africa would soon pull its paramilitary forces out of Rhodesia and that doing so would demonstrate to Smith that it was time to negotiate seriously for a settlement, but “much depends on what outside pressure can be brought to bear.” The Zambian president then urged Ford and Kissinger to play a role in Rhodesia.89 Kaunda then addressed Namibia, praising the United States for its positions at the United Nations in support of Namibian independence but adding that “we want you to do something practical.” He hoped the United States could influence Vorster or else he would “do too little too late” and attempt to replicate the South African Bantustans in Namibia. Ford inquired what Bantustans were and also asked how many tribes were in Namibia. Kaunda explained that Bantustans were areas where blacks were isolated from whites, and that there were enough tribes for Vorster to create multiple Bantustans. The Zambian leader asked Ford to “pressurize” Pretoria to prevent this. Regarding South Africa itself, Kaunda explained that the OAU’s position clearly demanded that the three million whites in that country behave like other Africans. If South African whites insisted on being treated differently from other Africans, then, Kaunda dramatically exclaimed, “we must throw them into the sea.” He hinted that the OAU could become more aggressive in the coming year, because General Idi Amin of Uganda would be taking over as chairman. 90 At the mention of the brutal Ugandan dictator, the secretary of state jumped back into the conversation and attempted another joke. “If he had kept his Foreign Minister I would have negotiated with him,” stated Kissinger. Amin’s foreign minister, Princess Elizabeth Bagaya, had recently fled the country into exile. Bagaya was an attorney educated at Cambridge University and also an international fashion model. She had accused Amin of sexual harassment, which given his usual behavior was quite likely, and resigned. Amin countered on national television with the claim that he had fired Bagaya for having sex with a white man in a bathroom at the Paris airport. The incident again revealed Amin’s madness and was certainly not a laughing matter. Kaunda ignored Kissinger’s sophomoric remark and continued discussing South Africa.91 “The whites in South Africa are Africans,” reiterated the Zambian president, and they must “accept the challenge of being Africans.” If they continued not to, the result would be a terrible civil war. Perhaps attempting to compensate for his Uganda joke and show some expertise Kissinger commented on the toughness of the “Boers” in their legendary turn-of-the-century fight against the British and the importance of avoiding such a confrontation. Kaunda needed no history lesson and responded that a modern conflict involving South Africa could engulf the region, because Pretoria had “the ability to strike all of Africa.” The Zambian leader concluded his presentation on the challenges of southern Africa by telling Ford that “we look for leadership.”92 President Ford thanked Kaunda for the “survey” of regional issues, which he considered “extremely helpful.” He hoped his administration could be “constructive,” for example by eliminating the Byrd Amendment. He promised “personal attention” in the attempt to get Congress to rescind it.93 Kaunda then asked his foreign minister if he had left out anything, and Mwaanga mentioned the ongoing diplomatic efforts to create a constitutional settlement for Rhodesia. “It would be helpful if the U.S. said

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something about these negotiations,” he added. Mwaanga mentioned a UN resolution requiring South African action on Namibia and asked what could be done if Pretoria did not do anything. Kissinger responded that the United States was “making some representations” to South Africa but that he could “give better attention” in June.94 The Zambian president invited his US counterpart to visit Africa. Ford replied that he had not yet been there, and hinted at such a trip after getting re-elected. Mwaanga added that his government wished Kissinger could “take up the long-standing invitation to visit Zambia.” The secretary of state intended to “come to Africa within the next year,” and if he made such a trip he would “come to Zambia.”95 Ford did not get re-elected, and unfortunately, although he lived into his nineties, he never set foot anywhere in Africa. Kissinger, on the other hand, kept his word. He would journey to Lusaka to give a startling address on US policy toward southern Africa almost exactly one year later. But first, that very evening, Kaunda delivered an even more shocking speech on the same topic at the White House.96

Kaunda’s White House bombshell From the Oval Office, Kaunda returned to Blair House for a talk with World Bank president Robert McNamara. After that discussion, the Zambian president and his wife Betty prepared for a formal black tie dinner at the White House, which would begin around 8:30 p.m. President Ford and his wife Betty escorted them down the Grand Staircase into the East Room to the receiving line and then into the State Dining Room. Contrasted with either the brief and disappointing encounter between Kaunda and Lyndon Johnson in 1964 or the 1970 snub of Kaunda by Nixon, the Ford administration certainly did show the Zambian leader tremendous respect. The presidents sat together, and evidently during dinner they discussed Angola again. In a “very forceful” tone, Kaunda emphasized the importance of getting Savimbi in a position to win the election, and pledged to work with Mobutu to do so.97 After dinner Ford stood and warmly praised Kaunda for guiding Zambia to independence and saluted him for his “wisdom in a controversial and difficult world.” He asserted that the United States admired the Zambian president for his diplomatic efforts to end conflicts. He stated that his administration welcomed the independence of the former Portuguese territories and would assist the development of such emerging nations. He added that the United States would attempt to help Kaunda resolve the remaining regional problems. Ford mentioned their “wide-ranging” discussions that afternoon, which “covered matters of common interest.” Noting their mutual love of golf, Ford invited Kaunda for “a little competition on the links” in order to cement their friendship. He concluded by proposing a toast to “the continuing excellent relations” between the two nations.98 Kaunda then rose and launched into a lengthy reply, pulling no punches. After thanking Ford for his hospitality and lauding the “frankness” of their discussions, he got down to business. The Zambian government worried greatly about the United States’ “lack” of a policy toward southern Africa. While such a posture could mean passivity or neutrality, it could also be “a deliberate act of policy to support the status

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quo,” which translated into support for racial oppression. Kaunda had hoped that the United States would cooperate in fostering peace and justice in his region of the world but now instead felt “dismay” because the United States had “not fulfilled our expectations.” Africa needed a commitment to action from Washington but had not gotten it of late. Such a failure to intervene by the United States provided “psychological comfort to the forces of evil.”99 Kaunda underscored his “dismay” with the current lack of US action or policy toward southern Africa by recalling the late 1950s and early 1960s, when he believed the United States had done better. He singled out the Kennedy administration, and specifically Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, who “could be slapped in the face by a white reactionary on our soil and yet, undaunted still smile, still stand by US principles of freedom, justice, and national independence based on majority rule.” In Kaunda’s view Williams’ staunch advocacy for racial equality in southern Africa in the early 1960s, even after being assaulted in Lusaka by a Rhodesian white supremacist, demonstrated the high ideals and level of commitment US officials were capable of. “What happened to that America?” wondered Kaunda. “Have the principles changed?”100 In any case, continued Kaunda, the “aspirations of the oppressed” had not changed. The people of southern Africa desperately wanted freedom and would fight if they must. Victories over the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique provided inspiration for the guerrilla soldiers elsewhere. Still, peaceful solutions were possible but only with outside assistance. “America must heed the call of the oppressed,” he exclaimed. “Urgent action is required,” and the best approach would be to pay attention to the root causes of conflict, which he identified as colonialism and institutionalized racism. “If we want peace we must end the era of inertia in Rhodesia and Namibia and vigorously work for ending apartheid,” he exclaimed.101 Having triumphed over the forces of fascism in the Mozambique and Angola, the liberation struggle targeted the final examples of white minority rule. “Can American stand and be counted?” asked Kaunda. In order to overturn the rebel regime in Rhodesia and remove South African control of Namibia, the Zambian government and its allies needed help from Washington. At the very least, the United States should “desist from direct and indirect support to the minority regimes.” Such a stance would increase the leverage for leaders such as Kaunda who sought negotiated settlements, which remained their preference. “We have recently demonstrated our readiness to make peaceful change possible in Mozambique and Angola,” Kaunda reminded Ford and the others in attendance, and he hoped to do the same in the remaining cases. “We are not fighting whites,” he concluded: “We are fighting an evil and brutal system.” Kaunda ended his bombshell speech by again thanking Ford for his hospitality and inviting him to visit Zambia. He capped off the evening’s performance by playing his guitar and singing “Tiyendo Pamodzi,” which translates into English as “let us go forward together.”102 Even as he sang the soothing Zambian song, the explosive words of Kaunda’s speech reverberated throughout the room and sparked emotional responses from some of the guests. Kissinger’s wife Nancy was “horrified.” Visibly angry and “almost hysterical,” she turned to Foreign Minister Mwaanga and demanded to know why the

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Zambian president had “deliberately chosen to poison what was otherwise a cordial and friendly atmosphere.”103 The “extremely displeased” secretary of state spoke with Ambassador Wilkowski immediately following the speech and demanded that she be in his office early the next morning (a Sunday). During their meeting, the “furious” Kissinger essentially accused Wilkowski of “helping the Zambians draft Kaunda’s offending speech.” She could not believe his tone, which made her feel like a traitor, and suspected that Kissinger “suffered from paranoia.”104 Clearly, Kaunda had struck a nerve with the secretary of state and his wife. President Ford, on the other hand, evidently did not take the criticism of US policy personally. As Kaunda departed from the White House later that night, Ford thanked him for the “advice which you have given us.” He hoped his administration could “work out policies which will bring about a greater understanding of human problems in your part of the world.”105 Kaunda appreciated these final words from Ford, who impressed him as being a “gentleman” and “almost Democratic” in his thinking.106 The Zambian president did not regret his remarks, because all he had done was tell “the truth.” He deliberately chose to voice his concerns in the White House, because it was “the only place where he could have succeeded in drawing the attention of the American public to the southern African problem.”107 He hoped to convince the people of the United States to support a new African policy from the Ford administration. His quest received a boost from the New York Times, which published most of his speech and praised it in an editorial. “If the Zambian leader has even nudged the Administration into an overdue review of policy at a time of profound change in southern Africa,” pronounced the editors, “his visit will have been worthwhile.”108

Final day and departure On the morning of Sunday, April 20, Kaunda talked with Senator Edward Kennedy at Blair House, and then visited Arlington Cemetery and laid wreaths on the graves of his brothers John and Robert. Just as he had done at John’s grave in 1964, he led his delegation in the quiet singing of “Rock of Ages.” A tourist nearby wondered if this was the African leader who had recently fired his female foreign minister and was killing so many of his own people, obviously confusing Kaunda with Idi Amin. She was quickly corrected by a reporter. Her daughter then inquired: “Is this the good one, Mommy?” The lady replied “Yes, this is the good one.”109 Kaunda’s effort to educate the US people about southern Africa and attract their sympathy was already working. After paying his respects to the Kennedy brothers, Kaunda returned to Blair House for a friendly conversation with Harry Belafonte. He then held a press conference, during which he praised President Ford as an “honest and sincere man.” In the afternoon he met with African ambassadors and then with members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Ambassador Mwale hosted a reception for Kaunda that evening at the Washington Hilton, which Secretary Kissinger attended.110 As the Zambian Airlines presidential jet prepared to take off from Andrews Air Force Base the next morning, Kaunda’s itinerary ruffled a final few feathers. When the pilot filed his plan to fly directly to Cuba, the controller objected: “You have got to be kidding!”

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The Zambian delegation was not kidding, and off they flew to Havana where they were welcomed warmly by Fidel Castro himself.111 Zambia and Cuba had established official relations in 1972, and during a trip to the island nation that year, Mwaanga had been very impressed by Cuba’s educational system and health care. He had “developed a great liking for Castro,” and beginning with this 1975 visit, Kaunda would do the same.112 Scheduling the flight directly from Washington, moreover, sent a message regarding Zambia’s non-alignment.

Kaunda’s summitry assessed What did the Zambian president’s April 1975 summitry in Washington accomplish? According to Ambassador Wilkowski, Kaunda “made his point that Zambia was proud and independent and nobody’s patsy.”113 With his shocking speech, honoring of the Kennedy legacy, connection with the Congressional Black Caucus and other critics of the Ford administration, and direct departure to Cuba, he certainly got Washington’s attention at the highest levels. But what was the concrete impact on US-Zambia relations or on US policy toward Africa more generally? As noted above, Kissinger would later claim that Kaunda was able to “change American national policy.” In Kissinger’s version, however, the only specific policy change worth mentioning was the Ford administration’s resulting decision to oppose the Soviet intervention in Angola.114 While the United States definitely did decide to escalate its support for the FNLA and UNITA in the summer of 1975, and Kaunda’s views surely did contribute to this decision, there were many other factors influencing US policy toward Angola. Concerns about oil in Cabinda, pleas from long-time ally Mobutu, the fall of Saigon, and the heavy Soviet weapons wreaking havoc around Luanda all influenced White House thinking. Giving Kaunda, a relatively respectable black African leader, so much credit for US intervention in Angola was perhaps a clever attempt by Kissinger to dodge some of the blame for a controversial initiative. What about other results from Kaunda’s diplomacy, aside from contributing to the US intervention in Angola? How much of the Zambian embassy’s specific “wish-list” was attained in the immediate aftermath of the summit? In concrete terms, the answer was not much. The Byrd Amendment was not repealed in 1975 nor did US diplomats establish close contact with the Zimbabwean nationalists. Pressuring Pretoria to surrender control of Namibia and imposing sanctions against apartheid would not occur for several more years. Most unfortunately for the people of Zambia, Kaunda’s talks with Ford and Kissinger brought no solutions for the unfolding economic catastrophe which would devastate their nation for decades to come. Ambassador Mwale’s hopes for US help with low copper prices and high oil prices, or US assistance for the development of Zambia’s commercial agriculture, were not fulfilled. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to dismiss the April trip as insignificant. Widespread media coverage, in the New York Times, Africa Report, and a particularly insightful column in the Ottawa Journal, suggested presciently that Kaunda’s visit could be a “turning point” for relations between the United States and southern Africa

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as a whole.115 Kaunda laid out the key regional issues clearly: peace and majority rule for Rhodesia, independence for Namibia, and an end to apartheid in South Africa. These challenging goals would all become central planks of US policy, beginning with Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in 1976. In April 1975 Kaunda succeeded in drawing the Ford administration’s attention to southern Africa in the short run and helped to foster an incredible transformation in US-Africa relations in the long run.

2

Lessons Learned from Angola, 1975–1976

For almost exactly one year following President Kenneth Kaunda’s April 1975 visit to the White House, the most significant issue in relations between the United States and Zambia was the complicated situation in Angola. During discussions with President Gerald Ford, Kaunda had requested some US support for Jonas Savimbi, in hopes that he could become a compromise candidate in a coalition government in Luanda. The government would include all three major Angolan groups: Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Agostinho Neto’s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, partly as a response to Kaunda’s request, initiated a covert CIA operation in July. Most of the money and weapons were sent to Roberto’s FNLA forces through Zaire, but some support was delivered to Savimbi through Zambia, in coordination with Kaunda. In October the South African army invaded Angola, giving the anti-MPLA forces a major short-term boost. This development proved detrimental in the long run, however, as Cuba responded with an expeditionary force of its elite special forces and turned the tide. As the military situation deteriorated in late November, Kissinger finally attempted a diplomatic offensive, which Zambian officials had been hoping for since the previous spring. Kissinger tried to convince the Soviets to stop supporting Neto’s MPLA and simultaneously to get the Chinese to renew their assistance to Roberto’s FNLA. He failed on both fronts. In mid-December things went from bad to worse for the “Doctor of Diplomacy,” when the US Congress refused the Ford administration’s request for additional funds for Angola, and the sordid details of the CIA operation were splashed across the front page of the New York Times. Kaunda suffered similar setbacks in his quest to forge a unity government in Luanda, both internationally and domestically. In January his emotional plea at a special summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was rejected, and students and faculty at the University of Zambia publicly protested his Angola policy. With economic challenges increasing and escalation of war in neighboring Rhodesia looming, he finally pulled the plug on Savimbi in February. After negotiations with the MPLA foreign minister in March, Kaunda granted formal recognition to Neto’s government on April 15, 1976. Kaunda and Kissinger’s efforts in 1975–76 to prevent the MPLA from taking control in Luanda had failed completely, but lessons had

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been learned; therefore, rather than cease cooperating, they decided that the United States and Zambia should work even more closely and carefully to foster a diplomatic solution in Rhodesia.

Spring 1975 Following a dramatic departure from Washington, Kenneth Kaunda arrived in Cuba on April 21, 1975, and had friendly talks with Fidel Castro. Leaving Havana, the Zambian president made short stops in the Bahamas and Haiti, and then spent a bit more time in Guyana where he met with Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. From Guyana the Zambian delegation flew to Barbados, and after a brief sojourn, continued on to Jamaica for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Kingston.1 Kaunda led the debate over Rhodesia, which was “quite a prominent issue” at the conference. He and his advisors helped convince the group to allow Abel Muzorewa to deliver a speech, which resulted in “an air of appreciation and understanding of the Rhodesian problems.” The representatives from the thirty-three Commonwealth nations voted affirmatively on several tactics: pressuring South Africa to remove its paramilitary personnel from Rhodesia, advocating for stricter international compliance with sanctions against Smith’s regime, and providing financial support to Mozambique if it closed its borders with Rhodesia.2 Around the time of Kaunda’s visit in April, Kissinger had asked his new assistant secretary for African affairs, Nathaniel Davis, for an assessment of Angolan guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi. On May 1, Davis submitted a report praising Savimbi’s personality but advising against a covert operation supporting his party, the UNITA. If the United States clandestinely supported Savimbi’s UNITA, it could find itself “drawn in deeper very fast,” and ultimately the political price would “exceed the possibility of accomplishment.” Another memo from the African Bureau on May 6 warned Kissinger that fighting in Angola would probably intensify. As the November 11 independence date approached, cooperation among UNITA and the other two major groups, Agostinho Neto’s MPLA and Holden Roberto’s FNLA, was unlikely.3 Assistant Secretary Davis simply did not think the Ford administration should intervene in the Angolan civil war. On 7 May he suggested that the United States stay out of the escalating struggle and instead wait to provide aid for the Angolan government after independence in November. A few weeks later, he reiterated the African Bureau’s concern: “We do not believe that US interests in Angola are strong enough to warrant a high level of US involvement or a significant commitment of US resources, particularly in providing arms.”4 The secretary of state was not willing in late May to accept Davis’ advice, which was to let events in Angola unfold without US involvement. Instead, he created a National Security Council (NSC) task force on Angola, put Davis in charge, and requested another report. He also asked the CIA for a specific proposal regarding assistance to Savimbi’s UNITA. On May 29, Kissinger discussed Angola with Huang Chen, China’s top diplomat in Washington. Huang chastized the Ford administration for allowing the Soviets to exercise major influence in Angola by building up Neto’s MPLA.5

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Criticism from the Chinese about the United States’ failure to contain the Soviets in Africa evidently influenced Kissinger’s thinking more than the initial warnings from Davis and the African Bureau. In any case, on June 13 Davis submitted the NSC task force report, which contained three options for US policy: (1) remain neutral and establish relations with the post-independence leadership in Luanda; (2) promote a peaceful solution through diplomacy; (3) intervene in the civil war by providing weapons to UNITA and/or the FNLA. The task force was somewhat divided but favored diplomatic efforts to end the civil war and foster a unity government. Choosing this option would have put the Ford administration squarely in line with the Zambian government’s overall strategy, which was to achieve peace and unity in Angola. Kissinger, however, was not so sure. While reviewing the document on June 19, he judged the recommended option of diplomacy as too weak. The secretary doubted that the United States had sufficient leverage with the Soviets to make an impact through diplomacy alone. He asked Davis to revise the report and specifically to clarify how the last two options—diplomacy or covert intervention—could be carried out.6 Kissinger believed that the key to either policy would be coordination with President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, an old friend of the United States who had a long border with Angola. Mobutu was becoming increasingly upset with the Ford administration and had made this very clear by expelling the US ambassador in early June. Afraid of alienating an ally at a crucial juncture, Kissinger sent Sheldon Vance (a former US ambassador in Kinshasa) to talk with the Zairean leader. On June 23, Mobutu informed Vance in no uncertain terms that Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola was a major threat to the security of the entire region. He suggested US assistance to the FNLA and UNITA and offered to coordinate the effort through Zaire.7 Kissinger would find this plan of action more appealing than the “weak” diplomacy preferred by Davis’ task force. Vance returned to Washington on June 27 and briefed the secretary on Mobutu’s views that support for the FNLA and UNITA was imperative. Kissinger asked Vance if the United States should “try to involve Kaunda,” and they agreed to notify the Zambian president in general terms of what they were doing.8 That afternoon, the NSC discussed Angola. The secretary of state informed the group that the critical issue was who controlled the capital, Luanda. In the opinion of Mobutu, heavy-duty Soviet equipment such as armored personnel carrier was shifting the balance of power in favor of Neto’s MPLA. Kissinger’s underlings at State favored a diplomatic effort to convince the Soviets to reduce the flow of weapons and facilitate a unity government, but he considered such an approach to be a “sign of weakness” which would essentially amount to doing nothing. Kissinger preferred a covert operation supporting the FNLA and UNITA, funneled primarily through Zaire. President Ford interjected that “doing nothing is unacceptable” and that the idea of relying on diplomacy was “naïve” and “amateurish.” Kissinger definitely favored cooperating with Mobutu and keeping Kaunda in the loop. For Ford, whose contact with African leaders had been miniscule, the talks with the Zambian president the previous month loomed large. Ford recalled that during their dinner conversation, Kaunda was “very forceful” in advising him to support

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Savimbi. The United States should help “get his man in first,” and then elections could be held.9 Ford and Kissinger interpreted Kaunda’s goal as empowering Savimbi at all cost. What Kaunda and his advisors actually wanted, it seems, was to bolster Savimbi as a compromise candidate who could possibly hold together a unity government and bring peace to Angola.10 Kaunda did object to the Soviets’ intervention, and he did want some type of US assistance to Savimbi; but, the difference between what his primary intentions evidently were and the Ford-Kissinger interpretation was quite significant. During the June 27th NSC meeting, of course, it was the FordKissinger interpretation that mattered. They contended that Kaunda considered Savimbi as “his man,” that Kaunda wanted Savimbi in control of Angola, and that Kaunda wanted US aid to facilitate this. The president concluded the discussion by requesting specific proposals for supporting UNITA and the FNLA, which would be considered in July.

Personnel shakeup and economic reform While the Ford administration debated a policy on Angola in May and June, Kaunda wrapped up his overseas tour, shook up his cabinet, and announced plans for major economic reforms. After participating in the Commonwealth conference in Jamaica, he stopped in Lisbon on May 7 for talks with the new Portuguese government. Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves may have been a relatively radical leftist on domestic issues, but regarding Angola he shared Kaunda’s desire for a coalition government of all three major groups. His foreign minister, Ernesto Melo Antunes, visited Luanda in mid-May in hopes of resuscitating the Alvor Accords. The central issue was trying to forge a national army consisting of equal numbers from the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA, but unfortunately this proved impossible. Fighting continued as each group jockeyed for control of Luanda.11 With no end in sight to the daunting challenges regarding Angola and Rhodesia, the Zambian president in late May implemented alterations at the highest level of his government. At a May 27 press conference he promoted Rupiah Banda, Zambia’s UN ambassador, to foreign minister. Kaunda also replaced Prime Minister Mainza Chona with Elijah Mudenda. Vernon Mwaanga, who apparently had been discussing classified matters with his cabinet colleagues too openly for Kaunda’s taste, was shifted from the foreign ministry to the Central Committee. In his last trip as foreign minister, Mwaanga participated in UN debates over Namibia. While in New York he also prepared a lengthy transition memo for Banda, his successor and old friend.12 The changes would not alter the substance of Zambian foreign relations, which were still orchestrated primarily by Kaunda and his key advisor, Mark Chona. Throughout June 1975, Kaunda grappled with a much more pressing problem than personnel, and that was the increasingly dire economic circumstances. Plummeting prices and decreasing demand for copper coupled with high fuel costs pummeled Zambia. Workers faced rising inflation and living expenses. Responding to the report submitted by a commission chaired by former Finance Minister John Mwanakatwe, Kaunda approved salary increases for civil servants. In an effort to redress the drastic

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income disparities among government employees, workers at the bottom of the pay scale received major raises of about 36 percent, while those at the top end only received about 6 percent raises. The policy may well have reflected good intentions but nonetheless fueled greater inflation and effectively increased the overall disparity between urban and rural incomes.13 At the annual United National Independence Party (UNIP) conference on June 30, the Zambian president delivered his “watershed speech” on the economy. “Society is sick,” he proclaimed. He denounced government elites for their lavish lifestyles, calling on them to live frugally and sacrifice on behalf of the masses. He announced that private land ownership would be replaced by 100-year leases and that any unused land would be taken over by the state. The Times of Zambia newspaper and all cinemas would become government-owned.14 This brought the number of state-owned companies in Zambia to about seventy. Evidently, Kaunda hoped this push toward a more socialist system would benefit his people, but whether it did so is not clear. What the policy definitely did was to augment the political power of the UNIP leaders, who enjoyed sixteen more years of one-party rule.15 Kaunda claimed that he wanted to help the common people of Zambia and to reign in the upper class, but his policies arguably only exacerbated the situation.

Action on Angola On July 9, intense fighting engulfed Angola, and the MPLA quickly took complete control of Luanda. Kissinger’s 40 Committee requested the CIA to submit a plan for action, and on July 17 the secretary of state approved Operation IA Feature. On July 18, President Ford gave the go ahead for the CIA to spend $14 million, primarily to provide support to the FNLA through Zaire, and he would authorize an additional $18 million over the next few months. Sheldon Vance promptly delivered the first $1 million installment to Mobutu, boosting his spirits. Zairean troops then spearheaded an FNLA invasion of northern Angola, allowing Holden Roberto to return to his country for the first time in over a decade. Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Davis, who had opposed intervention from the beginning, soon resigned in protest.16 On July 29 the first C-141 cargo plane carrying weapons departed from the United States for Kinshasa.17 Significant concrete US involvement in the Angolan civil war had begun. That same day, Ford arrived in Helsinki for a major international conference, which also featured Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev. During the three days of meetings in Finland, no mention was made of Angola. According to Kissinger, this was because IA Feature had just been approved and the United States “wanted to restore the balance before turning to diplomacy.”18 Rather than ask the USSR to stop pouring fuel onto the Angolan fire before it blazed out of control, which is a key part of what the Zambians were hoping the United States would do, the Ford administration opted to postpone any diplomatic attempts until they had added significant amounts of their own incendiaries to the inferno. At the end of July the MPLA blocked the advance of Roberto’s FNLA and his Zairean allies before they had reached Luanda, and in early August they received a

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small morale boost from a new outside source who quickly became a key player in the drama, Cuba. The MPLA had first requested aid from Fidel Castro in July 1974 and again in October. The Cuban government responded with encouraging words but then did nothing. In late December the Angola staffer on Castro’s Central Committee, Carlos Cadelo, met with Neto in Dar es Salaam. Cadelo flew to Lusaka and in early January 1975 crossed from western Zambia into Angola to examine the situation on the ground. He returned to Tanzania for another meeting with Neto, who provided him with a very detailed wish-list for long-term Cuban assistance to the MPLA. The one critical short-term request was for $100,000 to ship weapons from Tanzania to Angola. Calelo reported to Castro, but again nothing happened. In June at Mozambique’s independence celebration, Neto reiterated his plea for funds to Cadelo. Finally in late July 1975, over a year after the original request, the Cuban government sent its first concrete contribution to the MPLA. On August 3, Cadelo sat down with Neto in a hotel room in Luanda for a lengthy conversation. He brought with him Castro’s promise of support, and $100,000 in cash.19 Within the next few days, a US official spoke with Kaunda regarding the recently approved Operation IA Feature. John Stockwell, the head of the CIA’s Angola task force, noted that the Zambian president was briefed sometime between August 3 and 9 and that Kaunda’s “cooperation” was “assured.”20 Stockwell’s account tells us nothing more specific regarding who met with Kaunda, how detailed the conversation was, or exactly what Kaunda agreed to contribute to the undertaking. According to Kissinger’s interpretation, the Zambian leader’s response to the briefing was “very positive.” Kaunda “agreed to cooperate in support of Savimbi through Zambia,” and he asked Mark Chona to serve as an “intelligence liaison” to assist the CIA in gathering information regarding Angola.21 The US ambassador in Lusaka, Jean Wilkowski, may have been in attendance when the CIA first briefed the Zambian president on IA Feature.22 Her exact part in facilitating Kaunda’s cooperation in the US support for Savimbi is unclear. Regardless of Wilkowski’s role, the Ford administration definitely supported UNITA beginning in August 1975. Moreover, this support was engineered out of the US embassy in Lusaka. Over the next few months the United States sent teams into Angola to gather intelligence and coordinated these undertakings with Kaunda. Furthermore, the CIA officer in Lusaka conducted a propaganda campaign against the MPLA, planting fabricated stories in the media about the presence of Soviet advisors in Angola and rapes committed by Cuban soldiers.23 While the CIA did not actually have evidence of a single atrocity committed by Cubans, the existence of Castro’s expeditionary force would soon become clear and extremely significant. Lusaka became an important diplomatic post for Havana, just as it was for Washington, after Castro opted in early August to ramp up his nation’s involvement in Angola. He decided to send 480 military advisors to Luanda to train MPLA recruits. When Castro’s emissary informed Neto on August 21 of the plan, the MPLA leader was “moved” and gratefully accepted the offer. In order to help coordinate this intervention and organize a possible escape route for Cuban personnel into Zambia if necessary, Castro also decided to establish an embassy in Lusaka. He chose Major Eduardo Morejon, who had recently served in South Yemen, to be Cuba’s

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first ambassador to Zambia. Morejon and three associates departed from Havana in late August to open the Lusaka facility.24

Senator Clark tours southern Africa On August 23, 1975, Senator Dick Clark (D-IA) arrived in Zambia, planning to discuss Angola with Kaunda. As chair of the Africa subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Clark believed it was his duty to tour southern Africa and see for himself what the results of US policy were. He had been appointed to head the subcommittee at the beginning of the year by default, because he had the least seniority and no one else wanted the job. He admitted that he “knew nothing about Africa” when he took over.25 By the time the senator arrived in Lusaka, he had already met with Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and with Mozambique’s recently inaugurated president, Samora Machel. Clark was definitely learning a lot. He commented to the Zambian press that past US policy, such as supporting Portugal in its colonial wars, had been wrong. He considered himself “very encouraged” about Kissinger’s attitude toward the continent.26 This would soon change, as he discovered more details about Angola. Just prior to departing from Washington for this trip, Senator Clark had been briefed on Angola by William Colby, the director of the CIA. Colby’s description had been intentionally vague, leaving the impression that no US personnel or weapons were involved. In order to verify what was actually happening, Clark hoped to talk directly with the key players: Mobutu, Neto, Roberto, Savimbi, and Kaunda.27 In Lusaka, the senator’s attempt to meet privately with Kaunda was foiled by Ambassador Wilkowski, who insisted on being present for the August 24 discussion. In her memoirs, Wilkowski portrayed the incident as a case of her standing up for the rights and responsibilities of an ambassador. She had a point in some respects, as Kaunda was scheduled to meet with President Vorster of South Africa the following day and so it was a crucial time for her to meet with the Zambian president. She oversimplified the situation, however, dismissing Clark as just a “senator from Iowa” and failing to mention that he was chair of the Africa subcommittee.28 If we accept her version at face value, that she insisted on being present during Clark’s session with Kaunda because of diplomatic protocol, the fact remains that she could have been more respectful of what the senator was trying to accomplish in his role on the Foreign Relations Committee. On the other hand, there is a chance that Wilkowski knew all about Colby’s misleading briefing of Clark and that she had been instructed by the CIA to interfere with the senator’s attempt to speak with Kaunda alone. The agency definitely did ask its officers in Kinshasa to control what Roberto and Mobutu revealed to Clark when he visited Zaire.29 Nevertheless, Clark kept digging, even visiting war-torn Angola itself. During his stop in Luanda, he received a very candid report from the CIA station chief there, Robert Hultslander, who told him that US support for Roberto and Savimbi would prove to be “disastrous.”30 In spite of the agency’s efforts (and possibly Wilkowski’s efforts) to censor what Clark learned about the US covert operation in Angola, he returned to Washington convinced that the CIA intervention needed to be closely monitored, at the least.

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Victoria Falls conference Senator Clark was not interested only in the Angolan issue, and before leaving Zambia he detoured to Livingstone to observe the dramatic August 25 conference on Rhodesia at Victoria Falls. Clark joined the throng of reporters, one of whom characterized him as “a spirited and determined academic type.”31 As a result of his dogged determination to get the facts, Clark witnessed the first ever meeting between Kaunda and Vorster, the historic high-water mark of the entire southern African détente process that had begun a year before. The Zambian president and his South African counterpart arranged negotiations between Ian Smith and the nationalists led by Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Joshua Nkomo, aboard the “Peace Train” perched on the bridge between Rhodesia and Zambia overlooking Victoria Falls. “The interests of Africa today focused on the vital talks that began in Livingstone,” proclaimed the editors of Zambia’s Daily Mail.32 Kaunda and Vorster opened the conference in the luxury railcar with short statements, wishing the opposing negotiators well, and then rode off in the Zambian president’s Mercedes for lunch in Livingstone. There was much joking between the two, including Vorster telling his favorite story about Idi Amin. According to Vorster’s joke, Amin had only reconsidered his plan to change the name of Uganda to Idi when he learned that people living in Cyprus were called Cypriots.33 Kaunda and Vorster spent most of the very long day together. Both sides described the conversations as friendly, useful, and respectful. The leaders agreed that Rhodesia was the top regional priority and then Namibia. They also agreed that it was important to avoid escalation of armed conflict, as “one Angola is enough.” Wilkowski, who had been briefed by Mark Chona, emphasized these positive aspects in her report to the State Department.34 While the Victoria Falls conference certainly represented a symbolic success for Vorster and Kaunda, the talks on the train between Ian Smith’s small party and the large delegation of black nationalists led by Abel Muzorewa made no progress whatsoever. Among the major issues separating the two sides were Smith’s insistence on a complete cease-fire on the one hand and Muzorewa’s demands for immediate majority rule and for all nationalist leaders to be guaranteed immunity from arrest if they returned to Rhodesia on the other. Muzorewa attributed the failure of the talks to significant differences of opinion on these types of substantive issues.35 Smith agreed that there was a wide separation of positions but also partly blamed the fizzling of the afternoon talks on alleged heavy drinking by members of the nationalist delegation.36 Not surprisingly, the Zambian Daily Mail praised Kaunda for a “job well done” and hailed the Victoria Falls conference as “the beginning of the long trek towards majority rule.” The editors were not surprised at the breakdown, as they realized that Smith “had to be difficult” and could not easily “hand power to blacks.” Still, the session was a step forward and it would not be long before the “people of Zimbabwe will be enjoying peace.”37 This optimistic editorial, unfortunately, was dead wrong. There was mounting dissension within the ranks of the participating nationalists, as Joshua Nkomo was having major doubts about Muzorewa’s tactics. The unity accord, brokered the previous December in Lusaka, was rapidly coming unglued. Furthermore, Robert Mugabe was not even present at the bridge conference but was instead in Mozambique

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consolidating his leadership of the ZANU forces who were preparing to escalate the armed struggle against Smith’s regime. Without Mugabe at the table, no final settlement was likely anyway.38

More complications Kissinger viewed the failure of the Victoria Falls conference from his typical Cold War perspective, concluding that the “stalemate” in Rhodesia raised the danger of intervention by outside forces, most importantly the Cubans. Therefore, he decided to develop a policy which could gain support from black southern African leaders and also keep the communist powers from expanding their influence in the region. While attending a session of the UN in New York, Kissinger talked with Zambian foreign minister Rupiah Banda on September 5. Neither mentioned Angola, instead focusing on Rhodesia. Banda suggested that the Ford administration convince Vorster to put more pressure on Ian Smith. For the first time, the secretary of state grasped the fact that in spite of their hatred of apartheid, black African leaders such as Kaunda were willing to work with the South African government to settle other regional issues. This clearly appealed to his realist sentiments, and he accepted Banda’s invitation to visit Lusaka in the spring.39 Rhodesia and Angola remained the two primary regional issues for Kaunda, and during the month of September both conflicts intensified and became more complicated. On September 7, with Muzorewa in the Netherlands seeking funds for the supposedly united African National Congress (ANC) (of Rhodesia), Nkomo held a meeting in Salisbury and scheduled an ANC Congress for September 27. He claimed that he was following the Lusaka agreement from December 1974, which had appointed Muzorewa as only an interim leader and required a national congress to choose a more longlasting replacement.40 Muzorewa quickly returned from Europe, and on September 11 he ousted Nkomo from the ANC. Kaunda, who had a longstanding friendship with Nkomo and desperately wanted unity among the liberation movements, was very unhappy. The other Frontline leaders concurred, and when they gathered in Lusaka on September 13 they expressed their displeasure to Muzorewa in no uncertain terms. “Bishop, you are not a pope,” said Nyerere. “You should reconsider your decision to expel Joshua Nkomo.”41 Muzorewa refused, Nkomo went ahead with his congress, and the fragile unity accord of the previous year disintegrated completely. Meanwhile the civil war in Angola, which already had involved several external players, became more convoluted. On September 4, Vorster authorized the powerful South African military to send advisors to assist UNITA and the FNLA. Special Forces under the command of Jan Breytenbach immediately departed for the war zone, where they began training and equipping ragtag FNLA soldiers. Two weeks later, General Hendrik Van den Bergh and General Constand Viljoen met with Savimbi in Kinshasa and were “dazzled by his personality.”42 Cooperation between South Africa and UNITA would soon become quite extensive. At about the time Savimbi gained powerful new patrons from Pretoria, he received an ultimatum from Kaunda on September 10. If Savimbi failed to get the

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Benguela railroad running again within sixty days, the Zambian president could no longer guarantee his nation’s support for UNITA. Partly this reflected the realities of international diplomacy, in that it would be difficult to continue advocating for a group that lacked any concrete power. Furthermore, it reflected the escalating economic hardship Kaunda faced. With the railroad closed, most of Zambia’s copper exports were on hold, which had necessitated his declaring force majeure, a legal maneuver allowing someone to get out of a contract due to circumstances beyond his control.43 Since the previous fall Kaunda had viewed Savimbi as a potential compromise leader of a coalition government, which was the only way to bring peace to Angola. He also probably preferred Savimbi’s pragmatism over Neto’s doctrinaire socialism when weighing economic factors such as the railroad. However, if Savimbi could not produce some concrete results and earn a legitimate role in a unity government, then there was only so much time the Zambian leader could give him. The clock was ticking for Savimbi, and that fact made the CIA nervous. Because Kaunda had other pressing priorities, such as exporting copper, he might pull the plug on UNITA, and for US intelligence operatives this meant he was a “potential problem.” Regarding Kaunda’s role in the covert US operation, Stockwell and his colleagues wrestled with the dilemma of how to “get him so involved he could never defect.” According to CIA reasoning, the key was to ship weapons for UNITA through Zambia with Kaunda’s knowledge. Because he had called for an international embargo on any arms shipments to either side in the Angolan civil war, getting him to violate the embargo himself would put him over a barrel. “If one planeload of arms could be introduced through Zambia, with Kaunda’s permission,” Stockwell explained, “he would be irreversibly committed to UNITA’s support.” In CIA lingo, when someone was forced into such a bind, they were referred to as “pregnant.”44 It seems certain that at some point a relatively small amount of US weapons were shipped to Savimbi’s forces through Zambia.45 In spite of this, the CIA did not succeed in “impregnating” Kaunda and thus guaranteeing his permanent backing of UNITA.

Disagreements with Chinese policy Another key external actor in Angola, the Chinese, also presented challenges in the fall of 1975. The PRC first entered the fray late in the summer of 1974 and by mid1975 had some 300 advisors serving with the FNLA in Zaire. Mao Zedong strongly disapproved of Moscow’s heavy-duty backing of the MPLA, and considered it another form of imperialism. But in spite of a shared displeasure with the Soviet intervention, there was no real cooperation between China and the United States.46 Zambia, who had an extremely strong relationship with the PRC in general, did face some diplomatic difficulties with Beijing regarding regional issues. These disagreements were on the agenda of a Zambian delegation led by Grey Zulu, the Secretary General of Kaunda’s UNIP, who toured Asia in September. On September 13, Vice Premier Li Hsien Nien explained to Zulu that the PRC was very pleased with Zambia’s approach to Angola and shared Kaunda’s desire to see the three groups stop fighting and cooperate in a coalition government.47 The Vice

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Premier added, however, that any increased intervention by Western powers would exacerbate the problem. Li warned Zulu that participation by South Africa in the fighting would be the worst case scenario. The Chinese believed that Vorster was using “counter-revolutionary tactics” in order to maintain white rule, and so they still did not believe that negotiating with Vorster was appropriate. Chinese disagreement with Zambia was even more pronounced regarding Rhodesia, where the PRC was backing Mugabe’s ZANU forces and felt that Kaunda favored Nkomo’s ZAPU. Furthermore, Li criticized the Zambian government for not keeping China informed on Rhodesian developments nearly as well as they had done regarding Angola.48 In spite of these diplomatic differences, overall the PRC remained a crucial friend of Zambia and was working diligently to complete the TAZARA railroad. Thirty years later, Grey Zulu still had “good memories” of Chinese assistance.49 The US government hoped to get back on track in improving its overall relations with the Chinese, and in the fall of 1975 was planning a presidential trip to Beijing, but disagreement at the highest level over Angola was a potential stumbling block. During a lengthy dinner conversation in New York on September 28, Kissinger emphatically delineated these differences to Chinese foreign minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua. Angola was at a critical juncture, explained Kissinger, but it seemed that the PRC was doing “nothing.” He admitted that the United States was providing weapons to the FNLA and UNITA and planned to increase this assistance in order to see that these two groups controlled significant amounts of territory when independence occurred in November, so that a unity government could be formed. He feared that the massive Soviet support for the MPLA would result in total destruction of the other two, and thus there would be no possibility of a coalition government. “It is a mathematical certainty that Neto will prevail,” he exclaimed, “unless Roberto and Savimbi are strengthened.”50 Foreign Minister Ch’iao presented the Chinese interpretation of the Angolan situation, which was quite different from Kissinger’s view. He conceded Kissinger’s point that the USSR was to blame for instigating the civil war but contended that “the Soviet Union will eventually fail.” China still hoped that the crisis could be resolved by negotiations among the three liberation movements, facilitated by their African neighbors. The crucial distinction was that the PRC did not see additional intervention by outside forces as necessary and in fact believed such intervention would be counterproductive. Specifically, the Chinese worried that some of their friends intended to “enlist the help of South Africa.” Ch’iao denounced such a strategy as “short sighted.” Kissinger claimed that the Ford administration also opposed Pretoria’s involvement but then reiterated his insistence on helping the FNLA and UNITA with additional weapons.51 The Chinese diplomat was not interested in such a policy, and neither were his superiors in Beijing. By the time of Kissinger’s visit to the PRC in late October, all the Chinese advisors who had been training Roberto’s troops were leaving Zaire.52

Congressional scrutiny In addition to not seeing eye-to-eye with China, Kissinger’s efforts to bolster the FNLA and UNITA soon began to undergo scrutiny in Congress. Senator Dick Clark,

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after returning from his revealing study mission to southern Africa, monitored Angola carefully through the fall. On October 24 he chaired a subcommittee hearing to examine the State Department’s request for a $20 million “supporting assistance loan” to Mobutu. The loan was part of an overall proposed US aid package for Zaire of approximately $80 million, which would be the largest amount the United States had ever provided an African country in one year. Edward Mulcahy, the deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, justified the request on the grounds that Zaire’s economy had been devastated by the copper market crash. At the time of the hearing, copper sold in London for 55 cents per pound, down drastically from a high of $1.50 per pound in April 1974. The resulting $500 million decline in export earnings from 1974 to 1975 dealt Kinshasa’s fortunes a heavy blow, and this loan was proposed as part of an international effort to bail out Zaire. The deputy assistant secretary admitted to Senator Clark that the policy was partly political. “We do have, as you well know Mr. Chairman, a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu,” said Mulcahy.53 That statement seemed strange to Senator Clark, who quickly inquired about some of Mobutu’s recent behavior, such as accusing the US ambassador of being a spy and kicking him out of Kinshasa. Mulcahy countered that it had been a misunderstanding and was no longer an issue. Clark then noted that Mobutu had been one of the first world leaders to condemn Israel, was the very first African leader to publicly criticize the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as assistant secretary, and had accepted aid from North Korea. Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) submitted a series of very tough questions about Mobutu, including allegations of his lavish personal lifestyle, such as frequenting a villa in Switzerland. His financial policies, furthermore, were quite suspect. The legislators basically questioned the wisdom of continuing to provide US aid to a dictator such as Mobutu and also argued quite convincingly that Zaire’s economic problems were not simply a reflection of falling copper prices.54 A few senators asking questions did not alter US policy, however, and US assistance would continue until Mobutu’s overthrow in 1997. During his 32-year “kleptocracy,” he amassed a personal fortune estimated at $4 billion.55 As Deputy Assistant Secretary Mulcahy attempted to rationalize a hefty aid package to Mobutu based on the copper crash, this begged the question of why the United States was not also helping Kaunda. Indeed, in the midst of the hearings Senator Clark inquired: “Why has not the administration proposed a balance-of-payments support package for Zambia similar to the one that has been proposed for Zaire?” Mulcahy explained that although the decline in the copper price was hurting Zambia, its overall economic situation was not as bad as Zaire’s. For example, the amount Zambia had to pay to service its foreign debts each month was a much lower percentage of its budget, and thus Kaunda was in a better position to secure loans from the IMF. Up to that point, he had not asked the Ford administration for a loan to offset copper losses but was evidently in negotiations with the IMF.56 This did not satisfy Senator Clark, who seemed sincerely concerned about Zambia’s challenging circumstances. Zambia enjoyed a balance-of-payments surplus of $202 million in 1974, but in just the first five months of 1975 it incurred a deficit of some $109 million. Since the government in Lusaka got 92 percent of its foreign exchange and 50 percent of its overall revenues from copper, wasn’t there a real danger that

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things would get even worse? Clark pointed to a September Wall Street Journal article which predicted potential problems for Kaunda when he tried to secure his next major loan. He expected that Zambia would soon be in the same boat as Zaire. “Given that situation,” wondered Clark, “would our Government be willing to consider the same kind of security assistance for Zambia?” Mulcahy responded that he could not guarantee anything: “But Zambia, also, we reckon among our better friends in Africa, and I am sure we would make an effort.” Clark, who shared Mulcahy’s appreciation for Zambia, was “glad to hear that.”57 Senator Clark considered Kaunda as a key player in the region and wanted more assurance that he would be supported. “When you are talking about smooth and peaceful transition, particularly in Rhodesia but really in other parts of southern Africa as well, the kind of leadership that President Kaunda has shown would weigh heavily in our political considerations,” he observed. Clark then pointed out that in the current budget the United States was providing Zambia with “no economic or development aid of any kind.” Mulcahy responded that Zambia had requested none. The senator commented that matters were not always that simple and that perhaps the US embassy in Lusaka had not encouraged Kaunda enough. The deputy assistant secretary was not sure that US encouragement would have mattered. “With many countries, we have a relationship which I suppose could be described as a client relationship,” he observed. “That has never been true between the United States and Zambia.”58 Considering such examples as Kaunda’s recent flight from Washington to Havana, his acceptance of massive assistance from the PRC, and his outspoken criticism of US policy in Vietnam, Mulcahy definitely hit the nail on the head with his assessment that Zambia was not a “client” of the United States. Senator Clark then returned the focus to Mobutu, who in contrast to Kaunda was arguably Washington’s most notorious “client” in the world and raised specific concerns about whether the Zairean dictator would use the proposed money in Angola. Clark asked Mulcahy for a quick overview of the Ford administration’s policy toward the Angolan civil war. The deputy assistant secretary summed it up as a policy that opposed intervention by nations from outside of Africa, citing Kissinger’s late September UN speech. Senator Clark approved such a “hands off ” approach and hoped the United States would not “become involved in determining their fate.” Mulcahy promised that the Ford administration had no such intention. “Good,” said Clark. “Then I assume that it follows that the United States does not officially support Zaire’s assistance to … the FNLA.” Mulcahy judged that to be a “good assumption.” The senator did not accept this. “What guarantee is there,” he wanted to know, “that the goods provided to Zaire will not replace goods Zaire has sent, let us say, to one of the liberation movements?” The deputy assistant secretary responded that the excellent past record of organizations such as the IMF guaranteed that such misuse of the funds would not occur. Clark was still not convinced. “I understand you to be saying then that you can give Congress your absolute assurance that none of this $81,343,000 is going to be used by Zaire to assist directly or indirectly Zaire’s involvement in Angola?” Mulcahy replied, “To the best of our ability and our ability to watch it, sir, we can give you that assurance.”59

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Angola explodes Mulcahy’s claims that US aid to Zaire would not be used to support the FNLA in Angola in any way were completely untrue, of course. Assisting Mobutu was a crucial ingredient in the covert US intervention, and in the second half of October it seemed to be working. Roberto’s FNLA forces, accompanied by a contingent of Mobutu’s troops, threatened Luanda. During an October 16 White House meeting with President Ford, Kissinger rejoiced: “We apparently won a victory in Angola between Caxito and Luanda.” Two days earlier, the anti-MPLA forces received a major boost when the South African military launched Operation Zulu, in which about 3,000 soldiers invaded Angola from the south and advanced very rapidly toward Luanda.60 The substantial intervention by Pretoria evidently was the result of requests for such action by the Ford administration, although Kissinger had denied any such intention during his late September talks with the Chinese foreign minister.61 The South African “Zulu” column drove north through Angola in a blitzkrieg that covered about forty miles per day. They soon were joined by a second column of 1,000 soldiers known as Operation Foxbat, who were airlifted to central Angola. The seemingly unstoppable force was finally slowed down on November 2 at the battle of Catengue, where about forty Cuban advisors assisted the MPLA in holding their ground. Most importantly, the Cubans at Catengue communicated to Castro that South African troops were fighting in Angola. On November 4 the Cuban president decided to send his best combat troops, and three days later the 652-man battalion of Cuban Special Forces departed in planes from Havana. By the early morning hours of November 10, Castro’s men took their positions on the battlefield at Quifangondo, north of Luanda. They crushed the FNLA forces. The influx of crack Cuban troops, code-named Operation Carlota, also soon repulsed the South African invasion. The tide had turned in favor of the MPLA.62

Mwale’s analysis Kissinger hoped to secure more funding to back the FNLA and UNITA for a renewed offensive against Luanda, but his efforts were complicated by public revelations of the US role in Angola. The most damning evidence emerged from an November 8 testimony to Congress by CIA director William Colby. The Zambian ambassador in Washington, Siteke Mwale, insightfully summarized this unfolding development for his colleagues back in Lusaka. Mwale noted that the $81 million aid package to Mobutu was intended to boost the forces in Angola. The Zambian ambassador believed that the US intervention had been motivated in general by US interest in the oil, gold, and diamonds of Angola. Furthermore, Mwale emphasized that the CIA covert operation was specifically prompted by Mobutu’s cries for help.63 Mwale’s mid-November analysis of the Angolan civil war mentioned nothing about Kaunda’s request in April for the Ford administration to back Savimbi, and thus it differs considerably from the interpretation Kissinger put forth in his memoirs. While Mwale surely knew full well of Kaunda’s hope that Savimbi could be strengthened

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sufficiently to become a legitimate compromise candidate in a coalition government, he did not seem to approve of the way the United States had decided to respond to Kaunda’s request. Things in Angola had spun dangerously out of control in the six months since April, and this was not what the Zambian government had intended. Rather than seeing Kaunda as responsible for US intervention, as Kissinger later contended, Mwale to the contrary underlined the Zambian president’s warnings about the disastrous results of superpower participation in a major civil war in southern Africa.64 The bottom line for Mwale was that intervention by outside powers such as the United States, the USSR, the Cubans, and South Africa brought tragedy to the region. In speeches across the United States he had stressed “the imperative need for external forces to keep out of Angola.” The ambassador underscored the sad fact that while Angolans had battled the Portuguese colonizers for over a decade, the great powers had done little to assist them. When it became a Cold War contest, however, both sides poured fuel on the fire and all hell broke loose. “Today, Russia, China, USA and others have flooded Angola with a formidable arsenal of highly sophisticated weapons to enable the Blackman to kill his own kith and kin,” concluded Mwale.65

Young in Lusaka As the civil war raged on, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto declared Angolan independence in Luanda on November 11. Although a very difficult road lay ahead for Neto’s government, a critical milestone had nonetheless been reached—the last independence ceremony by a former Portuguese colony in Africa. Representative Andrew Young (D-GA), who had been one of the lone voices in Washington decrying US support for Portuguese colonialism in the early 1970s, delivered a speech celebrating “The End of Empire.” Five hundred years of exploitation and brutality had finally ended, but Young recognized that it was “naïve” to expect Angolans to “quickly resolve problems generated by centuries of political, economic, and social domination by a foreign power.” The congressman advocated African diplomacy to resolve the conflict through the OAU and hoped “major powers” would “desist from their intervention.”66 Two weeks later Congressman Young took a closer look at the situation in southern Africa when he journeyed to Lusaka with Coretta King, widow of the late civil rights leader Martin Luther King. King and three of her children were hosted by Ambassador Wilkowski, who worked overtime preparing meals for them. Wilkowski believed that such visits by well-known African Americans “helped” her diplomacy somewhat, although “not measurably.”67 On November 25, Young and Mrs. King dedicated the Martin Luther King Cultural Center, a source of educational opportunities for Zambian students. Ambassador Mwale, who had known the Reverend King and would later serve on the Board of the King Center in Atlanta, also participated in the ceremony. He personally carried the statue of King, which would be displayed at the center, from Washington.68 President Kaunda hosted a reception at State House for Coretta King, whom he respected as “a great freedom fighter in her own right.” The opportunity to honor her,

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and her late husband whom he had befriended in 1960, pleased the Zambian president. Mrs. King’s “stepping on our soil on her own behalf and Martin’s behalf was something we appreciated greatly.”69 The Martin Luther King Cultural Center in Lusaka became one of the most successful and significant aspects of relations between the United States and Zambia. Over the following decades the facility would provide knowledge and opportunity for thousands of Zambians, free of charge. Services offered include advising about studying in the United States, books and journals, films, and eventually free internet access. In addition to participating in the ceremony to open the King Cultural Center and attending the reception at State House, Congressman Young gathered updated information about the Angolan civil war. He discussed the unfolding drama with Kaunda, with Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda, and with some Angolans who were based in Lusaka. He concluded from the conversations that all US funding and weapons for any of the factions in Angola should be “immediately discontinued.”70 Young also denounced the role of the USSR. During his remarks at the opening of the King Center, he advocated an embargo on US grain sales to Moscow unless the Soviets stopped providing weapons to the MPLA. During this speech he also praised Kaunda for the Victoria Falls summit with Vorster, praising the initiative as the type of thing that Martin King would have done.71 Inspired by his visit to Lusaka, Young would become a vocal participant in the congressional debate over Angolan policy in the following weeks.

Diplomacy and military setbacks Meanwhile, Kissinger finally initiated a diplomatic effort to convince the USSR to stop shipping arms to Luanda, a tactic the Zambian government had been hoping to see for over six months. On November 20, US officials handed Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin a message which protested Soviet actions in Angola as having passed “reasonable bounds.”72 Moscow responded two days later with a note which simply advocated the removal of all external forces but made no commitment to stop arms shipments. During a November 24 speech in Detroit, the secretary of state declared that the Soviets’ “interventionist policy” was a threat to détente. Three days later, using more stick than carrot, Ford authorized $7 million in additional funds for IA Feature. This used up all the money available for CIA operations, so the president opted to request $28 million from the US Congress for the 1976 budget.73 Instead of truly committing to diplomacy with the Soviets to de-escalate the fighting in Angola, the Ford administration clearly intended to up the ante first. A few days after requesting more funding from Congress, Ford and Kissinger raised the issue of Angola during a summit in Beijing. They implored the leaders of the PRC to support their anti-MPLA efforts on several fronts. First, on December 2, Ford asked Chairman Mao to convince Mozambique to stop assisting Neto’s forces. The Chairman responded that doing so would be “difficult.” Kissinger insisted, and Mao agreed to “make a try.” Ford concluded the conversation by reiterating that “time is of the essence” regarding Angola.74

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During the morning of December 3, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping discussed Angola in depth with Kissinger and Ford. Deng hoped that they could cooperate to “bring about a better situation there” but worried about the complex problem caused by South African involvement. “I believe you are aware,” he commented, “of the feelings of the black Africans toward South Africa.” Kissinger quickly replied that the United States was “prepared to push South Africa out” after “an alternative military force” had been organized. Ford then shifted the focus to Zaire. Deng acknowledged having good relations with Mobutu but insisted that the PRC could only provide light weapons. Kissinger interjected that the United States could supply weapons but that what was really needed was “training in guerrilla warfare.” Deng observed that the PRC had trained all three groups in guerrilla fighting in the past but made no mention whatsoever of resuming such training.75 The president underlined the anti-MPLA orientation of his policy, stating that “UNITA and FNLA need help particularly.” The Vice Premier explained that the PRC had attempted to send weapons to UNITA, but that they had been held up in Tanzania. China was not against arming these groups but had “no way of transferring weapons into their hands.” Kissinger suggested Zambia or Zaire. Deng responded that the PRC could work through Zaire, but would have trouble supporting UNITA or the FNLA through any of the southern nations because of the intervention by Pretoria. Ford replied that the United States “had nothing to do with the South African involvement” and would “take action” to get them out, if a balance could be maintained. He also offered to “talk to Zambia with regard to transshipment.” Kissinger added that the United States had “some influence” with Kaunda.76 In spite of Kissinger and Ford’s pleas, Vice Premier Deng would not agree that shipping weapons to UNITA or the FNLA could be easily accomplished through the southern countries. “Please understand this with regard to African countries—even the smaller ones: they are extremely sensitive on matters involving national pride,” Deng contended. Because of this the PRC had not raised the issue again of supplying Savimbi’s forces, even with all the assistance Beijing was providing “in Tanzania and Zambia in railway construction.” Realizing that Deng would not budge on assisting Savimbi, Ford tried to pin him down on increasing support for the FNLA through Zaire. “Will you move in the north if we move in the south?” he inquired. Deng remained noncommittal even then and turned the tables on Ford. Washington “should give greater help in the north, too,” observed Deng. “As far as I know,” he added, “you have many ways to help.”77 Ford and Kissinger quickly confirmed that they were pursuing several avenues of assistance for the anti-MPLA forces. “We are working with France,” remarked the secretary of state. “I just approved before I left Washington $35 million more above what we have done before; and that is on its way as I understand it,” said Ford. This was an oversimplification, of course, since he had only actually been able to authorize $7 million and had asked Congress for $28 million more. It was also overly optimistic, as the request would soon meet intense opposition from legislators. Ford could not have foreseen that, however, and he expected his former colleagues on Capitol Hill to give their blessings to his Angola policy. Vice Premier Deng certainly hoped that they would. “It is worth spending more money on that problem,” he stated: “Because

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that is a key position of strategic importance.” Ford concluded the lengthy session on Angola with an extremely candid and revealing remark, illuminating part of his administration’s underlying motive for intervening in the first place: “Their natural resources are vital.”78 Ford, the former lineman at the University of Michigan, certainly gave “the old college try” in hopes of resuscitating his anti-MPLA policy during the talks in Beijing, but the situation on the ground in Angola was deteriorating rapidly and rendering his administration’s tactics moot. On December 6 a large load of Soviet materiel arrived in Luanda. This shipment included: ten planes, twenty 76-mm artillery pieces, and twenty 82-mm mortars. Another delivery of twenty tanks and fifty vehicles was expected in the near future. Also on December 6, MPLA forces captured Caxito, just above Luanda, and began pursuing the retreating FNLA and Zairean troops. Further north in the oilrich Cabinda province, a full regiment of Cuban infantry soon arrived to bolster the MPLA defenses, and Mobutu’s dreams of snatching the territory evaporated for good. Reports on December 7 indicated that south of Luanda, the offensive spearheaded by South African forces had been halted by the MPLA.79 As their allies’ military fortunes collapsed on the battlefields of Angola, the Ford administration renewed their eleventh-hour diplomatic initiative to convince the Soviets to back down. On December 8, Kissinger asked Ambassador Dobrynin if his government would stop the flow of weapons. The next day, Ford told Dobrynin that the Soviet intervention in Angola was “not healthy.” Kissinger suggested the removal of all external forces, cessation of arms shipments, and the formation of a coalition government through OAU mediation. On December 18, Soviet Premier Brezhnev rejected the proposal.80 The situation in Angola had simply gone too far in favor of the MPLA, primarily due to Cuban assistance, for Kissinger’s diplomatic initiative with Moscow to succeed. Had he taken a similar approach in the spring, as Zambian diplomats had hoped, he may well have had more luck; moreover, the people of Angola would not have suffered nearly as much.

Tunney Amendment With its military effort disintegrating in both northern and southern Angola and its diplomacy hitting brick walls in both Beijing and Moscow, the Ford administration’s policy next experienced a public lambasting both in the halls of congress and in the national media.81 On December 9 during a debate over US membership in the African Development Fund, Andrew Young proclaimed: “Frankly, we have got another CIA-run war in Angola matched with equal brutality by the influx of the Soviet Union.” He presciently predicted that even Angola would turn to the United States for technical assistance in drilling oil eventually, and the sooner the Ford administration stopped inciting war, the sooner such development could begin.82 Young was among the first members of Congress to discuss the CIA intervention in Angola publicly. Others who would liked to have done so, such as Senator Clark, were sworn to silence because of the briefings they had received from the agency.

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The veil of secrecy was completely lifted on December 12, when the Ford administration’s covert operation in Angola became front page news in the New York Times. David Binder’s story claimed that the United States had provided $50 million for the civil war in Angola, and it was accompanied by a photo of an anti-MPLA soldier with a captured Soviet vehicle. The next day, Binder followed up with a story focused on Senator Clark’s opposition to the US operation. On December 14, Seymour Hersh published a lengthy piece in the New York Times on the fierce debate within the State Department over Angola during the previous summer, including the fact that Nathaniel Davis had resigned in protest.83 On December 16 Young again addressed Angola, noting that he had discussed the situation with Kaunda during his November visit to Lusaka. The congressman, who had helped Martin Luther King draft his famous April 1967 speech against the war in Vietnam, contended that “it was crucial that the Congress act now to cut off the flow of US funding to various factions in Angola and that all US military involvement in the way of armaments and supplies be immediately discontinued.”84 Three days later the Senate considered an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill proposed by Clark and Senator John Tunney (D-CA), which would do exactly that. The Tunney Amendment prohibited the spending of any funds from the 1976 budget for CIA operations in Angola, except to gather intelligence. On December 19, Clark and his colleagues approved the measure, 54 to 22.85 Senate approval of the Tunney Amendment infuriated President Ford. During a December 22 NSC meeting on the status of negotiations with the USSR over limiting nuclear weapons, Ford opened the conversation thusly: “Before we get into the basic part of the meeting, I want to take a minute to talk about Angola. The vote in the Senate on Angola was, to say the least, mildly deplorable.” He did not think it was good policy or reflective of public opinion and felt his administration should stick to its guns to the greatest possible extent. The president elaborated: “We should spend every dime legally that we decided upon … and do everything we can. Hopefully—and Secretary Kissinger recommended this option—it will lead to some kind of negotiated settlement.” He then concluded that if the United States became “chicken because of the Senate vote, prospects will be bad. Every department should spend all it can legally.”86 Kissinger, also angry over the amendment, commented that if the Ford administration could “keep going and the Soviets do not think there is a terminal date on our efforts and we threaten them with the loss of détente, we can have an effect.” As he had done from the beginning, Kissinger primarily emphasized the impact of Angola on US-USSR relations, focusing on the big strategic picture. “The way the Soviets throw their weight around,” he added, was “one reason why Angola is so important.” Washington had to be careful not to “whet the Soviet appetite.” When CIA Director Colby observed that the USSR might send a guided missile destroyer to Luanda harbor, Ford wondered if the US navy was “sending any ships.” General George Brown, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cautioned that congress had prohibited such action. Ford corrected him: “There was no indication we cannot deploy naval vessels in the Atlantic which would affect Soviet perceptions.”87 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that there was no military basis for sending ships to Angola. Ford concurred but added that “perceptions are sometimes

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more important.” Kissinger seconded the president. “There is no military need, but there is a psychological benefit. We can send them a message by doing this.” Sending a message to the Soviets would do nothing in the short run to improve the flagging fortunes of Roberto or Savimbi’s forces but actually helping the FNLA or UNITA achieve victory on the ground in Angola had never been the primary intention. Kissinger’s top priority had been to demonstrate toughness to the Soviets, and the people of Angola had been victims in the game. He accused Moscow of this very line of reasoning: “They have a game going in Angola.” He then revealed his real concern, which was Angola’s impact on Washington’s credibility. “They will want to run around Africa and Europe,” he lamented, “and say ‘The Americans can’t cut the mustard.’”88

A visit from Castro Kissinger did not even mention the external actor with the most bragging rights regarding Angola, which of course was Cuba, whose leader was already proudly proclaiming his people’s stunning victory over imperialist forces. On December 23, Fidel Castro surprised a Zambian delegation in their Havana hotel room and “quickly moved to the question of Angola.” Castro explained that he had decided to support the MPLA not only because of their ideology but also because their opponents were backed by the CIA. He pointed out the threat “to Zambia’s and Zaire’s sovereign integrities by the presence of South Africa in Angola.” The Cuban leader “confessed that his country was actively involved in the war” and at that point had “about 4,000 troops fighting alongside the MPLA.” He emphasized that his country would “continue to send more and more soldiers to Angola until victory for the MPLA is secured.”89 After Castro made his case, the head of the Zambian delegation, Reuben Kamanga, responded with admirable confidence. Kamanga was at the time only a member of the relatively powerless UNIP Central Committee, but as a former vice president and foreign minister of Zambia, he had considerable experience talking as an equal with world leaders. Before presenting his country’s position on Angola, he handed Castro a personal message from Kaunda. He then outlined the history of Zambian relations with the Angolan liberation groups, noting that the MPLA had originally formed in Zambia and received crucial early support. He defended his government’s policy as being based on two principled foundations: (1) The OAU had recognized all three major Angolan parties as legitimate; (2) Kaunda was against inciting war by recognizing any one group as superior. “The situation in Angola at the moment which was escalated into a fullscale civil war,” commented Kamanga, “makes it out of character for any peace-loving nation to support or recognize any one movement as this would only be fanning the war and not stopping it.”90 Under challenging circumstances, Kamanga diplomatically put forward a pretty compelling justification for Zambia’s refusal to surrender its advocacy of a unity government and recognize the MPLA. His colleagues were impressed with how he had “handled this most sensitive and emotional issue especially in the light of the fact that Zambia and Cuba” took “opposing stands on the matter.” Castro evidently respected Kamanga for expressing the Zambian government’s views frankly, and the

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“meeting ended with both sides mutually appreciating each other’s stand point and still upholding the friendship existing between the two countries.”91 Essentially, the two nations agreed to disagree on Angola but not let it interfere with positive bilateral relations, which had gotten a major boost only eight months before when Kaunda met with Castro in Havana.

Kaunda’s efforts Back in Lusaka, Kaunda remained committed to seeking a coalition government in Luanda and had spelled out his stance clearly in front of a group of Zambian air force officers earlier in the month. “We strongly condemn outside intervention in Angola, from whatever quarter,” stated the president. “We believe in a government of national unity as still the best solution which will end the war and guarantee the territorial integrity of Angola.”92 In late December, Kaunda and his top advisors were preparing for a special OAU conference on the crisis. On the 23rd, while Kamanga defended Zambian policy to Castro in Havana, advisor Mark Chona attempted to rationalize it to journalist Fred Bridgland. Chona lambasted the Soviets, and to a lesser extent the Cubans, for intervening. “Why now that Angola is independent should the Russians supply SAM-7s for blacks to kill blacks when they did not provide such sophisticated weapons before?” wondered Chona. He added: “The people running from their battered homes in Angola are blacks.”93 In order to have any leverage at the OAU summit to push his unity-government platform, Kaunda continued efforts to prop up Savimbi’s UNITA forces. Top officials in Pretoria, however, prompted in part by the US Senate’s blocking of future funding with the Tunney Amendment, had decided to move in the opposite direction and withdraw. On New Year’s Eve, South African foreign minister Brand Fourie journeyed to eastern Zambia for talks with Kaunda at his holiday retreat. The Zambian president made one last plea for Pretoria to stand firm with Savimbi. The South African diplomat informed him that because crucial allies such as France and the United States were “getting off the bandwagon,” that would no longer be possible.94 Heading into the new year of 1976, the chances of forging a coalition of the three major parties in Angola looked increasingly dim, but Kaunda and his allies pressed on. The Ford administration practiced diplomacy on behalf of this objective. William Schaefele, the new assistant secretary of state, spent eleven days traversing Africa advocating this position. President Ford wrote to thirty-two African heads of state making the same plea. The CIA sent all available agents to Ethiopia to lobby behind the scenes at the special OAU summit on Angola, scheduled to begin on January 10.95

Difference of opinion with Tanzania Hoping to lay the groundwork for the summit, the foreign ministers of Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique met in Addis Ababa on January 8. Rupiah Banda acknowledged that while Tanzania and Mozambique had recognized the MPLA

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government, Zambia still hoped to work with them to “form a bridgehead between those who supported a Government of National Unity and those who recognize the government formed by MPLA.” Banda denounced the influx of Soviet weapons and thousands of Cuban troops, because “never before had there been such an intervention of foreign forces in Africa.” He identified the integrity of the OAU and the national security of Zambia as key factors. Banda concluded by conceding the point that South Africa must withdraw but then also called for the Soviets and Cubans to leave. “The OAU,” he suggested, “should call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops.”96 Ibrahim Kaduma, foreign minister of Tanzania, emphasized that it was wrong from any nation to ask the OAU to support a “Government of National Unity.” Instead, the OAU should recognize Neto’s government in Luanda and help drive out the real foreign intervention and only “enemy,” which was South Africa.97 There was no bridging the gap between the position of Zambia, on one side, and the position of Tanzania on the other. For Kaunda, who arrived in Ethiopia for the special summit the next day, the disagreement with Tanzania was painful. He later recalled it as the “one time we differed with Mwalimu Nyerere.”98 It wasn’t just the difference of opinion that was painful but also the way it transpired. The presidents had met in December for a long talk about Angola in Lusaka, and Kaunda believed that Nyerere agreed with his stance. Upon flying back to Dar es Salaam, however, Nyerere held a press conference and immediately announced his recognition of the MPLA. When Kaunda heard the news, he felt betrayed by his old friend.99 Perhaps Kaunda should not have been so shocked, as some evidence suggests that Nyerere had been backing Neto’s forces for several months. Tanzanian officials seized 90 tons of Chinese weapons in August 1975 which were intended for UNITA and reportedly transferred them instead to the MPLA.100 In any case, when the OAU heads of state convened on January 10 there was no doubt that some old friends such as Zambia and Tanzania were bitterly divided about Angola. As the contentious conference moved through its third day of debate over Angola, Kaunda rose to address the “unusually and tensely quiet assembly.”101 In his opinion the Angolan civil war was “one of the most serious and tragic crises the Continent has ever faced.” The Zambian president, tears in his eyes, continued: “Men, women, and children, the sick and the poor are being mowed down like animals by weapons from powers whose own nationals are enjoying peace and progress in their own countries.” For Kaunda, the bottom line was that the “civil war in Angola must be brought to an end.” He insisted that his fellow African heads of state think seriously about their mission in Addis Ababa. “We come not to save face,” he reasoned, “but to save the lives of millions of Angolan people.”102 Carefully Kaunda staked out his position, arguing that the OAU was “not an Electoral College” and had no right to single out any particular political party. Instead, the mission of the assembled leaders was to help Angola “achieve peace, unity, economic and social progress, sovereignty and the integrity for the whole territory.” With this in mind, he argued, the OAU should call on the three main “political parties” to form a “Government of National Unity.” The summit should advocate a cease-fire, which should be internationally supervised. Kaunda contended that the

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OAU should denounce all foreign intervention, not only by South Africa but also by the Soviet Union, and by any other powers whose troops or equipment were “being used to murder and maim the innocent Angolan people.” He urged his colleagues to “demand the total withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and equipment from the Angolan soil.”103

Division in the OAU The Zambian leader had argued his case eloquently, and the debate continued through the night. Finally, at 7:30 a.m. on January 13, the heads of state cast their votes with a disappointing result for Kaunda: “There was an unbelievable tie of 22 for the Government of National Unity and 22 for the MPLA Government.”104 There had been two motions put forth. The first, by Senegal’s president Leopold Senghor, advocated Kaunda’s position: cease-fire, withdrawal of all troops, and formation of a coalition government. The second, by Nigeria’s Murtala Muhammed, called on the OAU to recognize the MPLA as the government of Angola. Both proposals resulted in deadlocks of twenty-two in favor, twenty-two opposed, and two abstentions. The tie turned into defeat for Kaunda and the anti-MPLA forces, however. The two abstainers, Ethiopia and Uganda, would soon announce support for the MPLA, and a chain reaction of African nations recognizing Neto’s government followed. Furthermore, on January 16 the South African military informed Savimbi that they would begin withdrawing all forces from southern Angola within a week.105 Kaunda returned to Lusaka and explained the results of the summit to parliament. He also reacted to peaceful protests against his Angola policy at the University of Zambia by ordering the arrest of several students and faculty and eventually closing the campus.106 Near the end of January he announced a national state of emergency, supposedly due to the public protests at the university. UK journalist Fred Bridgland later speculated that Kaunda was actually responding to an attempted mutiny among his military. Rumors circulated in Lusaka about a gun fight among Zambian air force personnel that took place in late January, when some pilots evidently refused to fly back to Angola for more bombing runs in support of Savimbi. This would seem to be a more compelling reason to declare a state of emergency, but the story remains unsubstantiated. In any case, Kaunda definitely faced dissent at home over his Angola policy.107

House approval of Tunney Meanwhile on Capitol Hill the US House of Representatives debated the Defense appropriations bill and, in particular, the Tunney Amendment which would prevent further covert operations in Angola. Several congressmen warned of another Vietnam if the Ford administration was allowed to continue its policy. Andrew Young picked apart Kissinger’s justification for intervention, which was essentially

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the old containment of communism argument, point by point. He contended that regardless of whichever party emerged in control in Luanda, they would employ some degree of socialism in their system. They would establish good relations with the United States and sell oil to the Gulf Corporation. Before too long, the Soviets would leave, because “the Russians do not get along with colored people.” They had been in Nigeria, Egypt, and Mozambique but never stayed, because “Russians are worse racists than Americans.” Young opined that “as soon as we get out of the military business and into the economic business we will get into something we can win.” It was time to stop the oldfashioned method of conducting a foreign policy focusing on confronting the Soviets at all costs. If we had not insisted on competing with the USSR, then the South Africans would “have no excuse for its outrageous aggression and incursion.” It was time to stop utilizing covert CIA operations, as had been done in Guatemala, Chile, Vietnam, and now Angola. Such undertakings had only brought “prolonged U.S. commitments and then embarrassing revelations.” It did not make any sense to spend millions of taxpayer dollars to “help General Mobutu get his brother-in-law to be the president of a neighboring country.” It was time for a more mature approach to the world. The United States was turning “200 years old and should act accordingly.” For Young during the debate over the Tunney Amendment, as with Kaunda during his speech at the OAU special summit, the bottom line was simply that the war in Angola must end. “The only thing we are doing,” he concluded, “is putting more weapons in to kill more people.”108 The views of legislators such as Young won the day. On January 27 the House voted resoundingly, 323 to 99, to prevent any of the 1976 Defense budget from being spent on covert operations in Angola.109 About a week after the vote, on February 5, Mark Chona arrived in Washington for a “marathon of meetings” with Senator Tunney, other members of Congress, and Kissinger. Chona emphasized that the Zambian government was not opposed to Neto’s taking charge in Luanda and in fact had provided important support to the MPLA in the past. When asked what the United States should do, he responded that it should “assist in bringing peace.” Chona elaborated on precisely how that should be done: “The assistance is not with guns and mercenaries at all, it is merely that the United States should use as much pressure as possible to bear against the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola.” The message from Kaunda was that the US should utilize strenuous diplomacy to facilitate a cease-fire in Angola. Chona implied that the Zambian government favored the recent Tunney Amendment, but that did not mean it was time to stop paying attention to southern Africa in general. On the contrary, he reiterated Kaunda’s April 1975 White House plea for increased US attention to the region. The US government should listen to the views of “African freedom fighters” today, or else such groups would turn to communist powers for aid and advice. “If the West does not act now,” Chona warned, “Africa has yet to see the worst of Civil Wars.”110 Kaunda wanted Washington to intervene in southern Africa but with diplomacy and development, not with arms and ammunition. The Zambian president’s prescription for a better US policy would be applied to Rhodesia by Kissinger beginning in April and then continued by Young and the rest of the Carter administration.

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Tying up loose ends Before Kissinger’s new approach to southern Africa could begin, it took a few more months to tie up the loose ends regarding Angola. The CIA, although prevented by the Tunney Amendment from accessing new funds in the 1976 budget, still had about $5 million remaining from the $32 million Ford authorized in 1975. The agency’s desperate attempts to save the FNLA and UNITA from the jaws of defeat included utilizing French helicopters, sending five more shipments of arms from Kinshasa into Angola and hiring Portuguese mercenaries. Roberto used CIA funds to hire UK and US mercenaries, several of whom turned out to be psychopaths. The MPLA captured the worst among them, George Cullen, and, after a highly publicized trial, executed him.111 In Washington, President Ford signed the Tunney Amendment into law on February 9, but one CIA official still would not give up. He arranged a flight of food from Rhodesia to Savimbi’s forces in the remote bush of eastern Angola. The plane, which had been leased from Mobutu, was destroyed by Soviet MiG fighters. George Bush took over as CIA director and demanded in March that all IA Feature spending cease. The final accounting included over $800,000 for Roberto and $500,000 for Savimbi to distribute among their forces, but it was included in a lump sum payment to Mobutu, who pocketed it. By March, the Gulf Oil Corporation had negotiated a deal with Neto’s regime to renew pumping oil from Cabinda province, and the US government had rewarded the MPLA with two new Boeing 737 jet airliners.112 Similarly, Kaunda tied up loose ends in Lusaka. After the OAU officially admitted Angola on February 10, he terminated Zambian assistance to UNITA.113 Kaunda received a letter of thanks for his past support from Savimbi in mid-February, requesting that his mother be allowed to reside in Lusaka. “I love all mothers,” explained Kaunda, “but there is no way we can now look after your mother without confusing the situation in Angola. I am afraid she has to leave.”114 Savimbi also asked that Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda not be fired for his pro-UNITA activities.115 Kaunda soon sacked Banda anyway and replaced him with Siteke Mwale. One of Mwale’s first jobs would be talking with the protesting students at the University of Zambia, who advocated formal relations with Neto’s MPLA government. Mwale passed on their message to State House.116 Although Kaunda did not immediately take the students’ advice, he would soon move in that direction. On March 16, Angola’s foreign minister Eduardo dos Santos arrived in Lusaka for negotiations. A month later, on April 15, 1976, Zambia officially recognized the MPLA government.117

Lessons learned The dramatic events between April 1975 and April 1976 provide many lessons in retrospect. Kaunda’s insistence on flying directly from Washington to Havana after his White House summit demonstrated clearly that he was not a “client” of the United States and that he was truly non-aligned in the Cold War. During a year when Castro caused considerable consternation for the Ford administration, Zambia and Cuba

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cemented their friendship with high-level visits and the opening of an embassy in Lusaka. Small nations might not always agree, as on the issue of Angola, but they could agree to disagree and continue to work together in general. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis took a firm stand against CIA covert intervention in Angola. He contended it would do more harm than good. Congressman Young similarly sensed that it was time to cease such operations and take a new approach to foreign affairs. Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford refused to accept their view and continued to emphasize the need to compete with the Soviets and maintain US credibility. Ford and Kissinger relied more on the stick than the carrot, waiting until the eleventh hour before attempting diplomacy with the Soviets over Angola. Had they tried diplomacy in the spring or even summer of 1975, as Zambian officials hoped they would, much suffering might have been avoided. When Ford and Kissinger decided to intervene and created Operation IA Feature in mid-July, they based their decision on their interpretation of Kaunda’s request for aid to UNITA. Kaunda disliked the heavy-handed Soviet presence in Angola and he did want to build up Savimbi as a compromise candidate in a coalition government, but that did not necessarily mean he condoned a massive influx of US weapons and money into Zaire. Kissinger’s later emphasis on Kaunda’s request being the primary reason that he and Ford approved IA Feature seems disingenuous at best. Chinese officials accusing the United States of weakness, Vietnam collapsing, and our most notorious “client,” Mobutu, throwing temper tantrums probably were more significant motivating factors behind the US intervention in Angola and desire to guarantee long-term access to the oil in Cabinda province also influenced US policy.118 That is not to say that Kaunda did not cooperate with the CIA operation and facilitate some of its shenanigans in support of Savimbi. The Zambian president took a very firm stand against the MPLA taking control of Angola by force and in favor of a unity government instead. He persevered down this path, in spite of a painful split with Nyerere and some noisy protests at the University of Zambia. Eventually, the Cuban troops defeated the anti-MPLA forces and the OAU recognized Neto’s government. Kaunda soon followed suit. He would have preferred a unity government, but for many reasons he decided to change course. Partly this reflected geographic and economic realities. The question of whether or not to open relations with Angola was not a philosophical Cold War game for Kaunda but a very concrete decision. His nation shared a lengthy border with Neto’s nation, and he needed the Benguela railroad reopened to move Zambian copper to the sea. While Angola was very important to Kaunda for many reasons, his top diplomatic concern was Rhodesia. Here again, Kissinger’s claim in his memoirs that Kaunda’s main priority was Angola when he came to the White House in April 1975 seems selfserving. Since Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, resolving the conflict in Rhodesia had been the Zambian leader’s number one foreign policy goal and remained his top goal until a resolution was finally reached in 1979. To Kissinger’s credit, in the aftermath of the Angola disaster, he did make a major effort to assist Kaunda regarding Rhodesia. Their close cooperation would help push Smith into publicly espousing majority rule, a key step toward eventual settlement.

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Perhaps Kissinger had learned a lesson about how best to approach southern Africa. Objectionable covert activities such as the hiring of Portuguese mercenaries and massive funding for greedy dictators such as Mobutu had not worked. Listening more carefully to the priorities of moderates like Kaunda might be more effective. However, revising US policy toward the region was not entirely Kissinger’s choice. Senator Clark’s close scrutiny of the Ford administration in late 1975 and the resulting Tunney Amendment ultimately forced Kissinger to take a different tack. Furthermore, Kissinger’s strategic goals had not necessarily changed. Limiting Soviet and Cuban involvement would remain central to his thinking, even when ostensibly espousing racial equality in Rhodesia. There is another lesson from this time period which may not have seemed as significant to the secretary of state, and that is the value of non-violence and cultural relations. Relying less on military might and more on diplomacy and educational programs might pay better long-term dividends. This was certainly what Representative Andrew Young believed, and his friend Ambassador Siteke Mwale definitely agreed. In a lengthy mid-November report from Washington, Mwale presented a powerful indictment of the tragic impact of foreign weapons in Angola, arguing for diplomatic intervention instead. Young’s late November visit to Lusaka, accompanied by Mwale, was also very significant in this regard. The Martin Luther King Cultural Center remains a living example of the positive impact that emphasizing education can have, and one of the most successful aspects of US-Zambia relations. Taking King’s vision onto the international stage and fighting for human rights would become central foreign policy planks in the Carter campaign, with Young at the forefront, but the soonest they could occupy the White House would be January 1977. In the meantime, the Ford administration still had one more year in office. Kissinger may not have learned the exact same lessons from Angola as Young and Mwale, but he did conclude that working with Kaunda in search of a solution in Rhodesia was the correct course of action going into the spring of 1976.

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Henry Kissinger’s 1976 Speech and Kaunda’s Response

The first conversation hinting that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger might visit southern Africa took place in August 1974, when Zambian foreign minister Vernon Mwaanga invited him to Lusaka. During the April 1975 White House talks between Gerald Ford and Kenneth Kaunda the prospect became much more serious, as Kissinger pledged to travel to Zambia within the next year. The first public discussion of the issue came during a November 1975 press conference, when the secretary explained that he hoped to visit Africa in 1976 but could not yet give any specific dates.1 In early February 1976, the Ford administration decided that Kissinger would definitely make the trip in the near future.2 After several weeks of frantic planning, the most important US diplomatic journey to the African continent in history began on April 23. The twoweek tour was highlighted by Kissinger’s April 27 speech in Lusaka, which outlined a new US policy toward southern Africa.3 From the time he first took office as national security advisor for Richard Nixon in early 1969 through the end of 1975 when he was Ford’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger paid almost no attention to the continent of Africa. He had not conducted any personal diplomacy regarding the conflicts in nations such as Rhodesia. All of that changed dramatically in April 1976, when he initiated the most significant US shift in the entire history of US-Zambia relations. His remarkable undertaking succeeded because of the contributions of a wide range of individuals, most notably Zambian President Kaunda and US ambassador Jean Wilkowski.4 The secretary of state’s two-week tour of Africa and major speech in Lusaka represented a turning point in the history of US foreign policy and revealed much about the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the character of Gerald Ford, and the priorities of Kenneth Kaunda.

Chona’s visit Throughout 1975 and the first month of 1976, the Ford administration’s top priority in Africa had been Angola. The focus quickly shifted to Rhodesia in February. On February 5, 1976, Kaunda’s key assistant for foreign affairs, Mark Chona, met with Kissinger in Washington to discuss southern African issues. Chona delivered a

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message from the Zambian president asking the Ford administration to put pressure on Rhodesian ruler Ian Smith, in order to facilitate a peace agreement between Smith and the Zimbabwean rebel leaders. In no uncertain terms, Kaunda’s security advisor informed Kissinger that if the United States did not intervene in Rhodesia, the rebels would be forced to accept more assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the results might well be even worse than the disaster in Angola. “If the West does not act now, Africa has yet to see the worst of Civil Wars,” warned Chona.5 By raising the specter of further communist advances beyond Angola, Chona evidently struck a nerve. Kissinger replied “sharply” that it was “inappropriate” for Zambia to threaten the US government and pledged that the Ford administration “would not tolerate another Cuban move into Southern Africa.” Chona responded that Kaunda had not meant to threaten the United States but only to appeal for US help in order to “preclude further Cuban and Soviet actions in Southern Africa.” Kaunda and Chona believed the situation posed a clear and present danger to the “security and independence of the entire region.” In early February the Ford administration decided for certain that Kissinger would visit southern Africa in the near future and the grim message from Kaunda which Chona had delivered was undoubtedly one of the most important factors prompting the decision. Some of President Ford’s political advisors believed the timing was terrible, because it meant the trip would take place right in the middle of the Republican primaries. The leading challenger for the Republican nomination, former California governor Ronald Reagan, seriously threatened to beat Ford in important southern states such as Texas anyway. A diplomatic initiative perceived as pressuring the white minority regime in Rhodesia to surrender power to the black majority obviously would not help Ford’s cause among white southern voters. President Ford, however, was genuinely concerned about the deteriorating circumstances throughout the southern African region and feared an all-out “race war.” He believed it was “imperative to send Henry Kissinger to the continent” and would not be dissuaded by his campaign staff. “I cannot judge whether the political impact will be good or bad,” he told them: “But we must do this because it’s the right thing to do.”6 Kissinger later lauded the president’s decision as one that “amazingly” put the national interests ahead of purely political calculations. Ford’s determination to “continue to do what is right regardless of the primaries” was indeed a remarkable departure from the self-serving jackassery of his predecessor in the Oval Office, Richard Nixon, and it clearly made a lasting impression on Kissinger.7 In early March the conflict in southern Africa escalated, increasing the pressure on the Ford administration to take action. Mozambique was providing bases for a rapidly increasing number of guerrilla soldiers in the army of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Approximately 700 ZANU soldiers infiltrated from Mozambique into Rhodesia during the first months of 1976. On March 3, Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique, announced that he was closing his border with Rhodesia to support UN sanctions. This dealt a severe blow to Smith’s economy, which was moving about half of its imports and exports through Mozambique. The policy would cost Machel’s government over $100 million annually, but he was willing to pay the price in support of majority rule.8

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Wilkowski’s report On March 5, the US Ambassador in Zambia, Jean Wilkowski, submitted a thorough and accurate assessment of the mounting crisis. With the Mozambique border closure and the rise in violence, Wilkowski argued that it was imperative for the United States to intervene diplomatically and make a strong statement in support of majority rule. Smith must be convinced that the United States would not help save him if the communist-backed forces launched an all-out attack. Peace talks between Smith and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), seemed to be at an impasse. Mark Chona had recently informed her that because of Smith’s intransigence, Kaunda had refused to meet with a Rhodesian delegation that Smith tried to send to Lusaka. Wilkowski contended that there was still a “slim chance” for a political solution between Smith and Nkomo but that it would require a strong push from Washington. If Smith continued to delay a settlement with Nkomo, then more radical elements among the Zimbabwe rebel leadership would “seek (to) dictate terms of majority rule to whites at point of a gun.”9 Wilkowski went on to emphasize the need for a new approach from the Ford administration. According to the ambassador, a strong sign of US support for a rapid transition to majority rule in both Rhodesia and Namibia was needed to regain Kaunda’s confidence. “Kaunda expects from the US some new initiative that will both avert further communist penetration in southern Africa while achieving majority rule without further delay.” This was a tall order for sure, but she believed that “doing nothing to make our position loud and clear” would engender great “Zambian as well as African disillusionment” with the US government. Perhaps trying to play a bit of hard ball in order to get the secretary of state’s attention, Wilkowski claimed that if Washington continued to focus solely on preventing the spread of communism, she would not be able to get an appointment with Kaunda in the next few days in order to deliver a message Kissinger had recently sent.10

Attacking Wilkowski Wilkowski got Kissinger’s attention almost immediately. This became clear during his staff meeting which began at 8 a.m. in Washington on March 5, the same day she sent the telegram. The discussion quickly turned to southern Africa. After Charles Robinson, the undersecretary of state for economics, reported on his recent visit to Zaire and a possible major aid package for President Joseph Mobutu, Kissinger inquired: “What about Zambia?” to which Robinson replied that he had not been to Zambia but noted that Mobutu did ask him to help his neighbor Kaunda. After some discussion of the possibility of getting some economic aid for Zambia, Kissinger then added: “But we also have to do something in the military field.” A figure of $10 million in military assistance to Kaunda was considered, with Undersecretary of State for Defense Robert Ingersoll pointing out that it would not be enough for Kaunda if his neighbor Mobutu was receiving $300 million.11

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Kissinger then made the general observation that most State Department officials were “philosophically opposed” to the United States “sending arms to Africa.” He pointed to the telegrams coming from embassies in Africa as evidence and singled out the ambassador in Lusaka as an example. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele contended that no requests had been sent from Zambia for military assistance. Kissinger responded: “Oh, no. You had, but she discouraged them.” Schaufele attempted to explain that Wilkowski had been sent a message instructing her to do something (evidently instructing her to discuss military assistance with Kaunda). Kissinger interrupted him: “But did she do it?”; Schaufele admitted that “She hasn’t talked to him.” The secretary of state then made clear his displeasure with Wilkowski’s conduct: “Within 24 hours she’s going to do it or she’s going to be hung. By tomorrow morning I want a report from her that she has carried out her instructions or I want her here on Monday to explain why she hasn’t.” Schaufele replied: “Yes, sir.”12 Kissinger, who was legendary for berating his underlings, wasn’t finished showing his staff how upset he was with Wilkowski. “Don’t tell me she can’t see Kaunda if she wants to. How can it be that she doesn’t carry out an instruction that I gave last Sunday?” Schaufele explained that the ambassador had an appointment with the Zambian president but it was cancelled due to urgent developments regarding Rhodesia. Kissinger wasn’t convinced. “You don’t think,” he observed, “if she were to do something he agreed with she’d be in there.” After some laughter, Ingersoll explained that he had sent Wilkowski a follow-up cable along those same lines. Kissinger, still not satisfied, snapped back: “Yes, but it obviously hasn’t made much of an impact, has it?” He concluded the rampage against the ambassador by stating “it’s going to be carried out tomorrow morning or I want her here on Monday. I probably want her here anyway.”13 The secretary of state, who had angrily blamed Wilkowski the previous April for the criticism of US policy in Kaunda’s speech at the White House, seemed hell-bent on recalling her from Zambia and perhaps even firing her. Evidently he changed his mind, because she served out the remainder of her stint in Lusaka. However, in spite of her being the first woman ambassador in Africa, serving nearly four years honorably in Zambia, and contributing considerably to the creation of a new policy toward southern Africa, she was not even mentioned in Kissinger’s memoirs, which devote approximately 150 pages to relations with Africa. Even the one photo in Years of Renewal that includes her is cropped so that she is only partially visible, and she is not named in the caption. His seemingly irrational insistence on blaming Wilkowski and criticizing her in 1975–76, combined with his failure to give her any credit when writing his memoirs twenty years later, certainly begs the question of whether or not Kissinger was sexist.

Financial reward for Zambia The conversation returned to the topic of possibly providing $10 million in military assistance to the Zambian government. Kissinger joked that “10 million isn’t a program. 10 million is a tip.” Undersecretary Ingersoll commented that Kaunda had in

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fact previously submitted a “great big laundry list” for defense. The secretary wondered “what are we doing about it?” He then echoed Ingersoll’s earlier point about Zaire getting so much more assistance: “I’m not saying we can’t accept a laundry list, but 10 million dollars can’t be adequate for a country whose neighbor received 300 million dollars.” Schaufele observed that there was already $20 million in aid proposed for Zambia, so $10 million more would bring it to a respectable figure of $30 million. Kissinger seemed somewhat mollified and asked to see a plan by the following week. “I think the only way we’re going to pull out of this Angola thing is to do something and do it fast—and do it visibly,” he commented. “I would like to do everything together as one program so that it also has some impact on the rest of Africa,” concluded Kissinger.14 It was clear from the gist of Kissinger’s March 5 staff meeting that he already intended to provide Kaunda with a significant financial aid package. In fact, the total amount of Official Development Assistance provided to Zambia would jump from the paltry $2.7 million budgeted in 1975 for fiscal year 1976 to the sizable $38.7 million allotted in 1976 for fiscal year 1977. There is no question that the economic support flowing from Washington to Lusaka partly served as a thank you for Kaunda’s role in Kissinger’s diplomatic initiative regarding Rhodesia, which he would launch in late April. However, there is also strong evidence to suggest that the Ford administration had already decided to drastically increase aid to Zambia before the secretary of state’s April meetings with Kaunda. Schaufele later recalled that this may have been motivated partially as a desire to reward Kaunda for his help during the Angola intervention. It also undoubtedly reflected the general respect for Kaunda’s moderate politics among State Department officials, including Kissinger.15

Shifting the focus to Rhodesia A few days after Kissinger’s staff meeting, on March 10, the Times of Zambia blasted the Ford administration in a lengthy editorial as being “mealie-mouthed about the mounting crisis in Rhodesia.” The Times contended that if Senator Hubert Humphrey were the president of the United States, the problem in Rhodesia would already be solved. Unfortunately, Ford and Kissinger were instead in charge of a US policy that would neither support black Africans fighting for change in Rhodesia nor push the British into a forceful intervention that could prevent further bloodshed. Considering its “useless” and “defensive” stance, the least the United States could do was to stop criticizing other nations such as Cuba or the Soviet Union who were providing muchneeded assistance to the Zimbabwe insurgents.16 Since December 1975, Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo had been meeting occasionally in hopes of negotiating a settlement and averting a full-blown war in Rhodesia. In spite of what Smith described as a “congenial atmosphere” in which both sides were “ready to crack a joke,” by mid-March 1976 it was clear that the two sides could not work out an agreement. The sticking point was Nkomo’s demand for immediate majority rule and a non-racial electoral process, conditions that Smith was unwilling to accept. Smith hoped that Kaunda could “knock some sense into Nkomo’s head,” but the Zambian president agreed with Nkomo’s insistence on

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immediate majority rule. On March 19 the Smith-Nkomo talks were terminated, unfortunately having failed to reach common ground.17 An upsurge in violence seemed unavoidable, and a March 19 editorial in the Zambia Daily Mail predicted it would reach “frightening proportions.” The editors characterized the Ford administration’s approach to the Rhodesian conflict as “puzzling.” While Ford and Kissinger were making statements in support of majority rule, they continued to fixate on the possible escalation of Cuban or Soviet involvement. According to the editors, the role of Russians or Cubans was “irrelevant.” If the US government truly wanted to see majority rule, it was time for them to take concrete action. In order to prevent a flood of communist weapons into the region, Washington must provide the Zimbabwe rebels with US weapons instead. “The Ford administration must state clearly whether it supports the whites in Rhodesia and their racism or it supports the Africans and their majority rule,” concluded the Daily Mail.18 While some in Zambia called for an US initiative, it would be the British government who made the first move. Two days later in Parliament, Prime Minister James Callaghan delineated a plan for resolving the crisis. If Smith would agree to four conditions, then the British would host a constitutional convention to plan the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. The four requirements Callaghan announced were: (1) acceptance of the principle of majority rule, (2) democratic elections within two years, (3) no independence without majority rule, (4) timely negotiations. Smith denounced Callaghan’s terms, but Kissinger immediately praised them during a speech in Dallas as “most constructive.” He pledged a major effort “to help all parties to return to the negotiating table.” Indeed, it would be the secretary of state who took the lead in the international mediation effort regarding Rhodesia, using Callaghan’s proposals as a springboard.19 It would take a few weeks to decide exactly how Kissinger would get involved and what his strategy would be. On March 24, the Washington Special Actions Group crisis management team met in the Situation Room in the White House basement. The group essentially was the National Security Council minus the president, and this session on southern Africa was chaired by Kissinger. The secretary asserted that black African leaders must understand that they could not have Cubans in Africa and also have US support. That same day, President Ford explained to a group of senators that he was determined to prevent Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa.20 As March came to an end the Ford administration remained focused primarily on preventing communist influence, but a significant shift toward supporting majority rule was under way. In a report to Kissinger on April 1, Assistant Secretary Schaufele contended that the Ford administration’s “passive stance” on Rhodesia was no longer appropriate. He estimated that there were 1,000 guerrilla soldiers active in Rhodesia, with as many as 6,000 training in Mozambique. By October the total guerrilla force could possibly grow to 12,000. At that point they would be able to “sustain a major guerrilla effort” which would “so stretch the Rhodesian security forces that their effectiveness would be greatly impaired.” He proposed a “pre-emptive strategy” in order to “take the play away from the Soviets and Cubans in a manner that will be viewed favorably by the Africans.” He advocated a two-pronged approach that

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would both thwart the Soviets and pressure Smith to negotiate a settlement. While acknowledging that the Ford administration had “very limited means” with which it could influence the situation in Rhodesia, he believed there were steps which could be taken to prevent a communist intervention, demonstrate support for majority rule, and “stem the tide of violent confrontation.” He suggested encouraging Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment and promising a US contribution to a fund for education and development in a majority-ruled Rhodesia. He also advocated communicating these plans to Kaunda and the other Frontline presidents.21 Schaufele’s recommendations to Kissinger were timely, because in early April the secretary of state was ready to initiate a dramatic diplomatic initiative regarding Rhodesia. Indeed, the specific itinerary of his first visit to Africa was already being hammered out. During a National Security Council meeting on April 7, Ford asked Kissinger when he would be going, and the secretary replied that his trip would begin on April 23. He would definitely stop in Tanzania and talk with President Nyerere. Although Kissinger viewed Nyerere as a “radical,” he believed that they agreed on the need to limit Cuban involvement in southern Africa. George Bush, the newly appointed head of the CIA, observed that Zambia and Mozambique were “exercising restraint” regarding the Cubans. Kissinger responded that he was also considering a stop in Mozambique. On the other hand he would certainly not visit Nigeria, because its government would not let him. Regardless of where exactly Kissinger did end up visiting, one major goal of the undertaking would be to “identify with African aspirations.”22 During an Oval Office meeting with President Ford on April 12, Kissinger again discussed the Africa trip and in particular the political risks. The secretary explained that he “planned to take a strong stand for the blacks with respect to South Africa.” The president responded: “That is okay with me.” Kissinger then added that he would be advocating repeal of the Byrd Amendment and warned that Ford would “get some flak from the South on it.” The president replied that supporting repeal was “our position.”23 Regardless of the possible impact on his political standing, Ford wanted Kissinger to travel to southern Africa and make a strong statement in favor of racial equality. After this final approval from the president, planning for the trip progressed very rapidly.

Trip logistics Meetings with Nyerere, Kaunda, and at least one leader of the Zimbabwean nationalists were assigned the highest priority. In Tanzania, ambassador James Spain was given just ten days notice to make the necessary arrangements, starting with the potentially tricky issue of getting a formal invitation from President Nyerere for Kissinger. Nyerere was a devoted socialist with “little regard for the Nixon-Ford administration.” He had ejected the Peace Corps and spoken strongly in favor of Puerto Rican independence. Spain explained to Nyerere that Kissinger was interested in meeting with him in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere expressed enthusiasm for such a visit and then asked when it might take place. Spain inquired: “How about a week from Saturday?” President Nyerere flashed his “pixyish grin” and said: “I extend a warm invitation.”24

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Kissinger called Talcott Seelye, the deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, to check on the progress of the arrangements on the morning of April 13. He informed Seelye that he wanted to meet with the embassy staffs wherever possible. Seelye then updated him on Spain’s effort to get an invitation from Nyerere. Kissinger switched the conversation to Zambia and observed that Kaunda was travelling. The secretary pointedly stated to Seelye: “I hope you sent a cable not telling him what we wanted but asking him.”25 Obviously Kissinger wanted Kaunda’s full support and cooperation to make his trip as effective as possible and therefore felt it was imperative to treat the Zambian president with the utmost respect. The stop in Lusaka, in fact, would be the most important part of the whole trip. Kissinger decided to give his major address outlining a new US policy toward southern Africa in Zambia, because it was the country “most directly affected by the Rhodesian issue.” The secretary hoped that his speech would help establish a “deadline” and “galvanize action” regarding Rhodesia.26 There was some consideration of Kissinger speaking in Livingstone, but ambassador Wilkowski argued in favor of Lusaka because more dignitaries and journalists would attend. Kissinger, always concerned that there be sufficient coverage of his diplomatic successes, accepted Wilkowski’s advice to deliver his remarks in the capital city.27 He also insisted that upon arrival in Lusaka his first meeting be with Kaunda, not with one of the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, again demonstrating his appreciation for the Zambian president’s key role in the overall success of his journey.28 Kissinger did hope to talk with Nkomo and Bishop Abel Muzorewa while in Lusaka, and he sought input from Kaunda and Nyerere as to whether he should see any other nationalist leaders. Nyerere felt that Nkomo and Muzorewa were the two most important Zimbabweans, because when the time came to negotiate a settlement, “Joshua and the Bishop will be there.” After several days of frantic efforts Wilkowski finally succeeded in contacting Nkomo at his home in Bulawayo and arranging for him to be in Lusaka when Kissinger arrived.29 Wilkowski and her colleagues met several times with Muzorewa in mid-April but were unable to convince him to talk with Kissinger. In his April 20 statement to the press the bishop denounced “American imperialism, which Dr. Kissinger is coming down to Africa to fortify.” He later described the Ford administration initiative as “duplicity designed not to bring about majority rule, but to subvert the liberation war through deceitful promises.” On April 23, US Embassy officials decried Muzorewa’s stance as “unfortunate and unconstructive.”30 In spite of their best efforts there would be no meeting between the secretary of state and the bishop.

Kissinger departs Departing from Washington on April 23 for London, Kissinger consulted with the new British foreign minister, Anthony Crosland. The two would become good friends, and their teams worked very closely on Rhodesia for the rest of the year. During this brief meeting, Crosland advised Kissinger that in order to appeal to the black African leaders he should avoid stressing the Cold War motivations behind his diplomatic

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intervention. If he hoped to get Ian Smith on board, there must be strong guarantees for the safety and welfare of the white population. Kissinger appreciated the advice, which gave him food for thought as he took off for Nairobi.31 On the plane the secretary admitted to reporters that until this trip, “he had not had time to formulate a coherent policy towards African issues.”32 Whether or not he could have had time for Africa before is debatable, but it certainly was a fact that he had not paid much attention to the continent prior to this trip. Kissinger’s first stop was in Kenya, where he met Jomo Kenyatta, the legendary president. Kenyatta had ruled since independence in 1961 and was nearing the end of his reign. He expressed little interest in the issues of southern Africa and did not even comment after the secretary summarized the speech on majority rule which he planned to deliver in Lusaka. Kenyatta was more concerned with “preserving what he had created” in Kenya. He hoped to obtain US economic and military support, and his biggest worry was the Soviet presence in neighboring Somalia. The specific details of US assistance quickly bored him, and he hustled Kissinger to an arena to witness tribal dances by women wearing elaborate jewelry. Masai warriors brandishing spears made the secretary’s security guards nervous. Kenyatta addressed the crowd, flicking his fly whisk and shouting the national slogan “harambee,” which means “let’s all work together.” A group of children sang “Red River Valley” in Swahili, and then Kenyatta insisted that Kissinger join him for some dancing. The aging president was “full of dignity,” while the secretary of state resembled “an elephant trapped among a group of gazelles.”33 After his short stop in Kenya, the “elephant” rambled on to Tanzania.

Meeting Mwalimu On Sunday, April 25, Kissinger arrived in Dar es Salaam, which he described as “hot, grimy, and poor.” It was nonetheless a crucial stop because of the remarkable reputation of Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. He was known to all as “Mwalimu,” which means “teacher” in Swahili. The secretary was thoroughly impressed by the “graceful and elegant” president, with sparkling eyes and fluid gestures. The former Harvard professor praised Nyerere for his “awesome command of the English language,” a characteristic that made him a “seductive interlocutor.” On the other hand, Nyerere could employ “steely hostility” when needed. He also grasped the workings of the US political system and how it limited Kissinger’s power. The secretary quickly came to understand why Nyerere “had an influence in Africa out of proportion to the resources of his country.” In fact, Kissinger believed that due to his “intellectual dominance,” Mwalimu was the “key to any solution” regarding the conflicts in southern Africa.34 Nyerere hosted Kissinger on Sunday evening at his residence, and his first order of business was to introduce the secretary of state to his mother and family. The two men entered his private office for their first conversation. Kissinger began enthusiastically: “I am really delighted to have this opportunity to meet you, because there are not many people in this part of the world who can philosophically shape events.” He then emphasized that he fully intended to put “the power of the United States behind the liberation of Rhodesia,” in terms that Smith could not misunderstand. His second

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point was that the United States and USSR should not create spheres of influence and turn Africa into a battleground. In any case, he was opposed to “goodwill trips” and was “here now to do something.” Nyerere responded that he was “very grateful” that Kissinger had come. He explained what the Frontline leaders hoped to see from the initiative: “We want pressure on the regime in Rhodesia; we want pressure on Vorster regarding Namibia, and ultimately for change in South Africa.”35 Kissinger admitted that he did not “know the nuances” of southern Africa but that he was “here to learn” from leaders such as Nyerere. He opined that if those seeking change worked together then the regime in Rhodesia would not survive long nor would Pretoria’s control of Namibia; but, he believed that “the problem of South Africa is harder.” Mwalimu agreed with the secretary’s plan to deal with Rhodesia first. “Recognizing that South Africa is a tougher nut to crack,” he added, “we would still be saying the objective in South Africa, as in Rhodesia, is majority rule.” Kissinger replied, “I plan to say this in Lusaka.” He promised to give Nyerere a copy of his speech and hoped he would like it. He asked the President if he approved of the proposal that all of Rhodesia’s neighbors close their borders. Any nations that complied could count on US assistance. Nyerere judged the idea to be “first class.” He asked Kissinger to assure him that the Ford administration had no intention of picking a favorite group in Rhodesia and backing it against the others. Kissinger guaranteed him that they had no such intention and mentioned the problems in Angola resulting from USSoviet competition. “We don’t want the big powers in Africa, entrenching themselves,” explained Mwalimu.36 The secretary of state promised the president that the overall US approach to southern Africa would be “influenced heavily by your thinking.” He reiterated the priorities: Rhodesia, Namibia, and then South Africa. Nyerere repeated his assessment that the US proposals were “first class.” Kissinger elaborated, specifying his intention to push for repeal of the Byrd Amendment and to provide aid for Rhodesian refugees. All of this sounded “very fine” to Mwalimu. The secretary asked about Mozambique. Nyerere responded that they had very friendly relations with the government there and had done much to support the liberation struggle in conjunction with the Chinese. Kissinger noted that the United States had not interfered in Mozambique. Nyerere contrasted that case with the “painful” example of Angola. Kissinger admitted that the United States had agreed more with Zambia in the case of Angola. “Yes, you agreed with my friends more than I did!” exclaimed Nyerere. “We disagreed with Zambia,” he added, “but we move on.”37 Kissinger inquired as to whether Nyerere could “send a message to Mozambique?” Mwalimu promised that he would do so. After the secretary of state had given his speech in Lusaka on Tuesday, Nyerere would contact Kaunda and President Samora Machel of Mozambique and suggest that all the Frontline foreign ministers meet with Kissinger at the UN conference in Nairobi the following week. It would be the “first visible sign of a response” to the speech. Kissinger considered this plan for supporting his initiative to be “excellent.”38 Their private conversation concluded, the two moved to a larger meeting room and joined the secretary’s delegation. Nyerere offered him some wine, but he politely declined, explaining “I almost never drink.” Mwalimu commented that he had been a

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teetotaler until the victory in Mozambique. After taking power, Samora Machel had discovered “stacks and stacks” of Portuguese wine in the executive cellars. Machel sent him some, and Nyerere enjoyed it very much. Because it came from Machel, he called it Samora wine. After finishing a glass, joked Mwalimu, he liked to say: “Bring me Samora.” Nyerere’s humor evidently amused the gathering of diplomats, who may not have expected it from the radical, scholarly socialist. When the laughter subsided, Kissinger requested some background on Machel. Nyerere explained that he had begun in the early 1960s as a soldier in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and had taken over as FRELIMO’s leader when Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated in 1969. Machel then succeeded in bringing together the various factions fighting against the Portuguese in Mozambique.39 Raising his last serious issue of the night, Kissinger told Nyerere that he intended to talk with Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka, “just to show the symbolism of meeting with someone from the Liberation Movement.” He had tried to arrange a session with Muzorewa, but the bishop refused and was now criticizing the entire US diplomatic endeavor. In any case, the secretary of state was still willing to see Muzorewa. He underlined the notion that the Ford administration was “not interested in pitting one faction against another.” Nyerere agreed with this view and joked that maybe Muzorewa would be willing to speak with Kissinger after his speech rendered him “more acceptable.” The secretary commented that often people had criticized him publicly but gotten along well with him in private. Nyerere wondered if it was a characteristic of democratic societies, which forced people to behave differently in public in order to attract voters. He thought that perhaps Soviet leaders had less to worry about. Kissinger disagreed, and contended that although Ford was being challenged in the Republican primaries, he would win in the end. “Reagan is a former movie actor,” observed Kissinger. “He doesn’t know what he’s saying, but he says it effectively.” The group laughed at the secretary’s criticism of Reagan, the president explained the program for the next morning, and the session was adjourned for the evening.40 The next morning found Kissinger and Nyerere at the national soccer arena side-byside in the presidential box, observing a parade in honor of the 12th anniversary of the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The Tanzanian army, trained in communist East Germany, marched by impressively. Occasionally, however, a soldier launched a sandal as a result of overzealous goose-stepping. Mwalimu “looked cool and elegant in a light gray bush suit,” observed Kissinger. On the other hand, the secretary of state “felt clumsy and uncomfortable” in his “blue pinstriped diplomat’s uniform.” After the parade, Nyerere hosted a luncheon. During his remarks, delivered in “beautifully cadenced English,” the president underscored US concern about Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa and promised to help limit it.41 Before Kissinger departed for Zambia, he and Nyerere sat down for another indepth discussion. The president opened the session by identifying southern Africa’s two top priorities as decolonization and development and then yielded the floor to Kissinger. The secretary discussed his overall African strategy, which was to utilize cooperation and dialogue. He explained that the trip was not prompted by any crisis but instead had been in the works since “before last summer.” He denied the accusations that he had scheduled the journey to boost his boss’s election prospects. His goal was to

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accomplish some long-term progress for Africa, not short-term political gain for Ford. He reiterated that he did not want to see any great power competition in southern Africa. He had not come only to make speeches, but to “tackle problems.” Kissinger admitted that in the past he had not paid as much attention to Africa as he should have but that such would not longer be the case. He intended to take the advice of leaders such as Nyerere. “My program,” he concluded, “is not an American program but an African program.”42 Mwalimu offered his thoughts on Kissinger’s remarks, first by concurring that there should not be too much outside involvement on the continent. Whether “tigers fight” or “elephants make love,” it was the grass that suffered. “We are small countries,” stated Nyerere, “and when the super powers either make love or quarrel we are in trouble.” Some help in the liberation of southern Africa would be welcomed, but Nyerere hoped to avoid further Cold War ideological competition. He then emphasized the fact that the Frontline leaders would rather negotiate than fight, pointing to the example of Kaunda working with South African president Vorster. Unfortunately that attempt at détente had failed, and now it was time to fight. The key to winning the struggle in Rhodesia would be maintaining unity. The goal of the guerrilla war was to convince the British to cajole Ian Smith to go to London for a conference with Nkomo and Muzorewa. At that point, the military leaders would also become involved.43 Kissinger wondered whether the Frontline presidents knew exactly which military leaders would participate. He also worried about the Soviets or the Cubans playing too large a role at that stage, by backing a particular faction. As long as African leadership was in control and unified, he promised US assistance. “We are not fighting for Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, or the United States,” responded Nyerere, “but for the liberty of Rhodesia.” Kissinger seemed convinced and then explained that the US contribution to the peace process would be economic and political but not military. The Ford administration intended to provide economic aid to Mozambique and other Frontline nations, but in return he wanted black African states to moderate their criticisms of the United States. “You have a right to ask the same of us,” offered the secretary, “and we will not lecture you.”44 Nyerere returned to the recent and tragic case of Angola and sought assurances that it would not happen again. He had acquired weapons from the Chinese to give to Jonas Savimbi so that his forces could participate equally in an Angolan government and army of national unity. When Savimbi decided instead to fight the other factions within Angola, Nyerere opted to keep the Chinese weapons in Dar es Salaam. He actually still had them. “We wanted arms for a national army,” he explained, “not for a civil war.” Kissinger interjected that Angola was “in the past.” Mwalimu admitted as much but contended that “looking at Angola will help us understand the situation.”45 Kissinger, whose PhD dissertation was on Napoleonic Era diplomacy, did not need this reminder about the importance of history. Turning the discussion back to Rhodesia, the president expressed support for an US diplomatic effort to achieve majority rule. “But we will expect pressure against Smith,” he added, “even if you do not supply us arms.” They discussed the fate of white Rhodesians. When Nyerere commented that hardliners like Ian Smith definitely would not remain in the country under black rule Kissinger joked, “You mean he will not be

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leader of the opposition party?” After some laughter Mwalimu continued, identifying the other group of whites who would not stay as those who had emigrated mainly for material comfort they could not enjoy in their home countries such as Britain. “They were of the lower middle class,” he observed, “but after a few years in Rhodesia, they have a mansion, servants and a swimming pool.” Kissinger again joked that he was looking for a place like that with a pool. Nyerere exclaimed: “We have a large one, the Indian Ocean.” After more laughter Nyerere proposed small grants for whites who wanted to leave, as a way to shorten the war. “The thing to do,” he emphasized, “is to get these two groups out of Rhodesia.”46 The secretary hoped the Frontline presidents could work on the details of constitutional guarantees for whites who wanted to stay in Rhodesia. Meanwhile, he would pursue financial compensation for whites who wanted to leave. Nyerere again predicted that “Smith will not stay.” Assistant Secretary Schaufele interjected: “He will move to Tanzania.” The president quickly replied: “Let him, he will find constitutional guarantees here.” The group laughed enthusiastically at this exchange, and then Kissinger inquired where Smith had been born. “In Scotland,” answered Nyerere. Kissinger asked if he should be meeting with any white Rhodesians on this trip. Mwalimu thought not, particularly considering the fact that Smith had recently announced that there would be no majority rule in Rhodesia for a thousand years. 47 The second lengthy conversation between Kissinger and Nyerere came to a close. The secretary of state thanked the president again for talking with him and promised to stay in close contact. “We do not have to agree on everything,” Kissinger concluded, “but on the basic decisions.”48 Although the US ambassador in Dar es Salaam, James Spain, did not approve of some aspects of the secretary of state’s initial interactions with the Tanzanian leader, especially the secretary’s tendency to talk too much, he later conceded that “progress was nonetheless made.”49 Kissinger himself characterized these initial meetings with Mwalimu as being extremely important. “Nyerere was the key to the frontline states,” he explained. “He was the bridge between such moderates as Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Botswana’s President Seretse Khama on one side, and the radicals Samora Machel and Agostinho Neto” on the other side.50 The next stop would be Lusaka, to meet with the “moderate” Kaunda.

Landing in Lusaka and morning meetings Two gigantic 747s carrying Kissinger and his party landed at Lusaka International Airport on the evening of Monday, April 26. The extra plane carried the secretary’s special bullet-proof Cadillac, which would be used for the short drive from the airport into the city. Ambassador Wilkowski “never fathomed why it was necessary” to use two jets and a limousine to get Kissinger to Lusaka but in any case appreciated the fact that he made the trip.51 During his initial press conference at the airport, Kissinger praised Kaunda as “one of the most dedicated and respected statesmen in Africa.” He recognized his “old friend” Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda in the welcoming party and thanked the people of Zambia for the invitation which they had “so long extended” for him to visit their country.52 After the quick limousine ride to the Intercontinental

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Hotel, the secretary again addressed the media: “We have chosen Lusaka to make our policy statement on our views on southern Africa,” he explained, “because of our admiration for the wisdom, moderation, and dedication of President Kaunda.”53 A Daily Mail editorial applauded Kissinger for supporting “majority rule and selfdetermination” in the region.54 At 9 a.m. the next morning, Tuesday, April 27, Kissinger entered State House for a short conversation with Kaunda. “Tall and solidly built,” the Zambian leader was a “striking figure.” Although not as well-educated or eloquent as Nyerere, he was “highly intelligent” and possessed the important attributes of “practicality and common sense.” According to Kissinger: “With his white hair, flashing eyes, and ready smile, he exuded authority.”55 The president greeted the secretary of state warmly and assured him that his was “a very welcome visit.” He reminded Kissinger that the previous secretary had also visited Lusaka, and so had former vice president Hubert Humphrey.56 President Kaunda recalled telling President Ford that southern Africa was at a dangerous “turning point,” and now it was time to focus on ways the United States could contribute to the process of moving events in the right direction. “As far as Rhodesia is concerned,” he observed, “we don’t see any solution to the problem as long as Smith is there.” The most logical approach was through South African president John Vorster, who was “Smith’s colonial master in the area.” Kaunda admitted that he was not certain how to remove Smith but explained to Kissinger that “we have to work together to find a way.” He believed that Mozambique’s decision to close its border would help the United States convince South Africa to be “more cooperative.” He recognized Kissinger’s concern about Soviet or Cuban involvement in Rhodesia but “knew of no African leader who had spoken of this possibility.” He did not want any outside support favoring a particular faction of the Zimbabwean guerrilla fighters. “They should be left alone;” he insisted, “that is the only way to avoid an Angolan situation in Rhodesia.”57 After dealing first with Rhodesia, continued Kaunda, the next priority should be Namibia, and finally South Africa itself. On Namibia the Ford administration should use diplomacy to influence the Pretoria regime to respect the UN ruling in favor of Namibian independence. While South Africa was a sovereign state and therefore a different case, Kaunda wanted it to be clear that he did not accept apartheid and he supported those who were struggling against it. “South Africa exists because of western commerce and investment,” so the United States could eventually play a key role in the battle against apartheid. “Your decision to come here,” he concluded, “shows that you want to find solutions to the southern African problems.”58 Kissinger pledged significant bilateral aid for Kaunda’s country as thanks for his help on this initiative, as well as on previous ones. “As for Zambia,” he explained, “we respect you as one of the intellectual and political leaders, and we appreciate the cooperation we have received in certain matters.” It was not stated, but these “certain matters” probably had been the covert intervention in Angola. “We want to assist in your development,” added the secretary, “and after I return to Washington we will look at programs of assistance to Zambia.” Kissinger kept his word in this instance, and Zambia would in fact see a quantum leap in US funding the following year. “We have no problems with you or your government, Mr. President,” he observed.59

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The Ford administration’s overall strategy for the region was to work with South Africa to bring majority rule to Rhodesia first, independence to Namibia second, and focus on fighting apartheid third. In order to accomplish all of this, Kissinger was even “prepared to have normal relations with Mozambique” and hoped to start by meeting with Mozambique’s foreign minister during the upcoming UN conference in Nairobi. “If foreign intervention is kept out of southern Africa,” concluded the secretary of state, “the United States can give you its maximum support.”60 After this brief and friendly exchange with Kaunda, Kissinger returned to the Intercontinental Hotel for a short session with Joshua Nkomo. The head of the ZAPU met the secretary of state in his hotel room. According to Kissinger, Nkomo was “the leader Kaunda was eager to see take over the Rhodesian government.” The secretary was struck by Nkomo’s massive physique. He believed that the ZAPU leader still had a good chance to be Zimbabwe’s first president, but only if negotiations resulted in a quick settlement. Although it had taken several days for Ambassador Wilkowski to arrange this rendezvous, it lasted less than ten minutes. Kissinger previewed his forthcoming speech for Nkomo and received his assurance that whites would be welcomed in a majority-ruled Zimbabwe.61 The secretary’s briefing did not impress Nkomo, who described it as “more like talking to a robot than to a person.” Kissinger believed the short meeting was successful in that it symbolized US support for the principle of majority rule, and he would later include a photo of it in his memoirs. The ZAPU leader, on the other hand, dismissed the encounter completely. “I only knew that whatever he wanted it was not what I wanted,” explained Nkomo in his autobiography.62

Kissinger’s Lusaka speech Kissinger returned to State House for lunch with Kaunda, after which the stage was set for him to deliver his long-awaited speech on the new US policy toward southern Africa. “The setting for the speech did not match its intended reach,” recalled the secretary. He would speak from a podium at one end of a long table, around which were seated about fifty people. The journalists outnumbered the dignitaries in the room. The Zambian president introduced the secretary politely but did include a few reminders of past US wrongs. “Kaunda had obviously arranged it,” explained Kissinger, “so that he would not lose too much face if I did not deliver what we had promised.”63 Kaunda need not have worried, as Kissinger proceeded to give one of the most remarkable speeches in the entire history of US foreign relations. The text had taken six weeks and seven drafts to finalize.64 The secretary of state began by explaining that he had undertaken this journey because “the challenges of Africa are the challenges of the modern era.” Events on the continent demonstrated clearly that the era of colonization was over and that the new era was defined by critical challenges such as nation-building, peacekeeping, economic development, and achieving racial justice. The intention was to create “a humane and progressive world order,” claimed Kissinger. “For without peace, racial justice, and growing prosperity in Africa,” he exclaimed dramatically, “we cannot speak of a just international order.”65

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The secretary contended that there was no point in rehashing the shortcomings of earlier US policy toward Africa or the failures of various African nations. “No good can come of mutual recrimination,” because it was “time to put aside slogans and seek practical solutions.” He had no interest in pitting one African nation against another or one faction in the liberation movements against another but instead called for unity. “I am not here to give American prescriptions for Africa’s problems,” he insisted: “Your program must be African.” The first priority must be racial justice throughout the continent. “Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a matter of foreign policy,” he observed, “but an imperative of our own moral heritage.”66 He then underlined Zambia’s central role in the struggle for peace and justice in the region. “By geography and economic necessity,” he pointed out, “Zambia is affected directly and grievously by strife in southern Africa.” In spite of the high costs, “Zambia has chosen to stand by her principles by closing her border with Rhodesia and enduring the economic consequences,” continued Kissinger. “This is a testimony to the determination of the people of this country and to the statesmanship of its great leader, President Kaunda,” he noted. The secretary then quoted from Kaunda’s 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, which had advocated racial justice for southern Africa, and compared it favorably to the immortal words written two hundred years earlier by Thomas Jefferson in his Declaration of Independence. “There can be no doubt that the United States remains committed to the principles of its own Declaration of Independence,” stated Kissinger. “It follows that we also adhere to the convictions of the Lusaka Manifesto.”67 Zambia’s ambassador to the United States, who was in the audience, was particularly impressed by the fact that Kissinger was acknowledging the significance of the Lusaka Manifesto in his speech.68 The secretary reiterated the broad moral underpinnings of his strategic initiative: “I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” The goals were nothing less than “self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa.” Kissinger planned to first unveil the specifics of a new US approach to Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa and then “sketch our vision of southern Africa’s hopeful future.”69 The secretary presented a ten-point program in support of the rapid realization of majority rule in Rhodesia. The US government approved of the recent British proposals and would do nothing to aid the Smith regime. In order to fulfill its international obligations, the Ford administration would urge Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Kissinger intended to communicate his views clearly and directly to Ian Smith, advocating “a rapid negotiated settlement leading to majority rule.” The State Department would warn Americans not to visit Rhodesia. Kissinger pledged to seek $12.5 million in aid for Mozambique. Furthermore, he would attempt to assist other neighboring nations who similarly closed their borders in the future. The United States would supply humanitarian aid to any refugees fleeing Rhodesia and long-term support for the newly independent country of Zimbabwe. Finally, he believed that in the majority-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, the new constitution should protect the rights of the white minority. “The United States,” he promised, “is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia.”70

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Kissinger turned his attention to Namibia and called on the Pretoria regime to “permit all the people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely, under UN supervision, on the political future and constitutional structure of their country.” He requested that South Africa announce a concrete timetable for Namibian independence and pledged US diplomatic and economic support in order to achieve that end. Regarding South Africa itself, the secretary decried apartheid as “an issue of great concern to those committed to racial justice and human dignity.” He admitted that historically the United States had been far from perfect regarding race relations and also clearly stated that white South Africans should not be forced to leave the land of their birth. “Within a reasonable time,” he nevertheless hoped, “we shall see a clear evolution toward equality of opportunity and basic human rights for all South Africans.” In the near future, he asked Pretoria to pressure Ian Smith into negotiating peace and majority rule for Rhodesia.71 The secretary next discussed the need for a comprehensive program to promote economic development across southern Africa, beginning with major bilateral assistance to countries such as Zambia who had been so severely affected by the crash in copper prices. He proposed US help to train local manpower, improve rural agriculture, upgrade technology, and modernize transportation systems throughout the region. “The industrial nations, the newly-wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries themselves,” he explained, “must collaborate for the goal of development.” He promised to elaborate on these concepts at the UN economic conference in Kenya the following week. He summed up his main points and repeated that “the United States supports Africa’s genuine nonalignment and unity.” Concluding his stirring address he exclaimed: “So let it be said that black people and white people working together achieved on this continent—which has suffered so much and seen so much injustice—a new era of peace, well-being and human dignity.”72 President Kaunda, who had been following Kissinger’s inspirational words attentively, had tears rolling down his cheeks by the end and rose to express his approval. “Some of us were emotionally charged when you were speaking,” he told the secretary. “We are fully convinced the statement you have just made represents the sentiments of the great majority of the American people,” he added. “The program you have enunciated will get our full support,” promised the Zambian leader.73 He embraced Kissinger and admitted that “we couldn’t believe this was a Secretary of State from Washington.”74 After dinner that evening, Kaunda called Ambassador Wilkowski’s home to again express his satisfaction regarding Kissinger’s visit, which he described as “fantastic” and “far beyond his expectations.” He offered special thanks for the work she and her staff had done in coordination with Zambian officials to facilitate such a success. Wilkowski was also very pleased with the role she had played and later singled out Kissinger’s speech as the event which allowed her to judge her Zambian tenure as “one of genuine, professional accomplishment.” In addition to helping coordinate the logistics of the visit, she believed that her frequent messages to Washington over the years advocating a stronger US stance in support of racial equality in southern Africa had contributed significantly to the substance of Kissinger’s address. The evidence suggests that she was correct, although the secretary failed to give her any credit for this contribution.75 How

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much this reflected sexism on the part of the secretary and how much it was simply a personality clash is difficult to determine. Disappointing efforts at sightseeing in Livingstone the next day, April 28, only added to the personal animosity between Kissinger and Wilkowski. On the flight down from Lusaka she had described in great detail the wonders that awaited him on the Zambezi River, where UN ambassador William Scranton had recently seen 19 hippopotamuses during one cruise. Unfortunately for Kissinger and Wilkowski, no hippopotamuses appeared during their excursion, probably due to the large number of speed boats buzzing around them carrying security personnel. To make matters worse, their craft began taking on water, raising the alarming possibility that they might end up swimming in “the crocodile-infested Zambezi.” According to Kissinger, critics who wanted him removed from the Ford administration “nearly got their wish.” He blamed Wilkowski for the “fiasco.” Their other outing, to look at the spectacular Victoria Falls, did not go very well either. The best perspective required walking onto a narrow bridge, and the acrophobic Kissinger was “far too nervous” to go far enough out for a really good view. “So much for the secretary’s safari,” Wilkowski concluded.76 April 28, it so happened, was Kaunda’s 52nd birthday. Ambassador Wilkowski informed the secretary of state that it was his birthday but only after he had departed for Zaire. She believed that Kissinger “should take satisfaction in knowing he has given Kaunda cause for (a) very happy birthday indeed.” Expressing one final disappointment with the ambassador, Kissinger replied two days later: “Unfortunately we were not aware that Kaunda’s birthday was April 28th.” Writing from Kinshasa, he asked her to pass a message to the Zambian president. “Nothing gives me more encouragement than your spontaneous and deeply moving words and action when I had finished my speech,” he stated. The secretary wished Kaunda continuing success “in the cause of peace and racial justice.” “My only regret,” he apologized, “is that I was not aware of the imminence of your birthday. Please accept my belated but no less warm congratulations.”77 This seemingly silly snafu surely exacerbated the secretary’s dislike for Wilkowski but did not detract from the success of his visit to Zambia.

Other stops in Africa After his headline-grabbing performance in Zambia, Kissinger visited Zaire, where he met with controversial leader Joseph Mobutu for a lengthy conversation on the presidential yacht as it sailed down the Congo River. Mobutu expressed concern about the heavily armed socialist government in neighboring Angola and asked for sophisticated weapons from the Ford administration.78 He dreamed of transforming Zaire into an “economic showplace,” which would demonstrate for the entire lessdeveloped-world the benefits of cooperating with the West. Kissinger was “sympathetic” but departed without making any promises.79 From Zaire, the secretary flew to Liberia for a short visit with President William Tolbert. Evidently the Liberian leader did not particularly impress Kissinger, who was pretty exhausted by that point in any case. On the other hand, in his memoirs

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he did single out the US ambassador in Monrovia, W. Beverly Carter, for high praise.80 Kissinger characterized Carter, one of the first African Americans to achieve ambassadorial rank, as a “towering man possessed of high intelligence and a charming manner.” The two men had butted heads the year before while Carter was still ambassador to Tanzania, in a dispute over how to handle a situation involving US hostages. Carter facilitated a ransom payment to free them, in defiance of US policy, and Kissinger punished him by withdrawing his name from consideration as the next ambassador to Denmark. After a few months passed, Kissinger had offered him the Liberia job, and he admired the honorable way Carter accepted the reassignment. “He was a big man in more than size,” concluded Kissinger, in a rare example of praise for a State Department subordinate.81 As the secretary’s plane landed in Senegal, news arrived of President Ford’s disastrous defeat by Ronald Reagan in the May 1 Texas primary, which seemed partly due to white southern voters’ negative reaction to Kissinger’s Lusaka speech. On April 30, Reagan had denounced Kissinger’s new African policy to a large crowd in front of the Alamo. He had criticized the secretary’s plan to repeal the Byrd Amendment and had emphasized the need for protection of white minority rights. Reagan had claimed that the Lusaka speech “undercut the possibility for a just and orderly settlement.” Over 100,000 Democrats crossed party lines and voted for Reagan in the Texas primary, helping him win every county and all 96 delegates. Kissinger’s staff tried to lighten the mood by singing “The Eyes of Texas Are upon You,” but the secretary nonetheless fumed about Reagan’s “totally irresponsible” remarks.82 In Senegal, the secretary of state spoke at length with President Leopold Senghor, “a poet and a statesman” whom Kissinger ranked with Nyerere as one of the two most intelligent leaders he met in Africa. Senghor was a moderate who approved of the new US policy toward southern Africa which had been announced in Lusaka. He told Kissinger that while he would support US efforts to keep Soviet and Cuban influence off the continent, it should be accomplished through diplomacy and economic development, not military means. He did not want to see “a second Angola.” The secretary was “deeply impressed” by the president’s analysis of international affairs and promised cooperation with Senegal in the future. He suggested that Senghor contact him or Ford directly with any concerns. After their conversation, the secretary gave a speech in Dakar espousing US assistance to fight drought and desertification in the Sahel region. Before departing he was “powerfully moved” by a visit to the slave fort on Goree Island. Kissinger remarked that the tragic location “should call all of us to our duty to build on this continent a period in which all human beings—black as well as white—can work together.”83 On May 6 in Kenya he delivered the final speech of his African trip, examining the broad challenges facing the world, particularly Africa, in the last quarter of the twentieth century. “The nations of this continent,” he promised, “can be confident that the United States is prepared to cooperate with them in their great struggles for justice” and “economic progress.” He discussed development issues such as trade, private investment, debt, severe poverty, resources, and technology. He announced a proposal designed to help alleviate the impact of market fluctuations on developing countries that were dependent on a single commodity, such as Zambia with its reliance on copper

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exports. “Let’s get down to business,” he concluded. “The United States extends its hand to those who will travel with us on this road to a more humane and bountiful future.”84 His two-week tour of Africa completed, Kissinger flew to Paris for a tête-à-tête with French president Valery Giscard about his country’s possible role in future programs for African development. He then returned to the United States, landing at Andrews Air Force Base on May 7. In summarizing his trip for the press he observed: “We managed to make some progress with a message that the United States favors negotiations and not struggle; that it favors majority rule but also minority rights.” He believed that “the leaders to whom we have talked heard that message and are prepared to reciprocate.” He indicated that his next task was to report on his Africa trip to the president.85

Kissinger reports to the president President Ford and Kissinger first met to discuss the trip on Sunday, May 9, and the secretary felt like the president approved of the results entirely. “From the moment I returned,” he later recalled, “Ford put himself conspicuously behind our Africa policy.”86 The National Security Council convened on evening of Tuesday May 11 in the White House cabinet room. Ford opened the session by reminding those present of the “fiasco in Angola,” and his view at the beginning of the year that if they did not do something substantial to stop the “growing radicalization” in southern Africa, then “we could be creating serious problems for ourselves.” He explained that the secretary of state had recently visited Africa and “carried out a good, responsible policy.” Ford acknowledged that he had received “a little political flack” but dismissed it as “totally without merit.” He insisted that his administration would “continue to do what is right regardless of the primaries.” The president wrapped up his brief introduction by contending that “we have halted the radicalization in Africa and opened the door for movement in a positive direction.” He then turned the floor over to Kissinger, who evidently had a pressing social engagement, by joking, “I don’t want to hold you up for the ballet, Henry.”87 The secretary summarized his trip for the NSC, explaining that the timing had been urgent as a result of the communist victory in Angola, which threatened to radicalize the entire area. “Even Kaunda of Zambia, a moderate,” pointed out Kissinger, “was announcing the beginning of an armed struggle in southern Africa.” He and President Ford had decided to take action in order to “arrest the armed struggle … preclude foreign intervention, give the moderate regimes something to hold on to and the radicals something to think about.” He hoped to “slow down the struggle and get control of the process” as he had done in the Middle East. Thus the intention of his speech in Lusaka was “to give us a platform on which we could stand.” In exchange for commitments Kissinger made in Lusaka, such as pushing for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, Kaunda and the other Frontline presidents agreed to limit the role of the Cubans in the region.88 Kissinger recapped his conversation with ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who promised “civilian rule” in the new nation of Zimbabwe if the Rhodesian conflict ended through negotiation in the near future, but predicted the emergence of a more militant

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government similar to Mozambique’s if the military struggle lasted too long. The secretary pointed out that access to key resources such as chrome could be endangered by ascension of a more radical regime in Zimbabwe. Ford interjected: “What will be our approach as to getting negotiations going again with Smith, Nkomo, Callaghan, and the rest?” The secretary responded that it was critical for South Africa to force Smith to negotiate, and soon. “If we don’t grab the initiative,” he warned, “we will be faced with the Soviets, and Cuban troops.” He believed that the program put forth in his Lusaka speech had been a successful first step toward that goal. He had given “the African states a positive program to rally around” and had convinced the moderate leaders such as Kaunda of the benefits of working with the United States. He concluded that African reaction had been “uniformly favorable,” even in nations such as Zaire that did not “give a damn about southern Africa.”89 The secretary next explained that during his trip he had discovered some “military problems,” especially in Zaire. President Mobutu feared the Angolans, who possessed 350 Soviet tanks. He proposed major US military assistance to Mobutu, perhaps even providing tanks, asking that “if Angola has them, why not him?” He worried that the collapse of Zaire would be “catastrophic.” With immense resources and thirteen neighboring countries, Zaire was a key to stability for the entire continent. “If Zaire goes, every African state will draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union (which they don’t like all that much) is the wave of the future,” claimed Kissinger. Because of the escalating conflict in Rhodesia, he added: “I do not feel decisions can wait for next year.” Aside from the case of Zaire, however, very little money would be required to mount an effective policy for Africa. “If we conduct a subtle diplomatic offense,” he concluded, “we can defuse the southern African situation so there will be no outside intervention.”90 Ford shifted the focus of the session by asking if there was any activity on the part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Kissinger replied that the PRC was “playing an intelligent game” in Africa. They were providing technical assistance, and they were “doing it well.” Overall, the PRC was the foreign country making the biggest impact in Africa regarding technical assistance. General Vernon Walters, the deputy director of central intelligence, noted that the PRC’s single largest overseas project was a $600 million railroad in Tanzania. “The railroad also goes through Zambia,” added Kissinger, “and the Chinese completed it on time.” He believed that in the short run the United States could work with the PRC to counter Soviet influence in the region but that in the long run “if they gain dominant influence in Africa it will be almost as bad for us as Soviet dominance.”91 Regardless of such impressive accomplishments by the Chinese, Kissinger still thought the Americans had “a chance in Africa.” One key challenge would be getting back into Nigeria’s good graces. Furthermore, it was crucial to keep the four Frontline states on board. The secretary hoped to “use Botswana and Zambia as a brake on Mozambique and Tanzania will be somewhere in between.” President Seretse Khama of Botswana and Kaunda were definitely moderates, and even Nyerere was “not keen on the Cubans.” These presidents had agreed to consult closely with Kissinger, which meant that the US had a strong platform from which to react “if the Cubans do show up” in other areas besides Angola.92

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“What we need to consider,” contended the secretary of state, “are major programs in countries such as Zaire, Senegal, Kenya, and Zambia.” In order to do this he thought “it would be worth dropping some of our third-rate programs in other countries.” There needed to be a priority put on “programs that would make a real difference.” Furthermore, the United States should coordinate their strategy with other Western countries such as France, in order to have even more impact. The plan that French president Giscard advocated would reward the moderate states. “Aid would go to Zambia,” for example, “but not Mozambique.” General Walters commented that it seemed like an “African Marshall Plan,” to which Kissinger responded that it would not necessarily involve large amounts of US money. He hoped to convince Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia to finance transportation and irrigation projects. “The beauty of this,” he contended, “is that these countries are so uninformed on Africa that once we are in there, we can have a major impact.”93 Kissinger reiterated that a diplomatic intervention regarding Rhodesia could go a long way to limit communist influence in southern Africa. He finished reporting on his first Africa trip and Lusaka speech by stating that the most important goal of US diplomacy was to “prevent a bloodbath” in the region. President Ford ended the meeting on a lighter note: “Once again, thank you, Henry, and don’t miss the ballet.”94

Conclusions Kissinger’s eleventh-hour intervention in the Rhodesian conflict made a very significant impact on US foreign relations. His first visit to the continent, and in particular his speech in Lusaka in April 1976, represented a watershed event in the history of US policy toward southern Africa. From that moment forward the US government at the highest levels committed considerable time and money to a new approach, one which was designed to help bring majority rule to Rhodesia and to support the black governments in nations such as Zambia. Once Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, furthermore, the Carter and Reagan administrations added the Mugabe government to their list of aid recipients partly in hopes of facilitating independence for Namibia. Finally in 1986, due to a grassroots movement among the United States people, Congress initiated tough sanctions against the Pretoria regime and the US was fully engaged in the fight against apartheid. Eventually, then, the entire blueprint spelled out by the secretary of state in his Lusaka address was carried out. Close examination of his African diplomacy in the spring of 1976 reveals more than just this feel-good story, however, and provides important new insights into Kissinger’s motives and methods. Evidence from Zambia and from recently declassified US documents demonstrates beyond any doubt that the secretary was acting at least as much out of Cold War calculations as from any moralistic principles. Time and time again he emphasized the importance of taking action in order to prevent an increase in influence for the Cubans or Soviets. His dealings with Nkomo and the Frontline presidents provide another in a long line of examples of his tendency to talk more than listen and his willingness to airbrush the facts in order to achieve a positive result quickly. His treatment of Ambassador Wilkwowski and refusal to give her even the

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smallest bit of credit for her contribution to the development of the revised policy toward southern Africa certainly suggest that although he could perhaps no longer be accused of racism, he may well have been sexist. Kissinger’s first visit to Lusaka represented perhaps the single most significant diplomatic event in the entire history of US-Zambia relations, and it was a turning point for US foreign relations. On the one hand, the decision to send the secretary to southern Africa in the midst of a primary challenge from Ronald Reagan demonstrated the strength of Gerald Ford’s convictions. Kissinger’s inspirational call for racial justice and his positive relations with Kaunda showed a new and admirable side of the secretary. He promised to provide support for the Zambian president, whom he considered a moderate, and he kept his word. On the other hand, his ongoing obsession with confronting communism convinced him of the necessity of continuing massive US assistance to Mobutu, whom he admitted was a corrupt dictator. During his final year in power, Kissinger overhauled US policy toward Rhodesia for the better. Kissinger certainly deserves credit for initiating the new policy, but as a diplomat he was still far from perfect. Nevertheless, his watershed Lusaka speech succeeded in giving the US government a platform from which it could launch future policies toward southern Africa.

4

“You Need to Have Kaunda’s Support”: Kissinger’s 1976 Diplomacy Regarding Rhodesia

Between May and November 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conducted a flurry of his trademark shuttle diplomacy in hopes of bringing majority rule to Rhodesia. With the full backing of his boss President Gerald Ford in spite of potential political backlash during an election year, Kissinger travelled tirelessly around Europe and southern Africa in an effort to replace Ian Smith with a black prime minister. Hoping to facilitate this diplomatic breakthrough, he cooperated closely with a fascinating cast of characters such as James Callaghan of Britain, Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Johannes Vorster of South Africa. Arguably his most crucial ally in this remarkable effort, however, was President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. In the midst of Kissinger’s initiative Mobutu advised him that in order to achieve the sought-after settlement for Rhodesia: “You need to have Kaunda’s support,” and there was no doubt that the secretary of state agreed.1 Carefully coordinating his every move with Kaunda, Secretary of State Kissinger nearly succeeded in fostering the transition to majority rule. Using the Pretoria government for leverage, he forced Smith to accept the principle of majority rule. Promising and then in fact delivering unprecedented aid to Zambia, he cajoled Kaunda into using his influence with his Frontline colleagues such as Nyerere to embrace the initiative. Taking a firm stance with Callaghan, he convinced the British to organize a conference in Geneva in hopes of hammering out the final agreement between Smith and Zimbabwean nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. The Geneva conference opened at the end of October, but a few days later Ford was defeated by Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter. As a lame duck, Kissinger opted not to participate in the Geneva sessions. The talks broke down in December and never reconvened, so the attempt to engineer peace, majority rule, and independence for Rhodesia remained a daunting challenge as Carter and his UN Ambassador Andrew Young took power in January 1977. The Carter administration eventually helped broker the deal that turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe in 1980, but their success undoubtedly owed a lot to the trailblazing cooperation between Kissinger and Kaunda.

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Talks with Vorster On May 14, one week after returning to Washington from his first visit to Africa, Henry Kissinger talked with Roelof “Pik” Botha, the South African ambassador to the United States. Kissinger hoped to arrange a meeting with either the South African foreign minister or prime minister, preferably in Europe, in order to discuss Rhodesia. He also offered to visit South Africa afterward if it seemed like it would be helpful. Botha told Kissinger that Prime Minister Johannes Vorster would publicize Pretoria’s response in a speech, and he did so on May 18 in Cape Town. Vorster expressed his appreciation for the Ford administration’s interest in the region, and offered to help find solutions regarding Rhodesia. This affirmation allowed the two governments to begin planning a top-level rendezvous, and it was agreed that it would occur in Germany near the end of June.2 In the weeks leading up to the talks, serious violence erupted in the Soweto area of Johannesburg, making Kissinger’s decision to work with Vorster more problematic. The conflict centered on the Pretoria regime’s announcement that in the schools the Afrikaans language must be utilized equally with English. The youth in Soweto worried about the challenges of mastering three languages—their own native tongue, English, and Afrikaans—and many of them particularly disliked Afrikaans because they associated it with a repressive regime. In mid-May thousands of students in Soweto started walking out of school, calling for an end to the Afrikaans requirement. On June 15, a student committee announced that a massive strike would take place the next day. The morning of June 16 saw thousands of young Soweto residents walking toward the stadium in Orlando West. Heavily armed police confronted the students and began firing tear gas to disperse the crowd. An officer fired his revolver into the crowd, killing thirteen-yearold Hector Petersen, and chaos ensued. Rock-throwing students encountered heavy gunfire, and Soweto soon resembled a war zone. By the next evening police officially reported 58 dead and 788 wounded. After another week of bloodshed the government acknowledged a death toll at 176, but Soweto residents believed it was much higher.3 After hearing reports of the violence in South Africa, President Gerald Ford concluded that Kissinger should go ahead with his plans to meet Vorster. “What we are trying to do is overcome things like this,” he explained. The secretary of state agreed but also worried that the late-May decision by President Kenneth Kaunda to allow Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) to open guerrilla bases in Zambia might foster instability there. He believed it was urgent to begin his diplomatic initiative as soon as possible. With the Soweto inferno still raging, however, many people disagreed with Kissinger’s decision to consult with Vorster. When activists announced plans for a massive protest in Hamburg, the proposed venue, the German government hastily moved the talks to a remote resort area in the conservative Bavaria region. Nevertheless, when Kissinger and his party arrived by helicopter on June 23, they found scores of German police confronting a large group of demonstrators. Kissinger initially met briefly with the prime minister alone. The secretary of state explained that his intention was to facilitate majority rule in Rhodesia. Vorster offered to help, as long as he believed the rights of the white minority

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in Rhodesia were being guaranteed. The two men joined the rest of the delegations for dinner and a two-hour discussion.4 After saying grace Vorster opened the conversation with an assessment of the military scenario: “If the Cubans and Soviets stay out, the fight between 15,000 on the Rhodesian side and a few thousand terrorists can go on for 15 years,” he contended. “Some say the situation will begin to unravel by this time next year,” countered Kissinger. Vorster insisted that as long as there was no significant communist intervention it would be a long struggle. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele wondered if black reluctance to fight would eventually encourage outside intervention. “That is the million dollar question,” responded Vorster. “Kaunda, for one, will be very wary of it because he’s genuinely as afraid of Russian communists as you and I are.”5 While the South Africans believed that Kaunda’s distrust of the Soviets would benefit white Rhodesians, they acknowledged that the situation was becoming more challenging. Vorster warned that “it will get harder for them,” in part because of the increasing role played by Mozambique in supporting guerrilla forces. Although Kaunda was beginning to allow ZAPU military bases in Zambia, Vorster explained that Mozambique was already the primary launching pad for guerrilla incursions. Kissinger had never been to Mozambique, but he had recently visited southern Zambia. “Can’t they cross the river where we were?” asked Kissinger. “The Zambezi?” responded Vorster. “At some times of the year it’s possible.”6 In his memoirs Nkomo elaborated on why the guerrillas preferred Mozambique. The river valley was a strong first line of defense for the Rhodesians. Then, south of the river, lay ravines and high bare hills, then a wide expanse of open bush with semi-desert set with a maze of land mines. It was thirty days’ journey, often against strong opposition, before a soldier moving south from Zambia could be in action against significant Rhodesian targets.7

Kissinger and Vorster agreed that the best chance for reaching a settlement with moderate elements in Rhodesia depended on keeping Kaunda and Nkomo central to the process, and that time was running out for this possibility. Vorster emphasized to the US delegation that he had dealt honorably with the Zambian government in the past, and that “everything they have asked us to do, we’ve done.” Vorster believed that he had a good relationship with Kaunda, and among the black Rhodesian leaders he definitely respected Nkomo the most. “If I had to ride the river with one of them, I’d pick Nkomo,” he explained. Kissinger wondered “how long will he be in the game?” If Nkomo was the leader of an internationally recognized government in Rhodesia, and more radical factions with Cuban or Soviet support attempted to oust him, then the United States could support him. Kissinger stated that if such a situation developed after Nkomo was at the head of a legitimate government, “We’d give arms to Nkomo.” He observed that “there is finite time—maybe a year … then afterwards one has to settle with the guerrilla high command. Then it’s an unwinnable situation.”8 Vorster and Kissinger also agreed that in addition to keeping Kaunda and Nkomo central to the settlement process, it was crucial to convince a sizable number of white

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Rhodesians to remain in the country under the new government. Vorster opined that doing this would require pledges that their retirement pensions would be paid and their property would not be expropriated. The other alternative would be compensation if they decided to leave. Either way, in Vorster’s opinion such financial arrangements would require significant participation by the Western powers, especially the British, since Britain still claimed legal authority and there were about 80,000 British citizens in Rhodesia. “Nkomo enforced by specific guarantees, can save the situation,” summarized Vorster. Kissinger added that the US government could support Nkomo, but definitely not Smith.9 The final piece of the Rhodesian puzzle as the delegations from Washington and Pretoria defined it in June 1976, was the support of the Frontline presidents. Schaufele believed that there was still a chance to get support from Kaunda and the others for such a settlement, but “barely.” Pik Botha, South Africa’s ambassador to the United States, commented that time was “running out.” The US and South African officials agreed that if what they considered a reasonable settlement wasn’t achieved soon, and the war dragged on, then there was a likely possibility of communist intervention as had happened in Angola. The result, as they saw it, might well be a mass exodus of whites and a Marxist government in Rhodesia. “The entire country will be a shambles, and the beautiful cities, Salisbury and Bulawayo, will be in rack and ruin,” predicted Vorster.10 Kissinger proposed that after the meeting adjourned, they begin putting together a package that incorporated all the elements they had discussed. He also felt it was imperative to keep the Frontline leaders such as Kaunda informed. “We have to tell the black Africans something that we discussed,” he said. Getting their support would require a timetable and a concrete package. Kissinger suggested that they meet with the Frontline presidents “and say, by February 1, Nkomo will be president.” Vorster agreed, and emphasized again that the British must be involved. The conversation concluded on a relatively optimistic note, with both Washington and Pretoria committed to a very ambitious diplomatic undertaking.11

Next steps and important developments The next step in what he later described as “by far the most complex” negotiations he ever undertook found Henry Kissinger in London on June 25, meeting with Prime Minister James Callaghan. The prime minister expressed a willingness to facilitate a transition to black rule in Rhodesia, but real concern about certain aspects, such as whether or not it would require British troops. He worried that they might be drawn into fighting against a guerrilla insurgency. He concurred with Kissinger and Vorster in preferring Nkomo as the new prime minister, but did not believe that the ZAPU leader commanded a sufficient force to control the security situation. “So how do we deal with the guerrillas on the border, if they don’t accept Nkomo?” he asked Kissinger.12 Kissinger contended that the best hope for Nkomo would be to end the war quickly and eliminate the guerrilla bases. He offered to send his assistant for African affairs, William Schaufele, to talk with Kaunda and Nyerere about this idea. In the meantime, a joint US-British working group would draft a specific proposal to present to Vorster

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and all of the Frontline presidents. Callaghan told Kissinger that “you should tell Nyerere and Kaunda” to pressurize the British “to do something like this.” They agreed to work closely together in their dealings with the Frontline leaders in particular, and on this complex diplomatic initiative in general.13 About ten days later, Assistant Secretary Schaufele departed from Washington for southern Africa. He consulted with Kaunda in Lusaka on July 8 and again on July 10, providing an overview of what Kissinger had discussed with Vorster. The Zambian president approved of the general plan for majority rule, a transition period, and minority guarantees. Kaunda indicated a willingness to “stick his neck out for it” if Smith and Vorster were on board; however, he expressed concern that if the transition was too long then the guerrillas might oust Nkomo. Nyerere hosted Schaufele in Dar es Salaam on July 11 and echoed Kaunda’s concern. He feared the “boys with the guns” might not accept a government led by Nkomo and opt instead to keep fighting.14 Kissinger’s diplomatic initiative toward Rhodesia depended on cooperation between Vorster and Frontline leaders such as Kaunda, but ongoing violence perpetrated by Pretoria threatened to derail such cooperation. On the same day Schaufele met with Nyerere, the South African defense forces violated Zambian territory and delivered a brutal blow against Namibian rebels who were members of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). The South African attack, which took place twenty miles inside Zambian territory in the Western province, killed over twenty people and wounded over forty. The editors of the Zambia Daily Mail believed the incursion reflected arrogance of “monstrous proportions.” They warned Pretoria that such behavior could alienate the Americans, who would not continue collaborating with racists forever. Kaunda’s foreign minister, Siteke Mwale, denounced the “diabolical act of aggression” in a late July speech before the UN Security Council. He explained that it represented the fourteenth time that South Africa had violated Zambian sovereignty in 1976. Several Zambians had been injured by land mines or gunfire, and the damage to Zambian property was considerable. He promised that these attempts by the Pretoria regime to force Zambia to stop supporting the liberation movements would not succeed and, if anything, would only strengthen their resolve.15 Just a few days after the July 11 incursion, the Kaunda government and Zambian people received “an important morale booster” when the Chinese-constructed TAZARA railroad linking Zambia to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam opened for business.16 On July 14 the Chinese government handed over joint control of the line to Kaunda and Nyerere. The gargantuan construction project had been completed in six years, almost two years ahead of schedule. TAZARA was designed to carry five million tons of freight per year and run eleven trains per day.17 The goal of this incredibly generous Chinese aid undertaking was to eliminate Zambian dependence on the white minority governments to the south in exporting its copper, which certainly seemed feasible in mid-1976. The completion of TAZARA raised Zambian spirits at a crucial juncture, encouraging President Kaunda to continue the fight against regional racism that he had been waging for twelve years. Zambian fortunes received another potential boost the following week during the Democratic National Convention at Madison Square Garden in New York, when the

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Democrats nominated Jimmy Carter as their candidate for president. Carter himself did not yet know a lot about Zambia or Kaunda, but one of his key advisors was Congressman Andrew Young, who did. Young played a prominent role at the convention and throughout the campaign, and there was widespread speculation about him being appointed to a high-level position if Carter won in November. A feature article in Time on Young quoted Carter as saying that the congressman was the only person to whom he owed any political debt. The article noted the belief that Young hoped to become ambassador to the United Nations, which is in fact what happened after Carter’s victory.18 Back in the House of Representative after the convention in early August, Young spoke out against South Africa’s July 11 attack inside Zambia. He also criticized the US government for abstaining on the July 30 Security Council resolution which had condemned the attack, opining that “we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with the vast majority of Africa for a racist few.” After his brief statement he inserted the lengthy speech which Siteke Mwale had given at the UN on July 27 into the Congressional Record.19 Young and Mwale had known each other since the early 1960s and had been together the previous November at the dedication of the Martin Luther King Library in Lusaka. Mwale later recalled that Young’s views on foreign relations “were in line with us. The number one problem for him was race.”20 A Carter triumph, then, would surely mean that the Zambian government would have a powerful ally named Andrew Young in a top position in Washington.

Second thoughts and Low to Lusaka On August 5, the same day that Young orated in support of Zambia, Kissinger discussed Rhodesia with Prime Minister Callaghan and his foreign minister, Anthony Crosland. They hammered out an economic plan, and agreed to send teams to present their proposal to Kaunda and Nyerere. Kissinger decided to dispatch his undersecretary for economic affairs, William Rogers, who had consulted with Kaunda in the early 1970s. Accompanying Rogers was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Schaufele.21 In an August 11 telegram Kissinger updated Kaunda on his recent talks with the British. He informed the Zambian president that South Africa planned to participate in the diplomatic initiative, and notified him that Rogers and Schaufele would provide a more detailed explanation. Mark Chona, Kaunda’s special assistant for national security, expressed great interest in the South African role, and confirmed an August 25 appointment with Kaunda for Rogers and Schaufele.22 The mission was postponed for two weeks because Kaunda and Nyerere were attending a conference for leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement in Sri Lanka, and because Ford was concentrating on securing his party’s nomination at the Republican national convention. Nonetheless, Kissinger remained focused heavily on Rhodesia during this period and updated Ford frequently. William Edmondson, the deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, later recalled that “he was holding daily meetings on Africa.”23 Certain developments were quite discouraging, such as the British seeming to change their mind about providing any guarantees for white Rhodesians or Kaunda and Nyerere’s expressing doubts about South African participation. On August 13 the secretary of state discussed

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the British government’s wavering on white minority guarantees. Ford, who felt trying to prevent a total white exodus as had happened in Angola was crucial, remarked: “That was our plan before, and I think we should stick with it.”24 Ford survived the formidable challenge by Ronald Reagan at the Republican convention, and his administration’s diplomatic intervention in southern Africa continued as planned. Rogers and Schaufele arrived in Lusaka on August 25 and updated Kaunda on Kissinger’s discussions with the British and the South Africans. Steve Low, the new US ambassador to Zambia, had just arrived the day before and attended the meeting even though he had not yet presented his credentials to Kaunda. The Zambian president “kind of joked about that a little bit. He said he was looking forward to meeting the American Ambassador as though I wasn’t present,” Low later recalled.25 Kaunda’s response to the Rhodesia plan was generally “positive,” although he was very worried about the lack of unity among the black nationalists.26 In late August, the secretary focused on a Rhodesian settlement. That undertaking appeared to be in jeopardy, however, when Kaunda delivered a speech that initially bothered the secretary of state. Kissinger talked about it with Frank Wisner, who had just been appointed the country director for southern Africa in the Bureau of African Affairs. On the afternoon of August 26 he asked Wisner to send a message to Ambassador Low, requesting that Low ask Kaunda if he still supported Kissinger’s diplomatic initiative. Low had just replaced the long-time US ambassador to Zambia, Jean Wilkowski, and he was already being given a very challenging task. Kissinger wanted Low to deliver Kaunda an ultimatum: “In the light of his speech, does he want to continue—yes or no?”27 A few hours later Kissinger called Wisner again, this time with renewed confidence regarding his diplomatic initiative. He did briefly revisit Kaunda’s speech but had decided that the Zambian president was “just pushing himself.” It no longer seemed like it threatened the success of the mission, which Kissinger was intent on pursuing. “We have got to get the goddamned trip together,” he exclaimed. Wisner stated that the South African ambassador liked the idea of Kissinger and Vorster meeting in Switzerland. The Swiss government was worried about demonstrators, and so for security reasons they preferred that the talks take place in the hills near Zurich. Kissinger was happy with that plan.28 On August 27 Kissinger returned to worrying about the details of his Rhodesian initiative and targeted the new US ambassador to Zambia, Steve Low, with his famous wrath. “I know that AF ambassadors are incapable of expressing a clear thought,” he exclaimed to Wisner. “About my travel schedule, there is no need for Steve Low to see the President personally,” he added, and commented that the scheduling could be handled directly through Mark Chona. About Low he observed: “So will you tell him he doesn’t need to discuss my schedule with Kaunda. He makes it sound as if I am just taking a trip.” Wisner explained that he had not seen Low’s report. Kissinger concluded the conversation by asking Wisner to “draft some bloody instructions” for Low and reiterated that the ambassador should “not bother Kaunda.” 29 The Zambian press had praised the appointment of Low the previous month, emphasizing his experience on the National Security Council and in US embassies

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in Senegal and Uganda.30 Kissinger truly may have had his doubts about the new ambassador. On the other hand, perhaps, he was just nervous about the very challenging southern African mission on which he was about to embark and opted to release his stress by criticizing whichever subordinate appeared on his radar. He had certainly never hesitated to criticize Jean Wilkowski, the previous ambassador in Lusaka. Low, who would serve for three years in Zambia and make major contributions to the US policy toward Rhodesia, later recalled that it was “never easy” to discuss politics and diplomacy with Kaunda.31 A few hours after his conversation with Wisner in which he blasted Low, Kissinger received a phone call from Bruce Van Voorst, a journalist with Newsweek. Van Voorst inquired about Kaunda’s recent public statements and whether or not the Zambian was “upset” about the proposals which Schaufele and Rogers had presented. “Not in the slightest” replied Kissinger. “Kaunda was dissatisfied with nothing Schaufele was telling him?” pressed Van Voorst. “Absolutely not,” explained the secretary. “I think he was covering his ass. He was in a position where a lot of radical statements were being made.” In fact, Kaunda had been hosting Angolan president Agostinho Neto, and Kissinger believed the Zambian leader felt a need to make radical remarks to impress his Marxist neighbor.32 The next day, August 28, Kaunda met with another neighboring communist president, Samora Machel of Mozambique. They discussed “consolidating their commitment to the intensified armed struggle in Southern Africa,” not exactly the type of talk designed to foster negotiated settlements.33 “There was no shortage of statements making it seem foolhardy for us to proceed,” Kissinger later remembered.34 At the White House on August 30, Kissinger offered Ford a final chance to change his mind and call off the African diplomacy. He told the president that “we have good reports from Nyerere and Kaunda.” There was a real possibility, however, that it would cost Ford votes in November. “We need to think about your political situation. I don’t want another Texas,” commented Kissinger, referring to Ronald Reagan’s primary victory, which had evidently been assisted by his April speech in Lusaka. Ford again impressed Kissinger with his determination to pursue what he considered proper foreign policy regardless of votes. “I think if it is right, we should do it, and the political consequences will come out all right,” insisted the president. The two continued discussing the potential domestic ramifications of the southern Africa undertaking, and Kissinger expressed his hope that he would be able to critique Carter’s proposed approach to foreign policy in a press conference the next day. “Now that we have gotten rid of that son-of-a-bitch Reagan, we can just do what is right,” interjected Ford. The secretary of state sought final confirmation that Ford approved of his possible trip. “You think I should go to Africa?” he asked. “Yes,” replied the president, “if there is a good chance.” Kissinger prognosticated: “I’d rate it a little better than 50–50.” Without hesitation Ford responded “Go!” 35

Planning another southern African sojourn In Philadelphia on August 31, the secretary of state discussed the Ford administration’s approach to southern Africa before members of the Opportunities Industrialization

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Centers, an African-American group created by Reverend Leon Sullivan. “When we read of young African students killed in riots, of guerrilla raids, of refugee camps attacked in reprisal … it means hopes extinguished and dreams shattered,” exclaimed Kissinger. He reviewed his efforts during the preceding months, such as his Lusaka speech, and the recent trip by Rogers and Schaufele to brief Kaunda. Kissinger announced that he would be meeting again soon with the South African prime minister. “Unmistakable progress has been made,” he explained, most importantly in the improved US relationship with black African leaders and the willingness of South Africa to participate constructively. He acknowledged that “Black African leaders … have the most difficult challenge” but believed that “the wisdom and moderating influence” of Kaunda and his Frontline colleagues were essential in order to bring peace and racial equality to the region. He concluded by asserting that it was also crucial for the United States to play a part in the process, choosing the course of “hope and heart” and thus helping to facilitate a “new birth of freedom.”36 After Kissinger’s speech, he and Sullivan hosted a press conference. The first questioner wondered what the secretary’s approach to southern Africa would be. “With respect to Rhodesia,” he answered, “we believe that there should be a rapid transition to majority rule, protection for minority rights, and a negotiation in which the black African states, the various movements in Rhodesia, and the existing authorities of Rhodesia participate to find a solution.” Another journalist inquired whether recent remarks by Kaunda meant the prospects for a settlement had decreased. “I think the situation is improving,” Kissinger replied. “The reports of Under Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele were, on the whole, positive.” He cautioned, however, that “Rhodesia is extremely complicated.” Responding to a query about ending the conflicts in southern Africa, the secretary contended that “time is running out … we have a moral and political obligation to do what we can to bring about a peaceful settlement.”37 On September 1, Kissinger sent Kaunda a copy of his Philadelphia speech, which he hoped would give the Zambian president “an encouraging statement of American policy.” He explained that his remarks reflected the helpful advice which Kaunda had given him regarding southern Africa. He thanked the Zambian president for his assessment of the increasingly difficult circumstances in Rhodesia but still thought that they owed “the people of Zimbabwe a sincere effort to secure agreement before the situation in that country deteriorates further.” He hoped that there would not be any major new demands by the Frontline presidents or nationalist leaders before he returned to Africa. He praised Kaunda for his past efforts to forge unity among the various Zimbabwean factions and emphasized that such unity was of the “greatest importance.” 38 Ambassador Low met Nkomo in Lusaka on September 4 and told him directly of the need for unity among the nationalists. The ZAPU leader countered that the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe could not be imposed from outside. Low respected Nkomo’s desire for autonomy and resistance to outside interference but suggested he travel to Tanzania to meet with the other nationalist leaders anyway. Nkomo complied and spent four days haggling with Robert Mugabe and Abel Muzorewa. Nyerere, who hosted the summit, energetically re-enacted the sessions for James Spain, the

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US ambassador in Tanzania: “Muzorewa says he will participate if Nkomo does first. Nkomo wants to get rid of Muzorewa … Mugabe has still another confused position.” Getting the nationalist leaders to work together in order to achieve a settlement in Rhodesia would not be an easy task.39 Meanwhile, the secretary of state flew to London to go over the political aspects of the plan for Rhodesia, which he would be discussing with Vorster in Zurich. The British had crafted a proposal for a transitional government, which would last a maximum of two years and be led by a Council of State and a Council of Ministers. The prime minister would be black, but whites would control defense and internal security. The British proposal “sounded reasonable” to Kissinger, who “had no basis for objecting to the details.”40 While in Britain, the secretary updated Kaunda on his itinerary. He would not continue directly to Lusaka after the Zurich meetings but instead would wait until the Dar es Salaam summit of Zimbabwean nationalists was adjourned. If the results were relatively positive, he still intended to lend his “fullest efforts” in search of a Rhodesian settlement.41 During the afternoon of September 4, Kissinger arrived in Zurich for his second round of meetings with Vorster, and the two principals had a brief discussion that evening at Vorster’s hotel. The Swiss government had insisted on a relatively isolated venue in order to make it easier for them to control protestors. Kissinger and Vorster met over lunch on Sunday September 5 and wrapped up the talks with a four-hour session on Monday. Vorster “did not waste time” and quickly agreed to terminate South African support for Ian Smith if he did not accept the British proposals for majority rule. Kissinger later characterized Vorster’s decision to pressurize Smith as “seminal.”42 In the midst of the three-day rendezvous with Vorster, Kissinger updated the press on the “fruitful” talks. “I believe that progress toward the objectives which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the states of black Africa has been made. It is our view that a basis for further negotiations exists,” remarked the secretary of state. He summarized the daunting task: “In other words, we are dealing with two different problems, five states, four liberation movements in black Africa, and South Africa, plus the authorities of Rhodesia and the authorities within Namibia.” He explained that he was monitoring the conference of Zimbabwean leaders in Dar es Salaam, and that if there was some sense of progress there he planned to continue. He would conduct further discussions in Pretoria but only after revisiting Kaunda and Nyerere and confirming their support for the undertaking. He emphasized that “a visit by me to South Africa would be in the interest of peace in southern Africa.” He added that he did not have any definite plans to meet with Ian Smith and that he would only do so when he had “assurance” from Vorster that it would be worthwhile.43 After the final session with Vorster in Zurich on Monday 6 September, Kissinger returned to London in order to “fine tune” the Rhodesian plan with Prime Minister Callaghan. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary Schaufele went to Tanzania, briefed Nyerere, and got an update on the summit of Zimbabwean leaders. On September 8, Nyerere professed that although Mugabe, Nkomo, and Muzorewa were still far from unified, the Anglo-American proposals might lead to a Rhodesian settlement.

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Therefore, he wanted Kissinger to come back to the region as soon as possible. In Washington, Kissinger and Ford labored feverishly to explain their southern African diplomacy to members of the US Congress, calling forty-seven legislators within the next week. Ford and Kissinger also used former secretary of state Dean Rusk as an interlocutor to give Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter an overview of the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations. “Bipartisanship was not completely dead,” remembered Kissinger.44 The Ford administration’s planning for a second trip to southern Africa revealed much about Kissinger’s strategy toward Rhodesia. He desired a signed agreement. He emphasized that he must work closely with Vorster: “If the present negotiations are to have a successful outcome, I will have to meet again with the South African prime minister.” He would then consult with Nyerere or Kaunda, and he specified that whoever it was “should be mandated to conclude negotiations.” Regarding the Zimbabwean nationalists, he hoped to talk with Nkomo. He would consider speaking with others if they happened to be in the vicinity but emphasized that US officials should directly invite only Nkomo. Furthermore, his meeting with the ZAPU leader should occur only after he had talked with the Frontline presidents.45

Kissinger returns to Tanzania and Zambia Late in the evening of September 14, 1976, a rowdy crowd greeted Kissinger upon his arrival in Dar es Salaam. The protestors followed him to his hotel, and when their noisy chanting seemed as if it would keep him awake all night, he called President Nyerere and threatened to fly back to Nairobi for some sleep. “Fifteen minutes later, the crowd miraculously disappeared in the same dilapidated government buses which had brought them,” recalled Kissinger. Nyerere evidently had orchestrated the event as a way to enhance his radical credentials. During the following day the president and the secretary engaged in two long meetings, which “lacked the warmth” of Kissinger’s April visit. On points of substance, though, Nyerere still concurred. Kissinger explained Nyerere’s procedure to Ford as “giving us the green light on most of our proposals … while beating us over the head publicly.” Kissinger left Tanzania relatively optimistic that progress toward a settlement in Rhodesia could be accomplished on this trip; not only because he had Nyerere’s private approval but also because he had received a message from Vorster pledging Ian Smith’s cooperation.46 On 16 September Kaunda welcomed Kissinger to Lusaka and delivered an emotional speech at State House. The Zambian president warned: “You have only a few days and not weeks to succeed. If you fail, we will have reached a point of no return and we will fight to the last man if necessary.” Kaunda explained that he and his colleagues desired “majority rule in Zimbabwe.” He elaborated on his idealistic motives: “We want peace for man’s dignity with honor.” Kissinger greatly appreciated the warm reception, so different than what had occurred in Tanzania, and afterward characterized Kaunda’s address as “moving.” 47 He speculated that the Zambian leader “sensed that antiAmerican demonstrations and public sarcasm would jeopardize public support in the

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United States. Or perhaps Kaunda’s conduct simply reflected his own generous nature.” In any case, a thankful Kissinger believed that the supportive address represented “one of those moments that compensate for the frustrations, competitiveness, and selfseeking that are so much a part of public life.”48 The State Department’s country officer for southern Africa, Frank Wisner, accompanied the secretary on his journey and echoed his assessment: “KK treated Kissinger very well, and that really helped make him feel welcome and useful in southern Africa.”49 Late that evening at the Intercontinental Hotel, US and British diplomats gathered to discuss recent developments regarding Rhodesia. Kissinger reiterated how happy he was with Kaunda’s welcoming speech. Ambassador Low emphasized the fact that Kaunda “didn’t say that they would continue the struggle,” which was very different than Nyerere’s public stance. The secretary elaborated on this point based on his oneon-one talk with the Zambian president: “He told me privately that he was desperate that war should end. Mozambique had 800 casualties and he didn’t want it to happen here.” Kissinger commented that perhaps there was somewhat of a difference of opinion on Rhodesia between Kaunda and Nyerere. The British High Commissioner in Lusaka, Patrick Miles, pointed out that while on the one hand “Nyerere is quite far from the front line,” on the other hand “Zambia might get bombed.” In a final key point regarding the role of Kaunda, Kissinger contended that “he talked as if he could settle by himself,” implying that the Zambian leader could speak for all of the Frontline presidents. Kissinger was cautiously optimistic as his conversation with British officials concluded around 11 p.m.50 At about 8 a.m. the next morning, Kaunda and Kissinger and their staffs met for a lengthy discussion before the secretary continued to South Africa. Kissinger expressed his appreciation for Foreign Minister Siteke Mwale’s contributions to the major diplomatic initiative that was underway. The feeling of respect was perhaps not reciprocated entirely. Indeed, Mwale later criticized Kissinger’s whole approach to southern Africa and characterized him as being “so imbued with power.”51 Of course the secretary did not know that any of the Zambians disapproved of his methods, and he launched into a summary of his plans to facilitate a settlement for Rhodesia. He did admit, however, that he had “no idea of what is going on in the liberation movements. I met Nkomo and we think well of him. None of us knows Mugabe.” Kaunda conceded that “Joshua Nkomo is my personal friend.” He analyzed the challenging divisions that persisted both between ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and within ZANU. He claimed that all the Frontline leaders had agreed that Nkomo was the best man to lead an independent Zimbabwe. He added that he did not really know Mugabe either but would be “very surprised if Mugabe had as much support as Joshua Nkomo.” The president’s special advisor for foreign relations, Mark Chona, echoed Kaunda’s dismissal of Mugabe: “I don’t think he has the support at the grass roots level.” Chona concluded, presciently, that “Mugabe is a difficult man to deal with.”52 The secretary posed several more questions, first wondering if a settlement with Smith could end the war. Kaunda thought that it might. Kissinger next asked if the Frontline presidents planned on attending the proposed all-parties conference and joked: “Would the liberation movements behave themselves if the Presidents aren’t there?” The group laughed, and Kaunda responded affirmatively: “If they

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want us there, we can be there.” Emphasizing the Zambian president’s significance the secretary stated: “Your influence will be important.” Kaunda commented that the constitutional conference needed to be “genuine” and that meant including “all representative groups” in Rhodesia. The two men agreed that the Frontline presidents must decide who should participate. Kissinger admitted that it was one thing for them to discuss what should happen but that without Smith’s approval the effort would not succeed.53 After some discussion of South Africa and apartheid, Foreign Minister Mwale shifted the subject to the ideal of non-racialism. “Mr. Secretary,” he said, “it seems like a small point but it is very important. It is not the intention of the black man to drive the white man into the sea.” Kissinger concurred with Mwale: “It is a very important point, which your President made to me.” The foreign minister stated that the Zambian government’s goal was “to see all races live together in peace.” Kissinger then inquired how many whites there were living in Zambia. Mwale replied that there were 65,000. Kissinger asked how many had there been at independence. Mwale explained that there had been about 77,000. “So there is no great change,” observed Kissinger. Kaunda underscored the point by saying: “Many came afterwards, knowing they’d be accepted.” The implication was that Zambia could serve as a successful multiracial example for Zimbabwe and even South Africa.54 Mark Chona opined that the “tragedy of Rhodesia is that every day Smith resists, he digs a grave for nonracialism.” The Zambian leader commented: “We believe this is a very, very crucial mission … But we are not over optimistic … But the serious implications of that—God help us all.” Kissinger observed that he “didn’t come here to fail.” Kaunda exclaimed: “You have our prayers.” He elaborated that it was “the last meeting we’re having before we know, God willing, whether or not your mission will have been a success … We have one major problem there, this is acceptance by Ian Smith and his fellow rebels … acceptance of majority rule.” The secretary of state explained that he would use US influence in order to reach the settlement that the Frontline presidents had crafted and emphasized that he “did need the moral encouragement of those who would benefit the most if peace is preserved and conflagration avoided.” He concluded: “If we succeed, you Mr. President, will have played a major role … If we fail, it will be our fault, but it won’t be for lack of trying.” Kaunda served tea to close the gathering.55

First secretary of state to visit South Africa At Lusaka’s international airport before his departure in the afternoon of September 17, Kissinger spoke to the media. He opened by commenting to Mwale: “I would like to thank you and President Kaunda for the warm reception we have received here.” The secretary then explained: “We were encouraged by the spirit of the talks and by the moral support … but it is of course clear that the serious negotiation lies ahead of us … I leave with the determination to make a major effort.” The first questioners asked if he would be negotiating in Pretoria, and whether or not he would talk with Ian Smith. He answered that while in South Africa he hoped to “move matters forward”

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but that he was still not sure if he would be meeting with Smith. He would only engage the Rhodesian leader if it “was the final element in reaching a satisfactory conclusion.” Another journalist wondered if Kissinger’s late entry into Rhodesian diplomacy, after the Frontline leaders had failed repeatedly to find a solution, indicated the secretary’s belief that he possessed “intellectual superiority?” Kissinger responded that he did not see how he could “demonstrate intellectual superiority by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa in April, all of the African countries, including this, urged the United States to make an effort.” Mwale ended the press conference by exclaiming: “We wish you all the success in your difficult task and wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back to Zambia.”56 On the evening of Friday September 17, the secretary of state arrived in Pretoria, the first time such a high-ranking American had ever visited South Africa. He proceeded to Libertas, Vorster’s residence, for dinner and a lengthy discussion on Rhodesia. Kissinger insisted that the only African-American member of his diplomatic team, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs John Reinhardt, attend the session. This was the secretary’s way of demonstrating the Ford administration’s “rejection of apartheid.” The prime minister and his colleagues treated Reinhardt with respect but kept their distance. Vorster did decide to share with the attendees his view that blacks were more interested in style than substance and that they were not good farmers because they could never master irrigation. Reinhardt remained stoic during this harangue but never missed a chance afterward to update Kissinger on his success at “irrigating his garden at home.” Regardless of the discomfort resulting from Vorster’s tactlessness, the conversation clarified the plan of attack for the weekend, which would culminate in a crucial confrontation between Kissinger and Ian Smith on Sunday.57 Kissinger hosted Vorster for breakfast the next morning at the US ambassador’s residence, mostly to go over some documents about which they had already agreed. The secretary of state spent the rest of the day at the US embassy meeting with South African critics of apartheid, and it was clear that they believed time was running out for non-violence. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Zulus impressed Kissinger the most. He lobbied for jailed African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela and convincingly warned the secretary not to agree to a solution for Rhodesia that aided apartheid. As Kissinger reported to President Ford: “Any settlement … which strengthens the apartheid hand of Mr. Vorster will most certainly herald a new wave of despair that will make violent options the only options for political realists.”58 While Kissinger met with the anti-apartheid activists, Ian Smith and his associates flew in from Rhodesia and proceeded to Ellis Park to watch the South African national rugby team, the Springboks, battle the All Blacks of New Zealand. Smith described the sporting showdown as “some decent clean enjoyment, in the midst of all the sordid politics and dreadful despondency.” He and his cabinet colleagues, including former Rhodesian rugby star Des Lardner-Burke, cheered extra hard for the one Rhodesian member of the Springboks, Ian Robertson. “In the past,” noted Smith, “Vorster and I had always sat together watching the game, but not today—I was shunted off to one side.”59 The Springboks defeated the All Blacks by a score of 15 to 14, giving Smith and his Rhodesian comrades something to cheer about on an otherwise dismal weekend for them.

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Confronting Ian Smith At 9:45 a.m. on Sunday September 19, Kissinger appeared in his bullet-proof limousine at the US ambassador’s house in Pretoria. Smith arrived fifteen minutes later, cheered by the spectators. After introductions, the secretary of state got down to business. In the eloquent words of Martin Meredith, an eminent scholar of Africa, Kissinger “coldly analyzed the severe economic and military difficulties that Rhodesia was facing, displaying knowledge of Rhodesian affairs so detailed and accurate that Smith and his colleagues were astounded. Without referring to notes, he gave details of military units, field deployments, supply positions, and financial problems.” He handed Smith a five-point memo, which called for an interim government that included blacks and a transition to majority rule. Smith read the document slowly, and commented that Kissinger was asking him to sign “his own suicide note.”60 In his memoirs Kissinger described the meeting similarly. He “had not been looking forward” to his confrontation with Second World War hero Ian Smith. Although the secretary’s diplomacy had been instrumental in bringing circumstances to this point, he “nevertheless did not relish having to tell my interlocutors that their way of life was coming to an end.” He treated Smith as a fellow statesman rather than a pariah, addressing him as “Prime Minister.” As Kissinger noted, it was ironic that the only time an US official dealt with Smith face-to-face as an equal was during a discussion that started the process of ending his rule. His key point to the Rhodesian leader was that according to US intelligence, “the attrition on you, absent foreign assistance, will make it more and more unmanageable. I don’t see where foreign assistance could come from.” He passed Smith the ultimatum and emphasized that “if you fight it out, a year from now you will face the same situation in more tragic circumstances.”61 Smith’s autobiography generally jibed with Kissinger’s version. He recalled the secretary expressing his regrets. Smith believed that Kissinger was “sympathetic” and that during their initial meeting he “spoke with obvious sincerity.” He praised the secretary as someone who “had an obvious capacity for grasping a situation, analyzing it, and putting forward the pros and cons.” Smith and his colleagues all had “the refreshing feeling that it had been done with honesty.” He also remembered Kissinger predicting a victory by Carter over Ford and the secretary’s view that things would get much worse for white Rhodesians. They agreed to adjourn for three hours so that Smith and his associates could discuss the memo calling for majority rule.62 At about 6 p.m. the Americans and the Rhodesians reconvened, this time at Vorster’s residence “Libertas” and a South African delegation was also present. Kissinger greeted Smith as “Mr. Prime Minister” and explained a small change in the wording that had been made. Smith read the first point of the memo aloud: “Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years” and commented that it was consistent. Smith asked which black leaders he would be negotiating with, and Kissinger explained that the Frontline presidents would determine that. He added that a general public statement should be made soon and Vorster interjected that something should be announced that very night. “The sooner the better,” said the South African leader, “to avoid speculation.”63

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Bernard Musset, the Rhodesian minister of internal affairs, raised the issue of the ministers of Defense and of Law and Order being white during the two-year interim period. “The British will support only one or the other,” answered Kissinger. “When I see Kaunda and Nyerere, I will support it.” Smith asked if he meant just one, and the secretary responded “one of the two. You can be sure of one.” Kissinger opined how it could be handled best in later negotiations if it was kept out of the written memo. Smith reiterated: “We would rather have both ministries be white. We will then accept a majority of blacks.” Kissinger summed it up: “So I can tell them that you accept a two-thirds majority of blacks, with a veto for the whites, in the Cabinet, provided the two security ministers remain white for the two years of transition?” Smith affirmed the wording, and Kissinger concluded: “That is not unreasonable.”64 The secretary of state explained that the goal of agreeing on a memo was “to create an event.” He added: “It can’t then be said that Ian Smith never offered majority rule.” He insisted that they would “agree on this document tonight.” The Rhodesian leader inquired if they could be more precise on some of the financial details, and Kissinger responded that the specifics would be worked out be a tripartite commission of Americans, British, and South Africans. “Our problem is,” he added, “we don’t want to encourage people to leave in the first year.” Smith concurred: “We don’t want the people to leave.” David Smith, the Rhodesian minister of finance, asked what kind of currency would be used for the fund, and Kissinger explained that it would be in US dollars. “We will create the fund,” he elaborated: “We will contribute something like 40%.” The goal was to build up the Rhodesian economy and keep the whites from leaving. Ian Smith pointed out that it would require new investment. Kissinger commented that part of the fund could be used to encourage private industry to invest and also that the “lifting of sanctions will help.”65 The group agreed that the fine print could be worked out during future meetings of the tripartite commission. Kissinger believed they had enough detail in the brief memo to go forward. “I have to see Kaunda and Nyerere tomorrow,” he explained. “If I say, ‘this is what he will accept, provided we work out an adequate plan,’ well, it’s tolerable.” Vorster contended that the Frontline leaders would not care about the details of the financial package. “Kaunda wants the whites to stay; Nyerere wants them to leave,” added Kissinger. “The big question is whether the money is adequate,” observed the Rhodesian prime minister. “If they are just getting a packet of sweets, they will leave.” Kissinger then clarified his view of how the process should work, “You put this forward, but you do not agree to establish the Interim Government until we have worked out the economic plan. This gives an incentive to move it fast.”66 Smith raised some other important issues. He and his colleagues hoped for “a commitment that as soon as we make this, sanctions will end and terrorism will end.” Kissinger responded that he could get them “assurance that when the Interim Government is set up, both sanctions and terrorism will end.” Smith was pleased. Kissinger asked if instead of terrorism they could refer to it as armed struggle, “for public reasons?” The Rhodesian leader allowed that Kissinger could use his wording and they would use theirs. He next requested “security support,” stating that during the interim period “Rhodesia should be given access to military supplies.” The secretary quickly responded that such assistance from Washington was impossible. However, if

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the Republicans remained in power and guerrilla attacks continued, then the United States could provide diplomatic support for the interim government. He stated that his goal in undertaking this initiative was not for the abstract principle of majority rule but rather was “to keep as many whites there, and get a moderate government into power.”67 “In the event of terrorism continuing,” prodded Smith, “couldn’t you say you will ‘use your good offices’ to enable us to defend ourselves?” Kissinger replied: “If the Soviets pick a faction, give it lots of arms, and start a war, I would certainly get active diplomatically. If I were a dictator, I would certainly resist it because it’s essential to inflict a defeat on the Soviets somewhere. My South African colleagues had a very painful experience last year because I overestimated what we could do in Angola.”68 At least for now Angola was lost to the Soviets but Kissinger hoped to keep Rhodesia and Zambia in the Western camp. “If the Soviets start a war,” he explained, “a sensible American government would resist because their motive is to surround Zambia with radical states and take it all over.” Smith seemed convinced of the need for acceptance and asked about the next steps in the process. “If you accept this in principle,” answered the secretary of state, “I can go to Kaunda and say this is what Smith will accept subject to our working out the economic arrangements … subject to an assurance that the guerrilla war stops.” Kissinger strongly encouraged Smith to make “a dramatic announcement of what you will support.” He warned that “if you don’t make the offer, you will pay this price but never get any credit.” Smith sought further verification about his neighbor: “Kaunda is on our side?” Kissinger answered affirmatively: “That’s right.”69 “I understand your problems,” said Smith, “but I have to sell it … My colleagues may ask for details.” Kissinger insisted: “I am going to take this to Kaunda and Nyerere anyway. All I’m asking is that you take the credit for it.” He then exclaimed: “If it fails all hell will be down on your head.” Smith observed, “If I fail or if I succeed, I will be told we are committing suicide.” Smith reiterated that he had to convince his cabinet, which could take until the end of the week. “Then I have nothing to tell Kaunda,” worried Kissinger. “Can you not tell him I have committed myself to it?” offered Smith. “That I can do,” replied the secretary. Smith thought he could get cabinet approval by Thursday, which was four days away. “We could live with that,” concluded Kissinger, and the session adjourned temporarily so that the delegations could discuss the developments amongst themselves.70 Kissinger admitted to his team that he was “beginning to see the slippery tendencies” of Smith. He criticized the Rhodesian leader for having “no sense of publicity.” He also believed that time was of the essence. Kissinger could wait until Friday for an announcement, but not three weeks. The secretary tried to look on the bright side: “I think there is a certain advantage in telling Nyerere and Kaunda these guys are caucusing. We can still put out the whole program.” Continuing with his optimistic interpretation he added: “From the moment we present it to Nyerere and Kaunda, we have the initiative if we play it boldly.” The Americans left the room and Kissinger spoke privately with Pik Botha, South Africa’s ambassador to the United States. “I have no problem with their plan,” he confided. “I’d rather they do it Friday and stick to that. If they slide off it, they will be killed.”71

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Kissinger, Vorster, and Smith reconvened and the secretary started their final round of discussions on what had already been a very long Sunday. “I have thought about our discussion, Mr. Prime Minister. I, in fact, recognize we may be asking you to commit suicide. That is perhaps too strong a word … we are asking you to do something drastic. In any case, by this we will save more lives and help more people than any other course I can see. It would put you in the best possible position to survive … Whether you do it Wednesday or Friday is not so important.” After commenting on his international image as a “crook,” which he attributed to the British press, Smith simply stated: “I accept your proposals.”72 “Let’s go over the assurances you asked for. End of guerrilla war,” said Kissinger. “End of sanctions,” added Smith. “Assurance of help if the terrorism doesn’t stop,” chimed in Desmond Lardner-Burke, the Rhodesian minister of law and order and former rugby star. Kissinger agreed to add these points into the memo. He asked Smith how he would make his public announcement. “Probably it will have to be radio or television,” answered the Rhodesian leader. Smith made a final comment to Kissinger, acknowledging his persuasiveness: “When I put these proposals to my colleagues, they were horrified. They expected me to go here and convince you they were unacceptable. But after hearing the evidence, I and my colleagues have decided we have to go back and convince them.” The historic encounter between the US secretary of state and the Rhodesian prime minister adjourned at nearly 9 p.m. on Sunday night.73 According to Frank Wisner, who witnessed most of the proceedings, Kissinger had forced Smith into accepting majority rule with “a truly brilliant tour-de-force.”74

Shuttling to the Frontline states During the morning of September 20, the secretary of state flew to Lusaka. He met with Kaunda for three hours at midday and first commented that during the previous day in South Africa he had a “hectic time” meeting with Smith. He explained that they were on the verge of having the Rhodesian prime minister announce his government’s acceptance of majority rule within two years. Once the Interim Government took charge, then sanctions would be lifted and the guerrilla war should cease. The new constitution would be negotiated at a conference, perhaps in Livingstone. He finally added the condition Smith had insisted on: “They want to keep the Defense and Law and Order ministers for this two-year period.” President Kaunda immediately asked if these ministries would be controlled by Smith’s men. He stated that he could not “say much at this juncture.” He wanted to thank Kissinger for “the measures you’ve taken to help us in southern Africa” but needed to consult with his Zambian colleagues and the other Frontline presidents before reaching any conclusions.75 Kissinger continued, emphasizing that the agreement Smith was considering would bring a “total end to white rule in Rhodesia.” He added that the “moment you have a new government with a black Prime Minister, you have a new reality.” As the group moved to another room for lunch, the secretary regaled Kaunda with stories about his recent speeches to African-American organizations in Boston and Philadelphia. He jokingly blamed his difficult press conferences after the speeches on John Reinhardt,

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the black US assistant secretary of state for public affairs. “I offered Reinhardt to be Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. He turned it down,” he explained. “Why?” asked Kaunda. “The time wasn’t right. He hadn’t been to Africa,” explained Kissinger. “So if I neglected Africa, it was Reinhardt’s fault,” kidded the secretary, prompting laughter. “We should say all’s well that ends well,” observed the Zambian president. “I’m going to blame you, Mr. President, for whatever happens. You were the first African President to insist that I come here. That is why the Lusaka speech was given here,” he noted. “Forgive me for my sins,” responded Kaunda.76 After a short break, the Zambian minister of finance John Mwanakatwe and the US Ambassador Steve Low joined the group for additional discussions. As he typically did at all gatherings, Kaunda served tea to the assembled guests. He then exclaimed: “on behalf of my colleagues, we express satisfaction for this job.” Kissinger replied, “I have the impression your colleagues are more friendly towards you than my Congress towards me.” The Zambian leader encouragingly reiterated: “We want to express satisfaction for what you have done. We can see light here. There is a chance of succeeding.” The conversation turned from Rhodesia to bilateral relations. “Dr. Kissinger has told us he has worked on wheat,” stated Kaunda. “16,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of vegetable oil,” specified the secretary. “This will go a long way to help,” observed the president. “We have an interest in the well-being of your country,” exclaimed Kissinger.77 As the session neared its end, the secretary repeated what he believed had been accomplished. “If we all behave with discipline this week,” he predicted, “in all probability we can get Smith to make the following proposal. He agrees to majority rule within two years.” He summarized the rest of the agreement, including Smith’s insistence that Defense and Law and Order be controlled by whites for the duration of the two-year interim government. When Kissinger finished, Kaunda’s minister of home affairs Aaron Milner expressed his worries about that particular point. “One provision that concerns me is that two important ministries, Defense and Law and Order, will be in their hands.” Kissinger countered that the governments of South Africa, Britain, and the United States would guarantee that white control of those ministries not scuttle the gist of the deal.78 The secretary of state elaborated on his challenging experience with the Rhodesian delegation in Pretoria, which he really believed had been a breakthrough. “I met with Smith for four hours. I presented these propositions to them, as worked out reflecting some of your concerns. It was one of the most painful discussions I have had.” Kaunda’s special assistant, Mark Chona, whose diplomatic dealings with the Rhodesians and South Africans were considerable, expressed doubts that echoed Aaron Milner’s. “The two ministries could possibly cause difficulties,” observed Chona. “Could they be flexible about this, maybe splitting up the two?” He asked. “They’ve burnt their bridges behind them and have to learn to work with blacks,” continued Kissinger. But, they were somewhat particular about which blacks they would prefer. Smith requested that the secretary encourage Kaunda and the other Frontline leaders “to choose a representative black delegation, with people who have following inside Rhodesia.” They contended that if the Frontline selected Zimbabwean delegates without support inside the country, it would turn into a civil war like Angola. Having

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heard Kissinger’s full briefing, Kaunda and his associates moved to another room to discuss it for the next hour.79 Upon returning the Zambian president told the secretary that regarding Zimbabwe, “we’re grateful for what you’ve done.” Kissinger responded that “it is almost certain that Ian Smith cannot survive the process he has started … When you get a black government, a black Prime Minister, a fixed date for independence, and a suspended constitution, it is a new situation.” He assured Kaunda that he wasn’t pressurizing him and that “it’s your decision.” Kaunda did not entirely agree and commented: “We are being pushed, in a way, because he’s making an announcement Friday.” Kissinger countered that he would hate to tell Smith not to make his historic speech because the Frontline leaders did not want it to happen, and Kaunda indicated his agreement that such a turn of events would be unfortunate. The secretary explained that he was intending to spend the night in Zambia before flying to Tanzania because Lusaka was “more comfortable.” He asked the president what he planned to say to the media and Kaunda responded that he would simply say that they “had very useful discussions.”80 President Kaunda definitely took a very cautious approach during his press conference. He pointed out that all of the Frontline leaders needed to consult and collectively analyze the results of the Kissinger-Smith meetings. They were a team that would deal with the issues together. “It would be wrong for one man to take a unilateral decision on the matter,” he added. Being very careful not to raise expectations, he reminded the journalists that the situation in southern Africa was critical. “We don’t want to say or do anything that might make things worse,” he concluded.81 As far as Kissinger was concerned, for Kaunda to address the media in a very low key fashion was fine. He cared far more about the Zambian leader’s private response to his report on the Pretoria meetings, and Kissinger later recalled that during their lengthy afternoon session Kaunda “exuded satisfaction.”82 In the evening of September 20 Kissinger returned to talk further with Kaunda, although he first spoke in depth with special advisor Mark Chona during the limo ride to State House. Chona began by summarizing Kaunda’s press conference, at which he refused to comment on specifics but generally called for Kissinger to continue his effort. The secretary was encouraged, and responded by emphasizing that “though there will be the two ministries held by whites, the chief minister will be black.” He contended that the “Interim Government is itself going to be an earthquake and everything will change.” Chona concurred: “That’s true. No one thought this was possible. It is a tremendous advance.” Approval from the Zambian official closest to Kaunda when it came to foreign relations surely boosted the secretary of state, who next elaborated on his concerns. “I am afraid that if this doesn’t work, and there is another Angola, the US will intervene.” He also addressed some of the critics who questioned his reasons for the entire diplomatic initiative: “We are accused of pursuing our own motives in Africa. Of course we do. We think our interests are best served by the moderates.”83 At that point the Zambian president joined them, and the discussion turned briefly to South Africa’s role. Kaunda asked Kissinger what he thought of Vorster. The secretary explained how the South African head of state was a “positive influence” in the meetings with Ian Smith. “Vorster tells us that if Smith does not carry out his agreements,” he added, “Vorster will then cut off his oil.” He went on to describe the Rhodesian prime

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minister’s response: “There were tears. It was a most painful negotiation.” Kissinger reiterated how important of a change he considered the interim government would be, and that he hoped to see whites remain beyond the transition. Finally, he explained that Smith and his colleagues wanted to “maintain the economy.” They moved to the dining room for the evening meal, and taking a break from official business, discussed soccer, a sport both Kissinger and Kaunda enjoyed watching.84 As dinner drew to a close, serious conversation about Rhodesia resumed. The secretary asked the president about Nkomo’s reaction. Kaunda replied that he hoped Kissinger would see the ZAPU leader that night. Kissinger then asked Kaunda to try his best to stop Nkomo, Nyerere, and others from making such critical public statements about US motives. “We are thinking about our next budget,” he stated, “to see if we cannot do something special for Zambia, Zaire, and for an independent Zimbabwe.”85 While large amounts of aid to Mobutu’s Zaire would be nothing new and Zimbabwe would not achieve independence until 1980, approving major assistance for Zambia in late 1976 would reflect a significant policy shift. Kissinger, in fact, kept his promise to Kaunda. When the budget for fiscal year 1977 was finalized, the US government did “do something special” for Zambia. With key influence from Kissinger’s State Department, Congress approved Security Assistance of $145 million for Lusaka. Classified as a Commodity Import Program loan, the money was to be used for “fertilizer, animal feed, and essential spare parts for transportation machinery.” The ease and speed of the loan’s approval by the Agency for International Development (AID) and then Congress “were directly attributable to awareness that Kissinger had made a personal commitment to Kaunda.” The assistance represented a quarter of all AID funds for the entire southern African region at the time.86 After dangling the carrot of possible financial support, Kissinger informed Kaunda that “some friendly words about this mission would be helpful.” The Zambian president agreed with the secretary’s reasoning. “This is a strong point,” stated Kaunda. “We want to see justice and fair play. When you kept away, we attacked you. It is only fair that when you are making such an effort, we should show that it is appreciated.” Kissinger asked whom the Frontline presidents would select among the black Zimbabwean leaders to negotiate with Smith. Kaunda predicted that it would be Nkomo or his second in command and Mugabe or his second in command. The secretary inquired if a new interim government could count on peace or if it would face ongoing guerrilla warfare. Kaunda obviously desired peace and therefore was “keen” to get the Frontline presidents and leaders of ZAPU and ZANU to support the settlement. With that in mind he requested a copy of “the Rhodesia points,” which had been negotiated with Smith. The secretary agreed to leave a copy but insisted that the document be kept secret. Kaunda promised that nothing would leak. “My giving you these is a mark of my confidence in you,” exclaimed Kissinger. “But I cannot give them in Dar.” Although Kissinger had lost faith in Nyerere, he trusted Kaunda to keep the document secret and present it to his Frontline colleagues.87 After the secretary and the president concluded their lengthy conversation and Kaunda left the room, ZAPU head Joshua Nkomo entered to get a briefing from Kissinger. The secretary noted unhappily that the Zimbabwean had been giving him “publicity,” and Nkomo denied “attacking” Kissinger. The secretary of state promised

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that “we want you to succeed.” He summarized the situation: “If the presidents agree, Smith will put forward majority rule within two years.” After outlining the proposed structure of the interim government, he notified Nkomo of the potential sticking point: “The Ministers of Defense and of Law and Order would be white.” Nevertheless Nkomo was somewhat pleased in general, though not entirely sold. “But you have to be guarded,” he cautioned, “dealing with that lot. The two ministries are there for two years.”88 The ZAPU chief asked the secretary to expound a bit more on the exact make-up of the interim government, which he did. Kissinger offered Nkomo a mild endorsement: “If you are the leader, the US will not be unhappy.” The Zimbabwean replied that he needed to discuss the proposal with his associates. “Apart from all else, though,” he admitted, “we did not expect this much. It is not ideal but we appreciate you can’t get the ideal always.” Accentuating the positive, Kissinger remarked: “I think it will be an earthquake, when the Interim government is in.” Still cautious, Nkomo reiterated his concerns about the two security posts being in white control. Kissinger again expressed support for the ZAPU leader’s ascension, reminding him that he had not met with any other black Zimbabwean. “I have confidence in you,” replied Nkomo. In closing Kissinger said: “We support Kaunda and you.”89 On the morning of Tuesday September 21, the secretary rode back to State House and met briefly again with Nkomo. He later recalled in his memoirs that the ZAPU leader remarked: “Your job has been to move Smith, and this is what you have done.”90 At 8 a.m. the secretary met with President Kaunda for the final time and summarized his talk with Nkomo. He informed Kaunda of Nkomo’s lingering concerns about the security ministries and his desire to raise the issue at the conference with Smith. He felt such negotiation would be difficult but not impossible. “The main thing” is to establish the “Interim Government,” he emphasized again. “Then the authorities are dismantled and there is a black government.” Kaunda concurred that the key was to get “the Interim Government formed,” with “the backing of the US and UK.” Kissinger quickly stated, “We back it.”91 They briefly discussed potential venues for a Rhodesia conference, and both favored Livingstone. “We have complete confidence in your ability to do it,” assured Kissinger. They talked about their responsibilities during the rest of the week, leading up to Smith’s hoped-for announcement on Friday evening that he had accepted majority rule. Kaunda requested that Kissinger stay in London until Smith’s speech and see to it that Prime Minister Callaghan call Nyerere at that point and give the Frontline presidents instructions: “So everyone knows what will take place.” Mark Chona added that they would need to be certain if the Rhodesian constitution was suspended and if so exactly what the role of the British would be during the transition period. “That’s what we need to know,” concluded Kaunda, “the sequence of things to be done.” For the last time Kissinger reiterated: “As soon as the Interim Government is formed, these things are done.” Kaunda simply stated “good” and escorted the secretary to the door so he could depart for Tanzania.92 According to Kissinger, the reaction to his accomplishments with Smith in South Africa by Nyerere was far less enthusiastic than the reaction by Kaunda had been. “Kaunda saw in what had been achieved a means to stabilize the region, safeguard his

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country, and secure majority rule under a moderate government for his neighbors,” the secretary later wrote. Nyerere interpreted the events in Pretoria as a chance to prove his radical credentials. He did not want to be seen as accepting a settlement imposed by the capitalist “imperialists.” Whereas the Zambian president was willing to move quickly to the Interim Government as Kissinger suggested, his Tanzanian friend “kept urging a constitutional conference under British chairmanship.” Nyerere wanted the Interim Government chosen only after a conference had been organized and a new constitution had been hammered out, meaning a lengthy delay that would greatly increase the leverage of his allies, the “boys with guns,” and a considerable reduction in the leverage of Nkomo and Kaunda. Therefore, during his meeting with Kissinger on September 21, the Tanzanian president showed little interest in having a detailed discussion of what had been agreed with Smith.93

Meeting Mobutu From Dar es Salaam the secretary flew to Kinshasa, where he spent the night. At 10 a.m. the next morning, he arrived at the presidential palace for a lengthy discussion with Joseph Mobutu.94 Kissinger began by thanking Zaire’s leader for his hospitality, noting that when he stayed in Tanzania the room was so small that as soon as he got out of bed he ran into the wall. “You are among friends here,” commented Mobutu. Turning to his Rhodesian diplomacy, Kissinger explained that his goal was to foster a quick transition to a black government in order to prevent the Soviets from achieving another Angolatype success. He explained the entire proposal in detail, including Smith’s requirement that the security ministries be in white hands for two years. “Kaunda and Nyerere have accepted this program in principle,” he claimed. Mobutu then recalled an agreement a few years before among him and his counterparts from Zambia and Tanzania. They had decided that Mobutu should take the lead on Angola, Kaunda on Rhodesia, and Nyerere on Mozambique. Kaunda kept his word but Nyerere did not, instead siding with the Soviets on Angola. Mobutu did not appreciate the Tanzanian president’s behavior. In spite of past disagreements, however, Mobutu believed that both he and Nyerere “should support Kaunda in his efforts for Zimbabwe.” Kissinger agreed wholeheartedly and added: “If Kaunda were acting alone, we would have had the right solution for Rhodesia.”95 Mobutu elaborated on why Kaunda should be most influential. “Zambia’s geographic position is such that it should play the lead role in Zimbabwe. Neither Zaire nor Tanzania will have to live with the outcome and neither of us know the conditions in Zimbabwe,” he observed. Kissinger seconded this opinion. “That is why Tanzania can be so heroic,” he opined. “It doesn’t have to fight.” That reality had allowed Nyerere to claim to be such a radical and in his public pronouncements imply that Kaunda was almost a traitor to the cause of the liberation movements because of his willingness to work with the United States and support a moderate like Nkomo. Unlike Nyerere, however, Kaunda had been “careful and correct” in his statements. According to Kissinger’s assessment, the war in Rhodesia had been very costly to Zambia and so Kaunda did not want to do anything that would jeopardize a potential peace settlement.

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The secretary of state hoped that Mobutu could help him by encouraging his Zambian friend, because it was crucial that a solution be reached in the next month or two. “It would also be a good idea if you had a word with Kaunda,” he explained. “You can tell Kaunda things I cannot say.” Kissinger expounded on his reasons for seizing the initiative and pushing so hard. “My reasons for moving ahead are cold-blooded. For seven years we did very little in southern Africa. Whoever ruled in Salisbury did not stop me from sleeping,” he admitted. “We now face a strategic problem of great urgency.” If no settlement was reached before the rainy season, which would begin approximately in November, then the guerrilla war would escalate and the Soviets would be able to exercise inordinate influence on the Zimbabwean nationalist movements. Meanwhile, as long as Smith’s white government remained in charge in Salisbury then there was nothing the United States could do. Rhodesia would be another disaster similar to Angola. “If we wait six months,” he feared, “we will lose everything.”96 Kissinger contended that Congress had undermined success in Angola and did not want to see another failure in Rhodesia. Therefore, he reiterated that Mobutu “had to encourage Kaunda,” because he “needs your support,” added the secretary. “As far as Kaunda is concerned,” promised Mobutu, “he has my support.” Kissinger specified that the US government would be demonstrating its appreciation for Kaunda’s role by providing Zambia with 10,000 tons of wheat. “You need to have Kaunda’s support,” concluded Mobutu. “I count on you,” Kissinger commented. “We will continue to do what we can to build up Kaunda and I plan to get more aid to Zambia.” Mobutu restated the point one final time for emphasis: “You must help Kaunda.”97 Siteke Mwale, who participated in Zambian foreign relations for over four decades, believed that Mobutu genuinely admired Kaunda. “He respected KK so much,” recalled Mwale. Moreover, the feeling was mutual. “KK believed in Mobutu’s efforts to unify Zaire and supported them,” observed the Zambian diplomat.98 Having concluded their initial discussion of Kaunda’s key role regarding Rhodesia, they talked informally for a while, behaving like old college buddies. Kissinger showered Mobutu with encomium. “I like people who conduct policies without illusions. You are bloodless,” he stated, adding “I admire the way you conduct your affairs.” They discussed the timing of back-to-back press conferences before the afternoon’s cruise on the presidential yacht. Mobutu suggested that Kissinger announce his plan to start his next Africa trip in Zambia, in order to strengthen Kaunda’s reputation. Kissinger responded that he was not sure he would be able to return to Africa before the end of the month but hoped to do so before 1976 came to a close. The secretary again praised his host: “I have been to Africa twice but the most useful talks on each trip have been the ones I have had with you.” Mobutu pointed out that while other African leaders were busy criticizing the United States as imperialist, he was one of the few to publicly point out that the Soviets were also imperialists.99 After the press conferences, Mobutu and Kissinger reconvened. The secretary asked the president what he had told the journalists. Mobutu replied that he had highlighted the impact of the US diplomatic initiative in southern Africa. Before April all of the African leaders had believed that the region’s problems could only be solved through fighting. Kissinger had changed that. “Because of your work, we now see a solution can be reached through peaceful means,” Mobutu observed. “That’s wonderful,” Kissinger

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exclaimed. Mobutu added that his session with the media had also covered economics and the fact that Zaire needed more US help because of the drop in copper prices and rise in oil prices. At that point Kissinger, perhaps overwhelmed by his gratitude for Mobutu’s kindness, commented somewhat incredibly: “You should have seized Cabinda.” The oil-rich province of Cabinda was part of Angola but had long been the apple of Mobutu’s eye. While encouraging extra-territorial aggression was not exactly ethical, the statement fit with Kissinger’s effort to curry favor with Mobutu. He applied icing to the cake by pledging to ask the National Security Council to speed up the delivery of military equipment to Kinshasa, such as tanks, artillery, and helicopters.100 For the afternoon they moved to Mobutu’s luxury boat on the Congo River. Kissinger opened by assuring Mobutu that for “the whole of Africa” the Ford administration based its policy on his views. After this shameless kowtowing to Zaire’s president by the US secretary of state, the conversation shifted back to Rhodesia and particularly Kaunda’s significance. “I have full confidence in Kaunda,” explained Mobutu. “The next time you come to Africa you should go to Lusaka first to emphasize the importance of Kaunda.” Kissinger concurred: “That would be the smart way to do it and it would show Nyerere the relative importance we attach to him.” He explained that furthermore, the United States planned to withhold some funding from Tanzania and transfer it to Zambia instead. Having concluded their lengthy discussion, the two sat down for a farewell lunch.101

Smith’s speech and reactions From Kinshasa the secretary travelled to London, and on September 23 he met with British foreign minister Anthony Crosland and Prime Minister James Callaghan at 10 Downing Street. Callaghan remarked that Kissinger was looking fine after such a long journey and thanked him for the effort. The secretary responded that it was a “combination of arrogance and ignorance that got me into this,” a phrase with which many of his critics might agree. “You are familiar with my talks with Smith,” he commented. “All we have heard indicates he will put forward the five points that I put to him.” He added that the Frontline presidents agreed that the British role in the conference was crucial. He explained that in Kaunda’s view, as soon as Smith made his announcement, Callaghan should call Nyerere to start arranging the conference itinerary. Kissinger then stated sternly: “You have a legal responsibility to create a framework for an interim government.” He added that the “most helpful thing” that Callaghan could do would be to talk with Nyerere after Smith made his announcement, and tell the Frontline presidents that it was up to them to choose the team of black Zimbabweans for the conference. “We would back you up,” he concluded. “It is important that you say you will put full weight behind it,” stated Callaghan. “You can count on it,” replied Kissinger. They wrapped up on a somewhat optimistic note, with Callaghan adding that he believed Kissinger could “work with Kenneth (Kaunda) and also Nyerere.”102 In a televised address on the evening of Friday September 24, Ian Smith accepted the five-point proposal. Smith agreed to the principle of majority rule, which was quite incredible considering that he had recently said that it would not occur in Rhodesia for

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a thousand years. He explained that during his meetings with Kissinger, “It was made abundantly clear … that as long as the present circumstances in Rhodesia prevailed, we could expect no help or support of any kind from the free world. On the contrary, the pressures on us from the free world would continue to mount.” Kissinger later described Smith’s remarkable speech as “dignified and unemotional.”103 Over the next two days, the Zambian president hosted the other four Frontline presidents in Lusaka to discuss the Rhodesian developments. Kaunda, Nyerere, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Seretse Khama of Botswana, and Agostinho Neto of Angola issued a strong statement congratulating “the people and fighters of Zimbabwe” for their “heroic armed struggle.” While they did not praise Kissinger specifically, the Frontline leaders did acknowledge that “international solidarity in the implementation of sanctions” had been instrumental in the fight against the illegal Rhodesian regime. Furthermore, their statement advocated the immediate establishment of a Transitional Government to implement majority rule, which had been Kissinger’s number one suggestion in his talks with Kaunda. They also called on the British government “to convene at once a conference outside Zimbabwe” to establish the Transitional Government, begin making plans for a new constitution, and discuss the means for restoring peace.104 During the afternoon of September 27, Kissinger hosted the South African ambassador, “Pik” Botha, in his Foggy Bottom office to discuss the Frontline reaction and next steps. Botha relayed to the secretary that the South African foreign minister, Brand Fourie, had been planning to accompany him to Washington, but when Prime Minister Vorster first heard the Frontline statement praising the armed struggle, he had decided to keep Fourie with him in Pretoria to focus on what he viewed as a negative signal from Lusaka. Kissinger was not as worried, and attempted to calm the South African diplomat. “It’s all right,” he began. “It is not a bad thing to have a shot fired across their bow.” He explained that in fact the Frontline leaders had not rejected anything significant or really said anything all that new or different.105 Seemingly reassured, Botha then inquired: “Where do we go from here?” Kissinger responded that his focus was now on moving quickly toward a conference, instead of “haggling around on the details.” He was hopeful that Callaghan’s government in London was prepared to carry out its responsibility of facilitating the talks and ultimately overseeing the transition to majority rule. “The British will try to assemble it. They have to find a place; the blacks have to choose a leader,” he observed. He then added that “one of them said to us it looks like Nkomo is their chosen instrument.” Kissinger’s assistant clarified that it had been Kaunda who predicted the emergence of Nkomo. Botha commented: “A pity it wasn’t Nyerere, because Kaunda has always favored him.”106 The secretary’s staff member brought in the latest telegrams from Tanzania and Zambia, and Kissinger and Botha went over them together. “Nyerere says the Africans cannot accept some of Smith’s points but will go to the conference with no preconditions of their own,” read the secretary. “That’s all right,” commented Botha. Kissinger concurred. “They have no preconditions of their own. That’s all the five Presidents were really saying at Lusaka. That’s not bad,” he concluded, and Botha agreed. Kissinger then showed Botha the latest messages from Kaunda. The Zambian

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president praised Ford and Kissinger for their efforts and hoped that the British would now step in and move things forward. In another cable, Kaunda’s security advisor, Mark Chona, detailed a conversation with Samora Machel. Even the relatively radical president of Mozambique believed that a settlement was possible in Rhodesia.107 After reviewing the most recent statements from Lusaka and Dar es Salaam with Botha, Kissinger concluded optimistically: “Okay. So actually we’re not in such bad shape at all.” He understood that there was no way the Frontline leaders could have come together over the weekend and simply offered an unqualified endorsement for Smith’s Friday night announcement accepting majority rule. Nevertheless, when all the messages were carefully examined, the possibilities of a conference being arranged and the entire Rhodesian settlement process moving forward looked pretty good. “The key is to get a moderate into power in Salisbury,” Kissinger reiterated, and for him that undoubtedly meant Nkomo. As Kissinger and Botha wrapped up their conversation about Rhodesia, the secretary prodded the South African ambassador: “It is over, if you don’t let Smith slip away.”108

Taking stock with Siteke Mwale About ten days after his conversation with Botha, Kissinger met with Siteke Mwale in New York to assess the Rhodesian situation. Kissinger summarized what he had accomplished during his southern African shuttle mission, emphasizing that “it took a long time to get Smith to agree to majority rule.” He admitted to being somewhat disappointed by the Frontline leaders public statements in the aftermath of Smith’s televised announcement. “We had a rocky week after Lusaka but things have quieted down. “Our leaders need to be cautious,” Mwale responded, “and not because we do not appreciate what you have done.” He explained that they had previously dealt with Smith. “I know him personally,” he emphasized, “and he cannot be trusted.” To that the secretary answered: “I am not asking you to trust Smith. You should trust us.”109 Mwale remained skeptical, and pointed to Smith’s desire to control the security ministries and host the conference in Rhodesia. “We are back to square one,” he solemnly stated. Kissinger tried to cheer him up. “Look at what has been accomplished,” he urged. “There will be a black prime minister … and most importantly, full majority rule within two years.” He also reminded Mwale that the meeting would definitely not be held in Rhodesia, regardless of Smith’s preferences. The venue instead would be in Switzerland. Somewhat mollified, Mwale acknowledged that “Geneva is fine.” Nevertheless he had major doubts and admitted: “I fear we will not have a transitional government in two years.” Kissinger contended that Smith could not hold out that long, because the United States planned to “keep up the pressure.” The secretary did worry, though, that Smith would scuttle the conference. Mwale pleaded with Kissinger not to let him. “If Smith delays, violence will increase.” The secretary of state, however, held out hope for the conference. He noted that the British planned to invite Nkomo, Muzorewa, and Mugabe to represent the various nationalist factions. “It would be good to invite Nkomo, Muzorewa, and Mugabe. Mugabe carries the military wing,” commented

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Mwale. He wondered if the nationalists would be able to get along at Geneva. “They must be ready to work together,” observed Mwale. “We know they are prepared to accept the conference.” Kissinger asked who might chair the nationalist group, and Mwale was not sure. “I hope by the time of the conference they will select a spokesman,” he said. “My worry is Smith. I wish he could be kept out,” reiterated the Zambian foreign minister. “No one else could sell this program in Rhodesia,” countered Kissinger. “We need his influence.”110 After discussing the possibility of sanctions against South Africa to foster a settlement for Namibia and potential US recognition of Angola, they shifted to bilateral issues. Kissinger explained that the Ford administration was doing its best to provide promised Public Law 480 food assistance to Zambia. “We sped up the PL 480 deliveries,” he stated. “Yes. We thank you,” replied Mwale appreciatively. However, he explained that Zambia had been counting on a small loan of $5 million from the Export-Import Bank to help complete a steel mill project. It seemed like the funding had been approved, but at the last minute the bank’s president told Mwale that a new feasibility study was required before the funds would be forthcoming. Kissinger was not happy to hear this and told his staffer: “Make sure someone calls EXIM.” As their long talk drew to a close, Kissinger observed that Mwale did not seem as calm as he had been during past meetings and wondered what was wrong. The Zambian explained that he was tired and under pressure during his visit to the United Nations. Kissinger commiserated. He concluded their session by briefly reminiscing about his stops in Zambia and positive relationship with Kaunda’s government. “I remember with great affection you and your President. You changed the atmosphere of my mission. I have not forgotten it,” he stated. “Anything we can do to strengthen Zambia we will do. Please give your President my warmest regards,” concluded the secretary.111

Geneva Three weeks later on October 28, the conference regarding a possible settlement for Rhodesia opened in Geneva. Ian Smith did not have much faith that the British would be tough enough to facilitate a settlement. On the other hand, he was pleasantly surprised when all the black delegates showed up.112 Henry Kissinger, whose shuttle diplomacy had done so much to make the Geneva conference possible, did not participate. Furthermore, the US election on November 2, in which Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford, meant the president and his secretary of state were “lame ducks.” With Andrew Young as a key supporter and advisor throughout his campaign, Carter seemed likely to bring a different approach to southern Africa into the White House in January. The prospect of Carter in charge of US policy encouraged the Zimbabwean nationalists to wait for a better deal, reducing the leverage Kissinger could have had at Geneva if he had decided to attend. Steve Low, the US ambassador to Zambia at the time, later speculated that “Ford’s defeat in November 1976 was a key to the ultimate failure of Geneva.” Whether Kissinger’s diplomatic magic could have produced a settlement at

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that point will never be known for sure, but Ford’s defeat guaranteed that the secretary of state would not even try.113 Kissinger did follow the developments at Geneva closely, though, and discussed Rhodesia thoroughly with Mark Chona, Kaunda’s key advisor, in London on December 11. Kissinger, who had attended a Chelsea soccer match that afternoon, was relaxed. Chona, on the other hand, was agitated because his boss President Kaunda had recently received a letter from Kissinger that had upset him. Evidently Kaunda felt like Kissinger was accusing him of no longer being on the same wavelength as the United States regarding Rhodesia. Kissinger admitted to Chona that he should have phrased things differently in his message to Kaunda and urged his Zambian counterpart to keep things in perspective. He had initiated an entirely new approach to southern Africa in April, and in September had gotten Smith to accept the principle of majority rule. “These are the big events,” he insisted. “This could never have been done without President Kaunda.” He was sorry for sending a badly written letter but believed that the United States and Zambia were still on the same course in support of a Rhodesian settlement that they had discussed in Lusaka months before. Kissinger and Chona then discussed the role of Mugabe, his Patriotic Front alliance with Nkomo, and the need to keep the Soviets out of the future nation of Zimbabwe. “No country has a greater stake in this than Zambia,” observed Kissinger. He asked Chona to pass his “affectionate greetings” to Kaunda, who he characterized as a “great man.”114 Later in December, Chona flew to Washington for more talks with Kissinger. The secretary of state had concluded by then that Geneva would fail, and because of Ford’s loss to Carter he felt there was nothing he could do to prevent it. In hopes of an eventual solution being crafted, he arranged for Chona to meet with some of the people Carter had chosen as his foreign policy team, most notably his nominees for secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, and ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young. Chona had known Young for years, and looked forward to working with the man he described as “our friend.”115 For Young the decision to serve in Carter’s cabinet as UN ambassador had not been an easy one, but he decided to do it as long as he could carry Martin King’s approach onto the international stage and focus primarily on southern Africa.116 Not surprisingly, the Zambian government would be among those he cooperated with most closely during his tenure in the Carter administration. Part of his work would be presenting a revised Rhodesian initiative, because Kissinger’s plan ran out of steam. At the end of 1976, the Geneva conference adjourned for the holidays and would never reconvene.

Conclusion As Kissinger departed Washington after eight years at the reigns of US foreign relations, his eleventh-hour attempt to apply shuttle diplomacy to southern Africa came up short. Nevertheless, he had accomplished something significant by coercing Smith into publicly endorsing the principle of majority rule. In doing so he had not only been the highest-ranking US diplomat to visit South Africa but also had demonstrated sustained and unprecedented high-level US cooperation with several black African leaders, most notably Kenneth Kaunda. In addition to working with Kaunda to facilitate

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progress regarding Rhodesia, he also responded favorably to the Lusaka government’s requests to strengthen bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia. For someone who had been a collaborator in Nixon’s neglect of black Africa and himself had known virtually nothing about Zambia’s neighborhood as late as December 1973, Kissinger’s major effort to cooperate with Kaunda and bring majority rule to Rhodesia in the second half of 1976 was nothing short of incredible. At the same time, it represented just another example of the shuttle diplomacy he had utilized toward China, Vietnam, and the Middle East since 1969. While he truly was striving for racial equality in Rhodesia, he was also trying one last time to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union’s potential influence in yet another distant corner of the globe. As 1977 dawned, Zambian officials truly appreciated Kissinger’s attempt and hoped for even more from Jimmy Carter and their old friend Andrew Young.

5

Too Good to Last: Kaunda’s Relations with the Carter Administration, 1977–1978

From January 1977 through May 1978, the friendly top-level ties between the United States and Zambia that had begun in 1976 during the Kissinger era continued and arguably got even friendlier. The administration of Jimmy Carter, with Ambassador Andrew Young as its point person, built new bridges to black African nations such as Nigeria and committed considerable time and political capital to try to facilitate a settlement in Rhodesia.1 Carter himself became the first US president to visit subSaharan Africa while in office, and all of this certainly impressed Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda. Bilateral relations got even more of a boost when Carter hosted Kaunda for two days of very friendly talks in mid-May 1978, which resulted in significant gains for the Zambian president; but, Kaunda correctly considered Carter’s remarkable relations with his nation “too good to last.”2

Zambian relations with Rhodesia, the USSR, and West Africa Entering 1977, seeking a solution in Rhodesia remained a very high priority for Zambia’s foreign relations.3 Siteke Mwale assessed the situation thoroughly for Kaunda and his other top advisors, noting that diplomatic efforts by the United States had led to a conference at Geneva that was nearing its conclusion. The key issue at Geneva was “the structure of the transitional government,” but major disagreement on this topic divided the black leaders. Bishop Abel Muzorewa favored a process whereby elections would choose a prime minister, because he believed he was more popular among the blacks of Rhodesia and would therefore triumph. The “patriotic front” coalition of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe preferred an appointed cabinet. In Mwale’s view, Muzorewa was a “sensitive person” who suspected that the Frontline leaders intended to “impose Nkomo on Zimbabwe.” In his memo to Kaunda, Mwale denied that any such thing was possible: “Nobody will choose leaders for Zimbabwe but Zimbabweans themselves.”4 Mwale summarized the significant efforts by the Zambian government to facilitate a resolution to the Rhodesian conflict—efforts which had “not been easy” and were not properly appreciated by some of the nationalist leaders. He contrasted the sometimes inappropriate behavior of the Zimbabwean freedom fighters whom Zambia had been

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graciously hosting with the more respectful conduct among the freedom fighters whom Zambia had hosted from Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. Based on the bad behavior of some of the Zimbabweans in Zambia, he posed a serious question for Kaunda to ponder: “What kind of neighbor are we going to have in independent Zimbabwe?” He predicted that if certain Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) elements (implying Robert Mugabe) took charge, they might close the borders with Zambia. If Muzorewa took charge, bilateral relations would definitely be strained.5 If Nkomo emerged on top, then the key concern for Kaunda would be the degree of Soviet influence in Zimbabwe. Excessive Soviet influence in Zimbabwe would not be in Zambia’s interest. “Our relations with the Soviet Union are well-known,” added Mwale. “Attempts have been made at party level to improve them, but the sum total still comes to very little.” Mwale contended that the Soviets did not respect Kaunda’s philosophy of humanism, and they viewed Zambia as a “stubbornly independent nation.” Neighboring nations Angola and Mozambique, on the other hand, both were on very friendly terms with Moscow. “That leaves Zambia in the middle,” concluded Mwale, “and enhances the dimension of the problem that she will face should the USSR play a dominant role in Zimbabwe through Mr. Nkomo.”6 About a week after Mwale submitted his insightful memo warning about potential problems for Zambia when Zimbabwe achieved independence, including possible Soviet influence, Kaunda sent a delegation headed by Mary Fulano to Moscow. Fulano, who was a member of parliament and represented the Central Province on United National Independence Party’s (UNIP) Central Committee, attended the World Forum of Peace Forces. While in the USSR she consulted with the Soviet-Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which was represented by Vladimir Shubin and Mr. Harhardin. Harhardin told Fulano that “the USSR was ready to increase her cooperation with Zambia in all fields.” Fulano responded by thanking the Soviet government for supporting the freedom fighters of southern Africa. Regarding bilateral relations, she expressed appreciation for Soviet doctors, engineers, and teachers that had served in her country and observed that “there was no doubt that both Zambia and the Soviet Union wished to improve further their relations.”7 Kaunda’s personal diplomacy in mid-January, however, focused on briefing leaders in West Africa on the latest developments regarding Rhodesia, and by then the Geneva conference had ended without resolving the conflict. Kaunda spent about ten days touring West Africa, hoping to “get countries such as Nigeria and Ghana involved in the intensification of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia.” His first stop was Nigeria, where he was greeted warmly by the new leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo. Kaunda and Obasanjo held long talks over several days, mostly about Rhodesia, but also discussed improving Zambia-Nigeria relations.8 Kaunda’s relationship with Obasanjo thus started on a very strong note, and the Nigerian would play a key role in resolving the Rhodesian dispute over the next few years. After Nigeria, Kaunda visited Ghana and held in-depth talks with their leader, General Ignatius Acheampong, again focusing on Rhodesia. The highlight of the Ghana stop for Kaunda, though, was his visit to the former village and home of the late Kwame Nkrumah. Kaunda laid a wreath on Nkrumah’s grave and met with his elderly mother. She embraced him, danced, and called him “my son.” It was an

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emotional moment, even for the standards of the always emotional Kaunda. The Zambian president next spent three days in Liberia, where he was given the royal treatment by President William Tolbert, the people, and the media. On January 21, Kaunda landed in Guinea, where President Sekou Toure personally welcomed him. Toure himself drove the presidential car, with Kaunda in the front passenger’s seat, and they proceeded to the People’s Hall where some five thousand party cadres and government officials waited to enthusiastically applaud the presidents’ speeches. Kaunda then talked privately with Toure, bringing him up to speed on Rhodesia. As in the previous countries, Kaunda was honored with an official dinner and a 21-gun salute. Short stops in Sierra Leone and Gabon concluded the whirlwind tour of West Africa, and Kaunda returned to Lusaka on January 22.9 Kaunda’s government soon took concrete steps to improve relations with the Soviet Union. On January 28, Reuben Kamanga, chair of UNIP’s foreign affairs committee, engaged in a lengthy chat with Vassily Solodovnikov, who had taken over as the Soviet ambassador in Lusaka in July 1976. Before his appointment as ambassador, Solodovnikov had been a professor in the USSR and in charge of the Africa Institute. Arriving at a time when Kaunda was still very bitter about the Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war, Solodovnikov had set about improving Soviet-Zambian relations. Utilizing his great knowledge of the region, he would skillfully achieve remarkable diplomatic success by the time he left Lusaka in 1981. He managed to forge a great friendship with Joshua Nkomo, foster closer ties between Zambia and the USSR, and earn the respect of his American counterparts.10 During his January 28, 1977, conversation with Kamanga, Ambassador Solodovnikov thanked UNIP for sending the high-level delegation led by Mary Fulano to Moscow earlier in the month. He believed it was a sign of better bilateral relations, which would be further improved by the upcoming March visit to Lusaka by Nikolay Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council. Solodovnikov then turned to military matters, confessing that his government was experiencing difficulties getting weapons into the hands of Nkomo’s guerrilla soldiers because Soviet planes did not have permission to fly from Angola into Zambia. Kamanga responded that he did not think there would be any problem getting Kaunda’s approval for such flights. Solodnovnikov also raised the issue of possible Soviet military assistance to Zambia, because of its “proximity to the unliberated areas.” Kamanga concurred with the ambassador’s assessment that bilateral relations were improving, and observed that “Zambia wanted to make the relations even warmer.”11

Carter takes charge As the Kaunda government worked on resolving the conflict in Rhodesia and restoring better relations with the USSR, the new Carter administration took power in Washington. Beginning with his inauguration, during which he and his wife Rosalynn briskly walked up Pennsylvania Avenue, Jimmy Carter tried to change the tone of US politics and diplomacy. Some of his key goals included placing a higher priority on human rights, working more closely with the United Nations, and improving American

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relations with black African nations.12 His point man for doing this would be former civil rights leader Andrew Young, whom he nominated to become UN ambassador. Young was approved 89 to 3 by the Senate and sworn in by Thurgood Marshall on January 30. That very day, Carter immediately instructed Young to go to Africa in order to “get some sense of what African leadership expected.”13 Before visiting Africa, Young joined Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for a meeting with the outgoing “doctor of diplomacy,” Henry Kissinger, to discuss southern Africa. The conversation revealed much about the very different approach to diplomacy that Carter and his top advisors on Africa such as Young and Vance would take in comparison to Kissinger. While the substance of their policies would in fact be very similar to those pursued by the Ford administration, the tactics would not. A key change would be a new emphasis on listening to the views of others, not a characteristic for which Kissinger was famous. During the late January briefing, for example, when Vance asked Young for his assessment of southern Africa, Young promptly asked for Kissinger’s analysis. “We need the benefit of your views,” explained the former civil rights activist. Kissinger, never hesitant to share his opinions with anyone, proceeded to provide a very thorough summary of his efforts in 1976 to facilitate a settlement for Rhodesia. The report was pretty straightforward, and many of the goals would also be sought by the Carter administration. In particular, Young and Vance agreed with Kissinger’s point that Kaunda would play a central role in achieving any breakthroughs.14 Young departed for Africa less than a week after his swearing in ceremony. During his stop in Nigeria, the ambassador talked at length with General Obasanjo and persuaded him that the Carter administration supported the movement for majority rule throughout southern Africa. Convinced of Young’s sincerity, Obasanjo praised him to the media and characterized their conversation as being very productive. The fact that Nigeria had not even allowed Henry Kissinger to step foot in their country in 1976 due to displeasure with American policy toward southern Africa underscored the significance of Young and Carter’s fresh approach to the continent. During his trip Young visited fifteen nations and met with seventeen African heads of state, including Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere, who emphasized the importance of repealing the Byrd Amendment. By overturning that 1971 amendment, the Carter administration would once again block imports of Rhodesian chrome and thereby rejoin the UN sanctions against Ian Smith’s minority regime. Back in Washington, Young delivered the message from black African leaders loudly and clearly on February 24, when he characterized repeal of the Byrd Amendment as a “referendum on American racism.”15 While still technically a congressman in early January, Young had introduced House Resolution 1746, which would reinstate the ban on Rhodesian chrome imports. With the additional boost of endorsements from Vance and Young, the House approved the bill on March 14 and the Senate followed suit the next day.16 During the signing ceremony, President Carter proclaimed: “I think it puts us on the side of what is right and proper. I believe that this resolution can lead to help in resolving the Southern African questions, particularly related to Rhodesia.”17 Positive responses to the Carter administration decision to get back into line with the UN sanctions were already coming from Lusaka. Even before the White

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House signing ceremony had taken place, Mwale invited US Ambassador Stephen Low to his office in order to express the Kaunda government’s pleasure at the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Mwale described the legislation as “a credit to the new Carter Administration.”18 Elijah Mudenda, who was Zambia’s prime minister in March 1977, recalled that the Kaunda government “welcomed the action taken by the Carter administration.” He praised it as clear “support for majority rule in Rhodesia” and a “useful indication” which did have “the desired adverse effect on the morale of the enemy,” giving encouragement to freedom fighters throughout southern Africa.19

Kaunda visit postponed While Kaunda certainly appreciated the positive signals emanating from Washington, he faced new complications closer to home. Earlier in the month, a force of insurgents based in Angola launched an invasion into the Shaba region of Zaire.20 Joseph Mobutu, president of Zaire, quickly requested an emergency supply of fuel for his military from Kaunda in order to mobilize his troops and crush the rebellion. Kaunda denied the request for fuel, explaining that the supply on-hand was barely sufficient for his own nation’s needs. Nonetheless, Mobutu’s military managed to repel the invaders. The incident presented some serious diplomatic difficulties for Kaunda, whose foreign ministry had been busy repairing relations with Angola.21 Challenges raised by the so-called “Shaba War,” in conjunction with the escalating conflict in Rhodesia, convinced Kaunda to cancel a trip scheduled for mid-May to Washington to meet with Carter. He notified the American president that he had decided to remain in Lusaka to “help maintain peace and stability in the region.” Carter quickly sent his regrets that they would not be able to meet face-to-face at that juncture, but added that he considered Kaunda’s decision “perfectly understandable” under the circumstances.22

Young to Lusaka In late May 1977, Young returned to Africa for a 17-day journey which included attendance at conferences of African diplomats in Nigeria and Mozambique, plus lengthy stops in South Africa in Zambia.23 During his visit to Lusaka, Young addressed students at the University of Zambia and explained that the US government was investigating companies who were suspected of violating oil sanctions against Rhodesia. He also spoke to a group of Namibian students at the American-sponsored Namibian Institute, expressing hope for a settlement and democratic elections in their nation soon. Kaunda hosted Young at State House for a one-hour meeting, during which they discussed the Carter administration’s policies toward southern Africa. During the press conference afterward, the ambassador remarked that “if the world had listened to President Kaunda a decade ago,” they would not be in this mess regarding Rhodesia today. Young promised full American support for ongoing rounds of negotiations, and

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then joked: “In one of these rounds Mr. Smith will be knocked out.” Kaunda concluded the media session by praising the White House’s new approach: “We are amazed by the way President Carter has pursued human rights.”24 Clearly Kaunda and Young got along well and were on the same page, and over thirty years later Kaunda fondly recalled the UN ambassador as a “friend of mine.”25 By May 1977, the Zambian leader already had developed very positive feelings toward the Carter administration and specifically its policies toward southern Africa and human rights. Kaunda’s foreign minister, Siteke Mwale, who had known Young since the early 1960s, observed that the priorities of the Carter administration were “in line” with those of Kaunda’s government. He added that, “The number one problem for them was race,” not anticommunism.26 According to Ambassador Stephen Low, who served in Lusaka from 1976 to 1979, Kaunda trusted US diplomats, regardless of political party, more than the British, who had disappointed him too many times before. However, he worried that Carter and Young were “too good to last.” Kaunda believed, correctly as it turned out, that the Carter administration would be “rejected” by the American public.27

Consultative team Nevertheless, the initiative of the Carter administration to facilitate a resolution of the Rhodesian conflict impressed the Zambian president. Cyrus Vance and British foreign minister David Owen had decided to establish a “consultative team” to focus on negotiations with the leaders of the various factions in the civil war. The key members were British diplomat Johnny Graham, and the US ambassador to Zambia, Stephen Low. Given his heavy involvement in Rhodesian talks during his tenure in Lusaka, Low described himself as more of a “special mediator” than a typical ambassador. His efforts had the blessing of Kaunda, who told him that American attempts to foster creation of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe were “by far more important than anything else in US/Zambian relations—go to it!”28 Beginning their shuttle diplomacy efforts in late May 1977, Low and Graham talked with Ian Smith in Salisbury and Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka and also had met with officials in Mozambique and Tanzania. On June 1 they described their undertaking to Kaunda’s Minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Milner. Graham told Milner that it seemed like Smith favored majority rule and suggested that the Zambian government discourage Nkomo from further fighting. Milner clearly disagreed and pointed out that as they spoke Smith was busy invading Mozambique and massing troops along the Zambian border. “Given the power of the United States,” he added, “they were strong enough to take appropriate measures against Smith.” Low responded that “the United States was not as strong as it seemed.” Milner did not seem convinced and concluded with a decidedly mixed message. “Zambia supported their initiative and hoped they would succeed,” he stated, but “in the meantime Zambia will continue to back the armed struggle.”29 After his somewhat contentious conversation with Milner in Lusaka, Low flew to Washington and updated State Department and National Security Council

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(NSC) personnel on the undertakings of the “consultative team.” One NSC staffer characterized his briefing as “most helpful to our thinking.” In spite of Low’s mediation efforts, however, the Rhodesian war escalated. About three thousand guerrilla soldiers of Mugabe’s ZANU force and a smaller number of Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) wreaked havoc throughout the country. Smith’s army responded by moving about a half million civilians into “protected villages” and, with incursions into Mozambique and Zambia, sought to strike at the guerrilla bases. In late June, Andrew Young criticized the Smith regime for “lashing out against its neighbors.” He contended that such raids would “only lead to more death, to intensified hatred, to even more bitter armed conflict and even great ruin in southern Africa.”30

Kaunda’s central role Kaunda spent much of June in London, participating in the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. The Zambian president’s contributions to the conference “set the tempo for the discussions on Southern Africa.” His keynote speech was “tough and forthright,” specifically in that he identified British companies as being among those who were violating the embargo on oil imports to Rhodesia. On the other hand, he refrained from criticizing the British government for failing to resolve the Rhodesian dispute, which had been an escalating problem for over eleven years. In addition to his public speeches, Kaunda conducted numerous private discussions with representatives from a wide range of Commonwealth nations, who appreciated his thorough updates. The Zambian leader received extensive press coverage while in Britain, and he made it clear to all concerned that in his view the only solution for southern Africa was “genuine majority rule for the two countries Rhodesia and Namibia and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.”31 After the Commonwealth conference, Kaunda returned to Lusaka and shortly thereafter sent an encouraging message to Walter Mondale, the American vice president. Mondale, who as a senator had been a strong supporter of the civil rights movement, also made major contributions to Carter’s innovative approach to southern Africa. In May he had met with the prime minister of South Africa, John Vorster, and forcefully presented the Carter administration’s displeasure with apartheid. Vorster, not surprisingly, did not appreciate the criticism and tried to defend his government’s policies.32 During the tense discussion, Mondale did express hope that there could be progress toward settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia, but his condemnation of the Pretoria regime may well have made Vorster less likely to play the helpful role which he had accepted during the 1976 Kissinger initiative. In any case, Mondale had strongly advocated racial equality and genuine democracy throughout southern Africa, and Kaunda expressed his gratitude for the effort. The NSC believed that positive US-Zambia relations and cooperation from Kaunda were critical for Carter’s “entire southern Africa policy” and in particular for “a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe.” With that in mind the NSC crafted a careful response for Kaunda’s June 21 letter to Mondale. The draft reply acknowledged the

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vice president’s agreement with the Zambian leader’s concern about the stubborn and unhelpful nature of Ian Smith, but also pointed out the potentially harmful effect of the decision by “certain nationalist leaders” to abandon peace talks. The NSC advised Mondale to make the following request to Kaunda: “I ask that you use the power of your office and your great personal influence to convince those who are skeptical or frustrated of the need for continued commitment to lead Zimbabwe to peace through a negotiated effort.”33 There was no doubt about the positive feelings between the governments of Zambia and the United States at the highest levels entering July 1977. In a congratulatory telegram in honor of American Independence Day, Kaunda praised Carter for “the noble goals set by your administration especially in the fight for human rights.”34 The US ambassador to Zambia, Stephen Low, and his colleague on the “Consultative Team” Johnny Graham, conducted a second round of talks with both Ian Smith and the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders. Mugabe objected strongly, demanding to know who would actually be in charge during the transition period. This issue would continue to bedevil mediation efforts until the final Lancaster accords at the end of 1979. In late July, Low again flew to Washington and met with Carter and British foreign minister Owen at the White House to review the Rhodesian negotiations. Owen, evidently frustrated by Mugabe’s intransigence, proposed a deal with just Nkomo.35 Anthony Lake and Richard Moose from the State Department opposed such a plan because it would irreparably damage relations with Mugabe, and Vance concurred because of the much larger guerrilla army under Mugabe’s control.36 A settlement that did not really end fighting and instead resulted in an Angola-style civil war was really no settlement at all.

The Anglo-American proposal Because the planned visit to the White House in May by Kaunda had been postponed, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania became the first leader of a Frontline state to meet with Carter, and their talks in early August focused primarily on how to facilitate peace in Rhodesia. The two presidents, somewhat surprisingly, agreed on almost every single point.37 For his part Nyerere agreed to convene a meeting of the Frontline presidents to discuss possible implementation of the newest proposals. Carter considered Nyerere’s pledge to be a “major concession,” given his earlier commitment to guerrilla warfare.38 Most controversially, Carter supported Nyerere’s idea that the new army in an independent Zimbabwe would be “based predominantly on the Patriotic Front forces.” Brzezinski acknowledged that this stipulation “probably goes further” than the British wanted to go, but he advised Carter to accept it in order to get Nyerere’s full cooperation regarding the proposal for a United Nations force providing security during the transition period, which is when elections on the basis of “one person/one vote” would be held for the first time.39 In mid-August, planning for what became known as the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia continued. Vance held further talks with Nyerere, British foreign minister

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Owen, and South African diplomats. On August 14, Vance and Carter discussed the plan of attack. The Pretoria government had indicated its disagreement with certain aspects of the Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia, but Carter was not deterred. “We are prepared to move strongly to implement our position, which is a fair one, including the use of sanctions against South Africa and encouraging Iran to cut off oil supplies if they don’t cooperate,” asserted Carter in his diary. “This applies primarily to Rhodesia.”40 Carter believed that he and Nyerere had hammered out an excellent proposal, even if it was much more radical than the British preferred, and he was even willing to consider the use of sanctions against South Africa if that would help facilitate a settlement in Rhodesia. Carter’s point man on the Anglo-American initiative was Andrew Young, who linked up with Owen and Zambian foreign minister Mwale in London before flying into Lusaka on August 26. With Kaunda acting as the host, a role at which he excelled, all five of the Frontline presidents and the leaders of the PF convened in the Zambian capital over the weekend to discuss Rhodesia.41 Owen and Young presented the plan to Mugabe and Nkomo on Saturday August 27. The PF leaders did not think the wording was strong enough regarding the role of the former guerrilla forces in Zimbabwe’s new military. Regardless of this criticism from the PF, the Frontline presidents encouraged Owen and Young to go ahead with their efforts. On morning of Sunday August 28 a follow-up session with the PF leaders took place, and then Young and Ambassador Low met with Kaunda in the afternoon to review the conference’s results. Young told Kaunda that the Carter administration was worried about the possibility of Ian Smith refusing to accept the latest proposal and seeking to work out his own “internal option” instead, but it was decided to present the AngloAmerican plan in South Africa and Rhodesia as it stood, and then try to smooth out the wrinkles.42 On Monday the Zambia Daily Mail, while acknowledging that major challenges existed, nonetheless signaled strong support for the undertaking in its lead editorial: “The most important outcome of the weekend talks in Lusaka is that they got both the British and the Americans showing greater concern over the problems of Rhodesia.”43 In Pretoria on August 29, Young and Owen delineated their proposal for Vorster, who warned them that Smith would reject it. From there they flew to Tanzania to consult further with Nyerere on August 30. Young, who had established a positive reputation for being able to negotiate with stubborn white leaders in the American south during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, faced a similar circumstance in Salisbury on September 1, when he and Owen met with Ian Smith and his top advisors. “The Rhodesians,” according to Low, “did not disguise their surprise and dismay at … the phrase that the independence army would be based upon liberation forces.” Smith predicted a “disastrous” effect on the white population and ensuing “chaos” throughout the country.44 Low recalled that this specific point about guerrilla soldiers serving in the new Zimbabwe army, which Carter and Nyerere had agreed on, acted as an “albatross” around the necks of the negotiators.45 It certainly upset Smith and his advisors. This prompted Young, the veteran of many tough talks in Birmingham and elsewhere, to remark: “Where I

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come from we have a saying that there isn’t any point crying over spilt milk.” This caused Smith to crack a smile for the first time, but did not make him more willing to endorse the proposal.46

Smith to Lusaka As the round of shuttle diplomacy by Owen and Young wrapped up on September 1, the new Anglo-American plan did not seem particularly likely to bring about a resolution to the Rhodesian crisis anytime soon. Although Kaunda appreciated the efforts of the United States and Britain to help facilitate a settlement, such an event seemed no closer than it had the year before at the height of Henry Kissinger’s involvement. Perhaps feeling desperate, the Zambian leader agreed a few weeks later to host Ian Smith for a private meeting in Lusaka. During the morning of September 25, Kaunda greeted Smith at the old city airport, and the two boarded a helicopter for the short trip to State House. Upon landing Smith approvingly noticed a few small antelopes and numerous guinea fowl prowling the presidential golf course, and the long-time adversaries entered Kaunda’s office for a one-on-one discussion. “We never really got to grips with anything,” recalled Smith, but “at least we had broken the ice.” The afternoon passed quickly and Smith flew back to Rhodesia. During a cabinet meeting on September 27, the Rhodesian leader briefed his advisors about the secret trip. “My comment was,” he wrote in his memoirs, “that if it was left to Kaunda I felt we could make a plan, but interference from outsiders, especially those who lived far from the scene and did not understand what was going on, could derail the affair.”47 About a week later, the story of their clandestine conversation broke in the international media, creating a wave of disbelief around the globe. The American and British governments initially doubted the truth of the story.48 In Kenya, an editorial in the Weekly Review criticized Kaunda for engaging with Smith. “The disturbing question in the minds of many political observers last week,” began the article, “was the actual aim of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda with regard to the reported seven-hour meeting in Lusaka two weeks ago with Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, Ian Smith.” The piece contended that over the years Kaunda had tried “several times before to enter into secret deals with Smith.” The Weekly Review editors concluded that the Zambian leader’s main motives were to oust Nyerere from his position as head of the Frontline states, and to orchestrate a settlement which would put Nkomo in charge of an independent Zimbabwe, because Kaunda had “always supported Nkomo.”49 Kapasa Makasa, the Zambian High Commissioner to Kenya and a long-time ally of Kaunda’s since their days as freedom fighters in the 1950s, quickly responded to the Weekly Review’s accusations. Makasa defended Kaunda’s decision to meet with Smith as due to his being a true “humanist,” and also reflecting his willingness to talk with anyone if it could help resolve a conflict. He emphasized that Zambia still supported the Anglo-American initiative in principle, and continued its backing for the PF in the war against Smith’s white minority regime. He dismissed the charges

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that Kaunda favored Nkomo and claimed that the head of ZAPU’s residency in Lusaka was no different than that of leading freedom fighters from other groups and other nations.50 While Makasa may have demonstrated a bit of bias in his rejoinder, his defense of his president and old friend was eloquent and impassioned.51 There was no doubt that Kaunda’s willingness to sit down with representatives from any nation or group was a strong point of his statesmanship.

Carter’s African initiatives Kaunda’s openness to talk with anyone was a trait that he shared with many top Carter administration officials, who continued to build better relations with many black African nations in the fall of 1977, in spite of the lack of a breakthrough on Rhodesia. One place that the improvement in US-African relations manifested itself strongly was at the United Nations, where Andrew Young’s first year as ambassador earned positive marks from most of his African colleagues. On October 4, Carter delivered a speech to the UN about conflict resolution and hosted a luncheon attended by ambassadors from approximately fifty African nations. Many of them had not attended such events during the Kissinger years, so the impact of Young’s work and Carter’s policies was clear.52 About a week later, Carter hosted Nigerian Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo at the White House. Their conversation, scheduled for ninety minutes, ended up lasting an extra hour. Carter was impressed by Obasanjo and the rising influence of his country throughout Africa. He credited Young with fostering the drastic improvement in Washington-Lagos relations since the previous year. “They can be extremely valuable in helping us with African affairs,” the president wrote in his diary, “because they are too strong to be ignored by the other African leaders.”53 The flip side of the Carter administration’s closer relations with most of black Africa, logically, was its being more critical of apartheid. This had initially been signaled loud and clear by Mondale in May. After the brutal murder of popular black leader Steve Biko in early September, grassroots activists protested on the streets of New York and African ambassadors at the UN pushed for tough measures against South Africa.54 Young, who had attended a UN memorial for Biko in late September, announced his personal preference for broad sanctions on October 24 but explained that official US policy was not up to him alone and would be decided by the Carter administration as a whole.55 During a meeting of the NSC that same day, Carter approved “stern action short of an economic boycott” against the Pretoria regime. On October 25 he conferred with Vance and Young and was told that among key Western allies there was “a general consensus that we impose a strict arms embargo.” In Carter’s opinion, the South African government was “taking a politically suicidal attitude” regarding the outside world. Young was instructed to vote against economic sanctions but in favor of a mandatory UN ban on weapons sales to South Africa, which was approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 4.56 This measure fell far short of the comprehensive sanctions that activists and some African leaders advocated; however, it was still a significant measure in that it was the first time the UN imposed

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a mandatory embargo against a member state and represented a major shift in the policy of the US government.57 As confrontation with the Pretoria regime intensified, prospects for peace in Rhodesia dimmed. Emissaries from Ian Smith talked with Kaunda at his safari lodge in the Luangwa Valley and received disappointing news. The gist of the message they brought back to Salisbury was that Nyerere had insisted to Kaunda that any settlement involving Nkomo must also include Mugabe. Smith later recalled that his primary fear after his own meeting with Kaunda, that their diplomatic initiative would be undermined by “external interference,” was materializing.58 It was Smith’s own military, though, that destroyed any hopes for a settlement in the short term by launching a devastating raid into Mozambique on November 23. Supposedly targeting Mugabe’s ZANU guerrillas, the three-day attack killed over one thousand people. The death toll included over one hundred children, and mass graves of women victims were later discovered.59 Such vicious tactics on the part of Smith’s forces only increased the determination of the PF forces to continue the fight, rendering a negotiating deal impossible in late 1977.

Chona to Washington Kaunda sent his top foreign policy advisor, Mark Chona, for a White House meeting as the end of the year drew near.60 Carter and Chona talked in the Oval Office on Friday December 9. According to Chona, his primary mission was to request that Carter refrain from any further US assistance to Jonas Savimbi in Angola.61 He described the results as somewhat disappointing because Carter felt he had to move cautiously on Angola, but nonetheless Chona characterized the Carter administration as “our good friends.”62 President Carter noted the meeting in his diary, but made no mention of Angola or any other foreign relations issue. Instead, he summarized the encounter as follows: “Mark Chona came over representing Zambian president Kaunda to warn me to be very cautious over the Christmas holiday.” In the published version of his diary the president added the comment that this was the first of a series of warnings sent by Kaunda based on “visions” about Carter’s “future well-being.”63 These limited details regarding Chona’s mission suggest that there was a unique mystical aspect to US-Zambia relations during the Carter years. Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) interpreted the significance of this meeting very differently, contending that Chona was “a Zambian who acts on behalf of Mr. Nkomo and President Kaunda.” He added that by granting him a “White House audience,” the Carter administration was embracing his message that if Smith’s planned internal solution and elections were allowed to take place, then the PF forces would respond by escalating the war. There was some truth in Dole’s opinion, most importantly that Carter and his top advisors had decided against supporting any attempt by Smith at an internal solution because such a settlement would not bring an end to fighting. Yet his accusation that Chona was working as much for Nkomo as for Kaunda was inaccurate. He also blamed the escalation

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of violence in Rhodesia on Carter’s willingness to host Chona in the Oval Office while ignoring real causes of violence such as brutal attacks by Smith’s military or Mugabe’s disinterest in peace talks.64 Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, responded thoroughly to Senator Dole’s accusations. He explained that Mark Chona was a special advisor to Kaunda and that he had been “received by the President in that capacity.” He detailed the Carter administration’s preference for a Rhodesian settlement that included allparties. Otherwise, the new government in Zimbabwe would be “subject to continuing challenges to its legitimacy from both inside the country and out.” Comparing this possibility to what had tragically transpired in Angola, Christopher added that the result could be “a destructive civil war.” He emphasized that the US had “not selected a favorite,” argued that no member of the administration had specified any individual for leadership of Zimbabwe, and pointed out that none of the nationalist leaders had met with Carter. The administration’s goal was “that the new government of Zimbabwe be internationally and domestically recognized.”65

Malta conference Although the Carter administration remained committed to seeking a solution for Rhodesia based on the Anglo-American plan entering January 1978, the absence of any activity in southern Africa by top level US diplomats since September suggested to Kaunda that the initiative had been abandoned. In a January 5 interview for UK television, he explained that the plan could have had a chance for success if it had spelled out more clearly how exactly Smith would be removed. He also made it clear that Zambia would not recognize elections that were overseen by Smith as part of an internal settlement. He concluded by asking the interviewer what had happened to the US-UK effort and why their Anglo-American plan had been “shelved.” At the time of his interview, the invitations to an all-parties conference regarding Rhodesia on the island of Malta had not yet been distributed, so Kaunda’s confusion was understandable.66 When Low notified all of the key players in mid-January that they were invited to the Malta conference planned for the end of the month, the PF leaders accepted. Smith on the other hand declined, opting instead to focus on negotiating his internal settlement with Abel Muzorewa. Nevertheless the Malta talks took place over a couple of days beginning on January 30, and on the bright side they presented the first opportunity for Owen and Young to engage in thorough discussions with Mugabe and Nkomo. Young’s ability to connect equally well with individuals as different as these two rivals during the conference was amazing.67 He characterized Malta as a “minimal success” because it resuscitated the Anglo-American plan as a middle course between war and Smith’s internal settlement, and demonstrated the willingness of the PF to engage in further talks.68 On February 7, a few days after the Malta conference adjourned, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose briefed Putteho Ngonda, the Zambian ambassador in Washington, on the results of the meeting. Ngonda opened

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the conversation by explaining that although he was certain Ambassador Low was keeping Kaunda informed regarding US diplomacy, it could be useful for him to give his government another perspective. Moose summarized the results of Malta, and then explained that the United States and Britain would probably be notifying the Frontline leaders within a few days to delineate their plan for another round of talks. The Carter administration really wanted to “keep up the momentum,” and hoped to see some concrete progress at the next conference. Moose added that the governments in Washington and London in no way endorsed Smith’s internal plan, because it would not end the war. Ngonda responded that Kaunda’s key concern remained how exactly the Anglo-American plan envisioned the removal of Smith from power, or as he phrased it, “who would bell the cat.” He added that the Zambian government did support the liberation struggle, but did not intend to impede British and American diplomatic efforts, which it still welcomed.69 On February 9 at State House in Lusaka, Kaunda talked at length with Ambassador Low and the British High Commissioner about Rhodesia. The Zambian president urged the United States and Britain to “proceed promptly” with their discussions with the PF, echoing the sense of urgency sounded by Young after the Malta conference. Kaunda specifically advised that lower level discussions begin immediately to work out the differences, which Low considered “interesting.” The US ambassador concluded with a lengthy observation: “To my recollection, this is the first time President Kaunda has accepted to involve himself in discussion of the substance and detail of the Anglo-American proposal …. His willingness to engage in discussion of the substantive problems provides a basis on which a future further appeal might be made to him to press for concessions by the PF.”70 This was one of the few times in his three years as ambassador that Low actually discussed concrete foreign relations issues with Kaunda, who normally left the discussion of such details to Mark Chona.71

Internal settlement A few weeks later, events in Rhodesia and Zambia severely complicated matters for the Carter administration’s diplomatic initiative, though. On March 3, Ian Smith announced that he had reached a final agreement with Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. Known as the “Salisbury Plan,” the deal called for elections after a one-year transition, during which the white minority would control the police and the military. During the actual elections, Smith’s army would enforce martial law. No members of the PF would be allowed to participate in the voting, unless they renounced the guerrilla war. Not surprisingly, Mugabe and Nkomo immediately denounced the plan outright. On March 6, Smith retaliated by sending his security forces into Zambia’s Luangwa district to strike at ZAPU training camps. The events of early March dashed the American and British hopes for organizing an all-parties conference for the foreseeable future, although US and UK diplomats refused to give up.72 At the United Nations on March 14, the Security Council declared Smith’s internal settlement “illegal and unacceptable.” The United States and Britain both abstained

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on the measure, and Young offered a thorough explanation of how Smith’s deal differed from the Anglo-American plan. He explained that the goal of the Carter administration remained the organization of an all-parties conference in order to achieve a lasting settlement and avoid escalating civil war. Mwale addressed the Security Council the following day and contended that the attack on March 6 into his country by the Rhodesian army represented a “grave threat to international peace and security.” In response to Mwale’s presentation, the Security Council passed a moderate resolution commending Zambia for its support of the liberation struggle and warning that further attacks by Rhodesia would result in sterner UN measures.73 About ten days later Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor, weighed in on the struggle in Rhodesia with a strong vote in favor of Joshua Nkomo. He pointed out to Carter that Nkomo had been a legitimate nationalist for twenty-five years, was “a prosperous businessman and capitalist,” and was favored by a wide range of governments including the British, the Soviets, and the Kaunda regime in Zambia. Brzezinski believed that among the potential future leaders of Zimbabwe, Nkomo was a “pragmatist” and also the best politician. He concluded that only Nkomo could end the fighting and maintain positive relations with the Western world.74 This thoughtful analysis by the national security advisor was surely on Carter’s mind as he prepared for a trip to Africa at the end of the month.

Carter to Africa From March 29 to April 2, Carter visited Nigeria for several days and stopped briefly in Liberia, making him the first US president to journey to sub-Saharan Africa while in office. He was warmly greeted in Lagos, which he attributed in great part to the positive work done by Young in rebuilding bilateral relations. Carter spent considerable time with Obasanjo, and the two leaders made a strong personal connection. They attended a Baptist church together, where they both read from the scriptures.75 In a public speech, Carter quoted Martin Luther King’s famous words, exclaiming that Nigerians were “free at last!” During private talks, Carter and Obasanjo agreed to oppose Smith’s internal settlement and continue supporting the Anglo-American plan instead.76 Along those lines, Carter also met with Siteke Mwale for discussions on southern African issues while he was in Lagos.77 Two weeks later, a high-powered diplomatic team embarked on a shuttle mission in hopes of arranging an all-parties conference and reaching a satisfactory resolution regarding Rhodesia. Owen, Vance, and Young flew to Tanzania and talked with Mugabe and Nkomo, only to be frustrated by the PF leaders’ insistence on having complete power during any transitional period. From Dar es Salaam the diplomats jetted to Pretoria in hopes of convincing Vorster to put pressure on Smith, but they had no luck with that request, since Vorster personally backed Smith’s internal plan. Continuing to Salisbury to talk with Smith and Muzorewa, the US-UK team actually had qualified success, as the Rhodesian leaders agreed to consider sitting down with the PF at an all-parties conference in the future but refrained from committing and claimed that their priority was governing their country fairly. The April undertaking

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by top-level American and British diplomats failed to arrange a conference among all the principals but did manage to make clear their policy of opposing the internal settlement and holding out for an agreement that included the PF.78

Kaunda’s May 1978 US visit Kaunda headed for the United States in mid-May 1978 for a week’s visit, motivated by a complicated mix of diplomatic, economic, and political factors. The Carter administration, which had first invited the Zambian leader a year before only to have Kaunda postpone the trip, looked for an inside Frontline perspective on the latest developments in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa and also wanted to further improve relations with black African governments, as Carter had recently done in Nigeria. Young explained that the White House invited Kaunda in order to get “first hand information and guidance,” and that the Zambian leader was expected to “give the Americans all the information they needed.”79 While Kaunda shared Carter’s interest in facilitating settlements of the ongoing regional conflicts, he was also motivated by economic and strategic desperation. Since the crash of copper prices in 1974 the Zambian economy had suffered a steady decline, and by 1978 a devastating combination of unemployment, inflation, and shortages of basic goods plagued the Zambian people. A nation that had seemed well on its way to becoming a prosperous success story in the early 1970s instead looked like it was headed in the opposite direction in the late 1970s. Furthermore, with more frequent attacks from the South African and Rhodesian forces killing and wounding soldiers and civilians alike and damaging the infrastructure, Zambia’s economic plight was additionally aggravated by the need to spend more money on defense. Also, as at least one very perceptive journalist pointed out at the time, a highprofile trip for talks with the Carter administration served Kaunda’s political interests. The Zambian leader’s policies were being severely criticized from within his UNIP, which would be holding the first full elections under the new one-party system in October 1978. Several long-time ministers faced serious threats for their seats in the parliamentary elections, and Kaunda himself would be challenged for the UNIP presidential nomination by well-known political veterans Simon Kapwepwe and Harry Nkumbula. According to insightful commentary in the New African, “Kaunda felt that leaving financial talks at ministerial level would not have the necessary and deep political effect at home. He had to do something about it and he had to do it quickly.” Thus it was not only diplomatic goals, economic disaster, and national security but also “a mounting wave of discontent against and strong criticism of the President’s domestic policies that prompted him” to go to Washington.80 At approximately 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday May 17, Carter greeted Kaunda upon his arrival at the White House and escorted him inside for an exchange of brief public remarks.81 President Carter began, characterizing Kaunda as “a friend.” He noted that the Zambian leader’s last visit to Washington had been three years earlier and that since then “momentous changes” had taken place in southern Africa. “His neighbors

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are standing in admiration of his leadership,” continued Carter. He added that Kaunda was a Christian, an idealist, and “a man of great integrity which has never been questioned.” Carter believed that he and Kaunda shared the same goals for Rhodesia and Namibia, and therefore he looked forward to the upcoming consultations with a “senior statesman” who grasped the complexities of southern Africa and “the unique qualities of the people of each nation” in that troubled region. “He is a good partner for us,” emphasized Carter.82 If Kaunda was looking to boost his political fortunes at home, he could not have asked for a better endorsement from his American counterpart, and he responded appreciatively to the “warm and friendly reception.” The Zambian leader acknowledged that this was not his first visit to Washington but pointed out that “being in the United States today is not the same thing.” He observed “an air of freshness which is invigorating to all those who are committed to the cause of man the world over.” He believed that “the new atmosphere which has brought America closer to many nations … is the product of President Carter.” According to Kaunda, the Carter administration had “given hopes for improved relations and cooperation between America and Africa.” He mentioned the significance of Carter’s recent visit to the continent, which showed respect for Africa’s importance to the United States. “We welcome this new approach,” he added. “So Africa is no longer of interest only to multinational corporations, but is also important in the maintenance of peace the world over,” concluded Kaunda.83

Figure 5.1 Kenneth Kaunda plays guitar and sings for Jimmy Carter and guests at a White House banquet on May 17, 1978. Courtesy Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

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After the friendly opening public statements, the two presidents adjourned to the Oval Office for a private talk that lasted about ten minutes. Carter then escorted Kaunda to the Cabinet Room, where they engaged with their top-level advisors in discussions for about 75 minutes. Kaunda spent the afternoon at Blair House working and resting in his room, and then he returned to the White House for a State Dinner. Carter welcomed him back at 7:30 p.m., and the two walked to the Blue Room to greet the invited guests. About twenty minutes later they moved into the State Dining Room for the formal evening meal, followed by dessert and entertainment. Kaunda himself serenaded the assembled guests with a Zambian song, and the two leaders exchanged toasts just after 9 p.m.84 Carter opened his remarks by praising his Zambian counterpart’s singing ability, and joked that the reason some guests might not have recognized the language of Kaunda’s prayer was because it was in “Presbyterian,” explaining that Kaunda’s father had been a minister in the Church of Scotland. He lauded Kaunda for his strong feelings about religion, freedom, equality, democracy, and self-expression. Carter noted that living in the White House could often be a sobering experience because it reminded him of the long history of the United States and of his great predecessors. He commented that “it is a very exciting thing to know that we have, in effect, the George Washington of Zambia here with us tonight; a man who had the confidence of his people and who enjoys a relationship with the people of Zambia that is mutually respectful and filled with confidence.”85 Carter noted that the two had been in close contact for over a year and that he had benefitted greatly from Kaunda’s advice. “I have had a chance to discuss with him today some of the most difficult questions that face the modern world,” explained the American leader, such as how to help bring “freedoms and basic human rights” to the people of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. Carter reminded the crowd that Kaunda had spoken in the same room three years before, delivering frank words that were “highly embarrassing to the American who were his hosts.” Since then it had become clear, in Carter’s opinion, that “had we listened to him closely and had the policies of our own government been shaped by him and his advice toward Africa, we could have avoided many serious mistakes.” He informed the audience that he and his guest had been discussing the economic challenges for Kaunda’s country which had been caused by the drastic decline in copper prices. “We stand with Zambia,” Carter exclaimed, and we recognize “that their future, their economic strength, is important to us and to the entire free world.” He closed his remarks by saying “mwaiseni mwane,” which means “welcome friends” in Bemba, Kaunda’s mother tongue.86 Before responding to Carter’s encomium, Kaunda summoned his delegation to the floor and led them in a spirited rendition of the song “Tiyende Pamodzi,” which means “let us go forward together” in the language Nyanja from Zambia’s Eastern Province.87 He then put down his guitar and offered his formal remarks in Carter’s honor, noting first that through correspondence he had already developed respect for his American counterpart. “My discussions with him today,” he added, “have confirmed my impressions.” Kaunda praised Carter as “a man endowed with penetrating simplicity and humility, as well as transparent honesty.” He thanked the US president for injecting a moral tone into politics and for focusing on human rights in international relations. “Jimmy Carter’s background has greatly assisted America’s approach to Africa and the Third World,” stated Kaunda, and “Zambia’s relations with the United

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States have improved.” Regarding the conflicts in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the Carter administration was playing a “decisive role” in the ongoing effort to achieve solutions. Kaunda enthusiastically returned to the topic of Carter’s desire for worldwide freedom and justice. “That the President of the United States should champion the cause of human rights,” he commented, “is a source of great inspiration to all of us.”88

Figure 5.2 Kenneth Kaunda and Jimmy Carter talk privately on the White House patio on May 18, 1978. Courtesy of Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

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The next day, Thursday May 18, found Kaunda back at the White House at 10:30 a.m., initially for a half-hour private conversation with Carter on the patio outside the Oval Office. The two leaders returned to the Cabinet Room and joined their advisors for another forty-five minute discussion. At approximately 11:45 a.m., Carter said farewell to Kaunda and the two-day presidential summit came to an end.89 The Zambian president remained in Washington for another day, however, criticizing the Smith-Muzorewa internal settlement in his luncheon address to the National Press Club on live television.90 On May 19 he testified before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on International Affairs, encouraging Congress to support the Carter administration’s policies toward Namibia and Rhodesia.91 That afternoon the Zambian president flew to Atlanta, escorted by Young. In a ceremony at the Ebenezer Baptist Church, which Kaunda had first visited in 1960, Young and Coretta King awarded Kaunda the Martin Luther King Nonviolent Peace Prize. It was the first time a non-American had received the honor. Overcome by emotion and shedding tears when accepting the award, Kaunda praised the late King as “the embodiment of all the ideals we cherish.” Young in turn echoed Carter’s characterization of Kaunda as the “George Washington of Zambia” and praised him and his people for hosting the freedom fighters from throughout southern Africa. During his stay in Atlanta, Kaunda also received an honorary doctorate from Morehouse College and was told by the governor that it was Kenneth Kaunda Day in Georgia.92 Arriving safely back in Lusaka, the Zambian president announced that his trip had been very encouraging. He commented that bilateral relations with the United States in general “could not be better.” He characterized Carter as a “very fascinating man” and noted approvingly that they were in agreement about what should be done regarding the conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia. The front page of the Times of Zambia pictured the two smiling presidents together under a headline which read “Welcome Home KK.” The paper’s editorial also praised the Carter administration for pledging significant financial assistance to Zambia, which would help stabilize the southern Africa region and contribute to the fight against racism and colonialism.93 The 7-day official visit to the United States represented a triumph for Kaunda at a crucial time. Heavy international media coverage emphasized his role as a veteran statesman and peacemaker. Reports of the glowing panegyric from President Carter reinforced his reputation and gave him and his party a boost in an election year. Kaunda could also point to some concrete results from his trip. In order to help stimulate the staggering Zambian economy, he had secured $100 million in loans from Washington for the next three years. The favorable terms featured a three-year grace period and a scheduled thirty-year repayment. This deal offered by the White House represented an increase of $15 million over the amount of assistance originally budgeted for Zambia by Congress.94 Kaunda did not attain everything on his wish list while in Washington, however. He asked Carter to sell his country “a limited quantity” of “defensive weapons limited in range and also in function.”95 He explained that such weapons were needed to protect Zambia from South African and Rhodesian attacks and that if they could not be acquired in the West, then he would seek them from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,

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Carter decided not to sell Kaunda any weapons, citing his policy of trying to reduce the sales of arms worldwide.96 In spite of the US president’s refusal to provide the requested military hardware, Kaunda later looked back on the 1978 White House visit as “something special.” He described Carter as “my friend and brother.” He very much appreciated the US leader meeting with him three times over two consecutive days and believed that his counterpart had been “very interested in genuine freedom in southern Africa” and that he took a “correct stance” on Rhodesia.97 Reminiscing about the meetings over thirty years later, Kaunda believed that the “very cordial” treatment by Carter signified “not just a matter of courtesy, but concern.”98 Both politically and personally, the 1978 trip undoubtedly represented the pinnacle of US-Zambia relations during Kaunda’s lengthy tenure as president.

Conclusions The first year and half of the Carter presidency, from early 1977 to mid-1978, may well have been the high-water mark of bilateral affairs during the Kaunda era. Soon after taking office, Carter signed the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and thereby renewed sanctions on Rhodesian chrome, a move that was very much appreciated in Lusaka. Kaunda was quickly invited to the White House, and although he decided to postpone the trip, Carter made a very good impression on Kaunda through his Africa point man Andrew Young and his ambassador to Zambia, Stephen Low. Southern Africa was a top priority at the highest levels of the Carter administration, including Secretary of State Vance and Vice President Mondale, and they created a Consultative Group to seek a solution in Rhodesia with Low as the American diplomat. Although the resulting Anglo-American proposals stalled over contentious issues such as who would control the military in independent Zimbabwe, it was not for lack of effort on the part of the United States. President Carter himself demonstrated a genuine interest in African issues and became the first incumbent US leader to visit sub-Saharan Africa in late March and early April 1978 when he spent several days in Nigeria and Liberia. During this trip he consulted with Siteke Mwale and left no doubt that the White House continued to believe that Kaunda would play a central role in any settlement in Rhodesia. In May 1978, Carter hosted Kaunda for two days of lengthy discussions and truly impressed the Zambian president with his sincerity and concern. In concrete terms, moreover, Kaunda secured the promise of a significant increase in US assistance to Zambia. On the other hand, increasingly frequent attacks from South Africa and Rhodesia convinced Kaunda to inquire about the purchase of military hardware, but these requests were denied by Carter. Eventually Kaunda would decide to purchase MiG jets and other heavy duty equipment from the Soviet Union, leading to a heated exchange with his American counterpart in early 1980. By then, controversial events forced Young to resign and the challenge to Carter from Ronald Reagan was becoming very clear. The cozy relations of 1977–78, as Kaunda had predicted, were indeed “too good to last.”

6

Challenges for Kaunda and Carter, 1978–1980

From mid-1978 to the end of 1980, relations between the United States and Zambia experienced some severe ups and downs. The two nations cooperated in order to facilitate a final settlement of the Rhodesian conflict and celebrated the independence of Zimbabwe. Both countries initially denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although their relations with the USSR in the invasion’s aftermath differed dramatically. While Carter imposed severe sanctions against the Soviets and called for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, Kaunda opted to purchase a massive quantity of expensive weapons from the USSR, leading to a mild quarrel with Carter. Both presidents faced serious challenges to their leadership during this period, from internal and external threats. While Carter appeared weak and ineffective and was ultimately beaten badly at the ballot box by Ronald Reagan, Kaunda asserted an authoritarian grip over his government and benefited from changes to the Zambian constitution that would essentially guarantee him another decade in power. Two men who had seemed to have so much in common in the spring of 1978 ended up heading in very different directions by the fall of 1980. The story of the “falling out” between Kaunda and Carter at the end of the 1970s reveals much about the political and diplomatic challenges facing world leaders as the Cold War once again heated up and South Africa escalated its regional aggression.

Agreement regarding Rhodesia Entering June 1978, bilateral relations between Zambia and the United States remained positive in the warm afterglow of Kaunda’s May visit to the White House. On June 26, Carter enthusiastically stated his wishes that the two nations would continue their cooperation. He praised Kaunda for “the deep commitment and moral courage that you have brought to the drive for human rights in southern Africa.” Carter also told his counterpart that he hoped to someday “visit you in Zambia.” About a week later on July 4, Kaunda congratulated Carter on the anniversary of US independence. He applauded the US president for his administration’s contributions to “peace, progress, and stability in the world.” He expressed his appreciation for the hospitality during their recent summit and thanked him for the “fruitful discussion on southern Africa as well as the tangible assistance offered to my country.”1

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In mid-1978, the governments in Lusaka and Washington devoted considerable attention to the ongoing conflict in Rhodesia, where Ian Smith was working on his “internal settlement” with Bishop Abel Muzorewa. On July 16, Muzorewa arrived in the United States at the invitation of senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). Helms hoped that the White House would support Muzorewa by ending the sanctions on chrome, but Carter held firm in advocating a settlement based on the Anglo-US plan that would include the Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. On July 19, the president hosted about twenty senators for breakfast and urged them to oppose Helms’ Amendment which would lift sanctions. Due partly to the president’s efforts, the senate on July 26 instead passed the Case-Javits Amendment, which stipulated that sanctions against Rhodesia would only be lifted when there had been a successful all-parties conference resulting in free and fair elections. The Carter administration insisted that only such a settlement could bring peace and democracy to an independent Zimbabwe.2 Kaunda surely approved of the Carter administration placing such a high priority on bringing a lasting peace to Rhodesia, and in August he arranged a meeting between Smith and Nkomo to pursue such a result. Smith returned to State House in Lusaka on the evening of August 14, where he found Nkomo waiting. Kaunda greeted him warmly and then left the room so that Smith and Nkomo could discuss a resolution. After a friendly late dinner with Kaunda, Smith and Nkomo continued their marathon session late into the night. According to Nkomo’s version of the discussions, he insisted that any final settlement must include Robert Mugabe, a requirement that greatly upset Smith. Nkomo also contended that Kaunda had strongly supported him on the necessity of including Mugabe.3 Smith claimed in his memoirs that he and Nkomo had agreed to a plan that would include Mugabe, but documentary evidence of the conversation has not been discovered. In any case, no deal including Nkomo was reached as a result of the August 1978 rendezvous, and Smith subsequently returned his focus to the “internal settlement” with Muzorewa.4

Challenges by Kapwepwe and Nkumbula By the time of the unsuccessful Smith-Nkomo meeting, Kaunda had learned that two popular veteran politicians intended to challenge him for the United National Independence Party (UNIP) presidential nomination in the December election— Harry Nkumbula and Simon Kapwepwe.5 In early August, Kapwepwe publicly pledged that if he were elected he would fight corruption and make government more efficient. He promised to reduce the resources being committed to the liberation struggle in neighboring countries and instead focus on fixing Zambia’s economy. Specifically, he proclaimed his intention to reopen the railroad through Rhodesia. While Nkumbula was suffering from declining health and popular mostly in the Southern Province, Kapwepwe appealed to a wide range of Zambians from the entire nation.6 At the early September party conference in Kabwe, Kaunda’s tight circle of UNIP loyalists conspired to prevent both men from running. They used physical force to prevent the two challengers from even entering the conference grounds. They rushed

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through a set of constitutional amendments which required the UNIP candidate to have been a party member for five years, to have received twenty delegates from each of Zambia’s nine provinces, and to have no criminal record whatsoever. These provisions combined to effectively end the chances for both challengers. One conference attendee who had been a UNIP cabinet minister in the 1960s, Lewis Changufu, later contended that there were enough Kapwepwe supporters at Kabwe for him to have won the nomination, but it was not to be.7 Kaunda maintained his dominance and would once again be the sole nominee. According to Sikota Wina, who had also been one of Kaunda’s cabinet ministers in the 1960s but had become frustrated with the lack of real democracy in Zambia, UNIP had instituted “a watertight system to produce one candidate.”8 The author of an important study of Kaunda’s foreign relations concluded that “the way he out-maneuvered both Harry Nkumbula and Simon Kapwepwe” revealed Kaunda to be “a ruthless politician” who refused to face an honest challenge in 1978, “destroying instead the challengers.”9

Zambian economy In addition to political challenges, Kaunda faced severe economic challenges in the final quarter of 1978, and as a result he made a controversial decision to reopen the railroad through Rhodesia that he had closed in January 1973. Renewing shipments through Rhodesia meant that some Zambian imports and exports would benefit the Smith regime, and this was surely not an easy decision for Kaunda. It upset his Frontline colleagues, Julius Nyerere and Samora Machel, who urged him not to. Nevertheless, due to a very complicated set of circumstances, he decided he must. The specific event that triggered the decision was the fact that 150,000 tons of fertilizer from the United States, which had begun arriving in July and was needed in Zambia in time for the November planting season, could not be unloaded at the congested harbor in Dar es Salaam fast enough. The first option had been to divert the shipment through Mozambique, but that route could not handle it in time, either. Finally, faced with a major shortage of fertilizer for the summer 1978–79 growing season and possible widespread starvation as a result, Kaunda decided he must swallow his pride and reopen the railroad link with Rhodesia. Congestion at the Dar es Salaam port was only the tip of an ice berg which threatened to sink the entire Zambian economy. Both the TAZARA railway and the Tanzam highway faced a wide range of serious problems. As of mid-1978, only 39 of 85 mainline locomotives were functioning. The others were awaiting repairs, but a severe shortage of spare parts meant that the work could be delayed considerably. Similarly, 340 of the 520 trucks assigned to the highway were in the shop awaiting repair, and a shortage of spare parts for those jobs also meant long delays in completion. This situation was exacerbated by the lack of foreign exchange, which was in part due to the precipitous decline in the price of copper that had begun in 1974. Furthermore, ore extracted in Zambia could not be exported in a timely fashion and was piling up. Failure to get the copper out prevented Zambia from earning the foreign exchange that it needed to buy spare parts for the trucks or locomotives. Making matters worse,

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the price of oil had increased drastically since the mid-1970s, so more of the limited foreign exchange that Zambia had at its disposal went for purchasing fuel for its trucks. With the highway and railroad not operating at anywhere near capacity, the congestion at Dar es Salaam could not be alleviated. Therefore, the only option for off-loading the agricultural aid sent by the Carter administration was to seek other routes, and this lead to the decision to reopen the railroad through Rhodesia. Kaunda made the announcement on October 6 so that the much-needed fertilizer could reach Zambian farmers before the rainy season.10

Smith visits the United States Meanwhile, Ian Smith was on his way to the United States, where support for his Internal Settlement with Muzorewa was mounting rapidly. Smith arrived in Washington on October 7, having been invited by a powerful group of senators that included Harry Byrd, Barry Goldwater, Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and Strom Thurmond. These senators urged Carter to invite Smith to the White House and allow him to present his case for the Internal Settlement. While Carter refused to see Smith personally, top Carter administration diplomats, including Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young, did meet with the Rhodesian leader. Smith was generally not impressed by the administration officials whom he met in Washington and was particularly irritated by Steve Low, the US ambassador to Lusaka and member of the “consultative team” on Rhodesia. Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) forces, based in Zambia, had used Soviet-supplied SAM-7 missiles to shoot down a Rhodesian Viscount jet near Lake Kariba in September. The crash killed forty people, and ten more had been killed as they tried to escape from the wreckage.11 The incident made Smith’s group lesswilling to make any promises regarding the transfer of power to the guerrilla forces and also provided powerful evidence for the US senators who wanted Carter to give the Internal Settlement a chance. During the tempestuous talks between Smith’s group and the Carter administration diplomats, only Andrew Young impressed the Rhodesian leader as being “constructive.” Young, who had successfully forged agreements with white leaders in Alabama in the 1960s, still evidently had a knack for interracial mediation, but it was not enough. Although Smith would agree during their first five days in Washington to attend a future all-parties conference, no concrete agreement was reached at that time.12 Senator Harry Byrd was still trying to arrange a White House meeting with Carter for Smith but to no avail. Byrd incorrectly blamed Carter’s refusal to host Smith on Young and characterized the Carter administration’s Rhodesia policy as “pro-terrorist” because it insisted on the inclusion of Nkomo and Mugabe’s factions. Events in Zambia beginning on that same day, October 18, raised questions about exactly who were the worst “terrorists” in the Rhodesian conflict, however. Smith’s military bombed a camp just a few miles from Lusaka on October 18, and about two hundred young male refugees from Rhodesia were killed. A few days later a second camp in Zambia was attacked, killing and injuring about 150 young women refugees from Rhodesia. Both

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facilities were partly funded by the United States, who helped provide education and healthcare for the youths.13 The escalating violence in Zambia in late 1978 dashed any hopes of a quick settlement based on the previous year’s Anglo-US proposal. On October 25, Vance delineated the deteriorating situation in a memo to Carter, noting that pressing for an all-parties conference at that time would be “counterproductive.” He also explained the planned US response to Kaunda’s request for humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the Rhodesian attacks on the refugee camps. The United States would immediately make $50,000 available to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Lusaka; begin providing another $500,000 to the Red Cross in Zambia as soon as possible; and urge the Red Cross to quickly disperse the $1 million contribution that the United States had made in September for southern African emergencies. Ambassador Low had been instructed to notify Kaunda of the funds being provided to the Red Cross by the United States, and Vance contended that the assistance would be “welcomed by the Zambians.”14 That was undoubtedly true, but Kaunda also understandably may have viewed the medical supplies as too little, too late. He had urgently requested an upgrade to Zambia’s air-defense system from British prime minister James Callaghan during talks in Nigeria in September and suspected that the vulnerable status of Lusaka’s defenses had been leaked by some UK official to Smith’s military, thus prompting the bombing raids.15 Frustrated once again by Britain, Kaunda turned to the United States for military assistance. On Saturday October 28, Vance met with Siteke Mwale. In light of the recent Rhodesian incursions onto his nation’s territory, the Zambian diplomat requested defensive weapons from the United States but to no avail. Vance explained that the Carter administration’s “policy of arms restraint precludes supplying military hardware to Zambia.” Approving official US sales of weapons to Kaunda’s government would require an executive determination by Carter which Vance believed would complicate the administration’s struggle with congress to maintain its policy regarding Rhodesia. He did promise Mwale that he would look into the possibility of providing US communications equipment, perhaps from commercial sources with “informal assistance” from the Defense Department.16 Informal assistance from the Carter administration to secure communications equipment did not nearly satisfy Kaunda’s needs, and so the Zambian president sought weapons from other sources. In late November, Secretary of State Vance’s attention again returned to the issue. He explained to Carter that the British foreign minister, David Owen, intended to speed up the delivery of a $20 million package to Zambia which included an air defense system for Lusaka. Owen feared that Kaunda was planning to send his new Defense Minister Grey Zulu to negotiate a $200 million weapons deal with the Soviet Union. Therefore Owen had asked Vance “to discourage Kaunda from asking for Soviet help in meeting Zambia’s critical defense needs.” Vance understood that Zambia needed to protect itself from Rhodesian attacks but still believed that Carter’s hands were tied. Furthermore, he did not want to see Kaunda purchasing massive quantities of weapons from the Soviets. “Given the constraints on our ability to respond quickly to Kaunda’s requests,” he concluded, “we should

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make a coordinated effort to encourage other western countries to provide military and economic assistance.” In order to maintain positive US-Zambia relations it was important that the White House provide Kaunda with at least something for defense, in light of the fact that the Rhodesian military had acquired ten US-made Bell helicopters in October for rapid troop deployment.17

Kaunda re-elected, ZAPU strikes again Whatever limited assistance the Carter administration could manage to provide for Zambia in the near future, it would definitely still be Kenneth Kaunda in charge on the receiving end. On December 12, 1978, the Zambian president won re-election and would thus be in power for another five-year term, but it was certainly not an inspiring example of democracy in action.18 About 66 percent of registered voters cast their ballots in the one-party contest, although nearly 20 percent of them had refused to endorse Kaunda and instead marked the “no” box. The strongest opposition to Kaunda came from Southern Province, where over half of the mostly Tonga electorate had hoped for the chance to vote for their fellow tribe member Harry Nkumbula. Unfortunately for any disgruntled Zambians hoping for a real choice, the legal appeal by Nkumbula and Kapwepwe against the September constitutional amendments had been defeated in the Lusaka High Court. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe had filed a joint appeal arguing that the nomination of Kaunda by the UNIP delegates at Kabwe had been unlawful. They claimed that there had been widespread intimidation and also contended that the constitutional amendments had not been properly approved. Although they had a solid case, it was thrown out of court on November 16, thus guaranteeing that Kaunda would be the only name on the ballot in December.19 In the early months of 1979, therefore, Kaunda retained a firm grip on Zambian foreign relations and the conflict in neighboring Rhodesia remained at the top of his agenda. As Smith and Muzorewa moved closer to implementing their Internal Plan, the ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrilla forces operating from Zambia and Mozambique escalated their resistance. On February 12, Nkomo’s troops using Soviet SAM-7 missiles shot down another Viscount plane near Lake Kariba, this time killing all fifty-nine passengers. Nkomo contended that these attacks on Rhodesian planes were justified by the fact that Smith’s military traveled on these flights mixed in with civilians. The primary target on this plane, which was headed to the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury, had been General Peter Walls, but he turned out to be on the next plane which departed a few moments later. The strike did kill Lieutenant “Spike” Powell, one of the notorious leaders of Smith’s brutal unit known as the Selous Scouts.20 Smith, claiming that only civilians were on board the plane, quickly ordered bombing runs against two ZAPU camps in Zambia—one near Livingstone and the other near Lusaka. In Washington, Senator Harry Byrd unquestioningly accepted Smith’s version of the ZAPU attacks on Rhodesian planes and requested that the Carter administration hold Kaunda accountable. According to Byrd, fifty-nine “civilians”

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had been murdered by “terrorists,” and according to this line of thinking, by hosting Nkomo’s ZAPU forces the Kaunda regime was therefore sponsoring international terrorism. “The government of Zambia has actively aided or abetted terrorists involved in this and other similar incidents,” insisted the senator, “and has granted to them sanctuary from prosecution for murder.” He believed that according to Section 620a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, such conduct on the part of Kaunda meant that the United States should terminate all aid to Zambia for one year. Douglas Bennet, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, explained in his response to Byrd that the Carter administration believed that Kaunda had not “provided sanctuary from prosecution” for individuals involved in shooting down the aircraft and therefore saw no need to suspend assistance to Zambia.21

Deciding against observers At the same time they were rejecting Senator Byrd’s request to cut off aid to Kaunda’s government, Carter administration officials faced criticism from Zambian diplomats at the United Nations who advocated a stronger stance against the Smith regime in light of the fast-approaching Internal Plan elections. During the first week of March, the UN Security Council deliberated over the situation in Rhodesia, and Zambia’s permanent representative, Paul Lusaka, played a key role. Ambassador Lusaka helped to present the position of the African Group of States at the UN, which called for resolutions denouncing Smith’s recent raids into Zambia and the upcoming April elections. Lusaka explained that while the Zambian government did not oppose elections in Rhodesia in principle, it believed that the elections planned for April under the Internal Settlement could not be “free and fair,” because of the “prevailing war situation.” Zambia and five other non-aligned members of the Security Council therefore introduced a draft resolution which “strongly condemned” the recent attacks into Zambia by Smith’s military. The document denounced the upcoming Internal Settlement elections and demanded that the United States not send observers, requesting instead that tougher sanctions against Rhodesia be imposed. The Carter administration abstained on the measure, explaining that the US constitution did not allow it to prevent observers from attending the Rhodesian elections. Ambassador Lusaka characterized his delegation’s performance in the UN debates as successful, for although they had been unable to pass a unanimous resolution against Smith’s actions, they did make a clear case that the elections planned for April in Rhodesia were “null and void.” Furthermore, Lusaka believed that his actions in New York made it much more difficult for the United States to “engage in any activities that may be construed as sanctifying the illegal regime in Salisbury.”22

Low’s last efforts Nearing the end of his tenure in Lusaka, Ambassador Low continued his tireless efforts to carry out the administration’s policy, responding to criticisms such as that

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submitted to him by an US missionary living in southern Zambia named Allen Avery. Avery had lived in a Zambian village for ten years, and he believed that he knew “the real score.” In a lengthy letter for President Carter and a shorter cover letter for Low, Avery denounced the US support for the Patriotic Front. He wondered if the US policy reflected fear of the Soviet Union. He advocated US support for the April elections which had been approved by 85 percent of white Rhodesians and asked Low: “Do you honestly feel their proposed government will be less free and fair than Zambia’s?” Given the way Kaunda’s UNIP government recently had prevented Nkumbula and Kapwepwe from running for president in the 1978 election, Avery arguably had a good point about the degree of democracy developing in Rhodesia relative to Zambia. The missionary concluded with what would turn out to be a prescient prediction of the long and brutal reign of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe: “All the sins of the whites against the blacks will look like child’s play compared to the violence the Patriotic Front will bring to both blacks and whites.” Low answered respectfully but forcefully to Avery, contending that the Carter administration preferred a settlement that would reflect not only white opinion but also the significant portions of the black population represented by the Patriotic Front.23 In his reply to the missionary’s letter, Low also addressed the issue of Soviet influence in Rhodesia. Avery had wondered if the Carter administration supported the “terrorist” guerrillas out of fear of the communists. Low countered that in his view, the longer the war continued, the bigger role the Soviets would play in the fighting and the more influence they would ultimately have in an independent Zimbabwe. A major priority of the US policy, therefore, remained fostering an allparties agreement that would end the violence and preclude a major communist intervention. In fact, Low had just spoken at length with Vassily Solodovnikov, the Soviet ambassador in Lusaka and point man for USSR policy in southern Africa, about the exact nature of their role in the Rhodesian conflict. When Low had questioned Solodovnikov about the amount of Soviet weapons reaching Mugabe’s forces through Ethiopia and elsewhere, the Soviet diplomat claimed that such assistance was decreasing. Solodovnikov insisted that when Nkomo returned from his current visit to the USSR, he would convince the Ethiopian regime to stop providing Mugabe with Soviet-made weapons. Low concluded that Solodovnikov’s lengthy tenure in Lusaka symbolized Moscow’s desire to see Nkomo emerge as the leader of an independent Zimbabwe.24

Nkomo targeted Nkomo remained the favorite Rhodesian nationalist of the Zambian government, too, as evidenced by front-page coverage of his March 29 press conference in Lusaka by the two state-run newspapers. In his remarks, the leader of ZAPU blasted the United States for its “ambivalent stand” on the upcoming April elections, which he characterized as a complete fraud. Referring to examples such as the US abstention in the recent UN Security Council debate over Rhodesia, he criticized the United States for “collaborating and conniving at Smith’s gimmick and gamble.”25 Nkomo’s strident

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criticism of Washington probably reflected his recent trip to Moscow and debt to the Soviets for their high-powered weaponry rather than substantial displeasure with the Carter administration. He actually had a very good relationship with Low and appreciated Andrew Young as being “sympathetic to our cause.”26 During his March 29 press conference in Lusaka, however, Nkomo aimed his sharpest arrows at the Smith regime, with nearly fatal results for him. He characterized the upcoming vote as a “non-election” and condemned the new constitution as “fraudulent.” The outcome would be “colonialism under cover of a black face,” and Rhodesia would remain a “fascist state.” He concluded that there could not be free elections during a war, and so his ZAPU forces must carry on the struggle until a final victory was achieved.27 Smith, who had met secretly with the ZAPU leader in Lusaka just six months before in hopes of making a deal, responded to this criticism of his Internal Plan by launching a series of bombing raids on ZAPU camps in Zambia and even destroying a house in Lusaka where Nkomo had been staying. Unable to kill Nkomo from the air, Smith deployed a team of his elite Special Air Service to assassinate the ZAPU leader on the ground. On April 14, approximately forty heavily armed Rhodesian commandos crossed into Zambia in seven Land Rovers, which they painted in the colors of the Zambian military for cover. In the early hours of April 15 they attacked Nkomo’s house in Lusaka, but the ZAPU leader was nowhere to be found.28 The following day in Chicago, civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, having heard about the recent bombing raids, characterized the conflict in southern Africa as having reached “catastrophic proportions.” He urged Carter to “immediately dispatch military and economic aid” to the “beleaguered” nation of Zambia. Richard Moose, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, responded to Jackson’s plea by explaining that the Carter administration had already promised Zambia over $100 million worth of aid for the next two years. The majority of the US help would take the form of farming supplies and equipment to help Kaunda diversify his economy, bolstering agriculture and thereby escaping from excessive reliance on the copper mining sector. The aid also included an emergency shipment of 50,000 tons of corn, in direct response to a request from the Zambian president to prevent a widespread famine. “We believe that this type of assistance is more effective than military aid in preserving Zambia from the shocks of southern African turmoil,” contended Moose.29 On April 17, an election according to the Internal Settlement began in Rhodesia and lasted for a couple of days, with 60 percent of eligible blacks voting. When the ballots were counted, Abel Muzorewa’s party had won fifty-one of the seventy-two black seats in the parliament, which meant he would be the first prime minister in the new nation that would be known as Zimbabwe Rhodesia. While the results seemed like progress, from his nearby perspective Low argued that the high voter turnout was misleading and reflected widespread intimidation on the part of Rhodesian security forces. Appearing on Meet the Press on April 25, Young compared the election to pre1965 elections in the US south, when blacks had been influenced and intimidated. Carter announced on April 27 that he would not make up his mind about whether or not to recognize the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government and lift sanctions until after Muzorewa’s inauguration on May 31.30

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Zambia-Soviet friendship On April 30, 1979, Kaunda hosted Soviet Ambassador Solodovnikov for talks at State House regarding Zambian-USSR bilateral relations. Among economic issues discussed were a Soviet loan of 6 million kwacha, which Zambia had not yet spent, and plans by the USSR to begin importing Zambian copper while exporting tractors and cars to Zambia. In terms of cultural issues, the ambassador mentioned the possibility that the USSR would open a facility in Lusaka where Russian language courses would be offered and educational books and films would be available. This would resemble the Martin Luther King library that had been opened by the United States in 1975 and was welcomed by UNIP. Zambian officials also sought Soviet support for the training and preparation of athletes for the summer 1979 Spartakiade and the 1980 summer Olympics, both to be held in Moscow. Turning to military matters, Solodovnikov requested help from Kaunda in facilitating Aeroflot flights from Luanda, Angola, to Lusaka, which were needed to transport and supply “liberation fighters.”31 Given the wide range of cooperation being considered, Solodovnikov’s three years in Zambia evidently had improved relations between the two countries significantly. This must have been a welcome development for Kaunda, who was more desperate than ever for external assistance given his country’s dire economic and military straits.

No recognition for Zimbabwe Rhodesia Kaunda then flew to Maputo, where he met with two of his Frontline colleagues, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique. The presidents agreed to work out a strategy for protection of lives and property in Zambia and Mozambique, given the “grave developments” in Rhodesia. Unfortunately the conflict in Rhodesia appeared far from over, but Kaunda and the other Frontline leaders remained “solidly behind the PF” as it continued the fight. Clearly the Zambian government and its neighboring allies had no intention of cooperating in any way with the new nation of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.32 As the inauguration of Muzorewa approached, Carter weighed his options regarding whether or not to lift sanctions and recognize Muzorewa’s government, and the unequivocal opposition expressed by Kaunda and Nyerere, both considered friends by Carter, surely made an impact.33 Perhaps the most compelling case for withholding recognition of Muzorewa’s government, however, came from Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chair of the African Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. During eight days in mid-April, Solarz had visited five nations in southern Africa and participated in thirty-four meetings with over eighty African officials. In Lusaka he talked with ZAPU leaders and also with President Kaunda. His tireless efforts greatly impressed Ambassador Low, who credited Solarz with fostering a “turning point” in US policy toward Rhodesia.34 Upon returning to Washington, Solarz sent Carter a lengthy report entitled “Rhodesia: Where Do We Go from Here?” In his conclusion he stated in no uncertain terms that based on his conversations in southern Africa, “it would be a

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serious diplomatic mistake to unilaterally lift sanctions and recognize the Rhodesian regime.” He advocated an ongoing effort to bring all the parties together “to secure a settlement of the conflict.”35 On June 7, 1979, one week after Muzorewa’s inauguration, Carter announced his decision to withhold recognition and continue sanctions. Following the advice of Solarz, he first stated that he was “absolutely convinced that the best interests of the United States would not be served by lifting the sanctions.” He explained his reasoning, noting that although the voting seemed to have been “administered in a reasonably fair way under the circumstances,” the new constitution had never been approved by the black voters, and the supporters of ZAPU and ZANU had not been allowed to participate in the process. “For these reasons,” Carter emphasized: “I cannot conclude that the elections were either fair or free.” He pledged to work for an all-parties conference and to keep the question of lifting sanctions under careful review. He believed that his policy best served “not only American interests, but the interests of our allies in a region of the world of increasing importance to us.” Withholding recognition from Muzorewa’s regime, he continued, would “preserve our diplomatic and ties of trade with friendly African Governments.” (Zambia was surely high on that list.) He closed his brief but forceful remarks by exclaiming: “It means a lot to our country to do what is right, and what is decent, and what is fair, and what is principled.”36 About two weeks later, in his report to the Zambian foreign minister on the Zimbabwe Rhodesia elections, the Zambian high commissioner in Botswana astutely analyzed Carter’s decision not to lift sanctions. High Commissioner Chipampata characterized the president’s reasoning as “quite convincing” and attributed it in great part to the possibility of “African reaction” had he opted to recognize Muzorewa. The Zambian diplomat pointed out, however, that the US Congress might force Carter to lift sanctions. “Should this happen,” he warned, “then we are going to have a chain reaction of all manner of states recognizing the rebel colony.”37 In fact, by the time Chipampata submitted his report, the Senate had already approved an amendment to the annual Defense Department bill requiring US recognition of Muzorewa’s regime. In the House of Representatives, Solarz undertook an energetic campaign to block recognition. With strong support from Mondale and Young, on June 28, Solarz secured passage in the House of an amendment to the annual State Department bill, which specified that only the president could lift sanctions. The outcome of the battle on Capitol Hill over whether or not to recognize Muzorewa would not be known until final versions of the Defense and State bills were approved by bicameral conferences in September.38

Low leaves, Barry visits On July 4, Steve Low, whose three-year tenure as ambassador to Zambia was finished, departed from Lusaka. He had spent a major portion of his time working more as a special mediator on Rhodesia, as the Carter administration’s member of Anglo-US consultative group, but had unfortunately not been able to facilitate a final settlement. Nonetheless his efforts were appreciated. In his last meeting with Kaunda before he left

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Lusaka, the Zambian president told him that although “he hadn’t resolved anything, he had tried his best.” There would not be a US ambassador in Lusaka during the upcoming Commonwealth conference, but Low followed the developments carefully back in Washington, where he was getting ready for his next posting in Nigeria.39 In late July, Washington mayor Marion Barry visited Zambia and met with Kaunda at State House. The Zambian president encouraged Barry and other black Americans to form a lobby group to influence US-Africa relations. Kaunda explained that although he respected Carter’s approach, more needed to be done. He also seemed to be concerned that Carter might not be re-elected to another term, because the majority of US voters were not ready for many of his policies. “We admire President Carter,” Kaunda told Barry, “and feel that perhaps he has come too early.” On July 25, the same day he hosted Mayor Barry, Kaunda held a press conference and called on the people of Zambia to display all of the positive aspects of “traditional hospitality” when they hosted the upcoming Commonwealth conference in August. An editorial in the Daily Mail pointed out that Zambia would be the first African nation to host the gathering and therefore “every Zambian should ensure that the visitors feel welcome.”40

Lusaka Commonwealth conference Perhaps the most important of the visitors coming to Lusaka would be Margaret Thatcher, who had recently been elected as the new prime minister of the United Kingdom. A member of the Conservative Party, Thatcher had been an outspoken critic of the Labour Party’s handling of the Rhodesian crisis. She openly praised Muzorewa and viewed the Internal Settlement as a step in the right direction, creating a widespread expectation that she would lift sanctions and recognize the new Zimbabwe Rhodesian government.41 Kaunda requested that some of his more experienced diplomats serving overseas return to Lusaka to help with this challenging circumstance, including Paul Lusaka, his ambassador at the United Nations. Before leaving New York, ambassador Lusaka met with Andrew Young. He explained that the top priority for the Zambian government during the Commonwealth event was to “gain Prime Minister Thatcher’s support.”42 Young was due to take over as chair of the Security Council on August 1 and hoped to continue focusing most of his efforts on African issues, particularly Rhodesia, but controversy in the Middle East threatened to derail his plans. At the insistence of a group of Arab diplomats, on July 26 he spoke briefly with the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) representative to the UN, Zehdi Terzi. This meeting soon sparked a chain reaction that would bring Young’s time as UN ambassador to end.43 As Carter’s diplomatic team for southern Africa entered a period of serious reshuffling and with no top-ranking US diplomat in Lusaka, Kaunda kicked off the Commonwealth summit at Mulungushi Hall on the evening of August 1, 1979. In his opening remarks, the Zambian president offered the delegates “a hearty and fraternal welcome.” He elaborated on the difficulties for a poor nation hosting such a big event, noting that if there were shortcomings in the accommodations people would complain, but on the other hand if everything was high-class then others would criticize Zambia for spending on a diplomatic endeavor rather than on programs for its own people.

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“Whichever way preparations go, a poor host cannot win,” observed Kaunda.44 While Zambian finances were several years into a severe decline, marked by rising debt for the government and shortages among the people, to foreign dignitaries only visiting hotels in Lusaka, it seemed that the economy was fine. For example, Zambia airways operated regular roundtrip flights from Europe, and the local currency, the kwacha, was still very strong—equal to about 1.3 British pounds or 80 US cents. The debilitating inflation of the 1980s and 1990s, when the exchange rate would plummet to about 5,000 kwacha to 1 US dollar, was still years away. Kaunda’s candid admission of his nation’s hardship at a time when it could perhaps still have been kept hidden from his foreign guests demonstrated an admirable level of self-effacing honesty about his economy, which unfortunately was not matched with similar transparency toward his party’s political machinations during the 1978 election. While not acknowledging even the slightest admission of guilt over UNIP’s trampling of democracy by preventing the candidacies of Kapwepwe and Nkumbula, Kaunda’s opening speech lambasted the April elections in Rhodesia as “illegal.” He characterized Muzorewa as a puppet and contended that power had not truly been transferred from the white minority lead by Smith to the majority of black Zimbabweans. “What we have today is white power clad in black habiliments,” he commented. Therefore he believed that Rhodesia was still in rebellion against Britain and must be high on the agenda at the Commonwealth conference. He and the other Frontline leaders supported the Patriotic Front in its ongoing struggle against racist “evil and rebellion.” He called on the attending dignitaries from the distant corners of the globe to “deal with these and other problems threatening peace and security with transparent honesty and a sense of purpose designed to strengthen Commonwealth unity.”45 If any of the assembled guests considered Kaunda hypocritical for advocating democracy in Rhodesia while failing to practice it in his own country, they kept quiet on that point. If Kaunda rightly could be scrutinized for the lack of true democracy in his political system, he deserved significant credit for his skill as a statesman and consummate host. While going over the final groundwork for the Commonwealth conference, he agreed with the advice of Mark Chona that the opening night should include a “social evening.” They decided that the opening session should include a dinner and live music. When the band began to play, Kaunda “bowed to Margaret Thatcher for a dance.” His wife Betty did the same with the British leader’s husband, Dennis Thatcher. A night that had started off on a somber, tense, and confrontational note “became a very jovial evening.” The Zambian president escorting his British “dancing partner” personified the potential for meaningful diplomatic cooperation during the conference.46 The development on the dance floor impressed ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who praised Kaunda’s actions: It was at the official conference ball, when he danced with Margaret Thatcher and you could see them both smiling in genuine friendship, that I began to believe that even this British prime minister would come to see the reality that the only road to political stability in southern Africa led through the establishment of a genuinely democratic government in Zimbabwe.47

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In addition to sending an important signal by waltzing with Thatcher on the opening night, Kaunda wisely scheduled the formal discussion of the contentious Rhodesian issue for the third day, giving delegates time to settle into their surroundings before having at it. In his brief speech on Friday August 3 Kaunda discussed the unique nature of the Commonwealth and its leaders, which not only included his white friends from countries such as Australia and New Zealand but also people of color such as Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica and other “brilliant men” from the Caribbean. Without discussing specific issues, Kaunda charged the attendees generally to continue practicing the “human interaction which destroys the prejudices of the past” and break down “walls of bigotry.” In offering a toast in response, Manley thanked all the people of Zambia for their sacrifices on behalf of the freedom struggle throughout southern Africa. The Jamaican characterized Kaunda as “one of the great men of the 20th century.” In conclusion, Manley exclaimed that “the greatest gift that this conference could give to those people, to this nation, and to this man is to pave the way for a successful and just conclusion to the problem of Rhodesia.”48 High praise and encouragement from Manley, a close friend of Africans such as Nyerere and Americans such as Young, boosted Kaunda’s efforts considerably. During Friday’s discussion, Thatcher made clear her view that the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government did represent a step forward and that Muzorewa was not simply a puppet for Smith and other whites. Nevertheless, she conceded that the current constitution was not acceptable and agreed to work seriously on the issue in informal meetings throughout the weekend. With Kaunda, Nyerere, Manley, and Malcolm Fraser of Australia playing key roles, an agreement was reached by Sunday night that Britain would organize an all-parties conference to craft an internationally approved settlement.49 The following week, the Zambia Daily Mail hailed “wise man Kaunda” for facilitating the key breakthrough, which was Thatcher’s agreement to host Rhodesia talks in London.50 In his final report on the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference for the UNIP Central Committee and Kaunda’s Cabinet, Reuben Kamanga judged the meeting to be “a resounding success.” Kamanga emphasized Kaunda’s efforts to put pressure on Thatcher regarding Rhodesia. “In spite of the extremely difficult circumstances under which the meeting was held,” Kamanga concluded that Kaunda “was able to steer this conference to a successful end.”51 It was well-deserved praise for what was arguably Kaunda’s greatest contribution to international relations, which ironically occurred in the year following his fateful decision to subvert democracy in his own nation.

Young resigns, Wisner arrives As Thatcher returned to London and began planning in earnest for an all-parties conference on Rhodesia, dramatic events rapidly unfolded in Washington that drastically changed the face of the Carter administration’s Africa team. On August 10, a reporter in Israel learned about Young’s late July meeting with PLO representative Terzi. Three days later Young informed the Israeli UN ambassador, Yehudi Blum, in detail about his discussion with Terzi. The government of Israel decided to file a formal protest against Young, and on August 14 Vance told Carter that Young should

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resign. The next day Young met with Carter at the White House and submitted his letter of resignation.52 In his lengthy hand-written response, Carter accepted Young’s resignation “with regret,” and thanked the ambassador for his good work.53 Young later contended that the State Department leaked the story of his meeting with Terzi intentionally in hopes of getting rid of him but possessed no proof.54 Regardless, one of the key players in Carter’s Africa team and a very good friend of Zambia left the administration in mid-August 1979. Carter quickly nominated Donald McHenry, a veteran African-American diplomat but one without the charisma of Young, to take over at the United Nations. McHenry would make significant contributions to the US efforts to craft a settlement for Namibia but did not have much direct influence on Rhodesia or US-Zambia relations during his brief tenure in New York. By mid-August Carter had also chosen Frank Wisner, Jr., as the replacement for Steve Low as US ambassador in Lusaka. During Henry Kissinger’s 1976 intervention in southern Africa, Wisner had been an important aid to secretary of state, and he had been the top-ranking US attendee at the ill-fated Geneva conference on Rhodesia. Wisner, a promising young diplomat, was well-qualified for the post in Lusaka; but, he did attract the suspicion of at least one member of UNIP who confused him with his father, Frank Wisner, Sr., who had been a key architect of many CIA operations in the 1950s.55 The younger Wisner arrived in Lusaka on August 27 to take over as US ambassador, bringing with him his wife and three children. He felt “privileged” to get his first chance at running an embassy and “intrigued” by the challenge of continuing Low’s efforts to facilitate peace in Rhodesia.56 A settlement still seemed far away, as the Zimbabwe Rhodesia forces had just mounted their tenth attack against ZAPU bases on Zambian soil since Muzorewa took charge in May. Another bombing raid near Lusaka occurred shortly after the Wisner family reached their new home. During his first press conference upon arrival, the Wisner explained that Young’s recent resignation would not change US policies in southern Africa. He added that the United States had always been very impressed by Kaunda’s determination to bring peace to the region. He also praised the Zambian president for his “commitments to democratic principles,” which may have seemed a bit strange to some of his audience who knew very well how UNIP had manipulated the 1978 elections.57

Lancaster House conference On September 10, 1979, British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington began the all-parties conference on Rhodesia at Lancaster House in London with a reception. Nkomo and Mugabe boycotted the gathering, explaining that they found it impossible to socialize with Muzorewa and Smith. Also boycotting the preliminary event was Mark Chona, security advisor to Kaunda, who had flown to Britain to attend the opening of the conference. Kaunda kept a close eye on the conference once discussions got started, and Zambia’s high commissioner in London, Madam Chibesakunda, reported near the end of September that “the negotiations appear to be progressing well.” She expected that resolving the contentious issue of how the transition period leading Muzorewa’s

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regime to an independent Zimbabwe would be handled would delay a final agreement at Lancaster House until November, and her prediction was not far off.58 Although the United States did not participate directly in the conference at Lancaster House, Carter remained active on Zimbabwe Rhodesian issues and took another firm stand against the efforts by senators such as Harry Byrd, Jr., to lift the sanctions against the Muzorewa regime. On September 24 the president met with Senator John Stennis, chair of the committee on armed services, and threatened to veto the Defense Bill if it included the latest effort by Byrd to lift sanctions. Carter also may have played a bit of hardball, offering to allow another amendment that funded a new nuclear aircraft carrier, as long as Stennis worked to keep sanctions in place. Whether or not such a quid pro quo occurred, there is no doubt that Carter threatened to veto the entire Defense Bill if it included this latest Byrd Amendment. The next day Carter underscored his opposition to ending the sanctions, writing to Stennis that such an action “would do serious harm to the conduct of our nation’s foreign policy.” He noted that some progress had been made at Lancaster House, but there was a long way to go. He contended that lifting sanctions would “disrupt the negotiating process.”59 Carter prevailed and the sanctions remained in place. The talks in London had hit a snag over the issue of who would enforce a cease-fire during the transition, and at that point Nkomo was about to order one final highpowered incursion in hopes of winning the war decisively on the battlefield. His intention was to invade Zimbabwe Rhodesia using a large force of Soviet tanks and blast Muzorewa’s military into submission. Before he could enact his plan, however, the Rhodesian air force destroyed three crucial bridges in Zambia on October 12. Nkomo suspected infiltration of his diplomatic team by British intelligence and a leak to Muzorewa but obviously could not complain under the circumstances. In any case, the ZAPU plan to strike a fatal blow against Muzorewa was thwarted.60 The destruction of the three bridges also meant that the TAZARA railroad was out of commission and that the only way for Kaunda to export his copper was through Zimbabwe Rhodesia, increasing the Zambian leader’s desire for a quick settlement at Lancaster. He therefore ratcheted up the pressure on Nkomo to reach an agreement.61

Cruel November and settlement November of 1979 was a cruel month for both Carter and Kaunda. Relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe Rhodesia deteriorated drastically in early November, when Muzorewa announced he was blocking maize shipments into Zambia and launched several more bombing raids. On November 20 alone, eleven bridges were destroyed, necessitating a major international fundraising effort for their rebuilding. The United States responded with a contribution of about $10 million worth of goods to the undertaking.62 Kaunda declared that his nation was in a state of war and called up his reserve forces. For Carter the crisis was in Iran, where about 150 militant students attacked the US embassy in Tehran and took sixty-three Americans hostage. The group, calling itself Muslim Students Following the Line of the Iman, would eventually release thirteen of the hostages who were women or men of color, hoping to gain sympathy

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from those groups in the United States.63 They never received much sympathy from many Americans but did succeed in dealing a devastating blow to Carter’s bid for reelection the following year. Also in November, Carter was required by law to review the progress at Lancaster and decide if sanctions should continue. For what turned out to be the last time, he opted to keep sanctions in place until a deal was finalized.64 As of mid-December no settlement had been signed, so at that point the British government sent a “fervent plea” to the White House to lift sanctions in order to force Nkomo and Mugabe to accept the plan. On December 16 Carter revoked the sanctions, and the next day an agreement was reached at Lancaster. In his official statement, President Carter proclaimed: “Today, final settlement was reached at Lancaster House on a Rhodesian settlement. The world can celebrate a triumph of reason and an extraordinary diplomatic success. A long, destructive and tragic conflict is ending.”65 All parties met and signed the Lancaster House accords at a ceremony on December 21. For Nkomo, the most encouraging aspect of the conference in London had been his ability to cooperate with Mugabe and establish what he thought was a solid relationship of mutual respect. They arranged to meet the morning after the signing ceremony to begin planning how ZAPU and ZANU would conduct a single campaign under the new constitution, as the Patriotic Front. When Nkomo arrived at Mugabe’s flat, however, it was already empty. He learned that Mugabe had departed for Tanzania, where he would soon announce that his ZANU party would contest the elections on their own. In an ominous sign of things to come, Nkomo and his followers had been betrayed by the power-hungry Mugabe.66

Soviet invasion Meanwhile in Moscow, the Soviet leaders plotted an invasion of Afghanistan in hopes of keeping a friendly socialist regime in control. The head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, led the lobbying efforts in favor of a major strike. When their long-time ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, worried about the possible negative impact on USSRUS relations, Leonid Brezhnez assured him that he need not be concerned because the invasion would be over “in three to four weeks.” When the Soviet military launched their attack on Christmas day, they shocked the entire world. President Carter soon called Brezhnev on the hotline, denouncing the invasion as “a clear threat to peace” and warning that it could lead to a fundamental deterioration in bilateral relations. The Washington Post declared in a headline that “Détente is Dead.” On December 29, Carter ordered the CIA to expand its assistance to the Afghan resistance to include weapons and ammunition. On January 4, 1980, he announced on national television that the United States would cease shipments of grain and high technology to the Soviet Union and added that he was considering a boycott of the summer Olympics in Moscow.67 The next morning in Lusaka, an editorial in the Times of Zambia strongly criticized the “outrageous Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.” The editors argued that the attack could bode ill for small less-developed nations and might be used as justification for a similar invasion of Zambia by South Africa. “The Russians have

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shown,” concluded the Times, “that they are not interested in peace but in war, selfaggrandizement, and lust for power.”68 At the UN Security Council in New York, the Zambian delegate sponsored a motion calling for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. Officials in the foreign ministry in Moscow expressed surprise at the strident tone of the Times of Zambia editorial and even more so at the Zambian stance at the United Nations. They wondered why Kaunda had supported Tanzania’s 1979 invasion of Uganda but criticized the Soviet attack on Afghanistan. It is not clear how they felt they could equate their enemies in Kabul with Idi Amin, whom Nyerere’s forces had ousted from Kampala, but nevertheless Soviet officials were upset with Zambia for criticizing them. The Zambian ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Shimabale, advised his superiors in Lusaka that to avoid jeopardizing the “training programs” that the Soviets had agreed to provide for Zambia, Kaunda should “continue treating the Afghan issue with care.”69 Carter charged ahead and escalated his forceful reaction to the Soviet incursion. He decided at his weekly foreign policy breakfast to boycott the Olympics and make the announcement on January 20 on Meet the Press. He immediately set about seeking international support for the boycott, hoping to thereby make it more effective and avoid criticism of the United States for destroying the Olympics. Following the suggestion of three black Americans who had served as ambassadors in African nations, Carter agreed to send boxer Muhammad Ali to several capitols on that continent to lobby leaders for participation in the Olympic boycott.70 In his State of the Union address on January 23, the president presented what became known as the Carter Doctrine, whereby he pledged to use “any means necessary,” including military force to prevent Soviet domination of the Persian Gulf.71 Soviet officials, who had been surprised by Zambian criticism, were even more perplexed by Carter’s far-reaching actions.

Zambia buys Soviet MiGs72 As the Zambian ambassador to the USSR had hinted, a major military agreement between Kaunda and Brezhnev was finalized in late January. Kaunda sent his minister of defense, Grey Zulu, to make a major down-payment for a massive shipment of hightech weapons. Zulu delivered about 14 million kwacha worth of “hard cash,” which represented a first installment of about 20 percent. Most notably Zambia acquired a squadron of sixteen MiG-21 jet fighters. On February 7, 1980, the Times of Zambia announced in its headline: “Zambia buys Soviet MIGs!” The article explained that Kaunda’s government would be paying a total of 70 million kwacha for the purchase, which also included armored cars, tanks, personnel carriers, and a program for training in the Soviet Union. According to the editors of the Times, the deal “would dramatically alter the strategic balance in southern Africa,” as the air force of South Africa would be no match. Zulu later recalled proudly that the regimes to the south “began to respect us,” since Zambia was no longer just a “pocket dictionary army.”73 In London the purchase of Soviet jet fighters by Zambia at the cost of some 50 million pounds was also a big news story. Journalists speculated that Kaunda thought he needed to beef up his military “in the event of attacks from South Africa.” The

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BBC reported that Zambia had already sent pilots to the USSR for training. “In the absence of denial,” explained High Commissioner Nyirenda, “this is considered to be fact.” Nyirenda’s report also noted that Prime Minister Thatcher wanted to join Carter’s boycott of the Moscow Olympics but was not getting much support from sporting organizations across Britain. Finally, the high commissioner included the latest UK foreign office predictions regarding the fast-approaching elections in Zimbabwe, which continued to “exercise the minds of the British public and indeed the Government.” Diplomats in Britain believed that Mugabe would probably win the most seats, with Nkomo a close second and then Muzorewa a respectable third.74

Carter and Kaunda quarrel The Zambian government’s decision to buy MiGs and other hardware from the USSR prompted a stern response from the White House, which in turn angered Kaunda. Ambassador Frank Wisner, who personally delivered the message, later characterized the Carter administration’s efforts to discourage Kaunda from working too closely with the Soviets as “perfectly reasonable.”75 Kaunda saw things very differently. The letter from Carter which Wisner gave to Kaunda evidently warned the Zambian leader that “increased Soviet-Zambian military cooperation would create difficulties” in the bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia. This reprimand from Carter infuriated Kaunda, who expressed his “very deep feelings of hurt” in a lengthy response on February 15. He did not think that “any Western leader” had “any moral right to question the preparations” that he needed to make “for the defense of Zambia.”76 The message from the White House expressing concern regarding the “procurement of Soviet military weapons” delivered by Wisner caused Kaunda “profound disappointment,” and he explained to Carter in no uncertain terms why he was so upset. Since just before Ian Smith’s November 1965 unilateral declaration of independence, Kaunda had been trying unsuccessfully to acquire up-to-date defensive weapons in order to protect his nation from Rhodesia and South Africa. Repeated requests to Washington, such as one by Mark Chona in 1968, had been categorically denied. Chona then had asked Sweden for military assistance, and in 1970 Kaunda had asked West Germany, but neither of these countries agreed to help. Britain did provide limited assistance, but this was somewhat mitigated by almost certain leaks to the Rhodesian regime regarding the status of Zambia’s missile defense systems. Italy and Yugoslavia did their best to help Kaunda, but they could only do so much. The true savior had been the PRC. Kaunda told Carter that “if it were not for Chinese support over these years when the West rejected us, we would not have withstood the combined forces of rebel Rhodesia and racist South Africa.”77 Kaunda reminded Carter that as recently as May 1978, he had asked the US president directly for “defensive weapons limited in range and also in function,” but again the reply had been “negative.” Since then Britain had provided some assistance but again had probably leaked information to Rhodesia which prompted a wave of bombing attacks on Lusaka. The destruction of bridges across Zambia in October and November 1979 had been the worst yet, which had prompted Kaunda to declare that

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his country was in a state of war. In the aftermath of the Lancaster House settlement, although it would seem that the threat would diminish, it actually got worse. South Africa, in particular, was getting more aggressive in its conflict in Namibia and had repeatedly violated the Zambian border. Kaunda contended that if Muzorewa did not win the upcoming election, there could well be a coup by Smith’s supporters. “In Zambia,” he explained, “we must be prepared for all eventualities.” Yet, the United States was still not helping. “Even if you yourself may be willing to consider favorably the Zambian defense needs,” Kaunda insightfully pointed out, “I cannot seriously believe that Congress will accept.” If anything, he added, the US Congress would be more likely to provide weapons to South Africa or whites in Rhodesia. Zambia remained a “sitting duck,” and Kaunda could not allow it any longer. Kaunda got a bit overly self-righteous (given UNIP’s treatment of Kapwepwe and Nkumbula) in claiming that his policy was necessitated by his being a “democratic” leader who depended on public support rather than a “dictator.” Nonetheless, his point that Zambia needed to defend itself from escalating attacks was valid. “If the United States has not been forthcoming,” he reasoned, “it is my duty to look elsewhere.” In concluding his thorough five-page justification for why he had bought weapons from the USSR, Kaunda promised Carter that he was still non-aligned in the Cold War. Nonalignment was a “cardinal principle” for Zambia, and he would not stray from it “under any circumstances.” He hoped Carter would seriously consider his explanation and that their two nations could continue strengthening their cooperation in the future.78

Ali’s mission Strengthening relations with Zambia was not high on Carter’s priority list heading into the spring of 1980, when his chief concerns included US hostages in Tehran, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and Ted Kennedy challenging him for the Democratic presidential nomination. Having decided that Team United States would stay away from the Moscow summer Olympics, Carter had sent boxer Muhammad Ali to five African nations hoping to garner support for the boycott. Kenya and Liberia agreed to participate, while Tanzania, Nigeria, and Senegal refused. Carter welcomed Ali at the White House in mid-February and recorded in his diary that in presenting the case for a boycott in Africa, the fighter had “done very well.”79 Public opinion as expressed in editorials around the country differed markedly with Carter’s assessment, harshly criticizing the president for sending a pugilist to do a diplomat’s work. The TimesPicayune in New Orleans contended that sending Ali to meet with African leaders and discuss serious foreign policy issues was like “putting Cyrus Vance in the ring with Larry Holmes.” Few observers considered the mission successful.80

Zimbabwe’s independence During the last three days of February citizens of the new nation of Zimbabwe lined up across the country to cast their votes, and people around the globe followed the events

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closely. When the results were finally tabulated in early March, Mugabe’s ZANU party had won a resounding victory and so Mugabe would become the first prime minister of Zimbabwe. Hopes that a coalition consisting of Nkomo and Muzorewa could keep Mugabe out of power were dashed. Nkomo was heartbroken and rightly suspected that the results reflected widespread intimidation by Mugabe’s henchmen.81 In his acceptance speech on March 4, Mugabe called for national unity and asked his fellow Zimbabweans to turn swords into ploughshares. Top-ranking officials in Washington were impressed by Mugabe’s tone, and on March 6, 1980, Carter decided that the United States would honor the results and recognize the new nation of Zimbabwe when Mugabe took charge the following month.82 On April 17, with a new flag waving and Bob Marley singing “Zimbabwe,” Robert Mugabe was sworn in as prime minister. A high-powered Zambian group led by Kaunda but also including Mark Chona, Reuben Kamanga, and Siteke Mwale witnessed the events.83 Andrew Young, in spite of his resignation from the UN the previous August, headed the US delegation, which also featured long-time Democrat powerbroker Averell Harriman, Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson, black activist Dorothy Height, and Representative Stephen Solarz.84 The people of Zimbabwe rightly celebrated their independence, dancing late into the night. Kaunda, who had recently opened the border post at Victoria Falls, could feel relatively secure that his nation would not be bombed by their neighbor to the south. A fifteen-year conflict between Zambia and Rhodesia, which had been initiated by Ian Smith in November 1965, was finally over. He would have preferred to see Nkomo win the election, but certainly considered Mugabe an improvement over Smith or Muzorewa. Carter, with very little to celebrate in the spring of 1980, could take some credit for having stood firm for principles and contributed to the settlement that created Zimbabwe.85 There would be no good news for Carter from Iran, however, where his plan for a risky rescue of the hostages tragically failed. As the operation began on April 24, two helicopters quickly developed mechanical problems and had to be abandoned. As the commandos arrived at the landing zone, a third helicopter malfunctioned, necessitating that the undertaking be cancelled. As the troops boarded a plane for departure, they were struck by a fourth chopper. The accident killed eight US soldiers and injured four more. When notified of the terrible turn of events by General David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Carter turned pale. The president then retired to bed, exhausted by the stressful day. The misfortune prompted Cyrus Vance to decide to resign the next day, which dealt yet another blow to Carter’s political fortunes.86

Zambia confronts South Africa Returning home from the Zimbabwe independence, Kaunda’s attention focused on Zambia’s Western Province, where South African troops had once again been launching raids in search of Namibian rebels and had killed and wounded innocent Zambians as a result. Paul Lusaka, the Zambian ambassador to the UN, had expressed his nation’s outrage in a letter to the Security Council. According to Lusaka, the

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South African forces had been “repeatedly crossing over into Zambia to commit the bestialities of intimidation, harassment, torture and outright destruction of Zambian life and property.” With this in mind he called on the Security Council to take action. The Security Council met to discuss Zambia’s complaint against South Africa on April 10, and Reuben Kamanga of UNIP’s Central Committee presented his nation’s case. That very day, eight Zambians died when a government vehicle hit a landmine planted by South African soldiers in the Western Province of Zambia.87 On April 11 the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 466, which strongly condemned South Africa’s “racist regime” for its actions and demanded that Pretoria “withdraw forthwith all its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Zambia.” On April 26, Kaunda announced that Pretoria had complied with the UN resolution and removed its troops from Zambian soil.

Responses to Kaunda’s February complaint A few weeks after Kaunda complained to Carter in February about the White House criticism of his decision to purchase Soviet MiGs, the US president sent a message to Lusaka in which he primarily discussed the separate issue of Zimbabwe. Carter promised to address the weapons question thoroughly in a follow-up message after further consideration, and expressed his desire for “continued cooperation between our two countries.”88 On April 10, approximately two weeks before resigning over disagreement regarding the failed mission to rescue hostages in Iran, Cyrus Vance wisely advised Carter on Kaunda’s thinking about weapons. According to Vance the key to the situation were the “humiliating Rhodesian attacks on Zambia in the final months of the Rhodesian conflict” which clearly demonstrated “Zambia’s vulnerability.” In Vance’s view it was understandable that in the aftermath of these incursions, when Kaunda was “unable to obtain what he believed would be adequate Western military assistance,” he turned to the Soviet Union and made the deal for approximately $100 million worth of high-tech weapons, including MiG-21 jets. Vance also pointed out that the requests for weapons that Kaunda had made to Carter during his 1978 visit were “more realistic,” implying that it was unfortunate that those requests had not been approved. The secretary did not feel there was any need to offer Kaunda additional weapons in 1980 on top of those acquired from the USSR but did suggest an offer to train Zambian military officers in the United States as an affordable way to stay in his good graces allow him to demonstrate Cold War non-alignment.89 Vance resigned on April 28, but his analysis still carried weight with Carter and the final message sent to Kaunda in mid-May clearly reflected the former secretary’s advice. “I want you to know,” Carter informed Kaunda, “that your concerns are appreciated and that we fully acknowledge that you have the right, indeed the obligation, to defend the sovereignty of your country.” Carter expressed his strong displeasure with ongoing attacks upon Zambian soil by the South African military but at the same time admitted to some misgivings about Kaunda cozying up to the Soviet Union which he believed opened the door for “political interference” by the USSR government. Carter concluded his relatively reassuring message by offering to train Zambian officers in

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the United States and promising to do his best to convince Congress to maintain the current level of US assistance to Zambia “despite our current budgetary difficulties.”90

Fenwick scolds Kaunda In order to defend his nation from possible heavier South African attacks, Kaunda had purchased high-powered weapons from the Soviet Union, including sixteen MiG fighters. Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa and outspoken critic of Soviet human rights abuses, objected strongly to the Zambian decision to buy the expensive MiGs.91 Fenwick, an avid pipe smoker who supposedly was the inspiration for a character named Lacey Davenport in the comic strip Doonesbury, was known as a nononsense fiscal conservative who was also quite liberal on social issues. She was very knowledgeable about Africa and well-regarded on both sides of the aisle. When the House debated foreign aid for the fiscal year 1981 in June 1980, Fenwick proposed an amendment to reduce aid to Zambia and explained her reasoning in detail. She could not understand how a country that claimed to be poor could find approximately $85 million to buy jets from the USSR. “I think we ought to tell them and show them in the clearest possible way that we are prepared to help with food and we are prepared to help with agriculture,” she commented, “but we cannot continue unabated the flow of millions of dollars, if they have so many of those millions, for weapons of war from the Soviet Union.” She suggested cutting the foreign aid for Zambia by $7 million, from $27 million to $20 million, in order to show Kaunda that the United States would not subsidize his purchasing of Soviet planes.92 Representative Solarz, the Africa subcommittee chair who had visited Zambia in the spring of 1979, rose in opposition to Fenwick’s Amendment. After first praising her contributions to the subcommittee and claiming that if he lived in her district he would cross party lines and vote for her, he proceeded to explain why he disagreed with her proposal. Solarz contended that Zambia was generally a supportive ally for the United States and for example had denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He pointed out that reaching a settlement of the Namibian conflict would certainly require cooperation from Kaunda. He added that while it was true that the Zambian president had turned to the USSR for expensive weapons, that decision had only been made after repeated requests to Washington and London had been denied. Given the fact that South Africa had launched numerous deadly attacks onto Zambian soil during the current year, it seemed appropriate for Kaunda to buy the equipment necessary to defend his people. Finally, he noted that the $27 million in aid for Zambia which Fenwick wanted to cut already represented a reduction of some $3 million from the previous budget. Therefore, according to Solarz, slashing another $7 million seemed improper at a time when Kaunda’s help was needed regarding the Namibian negotiations and “when millions of Zambians live on the verge of starvation.”93 Fenwick rose again and rebutted the arguments from Solarz, ultimately winning the debate. In her view, the South African incursions were justified in that they were searching for Namibian rebels. “I think what we must say to Mr. Kaunda, respected

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and valued as he may be, ‘If you are going to harbor SWAPO guerrillas in your country, you have got to expect hot pursuit.’” In her view any nation that allowed guerrillas to operate from its territory must be willing to accept attacks in “hot pursuit.” Fenwick criticized Kaunda for not allowing the UN to inspect the refugee camps in Western Province for the presence of SWAPO guerrillas. She characterized Soviet MiGs as “a strong offensive weapon” rather than strictly defensive. Although Kaunda claimed to only want peace, “one does not often advance peace with Soviet MIGs,” concluded the congresswoman convincingly. The amendment to cut aid to Zambia by $7 million for the fiscal year 1981 was approved by a vote of 220 to 148.94 On June 9 the UNIP party responded quickly, suggesting that the United States cease all aid to Zambia rather than just reducing it.95 Fenwick’s Amendment obviously had struck a nerve.

Moscow Olympics In June 1980, Carter had a long list of higher priority issues than aid to Zambia on his foreign relations agenda, including his ongoing effort to rally international support for his boycott of the Moscow summer Olympics. By most measures, in spite of claims to the contrary by national security advisor Brzezinski, the boycott was a failure. Washington’s major allies in Western Europe such as Britain, France, and Italy all competed in the games. At the opening ceremony on July 19, athletes from eighty nations marched into the stadium.96 A contingent from Zambia, including runners, boxers, and the men’s soccer team, was among them. Although the Zambians did not win any medals, there were some high points. The soccer team put up a fight against the host Soviet team, losing 3–1, and boxer Winfred Kabunda won two matches in the featherweight division to advance to the quarterfinals before being eliminated.97 It is not clear exactly why Zambia opted to send a team to Moscow. It was not because they were against Olympic boycotts in principle, as some nations claimed to be, and actually Zambia had been one of twenty-eight nations to boycott the 1976 summer Olympics in Montreal. That boycott had been organized to protest against participation by New Zealand, who had sent its rugby team on tour of South Africa earlier in 1976.98 Some possible explanations for Zambia’s decision to participate in 1980 are the success of Soviet officials such as Ambassador Solodovnikov in improving bilateral relations or perhaps refusal to join Carter’s boycott out of resentment over US criticism regarding the purchase of the MiGs.

Defeat for Carter Kaunda’s bitterness over US criticism of his decision to buy Soviet planes symbolized a slight decline in US-Zambia relations in 1980, which reflected the larger pattern of severe challenges facing the Carter administration in its relations with Africa. There was a brief moment of celebration when Carter hosted Mugabe at the White House on August 27, but that could hardly make up for the resignation of Young or the widely criticized mission by Ali.99 In the bigger picture of foreign relations overall,

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several severe crises undermined Carter’s credibility—most notably the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the US hostages in Iran. During a televised debate in Cleveland on October 28, Reagan pointedly asked the US people: “Is America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel that our security is safe, that we’re as strong as we were four years ago?”100 For a majority of voters the answer to those questions evidently was “no,” and a strong perception that Carter’s foreign policy had been a failure contributed to his landslide defeat by Reagan on November 4. When remembering Carter’s defeat twenty-five years later, Kaunda expressed considerable disappointment over the outcome. “I was very keen that he should win a second term,” recalled the Zambian president, “I was very sad when I learned that my friend had lost.” According to Kaunda’s recollection, if Carter had been re-elected “it would have been wonderful for those of us who were on the cause of removal of racism in southern Africa.”101 Perhaps the passage of time had lessened Kaunda’s bitterness about the Carter administration’s criticism over the MiGs or maybe in retrospect Carter looked even better when compared with the Constructive Engagement policy toward southern Africa enacted by his successor, Reagan. In the weeks leading up to the 1980 election, on the other hand, Zambian diplomats stationed at the embassy in Washington had strongly criticized the Carter administration for not taking substantive action against apartheid or making concrete progress toward a solution in Namibia.102 The Zambian government’s opinion of the Carter presidency at the end of 1980 was decidedly mixed, and bilateral relations were at best lukewarm. Whether this situation would improve or decline when Reagan took power remained to be seen.

7

Constructive Engagement and Kaunda’s Crackdown, 1980–1982

In late 1980 Americans anticipated major changes in foreign relations, including policy toward southern Africa, as the administration of Ronald Reagan would soon take charge. Chester Crocker was appointed assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and he had made his disagreement with the Carter approach to Africa very clear. He would indeed attempt a major overhaul that featured closer cooperation with Pretoria. While people of color generally were wary of working too closely with a racist regime, Kenneth Kaunda himself was willing to talk with South African leaders if doing so could advance the fight against apartheid or the struggle for the independence of Namibia. For their part, Crocker and his colleagues agreed to conduct groundbreaking discussions with the socialist government of Angola, whom the United States did not recognize, in order to further the peace process. The cooperation in search of a regional settlement hit several roadblocks in the first two years of Reagan’s presidency, most notably a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy scandal in Zambia that resulted in Kaunda evicting two American diplomats. Hard work in Washington and Lusaka repaired the damage, and by the end of 1982 bilateral affairs were again quite healthy. Interactions between Zambia and the United States from late 1980 to the end of 1982 demonstrate the complexities of international relations at a time when the fights against racism and colonialism in southern Africa continued, the global Cold War simultaneously heated up again, and the leadership in Washington and Lusaka headed in conservative, even reactionary, directions.

Suspected coup uncovered In Zambia at the end of 1980, Kenneth Kaunda cracked down on dissent, consolidating control of the one-party state. His security forces accused several prominent Zambians, including Valentine Musakanya, of plotting a coup, and rounded them up on Independence Day 1980.1 At 3 a.m. on October 24, five police officers burst into the home of Musakanya, an influential and respected official in Kaunda’s first administration. With weapons trained ominously on Musakanya, who had also served as Governor of the Bank of Zambia and a top IBM executive, the policemen proceeded to search the entire premises for several hours. Accompanied

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by six soldiers, the officers next took Musakanya to his farm and then his office for lengthy searches. Some twelve hours after rudely awakening him, the officers brought Musakanya to the Police Headquarters in Lusaka, finally allowed him to eat, and told him he was under arrest on unspecified charges, justified by a 28-day detention order. After spending a cold night at the chaotic headquarters crowded with Independence Day revelers, Musakanya was taken on October 25 to Lusaka Central Prison. The prison, which had been designed for 250 prisoners, was home to over 1,000 men when Musakanya arrived, in extremely crowded and unsanitary conditions. “I saw black animals in a pen similar to the slave ships,” recalled Musakanya. Crammed into a barren cell with 23 others, Musakanya did not even have a proper blanket. An overwhelming stench of urine and feces permeated the atmosphere, and this hell on earth would be his home for the next five years. Musakanya, who had sat with Kaunda in the Oval Office during his December 2, 1964, meeting with Lyndon Johnson, found himself on December 2, 1980, being interrogated and tortured by the notorious Special Branch, which was commanded by Wilted Phiri. A few days later, Phiri replaced Mark Chona as Kaunda’s top advisor for political affairs, suggesting that the Zambian government would become increasingly authoritarian.2 The coup plot was not entirely a figment of Kaunda’s imagination. Musakanya evidently had concluded in 1979, after Simon Kapwepwe’s attempt to garner the United National Independence Party (UNIP) nomination was thwarted, that the only way to remove Kaunda from power and get Zambian development back on track was through extralegal means. He and other critics of Kaunda’s regime such as a white lawyer named Pierce Annfield had hoped to install Kapwepwe as the new ruler, but that dream was abandoned when Kapwepwe died in January 1980. In spite of clear indications in April 1980 that Kaunda suspected a plot was afoot, planning continued. Musakanya flew to France for funds. General Godfrey Miyanda stole weapons from the Zambian Army stockpile and the arms were hidden on Annfield’s ranch south of Lusaka. About sixty men, some Zambian and some Congolese, were transported to the farm and began training. The final key player was General Christopher Kabwe, who had promised to divert Kaunda’s presidential plane to a rendezvous point where Musakanya would convince his former friend to step down.3 Musakanya’s decision to participate in such a scheme certainly may be questioned, and it is also not surprising that the Zambian government took firm actions to prevent the coup. Nevertheless, the brutal way Musakanya was treated by policemen and Special Branch personnel, and the atrocious conditions in Lusaka Central Prison, paint a disturbing picture of the actual circumstances in Kaunda’s supposedly peaceful and democratic nation. With war no longer raging in neighboring Zimbabwe, little justification remained for the continuation of such totalitarian tactics. The fact that someone as intelligent and experienced in politics and diplomacy as Musakanya opted for such a radical step as a coup against his former friend Kaunda indicates the degree of displeasure felt by some Zambians at UNIP policies and practices, after nearly a decade of one-party rule. Having successfully crushed the 1980 coup plot, Kaunda and top advisors such as Wilted Phiri tightened their grip on power.

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From Carter to Reagan With the presidency of Ronald Reagan scheduled to begin at noon on Tuesday January 20, 1981, outgoing president Jimmy Carter was still working non-stop throughout his final morning in power to negotiate the release of the fifty-two American hostages who had been held in Iran for 444 days. Carter, who had not gotten a proper night’s rest since Sunday, was busy from 2 a.m. until just before Reagan arrived at 11 a.m., working on finalizing the financial aspects of the agreement. As Carter departed from the inaugural platform after Reagan was sworn in, a Secret Service agent informed the former president that a jet carrying the just-released hostages was on its way to the Turkish border. “This was one of the happiest moments of my life,” Carter recorded in his diary.4 Kaunda sent one message to the White House on January 20 thanking Carter for his warm hospitality in 1978 and crediting him with helping to facilitate a resolution to the Rhodesian conflict. He contended that “The settlement in Zimbabwe … is a credit to Your Excellency personally, and to your unflinching commitment to human rights the world over.” Kaunda sent a second message for Reagan congratulating him on becoming the 40th US president. He expressed his hope that relations between their two nations would continue to be positive during Reagan’s presidency. He opined to his new counterpart that among the key challenges in international affairs were “the question of urgent self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia and the eradication of apartheid in South Africa.” In conclusion he promised Reagan that “Zambia looks forward to working with your administration in finding solutions to these problems.”5 The point man on the ground in Lusaka coordinating any potential US-Zambian cooperation on regional diplomacy such as Namibian negotiations was Ambassador Frank Wisner, who had been in his post since August 1979 and had a good grasp on the circumstances. Wisner later recalled that the coup plot by Musakanya and his associates rattled Kaunda’s confidence, and had a very negative influence on his mindset and conduct. In Wisner’s opinion, the Zambian leader displayed some level of “psychosis” after the coup, and his policies took a hard turn toward Eastern Bloc authoritarianism. Advisors with closer connections to the USSR and East Germany such as Grey Zulu, Kaunda’s top advisor on defense, played a bigger role during this time. “It was a shitty period,” concluded Wisner frankly.6 On March 6, 1981, an editorial in the Times of Zambia accused the US Embassy in Lusaka of providing intelligence to the Rhodesian government in the late 1970s that facilitated the bombing of bridges and refugee camps in Zambia, as well as more recently sharing information with the apartheid regime of South Africa that contributed to an incursion into Mozambique. Wisner promptly wrote a lengthy letter to the Times editor, Naphy Nyalugwe, categorically denying the charges as “ludicrous.” Wisner took the “strongest possible exception” to the claims in the editorial, and condemned them as utter fabrications. “The reality is America’s deep and repeatedly demonstrated concern for Zambia’s independence and economic development,” he added. Wisner emphasized, “In the last three years alone, my government has provided more than $130 million in direct economic assistance to Zambia.” He reminded Nyalugwe of the

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major contributions by American officials to the long process that brought peace to Zimbabwe. “We have played and will continue to play a similarly constructive role in the quest for Namibian independence,” pledged the ambassador. Wisner sent a copy of his letter to Reuben Kamanga, the former vice president and foreign minister, who was still quite influential in the Kaunda government as chairman of the UNIP Political and Legal Committee. He explained to Kamanga that his letter to Nyalugwe had been necessitated by the false charges in the Times editorial, which threatened to undermine “the trust and confidence that must exist if the United States and Zambia are to have an effective relationship.” Finally Wisner asserted to Kamanga that “I need not tell you how baseless is the charge that the United States, through any of its Embassies, has conspired with the Government of South Africa in actions detrimental to the sovereignty and well-being of Zambia.”7 As it turned out, the critical Times editorial was just the tip of the iceberg and US-Zambian relations would get much worse before they got better, but Wisner did not know that yet. Instead, he was busy preparing for a visit to Lusaka by his new boss Chester Crocker, Reagan’s nominee for the position of assistant secretary of state for African affairs.8

Zambian-Soviet relations As US-Zambian relations headed toward an all-time low point, Kaunda’s government continued enjoying a relatively warm relationship with the Soviet Union. The new Zambian ambassador in Moscow, Joshua Siyolwe sat down for two lengthy discussions with Soviet officials in early April. On the afternoon of April 4, Siyolwe met with General Zotov, a chief of the Soviet general staff, and Zotov informed Kaunda’s ambassador that the USSR planned to send instructors to Lusaka to provide special training for Zambian pilots who would be flying the MiG fighters that had been recently acquired. He also noted that Kaunda expressed his great pleasure after observing successful test flights of the planes. Both parties worried about the new Reagan administration, and in particular its support for Jonas Savimbi in Angola and cooperation with South Africa’s efforts to de-stabilize the region by sponsoring insurgents in Mozambique. Turning to Namibia, Zotov praised Sam Nujoma’s South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) for its fight against the South African military, and contended that with ongoing support from the USSR and Zambia, SWAPO would prevail. On April 15 in Moscow, Siyolwe discussed similar issues with General Sergeichik, the deputy chairman for economic relations, notably the plan to send instructors to train Zambian pilots to fly the MiGs and the recent test flights observed by Kaunda. One interesting additional detail raised by Sergeichik was that the Soviets had begun receiving shipments of Zambian cobalt, instead of cash payments, for the military assistance sent to Lusaka. In his cover letter to Secretary of Defense Grey Zulu, military attaché Mbewe characterized both conversations with the Soviet military personnel as “very warm and cordial.”9 American concerns about Zambian-Soviet relationship were valid, though just one of a long list of challenges facing Reagan’s newly nominated assistant secretary of state.

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Chester Crocker Chester Arthur Crocker, named after his great-grandfather President Chester Arthur, had studied African affairs as an undergraduate at Ohio State and while earning a PhD at Johns Hopkins. In the early 1970s he worked under Henry Kissinger as part of the National Security Council staff. From there he moved to Georgetown University, where he taught courses on African history and became the director of the African Studies program. In the late 1970s he began attracting attention by publishing several articles that severely criticized the Carter administration’s approach to southern Africa. He proposed a new approach, known as Constructive Engagement, that he believed would provide the United States greater influence in the region by simultaneously cooperating with the white government in South Africa and the black governments in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.10 After initially supporting the failed campaign for the 1980 Republican nomination of George Bush, Sr., he joined the Reagan camp. After the smashing victory over Carter in November 1980, Crocker was recommended by Reagan’s national security adviser Richard Allen for the position of assistant secretary of state for African affairs.11 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), an arch-conservative, worried that Crocker would not be friendly enough with the Pretoria regime and held up senate approval of his nomination for several months. In the meantime, Crocker got started with his job by spending three weeks visiting twelve nations in southern Africa in April 1981, including Zambia. The Kaunda government signaled its concerns about the new Reagan administration’s Constructive Engagement policy by only sending Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Gibson Zimba, driving his own vehicle, to pick up Crocker at the airport. Kaunda did agree to host Crocker for lunch and talks at State House. The Zambian president wondered why the United States was renewing closer ties with South Africa. “Western civilization is based on Christianity,” commented Kaunda, and he added pointedly that “absolutely nothing in apartheid is Christian.”12 Crocker responded that he had come to southern Africa to listen to the views of various leaders and that his policy was not set in stone yet, but nevertheless his demeanor struck Kaunda as “arrogant and adamant.”13 For his part, Crocker found Kaunda to be “a salt of the earth kind of guy,” not a theoretical thinker or an intellectual.14 Ambassador Wisner, who accompanied his boss during this initial talk with Kaunda, described the Zambian president as “wary” of Crocker and fearful that Constructive Engagement was letting South Africa “off the hook.”15 When Crocker visited Dar es Salaam, President Julius Nyerere emphasized that “the southern African process must begin in Namibia. That’s where you must focus your efforts. Namibia is the key,” insisted Nyerere.16 This advice certainly made sense, given the fact that the Rhodesian war had finally ended and Rhodesia had become the independent majority-ruled nation of Zimbabwe. All of the black leaders Crocker met with during his tour of southern Africa agreed that mineral-rich Namibia should be a top priority for American diplomacy. However, facilitating a solution for Namibia, which had been controlled by its southern neighbor South Africa since 1915 and also bordered on war-torn Angola, would not be easy. Crocker’s potential to craft a Namibian settlement was viewed with considerable distrust not only on the far left

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end of the southern African political spectrum in Mozambique, where the radical government of Samora Machel threatened to cut relations with Washington, but also on the far right of that spectrum in South Africa, where Prime Minister P.W. Botha refused to see him. While he was in Pretoria, Crocker did meet at length with Foreign Minister Roelof “Pik” Botha, whom he invited to pay a visit to the United States.17 Returning to Washington in May, Crocker found his nomination still being blocked by Senator Helms. Though not yet officially the assistant secretary, he worked behind the scenes briefing Secretary of State Alexander Haig for the mid-May talks with Pik Botha, who had decided to accept Crocker’s invitation. Details of their discussions leaked to the press, and the charge d’affaires in the Zambian embassy, H.M. Chisuta, summarized the key aspects in a report for Foreign Minister Lameck Goma. Chisuta informed the higher-ups back in Lusaka that the Reagan administration proposed linking the removal of all Cuban forces from Angola with the departure of South African troops from Namibia. Chisuta emphasized that the United States had no intention of putting pressure on South Africa, clearly seemed to favor Pretoria in its approach to southern Africa, and was not in any hurry to facilitate a Namibian settlement. “The administration’s apparent policy on Namibia thus far does not inspire confidence,” concluded Chisuta.18 Finally, on June 9, after five months of stonewalling by Helms, the Senate approved Crocker’s nomination by a vote of 84 to 7. The confirmation came just in time for the new assistant secretary of state to join Deputy Secretary of State William Clark for a significant four-day visit to South Africa and Namibia. Clark, a former judge from California and long-time ally of Reagan’s, was wined and dined by the South African leadership in Cape Town, and for the most part he enjoyed himself on the trip. Like Reagan, Clark was predisposed to favor the views of the Pretoria regime, but the overbearing nature of P.W. Botha and his foreign minister Pik Botha was a bit much even for him. Crocker believed that the “mixed bag” experience of Clark in Cape Town could be beneficial and give him some room to operate as he tried to forge a peace deal for Namibia.19 With this ambitious goal in mind the US delegation talked with SWAPO representatives in Windhoek. Their leader, Sam Nujoma, was definitely not impressed by Clark and Crocker. He was shocked by their requirement that Cuban departure from Angola be a quid pro quo for South African departure from Namibia. Nujoma considered Crocker’s overall policy of Constructive Engagement to be a “diabolical scheme” rooted in “ruthless” cooperation with South Africa.20

CIA spy scandal Selling his policy to Nujoma and Frontline leaders such as Kaunda would be extremely difficult for Crocker in any case; but, shortly after he returned to Washington in midJune, news arrived of a crisis at the American embassy in Lusaka which exacerbated the challenge. The dark days in Zambia, where the treason trial of Valentine Musakanya and others arrested in the October 1980 coup plot had just begun, were getting darker.21 On June 22, 1981, Kaunda’s government accused two US diplomats, John David Finney and Michael Francis O’Brien, of working for the CIA and

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conducting “inappropriate activity.” Finney, the first secretary for political affairs at the US embassy in Lusaka, and O’Brien, the public affairs officer, were ordered to immediately depart from Zambia. Three other American diplomats who had previously worked in Lusaka were implicated in the scandal and declared “prohibited immigrants” by the Kaunda regime. A diplomat in the Zambian foreign ministry, Webster Lumbwe, was also charged with being a CIA spy and detained. The Zambian government contended that Finney and O’Brien had plotted with Lumbwe to gather information about the Soviet MiGs that had been recently acquired, and also had “examined the possibility of an alternative leadership” for Zambia. Supposedly, the CIA was concerned about the close Zambian-Soviet ties, and had decided to remove Kaunda and replace him with Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions. A spokesperson for the State Department quickly denied the charges against Finney and O’Brien.22 Not surprisingly, Wisner considered this incident to be the “greatest single crisis” and the “most difficult moment” of his tenure in Lusaka. He admitted in a 1998 interview that “a CIA officer” had been charged with recruiting Zambians.23 When asked about the scandal in 2008, however, he refused to admit any CIA involvement and emphasized that the US government had “never implied that Finney and O’Brien were in the CIA” and reiterated that they were “not in the CIA.” (This, of course, did not necessarily mean that some other CIA agent had not been operating in Lusaka and established contacts with Zambians such as Webster Lumbwe.) Regarding the notion that the Reagan administration wanted to oust the Zambian president and replace him with Chiluba, the union boss who also would be imprisoned in late July, Wisner insisted that the United States had “no interest in overthrowing Kaunda.” He believed that suspicion had been sparked because Finney had been in contact with Chiluba, with no sinister intentions, but that this interaction had been perceived as threatening by paranoid Kaunda advisors such as defense minister Grey Zulu. Wisner defended O’Brien as a “very good officer,” and argued that the expulsion of these two diplomats was an “absolute miscarriage.”24 In early July, few weeks after Finney and O’Brien’s departure from Lusaka, the State Department recalled Wisner himself to Washington for “urgent consultations” about the tenuous state of US-Zambian relations. Zambian diplomats in Washington noted the expulsion of Finney and O’Brien and expressed their intention to draft a thorough report on the implications for bilateral relations.25 By that time, Lumbwe, the suspected spy in the Zambian foreign ministry, had admitted that the CIA had been asking him about the MiG fighters and also the location of surface-to-air missiles in Zambia. In early August, the Times of Zambia reported that another US diplomat from the American embassy in Lusaka had been recalled, and claimed that documents in the newspaper’s possession proved that Lupton was one of 18 CIA agents operating in Zambia. The Times also pointed out (accurately) that ambassador Wisner’s father had been a major figure in the CIA, thus implying that perhaps the younger Wisner was not only a diplomat, but also a spy.26 As the crisis escalated and threatened irreparable harm to bilateral relations, Kaunda displayed a “sense of caution” which Wisner believed reflected the Zambian leader’s need to “maintain a relationship with the United States.” He had not evicted the

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ambassador, and it turned out that Wisner’s return to Washington was only temporary and allowed for relations to be resuscitated. Kaunda underscored this possibility in a very friendly July 4th message to Reagan, which made no mention of the spy controversy, praised the United States for its “invaluable role in the promotion and maintenance of world peace,” and expressed faith that the Reagan administration could help facilitate a “genuine solution to the urgent problem of Namibia.”27 The positive message from Kaunda to Reagan attracted considerable international attention, starting with a radio commentary in South Africa on July 5 which considered it a welcome development.28 On the other hand, China was not so enthusiastic about Kaunda’s diplomacy, and in a July 5, 1981, story the Chinese press described Kaunda’s letter to Reagan as “conciliatory,” noting that it had made no reference to the CIA spy scandal or eviction of two diplomats. The Chinese press had also recently published several stories criticizing Kaunda for his purchase of Soviet MiG fighters. The Zambian ambassador to Beijing, W.R. Mwondela, warned his superiors back in Lusaka that these recent stories in the state-run Chinese press could well indicate displeasure with the Kaunda government on the part of the Chinese government.29 Clearly, for Kaunda to maintain warm relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in mid-1981 required him to nimbly walk a diplomatic tightrope. The Reagan administration definitely hoped to stay in Kaunda’s good graces, as positive relations with him and other Frontline leaders was a crucial component of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement, and so Haig sent Reagan’s roving emissary General Vernon Walters to talk with the Zambian leader. Walters had fought heroically in the Second World War and served as an advisor and trusted interpreter for all US presidents beginning with Harry Truman. He held the post of deputy director of the CIA for five years in the 1970s, and then Reagan appointed him ambassador-at-large in 1981. A key role for such diplomats was to serve as a troubleshooter, and that was his mission when he journeyed to Lusaka in the aftermath of the spy scandal. Crocker described Walters as a “jovial extrovert” who was able to work his diplomatic magic by telling the “perfectly chosen anecdote.”30 Evidently he did something along those lines in his meeting with Kaunda, during which he “assuaged” the Zambian president and convinced him to allow Wisner to return to the US embassy.31 Wisner appreciated the good work done by the “able and effective” Walters on his behalf.32 As of September 2, 1981, the ambassador was back at his post in Lusaka and pictured on the front page of the Times of Zambia shaking hands with Kaunda.33

South African aggression and Kaunda’s response By the time Wisner had returned to Lusaka, events had unfolded that made American diplomacy in southern Africa more challenging, and in particular complicated the aspect of Constructive Engagement that called for cooperation with Pretoria. On August 23 the South African air force launched Operation Protea with devastating bombing runs against the Angolan alert systems, and the next day over ten thousand South African troops stationed in Namibia invaded the southern Angolan province of Cunene.34 South African Defense Force (SADF) soldiers occupied the provincial

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capital and five other major towns, controlling a total of 40,000 square miles of Angolan territory. With the intention of cutting off support for Nujoma’s SWAPO in the border area, the South Africans burned villages, killed livestock, and mined roads. The attack caused the deaths of about 450 Angolan or SWAPO troops and four of their Russian advisors, while only 14 South Africans died. When the UN Security Council considered a resolution condemning Pretoria for the ferocious incursion, the Reagan administration vetoed the measure.35 Kaunda responded on September 20 with a statement denouncing the United States for “bending over backward” to please South Africa, including its tolerance for the Springboks rugby team visiting the United States as part of its ongoing world tour. He warned that if American policy toward the region did not change, then “disaster would result.”36 The Zambian president then embarked on his first visit to Australia, where he consulted at length with Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who had been very supportive of Kaunda’s role regarding Rhodesia during the 1979 Lusaka commonwealth conference. During their September 26, 1981, discussion, Kaunda underscored the need for a Namibian settlement. He supported full implementation of UN Resolution 435, and feared that the crisis could escalate into a massive East-West showdown as had happened in 1975 in Angola. He criticized the American insistence on linking the removal of Cuban troops from Angola with the departure of South African forces from Namibia. He questioned the American equation as “saying which came first between the egg and the chicken.” The recent incursion by Pretoria clearly showed who was at fault. He argued that as long as the “South Africans are in Angola it is not possible for the Cubans to leave.” In their tilt toward Pretoria and linkage of Namibia and Angola, Kaunda told Fraser that “he thought the Americans were making a great mistake.”37 Fraser thanked Kaunda for his helpful briefing, and hoped the trip would set the stage for more visits to Australia by the Zambian leader in the future. He also mentioned the Springbok rugby team, who had recently played in neighboring New Zealand. Widespread demonstrations had taken place in Australia against the South African team, and Fraser’s government had forbidden the plane carrying the Springboks from refueling in Australia. Kaunda praised Fraser for the way he and his nation had handled the controversial Springbok issue.38 Zambian diplomats had been following the Springboks’ tour closely for a couple of months, in fact, and Kaunda’s ambassador in Washington, Putteho Ngonda, pointed to the Reagan administration’s decision to approve visas for the team as an example of the closer relations between the United States and South Africa. Ngonda noted that members of the Congressional Black Caucus had lobbied against the issuance of visas as a way to protest apartheid, but that Crocker’s State Department contended that sports and politics should not mix. Ngonda accused the United States of being hypocritical and applying “double standards,” given past American support for Olympic boycotts.39 Ambassador Ngonda illuminated the complexity of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement in his report from Washington, discussing the complicated American approach to Angola. On one hand the Reagan administration made clear that it had absolutely no intention of opening official relations with the socialist government in Luanda, and was making a strong push to get the US Congress to repeal the Clark

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Amendment that forbade assistance to Savimbi’s UNITA. On the other hand Crocker had already met with Angolan diplomats to discuss Namibia, and the Reagan administration had supported an $85 million loan by the Export-Import bank to Angola to fund its joint venture with Gulf Oil to develop more offshore drilling for petroleum. Ngonda concluding that the pro-business Reagan administration had no desire to disappoint Gulf Oil, which was “anxious to continue reaping fabulous profits from its operations in Angola.” Once again, the Zambian ambassador detected a high degree of hypocrisy in US foreign relations.40

Kamanga’s tour of the United States Although there were obviously disagreements over policy and there had been challenging circumstances during Reagan’s first six months in office, most notably the eviction of the two diplomats from the embassy and the temporary recall of Wisner to Foggy Bottom, by October relations between Zambia and the United States in general seemed to be recuperating. Chiluba, the labor leader with whom the evicted American diplomats had supposedly been conspiring, was released from prison. Wisner had returned to Lusaka and was back to work, and the Central Committee of Kaunda’s UNIP accepted the Reagan administration’s invitation to send a high-level team for a three-week tour of the United States. Reuben Kamanga, former vice president and foreign minister for Kaunda and still influential in Zambian politics and diplomacy as a key member of the UNIP Central Committee, headed the delegation. A few days after arriving in Washington and meeting with various diplomats, members of Congress, and journalists, Kamanga went to the White House on October 23 for a talk with Vice President George Bush. The vice president greeted Kamanga warmly, and fondly recalled his brief visit to Lusaka in the early 1970s while UN ambassador. Bush sent best wishes to Kaunda, and it seemed evident to the Zambian delegation that Bush truly admired the Zambian president. The vice president expressed his hope that Zambia could help the Reagan administration facilitate a Namibian agreement which would end the bloodshed in southern Africa, and he promised to “exert his own influence and power to help President Reagan achieve a peaceful and durable settlement in Namibia.”41 Kamanga assured the vice president that the Zambian government shared the Reagan administration’s desire for peace. He handed a message from Kaunda to Bush for his boss, which the vice president promised to deliver to Reagan. Later that day after Kamanga’s visit concluded the vice president passed the letter for Reagan to Richard Allen, the national security advisor, asking him to give it to the president and suggesting that Reagan respond. Bush informed Allen that his discussion with the Zambian delegation “went very well.”42 Before departing from Washington on October 25, Kamanga and his colleagues met with an old friend, former ambassador Jean Wilkowski, and learned about her new position working for a non-profit called Volunteers in Technical Assistance, which sought to provide technical aid to developing nations. They also attended a celebration of Zambia’s independence at the residence of their ambassador, Putteho Ngonda. They visited Lusaka’s “Sister City” of Los Angeles, where the African-American mayor

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Tom Bradley hosted them and showered praise on Zambia for its role in the southern African liberation struggle. Bradley, the first black mayor of Los Angeles, demonstrated the great gains that people of color had made in the United States, and the strong connections between blacks in the United States and in Africa. The connection was cultural, but could also be very concrete. During their meeting, Bradley informed Kamanga that a recent concert in LA had raised $7,000 to be donated to the children’s wing of Lusaka’s University Teaching Hospital.43 From Los Angeles the group flew to Atlanta, where they met with Coretta King and toured the Martin Luther King center for non-violent social change. On display was a replica of Zambia’s “Freedom Statue,” donated to the King center by UNIP. The statue’s presence in Atlanta demonstrated that the strong cultural connection between blacks in Africa and the United States was not just a one-way street. Another powerful reminder of the connection occurred when Kamanga and his colleagues joined with former UN ambassador Andrew Young for a conversation at Lake Lanier, a resort about thirty miles out of the city. The relaxing atmosphere that Young and his wife provided impressed Kamanga as “superbly fine.”44 In the course of their discussions, Kamanga congratulated Young on his election as mayor, which had been applauded in Lusaka. Young explained his intention to “establish commercial and trade links between the city of Atlanta and the black nations of Africa.”45 During his two terms in office, he would indeed be very successful at facilitating such connections between Atlanta and Africa.46 After Atlanta the Zambian delegation spent a few days in New York City, and then returned to Lusaka in early November. Assessments of the journey by Kamanga and his colleagues all suggested that bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia were back on track after the spy scandal and other challenges of mid-year. Kamanga appreciated the renewal of concrete assistance from the Reagan administration, which included a $13 million loan from the US Agency for International Development for reconstruction of the road from Kafue to the Zimbabwe border at Chirundu. The highway had been extensively damaged during the Rhodesian war, and its rebuilding would stimulate Zambia-Zimbabwe trade and regional commerce in general. Positive relations with the black-ruled Frontline nations such as Zambia was a keystone of Chester Crocker’s Constructive Engagement policy, and the Kamanga mission demonstrated that the relationship between Washington and Lusaka was headed in the right direction.47 Ambassador Wisner thanked Kamanga for taking the trip and making a “fine impression” on all the Americans with whom he had interacted.48

Differences of opinion In closing his optimistic update on bilateral relations, Wisner reminded Kamanga that the Reagan administration was working hard to facilitate a settlement for Namibia. Indeed, while the Zambian delegation had been touring the United States, Crocker was leading a team of diplomats from the Contact Group (the United States, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany) on a mission to the Frontline states, Namibia, and South Africa. Several major hurdles confronted Crocker and his colleagues, such as

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debate over the role and size of a UN peacekeeping force and intense disagreement over the controversial notion of linking South Africa’s departure from Namibia with Cuba’s departure from Angola. Nevertheless, in his view, the Contact Group’s visit to southern Africa in late October succeeded “in its immediate objectives,” which was to make progress on discussing a proposed constitution for the future independent Namibia. Crocker proudly proclaimed that the eleven other governments were impressed by his ability to be “both versatile and tough.”49 Putteho Ngonda noted Crocker’s optimism upon returning from his October mission, but was a bit more skeptical about how much progress had actually occurred regarding Namibia. He worried that the Pretoria regime intended to employ their “familiar stalling tactics” and would thus make a settlement impossible in the near future. Ngonda was not at all optimistic about the Reagan administration in general and what he considered to be the “reactionary mood” in Washington. He pointed to the ongoing attempts by Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment and thus renew assistance to Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi, who was then in Washington.50 According to Ngonda, Savimbi “could have not visited the United States at a more opportune time.” He predicted that the government of Angola should expect increased attacks by Savimbi’s UNITA forces, and that as a result Zambia would be faced with a rising tide of refugees from the fighting. “Angola’s prospects for internal peace and reconciliation,” he sadly and accurately concluded, “do not look bright at all.”51 Ngonda’s harsh criticism of the Reagan administration suggested that Wisner’s hopes for partnership may have been a bit premature and overly optimistic. There remained some major differences of opinion between Lusaka and Washington as 1981 drew to a close. For example, while members of Congress and Assistant Secretary Crocker hosted rebel Savimbi, Kaunda welcomed Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos to State House for a visit on December 11. Even Reuben Kamanga, who had just benefited from generous American hospitality and so clearly enjoyed meeting Vice President Bush in the White House, strongly disagreed with Reagan’s policy in the Middle East. He criticized the United States for supplying weapons to Israel, which was certainly true. He also accused the Reagan administration of siding with Iran in the Iraq-Iran war, which was not entirely accurate. In any case, Zambia enthusiastically backed Iraq in the conflict. In a letter to Tarik Aziz, Saddam Hussein’s foreign minister, Kamanga stated, “I wish to express total support of Iraq as we have always done.” He closed by calling for continued friendship between Iraq and Zambia and exclaimed “Long live President Saddam Hussein!”52 Such a sentiment would not have been nearly as unpopular in the United States in 1981 as it would become in later decades, but Kamanga’s criticism of the Reagan administration for its Middle East policy nonetheless revealed fault lines which lingered between Lusaka and Washington as 1982 dawned.

More “Constructive” Engagement Relations between Washington and Pretoria, on the other hand, seemed closer than ever moving into 1982. South African foreign minister Pik Botha notified Crocker that South Africa would support Security Council Resolution 435, the UN plan for

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Namibia. In February, the Reagan administration relaxed the controls on providing Pretoria a wide range of military items. This was partly a response to the progress on Namibia, and partly just a reflection of the broader Constructive Engagement policy that Crocker had been crafting for over a year. With the more lax laws in place, the US Commerce Department approved requests from American companies to sell light aircraft, computers, and 2,500 high-voltage cattle prods to the South African military and police. The Reagan administration also indicated its backing of P.W. Botha by nominating Herman Nickel as the new ambassador to Pretoria. Nickel, an immigrant from Germany, was a long-time journalist who had written several articles opposing the imposition of any economic sanctions against South Africa. In spite of intense opposition to his nomination by the anti-apartheid movement, he was confirmed by the US Senate in March.53 March 1982 did see signs of improvement in bilateral US-Zambia relations, when Kaunda invited General Vernon Walters, Reagan’s ambassador-at-large, back to Lusaka for another talk. Walters personally delivered a message from Reagan to the Zambian president, which was a reply to an earlier letter. Walters, ambassador Wisner, and Kaunda met at State House on March 14 for a thorough discussion, which reaffirmed their nations’ “commitment to pursue relations on the basis of mutual respect.”54 This was Wisner’s last official meeting with Kaunda as ambassador. A month later in midApril, his tenure as ambassador ended and he departed for Washington to become Crocker’s deputy assistant secretary for African affairs. During the farewell festivities for Wisner in Lusaka, Zambian officials spoke optimistically about the potential for the Reagan administration to facilitate a settlement in Namibia. Wisner acknowledged that during his posting to Lusaka the two countries had their share of “differences and misunderstandings.” However, he characterized his overall experience in Zambia as “fantastic,” and he promised to help maintain positive bilateral relations at his new position back at Foggy Bottom.55 Wisner could take some pride in helping to rebuild a solid relationship after the nadir of mid-1981. He later recalled that he “liked Zambians” in general, and characterized Kaunda as “a good friend of the USA.”56 On April 30, Kaunda seemed to send a strong signal in support of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement by sitting down at a summit with P.W. Botha around a table straddling the South Africa-Botswana border, in the towns of Kopfontein and Mareela.57 At Botha’s request, Kaunda opened the discussion with a prayer.58 The session was evidently cordial, although no official account of the actual conversation was ever released. The press was told that the two leaders discussed a Namibian solution, but Kaunda later recalled focusing mostly on South Africa’s internal problems and requesting that Botha release Nelson Mandela from prison. Mandela had just been transferred from Robben Island to the less severe Pollsmoor Prison, but there is no proof that Kaunda had influenced the move. Kaunda himself acknowledged that he and Botha “discussed a lot” during the April 30 meeting, “but little was achieved.”59 Kaunda’s willingness to talk face-to-face with his counterpart from Pretoria sparked some criticism in the United States, particularly among black Americans, who felt it was a “betrayal of the cause of the oppressed.” Crocker, on the other hand, contended that it was a significant step in the right direction and could help bring peace to southern Africa.60

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Although Kaunda’s decision to engage personally with Botha certainly fit nicely with Crocker’s policy, there is no evidence that the meeting represented a response to a Reagan administration request. Kaunda claimed that the idea had occurred to him during a lengthy interview with a journalist from New Zealand, and that it was primarily motivated by his Christian faith that you must always “Love thy neighbor as thou love thyself.”61 This was classic Kaunda, who has often explained his behavior by pointing to the Bible. “Whether this is for public effect or genuinely felt is a matter for debate,” cautioned Stephen Chan, in his insightful analysis of Kaunda’s diplomacy. Chan closely examined the April 30, 1982, summit between Kaunda and Botha, and carefully considered the subsequent claims that it had started the process which brought later breakthroughs on Namibia. He discovered that giving Kaunda and Botha too much credit for the later Namibian settlement was not justified. He did concede, however, that the Botswana meeting had the positive result of Botha and Kaunda agreeing to “keep each informed of the other’s thoughts.”62 While Kaunda’s face-to-face session with Botha could be seen as making a slight contribution to Constructive Engagement, Crocker had no intention of arranging such a meeting between President Reagan and the South African leader. When officials in Pretoria suggested that top-level talks could help negotiations on Namibia “proceed more smoothly,” Crocker explained that he was not interested. He feared the result of such an “uncontrollable Reagan-Botha summit” would be the American president agreeing to support South African policies and proposals that would make any future progress on regional issues such as a Namibia settlement impossible.63 Instead of a risky Reagan-Botha summit, Crocker continued his talks at the ministerial level during a special UN session disarmament in New York in June 1982. As Contact Group diplomats discussed peace proposals in New York, South African diplomats simultaneously spoke with members of the Reagan administration in Washington, and for the first time made public their requirement that the departure of all Cuban forces from Angola be part of any agreement to withdraw their forces from Namibia. Putteho Ngonda, the Zambian ambassador, decried such linkage as “counterproductive.”64 During his first year in office Crocker had put in a lot of time on Namibia and made little concrete progress, so in hopes of breaking the logjam he sent the dynamic duo of Walters and Wisner to Angola in June to meet directly with President Dos Santos.65 Wisner, his deputy who had just weathered the storm of three rocky years in Lusaka, had first-hand knowledge of southern Africa’s tricky terrain. Walters, the former CIA official who had strong sympathy for Savimbi, seemed like a strange candidate to approach Dos Santos, but he turned out to be a great choice. His warm personality and ability to speak Portuguese increased the effectiveness of his diplomacy in Luanda considerably. The Angolan president listened patiently, and responded by approving the proposed cease-fire, and agreeing that it was imperative to find a “just solution.” The overall tone of his response to Wisner and Walters in June was quite promising; but, he requested some more time before addressing the issue of Cuban withdrawal from Angola. When Wisner and Walters returned to Luanda in July, Dos Santos was upset by renewed South African military activity in the southern region of his country. On the question of when Cuban forces would

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leave Angola, he could offer nothing better than “after Namibia’s independence.”66 With some promising signs but no breakthrough, Walters and Wisner went back to Washington to brief Crocker and regroup.

Bilateral relations Meanwhile, US diplomats continued their efforts to rebuild the bilateral relationship with Zambia. Wesley Egan, temporarily in charge of the embassy in Lusaka until a new ambassador arrived, met with finance minister Kebby Musokotwane to announce a major shipment of wheat and rice from the United States. Egan reviewed the recent history of American aid to Zambia, which consisted mainly of food and fertilizer. The new deal was the eighth US delivery of food aid since 1977. A few days later Nalumino Mundia, the prime minister, signed the final agreement, which stipulated that Zambia would pay for the latest shipment of food and fertilizer over forty years under very favorable loan terms. He expressed the Kaunda government’s hope, however, that the focus of future US assistance would be on helping Zambia to develop the ability to produce its own fertilizer and foods rather than depending on emergency shipments in years with drought or floods.67 In particular he hoped the efforts to expand the fertilizer factory in Kafue would be supported. A Times of Zambia editorial seconded Mundia’s plea, urging the United States and other allies to “provide development aid instead of bags of rice or maize.” The editors concluded that “we are failing not because our friends have begrudged us aid,” but because the aid is in the form of finished products or cash we cannot use wisely without more expertise.68 With Zambian journalists and politicians expressing appreciation for American assistance, bilateral relations seemed healthy again when the new US ambassador, Nicholas Platt, got to Lusaka in August. Platt, a Harvard graduate, had joined the Foreign Service in 1959 and initially focused on Asian affairs. In the late 1970s he did a lot of work in the State Department’s UN Bureau, and that was part of the reason that Crocker felt he would be a good choice to replace Wisner in Lusaka. The ongoing diplomatic initiative toward southern Africa was very much of a multilateral undertaking, so the thinking was that Platt’s experience with the United Nations (where Namibia had been a hot topic for years) would be useful. Crocker selected Platt as ambassador to Zambia because he had “regional clout” and “knew the issues,” meaning that the assistant secretary would not need to fly to Lusaka every time there was “something to say” to Kaunda of importance.69 Platt’s assignment included both helping maintain the multilateral diplomacy Crocker had initiated, and continuing to mend bilateral relations between Washington and Lusaka. Upon Platt’s arrival and his initial speech that praised Kaunda’s contribution to peace negotiations in the region, a Times of Zambia editorial offered a mixed assessment of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy. “There have been tiffs now and then between Zambia and America,” admitted the editors, “but the two countries remain good friends politically, and in cultural, trade, and several other fields.” On the other hand, the editors denounced the United States for “delaying Namibian independence” and generally being “hell-bent on destabilizing almost every region in the world.”70 When

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Kaunda accepted Platt’s credentials on August 30, he noted that although there had been a “hitch” in US-Zambia relations during the previous year, those challenges were now a “thing of the past.” He lauded the Founding Fathers for establishing democracy in the United States, and hoped that the Reagan administration would carry on those traditions and help end oppression in southern Africa. Specifically, he proposed that American diplomats take on “a more significant role” regarding Namibia.71

Enabling Mobutu’s kleptocracy For Kaunda, a more pressing concern than the new US ambassador continued to simmer regarding the border between Zambia and Zaire, so he spent a couple of days at the end of August 1982 in Kinshasa consulting with President Joseph Mobutu. The two leaders, as usual, treated each other cordially. As former foreign minister and long-time diplomat Siteke Mwale later recalled, Kaunda supported Mobutu’s ongoing efforts at “Zaireanization,” and for his part Mobutu “respected KK.”72 Troops from both militaries continued to patrol the border; however, and in particular the army of Zaire treated their counterparts from Zambia with suspicion. Mobutu evidently worried that former rebels from the Katanga province were hiding in Zambia and plotting to overthrow him. There was no shortage of paranoia in central southern Africa in the early 1980s, a fact noted in late 1982 by Zambia’s ambassador in Kinshasa, Mr. W.K.C. Kamwana. “Some suspicions especially on the Zairean side continued to be entertained as regards the real intentions and feelings of the Zambian government,” he commented. “This situation can perhaps be partly explained by the kind and disposition of persons surrounding and close to President Mobutu Sese Seko who appears to have morbid fears of unreal dangers and challenges. Accordingly, the political system that is evolving is one in which witch-hunting and suspicions are very much in vogue,” concluded Kamwana.73 Mobutu surely was exceptionally paranoid, but he remained a powerful figure on the world stage and a close friend of the United States. On September 23, 1982, he met with President Reagan during a UN session in New York. After their first meeting a year earlier, Reagan had confided in his diary that the United States was “trying to help” Mobutu, but that the economy of Zaire was in “bad shape,” in part because of “corruption which he’s promised to clear up.” After their second meeting, Reagan no longer seemed concerned about the corruption and simply stated that Mobutu of Zaire was “a darn good leader & friend of the US.”74 In his memoirs, Crocker barely mentioned Mobutu, but did characterize his regime as “kleptocratic.”75 The lack of details about his interactions with Zaire may have reflected Crocker’s distaste for dealing with such a corrupt and greedy bunch. In a later interview with writer Michela Wrong, who wrote a fascinating expose on Mobutu’s corrupt presidency, Crocker recalled that every time he went to see Zaire’s leader depart from Washington, “The DC10 would barely be able to take off, its belly was so full of stereos and microwaves.”76 The kleptocracy established in Zaire has been well documented by many authors, including journalist Bill Berkeley. According to Berkely, Mobutu’s ill-gotten wealth was approximately $5 billion, which was deposited in Swiss bank accounts and used

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to purchase ranches, villas, and yachts throughout Europe. He constructed a mindboggling white marble palace near his birthplace at Gbadolite, known as “Versailles in the jungle.” He and his family and friends frequently flew to Paris for shopping sprees or to Florida to enjoy Disney World on specially chartered Concorde jets. Herman Cohen, who would replace Crocker as assistant secretary at the end of the 1980s, candidly characterized Mobutu’s regime as “basically a clan, a family of cousins acting like the Mafia in Sicily, making these illegal deals, siphoning the money off cobalt and copper revenues.”77 A key use for some of the money was to pay off opposition leaders and the army, which allowed him to maintain power for over three decades. Zambian diplomat Siteke Mwale praised Mobutu for being perhaps the only person who could hold Zaire together as a nation, but decried the massive greed and corruption of his regime. He also rightly attributed Mobutu’s longevity to the assistance from Washington and Paris. “His survival was mainly due to Western support,” concluded Mwale.78 In his interview with Wrong, Crocker claimed that whenever he had pointed out to his superiors, secretaries of state Al Haig or George Shultz, that Mobutu was corrupt, they would always respond: “We know he is evil, but who else is there?” Crocker also characterized Mobutu as a master of manipulation, who wisely turned rivalries between the United States, France, and Belgium, and also between the CIA and the State Department, into leverage to remain in someone’s good graces at all times.79

African trip by Bush In November, both Crocker and Mobutu got a major boost when Vice President George Bush and his wife Barbara undertook a tour of seven African nations. They started their busy trip with stops in Senegal and Nigeria, and then took a detour to Moscow for the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev. After the somber and eventful side-trip to the Soviet Union, Bush returned to southern Africa. In Zaire, Bush praised Mobutu as “a great friend of the USA” and classified him as “second to none in Africa.” The two discussed several aspects of their nations bilateral relations, including military assistance provided to Zaire and free electricity granted to American corporations in Shaba province.80 While in Kenya, Bush defended the Reagan administration staunchly for working with the Pretoria regime in order to pursue peace in the region. He insisted, however, that Constructive Engagement was not an endorsement of apartheid. Journalists questioned the vice president on this point during a press conference in Nairobi, and he replied that “the worst thing that could happen … would be for the United States to withdraw or pull right back across the Atlantic Ocean and live comfortably.”81 A major component of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement strategy was his commitment to maintaining positive relations with Robert Mugabe and his government in the newly independent nation of Zimbabwe. George and Barbara Bush spent three days in Zimbabwe. During a state dinner in Harare, Bush lauded Mugabe’s “policy of reconciliation” and praised his nation as a “noble experiment in a strife-torn region.” He judged Zimbabwe’s progress as a great model for Namibia, and thanked Mugabe for his help in the Namibian negotiations.82 At the time of Bush’s visit, Mugabe had already begun the process of cracking down on Joshua Nkomo and his Ndebele followers. On

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February 6, his regime announced that they had discovered a cache of weapons on a farm owned by Nkomo, and accused him of cooperating with South Africa to plan Mugabe’s overthrow. About a week later, Nkomo was dismissed from the government.83 A few months later, six tourists (two each from Britain, Australia, and the United States) were kidnapped on the road from Victoria Falls to Bulawayo. They were all eventually killed. Mugabe’s government blamed it on Nkomo, but he denied any involvement and made a pretty convincing argument that the tragic incident had been staged by Mugabe’s regime to discredit him.84 During the first week of November, the Zambian government received some disturbing inside insights from Mr. A. Mtshani, Zimbabwe’s undersecretary for commerce and industry. Mtshani had worked in Zambia as a government economist and during a return visit to Lusaka he shared his view of the unfolding events in Zimbabwe with John Banda, who worked for the Zambian ministry of information and broadcasting services. Banda shared the information with Reuben Kamanga, who promptly passed it on to Kaunda. Mtshani believed that the six tourists were safe, which unfortunately turned out to be overly optimistic. His comments regarding Nkomo and Mugabe were more accurate. He noted that the situation in Zimbabwe was “critical,” and that it had “deteriorated since the removal from the Government of Mr. Joshua Nkomo.” He insisted that Nkomo had not been planning to overthrow Mugabe, and that to the contrary he was “prepared to work under Mr. Mugabe at any time.” He worried that the circumstances would continue to deteriorate in Zimbabwe if Mugabe did not start to act more rationally. From his perspective, and the Zambian government would certainly have agreed, acting rationally would include bringing Nkomo back into the government. According to Mtshani, “If only Mugabe knew how much the old man (Nkomo) wants to assist him … he would not behave in the way he is.”85 Tragically, Mugabe’s treatment of Nkomo and his followers would get much worse before it got better. After their stop in Harare, George and Barbara Bush paid a visit to Kaunda at State House in Lusaka. The future first lady was impressed by the Zambian leader, whom she referred to as “a darling man.” She fondly remembered him playing guitar and singing a duet with his wife. Barbara Bush characterized Kaunda and his wife as Christians, and recalled “a picture of the Last Supper over their dining room door” at State House.86 In his assessment of the November 1982 trip, George Bush also remarked that “The thing that gave me hope about Africa, in the face of enormous economic problems, was their adherence to Christian values.” He informed President Reagan that “Each of the leaders I visited was impressed by your interest and sympathy.”87

US-Zambian relations in late 1982 Bush and Kaunda discussed the Namibia negotiations, and according to the Zambian leader their views were “divergent.” In a lengthy follow-up letter to Reagan, Kaunda outlined this divergence regarding Namibia and offered several concrete suggestions. He suggested that the Reagan administration “review your position

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on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.” In his view, these troops were considered as a necessary shield from South African attacks and it was unfair to ask Angola to eject them. Kaunda also requested that the Reagan administration publicly distance itself from Savimbi’s UNITA and acknowledge that dealing with UNITA was an “internal matter” for the government in Luanda. Furthermore he proposed American recognition of the MPLA regime of Dos Santos. He knew that during the last three administrations, the White House had withheld recognition from Luanda. However, he argued that because US diplomats were actively seeking a solution on Namibia and therefore in contact with Angolan diplomats, “the situation has now changed.” He believed a final deal on Namibia was near, and believed that the Reagan administration could play a key role, just like Nixon had orchestrated the breakthrough on US-China relations.88 As it turned out, Kaunda’s missive was overly optimistic on the timetable for a settlement on Namibia, which would not occur for six more years. However, his thinking in late 1982 was actually very close to that of Chester Crocker on several key issues. For example, Crocker was seriously considering a move toward US recognition of the MPLA regime, and had in fact authorized Frank Wisner to raise the possibility in his discussions with Angolan diplomats in Lusaka and Luanda. Wisner also noted remarkable progress, such as Angola’s willingness to consider evicting the Cubans during the implementation of UN Resolution 435, whereas they had earlier only offered to do it after Namibian independence was final. In spite of considerably more convergence on the negotiations than Kaunda realized, a breakthrough at that point was not in the cards. The Dos Santos government in Luanda held what Crocker considered to be an unrealistic fear that the South SADF would remain a threat even after they withdrew from southern Angola and evacuated from their bases in Namibia. “It was as if they viewed South Africans as possessing some miraculous white magic that enabled their SADF to defy the laws of logic and geography,” he recalled.89 Kaunda’s ambassador in Luanda offered what was perhaps a more accurate explanation for MPLA reluctance to oust the Cubans, and that was their very realistic fear of ongoing UNITA insurgency long after South Africa’s exit from Angola and even after Namibian independence. The Zambian ambassador’s thorough and extremely gloomy assessment of the tragic plight of the Angolan people proved to be prescient.90 As 1982 drew to a close, bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia were definitely strong, having been quite nicely repaired by Wisner, Walters, Crocker, and Vice President Bush on one side, and by Kaunda and Kamanga on the other. The two nations planned to consult closely on not only bilateral issues, but also regional initiatives such as Namibia. In the coming year, Kaunda would once again return to Washington to meet with a US president, this time Ronald Reagan. Bush had delivered a letter inviting Kaunda to the White House, and the Zambian leader gladly accepted the invitation. “I very much look forward to an opportunity of meeting you and to exchange views on issues of great concern to the United States and Zambia,” responded Kaunda.91 The coming years would see even closer cooperation between Lusaka and Washington, and eventually both countries would be able to take some pride in their contributions to facilitating the independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid.

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Kaunda and Crocker Cooperate on Regional Diplomacy, 1983–1984

Heading into 1983, the halfway point of Ronald Reagan’s first term in the White House and an election year for Kenneth Kaunda, relatively positive bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia provided hope for increased diplomatic cooperation in the elusive search for independence for Namibia and stability in Angola. In March 1983, Kaunda returned to the White House for a lengthy discussion with another American president. Although he and Reagan clearly did not agree on everything, just the fact that the meeting took place demonstrated an encouraging thaw in bilateral relations after the nadir of 1981. Building on this momentum, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker journeyed to Lusaka in February 1984 to mediate negotiations between South African and Angolan officials. The Lusaka

Figure 8.1 Ronald Reagan and Kenneth Kaunda chat by the fire in the White House on March 30, 1983. Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California.

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conference, skillfully hosted by Kaunda, led to a promising agreement in which the Pretoria government pledged to withdraw its forces from Angola. The optimism after the Lusaka conference proved short-lived, however, and it turned out that the events of 1983–84 represented the last example of meaningful diplomatic interaction between Kaunda and his American counterparts during his presidency.

Namibia The focus of US-Zambian regional diplomacy in the early 1980s was primarily on facilitating independence for Namibia, a large territory on the southwestern coast of Africa that had borders with Angola (1,376 kilometers), Botswana (1,360 kilometers), South Africa (967 kilometers), and along the Caprivi Strip with Zambia (233 kilometers). With a total area of about 825,000 square kilometers, Namibia is about half the size of Alaska and 70 percent as big as South Africa, which took over the territory from its initial colonizer, Germany (which had first seized control of the area in 1884), during the First World War. Though Namibia had a small population (only about 2.2 million people in 2013), it boasts valuable resources such as diamonds and it took on an inordinately large significance by symbolizing the Pretoria regime’s main attempt at extending apartheid beyond South Africa’s recognized borders. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s South Africa ruled Namibia (known then as Southwestern Africa) as a League of Nations mandate. After the Second World War, when the Nationalist Party established apartheid, it also effectively made Namibia a part of South Africa itself.1 Upon achieving independence in 1964, Zambia became the primary host for Namibian exiles who sought freedom from South African rule. The most important of these groups was the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), led by Sam Nujoma, who established a base of operations in Lusaka. With the end of Portuguese control in 1974, the much larger border between Angola and Namibia opened and most of SWAPO’s activities moved from Zambia to Angola. Zambia remained an important destination for refugees who received health care and education, including at a UN-funded university for Namibian students in Lusaka. Additionally, Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda worked diligently to put Namibian independence on the agenda of Western powers such as the United States. Andrew Young, the American ambassador to the United Nations during the first half of the Jimmy Carter administration, and his deputy Donald McHenry, helped craft UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978, which called for Namibian independence and a total withdrawal of South African control.2 Although the Pretoria regime agreed in principle to pursue a settlement based on Resolution 435, in reality it refused to implement it. Arguably, one of the reasons the South African government did not actually adhere to Resolution 435 and leave Namibia at this point was that the Carter administration opted not to impose economic sanctions to force its hand.3 Talks regarding Namibian independence broke down in early 1981, and it was at this juncture that the administration of Ronald Reagan entered the White House. In 1983 and 1984, Reagan’s point man on Africa, Chester Crocker, worked closely with Kaunda to resuscitate Namibian hopes for independence under Resolution 435. Crocker’s insistence that Namibian independence be “linked” to the

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simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, however, complicated matters, and no final settlement would be reached regarding Namibia until the end of the 1980s.4

Situation entering 1983 For Kaunda and Crocker to accomplish their regional goals, such as independence for Namibia and stability in Angola, they would need help from the government in Luanda; but, circumstances there were quite complicated. Boniface Zulu, the Zambian ambassador to Angola, summarized the situation in January as “unpredictable.” Major challenges facing the Angolan president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos and his ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party included domestic criticism, a struggling economy, the continued presence of South African troops in neighboring Namibia and within the southern part of Angola itself, as well as the resurgence of the guerrilla forces of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. Ambassador Zulu predicted that the large contingent of Cuban troops would remain in Angola for the foreseeable future, because their removal would result in a quick conquest of the country by UNITA (with South African assistance). He pointed out that Zambian-Angolan relations were “improving,” but noted that Dos Santos still suspected that UNITA guerrillas operated out of bases in western Zambia and thus was not completely happy with Kaunda. Finally, he warned that the recent emergency powers granted to the Angolan president by the parliament in response to the worsening security situation presented a real “danger” of Dos Santos “over-using these powers.”5 Nicholas Platt, the new US ambassador who had been in office in Lusaka only since August, flew to Luanda in late January to get an update from the Angolan government. Monitoring the daunting regional issues in southern Africa was a major requirement of the job for American diplomats stationed in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s, and so Crocker had thought carefully before nominating Platt for the post. The assistant secretary characterized Platt as the latest in “a string of the finest officers in the Foreign Service” sent as US ambassador to Kaunda’s country.6 The fact-finding mission to Luanda reflected Crocker’s respect for Platt, but his discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister Venancio da Moura produced little in the way of worthwhile information. The MPLA official claimed that recent Angolan talks with the South African government had not made progress, and that the Pretoria regime continued its “insincere” and “dishonest” behavior. Da Moura told Platt that the Dos Santos regime would cease discussions with the South Africans (although they actually continued), but nevertheless requested that a high-level American entourage visit Luanda. Upon returning to Lusaka, Platt informed Crocker that there was no reason to send such a team to Luanda at the time.7 Another year would pass before Crocker brought Angolan and South African diplomats together for talks in Zambia. Back in Washington, Crocker sought a continuation of his complex and controversial policy of Constructive Engagement. In addition to tightening the ties with the white regime in Pretoria, this policy featured significant financial assistance to black-led governments throughout the southern African region. Robert Mugabe’s government in Harare would receive $40 million in 1983, while Kaunda’s government

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in Lusaka was provided with about $20 million in developmental aid.8 Samora Machel’s government in Mozambique was also being added to the assistant secretary’s wish list for future assistance. Crocker contended that these aid packages would promote stability, guarantee access to strategic minerals, and encourage participation in the US diplomatic initiative toward Namibia and Angola. What this also meant was that Constructive Engagement immediately became a prime target for critics on both ends of the spectrum. Left-wing groups such as TransAfrica castigated Crocker’s cozy relationship with Pretoria, while right-wing legislators such as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) blasted the assistant secretary for requesting funding for one-party socialist governments in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.9 For other opponents of Constructive Engagement, the worst aspect of Crocker’s policy was its insistence on the “linkage” of independence for Namibia with the removal of all Cuban troops from Angola. Sam Nujoma, head of the SWAPO, the leading Namibian nationalist party, considered linkage to be “the greatest obstacle” blocking achievement of SWAPO’s goal of independence for Namibia. During the Seventh Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, which took place in India in early March 1983, Nujoma condemned linkage as “a nefarious exercise of unbridled blackmail which has now come to characterize the whole process of the so-called ‘constructive engagement,’ a policy whereby the Reagan Administration has publicly and unmistakably embraced apartheid South Africa.”10 Nujoma and his allies across southern Africa ranked among the strongest critics of Constructive Engagement, and the first leader from the region given the opportunity to possibly point out their concerns to Reagan would be none other than Kenneth Kaunda.

Kaunda meets Reagan On March 20, 1983, President Kaunda and a delegation that included his wife Betty, Foreign Minister Lameck Goma, Security Advisor Wilted Phiri, and Reuben Kamanga of the UNIP Central Committee departed for a three-week tour of Africa, Europe, and North America. During a press conference while briefly visiting Cyprus, Goma explained that Kaunda hoped that he and Reagan would discuss Namibian issues, and in particular the American insistence on linking a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with independence for Namibia. Back in Lusaka, US ambassador Nicholas Platt, who was preparing to fly to Washington to participate in the White House meetings, announced a deal authorizing a shipment of American wheat to Zimbabwe in exchange for a shipment of corn to drought-stricken Zambia. Platt expressed his hope that Zambia would soon be an exporter of food rather than aid recipient; moreover, he characterized bilateral relations as generally warm, as evidenced by the visit a few months earlier by Vice President Bush.11 On March 29, President Kaunda arrived in Washington to begin a four-day visit. He was the first of the Frontline leaders to visit Reagan, and a big part of his mission was to discuss regional issues such as the ongoing struggle for peace and racial equality. An editorial in the Times of Zambia blamed the simmering conflict in Namibia on the two “lions”: South Africa and the United States. The editors hoped that Kaunda could

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Figure 8.2 Kenneth Kaunda, Ronald Reagan, and Vice President George H.W. Bush during a White House lunch on March 30, 1983. Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California.

convince Reagan to take actions that would avoid a “holocaust” in southern Africa. “His only weapon,” observed the Times, “is his statesmanship, his personality, and his strong persuasive voice of reason.” The editors concluded with a plea for understanding and a progressive response by the Reagan administration: “For once let the Americans listen, if they have any ears to hear, and take heed through positive action, if they still have the moral power that has created the ‘Great America’ many still cherish.”12 How well Ronald Reagan actually listened to Kenneth Kaunda during their discussion on March 30 is a debatable point. After a breakfast at Foggy Bottom hosted by Secretary of State George Shultz, Kaunda met with Reagan in the Oval Office for about an hour. The two statesmen continued their talks over lunch, and wrapped up the session with a press conference. Reagan described it in his diary as “a good meeting and lunch.” In his estimation, it seemed that Kaunda felt “good about the trip.” Reagan believed that he had presented Constructive Engagement convincingly: “We made clear we detest Apartheid but believe we can do better with S.Africa by persuasion.”13 Chester Crocker, who participated in the Kaunda-Reagan rendezvous, characterized the session as “polite,” a fact he attributed to them being “both very gracious men.”14 In his public statement after their working lunch, President Reagan praised Kaunda as “one of Africa’s senior and most respected statesmen” and a skilled diplomat who “plays an admirable role in international events.” He noted that their cordial conversation had covered a wide range of topics, but had focused especially on Namibia. “We share a common commitment,” commented Reagan, “for the prompt implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and look forward

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to the day when we can celebrate a free and independent Namibia.” He lauded Kaunda for his efforts to promote agriculture, and was “proud to have cooperated with you in that development.” He offered his highest praise for Kaunda’s “tireless efforts for peace and regional stability in Africa,” and for his leadership role in the Organization of African Unity. Reagan hoped that Zambia and the United States would maintain their “strong bilateral relationship” and continue cooperating on “regional and global issues.” He concluded with warm words: “It’s been a pleasure, Dr. Kaunda, to have you as our guest.”15 Kaunda followed Reagan’s remarks by thanking him for the “friendly reception” and “warm hospitality” in Washington and echoing Reagan’s assessment that their talks had gone “very well.” He emphasized that bilateral relations were strong, and that the two governments concurred that apartheid must end and that Namibia should be independent. “We agree that the basis of the solution to this problem should be Resolution 435 of the United Nations Security Council,” commented Kaunda. He added that the two administrations should keep working together to bring a settlement to Namibia. “I hope that the discussions we have had will form a strong foundation on which to build our future relations,” stated the Zambian president, and he closed by once again thanking Reagan for his “generous hospitality.”16 From the White House, Kaunda returned to his hotel for another discussion with Shultz. Highlights of the remainder of his stay in Washington included delivering an address to the National Press Club and meeting with Mayor Marion Barry and officials from the World Bank. Shortly after returning home, Kaunda reiterated his appreciation for the “warm hospitality” to Reagan in a lengthy letter. “I value immensely the exchange of views which we had and continue to have on the situation in Southern Africa,” wrote Kaunda, “especially on Namibia as these are matters with which we in this part of the world are pre-occupied.” He continued in this laudatory fashion, telling Reagan that “you hold the key to the independence of Namibia and to the future of South Africa.” He hoped the American president would “use this key now to open the way to a peaceful and stable Southern Africa.” He judged US-Zambia relations to be “cordial” and invited Shultz to visit Zambia. Kaunda emphasized that he was “comforted by the knowledge that we can work together.” The Zambian president kept his word, and for the next year he would work quite closely with the Reagan administration, particularly in search of peace and stability in Angola.17 Initial analysis in the aftermath of Kaunda’s visit to Washington by the Times of Zambia editors was generally positive, describing it as a “triumphant” tour that demonstrated the strength of US-Zambia relations. They praised Kaunda for his ability to prod Reagan into publicly endorsing UN Resolution 435 as a requirement for any Namibian settlement. “For once the Americans were prepared to listen,” they stated proudly, “to the voice of reason from the ‘wilderness’ of Zambia.” The Times acknowledged, however, that Kaunda did not criticize the Reagan administration’s controversial “linkage” of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with Namibian independence.18 A few months later the Zambian ambassador to the United States, Putteho Ngonda, provided a perceptive summation of the limited concrete impact of Kaunda’s visit that was much more nuanced than the initial media reports. According to Ngonda’s insightful analysis, the major accomplishment of the trip was giving the pro-Pretoria

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Reagan administration some exposure to “the views of a leading statesman from the region.” Moreover, Ngonda conceded that Reagan deserved credit for hosting Kaunda in a “cordial atmosphere.” During the months following Kaunda’s visit, however, the Reagan administration showed no signs of revising its policy toward South Africa or surrendering its demand that any settlement in Namibia be “linked” to the complete removal of Cuban forces from Angola. In spite of Kaunda’s effort, then, the Reagan administration actually had not “seen the need to alter its basic stand regarding the major concerns” of the southern African region.19 While Kaunda’s public statements and the editorials in his government’s newspaper may have been quite positive in their assessments of the March 30, 1983, encounter with Reagan, not long after returning to Lusaka the Zambian leader admitted in a private conversation with Nigerian diplomat Emeka Anyaoku, the deputy secretarygeneral of the Commonwealth, that “there was no dialogue” with the American president. Although Reagan had been polite during their meeting, in terms of substance Kaunda indicated to Anyaoku that he “felt he got nowhere.”20 This sense of frustration with his failure to make any real progress with Reagan reverberated throughout Kaunda’s recollections of the talks many years later. He remembered that after his hour-long explanation of the dire circumstances in southern Africa and the need for a new US policy, all Reagan could say in reply was to ask, “Mr. President, why don’t we do business together?” In Kaunda’s view what this indicated was that all of his thoughts and suggestions regarding South Africa, Namibia, and Angola “did not appear important” to Reagan, and that above all, what mattered “was business.” It was clear to Kaunda that with Reagan in the White House, “there was no will to solve the southern Africa situation.” Looking back on the talks over twenty years later, he believed that in spite of being welcomed into the Oval Office and served a fine lunch, at the end of the day “there was really no improvement in the USA position on our region.”21

Carrying on in spite of Constructive Engagement In spite of frustration with Reagan’s fixation on “doing business,” or disagreement with certain aspects of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement, Kaunda carried on his efforts to facilitate settlements of southern Africa’s conflicts. In a risky and remarkable move of statesmanship, the Zambian leader aggressively sought to strengthen relations with Angola. First, on July 2, Kaunda paid a brief visit to Luanda. Then in late July, he hosted a four-day tour of Zambia by the Angolan president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Welcoming to Lusaka the socialist Dos Santos, leader of a country whose government the United States did not officially recognize, only a few months after he had met with Reagan in the White House, clearly demonstrated Kaunda’s determination to be nonaligned. The elaborate State Visit by Dos Santos started with two private meals between the presidents in Lusaka on July 28, followed by a flight the next morning to Ndola to visit the Copperbelt for several hours, after which the leaders flew back to Lusaka for another dinner and further discussions. On the 30th the two leaders opened Zambia’s annual Agricultural and Commercial Show, and then returned to

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State House for a formal banquet and additional talks. The morning of the 31st found Dos Santos in Livingstone seeing Victoria Falls, after which he returned to Lusaka for a ceremonial departure and flight back to Angola.22 The Zambian government rolled out the red carpet for Dos Santos, particularly considering the fact that it initially had been opposed to his MPLA party’s rise to power in 1975. Those days were long gone. Secret background documents related to the Dos Santos visit, provided to Kaunda by his Cabinet Office, reflected a high level of respect among Zambian officials for the Angolan government. While Kaunda’s advisors understood that there was still some suspicion in Luanda that Zambian territory housed some members of the UNITA rebel forces, overall relations between the two nations were considered “warm.” One example of this was the existence of a trade agreement signed in 1978. Another was that Kaunda’s advisors believed that Dos Santos had “considerable influence on events in southern Africa.” They expressed their respect for not only the Cuban-style social programs of Angola that provided free education and health services to all citizens but also for the “pragmatism” with which the Luanda regime handled its abundant natural resources such as oil. In spite of having no official diplomatic relations with Washington, it allowed the American corporation Gulf Oil to drill and export petroleum to the United States (for a good price). “By 1985,” stated Kaunda’s advisors with admiration, “Angola is expected to be the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa.”23 Kaunda’s effort to reach out to Dos Santos paid quick dividends, and soon thereafter his ambassador in Luanda, Boniface Zulu, reported that “Angola/Zambia relations appear to have improved a great deal, particularly after the recent State Visit.” In spite of this encouraging diplomatic development, however, Zulu emphasized that due to a major resurgence by UNITA rebels, the overall security situation in Angola was rapidly deteriorating and the country was in a “state of civil war.” Early August featured heavy fighting between government forces of the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi’s rebels, and one town was completely destroyed by artillery shelling and/or bombing raids by the South African air force. The escalating attacks were destroying infrastructure, stopping farmers from planting, and causing villagers to flee. Rising violence had caused “an influx of Angolan refugees crossing into Zambia.” On August 23 President Dos Santos delivered a nationwide address on radio and television and stated unequivocally that “the war with UNITA would be considered as priority number one.”24 As Dos Santos struggled to contain the UNITA offensive, major assistance was provided by the Soviet Union, which had approximately 2,000 advisors in Angola at the time. The commander of the Soviet forces, General Konstantin Kurochkin, had arrived in Luanda in May 1982 after heavy combat experience in Afghanistan and quickly established a close working relationship with Dos Santos and his staff. During his three-year tour in the southern African nation, Kurochkin met monthly with Dos Santos, who thanked the Soviet general after his 1985 departure by sending him a Mercedes-Benz. In helping to thwart Savimbi’s forces in August 1983, Kurochkin and his men made many crucial contributions, such as providing advice, military equipment, food, and invaluable intelligence to the Angolan military and also to its Cuban allies. Indeed, the degree of cooperation between the Soviets and Cubans over many years in combating UNITA and the South African military was amazing. Their ability to work together was a key reason that Savimbi’s forces were kept at bay.25

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Observing these events from Washington, Putteho Ngonda reasoned that the escalation of fighting in Angola may have pleased the Reagan administration. It seemed to him that American officials believed that the worsening circumstances made the Dos Santos regime more likely to accept US demands for the eviction of the Cubans. Of course, the absolute opposite interpretation was possible, as the government in Luanda could react to the UNITA offensive by becoming more dependent on Fidel Castro’s assistance. In any case there was no doubt in Ngonda’s mind that the ongoing civil war in Angola made independence for neighboring Namibia less likely. Ngonda concluded (correctly as it turned out) that “the prospects regarding a peaceful resolution” in Namibia were remote. Kaunda’s envoy in the American capital also assessed the antiapartheid movement, and emphasized that several state and city governments had passed laws requiring divestment of funds from US corporations doing business in South Africa. He noted that there was some pressure on the US Congress to pass similar legislation imposing economic sanctions on the Pretoria regime, but argued (correctly in the short run, until passage of the 1986 sanctions bill over Reagan’s veto) that it was “doubtful that the current initiatives on the part of opponents of apartheid will become law.”26 In mid-September, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became the second Frontline leader to meet with Reagan at the White House. Reagan expressed his disappointment that Mugabe’s ambassador to the United Nations had abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning the Soviets for shooting down a Korean passenger plane.27 In general, he found Mugabe to be “a very opinionated man.” Reagan did not appreciate Mugabe’s nonstop monologue criticizing American policy in Central America, Constructive Engagement, and “linkage” of Cuban troop removal from Angola to Namibian independence. When finally given an opportunity to speak again, Reagan interjected: “We can only persuade So. Africa to allow Namibia’s independence if we get the Cubans out.”28 About a week later in an interview with a New York Times reporter, Kaunda echoed Mugabe’s strong doubts about Reagan’s approach to the southern African region. Kaunda contended that the United States was actually “an accomplice of South Africa in Angola.” By insisting on linkage, what Crocker’s policy had done was to buy time for the Pretoria regime to strengthen UNITA, as evidenced by the recent upsurge in attacks. “What the Reagan Administration is doing,” said Kaunda, “is to enable Savimbi to build up his forces with the help of South Africa.” As a result, concluded the Zambian president, Cuban withdrawal was now less likely than before.29 Perhaps influenced by the analysis from his ambassador in Washington and his lengthy talks with Dos Santos, Kaunda was becoming more critical of Constructive Engagement and especially “linkage” entering the last few months of 1983, but he was still willing to assist Crocker in mediating possible peace talks.

Zambian one-party politics National elections were scheduled to take place in Zambia in late October 1983, and domination by President Kaunda and UNIP was assured in the one-party system with

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no viable opposition to Kaunda even from within the party. After Simon Kapwepwe’s death in 1980, the only possible threat to Kaunda was Harry Nkumbula. In 1981 the “Old Lion” had insisted that his party, the Zambian African National Congress, was still in existence. In 1982, as his health rapidly disintegrated, he pledged to run for parliament again in 1983. It was not to be, however. “A life lived to the full finally took its toll on October 8, 1983,” stated Nkumbula’s biographer, “when Zambia’s finest politician lost his battle with cancer.” On his death bed he bemoaned what he considered to be the sorry state of his nation’s political economy, attentive to such matters until the end.30 Not surprisingly, given that he was the only candidate, Kaunda triumphed in the October 27 presidential election, receiving 93 percent of the votes from the 63 percent of eligible citizens who participated. All of the cabinet ministers won re-election, but seven other ministers were defeated. The elections took place in a peaceful atmosphere, although there were allegations of corruption. Kaunda was sworn in for another term in State House on October 30. A few days later, in hopes of sparking an economic recovery (which did not occur), Kaunda appointed Luke Mwanashiku as his new minister of finance.31 Kaunda’s party had no intention of surrendering control any time soon. According to insightful analysis by scholar Bizeck Phiri, criticism of the one-party system began to intensify in the early 1980s as the old justification that wars in neighboring states such as Zimbabwe necessitated the system no longer made sense. Such critics were usually denounced, unfairly, as enemies of the state. “Meanwhile, UNIP tightened its grip on political power,” explained Phiri, “by systematically filling the most important positions with sycophants.” Potential challengers looking to follow in the footsteps of Kapwepwe or Nkumbula within UNIP were fired or sent abroad as ambassadors. A key example was Mainza Chona, a former secretary general of UNIP, who was exiled to the Zambian embassy in China.32

Challenges to Constructive Engagement With Kaunda firmly entrenched in Lusaka heading the Zambian government for at least one more term, Chester Crocker’s future was much less certain and his controversial policy of Constructive Engagement faced more challenges from all sides. On October 28, just a day after Kaunda’s re-election, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 538. As the United States abstained, other members of the council asserted that their earlier Resolution 435 was the only basis for Namibian independence, and denounced “irrelevant and extraneous issues” such as linkage to Cuban withdrawal from Angola.33 Crocker would later criticize Resolution 538 as “U.N. silliness,” and claim that backstage American diplomacy had “saved the world organization from looking even worse.” His superiors at the State Department evidently did not agree, however, and three days later Secretary Shultz instructed his Policy Planning Staff to conduct a formal evaluation of Constructive Engagement. Crocker believed that Shultz still supported him and saw an in-house review as the best way to preserve his approach to southern Africa, but acknowledged that “it was hardly comforting.”34

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While Resolution 538 sparked re-evaluations in Washington, it emboldened officials in Luanda and Moscow. As the MPLA celebrated eight years of independence on November 11, Dos Santos rejoiced in the latest sign of support from the United Nations. He encouraged his people to “strengthen our unity as we struggle” and concluded his speech by proclaiming that the “great imperialist dream of changing political power in Angola” would never be fulfilled. On November 18, Soviet diplomats at the United Nations approached representatives from Pretoria and suggested that the South African military forces be quickly withdrawn from Angola. In their view, Resolution 538 meant that the “Chester Crocker cycle” had been finally “terminated,” and that South Africa was completely isolated. The Soviets’ derision of Crocker would surely make Dos Santos more stubborn. Crocker later characterized the fall of 1983 as being like “crossing a swamp at dusk, not knowing the depth of the water or the shortest way to firm ground.”35 Desperate to salvage a settlement in southern Africa, the assistant secretary secured permission from Shultz to attempt to arrange a cease-fire in Angola in order to resuscitate negotiations, and Crocker’s initial step was to rendezvous in Rome with South African foreign minister Pik Botha. In the first top-level US-South African talks in a year, the two diplomats met in the Italian capital on December 5. Crocker requested that Botha convince his government to send a strong signal in support of peace in Angola, as the military track held little promise given the ongoing Cuban presence and the Soviet stance. The gist of Crocker’s message to Botha was that “it was time for a strong and credible peace initiative.” The South African foreign minister “slipped into his Godzilla suit” and argued every point Crocker made, even threatening to end the Washington-Pretoria alliance. Crocker concluded that this had been an “important exchange” with Botha, who he thought was “playing the devil’s advocate.”36 It turned out that Botha’s tough reaction was not a bluff, and the next day, December 6, 1983, the South African army and air force launched a massive attack on Angola, named Operation Askari.37 The largest operation initiated by Pretoria against Angola in two years, Operation Askari sent air strikes 200 miles over the border and ground troops 125 miles into Angolan territory. The offensive, which lasted five weeks, met with heavier resistance than expected including newly delivered air defense missile systems. The South African forces killed over 300 Angolans, while suffering twentyone deaths among their own forces. Liberal elements in South Africa responded to the bloodshed by calling for the Pretoria regime to cease such operations in Angola. Botha evidently felt the heat and soon signaled a willingness to implement a cease-fire and negotiate.38

Lusaka Accords A diplomatic breakthrough between South Africa and Angola occurred in February 1984 in Lusaka, facilitated by the gracious host Kenneth Kaunda and mediated by Chester Crocker. Although the deal eventually fell apart and real peace would not be achieved in southern Africa for many more years, the Lusaka Accords represented

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the last major contribution to high-level US-Africa relations during the long career of Kaunda. The chain of events leading to the dramatic conference began in earnest on January 20 on the Cape Verde island of Sao Vicente, where Crocker’s deputy (and former ambassador to Zambia) Frank Wisner secured a promising offer from Angolan vice minister of foreign affairs Venancio da Moura, pledging Angolan control of Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO forces after the South African military withdrew. The official from Luanda expressed his nation’s commitment to pursue a comprehensive settlement that would encompass the broad spectrum of relevant issues, including independence for Namibia governed by Resolution 435 and departure of Cuban forces from Angola. Wisner informed Crocker of the good news, and the assistant secretary flew to Cape Town on January 27 to talk with Pik Botha and start making arrangements for the peace conference.39 After discovering that the South African officials in Cape Town were “impressed” with the promises secured from the Angolan representative in Cape Verde, Crocker flew up to Lusaka to meet with Kaunda on January 29. He found the Zambian president to be “effusively supportive” of American progress with Angola and South Africa.40 Editors of the Zambia Daily Mail were not so sure. In their January 31 editorial they criticized Constructive Engagement for being too concerned with Cold War calculations (especially Cuban troops), and denounced it as a “rejected theory.” The Daily Mail furthermore contended that “the United States was the only country with the influence to effect a peaceful change in Southern Africa, and that failure to act quickly would lead to more bloodshed in the region.” In a follow-up editorial on February 3, the Daily Mail emphasized the need for Crocker to insist on a complete South African withdrawal from Angola. “If he fails to do so,” accused the editors, “it will only confirm that the US government is definitely in cahoots with the racists.”41 Diplomacy and politics in the southern African region that Crocker aptly referred to as a “rough neighborhood” were far from simply black and white, of course, and while Zambian newspapers blasted American policy as racist, Kaunda maintained contacts with Pretoria’s ally in the Angolan civil war, Jonas Savimbi. Crocker was aware of this, and Kaunda knew that the US assistant secretary was aware. At the same time, moving into 1984, Kaunda built stronger bonds with Savimbi’s enemy, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Kaunda increasingly acted as a “careful, correct, and benign mentor” for Dos Santos, whom he called “the young man in Luanda.” The two presidents met in Lusaka on February 5 and agreed that Kaunda should host the peace conference proposed by Crocker. This decision on such short notice by the Zambian leader reflected years of hard work by US diplomats who had endeavored to maintain good relations with him.42 Not all of the principals involved in the Angola conflict believed that early 1984 was the right time for negotiations, however, as Soviet general Kurochkin learned during his lengthy visit to Cuba. Kurochkin consulted with Fidel Castro in early February, and the Cuban leader told him in no uncertain terms that he disapproved of the Angolan decision to participate in the talks being convened in Zambia. “It would be much more advantageous,” said Castro, “to conduct negotiations in a year or a year and a half ’s time.” He believed that by then the Angolans would be much more heavily fortified

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with Soviet equipment and would have more leverage in any talks with representatives from Pretoria and Washington. Castro considered the acquiescence to negotiate in February 1984 by the Luanda regime as a betrayal, and was concerned that if the ill-timed initiative succeeded in getting South African forces out of Angola, then the Cuban justification for being in Angola would be gone. His country would look like a colonizer meddling in the internal affairs of Angola, solely being used to fight UNITA.43 Castro could do nothing to stop the diplomatic momentum, though, and the Lusaka Conference went ahead as scheduled. The talks in Lusaka in February would bring some of the most promising results from early 1980s US diplomacy regarding southern Africa, and looking back on this event later, Crocker asserted: “The story of 1984 starts with Kenneth Kaunda.” Although Crocker further explained that the Zambian leader ran “a somewhat eccentric operation out of his State House mansion,” he acknowledged that Kaunda was “inspired by the desire to cool down the regional conflict.” Noting Kaunda’s trademark white handkerchief and frequent tears, Crocker described him as “part romantic and part African mystic.” Crocker believed that years of frustration regarding conflicts in Zimbabwe and Angola made the Zambian president’s diplomacy appear somewhat “flaky” at times, yet he concluded his characterization of Kaunda by calling him an “eager statesman and globetrotter” who deserved credit for his “accessibility and charm.”44 The delegations from Pretoria and Luanda arrived in Lusaka, which Crocker considered “the ideal venue,” in mid-February. The Angolan team was led by Manuel Alexandre “Kito” Rodrigues, a top-ranking member of the MPLA central committee who had been a key assistant to Agostinho Neto in the late 1970s and remained influential in the Dos Santos regime throughout the 1980s. A quiet but warm man who was still only in his early forties in 1984, Kito loved Cape Verdean music and American professional and college basketball. He greatly impressed Crocker as being an “extraordinarily versatile” person who had mastered a wide range of government positions in the complex environment of Luanda. The team from Pretoria was headed by the formidable foreign minister Pik Botha, well known for his gruff demeanor and diplomatic acumen.45 The Zambian government provided vast meeting spaces in interlocking rooms at Mulungushi Hall, where Crocker and Platt could act as mediators between the Angolan and South African delegations. Kaunda, “the consummate host and convener,” opened the plenary session of the peace conference with a prayer and “personally served tea” to the assembled dignitaries. Throughout the talks he maintained an open door at State House for the delegates to consult or lobby, and he closed the conference with more prayers and a fine banquet.46 After discussions ended on February 16, the participants issued a joint communiqué thanking Kaunda for his excellent hosting.47 The resulting Lusaka Accords, hammered out during the intense conference, included three major components: (1) South Africa would withdraw its forces from Angola; (2) Angola would control the activities of SWAPO; and (3) South Africa would support ongoing efforts to negotiate Namibian independence under UN Security Council Resolution 435. Significant elements of the agreement were that it was signed by two states in a third neutral country, both signatories supported it and stood to

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gain from it, and the accord stipulated concrete measurable actions (most importantly the removal of South African troops from Angolan territory). For all of these reasons, one scholar of Kaunda’s foreign policy praised the agreement highly and lauded the Zambian president for facilitating it.48 In the conference’s aftermath, Kaunda told the participants optimistically that “you have reached the Rubicon and you must now cross it. Peace lies yonder the Rubicon.” The editors of the Zambia Daily Mail characterized the event as “a successful mutual confidence-building exercise.” They saluted their nation’s leader for his role: “President Kaunda’s world statesmanship had a positive bearing on the outcome.” Reversing course somewhat from earlier criticism of Crocker, the editors conceded that “the American envoy deserves no less commendation for his part in this drive to end hostilities and chart a clear path for Namibia’s independence.”49 Conference participant and US ambassador Nicholas Platt echoed the editors’ encomium for Crocker, arguing that much of the credit for the agreement was due to the assistant secretary being “one of the really tough, resilient people who has worked on foreign policy.”50 Crocker later looked back on the Lusaka Conference as a “sweet success.” In his view it had broad significance for the Africa Bureau, as it “bolstered our fortunes in Africa, Europe, and Washington.” He noted that Pik Botha and his colleagues from Pretoria were “delighted to be on the high ground” for once. Crocker underscored the significance for the Zambian president: “Kaunda was tickled with the high visibility payoff for his gamble in hosting talks that had stopped the war between his neighbors.”51 Two weeks after the Lusaka Conference, Reagan sent a warm letter for Platt to deliver to Kaunda thanking the Zambian president for his “role in the tripartite meetings.” Recalling their White House rendezvous a year before, Reagan’s message praised Kaunda as a “mediator, counselor, and statesman.” According to the laudatory missive, “even a temporary peace in a war-torn region is a significant accomplishment.”52

Ongoing diplomacy after Lusaka How temporary the peace would be was the key question. Before the ink was dry on the Lusaka Accords, journalists asked Crocker and Platt pointedly about whether or not South Africa would keep its word, and how effective the agreement would really be in terms of bringing peace to Angola and independence to Namibia. During the February 17 press conference, one scribe presciently wondered: “Some of us who have been watching the Namibian independence question from near the beginning and saw the South African behavior could be forgiven a slight bit of skepticism about their intentions. What reasons do you have for believing that they are anymore sincere about wanting to comply with 435 now than they were in ’78 or ’81?” Crocker quickly responded that it was certainly fair to raise questions about any of the parties involved in the Angolan and Namibian conflicts, but added that “we don’t feel that we are being hoodwinked by anybody.” Ambassador Platt then chimed in: “The process that has been established is one which permits both sides to test each other’s bona fides, in gradual incremental bite-sized pieces, as it were, which move the process along.”53

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A few days later, on February 21, the Angolan government briefed Soviet and Cuban officials on the substance of the Lusaka Accords. Of particular interest was the point that all South African, Cuban, and SWAPO forces should evacuate southern Angola. A joint monitoring team of South African and Angolan personnel was expected to oversee this process. In the view of Castro, who had been against the Lusaka talks from the start, the idea that Angolan and South African forces could cooperate to oversee this cease-fire and evacuation of forces including SWAPO was “impermissible and incredible.” In order to discuss this situation and smooth over any disagreements, Castro hosted Dos Santos in Havana for a three-day visit in mid-March 1984.54 Both sides considered the discussions to be friendly and productive. Meanwhile, amazing events were unfolding in southern Africa. As Castro hosted Dos Santos and South African soldiers began the challenging attempt to cooperate with Angolan troops to monitor the cease-fire in Angola as stipulated by the Lusaka Accords, Pretoria pulled off a dramatic diplomatic display on the border with Mozambique. South African president P.W. Botha shockingly sat down on March 16, 1984, with Mozambique’s leader Samora Machel near the crocodile-infested Nkomati River. In front of over 1,000 guests, the bitter rivals signed a peace accord in which they pledged “non-aggression and good neighborliness.”55 The Nkomati Accords seem to have caught Kaunda somewhat by surprise, but his government responded with positive signals in the Zambian papers and sent Defense Minister Grey Zulu to Maputo with a message of congratulations for Machel from Kaunda.56 While it was unclear what the long-term impact of the Nkomati Accords would be, the short-term damage it did to the African National Congress (ANC) was quickly evident. Machel agreed to evict the ANC leadership from Maputo and cut off support for its military operations. President Botha, however, benefited almost immediately from his diplomatic efforts on the Nkomati River, soon being invited for a seven-nation tour of Western Europe.57 Meeting with his Frontline colleagues in Arusha, Tanzania, Kaunda attempted to capitalize on the Lusaka and Nkomati deals by suggesting a comprehensive peace conference involving all Frontline leaders and South Africa. When this idea was rejected, Kaunda tried in May to mediate an agreement in Lusaka between SWAPO and the internal Namibian party that was supported by Pretoria, which would not involve removal of Cuban troops from Angola.58 Nujoma called for immediate negotiations for independence based on Resolution 435 but found that the South African diplomats had no interest in surrendering the demand for “linkage” and were just stalling for time, while the internal Namibian “puppets” were more interested in drinking all of the brandy and gin that the Zambian hosts had provided at the Mulungushi Conference Center. Kaunda’s efforts to produce a settlement included chairing a session that lasted for twenty straight hours and arranging for a face-to-face meeting at State House between Nujoma and three high-ranking South African generals, but none of these maneuvers bore fruit.59 Crocker returned to Lusaka in late May to again consult with the Zambian president, who “seemed to be depressed at the realization that others were prepared to play these games at his expense.” The assistant secretary later recalled: “I found Kaunda to be genuinely disappointed when I confirmed once again that there was no

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way round the Cuban link unless SWAPO and the Front Line States were prepared to abandon Resolution 435.” The Zambian leader’s view was that there was very little chance that “the Angolans could move on the Cuban issue,” and he likewise “feared that our renewed pressure would only drive the MPLA closer to Moscow.” On this point Kaunda was completely correct, as by this time Moscow “had already endorsed a major further expansion of Soviet arms deliveries” to the Luanda regime over the next year. This would not be discovered until later, though, so heading into summer 1984 Crocker still believed things were on the right track.60 Kaunda was not so sure that things were headed in the right direction, though, and he informed Reagan of this in no uncertain terms in a June letter. He did thank the US president for his kind March missive, and gave credit to the Reagan administration for arranging the Lusaka Conference in February. “Zambia only played the host,” he conceded. He appreciated the American effort to bring about the Lusaka Accords. “The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola in accordance with the Agreement is, certainly, an important objective,” he remarked. He then added that it was imperative that Namibia’s independence under Resolution 435 should be promoted as soon as Pretoria’s forces leave Angolan territory. He called on Reagan to address the causes of regional conflict, not just the effects. “I, therefore, appeal to you, once again, Mr. President, to reconsider your position on the ‘linkage’ between Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola,” exclaimed Kaunda. He did not think a great nation like the United States, born out of the struggle for equality and human dignity, wanted to make the people of Namibia hostages of the East-West conflict. “Yet, this is what your country’s insistence on ‘linkage’ is doing,” he concluded.61

Conclusion The Reagan administration did not deserve all the blame, of course, as the Pretoria regime refused to hold up its end of the bargain. Kaunda and Crocker had worked well together during the February 1984 conference in Lusaka in hopes of jumpstarting the peace process in the region. The resulting Lusaka Accords were encouraging in principle, but in reality the mandated withdrawal of South African troops from Angola did not take place until April 1985, a year later than stipulated in the agreement.62 The Soviets and Cubans responded to Pretoria’s intransigence by agreeing to increase significantly their support to Luanda.63 Soon after that, UNITA received a big boost from the US Congress, and fighting again escalated in Angola. The MPLA would continue to rely on Cuban and Soviet assistance, and South Africa would refuse to grant independence to Namibia, for several more years. Not until 1990 would Sam Nujoma and his SWAPO party take control of the government in Windhoek. Kenneth Kaunda’s collaboration with Chester Crocker in February 1984, which seemed like such a promising step in the right direction, did not end the fighting. The collapse of the Lusaka Accords was “a great embarrassment for Washington, and Crocker in particular,” and a “major blow for constructive engagement.”64 It had been an admirable effort, nonetheless, and it turned out to be the last major diplomatic

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initiative involving officials from State House and the White House, ending two decades of top-level coordinated efforts. Kaunda’s high-profile meeting with Reagan in 1983 and his convening of the Lusaka Peace Talks in 1984 demonstrated some of his best attributes as a statesman, as he stood up yet again to battle racism in the southern African region and played the consummate host. Like so many times before, during his earlier interactions with Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, the cooperation between Kaunda and the Reagan administration in 1983–84 included on the one hand agreement on the big-picture strategic goal of seeking peace and justice in southern Africa, but on the other hand differences over tactics and priorities. For Kaunda, dealing with the United States while maintaining control of the Zambian government, advocating for racial equality, and practicing nonalignment during the ongoing Cold War remained as challenging in 1984 as it had been in 1964.

9

Kaunda’s Final Years in Office, 1984–1991

On October 24, 1984, Zambia celebrated twenty years of independence and publicly recognized Kenneth Kaunda’s sixtieth birthday, which had actually taken place several months before. Kaunda, who had been president for the entire two decades of the nation’s existence, hosted festivities that were attended by neighboring leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The dignitaries laid a foundation stone at the site of a proposed new United National Independence Party (UNIP) headquarters, placed wreaths at the Freedom Statue nearby, and witnessed a parade and Zambian Air Force demonstration.1 Kaunda’s stature as a global statesman remained solid, but the social discord and economic struggles that would end his reign in 1991 already percolated not far beneath the surface. Meanwhile in the United States, on November 6, 1984, Ronald Reagan demolished Democratic challenger Walter Mondale in the presidential election, earning a record 525 electoral votes (Mondale got just 13), to win another term in the White House. “On behalf of the government and people of Zambia,” Kaunda congratulated Reagan in a November 7 message on his “landslide victory.” He hoped that during Reagan’s second term, the United States would “spare no efforts to open the way for Namibia to attain self-determination and independence under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.” Kaunda also desired that the Reagan administration would “take firm measures to guarantee a just order in South Africa.” He promised that Zambia would continue its efforts to remove the causes of conflict in the southern African region and would support US diplomacy along those lines.2 Reagan’s re-election meant that Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, who had survived an internal State Department review during the previous year, could continue promoting his policy of Constructive Engagement. During the next four years this policy would be threatened from both the right and left sides of the political spectrum, yet Crocker remained a fixture at Foggy Bottom who would keep fighting for his preferred approach of cooperating with black African governments and resisting economic sanctions against the white Pretoria regime. The strongest challenge to Crocker’s Constructive Engagement began in the immediate aftermath of the 1984 election, orchestrated by Randall Robinson, head of the AfricanAmerican lobby group TransAfrica. Robinson and a few allies staged a sit-in at the South African embassy in Washington on November 21, and their arrest attracted considerable media attention. Utilizing tactics from the earlier civil rights movement,

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Robinson mounted a surprise attack on the Reagan administration’s refusal to endorse economic sanctions. Robinson decided to form a grassroots umbrella group called the Free South Africa Movement, specifically to call for divestment of private funds from all corporations doing business in South Africa and to lobby the US Congress to impose tough economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime. Marchers picketed the embassy in Washington daily, the movement quickly gathered steam, and by December the protests had spread to Boston and New York.3 While these dramatic events provided a glimmer of hope for people such as Kaunda, who wished for a “just order” in South Africa, the Reagan administration firmly defended its policy of cooperating with Pretoria and blocking sanctions. The black South African minister and activist Desmond Tutu, on his way to Norway to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, stopped in Washington for a December 7 Oval Office meeting with the president. While Reagan acknowledged that Tutu’s support for economic sanctions was “sincere,” he characterized the archbishop as “naïve,” defended Constructive Engagement, and insisted that the United States had “made considerable progress with quiet diplomacy.” Reagan contended that US corporations treated black South African employees well, resulting in “tremendous improvement” for thousands of them. He characterized Tutu as “unaware” that a major part of the problem in South Africa was “tribal not racial.”4 Clearly, Reagan felt he understood the situation in South Africa at the end of 1984 much better than Tutu. Members of Robinson’s fast-growing Free South Africa Movement, as well as the African National Congress (ANC) and its supporters, such as Kaunda, strongly disagreed. Congress debated South Africa intensely throughout the following year, with long-time proponents of sanctions, such as Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA), weighing in yet again; but, the first priority for the Reagan administration in early 1985 was rebuilding a close US relationship with Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In February, Savimbi and Crocker met in Cape Town and had a “constructive exchange.” Crocker notified his boss back in Washington, Secretary of State George Shultz, who briefed the president on February 27. Reagan confided to his diary that Savimbi was a “good man” and claimed that he had “offered a plan for peaceful settlement in Angola.” While Reagan’s interpretation may be debatable, there was no doubt that the State Department and conservatives in Congress wanted to renew the support for Savimbi that had been blocked by the Clark Amendment since January 1976. Crocker and his staff lobbied on Capitol Hill and spoke to numerous conservative organizations in support of repealing Clark, and in July the House of Representatives approved the repeal. Watching the voting on CNN, Crocker celebrated. In October the repeal would officially go into effect, allowing renewal of US support for Savimbi’s UNITA.5

Sanctions debate Meanwhile, other members of the US Congress once again mounted an assault on the most controversial aspect of Crocker’s Constructive Engagement, which was the Reagan administration’s staunch opposition to imposing economic sanctions

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against Pretoria. In March, Dellums introduced House Resolution 1460 in order to (1) prohibit new US investment in South Africa; (2) block US bank loans to the South African public sector; (3) ban sales of Kruggerands in the United States; and (4) stop the sale of US computers to South Africa. Hearings regarding the Dellums bill and other similar measures took place in both the House and the Senate during the next few months. Crocker presented the White House position that sanctions would do more harm than good. Among the witnesses testifying in support of sanctions was Andrew Young, former civil rights activist and UN ambassador serving in 1985 as mayor of Atlanta. On May 22 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Young contended that imposing sanctions could give some whites in South Africa an excuse to make changes that they knew in their hearts were the right thing to do. He explained that sometimes it takes an “outside idealistic authority” to facilitate change, and he believed that the US Senate could be that authority.6 Aggressive actions by the South African security forces in the first half of 1985 must have made even Young wonder if a peaceful end to apartheid was still possible. The police had recently killed nineteen civilian protesters in the village of Uitenhage, near Port Elizabeth, prompting more protests by activists and the banning of about thirty more organizations by the Pretoria regime. On May 22, the same day that Young spoke to the Senate committee, a South African commando team was captured in the petroleum-rich Angolan province of Cabinda, where they were planning to sabotage an US-owned Gulf Oil facility. A few weeks later a South African military force invaded Botswana’s territory in search of ANC bases in Gaborone, killing sixteen people, including women and one child.7 While these tragic events made it more difficult to defend Constructive Engagement and catalyzed the call for sanctions, from the outside it looked like the US approach was not improving in any concrete way. In a June 30, 1985, interview, Kaunda observed that there was “no sign of a change of US policy on Southern Africa as a consequence of the Cabinda incident and Botswana incident.”8 Kaunda’s estimate that there was no change in Reagan administration policy toward apartheid was essentially accurate in mid-1985, although there were serious calls for economic sanctions moving forward in the US Congress. In addition to the possible comprehensive sanction bills submitted by Dellums and others in the House, a tough Senate bill had been proposed by Ted Kennedy (D-MA). On July 11, the upper chamber approved a slightly weaker version drafted by leading Republicans Richard Lugar from Indiana and Bob Dole from Kansas, both of whom were strong allies of Reagan, which signaled that the tide was turning. Reagan reiterated his opposition to economic pressure against Pretoria in a July 26 diary entry: “Now our Congress yielding to demonstrations, etc. is debating legislation to impose sanctions on S.A. Govt. We’re opposed. It isn’t a solution to the problem of apartheid & it will hurt Blacks we’re trying to help.”9 Furthermore, although the death toll of black civilians in South Africa had passed 500 since late 1984, in public comments Reagan continued to blame the violence on “riotous behavior” by groups such as the ANC. In a rare case of disconnect from the opinion of the majority of US people, Reagan remained adamantly against economic sanctions and sympathetic to the white regime. On September 9 with advice from Lugar and Dole, the president issued Executive Order 12532, which differed from the

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bills proposed by Dellums and others in that it did not require additional sanctions within one year if the South African situation had not improved, and it emphasized programs encouraging US corporations to treat black South African workers better instead of requiring that US corporations depart from South Africa. The compromise measure did include a ban on bank loans and computer sales from the United States to the Pretoria government, however, so there was finally a glimmer of hope for groups such as Oliver Tambo’s ANC that were calling for comprehensive economic measures.10

Kaunda as host About a week after Reagan signed the executive order, Kaunda hosted a remarkable rendezvous on September 13 at his private game lodge in Mfuwe between leading white South African businessmen such as Gavin Relly (chair of Anglo-US mines) and Tony Bloom (leader of the Premier Group), on one side, and top officials of the ANC such as the party president Tambo and Thabo Mbeki, head of the party’s foreign relations department, on the other. Kaunda urged the erstwhile enemies to focus on their similarities, pointing out that the “things that men have in common are Godmade.” The words of the Zambian president and beautiful surroundings seemed to work some magic, as the participants got along surprisingly well and realized that they shared a love for their home country and a hope for a peaceful future. Back in Pretoria, however, Prime Minister P.W. Botha was furious and denounced the businessmen for showing “signs of weakness towards the enemies of South Africa.”11 Regardless of Botha’s angry response, the meeting at Mfuwe served the important purpose of informing several influential white South African businesspersons that the ANC leaders were rational human beings, and vice versa. Tambo and Nelson Mandela had actually begun their long friendship with Kaunda in February 1962 at the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) conference in Ethiopia. Though some delegates, including Zambia’s Simon Kapwepwe, doubted the legitimacy of the ANC at the time of the 1962 conference, Kaunda assured Mandela of his backing and told him: “Nelson, speaking to me on this subject is like carrying coals to Newcastle. I am your supporter.” He explained, however, that Kapwepwe worried that the ANC might be too tribal and not truly representative and asked Mandela to talk with him. Mandela spent an entire day in Addis Ababa, and after a lengthy discussion with Kapwepwe “converted” him to believing in the ANC. From then on the leadership of Zambia’s UNIP joined together as staunch allies of Mandela and Tambo and their party.12 Tambo’s operations in exile had initially functioned primarily out of Britain and Ghana, and then in the early 1960s the ANC “official” headquarters shifted to Tanzania; however, Zambia offered a more convenient location much closer to South Africa, and so as of 1967 Lusaka became the headquarters of the ANC.13 In the late 1960s through the 1970s and 1980s, the Lusaka ANC office was essential, and Tambo spent a lot of time there.14 “I treated Oliver Tambo as a head of state,” Kaunda later recalled, “chased away illegally from his country.” He added that UNIP decided that the ANC could “set up their own organizations” on Zambian soil. Billy Modise, a leading ANC official in

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exile, noted that allowing the ANC to set up shop in Lusaka was a dangerous decision by Kaunda. “It was a big risk for Zambia,” he acknowledged, “but there we were.”15 Tambo greatly appreciated the fact that Kaunda, whom he described as “our great leader KK,” provided facilities for the ANC in Lusaka.16

Interesting visits In Washington in mid-September, while Crocker’s Constructive Engagement faced mounting left-wing threats from the Free South Africa Movement’s call for divestment and sanctions, he managed to maintain other important aspects of his approach in spite of attacks from the right. Crocker arranged a September 19 White House rendezvous between Reagan and Soviet-backed socialist Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique. In this case, as Frank Wisner (the former ambassador to Zambia) later recalled, the effort to prevent the Machel-Reagan encounter emanated from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its director William Casey, who hoped that the US government would intervene in Mozambique’s civil war on the side of the right-wing Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels as they had backed Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola. According to Wisner, who was serving as Crocker’s deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs at the time, CIA boss Casey “opposed Machel’s visit right down to the moment that Samora Machel was standing outside of Reagan’s office.” Casey had nearly succeeded in undermining this important aspect of Constructive Engagement, but Reagan “did the right thing” and gave Crocker and Wisner solid support to keep pursuing their nuanced approach to southern Africa.17 In spite of CIA efforts to block it, the amazing scene of an arch anticommunist US president hosting a Marxist leader unfolded smoothly. President Machel amused Reagan with some jokes and impressed him with his sincerity.18 In his diary Reagan recorded his thoughts about the day: “State visitor—Pres.Machel of Mozambique. Turned out to be quite a guy & I believe he really intends to be ‘nonaligned’ instead of a Soviet patsy. We got along fine.”19 The Machel-Reagan summit demonstrated that Constructive Engagement was clearly more complex than its critics acknowledged, and for better or worse it was going to be around in some form for several more years. Events of 1985 had generally been disappointing to opponents of apartheid such as Kaunda, with the start of Reagan’s second term preventing comprehensive sanctions and allowing for the renewal of assistance to Savimbi. The beginning of 1986 provided small signs of progress in the global struggle for racial equality, with the second inauguration of Andrew Young as mayor of Atlanta and the first national celebration of a holiday for the late Martin Luther King both taking place in January. The end of the month found Young and his former boss Jimmy Carter in Zambia as part of their agricultural mission to several African nations. In Lusaka the two unofficial ambassadors from Dixie met with their old friend Kaunda and talked about ways to promote corn bread among the Zambian people, who grew copious corn but imported wheat for bread.20 Young creatively suggested a television show featuring Rosalynn Carter and Betty Kaunda cooking the southern staple. “Cornbread will be in,” he predicted.21 While this interesting idea

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never came to fruition, it was nice nonetheless for Kaunda to reconnect with two US officials with whom he shared so many beliefs.

Escalating conflict and a controversial speech A few months after Carter and Young’s visit, things once again took a turn for the worse in Zambia when two South African bombers stationed in the Caprivi Strip of Namibia dropped their deadly cargo on a refugee center in the Makeni neighborhood of Lusaka. The May 19 attack killed two people and injured five, as well as causing major damage to property. Kaunda’s minister of defense Grey Zulu, who lived in Makeni, recalled that as a result of such strikes by the South African air force, “we were living in fear.” Kaunda understood that the bombing was retaliation by the Pretoria regime for his decision to allow the ANC to operate out of Lusaka. Because of Zambian support for Tambo and Mandela’s group, “South Africa hit us back very hard. But that is the price we had to pay,” Kaunda concluded.22 The same day as the bombing raid on Lusaka, the South African military struck Zimbabwe and Botswana. The South African aggression outraged a team of Commonwealth mediators that was touring the region in hopes of facilitating negotiations between the Pretoria government and the ANC, and the group called off its mediation mission. Even Reagan, though still opposed to sanctions and trying to maintain positive ties with Pretoria in general, commented that “there is no justification for acts of this kind.” On May 20 the US government expelled the South African military attaché Brigadier Alexander Potgeiter from the embassy in Washington. Reagan approved of the expulsion of Potgeiter, as a way to “emphasize our feelings about their raids into 3 neighboring countries.”23 In June 1986, conflict escalated in South Africa when over a million workers went on strike protesting ongoing repression by the government and the recent military raids into Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. Police arbitrarily arrested hundreds of union members, activists, and church leaders. President Botha feared that the tenth anniversary of the Soweto tragedy would cause chaos, so he imposed a state of emergency and prohibited press coverage. Defying world opinion, he exclaimed that South Africa was willing and able to “go it alone.” On June 18 the US House of Representatives responded to the simmering situation by passing a tough sanctions bill by voice vote, and Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) called Assistant Secretary Crocker and urged him to work with Secretary of State Shultz to see that President Reagan “get out front” on the sanctions debate. Crocker and Shultz reluctantly agreed to arrange a high-profile speech on South Africa, and it was scheduled for July 22 in the East Room before members of the World Affairs Council.24 Crocker’s concern that it would be impossible to control the content of the speech, which he feared could do more harm than good, proved well founded. As he and Shultz walked toward the East Room for the crucial comments by Reagan, they were shocked to see two arch-conservatives, CIA director Bill Casey and speech writer Pat Buchanan, emerge from the Oval Office. They had evidently been making a lastminute overhaul to the draft submitted by the State Department. Sure enough, a few

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moments later before an international audience on CNN, Reagan praised the progress made by the Botha regime and denounced economic sanctions as “immoral.” Worst of all, he decried the “calculated terror by elements of the African National Congress” and emphasized ANC links to the Soviet Union. In doing so, Reagan seemed to be blaming the ANC entirely for the conflict in South Africa and suggesting that its motive was to spread communism rather than to end apartheid. He defended his delivery in his diary that evening, and also noted with evident pride that “Dick Nixon called & thought it was masterful.”25

Passage of CAAA and Machel’s death The value of Nixon’s opinion on the best approach to relations with southern Africa would certainly have troubled many, including Kaunda, who clearly remembered Tricky Dick’s prioritization, which had put the region at the very bottom of the White House agenda. Moving into the last months of 1986, Kaunda perhaps felt just a little déjà vu and continued to express displeasure with Reagan administration policies, particularly toward South Africa. In early September at the 1986 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare, for example, the Zambian leader contended that “sanctions could have no effect without the industrial nations of the world.”26 Kaunda’s wish soon came true as the US House voted in favor of a tough sanctions bill, which the Senate had previously approved, on September 12. The bill, known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), was sent to the Oval Office, where Reagan proceeded to veto it on September 26. Within a week Congress overrode Reagan’s veto and the CAAA became law. This measure, which represented a shocking foreign policy defeat for Reagan and a triumph for the grassroots anti-apartheid movement and an amazing example of the increased influence of African Americans in Washington, would play a crucial role in pressuring the Pretoria regime to dismantle apartheid.27 While the administrations in Washington and Lusaka viewed the passage of the CAAA from different perspectives, the two governments soon shared a deep sense of sadness when they heard that Samora Machel had died in a plane crash on October 19. Machel had been at a conference in Mbala, Zambia, to talk with other Frontline leaders about how to best end apartheid and generally promote peace throughout southern Africa. There was no doubt in the minds of Zambian officials that at least in an indirect sense, Pretoria was to blame. “Had these problems which South Africa has wrought on this region not existed,” concluded Kaunda’s advisors, then “President Machel would not have had to make that ill-fated journey.” Because the crash occurred in South Africa, international aviation law dictated that the Pretoria regime should conduct the official investigation. The investigators concluded that the crash was an accident; but, not surprisingly, strong suspicions about the possibility of sabotage perpetrated by the Pretoria regime lingered.28 Defense Minister Grey Zulu, who had a “warm” relationship with the president of Mozambique, eloquently expressed the pain Kaunda’s government felt upon hearing about the death of Machel. Zulu characterized Machel as “a very cheerful man and always smiling.” As Machel departed from the airport at Kasaba Bay on Lake

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Tanganyika in northeastern Zambia after the summit with Kaunda and Mobutu, his final words to the defense minister had been playful. “Grey,” asked Machel, “how can a Zulu not speak a Zulu language?” When he was informed the next morning of the plane crash that had killed Machel, the notoriously tough Grey Zulu “broke down into tears like a child.”29 This would definitely be one of the very few incidents of the 1980s that prompted essentially the same reaction from the Zambian defense minister and the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. The “funereal gloom” in the State Department’s Africa Bureau, already thick from the passage of the CAAA, escalated to “especially heavy” after the announcement of Machel’s death. The untimely demise of “this man who had impressed both Reagan and Thatcher” would make it considerably more difficult to fight off the right-wingers such as Buchanan and Casey, who wanted to support RENAMO in the Mozambique civil war and cut off all aid to the government, which was led by the relatively unknown Joachim Chissano, Machel’s successor. Upon hearing about the plane crash, Charles Freeman, who had recently replaced Frank Wisner as Crocker’s deputy, looked “quizzically” at the assistant secretary and sarcastically remarked: “You never told me how much fun this would be.”30 In spite of shocks such as Machel’s death, Freeman would prove invaluable in helping Crocker to keep some key aspects of Constructive Engagement alive through the last two years of Reagan’s presidency, most notably US mediation efforts that helped bring about Namibian independence.

Hard times in Zambia Kaunda certainly was pleased to see the ongoing efforts by the Reagan administration to facilitate a settlement for Namibia, and also was undoubtedly happy to see the Congress pass the CAAA. He could rejoice in the fact that there were finally concrete measures being taken against the Pretoria regime, which suggested that it was only a matter of time before apartheid would fall. While Kaunda could take pride in his contributions to international affairs, especially regarding several conflicts and issues in the southern African region, there were extremely serious problems within the Zambian political economy that were near the boiling point entering 1987. Poverty was rampant and getting worse, and people were suffering. The plunge of copper prices contributed to a massive increase in national debt. Kaunda and his one-party UNIP government had not been successful in diversifying the economy beyond mining, into areas with great potential such as agriculture and tourism. High unemployment and a decision to cut the subsidy on “mealie-meal,” the staple of most Zambians’ diet made from ground corn, had led to price hikes that sparked widespread food riots throughout 1986. The common people, faced with starvation, were tired of endless appeals for “belt-tightening” while UNIP party elites seemed to be living in luxury.31 The dire circumstances in Zambia and the incredible degree of political and economic reform that was needed to address them properly were elucidated loud and clear in a letter to Kaunda on March 31, 1987, by Robinson Nabulyato, who had been speaker of the National Assembly since 1969 and generally loyal to Kaunda and his UNIP party. It was clear to Nabulyato in early 1987, though, that wholesale changes

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were required, or else Kaunda faced the very real possibility of a military coup or popular rebellion. Popular opinion reaching the speaker’s chambers blamed Zambia’s poverty on Kaunda and his top advisors, who average Zambians believed had “ruined the economy.” While most people faced starvation, the children of high-ranking UNIP members attended expensive schools and then became chairs of multinational corporations. Nabulyato warned presciently that a wide range of popular grievances against Kaunda and UNIP, “coupled with heavy taxes, make military coup a real possibility.” The speaker suggested that it was time to dissolve the Central Committee, end one-party rule, and hold truly democratic elections.32 Kaunda was not ready to accept the speaker’s analysis in 1987, but instead preferred to explain Zambia’s economic struggles as a result of the UNIP government’s decision to participate actively in the fight to liberate all of southern Africa from racism. Some observers, such as Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, the authors of a Commonwealth report on the impact across the region of Pretoria’s aggressive “destabilization” policy, concurred with Kaunda and contended that the nation’s struggling economy was “a direct result of the retaliation by minority regimes.” Johnson and Martin defended Kaunda for his decision and disagreed with Nabulyato’s assessment. They argued that Zambia’s massive debt was primarily due to the costs of standing up to Pretoria in the 1980s, added to the earlier cost of fighting Ian Smith in Rhodesia during the late 1960s and through the 1970s. The resulting Zambian foreign debt, approximately $1 billion by late 1987, was caused by the intransigence of the apartheid system and Kaunda’s policy of challenging it; moreover, according to Johnson and Martin, Kaunda’s admirable foreign policy crippled the economy, not “poor management and the falling price of copper.”33 In the second half of 1987, the Zambian president opted to continue his focus on fighting apartheid and promoting Namibian independence, rather than overhauling his nation’s political economy and holding multiparty elections. Acting as chair of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he visited Washington in early October, where a debate over sanctions against Pretoria raged yet again. The White House claimed that one year of the CAAA had not done any good and that a return to cooperation would be better, prompting strong rebuttals from members of Congress. Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that the CAAA was actually not tough enough, while Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) believed that the sanctions “had restored the good standing of the United States in the rest of Africa” and should be maintained. On October 8 Kaunda once again met with Reagan in the Oval Office, where the two leaders had “considerable” discussion about the best way to end apartheid. In a press conference afterward, Kaunda diplomatically observed: “We have our differences in approach, but not differences on principle.”34

Cuito Cuanavale35 Just a day before Kaunda met with Reagan, on October 7, 1987, a month of heavy fighting had ended in southern Angola with the Soviet-supplied Angolan army being repulsed by the combined forces of Savimbi’s UNITA and the South African military. Over the next six weeks, the joint UNITA-South Africa offensive threatened to capture

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the key Angolan base at Cuito Cuanavale, even utilizing devastating “chemical shells with poisonous substance.”36 With a major defeat for troops of the ruling MPLA party in Angola looking like a very real possibility, Fidel Castro made a fateful decision on November 15 to essentially double the size of the Cuban contingent in Angola (to a force that would ultimately number over 50,000).37 About a month later Castro received word that the Soviet Union would escalate its supply of heavy weapons, and as a result the showdown at Cuito Cuanavale would become “Africa’s largest battle since World War II.” During a terrible six-month struggle that featured brutal modern weapons such as heavy artillery on both sides, Soviet MiG fighters flown by Cubans (these planes played a crucial role), South African tanks, and US stinger missiles operated by UNITA, over 25,000 people died. At a key point in the epic encounter, Castro conducted the attack by phone from Havana.38 In the end, neither side was able to claim complete victory, but the Soviet firepower (especially MiGs) brought to bear by the Angolan forces with their Namibian and Cuban allies helped drive the South African military out of Angola for the final time on August 30, 1988, setting the stage for a negotiated settlement of Namibia’s independence.39 The significance of Cuito Cuanavale remained a point of debate among scholars and former participants in the story twenty-five years later, but there is no doubt that the failure to achieve victory in Namibia was part of the reason that the South African government eventually agreed to grant independence.40

More hard times and 1988 elections While circumstances for Namibians improved, the situation for most Zambians continued to decline in 1988. Food riots worsened in the Copperbelt, and members of the armed forces suffered from less income and lacked even the basics such as proper shoes. When Saddam Hussein graciously supplied the UNIP government with a large grant (possibly as much as $40 million), much of the money was used to make long-needed upgrades to the conditions in the Zambian military. The commanding officer at the time, Lieutenant General Christon Tembo, became a national hero. Kaunda, surely remembering the warning about possible military coups in 1987 by Robinson Nabulyato, the Speaker of the National Assembly, opted to remove the potential threat. He replaced Tembo as top army commander and sent him to be Zambia’s ambassador to West Germany.41 October 1988 brought another national election in Zambia, and with it another series of dramatic episodes involving potential opposition to Kaunda and his ruling UNIP party.42 On October 7, 1988, while serving as his nation’s envoy in Bonn, General Tembo was arrested along with five other officers being accused of plotting a coup. The elections went ahead as scheduled in spite of the drama, and not surprisingly since he was once again the only candidate on the ballot, Kaunda won election for a sixth fiveyear term in charge at State House. Of the eligible voters in Zambia, only 55 percent turned up at the polls. Of those voting, 95 percent registered support for Kaunda’s re-election. The results were deceptively reassuring for Kaunda and top UNIP officials, who still refused to acknowledge the degree of popular unrest. Some observers could see the writing on the wall, however, such as Robinson Nabulyato. In the aftermath of the 1988 elections, he refused to accept appointment for another term as Speaker.43

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The fall of 1988 in Washington also featured a presidential election, in which Reagan’s vice president George H.W. Bush ran for the Republicans, challenged by Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis. There was no question in the mind of Sam Nujoma, Namibian rebel and the head of South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), regarding which candidate he preferred. Nujoma met with former president Carter in Atlanta earlier in the year and was encouraged by Carter’s pledge that if the Democrats won they would strongly support Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435. While in Atlanta in the spring of 1988, Nujoma also met with Mayor Andrew Young, whom he had known well since the late 1970s. Young promised that he would get Namibia on the agenda during the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta in July. Young kept his word, and in his speech in support of the nomination of Dukakis, the mayor called for a Democratic victory in order to see an overhaul of US foreign policy regarding the entire southern Africa region, so that “Nelson Mandela in South Africa would never have to have another birthday in jail.” In spite of Young’s July speech and tireless campaigning through the fall, Dukakis lost soundly to Bush, who won forty states and received 53 percent of the vote in November.44

Namibian independence Shortly after Bush’s triumph, negotiations over Namibia’s fate, which had been stalled for a month awaiting the election results, resumed with tense meetings among Cuban, Angolan, and South African diplomats mediated by Crocker in Geneva. Progress was gradually made on the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal and the make-up of the observation teams, and then the venue for talks shifted on November 30 to Brazzaville, in French-speaking Congo. Two additional weeks of give and take, with intense haggling about the need for pledges by Pretoria to cease its support for UNITA and Luanda to do likewise for the ANC, produced a draft agreement, which was signed on December 13. It was also agreed that the final official signing ceremony would take place at the United Nations in New York on December 22. Another last-minute hurdle appeared when South African officials expressed their desire that President Botha be invited to the White House and also take part in the UN ceremony. Crocker understood the desire, particularly considering the reality that the agreement was extremely significant in the history of southern Africa, and that Reagan had hosted “Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe, Kenneth Kaunda, Quett Masire, Mobutu Sese Seko, Daniel Arap Moi, and many other African leaders.” The painful truth in this case, though, was that Reagan would not be at the UN ceremony, and “in the Washington world of bumper stickers,” politics prevented him from meeting with Botha. It took a phone call to the South African foreign minister Pik Botha by George Shultz to iron out this wrinkle, and the signatories headed for the Big Apple.45 Though Reagan was not personally involved in the negotiations formalizing Namibian independence, he was kept updated on the talks and noted the breakthrough in Brazzaville, the scheduling of the final curtain call in New York, and the fact that Shultz would be the top US official at the UN ceremony.46 When Crocker returned to Washington on the way to New York after the encouraging events in Brazzaville,

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Shultz welcomed him to a staff meeting at Foggy Bottom, where the assistant secretary received a spontaneous standing ovation (surely a rare event at the State Department). “Once in a while,” proclaimed Shultz, “after long effort, something works. Chet, you have conducted a brilliant piece of diplomacy.” Shultz also later acknowledged that the US mediation reflected the contribution of Crocker’s subordinates, particularly Chas Freeman in the final year and before that Frank Wisner, whom the secretary praised for his ability to “convey friendliness and ferocity all at once.”47 At the December 22 ceremony in New York, Shultz represented the United States and witnessed quite an interesting spectacle that featured several decidedly nondiplomatic speeches by the representatives from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. “It was an incongruous assemblage,” observed Shultz, “where attitudes ran from unholy to ungracious to vicious.” Once the increasingly harsh oratory concluded after over a full awkward hour, Shultz whispered to Crocker, “That’s some bunch of characters you’ve been working with!” At the end of the strange day, however, Namibian independence was ratified, and the secretary rightly concluded that what really mattered was “that everybody came.” In his opinion, the deal was testimony to the tireless shuttle diplomacy by his assistant secretary, and he made sure that when the official photograph was taken that Crocker “was prominently placed at the center of the group.” The independence of Namibia meant that at long last, “the colonial era in Africa had ended.”48 The enthusiasm expressed by Shultz and Crocker in their descriptions of the final settlement signed in New York and what it meant for Namibia specifically was shared by Sam Nujoma, but he did not agree with the US diplomats’ overall assessment of Reagan administration policy toward southern Africa as being a great success across the board. According to Nujoma, after the December 22 ceremony, “SWAPO had every reason to feel elated, but the need for caution was never dispelled.” A key concern for Nujoma was that the newly elected George Bush had already clearly indicated that he would continue supporting Savimbi’s UNITA forces, so the long civil war in Angola would rage on. Nujoma was happy for his own nation, but displeased with the likelihood that fighting would continue for the foreseeable future next door.49

Transition in DC and new challenges in Zambia The end of the Reagan administration meant the end of Crocker’s eight years as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. In a thorough academic study of Crocker’s tenure and his Constructive Engagement policy, J.E. Davies contended that Crocker was by and large unsuccessful. “The real measure of failure is that American credibility, influence and prestige in South and southern Africa was not increased by his policies,” argued Davies. Cuba, not the United States, gained credibility around the world for its approach to southern Africa, and Marxist-oriented governments controlled both Angola and Namibia through the 1990s and beyond. “In the final analysis,” Davies concluded, “Crocker failed in his two most important goals: to conduct a policy with South Africa by which the United States could pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage and to win the Cold War in the Third World.”50 Furthermore, even the most positive

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developments in southern Africa during the Reagan years can be seen as failures for the assistant secretary. The sanctions that helped end apartheid were passed against Crocker’s wishes and over Reagan’s veto, the policy of linkage had perhaps delayed the Namibian settlement by several years, and although Cuban troops did leave Luanda, the ongoing US support for UNITA as Crocker left office meant Angola’s tragic civil war would continue. Overall, it is difficult to disagree with the critical assessment of Constructive Engagement proffered by Davies. Regardless of the success or failure of the Reagan administration’s policy toward southern Africa, January 1989 brought a new president into the Oval Office, Bush. His candidacy inspired little enthusiasm among the eligible voting public, of whom only 50 percent turned out (the lowest US voter turnout in four decades). Critics contended that Bush was elitist and that average people felt no connection to him. On the positive side of the ledger, however, he was very experienced in foreign relations. Moreover, Bush was relatively knowledgeable about Africa in general and quite familiar specifically with Zambia, which he had visited as UN ambassador in the early 1970s and again as vice president in the early 1980s. He already knew Kaunda better than Reagan did, and while the Zambian leader may have preferred a Democrat in the White House (as long as the Democrat was of the Kennedy or even Carter variety), he was reasonably optimistic about the prospects of a Bush presidency for Zambia and for southern Africa. As it turned out, Bush’s inaugural address on January 20, 1989, in which he issued a spirited call for public service and volunteerism and introduced the concept of a Thousand Points of Light, was “more articulate and stirring than many had expected.”51 As Bush took the helm in Washington, Kaunda kicked off his sixth term in State House by proposing some economic reforms in a New Year’s Day address. The most significant measure was his decision to end price controls on maize meal (corn meal), the staple food for Zambians. This policy, aimed at increasing government revenue to help deal with the spiraling debt crisis, would eventually prompt widespread unrest. Kaunda, like his counterpart in the White House, still seemed more interested in foreign relations than economic policy, though, and he attended several regional meetings in the first few months of 1989. At the Socialist International Conference in Harare on February 15, for example, he called for all nations to impose stricter economic sanctions against South Africa. Back in Harare on March 22 for the OAU Summit on Southern Africa, he criticized the United States for its ongoing support of UNITA in Angola. During the first week of May, Kaunda hosted a visit to Lusaka by Pope John Paul II, who presided over an open-air mass and prayed for Zambians suffering with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), which in the late 1980s was starting to decimate the nation’s population.52 On May 28, Kaunda began a ten-day US tour, scheduled so that he could attend the Fifth Annual International AIDS Conference in Montreal. After visits to Guyana, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Jamaica, the Zambian leader arrived in Canada and gave his speech at the AIDS conference on June 4. Over 12,000 people convened in Montreal, among them protesters upset over issues such as the Canadian government’s lack of a federally funded AIDS strategy or Washington’s decision to ban HIV-positive people from visiting the United States. Kaunda attracted considerable attention when he acknowledged that one of his sons had died from AIDS in 1986, making the Zambian

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president the first African leader to speak publically about the disease affecting his own family.53 Some scholars subsequently praised Kaunda for acknowledging the impact of AIDS on his own family and for deciding that he and his wife Betty should be tested and disclose the results.54 Lawrence Altman, a medical doctor who personally witnessed Kaunda’s plea in Montreal for more governmental support for additional AIDS research before the epidemic became “a soft nuclear bomb,” however, criticized the Zambian president for not speaking out earlier. “In the years of Mr. Kaunda’s silence hundreds of thousands of Africans had become infected,” lamented Altman.55 While of course it would have been better if Kaunda spoke out years earlier, his June 4, 1989, address in Montreal still represented a major contribution to the global fight against AIDS.

Bush hosts Kaunda From Montreal, Kaunda flew to Washington and on the morning of June 7 sat down with President George Bush in the Oval Office for a very friendly discussion, which was not surprising since they had known each other for about two decades and met on several occasions over the years. Bush welcomed his counterpart and stated that “whenever I see President Kaunda, it brightens my day.” Kaunda thanked Bush for agreeing to see him during such hectic times and stated that while the whole world always experienced some anxiety when a new administration took charge in the

Figure 9.1 Kenneth Kaunda visits with his old friend George H.W. Bush in the White House on June 7, 1989. Courtesy of the George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas.

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White House, when Bush was elected “the world knew it didn’t need to worry.” He praised the president’s recent NATO speech as one that would help facilitate peace. He commented that he was especially hopeful that the recently signed Namibian independence agreements would be successful and added that Zambian officials would “do everything in our power to make them work.”56 The two men next discussed South Africa, with particular attention to the question of whether sanctions should be increased, decreased, or maintained at the present level. Kaunda acknowledged that certain leaders in Europe, such as Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, were still claiming that sanctions did more harm than good to the blacks in South Africa. “We, in Africa,” he countered, “do not think that is correct.” He felt that it was fine if the United States kept its current level of sanctions in place, or gradually increased them, but he believed the Bush administration also needed to continue diplomatic involvement with the Pretoria regime. “It is important to have contact with them,” he stated. He pointed out that the South African military had recently launched yet another attack on the soil of his nation, supposedly against an ANC base, and killed twenty innocent Zambians. For a timely end to apartheid to be achieved, Kaunda believed that the Pretoria regime needed to end the state of emergency, lift the ban on the ANC, and release Nelson Mandela from prison. Bush then responded, attempting to assure the Zambian leader that he and everyone else in the room (such as Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Herman Cohen, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs) shared Kaunda’s “outrage against the evil of apartheid.” They did not think, however, that the current CAAA needed to be strengthened. Bush compared his view of South Africa with what he thought about the recent crisis in China, where the government had brutally cracked down on demonstrators. He did not believe that completely isolating the Beijing regime was the answer. “I’m just not sure,” Bush explained, “that cut-offs in trade are useful tools to discipline someone we don’t like.”57 After essentially concurring about the best way to deal with South Africa, they moved on to consider other issues in the southern African region. Bush wanted to see peace achieved in Angola through national reconciliation. Kaunda commented that there were positive signs regarding Angola and talks were ongoing. He was hopeful that President Dos Santos could accept a government of unity that would even include Jonas Savimbi of UNITA. (Unfortunately he was wrong about this, and fighting continued until Savimbi’s death in 2002.) Turning to Mozambique, Bush promised that the United States would stick with the government and not support the RENAMO rebels. “You will see no surprises from us there,” he pledged. Kaunda responded that he was comfortable in general with the Bush administration’s diplomacy toward the southern African region. The Zambian president thanked Bush for US assistance to Zambia, such as agricultural assistance and funding for “AIDS research.”58 What turned out to be Kaunda’s final discussion in the White House as president of Zambia ended on a positive note, a fitting turn of events given his lengthy friendship with Bush. Things had come full circle since Kaunda’s inspirational initial Oval Office visit with John Kennedy back in April 1961.

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KK’s regional diplomacy Through the summer of 1989, Kaunda remained focused on foreign relations issues, such as trying to bring peace to Angola and end apartheid in South Africa. On June 22 he joined other regional leaders at Mobutu’s palace at Gbadolite in Zaire, in hopes of advancing the peace process for Angola. Mobutu managed to bring both Savimbi and Dos Santos to the table and was briefly hailed by the international media for his efforts. The talks broke down in confusion, however, which was evidently exacerbated by Kaunda’s statement to the press that the plan being considered would send Savimbi into exile. The Gbadolite conference brought no concrete progress for Angola, but it did help Mobutu wrangle an invitation to the White House for a visit with Bush. While in Washington the leader of Zaire had the nerve to call on the Bush administration to end its support for Savimbi, and Mobutu also hinted to the media that he himself should be considered for a Nobel Peace Prize.59 Both suggestions fell on deaf ears, and Mobutu’s final fling with a US president ended in disappointment. In July, Kaunda turned his focus to South Africa, and his contribution to the fight against apartheid carried more weight than his confusing comments in Zaire. In October 1987 the forty-eight Commonwealth heads of state and government, at their summit in Vancouver, Canada, had requested historians Phyllis Johnson and David Martin to prepare a report on the impact of Pretoria’s foreign policy and apartheid on the other nations in southern Africa, which would be published in advance of the next Commonwealth summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 1989. Kaunda provided a powerful preface to the book, which was titled Apartheid Terrorism. In his mid-July 1989 comments, he compared apartheid to the Holocaust, estimating that it had prematurely ended the lives of 1.5 million people in southern Africa and had cost the Frontline states $45 billion. But he believed that on the bright side, the end of apartheid was near. The battle of Cuito Cuanavale had dealt the South African military a debilitating blow, and the ongoing sanctions were devastating the South African economy. The courageous resistance of black South Africans such as Desmond Tutu was leading the opposition from within, and there were even those who could see the writing on the wall among white Afrikaners in the Nationalist Party. “Given the weakened condition of apartheid both economically and militarily this is the hour to tighten the screw,” contended the Zambian president. “I for one want to see apartheid dismantled immediately,” concluded Kaunda.60

KK hosts De Klerk Shortly after writing these words, in the second week of August 1989, Kaunda announced that he would host incoming South African leader Frederik W. de Klerk for a meeting in Livingstone. De Klerk had been selected to eventually replace President Botha, who had suffered a stroke in January, but the transition was not planned to take effect until after September elections made it official. Botha condemned de Klerk’s decision to visit Kaunda in a televised speech on August 14, commenting that “The ANC is enjoying the protection of President Kaunda and is planning insurgency

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activities against South Africa from Lusaka.” De Klerk stood his ground regarding the visit, and Botha subsequently resigned. The cabinet in Pretoria promptly swore in de Klerk as acting president. So, when Kaunda sat down with de Klerk, he was the leader of South Africa. It was the first time Kaunda had officially greeted a South African head of state on Zambian soil. The August 28 rendezvous between de Klerk and Kaunda occurred within sight of the picturesque Victoria Falls, but also just a mile from where South African commandos had attacked an alleged ANC hideout in April 1987, killing four people and destroying two houses. At that point Kaunda had denounced the Pretoria regime as “racist murderers,” so the August 1989 meeting represented an amazing improvement in relations between the two governments. Moreover, Kaunda and de Klerk appeared to be quite friendly during their talks, and the panoramic backdrop underscored the positive mood. In their joint news conference afterward, they did not identify any specific issues that had been covered. De Klerk furthermore stated that there had been no discussion of any ANC proposals for ending apartheid, and Kaunda denied that he had been speaking to his South African counterpart on behalf of the ANC.61 Reports at the time claimed that the release of Nelson Mandela from prison had not been on the agenda. In his recollections of the meeting some fifteen years later, though, Kaunda recalled that “Frederick De Klerk and I talked about releasing Nelson Mandela,” and added that he had been very impressed by de Klerk’s sincerity.62 In a thorough analysis of the meeting, the scholar Stephen Chan concluded that although there was no written record of exactly what was discussed, “it seems difficult to imagine the name and release of Nelson Mandela not intruding into the conversation.”63 When asked his views about what role Kaunda may have played in convincing de Klerk to release Mandela, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs Chester Crocker said that he was “skeptical,” particularly since Kaunda was “on his way out” by late 1989; but, Crocker did acknowledge the significance of the ANC headquarters being in Lusaka and the Zambian leader’s close ties to that organization.64 While it may never be possible to determine if Kaunda encouraged de Klerk to release Mandela during their discussion on August 28, 1989, or how much impact such encouragement may have had, there is no doubt that the meeting was friendly and that it signaled a major shift in South African politics and diplomacy. At the time, de Klerk praised Kaunda for his “contributions toward finding a peaceful solution to the problems of the region.” Kaunda relayed to the assembled journalists that he and his advisors “found the talks very useful.” He joked that he was happy to learn that de Klerk was a fellow member of the “golfing fraternity,” but that the leaders’ handicaps were both “state secrets.”65 The editors of the Zambia Daily Mail rightly argued that the “Eyes of the World” were watching Kaunda and de Klerk, and that the meeting could help demonstrate to the global audience that it was time for apartheid to end.66 Regardless of what exact words passed between the two men, by flying to Livingstone the president from Pretoria had indicated a clear willingness to reach out to a black Frontline leader, notably the one who had the closest relationship with the ANC. Kaunda later recollected that de Klerk seemed to be “a sensible person who was genuinely prepared to leave the apartheid days behind.”67 Indeed, very soon after the summit at Victoria Falls, de Klerk began taking the earth-shattering concrete steps that

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would rapidly deconstruct the system of institutionalized racism that had ruled South Africa for over four decades.

Apartheid’s demise in global context Nelson Mandela and his ANC associates had doubts about de Klerk, but they were soon pleasantly surprised. During his inaugural address he pledged to negotiate with any group seeking peace, and soon thereafter he allowed a demonstration against police brutality to take place in Cape Town without violent suppression. On October 10, 1989, he announced that Walter Sisulu and seven other former Robben Island prisoners were to be released. Mandela gladly said farewell and notified the Pretoria regime of his appreciation. “De Klerk had lived up to his promise,” Mandela later commented. After they left prison they were free to speak on behalf of the ANC, meaning the long ban against the nationalist organization was effectively over. De Klerk soon announced that the Separate Amenities Act would be repealed, thereby ending segregation in parks, theaters, restaurants, buses, libraries, and other public facilities.68 On December 13, Mandela briefly left prison for a long discussion with President de Klerk, who impressed him by listening to what he had to say. Mandela informed de Klerk that the recently announced five-year plan, especially the aspect of “group rights,” was not acceptable to the ANC. To his surprise, de Klerk responded that “we will have to change it.” Mandela explained his hopes for how his release would take place and emphasized that if there were not more signs of progress at that time, then he would renew his protests and probably be arrested again. De Klerk continued listening carefully and promised to take everything Mandela said into consideration. Overall, as he returned to prison, the ANC leader believed that his talk with de Klerk had been “extremely useful.” He notified his comrades in Lusaka that the new president “seemed to represent a true departure from the National Party politicians of the past.” He also told other ANC leaders that he truly felt that de Klerk was a person whom they “could do business with.”69 It turned out to be a relatively accurate assessment. The remarkable changes taking place in South Africa in late 1989 were part of a global movement in the direction of freedom and democracy. In early November, just a month before Mandela’s meeting with de Klerk, for example, James Baker learned that the government of East Germany had announced a new visa policy which meant that travel to West Germany would be “completely unrestricted and unregulated.” The fall of the Berlin Wall and total re-unification of Germany were rapidly approaching. Baker raised a toast to the moment the world had been waiting twenty-eight years to see, describing it as “a truly astonishing turn of events.” It reflected the fact that the reform-minded leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev had announced in early October his intention to allow Germany to control its own destiny, free from four decades of Soviet domination. A few weeks later Gorbachev extended this freedom to all of the satellite states. Baker visited both West and East Germany in early December and witnessed first-hand the rapid movement toward freedom. Then, on December 22, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, and the breakup of the actual USSR had begun.70 In Zambia, critics of Kaunda’s long one-party rule took heart

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in the events in Europe and believed that it was time for them to finally return to multiparty democracy. On New Year’s Eve, 1989, labor leader (and future president) Frederick Chiluba asked his supporters at a rally: “If the owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are the Africans to continue with it?”71 Multiparty democracy would indeed return to Zambia soon, but before that the world watched the rapidly unfolding events in South Africa with great excitement. On February 2, 1990, President de Klerk addressed the parliament and announced steps initiating the final dismantling of apartheid. The concrete measures included the formal lifting of the ban on the ANC and termination of the State of Emergency. “The time for negotiation has arrived,” said de Klerk. On February 10 he invited Mandela back to his office at Tuynhuys and informed him that he would be released from prison the next day. De Klerk wanted to fly him immediately to Johannesburg and have a ceremony there, but Mandela insisted that his release be in Cape Town so that he could first thank the people in the city that had been his home for twenty-seven years. De Klerk agreed and Mandela returned for one final night in prison, where he called his wife and friends and asked them to fly down to Cape Town for his release the next day.72 After Mandela left, de Klerk received an encouraging phone call from Bush, who had been very pleased during a break at Camp David to see the televised announcement about the planned release of the ANC leader scheduled for the next day. “I want to congratulate you for the steps you have taken the last few weeks,” stated Bush. In reply, de Klerk thanked the US president and expressed his wishes that the release would go smoothly. “We look forward to the future with hope,” said the South African president. “Do you think Mandela will come out in a positive mood,” inquired Bush. “Will he recognize that you have made changes?” It was a million-dollar question, to which de Klerk responded that he believed Mandela would be “relatively positive.” He added that Mandela’s party, the ANC, displayed “great cohesion,” which somewhat limited Mandela’s flexibility. “He will be positive, but within the framework of the National Executive Committee of the ANC which will meet in Lusaka.” Given the situation, de Klerk cautioned against expecting too much from Mandela. “He wants a little bit of distance initially so as to establish his independence,” concluded de Klerk, correctly.73

Free Mandela visits Lusaka A few minutes before 4 p.m. the next day, February 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela emerged a free man, finally ending his 10,000 days of imprisonment. He rode with his wife Winnie and old friend Walter Sisulu, as their motorcade started off. Just before the gate his car stopped and allowed him and Winnie to get out of the car and walk onto free soil. He raised his right fist and the crowd roared, which gave him a “surge of strength and joy.” Eventually reaching the center of Cape Town and negotiating the massive swarms of supporters, he delivered a stirring address in front of the old City Hall. “Friends, comrades, and fellow South Africans. I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all! I stand here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people,” stated Mandela. He explained that he was still a faithful member of the ANC. He concluded by saying that the days of apartheid were clearly numbered,

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but that the battle was not over yet. He encouraged them to return to the barricades and intensify the struggle, and promised to walk the last mile with them.74 Mandela soon got to work, and his first responsibility was to report to the National Executive Committee of the ANC in Lusaka. He flew to Lusaka to meet with his associates on February 27, 1990.75 Kaunda greeted him at Lusaka International Airport, and from there all the way to the city center the crowds along the road were huge. “There was so much excitement that it was difficult to keep order,” recalled the Zambian president.76 Kaunda felt honored that Zambia was the first foreign nation that Mandela visited, and while the primary purpose for the trip was to meet with the ANC leadership, it also was a chance for Mandela to express his gratitude to Kaunda and the people of Zambia for all of their sacrifice in support of the anti-apartheid struggle over the years. “He knew how much we suffered,” observed Kaunda. “It was like a big dream come true.”77 While Mandela definitely appreciated what Kaunda, “a longtime supporter of the Congress,” had done to facilitate the struggle over the years, he did not agree with everything that the Zambian president said during this visit to Lusaka. For example, he disagreed with Kaunda’s suggestion that the ANC officially suspend armed operations within South Africa because of Mandela’s release. “While we valued Mr. Kaunda’s wisdom and support,” commented Mandela, “it was too soon to suspend the armed struggle.”78 Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA), who visited Zambia in early March 1990 as part of a US congressional delegation sent to Lusaka, concurred with Mandela that it was too soon to relax the pressure on Pretoria. In his presentation to the ANC leadership in Lusaka, Dellums outlined the efforts in the United States to support the anti-apartheid struggle and contended that the sanctions imposed in 1986 should be maintained until more concrete progress was made. Furthermore, the congressman explained that he had advised President Bush that US sanctions should only be lifted when black South Africans approved. Mandela and his colleagues thanked Dellums for his enlightening summary of events in the United States, and also for all of his help in instituting and maintaining sanctions. After the presentation, Mandela shook Dellums’ hand and told him: “I have heard much of you. You gave us hope. We know of your good works.” While he talked with Mandela face-to-face, Dellums was “riveted.” He later described the South African leader as “probably the strongest person I would ever meet during my life.” The visit to Zambia was an incredible experience overall for Dellums, and not only because he got to meet Mandela. He described his visit to Zambia, which was the first nation he had ever visited in sub-Saharan Africa, as the fulfillment of a lifelong desire that had been passed to him by his mother. She had told him as a boy that her greatest wish was to visit a country where people of color held the highest positions of power. “On the morning I awakened in Zambia, where a black person sat as president, I had lived to fulfill my mother’s dream.”79

Movement for multiparty democracy Hosting Mandela and the US congressional delegation in late February and early March was one of the final successful events of the long presidency of Kenneth

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Kaunda, and it was becoming clear that the end of his reign was near. About two weeks later, on March 14–17, 1990, Kaunda’s UNIP held its fifth national convention at the Mulungushi International Conference Center in Lusaka. A number of UNIP members, such as former foreign secretary Vernon Mwaanga, called for major reforms of Zambia’s political system. Mwaanga and his allies advocated a limit of two five-year terms for any president, a major reduction in the size of the Central Committee, a free and open atmosphere during elections that allowed any qualified candidate to run safely without intimidation, an end to the State of Emergency that had been in place since 1964, and a clear separation between the UNIP party and the state. The UNIP leadership overwhelmingly rejected all of the proposals, convincing Mwaanga and likeminded critics of Kaunda’s one-party rule that it was time for Zambia to reinstitute multiparty politics.80 Kaunda refused to endorse any meaningful reforms and also spoke out against multiparty democracy, claiming that the situation in Zambia differed significantly from the situation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, where democracy was starting to sprout. He pointed to other African nations where the initiation of multiparty politics had led to violence, suggesting that the same would happen in Zambia.81 Kaunda reiterated this message at the National Council session in May, again arguing vigorously that the conditions allowing democracy to blossom at the end of the Cold War in other parts of the world did not exist in Zambia. Courageous critics such as Mwaanga and Sikota Wina, another former high-ranking official, refused to back down from their demands for democracy.82 Kaunda’s intransigence pushed Mwaanga and other veteran political elites to begin discussing the possibility of creating an opposition party; the most serious threat to Kaunda’s government, however, soon began rumbling up and down the streets of Zambia’s cities. On June 19, 1990, economic reforms resulted in an increase of over 100 percent in the price of mealie-meal, or ground corn, the staple food that most Zambians eat every day. On June 25 over 2,000 students demonstrated in Lusaka against the price increase, calling for restoration of the subsidy on mealie-meal. They also advocated multiparty democracy and the immediate resignation of Kaunda. Defense forces confronted the crowds attempting to march to State House, and the ensuing violence killed at least twenty-three civilians. Kaunda responded harshly, denouncing the protesters as “hooligans” and refusing to even consider reforms such as lifting the State of Emergency.83 Events in Zambia resembled similar occurrences across the vast African continent, as protests calling for democracy (and usually starting with university students) rose from twenty per year in the early 1980s to over fifty in 1990 alone.84 On July 20, 1990, at the Garden Motel in west Lusaka, delegates from a wide range of interest groups convened a “historic meeting” to discuss the formation of an official opposition party. In the words of Zambian official and scholar John Mwanakatwe, the event brought together “a widely representative group of men and women from virtually all walks of life anxious to advance the campaign for the re-introduction of a multi-party system.” The participants called for a referendum in which the people of Zambia could decide whether or not to end UNIP’s one-party rule, cessation of the 26-year State of Emergency, and implementation of unrestricted universal voting rights. Among the key players at the Garden Motel were Arthur Wina, Levy Mwanawasa, Frederick Chiluba, Simon Zukas, and Vernon “VJ” Mwaanga.85

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Mwaanga decided to support the newly named Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) after a lengthy private conversation with former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. Mwalimu, the Swahili word for teacher and the title by which Nyerere was known, advised Mwaanga that Zambia should adopt multiparty democracy. Nyerere contended convincingly that “the world had changed and we must change with the rest of the world. When you see your neighbor being shaved, you must wet your beard.”86 Zukas, a long-time economic advisor to Kaunda, attended with some trepidation given his inside knowledge of the way potential opposition parties had been dealt with in the 1970s and 1980s. After deciding to go ahead with the risky endeavor, Zukas made a strong statement on the convention floor in support of multiparty politics, denouncing UNIP’s long rule as despotic. “The one-party participatory democracy was neither participatory nor democratic,” stated Zukas, earning an ovation from the crowd and a headline in the next day’s newspaper.87 On July 25, 1990, Kaunda announced that the referendum on multiparty democracy would be postponed, claiming that the protesters had unleashed the “forces of hate.” In the same speech he announced that several accused coup plotters including General Christon Tembo were being pardoned, but this did little to placate the demands of Zambians who clearly wanted substantive change to the political system. On September 17 at a rally in the Copperbelt city of Kitwe, approximately 70,000 people gathered and made it clear that unless Kaunda listened to the demands for multiparty democracy, mass action would result. A week later, the Zambian president proclaimed that the views of the people were clear, and that a referendum was not necessary. Instead, a multiparty system would be reinstituted and free elections would be held in October 1991. On December 4, 1990, the National Assembly approved a law allowing the formation of opposition parties, and Kaunda signed it a few weeks later. The MMD immediately filed for recognition as a political party, and soon afterward elected Frederick Chiluba as its party leader.88 The MMD slogan was “The Hour Has Come.” At an MMD rally at Pope Square in Lusaka attended by over 100,000 people, Simon Zukas addressed the multitudes, which were enthusiastic for change. He opened his remarks by saying, “The Hour,” and the crowd responded by loudly shouting, “Has Come!” Each subsequent speaker repeated the mantra, and there seemed little doubt that Kaunda’s days in State House were numbered.89

KK’s defeat On October 31, 1991, as everyone (except perhaps Kaunda himself) expected, Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba won the Zambian presidency in a landslide of 75 percent to 24 percent, ending the 27-year reign of Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP party. Chiluba, born in Kitwe in 1943, was a relatively young man of forty-eight years when he unseated Kaunda. Chiluba’s father had been a copper miner, and he himself held a wide range of jobs such as bus conductor and book-keeper on a sisal plantation in Tanzania. While working for a Swedish-owned mining equipment company, he joined the labor movement. In 1974 his fellow workers elected him to be chairman

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of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, an organization that counted over 300,000 members in the 1970s. Sensing a threat from the popular union leader, Kaunda had him imprisoned in 1981. While campaigning in 1991, Chiluba frequently compared himself to the legendary Polish labor leader and democratic politician Lech Walesa. In his inauguration address he pledged that “The era of the dictator, hypocrisy and lies is over.”90 Although ultimately Chiluba’s presidency would be a disappointment in many ways, his overwhelming victory in the 1991 election was most important for showing how much the Zambian people wanted something new. Unlike other elections in Zambian history specifically, or southern African history in general, the 1991 election did not reflect the influence of ethnicity, nor did it really indicate that the people felt strongly about Chiluba or the MMD. It was simply a referendum on change. The vote “was viewed by Zambians as an opportunity to overturn the status quo and bring about major political and economic reform.” Voters later interviewed rarely if ever mentioned which person or party for whom they voted, but instead usually said, “I voted for change” or “I voted for the Hour,” referring of course to the MMD slogan “The Hour Has Come.” One MMD organizer compared removing Kaunda from office to a group of people cutting down a gigantic baobab tree: “one with an ax, one with a hoe, one with a pen knife, but all with the goal of cutting it down.”91 In agreeing to the multiparty election, Kaunda had not by any means intended to be cut down like a baobab tree, but in fact actually believed he would win. In order to legitimize his expected triumph in the eyes of the world, moreover, he personally called Jimmy Carter and invited him to head a delegation from the Carter Center to monitor the process.92 As the polling day approached, however, Kaunda began to publically criticize the foreign observers for interfering in local politics. Using this false claim as a justification, he refused to rescind the State of Emergency, which would be in effect until the end of his long reign.93 In spite of the increasing tension as Election Day approached, Carter and his team remained in Zambia and continued working hard to guarantee the fairest possible contest. This was the Carter Center’s first attempt at election observation in Africa, so the team was intent on doing its best in spite of being criticized by UNIP officials. “Despite this intimidation,” recalled Carter, “we decided to remain and dispersed our observer teams through all the regions of the country.”94 The former US president tried to facilitate the transition to multiparty democracy in Zambia, which involved nearly a year’s worth of activity and planning by Carter himself and his staff that featured the training of 3,000 Zambian election observers. Carter’s herculean efforts in the name of democracy even earned the respect and admiration of the staunchest right-wing Republicans. The opening of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California was scheduled for November 4, just a few days after the Zambian voting would be finished, and so when Carter was invited to the Reagan Library ceremony he initially declined due to his focus on unfolding events in southern Africa. Lodrick Cook, the chairman of the Reagan Foundation and CEO of the Arco Corporation, who was organizing the gala extravaganza, could not believe that Carter was actually saying no to the Reagan invitation in order to monitor an election in Zambia. When he realized that Carter was absolutely serious, and that the Zambian election was a “defining moment in African

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democracy,” Cook offered the use of an Arco private jet for a quicker trip to California. On November 3, after his challenging duties in Zambia were finished, Carter boarded the Arco jet to be “whisked back to Los Angeles in time for the library ceremony.”95 Carter experienced considerable drama before departing, however, including his sharing an emotional moment with Dr. Franklin Sonn, the rector at a Cape Town university who would serve as South Africa’s ambassador to the United States from 1995 to 1998. As Carter and Sonn walked into a polling site, Sonn broke down in tears. Carter worried that his colleague might be ill and asked if he needed water or a rest, and Sonn replied that he was simply overcome by his feelings because he was fiftythree years old but had never before seen anyone vote. Sonn and Carter wept together for a few minutes and then went about their duties as election observers. Carter later contended that having Sonn and other ANC officials observe the events in Zambia amounted to “the first step toward a multiracial election” in South Africa.96 As the results rolled in, Kaunda may have also been crying, but for a very different reason. He had made it clear to Carter that he expected to win; however, he ended up losing to Chiluba in a landslide in which the challenger received 75 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly given the fact that Zambia had been under UNIP’s one-party rule since the early 1970s, the constitution was not clear on the post-election process. Adding to the fact that the relationship between Chiluba and Kaunda was “very frosty,” obviously a recipe for disaster existed. Fortunately, Carter met with both men and helped plan the transition.97 Perhaps understandably after twenty-seven years of being ostensibly worshiped and idolized by the people of Zambia, and treated with respect (most of the time) by major world leaders from around the globe, surrendering power was not easy for Kaunda. He would later claim: “There was no doubt that apartheid was keen to assist, materially and in other ways, Frederick Chiluba’s coming to power.”98 Although he could not hide his disappointment, Kaunda did an admirable job of acknowledging his loss and passing the baton to Chiluba. At approximately 9 a.m. on Saturday November 2, 1991, the long-time president of Zambia appeared live on TV to concede defeat and bid farewell to the citizens of his country. “Together we have built a solid foundation and scored some achievements … That is the nature of multi-party politics. You win some and you lose some … I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate President Chiluba for winning the election,” concluded Kaunda. The brief address, during which Kaunda looked composed but expressed obvious emotion in his trembling voice, lasted only about five minutes. His 9,860 days at the helm in State House came to an abrupt close. As he departed from the studio he shook hands with some sobbing employees of the Zambian National Broadcasting Network. About an hour later, Chiluba was sworn in as the second president of Zambia.99 In Macbeth, William Shakespeare wrote about the passing of the traitorous Thane of Cawdor that “nothing in his life became him like the leaving it,” and this description can be applied to the manner in which Kaunda ended his presidency. Scholar and election observer Stephen Chan pointed out shortly afterward that, as a result of Kaunda’s decision to allow a peaceful transition of power, “Zambia became the first African state in which a single-party government left office because of the ballot box,” and in this way Kaunda set an important example for others to follow.100 Contemporary world leaders concurred with Chan’s assessment regarding the significance of the Zambian election

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of 1991. From Pretoria, President de Klerk of South Africa paid tribute to Kaunda for “having taken first steps towards multi-party democracy,” which he characterized as “a truly praiseworthy example for our continent.” From Washington, President Bush lauded his friend for the “statesmanlike decision to reintroduce multi-party politics to Zambia,” an action which according to Bush allowed Kaunda to make “further lasting contributions” to Zambian history and “to Africa’s democratic development.” Carter, having played a key role in organizing the election, also saw fit to praise Kaunda. “Your commitment to free and fair elections for your country,” wrote the former US president, “set a fine example for other African leaders who desire democracy for their people.”101 Kaunda’s last official contribution during his twenty-seven-year reign in Lusaka to Zambia-United States relations was to give democracy in southern Africa a boost by allowing a multiparty election that ended his presidency. Adding to the irony of Kaunda’s defeat was the fact that two of his closest friends among all high-ranking US officials, Jimmy Carter and George Bush, were involved (very directly in the case of Carter and indirectly in the case of Bush) in his political demise. A final irony was the fact that Kaunda had worked tirelessly throughout his final years as president to facilitate a peaceful end of apartheid and transition to true democracy in South Africa; before that process was fully completed, however, he himself was voted out of office. While friends and foes alike from around the globe heaped praise on Kaunda for accepting the results of the election and surrendering power peacefully, the earlierthan-expected exit from office surely left the former Zambian president with mixed feelings as he departed State House and took up private life.

Epilogue: 1996–2014

Five years after being voted out of office by the people of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda pondered a run for the presidency in 1996 in order to regain power and unseat Frederick Chiluba. Eventually, however, Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) opted to boycott the elections. UNIP’s decision to protest rather than participate in the 1996 elections resulted partly from displeasure with the Chiluba regime’s implementation of a new measure requiring that both parents of a Zambian president be Zambian citizens by birth, which applied to Kaunda since his parents had been born in Malawi. Furthermore, Chiluba’s government adopted another rule that banned anyone who had served two previous terms as president from contesting again.1 This clause obviously applied to only one person in Zambia—Kaunda—and thus added fuel to the fire. Kaunda denounced the “discriminatory constitution,” and received some support for his stance, but his action did not generate much enthusiasm among Zambian voters. UNIP’s days in power were definitely over. Critics of Kaunda’s treatment of potential opponents during his long one-party reign have pointed out that he and UNIP had only gotten a taste of their own medicine, recalling the way that attempts by Simon Kapwepwe and Harry Nkumbula to challenge Kaunda in 1978 had been prevented by “constitutional” chicanery that Chiluba’s machinations closely resembled. While it is surely true that, in the words of Shakespeare in Hamlet, Kaunda had been “hoist on his own petard,” the 1996 elections were not a great sign for the healthiness of multiparty democracy in Zambia, and indeed going into the last few years of the century there was no official opposition in the Zambian parliament. Kaunda would eventually let politics go in order to focus on his work as an elder statesmen and crusader in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but things would actually get worse before they got better for the ex-president. At 4 a.m. on Christmas Day in 1997, Chiluba’s security forces arrested Kaunda and threw him into prison, accusing him of initiating a coup attempt that had occurred in October. As with the constitutional shenanigans in 1996, on the one hand, observers may have seen some similarity in the 1997 jailing to Kaunda’s arrest of Valentine Musakanya and others during the UNIP reign and felt that he was getting no worse than he had given. On the other hand, it also sparked immediate outcries from people who felt the former president was being badly mistreated. Most notable among those coming to Kaunda’s rescue in December 1997 was former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. Kaunda, who had gone on a hunger strike to protest his detention, received a visit from Nyerere after a few days in prison. Nyerere, concerned about his friend’s health, threatened to join the hunger strike. At this point Kaunda decided to break his fast and enjoy tea and biscuits with Nyerere. His old Frontline comrade

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departed, but not before asking Chiluba to let Kaunda go home and stay there until formally convicted of a crime.2 Kaunda was soon released, though he remained under house arrest until all charges were finally dropped in June 1998. In March 1999, in the final indignity of his postpresidency, a judge ruled that Kaunda’s citizenship should be revoked. Kaunda challenged the decision and the ruling was overturned in 2000. He resigned as UNIP president that same year.3 After a very rough first decade out of State House, things began improving for Kaunda in 2002. In September he moved to the United States to begin living in Boston for one year as the first “President-in-Residence” at Boston University, where he would be hosted by the African Presidential Archives and Research Center. The mission of this initiative was to encourage democracy in Africa by bringing former democratically elected leaders to live for a year in the United States. The presidents, in turn, would share their insights with teachers, students, business leaders, and government officials around the United States. Kaunda kicked off his year by delivering the keynote address at a conference at Boston University, and over the next several months he also lectured at Yale and Princeton Universities and at corporate events in Houston and Atlanta.4 In part because Kaunda did such a good job as the first “President-in-Residence,” the Boston University program was still going in 2014. Kaunda’s successors in Boston included his own former foreign minister Rupiah Banda, who served as Zambia’s fourth president from 2008 to 2011.5 One of the true highlights of Kaunda’s year in the United States was his weeklong visit to Boulder, Colorado, in April 2003 to participate in the fifty-fifth Annual Conference on World Affairs.6 The event, hosted since 1948 at the University of Colorado, brings diplomats, politicians, authors, and many other luminaries together for a week of lectures and panel discussions that are free and open to the community. Participants are not paid, and they stay with families in the Boulder area. Kaunda and his assistants stayed at the beautiful home of former US diplomat Joseph Stepanek, high on the “Hill” in Boulder overlooking the university and adjacent to the picturesque Flatirons rock formation. Stepanek, who had met Kaunda several times while serving as country director for the Agency for International Development in Zambia from 1994 to 1996, greatly enjoyed hosting the former president. He recalled fondly how Kaunda “played our piano and sang hymns in his native Bemba.” Kaunda told Stepanek that the week in Boulder was the best experience he had during his year in the United States.7 For the author, Kaunda’s week in Boulder was an incredible career opportunity in many respects. The former president was willing to meet with me for a very enjoyable interview at the Stepaneks’ house. He encouraged me to visit Zambia soon, which would have profound impact on my life both professionally and personally.8 Many of my students and friends joined me in attending the various sessions in which he participated. One of the panels, entitled “Development Strategies in Africa,” emphasized the tragic impact of HIV/AIDS across the continent. In response to a question from the audience about the proposal by President George W. Bush that the United States provide $15 billion to combat the epidemic, Kaunda quickly replied, “We are waiting.”9 Kaunda not only took part in five panels during the Conference on World Affairs in Boulder but also delivered one of the plenary addresses. In his lecture, entitled “Zambia and the Democratization of Southern Africa,” he provided a thorough overview of the

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role his nation had played in fighting for racial justice in surrounding nations such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. He painted it in a relatively positive light, emphasizing the sacrifices that the people of Zambia had made and the great toll it had taken on the Zambian economy. At the end of the address, he requested that everyone in the crowd join with him in the struggle against HIV/AIDS. He then surprised the crowd with his trademark musical finish. In a strong and emotional voice Kaunda sang: Sons of Africa rise and fight. Girls of Africa rise and shine. In the name of great Africa, we shall fight and conquer aids. Forward ever, backward never. In the name of great Africa, we shall fight and conquer AIDS. We shall fight and conquer AIDS. We shall fight and conquer AIDS. In the name of great Africa, we shall fight and conquer AIDS.10

Not long after taking part in the conference in Colorado, Kaunda attended the ceremony at the State Department in Washington when President Bush signed the US Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. Before delivering his remarks, Bush recognized Kaunda as a special guest. During his speech he acknowledged Kaunda’s role in the struggle. “We see hope in the work of individuals like the former President of Zambia who lost his son to AIDS, a son who left several children to the care of their grandfather,” stated Bush. “The good President turned his grief to good works and created the Kenneth Kaunda Children of Africa Foundation. His foundation pays for food and medical care and schooling for AIDS orphans,” he added. “Mr. President, we honor you for your service and for the example you have shown to others who live on your ravished continent,” concluded Bush.11 A month later Bush addressed a US-Africa business conference hosted by the Corporate Council on Africa. The president provided a thorough overview of his administration’s priorities in its relations with Africa: promoting democracy, preventing terrorism, encouraging economic growth, and fighting diseases. He outlined his upcoming trip to the continent that would include stops in Botswana, South Africa, and Senegal. He discussed in depth his newly signed President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which would be spending $15 billion over five years to combat HIV and other illnesses in several African and Caribbean nations including Zambia. “As former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has said, ‘we have conquered slavery, colonialism, and apartheid. We must now fight HIV/AIDS, the most deadly enemy we have ever faced.’ And he is right,” asserted Bush.12 President Bush’s interest in Africa was impressive, and PEPFAR certainly helped alleviate the suffering of millions of people. When the program was renewed for five more years in 2008, Congress increased the funding from the original $15 billion for five years to $48 billion for the next five years. The administration of Barack Obama would carry on Bush’s initiative. In the meantime, Kaunda continued playing a key part in the drama and also maintained his close ties to the United States that had been rejuvenated during his year in Boston. In May 2006 he gave the closing speech at a forum about Africa in San Diego focused on fighting AIDS and hunger as duel epidemics. The event was hosted by a nonprofit organization called Project Concern, and the group invited him back to southern California to be honored for his ongoing

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humanitarian work in November 2006. In addition to receiving his award, Kaunda attracted some press coverage noting his enjoyment of ballroom dancing when he attended a filming of the popular television program, Dancing with the Stars.13 While Kaunda remained vibrant and active through his eighties, his wife Betty’s health declined steadily due to diabetes. In September 2012 he lost his long-time favorite dancing partner when Betty passed away at eighty-three while visiting one of their daughters in Zimbabwe. Kaunda, who was in South Africa at the time, was allowed to use a South African government jet by President Jacob Zuma to fly to Zimbabwe and escort his wife’s body back to Lusaka. Betty Kaunda was survived by her husband of sixty-six years and their eight children, thirty-eight grandchildren, and seventeen great-grandchildren. Saying farewell to his wife, whom he had married in 1946 and who had been his closest confidante through thick and thin, was obviously a very sad event in Kaunda’s life; but, he carried on. About fifteen months after his wife’s funeral, the year of 2014 dawned, and it promised to be an unforgettable one for Kenneth Kaunda and Zambia. On New Year’s Day 2014, the former president looked forward to his ninetieth birthday in a few months, and Zambia began planning to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of independence from Britain in October. Before any of that took place, however, Kaunda was back in the service of his country when President Michael Sata named him as the captain of the team that would attempt to win the bid for Zambia to host the 2019 African Cup of Nations. Kaunda, an enthusiastic lifelong supporter of soccer and a spectator in February 2012 in Gabon when the “Chipolopolo Boys” won their first Cup of Nations, was a great choice to lead the effort. The Zambian victory in Gabon in 2012, when they defeated the powerful team from Ivory Coast on penalty kicks, had been incredibly emotional for Kaunda and all Zambian fans since the national team had perished in a plane crash just off the coast of that same West African nation nineteen years before. During an interview a few weeks before his ninetieth birthday, in April 2014, he shared his thoughts: “I still love soccer at my age, and the 2012 Africa Cup victory was the greatest moment for me, because the dream of all past national teams, even those that perished in that painful tragedy in 1993, was realized by that victory.”14 The parties in honor of Kenneth Kaunda’s ninetieth birthday on April 28, 2014, were numerous, including receptions hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka and the Zambian government. Panegyric rained down upon Kaunda from all sides. The Post, a newspaper that ironically had been created in the early 1990s as a media vehicle for the opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party that ousted Kaunda, lavished great praise on its former enemy. The Post editors wondered why a person who had done so much to promote peace in the world had never been honored with a Nobel Peace Prize, and thanked him for everything he had done over the decades for Zambia and all of humanity. “Long live comrade KK!” concluded the Post editorial.15 At a conference entitled “Unity in Diversity: One Zambia, One Nation” organized in Kitwe’s Hotel Edinburgh by Copperbelt University, Kaunda’s first ambassador to the USSR and his foreign minister in the early 1970s, Vernon Mwaanga, sang similar praises for the first president of Zambia. Mwaanga, who eventually had a serious falling-out with the UNIP government and became a key player in Chiluba’s MMD regime in the 1990s, lauded Kaunda for being more focused on building unity in the nation than

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building his own wealth. “KK preached the importance of uniting all tribes of Zambia for a common cause,” commented Mwaanga.16 Professor Francis Chigunta, an expert on development and former advisor to another MMD president, Rupiah Banda, also congratulated Kaunda for fostering unity in the country. He pointed out that without unity, a country will not move forward. “Dr. Kaunda all his life has attempted to create a non-racial, non-tribal society, and this is the unity that has held us together for the last 50 years as we celebrate the Golden Jubilee of Independence.”17 The top US diplomat in Zambia at the time David Young visited Kaunda at his home to wish him a happy ninetieth birthday. Kaunda explained that he was very touched by all of the gifts he had received, but was sad that his late wife Betty was not with him for the festivities. He applauded Barack Obama for carrying on the fight against HIV/ AIDS, as well as working to end war around the globe. “I have been keenly following what President Obama has been doing to promote peace throughout the world and I must say it’s a commendable job he should continue,” concluded Kaunda.18 As a present for Kaunda’s ninetieth birthday, Charge d’Affaires Young gave him a copy of an October 15, 1964, telegram from Lyndon Johnson congratulating Kaunda for Zambia’s independence and promising to strengthen bonds of friendship between Zambians and Americans. In presenting the historic telegram to Kaunda, Young pronounced: On the occasion of the 90th birthday of former President Kenneth Kaunda, and as part of the United States’ celebration of the 50th year of Zambia’s independence, the Embassy of the United States of America shares this October 1964 congratulatory message from former U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to former President Kenneth Kaunda. The United States is proud of our longstanding relationship with the people and government of Zambia. As we look back to 50 years ago, we remember a time of freedom struggles in both our countries. In the United States, we were in the midst of a civil rights movement that eventually brought equal rights to all American citizens as enshrined in our Constitution. That movement resulted in the enactment of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 that also celebrates its 50 anniversary this year. We are proud to share this 50th anniversary of the culminations of both of our countries’ freedom movements, and our leaders who bravely brought about change. Happy Birthday, First Republican President Kenneth Kaunda!

This was a fitting gift for Kaunda, the person who had done more than anyone else to forge closer ties between the two nations.19 KK and the United States had truly experienced a long and remarkable ride together, from his first visit to the United States in 1960 to his landmark 1975 White House speech through Zambia’s fiftieth anniversary in 2014 and beyond.

Notes Introduction 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9 10

11

12 13

Other neighbors include Tanzania, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique. The border with DRC is the longest at over 2,300 km, and the border with Angola is second longest at just over 1,000 km. Size and population statistics from the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/public/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html accessed May 25, 2015. On Zambian (then called Northern Rhodesian) politics in the early 1950s see Bizeck Jube Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), especially 42–91. On Nkumbula see Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). For analysis of Nkumbula’s trip to London to lobby against the Federation and some discussion of US policy toward Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, see Andy DeRoche, “Ambassador to Norway, Historian of Bethel: The Career of Margaret Joy Tibbetts,” Maine History (July 2013), 255–283, especially 258–262; and Andrew DeRoche, “Frances Bolton, Margaret Tibbetts, and the US Relations with the Rhodesian Federation, 1950–1960,” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, editors, Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 299–325. Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 36. Fergus MacPherson, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1974), 263–303; for details on Kaunda’s early life also see Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free (London: Heinemann, 1962). George Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa’s Liberation Struggle (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 99–100. “Rising African Leader Takes Look at the U.S.,” Life, May 30, 1960, 89–92. Kaunda was one of many African leaders to be very impressed by Kennedy. For a thorough explanation of this phenomenon, see Philip Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For a thorough discussion of this period, see Andy DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments: Kenneth Kaunda and the United States, 1960–64,” Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies (October 2008), 369–394. Thanks to the editors of Safundi for granting permission to re-use portions of that article. Zambia’s early efforts at development after independence are insightfully analyzed in Andrew Sardanis, Zambia: The First 50 Years (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 11–66. For a detailed examination of the Johnson years, see Andy DeRoche, “Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA, 1964–68,” Cold War History (May 2007), 227–250. Thanks to the journal for permission to republish portions of it here.

234 14

15

16

Notes For further elaboration on these points, see Andrew J. DeRoche, “‘You Can’t Fight Guns with Knives’: National Security and Zambian responses to UDI, 1965–1973,” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, editors, One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 77–97. On Wilkowski’s efforts in Zambia see Andy DeRoche, “‘She Did a Lot for Us’: Jean Wilkowski in Zambia,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review (April 2015), 38–43. For a longer treatment of the Nixon years, see Andy DeRoche, “KK, the Godfather, and the Duke: Maintaining Positive Relations between Zambia and the USA in Spite of Nixon’s Other Priorities,” Safundi (January 2011), 97–121. Thanks to the editors of Safundi, and the Routledge press, for permission to reuse an excerpt here.

Chapter 1 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Georgetown University Library, Washington, District of Columbia (hereafter GU), Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Jean Wilkowski interview, August 23, 1989, 40. Vernon Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1982), 261–262. Vernon Mwaanga, “The View from Zambia,” Africa Report (September–October 1974), 37–39. Times of Zambia, August 17, 1974, 1. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (New York: Longman, 1997), 132–135. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Samora Moises Machel,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), March 20, 2005, 9. MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 146–147. Jean Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 266–267. John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 52–53. Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 52. James Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 179. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Talking with John Vorster,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), www.zamnet.zm/zamnet/post/kk.html, accessed December 6, 2004. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), 127–135. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 239–241; Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 137–138. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 138–142. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 77, Folder 13, copy of the editorial in Johannesburg Star, October 16, 1974, with cover sheet from Chona to Kaunda.

Notes 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46

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UNIP, Box 77, Folder 13, copy of Vorster’s October 23, 1974 speech in Cape Town, with cover sheet from Chona to Kaunda. Elijah Mudenda, Zambia: A Generation of Struggle (Harare: SAPES, 1999), 140. Getrude Phiri’s daughter, Heather, is the author’s wife. Heather discussed the event with her uncle Henry Phiri, Getrude’s brother, who remembers it well. Unfortunately the author was never able to meet his mother-in-law Getrude, as she died in 2001. UNIP, Box 86, Folder 30, “Lusaka Manifesto Revisited,” speech by Donald Easum, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, November 26, 1974. “Détente in the Southern Air,” To the Point: World News in Depth (November 1, 1974), 7–8. Thanks to Professor Jackie Grobler for his suggestion to peruse To the Point in the University of Pretoria’s library. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 144–145. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk (London: Sphere Books, 1979), 138. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 161–163. Chona quoted in Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 147. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 241–242. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Ending UDI,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), December 18, 2005, 4. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 242. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 150–151. Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk, 140–141. Times of Zambia, “Opinion,” November 6, 1974, 1. Times of Zambia, “Opinion,” November 18, 1974, 1. Times of Zambia, November 22, 1974, 1; December 2, 1974. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 626– 629; Robert Schulzinger, “The Decline of Détente,” in Bernard Firestone and Alexei Ugrinsky, editors, Gerald R. Ford and the Politics of Post-Watergate America Volume 2 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 408–410. Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk, 142–143. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Ending UDI,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), December 18, 2005, 4. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 151–157. Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 273. To the Point: World News in Depth, December 13, 1974, 5. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Southern Africa, Our Role,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), March 27, 2005, 9. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, 320. Beatwell Chisala, The Downfall of President Kaunda (Lusaka: Co-op Printing, 1994), 143; Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Fighters at State House,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), September 11, 2005, 8. In this “diary” article Kaunda recalled a falling out with Neto at some point, after several MPLA officers were executed without trial on Zambian soil. Evidently, after this dispute Kaunda no longer allowed Neto to live in State House. Kaunda also described a wrangle with Savimbi, after which he insisted that he and his mother no longer live in Lusaka. No date was specified for either incident. UNIP, Box 144, Folder 42, Zambian Defense Ministry, “Report on UNITA Activities,” May 4, 1973. This report stated that “UNITA is not recognized by Zambia.”

236 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62

63

64 65 66 67

68

Notes Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 112–113. MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 175–177. Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 15, 29. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 224–225. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 279–283. MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 177. Zambia Daily Mail, February 4, 1975, 1. During his December 1974 trip to South Africa, his first visit anywhere in Africa, Young met with banned Pan-African Congress leader Robert Sobukwe. He subsequently brought two of Sobukwe’s children to live with his family in Atlanta and attend college. For details, see DeRoche, Andrew Young, 53–54. “Statement of Andrew Young,” March 10, 1975, Congressional Record, 94th Congress, First Session, 5825. Jeffrey Engel, editor, The China Diary of George H.W. Bush: The Making of a Global President (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 202, entry for March 13, 1975. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 255–259. UNIP, Box 86, Folder 30, Vernon Mwaanga, “Statement to Parliament on Events in Southern Africa,” March 18, 1975. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Chitepo Assassination (Harare: The Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), 55–67; Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk, 149–153. Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 269–270. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, December 23, 2005. UNIP, Box 145, Folder 51, “Addendum to Brief on Visit to the United States, April 18th–April 21st” The brief and addendum were undated, but from the context clearly prepared shortly after April 8. There is no author specified, but the documents were evidently written by Mwale. UNIP, Box 145, Folder 51, “Brief for the Zambian Delegation to the United States, Led by His Exellency, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, April 18th to 21st, 1975.” “Brief for the Zambian Delegation,” especially pages 6–7 and 11–12. The entire report was over 20 pages in length. “Brief for the Zambian Delegation,” 1–2, 4; author’s interview with Mwale. Ibid., 1, 14. UNIP, Box 145, Folder 51, J.B. Zulu to Siteke Mwale, undated but most likely early April 1975; UNIP, Box 144, Folder 45, “A Report on the Meeting with the IMF Staff in Washington D.C. on May 22nd, 1975.” Zulu, who was evidently a Zambian and worked at the IMF, attended the May 22nd meeting. The key issue discussed was the fact that in spite of the severe budget shortfall Zambia faced in 1975 because of low copper prices, the IMF was requiring them to make massive repayments based on high earnings the year before, when copper prices hit a record high. Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, 4, 8, and 384; John Mwanakatwe, Teacher, Politician, Lawyer: My Autobiography (Lusaka: Bookworld Publishers, 2003), 273–274, 288–289. Mwanakatwe, who had served as minister of finance from 1970 to 1973, resumed the post in May 1976.

Notes 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85

86 87 88

89 90 91 92

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Andrew Sardanis, Africa: Another Side of the Coin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 292–293. “Brief for the Zambian Delegation,” 4–5. Ibid., 5. GU, FAOHC, Jean Wilkowski interview, August 23, 1989, 40; Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 284. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 791–793. New York Times, April 20, 1975, 3. Digital National Security Archive, The Kissinger Transcripts (hereafter KT), document 01584, memorandum of conversation among Kenneth Kaunda, Vernon Mwaanga, Mark Chona, Siteke Mwale, President Ford, Henry Kissinger, Nathaniel Davis, and Jean Wilkowski, April 19, 1975, 1–2. KT, document 01584, memorandum of conversation among Kaunda, Ford, et al., April 19, 1975, 2–3. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 4. Perhaps feeling some remorse for her contribution to this crucial White House conversation which was a key factor leading to major US support for Savimbi in the long and tragic Angolan civil war, the ambassador later downplayed her contacts with Savimbi and even stated that if she had been asked in 1975, she would have cautioned against supporting him. See Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 263–265. KT, document 01584, memorandum of conversation among Kaunda, Ford, et al., April 19, 1975, 4–5. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 6–7. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 7–8. Ibid., 8. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 791–798. Kissinger’s account was accepted at face value and reiterated in most of the scholarly literature, including Jussi Hanhimaki’s The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 407, and Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 285. Thanks to the National Security Archive, we now know it wasn’t quite as simple as Kissinger made it seem. Author’s interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, Zambia, December 7, 2005. Mwaanga was foreign minister in April 1975. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. Chona was Kaunda’s special assistant for security issues in April 1975. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. Mwale was Zambia’s ambassador to the United States in April 1975. He took over as foreign minister in 1976, and was very influential in convincing Kaunda to recognize the MPLA and establish formal relations with Angola. KT, document 01584, memorandum of conversation among Kaunda, Ford, et al., April 19, 1975, 8. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 9.

238 93

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97

98

99

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101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112

113 114 115

Notes Ford did nothing about the Byrd Amendment all summer. He did pay some personal attention to the debate over it in the fall, but the repeal measure failed again. See Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 207–209. KT, document 01584, memorandum of conversation among Kaunda, Ford, et al., April 19, 1975, 10–11. In spite of Kissinger’s comments, Namibia never became a high priority for the Ford administration. Ibid., 11. The significance of Kaunda’s April 1975 speech at the White House was recognized and briefly analyzed in Philip Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 232–233. Gerald Ford Library, National Security Council Meetings file, Box 2, minutes for meeting on Angola, June 27, 1975, 6–7, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/ document/nscmin/750627a.htm, accessed June 21, 2009. During this NSC meeting Ford twice referred to his April dinner conversation with Kaunda, and the focus on getting Savimbi into power. “Toasts of the President and President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia,” April 19, 1975, Public Papers of the Presidents Gerald R. Ford 1975, Volume I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), 533–535. Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University Archives, Washington, DC, Charles Diggs Papers (hereafter CD), Box 192, Folder “Zambia,” “A Response to a Toast by President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia at a White House Dinner Given in his Honour by President Gerald Ford April 19, 1975,” 1–3. The document in the Diggs Papers was issued by the Zambian embassy in Washington. CD, “A Response to a Toast,” 3–4. On Williams and Africa see Thomas Noer, Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 223–269. CD, “A Response to a Toast,” 2 and 4. Ibid., 5–6. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 262. Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 286–287; GU, FAOHC, Jean Wilkowski interview, August 23, 1989, 41. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 262–263. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: US Presidents, Johnson’s Anger,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), October 2, 2005, 6. “White House Blast,” Zambia Daily Mail, April 26, 1975, 1. Editorial, “Warning of Racial War,” and “Kaunda: ‘Dismayed’ by America,” New York Times, April 25, 1975, 34–35. Bruce Oudes, “Kaunda’s Diplomatic Offensive,” Africa Report (May–June 1975), 41–43. Kaunda’s full White House speech was also published with this article. Oudes, “Kaunda’s Diplomatic Offensive,” 42. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 263. Ibid., 165–166; Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Fidel Castro, My Friend,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), August 21, 2005, 8, and “KK’s Diary: Fidel Castro, Together with Africa,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), August 28, 2005, 8. Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 287. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 791. Robert Manning, “Kaunda Visit Turning Point in U.S.-African Relations,” The Ottawa Journal, May 30, 1975, 7.

Notes

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Chapter 2 1 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14

15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27

Vernon Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1982), 265. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 144, Folder 45, P. Mdala, “Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kingston, Jamaica, 29th April to 6th May 1975,” 3–4, 10–12. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 285. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 803–804. Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 408–409. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 286–287. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 410. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 806. Gerald Ford Library, National Security Council Meetings file, Box 2, minutes for meeting on Angola, June 27, 1975, 6–7, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/ document/nscmin/750627a.htm, accessed June 21, 2009. Author’s interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, Zambia, December 7, 2005; author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005; author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (New York: Longman, 1997), 179–180. Mwaanga, An Extraordinary Life, 266–268. John Mwanakatwe, Teacher, Politician, Lawyer: My Autobiography (Lusaka: Bookworld Publishers, 2003), 249–257. For a fascinating and insightful discussion of a state-owned drive-in movie theater in Tanzania, see Laura Fair, “Drive-In Socialism: Debating Modernities and Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,” The American Historical Review (October 2013), 1077–1104. Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 8, 397; John Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1994), 127. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 413; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 809. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 258. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 818. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 245–255. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 86. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 809. On Wilkowski’s career see Andy DeRoche, “‘She Did a Lot for Us’: Jean Wilkowski in Zambia,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review (April 2015), 38–43. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 194–195, 208. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 255–259. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 331, 382. “Ford’s African Policy Bad—US Senator,” Sunday Times of Zambia, August 24, 1975, 1. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 227–228.

240 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47

48

49

50

Notes Jean Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service (Notre Dame, IN, 2008), 282–284. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 228–229. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 353. Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 151. Zambia Daily Mail, August 26, 1975, 1. Digital National Security Archive, The Kissinger Transcripts (hereafter KT), document 01972, memorandum of conversation among Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Henry Kissinger, et al., June 23, 1976, Bodenmais, West Germany, 10–12. Jean Wilkowski, telegram from Lusaka to the State Department, August 29, 1975, in microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1991), document 00520. Abel Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk (London: Sphere Books, 1978), 164–167. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 177–182. Albert Mvula, “Bridge Over Troubled Water,” and lead editorial, Zambia Daily Mail, August 27, 1975, 4. James Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 185. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 910. Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 209. Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk, 167–169. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 294–295. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 128–129. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 193. The exact details regarding the providing of weapons for Savimbi through Zambia remain cloudy. Bridgland was told by UNITA troops that they had received weapons from Zambia. A CIA officer informed Wilkowski of an “imminent air shipment of arms.” Anglin concludes that while most of the US weapons shipped to Angola moved through Zaire, “some undoubtedly reached UNITA through Zambia.” See Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 165; Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 264; Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, 331. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 226–227; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 293–294. Li Hsien Nien, more commonly referred to as Li Xiannian, also served as finance minister in the 1970s and became president of the PRC in the 1980s. He led guerrilla forces in the 1930s, was a long-time member of the communist party leadership, and was widely respected for his integrity. See Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898–1976 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 455–456. UNIP, Box 67, Folder 33, “Report of His Honour A.G. Zulu, Secretary General of the Party on His Official Visit to the Republic of India, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China, 1st–21st September, 1975,” 30, 35–38. Author’s interview with Grey Zulu, Lusaka, Zambia, July 22, 2005. Zulu praised the Chinese in his memoirs for providing planes, tanks, and other weapons for free. See Grey Zulu, Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu (Ndola: Times Printpak, 2007), 386–387. Thanks to Nancy Mitchell for sending me a copy of Zulu’s memoirs. KT, document 00363, memorandum of conversation between Ch’iao Kuan-hua and Henry Kissinger, September 28, 1975, 20–22.

Notes 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

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KT, document 00363, 20–22. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 330. The last Chinese advisors left Kinshasa on October 27, 1975. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs and the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Ninety-Fourth Congress First Session on Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire October 24, 1975 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 1, 25–32, Mulcahy quotation at 32. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” 32–34, 46–48. Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 303–304. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” 30–31. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” 31. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” 31–32. “Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire,” 40–42. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 414. Westad, The Global Cold War, 230–231. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 301–308, 343–345. UNIP, Box 145, Folder 52, Report from Siteke Mwale, Zambian ambassador to the United States, to Rupiah Banda, Zambian foreign minister, November 20, 1975, 10–11. Report from Mwale to Banda, November 20, 1975, 11; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 791–798. Report from Mwale to Banda, November 20, 1975, 12. Andrew Young, “The End of An Empire,” November 11, 1975, Congressional Record, 94th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 36031–36032. Author’s phone interview with Wilkowski, June 2, 2008; Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 280–281. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, December 23, 2005, Lusaka, Zambia. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Meeting Martin Luther King, Jr.,” Post (Lusaka), May 3, 2008, accessed online at www.postzambia.com on May 19, 2008. Andrew Young, “U.S. Secret Involvement in Angola,” December 16, 1975, Congressional Record, 94th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 41096. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 154. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 818. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 418. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 418. KT, document 00398, memorandum of conversation among Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p’ing), Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, et al., December 3, 1975, 19–20. KT, document 00398, 20–21. KT, document 00398, 21–22. KT, document 00398, 22. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 318–321. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 821; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 420–421. On pages 832–833 of Years of Renewal, Kissinger claimed that Operation IA Feature was on the “verge of success” when Congress pulled the plug on 19 December. This is not convincing, given the military and diplomatic realities of late November and early December.

242 82

83 84 85

86

87 88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100

101 102

103 104

Notes Andrew Young’s statement, December 9, 1975, Congressional Record, 94th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 39397. For discussion of the debate over joining the African Development Fund, see Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 59–60. New York Times, December 12, 1975, 1; December 13, 1975, 8; December 14, 1975, 1. Young, “U.S. Secret Involvement in Angola.” Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 231. Senator John Tunney was the son of famous boxer Gene Tunney, and supposedly inspired the Robert Redford film The Candidate. Gerald Ford Library, National Security Council Meetings file, Box 2, minutes for meeting on SALT (and Angola), December 22, 1975, 1–2, www. fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nscmin/751222.pdf, accessed July 24, 2009. Gerald Ford Library, National Security Council Meetings file, Box 2, minutes for meeting on SALT (and Angola), December 22, 1975, 2, 12–13. Ibid., 2, 13–15. UNIP, Box 58, Folder 8, “Report of the Zambian Delegation to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, December 15th–23rd, 1975,” 10. The report was written by P.D. Chisanga, executive secretary of UNIP’s youth brigade. The figure of 4,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola in late December is also given in Westad, The Global Cold War, 235. “Report of the Zambian Delegation,” 11. “Report of the Zambian Delegation,” 11. December 2, 1975 speech by Kaunda cited in Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 152. December 23, 1975 interview with Chona cited in Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 157. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 157–160. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 159. UNIP, Box 159, Folder 87, “Record of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia Held at the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia, Addis Ababa at 11:00 Hours on Thursday, January 8, 1976,” 1–3. The record of the meeting was drafted by D.B. Moombe, counselor at the Zambian embassy, on January 8, 1976. “Record of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia,” 5. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: The Big Powers,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), September 18, 2005, 5. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, December 23, 1975, Lusaka, Zambia. UNIP, Box 159, Folder 87, Kalenga Kangwa, Zambian ambassador to Ethiopia, “Postmortem of the Angolan Crisis and MPLA Victory,” February 1976, 5–6. Kangwa sent a copy of his report to the Zambian ambassador to China, A.S. Masiye, on March 25, 1976. Kangwa, “Postmortem of the Angolan Crisis,” 1. UNIP, Box 67, Folder 33, Kenneth Kaunda, “Speech by his Excellency the President Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the O.A.U. Extraordinary Summit on Angola, Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, January, 1976,” 1, 4. Kaunda, “Speech by his Excellency the President Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the O.A.U Extraordinary Summit on Angola,” 4–6. Kangwa, “Postmortem of the Angolan Crisis,” 1.

Notes 105 106 107 108 109 110

111 112 113 114 115

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Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 162. Bizeck Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), 172–174. Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, 323–324; Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 186–188. Statement by Young, January 27, 1976, Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 1041–1043. DeRoche, Andrew Young, 62. UNIP, Box 77, Folder 13, “An X-Ray on Angola,” report of Mark Chona’s February 5, 1976, talks in Washington, sent from Kaunda to Grey Zulu, Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga, and Rupiah Banda, with cover memo on February 11. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 220–226. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 233–234, 241–246. Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, 328. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Fighters at State House,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), September 11, 2005, 8. The remarkable thank you letter from Savimbi to Kaunda is reprinted in its entirety in Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 197–198, and Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 235–236. Author’s interview with Mwale, December 23, 2005, Lusaka, Zambia. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 184–185. For fascinating details on US efforts to acquire Angolan oil in the late 1970s, see Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 159–160.

Chapter 3 1

2 3

4

“Visit to Africa” press conference, November 25, 1975, in Hanes Walton, Robert Stevenson, and James Rosser, editors, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 108. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 915. The most detailed account of the 1976 trip and speech is in Kissinger’s memoirs, The Years of Renewal. Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, includes the entire Lusaka speech as well as several other public statements by Kissinger during the trip. While important recent studies of Kissinger and the Cold War such as Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) acknowledge the importance of the trip, they do not provide in-depth discussions. In this chapter, my goal is to provide the first thorough scholarly analysis of Kissinger’s April 1976 Africa diplomacy, utilizing newly declassified US sources and research in Zambia. On Wilkowski’s career see Andy DeRoche, “‘She Did a Lot for Us’: Jean Wilkowski in Zambia,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review (April 2015), 38–43.

244 5

6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17

18 19

20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27

28

Notes Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 77, Folder 13, “An X-Ray on Angola,” report of Mark Chona’s February 5, 1976, talks in Washington, sent from Kaunda to Grey Zulu, Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga, and Rupiah Banda, with cover memo on February 11. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 380. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 915–916. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 211. Telegram from Jean Wilkowski in Lusaka to the State Department, March 5, 1976, document #SA00561 in the microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1991). Telegram from Wilkowski to State, March 5, 1976. Digital National Security Archive, The Kissinger Transcripts (hereafter KT), document 01904, memo of Kissinger’s staff meeting, March 5, 1976, 1–2, 6–7. KT, document 01904, memo of Kissinger’s staff meeting, March 5, 1976, 9–10. Ibid., 10–11. Ibid., 11–13. Caleb Rossiter, The Bureaucratic Struggle for Control of U.S. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy vs. Development in Southern Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 98–99, 147–148. Rossiter interviewed Schaufele in November 1981. “Opinion,” Times of Zambia, March 10, 1976, 1. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake, 1997), 190–195; Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 209–211. Zambia Daily Mail, March 19, 1976, 4. Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (hereafter GF), Ron Nessen Papers, Box 124, Rhodesia folder, “Kissinger on U.S. Intentions on Rhodesia and Cuba,” March 23, 1976; DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 211. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 920. “Rhodesia—A Proposed Course of Action,” William Schaufele to Kissinger, April 1, 1976, document #SA00569 in South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1–4, 6. Gerald Ford Library website, minutes of the National Security Council Meeting, April 7, 1976, 1, 13–14, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/ nscmin/760407.pdf, accessed January 6, 2010. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 924. James Spain, In Those Days: A Diplomat Remembers (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998), 123–124. KT, document 14826, memo of phone conversation between Kissinger and Talcott Seelye, April 13, 1976, 9:15 a.m. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 915–916. Telegram from Wilkowski to the State Department, April 18, 1976, on microfiche received from the State Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. These microfiche will hereafter be identified as FIA 8802541. For a good discussion of Kissinger’s concern with the media, see Dan Caldwell, “The Legitimation of the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy,” Diplomatic History (September 2009), 633–652. Telegram from the State Department to Wilkowski, April 19, 1976, FIA 8802541.

Notes 29

30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

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Telegrams from State Department to Wilkowski, April 13, 1976; Spain to State Department, April 16, 1976; and Wilkowski to State Department, April 19, 1976, FIA 8802541. Telegram from Wilkowski to State Department, April 18, 1976, FIA 8802541; Muzorewa’s April 20, 1976, statement in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, editors, Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 399; Abel Muzorewa, Rise Up & Walk (London: Sphere Books, 1978), 208; US Embassy statement in Times of Zambia, April 23, 1976, 8. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 927–928. Kissinger quoted in Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan, 1980), 221. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 928–930. Ibid., 931–934. KT, document 01932, memo of conversation between Nyerere and Kissinger, April 25, 1976, 1–3. Ibid., 3–6. Ibid., 7–8. Ibid., 8–9. Ibid., 10–11. Kissinger was surprised that Mondlane had been assassinated, again demonstrating his lack of knowledge of southern African history. In contrast, the key US diplomat regarding southern Africa in the Carter administration, Andrew Young, had actually been a personal friend of Mondlane’s and was well-versed in the region’s history. KT, document 01932, memo of conversation between Nyerere and Kissinger, April 25, 1976, 11–13. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 935. KT, document 01933, memo of conversation between Nyerere and Kissinger, April 26, 1976, 1–3. Ibid., 3–8. Ibid., 8–10. Ibid., 10. Ibid., 11–12. Ibid., 12. As it turned out Nyerere was wrong about Ian Smith’s future. Smith did remain in Zimbabwe under black rule. He served in parliament in the opposition until the mid-1980s. He then retired and lived in Harare until the end of 2005. Only then did he move to South Africa for medical care, where he died in Cape Town in November 2007. Ibid., 13. Spain, In Those Days, 124. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 936. Jean Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 290. Kissinger’s press conference upon arrival at Lusaka airport in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 177–178. Zambia Daily Mail, April 27, 1976, 1. Editorial by Vincent Mijoni, Zambia Daily Mail, April 27, 1976, 4. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 937. KT, document 01934, memo of conversation between Kaunda and Kissinger, April 27, 1976, 1. Other Zambians present for the discussion included Prime Minister

246

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

75 76

77 78

79 80

Notes Elijah Mudenda, Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda, Secretary General Grey Zulu, Ambassador Siteke Mwale, and special assistant Mark Chona. Kissinger was accompanied by Deputy Secretary Charles Robinson, Ambassador Jean Wilkowski, Assistant Secretary William Schaufele, and staff members Winston Lord and Harold Horan. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 3–4. Ibid., 4. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 938–939. Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London: Methuen, 1984), 171. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 939. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 687. GF, Papers of Michael Raoul-Duval, Box 16, Kissinger Trip to Africa folder, “Address by the Honorable Henry Kissinger at a Luncheon in the Secretary’s Honor Hosted by His Excellency Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia,” State House, Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976, 1. The speech is published in its entirety in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 121–130. GF, Papers of Michael Raoul-Duval, Box 16, Kissinger Trip to Africa folder, “Address by the Honorable Henry Kissinger at a Luncheon in the Secretary’s Honor Hosted by His Excellency Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia,” 2–3. Ibid., 3. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. GF, Papers of Michael Raoul-Duval, Box 16, Kissinger Trip to Africa folder, “Address by the Honorable Henry Kissinger at a Luncheon in the Secretary’s Honor Hosted by His Excellency Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia,” 4. Ibid., 5–6. Ibid., 7–8. Ibid., 9–12. Zambia Daily Mail, April 28, 1976, 1. “Kissinger pledges ‘unrelenting opposition’ to white Rhodesian regime,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 28, 1976, 3. Kissinger also included this quote in Years of Renewal, 939. Telegram from Wilkowski to US embassy in Kinshasa, April 28, 1976, FIA 8802541; Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 291–293. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 941–942; Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 293–294. The author’s experiences in this vicinity would fortunately be considerably better than Kissinger’s. He proposed to his wife on the bridge overlooking Victoria Falls, and they got married on a boat cruise on the Zambezi. Several hippopotamuses made their appearance during the wedding ceremony. Telegram from Wilkowski to US embassy in Kinshasa, April 28, 1976; telegram from Kissinger to Wilkowski, April 30, 1976, FIA 8802541. For a fascinating portrait of Mobutu and his corrupt “kleptocracy,” see Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 942–947. Carter has received very little attention from historians of US foreign relations. A notable recent exception is a brief but insightful discussion of his career and

Notes

81

82

83 84

85

86 87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94

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confrontation with Kissinger in Brenda Gayle Plummer, In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956–1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 319–320. Ibid., 947–949. Carter was a career Foreign Service Officer who was born in 1921 and died relatively young in 1982. It is interesting that Kissinger makes such an effort to combat charges of racism in his memoirs by praising Carter, but does nothing of the sort regarding charges of sexism and completely ignores Wilkowski. “Reagan Attacks Kissinger for His Stand on Rhodesia,” New York Times, May 1, 1976; John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 167; Isaacson, Kissinger, 688. For an overview of Reagan’s attacks on Kissinger and Ford’s attempt to defend his secretary of state in Texas, see Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 226–227. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 949–953. Henry Kissinger, “Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development,” address at UN conference in Nairobi, Kenya, May 6, 1976, in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 143–165. Kissinger’s May 7, 1976, remarks upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 195. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 956. Gerald Ford Library website, minutes of the National Security Council Meeting, May 11, 1976, 2, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nscmin/760511.pdf, accessed January 23, 2010. Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 3–4. Ibid., 4–5. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 6–8. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 10.

Chapter 4 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

Digital National Security Archives, The Kissinger Transcripts (hereafter KT), document 02084, discussion between Kissinger and Mobutu, Kinshasa, Zaire, morning of September 22, 1976, 11–17. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 964–965. Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 396–398. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 966–969. KT, document 01972, memo of conversation between Kissinger, Vorster, and their delegations, June 23, 1976, 1–6. Ibid., 7–9. Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (Harare: SAPES Books, 2001), 166.

248 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22

23

24 25

26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33

34

Notes KT, document 01972, memo of conversation between Kissinger, Vorster, and their delegations, June 23, 1976, 11–12. Ibid., 13–14. Ibid., 14–15. Ibid., 16–20. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 972–974. Ibid., 974–975. Ibid., 978–979. Zambia Daily Mail July 17, 1976, 4; Mwale’s July speech inserted by Andrew Young, August 5, 1976, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 26043–5. Elijah Mudenda, Zambia: A Generation of Struggle (Harare: SAPES Press, 1999), 107. Bertha and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (TAZARA): An Analysis of Zambia’s Decision-Making in Transportation (Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publishing Company, 1990), 63–65. “Carter’s Only Campaign Debt,” Time (July 26, 1976), 26–27. August 5, 1976, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 26043–5. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 980. Kissinger to Kaunda, August 11, 1976, and US Embassy in Lusaka to the State Department, August 11, 1976, in the microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1991), documents 607 and 608. Interview with William Edmondson conducted by Tom Dunnigan, April 26, 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, accessed through the Library of Congress, “American Memory,” http:// memory.loc.gov, accessed February 23, 2007, quote from 24–25. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 981. Georgetown University Library, Washington, District of Columbia, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (hereafter FAOHC), Steve Low interviewed by I.W. Zartman, 1988, 6. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 981–982. Digital National Security Archives, Henry Kissinger Phone Conversations (hereafter KP), document ka15206, phone conversation between Kissinger and Wisner, August 26, 1976, 2:50 p.m. KP, document ka15208, phone conversation between Kissinger and Wisner, August 26, 1976, 6:50 p.m. KP, document ka15216, phone conversation between Kissinger and Wisner, August 27, 1976, 2:51 p.m. Zambia Daily Mail, July 16, 1976, 1. Author’s interview with Low, June 2, 2003, Washington, DC. KP, document ka15218, phone conversation between Kissinger and Van Voorst, August 27, 1976, 5:31 p.m. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 59, Folder 9, “Summary and Conclusions of the High Level Talks Held between the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia,” Tete, Mozambique, August 28, 1976. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 981.

Notes 35

36

37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61

249

White House Conversation among Ford, Kissinger, and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, 9:40 a.m. on August 30, 1976, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Advisor’s Memoranda of Conversation Collection. Thanks to Tim Scarnecchia for sharing this document with me. Henry Kissinger’s August 31, 1976 speech in Philadelphia in Hanes Walton, Robert Stevenson, and James Rosser, editors, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 217–229. Philadelphia press conference by Kissinger and Leon Sullivan, August 31, 1976, in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 229–235. Kissinger to Kaunda, September 1, 1976, in South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989, document 619. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 217. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 983–984. Kissinger in London to Kaunda, September 4, 1976, document acquired by the author via Freedom of Information Act (hereafter FIA) request number 8802541. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 985–986. Kissinger’s press conference in Zurich, September 5, 1976, in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 235–239. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 987–989. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 218. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 989–992. Zambia Daily Mail, September 17, 1976, 1. Photos on the front page of the Zambian paper featured Kissinger with Kaunda and his foreign minister, Siteke Mwale. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 993–994. Author’s phone interview with Frank Wisner, June 4, 2008. KT, document 02064, discussion among Kissinger, Low, William Rogers, Miles, and Richard Samuel, Lusaka, Zambia, September 16, 1976, 10 p.m.–10:58 p.m., 1–5. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. KT, document 02065, discussion among Kaunda, Chona, Mwale, Kissinger, Rogers Schaufele, and Low, Lusaka, Zambia, September 17, 1976, 8:10 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., 1–4. Ibid., 5–6. Ibid., 8–10. Ibid., 11–14. Lusaka press conference by Kissinger and Mwale, September 17, 1976, in Walton, Stevenson, and Rosser, The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 249–252. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 995–997. Ibid., 997–998. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 201. Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan, 1980), 253–254. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 998–1000.

250 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95 96 97 98

99

Notes Smith, The Great Betrayal, 201–203. KT, document 02072, discussion among Kissinger, Smith, Vorster, and support staff, Pretoria, South Africa, September 19, 1976, 5:55 p.m. to 8:46 p.m., 1. Ibid., 4–5. Ibid., 7–9. Ibid., 10–12. Ibid., 12–13. Ibid., 14–16. Ibid., 17–19. Ibid., 19–21. Ibid., 22–24. Ibid., 25–27. Ibid., 28–29. FAOHC, Frank Wisner interviewed by Richard Jackson, 1998, 57. KT, document 02076, discussion among Kaunda, Mark Chona, Henry Kissinger, et al., Lusaka, Zambia, September 20, 1976, 1:45 p.m. to 4:43 p.m., 1–4. Ibid., 5–6. Ibid., 7–11. Ibid., 11–12. Milner had been born in Rhodesia and was thus understandably doubtful about Smith’s intentions. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 14–15. Zambia Daily Mail, September 21, 1976, 1. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1003. KT, document 02075, discussions among Kaunda, Mark Chona, Joshua Nkomo, Kissinger, and William Rogers, Lusaka, Zambia, evening of September 20, 1976, 1–2. Ibid., 3–6. Ibid., 6. Caleb Rossiter, The Bureaucratic Struggle for Control of U.S. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy vs. Development in Southern Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 98, 146–147. KT, document 02075, 6–11. Ibid., 12–13. Ibid., 13–15. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1004. KT, document 02079, discussion among Kissinger, Mark Chona, and Kissinger, September 21, 1976, 8:02 a.m. to 8:15 a.m., 1–2. Ibid., 2–3. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1004–1005. For a thorough indictment of the mind-boggling greed and corruption of Mobutu’s three-decade dictatorship, see Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). KT, document 02084, discussion between Kissinger and Mobutu, Kinshasa, Zaire, morning of September 22, 1976, 1–6. Ibid., 7–10. Ibid., 11–17. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, December 23, 2005. Mwale, the former ambassador to the United States and foreign minister, died on September 19, 2010, at the age of 80. KT, document 02084, 18–22.

Notes 100

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

114 115 116

251

Ibid., 23–27. Kissinger’s comment that Mobutu should seize Cabinda, which he did not include in his memoirs, resembled his earlier encouragement for Indonesian President Mohamed Suharto to invade East Timor, an even more unethical maneuver which Kissinger had similarly omitted from his memoirs. For a brilliant analysis of Kissinger’s role in the East Timor tragedy, see Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 401–403. KT, document 02082, discussion between Kissinger and Mobutu, Kinshasa, Zaire, afternoon of September 22, 1976, 1–5. KT, document 02087, discussion among Kissinger, Callaghan, Crosland, et al., London, morning of September 23, 1976, 1–6. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1011–1012. UNIP, Box 237, Folder 14, “Statement of the Five Frontline Heads of State on the Latest Developments in Zimbabwe,” Lusaka, Zambia, September 26, 1976. KT, document 02090, discussion between Kissinger and Botha, Washington, DC, afternoon of September 27, 1976, 1–2. Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 3–5. Ibid., 5–6. KT, document 02109, discussion between Kissinger and Mwale, New York, NY, evening of October 8, 1976, 1–2. Ibid., 3–6. Ibid., 10–11. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 212–215; Nkomo, Nkomo, 178. Andy DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 73; author’s interview with Steve Low, Denver, Colorado, November 13, 1995. KT, document 02146, discussion between Kissinger and Chona, London, evening of December 11, 1976, 1–10. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. DeRoche, Andrew Young, 74–75.

Chapter 5 1

2

For Carter’s role in the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, see Andrew DeRoche, “Standing Firm for Principles: Jimmy Carter and Zimbabwe,” Diplomatic History (Fall 1999), 657–685. Recent important examinations of the Carter administration’s approach to southern Africa include Simon Stevens, “‘From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor’: The Carter Administration and Apartheid, 1977–81,” Diplomatic History (November 2012), 843–880; Nancy Mitchell, “Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia,” in Sue Onslow, editor, Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (New York: Routledge, 2009), 177–200; and Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), especially 37–165. Author’s interview with Stephen Low, US ambassador to Zambia, 1976–79, Washington, DC, June 2, 2003.

252 3

4

5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12

13 14

15 16 17

18

19 20

Notes For an insightful study of Joshua Nkomo and his Zimbabwe African People’s Union in the 1970s, see Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–1987: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), especially 161–236. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party (hereafter UNIP), Lusaka, Zambia, Box 237, Folder 14, “Independence: Zimbabwe,” memo from Siteke Mwale to Kenneth Kaunda, January 3, 1977, 1–6. UNIP, “Independence: Zimbabwe,” Mwale to Kaunda, January 3, 1977, 7–8. Ibid., 8–9 UNIP, Box 59, Folder 9, Mary Fulano, “A Report on the World Forum of Peace Forces in Moscow, 14th to 16th January 1977,” submitted to Kaunda on March 31, 1977, 1, 12–14. UNIP, Box 59, Folder 9, Reuben Kamanga, “A Brief Report on the State Visit by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, to the Five West African Countries from 11th to 22nd January,” 1977, 1–3. Ibid., 5–10. Solodovnikov’s success in Zambia is described in Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 167–169. UNIP, Box 151, Folder 68, Reuben Kamanga memo to Mwale and report of conversation with the Soviet ambassador, February 3, 1977, 1–7. For a clear and concise analysis of why and how the Carter administration intended to improve relations with black Africa, see Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 61–62. Author’s interview with Andrew Young, Atlanta, Georgia, March 2, 1994. Memorandum of January 19, 1977, conversation between Kissinger, Reinhardt, Vance, Brzezinski, Young, et al., in Myra Burton, editor, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXVIII Southern Africa (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), document 239, 714–726, Young quote from 715. Near the end of the lengthy and fascinating conversation (p. 722) Kissinger criticized Robert Mugabe as being “absolutely untrustworthy,” a tragically prescient description. Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 77–78. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 246–248. Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter JCL), Staff Offices, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat, Box 284, Folder “Steel/Chrome,” March 18, 1977, “Remarks of the President upon Signing H.R. 1746 Rhodesian Chrome Legislation,” 1. Zambia Information Services, Press Release Number 7/77, “Dr. Siteke G. Mwale Meets United States Ambassador, Mr. Stephen Low,” March 17, 1977. This document was given to the author by a scholar who requested anonymity, but whose massive collection of materials on Zambia has been extremely helpful. Elijah Mudenda, Zambia: A Generation of Struggle (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999), 143–144. One result of the invasion that became known as “Shaba I” was that the Carter administration sent about $2 million in non-lethal assistance to Mobutu and decided that the initiative spearheaded by Young and Vance to open relations with Angola was squashed. For discussion of these events, see Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 39–42.

Notes 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28

29

30 31 32

33

34 35 36

37 38 39

253

UNIP, Box 150, Folder 63, report on “Zambia/Zaire Relations” for May 1977, from ambassador Munkanta in Kinshasa to Foreign Minister Mwale, 1. JCL, White House Central Files (hereafter WHCF), Subject—Confidential Files, Countries, Box CO-68, Folder “CO178 1/20/77–1/20/81,” telegram from US embassy in Lusaka to the State Department, May 12, 1977, with Kaunda’s May 6th letter, and Carter’s May 19th response. JCL, mandatory review document #91-078, in author’s possession, Young to Carter, “My Trip to Africa,” June 3, 1977, 1. Zambia Daily Mail, May 24, 1977, 1. Author’s interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, Zambia, June 18, 2010. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, December 23, 2005. Author’s interview with Stephen Low, Washington, DC, June 2, 2003; letter from Low to the author, July 17, 1995. Georgetown University Library, Washington, DC (hereafter GUL), Foreign Affairs Oral History Project (hereafter FAOHP), Interview of Stephen Low, conducted by William Zartman, 1988, 19. UNIP, Box 151, Folder 68, “Record of a Meeting between the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs (Milner) and the Anglo-American Peace Mission on Rhodesia Held on 1st June 1977,” 1–4. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 250. UNIP, Box 149, Folder 62, “A Brief Report for May and June, 1977,” from Zambian high commissioner Shamoya to Siteke Mwale, July 8, 1977, 7–11. The Mondale/Vorster meeting is discussed in Piero Gleijeses, “A Test of Wills: Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of Namibia,” Diplomatic History (November 2010), 870–871. JCL, WHCF, Subject File—Confidential, Box CO53, Folder “CO 141 1/20/771/20/81,” National Security Council memo from Christine Dodson to Denis Clift, “Vice President Mondale’s Letter to President Kaunda,” July 12, 1977. My research in the United States and Zambia has not yet determined whether a reply was ever sent from Mondale to Kaunda, but in any case this draft clearly demonstrates the level of respect for Kaunda in the Carter White House and the high hopes for his potential contribution to a settlement in Rhodesia. JCL, WHCF—Subject—Countries, Box CO68, Folder “CO 178 1/20/77-1/20/81,” State Department telegram to the US embassy in Lusaka, July 11, 1977. JCL, Staff Secretary Files, Box 39, Carter’s hand-written notes from meeting with Owen on July 23, 1977. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 250–251. Given the terrible tragedy experienced in Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s rule in 1982–83 and again after 2000, it is easy to look back and second guess US policy during the Carter years. The bottom line for diplomats such as Lake, Moose, Young, Vance, and ultimately Carter, was that they wanted to end fighting in Rhodesia once and for all. Trying to avoid another Angola made sense. Furthermore, there was truly no way for them to predict Mugabe’s disastrous dictatorship. Julius Nyerere, Crusade for Liberation (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1978), 8. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), entry for August 4, 1977, 76–77. JCL, memo from Brzezinski to Carter, August 4, 1977, “Points to Confirm with Nyerere,” opened on January 20, 2000, via Mandatory Review, copy in author’s possession.

254 40 41

42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51

52 53 54

55

56 57

58 59 60

61 62

63

Notes Carter, White House Diary, entry for August 14, 1977, 83. In a June 5, 2003, interview with the author in his Georgetown office in Washington, DC, Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989, described Kaunda as the “consummate host and convener.” Documents in author’s possession from Freedom of Information Act (hereafter FIA) request number 8802626, telegram from Young to the State Department, August 28, 1977. Zambia Daily Mail, August 29, 1977, 1 and 4. FIA 8802626, telegram from Low to the State Department, September 1, 1977. GUL, FHOAP, Low interview by Zartman, 1988, 17. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 254–255. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 238–240. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 240. The Weekly Review, “Kaunda Meets Smith,” October 10, 1977, 14. UNIP, Box 147, Folder 55, Kapasa Makasa’s October 13, 1977 letter to editors of The Weekly Review and October 14, 1977, memo to the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For his recollections of his early life in Northern Rhodesia and account of the independence struggle in the 1950s, see Kapasa Makasa, Zambia’s March to Political Freedom (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1990). Carter, White House Diary, 112. Ibid., 117. For a moving and insightful examination of Biko’s life and death, as well as the call for sanctions in the aftermath that resulted in an arms embargo, see the documentary film by Connie Field, Have You Heard from Johannesburg (Clarity Films, 2010), “Story Three: The New Generation, 1968–1977” especially Chapters 8 and 9. In these two final chapters of the segment, which run for about twenty minutes, there is great footage of Biko, as well as Andrew Young addressing the UN after Biko’s death. DeRoche, Andrew Young, 90. Some aspects of my earlier interpretation have been challenged in the thought-provoking revisionist examination of the Carter policy toward South Africa by Simon Stevens. See his “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor,” especially pages 865–873. Carter, White House Diary, 123–126. Anna Mart van Wyk, The 1977 United States Arms Embargo against South Africa: Institution and Implementation to 1997 (University of Pretoria Ph.D. Dissertation, 2004), 88–90. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 240–241. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 257. JCL, WHCF—Subject—Countries, Box CO68, Folder “CO178 1/20/77–1/20/81,” White House memo about scheduling twenty minutes for Chona with the president, December 7, 1977. For discussion of aid to Savimbi during the Carter years continuing in spite of the earlier Clark and Tunney amendments, see Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 50–52. Author’s interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, December 24, 2005. Chona was particularly friendly with Andrew Young, and his wife visited the Young family in Atlanta in the 1980s while Young was mayor. Carter, White House Diary, 146.

Notes 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91

255

JCL, WHCF—Subject Files, Box CO50, Folder “CO129 1/1/78-6/30/78,” Bob Dole to President Carter, December 27, 1977. JCL, WHCF—Subject Files, Box CO50, Folder “CO129 1/1/78—6/30/78,” Christopher to Dole, January 28, 1978. FIA 8802626, Low to the State Department, February 6, 1978. Young’s diplomatic success at Malta analyzed in DeRoche, Andrew Young, 91–93. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 258–260. FIA 8802607, telegram from the State Department to the US embassy in Lusaka, “Zambian Ambassador Ngonda’s Feb. 7 Meeting with Asst. Secretary Moose—Malta and Human Rights,” February 9, 1978. FIA 8802607, telegram from Low to the State Department, February 9, 1978. Author’s interview with Steve Low, Washington, DC, June 2, 2003. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 262. JCL, Mandatory Review request 92–018, memo from Young to Carter, March 17, 1978, “U.S. Mission to the United Nations Activities March 8–15.” Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, March 24, 1978, “Rhodesia and Nkomo,” file “Weekly Reports to the President 1/78-3/78, Box 41, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL.” This formerly top secret document was opened via mandatory review on January 13, 2014, and kindly sent to the author by archivist Brittany Parris. Carter, White House Diary, 182. Robert Shepard, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 110. JCL, WHCF—Subject File, Box CO68, Folder “CO178 1/20/77–1/20/81,” bio of Siteke Mwale, May 5, 1978. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 264–265. Times of Zambia, May 18, 1978, 1. “Kaunda Wins Promises of Aid,” New African, July 1978, 51. Thanks again to the scholar who wished to remain anonymous for sharing this article with me. JCL website, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978, “The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter,” May 17, 1978, 1. JCL, Staff Offices, Speechwriters—Chronological File, Box 25, Folder “5/17/785/18/78—State Visit—Pres. Kaunda, Zambia,” May 17, 1978, “Exchange of Remarks Between the President and His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, The East Room,” 1–2. Ibid., 3. JCL website, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978, “The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter,” May 17, 1978, 2–4. JCL, Staff Offices, Speechwriters—Chronological File, Box 25, Folder “5/17/785/18/78—State Visit—Pres. Kaunda, Zambia,” May 17, 1978, “Exchange of Toasts Between the President and His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda President of the Republic of Zambia, The State Floor,” 1. Ibid., 1–3. Ottawa Citizen, “Kaunda Praises Carter Policy,” May 18, 1978, 47. Ibid., 3–5. JCL Website, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978, “The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter,” May 18, 1978, 2. New York Times, “Zambian Asks Firmness on Africa,” May 19, 1978, A4. Times of Zambia, May 20, 1978, 1.

256 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Notes Ottawa Citizen, “Zambia’s Chief, Kaunda, Awarded Nonviolence Prize,” May 20, 1978, 95. Times of Zambia, May 24, 1978, 1. New York Times, “An Increase in Aid,” May 19, 1978, A4; Times of Zambia, May 24, 1978, 1. UNIP, Box 79, Folder 19, letter from Kenneth Kaunda to Jimmy Carter, February 15, 1980, 3. New York Times, “U.S. Arms Aid Not Likely,” December 17, 1978, A15; Ottawa Citizen, “Communist Aid May Be Sought By Zambians,” May 17, 1978, 79. Sunday Post (Zambia), Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Jimmy Carter, My Brother,” October 9, 2005, 8. Author’s interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, Zambia, June 18, 2010.

Chapter 6 1

2 3 4 5 6

7

8 9 10

11

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter JCL), White House Central File (hereafter WHCF), Subject Files, Countries, Box CO68, Folder “CO178 1/20/77– 1/20/81,” Carter to Kaunda, June 26, 1978; Kaunda’s July 4, 1978, message to Carter included in telegram from State Department to the US embassy in Lusaka, July 10, 1978. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 266–268. Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (Harare: SAPES Press, 2001), 195. Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Africa’s Most Controversial Leader (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 262–264. Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 149. On Kapwepwe’s attempt to challenge Kaunda in 1978 see Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 121–123. Miles Larmer, “Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian one-party state, 1972–1980,” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, editors, One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 112–114. Sikota Wina quoted in John Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1994), 101. Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press, 1992), 14–15. Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 67, Folder 33, December 6, 1978, memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the UNIP Central Committee for Reuben Kamanga and enclosed report from the Contingency Planning Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, “Why Zambia Re-Opened the Southern Railway Route,” 1–11. Zambian officials were working feverishly to explain the decision to the Organization of African Unity, and also to the Chinese government, who had built the TAZARA railroad. Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961–87 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 191. According to Sibanda, who was a member of Nkomo’s army,

Notes

12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19

20 21 22

23

24

25 26 27 28 29

30 31

32 33 34 35

257

it may have actually been Rhodesia’s notorious Selous Scouts who murdered the survivors and then blamed it on ZAPU. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 268–270; Smith, The Great Betrayal, 271–272. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 270–271. JCL, Plains File—Subject Files, Box 39, Folder “State Department Evening Reports, 10/78,” memo from Vance to Carter, October 25, 1978. UNIP, Box 79, Folder 19, Kaunda to Carter, February 15, 1980, 3–4. JCL, Plains File—Subject Files, Box 39, Folder “State Department Evening Reports, 10/78,” memo from Vance to Carter, October 30, 1978; also see “U.S. Arms Aid Not Likely,” New York Times, December 17, 1978, 15. JCL, Plains File—Subject Files, Box 39, Folder “State Department Evening Reports, 11/78,” memos from Vance to Carter, November 24 and 30, 1978. The best analysis of the 1978 elections is in Larmer, Rethinking African Politics, 121–129. Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa, 149–150; Bizeck Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic, 1890–2001 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), 163–164. An appeal to the Zambian Supreme Court by Kapwepwe and Nkumbula was dismissed in late July 1979. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 196. JCL, WHCF—Subject Files, Box FO32, Folder “FO 3-2/CO 178 1/20/77–1/20/81,” Byrd to Carter, March 15, 1979; Bennet to Byrd, April 24, 1979. UNIP, Box 152, Folder 70, “Report on the Security Council Meeting on the Question Concerning the Situation in Southern Rhodesia from March 2 to 8, 1979,” with cover letter from Ambassador Lusaka to Foreign Minister Chakulya, April 18, 1979. JCL, WHCF—Countries, Box CO51, Folder “CO 129 1/1/79-4/30/79,”Allen Avery to Low, February 16, 1979, Avery to President Carter, February 16, 1979, and Low to Avery, March 19, 1979. Documents received by the author via Freedom of Information Act request number 8802656 (hereafter FOIA), telegram from Low to the State Department, March 19, 1979. FOIA 8802656, Low to State, March 30, 1979. Low interview with author, November 13, 1995, Denver, CO; Nkomo, Nkomo, 194. FOIA 8802656, Low to State, March 30, 1979. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 193–194. JCL, WHCF—Subject, Foreign Affairs, Box FO32, Folder “FO3—2/CO178 1/20/771/20/81,” telegram from Jackson to Carter, April 16, 1979; Moose to Jackson, May 11, 1979. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 274–275. UNIP, Box 79, Folder 19, Kaunda to the Prime Minister, May 8, 1979; Kaunda to Mudenda, May 11, 1979; “Minutes of the Special Meeting on Zambia-Soviet Friendship, May 18, 1979”; Mundia to Kaunda, May 16, 1979. FOIA 8802656, Low to State, May 1, 1979. JCL, WHCF—Subject, Box CO51, Folder “CO 129 5/1/79-6/30/79,” memo from Louis Martin to Carter on “U.S. Blacks and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe,” May 29, 1979. Low interview with the author, Denver, CO, November 13, 1995. JCL, WHCF—Trade, Box TA4, Folder “TA1/co129 1/20/77-6/18/79,” Solarz to Carter, May 23, 1979; and Stephen Solarz, “Rhodesia: Where Do We Go from Here? A Report of a Study Mission to Rhodesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana, and South Africa from April 13–20, 1979,” 4, 26–27.

258 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44

45

46 47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54

Notes JCL, Staff Offices—Louis Martin, Box 109, Folder “Zimbabwe,” Jimmy Carter, “Remarks of the President in an Announcement on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Sanctions,” June 7, 1979. Carter’s strong stand here and throughout 1979 has been thoroughly described in Andrew DeRoche, “Standing Firm for Principles: Jimmy Carter and Zimbabwe,” Diplomatic History (Fall 1999), 657–685. UNIP, Box 153, Folder 71, “Report No. 4-5/79: Rhodesia,” Chipampata to Chakulya, June 19, 1979, 6. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 280. Low interview with the author, June 2, 2003, Washington, DC. Among the highlights of Low’s three years in Nigeria would be a 1980 visit by Muhammad Ali. Zambia Daily Mail, July 26, 1979, 1, 4. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 72. Documents received by the author from the Carter library via Mandatory Review request number 92–141, memo from Young to Carter, July 27, 1979. Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 110–112. The controversial incident is also thoroughly addressed in Andrew Young and Kabir Sehgal, Walk in My Shoes: Conversations between a Civil Rights Legend and His Godson on the Journey Ahead (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 179–183. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 127, “Speech by His Excellency the President Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the Opening of the Commonwealth Summit, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka— Wednesday 1 August 1979,” 1. Information about airlines and exchange rates included in materials for the delegates included in the UNIP Central Committee’s final report on the conference circulated on January 15, 1980, UNIP, Box 209, Folder 127. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 127, “Speech by His Excellency the President Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the Opening of the Commonwealth Summit, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka— Wednesday August 1, 1979,” 2–3. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: British Prime Ministers,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), September 25, 2005, 8. Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, 199. For another positive analysis of Kaunda’s role as conference host, see Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 95. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 127, “Speeches at a Dinner Given by the President of Zambia for Commonwealth Heads of Government—Lusaka August 3, 1979,” 1–4. Manley, the biracial son of a prominent white official and black artist, had been educated at the London School of Economics. He served as prime minister from 1972 to 1980 and again from 1989 to 1992. He died in 1997. Among his many books was a study of the impact of cricket on West Indian nationalism. Manley interactions with Young are described in DeRoche, Andrew Young, 86, 124. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 75–77. Zambia Daily Mail, August 7, 1979, 1, and August 9, 1979, 1. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 127, Report to the Central Committee and Cabinet from Reuben Kamanga, chair of the political and legal committee, on “International Conferences: Hosting of the 22nd Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting—1 to 8 August, 1979, Lusaka,” January 15, 1980, 1–3. DeRoche, Andrew Young, 111–112. JCL, Name File, Andrew Young, Carter to Young, August 15, 1979. Young and Sehgal, Walk in My Shoes, 181.

Notes 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73 74

75 76 77 78

259

UNIP, Box 207, Folder 122, undated report about Frank Wisner, US ambassador to Zambia, with excerpt from a book by Soviet spy Kim Philby. The excerpt discussed the senior Wisner’s efforts for the CIA to subvert the government of Albania. The unidentified UNIP official evidently confused the younger Wisner, a diplomat, with his father, a spy. Frank Wisner, Jr., phone interview with author, June 4, 2008. Zambia Daily Mail, August 28, 1979, 1. UNIP, Box 153, Folder 72, “Up To Date Report on the Zimbabwe Issue,” high commissioner Chibesakunda to Reuben Kamanga, September 27, 1979, 1–6. JCL, WHCF—Subject Files, Box TA4, Folder “TA 1/CO129 6/19/79–1/20/81,” Carter to Stennis, September 25, 1979; DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 283. Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, 202–203. Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan Press, 1980), 380. Alexander Grey Zulu, Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu (Ndola: Times Printpak, 2007), 376–382. Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 196. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 284. JCL, WHCF—Subject Files, Box CO51, Folder “CO 129 7/1/79–1/20/81,” memo from Jerry Funk to Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 14, 1979, and Executive Order #12183 “Revoking Rhodesian Sanctions,” December 16, 1979; JCL, Staff Offices, Speechwriters—Subject, Box 26, Folder “Rhodesia 4/19/78–3/27/80,” White House statement on Lancaster settlement, December 17, 1979. Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, 205–206. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 201, 209. Times of Zambia, January 5, 1980, “Opinion,” 1. UNIP, Box 154, Folder 73, Political Report from Ambassador Shimabale in Moscow to Zambian foreign minster Nicholas Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 93–94, 115. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 209–210. While the story of Zambia acquiring Soviet MiGs has not been examined by diplomatic historians before, the crucial role played by MiGs flown by Cuban pilots in winning the 1987–88 battle of Cuito Cuanavale and driving the South African military out of Angola for once and for all has been analyzed in Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 422–426. Alexander Grey Zulu, interview with author, Lusaka, Zambia, July 22, 2005; Zulu, Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu, 386; Times of Zambia, February 7, 1980, 1. UNIP, Box 154, Folder 73, “Special Report for February 1980,” from high commissioner Nyirenda in London to Foreign Minister Chakulya in Lusaka, no specific date but probably mid-February. Frank Wisner phone interview with the author, June 4, 2008. UNIP, Box 79, Folder 19, Kaunda to Carter, February 15, 1980, 1 and 5. Kaunda to Carter, February 15, 1980, 1–4. Kaunda to Carter, February 15, 1980, 3–5. When recalling this letter 25 years later, Kaunda stood by his stance, and still believed that circumstances justified his

260

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88

89

90

91

92 93 94

95

96

Notes purchase of Soviet weapons. See Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: The Big Powers,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), September 18, 2005, 5. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 400. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 115–118, quote on 117. Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, 213–216. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 286; Carter, White House Diary, 407. UNIP, Box 216, Folder 22, “Delegation to the Zimbabwe Independence Celebrations,” April, 17–18, 1980. JCL, Chief of Staff—Butler, Box 95, Folder “Delegations [Zimbabwe], 4/14/80,” press release listing US delegation, April 14, 1980. DeRoche, “Standing Firm for Principles,” 683–685. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 206–208; Carter, White House Diary, 421–422. Paul Lusaka to the President of the Security Council, April 8, 1980, Document S/13878, and N.J. Sikaula, Zambian Charge d’affaires at the UN to the Secretary General, April 15, 1980, Document S/13893 in United Nations Security Council Official Records Thirty-Fifth Year Supplement for April, May, and June 1980 (New York: United Nations, 1982), 8, 20; Resolution 466 (1980), “Complaint of Zambia Against South Africa,” in Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1980 Security Council Official Records: Thirty Fifth Year (New York: United Nations, 1981), 17. Carter to Kaunda, March 3, 1980, JCL, file National Security Advisor Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Folder “Zambia: President Kenneth Kaunda,” mandatory review number 2009–252, declassified per author’s request on April 19, 2012. Memo from Vance to Carter, “Our Response to President Kaunda on Soviet Arms,” April 10, 1980, JCL, file National Security Advisor Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Folder “Zambia: President Kenneth Kaunda,” mandatory review number 2009–252, declassified per author’s request on April 19, 2012. Carter to Kaunda, May 13, 1980, JCL, file National Security Advisor Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Folder “Zambia: President Kenneth Kaunda,” mandatory review number 2009–252, declassified per author’s request on April 19, 2012. For a fascinating discussion of Fenwick’s 1975 visit to Moscow (pipe-smoking and all) and subsequent efforts to include human rights considerations in US/Soviet relations, to the chagrin of Kissinger, see Amy Shapiro, Millicent Fenwick: Her Way (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 168–176. Congressional Record 96–2 (1980) Volume 126, 13455–13538, Fenwick quote from 13467. Ibid., Solarz quote from 13468. Ibid., Fenwick quote from 13469, vote tally on 13470. Fenwick’s role in reducing aid to Zambia was briefly addressed in Caleb Rossiter, The Bureaucratic Struggle for Control of U.S. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy vs. Development in Southern Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 149. Jacqueline Kalley, Elna Schoeman, and L.E. Andor, Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 681. This book is an incredibly helpful resource for anyone studying the political history of southern Africa. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 226–232.

Notes 97

98 99 100 101 102

261

The Zambian soccer performance in 1980 was not nearly as impressive as it would be in 1988 in South Korea, however, when they would thrash Italy 4–0 thanks to a hat trick from their all-time greatest striker Kalusha Bwalya, who would enjoy a successful career in Belgium and Holland. See Peter Alegi, African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World’s Game (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 95. “Zambia at the 1980 Summer Olympics” and “1976 Summer Olympics,” www. en.wikipedia.org, accessed August 3, 2011. Mugabe’s visit discussed in DeRoche, Andrew Young, 118. Reagan quoted in Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 246. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: Jimmy Carter, My Brother,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), October 9, 2005, 8. UNIP, Box 156, Folder 78, “Report on the United States Presidential Election Campaign,” from the Charge d’Affaires in Washington to Foreign Minister Chakulya, October 18, 1980, 5.

Chapter 7 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8

For a brilliant examination of the coup and especially the role of Musakanya, see Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 173–184. Miles Larmer, editor, The Musakanya Papers: The Autobiographical Writings of Valentine Musakanya (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2010), 62–70. Miles Larmer, “Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian One-Party State, 1972–1980,” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, editors, One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 98–125, especially 114–119. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 510–517, quote on 513. Kaunda to Carter, January 20, 1981, and Kaunda to Reagan, January 20, 1981, Folder 20, “Zambia: President Kaunda—Cables,” Box 42, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council (hereafter NSC), Head of State File, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California (hereafter RRL). Author’s phone interview with Frank Wisner, June 4, 2008. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), External Relations Files, Box 67, Folder 33, Frank Wisner to Reuben Kamanga, March 9, 1981; Frank Wisner to Naphy Nyalugwe, March 9, 1981. His eight years as assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 made him the longest-serving person in that position, and he was among the two most influential along with G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, who served from 1961 to 1966. The position had been created in 1958 in great part due to the efforts of Congresswoman Frances Bolton. On her contributions to US/Africa relations, including a visit to Zambia in 1955 when it was still Northern Rhodesia, see Andy DeRoche, “Frances Bolton, Margaret Tibbetts, and the US Relations with the Rhodesian Federation, 1950–1960,” in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, editors, Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 299–325.

262 9

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13 14 15 16

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22 23

24 25

26

27

Notes UNIP, Box 156, Folder 79, Mbewe to Zulu, May 5, 1981, and memos of conversations between Siyolwe and Zotov, April 4, 1981, and between Siyolwe and Sergeichik, April 15, 1981. The best scholarly study of Crocker and his Constructive Engagement policy is Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 481–485. “A Wary Look at SA Links,” Johannesburg Star, April 18, 1981, 4. This article was kindly given to me as part of a voluminous collection of documents related to Zambia/US relations by a scholar who insisted on remaining anonymous. His assistance was extremely helpful. Quote about Crocker from a 1987 interview with Kaunda by the anonymous Canadian scholar of Zambian history mentioned in the previous note. Author’s interview with Chester Crocker, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 5, 2003. Author’s phone interview with Frank Wisner, June 4, 2008. Quote about Nyerere from interview with Crocker in Cuba: An African Odyssey, a 2007 film by Jihan El-Tahri. Crocker appears on camera about 20 times in the second half of this excellent documentary, thoroughly discussing the Reagan administration’s policy toward southern Africa. Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: Norton, 1992), 74–75, 93; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 488–489. UNIP, Box 156, Folder 79, report for May 1981 from charge d’affaires Chisuta in Washington to Foreign Minister Lameck Goma in Lusaka, May 30, 1981. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 96–99. Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma (London: Panaf Books, 2001), 283, 306. For Musakanya’s very compelling criticism of the Kaunda government’s abuse of authority during his 1981 trial, see Larmer, The Musakanya Papers, 71–75. Musakanya was convicted of treason and sentenced to death, but his conviction would be overturned on appeal in 1985. “U.S. Denies Zambia’s Charges against Diplomats,” New York Times, June 24, 1981, A5. Georgetown University Library (hereafter GUL), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (hereafter ADST), Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, interview with Frank Wisner by Richard Jackson, March 22, 1998, 67. Author’s phone interview with Wisner, June 4, 2008. UNIP, Box 158, Folder 85, Zambian ambassador in Washington Puttteho Ngonde to Foreign Minister Goma, “Report for the period 1st to 30th June 1981,” 1. The report on US/Zambia relations in the aftermath of the spy scandal promised in this document was not in the UNIP archives and perhaps was never submitted, since relations were quickly repaired. “Washington Reviews Zambia Ties,” Times of Zambia, July 13, 1981, 1; story accusing Lupton of being CIA spy and implying that Wisner also was a spy in Times of Zambia, August 3, 1981, 1. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State File, Box 42, Folder 20, “Zambia: President Kaunda—Cables,” Haig’s telegram to the US embassy in Lusaka containing Kaunda’s message to Reagan and a brief reply, July 15, 1981.

Notes 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43 44 45 46

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Handwritten notes about the July 5, 1981, radio report in South Africa in collection of Zambian documents given to the author by the historian who requested to remain anonymous. UNIP, Box 158, Folder 85, Ambassador Mwondela to Foreign Minister Lameck Goma, “Special Dispatch for the period 27 June to 10 July,” July 15, 1981, 11–17. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 145. Author’s phone interview with Wisner, June 4, 2008. GUL, ADST, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, interview with Wisner by Jackson, March 22, 1998, 67. Times of Zambia, September 2, 1981, 1. On Protea see Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 186–189. James Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–1988 (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1990), 280; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 505. Kaunda’s September 20, 1981, statement broadcast on Radio South Africa on 21 September, notes by anonymous Canadian scholar in author’s possession. UNIP, Box 160, Folder 89, October 22, 1981, cover letter from G.R. Zimba to Reugen Kamanga and memo of September 26, 1981, conversation between Kaunda and Fraser. Ibid. UNIP, Box 158, Folder 85, “Report for the Period 1st to 31st July, 1981,” Putteho Ngonda to Lambeck Goma, August 1, 1981, 2. In his report Ngonda also worried that Constructive Engagement might lead to an American decision to provide Pretoria with enriched uranium. For thorough analysis of the extent of nuclear cooperation between the United States and South Africa during Reagan’s first term, see Anna-Mart Van Wyk, “ The 1977 United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Institution and Implementation to 1997,” PhD dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2004, 220–227. Ngonda to Goma, August 1, 1981, 2. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, “Report of the UNIP Delegation’s Visit to the United States, from 17th October to 4th November, 1981,” 1. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State File, Box 42, Folder 21, “Zambia: President Kaunda,” memo from George Bush to Richard Allen, October 23, 1981. The October 1981 letter from Kaunda to Reagan could not be found either in the Reagan Library or in the UNIP archives, and perhaps ended up in the State Department records at the National Archives. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, “Report of the UNIP Delegation’s Visit to the United States, from 17th October to 4th November, 1981,” 4–6. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, Reuben Kamanga to Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Young, November 11, 1981. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, “Report of the UNIP Delegation’s Visit to the United States, from 17th October to 4th November, 1981,” 8. Young’s success in developing international connections while mayor is analyzed in Andy DeRoche, “Andrew Young and Africa: From the Civil Rights Movement to the Atlanta Olympics,” in James Cobb and William Stueck, editors, Globalization and the American South (Athens: University of Georgia, 2005), 185–208, especially 197–199. For discussion of Crocker’s struggle to continue providing significant aid to Zimbabwe in the fall of 1981 in spite of resistance from Senator Jesse Helms, see Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 317.

264 48 49 50

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55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

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Notes UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, Frank Wisner to Reuben Kamanga, November 17, 1981. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 118–121. For fascinating discussion of the congressional debates about supporting Savimbi, see Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 490–491. Senator Paul Tsongas strongly opposed renewal of support for UNITA, while Jesse Helms led the forces embracing Savimbi. Crocker sought a “pragmatic middle ground.” UNIP, Box 159, Folder 88, “Report for the Month of November, 1981,” Putteho Ngonda to Lambeck Goma, December 4, 1981, 1–3. UNIP, Box 209, Folder 129, Reuben Kamanga to Tarik Aziz, November 25, 1981. Kaunda and Hussein had hit it off at the 1979 Non-Aligned Summit in Cuba, and Iraq provided Zambia with massive financial assistance in 1980 including a $4 million grant to rebuild roads. For details, see UNIP, Box 58, Folder 8, “Economic Brief on the Arab Republic of Iraq,” June 1981, 4–5. Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 496–497. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State File, Box 43, Folder 2, “Zambia: President Kaunda,” memo from Paul Bremer to William Clark, April 27, 1982. The letter from Reagan to Kaunda delivered by Walters on March 14, 1981, like the earlier letter from Kaunda to Reagan delivered in October 1981 by Kamanga, were not found by the author at either the Reagan Library or the UNIP Archives. “Change for Better,” Times of Zambia, April 14, 1982, 1. Frank Wisner phone interview with the author, June 4, 2008. For a recent analysis of Kaunda’s relationship with the apartheid regime based on archival research in South Africa, see Larmer, Rethinking African Politics, 185–224. Philip Brownrigg, Kenneth Kaunda (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1989), 131. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: The Release of Nelson Mandela,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), November 27, 2005, vi. UNIP, Box 160, Folder 91, “Report for the Month of April, 1982,” Ambassador Putteho Ngonda in Washington to Foreign Minister Lameck Goma in Lusaka, May 8, 1982, 1. Brownrigg, Kenneth Kaunda, 130. Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press, 1992), 86–92. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 125–126. UNIP, Box 160, Folder 91, “Report for the Period 1st June–11th July, 1982,” Ngonda to Goma, July 11, 1982, 1–2. On American talks with Angola in 1982 see Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 198–201. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 144–148. For insightful critiques of Western aid strategies, see Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2009); Wangari Maathai, The Challenge for Africa (New York: Anchor Books, 2009). “Zambia Clinches K7M Loan Deal,” Zambia Daily Mail, June 21, 1982, 1; “Mundia Signs Forex Deal,” Zambia Daily Mail, June 25, 1982, 1; “Opinion,” Times of Zambia, June 28, 1982, 1. Interview with Nicholas Platt by Paul McCusker, July 25, 1994, 1, 7–10, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, in the Library of Congress, “American Memory,” http://loc.gov/cgi-bin/ query/r?ammem/mfdip, accessed February 26, 2007. “Opinion,” Times of Zambia, August 8, 1982, 1.

Notes 71

72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

84 85

86 87 88

89 90

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NIP, Box 155, Folder 75, Report for P.J. Mukanzo, Zambian embassy in Egypt, to UNIP administrative secretary, January 25, 1983, “President Kaunda Receives Letter of Credence from the New United States Ambassador to Zambia,” 8. Author’s interview with Siteke Mwale, December 23, 2005, Lusaka, Zambia. UNIP, Box 161, Folder 93, “Monthly Political Report for the Period 1st to 31st December, 1982,” Ambassador Kamwana in Kinshasa to Foreign Minister Goma in Lusaka, December 31, 1982, 1–2. Douglas Brinkley, editor, The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 52, 268. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 174. Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 101. Bill Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 111–112. Author’s interview with Mwale, December 23, 2005, Lusaka, Zambia. Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 203–204. UNIP, Box 161, Folder 93, “Monthly Political Report for the Period 1st to 31st December, 1982,” 5. Bush cited in DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 319. Bush cited in DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 318. Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (Harare: SAPES Books, 2001), 228–229; Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–1987: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 248–249. Nkomo, Nkomo, 240–241. UNIP, Central Committee Files, Box 216, Folder 22, John Banda to Reuben Kamanga, November 10, 1982, and cover letter from Kamanga to President Kaunda, November 22, 1982. Barbara Bush, Barbara Bush: A Memoir (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), 268. George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999), 322–324. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, “Zambia—President Kaunda,” letter from Kaunda to Reagan, December 8, 1982, declassified via mandatory review in February 2008 and sent to the author by RRL archivists. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 148–152. UNIP, Box 161, Folder 93, Report for the Period January to December 1982, from the Zambian embassy in Luanda, Angola, no author named, and undated; but, evidently it was compiled at the end of 1982. Among the many compelling arguments in this document are allegations that the MPLA government was spending 80 percent of its budget on the war and was paying as much as $1,000 per month per Cuban soldier, while everyday Angolans struggled to attain even the most basic requirements for life. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, “Zambia—President Kaunda,” letter from Kaunda to Reagan, December 8, 1982, declassified via mandatory review in February 2008 and sent to the author by RRL archivists.

Chapter 8 1

Marion Wallace with John Kinahan, A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 1–2. For recent stats, see the CIA World Factbook at www.cia.gov.

266 2

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5

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7 8

9 10 11

12 13 14 15

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Notes Wallace, A History of Namibia, 279–289. For the text of UN Security Council Resolution 435, which was adopted on September 29, 1978, see Ronald Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945–1990 (New York: Kegan Paul, 1994), 275–276. Piero Gleijeses, “A Test of Wills: Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of Namibia,” Diplomatic History (November 2010), 853–891, especially 884–890. For a thought-provoking discussion of “linkage” and its significance, see Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 180–185 and 254–262. Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), Box 161, Folder 93, Ambassador Boniface Zulu to Lameck Goma, minister of foreign affairs, “Monthly Political Report—January 1983,” 1–4. With Dos Santos still in office at the time of this writing in 2015, Ambassador Zulu’s concerns about him being power hungry were valid. Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: Norton, 1992), 185. Indeed, Platt was following in the footsteps of three excellent predecessors: Jean Wilkowski, Steve Low, and Frank Wisner. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 156. “US dishes out aid to Africa,” Times of Zambia, April 5, 1982, 4; clipping from the files given to the author by the generous Canadian scholar who asked to remain anonymous. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 320–323. Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma (London: Panaf Books, 2001), 307–309. Times of Zambia, March 21, 1983, 1, and March 25, 1983, 7. Newspaper articles describing Kaunda’s 1983 trip to the United States were viewed at the Zambian National Archives in Lusaka during a brief visit on May 26, 2010. Thanks to archivist Agatha Silembe for her assistance. Times of Zambia, March 30, 1983, 1. Douglas Brinkley, editor, The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 141. Author’s interview with Chester Crocker, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 5, 2003. Speech by Ronald Reagan, “Remarks of President Reagan and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia Following Their Meetings,” March 30, 1983, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983, Volume I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), 476–477. Speech by Kenneth Kaunda, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983, Volume I, 477. Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California (hereafter RRL), Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, “Zambia—President Kaunda,” letter from Kaunda to Reagan, May 4, 1983, declassified via mandatory review in February 2008 and sent to the author by RRL archivists. Times of Zambia, April 1, 1983, 1; and April 8, 1983, 1. UNIP, Box 162, Folder 96, “Report for the Period 1st March to 30th June, 1983,” from Ambassador Putteho Ngonda to Foreign Minister Lameck Goma, June 30, 1983, 1–2.

Notes 20

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Notes from interview with Emeka Anyaoku on May 21, 1984, by the Canadian historian who requested to remain anonymous, in the files that he generously provided the author. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: US Presidents, Johnson’s Anger,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), October 2, 2005, 6. UNIP, Box 161, Folder 95, “Approved Programme for the State Visit by His Excellency Comrade Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, President of MPLA—Workers’ Party and of the People’s Republic of Angola to the Republic of Zambia: 28th to 31st July, 1983,” 1–2. UNIP, Box 161, Folder 95, “Brief on the People’s Republic of Angola for Use by His Excellency the President, Dr. Kaunda, on the Occasion of the State Visit to Zambia by the Angolan President, His Excellency Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, from 28th July to 31st July, 1983,” Cabinet Office, Lusaka, 26 July, 1983. UNIP, Box 162, Folder 96, “Regular Report No. 8/83 for the Month of August 1983,” Ambassador Boniface Zulu in Luanda to Lameck Goma in Lusaka, 1–5. Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 75–80, 90–92, and 103. Shubin’s fascinating and very useful account of Soviet activities in Angola is based heavily on General Kurochkin’s personal notebooks. Shubin also interviewed Kurochkin, who told him that when the Mercedes-Benz arrived in Moscow from Luanda, his superiors prevented him from ever actually driving it because that went against the principles of “perestroika” that were going into effect in late 1985. UNIP, Box 162, Folder 96, “Report No. 4/83 for the Period 1st to 31st July, 1983,” Putteho Ngonda in Washington to Lameck Goma in Lusaka, August 3, 1983, 1–2. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 322–323. Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 179. Joseph Lelyveld, “Kaunda,” International Herald Tribune, September 24, 1983, T65, clipping in collection given to the author by the Canadian scholar who requested anonymity. Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 150–152. Jacqueline Kalley, Elna Schoeman, and L.E. Andor, Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 688. Bizeck Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), 164–165. For Mainza Chona’s first official communication from China, see UNIP, Box 163, Folder 99, Chona to Lameck Goma, April 16, 1984. Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Nan Talese, 1997), 546–547. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 179. Ibid., 177, 179–180. Ibid., 187–189. For a concise summary of Operation Askari, see Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 231–233. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 190–191; J.E Davies, Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 150; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 547; James Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988 (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1990), 293.

268 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

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Notes Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 191–192. Ibid., 192–193. Editorials, Zambia Daily Mail, January 31, 1984, 4, and February 3, 1984, 4. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 186 and 193–194. Shubin, The Hot “Cold War,” 97–98. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 184–185. Ibid., 159–160, and 194. Author’s interview with Chester Crocker, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 5, 2003. “Pull-Out Breakthrough Made,” Zambia Daily Mail, February 17, 1984, 1. Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press, 1992), 54. “Pull-Out Breakthrough Made,” 1; editorial, Zambia Daily Mail, February 18, 1984, 4. Nicholas Platt interview by Paul McCusker, July 25, 1994, 10, in the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, in Library of Congress “American Memory” online collection, www.memory.loc.gov, accessed February 26, 2007. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 196. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, “Zambia—President Kaunda,” letter from Reagan to Kaunda, March 3, 1984, declassified via mandatory review in February 2008 and sent to the author by RRL archivists. Transcript of Crocker and Platt press conference in Lusaka, February 17, 1984, sent in telegram from Secretary Shultz to all US embassies in Africa on February 25, 1984, document #01582 in the microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1991). Shubin, The Hot “Cold War,” 100. Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 548. The Zambian government’s initial responses to the Nkomati agreement are described in March 28, 1984, telegram from the US embassy in Lusaka to the State Department, document #01621 in the microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989; for the view that Kaunda was not involved in the planning of Nkomati see Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 88. Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 549; Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 199. Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 88. Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 340–343; Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 89. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 196 and 201. Soviet military assistance to the MPLA, even before the upsurge in the second half of 1984, was already humungous. American defense intelligence estimated Soviet military aid to the MPLA through mid-1983 at over $1.2 billion. See Defense Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Military and Other Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” April 1984, 9, document #01629 in the microfiche collection South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962–1989. RRL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, “Zambia—President Kaunda,” letter from Kaunda to Reagan, June 22, 1984, declassified via mandatory review in February 2008 and sent to the author by RRL archivists. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 196–197. Shubin, The Hot “Cold War,” 100–103. Davies, Constructive Engagement, 154.

Notes

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18 19 20

Jacqueline Kalley, Elna Schoeman, and L.E. Andor, Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 689. Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California (hereafter RRL), Executive Secretariat, National Security Council (NSC), Head of State Files, Box 42, Folder 20, “Zambia: President Kaunda Cables,” Kaunda to Reagan, November 7, 1984, enclosed in cable from Ambassador Nicholas Platt to the State Department, November 8, 1984. Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 326–327. Douglas Brinkley, editor, The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 285. Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: Norton, 1992), 285–289; Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 303. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 331–332. J.E. Davies, Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia, & Angola, 1981–8 (Oxford: James Currey, 2007), 155. Notes from an interview with Kaunda on June 30, 1985, in Lusaka, conducted by the Canadian scholar who generously shared his files with me and requested to remain anonymous. Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 345. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 332–333. Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Nan Talese, 1997), 600–602. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 257–258. Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 43 and 254. For a well-researched and insightful study, see Hugh MacMillan, “The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964–1990,” Journal of Southern African Studies (June 2009), 303–329. Kaunda and Modise interviews in the “Frontline States” section about twenty-eight minutes into “Story Seven: Free at Last” in Connie Field’s documentary film Have You Heard from Johannesburg (Clarity Films, 2010). Political Archives of the United National Independence Party, Lusaka, Zambia (hereafter UNIP), External Relations Files, Box 67, Folder 33, Oliver Tambo to Reuben Kamanga, December 31, 1980. The letter was written on ANC stationary with a Lusaka P.O. Box as the return address. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Foreign Affairs Series, Frank Wisner interviewed by Richard Jackson, March 22, 1998, 69. The meeting is briefly recounted in DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 334–335. Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 354. On Young’s role promoting the globalization of the southeastern United States, especially by fostering connections to Africa, see Andy DeRoche, “Andrew Young and Africa: From the Civil Rights Movement to the Atlanta Olympics,” in James

270

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23 24 25 26

27 28

29 30 31 32

33 34

35

36 37

38

Notes Cobb and William Stueck, editors, Globalization and the American South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005), 185–208. Andrew DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 136–137. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report (London: James Currey, 1989), 82; author’s interview with Grey Zulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, July 22, 2005; Kaunda interview in the “Frontline States” section about twenty-eight minutes into “Story Seven: Free at Last” in Connie Field’s documentary film Have You Heard from Johannesburg (Clarity Films, 2010). Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 305–306; Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 412 and 414; Davis, Constructive Engagement, 156. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 337–338. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 338–339; Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 426. Kaunda’s speech at the Harare summit quoted in Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press, 1992), 98. DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 340–341. UNIP, Presidential Files, Box 164, Folder 101, “Brief on Mozambique for Use by His Excellency the President, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, During the State Visit to Zambia of His Excellency J.A. Chissano, President of Mozambique, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique from 19th to 22nd February, 1987,” 8–9; James Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 317. Alexander Grey Zulu, Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu (Ndola: Times Printpak, 2007), 391. Sincere thanks to Nancy Mitchell for sending me a copy of Zulu’s book. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 330–331. John Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1994), 118–119. Robinson Nabulyato to Kenneth Kaunda, March 31, 1987, in Zambian National Archives and reprinted in Giacomo Macola, editor, Robinson M. Nabulyato: African Realities, A Memoir (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2008), 113–115. Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, 100. Reagan’s October 8, 1987, meeting with Kaunda noted without comments in Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 537. Quotes from congressman and Kaunda in Washington Post, October 9, 1987, A31. This crucial event in southern African history is thoroughly discussed in Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), especially 422–426. Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 107. Davies, Constructive Engagement, 157. Davies insightfully points out that when Reagan was elected there were about 15,000 Cubans in Angola, and while getting them out was a key goal of Constructive Engagement, the number more than tripled by 1988. These events are thoroughly described in Director Jihan El-Tahri’s documentary film Cuba: An African Odyssey (Arte France, 2007), in part two from 71 to 91 minutes.

Notes 39

40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52

53 54

55

56

271

The best-researched scholarly account of Cuito Cuanavale and its significance is Piero Gleijeses, “From Cassinga to New York: The Struggle for the independence of Namibia,” in Sue Onslow, editor, Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (London: Routledge, 2009), 201–224, especially 209–217. Crocker’s version of events gives far less credit to the Cuban military. See Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 370–371. Davies, on the other hand, contends that Castro’s decision to escalate his nation’s intervention turned the tide in 1988. See Davies, Constructive Engagement, 173–175. Thanks to Bloomsbury’s anonymous reviewer of my book manuscript for pointing out the ongoing debate over Cuito Cuanavale. For different views than the interpretation by Gleijeses, see Sue Onslow and Anna-Mart van Wyk, editors, Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974: A Critical Oral History, 2013, https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/southern-africa-the-cold-war-post-1974. Patrick Wele, Zambia’s Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe (Solwezi: PMW Press, 1995), 162–164. The 1988 election is insightfully examined in Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 249. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 695; Phiri, A Political History of Zambia, 165. Sam Nujoma, Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma (London: Panaf Books, 2001), 375; DeRoche, Andrew Young, 144–145. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 440–443. Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 678 and 681. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1114 and 1128. See Shultz’s comment about “characters” in Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 446; and the secretary’s description of the ceremony and its significance in Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1129. Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, 384–385. Davies, Constructive Engagement, 210–212. Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush (New York: Times Books, 2007), 62–63 and 69. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 696. Jean Wilkowski, who served as US ambassador in Lusaka from 1972 to 1976, noted sadly in her autobiography that her Zambian driver and friend of four years, Saul Mutemba, later became one of the first Zambians known to have died from AIDS. See Jean Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman in the U.S. Foreign Service (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 243–245. Kaunda’s 1989 Montreal speech noted prominently in “A History of the International AIDS Conferences,” www.aids2012.org, accessed July 22, 2013. Joseph Stepanek, Implicated in My Life: A Memoir Rooted in Poor World Development (Boulder, CO: Johnson Printing, 2010), 294. Stepanek was the US director of the Bureau of Aid for International Development in Zambia in the mid-1990s, and hosted Kaunda when he spent a week in Boulder in 2003. Lawrence Altman, “Talking about AIDS, with All the World Watching,” in The Doctor’s World Column on August 8, 2006, www.nytimes.com, accessed July 22, 2013. Meeting between George Bush and Kenneth Kaunda, Oval Office, June 7, 1989, 10 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., Memorandum of Conversation on the Bush Library Web site at bushlibrary.tamu/research/memcons_telcons.php, accessed on July 18, 2013, 1.

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59

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73

74 75

76 77

Notes Kaunda’s comment that the election of Bush had been reassuring fits with the general assessment of the Bush presidency provided by Naftali in George H.W. Bush, especially on page 3. Meeting between George Bush and Kenneth Kaunda, Memorandum of Conversation, 2. Ibid., 3. Not everyone would agree with Kaunda’s positive assessment of the US approach to AIDS in Africa going into the 1990s. For a critique of the Bush administration’s policy toward HIV/AIDS in Africa in general, see Greg Behrman, The Invisible People: How the U.S. Had Slept through the Global AIDS Pandemic, the Greatest Humanitarian Catastrophe of Our Time (New York: Free Press, 2004), 29–32. For the increasingly tragic situation due to AIDS in Zambia in the mid-1990s, and the insufficient level of funding by Bush and his successor Bill Clinton, see Behrman, 68–70. Herman Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 92–93. Cohen succeeded Crocker as assistant secretary of state for African affairs, serving during Bush administration from 1989 to 1993. Kenneth David Kaunda, “Foreword,” July 19, 1989, in Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, xi–xvii. William Claiborne, “De Klerk, Kaunda Hold Talks,” Washington Post, August 29, 1989, A16. Kenneth Kaunda, “KK’s Diary: The Release of Nelson Mandela,” Sunday Post (Lusaka), November 27, 2005, VI. Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 139–150, especially 144. Author’s interview with Chester Crocker, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 5, 2003. “We Seek Peace—De Klerk,” Zambia Daily Mail, August 29, 1989, 1. “Editorial,” Zambia Daily Mail, August 28, 1989, 4. Kaunda, “KK’s Diary.” Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 481–482. Ibid., 483–484. James Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 158–176. For Baker’s discussion of the end of apartheid, his attendance at Namibia’s March 1990 independence, and his first meeting with Mandela, see 217–229. Chiluba quoted in Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010), 53. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 485. Telephone conversation between George H.W. Bush and President De Klerk, February 10, 1990, 12:35 p.m.–12:45 p.m., Eastern Standard Time (evening in South Africa). Memorandum of Telephone Conversation on the Bush Library Web site, bushlibrary.tamu/research/memcons_telcons.php, accessed July 18, 2013, 1–2. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 489–494. For a revealing analysis of Mandela visit, particularly how his wife Winnie Mandela defused a crowd that was growing increasingly hostile in its expression of displeasure about Kaunda’s policies, see MacMillan, “The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia,” 326–327. Kaunda, “KK’s Diary.” Kaunda interviewed in “Story Seven: Free at Last,” in Connie Field, Have You Heard from Johannesburg (Clarity Films, 2010), 67th minute.

Notes 78 79

80 81 82 83

84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

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Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 498–499. Ronald Dellums and H. Lee Halterman, Lying Down with the Lions: A Public Life from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000), 142–143. Vernon J. Mwaanga, The Long Sunset: My Reflections (Lusaka: Fleetfoot Publishing, 2008), 69–71. Thanks to Nancy Mitchell for sending me this book. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 698. Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era, 205–206. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 698; Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era, 164. According to Kalley, over forty-five civilians died in the riots, while Mwanakatwe numbers the deaths at twenty-three. Radelet, Emerging Africa, 52. Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era, 198–200. Mwaana, The Long Sunset, 186–187. Simon Zukas, Into Exile and Back (Lusaka: Bookworld, 2002), 177–178. I had the great privilege of meeting Zukas at a conference at the University of Zambia in August 2005. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 699. Zukas, Into Exile and Back, 178–179. T. Rees Shapiro, “Zambian President Later Faced Corruption Charges: Frederick Chiluba, 68,” Washington Post, June 23, 2011, B8. I thank my uncle, Ron Willard, for sending me Chiluba’s obituary. Daniel Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 177–178. Jimmy Carter, Beyond the White House: Waging Peace, Fighting Disease, Building Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 103. Kalley, Schoeman, and Andor, Southern African Political History, 701. Carter, Beyond the White House, 104. Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey beyond the White House (New York: Viking, 1998), 314–315. Carter, Beyond the White House, 104–105. Mwaanga, The Long Sunset, 92 and 256. Kaunda, “KK’s Diary.” Tiyaonse Kabwe, editor, Kenneth David Kaunda: Founder President of the Republic of Zambia (Perspectives on His Exit from Office) (Harare: SAPES Books, 1997), 1. Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, 188–190. Chan also cited the quotation from Macbeth. De Klerk to Kaunda, November 2, 1991; Bush to Kaunda, November 2, 1991; Carter to Kaunda, November 2, 1991, all reprinted in Kabwe, Kenneth David Kaunda, 39, 89–90.

Epilogue 1

The 1996 election is discussed thoroughly in Bizeck Phiri, A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the Third Republic (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), 185–189. Also see Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 258–259.

274 2

3 4 5 6

7 8

9 10

11

12

13

14 15 16 17

18

19

Notes Kaunda recalled his arrest and the visit by Nyerere, during a session on “Political Challenges Facing African Leadership,” Conference on World Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, April 11, 2003, author’s personal notes from the session. “Kenneth Kaunda” in Britannica Online Encyclopedia, www.britannica.com, accessed August 1, 2014. Boston University African Presidential Archives and Research Center, “Newsletter,” Winter 2003. “African Presidential Center,” www.bu.edu, accessed August 1, 2014. Gabriel Banda, Kaunda’s special assistant who accompanied him in Boston and on his travels, has told the author on numerous occasions that the trip to Boulder was a highlight of Kaunda’s year in the United States. Joseph Stepanek, Implicated in My Life: A Memoir Rooted in Poor World Development (Boulder, CO: Johnson Printing, 2010), 292–294. Author’s interview with Kenneth Kaunda, April 10, 2003, Boulder, Colorado. For the story of how interviewing Kaunda led to the idea for this book, and more importantly to meeting my wife Heather on a bus, see Andy DeRoche, “Embracing Ubuntu: How a White Gen Xer from Maine Learned about Race and Married a Zambian,” in Elwood Watson, editor, Generation X Professors Speak: Voices from Academia (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 95–116. Todd Neff, “Panelists: Africa Can’t Do It Alone,” Boulder Daily Camera, April 9, 2003, 3b. Kenneth Kaunda, “Zambia and the Democratization of Southern Africa,” April 9, 2003, Conference on World Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, April 9, 2003, cassette recording in author’s possession. George W. Bush, “Remarks on Signing the U.S. Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003,” May 27, 2003, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2003, Book I—January 1 to June 30, 2003 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 541–542. George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Corporate Council on Africa’s United States-Africa Business Summit,” June 26, 2003, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2003, Book I—January 1 to June 30, 2003, 699. Arrivenet, “Former President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda Visits U.S. in November to Raise Awareness of African AIDS Crisis,” October 26, 2006, www.press.arrivenet. com/politics, accessed November 15, 2006. Darious Kapembwa, “Make Sport Part of Life, KK Urges Youth,” Post (Lusaka), April 14, 2014, www.postzambia.com, accessed April 14, 2014. “Long Live Comrade KK!” Post (Lusaka), April 28, 2014, www.postzambia.com, accessed April 30, 2014. Darious Kapwmpwa, “VJ Hails Kaunda’s Contribution to Unity,” Post (Lusaka), April 28, 2014, www.postzambia.com, accessed April 30, 2014. Abel Mboozi, “KK, Liwewe Unified Zambia,” Post (Lusaka), May 8, 2014, www. postzambia.com, accessed May 9, 2014. Dennis Liwewe was a long-time commentator for Zambian soccer whose distinctive voice was known and loved by all fans. He died in 2014, but had fortunately lived long enough to see the 2012 Africa Cup of Nations victory. Abel Mboozi, “Putin Congratulates Kaunda,” Post (Lusaka), April 29, 2014, www. postzambia.com, accessed April 30, 2014. Russian president Vladimir Putin had sent Kaunda a happy birthday message. “Statement from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson on the Occasion of Zambia’s Independence,” Embassy of the United States, Lusaka, Zambia, Latest Op-Eds, http:// zambia.usembassy.gov, accessed August 6, 2014.

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Index Note: Locators with ‘f ’ and ‘n’ denote figures and notes, respectively. Acheampong, Ignatius 116 Addis Ababa 53–4, 204 Aeroflot flights 146 Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of 137, 153–4, 156, 159, 161, 190 Africa Freedom Day 2 Africa Institute, USSR 117 African Americans 2, 9, 47, 79, 93, 98, 102, 151, 172, 201, 207 African Bureau 34–5 African Cup of Nations 230 African Development Fund 50 African development programs 79–80 African Group of States 143 African National Congress (ANC) 1, 10, 13, 41, 98, 192, 197, 202, 207. See also under specific African nations African Presidential Archives and Research Center, Boston University 228 Africa Report 30 Afrikaans language 86 Agency for International Development (AID) 105, 173, 228 Agricultural and Commercial Show, Zambia 189 agriculture/agricultural industry, Zambia 21, 30, 77, 140, 145, 159, 188–9, 205, 208, 215 AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) 213–15, 227–9, 231, 271 n.52, 272 n.58 Alabama 140 Alegi, Peter 261 n.97 Ali, Muhammad 154, 156, 160 All African People’s Conference of 1958, Ghana 1 All Blacks (New Zealand national rugby team) 98

Allen, Richard 167, 172, 263 n.42 Allende, Salvador 18 all-parties conference 15, 96, 127–30, 138, 140–1, 147, 150–1, 153 Altman, Lawrence 214, 271 n.55 Alvor Accords 7, 16–17, 36 American Committee on Africa (ACOA) 2 American Independence Day 122 Amin, Idi 26, 29, 40, 154 Andor, L.E, 260 n.95, 267 n.31, 269 n.1, 271 n.43, 271 n.52, 273 n.43, 273 n.81, 273 n.83, 273 n.88, 273 n.93 Andrews Air Force Base 22, 29, 80, 247 Andropov, Yuri 153 Anglin, Douglas 235 n.40, 235 n.44, 236 n.68, 239 n.15, 240 n.45, 243 n.107, 243 n.113 Anglo-American peace mission on Rhodesia 88–9, 120–2, 127–30, 135, 138, 140–1, 147–8 Angola battle of Cuito Cuanavale 209–10 border nations 1, 35 casualties 193, 210 Chinese intervention 42–3, 46, 54, 72 CIA intervention 37–9, 50–3 civil war 16–17, 22–5, 33–59, 190 Cuban intervention 33, 38–9, 46–7, 50, 52, 59 Cuban troop withdrawal from 168, 171, 174, 176–7, 185, 188–9, 191–2, 194 hiring foreign mercenaries 57 independence in 1975 7, 16, 47, 193 Kaunda-Crocker diplomatic cooperation 183–99 Kaunda-Ford talks on 22–5, 33–6

Index Kaunda’s mediation efforts 15–18, 22–5, 33–6, 38, 41–2, 46–7, 53, 57, 65, 189, 193–6, 216 Lusaka Accords 193–6 major parties 15–17, 33, 53 military setbacks 48–50 Mwale’s analysis of civil war 46–7 NSC task force report 34–5 oil deposits in Cabinda 17, 20, 24–5, 30, 50, 57–8, 109, 203, 251 n.100 Portuguese rule 7, 47, 184 resources in 46 Shaba War 119 South African involvement/attacks/ invasion of 33, 46, 52, 55, 170–1, 190, 193 South African troop withdrawal from 53, 55, 171, 181, 184, 195, 198, 210 Soviet intervention in 17, 20, 24–5, 30, 33–8, 42–3, 47–8, 50–9 struggle for independence 33–59 Tanzanian involvement 72 UNITA insurgence 15–17, 190–1 US policy and intervention 33–9, 43–52, 57–9, 126, 172 Zairean involvement in 45, 50, 52 -Zambia relations 189–90 Annual Conference on World Affairs, Boulder 228–9 Annual International AIDS Conference, Montreal 213–14 anti-American demonstrations 95–6 anti-apartheid movement 98, 175, 191, 207, 215, 220 anti-Communism 2, 120, 205 Antunes, Ernesto Melo 24, 36 Anyaoku, Emeka 189, 267 n.20 apartheid 1, 8, 12, 19, 28, 30, 41, 74–5, 77, 82, 97–8, 121, 125, 161, 163, 167, 171, 184, 186–7, 191, 205, 220, 264 n.57 contrasted with Holocaust 216 end of 31, 121, 165, 181, 188, 203, 207–9, 213, 215–20, 225, 229, 272 n.70 Apartheid Terrorism 216 Arco Corporation 223–4 Arlington Cemetery, US 29

285

armed conflict 16, 40, 120–1 armoured vehicles 50–1, 154 Arthur, Chester 167 artillery 50, 108, 190, 210 Asia 18, 42, 177 Atlanta -Africa trade links 173 Kaunda’s visit to 134 King Center in 47–8, 173 Nujoma’s visit to 211 Young as mayor of 203, 205, 211 Atlantic Ocean 2, 179 Australia 150, 171, 180 authoritarianism 137, 164–5 Avery, Allen 144, 257 n.23 Aziz, Tarik 174, 264 n.52 Bagaya, Elizabeth 26 Bahamas 34 Baker, James 215, 218, 272 n.70 Banda, Gabriel 274 n.6, x Banda, John 180, 265 n.85 Banda, Rupiah 8, 10, 36, 41, 48, 53–4, 57, 73, 228, 231, 241 n.63, 241 nn.63–4, 243 n.110, 244 n.5, 246 n.56 Bank of Zambia 163 Bantustans 26 Baptist Church, Nigeria 129 Barbados 34 Barber, James 234 n.12, 240 n.38, 263 n.35, 267 n.38, 270 n.28 Barratt, John 234 n.12, 240 n.38, 263 n.35, 267 n.38, 270 n.28 Barry, Marion 147–8, 188 battle of Cuito Cuanavale 209–10, 216, 259 n.72 BBC 155 Beijing 18, 42–3, 48–50, 170, 215 Belafonte, Harry 29 Bemba language 132, 228 Benguala railroad 16, 42 Bennet, Douglas 143 Berkeley, Bill 178–9, 265 n.77 Berlin Wall, fall of 218 Biko, Steve 125, 254 n.54 Binder, David 51 Birmingham 123 black voting rights 1

286

Index

Blair House 22, 27, 29, 132 Bloom, Tony 204 Blum, Yehudi 150 Boeing 737 57 Boeing 747 73 Bolton, Frances 233 n.5, 261 n.8 books and films, educational 48, 146 Boston University 228 Botha, P.W. 168, 175–6, 197, 204, 206–7, 211, 216–17 Botha, Roelof “Pik” 10, 86, 88, 101, 110–11, 168, 174–5, 193–6, 211 Botswana 11, 13, 17, 73, 81, 110, 147, 175–6, 184, 203, 206, 229, 233 n.1, 257 n.35 Bradley, Tom 173 Bremer, Paul 264 n.54 Breytenbach, Jan 41 Brezhnev, Leonid 14, 37, 50, 153–4, 179 Bridgland, Fred 53, 55, 236 n.47, 240 n.31, 240 n.43, 240 n.45, 241 n.71, 242 nn.92–5, 242 nn.92–5, 243 n.105, 243 n.107, 243 n.115, 243 n.117 Brinkley, Douglas 265 n.74, 266 n.13, 267 n.28, 269 n.9, 269 n.19, 269 nn.4–5, 270 n.23, 270 n.25, 270 n.34, 271 n.46, 273 n.95 Britain citizens in Rhodesia 88 criticism of US sanctions 215 and elections in Zimbabwe 155 and Geneva conference 85 involvement in Rhodesia 72, 76, 88–91, 94, 96, 100, 102, 106–7, 109–12, 120–4, 128–30, 141, 149–53, 155 military assistance to Angola 57 military assistance to Zambia 141, 155 Namibian settlement efforts 173–4 plea to lift US sanctions 153 Thatcher’s agreement to host Rhodesia talks in London 150 -Zambia relations 120, 149–50 Brown, George 51 Brown, James 5 Brownrigg, Philip 264 n.58, 264 n.61 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 122, 129, 160, 252 n.14, 253 n.39, 255 n.74, 259 n.65 Buchanan, Pat 206, 208 Bulawayo 68, 88, 180

Bureau of African Affairs 91 Bureau of State Security, South Africa 10 Burkina Faso 12 Burnham, Forbes 34 Burton, Myra 252 n.14 Bush, Barbara 179–80, 265 n.86 Bush, George H. W. at Brezhnev’s funeral in Moscow 179 as CIA director 57 Corporate Council on Africa 229 inaugural address 213 interest in Africa 229 -Kamanga meeting 172, 174 -Kaunda meeting 187, 213, 229 Kaunda’s message to 172 -Mobutu meeting 179, 216 -Mugabe meeting 179–80 Namibia negotiations with Kaunda 180–1 NATO speech 215 presidential campaign 211 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 229 Republican nomination of 167 “Thousand Points of Light” concept 213 trip to Africa 179–80, 229 US-Africa business conference hosted by 229 as US diplomat in PRC 18 US Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 229 victory of 211 Buthelezi, Mangosuthu 98 Bwalya, Kalusha 261 n.97 Byrd, Harry 140, 142–3, 152, 257 n.21 Byrd Amendment, repeal of 8, 12, 19–20, 26, 30, 67, 70, 76, 79–80, 118–19, 135, 152, 238 n.93 CAAA (Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act) 207–9, 215 Cabinda, oil deposits 17, 20, 24–5, 30, 50, 57–8, 109, 203, 251 n.100 Cadelo, Carlos 38 Caetano, Marcello 8 California 2, 62, 168, 223–4, 229 Callaghan, James 66, 81, 85, 88–90, 94, 106, 109–10, 141, 251 n.102

Index Cambridge University 26 Camp David 219 Canada 173, 213, 216 Cape Town 10, 86, 168, 194, 202, 218–19, 224 Cape Verde 194–5 Capitol Hill 49, 55, 147, 202 Caribbean, the 150, 229 Carrington, Peter 151 Carter, Jimmy 246 n.80, 247 n.81, 248 n.18, 251 n.1, 252 n.12, 252 n.17, 252 n.20, 253 n.38, 253 nn.22–3, 253 nn.32–3, 253 nn.35–6, 254 n.55, 254 n.61, 256 n.1, 257 n.33, 258 n.36, 258 n.42, 260 nn.89– 90, 261 n.5, 266 n.3 admiration of Kaunda 131–2 agricultural mission in African nations 205 boycott of Moscow summer Olympics 137, 146, 154–6, 160, 171 decision withholding recognition of Muzorewa’s new government 146–7 defeated by Reagan 135, 137, 161 diary of 123, 125–6, 156, 165 Iran hostage crisis 79, 152–3, 156–8, 161, 165 Kaunda’s admiration of 132–4 key goals 117 and Lancaster House conference 152–3 letter to Kaunda 155 observation of 1991 Zambian elections 223–4 policy towards Namibia 134 presidential campaign 59 press conference 92 proposed foreign policy 92, 112 reaction to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 153–4 revoking Rhodesian sanctions 153 Solarz’s report on Rhodesia 146–7 sworn in as president 117–18 victory of 85, 90, 112 Carter, Rosalynn 117, 205 Carter, W. Beverly 79 Carter Doctrine 154 Case, Clifford 44 Case-Javits Amendment 138

287

Casey, William 205–6, 208 Castro, Fidel 2 assistance to Angola 38, 46, 52, 191, 194–5, 210 and battle of Cuito Cuanavale 210, 271 n.39 and Kaunda talks 30, 34, 53 Kurochkin’s meeting with 194 view of Lusaka Accords 194–5, 197 at Zambian delegation in Havana 52–3 Catengue, battle of 46 Caxito 46, 50 Chan, Stephen 176, 217, 224–5, 256 n.9, 258 n.47, 264 n.62, 268 n.48, 268 n.56, 268 nn.58–9, 270 n.26, 272 n.63, 273 n.100 Changufu, Lewis 139 Chiao Kuan-hua 43 Chibesakunda, Madam 151 Chicago 145 Chigunta, Francis 231 Chile 18, 56 Chiluba, Frederick 169, 172, 219, 221–4, 227–8, 230, 272 n.71, 273 n.90 China (PRC) 3 criticism of Kaunda 170 disagreement with Zambia regarding Rhodesia 43 involvement in Angola 42, 48–9 military assistance to Zambia 155 Mwaanga’s visit to 18 against Soviet backing of Angola’s MPLA 42 Tazara railroad project 4, 43, 49, 81, 89, 139, 152, 256 n.10 and US relations 5, 42–3, 48–9 US request to support anti-MPLA efforts 48–9 and Zambia relations 3, 43, 49 Chipampata, High Commissioner 147 Chipolopolo Boys (Zambian soccer team) 230 Chisala, Beatwell 235 n.45 Chisanga, P.D. 242 n.89 Chissano, Joachim 208, 270 n.28 Chisuta, H.M. 168 Chitepo, Herbert 19, 22 Chona, Mainza 36, 192

288 Chona, Mark 4, 8, 36, 38, 243 n.110, 244 n.5, 246 n.56, 254 n.62 and Carter meeting 126–7 Chona’s report on Rhodesia 61–2 and de Villiers meeting 10 Dole’s accusations against 126–7 and Kissinger meeting 61–2, 113 and Lancaster House conference 151 against Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola 53 and Tunney meeting 56 Christian values 180 Christopher, Warren 127 Church of Scotland 132 CIA operations in Angola 4, 17–18, 37–9, 42, 46, 48, 50–3, 55–8, 176, 240 n.45 assistance to Afghan resistance 153 effort to prevent Machel-Reagan encounter 205 in Mozambique 205 spy scandal in Zambia 67, 151, 163, 168–70 cinemas, government-owned 37 Claiborne, William 272 n.61 Clark, Dick opposition to US operation in Angola 51 report on southern Africa 43–5 tours to southern Africa 39–40 and Tunney Amendment 51, 59 Clark, William 168, 264 n.54 Clark Amendment 171–2, 174, 254 n.61 repeal of 202 Clinton, Bill 272 n.58 CNN 202, 207 cobalt 166, 179 Cobb, James 263 n.46 Cohen, Herman 179, 215, 272 n.59 Colby, William 17, 39, 46, 51 Cold War 4–5, 22, 41, 47, 57–8, 68–9, 72, 82, 137, 156, 158, 163, 194, 199, 212, 221 colonialism 5, 14, 22, 28, 47, 134, 145, 163, 229 Commodity Import Program loan 105 Commonwealth conferences in Jamaica 34, 36 in Kuala Lumpur 216

Index in London 121 in Lusaka 148–50, 171 in Vancouver 216 communism 4, 22, 24, 41, 56, 62–3, 66–7, 71, 80, 82–3, 87–8, 92, 144, 207 Congo River 78, 109 Congressional Black Caucus 9, 17, 29–30, 171 Congressional Record 90 Conservative Party, UK 148 Constructive Engagement policy 161 challenges to 192–3, 201–3, 205 critical assessment by Davies 212–13 criticism by Zambia Daily Mail 194 and Kaunda’s crackdown, 1980–1982 163–81 Cook, Lodrick 223–4 copper 1–3, 20–1, 30, 36, 42, 44, 58, 77, 79–80, 89, 109, 130, 132, 139, 145–6, 152, 179, 208–9, 222, 230, 236 n.67 Copperbelt University 230 corn 145, 186, 205–6, 208, 213, 221 Corporate Council on Africa 229 corruption 83, 138, 178–9, 192, 246 n.78 coups Chilean 18 plot in Zambia 163–5, 168, 171, 209–10, 222, 227 Portuguese 7–8, 15 Crocker, Chester 163, 254 n.41, 262 n.10, 262 n.16–17, 262 n.19, 262 nn.13–14, 263 n.30, 264 n.63, 264 n.66, 264 nn.49–50, 265 n.75, 265 n.89, 266 n.14, 266 nn.6–7, 267 n.34–8, 268 n.39, 268 n.42, 268 n.44, 268 n.46, 268 n.51, 268 n.53, 268 n.57, 268 n.60, 268 n.62, 269 n.5, 270 n.23, 270 n.30, 271 n.39, 271 n.45, 272 n.59, 272 n.64 Constructive Engagement policy 163–81 Contact Group mission regarding Namibia 173–4, 176 early career 167 failures of 212–13 -Kaunda diplomatic cooperation 167, 183–99

Index nomination of 167–8 -Savimbi meeting 202 talks with Nyerere 167 visit to Africa 167 Crosland, Anthony 68, 90, 109 Cuba educational system 30 health care 30 involvement in Angola 33, 38–9, 46–7, 50, 52, 59 Kaunda’s visit to 29–30, 34, 213 withdrawal of troops from Angola 168, 171, 174, 176–7, 185, 188–9, 191–2, 194 and Zambia relations 29–30, 52–3, 57–8 Cuban Special Forces 46 Cuito Cuanavale, battle of 209–10, 216, 259 n.72 Cyprus 40, 186 Dakar 79 da Moura, Venancio 185, 194 Dancing with the Stars 230 Dar es Salaam 38, 54, 67, 69, 72–3, 89, 94–5, 107, 111, 129, 139–40, 167 Davies, J.E 212–13, 267 n.38, 268 n.64, 269 n.7, 270 n.37, 271 n.39, 271 n.50 Davis, Nathaniel 17–19, 34–5, 37, 44, 51, 58, 237 n.75, 270 n.23 Declaration of Unity 14–15 Defense and Law and Order 102–3 Defense appropriations bill, US 51, 55–6, 152 Defense Department, US 147 de Klerk, Frederik W. 216–19, 217, 218, 219, 225, 272 n.61, 272 n.65, 272 n.73, 273 n.101 Dellums, Ronald 202–4, 202–4, 220, 273 n.79 Dellums bill 203–4 Democratic National Convention in Atlanta 211 in New York 89–90 Democratic Party, US 79, 90, 157, 211, 213 Democratic Republic of Congo 1 Deng Xiaoping 49, 241 n.75 Denmark 79

289

DeRoche, Andrew 233, 234 n.11, 234 n.14, 236 n.54, 238 n.93, 242 n.82, 243 n.109, 244 n.8, 249 n.39, 249 n.45, 251 n.1, 251 n.116, 252 n.15–16, 253 n.30, 253 n.36, 254 n.46, 254 n.55, 254 n.59, 255 n.72, 255 n.78, 255 nn.67–8, 256 n.2, 257 n.12–13, 257 n.30, 258 n.36, 258 n.38, 258 n.43, 258 n.48, 258 n.52, 259 n.59, 259 n.64, 260 n.80, 261 n.99, 263 n.47, 266 n.9, 269 n.3, 269 n.18, 270 n.21, 274 n.8 DeRoche, Andy 233 n.11, 233 n.13, 234 nn.15–16, 239 n.22, 243 n.4, 251 n.113, 261 n.8, 263 n.46, 269 n.20 de Villiers, Marquard 10–11 diamond 20, 46, 184 Diggs, Charles 5, 17–18 Dobrynin, Anatoly 48, 50, 153 Dole, Bob 126–7, 140, 203 Doonesbury (comic strip) 159 Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo 17, 57, 174, 176, 181, 185, 189–91, 193–5, 197, 201, 215–16, 266 n.5, 267 nn.22–3 Dreyer, Ronald 266 n.2 Dukakis, Michael 211 Eastern Europe 221 East Germany 71, 165, 218 Easum, Donald 11–12, 17, 235 n.22 Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta 2, 134 Edmondson, William 90 Egan, Wesley 177 elections, Zambia of 1964 2 of 1978 130, 144, 149 of 1988 210 of 1991 222–5 of 1996 227–31 Ellis Park 98 El-Tahri, Jihan 262 n.16 Engel, Jeffrey 236 n.56 English language 86 epidemics 214, 228–9 equality 1, 4, 5, 25, 28, 59, 67, 76–7, 93, 114, 121, 132, 186, 198–9, 205 Ethiopia 53–5, 144, 204, 242 n.100

290

Index

Executive Order 12532 203–4 Export-Import Bank 112, 172 Fair, Laura 239 n.14 fascism 20, 28, 145 Fenwick, Millicent 159, 260 n.91, 260 n.94 Fenwick Amendment 159–60 fertilizer 105, 139–40, 177 Field, Connie 254 n.54, 272 n.77 Finland 37 Finney, John David 168–9 First World War 184 Foggy Bottom 110, 172, 175, 187, 201, 212 food aid 103, 108, 112, 145, 177, 205–6, 215 food riots (1986) 208 food shortages 21 Ford, Betty 27 Ford, Gerald 5, 23f Angola policy 48–52 at Beijing summit on Angola 48–50 decision to send Kissinger to visit southern Africa 61–2, 67, 92 defeated by Carter 85, 112–13 and Deng Xiaoping discussion on Angola 49 fear of an all-out “race war” in southern Africa 62 foreign policy 20 Kaunda’s invitation to visit Africa 27 and Kaunda White House talks, 1974–1975 7–31, 35–6 Kissinger’s suggestion to call off African diplomacy 92 pardon of Nixon 8–9 and Reagan 79, 91–2 and Tunney Amendment 51 visit to USSR 13–14 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 143 foreign exchange 21, 44, 139–40 Fourie, Brand 53, 110 France 25, 49, 53, 57, 80, 82, 160, 164, 173–4, 179, 211 Fraser, Malcolm 150, 171, 263 n.37 Freedom Statue 173, 201 Freeman, Charles 208, 212 Free South Africa Movement 202, 205 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 9–10, 15, 20, 22, 71 Fulano, Mary 116–17, 252 n.7

Gabon 117, 230 Gaylard, Jack 15 Gbadolite conference 179, 216 Geneva conference 85, 111–13, 115–16, 151, 211 Georgetown University 167 Gerald Ford Library 23, 238 n.97, 239 n.9, 242 nn.86–7, 244 n.19, 244 n.22, 247 n.87 Germany control of Namibia 184 Kaunda’s plea for military assistance 155 Kissinger-Vorster talk on Rhodesia in 86–8 Namibian settlement efforts 173–4 new visa policy 218 re-unification of 218 Gewald, Jan-Bart x, 233 n.5, 234 n.14, 256 n.7, 261 n.3, 261 n.8 Ghana 1, 116, 204 Giacomo, Macola 233 nn.4–5, 234 n.14, 256 n.5, 256 n.7, 261 n.3, 261 n.8, 267 n.30, 270 n.32 Giscard, Valery 80, 82 Gleijeses, Piero 2, 236 n.57, 237 n.85, 239 n.3, 241 n.52, 243 n.118, 251 n.1, 252 n.20, 253 n.32, 254 n.61, 259 n.72, 262 n.10, 263 n.34, 264 n.65, 266 nn.3–4, 267 n.37, 270 n.35, 271 n.39, 271 n.40 global economic crisis (1970s) 20–1 Goldwater, Barry 140 Goma, Lameck 168, 186, 262 n.18, 262 n.25, 263 n.29, 263 n.39, 264 n.51, 264 n.60, 264 n.64, 265 n.73, 266 n.5, 266 n.19, 267 n.24, 267 n.26, 267 n.32 Goncalves, Vasco 36 Gorbachev, Mikhail 218 Goree Island 79 Graham, Johnny 120, 122 grassroots movement 82, 125, 202, 207 Greene, John Robert 234 n.10, 247 n.82 Grobler, Jackie 235 n.23 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1 Guatemala 56 guided missiles 51 Guinea 117, 124

Index Gulf Corporation 56–7 Gulf Oil 20, 172, 190, 203 Guyana 34, 213 Haig, Alexander 168, 170, 179, 262 n.27 Haiti 34 Halterman, H. Lee 273 n.79 Hamburg 86 Hanhimaki, Jussi 237 n.85, 239 n.5, 239 n.16, 241 n.80, 243 n.3, 251 n.100 Harhardin, Mr. 116 Harriman, Averell 157 Harvard 69, 177 Havana 30, 34, 38–9, 45–6, 52–3, 57, 197, 210 Height, Dorothy 124, 157 Helms, Jesse 138, 140, 167, 168, 186, 263 n.47, 264 n.50 Helsinki conference 37 Hersh, Seymour 51 Hinfelaar, Marja 233 n.5, 234 n.14, 256 n.7, 261 n.3, 261 n.8, x Ho Chi Minh 2 Hochschild, Adam 241 n.55 Holmes, Larry 156 Horan, Harold 246 n.56 House Committee on International Affairs, US 134 House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa, US 146, 159, 209 House of Representative, US 55, 90, 147, 202, 206 Houser, George 2, 233 n.8 House Resolution 1460 203 House Resolution 1746 118 Huang Chen 34–5 Hugh, MacMillan 269 n.14 Hultslander, Robert 39 human dignity 76–7, 198 human rights 59, 76–7, 117, 120, 122, 132–3, 137, 159, 165, 260 n.91 Humphrey, Hubert 65, 74 Hussein, Saddam 174, 210, 264 n.52 India 186 Indian Ocean 73, 89 inflation 36–7, 130, 149 Ingersoll, Robert 63–5

291

interest groups 221 International Committee of the Red Cross 141 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 21, 44–5, 236 n.67 internet, free access 48 Iran hostage crisis 79, 152–3, 156–8, 161, 165 Iraq-Iran war 174 Isaacson, Walter 235 n.36, 246 n.64, 247 n.82 Israel 44, 150, 174 Italy 155, 160, 193, 261 n.97 Ivory Coast 20, 230 Jackson, Jesse 145, 257 n.29 Jackson, Maynard 157 Jackson, Richard 250 n.74, 262 n.23, 263 n.32, 269 n.17 Jamaica 34, 36, 150, 213 Japan 18 Jefferson, Thomas 76 Johannesburg 15, 86, 219 Johannesburg Star 11 John Paul II, Pope 213 Johns Hopkins 167 Johnson, Lyndon 2, 3–5, 3f, 27, 164, 199, 231, 233 n.13 Johnson, Phyllis 209, 216, 234 n.14, 236 n.59, 270 n.22 Jones, David 157 Kabul 154 Kabwe, Christopher 164 Kabwe, Tiyaonse 273 n.99 Kabwe conference 138–9, 142 Kaduma, Ibrahim 54 Kalley, Jacqueline 260 n.95, 267 n.31, 269 n.1, 271 n.43, 271 n.52, 271 n.83, 273 n.81, 273 n.88, 273 n.93 Kamanga, Reuben 51–3, 117, 150, 157–8, 166, 172–4, 180–1, 186, 243 n.110, 244 n.5, 252 n.8, 252 n.11, 256 n.10, 258 n.51, 259 n.58, 261 n.7, 263 n.37, 263 n.44, 264 n.48, 264 n.52, 264 n.54, 265 n.85, 269 n.16 -Bush meeting 172, 174

292

Index

criticism of Reagan’s Middle East policy 174 report on Lusaka Commonwealth Conference (1979) 150 visit to US 172–3 -Young conversation 173 Kamwana, W.K.C. 178, 265 n.73 Kangwa, Kalenga 242 n.104, 242 nn.100–1 Kansas 2, 126, 203 Kapwepwe, Simon 3, 130, 138–9, 142, 144, 149, 156, 164, 192, 204, 227, 256 n.6, 257 n.19 Kassebaum, Nancy 206 Kaufman, Scott 252 n.12, 259 n.63, 269 n.13 Kaunda, Betty 23, 27, 149, 186, 205, 214 death of 230 Kaunda, Kenneth. See also under specific entries anti-apartheid stance 19, 74, 188, 205, 208–9, 215–17, 220 appreciation of Mrs. King’s visit to Lusaka 47–8 arrest and release of 1–2, 227–8 awarded honorary doctorate from Morehouse College 134 awarded Martin Luther King Nonviolent Peace Prize 134 Barry’s meeting with 148 birthday of 78, 230 Bush’s Namibia negotiations with 180–1 Carter’s letter to 155 Clark’s talks with 39 at Commonwealth conference, London 121 congratulatory message from Johnson 231 crackdown 163–81 -Crocker diplomatic cooperation 183–99 decision to reopen railroad link with Rhodesia 139–40 defeat and end of presidency 212–13, 222–5 -de Klerk discussion and request to release Mandela 217 description of 74 dismissal of Mugabe 96 dissent towards 55

domestic policies 130 dubbed as “George Washington of Zambia” by Carter 132, 134 economic reforms 36–7 emotional side of 116, 134 facilitating Smith-Nkomo talks 138 fight against HIV/AIDS 227, 229 final years in office, 1984–1991 201–25 as first president of Zambia 1 humanitarian work of 229–30 hunger strike protesting arrest 227 irony of 225 Kissinger’s letter to 113 and Lusaka talks on Rhodesia 14–15 media coverage of 127, 134 meeting with Frontline presidents on Rhodesia 110 message to Bush 172 musical talent of 28, 131–2, 180, 228–9 New Year’s Day address 213 at OAU conference 53–4, 56 one-year stay in US 228–30 parties in honor of 90th birthday 230–1 personnel shakeup 36–7 philosophy of humanism 116, 124 plea for defensive weapons from US/UK 134–5, 137, 141–2, 154–5, 158 praise and encouragement from Manley 150 praised by Post editorial 230 “President-in-Residence” at Boston University 228–30 press conferences 2, 22, 29, 36, 104, 121, 127, 148, 209 as prime minister 2 “psychosis” of 165 reaction to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 154 re-election of 142, 192, 210, 213 religious faith and integrity of 131–2, 180 Roger’s talks with 90–3 Schaufele’s talks with 90–3 Secretary General of ANC 1 and Shaba War 119 singing ability of 131f, 132 -Solodovnikov talks 146 speech at AIDS conference in Montreal 213–14

Index struggle for independence 1–5 transparency of 149 and UNIP presidential nomination 130, 138–9 UNIP’s criticism of 130 at Victoria Falls conference 40–1 visits to US 2, 3f, 7, 21–31, 23f, 33–4, 214–15 visit to Australia 171 visit to Cuba 29–30, 34, 213 visit to Europe 121 visit to Lisbon 36 visit to USSR 13–14, 15 visit to West Africa 116–17 “watershed speech” at UNIP conference 37 Weekly Review’s accusations of 124–5 worshiped and idolized by Zambian people 224 Young’s talk with 47–8, 51 Kaunda-Bush relations, 1989 212–15 HIV/AIDS initiatives by Bush 228–9 Kaunda’s visit to US 213 US-Africa business conference hosted by Bush 229 Kaunda-Carter relations, 1977–1980 115–35, 137–61 agreement regarding Rhodesia 137–8 Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia 122–4, 135 Carter’s admiration for Kaunda 131–2 Carter’s African initiatives 125–6 Carter’s decision withholding recognition of Muzorewa’s new government 146–7 Carter’s trip to Africa 129–30 Chona-Carter meeting 126–7 Consultative Group peace talks 120–2, 135, 147 economic challenges 139–40 impact of Kaunda’s decision to reopen railroad link with Rhodesia 139–40 Jackson’s plea for US aid 145 Kaunda’s admiration for Carter 132–4, 137, 148 Kaunda’s decision to buy Soviet weapons and US criticism 134–5, 137, 141–2, 155–6, 158–61

293

Kaunda’s US visit (May 1978) 130–5 Carter’s admiration of Kaunda 131–2 Kaunda’s remarks in Carter’s honor 132–4, 137 Kaunda’s US visit postponed 119, 122 Lancaster House conference 151–2 Low’s end of tenure efforts in Lusaka 143–4, 147–8 Malta conference 127–8 Nkomo’s criticism and Smith’s attack 144–5 political challenges of Kaunda 138–9 positive responses to Carter administration 118–19, 122 and Rhodesia-Zambia attacks 140–3 Smith-Kaunda private meeting 124–6 thank-you message to Carter 165 Young’s resignation and Wisner’s arrival 150–1 Young’s visit to Africa 118–20 Kaunda-Ford relations, 1974–1975 7–31 on Angola 22–5, 35–6 arrangements for upcoming visit 7–8, 19, 21 Kaunda’s bombshell speech at White House 7–8, 27–9, 56 Kaunda’s invitation to visit Africa 27, 28 on key regional issues 25–7, 30–1 on Namibia 26, 31 proposal for better US policy 56 on Rhodesia 25–6 on South Africa 26–7 Kaunda-Kissinger relations, 1976 73–8 discussion on Namibia 74–5, 77 discussion on Rhodesia 74–6 discussion on South Africa 74–5 Kaunda-Reagan relations, 1980–1982 163–81 Contact Group mission on Namibian settlement 173–4 differences of opinion 173–4 4th of July message to Reagan 170 Kamanga’s visit to US 172–3 Kaunda-Reagan meetings 186–9, 209 Kaunda’s support of Constructive Engagement and summit with P.W. Botha 175–6

294

Index

messages from Reagan 175 messages to Reagan 165, 172 Platt’s role and assignment 177–8 Walters’ meeting with Kaunda 170, 175 Kennedy, Edward 29 Kennedy, John vii, 2, 4–5, 28–30, 213, 215, 233 n.10 Kennedy, Robert 2, 29 Kennedy, Ted 156, 203, 209 Kenneth Kaunda Children of Africa Foundation 229 Kenneth Kaunda Day, Georgia 134 Kenya 16 Ali’s mission to urge Moscow Olympics boycott 156 Bush’s visit to 179 Kissinger’s visit to 69, 79, 82 UN economic conference in 77, 247 n.84 Weekly Review’s accusations of Kaunda-Smith private talk 124–5 Kenyatta, Jomo 16, 69 KGB, Soviet Union 153 Khama, Seretse 13, 15, 73, 81, 110 Kinahan, John 267 n.1 King, Coretta 47, 134, 173 King, Martin Luther 19, 47 Carter’s quote of 129 -Kaunda meeting 2 Kaunda’s praise of 134 murder of 5 national holiday honoring 205 and Young 51 Kinshasa 16, 35, 37, 39, 41, 44, 57, 78, 107, 109, 178 Kissinger, Henry 7 Boston speech 102 and Botha talks 110–11 and Callaghan talks 85, 88, 90, 94 conversation with Wisner 91–2 criticism of 78 criticism of Wilkowski 64, 77–8, 82–3, 92 Crosland’s advice to 68–9 Dallas speech 66 diplomacy with external forces to support anti-MPLA efforts 48–9 diplomacy with the Soviets/Cuba over Angola 48–52, 58 over Rhodesia 66, 74

efforts in Angola 33–5, 58 first visit to Africa (April 1976) 61–2, 67–80 meeting with Kaunda in Zambia 68, 73–8 meeting with Kenyatta in Kenya 69, 79 meeting with leaders of other regions 78–9 meeting with Mobutu in Zaire 78, 85 meeting with Muzorewa 68 meeting with Nkomo in Zambia 68, 75 meeting with Nyerere in Tanzania 67–73 focus on Rhodesia 41, 58–9, 61–2, 65–7, 82, 85–114 Schaufele’s recommendations 66–7 talks with Callaghan 85, 88, 90, 94 talks with Vorster 86–8, 94–5 Wilkowski’s report and Kissinger’s response 63–4 at Geneva sessions 85 meeting with Mwaanga 8 memoirs of 25, 46, 58, 64, 75, 78–9, 99 under Nixon 61 Philadelphia speech 92–3, 102 press conferences 73, 93, 97, 102, 108–9 report to Ford on Africa trip 80–2 second visit to Africa (September, 1976) 95–102 assessment with Mwale on 111–12 meeting with Kaunda in Lusaka, Zambia 95–7, 102–6 meeting with Mobutu in Zaire 107–9 meeting with Nkomo in Zambia 105–6 meeting with Nyerere in Tanzania 95, 106–7 meeting with Smith in Pretoria, South Africa 99 meeting with Vorster and Smith in Pretoria, South Africa 99–102 meeting with Vorster in Pretoria, South Africa 97–8 planning for 92–5 sexist attitude of 64, 78, 82–3 talks with Banda 41

Index talks with Chiao Kuan-hua 43, 46 and Tunney Amendment 51 updates to Ford on Rhodesia 90 view of Nyerere 67 view of Smith 104–5, 111–12 view of Victoria Falls conference 41 view of Vorster 104 visit to China 43 visit to Europe 85–6, 88, 94, 106, 109 Washington speech 19–20 Zurich meetings 94 Kissinger, Nancy 28 Kurochkin, Konstantin 190, 194, 267 n.25 kwacha, local currency 21, 149 Labour Party, UK 148 Lagos 125, 129 Lake, Anthony 122 Lake Kariba 140, 142 Lake Lanier 173 Lancaster House conference 12, 122, 151–3, 156, 259 n.65 land reforms 37 Land Rovers 145 Lardner-Burke, Desmond 98, 102 Larmer, Miles 233 n.6, 256 nn.6–7, 257 n.18, 261 nn.1–3, 262 n.21, 264 n.57, 271 n.42, 273 n.1 League of Nations 184 left-wing groups 186, 205 Lelyveld, Joseph 267 n.29 Liberia 78–9, 117, 129, 135, 156 Life (magazine) 2 Li Hsien Nien (Li Xiannian) 42–3, 240 n.47 Lincoln Memorial, Washington 2 Lisbon 7, 9, 16, 22, 24, 36 Lithuania 218 Livingstone 40, 68, 78, 102, 106, 142, 190, 216–17 Lord, Winston 246 Los Angeles 172–3, 224 Low, Steve 91–2, 119, 120, 122, 135, 251 n.2, 252 n.18, 253 nn.27–8 Avery’s letter and Low’s response 144 diplomacy efforts regarding Rhodesia 120–1 end of tenure efforts in Lusaka 143–4 end of tenure in Zambia 147–8 and Kaunda talks 128, 147–8

295

meeting with Solodovnikov 144 posting in Nigeria 148 succeeded by Wisner 151 Luanda 16–17, 25, 30, 33, 35–9, 46–8, 50–1, 53–4, 56, 146, 171, 176, 181, 185, 189–91, 193–5, 198, 211, 213, 265 n.90, 267 n.24, 267 n.25 Luce, Henry 2 Lugar, Richard 203 Lumbwe, Webster 169 Lupton 169 Lusaka. See also under Zambia and specific entries Kaunda-Nyerere talks in 54 Kaunda-Smith talks 124–5 Kissinger’s speech on new US policy 70, 75–8 Martin Luther King Cultural Center 47–8 parliament 55, 227 State House 9, 11, 13, 16, 47–8, 57, 74–5, 95, 104, 106, 119, 124, 128, 138, 146, 148, 167, 174–5, 180, 190, 192, 195, 197, 199, 210, 213, 221–2, 224–5, 228, 235 n.45 US embassy in 38 Young’s visit to (May 1977) 119–20 Lusaka, Paul 143, 148, 157, 260 n.87 Lusaka Central Prison 164 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference (1979) 148–50, 171 formal discussion on Rhodesian issue 150 Kamanga’s report on 150 opening session 148–50 Thatcher’s speech 150 Lusaka Conference on Rhodesia 14–15 on South Africa 193–6 Lusaka High Court 142 Lusaka International Airport 73, 220 Lusaka Manifesto, 1969 10–12, 25 compared to US Declaration of Independence 76 Machel, Samora 9, 12, 13 Clark’s meeting with 39 -Crocker meeting 205

296

Index

early career life of 71 -Kaunda meeting 9, 12–13, 15, 92, 110 and Nkomati Accords 197 -Nyerere relationship 70–1, 139, 146 -Reagan summit 205 support of UN sanctions in Rhodesia 62 untimely death of 207–8 Macola, Giacomo 233 nn.4–5, 234 n.14, 256 n.5, 256 n.7, 257 n.19, 261 n.3, 261 n.8, 267 n.30, 270 n.32 MacPherson, Fergus 233 n.7 MacQueen, Norrie 234 n.6, 239 n.11 Mafia 179 maize 152, 177, 213 Makasa, Kapasa 124–5, 254 nn.50–1 Makeba, Miriam 11 Mandela, Nelson 98, 175 address at Cape Town 219–20 and Buthelezi 98 and Dellums meeting 220 friendship with Kaunda 204, 220–1 Kaunda’s efforts to release 175, 215, 217 meeting with de Klerk 218–19 release of 217–19 visit to Lusaka 220 Mandela, Winnie 219, 272 n.75 Manley, Michael 150, 258 n.48 Manning, Robert 238 n.115 Mao Zedong 42, 48 Marley, Bob 157 Marshall, Thurgood 118 Martin, David 209, 216, 234 n.14, 236 n.59, 270 n.22 Martin Luther King Center, Atlanta 47–8, 173 Martin Luther King Cultural Center, Lusaka 47–8, 59 Martin Luther King Nonviolent Peace Prize 134 Masai 69 Masire, Quett 211 Masiye, A.S. 242 n.100 Massachusetts 211 mass graves 126 Massie, Robert 247 n.3, 262 n.11, 262 n.17, 263 n.35, 264 n.50, 264 n.53, 267 n.33, 267 n.38, 268 n.55, 268 n.57, 269 n.11

Mbeki, Thabo 204 Mbewe 166 McCusker, Paul 264 n.69, 268 n.50 McHenry, Donald 151, 184 McNamara, Robert 21, 27 Meet the Press 145, 154 Meredith, Martin 99, 245 n.32, 249 n.60, 259 n.61 Middle East 80, 82, 114, 148, 174 MIG fighters 57, 135, 154–5, 158–61, 166, 169–70, 259 n.72 Mijoni, Vincent 245 n.54 Miles, Patrick 96 Milner, Aaron 103, 120, 250 n.78 minerals 20, 167, 186 Mitchell, Nancy 240 n.49, 251 n.1, 270 n.29, 273 n.80 Mobutu, Joseph 27, 35 allegations against 44 and Bush meeting 179, 216 corruption of 178–9 as “kleptocratic” 178–9 lifestyle of 44 meeting with Reagan 178 press conferences 108–9 relations with US 35 and Shaba War 119 views of Angolan issue 35 Modise, Billy 204–5, 269 n.15 Moi, Daniel Arap 211 Mombasa 16 Mondale, Walter 121–2, 125, 135, 147, 201, 253 nn.32–3 Mondlane, Eduardo 71, 245 n.39 Monrovia 79 Montreal Olympics (1976) 160 Moose, Richard 122, 127–8, 145, 253 n.36, 257 n.29 Morejon, Eduardo 38–9 mortars 50 Moscow Olympics (1980) Soviet “training programs” for Zambians 146, 154 US boycott 137, 154–6, 160, 171 Zambia’s participation 160 Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 220–3, 230–1 Moyo, Dambisa 264 n.67 Mozambique

Index ANC of 197 border closure decision 63, 74 CIA operations in 205 civil war 205, 208 and coup in Portugal (1974) 7, 8, 15 effect of independence on South Africa 10 financial support by the Commonwealth nations 34 guerrilla forces in 87 independence (1975) 7, 10 independence celebration 38 negotiations for independence independence agreement 9 Kaunda’s mediation efforts 8–10 Mwaanga-Kissinger talks 8 Portuguese rule in 9, 71 raids of Rhodesian forces into 126 relations with USSR 116 and Rhodesia 11–12, 62–3 -South Africa relations 11 US aid to 72, 76 and US relations 168 ZAPU/ZANU guerrilla forces operating from 142 Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) 205, 208, 215 Mtshani, A. 180 Mudenda, Elijah 36, 119, 235 n.20, 243 n.110, 244 n.5, 246 n.56, 248 n.16, 252 n.19, 257 n.31 Muehlenbeck, Philip 233 n.10, 238 n.96 Mugabe, Robert 7, 13, 40–1 acceptance speech of 157 and Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia 123, 129 boycotting of Lancaster conference 151 -Bush meeting 179–80 crack down on Nkomo 153, 179–80 as first prime minister of Zimbabwe 157 at Geneva conference 115 Kaunda’s dismissal of 96 -Reagan meeting 191 Muhammed, Murtala 55 Mukanzo, P.J. 265 n.71 Mulcahy, Edward 17, 44–6, 241 n.53 Muller, Hilgard 10, 12

297

multinational corporations 131, 209 Mulungushi Conference Center 148, 195, 197, 221, 258 nn.44–5 Mundia, Nalumino 177, 257 n.31 Musakanya, Valentine 163–5, 168, 227, 261 n.1, 262 n.21 Mushala, Adamson 16 Muslim Students Following the Line of the Iman 152–3 Musokotwane, Kebby 177 Musset, Bernard 100 Muzorewa, Abel 12–15, 18, 34, 40–1, 68, 71–2, 93–4, 111, 127–9, 140, 142, 145–52, 155–7, 235 n.25, 235 n.32, 235 n.37, 236 n.59, 240 n.35, 240 n.41, 245 n.30 criticism of US efforts 68, 71 at Geneva conference 115–16 refusal to meet Kissinger 71 seeking funds from Netherlands 41 Thatcher’s support for 148 visit to US 138 Mvula, Albert 240 n.37 Mwaanga, Vernon 4, 10–11, 13–14, 24–8, 30, 61, 221–2, 230–1, 234 n.16, 234 nn.2–3, 235 n.28, 235 n.30, 236 nn.57–8, 237 n.75, 237 n.86, 238 n.103, 238 n.105, 238 n.111, 239 n.1, 239 n.10, 239 n.12, 273 n.80, 273 n.97 meeting with Kissinger 8 speech in Lusaka 18–19 support for Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 222 tour of Asia 18–19 at UN General Assembly session 10, 36 Mwale, Siteke 7, 19–21, 19– 22, 25, 29–30, 57, 89–90, 96– 98, 108, 115–16, 119–20, 135, 141, 157, 178–9, 236 n.65, 236 n.67, 236 nn.61–2, 237 n.75, 237 n.88, 239 n.10, 241 n.68, 241 nn.63–5, 242 n.99, 243 n.116, 246 n.56, 246 n.68, 248 n.15, 248 n.20, 249 n.47, 249 n.56, 249 nn.51–2, 250 n.98, 251 n.109, 252 n.11, 252 n.18, 252 nn.4–5, 253 n.26, 253 n.31, 255 n.77, 265 n.72, 265 n.78 analysis of Angolan civil war 46–7, 59

298 and Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia 123 Carter’s meeting with 129 Kissinger’s assessment on Rhodesia with 111–12 memo to Kaunda 115–16 speech at UN Security Council 89, 112, 129 visit to Lusaka 59 Mwanakatwe, John x, 36, 103, 221, 236 n.68, 239 n.13, 239 n.15, 256 n.8, 270 n.31, 273 n.85, 273 nn.82–3 Mwanashiku, Luke 192 Mwanawasa, Levy 221 Mwondela, W.R. 170, 263 n.29 Nabulyato, Robinson 208–10, 270 n.32 Naftali, Timothy 271 n.51, 272 n.56 Nairobi 69–70, 75, 95, 179, 247 n.84 Namibia Carter administration’s policies towards 134 diplomatic negotiations 165–6 geographic position 184 German colonization 184 independence 211–12 independence struggle 163, 181 Kaunda-Bush negotiations 180–1 Kaunda-Crocker diplomatic cooperation 183–99 Kaunda-Ford talks on 26, 31 Kaunda’s efforts in 159, 171, 175 McHenry’s efforts in 151 OAU policy on 26 Reagan’s policies towards 180–1, 212–13 South African attacks on 156, 170–1 South African rule 19, 70, 184 South African troop withdrawal from 171, 174, 176, 181, 184 UN supervision 77 US policy and intervention 70, 172–4 US support for independence 19–20, 70, 74, 77 Young’s efforts 211 -Zambia relations 184 Namibian Institute 119 National Assembly 208, 210, 222

Index National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 15–17, 20, 22–4, 30, 33–7, 41–3, 45–6, 49–50, 52, 57 National Press Club 134, 188 national pride, Africa 49 National Security Council (NSC) 34–6, 51, 66–7, 80, 91, 109, 120–2, 125, 167, 238 n.97, 239 n.9, 242 nn.86–7, 244 n.22, 247 n.87, 253 n.33, 261 n.5, 269 n.2 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 15–17, 22, 24–5, 30, 33–6, 38, 41–3, 46, 49, 52–4, 57–8, 172, 174, 181, 185, 190–1, 195, 198, 202, 205, 209–13, 215, 240 n.45, 264 n.50 Nazis 10 Netherlands 41 Neto, Agostinho and Cadelo talks 38 Castro’s support 38 and Clark talks 39 declaration of Angolan independence 47 -Kaunda relations 16–17, 23, 33, 58, 92 regime 57 and Rodrigues 195 Soviet support to 17, 24–5, 33, 35 and Zambia relations 57 New African 130 New Orleans 156 newspapers 37, 144, 169, 189, 194, 222, 230, 266 n.11 Newsweek 92 New York 2, 10, 36, 41, 43, 89, 111, 125, 143, 148, 151, 154, 176, 178, 202, 211–12 New York City 173, 211 New York Times 29, 30, 33, 51, 191 New Zealand 98, 150, 160, 171, 176 Ngonda, Putteho 127–8, 171–2, 174, 176, 188–9, 191, 263 nn.39–40, 264 n.51, 264 n.60, 266 n.19, 267 n.26 Nicaragua 213 Nickel, Herman 175 Nigeria 55, 81 Ali’s mission to urge Moscow Olympics boycott 156

Index Bush visit to 179 Carter trip to 129 Kaunda visit to 116 relations with US 118, 125, 130 role in resolving Rhodesian dispute 116 Young visit to 118 Nixon, Richard breakthrough on US/China relations 181 criticism of 9, 62, 114 Ford’s pardon of 8–9 neglect of Africa 5, 9, 14, 61, 114, 207 resignation of 5, 9 snub of Kaunda 21, 27 Nkomati Accords 197, 268 n.56 Nkomati River 197 Nkomo, Joshua 7, 11, 40 and Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia 120, 123, 129 attempted assassination of 145 betrayal by Mugabe 153, 179–80 boycotting of Lancaster House conference 151 criticism of Smith and Rhodesia policy 144–5 at Geneva conference 115 and Kaunda relations 96, 138 memoirs of 87 Mugabe’s crackdown on 153, 179–80 press conference 144–5 and Smith peace talks 63, 65–6, 138 Soviet support to 87, 144 Nkrumah, Kwame 1, 116 Nkumbula, Harry 1, 130, 138–9, 142, 144, 149, 156, 192, 227, 233 nn.4–5 Nobel Peace Prize 202, 216, 230 Non-Aligned Conference 5 Non-Aligned movement, Sri Lanka 90 Non-Aligned movement, Zimbabwe 207 non-profit organization 172, 229–30 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 4 non-violence 2, 59 North Carolina 2, 138 North Korea 44 Norway 202 nuclear weapons 4, 51, 152, 214, 263 n.39 Nujoma, Sam 166, 168, 171, 184, 186, 194, 197, 198, 211, 212, 262 n.20, 266 n.10, 268 n.59, 271 n.44, 271 n.49 Nyalugwe, Naphy 165–6, 261 n.7

299

Nyandoro, Gideon 245 n.30 Nyangoni, Christopher 245 n.30 Nyerere, Julius (“Mwalimu”) 12, 13, 54 and Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia 122–3 Clark’s meeting with 39 -Crocker talks 167 -Kaunda talks 54 Kissinger’s meeting with 67–73, 95, 106–7 Kissinger’s view of 67 -Machel relationship 70–1, 139, 146 meeting with Carter 122 role as mediator 73 victory of 71 Nyirenda, High Commissioner 155 Obama, Barack 229, 231 Obasanjo, Olusegun 116, 118, 125, 129 O’Brien, Michael Francis 168–9 Official Development Assistance, to Zambia 65 oil 17, 20–1, 24–5, 30, 46, 50, 56–8, 77, 103–4, 109, 119, 121, 123, 140, 190, 243 n.118 Onslow, Sue 251 n.1, 271 nn.39–40 Operation Askari 193, 267 n.37 Operation Carlota 46 Operation Foxbat 46 Operation IA Feature 37–8, 48, 57–8, 241 n.81 Operation Zulu 46 Opportunities Industrialization Centers 92–3 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 5 division in 55 mediation in Angola 23, 33, 47, 50, 52–5 policy on Namibia 26 policy on Rhodesia 25 Osei-Hwedie, Kwaku 248 n.17 Ottawa Journal 30 Oudes, Bruce 238 nn.109–10 Oval Office meetings viii, 5, 7, 22, 25, 27, 62, 67, 126–7, 132, 134, 164, 187, 189, 202, 206–7, 209, 213–15, 271 n.56 Owen, David 120, 122–4, 127, 129, 141, 253 n.35

300

Index

Palestinian Liberation Organization 148 Pan-African Congress 236 n.54 Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) 204 parliament Angolan 24, 185 British 66 South African 11, 219 Zambian 18, 55, 192, 227 Zimbabwean 245 n.47 Patriotic Front 113, 115, 122–4, 126–8, 138, 144, 149, 153 Peace Corps 2, 67 Persian Gulf 154 Petersen, Hector 86 Philadelphia 92–3, 102, 249 nn.36–7 Phiri, Bizeck 192, 233 n.3, 243 n.106, 257 n.19, 267 n.32, 271 n.43, 273 n.1 Phiri, Getrude 11, 235 n.21 Phiri, Wilted 164, 186 platinum 20 Platt, Nicholas 177, 185–6, 196, 264 n.69, 268 n.50, 269 n.2 Podgorny, Nikolai 14, 117 Pollsmoor Prison 175 Poorter, John 15 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 16–17, 22–5, 33–8, 42–3, 46–58, 181, 185, 190, 193, 195, 198, 210, 235 n.45, 237 n.88, 265 n.90, 267 n.22, 268 n.60 Port Elizabeth 203 Portugal 7–10, 15–17, 22, 24, 27–8, 36, 39, 47, 57, 59, 71, 184 Portuguese language 176 Posner, Daniel 273 n.91 Post (newspaper) 230 Potgeiter, Brigadier Alexander 206 Potts, Jim 17 poverty 79, 208–9 Powell, Lieutenant “Spike” 142 “President-in-Residence,” Boston University program 228–30 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 229 Pretoria. See South Africa Princeton University 228 Project Concern 229–30

Public Law 480 programme, US 112 public service 213 Puerto Rican independence 67 racism 4–5, 8, 13, 22, 28, 56, 66, 83, 89–90, 118, 134, 149, 155, 158, 161, 163, 194, 199, 209, 217–18, 247 n.81, viii Radelet, Steven 272 n.71, 273 n.84 Reagan, Ronald anti-apartheid policy 202–8 challenge to Carter 135, 137 CIA efforts preventing Machel-Reagan encounter 205 controversial speech on South Africa 206–7 criticism of Kissinger 79 diary of 178, 187, 202–3, 205 and Ford 62, 79, 91–2 Kamanga’s criticism of 174 letter to Kaunda 196 -Machel meeting 205 meeting with Kaunda 183, 186–9 Middle East policy 174 -Mobutu meeting 178 -Mugabe meeting 191 Namibia policy 180–1, 212–13 re-election/second term 201, 205 South Africa policy 174–5, 189 sworn in as president 165 victory of 79, 135, 137, 161, 201 Reagan Foundation 223 Red Cross, Zambia 141 “Red River Valley” (Kenyan song) 69 Reinhardt, John 98, 102–3 Relly, Gavin 204 Republican Party, US 62, 71, 90–1, 101, 167, 203, 211, 223, 231 retirement pensions 88 Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 12, 122, 151–3, 156, 259 n.65 African National Congress (ANC) of 41 attacks on Zambia 141, 151–2 British rule in 88 Bush’s visit to 179 Carter administration’s policies towards 134 Case-Javits Amendment 138

Index Chinese intervention 43 Chona’s report on 61–2 civil war 41, 62–3, 65–6, 85–161 Cuban assistance to 62, 65 danger of disintegration 19 economic crisis 62 economy 100 education and development aid by US 67 freedom fighters 115–16 guerrilla forces 66, 88, 121, 123 humanitarian aid to refugees by US 76 independence 156–7 Internal Settlement elections 143–5, 147 issue of Soviet influence in 144 joint US-UK initiative/proposals 66, 68, 85, 88–90, 94–6 Kaunda-Ford talks on 25–6, 31 Kaunda’s cooperation and mediation efforts 3–4, 8–13, 40–1, 62, 85–114 Kissinger’s efforts 41, 58–9, 61–7, 85–114 Mozambique’s assistance to 11–12, 62–3 new constitution 147, 153 new nation of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 146–7, 156–7 new US policy towards 76 raid into Mozambique 126 refugees 70, 76, 140 Smith regime 20, 34, 121 South African attacks on 206 South African forces in 34 Soviet assistance to 62, 65–6, 69–74, 79, 81–2, 87, 101, 107, 116 Thatcher’s support 148 transition to majority rule 85, 88 UK initiatives/proposals 90–1, 94, 106 unilateral declaration of independence (1965) 3, 58, 155 US aid 185 food 186 US imports of chrome 8, 20, 118 US policy towards 13, 68–9 US sanctions against 3, 5, 7, 20, 34, 62, 100, 118, 135 Victoria Falls conference on 40–1

301

Wilkowski’s report and Kissinger’s response 63–4 ZAPU attacks on Rhodesian planes 142–3 Rhodesian Federation 1 rice 177 right-wing groups 24, 186, 205, 208, 223 Robben Island 175, 218 Roberto, Holden 15–17, 20, 23–4, 33–4, 37, 39, 43, 46, 52, 57 Robinson, Charles 63, 246 n.56 Robinson, Randall 201–2 “Rock of Ages” (song) 29 Rodrigues, Manuel Alexandre “Kito” 195 Rogers, William 5, 90–3, 249 n.50 Rome 193 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, California 223 Rosser, James 243 n.3, 245 n.52, 246 n.65 Rossiter, Caleb 244 n.15, 250 n.86 Rumsfeld, Donald 51 Rusk, Dean 4, 95 Russian language courses 146 Rustin, Bayard 2 Sahel region 79 Salisbury 12, 15, 41, 88, 108, 111, 120, 123, 126, 128–9, 142–3 SAM-7 53, 140, 142 Samuel, Richard 249 n.50 Sao Vicente 194 Sarantakes, Nicholas 259 n.70, 260 n.80, 260 n.96, 261 n.100 Sardanis, Andrew 233 n.12, 237 n.69 Sata, Michael 230 Saudi Arabia 82 Savimbi, Jonas 15–17, 23–5, 27, 33–4, 36, 38–9, 41–3, 46, 49, 52–3, 55, 57–8, 72, 126, 166, 172, 174, 176, 181, 185, 190–1, 194, 202, 205, 209, 212, 215–16, 235 n.45, 237 n.78, 238 n.97, 240 n.45, 243 n.115, 254 n.61, 264 n.50 Scarnecchia, Tim 249 n.35 Schaufele, William 53, 64–7, 73, 87–94, 244 n.21, 246 n.56 Schoeman, Elna 260 n.95, 267 n.31, 269 n.1, 271 n.43, 271 n.52, 273 n.81, 273 n.83, 273 n.88, 273 n.93

302 Schulzinger, Robert D. 235 n.36, 247 n.82 Scowcroft, Brent 215, 249 n.35 Scranton, William 78 Second World War 10–11, 18, 99, 170, 184, 210 Secret Service, US 165 Seelye, Talcott 68, 244 n.25 Sehgal, Kabir 258 n.43, 258 n.54 Selous Scouts 142, 257 n.11 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US 39, 134, 203 Senegal 55, 79, 82, 92, 156, 179, 229 Senghor, Leopold 55, 79 Separate Amenities Act 218 Sergeichik, General 166, 262 n.9 Seventh Summit of Non-Aligned Countries 186 Shaba War 119, 179, 252 n.20 Shapiro, T. Rees 273 n.90 Shaw, Timothy 235 n.40, 235 n.44, 236 n.68, 239 n.15, 240 n.45, 243 n.107, 243 n.113 Shepard, Robert 255 n.76 Shimabale, Mr. 154 Shubin, Vladimir 116, 236 n.49, 252 n.10, 267 n.25, 268 n.43, 268 n.54, 268 n.63, 270 n.36 Shultz, George 179, 187–8, 192–3, 202, 206, 211–12, 271 nn.47–8 Sibanda, Eliakim 240 n.40, 244 n.17, 252 n.3, 256 n.11, 257 n.20, 257 n.28, 265 n.83 Sierra Leone 117 Sikaula, N.J. 260 n.87 Sisulu, Walter 218–19 Sithhole, Ndabaningi 13, 128 Siyolwe, Joshua 166, 262 n.9 Smith, David 100 Smith, Ian 3, 9 and Anglo-American initiative 120, 123–5 attempted assassination of Nkomo 145 birth of 73 Carter’s refusal to meet 140 internal settlement, “Salisbury Plan” 127–30, 134, 138, 140, 142–3, 145, 148 meeting with Kaunda 124–5 memoirs of 124, 138

Index and Nkomo peace talks 63, 65–6, 138 televised announcement 109–11 and US five-point proposal 99, 105, 109–10 visit to US 140–2 Vorster’s support of 129 Soares, Mario 9, 16 Sobukwe, Robert 236 n.54 Socialist International Conference 213 socialist policies 5, 37, 56 Solarz, Stephen 146–7, 157, 159, 257 n.35, 260 n.93 Solodovnikov, Vassily 117, 144, 146, 160, 252 n.10 Somalia 69 Sonn, Franklin 224 South Africa African National Congress (ANC) of 98, 203–5, 207 air force 154, 170 ANC operation out of Lusaka 204–6, 216–17, 220 apartheid regime 8, 203 attacks on Namibia 156, 170–1 attacks on Zambia 89–90, 206 Carter administration’s displeasure with apartheid in 121 casualties 203 conflict of 1986 206–7 cooperation with Kaunda 7, 10–11 de Klerk’s role 217–19 end of apartheid 218–19 invasion of Zambia 153 involvement and invasion of Angola 33, 46, 49–50 Kaunda-Ford talks on 26, 31 Kaunda’s effort against apartheid 209, 216–21 Lusaka Accords 193–6 nukes in 4 Operation Protea 170–1 police brutality in 218 Reagan’s anti-apartheid policy 202–8 Reagan’s controversial speech on 206–7 Reagan’s policy towards 174–5, 189 relations with Mozambique 11 Soweto riots (1976) 86 Soweto tragedy 206

Index state of emergency 215, 219 UN ban on weapons sales to 125–6 US sanctions against 82, 112, 123, 201–2, 213 and Zambia relations 13, 53, 217 South African Defense Force (SADF) 170–1, 181 South African embassy protests, Washington 201–2 Southern Rhodesia 1–2 South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) 89, 160, 166, 168, 171, 184, 186, 194–5, 197–8, 211–12 Soviet Union 3 breakup of 218 invasion of Afghanistan 137, 153–4, 156, 159, 161, 190 Kaunda’s visit to 13–14 presence in Somalia 69 racism against colored people 56 Soviet-Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee 116 support to Angola (arms shipments) 15, 24, 33, 35, 43, 50 external objection to 36, 42, 48, 53 US diplomatic initiative convincing Soviets to back down 48, 50 and US relations 4–5, 13–14, 25, 33, 153 and Zambia relations 146 Soweto riots (1976), Johannesburg 86, 206 Spain, James 67–8, 73, 93, 244 n.24, 245 n.49 Spartakiade, 1979 146 Spinola, Antonio de 8–9 Springboks (South African national rugby team) 98, 171 Sri Lanka 90 State Department’s Africa Bureau 9–10, 208 State House, Lusaka 9, 11, 13, 16, 47–8, 57, 74–5, 95, 104, 106, 119, 124, 128, 138, 146, 148, 167, 174–5, 180, 190, 192, 195, 197, 199, 210, 213, 221–2, 224–5, 228, 235 n.45 state-owned companies 37, 239 n.14 Stennis, John 152, 259 n.59 Stepanek, Joseph 228, 271 n.54, 274 n.7 Stevens, Simon 251 n.1, 254 n.55

303

Stevenson, Robert 243 n.1, 243 n.3 stinger missiles 210 Stockwell, John 38, 42, 239 n.20, 239 n.23, 239 n.27, 240 n.29, 240 n.44, 242 n.85, 243 n.115, 243 nn.111–12 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) 14, 167, 242 nn.86–7 sub-Saharan Africa 115, 129, 135, 190, 220 Sullivan, Leon 22, 93, 249 n.37 “Sullivan Principles” for US corporations 22 Sutherland, William 2 Suyin, Han 240 n.47 Swahili 69, 222 Sweden 155 Swiss bank 178–9 Switzerland 44, 91, 111 Tambo, Oliver 204–5, 206, 269 n.16 Tanganyika 71, 208 tanks 50, 81, 109, 152, 154, 210, 240 n.49 Tanzania 2, 12 Ali’s mission to urge Moscow Olympics boycott 156 Cadelo’s visit to 38 and China relations 49 congestion at Dar es Salaam port, impact of 139–40 invasion of Uganda (1979) 154 involvement in acquiring Chinese weapons to Angola 72 seizure of Chinese weapons 54 Tazara railroad 4, 43, 49, 81, 89, 139, 152, 256 n.10 and Zambia relations 53–4 Tazara railroad 4, 43, 49, 81, 89, 139, 152, 256 n.10 technology/technological development 77, 79, 153 Tehran, US hostages in 152, 156 Tembo, Christon 210, 222 Temple University 19 terrorism/terrorists 10, 15, 87, 100–2, 140, 143–4, 216, 229 Terzi, Zehdi 148, 150–1 Texas 1, 62, 79, 92, 247 n.82 Thatcher, Dennis 149 Thatcher, Margaret 148–50, 155, 208, 215, 258 n.41, 258 n.49 Thomas, Scott 269 n.13

304

Index

“Thousand Points of Light” concept 213 Thurmond, Strom 140 Tibbetts, Margaret 233 n.5, 261 n.8 Times of Zambia 13–14, 37, 65, 90, 134, 153–4, 165–6, 169–70, 177, 186–8 Times-Picayune 156 Tito, Josip Broz 14 “Tiyendo Pamodzi” (“let us go forward together”; song) 28, 132 Tolbert, William 78, 117 Tomahawk cruise missile 14 Tonga electorate 142 To the Point (news magazine) 15 Toure, Sekou 117 tourism 208 “Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa” (de Villiers) 11 TransAfrica 186 sit-in staged at South African embassy, Washington 201–2 transportation systems 12, 77, 82, 105, 146 Truman, Harry 170 Tsongas, Paul 264 n.50 Tunney, John 51, 56, 242 n.85 Tunney Amendment 50–3, 55–7, 59, 254 n.61 Tutu, Desmond 202, 216 UCLA 19 Uganda 26, 40, 55, 92, 154 unemployment 130, 208 United National Independence Party (UNIP) call for political reforms 221 Central Committee 36, 38, 52, 116, 150, 158, 172, 186, 195, 209, 221, 256 n.10, 258 n.44, 258 n.51 convention at Mulungushi International Conference Center, Lusaka 148, 195, 197, 221, 258 nn.44–5 criticism of Kaunda’s domestic policies 130 formation of 2 Kabwe conference 138–9 National Council session 221

new headquarters 201 Political and Legal Committee 166 presidential nomination 138–9 Zulu’s tour to Asia 42–3 United Nations 8 Biko memorial 125 State Department UN Bureau 177 UN conference, Nairobi 75, 77, 247 n.84 UN Security Council 89–90, 125–6, 143–4, 148, 154, 157–8, 171, 184, 187–8, 191–2, 195, 201 Resolution 435 171, 174–5, 181, 187–8, 192, 194–8, 201, 211, 266 n.2 Resolution 466 158, 260 n.87 Resolution 538 192–3 United Nations Charter 76 United States (US). See also under specific entries Agency for International Development 173 bicameral conferences 147 boycott of Moscow Olympics initiated by 137, 154, 156, 160 -China relations 181 Civil Rights Act of 1964 231 civil rights movement 121 Commerce Department 175 Congress 5, 8, 22, 26, 33, 43–6, 48–52, 56, 67, 76, 82, 95, 98, 103, 105, 108, 134, 147, 156, 159, 169, 171–2, 174, 191–2, 197–8, 202–4, 207–9, 220, 229, 241 n.81 constitution 143 Declaration of Independence 76 Founding Fathers 178 House of Representatives 55–6, 90, 147, 202, 206 Independence Day (July 4) 137, 170 Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 229 national policy 25 navy 51 1965 elections 145 non-alignment 5 Senate 17, 39, 51, 53, 118, 134, 138, 147, 167–8, 175, 203, 207

Index Unity Accord 7, 40–1 “Unity in Diversity: One Zambia, One Nation” conference 230–1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 76 University of Colorado 228 University of Zambia 12, 33, 55, 57–8, 119, 273 n.87 University Teaching Hospital, Lusaka 173 uranium 20, 263 n.39 USSR Supreme Council 117 Vance, Cyrus 113, 118, 120, 122–3, 125, 129, 135, 140–1, 150–1, 156–8, 252 n.20, 253 n.36, 260 n.89 Vance, Sheldon 35, 37 van den Bergh, Hendrik 10–11, 41 Van Voorst, Bruce 92 van Wyk, Anna Mart 254 n.57, 263 n.39, 271 n.40 Victoria Falls 157 Victoria Falls-Bulawayo road 180 Victoria Falls conference 40–1, 48, 217 Vietnam 4, 45, 56, 114 Vietnam War 5, 51, 55, 58 Viljoen, Constand 41 Vladivostok summit 14 volunteerism 213 Volunteers-In-Technical-Assistance 172 Vorster, John 9, 10 Chinese view of 43 dubbed “fascist usurper” 20 and Kaunda cooperation 10–12, 15, 22, 26, 39–41, 72, 74, 87, 89 Kissinger’s view of 104–5 -Kissinger talks 86–8, 91, 94–5, 98–100 -Mondale meeting 121 October speech 12 UK/US proposal 88–9, 94, 102 US pressure on 41, 70, 123, 129 at Victoria Falls conference 40–1 Zurich meeting 94–5 Walesa, Lech 223 Wallace, Marion 265 n.1, 266 n.2 Walls, Peter 142 Wall Street Journal 45 Walters, Vernon 81–2, 170, 175–7, 181, 264 n.54

305

Walton, Hanes 243 n.1, 243 n.3 Washington viii, 2, 4–5, 7–8, 10, 13, 17, 19–21, 25, 28–30, 34–5, 39, 45–7, 49, 51–2, 56–7, 59, 61, 63, 65–6, 68, 74, 77, 86, 88–90, 95, 100, 110, 113, 117–20, 122, 125–8, 130–2, 134, 138, 140, 142, 145–6, 148, 150, 153, 155, 157, 159–61, 163, 168–79, 181, 185–6, 188, 190–1, 193, 195–6, 198, 201–2, 205–7, 209, 211–16, 225, 229, Washington Post 153 Washington Special Actions Group 66 Weekly Review 124 Wele, Patrick 271 n.41 Westad, Odd Arne 236 n.50, 240 n.46, 241 n.61, 243 n.3 Western Europe 160, 197 West Germany 155, 210, 218 wheat 103, 108, 177, 186, 205 Wilkowski, Jean 5, 8 efforts for Kissinger’s Africa trip 68, 75, 77 as first woman ambassador in Africa 64 and Kaunda talks 39, 77 Kissinger’s criticism of 64, 77–8, 82–3, 92 memoirs of 39 report on Rhodesia and Kissinger’s response 63–4 working at Volunteers-In-TechnicalAssistance 172 Williams, G. Mennen 28, 261 n. 8 Wina, Arthur 221 Wina, Sikota 139, 221, 256 n.8 Windhoek 168, 198 Wisner -Walters talks with Dos Santos 176–7 Wisner, Frank, Jr. 91, 96, 102, 151, 155, 165, 175, 181, 194, 205, 208, 212, 249 n.49, 250 n.74, 259 n.75, 259 nn.55–6, 261 nn.6–7, 262 n.15, 262 n.23, 264 n.48, 264 n.56, 266 n.6, 269 n.17 Wisner, Frank, Sr. 151 Wolpe, Howard 209 World Affairs Council 206 World Bank 21, 27, 188

306

Index

World Forum of Peace Forces 116 Wrong, Michela 178, 179, 246 n.78, 250 n.94, 265 n.76, 265 n.79 Yale University 228 Years of Renewal (Kissinger) 64 Yemen 38–9 Young, Andrew 9, 17–18 and Anglo-American initiative for Rhodesia 123 as chair of UN Security Council 148 at Democratic National Convention, New York 89 efforts on Namibia 211 embargo on US grain sales to Moscow proposed by 48 gift for Kaunda’s ninetieth birthday 231 and Kamanga conversation 173 as mayor of Atlanta 173, 203, 205 meeting with Terzi and its impact 150–1 and Mwale 90 and Paul Lusaka’s discussion on Lusaka Commonwealth conference 148 press conferences 119–20 resignation of 135, 150–1 succeeded by McHenry 151 tenure in Carter administration 113–14, 115, 118, 148 and Tunney Amendment 56 -Vance-Kissinger meeting 118 visits to Africa 118–20 visit to Atlanta with Kaunda (1978) 134–5 Yugoslavia 14, 155 Zaire 15 border concerns 178 border regions 35, 81 Bush’s visit to 179 economic crisis 44 involvement in Angola 45, 50, 52 Kissinger’s visit to 78 kleptocracy in 178–9 resources in 81 US aid 37, 44–6, 57–8, 63, 65, 81, 108 Zambezi River 78, 87 Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) African National Congress (ANC) of 192, 202

air force 53, 55, 201 -Angola relations 119, 185 attacks on Rhodesia 142–3 bilateral relations with US 130–5 boycott of Montreal Olympics (1976) 160 British rule in 1 Carter Center 223 casualties 140, 142, 157–8, 215 challenges of 1975 18–21 and China relations 43 CIA spy scandal 163, 168–70 constitutional amendments 137, 139, 142 copper reserves 1–2, 21–2, 44–5 coup plot 163–4 criticism of Soviet attack on Afghanistan 154 and Cuba relations 29–30, 52–3, 57–8 debt crisis 208–9, 213 defense spending 4, 130, 209 democracy in 150 demographics 1 destruction of bridges/refugee camps 155–6, 165 détente with South Africa 10–11, 15, 19 economy 1, 20–1, 36–7, 138–40 copper crash 44, 77, 130, 139, 208–9 decline/crisis 130, 132, 149, 208–11 reforms 213 educational policy Soviet support 146 US support 2, 47–8, 59, 119, 141, 146 food riots (1986) 208, 210 foreign exchange 139–40 foreign policy 18 free internet access 48 GDP 1 geographic position 1, 107 global downturn, impact of 20–1 guerrilla forces in 185 healthcare system 141 historical background 1–5 IMF loans 44–5 independence attained on October 24, 1964 2, 184 independence day celebrations 1, 11–12, 172, 201, 230–1

Index military assistance from US 63–5, 158–9 military straits 134–5, 137, 141–2, 145–6, 154–5 mining industry 20–1, 145, 208, 222 ministry of information and broadcasting services 180 multiparty democracy 220–2 Namibian refugees in 184 neighboring nations 116, 138 -Nigeria relations 116 non-alignment principle 156 one-party system 37, 130, 191–2, 218–19, 222 parliament 18, 55, 192, 227 political economy 208 poverty 79, 208–9 purchase of Soviet weapons 154–5, 158 reserve forces 152 Rhodesian attacks on 130, 134, 140–3, 145, 155, 165 -Rhodesia relations 115–16 South African attacks on 89–90, 130, 134, 156, 157–9, 206, 215 South African invasion of 153 -Soviet relations 116–17, 146, 154, 166, 169 state of emergency 55, 221, 223 state of war 152, 156 state-owned companies 37 struggle against colonialism 22 -Tanzania relations 53–4 Tazara railroad project 4, 43, 49, 81, 89, 139, 152, 256 n.10 threat of coups in 208–10 unemployment 130 UN intervention in South Africa’s withdrawal from 158–9 US aid 63, 74 AIDS research 215, 228 economic 63, 77, 103, 105, 108, 112, 165, 177 farming and agricultural 139–40, 145, 177, 215 Fenwick Amendment 159–60 financial 134, 173, 186 food 103, 108, 112, 145, 177, 205–6, 215 humanitarian 141 weapons 134–5, 142, 145

307

US refusal to provide military hardware 130, 155 -West Africa relations 116–17 whites in 97 ZAPU military bases in 86–7 ZAPU/ZANU guerrilla forces operating from 142–3 -Zimbabwe trade 173 Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) 1–2 Zambia Airways 149 “Zambia and the Democratization of Southern Africa” 228–9 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 169, 223 Zambia Daily Mail 40, 66, 74, 89, 123, 148, 150, 194, 196, 217 Zambian National Broadcasting Network 224 Zanzibar 71 Zartman, William 248 n.25, 253 n.28, 254 n.45 Zhou en Lai 18 Zimba, Gibson 167, 263 n.37 Zimbabwe. See Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 13–14, 19, 22, 41, 43, 62, 96, 105, 116, 121, 126, 142, 147, 153, 157 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) 13–14, 43, 63, 75, 80, 86–8, 93, 95–6, 105–6, 121, 125, 128, 140, 142–7, 149, 151–3, 257 n.11 “Zimbabwe” (song) 157 Zotov, General 166, 262 n.9 Zukas, Simon 221, 222, 273 n.87, 273 n.89 Zulu, Alexander Grey 42, 43, 46, 141, 154, 165, 166, 169, 197, 206, 207, 208, 240 nn.48–9, 243 n.110, 244 n.5, 246 n.56, 259 n.62, 259 n.73, 270 n.22, 270 n.29 Zulu, Boniface 185, 190, 266 n.5, 267 n.24 Zulu, Grey 42, 141, 207–8 Zulu, J.B. 236 n.67 Zulu language 208 Zulu people 98 Zuma, Jacob 230 Zurich 91, 94, 249 n.43