Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development [1 ed.] 9783030742133, 9783030742140

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Oseni Taiwo Afisi  Editor

Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development

Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development

Oseni Taiwo Afisi Editor

Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development

Editor Oseni Taiwo Afisi Department of Philosophy Lagos State University Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria

ISBN 978-3-030-74213-3    ISBN 978-3-030-74214-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

The idea for this volume was informed by the interesting discussions generated at the Karl Popper for Africa International Conference, which was held in Lagos, Nigeria, from March 28 to 31, 2019. The conference was organized with financial support from the Karl Popper Charitable Trust, United Kingdom. This collected volume reflects diverse contributions from some notable Popper scholars as well as emerging scholars interested in Popper’s philosophy, and its relevance to Africa. All the authors have brought wide-ranging approaches in many ways that can expand the frontiers of Popper’s philosophy. Many thanks to Professors David Miller and Jeremy Shearmur and other board members of the Karl Popper Charitable Trust for their immense support. I wish to also acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Adeolu Oyekan and Mr. Emmanuel Ofuasia in helping to put the manuscript in proper shape.

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Contents

1 General Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Oseni Taiwo Afisi Part I Popper and Politics in Africa 2 Popper’s Politics in the Light of African Values������������������������������������    9 Thaddeus Metz 3 Karl Popper’s Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-Once’? ��������������������������������������������������   31 Oseni Taiwo Afisi 4 Africa’s Development Crisis and the Limits of Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism ������������������������������������������������������   43 Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan 5 Karl Popper, the Nigerian State and Democratic Consolidation����������������������������������������������������������������   57 ‘Dele Ashiru 6 The Distinctive Character of Popper’s Critical Rationalism ��������������   69 Jeremy Shearmur 7 Tolerance, Multiculturalism and the Search for National Unity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   83 Victoria Openif Oluwa Akoleowo 8 Shedding the Subaltern Condition: Karl Popper and the New Cosmopolitanism ����������������������������������������   97 Adam Chmielewski

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9 Popper and Youth Participation in Democracy in Africa: Perspectives on Applying the Dynamics of an Information Society������������������������������������������������������������������������  109 Casimir Kingston Chukwunonyelum Ani and Uche Miriam Okoye 10 Assessing Faith-Based Terrorism Through Popper’s Conception of Tolerance��������������������������������������������������������������������������  117 Olawunmi Cordelia Macaulay-Adeyelure 11 Towards an Ethos of Toleration in Multicultural Societies: The Significance of Popper’s Critical Rationalism ������������������������������  127 Peter Osimiri 12 “How Far May We Tolerate the Intolerant?” Assessing Popper’s Reflections on Tolerance from the Nigerian Polity��������������������������������������������������������������������������  139 Mohammed Akinola Akomolafe 13 Falsificationism: In Defence of the Scientific Status of Marxism��������  149 Maxwell Omaboe and Eromosele Eric Usifoh 14 Karl Popper’s Critique of Nationalism: Exorcising Tribal Mentality in Modern African Society����������������������  161 Olayemi Salami 15 Situating Postcolonial Africa within Popper’s Critique of Nationalism ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  169 Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan 16 Karl Popper, Tribalism and the Question of Africa’s Development��������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Oseni Taiwo Afisi 17 Karl Popper on Nationalism and the Issue of Indigenization in Lagos ����������������������������������������������������������������������  195 Bashir Olalekan Animashaun Part II Popper and Knowledge Production in Africa 18 A Popperian Perspective on Poverty and Epistemic Injustice in Africa ����������������������������������������������������������  205 Ademola Kazeem Fayemi and Paul Tosin Saint-Wonder 19 Karl Popper and Intellectual Openness in Africa: The Rationale for Political Emancipation ��������������������������������������������  219 Christabel Chidimma Ezeh

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20 Verificationism and Falsificationism from an African Indigenous Knowledge Perspective����������������������������  235 Emmanuel Ofuasia 21 Interrogating Edmund Gettier’s Idea of Justification with Karl Popper’s Anti-­Foundationalism��������������������������������������������  247 Michael Aina Akande 22 Popper’s Critical Rationalism and the Legitimacy of an African Epistemic System��������������������������������������������������������������  257 Ignatius Ifeanyichukwu Ogbodo and Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba 23 General Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  269 Oseni Taiwo Afisi

About the Editors and Contributors

About the Editor Oseni  Taiwo  Afisi  is the current head of the Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria. He was convener of both the Karl Popper for Africa International Conference (28–31 March 2019) and the UNESCO (MOST) Syndicated Workshop (29–30 March 2019). His areas of competence include logic, political philosophy, and philosophy of science with special interest in Karl Popper’s critical rationalism. He obtained his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in philosophy from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He later proceeded to the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, where he obtained a doctorate degree in philosophy. Dr. Afisi was a visiting academic at the Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia, in 2011. He has attended several conferences and has published widely in highly revered journals.

About the Contributors Michael  Aina  Akande  received his PhD from the University of Lagos. He is a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University. His research interest is in the area of epistemology and African philosophy. He has written works published in both local and international journals. Victoria  Openif  Oluwa  Akoleowo  is a faculty member  in the Department of Philosophy, Dominican University, Ibadan, Nigeria. She is also an associate lecturer at the SS Peter and Paul Catholic Major Seminary, Ibadan, where she teaches introduction to logic and philosophical psychology. Her research interests include feminist philosophy, professional ethics, and African Studies. Her area of current research is on decolonization in African universities. xi

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About the Editors and Contributors

Mohammed Akinola Akomolafe  received his PhD from the University of Lagos. He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria. His areas of specialization are socio-political philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics. Casimir  Kingston  Chukwunonyelum  Ani  is currently the director of the Directorate of Strategic Contacts, Ethics and Publications (STRACEP) at the University of Nigeria. He is a senior lecturer (Department of Philosophy), senior research fellow at the Institute of African Studies/Development Studies, and member of the Research Ethics Association of South Africa. He is the Glob ethics, Geneva, Contact for Nigeria and West Africa. A member of the UNESCO expert mechanism, NGO panel on Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH). In 2016, he was appointed the chairman of the working group on intellectual property/gender of the UNESCO ICH NGO Forum. He is a board member of the UNN Business School. He was the pioneer secretary of the strategic committee at the University of Nigeria’s new business school. He is a member of the editorial board of the Open Journal of Philosophy and Open Journal of Political Science, SCIRP Publishing Company, USA. Bashir Olalekan Animashaun  graduated from Lagos State University where he obtained BA and MA degrees in history. He obtained his PhD degree from the University of Ibadan. He has lectured history at the Lagos State University since 2000 and is a senior lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies, Lagos State University. His research specialty is in Nigerian History with emphasis on Lagos History. He is currently the vice president of the Historical Society of Nigeria, South–West. ‘Dele Ashiru  is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, where he teaches medieval and contemporary political thoughts. His current research interest is in the area of political Islam, fundamentalist pressures in Africa, and the political economy of terrorism and development. He is currently the chairman of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), University of Lagos Branch. Adam  Chmielewski  is a professor at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Wrocław, Poland. He studied philosophy and social sciences at the universities in Wrocław, Oxford, New York, and Edinburgh. He has authored several books, among them Popper’s Philosophy: A Critical Analysis (1995) Incommensurability, Untranslatability, Conflict (1997), and Open Society or Community? (2001). His latest book is Politics and Recognition: Towards a New Political Aesthetics (Routledge, 2020). Christabel  Chidimma  Ezeh  is a doctoral research student of philosophy at the University of Nigeria Nsukka, specializing in jurisprudence. Her areas of research interest are legal philosophy, social and political philosophy, and moral philosophy.

About the Editors and Contributors

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Ademola Kazeem Fayemi  is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and a Faculty member at the University of Lagos, Nigeria, where he teaches philosophy. His research interests and areas of competences include African philosophy, socio-political philosophy, and bioethics, where he has widely published. Olawunmi  Cordelia  Macaulay-Adeyelure  is a faculty member at Lagos State University. She obtained a PhD from the prestigious Sofia University in Bulgaria. She has several published papers in journals of high repute. She is an expert in bioethics, political philosophy, and Existentialism. Thaddeus Metz  is a professor of philosophy at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Author of more than 250 published works, he is particularly known for having analytically articulated an African moral theory, applied it to a variety of ethical and political controversies, compared it to East Asian and Western moral perspectives, and defended it as preferable to them.  His next book, A Relational Moral Theory: African Contributions to Global Ethical Thought,  is expected to appear with Oxford University Press. Emmanuel Ofuasia  is currently a doctoral research student in philosophy at Lagos State University, Nigeria. He got his bachelor’s degree (first class) in philosophy from Lagos State University, Ojo, and a master’s degree in philosophy from the University of Lagos. His research interests include African philosophy, process-­ relational metaphysics, and history and philosophy of physics. At the moment, his research focus is on the process-relational undergirding of Yorùbá philosophy. Ignatius Ifeanyichukwu Ogbodo  has an MA degree in ethics from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is a current doctoral research student in philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. He is also a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria. Anthony  Chimankpam  Ojimba  is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. He is the Nigerian south east coordinator, Researchers International Network (RIN). He is also a member of Nigeria Philosophical Association (NPA). He holds a PhD in metaphysics from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. Uche Miriam Okoye  is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Her research and publication interests are in the fields of epistemology, gender studies, philosophy of development, and social political philosophy. She currently pursues a doctoral degree program at the University of Nigeria with focus on logotherapy, human actions, and motivations. She is a member of the Association of Philosophy Professionals of Nigeria (APPON) and Philosophers’ Association of Nigeria (PAN).

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About the Editors and Contributors

Maxwell Omaboe  is currently a doctoral research student at the Centre for African and International Studies, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana. He completed his MPhil degree from the Department of Classics and Philosophy at the University of Cape Coast with a researched thesis in Marxist philosophy. His research interest relates to studies in Marxist philosophy, film studies, and philosophy of science. Peter Osimiri  received his PhD from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He lectures in the Department of Philosophy, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria. His research interest spans political philosophy, ethics, environmental philosophy, and bioethics. He is currently collaborating with a number of colleagues to produce an introductory text on the philosophy of value. Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan  holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in philosophy from the Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, and has completed his PhD from the University of Lagos. He has taught undergraduates and postgraduates for over a decade as a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria, and has published peer-reviewed articles in reputable journals on political philosophy, ethics, comparative and cultural philosophy, and gender theory. He is currently a research fellow on identities and social cohesion in Africa at the Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa. Paul  Tosin  Saint-Wonder  has bachelor’s Degree in philosophy from the Lagos State University. He holds a master’s degree in philosophy from the University of Lagos. Paul has quite the experience in holding tutorials for undergraduates for over 8 years. While he remains under the tutelage of his professors from his higher institutions, Paul also provides coaching and editing services for long essay and thesis writers. Olayemi  Salami  is currently a doctoral research student in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos. He is a lecturer at The Ultimate University, Porto-Novo, Republic of Benin. He has a number of publications to his credit. Jeremy Shearmur  was educated at the London School of Economics, where he also worked for 8 years as assistant to Professor Sir Karl Popper. He taught philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and political theory at the University of Manchester, was director of Studies at the Centre for Policy Studies in London and a research associate professor at George Mason University, and then taught political theory and subsequently philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the author of two books, the editor of three (with two more in press), and has published about hundred papers. Eromosele Eric Usifoh  is a lecturer in the Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. He holds a PhD degree in philosophy, from the University of Lagos. His interest is in socio-political philosophy with specialization in the principles of democracy, where he has substantial publications. He is also engaged in research in African philosophy and ethics.

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Contributors Oseni  Taiwo  Afisi  Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Michael Aina Akande  Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Victoria  Openif  Oluwa  Akoleowo  Dominican University, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria Mohammed Akinola Akomolafe  Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Casimir Kingston Chukwunonyelum Ani  University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Bashir Olalekan Animashaun  Lagos State University Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria ‘Dele Ashiru  University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria Adam Chmielewski  The University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland Christabel Chidimma Ezeh  University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Ademola Kazeem Fayemi  University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria Moi University African Cluster Centre, Eldoret, Kenya Olawunmi  Cordelia  Macaulay-Adeyelure  Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Thaddeus Metz  University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa Emmanuel Ofuasia  Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Ignatius Ifeanyichukwu Ogbodo  University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba  University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Uche Miriam Okoye  University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria Maxwell Omaboe  University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana Peter Osimiri  University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria Adeolu  Oluwaseyi  Oyekan Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa Paul Tosin Saint-Wonder  University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria Olayemi Salami  University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria Jeremy Shearmur  Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Eromosele Eric Usifoh  University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana

Chapter 1

General Introduction Oseni Taiwo Afisi

This edited volume on Karl Popper’s philosophy adds to the existing literature in the study and the research of the central ideas of critical rationalism. What makes this multi-authored volume unique is not only about how Popper’s ideas have been extensively discussed, but about how the ideas in Popper’s philosophy have been used as contextualisation to the issues and problems of knowledge, politics and development in Africa. This volume will do best as a literature on an advanced political philosophy course as well as a course on cross-cultural philosophy, especially in a comparative philosophy course on African and post-analytic philosophy. It would do best in a course which compares European and African philosophical perspectives. The various discussions in this volume centre on Popper’s systematic ideas on critical rationalism, emphasising on issues that bother not only on both his philosophy of science and political philosophy, but also on his philosophy of life, as they apply to the condition of developments in Africa. In order to address contemporary problems, especially as it relates to Africa, the political philosophy of Popper has been regarded in this book as suitable. The discussions of Popper’s political philosophy that have taken place engage us directly with all the particularities of socioeconomic and political problems within contemporary Africa. In other words, they present facts on the present socio-political reality in Africa, raising questions about what kinds of political ideas and concepts can be offered as appropriate to the seemingly volatile and unstable political environment, which so greatly requires many dimensions of development. Undoubtedly, in contemporary African political system, there still exists systemic economic inefficiency, which allows room for endemic and pervasive corruption. The open society in Popper’s political philosophy underscores intellectual openness, where a society is marked by rational intellectualism and democratic transformations. The open society promotes individual freedom, human rights, justice, free-market economy O. T. Afisi (*) Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_1

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and accountability. However, a closed society promotes institutional systems that are often totalitarian. Such kinds of society promote a system which encourages the need to have a strong centralised rule. African political systems seem to approximate the condition of a closed society. Popper’s alternative to a closed society is his insistence that social reforms should be piecemeal. The piecemeal idea emphasizes that government must respond piecemeal to societal problems in order to mitigate the societal evils that may accompany large-scale social planning. Additionally, this volume also discusses how Popper’s philosophy is relevant to science in Africa, for example, as it relates to his emphasis on knowledge and its mode of acquisition. These discussions are especially important, bearing in mind that the twenty-first century is an age where development is largely determined, not by natural resources alone, but by the knowledge economy and the digital revolution. There is, presently, in Africa a huge deficit in scientific knowledge, in comparison to many other parts of the world. Africa today is a continent where the scientific tradition is yet to take a firm root. Popper’s philosophy of science contains ideas that are capable of stimulating the needed discussion on how best to make scientific knowledge relevant to Africa’s quest for development in the twenty-first century. As Popper-style-openness is both political and intellectual, the volume at hand has two parts. Part 1 (Popper and Politics in Africa) concerns with new problem situations, with the peculiar characteristics of the political reforms that Africa needs. This part includes chapters that discuss issues of Popper’s political philosophy within the context of politics in Africa. The chapters examine issues that include social reform, liberal democracy, electoral process, multi-ethnic politics, inter-­ religious crises, tolerance and human rights. The second section, Part 2 (Popper and Knowledge Production in Africa) is concerned with the theoretical apparatus that should apply to that task of reforms that need to be carried out in Africa. The chapters here discuss Popper’s ideas of falsificationism, fallibilism, and anti-­ foundationalism as they relate to the issues of knowledge production, epistemic justice and indigenous knowledge system in Africa. Part I (Popper and Politics in Africa)  The discussions in Chap. 2 Thaddeus Metz “Popper’s Politics in the Light of African Values” proposes an Afro-communal moral foundation in Africa that has the features of an open society politics, but differs from the one that Popper specifies. Oseni Taiwo Afisi’s paper in Chap. 3 “Karl Popper’s Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-once’?” advocates a modification to Popper’s piecemeal social engineering to becoming a “many-pieces-at-once” social engineering. As part of his central arguments, Afisi establishes three theses: (a) that Popper’s piecemeal social engineering is a model for social reform; (b) that piecemeal social engineering is too slow when radical institutional changes are needed quickly; (c) that societies which require radical faster and much more sweeping political change, such as societies in Africa will need a “many-pieces-at-once” social engineering. In Chap. 4, “Africa’s Development Crisis and the Limits of Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism” Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan examines Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism. He argues the position that Popper’s position stands between minimalism

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and welfarism. However, this minimal welfarism is incapable of addressing most of the challenges facing contemporary African states. ‘Dele Ashiru’s “Karl Popper, the Nigerian State and Democratic Consolidation” in Chap. 5 examines the effects of colonialism on current Africa’s political structure. He submits that politics in independent African states is a reflection of ethnic and divide and rule politics that characterised the colonial politics in Africa. In Chap. 6, “The Distinctive Character of Popper’s Critical Rationalism” by Jeremy Shearmur addresses the core of what Critical Rationalism is about and how it is applicable to the different areas of Popper’s interests. The chapter stresses on Popper’s critique of proportional representation. Popper’s criticisms resonate with how democratic institutions can be strengthened, especially as it relates to the conduct of elections. One issue that stands out in the paper is how to address some of the mistrusts in the conduct of elections in Africa. Sheamur recommends appointing by consensus between the main political parties, the government of another country who will be responsible for the conduct of one’s elections in a fair and neutral manner. While this is likely to bring about fair-dealing and efficiency, it is highly probable to be devoid of the usual democratic elections in most African countries that often entail massive rigging, vote-buying, the power of incumbency and corruption. Chapter 7 “Tolerance, Multiculturalism and the Search for National Unity” by Victoria Openif Oluwa Akoleowo examines Popper’s famous idea on tolerance “Do not tolerate the intolerant”. Akoleowo cautions that a rigid application of intolerance to the intolerant may further provoke a crisis in the society. She advocates mutual recognition and respect for all parties. Adam Chmielewski’s essay “Shedding the Subaltern Condition: Karl Popper and the New Cosmopolitanism” in Chap. 8 explores how Popper’s philosophy has significantly shaped the social transformation taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. He avers that Popper’s ideas can equally form the theoretical foundation for a cosmopolitan order that is capable of addressing the problems of today’s Africa. Casimir Kingston Chukwunonyelum Ani and Uche Miriam Okoye’s Chap. 9 paper “Popper and Youth Participation in Democracy in Africa: Perspectives on Applying the Dynamics of an Information Society” espouses how the values of open society provide opportunities for youth participation in the democratic process in Africa, especially in this digital age. In Chap. 10 “Assessing Faith-Based Terrorism Through Popper’s Conception of Tolerance” Olawunmi Cordelia Macaulay-Adeyelure discusses some of the factors responsible for violence, extremism and terrorism in relation to religion and faith in Africa. She advocates Popper’s critical dialogue as a basis for critical and thoughtful engagements. Peter Osimiri’s Chap. 11 “Towards an Ethos of Toleration in Multicultural Societies: The Significance of Popper’s Critical Rationalism” examines the place of toleration in ethnocultural crises that plague many African states. He seeks to establish an ethos of toleration from Popper’s critical rationalism as a means to ensure peaceful coexistence among diverse ethnocultural groups in Africa. In Chap. 12 “How Far May We Tolerate the Intolerant?” Assessing Popper’s Reflections on Tolerance from the Nigerian polity” Mohammed Akinola Akomolafe

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disagrees with Popper on toleration. Akomolafe is of the view that the act of not tolerating the intolerant will further result in chaos and anarchy rather than peace and mutual coexistence among the different ethnic regions in Nigeria. Chapter 13’s “Falsificationism: In Defence of the Scientific Status of Marxism” Maxwell Omaboe and Eromosele Eric Usifoh attempts to justify the scientific nature of Marxism against Popper’s criticism of it. Omaboe and Usifoh’s effort is to establish that Marxism influenced the development of an African socialism ideal in the attempt towards Africa’s development. Olayemi Salami in Chap. 14 “Karl Popper’s Critique of Nationalism: Exorcising Tribal Mentality in Modern African Society” critically examines how tribal sentiments and identities have become the bane of a political development in modern-day African society. Salami underlies his study on the critique of nationalism as espoused by Popper. In Chap. 15 “Situating Postcolonial Africa within Popper’s Critique of Nationalism” Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan examines Popper’s critique of nationalism within the context of postcolonial Africa. Oyekan’s position is that Popper is hasty to have generally condemned all forms of nationalism without considering the merits in anti-colonial nationalism in its efforts at attaining self-rule. In Chap. 16 “Karl Popper, Tribalism and the Question of Africa’s Development” Oseni Taiwo Afisi discusses the fundamental gross generalisation of the concept of tribalism. No doubt, Popper rejects tribalism. However, the author claims that a distinction has to be made about the kind of tribalism that Popper is critical. Popper is only critical of nationalism which encourages tribal affiliation of the kind that led to the rise of totalitarianism of the Nazism regime in Europe at the time. Popper’s criticism does not apply to the Maori tribe of New Zealand and/or the different tribes of traditional African societies which were not totalitarian, yet collectivist in nature. Bashir Olalekan Animashaun in Chap. 17 “Karl Popper on Nationalism and the Issue of Indigenization in Lagos” is critical of Popper’s rejection of the idea of nationalism. Popper’s rejection of nationalism is based on his conviction that people can be united to declare an autonomous single national political and cultural identity. The author believes that human beings have always organized themselves in group formations, and loyalty to a nation-state is not unexpected. This makes the case for reasons that indigenization and land ownership are powerful factors for nationalism in Lagos. The author discusses the issue of the occupation of Lagos by the Idejos and how their nationalistic tendencies helped the Idejo in the restoration and sustenance of their land ownership status and their relevance in the politics of Lagos especially from 1861. Part II (Popper and Knowledge Production in Africa)  The beginning of Part 2 of this volume is Chap. 18 “A Popperian Perspective on Poverty and Epistemic Injustice in Africa” where Ademola Kazeem Fayemi and Paul Tosin Saint-Wonder interrogate the issue of epistemic injustice in the context of knowledge production on economic poverty in Africa. They both conclude that Popper’s philosophy is adequate in addressing the dearth of poverty research ideas and policy development in Africa.

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Christabel Chidimma Ezeh’s “Karl Popper and Intellectual Openness in Africa: The Rationale for Political Emancipation” in Chap. 19 examines research in Popper’s intellectual openness as a possibility to understanding economic poverty in Africa. In Chap. 20, “Verificationism and Falsificationism from an African Indigenous Knowledge Perspective” Emmanuel Ofuasia’s essay considers Popper’s demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience, but concludes that Yorùbá meta-­ epistemic system frowns at demarcation but accommodates both the scientific and the non-scientific. Michael Aina Akande’s Chap. 21 paper “Interrogating Edmund Gettier’s Idea of Justification with Karl Popper’s anti-foundationalism” explicates the weaknesses of foundationalist epistemology as uncritical and faulty. Akande juxtaposes his endorsement of critical questioning of epistemic theories on Popper’s anti-­ foundationalism and Yoruba epistemic analysis. Chapter 22’s “Popper’s Critical Rationalism and the Legitimacy of an African Epistemic System” Ignatius Ifeanyichukwu Ogbodo and Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba interrogate African knowledge system as legitimate science. They propose the critical attitude as espoused by Popper for African science to reach the level of credibility.

Part I

Popper and Politics in Africa

Chapter 2

Popper’s Politics in the Light of African Values Thaddeus Metz

2.1  Introducing Popper in Relation to Africa Karl Popper did not say much about Africa, by which I mean the cultures salient among the black peoples indigenous to the continent, especially the sub-Saharan part of it. Focusing on Popper’s works in political philosophy, they are plainly internal to the Western tradition. In terms of figures, Popper provides analyses of Plato’s views of justice in the light of Greek society at the time, Immanuel Kant’s conception of the Enlightenment and its implications for how institutions ought to be structured, and Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism and how it has been received by others. Regarding themes, Popper has considered how best to understand the nature of values such as freedom, democracy, and equality as characteristically understood in the West. About the only thing in Popper’s political philosophy that suggests a bearing on Africa is his discussion of a closed society, where it is likely that he would have considered indigenous sub-Saharan peoples to be instances of such. Although Popper’s focus was Europe and he did not systematically engage in comparative intellectual history or philosophy, he clearly believes that Greek society alone spawned the values essential for an open society. For just one example, Popper remarks, “The war of ideas is a Greek invention. It is one of the most important inventions ever made. Indeed, the possibility of fighting with words instead of fighting with swords is the very basis of our civilization” (1992, 373; see also Popper 1945a, 153). The stereotype of traditional African cultures, particularly among mid-­ twentieth century Western intellectuals, has been that they are both tribal and collectivist, which are the defining features of a closed society. That is, traditional African cultures have often been thought to place traditional beliefs and practices above question (tribalism) and to deem the clan to be morally more important than T. Metz (*) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_2

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any given member of it, let alone strangers (collectivism). Indeed, it is not just stereotyping Westerners who have described indigenous sub-Saharan peoples in these two ways (cf. Ake 1987; Sogolo 1993, 121–129; Adeyinka and Ndwapi 2002, 18–19), both of which Popper thinks run roughshod over individual rational reflection and choice, which, with Immanuel Kant, he considers to have the highest intrinsic value (beyond their instrumental use for social improvement). One interesting project would be to question the degree to which pre-colonial African cultures were closed. For instance, one could cast doubt on this supposition by exploring the ideas that they tended not only to believe in human dignity (e.g., Gyekye 2010, sec. 6), but also to resolve disputes by appeal to consensus consequent to deliberation, either among elders or, often enough, everyone with a stake in the outcome (under the proverbial tree) (e.g., Bujo 2009). However, that is not my project here, which would be more apt for the historian or sociologist than for a philosopher. Instead, my aim is to draw on values salient in the African philosophical tradition in order to appraise several key elements of Popper’s account of how the state should function in an open society. In particular, I appeal to the ideal of communal relationship that is prominent among African philosophers and their peoples in order to contest some of Popper’s views. More specifically, after showing that Popper believes that the state in an open society should improve social arrangements albeit without seeking to promote a particular conception of the good life, should protect rights that merely serve the function of facilitating individual choice, and should employ majoritarian democracy to be able to avoid unwelcome rulers and policies, I argue that the relational value of communion grounds attractive alternatives. Popper famously contrasts his individualism with collectivism. If the only choice were between contending that the individual person is most important or that the group is most important, I would argue in favor of individualism, including Popper’s broadly Kantian version of it. However, this is a false dichotomy, in the sense that a third alternative is available. After Popper’s central works in political philosophy were published between the 1940s and the 1980s, a relational approach emerged in the English-speaking philosophical literature. Examples include the African philosophy of ubuntu (the southern African Nguni term for humanness), the Western feminist ethic of care, and the East Asian Confucian tradition (surveyed in Metz and Miller 2016). It is a certain interpretation of the first, African approach that I invoke here to cast doubt on Popper’s political philosophy. Although one scholar sees “social” or “communitarian” elements in Popper’s political philosophy (Afisi 2016a, b), I point out that they are weak, mainly in that Popper’s appeal to relationality accords it value merely as a means. Given a plausible Afro-communal ethic, certain kinds of intersubjectivity should also be pursued as ends. In the rest of this essay I begin by sketching the aspects of Popper’s political philosophy that I will evaluate, after which I present the Afro-communal moral principle that I will use to do so. According to this ethic (first articulated and defended in Metz 2011a, 2012a), an agent, including a state has a basic duty to treat people as having a dignity in virtue of their ability to relate communally, described in some detail below. If what is special about people is their capacity for

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relationality, and not so much their capacity for rationality as per Popper, then, I show, one arrives at different and plausible views of whether the state should be neutral in respect of the good life, which liberties it should protect, and how political power should be allocated within it. I conclude by briefly discussing some of Popper’s other political philosophical views that should be considered elsewhere.

2.2  A Sketch of Popper’s Politics As is well-known and was mentioned in the introduction, Popper’s political philosophy is centered on a distinction between open and closed societies. In this section I expound Popper’s ideal of an open society, his underlying motivation for it, and the political principles he believes are appropriate for it. I evaluate Popper’s politics only in the following sections. By an “open,” as opposed to “closed,” society Popper has in mind two major features, at least in The Open Society and Its Enemies.1 First, there is what he calls the “intellectualist distinction” (Popper 1945a, 178), concerning the degree to which people evaluate and change social arrangements according to their reasoned judgment. For example, Popper remarks that an open society is one that “sets free the critical powers of man” (1945a, 1) or that “the open society is one in which men have learned to be to some extent critical of taboos, and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence” (1945a, 178). A society is closed, then, insofar as some facets of it are beyond question and may not be subjected to criticism by its members.2 Perhaps some social rules are deemed to be the will of God or of the clan’s ancestors, or maybe some of them have been laid down by an elite group of human persons who think they know better than anyone else by virtue of say, divine revelation, social class, or educational background. Second, there is a distinction in terms of value, with Popper saying that the “collectivist society will also be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society” (1945a, 152). Elaborating, Popper says, “I use the term ‘collectivism’ only for a doctrine which emphasizes the significance of some collective or group, for instance, ‘the state’ (or a certain state; or a nation; or a class) as against that of the individual” (1945a, 179), and he speaks of the closed society’s “creed that the tribe is everything and the individual nothing” (1945a, 166). Whereas a closed society accords a normative priority to a group over its members and other individuals beyond it, an open one instead adheres to individualism,  The phrasing is somewhat different in a later essay (Popper 1976a, 78).  This distinction is reminiscent of Jürgen Habermas’s (Habermas 1984, 1987) distinction between modern and pre-modern societies, where the former are characterized by rationalization processes, one major form of which is the increased extent to which society (or at least the lifeworld dimension of it) is determined by communicative action. 1 2

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the “belief in the human individual as an end in himself” (1945a, 166). So construed, individualism is not equivalent to egoism, and instead is the idea that other people besides a given agent can matter for their own sake apart from their being members of a group. Part of treating other people as ends in themselves, and not merely as a means, is giving them the responsibility to make decisions as well as holding people accountable for their decisions. These two distinctions, regarding the extent to which society is rationally evaluated and the degree to which individuals are respected, are on the face of it different from one another. However, for Popper there is a close conceptual relationship between them, given a Kantian understanding of what precisely it is about the individual that merits respect, viz., her capacity for rational reflection and free choice. If each individual is special because he is “born with the burden of responsibility for free decision” (1994a, 134), or if “the dignity of man lies in his freedom” (1994b, 138; see also 1976b, 100), then respect for individuals means allowing them to exercise their intellectual powers and to act on their deliverances, i.e., to rationally evaluate the society in which they live and to change it on that basis. Indeed, at one-­ point Popper characterizes an open society as “a way of living together, based upon the idea of not merely tolerating a man and his convictions but of respecting him and his convictions” (Popper 2008a, 236). When in contrast a group proclaims itself uniquely qualified to decide on certain matters, which are treated as taboo, then it fails to treat others with equal respect in virtue of their ability to choose freely according to their own deliberation. Hence, there is an ethical foundation for Popper’s political philosophy, namely, a broadly Kantian account of what is valuable about human nature as distinct from animal nature: Beginning with the suppression of reason and truth, we must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is human…. We can return to the beasts. But if we wish to remain human, then there is only one way, the way into the open society. We must go on into the unknown, courageously, using what reason we have. (Popper 1945a, 177)3

What is human, for Popper, is our capacity to reason, limited as it is, while what is beastly or animal is not grounded on that, and is instead emotional, mythical, mystical, or religious. Morality, then, is fundamentally a matter of equal respect for that higher, distinctively human capacity for critical reflection. As Popper remarks, “(T) he only attitude which I can consider to be morally right is one which recognizes that we owe it to other men to treat them and ourselves as rational” (Popper 1945b, 227), and “I maintain, with Kant, that it must be the principle of all morality that no

 I thus disagree with one commentator who believes that what Popper “needs is some positive account of human nature, which will enable us to see the value of critical rationalism as an expression of that nature over its competitor faiths. But it is just this that he fails to offer” (O’Hear 2004, 194). I believe Popper does offer such an account (even if there are strands of his thinking that prevent him from maintaining that it is epistemically justified relative to competitors). 3

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man should consider himself more valuable than any other person” (Popper 1945a, 219).4 Having spelled out what an open society is and why Popper morally prefers it to a closed one, what remains to discuss in this section is what an open society would concretely look like in terms of its political institutions. On this score, I consider three facets of how Popper believes that a state in an open society must treat those in its territory. First, when it comes to what the purpose of the state should be, Popper contends that it should serve a strictly “protectionist” function (1945a, 96–100), which for him means that its final end should be to prevent people’s freedom from being undermined, especially those who are in a weaker position of power. I demand protection for my own freedom and for other people’s. I do not wish to live at the mercy of anybody who has the larger fists or the bigger guns…. (T)he fundamental purpose of the state should not be lost sight of; I mean the protection of that freedom which does not harm other citizens. Thus I demand that the state must limit the freedom of the citizens as equally as possible, and not beyond necessity. (1945a, 96)

If liberalism is the doctrine that the point of the state is to protect people’s abilities (and especially their equal liberties) to act in ways they see fit, then Popper is a liberal, and he often describes himself as such (e.g., Popper 1992, viii, 6–7, 351, 374). Some have read these and similar remarks from Popper as indicating that he is not merely a liberal, but also a libertarian, according to which the only proper job of the state is to prevent harmful interference, such that it would be unjust to tax the rich so as to fund access to education and to relieve poverty. While there are some passages that could be read in that way,5 there are others, ranging over more than 30 years, that simply cannot. Indeed, Popper explicitly says, as early as The Open Society and Its Enemies, that his protectionist doctrine rules out libertarianism: We must construct social institutions, enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong. The state must see to it that nobody need enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin…. (I) f we wish freedom to be safeguarded, then we must demand that the policy of unlimited economic freedom be replaced by the planned economic intervention by the state. (1945b, 117)

Enough said.6 Although Popper favors regulating and taxing market exchanges in order to protect the poor from being dominated, including by funding their higher education  For a different reading of Popper’s foundational ethic, focused on the negative golden rule, see Pralong (1999, 136–138). Popper is also sometimes read as advancing negative utilitarianism, but Popper explicitly disavows it as a moral criterion (instead advancing it as a rough guide to public policy); see section 13 of the Addenda to Volume II of the fifth edition of the Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper 1966). 5  For one who appears to accept a libertarian reading of Popper, see Corvi (1997, 72). 6  But for those wanting additional redistributivist passages, see Popper (1945a, 97, 115, b, 118, 1976a, 78, 83). For a similar reading, see Shearmur (1996, 112–114). 4

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(1945a, 115), he is against paternalism and moralism, the views that the state should strive to promote well-being or virtue in people’s lives, respectively. Instead, Popper approvingly points out how during his lifetime in the West there was between the laws of the state, on the one hand, and on the other the taboos we habitually observe, an ever-widening field of personal decisions…. We make rational decisions…. We recognize rational personal responsibility. (Popper 1945a, 152)

Popper deems it a Platonic, and hence objectionable, view that “the state should look after the moral life of its citizens” (1945a, 114; see also 99 and 1945b, 29). One contemporary way of putting this point is that the state must be “neutral” in respect of conceptions of a happy, virtuous, and more generally good life. Instead of punishing people for not being better people, or manipulating them so that they will be better off, the state should refrain from making judgments of these matters, letting citizens decide for themselves how to live their lives and bear the consequences (presumably including being held accountable for reducing the freedom of others). Note how Popper’s foundational ethic, of respect for rational decision-making, plausibly justifies the combination of accepting redistributivism while rejecting paternalism/moralism, or of what is sometimes described as state interference in the boardroom but not in the bedroom. Popper suggests that a principle of protecting freedom, understood as the ability to make one’s own reasoned choices, means the state must provide wealth to those who lack it for no fault of their own, so that people are able to choose from a variety of ways of life, but may not overrule people’s own reflective choices when it comes to how to live their lives. Popper has hence predated by more than two decades other influential Kantian liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. A second political dimension of an open society concerns the sorts of rights that the state would protect in it. In a word, given Popper’s individualism, they would all be equal human rights, that is, rights the bearers of which are individual human persons (Popper 1945a, 77, 1976b, 100, 1992, 5, 363). Such a restriction means that no group, such as a people, has rights that the state should enforce. Indeed, Popper explicitly rejects the idea of an “alleged right of a nation to self-determination”, calling it an “absurdity” (1992, 367–368), with one commentator saying, “Popper’s indictment of nationalism is wholesale” (Vincent 2005, 38). Furthermore, if what confers a dignity on us is our capacity for reason, it follows that those humans that are not persons, i.e., that lack the power to reason, do not have human rights either (although they might be entitled to other protections, e.g., as beings who can suffer). In addition, given Popper’s rationalism, the content of the rights consists of what would particularly serve the function of enabling individuals to develop, exercise, and act in accordance with their critical faculties. “(E)very man should be given the right to arrange his life himself so far as this is compatible with the equal rights of others” (Popper 1992, 363). Concretely, this principle means that rights to information, scientific enquiry, academic freedom, speech, a free press, religious freedom, association, and the like all merit enforcement (Popper 1945a, 115, 171, 1945b, 214, 225, 1976a, 78–79, 1992, 347–354). The idea that the state should protect only such open-ended liberties, ones enabling people to pursue a wide array of forms of

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life of their choosing, contrasts with, for instance, the view that the state should enable people to live objectively well. A third major feature of a state in an open society for Popper is a democratic distribution of political power or, more carefully, of the ability to remove rulers. Popper maintains that it would be unjust to restrict political choice to a particular group with a purportedly special knowledge. Neither divine revelation nor educational attainment nor virtuous character is a proper ground for being able to lay down the law or choose those who will. “(T)he Platonic idea of the rule of the wise and good should, I believe, be rejected unconditionally” (Popper 1994c, 221). Instead, those who rule must be able to be democratically replaced, supposing “we mean by ‘democracy’ the control of the government by majority vote” (Popper 2008a, 243). Popper’s justification for democracy is not the following one that not only is so familiar, but also fits so well with his dignity-based morality and conception of an open society. This is the rationale that since all persons have a dignity in virtue of their capacity to reason, and since everything about social interaction should be subjected to rational criticism, a state must afford everyone the opportunity to choose the content of the law for themselves or in principle be allowed to provide critical input. According every person an equal vote in order to give them an equal voice appears to follow straightaway from both of the two defining features of an open society, individualism and rationalism. However, this is not Popper’s reasoning, insofar as it suggests the importance of self-governance for democracy. Popper rejects a conception of democracy as rule by the people, and instead puts his point by saying that a state must “enable its citizens in practice to change a government without bloodshed when a majority wishes such a change” (1999a, 89; see also 1976a, 85, 1992, 350, 1994c, 220, 1999b, 96–97, 2008a, 242–243). Instead of violence being necessary to change a state’s rulers or rules, such change should be made on the basis of free choice. Popper calls this “theory of majority power of dismissal” (1999b, 97) to have been the “most important point” (Popper 1999b, 93) of his magnum opus, The Open Society and Its Enemies (see 1945a, 106–111, 1945b, 119, 140–141, 149–150). Although Popper most often considers the question of how to replace rulers, he also at times addresses, at least implicitly, the further questions of how much power rulers should have relative to others and how they ought to exercise it when picking the rules. For example, Popper rejects a Parliamentary, proportional representation system of government in favor of a two-party system, for a variety of reasons. First, there is the idea that when there is a clear “majority government,” (Popper 2008b, 368), it can more easily be held accountable and threatened with removal by another party waiting in the wings to govern. “Proportional representation creates the danger that the majority verdict at the polls, and hence the effect of defeat upon parties that is beneficial to democracy, will be regarded as a trivial detail” (Popper 1999b, 97, 2008b, 367–369). Second, Popper points out that in a system of proportional representation, parties, and not persons, are what citizens vote for, and then those who hold office do so as representatives of the parties that have appointed them, not of citizens (Popper 2008b, 365–367). Popper prefers a system in which members of

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a legislature represent citizens directly, even if they are affiliated with parties. Third, Popper notes that in a system of proportional representation, “small parties can exercise a disproportionately great––and often decisive––influence, both on the formation of a government and on its resignation, and so on all its decisions” (Popper 2008b, 367–368). Popper’s preferred alternative to a proportional representation system is a two-­ party system, characteristic of the United States. Here, the governing party has defeated the other by having received the majority of votes from citizens in a winner-­take-all apportioning of them. And when deciding which laws to adopt, the elected representatives seek to advance the interests of their respective constituencies by marshalling enough votes to obtain a majority in the legislature. In the rest of this essay, I do not question Popper’s preference for an open society, that is, one characterized by individualism and rationalism, but do provide reason to doubt that his political prescriptions are uniquely apt for such a society. Upon advancing a moral foundation different from Popper’s Kantianism, I show that an alternative politics grounded on it could be appropriate for an open society and is prima face attractive.

2.3  An Afro-communal Ethic In this section I expound a moral principle intended to rival Popper’s Kantian one of treating persons as rational. In a broad sense, both his principle and mine are individualist, in that both ethics imply that something other than groups are morally most important, and specifically, that it is a human person that has a dignity. However, in a narrow sense, my principle is an alternative to Popper’s form of individualism, which is Kantian (even if not specifically Kant’s). For Popper, the individual has a dignity in virtue of her intrinsic properties, features of hers that make no essential reference to anyone else, namely, her “convictions,” as above. To be sure, the ability to act on rationally acquired beliefs, as opposed to operate on instinct or conditioning, is to be exercised in a social manner for Popper, e.g., in the forms of scientific enquiry and democratic polity. However, his Kantian foundation influences the nature of sociality that is justified relative to a different, more fundamentally relational ethic. Or so I argue in the following section, after in this section drawing on the African philosophical tradition to expound a relational ethic according to which what makes a person morally important is her ability to relate communally with others.7

7  The following paragraphs borrow from Metz (2015a, 2017); what is intended to be new in this article is not the African ethic, but rather its application to political philosophical issues in ways that provide powerful alternatives to Popper’s political  views. For different approaches to sub-­ Saharan morality, see, for just two examples, Bujo (2005), who takes vital force to be a basic value to be promoted, and Gyekye (2010), who treats the common good as foundational.

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Instead of conceiving of morally right action in terms of what respects a final good intrinsic to a person, such as her capacity for rationality (or her autonomy, life, or being an organism), my favored ethic places a certain way of relating between individuals at the ground of how to treat others. The claim is not that relationships matter and individuals do not, but instead that individuals matter because they are capable of certain relationships. As noted above, the word “ubuntu” means humanness in some of the indigenous languages of southern Africa, and it is widely used to capture the morally salient features of sub-Saharan philosophies. According to this morality, one is at bottom to exhibit ubuntu, that is, to live a genuinely human way of life. Those who fail to do so are often called “non-persons” or even “animals” (e.g., Nkulu-N’sengha 2009, 143–144), metaphorical terms suggesting that people have failed to realize what is special about their human nature. Like Popper, then, a large swathe of indigenous African morality distinguishes between human and animal nature, and prescribes becoming more human and eschewing becoming like a beast. However, they differ in terms of what it is about human nature that is highly valuable for its own sake. Whereas for Popper it is our capacity for rationality, a more African view is that it is our capacity for relationality. An influential maxim associated with ubuntu is “A person is a person through other persons,” which, morally understood, prescribes developing into a real person or genuine human being, which one can do by relating positively to others in certain ways (for just two sources, see Khoza 1994; Mokgoro 1998, 17). The following comments by scholars of African ethics, from places as diverse as Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, suggest some kind of relational approach to morality: (I)n African societies, immorality is the word or deed which undermines fellowship. (Kasenene 1998, 21) When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, he or she has ubuntu.” This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate…. Social harmony is for us (Africans—ed.) the summum bonum––the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague. (Tutu 1999, 35) (O)ne should always live and behave in a way that maximizes harmonious existence at present as well as in the future. (Murove 2007, 181) A life of cohesion, or positive integration with others, becomes a goal, one that people design modalities for achieving. Let us call this goal communalism, or, as other people have called it, communitarianism. In light of this goal, the virtues…. become desirable. (Masolo 2010, 240)

I do not take these comments about fellowship, harmony, and communalism at face value, for doing so has counterintuitive implications regarding human rights, which my principle is meant to capture (argued below). As they stand, they variously suggest that certain (harmonious or communal) relationships are good for their own sake, that it is always wrong to undermine them, and that one should promote them as much as possible. However, if existing relationships alone were ethically relevant, then a person not in the relevant relationship with an agent, such as a stranger in a foreign land, would lack moral standing relative to her. If it were always wrong

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to act in ways that undermine the relevant relationship, then threats, violence, and other forms of force would be categorically impermissible, even when directed against aggressors in order to protect innocents. Moreover, if one were supposed to maximize the relevant relationships, then it would be permissible to use any means whatsoever, including intentionally harming innocents in severe ways, whenever doing so would promote harmony in the long run. To avoid these implications while retaining a relational approach, I advance a principle according to which individuals have a dignity in virtue of their communal nature, or capacity for harmony, that demands respect. The idea is not that being part of a particular community confers a dignity that must be recognized by members of it, but rather than being able to relate communally with anyone must be recognized by anyone. By “communion” or “harmony” I mean the combination of two logically distinct relationships that are often implicit in African characterizations of how to live well (initially distinguished and reconstructed in Metz 2007). Consider these quotations from an additional group of philosophers, theologians, and related theorists, from Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa: Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all. (Gbadegesin 1991, 65) (H)armony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group. (Mokgoro 1998, 17) The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good. (Gyekye 2004, 16) (T)he purpose of our life is community-service and community-belongingness. (Iroegbu 2005, 442)

Notice that, in these characterizations of how to commune or harmonize, two logically distinct relationships are repeatedly mentioned. First, there is considering oneself part of the whole, being close, sharing a way of life, and belonging, which I label “identifying with” or “sharing a way of life with” others. Second, there is achieving the good of all, being sympathetic, acting for the common good, and serving the community, labelled “exhibiting solidarity with” or “caring for” others. Note how these are different ways of relating: one could cooperate with others on projects that are not good for them, and, conversely, one could act in ways that are good for others but do not include participating with them even-handedly. For the purposes of this essay, it will be enough to work with the following representation of communion or harmony (Fig. 2.1): By the ethic advanced here, it is not this communal relationship that has a basic moral value, but rather an individual’s natural capacity for it. Typical human beings, for example, have a dignity insofar as they are in principle able both to be communed with and to commune. The highest moral status accrues to human persons generally, beings that by nature can be both objects of a harmonious relationship, viz., able to be identified with and cared for by others, and subjects of it, able to identify with and care for others. There are two key differences between this account of dignity and Popper’s. Although all cooperation involves the exercise of reasoned decision-making, not all

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Fig. 2.1  Schematic representation of harmony

exercise of reasoned decision-making involves cooperation. Popper’s account entails that a psychopath, by which I mean someone substantially incapable of other-regard, could have a dignity equal to ours (even if his behavior would be liable to criticism), but the Afro-communal account entails that such an individual does not (but could still warrant certain kinds of moral treatment for its own sake).8 In addition, for Popper it is strictly our agency that confers a dignity on us, whereas, by the Afrocommunal account, it is agency  qua other-regarding plus our patiency, i.e., our capacity for others to identify with and exhibit solidarity toward us. In a nutshell, by the African account it is our ability both to love and be loved in a broad sense that makes a given one of us the most important beings, morally speaking, on the planet. Turning from moral status to normative theory, I propose that an act is right insofar as it respects others in virtue of their natural capacity to relate communally or harmoniously; otherwise, an act is wrong. Equivalently, an act is wrong if and only if degrades others who can in principle be party to relationships of identity and solidarity, especially insofar as (roughly) it treats innocent parties in extremely anti-­ social or discordant ways, with enmity. Discord consists of the opposites of identity and solidarity, where instead of togetherness and coordination there is distance and subordination (together constituting division), and instead of altruism and aid there is cruelty and harm (ill-will) (Fig. 2.2). From this perspective, what typically makes actions such as lying, promise breaking, abusing, kidnapping, and the like immoral is that they treat innocent parties discordantly and thereby disrespect their capacity to be harmonized with and to harmonize.9  For further discussion of this case, along with a case of autism, see Metz (2012b, 397–398).  Although markets and bureaucracy fail to exemplify some harmony, as conceived of here, they do not essentially involve discord, either. For brief discussion of how the present ethic bears on these modern institutions, see Metz (2014a, 68–70). 8 9

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Fig. 2.2  Schematic representation of discord

That explanation of why these acts are wrong is, I submit, prima facie plausible and differs from the Kantian notion that acts are wrong because they are degradations of rationality or free choice. Instead, wrong acts by the present ethic are those failing to treat people as special in virtue of their capacity for harmonious relationships. If a person has not been discordant, then there is strong reason to treat her in a harmonious manner, roughly, to coordinate with her and do what it is expected to benefit her. Typically, then, indifference and isolation are immoral, and worse are discordant actions involving subordination consistent with an “us versus them” attitude as well as harm consistent with a selfish motivation. However, it does not follow that discordant actions are always wrong. They are instead wrong when, and only when, they fail to express respect for the dignity of people’s communal nature, which they need not do. It is one thing to act discordantly toward someone who has not herself acted that way. If someone has not initially acted in a discordant way, and has instead related harmoniously with others (who themselves have not been discordant, let us suppose), then she counts as “innocent” and is liable for only harmonious treatment. Were one to treat an innocent person in a severely discordant way, most often one would be thereby violating her human rights, even if in the long run more harmony would be fostered in society. What killing, torture, slavery, rape, human trafficking, apartheid, and other gross infringements of civil liberties and equal opportunities arguably have in common is that they are instances of substantial discord directed to those who have not acted this way themselves, thereby denigrating their special capacity to be party to relationships of identity and solidarity. This account of what constitutes a human rights violation plausibly rivals the Kantian rationale in terms of the degradation of reasoned decision-making. To be sure, subordination involves suppressing another’s ability to make a reasoned decision for herself. However, by the present approach to human rights, it is not merely subordination that counts but also harm, the reduction of people’s quality of life.

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That could be a matter of making people worse off, but it might also be a matter of making them worse people, i.e., impairing their capacity to relate communally with others, that is, their ubuntu. Inherent to the analysis of human rights violations in terms of discordance is a conception of the good (and bad), specifically of both well-being and excellence, where it is plausible to think that what constitutes a human rights violation, such as torture, is characteristically behavior that makes others badly off, that harms them. The differences between Popper’s ethic and the African one entail divergent prescriptions about how state institutions ought to be structured. To the extent that one finds the African ethic attractive, that is some reason to favor its prescriptions. However, many readers will find the prescriptions prima facie plausible in themselves, even if they are not yet convinced by the specific moral principle from which I derive them in the following section.

2.4  Popper’s Politics and the Afro-communal Ethic Recall the three facets of Popper’s political philosophy that I have expounded, viz., his views of neutrality, liberty, and authority (in catchwords). Given his Kantian moral foundation, Popper is (or at least believes himself to be) committed to the views that the state should not seek to advance particular conceptions of the good life, should instead protect only the abilities of individuals to live as they see fit, and should give a majority of citizens the final authority to pick (or replace) rulers and a majority of rulers the final authority to pick rules. In this section, I provide reason to doubt each of these views, arguing that Popper’s politics is insufficiently communal. I do not deny Popper’s view that an open society is preferable to a closed one. In fact, treating people as having a dignity in virtue of their capacity to commune forbids both treating groups as having the highest final value and discouraging people from questioning social arrangements. After all, neither feature of a closed society is compatible with cooperative relationships between people, which is central to communion. However, it does not follow that Popper’s specific conception of how the state ought to function in an open society is justified; what follows is another, arguably more appealing vision of what politics there could look like. Recall, first, that, for Popper, the state ought to be neutral in respect of people’s well-being or virtue, or in his words that “the politician should limit himself to fighting against evils, instead of fighting for ‘positive’ or ‘higher’ values, such as happiness” (1945b, 263). According to Popper, the state should not make base any decision on a judgment regarding which ways of life are better than others, and it should instead merely protect citizens’ freedom to choose their preferred lifestyles. However, by the Afro-communal ethic, an agent is to treat others as important in virtue of their ability to commune and to be communed with, which, in turn, means relating to them in beneficent ways. According to this relational morality, for the state not to care about its citizens’ happiness and moral life would be for it to fail to treat them with respect.

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Such care need not take a coercive form, and usually should not, given the cooperative dimension of a communal relationship. A policy of enabling others to live better, and particularly more moral, lives need not be construed in terms of “state-­ enforced norms” (Popper 1945a, 99). Instead of punishing people for harming themselves or exhibiting vice, an Afro-communal state might facilitate and encourage other, more communion-friendly choices (first discussed in Metz 2011b, 238–239). For example, the state could fund couples counselling for the public, with the aim of strengthening marriages and other intense communal relationships. Similarly, it could offer parenting classes, in order to make it more likely that children flourish. It could also offer instruction on emotional intelligence and conflict resolution, to help co-workers and neighbors get along better. These sorts of courses would presumably be offered in a state clinic of some kind that would be associated with a department of social welfare, and on the face of it they could do a lot of good compared with their absence. Consider, now, how a state university might operate to foster virtue among its students, which they would have been less likely to acquire without such public support. For Popper, higher education ought to be strictly devoted to fostering “a critical appreciation of the things that are said (and the things that are done)” (1945b, 262; see also 263 and 1945a, 115). However, part of honoring people’s capacity to commune is enabling them to exercise it, meaning that a publicly funded university might also teach students, say, how to become more aware of their implicit biases, how to identify and deal with conflicts of interest, and how to become more attuned to other people’s points of view and feelings. In addition, university pedagogy could incorporate what are often called “communities of practice,” where students would learn by collaborating with others to realize shared goals. Relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for others’ quality of life are more likely to be realized in the context of joint, public activities than isolated assignments done or prepared for at home in which students are competing against each other for grades. Still more, enabling students to excel at the right sort of job, meaning one that would contribute positively to others’ good, would be a significant way for a university to impart virtue. If the state must treat people as having a dignity because of (in part) their capacities to be cared for and to care for others, then it must care for each of them by enabling them to find work in accordance with their particular abilities and inclinations to care for others (Metz 2015b, 209–214). Similar kinds of approaches would be apt for other state funded institutions, such as healthcare. It would be reasonable, for instance, to use public funds to treat psychopathy, autism, narcissism, and racism with an eye toward enabling people to become more communal (where that includes treating innocent strangers harmoniously). For another example, when the state fights poverty, it would not merely dole out money that could be used to obtain whatever ends poor people might have, but instead would in the first instance provide resources that are objectively good for them, such as enabling them to access nature, neighborhood parks, artistic productions such as plays and concerts, tools with which they could be creative, and of course education and healthcare.

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I have argued that these kinds of virtue-friendly policies follow from an Afro-­ communal ethical foundation, but I presume they have some intuitive pull even for those who do not share that value system. Note that these policies need not be placed above democratic deliberation, viewed as a function of superior knowledge that only a few possess and that are rammed down citizens’ throats. Instead, these policies may be offered as the conception of justice that an elected government ought to adopt for citizens, including for those with diverse religious and cultural backgrounds. In addition to avoiding tribalism, these policies are also not collectivist; they are in no way fundamentally oriented toward supporting a particular group such as a people or a state. Popper would no doubt object that we cannot know what is objectively good for human beings, or at least that we might be mistaken about that. However, he has himself advanced not only a principle of morally right action, but also a conception of dignity on which it is grounded as well as companion accounts of how the state ought to function. If he can take seriously those normative and evaluative principles in the face of either skepticism or fallibilism, then he can do the same for an Afro-­ communal approach.10 For the second major political issue, let us turn to which kinds of rights a state ought to enforce on behalf of its citizens. The reader will remember that, according to Popper, the only bearer of rights should be an individual and that their content should involve enabling an individual to make a reasoned decision for herself. “(I)t is the end of the state to protect the freedom of its citizens” (Popper 1945a, 82) considered as individuals, and not, say, to enable national self-determination, where a nation could take the form of a community, meant here to signify systematic bonds of identity and solidarity. The Afro-communal ethic does entail that some broad individual freedom matters, insofar as cooperating is a central feature of relating communally. However, the ethic also prescribes protecting certain kinds of freedom more than others. For example, above I noted the kind of freedom that the state would provide to its poorer citizens is not so much the ability to choose any way of life they want, but more the ability to choose ones that would be objectively good for them. Instead of going out of its way to enable people to spread ugliness, ignorance, and hatred to a degree equal to beauty, knowledge, and love, an Afro-communal state would in principle provide the kinds of resources that are particularly conducive towards fostering well-being and virtue. For another example, a state that treats its citizens with respect in virtue of their capacity to relate communally will protect a right to culture on their part.11 For an agent such as a state to treat people as special in virtue of their capacity for communal relationship, it must not degrade their particular, substantial actualizations of  Governments might as an empirical matter be disinclined to adopt such an approach, but as a matter of normative political philosophy, for all that has been said so far, they should. 11  The next few paragraphs borrow from Metz (2014b, 142–144). For a commentator sympathetic to the point, albeit not on characteristically African normative grounds, see O’Hear (2004, 196–197). 10

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this capacity, viz., in the form of long-standing and widespread communities. Although a community qua instance of communion, understood as including a cooperatively shared a way of life (and so a kind of consent), is not one and the same thing as the mere capacity for such, it is people’s exercise of that capacity. And it is plausible that respecting people’s capacity for communion requires recognition of the way they have actualized it, or, equivalently, that degrading communal relationships is to degrade those individuals who have been party to them. So, if people have established communal relationships, then the state should respect them by not targeting them for destruction, by doing what it can to avoid impairing them, and by taking active steps to protect them, when the cost to other values is low. These supportive activities could, first, include making exceptions to rules, permitting some collective self-determination over, say, civil matters. On this score, a state could enable different cultures to lay down what counts as getting married, subject roughly to the condition that both parties give their free and informed consent (and hence are relating harmoniously). A second way to enhance shared ways of life would be for the state to provide resources to support people’s intellectual or aesthetic cultures. For instance, it could subsidize the publication of literature in different languages used within the state’s territory—and of course it need not support only one language to the exclusion of others. A third way to protect communal identities might involve making privileges contingent on certain conditions so as to retard the encroachment of English. Consider Israel’s policy of making a radio broadcast license conditional on 50% of transmissions being in Hebrew, a language at the heart of most people’s self-conceptions there. These kinds of policies do not rise to the level of “national self-determination.” However, they are not far off, in that they are designed to protect communities, understood as realizations of people’s capacity for communal relationships. By this approach, people’s ability to retain and even enrich their culture merits protection not for corporate reasons; it is not a group right that grounds duties not to interfere with people when it comes to what they eat or how they worship together. Instead, if ever an agent were intentionally to disrupt (or sometimes fail to support, when he could easily do so) communal relationships, including a shared sense of self and cooperative practices, it would thereby express disrespect of the individuals who have a dignity because of their ability to relate communally. In addition, note that the claim is not that the effect of impairing communion would be detrimental to individuals. Instead, the position is that when a specific cooperative practice has been willingly adopted by a large number of people for a long span of time and is central to their self-conception, it plausibly has a moral significance that can be worth respecting as an instantiation of their special capacity to relate communally. Such a rationale is, I submit, a plausible rival to the Kantian suggestion that culture matters for justice merely because it facilitates the autonomous choices of individuals (Kymlicka 1989; Rawls 2001, 93–94). Third, and finally, I now take up Popper’s defense of democracy. He maintains that it is preferable to tyranny on the ground that it enables a majority to change a state’s rulers without violence. “There are in fact only two forms of state: those in which it is possible to get rid of a government without bloodshed, and those in

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which this is not possible…. All that counts is whether the government can be removed without bloodshed” (Popper 1999b, 94; see also 1976a, 85). So stated, Popper’s remark is too crude. If literally the only thing that mattered were the ability to remove a sitting government without violence or even force, then one could, say, use a “pass the hat” method. That is, every citizen could write down her preferred candidates on a piece of paper, place them all into a hopper, and then have a piece pulled out at random, with the current rulers stepping down supposing their names were not on it. Indeed, one could just have a computer pick citizens at random to serve in the government, where officials step down in accordance with the results of the lottery. These procedures are not democratic, or, if they are, they are surely not an attractive sort, despite removing the government without bloodshed. Although these procedures would  avoid a violent transfer of power and they would be “fair” in a sense, what is missing from them (for one thing) is the element of choosing consequent to rational discussion about the qualifications and proposals of the candidates. On this score, Popper does in fact have the intellectual resources that can plausibly explain why such deliberation is important: it is necessary to respect us as rational beings. Consider his remarks that democracy “makes possible the reform of institutions without using violence, and thereby the use of reason in the designing of new institutions” (1945a, 110), and that “in an open society there is the possibility of free discussion and that discussion has influence on politics” (1976a, 78). Appealing to reason and free discussion indicates that it is not merely force-free dismissal that counts; what also matters is the collective, rational evaluation of political institutions. However, one need not appeal to the Kantian value of rationality in order to make sense of why changing a government should be done in the light of the free choice of citizens upon deliberation of the alternatives. By the Afro-communal ethic, this procedure is appropriate as a way of respecting citizens who are capable of being party to relationships of identity and solidarity. Identifying with others means enjoying a sense of togetherness with them and choosing on a cooperative basis, where the first is more likely to result from a democratic procedure and the second is, more strongly, constituted by it. Part of sharing a way of life with others is sharing political power, by this approach. In addition, there is the familiar idea that, when it comes to solidarity or caring for others’ quality of life, a government is more likely to do what is good for its citizens if they have substantial input into who is in charge of it. In fact, considerations of communion entail, contra Popper, that the right sort of democratic procedure would avoid a two-party system or other form of majority rule, and instead would require unanimous agreement, where feasible, say, at the Parliamentary level. For example, Kwasi Wiredu (2000) has famously put forward a proposal for a “non-party polity” in which legislators, who have been elected by a majority of the populace (such being practically necessary in urban environments), would not be affiliated with a particular constituency for the sake of which they would jockey for a majority of votes. Instead, they would propose policies that they think are good for the public as a whole, and would adopt only those that are the object of unanimous agreement among themselves.

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As is common for African political philosophers to point out these days, consensus would not necessarily mean that everyone agrees to the same policy for the same reasons, which would be unrealistic to expect. Instead at the core it would mean that no one has objections serious enough to stand in the way of a policy’s adoption. The notion of agreement is one of agreeing to let a law pass because it is good enough for all, not agreeing that it is the best from every perspective. Respect for people in virtue of their communal nature means seeking such unanimous agreement wherever it is practical, for two reasons. First, when it comes to identity, consensus among legislators would produce a stronger sense of togetherness between themselves and between citizens, and would also constitute a more intense form of cooperation than would majority rule. Second, in terms of solidarity, everyone’s interests are more likely to be satisfied to an adequate degree by a given policy if everyone must ratify it than if a mere majority must do so. In short, with a consensual approach, there would not be a minority left completely out in the cold, that is, feeling alienated, being unsupported in its aims, and faring badly. Before concluding, I address the suggestion that Popper’s politics is more relational than it might appear at first glance. One Popper scholar, Oseni Afisi, has labelled Popper’s political philosophy “liberal-communitarian” (Afisi 2016a, b), which might lead one to suspect that I have drawn too stark a contrast between Popper’s Kantian individualism and my Afro-communalism. Afisi sees “a communitarian impulse” (2016a, 2) and “social aspects” (2016b, 13) in Popper’s politics, insofar as Popper recognizes that dialogue with others is required in order for us to reason well. Because he acknowledges that “individuals cannot author their own values without engaging critically with others” (Afisi 2016a, 3), and that “critical reflection with others is necessary if individuals are to act freely in fulfilment of their self-determination” (Afisi 2016a, 3), Afisi believes that Popper’s form of liberalism includes an important “social dimension” (Afisi 2016a, 3) that is missing from other forms of liberalism. Setting aside the issue of whether other liberals have failed to recognize the prerequisites for autonomy, I maintain that the sort of sociality Afisi finds in Popper’s position is not the robust sort advanced in this essay. Afisi is discussing a kind of intersubjective engagement that is “necessary” for self-determination only in an instrumental sense, that is, as a causal tool by which to bring about a distinct state of affairs of authorship of one’s own values or self-determination. Basically, it is only by engaging in dialogue and debate with others that we can efficiently set, pursue, and obtain our respective goals as individuals. In contrast, the relationality I have championed here is to be sought as an end, not merely as a means to a further end of autonomy. I have suggested that what is important about us is our capacity to relate communally with others, which entails a variety of rich alternatives to Popper’s politics. Specifically, if critical reflection with others were of merely instrumental value, then we could not justify––or at least not nearly as straightforwardly––the views (among others) that the state should work to improve its citizens’ objective quality of life, protect their culture as a way of treating them with respect, and seek consensus in the distribution of political power among legislators. These are, I maintain, prima facie plausible alternatives to Popper’s views, and they

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are most naturally grounded on an ethic that would have the state exhibit and promote communal relationships as ends (albeit as way thereby to express respect for persons capable of them).

2.5  Concluding Remarks In this essay I have critically addressed the sort of political philosophy that Popper believes is the companion to an open society. I have not rejected the ideal of an open society; I agree that a society should be neither tribal nor collectivist, as Popper conceives of these. However, I have questioned whether the state in an open society should function in the ways Popper believes, to the extent that they follow from his foundational commitment to a Kantian ethic according to which we are human insofar as we are rational.12 Suggesting, with the indigenous African tradition, that we are instead human insofar as we are relational, and specifically communal, I have sketched a different politics. Roughly according to it, the state need not avoid advancing certain conceptions of the good life, should not merely protect individuals’ ability to live as they see fit, and should not rest content with the majority rule that is typical of a two-party system. Instead, the state should do things such as enable citizens to develop their virtue, help them safeguard and enrich their culture, and require consensual agreement among at least elected representatives before a law is considered valid. These and other policies, I have argued, would express respect for people as capable of being communed with and of communing. If I am correct that such policies follow from an Afro-communal ethic, and if one finds this ethic attractive, then one is committed to the policies. However, as I have pointed out at times, the policies are in themselves and on the face of it reasonable alternatives to Popper’s politics for an open society. There is nothing in them that is either tribal or collectivist, and so at least for that reason should be taken seriously by those sympathetic to Popper’s broad program. In closing, I acknowledge that I have not addressed Popper’s entire political philosophy. For example, I have not considered his defense of equal opportunity, the notion that the educational and employment positions available to a person should not be determined by factors such as social caste or parental wealth. I also have not addressed Popper’s evaluation of capitalism, the issue of who should be legally allowed to own the means of production. In addition, I have not taken up his rejection of revolutionary upheaval in favor of piecemeal change. If the Afro-communal ethic has entailed some plausible conclusions about the proper functions of the state in this essay, then I submit that it would be worth extending its applications to these matters in other work.

 Leaving open the possibility that there are additional rationales for his political views beyond his Kantian ethics. 12

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Acknowledgments  This essay has been improved as a result of oral feedback received at the Conference on Karl Popper, Knowledge and Politics in Contemporary Africa organized by the Department of Philosophy at Lagos State University in Nigeria in 2019 as well as copious, useful, written comments from an anonymous referee.

References Adeyinka, Adeyinka, and Gaolekwe Ndwapi. 2002. Education and morality in Africa. Pastoral Care in Education 20 (2): 17–23. Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2016a. Popper, liberal-communitarianism, beyond the politics of liberalism. Philosophia: E-Journal of Philosophy and Culture 11: 1–18. ———. 2016b. Towards exploring an enduring liberal-communitarianism in Karl Popper through his intellectual biography. Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion 24: 13–22. Ake, Claude. 1987. The African context of human rights. Africa Today 34 (1–2): 5–12. Bujo, Bénézet. 2005. Differentiations in African ethics. In The Blackwell companion to religious ethics, ed. William Schweiker, 423–437. Malden: Blackwell. ———. 2009. Springboards for modern African constitutions and development in African cultural traditions. In African ethics: An anthology of comparative and applied ethics, ed. Munyaradzi Felix Murove, 391–411. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Corvi, Roberta. 1997. An introduction to the thought of Karl Popper. London: Routledge. Gbadegesin, Segun. 1991. African philosophy. New York: Peter Lang. Gyekye, Kwame. 2004. Beyond cultures: Perceiving a common humanity. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 2010. African ethics. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/african-­ethics/ Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The theory of communicative action, Volume 1: Reason and rationalization of society, Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. ———. 1987. The theory of communicative action, Volume 2: A critique of functionalist reason, Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Iroegbu, Pantaleon. 2005. Beginning, purpose and end of life. In Kpim of morality ethics, ed. Pantaleon Iroegbu and Anthony Echekwube, 440–445. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Kasenene, Peter. 1998. Religious ethics in Africa. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Khoza, Reuel. 1994. Ubuntu, Botho, Vumunhu, Vhuthu, African humanism. Sandton: Ekhaya Promotions. Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, community, and culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Masolo, D.A. 2010. Self and community in a changing world. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. Metz, Thaddeus. 2007. Toward an African moral theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3): 321–341. ———. 2011a. Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal 11 (2): 532–559. ———. 2011b. An African theory of dignity and a relational conception of poverty. In The humanist imperative in South Africa, ed. John De Gruchy, 233–241. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media. ———. 2012a. Developing African political philosophy: Moral-theoretic strategies. Philosophia Africana 14 (1): 61–83. ———. 2012b. An African theory of moral status. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3): 387–402. ———. 2014a. Just the beginning for ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 65–72. ———. 2014b. African values, human rights and group rights. In African legal theory and contemporary problems, ed. Oche Onazi, 131–151. Dordrecht: Springer.

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———. 2015a. African ethics and journalism ethics: News and opinion in light of ubuntu. Journal of Media Ethics 30 (2): 74–90. ———. 2015b. An African egalitarianism: Bringing community to bear on equality. In The equal society: Essays on equality in theory and practice, ed. George Hull, 185–208. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2017. The ethics and politics of the brain drain: A communal alternative to liberal perspectives. South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (1): 101–114. Metz, Thaddeus, and Sarah Clark Miller. 2016. Relational ethics. In The international encyclopedia of ethics, ed. Hugh Lafollette, 1–10. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Mokgoro, Yvonne. 1998. Ubuntu and the law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 (1): 15–26. Murove, Munyaradzi Felix. 2007. The Shona ethic of Ukama with reference to the immortality of values. The Mankind Quarterly 48 (2): 179–189. Nkulu-N’sengha, Mutombo. 2009. Bumuntu. In Encyclopedia of African religion, ed. Molefi Keti Asante and Ama Mazama, 142–147. Los Angeles: Sage. O’Hear, Anthony. 2004. The open society revisited. In Karl Popper: Critical appraisals, ed. Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald, 189–202. New York: Routledge. Popper, Karl. 1945a. The open society and its enemies, Volume 1: The spell of Plato. 1st ed. London: George Routledge & Son, Ltd. ———. 1945b. The open society and its enemies, Volume 2: The high tide of prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. 1st ed. London: George Routledge & Son, Ltd. ———. 1966. The open society and its enemies, Volume 2: The high tide of prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. 5th ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1976a. The open society. In Revolution or reform?: A confrontation, ed. A.T. Ferguson, 65–87. Chicago: New University Press. ———. 1976b. Theoretical background II.  In Revolution or reform?: A confrontation, ed. A.T. Ferguson, 94–100. Chicago: New University Press. ———. 1992. Conjectures and refutations. New York: Routledge. First published in 1962. ———. 1994a. Immanuel Kant: The philosopher of the enlightenment. In Search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years, Trans. Laura Bennett, 126–136. London: Routledge. ———. 1994b. Emancipation through knowledge. In Search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years, Trans. Laura Bennett, 137–150. London: Routledge. First broadcast in 1961. ———. 1994c. What does the West believe in? In Search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years, Trans. Laura Bennett, 204–222. London: Routledge. First published in 1959. ———. 1999a. On freedom. In All life is problem solving, Trans. Patrick Camiller, 81–92. New York: Routledge. First published in 1958. ———. 1999b. On the theory of democracy. In All life is problem solving, Trans. Patrick Camiller, 93–98. New York: Routledge. First published in 1987. ———. 2008a. The open society and the democratic state. In After the open society, ed. Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, 231–248. First published in 1963. ———. 2008b. On democracy. In After the open society, ed. Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, 360–369. First published in 1988. Pralong, Sandra. 1999. Minima Moralia: Is there an ethics of the open society? In Popper’s open society after fifty years, ed. Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong, 127–143. New York: Routledge. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shearmur, Jeremy. 1996. The political thought of Karl Popper. London: Routledge. Sogolo, Godwin. 1993. Foundations of African philosophy. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Tutu, Desmond. 1999. No future without forgiveness. New York: Random House. Vincent, Andrew. 2005. Nationalism and the open society. Theoria 52 (107): 36–64. Wiredu, Kwasi. 2000. Democracy and consensus in African traditional politics: A plea for a non-­ party polity. Polylog 2. https://them.polylog.org/2/fwk-­en.htm

Chapter 3

Karl Popper’s Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-Once’? Oseni Taiwo Afisi

3.1  Introduction One of the most important themes of Popper’s political thought is his mistrust of large-scale planning. Popper introduces an antithetical idea: the idea of piecemeal social engineering. Popper terms ‘piecemeal engineering’ the redressing of agreed social problems by a trial-and-error, bits-and-pieces approach. The specific end must be to ameliorate a condition that all reasonable people agree is a problem. The means to that end must be tentative: the social engineer must be fallibilist concerning any aspect of the approach that is taken. Popper expects that from epistemic modesty of this kind will also flow a disposition to respect individual rights and to protect against any injustice. Many Popper scholars such as Brian Magee (1973) and John Gray (1976) consider piecemeal engineering (as the centrepiece of social and political philosophy) to be isomorphic with falsificationism (as the centrepiece of philosophy of natural science). For Magee (1973, 78) in particular, “Popper’s political philosophy is seamlessly interwoven with his philosophy of science”. Magee’s claim was that with falsification, or with conjecture and refutation, Popper believed anyone may criticise and contribute, and equivalently, piecemeal engineering shuns authority or vaunted expertise and depends merely upon making it the case that one can learn from one’s mistakes. Magee claims furthermore that, through this approach, we can better eliminate errors and make better social reforms than can be done by utopian/large-scale social planning. That is to say, piecemeal engineering may be modest, but modest is better. Based on this understanding, piecemeal engineering is claimed to provide a practical underpinning for a scientific–experimental intervention in society involving a process of social learning. Popper gave thematic significance in both his philosophy of science and his philosophy of politics to be the critical method of falsification or error elimination O. T. Afisi (*) Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_3

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(conjecture and refutation), together with rationality, fallibilism and openness. At the same time, Popper personified as ‘an’ engineer the reformer who would work in trial-and-error spirit by a piecemeal approach. My aim in this paper is to evaluate Popper’s piecemeal engineering as a model for achieving social and political change where and when major social and political change is deemed necessary. The parallel evaluative question concerning natural science would be whether conjecture and refutation can drive, in real-time, ultimately very major needed intellectual change. However, because I wish to consider the scale and speed of social change that is needed in less developed nations such as in Africa, and other nations that are often riven by corruption, my evaluative question concerns whether piecemeal engineering is competent to such tasks. I shall briefly contextualise this study to Africa, where the scale of socio-economic and political change that is both needed and needed quickly is vast, and where corruption is rife. By discussing first in the philosophy of science why I believe Popper’s method can quickly accomplish intellectual change, I shall also defend the value of piecemeal engineering for social reform even of deeply troubled nations such as those in Africa. However, I will defend the need for many-pieces-at-once reform when the needs are urgent enough, despite the fact that this would blur somewhat the empirical learning that Popper hoped would be accomplished. I agree with Popper that piecemeal engineering is a requirement for epistemic most-responsible peer review and social learning, and so also for the most careful variety of social transformation. Partly in terms of “many-pieces-at-once” social engineering that varies Popper’s prescription somewhat, I shall argue for the following four points: 1. that one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal social engineering that Popper prescribed is liable to be too slow when radical institutional changes are needed; 2. that, since a significant change (cause) is required in order to achieve a noticeable consequence (effect) in social relations, small one-at-a-time piecemeal changes would often not change society noticeably; 3. that the magnitude of the situation often requires that social reform be undertaken many-pieces-at-once; 4. that while Popper’s one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal social engineering seems sensible where societies are more technologically advanced and are already deeply developed, societies that are less developed require faster, much more sweeping political change, that consequently will be “many-pieces-at-once”.

3.2  Understanding Piecemeal Engineering Fundamentally according to Popper, the piecemeal engineering approach is the introduction of modest changes to address specific problems and modest implementation of progressively modified steps or policies in response to the observed consequences of those interventions. Piecemeal engineering involves small scale

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intervention to deal with social issues, and to see whether they are producing their intended effects, and to find ways of mitigating any unintended consequences. It is therefore a trial-and-error approach to learning that seeks to refine interventions based on that learning. For Popper, the way to disentangle causes and effects is to avoid undertaking reforms of too great a complexity. Popper insists that it should always be possible to know the effect of the changes we have introduced in social reform. In Popper’s estimation, by pursuing a sweeping social change, one would make it very difficult to determine exactly which aspect of the intervention is having the most influence. Yet Popper insisted that our concern needs to be with understanding causes and effects, for that is how we can be duly tentative, and fallibilist, concerning our steps. We would otherwise have no way to learn from our mistakes. So, without disentangling causes and effects, one would be in confusion concerning whether any intervention attempted was contributing to or thwarting a desired social transformation. Therefore, the epistemically responsible way to achieve the desired end is to approach social problems piecemeal. Sweeping grand scale change is epistemically irresponsible and is likely not relative to what one aims to accomplish. It would be destructive rather than helpful.

3.3  P  iecemeal Social Engineering as a Method of Changing Society As a method of changing society, Popper’s piecemeal social engineering involves performing small scale reforms aimed at determining how public policies can produce demonstrated social benefits when the principle of negative utilitarianism is applied. Negative utilitarianism involves the view that the aim of public policy is to alleviate indisputable suffering rather than to promote happiness. Whatever happiness even amounts to is subject to dispute. Partly for that reason, the means to bring better happiness about would be contentious, and would not easily be susceptible to empirical test. These are reasons why Popper considers the (positive) utilitarianism of Mill to be potentially a vehicle for dogmatism. Popper advanced negative utilitarianism as a way to steer between dogmatism and scepticism (or moral nihilism). Negative utilitarianism requires us to promote the least amount of evil or harm within the means by which we seek to address the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number. Popper’s idea is that governments should respond piecemeal to recognised social ills – to whatever is widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people. So a government’s application of piecemeal methods will be trial-and-error attempts to mitigate these acknowledged harms; and when those urgent evils of society are dealt with piecemeal, it is with a view to best learning from one’s mistakes. Any revolutionary attempt to restructure society through large-scale social planning Popper viewed as a pernicious consequence of historicism. Conversely, Popper

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viewed the preference for piecemeal social engineering as protection against totalitarianism. Whereas historicism and holism/large-scale social planning or utopian social engineering all define direct roads to totalitarianism in Popper’s view, commitment to piecemeal social engineering as a model for social reform confers safety from that eventuality. Precisely by fostering criticism, the prescription to do social engineering piecemeal is opening of society rather than the closing of it. Utopian/ holistic/large-scale social planning, Popper claimed, requires the centralised rule of a few, the suppression of dissent and, ultimately, the use of violence instead of reasoning to settle the disputes that arise in the pursuit of the ultimate goals of the large-scale planners. The way that Popper rejected such totalitarian ways draws inspiration from the conservatism that the piecemeal approach signifies. Popper’s reasons for conservatism or against revolutionary fervour in social reform are essentially Burkean. In favouring the Burkean point of view, which emphasises caution in making social changes, Popper foreswore revolutionary behaviour in politics. The particular qualities of Popper’s liberalism all have a basis in this Burkean view. Piecemeal social engineering, Popper argued, gives room for democratic ideals, the tolerance of dissent and the use of reason and compromise to settle political disputes (Popper 1945, 157–168). Popper provided three basic arguments against utopian/holistic social engineering. These arguments can be found in both The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1, chapter 9, entitled: “Aestheticism, Perfectionism, Utopianism” 5th edition, and The Poverty of Historicism section 21, titled: “Piecemeal versus Utopian Engineering”. The first is that the utopian’s aim is to restructure the “whole of society in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint” (Popper 1957, 66). Popper’s position is that unlike a piecemeal social engineer who looks at the social issues and senses that the best method of re-designing society is addressing those issues in small adjustments and re-adjustments with the possibility of further improvements, the utopian’s attempt at using a definite plan or blueprint to address social issues as whole requires “a strong centralised rule of a few, and … therefore is likely to lead to dictatorship” (Popper 1945, 140). The second argument results from the first. As a result of the dictatorship arising from the implementation of the definite plan or blueprint of the utopian, the difficulty would be to measure the effects of the transformation agenda within the society. Since dictatorship does not take kindly to criticism, “the benevolent dictator will not easily hear of complaints concerning measures he has taken” (Popper 1945, 140). Rational criticism or feedback on the measures of the dictator’s social reform is discouraged and complaint would be suppressed at all cost. The piecemeal engineer, on the other hand, understands his fallibilism. “The piecemeal engineer knows, like Socrates, how little he knows” (Popper 1957, 67). He understands the importance of rational criticisms and feedback. He understands that there are unintended consequences that arise out of a holistic social reform. Consequently, he knows that the best way to achieve an expected result is to address reforms step by step, trial and error, bits and bits in order to avoid unintended consequences of any reform.

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The third argument against Utopian engineering also results from the second and the first. This is what Popper refers to as “the problem of the dictator’s successor” (Popper 1945, 141). Popper’s concern with the Utopian engineer in this regard is that, in all of the benevolent dictator’s doing to suppress rational criticism and critical feedback on the reforms he has undertaken, it is improbable or virtually impossible that he will attain the height to which he had set for himself to realise the ends of his reform during his lifetime. The difficulty for the Utopian engineer then becomes the ability to find “an equally benevolent successor” (Popper 1945, 142). The shame is that the successor may not be too keen or very much disposed to pursuing the same ideal or disposition as the predecessor, and then all the suffering imposed on the people for the sake of the ideal may not have worth their sacrifices. With Popper’s arguments (which clearly set apart piecemeal social engineering from utopian social engineering), I think Popper is right that the open society, where piecemeal social transformation holds sway, is far superior to tribal or closed totalitarian regimes. To Popper, tribal or closed societies very often base their social transformation agenda upon utopian/holist social engineering of remodelling the whole of society at one sweep. This view underwrites Popper’s anti-utopianism and his negative utilitarianism. With the principle of negative utilitarianism, Popper’s aim is that the amelioration of suffering of the citizenry can be better achieved through a bits-and-pieces approach. This is why he favoured changes in piecemeal fashion backed by a trial and error method to avoid the unforeseen side effects of any large-scale change. Although Popper’s approach signifies a careful setting down and articulation of clear goals in the social transformation process, the viability of piecemeal social engineering in changing society effectively needs to be questioned. Unlike in natural science where there is the possibility of controlling and manipulating as few variables as possible, it is quite a difficult task to have adequate social science knowledge to inform us of major and simultaneous experimentation and to be able to monitor all causes and effects. The difficulty in monitoring a strong causal nexus in the society results from the complexities of social relations. One of these complex interactions is how the “free market” can be skewed by government intervention. However, according to Popper, government intervention is not always wrong as long as it is within the confines of the law (Popper 1945, 125). Although sociologists often attempt to explain social causes and effects in terms of changing variables, developing an empirical basis for the presumed social causal nexus is hard. This is because the task of confirming that an effect is a result of a cause in social relations requires that we isolate one cause and one effect, and confirm beyond a reasonable doubt that the effect is as a result of the particular cause. To achieve success in such confirmation would mean that any noticeable effects require bold significant causes. In other words, given the complexities in society, it would require a significant change (cause) to achieve noticeable consequences (effect). The reason is that the “magnitude and the scope of the change to be introduced in changing society cannot be decided in an a priori way, but depends on the nature of the case” (Irzik 1985, 5). For this reason, it would be difficult to see what

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effect small piecemeal institutional changes can have in achieving noticeable consequences in changing society.

3.4  T  owards Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-Once’? In my own evaluation of Popper’s piecemeal social engineering, notwithstanding my criticisms noted in the preceding section, I largely endorse Popper, albeit that I consider that social engineering must often be mounted many-pieces-at-once. I have considered reasons why many-pieces-at-once social engineering can still be piecemeal social engineering. As a result of the complexities of social interaction, the magnitude of the situation often requires that social reform be undertaken in a more radical manner. This radical (or many-pieces-at-once) social engineering is plausible when we consider that the causal nexus in social relations depends on the ‘rationality principle’ or the existence of real social-causal mechanisms linking cause to effect. In other words, since social cause and effect are determined by how people’s behaviour affects the course of events, then the degree of social reforms would be determined by the consequences of social situation. I agree with Popper that piecemeal social engineering would promote necessary institutional checks and balances. I also agree that it would make the government more responsive to the people, increase equality and help a government respond to recognized social ills – to whatever is widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people, by making only small quantitative changes by trial and error. The modification I make to Popper is to argue that social reform may need to be many-pieces-at-­ once social engineering depending on the nature of the circumstances. In fact, what Popper termed as the ‘rationality principle’ is apt in this circumstance and can be used to justify the concept of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ piecemeal social engineering. It is consistent with Popper’s view that the ‘rationality principle’ would allow for different circumstances to determine the type of piecemeal engineering required. In some circumstances A, X piecemeal engineering may be adopted, in B circumstances, Y piecemeal engineering may be adopted, and in C circumstances, Z piecemeal engineering may be adopted and so on. So the logic of the situation is about piecemeal engineering (in kind or degree or numbers such as a different policy to address security issues or tackling security issues as well as health or economic issues simultaneously). The situation analysis can allow social reform to be considered in terms of the magnitude of the case or reforms needed at every point in time. The logic of the situation requires that we analyse the situation that makes an agent act the way they act before we pass value judgements. In this case, the magnitude of the case would determine the scale and the speed of social engineering that is required; it may either be piecemeal or ‘many-pieces-at once’ social engineering. Popper was emphatic that social institutions should be altered in a piecemeal fashion only so as to avoid the perils of a holistic reconstruction of society in one

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sweep. However, he was not naïve that reforms may require a more drastic social reform. He was only being cautious of a radical holistic social reform process. Clearly, with the description of piecemeal social engineering that Popper gave in The Poverty of Historicism, it appears that as a backdrop to his work on piecemeal social engineering, there is an assumption about the kind of society in which the people whom he was addressing lived. In a lecture, “Freedom: A Balance Sheet” Popper stressed that “Western democracies are the best of which we have knowledge … never before was there a society in which common men were so much respected as in ours, in which there were so few who are downtrodden and insulted” (cf. Shearmur 1996, 32). It appears that piecemeal social engineering only seems most sensible where societies are already deeply developed and ideals of moderate liberal political thought are well established. It also appears that the pre-conditions of applying piecemeal social engineering are that the society itself would be liberal and economically developed. The assumption here is that since the society that Popper is addressing is already developed, all that is required is the making of small adjustments and readjustments which can be continually improved upon. Consequently, if we accept this assumption that piecemeal social engineering works better in a society that is already significantly developed, it, therefore, implies that the piecemeal social engineering approach may not accommodate the worst-off/ most impoverished kinds of society even if they are liberal. By this estimation, piecemeal social engineering may be best suitable only for developed societies and appears to ignore the challenges to social transformation facing less developed societies. Although the above assumption may not be what Popper intended, even when he appeared to have said that Western societies are the best in this respect, he did not say they were the only ones. This implies that less developed non-Western societies can also adopt piecemeal strategies. Even if it appears that there is a disparity regarding which societies piecemeal social engineering is most applicable, it does not imply that reforms in both developed and less-developed societies do not have to go on many-pieces-at-once. The magnitude of social reforms to be undertaken in developed societies may differ and be less thoroughgoing from that which is needed in less-developed societies. A one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal method may be appropriate for a society which is already developed for instance, in urban transportation, medical care and health technology, telecommunication and information systems, road infrastructures, power and energy, and standard educational system. However, the case is most certainly different in a society that requires a faster approach than what the one-piece-at-a-time piecemeal method (that Popper endorses) can offer in response to the challenges of development and modernisation. The fact here is that Popper’s piecemeal social engineering is intended to improve public policies and to promote the values of freedom, individual rights, individual self-determination and tolerance as they become the key features of an open society or liberal democracy in developed societies. However, Popper offered no explanation of how piecemeal social engineering can help social reform and promote efficient public policy in other democratic societies where corruption and underdevelopment still hold sway, like societies in Africa. In other words,

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piecemeal social engineering seems quite inadequate to deal with the scale of problems facing less developed nations which have not gone through the same process of social change or evolution that led to the rise of the Western liberal individualist – market model of society. I acknowledge that the democratic and fallibilist aspect of Popper’s piecemeal social engineering would go a long way in defining the path that ideal social transformation ought to take. While one is not in doubt that piecemeal social engineering can suitably address social problems the slow progress it may record is contentious. My contention is however that making small quantitative changes may be too slow for a society that requires a radical transformation in order to keep pace with the rest of the developed world. The process may be too slow to significantly contribute to radical institutional change. The case is strong, and I rehearse this argument also for developed societies that also need to address, for instance, the insatiable and enormous social problems of urbanisation, mass transportation, road traffic jams and smog, medical care and educational systems. My position here is that the piecemeal social engineering that Popper’s liberalism endorses may delay progress and limit social change to a snail’s pace. Consider the following examples of social problems: It remains to be seen if the appeal to making small changes involved with seismic retrofitting, for instance, for a city which needs rapid development would yield a great number of supports for the approach. Similarly, a piecemeal response by a government to high unemployment, hunger and poverty in a society would not only fail to alleviate the immediate short-term crisis, but its long-term problem may also become hard to manage. Taking a piecemeal engineering method to address security issues such as counter-­ piracy, such as the Somalia piracy crisis, instead of a comprehensive intervention would not only under-address the problem; it may generate new and greater problems. A society, for instance, which needs to establish infrastructural projects such as a high-speed train system to improve transportation for its growing population, wind or nuclear energy for power, and improved healthcare technology, would rather consider a radical engineering approach, when/if this is done rapidly it might also bring about tangible benefits to the economy. China, Japan and South Korea are examples of emerging economies that are making rapid progress in manufacturing and factory automation, whose economic growth can be said to have been assisted by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering. These emerging economies are certainly also generating massive social and environmental problems at the same time as their extremely rapid economic growth is pursued. Adequate solutions to addressing these environmental issues can also be addressed ‘many-pieces-at-once’ depending on the magnitude of the situation. In general, piecemeal social engineering is likely to lead to numerous problems such as inefficiencies, slow information transfer, high cost of services, unreliability, and consequently, delays in social transformation. The thesis that I defend, therefore, is that social change should be managed many-pieces-at-once. I endorse Popper’s piecemeal social engineering, provided that included under it is critical, tentative, non-dogmatic, many-pieces-at-once social engineering. Many-pieces-at-once social engineering is a more realistic

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description of how liberal governments in democratic society work. Governments do not just sit down and undertake only one reform or adjustment at a time. Governments are made up of different departments and ministries — all of which undertake all kinds of reforms simultaneously. Some may undertake bank reforms, others may also undertake education reforms, legal reforms, sports reforms, health reforms. All of which can go on simultaneously insofar as they are undertaken by different departments of government. This approach is many-pieces-at-once. The piecemeal approach considered from the point of view of each department is onepiece or two-­piece reform and from the point of view of society, it is many-piecesat-once reform. Popper’s phrase “piecemeal” can be used as a placeholder in the sense of a fragmented approach that is for any kinds of reforms that are adjustments in every facet of society  — adjustments that change the society’s “content/substance” rather than adjustments that are intended to change its “structure /foundation”. In a many-­ piece-­ at-once approach, we can have one-piece, two-piece, three-piece, many pieces and lots of pieces. In this approach to reform of, say, a building (a bungalow, let us say), one can change the roof, plumbing and electrical. If one changes just the roof it is one-piece engineering, and if one changes the roof plus the plumbing it is two-­piece engineering if one changes the roof, plumbing, electrical it is three-piece social engineering, and if one changes the roof, plumbing, electrical, ceiling, parts of the wall then it is many pieces engineering. These are changes that target the “content” or “substance” of the building, and not the structure or foundation of the building. Even if one decides to do a wholesale change, (not one-piece, two-piece, three-piece, many pieces and lots of pieces) by taking the entire building (bungalow) down and starting from the foundation, and by erecting another building (a skyscraper, etc.), this is changing the “structure” of the society, one still needs to change it many-pieces-at-once in order to mitigate any unintended consequences. So, it is a different building entirely or perhaps with more floors, rooms, compartments and with a different foundation. This does not require any wholesale change or revolution. The planning and strategy that are involved in changing the structure of society also require many-pieces-at-once. The examples of China, Japan and South Korea, which are instances of emerging economies who are making rapid progress in manufacturing and factory automation, are countries that have changed the structure and content of their societies been assisted by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering. These countries or economies did not go through a wholesale reform or revolution. The structure or foundation of these societies was not changed (in one fell swoop), rather it is their “contents or substance” that were changed or are being changed. In many-pieces-at-once social engineering, while there may be costs from this in terms of how feasible it is to learn from mistakes along the way, the scale of the problems may require this approach. The magnitude of the problem, for instance, in the recurring problems of poverty, injustice, electoral fraud, unemployment, diseases, corruption, police brutality, bad leadership, lack of the development of science and technology and general underdevelopment that confront most developing nations, particularly in Africa, would require faster, more sweeping political change than can be done in bits-and-pieces. However, vigilance is needed, in compliance

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with Popper, to detect whether the measures work and whether they work without side-effects that are as negative as the ills redressed. Caution is also required to see that this radical socio-economic and political change is not informed by large-scale social planning as it may lead to totalitarianism. It is essential that piecemeal engineering that addresses many problems simultaneously is still accountable to the people’s assessment, rational criticism and feedback regarding whether the reforms work. The need for critical feedback that Popper stressed where everyone would have a say, including ordinary people, as well as including the elites, is important for the evaluation of how the reforms work. The evaluation may perhaps be difficult to accomplish, but the possibility of criticism must remain, in a way that is precluded when totalitarian regimes prosecute utopian central management of everything in society.

3.5  Conclusion I conclude by noting that the notion of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering that I defend is distinct from the idea of large-scale reform. Although one can have rapid social change where there is good evidence regarding the means-ends effect sought, for instance, about having a comprehensive reform of the health system or the introduction of social security or pensions for all, the results of such in large-­ scale social planning would be difficult to monitor. Through Popper’s conjecture and refutation approach one could pick the right variables to change to promote social ends, one can monitor the extent of reforms even when it is done ‘many-­ pieces-­at-once’ over a long period. Where there are mistakes along the way one is able to retrace and correct such mistakes. No matter how rapid the reforms are undertaken by ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering the effects are better mitigated than the unintended consequences that large-scale planning would bring about. In other words, if for instance, we say that the notion of: ‘Many-pieces-at-once’ piecemeal social engineering = A. Effects of reforms = B Unintended consequences = X The argument is that it is still possible to monitor the significant consequences of (B) within the context of (A). However, in the process of monitoring the significant consequences of (B), there may arise some inadvertently damaging (X). The only way one may identify the unintended consequences (X) is by careful monitoring of means-end hypotheses linking A and B. My way of thought is that ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering can be suited to a number of different political positions. It can be either right or left-wing. It could be very liberal or communitarian, capitalist or socialist, but may not be communist since it is not intended to be carried out as a result of a revolutionary dictatorship or large-scale central planning.

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The concern is that large-scale planning or central decision-making is usually insensitive to individual autonomy, socio-cultural and also environmental factors. The conception of having a more localised level of decision making which interconnects with some level of individual autonomy would promote critical rationality where critical feedback arises from monitoring effects of piecemeal, but ‘many-­ pieces-­at-once’ social reform. This process ensures that there is an adequate demarcation between individual autonomy, which allows individuals to present their views and give critical feedback, and the autonomy of the state in carrying out the societal reforms it is constitutionally empowered to implement. The concern about large-scale social planning or centralised policy is that there are usually a small number of people that design plans or reforms that are meant to affect the entire citizenry. Since central planners or large-scale social planners are usually dictators who do not take kindly to criticism, as I mentioned earlier regarding Popper’s second argument against utopian social engineering, the reform loses the critical rationalism which is available from the citizenry. The critical feedback that is available from all those people that actually engage with their world is not entertained. So there cannot be critical rationality if there is no freedom. In all of this, I emphasise that the notion of ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering as a modification to Popper’s piecemeal reform questions all forms of large-­ scale social planning or central decision making which suppress the possibility of individual autonomy and critical feedback from citizens. Among other things, ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering emphasises a structure which has links to different levels of autonomy, and that each level is allowed to implement its function without impediments or external constraints. Individuals have their particular duties to the state, and even within the state, local government roles are different from those of the central government. More often than not, both in democratic and non-democratic societies, the central governments have effective control of local governments. The rationality of large-scale planning or centralised decision making is the need for strong leadership. However, the downside is that central governments usually do not possess the very competence and information about local issues. Admittedly, there is a need for strong leadership or coordination in government whether at the central or local level. However, the extent to which such coordination is of a liberal form is one of an intelligent social level, and the extent to which it is a dictatorship of one small part of the rationality, is disputable. Whichever side the argument goes, no rationality of centralised decision making which promotes large-scale social planning at the expense of individual freedom and critical feedback is correct. A valid argument is one that promotes a kind of reform, such as the ‘many-pieces-at-once’ social engineering, which is based upon freedom, critical feedback and critical rationalism in the sense that allows the mitigation of unintended consequences that may arise out of the very social reform.

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References Gray, John. 1976. The liberalism of Karl Popper. Philosophical Notes 9: 1–8. Irzik, Gurol. 1985. Popper’s piecemeal engineering: What is good for science is not always good for society. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1): 1–10. Magee, Bryan. 1973. Karl Popper. New York: The Viking Press. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies: The spell of Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1957. The poverty of historicism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Shearmur, Jeremy. 1996. The political thought of Karl Popper. London: Rutledge.

Chapter 4

Africa’s Development Crisis and the Limits of Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan

4.1  Introduction Karl Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism was a response, more specifically, to the rigid and in his view, large scale vision of government that characterized Plato’s politics, and Karl Marx’s notions of historical and dialectical materialism. More broadly, negative utilitarianism represents Popper’s alternative to the idea of big government, large scale planning and the attendant paternalism that arises from the pursuit of grandiose telos by those in power. Negative utilitarianism essentially rejects metaphysical notions of historical destinies of societies, the epistemological assumptions that undergird same (scientific socialism as an instance) as well as the ethical implications of practical actions in pursuit of the ‘goals’ of the state. It must be borne in mind that Popper wrote at a period when the world was in the grip of ideological and nationalist contestations, apotheosized by Hitler’s Nazis ambitions which plunged the world into a costly war, soon to be followed by the Cold War. In the light of new local, regional and global challenges being faced by different states today, it is important that we re-examine some of the ideas that have been proffered by scholars, notably philosophers, as conceptual approaches to the art of maintaining order and engendering development not only within different states, but across the world. In this chapter, I intend to explore the significance of Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism (NU). It is my contention that NU was Popper’s response primarily to dictatorship and the erosion of individual liberty. This motivation, I posit, situates it within the minimalist tradition, as he seeks to assert simultaneously the dangers of collectivism on one hand, and the significance of individual autonomy in the project of life-making. I shall argue that whereas Popper’s concerns are well founded, NU represents an inadequate ethical or epistemic framework of state obligations in A. O. Oyekan (*) Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_4

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certain situations. In the specific case of Africa, it is my view that NU is incapable of addressing the numerous existential challenges being faced by nearly all the states on the continent.

4.2  Karl Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory in ethics. Consequentialism refers to the doctrine that actions should be judged right or wrong on the basis of their consequences. One of the simplest forms of consequentialism is classical utilitarianism. Utilitarianism in normative ethics, then refers to a tradition stemming from the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill according to which an action is right if it tends to promote happiness, and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness- not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it. In other words, individual desires may be subordinated for the good of the majority of the members of society (Encyclopædia Britannica 2004). Utilitarianism is commonly tagged as a theory that vouches for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons (Graham 2004). In order to better understand the concept of negative utilitarianism and as proposed by Popper, it is pertinent to conceive this general understanding of utilitarianism which entails maximizing happiness as positive utilitarianism. On the contrary, NU is an umbrella term for versions of utilitarianism which model the asymmetry between suffering and happiness by placing either relative or absolute priority on the avoidance of suffering (Fricke 2002). Historically, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively originates in Buddhism and is more than 2000 years old. Epicurus it must be remembered, once posited that the complete absence of pain constituted the limit and highest point of pleasure (Socrethics 2019). Depending on the degree of emphasis over suffering, Ord (2013) stratifies Negative utilitarianism into Absolute Negative utilitarianismwhich holds that only suffering counts; Lexical NU- which believes that suffering and happiness both count, but no amount of happiness (regardless of how great) can outweigh any amount of suffering (no matter how small); Lexical Threshold NUhere suffering and happiness both count, but there is some amount of suffering that no amount of happiness can outweigh; and Weak NU- where suffering and happiness both count, but suffering counts more. There is an exchange rate between suffering and happiness or perhaps some nonlinear function which shows how much happiness would be required to outweigh any given amount of suffering. He further highlights two forms of NU viz. Strong Practically-Negative Utilitarianism which posit Classical Utilitarianism with the empirical belief that suffering outweighs happiness in all or most human lives and Weak Practically-Negative Utilitarianism that holds that in many common cases it is more effective to focus on alleviating suffering than on promoting happiness (2013).

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As we shall see, Popper who happens to be the object of focus here pitched his tent under the umbrella of the Absolute NU. It is primarily in The Open Society one can find some of his better known, but always rather epigrammatic evaluations of different modes of politico-ethical thinking in the light of negative utilitarianism. While the more conventional utilitarianism states that we ought to promote or maximize happiness for the greatest number of people, the doctrine of negative utilitarianism advocated by Popper turns this precept on its head, and claims instead that we should minimize the amount of avoidable human suffering. This is an idea, which according to Popper ought to lead us away from Utopianism, historicism, and irrationalism. Instead of trying to make society perfect, we should instead try to make ‘piecemeal’ or incremental improvements to our own present lot (Thorsen 2011). According to Popper: There are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good (1966, 158).

Popper’s idea then is that governments should respond piecemeal to recognized social ills – to whatever is widely acknowledged to be harmful to the people. This can take the form of economic intervention, state protectionism and the creation of legal frameworks (Afisi 2015, 90). Afisi’s further information explicates Popper as advocating a limited intervention of the state to only that which is necessary in order to avoid undue increment of the powers of the state: So the piecemeal approach of governments will involve trial-and-error attempts to mitigate these acknowledged harms; and when those urgent evils of society are dealt with piecemeal, it is with a view to best learning from one’s mistakes. No matter how slowly this piecemeal approach proceeds the outcomes are better than the consequences of the totalitarian holistic or utopian/large-scale social planning approach to social and political reforms (Afisi 2015, 91).

The fundamental maxim of Popper’s negative utilitarianism which is to “avoid suffering and violence” led him to propose an asymmetry between happiness and suffering when he said that; I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant’s principle “promote other people’s happiness…” seem to me (at least in their formulations) wrong on this point which, however, is not completely decidable by rational argument (…). In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula “Maximize pleasure” is that it assumes, in principle, a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible (Popper 1966, 235)

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Other influences to Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism owes much to his epistemological works as well as personal and historical experience such as his observed failure of happiness-promoting philosophies like classical utilitarianism. This is added to the unpleasant experiences of some of his closest relatives who became victims of Nazi Germany, and resulting in suicide (Socrethics 2019). As can be seen, this idea as proposed by Popper did not just make an accidental appearance in his Open Society as elsewhere in his Conjectures and Refutations he says that “is my thesis that human misery is the most urgent problem of a rational public policy” (Popper 1989, 361). Popper’s objection to “positive utilitarianism” is his circumspection that it leads to utopianism. Attempts to increase happiness, especially when guided by some ideal of complete or perfect happiness, are bound to lead to perilous utopian political projects. In his words, “It leads invariably to the attempt to impose our scale of ‘higher’ values upon others, in order to make them realize what seems to us of greatest importance for their happiness; in order, as it were to save their souls. It leads to Utopianism and Romanticism” (Popper 1966, 237). Thus, ambitious projects are dangerous because they tend to justify extreme measures, including severe human suffering in the present, as necessary measures to secure a much greater human happiness in the future. We must therefore “not argue that the misery of one generation may be considered as a mere means to the end of securing the lasting happiness of some later generation or generations” (Popper 1989, 362). Moreover, such projects are doomed to fail anyway, owing to the unintended consequences of social planning and the irreconcilability of the ultimate human ends of freedom, equality, and happiness. Thus Popper’s rejection of positive utilitarianism becomes part of his broader critique of utopian social engineering, while his advocacy of negative utilitarianism is tied to his support for piecemeal social engineering. It is piecemeal engineering that provides the proper approach to tackling the identifiable, concrete sources of suffering in our world (Gorton 2019). Popper thought that reducing suffering provides a clearer target for public policy than chasing after the never-ending goal of increasing happiness. In addition, he argued, it easier to reach political agreement to combat suffering than to increase happiness, thus making effective public policy more likely. “New ways of happiness are theoretical, unreal things, about which it may be difficult to form an opinion. But misery is with us, here and now, and it will be with us for a long time to come as we all know it from experience” (Popper 1989 346). Popper thus calls for an approach to public policy that aims at reducing and, hopefully, eliminating such readily identifiable and universally agreed upon sources of suffering as “poverty, unemployment, national oppression, war, and disease” (Popper 1989, 361). In his formulation of the important principles of humanitarian and political ethic Popper’s arguments on negative utilitarianism suggests that we should simply ensure ‘The least amount of avoidable suffering for all’, or briefly ‘minimize suffering’ as one of the fundamental principles of public policy (Popper 1966, 235). Instead of describing how society as a whole should be organised, this negatively defined doctrine urges us to get down to business, and try to alleviate suffering

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whenever and wherever possible. The demand to increase happiness for those who are already well off does not carry with it the same sense of urgency. Instead of maximising happiness we should instead focus our best efforts at reducing avoidable suffering for all, and try to distribute unavoidable suffering as equally as possible. And so for Popper, in order to alleviate suffering in the here and now, and eschew dreams of total human happiness and fulfilment we adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good (1966, 158). Thus, if one truly wants to alleviate human suffering one ought therefore, at least in most cases, to adopt a more gradualist approach to practical policy-making (Thorsen 2011). Popper’s position did not escape the scathe of critics. Objections to Popper’s negative utilitarianism come in different nomenclatures such as “the doomsday device”, “pinprick argument”, “the ‘all are worse-off’ argument” and the “indifference argument”. R.N Smart’s (1958) objection presupposes a doomsday approach to Popper’s negative utilitarianism. The implication that Smart intends bringing out is that if suffering is a necessary contingency in human reality and it is practically impossible to annihilate suffering altogether, negative utilitarianism in a sense then would oblige the ruler to painlessly exterminate all of humanity and send them to eternal bliss (Smart 1961). There is also the pinprick argument against negative utilitarianism. The consequence of the pinprick argument to which attention is being drawn to here is the result of having to obliterate everything that is capable of being a possible source of pain or suffering. Thus it would be certainly grotesque as this would even involve a lot of humans if not all. Ord (2013) further observes that people often engage in certain voluntary suffering such as the pains of the gym, the patriotic sacrifice of certain persons as observed in various cases of independence from colonialism, working harder to get better pay etc. to increase their sense of happiness rather than focusing on reducing pain in the world. Ord notes that such trade-offs between suffering and happiness according to Popper’s negative utilitarianism would be morally bad and impermissible. However, this he claimed is an implausible stance as it would make “everyone worse off”. In Ord’s exposition of the indifference argument, he observes that the position of Popper’s negative utilitarianism would make one indifferent to an ideal or utopic world where everyone is happy. The implication then is that negative utilitarianism would prefer the non-existence of a world than the prospect of an ideal world of happiness that faces the threat of losing its happiness. (2013). Those who criticize NU as above, and whose points I find persuasive, focus on what they consider as the theoretical limitations of its assumptions. Popper wishes that we delineate between the alleviation of suffering and the pursuit of happiness, as though we can in all cases separate both from each other. I consider that counterintuitive. I believe that the implications of Popper’s idea would have been clearer if he had interrogated suffering and happiness a bit more conceptually. Such analysis is not my primary focus here, but I consider it useful that we appreciate the

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limitations of talking about suffering as a simple concept which stands on the opposing side of the track against happiness. There are in my view, types of suffering, and one sense in which we can distinguish one suffering from another is to talk about it. It is possible to suffer wilfully, deliberately and consciously for different reasons, one of which is the reasonable belief in such suffering bringing about happiness in a quantum greater than would accrue were such suffering to be avoided. Consider a poor kid who has to trek to school for several kilometres daily without breakfast because the family could not afford the meal as well as daily transportation. Assume further that the decision to go to school and be educated is the kid’s, in defiance of his parent’s wish that he engages in menial labour to take care of himself and the family, in the hope that someday he will become wealthy and comfortable on account of his education. Assume also, that there is an orphaned kid who makes this trip from on a daily basis with the first kid to school not because the foster parents cannot afford the cost of daily transportation but because they consider it appropriate for her to suffer if she is to become successful. In one case, we see a form of wilful suffering which is unavoidable (at least as it appears) under the circumstance if the kid is to achieve his goal. In the second scenario, we consider the suffering wilful and deliberate as well (assuming the foster parents did not impose schooling on the kid), though not unavoidable. One can imagine also, that somewhere between the beginning of the pursuits of these kids and their dreams of becoming successful, there will be different types of suffering, punctuated by moments of episodic happiness such as doing well in a test, getting promoted from one class to another, and possibly winning a scholarship for further studies. Such moments of joy amidst the suffering do not in themselves represent the ultimate aim, but rather, steps towards it even as the suffering continues. The point I seek to make here is that in the lives of individuals, and I think it applies to groups and societies as well, suffering and happiness do not always run on parallels as Popper’s delineation appears to suggest. Both are sometimes interwoven. In some cases, too, the absence of one implies the other such that it is possible for situations, or an institution to simultaneously eliminate suffering and promote happiness. This is especially so in situations where the suffering constitutes an obstacle to happiness by the individual or group experiencing it. Secondly, but relatedly, one could ask why Popper thinks we can alleviate suffering but not promote happiness. I ascribe this to Popper’s perception of the concreteness of suffering as opposed to the abstract nature of happiness. So, if suffering is that which we already experience and feel, while happiness is a state of illusion or idealness to which we constantly aspire, it may be reasonable to deal with the former which is real than chase endlessly after the latter. But if suffering and happiness are interwoven and mutually conditioning, it means that there is a high possibility of attaining happiness relative to how well suffering has been ameliorated. If happiness, as opposed to suffering in Popper’s opinion is not pursuable on account of its intangibility, there is no basis to measure suffering on another set of criteria. Suffering, like happiness, varies in intensity. If it is possible to ameliorate suffering arising from say diseases and hunger, there is no reason why happiness cannot be increased by wellbeing and nourishment. Tangibility and concreteness applies to

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both state and makes the amelioration of one and the promotion of the other possible without necessarily being utopian.

4.3  T  he Minimalist and Welfarist Approaches to State Management Minimalism and welfarism are polar state ideologies about how scarce resources should be distributed among the populace. One of the most influential supporters of the minimal state was Robert Nozick who argues that the minimal state is the only morally justifiable form of government. This contention rests upon his understanding of the separateness of each person, the existence of inviolable rights, and the side constraint that these rights impose on the behaviour of others. He thus held that under a minimal state, all citizens receive protection. The minimal state protects everyone against violence, theft and fraud, and it provides for the enforcement of matters such as contracts (Nozick 1974, ix). His reason is that if the state were to seek a wider role than the narrow function of providing protection, it would interfere with the liberty and property of its citizens and in so doing contravene their absolute rights (Patterson 2005). Welfare rights are illegitimate rights as it is not only demeaning to its beneficiaries, government programmes also diminish self-reliance, breed dependency, and reinforce social pathologies by creating unintended rewards for people to do the things necessary to receive the welfare payments – which tend to be the very things they are trying to remedy (e.g., pay people to have children they cannot support and encourage unemployment) (Younkins 1998). Younkins also observes that, a system that tries to force acts of love, such as charity, violates the true nature of love and, as a result, creates injustice. He further notes that much of the need for the welfare state is caused by the government itself. Therefore, even without government poverty-­causing programmes, there would still be unfortunate people such as the disabled, the illiterate, the sick, the unemployed, the mentally incompetent, the elderly, and single mothers of infant children. The welfare state is a poor substitute for personal local acts of charity that emphasize self-reliance and self-respect  – qualities that tend to be missing when government welfare is viewed as positive “rights” to be asserted. It is in the light of these agitations against the welfare state that he vouches for a minimalist government which for him is a man-made institution that holds only such powers as it receives from individuals. Individuals did not and could not give the state any right to use force for any purpose other than self-defence. Since no individual has a right to interfere with the freedom of another, it follows that any attempt by the government to use force against a citizen for any reason other than self-defence of other citizens is an abuse of power and is equivalent to the very thing that the state was organized to prevent. Therefore, a government should be restrained from improperly using its force against its citizens whether it is used for

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“humanitarian” purposes or for the benefit of those within the government itself. Government is organized by, and operated for, the benefit of the people, but should be subject to a series of restraints that attempt to keep power from being abused. Thus, freedom is not the ability to get what we want. Other non-man- made obstacles such as lack of ability, intelligence, or resources may result in one’s failure to attain his desires. Freedom means the absence of coercive constraints; but it does not mean the absence of all constraints. It follows that freedom is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for one’s happiness. The idea of a minimal state is thus based on a clear understanding of human nature, natural rights, and the requirements of reality. Equality before the law (i.e. political equality) is derived from the nature of the human person. However, since people are unequal in intelligence, motivation, ability, physical attributes, etc., the result in a free society will be different incomes, amounts of wealth, achievements, social statuses, etc. Inequality and diversity are intrinsic to the natural human order. Hence, benevolence, compassion, charity, and virtue can only exist in a social system that recognizes that people are free and unequal (Edward 1998). Contrarily, the welfare state refers to the concept of government in which the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life. A fundamental feature of the welfare state is social insurance, which is usually financed by compulsory contributions and is intended to provide benefits to persons and families during periods of greatest need. The welfare state also usually includes public provision of basic education, health services, housing (in some cases at low cost or without charge), antipoverty programs and the system of personal taxation (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). According to Pierson (2001), three policy domains are central to the welfare state—health care, pensions and labour market policy. Richard Titmuss (1987), seen by many as the founder of the discipline of social policy, pointed out that to equate the welfare state only with visible state provision is misleading, and he drew attention to the social division of welfare, noting three systems of welfare: social or public; fiscal; and occupational. For Popper, the principle of maximizing happiness is a tool in the hands of dictatorial government even of a benevolent character. Furthermore, happiness is to some extent dependent on taste, so that the attempt to maximize it in society at large is likely to involve the imposition of standards of taste. More fundamental than this, however, is his contention that the urgency or moral appeal to help people in distress is greater than any call to help people who are not in distress (Acton and Watkins 1963). In contrast to Nozick, others argue in favour of a more expansive state. They claim that government is obliged to provide citizens with access to those things that are basic to human life (should they choose to accept them from the government), and to look after the welfare of those who are least well off. Rawls, for example, argues in favour of a ‘big’ government (including expansive state provided welfare, education and health services funded through taxation) on the basis that it is

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sometimes justified to treat people unequally where unequal treatment results in improvements for everyone- most especially the least well off (Patterson 2005). John Rawls defines society as “a more or less self-sufficient association of persons” undertaken as a cooperative arrangement for the purpose of mutual advantage (Rawls 1999, 4). Rawls holds that by forming an association and acting in cooperation, those who belong to society can obtain benefits they would not be able to achieve if they were acting on their own. Rawls claims justice is “the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1999, 3). The principles encapsulated within public conceptions of justice apply to the basic structure of society. Proposes a conception of justice called “justice as fairness” wherein he abstracts it from the social contract theory and defends it as the most reasonable and preferable conception of justice possible (Patterson 2005). The “veil of ignorance” means that persons in the hypothetical original position are unaware of such things as their wealth, intelligence, social standing or conception of good (Rawls 1999, 11). As a result, they are unable to predict what effect their decisions will have on their own life circumstances. If individuals in the original position choose distributive principles that benefit some but disadvantage others, they cannot be sure whether they will be favoured or whether they will be disadvantaged. Rawls argues that because of this they will select principles beneficial to all. Rawls’ two principles of justice buttress his proposition of the welfare state as the true ideal state states that individual citizens are entitled. The first principle requires equality in the assignment of basic rights, and guarantees various liberties such as freedom of speech, political liberty, and liberty of conscience. The second principle applies to the distribution of wealth and authority. It states that while the distribution of income and power does not have to be equal, it must result in compensating benefits for everyone, and it must occur in such a way that the least advantaged gain the greatest benefit. This is known as “the difference principle”. In addition, the second principle requires that positions of authority and responsibility be accessible to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Patterson 2005). Twenty-first-century advocates of the welfare state begin with the premise that something is not working when large fractions of society face diverse deprivations, and that government can and should do something about these failures. Moreover, ordinary individuals are facing stresses that they are having difficulty coping with. For these adherents, it comes with the realization that welfare state cannot remedy all of the ills facing our society, but believe it can make a difference (Stiglitz 2017).

4.4  Africa and the Crises of Development Africa, in terms of the indices that make for stability and viability of the standard of living, education, healthcare, infrastructure, industrialization, occupies the lowest rung of the global ladder. The 2002 report of least developed countries by UNCTAD defines generalized poverty as:

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The low-income per capita figures in West Africa are suggestive of widespread or generalized poverty. On the basis of the purchasing power parity of the US$2 a day poverty line, the incidence of poverty amongst ten West African countries that are least developed ranged between 60% and 94% during 1995–2000. It would therefore be correct to state that there is generalized poverty in several West African countries and beyond. This evidence of widespread poverty in the region is suggestive of a substantial proportion of the population being poor over extended periods of time (Oduro and Aryee 2003). Africa did not meet the Millennium Development Goal target of halving poverty by 2015 and projections are that the world’s poor will be increasingly concentrated in Africa. Rural areas remain much poorer than urban areas, although the gap narrowed. The poverty rate among female-headed households is lower than among male-headed households, but house- holds headed by widows are worse off (and these results may change once differences in demographic composition are taken into account). Poverty is a persistent condition for many poor; three out of five poor are chronically poor (Kathleen et al. 2016). More so, despite the increase in school enrolment, more than two out of five adults are still unable to read or write, and the quality of education is very low. About three- quarters of sixth graders in Malawi and Zambia cannot read for meaning, providing just one example of the school quality challenge. This is why the need to reinvigorate efforts to tackle Africa’s basic educational challenge and build Africa’s future human capital is urgent (Kathleen et al. 2016). Health outcomes mirror the results for literacy: Progress is occurring, but outcomes remain the worst in the world. Nearly two in five children are malnourished, and progress in immunization rates and bed-net distribution is slowing. Africans enjoyed considerably more peace in the 2000s than they did in earlier decades, but the number of violent events has been on the rise since 2010, reaching four times the level of the mid-1990s. Tolerance of domestic violence (at 30% of the population) is still twice as high as in the rest of the developing world. Greater tolerance of domestic violence and less empowered decision making among younger (compared with older) women suggest that a generational shift in mindset is still to come and so Africa also remains among the bottom performers in terms of voice and accountability (Kathleen et al. 2016). Women can expect to live in good health 1.6 years longer than men, and among children under 5 it is girls, not boys, who are less likely to be malnourished (by 5% points). But illiteracy remains substantially higher among women, women suffer high rates of domestic violence, and women are more curtailed than men in their access to information and less free to make decisions (Kathleen et al. 2016). HIV/AIDS is a health problem in many African countries. It is estimated that the prevalence rate is 11% in Cote d’Ivoire, 8% in Cameroun, 7% in Burkina Faso, 6% in Togo and 5% in Niger. Life expectancy in Cote d’Ivoire is estimated to have

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declined by about 8 years because of HIV/AIDS. Labour migration, low education, poor understanding about how the disease can be spread, low use of condoms, low nutritional levels and health care systems that are not careful about not using syringes on more than one person are some of the factors that can explain the spread of the disease (Oduro and Aryee 2003). The West African sub-region has been characterized by armed conflict and undemocratic changes in the political regime that have on some occasions been accompanied by civil unrest and the loss of life. A few countries have experienced civil wars and coup d’états that started in the 1980s, for example Chad and Liberia. There have also been instances of ethnic conflict, which though localized, destabilizes the communities that are affected. As such, Nigeria for instance has now become a playground for mafias, terrorists and guerrilla sects such Boko haram and Fulani herdsmen, kidnappers, ritual killers and the likes (Oduro and Aryee 2003). Youth are supposedly Africa’s greatest asset. Africa’s youth population is rapidly growing and expected to double to over 830 million by 2050. If properly harnessed, this increase in the working age population could support increased productivity and stronger, more inclusive economic growth across the continent. But today, the majority of youth in Africa do not have stable economic opportunities. Of Africa’s nearly 420 million youth aged 15–35, one-third are unemployed and discouraged, another third are vulnerably employed, and only one in six is in wage employment. Youth face roughly double the unemployment rate of adults, with significant variation by country. The problem is not just unemployment but underemployment, which peaks at just over half of youth in the labour force in low income countries (Africa Development Bank Group 2016). Clearly the situation in Africa is not one to cheer, and in order to ameliorate the grim situation, a panoramic and pragmatic solution is required not just to arrest the situation but to work towards drastic improvement and progress in the affairs of things. Numerous literatures have documented the numerous factors responsible for the lamentable situation of most parts of Africa, ranging from slave trade to colonialism, neo-colonial exploitations that continues to deepen the expropriation of resources and capital, thereby widening inequality, poor leadership and corrupted elites among others. Examining the diverse factors is beyond the scope of this chapter. What I intend to do in this section is examine whether NU provides a viable pathway for African states in search of a way out of the deplorable situation that has left most of the continent suffering for decades. Despite the inherent difficulties laden with Popper’s NU as noted earlier arose out of certain experiences in Europe, with wider ramifications for the world. Some of such tendencies still manifests today, especially in Africa. Thus, the problems of totalitarianism and utopian state planning that motivated Popper provide reasons to take his idea seriously. Africa, in spite of the external nudge towards democratization and liberalization after the end of the cold war is still home to numerous despots who run their different countries as private fiefdoms. From Yoweri Museveni of Uganda to Paul Biya in Cameroon, Paul Obiang Nsegweso in Equatorial Guinea and until recently the late Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Africa has an array of strongmen who have hijacked their various states and molded them in their personal

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images. In many of these states, grandiose projects with little or no bearing to the wellbeing of the people serve as conduits for ill-gotten wealth often stashed away in foreign countries while the people suffer. Even in countries where there has been a semblance of steady democratization, institutions are either so weak or non-existent, to the effect that the state at every point in time is the image of the current occupant of the office of the head of state. This means that ambitious projects are often designed and poorly implemented, only to be abandoned by a new government which starts its own cycle of big projects that are also likely to die with at the end of the tenure of such governments. This constitutes a big drain on scarce resources and impoverishes the people even further. This has hinted at above, makes a case for Popper’s NU in a continent like Africa, especially if the problem is viewed from the angle of leadership deficit. Yet, there are a couple of reasons why NU does not appear adequate in addressing the poverty crisis and the burden of underdevelopment that Africa currently bears. Piecemeal social engineering as advocated by Popper, when placed side by side the dire situation of most African states represents at best an attempt to scratch the issues on the surface. Even if we were to limit ourselves to eliminating suffering as Popper canvassed, a number of the issues at the local level cannot be compared to a global economic recession as it also happened in the 1930s. Adapted to contexts, poverty alleviation models can be borrowed from society A as opposed to the failed approach in society B, to cite another instance. The short period in which China has lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty shows that large scale planning can and do succeed. Indeed, the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the Second World War is an instance of an ambitious plan that succeeded significantly. In addition, that a holistic plan is susceptible to failure is not to say the chances of failing totally are very high. Certain aspects of a plan can fail and then be modified, while the overall goal remains the same, just as some hypothesis in a scientific experiment could be wrong without essentially altering the theory itself. What is important is to have adequate gauging mechanisms for periodic reviews, feedback and modifications as necessary in the pursuit of grand objectives, which of course need not be couched in any metaphysical or historicist terms.

4.5  Conclusion So far, I have tried to evaluate Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism and its corollary of piecemeal social engineering as mechanisms of state management within the context of contemporary Africa’s experience. Popper’s approach, I have argued, have minimalist implications even if it is thinly welfarist in ambition. This approach I posited, does not appear adequate in the face of Africa’s daunting problems. What the continent needs at this time are very bold initiatives across its numerous states to hasten the eradication of poverty, diseases, illiteracy and hunger, and also move it closer to the rest of the world on the ladder of development. Doing this will require among others, resolving the

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postcolonial crisis of nationhood assailing some of those states, the strengthening of institutions that enhance state building, the reduction of dependence on developed societies and the reconfiguration of the parasitic relationship between the continent and the West (China can now be added to that group) which makes it an appendage of the imperial metropole. Africa cannot develop if it continues to pander to orthodox economic ideologies that minimizes the role of government in the affairs of the people. Numerous reforms and adjustment programs sold to different states in Africa after the cold war have merely succeeded in handing over the resources of many the affected countries to western multinational corporations to the detriment of the people. China, which continues to intervene strongly economically on behalf of its citizens has today joined the neo-colonial scramble for Africa’s resources. While Africa cannot turn to the failed socialist model of the Soviet era in finding solutions to its problems, it has quite a lot in my view to learn from the Scandinavian models which are premised on a balance between individual autonomy and state involvement in the provision of the basic needs of modern life such as shelter, healthcare, education and feeding among others. The appeal of the welfarist approach of the Scandinavian states is that holistic planning and visible state involvement need not result in the erosion of individual freedom or descent into authoritarianism. Democratization and the deepening of citizens’ involvement in governance as well as policy formulation can legitimize holistic plans and ensure their continuity and effective implementation across the lifespans of governments and even generations.

References Acton, H.B., and J.W.N. Watkins. 1963. Negative utilitarianism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society; Supplementary Volumes 37: 83–114. Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2015. Karl Popper’s critical rationalism and the politics of liberal-­ communitarianism. Doctoral thesis; Department of Philosophy and Political Science University of Canterbury. Africa Development Bank Group, 2016. Jobs for Youth in Africa: Catalyzing Youth Opportunity Across Africa. http://www.afdb.org/[email protected] Edward, Younkins. 1998. The minimal state, not the welfare state. The Individual. Fricke, Fabian. 2002. Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus. Kriterion Nr. 15: 13–27. Gorton, William. Accessed 27/08/2019. Karl Popper: Political philosophy. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/popp-­pol Graham, Gordon. 2004. Eight theories of ethics. London: Routledge. Kathleen, et  al. 2016. Poverty in a rising Africa: Africa poverty report. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-­1-­4648-­0723-­7. Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Oduro, D.A., and I. Aryee. 2003. Investigating Chronic Poverty in West Africa. Chronic Poverty Research Centre, ISBN Number: 1-904049-27-3. Ord, Toby. 2013. Why I’m Not a Negative Utilitarian. www.amirrorclear.net/academic/ideas/ negative-­utilitarianism Patterson, Rachael. 2005. The minimal state v the welfare state: A critique of the argument between Nozick and Rawls. Southern Cross University Law Review 9: 167–182.

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Pierson, P. 2001. The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Popper, Karl. 1966. The open society and its enemies. 5th ed. London: Routledge and kegan Paul. ———. 1989. Conjectures and refutations. 5th ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smart, R.N. 1958. Negative utilitarianism. Mind 67: 542–543. Smart, John Jamieson Carswell. 1961. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. Australia: Melbourne University Press. Socrethics. 2019. Negative utilitarianism and justice. www.socrethics.com/folder2/justice Stiglitz, Joseph. 2017. The welfare state in the twenty-first century. Revised Conference Paper Presented at Columbia University. Thorsen, Dag Einar. 2011. The politics of freedom: A study of the political thought of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, and of the challenge of neoliberalism. Doctoral Thesis. Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo. No. 315. ISSN 1504-3991. Titmuss, Richard M. 1987. In The philosophy of welfare: Selected writings of Richard M Titmuss, ed. Brian Abel-Smith. London: Allen and Unwin. UNCTAD. 2002. The least developed countries report 2002: Escaping the poverty trap. Geneva: United Nations. Younkins, E. W. 1998. Capitalism and Morality. Retrieved from http://wwwold.wju.edu/academics/iscm/pdf/Rico1.pdf

Chapter 5

Karl Popper, the Nigerian State and Democratic Consolidation ‘Dele Ashiru

5.1  Introduction Karl Popper’s optimism of an open and free society may remain a mirage in most African societies given the critical role the state is expected to play in the attainment of such a free and egalitarian society. According to Popper, “any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the state.” (cf. Shearmur 2002, 51) It is a truism that African states emerged from the ashes of colonialism. This historical circumstance has always compelled the inherited state to act in such a manner that can neither create an “open society” nor guarantee freedom in such society in the Popperian conception. Indeed, Popper argues that ‘nobody should be at mercy of others, but all should have the right to be protected by the state and that these ideas should be extended to the economic realm’. He insists that ‘it is unacceptable that the economically strong is free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob him of his freedom’ or to ‘force those who are starving into a “freely” accepted servitude, without using violence’ (Shearmur 2002, 52). Unfortunately, the colonial configuration of African states predisposes that they violate individual and collective liberties without control. The colonial state was a law and order state. Its powers were enormous and immense which were often used arbitrarily. These very dangerous trappings of the colonial state were inherited by African political elites in order to sustain the authoritarian and brutish character of the colonial state even after the attainments of independence. Thus, as Claude Ake observes, there is nothing which those who control state power cannot do or cannot get. By the same token, those without access to state power have no immunity at all. These conditions have placed an unusually high value on political power. The struggle for it is inordinately intense, with the result that politics in Nigeria has assumed the character of warfare. ‘D. Ashiru (*) University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_5

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The competition to capture the state by a political elite already factionalized along ethno-religious divide often follows no rational logic but only what is expedient in their rabid chase for political power. The situation is so bad that “those who win state power can have all the wealth they want even without working for it, while those who lose the struggle for state power cannot have security in the wealth they have made even by hard work. The struggle to capture state power, inevitable becomes a matter of life and death (Ake 1996, 24). This may partly account for the acrimonious and often violent manner in which competition for political powers are conducted through the ballot box in most African countries, including Nigeria. Our tentative assumption and central argument is that since Nigeria returned to civilian rule often erroneously referred to as “democratic rule” in 1999, the Nigerian state and its actors have done more to weaken, rather than strengthen democracy, especially its ethos of freedom, rule of law, safeguard of fundamental human rights and constitutionalism.

5.2  The State, Democracy and Democratic Consolidation The state, like many other concepts in the social sciences has no precise meaning. Indeed, what the state means has been a subject of controversy and scholarly contestations. In this regard Dunleavy and O’Leary observe that the state is not a material object; it is a conceptual abstraction (cf. Hay and Marsh 2006, 4). A state may be conceived as a politically organized group of people occupying a definite geographical space with a sovereign government. According to Weber, a compulsory political organization with continuous operation will be called a “state” in so far as its administrative state successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order (cf. Hay and Marsh 2006, 8). It should be noted that while governments may change as the law within a geographical space dictates, the state as an institutional ensemble persevere as it evolves over a period of time. Meanwhile, there are basically two contending perspectives of the state. They include: The Liberal and the Marxian paradigms of the state. Whereas the liberal paradigm opines that the state is objective, neutral and acts in the interest of every segment of the society especially in the resolution of conflicts and disputes that may arise within society. This is akin to Popper’s idea of the state which stipulates that “the state must see to it that nobody needs to enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation or economic ruin” (Shearmur 2002, 52). The Marxian paradigm on the other hand insists that the state is but an instrument of the dominant class often used to exploit and suppress the mass of the people. Indeed, it is the executive committee of the bourgeoisie for the oppression, suppression, exploitation and domination of the masses in the society. The Nigerian state approximates this Marxian conception. In his own intervention on the question of the state, Hamza Alavi identifies three characteristics of a post-colonial state which are, first, its “overdeveloped” nature on

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account of its colonial origin. The colonial state was a law and order state imported from metropolitan Europe and this character of the state persists long after independence. The second, according to Alavi, is that the state intervenes widely in the economy of the society thereby creating a vehicle for primitive accumulation of the society’s common wealth and its appropriation by a faction of the political elites. The third, is that the post-colonial state enjoys relative autonomy in the sense that it is compelled by its original circumstance to act on behalf of both indigenous and imperialist bourgeoisie (Alavi 1972). This may explain why the state in post-­ colonial societies are often not insulted from private capture by the dominant political elites. It is instructive to note that the struggle of the early 1980s was concentrated on how to decolonize the state in Africa. According to Raufu Mustapha (2006, 199) what was sought was the type of state that is consistent with Africa’s needs; not a minimalist state or a service delivery one, but a transformative developmental state which has a role in promoting growth. Just like the state, democracy is another concept with a heavily contested meaning. There are various definitions as there are scholars and thinkers in the discipline. However, Claude Ake (2000) disagrees with this assertion. He believes that the controversy surrounding the definition of democracy is on account of its trivialization. According to him, “democracy is being trivialized under the cover of clarifying a supposedly complex and confusing concept”. He declares that “for a political concept, democracy is uncharacteristically precise. It means popular power”. Citing Aristotle, who is no friend of democracy (Ake, 2000: 7) insists that “democracy exists where the sovereign authority is composed of the poorest classes and not of the owners of property.” Democracy assumes a political community where in there is some form of political equality among the people, understood as the direct rule by the people, outside the notions of consultation, consent and representation. There are several shades of democracy such as ancient, classical, liberal, consensus, and representative democracies. It is instructive to note that more recent conceptualizations of democracy refer largely to liberal democracy. As indicated by Ake (2000, 9) liberal democracy ‘is markedly different from democracy even though it has significant affinities to it’. According to him, liberal democracy focuses on the individual, whose claims are ultimately placed above those of the collective, it replaces government by the people with government by the consent of the people and instead of the sovereignty of the people it offers the sovereignty of law (Ake 2000, 10). However, Robert Dahl (1982, 11) suggests that democracy is a system of elected representative government operated under the rule of law, where the most significant groups in the population participate in the political process and have effective representation in the practice of making government decisions, that is, allocation of scarce resources. For Karl Popper, the open society represents his idea of democracy which aims at promoting criticism and diversity without the state succumbing either to violence or irreconcilable social divisions. Popper emphasizes the need for peaceful resolution of conflicts relying on the ethos of freedom thought, speech and toleration of diversity such that substantial social differences are to be channelled into the democratic process where governments can be replaced peacefully through free and

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regular elections. It is no gainsaying that Popper recognizes the presence of certain dangers in the historical evolution of the open society. He, therefore, suggests that it could become an “abstract society” in which social relations might become too rational. Given the fact that there would always be emotional needs which human beings cannot satisfy in an abstract society, Popper made the distinction between the private and public sphere. He maintained that the private sphere provides emotional and biological regeneration for the public sphere. For Popper, Democracy provides a peaceful means of reform and change of government while ensuring that the freedom of thought and speech necessary for intellectual progress is not inhibited or jeopardized. However, Popper cautioned against unbridled freedom because ‘unlimited freedom means that a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and rob him of his freedom” he opines that freedom requires limitation and of course protection by the state. This idea finds expression in Poppers “paradox of freedom”. Meanwhile, whether from the classical or Marxian perspective of democracy, Larry Diamond avers that democracy is instrumental to freedom in three fundamental ways. First, free and fair elections inherently require certain political rights of expression, organization and opposition which are unlikely to exist in isolation from broader civil liberties. Second, democracy maximizes the opportunities for self-­ determination, which enable persons to live under the laws of their own choosing. Third, it facilitates moral autonomy, which represents the ability of each individual citizen to make normative choices and thus be at the most profound level of self-­ governing (Diamond 1999). Democratic consolidation refers to the challenge of securing a new or emergent democracy from relapse or outright collapse. There are basically two ways of conceptualizing democratic consolidation the first refers to the process of avoiding democratic breakdown in which case it has to do with the process of stabilizing and maintaining new democracies while the second refers to the process of deepening, completing, or organizing a democracy that has emerged from a pseudo or sub-type democracy to a free and egalitarian one. Samuel Huntington (1991) proffers a “two turnover” thesis of democratic consolidation. He is of the view that democracy could be said to be consolidated when an entrenched regime delivers free, fair and competitive election. This is by which that the party that wins power at the initial stage of transition losses in subsequent elections, then hands over to the winning party. While the incumbent also in turn hands over power peacefully to another party who wins at the subsequent election. Put differently, democracy is being consolidated when today’s winners become tomorrow’s losers and vice-versa. The principal purpose of democratic consolidation is to engender behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional adherence to democratic principles and methods by both elites and the masses. It, therefore, refers to a “deep, unquestioned routinized commitment to democracy and it procedures at the elite and the mass levels” (Diamond 1999, 65). It refers to a reduction in the uncertainty of democracy regarding not so much the outcomes as to the rules and methods of political competition. Espousing another perspective Linz and Stephan (1996, 5) argue that for a democracy to be consolidated, it must “become the only game in town.” They offer a frame

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work encompassing behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional means of determining whether a democracy is consolidated. According to them, behaviourally, it signifies a situation where there are no significant socio-economic, political, institutional or national actors trying to achieve their aims through unconstitutional means such as through violence or any attempt to secede from the state. Attitudinally, they suggest that consolidation is achieved when a strong public opinion informs democratic procedures and institutions privilege it, as the only appropriate means of governing. Constitutionally, in consolidated democracies both government, non-state actors and social forces in the state becomes subjected to and abide by laws, procedures and accepted institutions for conflict resolution. What this implies is that, even if there are severe governance problems and widespread discontent with the ruling government, everybody including the elites and the mass of the people uphold the belief and commitment to constitutional means as the only legitimate way of changing a government. Consolidation therefore entails not only agreement on the rules for competition for power, but also fundamental self-enforcing restraints on the exercise of power (Diamond 1999, 70). In order to consolidate democracy, new and fragile democracies must confront and surmount three important hurdles, which are the challenges of democratic deepening, political institutionalization and regime performance. Deepening makes the formal structures of state more liberal, accountable, representative and accessible. Political institutionalization refers to the process of safeguarding individual and group rights, exercise of restraint in the use of state powers and ensuring that the judiciary is free and empowered to check abuses. State institutions must therefore exhibit a high degree of institutional adherence, capacity and autonomy. In terms of regime performance, the democratic regime must produce sufficiently positive policy outputs to build broad political legitimacy or at least avoid the crystallization of substantial pockets of resistance to the regimes legitimacy (Diamond 1999).

5.3  T  he State and Democracy Consolidation: Whither Nigeria? Every state, though in theory, is a state for all, it is in practice a state for some; the Nigerian case is an extreme example of this reality (Ake 1996, 24)

The euphoria of life more abundant, which greeted Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999 is now gradually waning, because more than twenty years after the democratic excitement, the success indicator, leaves more to be desired. Following Diamond’s characteristics of democratic consolidation, which are regime performance, political institutionalization and democratic deepening, it is now obvious that a lot still needs to be desired in the journey for the attainment of an open, free and egalitarian society in the Popperian conception. In relation to regime performance, which Diamond categorized into economic and political performance, successive administrations in Nigeria has not performed

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in a manner that leaves the people with the conviction that “democracy is the only game in town”. In terms of economic performance, the Nigerian economy has remained largely mono-cultural, relying excessively on rents from oil exportation. The economy is bogged down by rising inflation, low productivity occasioned by high level of unemployment and mounting public debt. A recent report published by the African Development Bank Group, indicated that by June 2018, the stock of public debt stood at $73.2 billion, up from $71.0 billion in 2017, representing 17.5% of GDP. Despite the increase, Nigeria remained at moderate risk of debt distress. In November 2018, the government issued a Eurobond of $2.9 billion, which reflects its new debt management strategy of prioritizing foreign debt to mitigate the high financing costs of domestic borrowing. Furthermore, relatively strong oil receipts solidified the current account surplus to an estimated 3.7% and bolstered improvements in the terms of trade by about 13% in 2018 alone. In the midst of this very poor economic indicator, the cost of governance in Nigeria is exceedingly high with the profligacy in governance. The long list of National Assembly members and their Jumbo pay put a very high financial burden on the state. It has been widely argued that Nigerian lawmakers are the most highly paid in the world. This was confirmed by Senator Shehu Sani, who publicly disclosed that a Nigerian Senators earns a monthly salary of seven hundred and fifty thousand naira (N750, 000) and a monthly allowance of 13 million, five hundred thousand naira (N13.5 million), which amounts to a total package of 14 million and twenty-five thousand naira (N14.25 million), per month. At the current black market rate of three hundred and sixty (360) naira to a dollar, a Senator earns about Forty thousand (N40, 000) dollars per month and Four hundred and eighty thousand (480,000) dollars per year. In comparison with a more advanced democracy, a Senator or a representative in the United States of America earns One hundred and seventy-four thousand (174,000) dollars per  annum. With this opulence and ostentatious life styles of elected public office holders, workers are not only poorly paid, they are owed several monthly salaries in some states of the federation. Despite the rating of the economy as the largest in Africa, there is little by way of practical performance because lending rates have remained very high, making the cost of doing business unreasonably high. The devaluation of the naira was largely responsible for the very high cost of living not only that it has also prevented Nigerians from benefiting from the proceeds of crude oil and other resources of the state. The economy has not only remained mono-cultural; it is import based as the elites mainly consume foreign products to the detriment of local production. In terms of political institutionalization, Popper avers that ‘institutions are like fortresses; they must be well designed and manned’ (cf. Shearmur 2002: 53). Unfortunately, virtually all institutions of state in Nigeria are deficient in one form or the other. Political parties lack any discernible idea; they are bereft of internal democracy on account of very strong elite factionalization which often led to serious crises during and after political party primaries. The citizens lack the requisite confidence in the institutions concerned with elections management and the electoral process. The Independent National Electoral Commission

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(INEC) saddled with the constitutional responsibility of conducting elections is often accused, of bias in favour of the ruling party and this perception has not changed over the years. For example, in 2015, fourteen political parties under the platform called Credible Alternative Alliance (CAA) accused the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of conspiring with the People Democratic Party (PDP) to frustrate other political parties ahead of the general elections in 2015. In addition, the former Governor of old Kaduna State and co-chair of the CAA, Alhaji Balarabe Musa said “INEC is deliberately creating difficulties for the emergence of parties under CAA. By doing so, the Commission is conspiring with the PDP to make sure that they did not contest the 2015 general election and also not to vote” (The Nation: 2015). In the same vein, when the All Progressive Congress (APC) was in opposition before assuming the reins of power in 2015, the party raised alarm on the plan by the ruling government to use the security agencies, especially the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Police to harass and intimidate the opposition. In a statement by the then National Publicity Secretary of APC, Mr. Lai Mohammad, the party said “the torrents of threats by the Minister of Police Affairs and the DSS over alleged inflammatory statements by the opposition is nothing but a thinly-veiled attempt at cowing the opposition and destabilizing it ranks” (The Nation: 2015). Similarly, the then Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) President (Comrade) Abdulwaheed Umar expressed concern that little was being done to deepen democratic culture in the polity as the government through the institutions of the state, especially the police have continued to demonstrate unacceptable intolerance of political opposition (The Nation: 2015). Today, the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that was then the ruling party is also making similar claims. The dysfunctional nature of state institutions in Nigeria and indeed in most African countries lends credence to the fact that while institutional strengthening is important, it may not be the only condition for democracy to thrive. It is a truism that democracy is supposed to take the country near equal opportunities for all citizens, but democracy in Nigeria is pushing the country towards structural nepotism going by the behaviour of elected public office holders. This assertion is epitomized by the recent scandal of alleged secret employment slots rocking the National Assembly especially the Senate. The leadership of the Senate is alleged to have “cornered” 100 slots for themselves in a country where mass unemployment is embarrassingly high. The leadership of the National Assembly is being accused of greed and crass insensitivity; this represents a dangerous threat to democratic consolidation. It also confirms how far Nigeria is drifting away from equal opportunities for all citizens by creating a stratified society between the few privileged elected officials of state and the mass of the people. The judiciary represents a very important institution in the democratization process. It is often said that it is the last hope of the common man. It is also that institution of state that is constitutionally empowered to ensure constitutionalism, safeguard fundamental human rights, guarantee individual and collective freedom and uphold the rule of law. In recent times, the judiciary in Nigeria has been accused of judicial corruption. This is clearly evident in the adjudication of election matters.

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The faceoff between the Justice Aloysius Katsina-Alu, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria and Justice Isa Ayo Salami, the then President of the Court of Appeal on allegations of trying to influence the judgment of election cases, bears eloquent testimony to the unethical practices in the judiciary. Nothing can endanger freedom and deconsolidate democracy, like a partial, compromised and corrupt judiciary where justice is for the highest bidder. Some judges associated with electoral cases were recently arrested by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for being in possession of huge sums of money believed to have been proceeds of bribe from political and election related cases. Considering Nigeria’s score card on regime performance and political institutionalization, it is fairly safe to conclude that state actors in Nigeria have not imbibed the requisite behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional democratic ethos. Although for the first time in the history of democracy in Nigeria, the erstwhile Peoples Democratic Party regime led by President Goodluck Jonathan was defeated in the 2015 general election and despite the threat of violence by some of his ethnic warlords, President Goodluck Jonathan in an unprecedented manner willingly handed over power to the incumbent government of the All Progressive Congress under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari. In spite of this feat, the political elites are still largely intolerant of opposition just as the political and electoral space remains violent in most state of the federation. Not only that, peoples’ rights and freedom are daily being trampled upon, state apparatuses are vicious, non-­ transparent and unaccountable. The political and economic exploitation of the citizens have resulted in mass poverty, rising crime rate, insecurity, ethno-religious conflicts, kidnapping for ransom, insurgency and terrorism in most part of the country. This has created a serious threat to food production as well as created huge numbers of internally displace persons (IDPs) in the affected areas. The most debilitating aspect of all these is the Boko Haram insurgency which led to the kidnap of some school girls in Chibok, Borno state in April 2014 for which some of the girls are yet to be rescued. In spite of all these, the political space is still closed to a vast majority of people as public office holders oscillate between one political office and the other. The state and its actors need to do more in order to deepen democracy in Nigeria. Official corruption remains a critical challenge to democratic deepening. It is noteworthy that the country has an unviable international reputation for official corruption according to a report of the 2018, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by Transparency International. The assessment which was based on the extent of public sector corruption in 175 countries, ranked Nigeria as the 144th least corrupt nation. The country scored 27 out of a Maximum 100 marks and was listed as 31st most corrupt nation in the world.

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5.4  T  owards Democratic Consolidation: What Is to Be Done? In order to consolidate democracy in Nigeria, the state needs to be restructured in such a manner that must shed it of its colonial origin. The Nigerian state remains an amalgam of several diverse people who were forcefully glued together by a powerful colonial government. These diverse people should be given an opportunity through a sovereign national conference (SNC) to deliberate on all grey areas of the Nigerian system without any “no go area” as was the case in such conferences in the past. At such a conference, the people should decide the future of the country and agree on a political arrangement that would guarantee freedom and shared prosperity for all the sections and segments in the country. Such decisions should include how to manage the thirty-six states structure, which some analysts have described as unviable and unwieldy. Also, there is the need to rethink the political and electoral system that thrives on a violent “winner takes all” mentality. The suggestion of Popper on the ‘ability of the population to change its government by means of a vote as opposed to force’ becomes apt. He asserts further that ‘such a government renders citizens themselves responsible for what government does, such that, in the event of their being unhappy with the results, they should blame themselves, rather than democracy’ (Popper 1945, 76) When this kind of advanced democratic ethos is achieved, it would certainly reduce the desperation and premium that is often placed on the capture and retention of political power by political elites in Nigeria. It would also reduce, if not eliminate electoral violence, when everybody is a ‘winner’ on account of their freely taken democratic decision. The concentration of power and resources at the centre creates a monstrous state whose power is immense and used arbitrarily as was witnessed when President Olusegun Obasanjo unilaterally seized local governments’ financial allocation for Lagos state contrary to the provision of the constitution. This “unitarist and commandist” federal arrangement must give way to a federalism that thrives on revenue by derivation and devolution of powers to the grassroots. A situation where states are not able to pay workers’ salaries unless they get handouts or bailouts from the federal government is unsustainable and retrogressive. Consequently, the salaries and emoluments of elected public officers must be reviewed and drastically reduced in order to plug wastages and reduce the ostentatious lifestyles of public officers and cost of governance in a country where annual budgets are funded through domestic and foreign borrowing. Relevant institutions of state must be strengthened for democracy to thrive. Indeed, Popper’s insistence that ‘we must construct social institutions, enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong’ reinforces the above position. The state must also see to it that nobody need enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin’ (Shearmur 2002: 52) In order to be able to achieve the above assertion by Popper; there should be a genuinely institutionalized and sustained war on corruption especially bureaucratic and judicial corruption.

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The handling of post-election cases by the judiciary is also crucial to guaranteeing a free and open society. In order to achieve speedy dispensation of justice, court infrastructure must be upgraded and improved. The courts should ensure that aggrieved persons from the various election processes who approached the courts, go-home satisfied that justice has been done in their various legal disputes. This would go a long way in stabilizing the entire system and avoiding blood bath. There should also be a complete overhaul of our constitutional and legal framework such that would enable a sound justice administration and delivery system in Nigeria. There should be more transparency and objectivity in the appointment, placement and discipline of judges. More competent hands should be employed as judges as against the current “promotion” exercise where once judicial officers attain seniority by dint of being the first to be appointed among his colleagues, he is promoted to the next higher court regardless of his competence, integrity and professionalism. Often times, we find that brilliant lawyers never get the opportunity to be appointed judges, rather you find family, friends, relations and cronies being so appointed. This has encouraged indiscipline, incompetence and travesty of justice in the justice administration system in Nigeria. In addition, the independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed especially by drawing its budget from the consolidated revenue so that salaries and other emoluments of judicial officers are managed by the National Judicial Council and not as “handouts” from the executive arm of government whose excesses the courts are expected to check. It should really not be a case of “he who pays the piper dictates the tune”. The allegiance of the judiciary should be to the constitution and the Nigerian people. They should not pander to the dictates of any individual in government and ensure that nobody is above the law. Certainly democracy cannot be consolidated when justice is perceived to be for sale and especially for the highest bidder. For Nigeria to be free, open and democratic, the education system must be decolonized and restructured. The state must institute an education system that is liberating with emphasis on social justice. The economy needs to be restructured and revolutionarily diversified along conscious mechanized agriculture. A nation which cannot feed its population can neither be free nor develop. The importation of fuel is robbing the economy of badly needed foreign exchange. In order to reverse this, the state needs to consciously boost the capacity of domestic refining instead of depending on imports whose landing cost is dependent on prevailing exchange rates and other external variables.

5.5  Conclusion Democracy has become the most popular system of government all over the world. This is because it is the only system of government according to Popper that offers the citizens the ability to change its government by means of vote as opposed to force. Also if it is conscientiously and meticulously operated it can guarantee freedom and well-being of citizens in a political system. However, from the foregoing

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expose, it is crystal clear that the state and its actors are very crucial to the creation of an open, free and democratic society. State institutions must not only be insulated from private capture by the political elites, it must be crafted and manned in such a manner that it functions for the generality of the people. In fact, Popper places considerable emphasis on the need for careful institutional design in order to ensure ‘democratic vigilance’. He admonishes that these institutions must be subjected to democratic control because ‘without democratic control, there can be no earthly reason why any government should not use its political and economic power for purposes very different from the protection of the freedom of its citizens’ (cf. Shearmur 2002: 59). In addition to strong institutions there must be a very strong and supportive social formation rooted in s strong cultural foundation because no country has become democratic and developed because they simply have truly independent institutions alone. Therefore, in order to consolidate democracy, the state must wage a sustained war against political, bureaucratic electoral and judicial corruption. There must be a conscious effort to fight poverty, unemployment, inequality and infrastructural collapse such as road, hospital, water supply, hospitals etc. if the society is plagued with these social vices, it puts a big question mark on the democratic argument. Thus, it is only when the state succeeds in surmounting these challenges that the peoples’ confidence can be rekindled on the messianic credentials of democracy as the most acceptable system of modern governance. Popper believes that there must be safeguard for citizens against disability, unemployment and care at old age and that the law should guarantee a livelihood to everybody willing to work. But much more fundamentally, economic power must not be allowed to dominate political power and that if need be, economic power must be fought and brought under the control of political power. This is because, if the democratic processes are recklessly monetized, it would close the political space for a large number of people and vitiate the potency of democracy as government of the people. There must be the conscious realization on the part of the people that the state exists to serve and protect collective and diverse interests. Only the people can therefore ensure that the state is inclusive and accountable. The survival of all democracies hinges on the twin principles of participation on the part of the ruled and accountability on the part of the rulers. The implication of this is that the citizens must have an active say in the governance process not only in electing political office holders but also by constantly holding them to account through processes that are equitable, transparent and responsive. For the people to be able to do this effectively, the people should be able to freely express themselves, seek redress, organize and if need be, protest in defense of their interests against the dominant forces in the state. Until this is achieved, it may be impossible for states in Africa to further democratization and its consolidation in their present form.

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References Ake, Claude. 1996. The political question. In Governance and development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley, ed. O. Oyeleye. Ibadan: Oyediran Consult International. ———. 2000. The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Alavi, Hamza. 1972. State in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. New Left Review 74. Dahl, Robert. 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Hay, Colin, Michael Lister, and David Marsh. 2006. The state: Theories and issues. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. Huntington, Samuel. 1991. Third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Linz, J., and A. Stephan. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and post-communist Europe. Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press. Mustapha, Raufu. 2006. Rethinking Africanist political science. In The study of Africa: Disciplinary and interdisciplinary encounters, ed. P.T. Zeleza, vol. 1. Dakar: CODESRIA Books. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies: The spell of Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Shearmur, Jeremy. 2002. The political thought of Karl Popper. London/New York: Routledge.

Chapter 6

The Distinctive Character of Popper’s Critical Rationalism Jeremy Shearmur

6.1  Introduction In his autobiography, Unended Quest (Popper 1976), Karl Popper discussed the way in which his ideas were often assimilated to logical positivism and, more generally, to the Vienna Circle. There were indeed some resemblances: both they and Popper were impressed by natural science, and by recent developments in logic. They also favoured a rational and humane approach to philosophy and to the study of social problems. At the same time, there were also significant differences. Popper’s approach developed in part out of his work in psychology (where he was particularly close to the Würzburg School). It developed in part out of discussions with Theodor Gomperz, and especially with Julius Kraft about the work of Kant and of Leonard Nelson (Hacohen 2016). Popper was not an empiricist in the same sense as were most of the Vienna Circle. And while the early work of Wittgenstein had been a strong influence on the Circle, Popper was a resolute critic of Wittgenstein’s work (Popper 1945, 2009). There were, as a result, important differences between Popper’s approach and not only that of the Vienna Circle, but also of the logical empiricism and analytical philosophy that developed from their work. Popper never thought that metaphysics was ‘meaningless’. He at first wished to avoid it because it was not then clear to him how metaphysical theories could be appraised. But he stressed that, on occasion, metaphysics had been an important positive influence on the development of science (Popper 1959, 38–9). In his later work he explicitly championed metaphysical views, and also offered an account as to how metaphysical theories could be evaluated (Popper 1963, 193–200; Popper 1982, 159–211). Popper was also a critic of the idea that it was possible – or necessary - to give a positive response to the problem of induction. He was also a critic of many J. Shearmur (*) Australian National University, Canberra, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_6

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probabilistic theories of induction. He suggested that instead of seeking for a positive way of resolving the problem of induction – or, more generally, of trying to justify our claims that our ideas were true  – we should, instead be concerned to make our claims open to criticism. All this, and its strengths and weaknesses, have been much discussed. However, it seems to me that not enough attention has been paid to what is distinctive about Popper’s work  – and to the question of how it addresses our various problem-situations today. I will, in what follows, set out to do this in four different areas: Popper’s ideas about science and the ‘empirical basis’; his ideas about metaphysical theories and their appraisal; his ideas about politics, and finally his ideas about the problem of toleration.

6.2  Science and the Empirical Basis Popper is well-known for his stress on our fallibility, where this includes the fallibility of our most powerful scientific theories. He thinks that science is an amazing achievement, yet at the same time that our best and most strongly-confirmed theories are fallible. This means that, in principle, we might discover that they are incorrect. There may be things which they predict which turn out to be false. And – and this is particularly important – that the picture that they offer us as to what the world is like, may be superseded by a different view that is offered by some new and improved theory. This emphatically does not mean that, for Popper, just anything goes. Rather, he suggests that we should aim at true theories which seek to inform us about the world. And he offers us an account of the kinds of characteristics which we should expect our theories to possess if they are to constitute steps along this path. Theories, he argues, should be bold, and testable. If we find that they run into problems, then we need to be ready to make changes in them. Typically, when we are testing our theories, we will be testing systems of ideas – several theories, and also statements of so-called ‘initial conditions’. What we need to change in the event of a falsification of this system of knowledge, is some element in this system. What we try to change is up to us. But as we make changes, we need to be governed by what Popper referred to as ‘methodological rules’. (These are chosen with an eye to what, in our view, the aim of science should be.) These rules involve such things as making sure that we can explain, with our new ideas, at least as much as we could do previously; that we can account for past successes, but also that we can explain why things went wrong in the earlier test. In addition, we will want our new ideas to be independently testable – and, indeed, to sometimes pass these tests. (Popper 1959, 1963, 215–50; see also Shearmur 2006a). All this has some interesting consequences. If we take the content of our current science seriously, we may find that it is at odds with our other ideas. Notably, from the time of Descartes onwards, physical science started to pose challenges to how we typically understand ourselves. For example, what is to be made of our ideas

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about our autonomy, about our consciousness and freedom, and about the significance of our plans, in the world as is pictured by science? Other important challenges to our ordinary ideas have been posed by the theory of natural selection. Different reactions to all this are possible. J. J. C. Smart, for example, took the view that science should be interpreted realistically, but he also held that any future science would look pretty much like present science (Smart 1978). The result was that current science was seen as a kind of Procrustean bed, into which everything else had to be fitted. Some writers – such as Pierre Duhem (1954) and more recently Henry Babcock Veatch (1978) – argued that science should not be interpreted realistically. This would save our more common-sense ideas from ontological challenge. On such a view, it does not seem that science can throw more light on what things are really like. Popper’s own view – which seems to me attractive – is rather different. He, like Smart, was a realist. He argued that we should pursue the goal of scientific reduction (typically seen as ‘fact-correcting’ in its character (Popper 1972, 191–205)), while at the same time being aware of the fact that scientific reductions are seldom completely successful. Popper, however, also urged that we should distinguish between ‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ reductions (Popper 1972, 285–318). Scientific reductions correct our existing ideas, by way of providing better explanations than we had previously; ones which, typically, correct our previous understanding of the world. By contrast, ‘philosophical’ reductions simply find ways of avoiding talking about entities which we find inconvenient. (He gave the nice parallel of the way in which the very proper people of Vienna eliminated the problem of body lice. People there were invaded by these unpleasant insects after the end of the First World War. The Viennese solved their problem by resolutely avoiding talking about them!) Popper, indeed, went further. He argued that, prior to attempting scientific reductions, we should give as full and as rich a description as we can of what there is to be reduced. Rather than – as Smart tended to do – diminishing the status and significance of those things that current science can’t explain, we should say as much about them as we can. One might, I think, interpret what Popper had to say about the ‘three worlds’ in these terms. Popper is well-known for arguing that we should distinguish between the physical world 1, the psychological world 2, and a world 3 of the abstract contents of our theories. It is striking that, while Popper was sceptical about whether in the end we would do so, he did not rule out the possibility of worlds 2 and 3 being given a scientific reduction to world 1. (Popper 1972; Popper and Eccles 1977.) I would like now to turn to issues relating to Popper’s ideas about science as such. Popper argued that, to be scientific, theories should be open to refutation. I also referred, however, to Popper not being an empiricist in the same sense as were most members of the Vienna Circle. The explanation for this, is that while Popper stressed the significance of empirical testing, he also emphasised the degree to which how we experience the world is influenced by various of our theories and presuppositions – including ways in which we are biologically predisposed to interpret the world in particular ways. To this, we can add, obviously, ways in which we are socialized into particular expectations about the world.

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After reviewing some well-known and much discussed features of Popper’s work, he reviews some themes which, in his judgement, have not received sufficient attention. These include Popper’s ideas about the ‘empirical basis’; about metaphysics and its appraisal; and some distinctive themes relating to political thought and toleration. On how to relate this to Popper’s ideas about testing and criticism, two things here seem to me particularly important. On the one hand, Popper stressed the need for us to explain how our ideas are to be critically appraised, and emphasised the significance of refutation and criticism, not confirmation. On the other, he stressed the significance of the repeatability of tests, and the inter-subjectivity of appraisal. What all this means, is that what is to count as appraisal of a theory has to be negotiated in advance with its critics or potential critics. In many cases, this will mean simply the adoption of tests that are standard in the field. But it may involve tough discussion and negotiation – e.g. if other people are inclined, initially, to see the world in very different ways than we are, or have arguments against the use of standard tests. All this is inter-related to Popper’s ideas about the ‘empirical basis’. Popper here stressed the idea that we should appraise our theories against (themselves testable) statements as to what is found to be the case when a test is undertaken. This led to the idea that our theories are appraised against an inter-subjectively accepted view as to what occurs. There has been a lot of controversy about how this is to be understood, with critics of Popper – and also some who defend him – arguing that his account does not give an adequate role to subjective experience (Shearmur 2006a, b; Andersson 2016). In my view, Popper here departed from the empiricist tradition which saw private experience as playing a key foundational role in respect of knowledge claims, and I think that he was right to do so. Popper obviously does not deny that we all have experiences, and that these typically motivate us to make statements about the world – e.g. the results of a test. However, what matters here is that a statement is being made by someone with the appropriate capacity (and if necessary, the training) to make it, in the appropriate circumstances – that they are reporting on the results of the test - and that others can in principle repeat the exercise, and appraise that judgement. The key role, in all this, is played by what one might call the performance that someone goes through, their report on it, and the tentative inter-­subjective acceptance of the results. All this is obviously fallible. The original observer might have made a mistake; there might be something that was problematic about how he reported the results of the experiment or observation. Or, if we hold a different theory about the world from the one which influenced him, we might be sceptical about what he has reported and wish to re-test his claim. But in all this, what we will be interested in appraising is the correctness of the statement that he made, rather than its relation to his experiences. We don’t know what those experiences were, and, in a sense, what they were does not matter  – unless we have a special interest in that individual, rather than in what he is claiming about the world. All this points us towards another feature of Popper’s approach. These days, a lot of emphasis is placed on the role of ‘presuppositions’ in human knowledge. Think only of work on this by Postmodernists and Poststructuralists, and also by some

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feminist scholars. Popper would agree with them that people do make presuppositions, that they may be incorrect, and that the individual is typically not aware of them. Popper would also argue that there is no way in which we could sensibly try to move instead to things which are not subject to presuppositions, and, say, re-build our knowledge on such a secure basis. Popper criticized this explicitly in Bacon, but Popper was at odds with all ‘foundationalist’ approaches to philosophy (Popper 1963, 3–30). At the same time, Popper’s approach differs from that of the other scholars to whom I am referring, in two important ways. First, they tend to be concerned with simply disclosing what they take to be the assumptions or presuppositions of other people. This seems typically to be done as if, to disclose these things was itself to undermine the work of the people whom they are studying. (Or, if this is not suggested, it is not clear what we are supposed to do with the information about presuppositions that is being disclosed.) But in Popper’s approach, we may make all kinds of presuppositions which are, in fact, fine. We may presuppose that there is a world external to us, or that causality is in operation. And this may be correct. Our task, rather, is to put our and other people’s ideas to critical appraisal. The key thing, for him, is to discover how we may critically appraise, and work together in improving, our presuppositions. Second, Popper would stress that we all make presuppositions and assumptions which can’t be justified. This is the case for all of us, including those who set out to investigate the presuppositions made by others. The result of this, is that we should not assume that it is only others who may be making perhaps problematic assumptions. We should not assume that it is we who have the truth, while everyone else is benighted. (It is striking that those who are keen on disclosing the presuppositions of others, or suggesting that they can’t properly aspire to truth, seldom explain how their own analysis is immune to such problems – or when they do, say things that are monumentally implausible.) Rather, we need to be open to the possibility that we can all learn from others, and that there may be flaws in even what we take to be the best of our ideas and procedures.

6.3  Metaphysics and Its Appraisal In his early work, Popper, while well aware of the fact that he held various metaphysical views, was not sure how they could be critically appraised. The result of this was that in his The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge (Popper 2009) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1959), while criticizing the view that metaphysics could not be meaningful, and stressing that it had sometimes played a useful role in the development of science, Popper tried to avoid his account of science resting on metaphysical ideas. Later, however, he developed ideas about how some metaphysical theories could be appraised. He also discussed how metaphysics might serve as ‘metaphysical research programmes’ for science. Popper also offered his own tentative metaphysical research programme for science, centred on the idea of indeterministic ‘propensities’. About this, however, I will not say more here. (See Popper 1976, 1990, and Popper and Eccles, 1977.)

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Let me, instead, say a little about the appraisal of metaphysics. Popper’s ideas about this were modest. They represented an extension of his more general approach of ‘critical rationalism’ – of the idea that we should set out not to try to show that our ideas are correct, or to justify them, but, rather, that we should offer them – and open them to appraisal – as attempts to resolve problems. This leads to arguments of two kinds. On the one hand, there can be arguments  – such as that of Leibniz against Cartesianism – to the effect that a problem (in this case, of how one solid object bounces off another) cannot be resolved in terms of Descartes’ mechanistic metaphysics (Popper 1994, 112–20). One might also argue that an approach simply shifts the initial problem rather than resolving it. One might also argue that an approach is involved in a degenerative problem shift: that it ‘resolves’ problems over time, simply by diminishing the content of what it asserts. One other approach here would be to give an account of just what the problems are of offering explanations in a particular field, in terms of a particular ‘metaphysical research programme’. One striking example is the difficulty that faces those who argue against Darwinism by invoking ideas of ‘intelligent design’. They may offer criticism; but their real problem is how to replace all the current scientific work which depends on Darwinian ideas (Shearmur 2010). On the other hand, Popper developed a criticism of the idea  – which echoes through much of the history of Western philosophy – that rational discussion can take place only between people who are in fundamental agreement with one another. He here offered a criticism of what he called ‘the myth of the framework’: of the idea that rationality was limited to a particular shared framework of ideas or assumptions (Popper 1994, 33–64). Popper argued, by contrast, that, if we admit our own fallibility and that we might hope to learn from one another, then we may usefully enter discussion with people whose ideas are very different from our own. In this context, however, Popper stressed that we should not expect that we will reach consensus – but that, nonetheless, our exchanges may be fruitful. He pointed, here, to the way in which Einstein and Niels Bohr had important but inconclusive discussions about metaphysical and methodological ideas relating to science (Popper 2008, 313–28). These exchanges, Popper stressed, were of great value for the development of science, even though they left these discussions still in disagreement. Popper also, in his The Open Society and Its Enemies, discussed the way in which clashes between different cultures, if they were the subject of critical reflection rather than the arrogant imposition of one set of ideas upon another, could be of the greatest value. He also gave the example, from the classical Greek historian Herodotus, of a ruler from ancient Persia as having brought together two groups of people, one of whom ate their dead, the other of whom burned them. Each was profoundly shocked to learn about the other people – but as Popper suggests (Popper 1994, 33–64), they could well have learned a lot if they reflected on the experience, even if they were not able to discuss things. The spreading of cultural contacts by way of commercial activity has also played an important role, historically, in leading people to understand that their ways of doing things are not necessarily the best ones. Popper stressed that while it may make for an easier discussion if those involved are all in agreement about fundamentals, there is the possibility of learning more if

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there are major points at issue between us. As I have mentioned, learning does not mean that we should expect to reach a consensus, or that the discussion may not at times be difficult. All that is required is that we enter the discussion with a concern for the truth, and a willingness to learn. There may, of course, be problems. Some people may think that they are in possession of infallible revelations as to what is true. However, as Popper has argued powerfully, just because we are certain of something does not mean that it is true. All told, Popper’s approach here seems to me powerful and interesting. He recognises the existence and legitimacy of metaphysical claims. However, he argues that it is not enough that we be attracted to some view: we need, rather, to engage critically with others and through this to discover what might be problematic about it. From such engagements – if we approach them in the right spirit – we may hope to learn. It is also important to note, however, that if we engage in this way, we are committing ourselves to taking our interlocutors as something like ends in themselves. We are all subject to the disciplines involved in seeking, together, for the truth. But this very quest is incompatible with the domination of other people. And while we may be attached to particular views, that we are certain of something does not mean that we are right – indeed, our very certainty may prove an obstacle to our learning more.

6.4  Popper’s Political Thought There are important common themes relating Popper’s more general ideas about philosophy to his political thoughts. In particular, Popper here also stresses our fallibility, and the need to learn when we have got things wrong. His approach, in The Open Society (Popper 1945), is humanitarian. He is concerned about human suffering and injustice. However, he was also all too aware that there were deep divisions among people who might share these broad humanitarian concerns. In part, he was struck by the way in which people might be led away from humanitarianism, by what Popper thought were mistaken views about knowledge. Popper here offered criticism of both Plato and Marx. These were important figures in themselves, but also in Popper’s view their ideas about knowledge had led many of his contemporaries away from humanitarian ideas. There were also divisions among those whose concerns were primarily humanitarian – for example (when he was writing), between socialists and liberals, Utilitarians and Christians. The problem, here, was that these groups were deeply attached to various substantive ideals. However, not only did others not find those ideals compelling, but they often thought that what, for the other people, would be an ideal society, would actually be terrible (Popper 2008, 118–32). Popper’s reaction to this, was to argue that, rather than trying to use politics to pursue our positive ideals, we should, rather, work with others to see what common ground we hold with them. For example, to what extent, while disagreeing about positive ideals, could we come to an agreement about things which are

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unacceptable? Popper argued that – within the scope of a state-secured system of limited rights – trying to address these things should form an agenda for governmental policy. Popper, further, stressed our fallibility here. What may seem good ideas about policy might prove highly problematic. He here argued for the significance of what he called ‘the rational unity of mankind’ (Popper 1945, chapter 24). This is the idea that, while not everyone would be in a position to formulate suggested solutions to our problems which would hold water, anyone might be in a position to offer useful criticism. After all, all of us hold different positions in life, and by virtue of this typically possess knowledge and information which is not held by anybody else which may be pertinent to the critical evaluation of policy. This, however, poses a problem. For we may have such knowledge: it may be we who can best illuminate just what is wrong with some policy. But what we typically don’t know, is how significant this knowledge is. All policies are likely to have some problematic unintended consequences. Just because something is flawed does not mean that it is not, in fact the best policy that might be undertaken. Further, just what the pros and cons are of different actions that might be taken to alleviate it, is also something that it is difficult for the individual to judge. One might add, here – although this is a point that has been stressed by Friedrich Hayek rather than by Popper – that our tentative scientific knowledge might indicate that there are some problems that cannot be remedied without causing greater damage elsewhere (see Shearmur 1996a; see also Shearmur 1996b.) Popper did not, to my knowledge, discuss what one might call the problem of how we can entrench politically the role of tentative expert knowledge which we may, as individuals, not be in a good position to evaluate. But it is interesting that Popper did offer a critique of proportional representation, and that aspects of his argument there may apply to this problem (Popper 2008). Popper’s argument against proportional representation was that a key role was played, in democracies, by our ability to vote a government out of power. He stressed the key importance of being able to get rid of bad governments without violence (Popper 1945.) Our ability to do this, however, was weakened in a system of proportional representation if, in it, power is held by a coalition. Under such a system, any member of the coalition could always argue that they were not responsible for a bad piece of policy: it was, rather, something that was forced on them by their allies. In addition, under a system of proportional representation, one might find that the same people get back into power even in the face of an adverse vote, as the highest preferences of some minority party. Popper’s suggestion is, thus, that we think of democracy as playing a negative role: of enabling us to get rid of governments of which we disapprove. I would suggest, however, that need to complement this by the development of a second chamber – of which I think that Life Peers in Britain’s House of Lords, who are appointed rather than elected, are an interesting model – by whom the ideas and policies of the elected government could be submitted to ongoing, and more expert, critical scrutiny (Shearmur 2016). It would be a body for critical reflection, rather than one which determines, say, where resources go. Such a second chamber might be designed to have representation of key interests and groups (e.g. tribes and key occupations) in the different areas of the country. One might even see such a

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chamber, in which there is respectful critical engagement by people who disagree, as serving as a focus for the currently centripetal forces of social media, and which would bring people together, more widely, into dialogue, rather than saying unpleasant things about one another on their various social media pages. To this, it might be objected – as Oseni Taiwo Afisi did to me in discussion: but what if one cannot trust governments to conduct fair elections? This may be a real problem, but to suggest a remedy is tricky, not least because what the problem is will depend on the particular circumstances of the country in question. Clearly, one might first pose the problem: what arrangements would make for independent and fair elections, and see just why the major parties would not agree to them. However, this might not work. Let me here make a suggestion, not because I think that it is particularly good, but to challenge you to come up with better ideas in its place. Suppose one was in a situation in which governments at least claim that they want fair elections. How about appointing, by consensus between the main political parties, the government of another country as having responsibility for the conduct of one’s elections? For example, how about inviting Norway and, say, Singapore to cooperate in this? I have suggested these two names just because they are places which have a reputation for fair-dealing and efficiency, and who – as far as I know – have no history of colonial rule in Africa, or obvious sinister financial interests there. It would, again, be interesting to hear what objections there would be to such arrangements. If it were argued: but this is to turn ones back on national autonomy. I will make two comments. The first is that such a solution would be chosen, not imposed by some colonial or neo-colonial power. The second is that it was to me interesting that, in his old age, Popper, when discussing the problems of social transition in the Soviet Union, argued that they might usefully take a lead from Japan (Popper 2008, 396). Japan, Popper commented, had been happy to adopt a legal system from Germany, when it saw that it did not itself have the kind of legal system that it needed as the basis for a modern commercial economy. This, and subsequent such moves, were very successful, and in no way diminished its identity or feelings of self-respect. If this was possible for them, does this open the door to possibilities for the rest of us? Indeed, in the face of the chaos in the UK to which the Brexit referendum gave rise, if the UK were ever to think of having such a thing again (something that I would be strongly against, as it seems to me at odds with the idea of parliamentary democracy), I would suggest that Switzerland be invited to run it for us!

6.5  Toleration Popper’s fallibilistic approach gives us an account of knowledge within which the sort of ideas about freedom of discussion which J. S. Mill discussed in On Liberty would apply. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that Popper also stressed that our freedom should be qualified by our duty not to hurt others. But what did

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Popper say, specifically, about toleration? His views are, in many respects, quite practical. In his ‘Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility’ (Popper 1992). Popper first stressed the harm that has been done by intellectuals – who, he argues, have encouraged mass murder in the name of ideas, theories and religious teachings. By contrast with this, Popper emphasised the importance of ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ from the Ten Commandments. Indeed, he contrasts it with Moses’ subsequently setting the armed Levites onto those who had worshipped the golden calf. Popper also endorsed Schopenhauer’s simple summary of the content of morality: ‘Hurt no-one, but help everyone as well as you can’. Popper then continues by stressing, with Voltaire, the significance of toleration as a consequence of our fallibility, and his idea that we should pardon one another’s follies. Popper also argues for the importance of what he calls ‘critical pluralism’, and the rational discussion of theories. This, in the area of policy, is to be conducted with an awareness of our fallibility, and he urges that we should weigh up impartially reasons for and against our theories, and also the idea that we are likely to come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks. Popper has also written about the limits to toleration, suggesting that we should not tolerate intolerance, violence or cruelty. Indeed, in his Open Society (Popper 1945), Popper, when summing up his ideas on ‘the most important principles of humanitarian and equalitarian ethics’ (Popper 1945, chapter 5, note 6), started with the idea of: ‘Tolerance towards all who are not intolerant and who do not propagate intolerance’. He expanded on this view, in a passage which is worth quoting at some length: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. – In this formulation, [Popper wrote] I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive; and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal.

Popper’s views about this were shaped by his own experience of National Socialism. However, the issues with which he was concerned are all too familiar to us, today. Popper stresses the importance of criticism, but at the same time expresses concern that we should not hurt the innocent or show disrespect for people’s religious views. As he said in The Open Society, ‘every freedom (like the freedom to publish) involves a duty (like the duty not to hurt – especially not the innocent’). But how might one put this into practise?

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One suggestion here might perhaps be drawn from a British court case, which involved W.  G. Foote, the publisher of the aggressively secularist journal The Freethinker, in April 1857 (see Shearmur 2008). This publication was intended to be disrespectful, and it published anti-religious cartoons. Foote was taken before the courts for blasphemy, and in his summing up of the case, the judge, Lord Coleridge, said: I lay it down as law, that, if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel

This seems to me to suggest a useful approach to our problem. For it indicates how it is possible to have the kind of engagement with the substance of views that ‘critical rationalism’ calls for, while at the same time being respectful of other people with whom we are engaged, and avoiding forms of expression which will be disrespectful of their religious or other deeply-held views. This idea would seem to me to undermine the claim that offensive material – such as the anti-Muslim cartoons in Charlie Hebdo and Jyllands-Posten – should receive protection simply as a consequence of ideas about freedom of speech. In general terms, if there are disagreements about issues about which people care deeply, perhaps the most stupid possible course of action would seem to be to set out deliberately to give offense to those people. At the same time, there is room for argument about what should be acceptable, and about legitimate differences in freedom of expression in, say, private as opposed to public settings. That being said, the view which I am canvassing here would also seem to me in line with the ideas that Popper himself expressed, in correspondence with the British Society of Authors concerning the Salman Rushdie Satanic Verses incident and Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Rushdie (Popper 2008, 202–204). Popper deplored Khomeini’s judgement (compare, here, Popper’s comments about intellectuals who encourage murder in the name of ideas). He also strongly disagreed with a proposal, from the Society of Authors, that intellectuals should publicly identify themselves with Rushdie’s work. Popper stressed that this would be understood by those who had been offended as identifying with the material which gave offense. And he also stressed that it would disregard the apology that Rushdie himself had offered to those who had been offended. All told, these are issues that require care and consideration on both sides. If people are not to offend others, they need to understand what others find offensive and why. While those giving such information need to make sure that they don’t use the idea that they should be accorded moral consideration as an excuse to impose on others. For this could, in effect, remove some topics from legitimate criticism. What, it seems to me, is needed is not to give a free hand to those who might be offended to define what is an offense. Instead, we need to work together to discover appropriate inter-subjective standards about this. Those who have a concern about being offended (e.g. minorities in a country, or, say, recent immigrants) need also to appreciate the customs and mores of the societies in which they are living. (It is striking, in the case of the Danish cartoons, that those who were taking offense seemed to have no idea of the tradition of

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no-holds-barred criticism in the Danish press.) They may, also, need to appreciate some history – e.g. of the way in which, in the past, in some countries, censorship inspired by religious views had been found oppressive, and in which important freedoms had to be achieved against such demands for censorship.

6.6  Conclusion Above all, here, we need to stress the importance of criticism but also to follow Popper’s idea that, when we assert our freedoms, we should pay attention to the sensibilities of others, and also follow him in the idea that we should all learn from Voltaire to pardon other people’s follies, and to hope that they will pardon ours. Things become that much more complex in an international context  – which, with the development of the internet, has been brought into the homes of all of us. We really need to learn that while we may readily now get access to content from anywhere, this does not mean that we understand the local context in which it was produced or its significance there. In addition, those from Western countries need to bear in mind that there may be history of which we, as individuals, are not aware, and particularly a history of things done in the name of our governments and what were claimed to be our values, which, to say the least, has been oppressive – and that this may, for other people, form the context in which they understand what we now have to say.

References Andersson, Gunnar. 2016. The Problem of the Empirical Basis in Critical Rationalism. In The Cambridge Companion to Popper, ed. J.  Shearmur and G.  Stokes, 125–142. Cambridge University Press. Duhem, Pierre. 1954. The aim and structure of physical theory [1914]. New York: Atheneum. Hacohen, Malachi. 2016. The young Popper, 1902–1937: History, politics and philosophy in interwar Vienna. In The Cambridge companion to Popper, ed. J. Shearmur and G. Stokes, 30–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies. London: Routledge. ———. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]. London: Hutchinson. ———. 1963. Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge. ———. 1972. Objective knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1976. Unended quest. London: Fontana. ———. 1982. Quantum theory and the schism in physics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlechild. ———. 1990. A world of propensities. Bristol: Thoemmes. ———. 1992. In search of a better world. London: Routledge. ———. 1994. The myth of the framework. London: Routledge. ———. 2008. After the open society. London: Routledge. ———. 2009. The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge. London: Routledge. Popper, Karl, and John Eccles. 1977. The self and its brain. Berlin: Springer International. Shearmur, Jeremy. 1996a. Hayek and after. London: Routledge.

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———. 1996b. The political thought of Karl Popper. London: Routledge. ———. 2006a. The logic of scientific discovery. In Central works of philosophy: Volume 4: The twentieth century: Moore to Popper, ed. J. Shand, 262–286. Chesham, Bucks: Acumen. ———. 2006b. The empirical basis. In Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, volume II: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. David Miller, Karl Milford, and Ian Jarvie, 197–208. Aldershot: Ashgate. ———. 2008. Blasphemy in a Pluralistic Society. In Negotiating the Sacred II: Blasphemy and sacrilege in the arts, ed. Elizabeth Burns Coleman and Maria Suzette Fernandes-Dias, 127–144. Canberra: ANU Press. ———. 2010. Why the ‘hopeless war’: Approaching intelligent design. Sophia 49 (4): 475–488. ———. 2016. Popper’s politics and political thought. In The Cambridge Companion to Popper, ed. J. Shearmur and G. Stokes, 352–376. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smart, John. 1978. The Content of Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (113):339–341. Veatch, Henry. 1978. Is Quine a metaphysician? The Review of Metaphysics 31 (3): 406–430.

Chapter 7

Tolerance, Multiculturalism and the Search for National Unity Victoria Openif Oluwa Akoleowo

7.1  Introduction Contemporary African societies are multicultural (Fardon and Furniss 1994). Formed by arbitrary demarcation of boundary lines by European colonial masters, African states came into being with little or no attention to precolonial ethnicities and alliances. This was further compounded by the colonial subjugation and polarisation of communities through the instrumentality of ethnic particulars. The product of this arbitrary demarcation and subjugation – multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious African states characterised by a disintegration of traditional cohesive groups. During colonisation, these African states also evinced faux antagonistic relationships which prevented a unified challenge to colonial rule. Colonialism’s bequest to Africa was thus, in the form of multicultural states characterised by ethnic and religious antagonisms. This bequest explains the average African state’s ongoing ethno-religious conflicts which act as impediments to sustainable development in Africa. Given that these ethno-religious conflicts arise out of ethno-religious intolerance, this paper seeks to examine the notion of tolerance as a mode of conflict resolution and prevention. Using the multiculturalist African state as a basis, this paper examines; (a) multiculturalism as a phenomenon underpinned by the principle of tolerance; (b) Karl Popper’s notion of the paradoxical nature of tolerance; and  (c) the possibility of adopting Popper’s notion of tolerance in African nation-states. The paper concludes by asserting that contemporary African leaders have not exhibited the intellectual and moral ability necessary for an impartial application of intolerance towards intolerant philosophies, as available evidence points to their utilising limited tolerance as a means of suppressing and silencing critics’ voices.

V. O. O. Akoleowo (*) Dominican University, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_7

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7.2  Multiculturalism Multiculturalism, simply stated, is a philosophical position that espouses legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity (Kymlicka 2012). Its origins can be traced to the efforts by liberal-democracies to accommodate immigrant minorities within the democratic framework, thus, marking an acceptance of the immigrant community as permanent citizens in the host countries (Kymlicka 1995). Derived from the word multicultural, meaning a diverse mix of culture, multiculturalism is characterised by diverse cultures accommodated within a state/society. Typically conflated with cultural diversity, multiculturalism differs from cultural diversity in that the latter is an acknowledgement of real or perceived differences, while the former transcends mere acknowledgement to acceptance of such diversity, and includes active efforts to foster inclusiveness. As a philosophy, multiculturalism advocates ideologies/policies that demand the maintenance of cultural diversity. Such maintenance can either be intercultural, where interaction and communication between differing cultures are emphasised, or through cultural isolation, where the uniqueness of cultures are emphasised (Berry 2013). An essentially contested phenomenon, multiculturalism is a concept that easily lends itself to misunderstandings and confusions (Kymlicka 1998). This is perhaps why Friedrich Heckmann enumerates seven different usages of the term in Europe (Heckmann 1993). These include; (1) as a descriptive category for the changing ethnic composition of a population; (2) as an acknowledgement of the social and cultural effects of migration; (3) as a feature of the underlying tolerance principle of liberal democratic societies; (4) as an acknowledgement of the effects of interaction between cultures; (5) as a nostalgic attitude towards immigrants; (6) as a political-constitutional principle for cultural diversity; and (7) as an illusory, but well-intended measure to achieve societal integration which fails to achieve its set objectives (Heckmann 1993, 245). We must also note at this juncture that Western and African conceptions of multiculturalism differ. Historically, Western societies are monocultural, homogenous groups, but modern conceptions of human equality, bolstered by increasing influx of migrant groups have turned contemporary western societies multicultural. An example of this is the United States of America’s experience with multiculturalism, which is limited to its adoption of state policies which encourage a tolerant society where every member of society is integrated into society, regardless of tribe, culture, race, gender, or religious biases. Multiculturalism, in the western sense, is therefore premised on the tensions created in largely hegemonic cultures by immigrants who, without adequate policy formulations to combat such, will be marginalised, alienated and excluded from social and political participation in the host country. It is, in this sense, a tool for including minority migrant groupings in society (Kymlicka 2012, 74). Contemporary African societies on the other hand are multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural. Pre-colonialism, African tribes had a long history of migratory movements; groups migrated for varying reasons, but migration was predominantly

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undertaken for trade or security reasons (Adepoju 1995). Immigrant groups were welcomed by host communities, and in some cases, eventually became even more renowned for membership of the group to which they had migrated, than their original hosts, witness Efunsetan Aniwura’s ascension in Ibadan despite being from Egbaland, (Idowu and Ogunode 2016) and the case of Lagos, Nigeria, which, since its recognition as the leading slave port in West Africa, has always been populated with a heterogeneous mix of immigrants (Mann 2007, 4). Colonialism ushered in another sense of the concept ‘multiculturalism’. Prior to colonialism, the African society was an integrated one, migrant groups were accepted on the basis of the value added to any society. Such migrants either adopted the cultural practices of the host community, or exerted sufficient influence to occasion the host community’s adoption of the migrants’ cultural practices. In situations where assimilation was not possible, migrant groups and host communities related mainly with mutual respect. An instance of such inter-group relations can be cited in the eighteenth century immigration of Hausa people to Agege, Lagos (Gatawa 2013). All were aware of the allegiances owed, and to whom. The colonial experience truncated this organic development of the African state in many respects. The colonialists paid little or no attention to tribal or ethnic allegiances when they carved up Africa into nation-states to serve their own selfish interests. These created nation-­ states comprising of differing tribalities and cultures were forcefully integrated by control mechanisms which functioned through the centralisation of power. These control mechanisms undermined indigenous local systems by delineating foreigners (the colonials), as sovereign authorities over the newly-formed states (Deng 1997). Post-colonialism, polyglot cities, produced by widespread urbanisation, placed African cities as some of the most multicultural societies on earth. Contemporaneously, four models of ethnic configuration can be identified in African states namely; (1) states with a high degree of homogeneity, for example Botswana which evinces cohesiveness, stability and sustained growth; (2) states with significant ethnic pluralism for example Nigeria and Kenya where cultural pluralism is contained and sustained by systems of distribution organised by a legitimate state; (3) states with significant ethnic pluralism where ethnic, racial and religious divisions require special policies to encourage mutual accommodation in a fragile presentation of unity and cohesion, exemplified by Namibia and Zimbabwe; and (4) states with zero-sum conflicts where there is no sense of collective identity, value or shared vision, and the dominant group in perpetuating the imposed state-character, defines the state identity, witness apartheid South Africa (Deng 1997). To further compound these ethnic mixes, African states are multireligious, with ethnic nationalities in different nation-states characterised by their affiliations to one of the major religions namely Christianity, Islam and Traditional religion. All these serve to highlight the distinction between Western and African conceptions of multiculturalism. Despite this distinction, multiculturalism is generally premised on the recognition and positive accommodation of ‘objective cultural differences’ (Murphy 2012, 14). Such recognition and positive accommodation of diversity has however resulted in a barrage of criticisms from scholars who argue that multiculturalism has failed

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to help its intending beneficiaries – the minorities, by unintentionally contributing to their social isolation in the host communities. This is coupled with arguments that multiculturalism is a threat to the way of life of the host communities by its unlimited accommodation of cultural diversity (Waldron 1995; Barry 2001; Song 2007; Putnam 2007). Thus, it is often criticised as a phenomenon that undermines social cohesion and local cultural values by its emphasis on the distinctness and rightness of all cultures. Multiculturalism is also faced with the challenge of how to deal with cultural values that directly conflict with other cultural values, that is, value systems within a multicultural state which contradict each other, for example a value system that views women as property, conflicting with one that upholds the equality of both sexes. Thus, in cases of incompatibility of value systems within the same multicultural state, which value system would the state uphold? In the face of the challenges posed by conflicting values and ethnic/cultural pluralism, some multiculturalists assert that multiculturalism advocates the fostering of tolerance as a moral and political virtue. Such tolerationist multiculturalists include Helen F. Wilson, (Wilson 2014) who defines tolerance as a moral good which is valuable in the understandings of a ‘pragmatic, yet progressive politics of difference’; and Chandran Kukathas, (Kukathas 1992a, b, 2003) who presents the most influential and extreme account of tolerationist multiculturalism by asserting that liberalism implies the commitment to tolerate cultural diversity, despite the tolerant or illiberal practices of such cultures. This emphasis on tolerance as a moral and political virtue begs the question of what tolerance is, and how, if it can, it resolves the myriad challenges faced by multicultural societies. These questions necessitate a definitional analysis of the concept of tolerance which shall be the focus of the next section.

7.3  On Tolerance and Toleration The Oxford English Dictionary defines tolerance as a word initially utilised to denote the action of bearing hardship, or the ability to bear pain and hardship, but which is now utilised to connote the ability or willingness to tolerate the existence of opinions or behaviour that one dislikes or disagrees with (Oxford English Living Dictionaries 2019). Generally, it is recognised as both a moral and political virtue, moral in the sense that it is “the disposition to refrain from exercising one’s power of interference on others’ disliked actions and behaviours” (Galeotti 2013, 274–5); and political in that it is that which encourages persons to recognise and acknowledge both diversity and the benefits derived from a diverse social community (Ajei 2017). As a moral concept, tolerance is a passive concept, as seen in its notion of permissiveness. In this mode, certain essential features can be identified in the notion of tolerance. These include Difference, Importance, Opposition, Power, Non-­ rejection and Requirement (McKinnon 2006). Tolerance necessarily implies

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difference, the difference between the tolerator’s stance or belief and that of the tolerated’s stance. It is also meaningful only when extended towards what is considered important/significant and not trivial. Implicit therefore in toleration is that it is a stance towards what one opposes. In other words, it is characterised by a “principled restraint with respect to action expressive of (their) strong feelings of dislike” (McKinnon 2006, 21). The tolerator recognises that she has the ability to change what she dislikes, but decides not to exercise this power; thus, toleration is a required value in multicultural collectives by the tolerator’s recognition of the inability to convert every member of society to her cause, and the realisation that the alternative to tolerance is social friction, which could eventually degenerate into war. Toleration can therefore be upheld as a “structural or interjectory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence…to strengthen the capabilities of parties to possible violent conflicts for resolving their disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those tensions and disputes” (Lund 2002). In this wise, the tolerant person is seen as wise/prudent/virtuous. As a political virtue, tolerance is defined as a “just, inclusive, pluralistic and objective attitude of mind or way of thinking toward different genders, races, religions and nationalities as well as different values, rights, interests, spiritualties and socio-political ideas” (Ding 2014, 1). This introduces us to the notion of toleration, which is best defined as the political practice of tolerance. Toleration is distinguished from tolerance mainly in that while tolerance is seen as an interpersonal attitude, toleration is the social praxis of such attitude. Toleration is characterised as contextual, objection-laden, accepting, limited, autonomous and practicable. As contextual, it refers to the relationship between the subject(s) and object(s) of toleration; it is an objection towards what the subject of toleration disagrees with; its acceptance mode allows for such disagreeable phenomenon to be accommodated despite its ‘wrongness’; ends when “reasons for rejection become stronger than the acceptance reasons” (Forst 2003, 72); must be freely chosen/done; and is practicable. It is also understood in four different ways namely: as permission laden, where authority figures allow the existence of groups with differing ideologies; as reciprocal implicit, where citizens regard themselves as equals and accord respect on such basis in the face of divergent beliefs; as a matter of political necessity, where the alternative is conflict; and as a positive acceptance of difference (Forst 2003, 71–5). Conceptually therefore, toleration can be, and has been regarded as a central value in liberal democratic societies on the basis of its acknowledgement of the pluralism of religions, cultures, and values (Mills 1859; Rawls 1999, 2001; Galeotti 2004).

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7.4  The Paradoxes of Tolerance It is important to note at this juncture that tolerance is paradoxical in nature. An analysis of the concept yields different paradoxes, and while this work concerns itself with most famous one credited to Karl Popper, it is necessary to identify other paradoxes of tolerance for scholarship’s sake. For D. D. Raphael, tolerance is paradoxical in that “(w)e cannot, as a matter of logic, tolerate anything unless it goes against respect for persons, and yet we ought not to tolerate anything which does that” (Raphael 1988). Bernard Williams contends that tolerance is only for the intolerable, yet if something is intolerable, we should not to tolerate it (Willams 1996). For Susan Mendus, tolerance, as a sense of moral disapproval, implies that one tolerates what is ‘wrong’ and ought not to exist. Simply stated, tolerating a ‘wrong’ thing is good. The paradoxical nature of this lies in the fact that while we have good reasons against exhibiting a tolerant attitude, we also have good reasons for exhibiting a tolerant attitude (Mendus 1989). Hans Oberdiek also argues that tolerance paradoxically leads to intolerance, with its denouncing (oppression) of those who think in nonprescribed ways, that is, those who refuse to be tolerant (Oberdiek 2001). Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance has however gained more fame than any of the other paradoxes of tolerance. Popper’s paradox runs thus: Less well known is the paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. –In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law. And we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal. (Popper 2012, 581)

Popper’s recognition of the paradoxical nature of tolerance here stated simply argues that tolerant societies must tolerate everything but intolerance. This is not to say that every seeming intolerant idea or action is not to be tolerated, but that intolerant ideas and actions are to be countered by rational discourse, and it is only when such rational discourse fails that the state is legitimately allowed to utilise force. Tolerating intolerance on the part of the tolerant state would eventually obliterate the tolerant state and turn it intolerant in the process, thus, the need for a ‘self-­ preservation’ clause defining when intolerance is permissible.

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7.5  Tolerance and National Unity As extrapolated from Williams’ and Mendus’ notions of tolerance, tolerance’s respect and acknowledgement for the Other’s view is based on a foundational negative normative judgment of the Other. While toleration requires non-interference and respect of the Other’s values, such respect merely implies enduring the Other’s value system, while holding to one’s value system as the authentic one. This is inimical to the concept of the common good which underpins the notion of national unity. National unity exists where members/citizens of a country possess a mutual understanding of what makes them one country, and act in ways that encourage, prolong and sustain such ‘oneness’. Acting to ensure this oneness does not equate to acting in uniformity; rather each citizen is able to freely carry out activities that aid the continuous ‘togetherness’ of her/his country in any manner that is suitable to her/him. National unity is sometimes denounced as a utopian ideal, but it is often emphasised as a necessary feature of a peaceful nation. Unity makes it possible for the citizens of a nation to act as a cohesive whole, mostly through their representatives, allowing them to achieve set goals as a nation, rather than as component individuals. However, national unity is possible only where there is an underpinning feature of a common identity shared by all citizens of a nation, and can only be fostered by having a common goal. The common goal is identified through dialogue which delineates areas of mutual understanding and agreement. The search for national unity, for a national identity requires a common purpose, and dictates constant engagement with all groups in a multicultural society. Such constant engagement includes bargaining, negotiating and compromise. This is invalidated by tolerance’s aloofness to integrating in order to find common grounds or understand the Other’s beliefs. Simply put, tolerance tolerates, but does not necessarily agree with the Other’s value system. National unity in a multicultural society must be sought to minimise ethnic rivalries, antagonisms and conflicts between the different groups, on the basis that all persons/citizens share a common humanity, have needs, hopes and fears in common (Hinton 2011). This presents another challenge for advocates of tolerance as an essential value in multicultural societies, given that implicit in the notion of national unity is the principle of intolerance. If national unity is possible only where there is an underpinning feature of a common identity shared by all citizens of a nation, and can only be fostered by having a common goal which implies a consensual agreement of certain ‘national’ values acceptable to all members of a multicultural society, then, ab initio, the concept of national unity is premised on an unwavering intolerance of ideas/values that the nation does not want to be identified with. From the above, tolerance presents at its best as a negative moral value. However, this paper admits that tolerance is a political necessity, even in its neutral sense of permissiveness. Thus, toleration, the practice of tolerance, is a fundamental necessity for the formation of a multicultural society. Toleration in this sense is the initial attitude exhibited towards an Other, by virtue of the One’s knowledge of the Other’s

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differing beliefs and values. This initial attitude allows for a peaceful coexistence between persons of different cultures, values and beliefs. However, how does tolerance/toleration help in resolving conflicts arising from conflicting values and belief systems of members of a multicultural society? More importantly, is tolerance not a hindrance in the multicultural society’s exercise of sovereignty over religiously diverse groups, some of which espouse beliefs and values that contradict those upheld by the multicultural state?

7.6  Limited Tolerance and Multiculturalism Popper’s notion of limited tolerance has recently gained renewed scrutiny from scholars in the face of the overwhelming challenges constituted by diverse social, religious and militant groups whose ideologies are at variance with mainstream societal inclinations. Scholars such as Rawls and Jurgen Habermas have therefore proposed differing alternatives to Popper’s limited tolerance. These alternatives range from proposing that the just society must tolerate the intolerant until there are valid reasons to believe that such toleration puts the society in danger, to arguing that the threshold of tolerance should be the result of a consensual agreement by the tolerator and tolerated (Rawls 1971; Habermas 2004). Popper’s advocacy for the tolerant society’s rejection of intolerant groups who utilise force and violence as their primary weapons is best read as an argument against extreme relativism. Liberal democracies typify contemporary tolerant societies, and tolerance is regarded as the best virtue for governing multicultural liberal societies. Following from J.S.  Mill’s articulation of freedom of expression, one would expect that the tolerant society would allow and encourage alternative opinions, given its fundamental basis that all beliefs and opinions are equally valid. Given the earlier analysis of tolerance, it is evident that tolerance is a stance within which the other’s beliefs and values are not recognised as equally valid, even though this seems contrary to what a superficial understanding of the notion preaches. Popper’s paradox seems to imply that the only solution to intolerance is for society to tolerate less, in the misguided belief that tolerating less would reduce or remove the effect(s) of intolerance. Thus, society perceives the act of extremist groups as intolerance, and reacts by also being intolerant to such groups. A better reaction would have been to scrutinise such groups in an effort to identify whether the ideologies espoused by such groups are as a result of any perceived or actual societal injustice/inequality. Building on this foundation, an application of Popper’s notion of limited tolerance in contemporary African society is at best erroneous, and at worst inimical to the question of national unity. While multiculturalism and the effects of colonial rule in Nigeria as an example has resulted into a federal system of government where all natural resources are abrogated by the centre, the quest for national unity can only be furthered by a consensual agreement on what constitutes the common good of the nation.

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Tolerance neither aids efforts at reaching consensus, nor does it encourage the quest for national unity by its mere advocacy that the tolerant mask the underlying tensions in society by smiling and accommodating the beliefs that generate such tensions. At its best, this simply leaves society simmering with tension continuously, and at its worst, encourages tension to build up into a keg of gunpowder which is liable to explode at any given instance. Thus, tolerance is fast becoming a mode of brushing off and compartmentalising differences; rather than a means through which such differences are understood and inculcated into societal policies. Tolerance should therefore not be regarded as the primary, fundamental value of the multicultural state which quests for national unity, rather it should be viewed as only one of the values of a multicultural society, the initial stance at the first point of contact with an ‘Other’ to whom the ‘One’ assumes a reciprocal stance. This initial stance is the first stage in the process of societal integration, and it must be bolstered by other values including love, and mutual respect. Such is the only mode of ensuring the nurturing required for integration in a multicultural society in search of national unity. Tolerance, as it is understood will neither nurture nor sustain such integration, rather it leads to an I – It type of relationship between members of society as espoused by Martin Buber, where one enters into relation with an Other for purpose of personal interests. Such I – It relationship posits the Other as an object of manipulation to be taken advantage of. This, ideally, is the relationship that subsists between humans and their external environment. The ideal relationship between humans is the I – Thou relationship type, where the I regards, and treats the Thou as a subject of mutual regard, similar to the I, and one to be accepted as equal to the I without any conditionalities attached to such acceptance (Buber 1958).

7.7  Leadership and the Multicultural African State Virtually every contemporary African societal  conflict arises out of an ethno-­ religious dimensionality. This can be traced to the struggle over scarce societal resources which are distributed by the state to which each ethnic/religious group feels entitled. This mix as earlier remarked on, creates ethno-religious tension, resulting in conflicts. Such tension undermines the national unity sought by African states which fall under the last three ethnic configurations. Consequently, African states ostentatiously quest to instil a sense of national identity, and characterise any talk of tribalism/ethnicity as divisive in what is best known as a fetishisation of national unity. What role then, does tolerance play in the African state’s quest for national unity in the light of the African state’s intolerance of tribalism/ethnicity? Africans are highly tolerant people, contrary to their portrayal as an intolerant people due largely to the ethno-religious divisions and conflicts pervading the continent (Dulani et al. 2016). By virtue of the multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious nature of their countries, Africans exhibit largely tolerant attitudes towards social differences, including but not limited to ethnic, religious, race, and health

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differences. They also exhibit a high level of tolerance for corrupt political leadership which has bedevilled the continent over the years. However, this high tolerance for corrupt political leadership is not reciprocated by such leaders who are widely regarded as a plague on the continent. Contemporary African states are plagued with the problem of leadership. This problem is amongst the key reasons given for Africa’s underdeveloped status, despite its abundance of human and natural resources. African leaders subvert democracy to cling to power for life, with examples of different African presidents amending their countries’ constitutions to ensure continuous survival of their regimes. They govern dictatorially, plundering national resources in flagrant disregard for the rule of law. In entrenching their hold on political power, they tyrannically clamp down on criticisms of their corrupt governance style, often arresting, detaining, and even torturing critics. Different arms of government are often subservient to these leaders who utilise them in silencing dissenting voices labelled as intolerant philosophies. Due to the facts above, African politicians are stereotyped as intolerant to dissent of any kind. They govern through the use of vain glory and egocentrism, nepotism and corruption, as well as repression of opposition figures. All these factors come into play in their decision-making process, for example Nigeria, where the current president is alleged to have appointed only people from a particular tribe/religion as heads of security agencies in the country, despite the constitutional requirement of federal character in all political appointments. Other examples abound to showcase African political leaders’ intolerance towards critics and members of the opposition. In response to allegations which label them as intolerant, African political leaders unknowingly re-echo Popper’s notion of limited tolerance. They argue that dissent is wrong, incites violence, and should thus, be suppressed or silenced. Armed in ‘righteous zeal’ to protect the unity of his/her country, the African leader wields all powers of the state at his/her disposal to silence the supposedly treasonous dissent. From the foregoing, it is evident that African leaders practice selective tolerance, tolerating groups/gender/race/religion/nationality arbitrarily, and denouncing other groups/gender/race/religion/nationality in the same manner. They practice intolerance, but label it tolerance. It is the principle of intolerance that leaves ample room for an intolerant person/state to tolerate or not when desired, and does not imply a contradiction of itself when done. It does not require a consistency on the part of its adherents like tolerance does, and therefore escapes being tarred with the same brush as tolerance which runs into self-contradiction by its call for unlimited toleration, even against what it condemns.

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7.8  Applying Limited Tolerance to Africa Contemporaneously, the selective tolerance of African leaders has occasioned situations where nepotism and tribalism determine how societal resources are allocated. Espousing limited tolerance in such conditions translates to empowering African political leaders in their silencing of dissent. Using the Nigerian state as an example, encouraging African leaders to apply limited toleration would likely as not backfire when such leaders label dissenting opinions as intolerant, and utilise all legitimate means to suppress such dissension. Popper quite obviously did not have the typical African leader in mind when he made this prescription, his position seemingly targeted discerning minds, those with the ability to critically determine which forceful ideas and actions are contrary to societal common good, and make determinations on what constitutes as intolerable intolerance by recourse, either to laid down statutes/rules, or adjudicate accordingly on a case-to-case basis. This discerning measure would give room for groups with sincere grievances and agitations to air their grievances, acting in this wise as J.S. Mill’s proverbial marketplace of ideas where ideas are sustained solely on their own benefits. Can Popper’s Critical Dialogue resolve this problematique embedded in the average African leader’s build-up? Can this measure ensure that holders of dissenting opinions express their fears, after which they enter into a memorandum of understanding which gives conditions all parties must fulfil for the sake of a peaceful status quo? While the author must refrain from answering with a definitive no, it is highly doubtful that the African leaders of our time possess the intellectual acumen to admit of such solution. Even where such African leaders are intellectually competent, they are unlikely to allow themselves to be involved in such altruistic endeavours. Such an agreement would not benefit them personally, thus, leaving them with no overriding reason(s) to comply with its provisions. To realise the advantages inherent in such an agreement, agree to its conditions, and abide by such conditions as we have earlier mentioned, requires a mind capable of intellectual discernment. This ability, the ability for intellectual discernment, is largely lacking in contemporary African political leaders, many of whom were elected, not on the basis of their intellectual prowess, but on mundane rationales, including ethnic, religious and charismatic reasons. Determinations of which type of intolerance is good or bad, which threaten society and which do not, not only requires a discerning mind, but also generates disagreements amongst members of society. It is thus difficult, even for a mind trained in multicultural, multireligious and multiethnic values, to equivocally espouse a unilateral application of limited tolerance in African states. Since most African leaders fall short of this standard, empowering them with the legitimate power to delegitimise dissent by labelling it as intolerant philosophies equates to state-sanctioned suppression of alternate views.

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7.9  Conclusion The average African leader’s mind gives the impression of being averse to criticism. African leaders therefore need to develop and inculcate a culture of free speech by ridding themselves and their citizenry of arrogant dogmatism. Popper’s distinction between open and closed societies becomes relevant at this juncture. Closed societies are characterised either by leaders who impose their ideological persuasions on the citizenry, or by  the enthronement of traditional and cultural norms, and such societies differ from open societies primarily in the closed society’s denial of dissent or criticisms of its ideas/norms. Given the average African leader’s aversion to criticisms, they can be classified as enemies of the open society who, by their silencing of dissenting opinions, deny holders of such opinions the opportunity to express their grievances, and where such grievances are valid, arrive at a deliberative consensus. This is what Popper’s piecemeal social engineering espouses- that the manifest ills in society can be identified in such expressive instances, and once identified, policies should be put in place to remove these ills, and the praxis of such policies monitored to ensure that unintended and unwelcome consequences are alleviated. This can only be achieved in a society characterised by openness. This would ultimately encourage integral development in the midst of people from diverse cultural and religious orientations. National unity can only be achieved through the fostering of relationships and dialogue, where the root causes of areas of tension and disagreement can be addressed and effectively resolved.

References Adepoju, Aderanti. 1995. Migration in Africa: An Overview. In The Migration Experience in Africa, ed. Jonathan Baker and Tade Akin Aida, 87–108. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitute. Ajei, Martin Odei. 2017. Tolerance, Consensus and Community: An African Perspective. Global-e. Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Berry, John W. 2013. Research on Multiculturalism in Canada. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (6): 663–675. Buber, Martin. 1958. I and Thou. New York: Scribner. Deng, Francis M. 1997. Ethnicity: An African Predicament. The Brookings Review 15 (3): 28–31. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ ethnicity-­an-­african-­predicament/. Ding, John Zijiang. 2014. Pluralistic and Multicultural Reexaminations of Tolerance/Toleration. Journal of East-West Thought 4 (4): 1–12. Dulani, Boniface, Gift Sambo, and Kim Yi Dionne. 2016. AfricaFocus Bulletin. Retrieved April 2, 2020, from www.africafocus.org: http://www.africafocus.org/docs16/tol1603.php. Fardon, Richard, and Graham Furniss, eds. 1994. African Languages, Development and the State. London: Routledge.

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Forst, Rainer. 2003. Toleration, Justice and Reason. In The culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies, ed. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione, 71–85. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta. 2004. Toleration as Recognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2013. Is Toleration a Moral Virtue? In Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy, ed. Dario Castiglione and Catriona McKinnon, 41–62. New York: Springer. Gatawa, Muhammad Muktar. 2013. Inter-group Relations in Historical Perspectives: A Case Study of Yoruba and Hausa Communities of Agege, Lagos, Nigeria. African Journal of History and Culture 5 (9): 171–177. Habermas, Jurgen. 2004. Religious Tolerance – The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights. Philosophy 79 (01): 5–18. Heckmann, Friedrich. 1993. Multiculturalism Defined Seven Ways. Social Contract Journal Issues 3 (4): 245–246. Hinton, Samuel. 2011. Ethnic Diversity, National Unity and Multicultural Education in China. US-China Education Review A (5): 726–739. Idowu, Olawale F., and Sunday A.  Ogunode. 2016. Gender and the Politics of Exclusion in PreColonial Ibadan: The Case of Iyalode Efunsetan Aniwura. The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs: 1–8. Retrieved from: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jtb/vol2/iss1/21. Kukathas, Chandran. 1992a. Are There any Cultural Rights? Political Theory 20: 105–139. ———. 1992b. Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka. Political Theory 20: 674–680. ———. 2003. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multiculturalism: A Liberal View of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1998. Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. New  York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2012. Challenges of a Multicultural World and Global Approaches to Coexistence: Realities, Visions, and Actions. Korea Foundation Global Seminar: 68–103. Retrieved September 12, 2019, from https://www.kf.or.kr/file/pdf/Will%20Kymlicka.pdf. Lund, Michael S. 2002. Preventing Violent Intrastate Conflicts: Learning Lessons from Experience. In Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven, 99–122. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Mann, Kristin. 2007. Slavery and the Birth of an African City: Lagos, 1760–1900. Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. McKinnon, Catriona. 2006. Toleration: A Critical Introduction. London/New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Mendus, Susan. 1989. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. London: Macmillan. Mills, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker and Son. Murphy, Michael. 2012. Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction. London/New York: Routledge. Oberdiek, Hans. 2001. Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Oxford English Living Dictionaries. 2019, March 22. Retrieved from en.oxforddictionaries.com: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/tolerance. Popper, Karl Raimund. 2012. The Open Society and Its Enemies. 7th Rev ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Putnam, Robert D. 2007. E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (2): 137–174. Raphael, David Daiches. 1988. The Intolerable. In Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus, 142–143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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———. 1999. The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Song, Sarah. 2007. Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy. 1995. Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative. In The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka, 93–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, Bernard. 1996. Toleration: An Impossible Virtue? In Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd, 18–27. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilson, Helen F. 2014. The Possibilities of Tolerance: Intercultural Dialogue in a Multicultural Europe. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32 (5): 852–868.

Chapter 8

Shedding the Subaltern Condition: Karl Popper and the New Cosmopolitanism Adam Chmielewski

8.1  Popper for Central Europe Throughout the period of the communist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries, Popper’s philosophy has been a rewarding source of inspiration not only for the intellectuals and politicians, but also for the people at large. In this difficult period in the history of the region, when people suffered economic hardships and endured the fetters imposed on their liberties, including freedom of association, speech and movement, they have looked up to Popper’s ideas for guidelines as to how to bring about the desirable change. This dreadful period has been successfully put to an end. Popper’s philosophical ideas, among many other factors, played a significant role in bringing about the desired breakthrough. The successful struggle with communist variety of the totalitarian regime, aimed at regaining our freedom, was informed by continuous references to Popper’s criticism of holistic utopianism, violence, and historicism, as well as to his stress on the importance of piecemeal social engineering. We have changed our region in a non-violent way through a dialogical process which may be viewed as an implementation of Popper’s conception of the rational method, according to which “rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’” (Popper 2013, 431). I do not hesitate to say, as I did in the past, that it was Popper who performed the role of ideologue of the peaceful revolution of the 1989 in the Central and Eastern Europe.1 Towards the end of his life Popper, who spent most of  This opinion, expressed in a letter to Karl Popper in 1982, has been quoted by David Miller “Sir Karl Raimund Popper”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, 43, 1997, pp. 400, 1

A. Chmielewski (*) The University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_8

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his life fighting the enemies of the open society and lived long enough to see their demise, rejoiced in the fact that the peaceful revolution took place.

8.2  Paradoxes of Ideology Having said that, however, one needs to remark upon a rather curious paradox: Popper claimed that the world of Western liberal democracies is perhaps not the best of all possible worlds, yet it certainly is the best of all existing worlds (Popper 1989, 369). The intellectual and political leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have drawn a great comfort from their uncritical acceptance of this claim. On the one hand, they seemed to be aware of the imperfections of the western democratic capitalist system they strove to implement, but, on the other, they strongly believed that the western political arrangements cannot be bettered. They perceived the liberal democracy and capitalist economy as a self-correcting system, capable of dealing with all forms of injustice and immunised against any serious instabilities. In other words, they have read this Popper’s assertion as a claim that if our problems will ever get solved, they will be done away with by the theory and practice of liberalism and the free market. Accordingly, the prevalent intention among them was to achieve the state of affairs which he so alluringly described, and to join this heaven on earth as soon as possible. Such an attitude has been of course much against the Popperian spirit. The error involved in such an interpretation of Popper’s philosophy was precisely the error of historicism, essentialism and finalism which he criticized. Also, such an attitude is based on the mistaken belief that a society, once opened, will remain open ever after. In other words, the attitude disregarded Popper’s warning that the future course of the society cannot be predicted, and, a fortiori, its future problems are equally unpredictable (Popper 1963, v–vi). Is worth remarking upon another paradox, too. Though Popper’s political philosophy undoubtedly played a strong inspirational role in the transformation, his idea of piecemeal social reform has in fact served as a fig-leaf for nothing less but a large-scale comprehensive transformation which he consistently criticised. The most characteristic feature of Popper’s political philosophy is his argument against the revolutionary utopianism and the holistic engineering. Against the revolutionary impatience with its holistic, wholesale designs for transformation, he argued in favour of the piecemeal social engineering. He thought that such changes are irrational, unrealistic, dangerous and self-undermining. He believed that the pursuit of holistic change is not only utopian, and thus impossible, but also that it inevitably leads to violence. Popper personally feared such an option because of the violence it involved, and it is this fear that dictated to him the policy of small steps.

and by Malachi Haim Hacohen, Karl Popper. The Formative Years 1902–1945. Politics and Philosophy in the Interwar Vienna, Cambridge University Press, London-New York 2000, p. 540.

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In his argument, he seemed not to appreciate the gravity of the challenges facing various regions of the world. His insistence on the piecemeal social engineering as the only acceptable way of social change should not come as a surprise for another reason too: a belief that the world is perhaps not in the best of possible worlds, but is the best of the presently available ones, is likely to prevent one from perceiving its existing evils as something to be remedied. It seems that it is precisely Popper’s belief in the technological, scientific and moral achievements of the West that prevented him from noticing the gravity of the problems affecting other regions of the world. More importantly, it prevented him from recognising that the overall change is sometimes necessary. Popper did not seem to understand that focusing only on a piecemeal change of one’s society very often does not go at the heart of the problem. He also did not seem to fully appreciate the fact that established social structures always resist the attempts at reforming them. He seemed not to understand that political realism is not just about trimming our goals to the possibilities afforded to us by the established social and political system, but something more than that: it is about the pursuit of what the system wants us to believe impossible. He did not perceive that quite often we grow accustomed to the unjust social structures, and that their problems escape our attention in virtue of the structural and symbolic violence constantly exerted by them. The task of revealing and making us aware of this structural violence is the job of a genuinely critical social theory. In this respect, Popper’s critical rationalism proved to be insufficiently critical, and the approach towards politics he advocated had a strong conservative dimension.

8.3  Self-Poisoning of Open Societies The initial success of the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe brought about the opening of the societies of the region. However, their opening soon revealed deep-seated tensions and internal conflicts whose gravity turned out to be more serious than initially envisaged, and, along with it, inability to deal with them. Moreover, the neoliberal reform produced problems of its own, of which extreme economic inequalities has been undoubtedly the most important one. As a result, those countries, presented as models of the successful political transformation, have become scenes of the social and political discontent, and presently undergo a self-­ imposed closure once again. Popper’s belief in the Socratic Method in solving problems gave way to the politics of contempt towards the opponents. His insistence on egalitarianism was disregarded and instead the region became a place of deep economic and political inequalities. The neophyte believers in the neoliberal reform did not pay attention to Popper’s warning not to make a godhead of the free market (Chmielewski 1999, 36). Popper’s cosmopolitan ideas have been replaced by appeals to the national sovereignty and ethnic pride; the countries in question have become a seedbed of rampant nationalism, which Popper strongly criticized as the principle of national

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self-determination. He wrote: “I think that all lovers of peace and a civilized life should work to enlighten the world about the impracticability and inhumanity of that famous – or shall I say notorious? – ‘principle of national self-determination’, which has now degenerated into the ultimate horror of ethnic terrorism” (Popper 1999, 149). Inclusionary ideas advocated by Popper were superseded by radical exclusionary, xenophobic and racist ideologies. Once opened, the Central and Eastern countries are now becoming repressive and intolerant regimes. To use Leszek Kołakowski’s prophetic phrase, which much incensed Popper, the newly open societies are falling victims of the self-poisoning (Kołakowski 1990).2 George Soros, Popper’s pupil and subsequently an ardent advocate of his idea of the open society which he actively promotes in many troubled places in the world, argued that the Eastern European countries may become permanently democratic only on the condition of substantial assistance from the West which should help them “to turn their aspirations into reality.” The financial aid, an access to the European Common Market, and promotion of the cultural and educational ties between the west and the east and eventually inclusion of Eastern Europe into the European community would foster the pluralistic societies in the region and “prevent the continent’s future repartitioning” (Bessner 2018). Soros believed that the problems emerging in the transformation of the Eastern part of Europe were a result of the unwillingness of the western world to extend the necessary assistance. As a matter of historical fact, however, all the preconditions of stabilisation of the open and pluralist regimes, enumerated by Soros, have been satisfied: the countries in question did receive an ample financial aid, they have gained the access to the European market, the cultural and educational ties between the West and the East have been formed, and they have also been included into the European community. This tremendous effort, however, turned out insufficient and did not prevent those countries from relapsing into the non-democratic forms of government. The reversals occurred very much in accordance with Popper’s diagnosis paradoxes of democracy, freedom, tolerance and sovereignty, which he discussed in the Open Society. He explained the paradox of freedom as an “argument that freedom in the sense of absence of any restraining control must lead to very great restraint, since it makes the bully free to enslave the meek” (Popper 2013, 581). He saw that tolerance leads to paradoxes because “unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then tolerant will be destroyed and the tolerance with them” (Popper 2013, 581). The paradox of democracy, or the paradox of majority-rule, comes about when “the majority may decide that a tyrant should rule” (Popper 2013, 581–582). Ironically, one of the victims of this turnaround was Popper’s philosophy itself. Popper’s Open Society, the “charter of cold-war liberalism” (Hacohen 2000, 540),

 In a letter (Popper to Chmielewski, April 8, 1991) Popper wrote: “Leszek Kolakowski[s]… opinions about my work are totally mistaken”. 2

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though initially widely read and much present in the everyday public discourse, soon suffered a dramatic setback. His idea underlying the concept of the open society became a subject of harsh criticism, and then fell into oblivion. The following incident from my own teaching practice may serve as an illustration. Optimistically assuming that the very mention of Popper’s name will be as informative for my students as it had been for me, I have recommended to my students to read Popper as an inspiration for their essays. After the lecture one of the students approached me and asked with a rather puzzled look on her face: “Professor Chmielewski, do you really want us to read Potter? Harry Potter?”

8.4  The Best of the Existing Worlds Popper’s claim about the western world being the best of the existing worlds reappears in a stronger version in his late lecture All Life is Problem Solving. “I think that our world and the human beings in it are both wonderful. Of course, I know there are also a lot of bad things in our world, and yet it is still the best there has ever been in history. (…) I am prepared to defend myself against anyone and argue that the general moaning about the evil world in which we live – which may be called the dominant religion of our times – is in conflict with all the facts” (Popper 1999, 99–100). Popper repeatedly extolled the European and Enlightenment rationality whose roots he located in the ancient Greece, and which culminated in western science and technology. The main feature of the openness of a society is rationalism of its members. As he wrote, “An open conflict between rationalism and irrationalism broke out for the first time in the Middle Ages, as the opposition between scholasticism and mysticism. (It is perhaps not without interest that rationalism flourished in the former Roman provinces, while men from the ‘barbarian’ countries were prominent among the mystics.)” (Popper 2013, 434). He also vehemently criticized the movements of Marxism and Nazism as the enemies of reason and the open society. Obviously, Popper was not the only western philosopher to put forward such a claim. Edmund Husserl argued that Europe is a site of emergence of universal and rational thinking par excellence, and the motherland of universal truth. He also argued that its ultimate aim should be seen as a spiritual aim for all nations and individuals. “The spiritual telos of European humanity, in which the particular telos of particular nations and of individual man is contained, lies in the infinite, is an infinite idea toward which, in concealment, the whole spiritual becoming aims” (Husserl 1970, 275). Jan Patočka followed in the footsteps of his mentor in revealing the spiritual Greek element as the essence of authentic Europeanness and the driving force of its historical expression. Both thinkers, very much like Popper, distinguish those European tendencies as fulfilling the philosophical vocation from those which, through the instrumentalization of human rationality, repudiated it (Alexandravicius 2019, 163). What is worth stressing is that while Popper praised the Sophists for their egalitarian views and harshly criticised Plato and Aristotle for their proto-totalitarian

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antiegalitarian conceptions, Husserl, much to the contrary, repudiated the relativist Sophists and adopted the Platonic rationalist epistemological position. In the quoted lecture Popper, however, went on formulate even a stronger claim: “My main thesis is that not only are we doing better economically, we are also morally better” (Popper 1999, 100).3 Several things need to be said in relation to this claim. First of all, the universalism informing this claim was a foundation of the Enlightenment liberal cosmopolitan politics of which Popper has been an outspoken exponent. According to this version of cosmopolitanism, all human beings are essentially equal and deserve equal treatment. That liberal intellectual order, however, established upon the Enlightenment concept of individual rationality, was prone to interpretations which belied its declared universalism. In particular, by attributing rationality to white men, it tended to deny it to women and the people of colour, and, in this way, it has lent itself to extreme racist distortions. Secondly, such construal of the western world, based on the moral opposition of the good and evil elements, is likely to cater, as it in fact did, to a variety of questionable attitudes. The most benign is the attitude of exoticism with which the people of the West tend to view the nations of other continents and other skin colour. It also caters to the attitude of “orientalism” diagnosed by Edward Said. In its most extreme forms, it encourages the occidental exclusionary, racist and supremacist ideologies and policies. The most recent and painful proof of that tendency is the present continuous crisis of mass migration of people from the non-European regions who seek shelter form the consequences of wars staged by the European and other western countries on their territories. The universalist cosmopolitanism based on the ideal of Europe, or the western world, as embodying the supreme human values, can thus easily be construed in an exclusionary way. Thirdly, this well-intended approach is undermined by the fact that the western world owes its economic superiority not only to the intellectual, rational and technological skills, but also to the ruthless and inhumane exploitation of the people of other continents, most especially and tragically, the people of Africa. It is unfortunate that Popper, like other occidental philosophers, did not see it worthwhile to dwell upon this dark aspect of the western civilization. The idea of superiority of the West, especially its moral superiority, is thus not just a myth. It is a very dangerous myth which obscures atrocities inflicted by the European colonial powers onto people outside their continent.

 More recently a similar Panglossian thesis about the moral progress of humanity has been argued for by Steven Pinker in: The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined, Viking, London 2011. 3

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8.5  The Enemies of the Open Society Popper’s work in the area of political philosophy is not only an exercise in historical interpretation and analysis. It has a strong interventionist dimension. In particular, irrespective of the evident immediate purposes of Popper’s opposition between the open and closed societies, his contention about the European moral superiority is in fact an attempt to redefine the European civilisation. More specifically, his argument purports to disown and to expunge the attitudes of exclusion, racism, superiority towards non-European peoples from the European tradition, to present them as foreign to the genuine European spirit. There is a number of problems with such an approach. First of all, the values which Popper saw as inimical to the humanitarian tradition to which he subscribes, have been inscribed from its very beginnings into the European tradition by its greatest thinkers, especially by Plato and Aristotle. This is the main reason why Popper made them the objects of his criticism. However, their work had played no less, and in fact more, constitutive role for the Western philosophical thought than the works of the champions of egalitarianism. The recurrent vigorous revival of the tradition of European exclusivism suggests that Europe cannot deny what defined its identity and tradition for more than two millennia. Secondly, the very idea of openness, a pillar of Popper’s political philosophy, suffers nowadays, again, from a strong backlash. It affects not only the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which only recently emerged from the communist predicament. The backlash against the openness is also obviously powerful in other European countries, including France and Germany, and other colonial powers of the past, as well as in the United States of America. It is strong also Great Britain, a country which Popper admired the most. The revival of the exclusionary attitudes is often presented as a perfect example of the return of the repressed. Their persistence demonstrates that they are not accidental perversions instilled in the European tradition by evil-minded personalities or imported from elsewhere: they are a part and parcel of the European tradition. Thirdly, the concept of the openness of the society does not look better if approached from the African point of view. For if the African countries are an example of the closed societies, one may argue that their condition is, paradoxically, not a result of some indigenous communitarian particularistic traditions, but rather a result of their excessive openness. If the African societies are closed, they owe it, first and foremost, to the overpowering external influences and forces which never treated them in a partner-like manner and instead projected their own exclusivist ideologies and practices onto them. The African nations continue to bear deep scars of their dark colonial past, while their attempts to emerge from subalternity is effectively hampered by new ways of their exploitation and denigration. It thus seems that it is not African peoples who should strive toward openness but rather the Western world in its relation to Africa.

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8.6  Toward a New Cosmopolitanism Popper was a cosmopolitan both in his thinking and life. He supports his cosmopolitanism by invoking the concept of equality and the attitude of egalitarianism. In his Open Society he repeatedly appealed to the Sophists’ doctrine of equality against Plato’s idea of hierarchical society, and claimed that “equalitarianism” was the arch-­ enemy of Plato (Popper 2013, 89). It is obvious that any concept of cosmopolitanism as a normative political theory has to include the idea of human equality. There are two problems with Popper cosmopolitanism, however. First of all, the very idea of cosmopolitanism is difficult to reconcile with the claim of the superiority of the western world. Secondly, in his discussion of equality Popper did not dwell on the ambiguity of equality and he never fleshed out in detail his understanding of this concept. The obvious ambiguities affecting the concept of equality may be illustrated, for example, by the fact that John Rawls, undoubtedly an egalitarian, in his difference principle postulated the unequal treatment of individuals in a society just in order to achieve an overall result of social equality. More comprehensively, Amartya Sen distinguished a number of meanings of the concept of equality and stressed that equality is advocated by most diverse doctrines, very often opposed to each other. He remarked that “In each theory, equality is sought in some ‘space’ (that is, in terms of some variables related to respective persons), a space that is seen as having a central role in that theory” (Sen 2009, 292). On an ideological plane, Boaventura de Sousa Santos has drawn attention to other problems with this concept: “Equality, understood as the equivalence among the same, ends up excluding what is different. All that is homogeneous at the beginning tends eventually to turn into exclusionary violence. World experience is highly diverse in its struggle for equality, and such diversity refers as much to means as to ends. This much has been claimed again and again by the social movements against sexual, ethnic, racial or religious discrimination” (Santos 2006, 37). Jean-Paul Sartre, in his comments to Frantz Fanon’s concept of the racialization of inequality, scathingly remarked: “What empty chatter: liberty, equality, fraternity, love, honour, country, and what else? This did not prevent us from making racist remarks at the same time: dirty nigger, filthy Jew, dirty Arab. Noble minds, liberal and sympathetic – neo-colonialists, in other words – claimed to be shocked by this inconsistency, since the only way the European could make himself man was by fabricating slaves and monsters. As long as the status of ‘native’ existed, the imposture remained unmasked. We saw in the human species an abstract premise of universality that served as a pretext for concealing more concrete practices: there was a race of subhumans overseas who, thanks to us, might, in a thousand years perhaps, attain our status. In short, we took the human race to mean elite. Today the ‘native’ unmasks his truth; as a result, our exclusive club reveals its weakness: it was nothing more and nothing less than a minority. There is worse news: since the others are turning into men against us, apparently we are the enemy of the human race; the elite is revealing its true nature – a gang” (Sartre 1963, lviii–lix).

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As can be seen from the above, the concept of equality is beset with serious ambiguities. Moreover, until quite recently it was disparaged and ridiculed by the neoliberal discourse. Nowadays, however, at the time of extreme economic and social inequalities, it undergoes a process of detoxication and becomes once again a legitimate concept not only in the economic theory, as in Thomas Piketty and Anthony Atkinson, but also a part of social and political agenda across the world. All the above suggests that the concept of equality, as an element of a possible cosmopolitan normative political theory, has to be defined more precisely than Popper did. No less ambiguous is the concept of unity which also makes up a part of the traditional concept of cosmopolitanism. It plays an important role in Popper’s argument against the enemies of the open society, and functions in his work in a number of senses. The first meaning of unity, which appears in expressions like “unity of tribal life”, “mystical unity” and related ones, is criticized throughout Open Society. Popper censored Plato for an attempt to restore this tribal unity through presenting his “dream of unity and beauty and perfection, this aestheticism and holism and collectivism.” He repudiates this meaning of unity as a “product as well as the symptom of the lost group spirit of tribalism” (Popper 2013, 188). He also finds the idea of ‘unbroken harmony and unity’ in the Christian philosophy of the middle Ages (Popper 2013, 241), as well as in Hegel (Popper 2013, 258). The second meaning of unity, which he approves of, plays an important role in his explanation of the idea of “critical rationalism”. As he claims, for example, “mankind is united by the fact that our different mother tongues, in so far as they are rational, can be translated into one another. It recognizes the unity of human reason” (Popper 2013, 444). The critical rationalism he advocates is based on the famous Socratic dictum: ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth’. The adage explains Popper’s idea of the “rational unity of mankind” (Popper 2013, 432)4 or “the unity of human reason” (Popper 2013, 437). As such, it is opposed to “Irrationalism, which is not bound by any rules of consistency, may be combined with any kind of belief, including a belief in the brotherhood of man; but the fact that it may easily be combined with a very different belief, and especially the fact that it lends itself easily to the support of a romantic belief in the existence of an elect body, in the division of men into leaders and led, into natural masters and natural slaves, shows clearly that a moral decision is involved in the choice between it and a critical rationalism” (Popper 2013, 437). To sum up, there are two meanings of unity of particular importance to Popper: one of them may be called the unity of imposed dogma, while the other the unity of negotiated compromise. The meaning of unity which Popper rejects is derivable from the concept of uniformity or sameness of the elements to be united, whereas the meaning he approves of is based on the concept of diversity.

 See also chapter 24 of the book.

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8.7  Conclusion: Recognition for Africa Popper’s belief in the superiority of the European civilisation exposes him to the charges of exclusionary universalism. What is needed is a cosmopolitanism which would not be exposed to such criticisms and which would help us to understand both the history and the present political problems between Africa and the West. Despite my critical appraisal of some Popper’s contentions, I believe that his stress on diversity, which plays the constitutive role in his definition of the “rational unity of mankind”, may be employed in delineating a conception of cosmopolitanism immune to the above critique. I also believe that the theory of recognition offers a theoretical platform capable of taking full advantage of the concept of diversity. The theory of recognition involves, first of all, the concept of the primary or rudimentary recognition. It refers to the individual ability to recognize each other’s humanity not in virtue of prior acceptance of some values, but solely in virtue of the other’s being human. It should be stressed that the concept of primary recognition thus understood presumes the concept of the difference between, thus diversity of, subjects of recognition. Secondly, it involves the idea of equal respect afforded by humans mutually recognizing themselves as human. Within the theory of recognition respect is to be seen a direct consequence of the natural ability of human individuals to recognize each other as humans. Nowadays, the concept of respect is frequently supported by the idea of universal and equal human rights. Thirdly, the theory of recognition involves the concept of esteem understood as a postulate to respect others not only as just humans but in their diverse particularity or singularity. By emphasizing diversity and polymorphism of human identities and their capabilities, it enables us to overcome the binary opposition characteristic for the Western philosophical thought. Fourthly, theory of recognition involves also the concept of love and friendship which are thought as not immediately relevant to politics since they are perceived as confined to private and intimate spheres. In its normative dimension, recognition of another person is interpreted as tantamount to expressing a positive attitude towards her. In its psychological dimension it is thought to be a precondition of satisfactory personal development. For the lack of recognition, misrecognition or negative recognition, makes it impossible for an individual to develop a healthy relationship both to herself and to others. The desire of recognition is thus an essential feature of every human being, but is also a force that unifies human individuals into communities.5 Through stressing human diversity, equality and respect, the concept of recognition helps to express what is most vital both for individuals and collectives, and may serve as a foundation of a normative idea of a just society, as well as a ground for emancipatory theories and activities. Through acknowledging human diversity, the theory of recognition provides a foundation for a new conception of cosmopolitanism. The new cosmopolitanism  Theory of recognition did not belong to Popper’s theoretical apparatus. However, as his conception of “the abstract society” suggests, he seems to have been aware of the importance recognition; cf. Popper, Open Society, 166–167. 5

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grows out of recognition and acceptance of plurality and diversity of cultures, perspectives, and world views, rather than from the hegemonic position or moral superiority of any one of them. Understood in this way, it enables to understand the human unity not through obliteration of diversity of people but rather through its full recognition. From this perspective the human unity is may be achieved not through an imposition of a dogma or a canon but rather through the process of continuous negotiations between individuals and groups who recognize themselves both as different-and-equal to each other. Recognition, which cannot but presume diversity, is not only a normative concept. It has also an important explanatory potential. For it enables to capture the ambivalence of human nature and the process of recognition itself. For the desire of recognition, never dormant and always insatiable in human being, not only fosters the noble values of acceptance, tolerance, freedom and respect. It also fuels the struggle for precisely these values and thus is responsible for the agonistic nature of human communities. In the present political realities, the universal craving for recognition is being exploited not in order to implement the values of the open and tolerant society, but rather disrespect, denigration and exclusion. A resort to ideas of tradition, national pride, collective loyalty, patriotism, sovereignty etc., serves nowadays not to foster positive recognition of human diversity, but rather the exclusionary policies towards designated groups of people, their traditions and customs. A skilful exploitation of the desire for recognition has now become an effective mode of dividing peaceful and tolerant societies into antagonised tribes. Finally, the theory of recognition based on the idea of diversity enables to acknowledge the equal moral status to all humans, irrespective of their traditions and skin colour. In particular, it enables to say that Africa deserves recognition. For Africa deserves not only a more just share in the global distribution of material goods. She deserves recognition of the diversity of her cultures and her achievements. No less importantly, Africa deserves recognition of the evils done to her people by the Western world. Africa’s struggle for recognition will not be helped by attributing moral superiority to the West. Neither will it be helped by viewing the process of recognition as taking place between master and slave. The African struggle for recognition cannot be based upon the ambiguous concept of equality alone. Its struggle for recognition would not do justice to her if it were to be based on the concept of difference for it would be tantamount to acknowledging the bipolar and essentialist opposition between what is European, or western, and what is African, as it is often done under the guise of the African values. The cosmopolitan theory of recognition based on the concept of diversity may help to acknowledge the extent to which the allegedly superior Western world has gravely sinned against the people of Africa. It may help to understand the simple truth that the West has sinned against African people by refusing to extend to them not only the respect and esteem, but the recognition of their very humanity. The successful coping with the condition of subalternity by the African people can be achieved through reclaiming their agency, both individual and collective. It would enable them to direct the course of their development according to their own understanding of their aspirations. A necessary precondition

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of the process of the emancipation of the African people is their own ability to recognize themselves as capable of reclaiming their agency. In order to do so, the African people need to recognize themselves as worthy of recognition. Such a recognition involves adoption of the egalitarian attitude which was the foundation of Popper’s political philosophy.

References Alexandravicius, Povilas. 2019. Strategies of Perception of Europe and Their Reception in Lithuania. Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia XIV: fasc. 1. Bessner, Daniel. 2018. The George Soros philosophy  – And its fatal flaw. The Guardian, July 6, 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/06/ the-­george-­soros-­philosophy-­and-­its-­fatal-­flaw. Chmielewski, Adam. 1999. The Future Is Open: A Conversation with Sir Karl Popper. In Open Society After Fifty Years, ed. Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong. London/New York: Routledge. Hacohen, Malachi Haim. 2000. Karl Popper. The Formative Years 1902–1945. Politics and Philosophy in the Interwar Vienna. London/New York: Cambridge University Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Kołakowski, Leszek. 1990. The Self-Poisoning of the Open Society. In Modernity on Endless Trial, 162–174. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Miller, David. 1997. Sir Karl Raimund Popper. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 43. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. London: Viking. Popper, Karl. 1963. The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1989. Conjectures and Refutations. In The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge. ———. 1999. Masaryk and the Open Society. In All Life is Problem Solving. (Trans. Patrick Camiller). London: Routledge. ———. 2013. Open Society and its Enemies, New One-Volume Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2006. The Rise of the Global Left. London/New York: Zed Books. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1963. Preface. In Wretched of the Earth, ed. Frantz Fanon. (Translated from the French by Richard Philcox with commentary by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha). New York: Grove Press. Sen, Amartya. 2006. Equality of What? In Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. Equality and Freedom. In The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 9

Popper and Youth Participation in Democracy in Africa: Perspectives on Applying the Dynamics of an Information Society Casimir Kingston Chukwunonyelum Ani and Uche Miriam Okoye

9.1  Introduction Most countries today grapple with democratic deficit, yet, it is a popular belief that this problem is more pronounced in Africa. Africa states seem to exist in a state of democratic discontent; her democratic institutions are facing serious decay. The political arena is dominated by old politicians who have been on the scene for far too long without much positive impact. Ambrose Evughaye describes democracy in Africa as the “government of the party, by the party and for the party only, with the hungry and deprived citizens of the rich state standing as on-lookers to the scenario of the crazy dance of corruption” (Evughaye 2001, 29). The famous Nigerian Afro-­ beat musician, late Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, as cited in Innocent Nass publication, termed democracy as practiced in Africa, as “demons in crazy demonstration.” (Nass 2012, 24). This can be attributed to the exploitation by the greedy, power-­ soaked political elites who have done nothing but destabilize and cripple the polities. The politicians are noted to live in affluence while the people wallow in abject poverty. This may account for reasons that many youths of Africa have lost hope in participating in the democratic process. There has been increasingly stimulating discussions on the democratic potentials of information and communication technology. These potentials fashion a model of democracy that can be termed ‘deliberative-collaborative e-Democracy model’, which seems to be emerging globally, and can ensure high quality policy-making, by involving citizens directly in the policy process through the use of some online platforms in order to enhance and manage the collaborative process. The purpose of this study is to apply the dynamics of information society to the Popperian democratic ideals in order to see how Popper could help change the African democratic

C. K. C. Ani (*) · U. M. Okoye University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_9

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conditions. The essence of this is to determine how Popper’s democratic ideas can function in contemporary digital culture among African youth. We will begin by revisiting Popper’s Open Society and its Enemies, a work he authored in two volumes. We consider how information society may lead to sustainable democracy that is inclusive and participatory in Africa through youth participation. The work considers the social media as a form of (on-line) society guided by information and knowledge use. The reason is that the social media is both the means and method by which young people navigate the information society. Therefore, this work is about working out a democratic model for African youths which will involve the use of information society (the social media) as a kind of democratic framework for attaining an African open society.

9.2  Karl Popper on the Open Society Popper’s philosophy traverses virtually all areas of human knowledge – sciences, arts and the social sciences. Science for him is “not a system of certain or well-­ established statements nor is it a system which steadily advances toward a state of finality,” (Popper 1957, 128); it is rather progressive, revolutionary and continuous. This is the tradition he refers to as the revolutionary principle of continuity (Popper 1965, 240). Great attention is paid to the publicity and criticism of the results of scientific investigations, which makes science a perceptually open system constantly changing to embrace more of nature. In matters of governance and in social organization, Popper maintains that the open scientific system should translate to an ‘Open Society’. His conception of an open society encapsulates his philosophy of politics and denotes a society characterized by open and rational debates depicting its unpredictable character. The Open Society and its Enemies is an attempt by him to explicate what an ideal society should be. Unlike most past philosophers who painted utopian pictures of an ideal society conceived to be changeless and perfect in nature, Popper conceives society as imperfect, and an epitome of the democratic process. The Open Society encourages equitable participation in political, economic and cultural life – a democratic-­ societal ideal that allows diverse opinions and critical debate. In a bid to distinguish Popper’s use of ‘open society’ from Bergson’s, who was first to employ the term, Popper explains that his term of the open society indicates an intellectualist distinction; “the open society is one in which men have learned to be to some extent critical of taboos, and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence” (Popper 1945a, b, 177). A society with predictable pattern of evolution is a ‘closed society’. Such a society is static, intellectually stagnated and marked by “what Popper would see as oppression and inhumanity” (O’Hear 2004, 189). One characteristic of a closed society is that it endorses collectivism, the doctrine that each individual’s essence is determined by the society as a whole. Another feature of this society is that it regulates and limits the freedom of the individual members. This is exemplified by the tribal and animistic societies’ use of customs,

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laws, traditions, myths, superstitions to dominate and stifle individual freedom (Popper 1945a, b, 151–153). In an open society, rational criticisms are encouraged. Policies are modified in the light of critical feedback that are received. In such a society, a government does not allude to creating blueprints of the good-life for the whole society, rather it solves societal problems through piecemeal engineering (O’Hear 2004). The government is also tolerant of the views and the criticisms of the people where rational discussions and debates are engaged in. The result is the spirit of compromise and cooperation in the society.

9.3  Popper’s Notion of Democracy Political philosophers have regarded the most important question as being who should rule? Popper concludes that the old political question is wrongly put. He therefore proposes to replace it with the modest question: “How can we organize our political institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers can do minimum amount of damage” (Popper 1994, 46). While looking for an answer to this question, he finds consolation in democracy, since it is only the democratic institutions that are designed to enable us to get rid of bad or incompetent or tyrannical rulers without bloodshed. He argues that “democracy provides an institutional framework that permits reform without violence, and so the use of reason in political matters” (Popper 1945a, b, 4). Democracy in the history of Philosophy is associated with ‘majority rule’. Democracy for the Greeks is the government of the people by the people – the rule of a community by its members (Cohen 1972). The Athenians governed themselves in the sense that every adult individual participated personally in discussions, voting and in policy decision making. However, in modern democracies, the face-to-face direct participation can no longer fit into the political structure due to the size of the population and the specialized knowledge needed in governance. Democracy is now a form of “representative government” (Theimer, 133) by persons elected and authorized to govern the people. However, times are changing. Today, we are dealing with a new public space where new democratic process could be developed to an ideal to be known as e-democracy. Popper had maintained that democracy does not consist in the rule of anyone in particular, but in the institutional control of those who rule: “Democracy provides the institutional framework for the reform of political institutions … It makes possible the reform of institutions without using violence, and thereby the use of reason in the designing of new institutions and the adjusting of old ones” (Popper 1945a, b, 110). A government is judged democratic, according to Popper, by the degree of adequacy allowed for the expression of the will of the people and their involvement in the decision making process. In his words: “Our administration favours the many instead of the few: this is why it is called a democracy” (Popper 1945a, b, 163).

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9.4  Democracy in Africa and Youths Participation in Politics In most Africa states today, representative democracy is in crisis. Emerging democracies are facing challenges in terms of the slow pace of political change, poor governance, ethnicity and persistent corruption (Obasanjo 1991). The various institutions of democracy lack the capacity to perform well due to structural inefficiency, and lack of democratic ethos by those who operate the institutions. This has led to a general decline in people’s interests, especially the youths, in party politics and in elections (Blumler and Gerevitch 1995). Ideally, democracy should depend mostly on the participation of the people, especially the youth to rebuild and strengthen the society. J. Sloam is of the view that the youths’ involvement in politics is of maximum importance; “we must explore how each new generation comes to develop its own conceptions of citizenship and express itself through civic and political engagement” (Sloam 2011, 4). Young people have an important role to play in democracy as they are the people who will be called upon to carry on the values of the democratic system as well as make attempts to improve it. Being the future generation of citizens and democratic representatives, they function as the cornerstone behind political change in every society. This may account for the reason that the African Union has developed the African Youth Charter with the primary aim to “strengthen, reinforce and consolidate efforts to empower young people through meaningful youth participation and equal partnership in driving Africa’s development agenda” (African Union 2006, 1). Since the participations of the youths in the democratic process is pertinent, the need to develop a more transparent, responsive and participatory decision-making process is critical. For this reason, the development of new information technology structures that speak to the understanding of the youths will offer new possibilities in increasing youths’ involvement and participation in politics.

9.5  The Dynamics of Information Society to Africa The twenty-first century is undoubtedly the age of digital technology and information. For modern democratic processes, information is a core need. Easy access to information has changed people’s attitude to the information they receive. Instead of passivity, they actively engage with it (Informing Communities 2009). Thus, Africa is in dire need of information digital technology where easy access to information meets peoples’ personal and civic awareness needs. Driving this vision are the democratic values of openness, inclusion, active participation and empowerment. It is important to discuss the democratic potentials of information and communication technology (ICT) in enhancing youth participation in the democratic process. Applying ICT to democracy is an emerging new deliberative-collaborative e-Democracy model. This model can ensure high quality policy-making by

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involving youths directly in the policy process in order to enhance and manage large scale information-collaborative process. With reference to the involvement of the youth in governance, three levels of e-Democracy are possible: The Information Level – Information is a basic need of every democracy. It is a sort of pillar that upholds democratic principles of a state. One can rightly say that democracy is meaningless without informed citizenry. Information is regarded as the life blood of democracy. The existence of informed citizens enhances public participation, by ensuring they make ‘conscious choices’ in matters relating to ‘public importance’. Everybody has the right to access governmental information since the freedom of information is the right of every citizen. The right to information is enshrined in several international agreements, including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1946. The Declaration clearly states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression without interference and to seek, receive and impact information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations Resolutions 1946). What is obtainable at the information level is that youth’s access to information will empower and facilitate their active participation in public affairs as well as in political decisions. The greater the youths’ public knowledge about governmental affairs, the greater their involvements in politics, public debates and discussions. This kind of involvement is necessary for the attainment of an open society. The Consultation level – This is the level of interaction and critical debate. On-line communication channels, such as chartrooms, e-referendum and e-voting are regarded as e-consultation, and can be employed at this level of interaction. E-consultation gives opportunities to individuals and organizations to provide feedback to the government on various issues of concern. “E-consultations are online forums in which a host seeks input from an interested public” (Peter and Abud 2009). The e-consultation is an emerging approach that offers opportunity to the public to engage the government in adequate consultations for better policy making. “For some initiatives, the public might be narrowed to target audiences and stakeholders. For others, the public might include the affected citizens, interested parties or even the general population” (Peter and Abud 2009). It is worthy of note that while stakeholders provide organized or organizational perspective on an issue, the youth through this platform will provide individual perspective. The idea behind e-consultation is for those affected by an issue of national concern to have their perspectives considered. Some citizens might be greatly affected while others might only be interested in the issue. Those affected (the youth in this case) need to be engaged in public deliberation regarding the issues that concern them and other issues of national concern. The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) provides a five-­ step decision-making model for engaging with the public (Peter and Abud 2009).

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Gather Information

Establish decisionmaking criteria

Develop Alternatives

Evaluate Alternatives

Make Decisions

The model is only but an example of public involvement in decision-making cycle and not a prescription. The public involvement may occur at any of the stages because different initiatives require public involvement at certain stages. The youth will appreciate the opportunity to get involved as long as their contributions are conveyed and implemented since they are not interested in governance but in their voices been heard. Therefore, the intention of E-consultation is not the devolution of decision-making to the public but rather to improve democratic governance by expanding opportunities for public involvement. The Participation Level  – At this level, direct participation in policy-making is involved. With the use of technology. This level facilitates a process that will involve the movement of ideas from the youth to the government over the kind of policies they want to be implemented (Macintosh 2004). Social networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube which offer citizens the tool to disseminate information and express political decisions using methods not previously available are involved at this level. The youth can contribute in a variety of ways: explore ideas, give suggestions, information and perspectives to governmental decision-making process. They can equally validate and reconcile variety of ideas both from the government and from the public domain and thereby stand the chance to better advice policy makers on issues especially of national concern. There are three levels of deliberative-collaborative relationship between the government and the public in a democracy according to Peter and Abud (2009) – One-­ way, two-way and multi-level interaction. The one-way interaction involves the dissemination of information. The two-way involves a host organization and participants that actively exchange information. The multi-level interaction is an on-line dialogue where participants actively engage and provide deliberative input into decision making process. The first two levels are used to manage dialogue as the participants discuss on particular aspects of the information provided by the host. However, the multi-level interaction is a process which is very difficult to be controlled by a host. Here, the host and participants enter into partnership as they actively shape policy options and alternatives. This way, the first two process or interactions are consultative while the multi interaction level is participatory. The e-Political platforms will ensure and sustain open societies and democracy since they encourage open rational debate using the tools of information and communication technology. They also promote democratic values such as participation, transparency, responsiveness, equity, accountability, efficiency and consensus

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orientation. However, while governments around the globe are consulting citizens on national policy through the internet, the level of on-line democratic consultation in Africa is very low. The falling level of civic literacy and lack of on-line deliberative facilities are some of the reasons for this. However, for informed deliberative and public involvement to take place, the issue of civic literacy must be considered. An uninformed and illiterate public cannot be involved in open, rational debate in Popper’s conception of it. What must be noted is that democracy in Africa requires a paradigm shift – from mere public opinion to informed deliberations and active participation; from analogue kind of democracy to e-democracy. Deliberative facilities must be put in place by governments which should also encourage civic literacy. This will enable the public to actively engage in and to be able to influence national policies and governmental decisions. This will encourage the influence of information society via information creation and dissemination; a trend that encourages rational debate, societal change and development. However, there is growing distrust in democratic governments, especially in Africa. One of the reasons is the citizens’ lack of information of government activities. This lack of information often breeds corruption, non-accountability and closeness. The alternative is to harness the powers of information society for optimum guarantee of an open society.

9.6  Conclusion The digital age is creating an information renaissance that is changing our lives in many great ways. However, the new age technologies do not seem to be serving all Africans adequately. Specifically, it is not serving democracy in Africa, especially on how the youths can use the digital technologies in getting involved. How African states respond to this quagmire will determine the quality of future and prospects of democracy in Africa. One way to address the problem is by encouraging youth participation in the democratic practices, and to greatly harness the tools of modern technologies in democracy. This will promote the open societal ideals, encourage youth participation and will ultimately translate to positive societal change and development in Popper’s prescription of it.

References African Union. 2006. African Youth Charter. Adopted by the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Banjul, Gambia, July 2. Blumler, Jay, and Michael Gurevitch. 1995. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge. Cohen, Carl. 1972. Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations. New York: Random House.

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Evughaye, Ambrose. 2001. Democracy in Africa. Vanguard, August 22, 2001. Global Knowledge Partnership. 2004. The Media and the Information Society. ISBN:938 2588 06 5. Lumpur: GKP. https://ict4peace.org/wp-­content/uploads/2007/07/unpan020000.pdf. Macintosh, Ann. 2004. Characterizing E-participation in Policy-Making. In Proceedings of 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 1–10. IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/ HICSS.2004.1265300. Nass, Innocent. 2012. Democracy, African Politics and Conflicts in a New World Order. Enugu: ABIC Books. O’Hear, Anthony. 2004. The Open Society Revisited. In Karl Popper Critical Appraisals, ed. Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald. New York: Taylor & Francis e-lib. Obasanjo, Olusegun. 1991. Opening Remarks. In Conference Proceedings on the Democracy and Governance in Africa, 2–4. Ota Nigeria. Peter, Joseph, and Manon Abud. 2009. E-Consultation: Enabling Democracy between Elections. IRPP Choices 15, no.1. ISSN:0711-0677. Available: www.irpp.org. Accessed 21 Mar 2019. Popper, Karl. 1945a. The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato. Vol. 1. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ———. 1945b. The Open Society and Its Enemies: The High Tide of Prophecy. Vol. 2. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1957. Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson. ———. 1965. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1994. In Search of a Better World. London: Routledge. Sloam, James. 2011. Rejuvenating Politics? Youth, Citizenship and Politics in the United States and Europe. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1910527. The Aspen Institute. 2009. Informing Communities: Sustaining Democracy in the Digital Age. The Report of the Knight Commission on the Information needs of Communities in a Democracy. ISBN:0-89843-5110. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/ informing-­communities-­sustaining-­democracy-­digital-­age/. Theimer, Walter. Ecyclopaedia of World Politics. London: Faber and Faber Ltd. United Nations. 1946. United Nation’s General Assembly Resolution 59 (1). 65m Plenary Meeting, 14 December.

Chapter 10

Assessing Faith-Based Terrorism Through Popper’s Conception of Tolerance Olawunmi Cordelia Macaulay-Adeyelure

10.1  Introduction In the present inquiry, I contend that discourses on religious toleration and pluralism are inadequate, both in scope and application within the African space. To my mind, extremism and violence motivated by religious faith will require other approaches. To this end, I explore the critical dialogue of Karl Popper to regurgitate a framework that poses an adequate and encompassing status quo for mutual and peaceful cohesion among people, irrespective of the faith they profess. For the foregoing task to be realized, this inquiry adopts Popper’s Critical Dialogue to foreground an insightful occasion of tolerance. In the section that follow, I disclose the most dominant factors that have been adduced for violence and extremism connected to faith. Afterward, I consider some of the solutions usually proffered – religious toleration and pluralism. I will then offer my grouses with this approach before exposing the main tenet of Popper’s Critical Dialogue in addition to how it may assist to mitigating some of these quashes.

10.2  O  n Terrorism and Extremism Connected to Religious Faith Perhaps the starting point of this research is to explain the meaning (as well as the interconnection between of each) of religion and faith. Since faith is a resultant and undeniable pillar in monotheistic religions, it is necessary to be familiar with religion before we diffuse into the meaning and features of faith.

O. C. Macaulay-Adeyelure (*) Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_10

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Etymologically speaking, religion is derived from the Latin word religare, which means “to tie, to bind” (Cayne 1992, 841). This extends to the act or art of affixing oneself to God. However, nearly all religions paint different pictures of God. Though often, there are similarities in these pictures, such as the claim of people in need of salvation, these pictures amount to no more than a superficial common ground. However, there are fundamental differences, such as the way to attain salvation. These fundamental differences are what make each religion distinct, for they cannot be reconciled with each other. Logically speaking, contradictory claims cannot all be true; either one picture of God is true or all of them are false (Powell 2006, 6). There are peculiar difficulties about this definition of religion, for it is impossible to specify clear and distinct criteria that any phenomenon must satisfy if it is to be accounted a specifically religious phenomenon. It is somewhat difficult to establish any definite feature common to all religions. For example, if the concept of a unique Creator-God is central to the Judaeo-Christian religion, it is certainly not so in the case of Hinduism or Buddhism or Taoism. So every definition of religion cannot be narrowed only in terms of belief in and attitudes towards a Creator-God and the same objection may be made about other attempts to define religion in terms of a simple set of criteria (Charlesworth 1972, ix). Definitions of religion tend to suffer from one of two problems: (a) They are either too narrow and exclude many belief systems which most agree are religious, or (b) They are too vague and ambiguous, suggesting that just about any and everything is a religion. A good example of a narrow definition is the common attempt to define religion as belief in God, effectively excluding polytheistic religions and atheistic religions while including theists who have no religious belief system. A good example of a vague definition is the tendencies to define religion as worldview  – but how can every worldview qualify as a religion? Perhaps it was an attempt to answer the foregoing posers that is has been by Simon Blackburn (2005, 316) harps that: The attempt to understand the concepts involved in religious belief: existence, necessity, fate, creation, sin, justice, mercy, redemption, God. Until the 20th century the history of western philosophy is closely intertwined with attempts to make sense of aspects of pagan, Jewish, or Christian religion, whilst in other traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, or Taoism, there is even less distinction between religious and philosophical enquiry. The classic problem of conceiving of an appropriate object of religious belief is that of understanding whether any term can be predicated of it: does it make sense to talk of it creating things, willing events, knowing things, or being good or caring or being one thing or many.

In Religion and Rational Theology, the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant, the editors stated that “if religious rituals are seen as a way of conjuring up God’s grace or divine aid in pursuing our earthly ends, then they are to be condemned as fetishism, the superstitious delusion of being able to produce supernatural effect” (Guyer and Wood 2001: xiv). Kant was convinced that human species cannot fulfil its moral vocation apart from the existence of a “moral community” or “Church” which to him depicts a

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religious setting freely entered into by well-disposed individuals for the purpose of combating the radical evil in human nature and strengthening their own and one another’s disposition toward good. He went ahead in the book to postulate that the laws of this community must be inner and moral, not statutory or coercive; membership in it must also be entirely free and equal. Existing religious community, if they are to effectively perform their true function for moral service of God and the destiny of the human race, must cease to be governed by a hierarchical political constitution and statutory religious laws (Guyer and Wood 2001: xiv). It has however, been argued that religion is not hard to define and the plethora of conflicting definitions is evidence of how easy it really is. The problem lies in finding a definition that is empirically useful and empirically testable. Let us now turn to faith. It should be stated for the annihilation of doubt that our treatment of religion is based solely on monotheistic religious institutions. Hence, our treatment and analysis of the basic ideas of faith shall be from this direction. Faith is one of the greatest pillars of religion. It was necessary to discuss religion in a lengthy manner as the idea of faith would then be easily absorbed without much fuse. Faith is a belief held even in the face of doubt (Cayne 1992: 338). A person who has faith and does things in faith is termed or conceived as a fideist. The term fideist is used to describe “one who thinks that religious faith is irrational or non-­ rational, and furthermore, that it is still somehow okay or even a good thing to have religious faith.” (Murray and Rea 2008, 93). To be a fideist involves faith and although there are many conceptions of faith, this study shall look at Faith as a propositional attitude, which involves a cognitive stance towards a statement. For instance, if I say: “Price of Brazilian hair shall increase this year!” People will take varying cognitive stances to the statement. Most of such is to believe it, doubt it, fear it, or hope in it. The stance that one uses to approach it is determined by what one stands to gain (Murray and Rea 2008, 97). Regardless of the various shifts on faith, I found that there four characterization of faith, among others that readily comes to mind (Murray and Rea 2008, 96). These are: (i) Faith is believing something in the absence of proof; (ii) Faith is believing something in the absence of supporting evidence; (iii) Faith is believing something in the face overwhelming counter evidence; and (iv) Faith is believing something that we do not know to be true. From the four characterizations made out for faith in the preceding paragraph, one discovers that it tells us about the nature of faith. That is how faith has to do with Evidence and Knowledge. Faith, despite being unable to show proof or evidence, still appears to lay claims to knowledge. Can this be possible? Toeing this tradition is the ancient church father Tertullian who in his De Carne Christi makes the claim “I believe because it is absurd!” Even the Islamic philosopher Al Ghazali also harps that “all truths about man and the universe are already contained in the Qur’an” (Smart 1999, 205). This means that through faith man can know the Divine as well the phenomena. Having prepared a solid grounding on religion and its affinity to faith, it is important to explain how these fundamental principles have in four ways

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caused friction and the distinction between the one and the other leading to chaos and friction in society. However, it will be pertinent to first of all have an idea of what terrorism too implies to be able to relate better with the onus of the present discourse. The term ‘terrorism’ is a derivative of terror. And terror in the opinion of Cayne (1992, 1021) is the “the instigation of fear in another person or a group of persons.” The fear that is being is stressed here is that which is done not only verbally but even physically thereby leading to injury, sickness, sorrow and the worst of all death for the victims (Shurle 2010). The latter is a capture of the term ‘terrorism’. By terrorism, we come to understand that the fear and the consequent action that are instigated against the group of people have a particular effect that had earlier been calculated. This is why for Waheed Olaiya (2009), terrorism is a calculated activity employed by a person or group of persons against another to cause violence in their demand for a particular denied justice. With religious faith and terrorism briefly considered, I will now state how they function in the continuous distinction between the self and the other in four ways. Omotosho (2003, 17) highlights four ways that religious motivated violence and terrorism permeates within the African space: 1. The lack of recognition of the Other: There is the seeming outlook that the two popular religions in Africa – Christianity and Islam are usually embroiled in differences which seem to surface spontaneously. However, there are cases where faith motivated insurgents such as the Boko Haram, have used verses of Al Qur’an and Islamic morality to endorse their lethal operations. The Boko Haram sect is a product of regional violence original to North-east Nigeria. Boko Haram, loosely translated from Hausa into English means “Western education is forbidden.” Boko Haram from the foregoing claims that it is forbidden to partake in anything that is Western-motivated. This seems to follow from the caution in Al Qur’an that “anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors”1 (Chothia 2012). The group was founded by Mohamed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric in Maiduguri. The long term agenda is to overthrow the Nigerian government and then institute the Sharia Code in the country. In other words, the focus is to “sanitize the Nigerian system which is spellbound by Western education and ideals” (Onuoha 2012, 136). 2. Campaigns of hatred and blackmail: Both Christians and Muslims are actively involved in campaigns of hatred against each other. This is manifested in various forms including: incitement, distortion of fact about each other, blocking each other’s chances as demonstrated in the issues of Shari’ah and Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Nigeria. Besides that, blackmailing and the distortion of fact s caused the famous Kafanchan riot, according to Bashir Isyaku and Imo. It was reported that one religious leader, the Revd. Abubakar Bako, publicly misinterpreted and falsified some verses of the Qur’an and made ­uncomplimentary

 For instance, see Al Qur’an 5:51 & 4:47.

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remarks about the Prophet Mohammad to the hearing of Muslims (Omostosho 2003, 17). 3. The lack of genuine desire to understand each other’s belief and culture: It is true that institutions of higher learning here and there offer some courses under various names but a careful study of such programmes has shown that they were not intended to foster understanding and respect. Instead they are used as a means of blackmailing and incitement, under the cover of academic freedom and dialogue (Omostosho 2003, 17). 4 . Extremism: Extremism from both sides is another important reason behind religious violence in Nigeria. As indicated above, in most cases this extremism is based on poor knowledge of the teaching of the religion being defended by the group involved. It is very unlikely that Christianity taught the Revd. Abubakar Bako to provoke adherent of other faiths as a means of propagating his religion (Omostosho 2003, 17). Granted, there may be other approaches to why religious-induced terrorism suffice, this study agrees with Omotosho (2003) when is recalled that in Nigeria alone, the record of religious conflicts is endless. However, one can still recall some notable towns and the years they engaged in religious conflict, post-independence. Some of these are: Maitatsine riots in Bulumkutu (1982); Moon-Eclipse crisis in Borno (1996); Kaduna (Maitatsine riots in Rigassa 1982, 1992, 2000) Tiv and Others in Nassarawa (2001); Jos (1994, 2000, 2001–2003, 2008, 2009, 2010). From the foregoing excursion into some religious crises and the reasons behind them, it is safe to say that religious faith can serve as the major background and catalyst for terrorist accomplishments. Recent trends in terrorist activities attest to this and this is “Islamic terrorism is a form of terrorism” (Falk 2008: 4). In spite of these realities, what kind of scholarly efforts have been made toward an understanding or comprehension of the ideas original to each of these faiths? This is the concern of the section that follows.

10.3  Religious Toleration and Pluralism: An Inadequate Panacea The discourses on the subject of religious and toleration pluralism has among many aims, the intent of making the world a better place, devoid of antagonism, coercion, and discrimination irrespective of the religious views professed and/or practiced. It is therefore not surprising as John Hick (2010, 717) harps that “the whole subject, within philosophy of religion, of the relation between the religious traditions presents so obvious a challenge to a dominant contemporary form of confessional religious apologetic, that it seems inevitable that it will be increasingly widely discussed in the coming decades”. However, before engaging critically with the foremost articulations, within the discourse, it is important to have a working comprehension of the concepts: ‘toleration’ and ‘pluralism’. In the words of E. Langerak (2010, 606):

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Toleration is the enduring of something disagreeable. It involves a decision to forgo using powers of coercion, so it is not merely resignation at the inevitability of the disagreeable, although begrudging toleration can be granted when one believes that coercion, while possible, would come at too high a price

However, for an appreciation of the inner kernel of toleration to be attained, perhaps the meaning of tolerance could be helpful. In this guise, Thomas Scanlon chronicles that “tolerance requires us to accept people and permit their practices even when we strongly disapprove of them. Tolerance thus involves an attitude that is intermediate between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition” (Scanlon 1996, 226). With these conceptual exposition, we glean that “Religious toleration” then “generally applies to expressing or acting upon theologically-related beliefs, although the mere holding of beliefs or the persons holding them have also been the objects of intolerance and toleration” (Langerak 2010, 606). ‘Pluralism’, on the other hand is a position which rejects the privileging of any one value or worldview over all others because it places inherent value in the diversity of perspectives. Pluralism goes “further than tolerance in that it rejects the hierarchal privileging of one’s own position over the Other’s as morally and politically problematic” (Erlerwine 2010, 8). Religious pluralism could then be understood as an ideological framework which gives or acknowledges the equality of all religions, without placing one higher or above another. It should however be stressed that regardless of the demarcation between religious tolerance and religious pluralism, they both share the respect and dignity for the religious world-view of the one by another. Having been able to expose the meaning of each of ‘toleration’ and ‘pluralism’, what is the intolerance? Intolerance may be perceived as “… the unwillingness to suffer the otherness of the Other, the unwillingness to limit the implications of one’s worldview in order to make room for the Other and her worldview” (Erlewine 2010, 9). In plain language, it means the failure to appreciate the thought system of the other given the prejudice that one’s outlook is a superior. The spate of intolerance recurring among most religious adherents appears to be a constant. This has culminated into the torrents of reports tied to religious conflicts, then loss of lives and valuables as well as a total disregard for humanity and nature in the name of protecting the sacredness of God and what the divine entity represents. It cannot be denied that even among the Abrahamic monotheisms, fissures and disagreements accrued from intolerance are rife. Persuasion, discrimination, segregation, antagonism and the extreme of all, coercion and violence against the other, the one who does not share the same ideas about the divine as holds by adherents, is a resultant. In other words, there is a structural antagonism which thrives unchecked against the other. By the other, we mean the individual or groups of individuals, who do not profess a particular faith. Given the above antecedent, philosophers, religionists, liberals and other concerned scholars have articulated variants of theories that have come to be branded under the label of religious tolerance and/or religious pluralism. Foremost scholars who have contributed to the subject matter are Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997), John Locke (1983), J.S.  Mill (1978) down to highly influential scholars such as John

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Hick (1980, 1985, 1989), John Cobb Jr. (1999), Jurgen Habermas (2002, 1996) in the preceding century and Robert Erlewine (2010) within the last decade. It needs to be hinted that in spite of the reflections deriving from these minds, “…calls for tolerance and pluralism either go unheeded or only further exacerbate the situation, given that those who make them fail to take into account the contours of the symbolic or discursive structure shared by the Abrahamic religions” (Erlewine 2010, 3). What then are the basic similarities shared by the Abrahamic religions/ monotheisms? According to Martin Jaffee (2001, 759) “Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are equally rich, historical embodiments of a single structure of discourse that underlies the historically developed symbol systems specific to each community”. This implies that in each of the afore-mentioned faiths, there are some common denominators “whose metaphysical underpinnings follow a logic that is rooted in a tense dynamic between particularity and universalism, wherein a particular community is imbued with universal significance, and as a result is brought in conflict with all other particular communities, which lack this universal significance” (Erlewine 2010, 10). These metaphysical underpinnings which form the common denominators among these faiths manifest in these four ways: Revelation, Election, Historical Mission and Eschatology (Jaffee 2001; Erlewine 2010). By revelation what is indicative is that each of the three Abrahamic monotheisms derives from supernatural encounter with the Divine. Robert Erlewine in this connection expatiates: “In the moment of revelation, the universal God of creation becomes manifest to a particular community through an act of revelation” (Erlewine 2010, 11). The process of “manifesting to a particular community” already attests to election. Each of Judaism, Islam and Christianity claims to have received the mandate to be used (elected) by the Divine as a voice for the rest of humankind. The entire trajectory of spreading and adding converts from all corners of the planet to their ranks is suggestive of the historical mission. The three monotheisms also share the eschatological view – the outlook that the world will come to an end. Hence, the mission through history is to propagate the end of the world and acquire as much converts for the Divine who had elected them following the supernatural revelation. As simples as these similarities, it is clear that among these religions, tension, friction and conflict will necessary and naturally ensue. If Judaism claims to have been elected and entrusted with the historical mission, done wonders it is Islam or Christianity a better voice for that matter? In Hick’s religious framework, religious pluralism advises that it only by entirely shedding the discursive structure of the elective monotheisms, that one may broker peace among the aggrieved. This is a move which he clearly does not view as problematic (Erlewine 2010, 21). However, his submission has come under serious rebuttals from Christian theologians and apologetics such as Pope Benedict XVI, who fail to subscribe to what they perceive as Hick’s stripping of the very essence of Christianity and the monotheistic thought system (D’Costa 1990; Ratzinger 2004). The implication is that these religious faiths will need to undergo some ‘revisions’ for the sake of peaceful cohesion. This study however disagrees with Hick (1985, 1989) since the ‘revisions’ of these beliefs contradict the very essence of

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religious dogmas which have been deemed by adherents as necessarily true irrespective of clime. At the juncture, it needs no elaboration from the foregoing that deep within the structure of each of the Abrahamic Monotheisms there is that tendency to repress and eschew, whether through force, persuasion or violence, whatever ideology that says contrary. However, this study maintains strongly that an employment of Popper’s Critical Dialogue may assist to birthing a status quo of mutual cohesion irrespective of faith. What then is the main thesis of Critical Dialogue? How may it assist in the overcoming of the established problems that we have encountered thus far? These are the main questions that the remainder of this essay contends with.

10.4  Popper’s Critical Dialogue for Faith and Terrorism The idea that informs Popper’s critical dialogue is derived from his critical rationalism and his attitude to scientific methodology. Essentially, critical rationalism from the perspective of Popper (1971, 225) implies “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience; it is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.’” From the scientific parlance, it is Popper’s conviction that we look to true theories that inform the world. According to Jeremy Sheamur (2019, 2), Popper “offers us an account of the kinds of characteristics which we should expect our theories to possess if they are to constitute steps along this path. Theories, he argues, should be bold, and testable. If we find that they run into problems, then we need to be ready to make changes in them.” For Popper (1994, 50), our readiness to concede that our theories and approaches to things may wrong or proved to be wrong will go a long way to assist our toleration of varieties of opinions. It needs to be stressed that for Popper, tolerance needs to be given serious attention from a unique perspective since it has become obvious, the role that intellectuals have played concerning theories or ideas that “have encouraged mass murder in the name of ideas, theories and religious teachings” (Sheamur 2019, 9). As for Popper, critical pluralism and the rational intellectual exchange of ideas are necessary for opposing parties to be able to learn about the practices of one another for peace to reign. This for him “is to be conducted with an awareness of our fallibility and he urges that should weight up impartial reasons for and against our theories, and also the idea that we are likely to come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks” (Sheamur 2019, 9–10). With the notion critical dialogue succinctly exposed, it is the case that Popper emphasizes the need to entertain and tolerate the other person with the bid to knowing more. Unless one knows what the other likes or dislikes, one will only treat the other with prejudices that may in the long run account for full scale violence and terrorism. Owing to the above, it is therefore pertinent to realize the urgency or necessity in the methodical approach of critical dialogue which allows both parties to

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interpenetrate one another. They need to sympathize the other and see why or how the other is motivated to act in a particular way. When one brings this to the fore of faith and terrorism, it now becomes clear that virtually one has been led regarding the violent activities of the other out of prejudice. Rather than trying to repress and subdue the other through armaments of ammunitions, it is important to give her some voice as Popper recommends. This urgency to giving the other some voice to express herself does not mean that they should be tolerated unanimously. This is the case for even Popper (1945, Chapter 5, Note 6) provided a caveat thus: We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal

Of the many truths that the foregoing initiates, one primary motivation is not to tolerate the one or the one who has refused to obey the voice of reason or has to be dealt with as the law stipulates. This means that it is important that all parties be given the right to explain the grievances and allow to be tolerated. However, the unnecessary tolerance of terrorism and extremism linked to religious faith is tantamount to doom for any state.

10.5  Conclusion What the discourse here entails are the role that religious faiths play in terrorist-­ related activities. It needs to be said that whereas the proposal of initial scholars like John Hick and Jurgen Habermas has yet to yield tangible results, perhaps owing to some of the flaws related hitherto, Popper’s critical dialogue seems to have a better input. One of the far-reaching importance of Popper’s ideas is the one related to the caveat that the intolerant must not be tolerated. We must not handle with kid gloves, the one or the other, who has failed to obey the voice of reason and continues to wreak havoc on the society. Whereas we need to dialogue “if people are not to offend others, they need to understand what others find offensive and why” (Shearmur 2019, 11). However, when one party refuses and continue its terrorist affair, critical dialogue validates the use of state power to bring the party to surrender for peace and mutual coexistence to reign.

References Blackburn, Simon. 2005. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Cayne, Bernard. 1992. The New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language. New  York: Lexicon Publishers.

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Charlesworth, M.J. 1972. Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. Chothia, F. 2012. Who Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists? British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­africa-­13809501. Assessed 7 July 2019. D’Costa, G. 1990. Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. Erlewine, Robert. 2010. Monotheism and Tolerance: Recovering a Religion of Reason. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Falk, A. 2008. Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives. Westport: Praeger Security International. Guyer, P., and A.  Wood. 2001. Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 2002. Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World. In Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, ed. E.  Mendieta. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Hick, John. 1980. God Has Many Names. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. ———. 1985. Problems of Religious Pluralism. New York: St. Martin’s Press. ———. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion. London: Yale University Press. Jaffee, Martin. 2001. One God, One Revelation, One People: On the Symbolic Structure of Elective Monotheism. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 69 (4): 753–775. Langerak, E. 2010. Theism and Toleration. In A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Paul Draper Taliaferro and Phillip Quinn. Oxford: Wiley-Black. Locke, John. 1983. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. J.H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. Murray, Michael, and Michael Rea. 2008. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Omotosho, A.O. 2003. Religious Violence in Nigeria: The Causes and Solution: An Islamic Perspective. Swedish Missiological Theme. Onuoha, F.C. 2012. The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend. Security Journal 25 (2): 134–151. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.15. Popper, Karl. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 1. London: Routledge. ———. 1971. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1994. The Myth of the Framework. London: Routledge. Powell, D. 2006. Guide to Christian Apologetics. Nashville: Lockman Foundation. Ratzinger, Joseph. 2004. Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997. On the Social Contract. In Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. V. Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scanlon, Thomas. 1996. The Difficulty of Tolerance. In Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd, 226–240. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shearmur, Jeremy. 2019. The Distinctive Character of Popper’s Critical Rationalism. 1–13 Paper Presented at the Karl Popper for Africa International Conference, Lagos State University, Nigeria, March 28–31, 2019. Shurle, Andre. 2010. Life and Death. Le Havre: Overture. Smart, Ninian. 1999. World Philosophies. London: Routledge.

Chapter 11

Towards an Ethos of Toleration in Multicultural Societies: The Significance of Popper’s Critical Rationalism Peter Osimiri

11.1  Introduction One major paradox of our time is that along with the homogenizing influence of the on-going processes of globalization, there has also being a groundswell ethnonationalist and religious conflicts around the world. In consonance with the predictions of modernization theory, one would have thought that as the world becomes increasingly integrated in economic terms that primordial loyalties and ethno-national differences would literally disappear as the world increasingly becomes a cosmopolitan place (Boulding 2000). Interestingly, in agreement with modernisation theory, the more radical Marxist ideology also prognosticates that ethnic and religious particularisms with ultimately give way to universalism as workers across the world unite into a transnational force (Mejer 1987). Although there is a convergence in the predictions of the modernisation and Marxist theories, the eventual withering away of ethnic particularism was never to be. On the contrary, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world has witnessed worldwide a resurgence of ethno-national and religious agitations which sometimes culminate in violent intrastate conflicts and civil wars. With more than a fair share of the ethnic/religious conflicts raging in the world today, the African continent has become a major theatre of conflict in the post-cold war era. But this is not surprising given that a substantial number of African multicultural states fall into the category described by Horowitz (1985) as deeply divided society. Such societies are characterised by endemic conflicts which are driven by well-entrenched cleavages created by communal, ethnic, and religious differences (Guelke 2012). So deeply entrenched is the ethno-religious diversity in most African states that efforts at promoting the emergence of state–wide national identity from the mélange of ethno-cultural groupings which presently constitute P. Osimiri (*) University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_11

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them have yielded little results Thus, many African states are plagued by political instability, ethnic conflict and, in some cases civil wars, demonstrating that these national societies remain deeply divided as ever. Taking as its point of departure the position that conflict exist at many levels, this paper argues that mutual antagonism between ethnic and religious groups within divided societies is often premised on the epistemic hubris of cultural and religious world-views, which are not only taken to be absolute verities but also exclude other world-views as inaccurate or inferior. Adopting the method of critical analysis and interpretation the paper, advocates a deliberate state-wide cultivation of the attitude of critical rationalism which is bound to reveal the fallibility and the open-endedness of world-views. Consequently, it concludes that the ethos of toleration that is conducive to the harmonious coexistence of diverse groupings in multinational societies will develop in the context of widespread acceptance of the epistemological assumptions of critical rationalism. The paper falls into three sections. The first part provides a conceptual analysis of the key ideas that are central to this work. These include concepts such as critical rationalism, world-views and toleration. The second demonstrates the possible connection between intolerant world-views and conflict while the final part attempts to plot the connection between critical rationalism and the ethos of toleration. To arrive at its submissions, the paper employs the qualitative method with a particular emphasis on critical analysis and rational argumentation, approaches which remain at the core of the philosophical enterprise.

11.2  Conceptual Issues Critical rationalism has been variously described in the literature as a doctrine, an epistemological concept or even an action guide. For our purposes in this paper, critical rationalism shall refer to a kind of philosophical tradition on how we ought to interrogate particular knowledge claims and advance knowledge in general. To conceptualise critical rationalism, it would be helpful to contrast it with an epistemological position that Popper (1994a) describes as uncritical or comprehensive rationalism. Uncritical rationalism1 is a justificationist view which posits that only knowledge claims that could be proved by reason and/or experience is valid. In other words, every assumption which cannot be supported by argument or experience is to be discarded. Popper was convinced that comprehensive rationalism is inconsistent since “it cannot in turn be supported by argument or by experience” (Popper 1994a, 442). In the place of comprehensive rationalism Popper adopts the idea of critical rationalism as the most appropriate attitude towards science and epistemology. Simply put, critical rationalism is a non-justificationist

 Examples of uncritical rationalist would be Plato and Descartes; the duo subscribes to the idea that certain things could be known with certainty and authority. 1

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approach2 to knowledge which in spite of the realisation that scientific theories cannot be conclusively verified posits that scientific progress could best be advanced through method of criticisms of conjectures which may result in refutations. In Popper’s words, critical rationalism fundamentally entails “an attitude of admitting that I may be wrong and you may be right and by that effort we get nearer to the truth.” (Popper 1994a, 431) In other words, critical rationalism as a project or method is one that is keenly aware of fallibility in epistemic matters and such encourages rigorous and unremitting critical scrutiny as means of eliminating epistemic errors to the barest minimum. Critical rationalism was developed partly in response to the problem of induction. According to David Hume the problem of induction consists in the fact that via induction knowledge claims can never be conclusively verified and thus we cannot be sure that they are true. Popper accepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction but objects to the suggestion that this implies a relapse into irrationalism or scepticism. Instead he denies the view that induction is central to scientific investigation while arguing that science proceeds by the principle of falsifiability. In Popper’s view, scientific advance is better served by falsifiability than the verification principle for the simple reason that that the former moves us closer to the truth than the latter. As Steven Thornton (2016) puts it: a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although not conclusively verifiable. This being the case Popper (1994a) opines that instead of dogmatically justifying theories by appeals to reason and experience, we should scrutinise such theories for contradictions and inconsistencies, which when eliminated moves us closer to the truth. If anything, the above quotation succinctly encapsulates the attitude of critical rationalism which required that theories and ideas must be subject to furnace of critical scrutiny with hope of discarding those refuted and tentatively holding to those yet to be refuted. Critical rationalism, in one word, is the demand that we extend the critical attitude all areas of human thought and action. (Wettersten u.d) Although Popper’s critical rationalism seems to possess a commonsensical appeal, the idea has been the object of scathing criticisms. In what follows, we examine two of such critiques with the view to defending Poppers critical rationalism against the highlighted objections. The first objection comes from Nicholas Dykes (2003) who argues that critical rationalism is founded on questionable premises that lead to a serious flaw in the internal logic of the doctrine. Amongst other criticisms, Dykes takes an exception to Popper’s assertion that “all knowledge is hypothetical and conjectural”. Dykes say popper was wrong because it is simply not true that all ideas are conjectural. To buttress his contention, Dykes provides a list epistemic claims that are demonstrably true: ‘the sun shines’; Einstein’s Grandparent are dead; 2 + 2 = 4. A possible Popperian response might be that Dykes misses the point  Critical rationalist is a non-justificationist in the sense that it discards the justificationist position which states that only knowledge claims that are proven by reason and experience are valid, Critical rationalism abandon altogether the search for absolute validity and truth and holds that knowledge claims that knowledge claims which have passed the test of critical scrutiny could be held as tentatively true. 2

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of critical rationalism because the statement the sun shines is based on induction and it is possible that this might not be case in the future. For the other claims which appear to be settled claims in Dyke list, it could be argued that the truth of this statements ultimately depend on the senses, and since according to Popper, there can be no unprejudiced observations, these claims rest on shaky grounds (2002, 51). Again, if we factor in Descartes hypothetical demon, it is possible that our senses are being manipulated. A Related criticism of Popper is that his acceptance of Kant’s idea that perception is theory laden makes the verification or confirmation of any theory absolutely impossible. This is how Thornton puts the problem: If a theory X is to be genuinely testable (and so scientific) it must be possible to determine whether or not the basic propositions which would, if true, falsify it, are actually true or false (i.e., whether its potential falsifiers are actual falsifiers). But how can this be known, if such basic statements cannot be verified by experience? (Thornton 2016)

In other words, a basic epistemological premises of critical rationalism are faulty, therefore critical rationalism is flawed. There is no doubt that Popper’s argument that all perceptions are subjective -since there are no apprehension of “pure datum” creates a big problem for accepting any theory as true, including critical rationalism (Popper 1979, 145). Beyond the search for truth, however, and from a practical perspective critical rationalism commends itself, given the capacity to advance knowledge. If all knowledge is problem-solving as Popper is wont to argue then on the grounds of its practical utility, critical rationalism should be embraced. A second key word central to the discourse here is world-view. In general, the term world-view, often employed interchangeably with Weltanschauung, is defined by the New Penguin English Dictionary as “a particular conception of nature and purpose of the world” (Allen 2000, 1601). For Gardner and Stern, a world-view is a system of beliefs that provide cultures and individuals with general perspectives and vantage point from which to view the world (Gardner and Stern 2002). Haralambos et al. (2004) provide a similar definition: the image or picture of the world held by members of a society. Aerts et  al. (1994, 6) in their book, World-views: From Fragmentation to Integration conceptualizes world-view in a most comprehensive fashion, which bears been quoted at length: A world-view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world and in this way to understand many elements of our experience of as possible. Societies as well as individuals have always contemplated deep questions relating to their being and becoming, and to the being and becoming of the world…. A world view is a system of coordinates or a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about ourselves and the world into a global picture, one that illuminates’ reality as it is presented to us within a certain setting.

From all the definitions enumerated above, it is clear that a world-view is a collection of coherent conceptions, a frame of reference or symbolic system of representation by which a people interprets and understands reality. Thus a world-view is a social construct and not a God-given truth nor an objective postulate. They are not valid in

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any absolute sense. Nevertheless, they shape a people’s culture, norms, values and institutions. They also provide individuals with meanings, purposes and motives which ultimately drive or direct their actions. With this conceptualisation of world-­ view, we may now examine the idea of toleration. Etymologically, the term toleration is from the Latin word tolerare which means to put up with, endure or countenance. The words tolerance and toleration are sometimes used interchangeably. According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, among other meanings, Tolerance refers “sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing or conflicting with one’s own”, whereas toleration refers to the act of allowing “to be or to be done without prohibition, hindrance or contradiction”. The meanings highlighted above suggest that there is no fundamental difference between Tolerance and Toleration. At best, we could insist “tolerance” is a set of attitudes while “toleration” is a set of practices (Murphy 1997). Thus, we conclude that defining any of the terms would shed some light on the other. Generally speaking, toleration refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained (Forst 2017).

11.3  The Connection Between World-Views and Conflict From its inception one of the major preoccupations of the International Relations (IR) discipline has been to explain the causes of violent intra and interstate conflicts, a preoccupation which yielded several fruitful answers. From the IR perspective, the explanations of the causes of war is proffered at three distinct levels, namely at the Individual, the State and the Systems levels. The first locates the cause of conflict in the individual actor, focusing on human nature and his innate capacity for aggression. The second puts the emphasis on the state actors and their unique mix of capacities and characteristics, while the third simply seeks to highlight the features of the international system that makes for conflict (Kegley and Blanton 2011). Rarely do IR and security scholars explain violent conflict from the perspective of world-views. The dominant approach to explaining conflict tends to emphasis the material and immediate causes of war such as tyranny, the struggle for resources and the jostling for statal advantages —ignoring intangible factors such as world-­ views. There is, however, a small minority of scholars who had provided a lead in explaining conflict from a cultural/world-view perspective. (Huntington 1997; LeBaron 2002) These scholars, do not of course deny the three-level explanation in IR but they argue that conflict operates at different levels and any attempt at resolution must take the cultural/world-view dimension of the conflict. Schirch in LeBaron (2003) for instance identifies three levels of conflict: the material/analytical, the social/ relational and symbolic/analytic. LeBaron corroborates the above typology when she speaks of the material, the communicative and the symbolic levels of conflict. Conflicts are usually triggered by the manner in which material good or resources

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distributed, but often they involve real or imagined threats to identity and shared values. Thus, sometimes conflict do a have deeper dimensions beyond the scramble for material resources. History is replete with conflicts and wars which are fundamentally precipitated by hubristic world-views and the consequent intolerance towards the “other.” The Rise of Hitler in Nazi Germany and the extermination of six million Jews in the holocaust could be traced to particular elements of the German world-view promoted by Philosophers like Nietzsche who propagated the idea that Aryan race to which the Germans belong is the “locus of the master race” (Christian 2012, 498). The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East is another classic example of world-­ view-­based conflict. Since 1948, when the Isreali state was proclaimed, the region has never known peace. After Camp David and many other several attempts to bring the conflict to an end the conflict rages on till today. Although the conflict is often framed in terms of contestation for territory on the part of warring parties, it should be clear that their conflicting world-views is the reason why the Arab-Israeli conflict has become intractable. Elya similarly contends that the Arab-Israeli conflict remain deadlocked after so many wars and decades of bloodshed, because both the Israelis and a Palestinians are “ruled by interpretations of reality that fit each rival party’s national creed” (2016). As a continent largely populated by multicultural states which are creations of colonial interlopers, Africa is a major theatre of conflict in twenty-first century. From the religious jihad of Boko Haram raging in Northern Nigeria to the Tutsi and Hutsi genocidal conflict in 1990s to the incessant murderous attacks of Al Shabbab in Kenya and Somali, Africa is bedeviled by the specter of ethno-nationalist and religious conflict which has led to the unconscionable level of destruction of lives and property. It was estimated for instance that nothing less than two million people were killed in the Nigerian civil war which broke out in 1967 and came to halt in 1970 (Diamond 2007). In Sudan, the conflict for liberation claimed an estimated another 2million before Southern Sudan gained independence. Between Al shabbab and Boko Haram thousands have been killed. In fact, Cannon and Iyekekpolo, estimates that the operations of Boko haram alone had led to death of nothing less 20,000 people and the abduction of thousands, including members of the Nigerian security forces and female schoolchildren (Cannon and Iyekekpolo 2018). Many of the conflict highlighted above are remotely precipitated by exclusivist world-views. The Boko Haram insurgency ravaging Northern Nigeria, for instance, is a product of a militant religious ideology which saw Western education as a structure that systematically promotes alien and corrupting values. To forestall the incursion of alien Western values, the Boko Haram insurgent have unleashed violent destruction on their targets with the ultimate hope of establishing sharia enclaves that would be insulated from Western influences. Alex Thurston aptly describes Boko Haram when he surmised that her ideology was premised on a “religious exclusivism that opposes all other value systems including rival interpretations of Islam” (Alex u.d).

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11.4  Critical Rationalism and the Ethos of Toleration As we have adumbrated in the sections above, at the root of many of the conflicts in Africa and other parts of the world are incompatible and intolerant world-views that either demonises or diminishes the “other”. Such world-views create an atmosphere of ethnic or religious tension which sometimes breaks into full-blown hostilities. In contrast, the attitude the attitude of reasonableness or critical rationalism in Poppers view would undermine the prevalence of violence (Popper 1986, 3). In his article titled Utopia and Violence, Popper contends that rationalists would rather engage the force of argument than the argument of force in resolving a dispute. In his words: A rationalist, as I use the word, is a man who attempts to reach decisions by arguments and perhaps, in certain cases, by compromise, rather than by violence. He is a man who would rather be unsuccessful in convincing another man by argument than successful in crushing him by force, by intimidation and threats, or even by persuasive propaganda. (Popper 1986. 4)

The relevant question at this juncture is how can we undercut intolerant world-­ views and create open societies characterised by toleration as a first step towards developing the ethics of solidarity across cultures? Our proposal is that a widespread understanding and acceptance of import of the epistemological assumptions of critical rationalism will eventuate in the development of the ethos of toleration that is conducive to the harmonious coexistence of the diversities of groupings in the multicultural societies of Africa. In what follows we will make explicit the epistemological assumptions of critical rationalism and demonstrate how they could “neutralise” intolerant and hubristic world-views. The first major assumption of popper’s critical rationalism to be highlighted is its non- justificationist stance. Justificationism as we indicated earlier is the position that the only epistemic claims which can be proven by reason/or experience should be accepted. By extension any claim that fails to fulfil this criterion ought to be rejected. Popper (1994a, 434), however, points out that justificationism or what he calls uncritical rationalism contradicts itself in that it cannot in turn, be supported by argument or by experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded. The implication of Popper’s observation is that the justificationist cannot consistently hold to justificationism since his position not justified by its own standard. The internal contradiction in justificationism brings to mind a similar problem that philosophers have had to grapple with since the time of Aristotle, namely that the attempt to prove or justify all knowledge will ultimately lead into an infinite regress (Miller 1983, 50). Aristotle’s solution was that to avoid the regress, we must stop at some basic, self-evident premise. But Popper is not convinced; he maintains that there is no way to ascertain that the veracity of our basic premises.3  In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle examines the challenge of the regress problem that occurs when the justification of a claim depends on say premise P1 which in turn depends on Premise P2 and continues in that order indefinitely. Aristotle’s position is that the infinite regress is a false problem because it is not the case that justification continues indefinitely. The chain of justifica3

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The import of the above observation for all knowledge, including the truth of world-views should be very clear. It shows that all epistemic claims, perhaps with the exception of those that are analytically true, rest on shaky intellectual grounds. If this is acknowledged, then no one can claim absolute certainty for his/her preferred cultural or religious world-view. If anything, an awareness of the shaky premises of epistemic claims should evoke some form of intellectual humility from the proponents of any body of knowledge. Beyond seeing them as heuristic devices for making meaning of, and navigating, the world, world-views within Popperian epistemological framework are anything but eternal verities are anything but eternal verities. Thus, in multicultural societies where there are clashes of ideas, a realisation of the fact that the world-views are socially constructed; that they are not apodictic truths calls for the toleration of the “other” whose position may be different from mine. After all, to recall, a Popperian, line, “… I may be wrong and you may be right…” Quite apart from the shaky foundation of knowledge, a second related assumption of critical rationalism is the idea of fallibilism and verisimilitude. The quest for foundational and incorrigible knowledge is further vitiated by poppers claim that all knowledge is fallible and conjectural. Popper affirms the employment of reason in solving human problems, both theoretical and practical, but he was never under the “illusion that the unfettered use of reason is bound to produce truth or the absence of error.” Popper’s fallibilism appears to be partly informed by his acute awareness of the problem of induction on the basis of which he concludes that even when we have discarded certain theories based on the fact that they are falsified, we can only describe the remaining unfalsified theories as better but we can be never be certain they are true. At best, unfalsified theories with a high degree of corroboration can only be described as approximating verisimilitude or truth-­ likeness. In his book Open Society Popper expressed his idea of fallibilism in the following terms. First, although in science we do our best to find the truth, we are conscious of the fact that we can never be sure whether we have got it. We have learned in the past, from many disappointments, that we must not expect finality. And we have learned not to be disappointed any longer if our scientific theories are overthrown; for we can, in most cases, determine with great confidence which of any two theories is the better one. (Popper 1994a, 252)

The assumption of the fallibility of all knowledge is the reason why Popper insists on subjecting all knowledge claims to public scrutiny and criticism in the open society where freedom thought and unfettered deliberation are the order of the day. In the open society, scientific theories which could be considered on Popperian terms, to represent more precise knowledge claims, have to be subject to rigorous testing in order to decide whether they are to be modified, discarded altogether or retained as probably true theories (if corroborated). In such societies, it is to be expected, therefore, that world-views which in contrast to scientific theories

tions terminates at some point because our mind is capable of intuiting first principles or self-evident truth which becomes the foundation for subsequent justifications.

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encapsulates a welter of speculative claims definitely ought to be subject to much more vigorous criticisms to determine which epistemic claims are to be retained of discarded. Where some parts or the whole of a world-view are accepted because they survive the test of critical scrutiny, they remain from a Popperian point of view, fallible, tentative and open-ended knowledge claims which could be overridden in the future by new facts or unexpected change in natural conditions. Given the conjectural status of world-views and indeed of all knowledge, it becomes foolhardy to engage in violent conflict over differences in world-views, however diametrical opposed those differences maybe. In a world populated by open societies, world-­ views becomes hypothetical propositions which must be subjected to critical examination to determine whether their claims are to be retained or discarded. The open society or more specifically as it is conceived here, the epistemologically open society becomes a mechanism or antidote against the rise of fundamentalism, xenophobia, and fanaticism, vices that are often the derivatives of hubristic world-­views. In open societies world-views like all other epistemic claims will not be accepted at face value. They will not be regarded as the sacrosanct revelation of culture or the cogitations of unquestionable sages, instead they will be subject to rational criticism and as such aspects of the world-view that flies in the face logic and the respect for human dignity would be exposed in the process. This way the open society succeeds in demystifying the discordant and incompatible world-views and creates a society of where toleration provides the launch pad for mutual respect and solidarity. Just like intolerance flows from the supposition that our world-view are eternal verities which ipso facto excludes and invalidates other world-views, the demystification of the world-views through the process of logical scrutiny is bound to create the intellectual climate for the development of toleration in the open society. Fanaticism and fundamentalism certainly flows from dogmatic world-views that essentialises the difference between people but when the fallibility of such world-­ views are demonstrated and the dogmatic beliefs they encapsulate are shown to be false through rational scrutiny, the basis for fanaticism that may ultimately find expression in conflict is destroyed. Popper has suggested for instance that the need for implicit guidance and the desire to circumvent uncertainty have driven societies to develop common dogmas or world-views (1999, 8). According to him, the First World War could be traced to the “war psychosis” created by such common dogmas (Popper 1999, 42). However, these dogmas fall apart when they come under the strictures of rigorous examination. Thus, Popper (1999, 88) counsels us “to break with the dogmatic tradition of one pure doctrine and to replace it with a tradition of critical debate…” that will eventuate in critical pluralism which he described as a competition between theories or world-views through a process of rational discussion and their critical elimination (Popper 1994b, 191). It is in the context of open societies where dogmatic world-views are routinely subjected to critical debate based on the realization of the fallibility of all world-views that we can hope to eliminate dogmatic fanaticism and institute an attitude of toleration towards one another.

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11.5  Conclusion In this paper our aim has been to demonstrate that a widespread embrace of the epistemological assumptions of Popperian philosophy would catalyze the attitude of toleration which will ultimately eventuate from the realization that what is often paraded as knowledge at the very worst are disguised dogmas and at the very best are tentative verisimilitudes. In other words, dogma, the idea that as a set of beliefs which are absolutely true, becomes incoherent within the Popperian framework. Given the attitude and the method of critical rationalism and the idea of open society recommend by Popper, intolerant world-views which have precipitated conflict around the world are demystified, eliminating one of the major variables behind interethnic conflicts in Africa and other parts of the world. Clearly, the vision of more tolerant world promoted here will require a world populated by open societies that have embraced the principle of critical rationalism. The critical question that arises, perhaps for which there is no Popperian answer, is that in the light of the empirical fact that our world is filled with both closed and open societies how do we ensure that the spread of toleration or more precisely, the attitude of critical rationalism across the world? One can only conjecture that the current open societies would continue to consciously and systematically cultivate the attitude of critical rationalism and toleration with the hope that these virtues might be embraced by an increasing number of societies.

References Aerts, D., et al. 1994. World-Views: From Fragmentation to Integration. Brussels: VUB Press. Alex, Thurston. ‘The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram’s Religious and Political Worldview. Analysis Paper, 22 The Brookings Project. Allen, R. 2000. New Penguin English Dictionary. London: Penguin. Boulding, Elise. 2000. Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Cannon, Brendon, and Iyekekpolo. 2018. Wisdom, Explaining Transborder Terrorist Attacks: The Cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. African Security 11 (4): 370–396. Christian, L.  James. 2012. Philosophy: An Introduction to the Heart of Wondering. Boston: Wadsworth. Diamond, Sarah. 2007. Who killed Biafrans? Dialectical Anthropology 31 (1/3): 339–362. Dykes, Nicholas. 2003. Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism. Philosophical Notes 65. Elya, Lewin. 2016. The Inevitable Dead End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Cogent Social Sciences 2 (1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2016.1227294. Forst, Rainer. 2017. Toleration. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato. stanford.edu on 23/01/19. Gardner, T.  Gerald, and C.  Paul Stern. 2002. Environmental Problems and Human Behaviour. Boston: Pearson. Guelke, Adrian. 2012. Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. Haralambos, Michael, Martin Holborn, and Robin Heald. 2004. Sociology: Themes and Perspectives. London: Collins.

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Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Huntington, P. Samuel. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kegley, W. Charles, and L. Shannon Blanton. 2011. World Politics and Transformation. Boston: Wadsworth. LeBaron, Michelle. 2002. Bridging Troubled Waters. San Francisco: Wiley. ———. 2003. Cultural and World-view Frames. Current Implications. Retrieved from http:// www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cultural-­frames on 25/03/19. Mejer. 1987. Marxist and Neo-Marxist Interpretations of Ethnicity. Sociological Focus 20 (4): 251–264. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of English Usage. 1994. Springfield: Merriam-Webster, Inc. Miller, D.(ed).1983. A Pocket Popper. Fotana: Glasgow. Murphy, Andrew. 1997. Tolerance, Toleration and the Liberal Tradition. Polity 29 (4): 593–623. Popper, Karl. 1979. Objective Knowledge. London: Clarendon. ———. 1986. Utopia and Violence. World Affairs 149 (1): 3–9. ———. 1994a. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1994b. In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years. New York: Routledge. ———. 1999. All Life Is Problem Solving. New York: Routledge. ———. 2002. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. New York: Routledge. Thornton, Steven. 2016. Karl Popper. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on February 2, 2019, http://plato.stanford.edu. Wettersten, R. John. Karl Popper: Critical Rationalism. Retrieved on 5 February 5, 2019, https:// www.iep.utm.edu/cr-­ratio.

Chapter 12

“How Far May We Tolerate the Intolerant?” Assessing Popper’s Reflections on Tolerance from the Nigerian Polity Mohammed Akinola Akomolafe

12.1  Introduction Popper emphasizes that one makes her problem very clear in research. Following Popper, allow me to state clearly my problem – the skepticism tied to the application of his principle of toleration within the Nigerian space. Hence, I will argue within the pages of this research that to adopt Popper’s discourse on toleration to its logical conclusion for resolving the regional crises in Nigeria, will lead to chaos and anarchy rather than peace and mutual coexistence. Caveat however! I do not boast to have a better alternative that is overriding and encompassing than Popper’s. More so, I do not conclude irreversibly that Popper’s (1992) proposal is not feasible or applicable in other climes. My contention is my doubt, my colossal reservation or suspicion that Popper’s ideas on toleration can be beneficial for resolving Nigeria’s distinct regional crises. For this purpose, I begin with a brief articulation of the crises that present themselves in Nigeria. This is the first task that the next section concerns with. Afterward, I will provide an exposition of the argument of Popper on toleration and how to treat the intolerant. I will employ the method of conceptual analysis to patent that the notion of ‘law’ as understood by Popper is where the problem lies. The institution of the Sharia Code in many states in northern Nigeria with principles that run contrary to the 1999 Constitution makes Popper’s notion that the intolerant is against the law vague. It is difficult to decide who is working within or outside the law, in this context. Hence, it is from this inference that my doubt is sustained in the fourth part, as to whether or not Popper’s ideas can ensure peaceful and mutual cohesion in Nigeria.

M. A. Akomolafe (*) Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_12

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12.2  T  he Reality and Implications of the Regional Crises in Nigeria In a bid to making the contentions and agitations rocking Nigeria as vivid as possible, I will limit my gaze to three of the six geo-political entities of the country: South-south, North-east and North-central regions. This does not mean that other regions do not have problems or challenges peculiar to them. The regions that we focus on are presently embroiled in issues of national interest which affect directly and indirectly the other regions that we choose to be silent over. More so, the spates of violence and intolerance in the regions we are concerned with disclose ideological diversities that have led to violence, extremism and countless casualties. I will commence with the South-south. I will explain how the cases of oil spillages, destruction of aquatic and terrestrial habitats, and the worst of all, the perceived meagre allocation to the region, crude oil derivatives have led to militancy in the region. Writing on the state of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region of South-south Nigeria, Adati Ayuba Kadafa holds that: In general, the assessment of other researchers into this issue acknowledges that the oil industry has undoubtedly brought economic benefit to the Nigerian state but has left environmental pollution problems with visible physical destruction. The prevention of environmental degradation is a task that must be pursued vigorously (Kadafa 2012, 39).

Oil spillage is one of the evils done by Multinationals in the area. According to the Human Rights Watch (1995): “Oil spill is one of the major environmental hazards in the Niger Delta. This particular cause of environmental hazard contaminates water, destroy plants and animals. The causes of oil spill have been attributed to poorly maintained pipelines and ‘blow-outs’ of poorly maintained oil well.” A similar standpoint has been echoed by Emoyan, O.O et al. that: The major sources of degradation of forests, land and water in the region include oil spills, gas leaks, blowouts, canalization and the discharge of wastes and effluent from oil and gas operations directly into surface water bodies and the land surface (2008, 31)

Normally, one would blame the influx of technology into this region as Ofuasia and Okogie-Ojieko (2017, 41) have argued that the occurrences at the Niger delta region “divulges the gradual and persistent hunt for capital, through technology at the expense and disregard for life both terrestrial and aquatic. Technology that now seems to be holding humanity and everything she stands for at the jugular.” This inevitably leads to the alienation of human beings from specie-life. Perhaps this alienation has led to various environmental and demographic anomalies leading to call for consideration on the part of the indigenes of the region. Granted that the booming oil price provides the Nigerian government with over 95% of its export earnings. However, its extraction and production undermine the quality of the living standards of Nigerians, particularly members of the oil producing communities such as the Niger Delta region and those living closest to the oil wells (Babalola 2013, 31). Oil exploration and gas flaring activities continue to

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deplete the ecosystem in this region due to lack of compliance with environmental standards. The cancer rates are higher in this area than the national rates, and respiratory ailments are plaguing the residents (Babalola 2013, 31). There are regulations in place to protect the people, but no entity enforces them. Laws, guidelines, and standards put in place over 40 years ago are consistently ignored or implemented and interpreted loosely, which contributes to the extensive pollution that is not cleared up as required. It is likely the case that it is the persistent undermining of the laws that has led to the resort to arms by some of the residents. This is in line with the proposal of conflict theories which have shown that when a group’s shared grievances about marginalization are combined with a strong sense of group identity, there is a tendency for the outburst of violent responses against the source of their marginalization, either real or imagined (Gurr 1994, 89). This is the position of Hill (2012, 66) who reveals that “one of the main reasons the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) took up arms was to win justice for the country’s residents.” Oluwatosin Babalola (2013) who shares this perception furthers that the oil extracted from the region accounts for Nigeria’s failure in four ways: Firstly, it undermines the living standards of the residents; Secondly, oil is responsible for the emergence of militant groups and insurgents; Thirdly, emphasis on the oil sector has crippled other manufacturing sectors leading to endemic poverty and soaring unemployment rate; and Fourthly, “oil proceeds are being used to sponsor insurgent groups, and much of the high level corruption that is taking place in the country occurs in the oil sector” (Babalola 2013, 30–1). These are coming even after the amnesty granted to the militants by the late and erstwhile president of Nigeria Umar Musa Yar’adua in 2007. In a nutshell, “citizens, especially the armed groups in the Niger Delta, want to share in the revenue from the sale of oil and are disenchanted with the conditions in which they live” (Babalola 2013, 31). As a result, kidnappings, secessionist movements, and the destruction of pipelines and burning of oil wells continue to be aboriginal to this region. I turn now to the North-­ east region where the Boko Haram scourge is a nightmare. The Boko Haram sect is a product of regional violence original to North-east Nigeria. Boko Haram, loosely translated from Hausa into English means “Western education is forbidden.” Boko Haram from the foregoing claims that it is forbidden to partake in anything that is Western-motivated. This seems to follow from the caution in Al Qur’an that “anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors”1 (Chothia 2012). The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric in Maiduguri. The long term agenda is to overthrow the Nigerian government and then institute the Sharia Code in the country. In other words, the focus is to “sanitize the Nigerian system which is spellbound by Western education and ideals” (Onuoha 2012, 136). Boko Haram is motivated by the idea that the Nigerian society is morally bankrupt and “the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of

 For instance, see Al Qur’an 5:51 & 4:47

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political and moral deprivation” (Akanji 2009, 55). To make Nigerian government bow to the demands, the group has admitted responsibilities for various attacks, maiming and killings of the innocent citizenry. At this juncture, one needs to give a short note on the lethal activities of Boko Haram. The sect has claimed involvement in several bombing attacks in different parts of Northern Nigeria, showing that it is establishing a presence across the region and fuelling tension between Muslims and Christians. These attacks included (a) the military barracks attack on 2010 New Year’s Eve in the north-eastern city of Damaturu; (b) the 2011 Christmas Day bombings on the outskirts of Abuja; (c) the May 2011 bombing during President Goodluck Jonathan’s inauguration, and (d) the August 2011 bombing of UN headquarters in Abuja, which was also Boko Haram’s first attack against a Western target and its only transnational attack (Babalola 2013, 29). The most audacious and outrageous affair that attracted widespread international attention is the kidnapping of some 276 Chibok school girls in April 2014. As a result, there have been speculations concerning method used by the sect to press their demands. In this guise, “There have been wide variations and divisions in the literature over the agitations and desires of the Boko Haram group. Much of Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killings of innocent Nigerians, including children, raise questions about any sincere purpose other than being an evil organization” (Babalola 2013, 29). The activities of the sect however continue to reverberate occasionally making the North-east region a dreadful place to thread. Herder-Farmer Conflict persists in the North-central region of the country. As a way of highlighting the factors that engendered this conflict, the starting point is the Lake Chad. Recall that some forty years ago, Lake Chad used to cover an area that is at least 40, 000 square kilometres but has shrunk to no more than 1, 300 square kilometres (Fisman and Miguel 2008: 112). The gap is not only disturbing but the emaciation of the Great Lake continues unabated (Fisman and Miguel 2008, 111). As global temperature rises, the Sahara Desert expands southward, hence desertification (Olomola 2019, 4). What are the socio-economic menaces or implications of this trend? Among many others, it has forced the Fulani Herdsmen to the south and middle belt regions of Nigeria, for instance. Owing to this forced exodus, the Fulani Herdsmen have clashed with crop farmers leading to loss of lives and properties with severe implications for food security in the country (Olomola 2019, 2). It is also instructive to note that there are diverse dimensions and consequences to Herder-Farmer crises peculiar to the North-central region of the country. One of these is the ‘New Wave of Pastoralism’ (Olomola 2019, 3). One of the characteristics of this wave of pastoralism is disclosed through the herders’ conversion from sticks and machetes to ammunitions and automatic rifles to not only protect their herds from being carted away by thieves and bandits, but to also deliberately subdue farmers/rural dwellers whose farmlands are encroached by the herds (Olomola 2019, 6). Hitherto, the herders were not so vicious; the search for grazing resources, leading to the encounter with rural dwellers who are mostly farmers has accelerated the tension. The loss of grazing resources has pushed the pastoralists further down Southern Nigeria. The rifles and ammunitions come handy as a form of resistance

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against retaliation by farmers/rural dwellers whose farms and crops are being devoured by the herds (Olomola 2019, 6). The incursion through migration, into the space of the farmers in the North-central region has led to unaccountable losses in lives and properties. This has led the Nigerian government to initiate the National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016, which allows for the creation of grazing portions in other regions of the country. This Bill has generated many reactions as some see this as an incursion of the dangerous herdsmen into their regions. Owing to the above, it is now important to interrogate the functionality and validity of the notion of toleration of Popper to see how it may assist in the realization of a peaceful status quo.

12.3  C  ritical Rationalism, Tolerance and the Quest for a Stable Society One of the most crucial contributions of Popper to philosophy is the emphasis on tolerance as implied in his critical rationalism. Perhaps to understand his discourse on tolerance, one needs to begin with the main thrust of his critical rationalism. Critical rationalism is an intellectual orientation whose major exponent is Karl Popper. However, it should be stated that other scholars such as Joseph Agassi, Hans Albert, William W.  Bartley, Ian Jarvie, Noretta Koertge, Alan Musgrave, David Miller and John Watkins have amplified its thesis. Whereas this research acknowledges the contributions of other minds to the tradition of critical rationalism, this study will limit its scope to the discourse of Popper. Critical rationalism from the perspective of Popper implies “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience; it is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’” (Popper 1971, 225). It should also be mentioned that critical rationalism is thoroughly anti-justificationist. In this respect, it is an extremely radical approach that diverges from the entire tradition of epistemology, whether rationalist or empiricist. It is from this understanding that the idea of critical dialogue emanates. Critical dialogue is an inspiration from Karl Popper’s reflections on the growth of knowledge. Popper suggests that we should look to true theories that inform the world. According to Jeremy Sheamur (2019, 2), Popper “offers us an account of the kinds of characteristics which we should expect our theories to possess if they are to constitute steps along this path. Theories, he argues, should be bold, and testable. If we find that they run into problems, then we need to be ready to make changes in them.” Two points here are crucially important! Firstly, Popper hints on the urgency that our ideas are to be critically appraised, and highlighted the importance of refutation and criticism, not confirmation. The second point, which we find more endearing concerns the significance of the repeatability of tests, and the inter-subjectivity of appraisal. In other words, we must be ready to have our theories appraised and also to be negotiated in advance with its critics or potential critics.

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It is the conviction of Popper (1994, 50) that if we admit that our thoughts, theories, and method can be (or proved to be) wrong, we may learn from one another as we enter into dialogue with people whose ideas are (sometimes radically) differ from ours. Popper (2008, 313) makes his case more vivid with an insightful illustration. He points to the important but inconclusive dialogue concerning theories on science and metaphysics between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein. Popper reflects that these exchanges were of great value for the development of science even when they parted from their considerations with discrepancies (Sheamur 2019: 6). This is where toleration of varieties of opinions is underscored. I will now give focus to the notion of tolerance in Popper’s ideas more explicitly. Popper begins his exposition on tolerance with the stress on the role that intellectuals have played concerning theories or ideas that “have encouraged mass murder in the name of ideas, theories and religious teachings” (Sheamur 2019, 9). Popper’s inspiration concerning toleration draws from three angles: The Mosaic Law of ‘Thou shallt not kill,” Arthur Schopenhauer’s discourse on morality and Voltaire’s accentuation on tolerance as an aftermath of the error prone nature of humanity. As a result, Popper argues for critical pluralism and the rational intellectual exchange of ideas. This, for him, “is to be conducted with an awareness of our fallibility and he urges that should weigh up impartial reasons for and against our theories, and also the idea that we are likely to come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks” (Sheamur 2019, 9–10). In spite of Popper’s insistence that we tolerate for the sake of peace and mutual coexistence, it is also important to reveal his submission that we should not tolerate intolerance, cruelty, extremism, insurgency and similar ugly trends. In his words: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. – In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all arguments; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive; and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal (Popper 1945, 212).

The above excerpt clearly sums up Popper’s emphasis on the limitation of tolerance. Clearly, Popper does not endorse the tolerance of the intolerant person or ideas. Popper seems to hint that we should engage in intellectual exchange owing to his conviction that “if people are not to offend others, they need to understand what others find offensive and why” (Shearmur 2019, 11). A critical examination of the foregoing excerpt, however, discloses the place of law when one considers that last sentence. For the remainder of this essay, I will

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concern myself with this ‘given’ in Popper’s understanding as I reduce my axioms to ‘law’ as hold by the Sharia adherent and the non-Sharia adherent as reflection of my skepticism concerning Popper’s proposal on tolerance within the Nigerian space.

12.4  T  he Notion of ‘Law’ in Nigeria and Popper’s Discourse on Tolerance The Nigerian state is bogged down by so many anomalies that have it impossible for it to live up to its supposed expectations. Olumuyiwa Falaiye (2012, 43–44) is also of this persuasion when he opines that, “rather than face the serious task of policy formulation, security and defense, micro-economic policies, immigration and customs and those other things that require the stability of the commonwealth, government is bogged down by irrelevant tasks.” Perhaps the starting point to show how Popper’s (1945, 212) insistence that, “We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law” is to examine how the rule of law operates in Nigeria. It has usually been lauded that Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution tells a lie about itself right from the introduction as follows: “WE THE PEOPLE of the Federal Republic of Nigeria … Do hereby make and enact, give to ourselves the following Constitution” (Nwabueze 1999, 174). This assertion is the converse of reality as there is no way all the citizens of Nigeria would converge to make and enact for themselves, a constitution. It is however instructive to understand that the 1999 Constitution does not extend to all parts of Nigeria. It is important to disclose that in the core areas of the Northern parts of Nigeria, the Sharia Law far supersedes the Constitution. Ironically however, it is the Constitution but not the Sharia Law that grants citizens from these parts of the country, access to political offices in the three arms of governance. The Sharia which is closely-knitted with the religious culture of northern Nigeria seems to have a general appeal than the Constitution. The issue of religion is a sensitive one especially in this region. It is a form of socio-cultural identity for northerners (Isichei 1983). It does not only define the people; it defines their politics. This informed the decision by 12 out of the 19 northern states to subscribe to the Islamic legal code, Sharia, after it was first introduced in Zamfara State in 2000 (Alachenu, 2013). At this juncture, it is clear how difficult the idea of tolerance a la Popper becomes as it concerns the Nigerian space. On the one hand, the 1999 Constitution will be seen as a document that is being tolerated in the core northern states of the country. On the other hand, the Sharia is seen by other regions as framework that needs to be gazed cautiously and tolerated. So, there are the Constitutional law and the Sharia law and each of them seems to be tolerated. It is the emphasis on the institution of the Sharia and the open denigration of the Constitution that has informed the ideology of the Boko Haram that shares the locus that “the best thing for a devout Muslim

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to do was to migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political and moral deprivation” (Akanji 2009, 55). In the wake of the series of bombings and activities of the sect, Popper’s focus that we should not tolerate the intolerant as well as his conviction that, “…any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law” (Popper 1945, 212) will give rise to a status quo of persistent wars and oppositions. One would also have to be cautious concerning Popper’s position on who is outside the law since those who uphold the Constitution find the people who venerate the Sharia more to be “outside the law.” The converse also persists. It is therefore not impossible to draw that from Popper’s perspective; tolerance may be a laudable ideal. However, the consideration not to tolerate the intolerant can give rise to a status quo of enmity, suspicions, animosity as well as the constant perception of the ‘other’ as a lesser human.

12.5  Conclusion My principal focus was to point out in clear terms how Popper’s discourse on tolerance may not work in a multi-legal system like Nigeria, where the Sharia Code operates in the core northern states against the Constitution that holds in all other parts of the country. I have disclosed that it is difficult to reason, assuming Popper, the person who is more lawful between these factions. Assuming the one takes Popper’s idea not to tolerate the intolerant, he takes the Sharia Code as the basis of the law. Assuming the other obeys Popper’s injunction not tolerate the intolerant, he takes the Constitution as the basis of law and works to crush the ‘opponent’, the ‘other’. From this analysis, it is the case that Popper’s insistence that we tolerate the intolerant who has placed himself outside the law, especially within the Nigerian space will not do. It is therefore pertinent to deliberate and assess other options to avoid the seeming doom that will be initiated assuming Popper’s injunction is followed to its logical conclusion.

References Akanji, O. 2009. The politics of combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria. In Domestic terrorism in Africa: Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, ed. W. Okumu and A. Botha. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Alachenu, J. 2013. Constitutional amendment: One clause, many troubles. Punch Newspapers. Accessed May 31, 2019 http://www.punchng.com/politics/ constitution-­amendment-­one-­clause-­many-­troubles/ Babalola, Oluwatosin. 2013. Combating violent-extremism and insurgency in Nigeria: A case study of the Boko Haram scourge. Masters Diss. Centre for Global and International Studies and the University of Kansas

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Chothia, F. 2012. Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists? British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Accessed July 7, 2019 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­africa-­13809501 Emoyan, O.O., I.A.  Akpoborie, and E.E.  Akporhonor. 2008. The oil and gas industry and the Niger-Delta: Implications for the environment. Journal of Applied Sciences and Environmental Management 12 (3). Falaiye, Muyiwa. 2012. A philosopher interrogates the African Polis: How can we get it right? An inaugural lecture delivered at the University of Lagos, Main Auditorium. May, 16. Fisman, Raymond, and Edward Miguel. 2008. Economic gangsters: Corruption, violence and poverty of nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gurr, T.R. 1994. People against states: Ethno-political conflicts and the changing world system. International Studies Quarterly 38 (3): 347–377. Hill, J.N. 2012. Nigeria since independence: Forever fragile? New York: Palgrave. Human Rights Watch. 1995. Africa, Nigeria: The Ogoni crises: A case-study of military in Southeastern Nigeria 8. Isichei, Elizabeth. 1983. A history of Nigeria. London: Longman. Kadafa, Adati Ayuba. 2012. Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Civil and Environmental Research 2 (3). Nwabueze, B. 1999. Our Match to Constitutional Democracy. Law and Practice: Journal of the Nigerian Bar Association. (Special Edition). Ofuasia, Emmanuel, and Sonia Elizabeth Okogie-Ojieko. 2017. A further reflection on Martin Heidegger’s contemplation on technology within 21st century mode of being. Philosophia: E-Journal of Philosophy and Culture 17: 29–44. Olomola, A.S. 2019. Enhancing governance of Nigeria’s pastoral system for improved productivity, conflict prevention and resolution. A Paper Presented at the UNESCO MOST Syndicated Workshop, Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Nigeria. March, 29–30: 1–26. Onuoha, F.C. 2012. The audacity of the Boko haram: Background, analysis and emerging trend. Security Journal 25 (2): 134–151. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.15. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies, Volume I. London: Routledge. ———. 1971. The open society and its enemies, Volume II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 1992. In search of a better world. London: Routledge. ———. 1994. The myth of the framework. London: Routledge. ———. 2008. After the open society. London: Routledge. Shearmur, Jeremy. 2019. The distinctive character of Popper’s critical rationalism. Paper Presented at the Karl Popper for Africa International Conference. Lagos State University, Nigeria. March 28–31: 1–13.

Chapter 13

Falsificationism: In Defence of the Scientific Status of Marxism Maxwell Omaboe and Eromosele Eric Usifoh

13.1  Introduction Many scholars, among them being Robert Tucker (1958, 130), Kwasi Wiredu (1980, 90) and Karl Popper (1962, 17) as notable examples, have declared Marxism unscientific. This claim is based on some philosophical theories. Meanwhile, the scope of ideological development to be presented here as Marxism covers two phases of Marxian trends: Classical Marxism- the thought expounded by Marx and Engels; and Orthodox Marxism- featuring the era of ideological development immediately following the death of Marx up until Leninism. However, in Popper’s falsificationism one finds the most deep-seated hostility against Marxism as a scientific theory. A statement or theory is scientific if any observational means, at least in principle, is capable of conflicting with the claim. This inherent property alone renders a statement or theory scientific according to the falsificationist criterion. Now, when the observational means actually disagrees with the statement, the statement or theory becomes a falsified theory, albeit an obsolete science. In reacting to Marxism based on the falsificationist principle, Popper’s writes: In some of its (Marxism) earlier formulations (for example in Marx’s analysis of the character of the ‘coming social revolution’), their predictions were testable, and in fact, falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations of the followers, Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence to make them agree. In this way, they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device that made it irrefutable. They, thus, gave a ‘conventionalist twist’ to the theory; and by this stratagem, they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status (1962, 37).

The belief that this criticism has gained ground in the academic literature finds expression in Dick Howard’s (2002, 7) remark that the challenge of Marxism’s claim to scientific socialism lies in the theory’s inability to surmount Popperian M. Omaboe · E. E. Usifoh (*) University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_13

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query. However, in his account of falsificationism, Popper failed to synthesize Marxian claims to falsificationism, and so considered Marxian formulations unfalsifiable. Popper submits, as evidence, that the social revolution envisioned by Marx is what represents the unfalsified instance of Marxism. Yet, as far as Conjectures and Refutations is concerned, there is no elaborate account that logically demonstrates how this conclusion was reached anywhere. Perhaps, one must consider the condemnation of dialectics by Popper (1966, 336) in his later work, The Open Societies and Its Enemies, as what provides the needed argumentative basis for his contempt for Marxism as found in Conjectures and Refutations. The justification of this claim is, sooner than later, to be made evident. Marx used dialectics to point history in a particular direction of development which should see a necessary succession of capitalism by socialism, then to communism. This relationship between dialectics and human society presupposes that there is conditional statement with the truth of dialectics as the antecedent and the communist revolution as a deduced consequent. According to Popper’s recommended Modus Tollens rule for theory testing, if the consequent is proven false, the antecedent (dialectics) is likewise falsified (Popper 1962, 37). Popper is of the view that the character of the communist revolution is falsified. Popper regards some Marxian hypotheses as false. So put together, Popper regards Marx’s theory as falsifiable, because it was in fact “refuted by events that occurred during the Russian Revolution” (Popper 1992, 43). In the light of Popper’s criticism of Marxism as science, one may ask whether the arguments from Conjectures and Refutations and The Open Societies and Its Enemies suffice to unquestionably unseat historical materialism and by extension Marxist socialism from the latter’s claim to scientific status. There is the need, therefore, to revisit Marxist philosophy in order to examine Russia’s socialist revolution of October 1917 in the light of falsificationism. The rigorous application of the falsificationist criterion to historical materialism is intended to determine the scientific status of Marxism. This is the major task of this paper. In a recent article by Carl Bildt “Why Marx Was Wrong” published on the 9th of May 2018, Bildt expressed a similar sentiment to Popper to claim that Marx’s theory is rubbish, wrong and pragmatically dangerous. The problem which Popper himself finds with Marxism is that instead of accepting Marxism as falsified, followers of Marx expanded the scope of Marxism to provide immunity to Marxism from refutation (Popper 1962, 37). What this means is that the problem with the scientific status of Marxian philosophy, as far as falsificationism is concerned, relates to those orthodox interpretations that shield the theory from having to be considered falsified. However, when these interpretations are dissociated from Marxian formulations, the remains of Marxism would only be a falsified theory. According to the strict application of falsificationism, this must lead to the rejection of the theory in question. Therefore, it becomes part of the history of science. It is therefore on this basis that this paper examines the Socialist Revolution of 1917, whether the instance really falsified Marxism.

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13.2  T  he Russian Phenomenon of 1917: Where Marxism Became Falsified As a key element in his evidence, Popper suggests that the Russian Revolution of 1917 falsified Marxism. This is captured in the earliest indented quotation and supported by a text from Conjectures and Refutation (1962, 37) for which reason the phenomenon under discussion deserves special treatment. Popper’s criticism tends to remind us of Bildt’s allusion to Popper as Popper calls Marx a “false prophet” in The Open Societies and its Enemies (Vol 2). Popper’s premises are summarised succinctly in the following passage: I judge them (Marxists) by their standard, by Marxism; for according to Marxism, the proletarian revolution should have been the outcome of industrialization, and not vice versa; and it should have come first in the highly industrialized countries, and only much later in Russia (1945, 342).

In support of Popper, Anthony Kenny also writes: If Marx’s hypothesis had been correct, a revolution would have occurred soonest in those states in which technology, and therefore exploitation, was progressing fastest. In fact, the first communist revolution occurred in backward Russia and the developed countries of Western Europe… (2010, 973).

Popper seems to assume that the Russian phenomenon of 1917 missed the character of Marx’s anticipated revolution, therefore Marxism became falsified. However, we think that Popper commits a basic error, as his assertions purport a kind of fundamentally wrong linkage between the socialist revolution in a general and communist revolution in particular. The linkage seems to postulate that the socialist revolution (as it occurred in Russia) is supposed to be the same as the communist revolutions that Marx anticipated. For without this assumption, then, there would be no reason to suppose that the nature of the Russian revolution has missed what Marx anticipated, for which reason Marxism is considered falsified. The Russian revolution of 1917, although a socialist revolution, was not supposed to be considered same as a communist revolution. The former is a requirement for the transition to the latter. For according to Karl Kautsky (2000, 181) international tendency is coupled with world commerce, which was yet to take to its global rise as far as Russia’s primitive economic historical epoch in a discussion is a concern. In effect, the suggestion that the Russian revolution falsifies how the expected Marxian revolution is to occur is a mistaken analogy between two distinct events, the social revolution, and the communist revolution. Granted, Marx had mentioned that the revolution is most likely to occur in early industrialised countries like Great Britain and France. It was because these countries were experiencing expansion through industrialisation, owing to the abundance of labour supply, large deposits of minerals (e.g. coal in Britain) and availability of capital for investment (Perry et al. 2003, 129). The Russian revolution began in the winter of 1916 when a steep rise in prices caused by food shortages led to a decline in the real wages of metalworkers. Also,

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the conditions under which Petrograd (now known as Saint Petersburg) workers found themselves were extremely miserable with the said region recording the highest rate of an industrial accident. Workers were forced to partake in overtime work and often paid at standard rates excluding the overtime remunerations. This sort of exceeding misery finds expression in the fact that 34 strikes were witnessed in January of 1917 alone in Petrograd, with activists involved counting up to 24,869. On the 23rd of February 1917, multitudes of factory women filled the streets despite calls by labour leaders to suspend protests. The 24th of February witnessed 200,000 workers of Petrograd going on strike. By the 25th of February, clashes between state armies and the revolutionary class were underway. On the same day, the revolutionary group created its provisional government from members of the Duma, leading to the emergence of dual governing power in Russia. By 3rd of March 1917, the last Tsar of Russia – Nicholas II – had abdicated and Russia was free from the feudal government (Smith 2003). The preceding narrative shows the role that workers misery played in the Russian revolution. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx demonstrates that the intensification of economic crises, as technology advances, orchestrates inevitable friction between the two classes. From this, Popper rightly identifies that the first step for the realization of Marxian revolution consists of “an increase of wealth in the ruling class (in this case, Russian feudal lords), the bourgeoisie, and of misery in the ruled class, the workers.” Popper gets this point right. It is this increasing tension, according to Popper (1966, 344), which culminates in the inevitable social revolution. According to the Communist Manifesto, Marx envisioned the communist revolution as essentially constituting a change in the ownership of a property from the bourgeoisie to the working class. The establishment of a skilled workers’ committee for managing state enterprises, following the abdication of the last Tsar (with some being members of the old administration), was indicative of the birth of workers’ control over production (Smith 2003, 61). In practical terms, this was not the communist revolution Marx envisioned. As spelt out by the Communist Manifesto, preceding communism is a socialist state where the working class has wrested power and therefore would want to be at the helm of affairs. But they cannot be in power unless the remnants of bourgeoisie influence are completely exterminated. The remnant bourgeoisie power is however exemplified by the existence of the state, whose duty it is to suppress the antagonism between the working class (now the rulers) and the disenfranchised bourgeoisie class. The prior relationship between what Popper labelled as the Marxian prophecies and the Russian revolution that occurred in October 1917 suggests a profound influence of Marx’s teachings on Russia. Nonetheless, when the focus is on the removal of the Tsarist regime without consideration of the fact that they were replaced by the allied forces of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry class led by the left intelligentsia, then the main point would be missed. To miss this point would confuse what the Russian socialist revolution (rightly called a bourgeoisie revolution) entails, yet this socialist revolution is the required core as a transitional stage with Marx’s ultimate projection, the communist revolution.

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In Capital, Marx hints at the following: the ever-extending scale of expropriation of many proletariats by a few capitalists on a centralized basis, globalization of world markets and dominance of monopoly capital on the global market. All of these grow simultaneously with the misery of the proletariat class (1867, 542). In The Communist Manifesto, Marx mentions the formation of giant modern industries that monopolize productivity across the globe. These industrial armies are revolutionary pillars identified by Marx as the modern bourgeoisie. Their revolutionary role consists of overthrowing the rule of Feudal Lords. To be sure, eighteenth century Russia was generally backward as compared to Marx’s example of industrialized countries, France and England. Feudal societies, which typified the Russian economic setting before the revolutionary insurrections, existed as a middle ground between primitive and advanced economies. Feudalism has a close link with the advancement of productivity in agriculture. As an agrarian society, feudal societies owe their major economic activities to peasant farming (Ethridge and Handelman 2010, 44). If the family size outgrows the capacity of the land to feed them, the surplus is eaten by the family and in the long run, the family starves to death. A feudal society is therefore meant to function as maintaining an appropriate balance between peasant families and the availability of the means of production (Foster 2005, 14). The lead taken by England in terms of technological advancement explains why its bourgeois revolution occurred earlier in the 1640s (Foster 2005, 16). It was, therefore, Russia’s turn to take to the leap of bourgeoisie revolution, an economic transition from a feudal mode of production to industrial manufacture. Bearing in mind the Marxian call that “workers of all countries, unite”, the proletariat workers, forming 2% of the Russian population, were too insignificant for the instantiation of such a revolution. If this were not true, how then would one reasonably justify Trotsky’s (2002) claim that communism (especially as practiced in less advanced Russia) cannot survive unless its borders are widened to incorporate other nations (Jackson 1999, 846)? In fact, of the 182 million inhabitants of Russia, less than a fifth lived in towns (Smith 2003, 5). Again the fronting intellectual elites (intelligentsia) of the proletarian class were dedicated to fighting not for the improvement of the conditions that plagued their followers but for ensuring their dominion over the ruled class and for shaping the mentality of the productive class. The 1917 February revolution in Russia does not merit the rendition “communist revolution”. Its name is clear, a bourgeoisie revolution and not a communist revolution. Therefore, the clear distinction between the bourgeoisie revolution and the (ultimate) communist revolution ought to be acknowledged in buttressing the point that the occurrence of the former does not falsify the possibility of the latter. The overthrow of exploitation was not allowed to be orchestrated by the unfolding venom of a dialectical drive. Its causes were largely political flaws and not economical. Smith (2003, 69) could not have minced words when he referred to it as such. As for the October Revolution, it was motivated by five key factors. It sought to challenge the private ownership of property, feeling of nationalism, the veracity of religion, the institution of family, liberalism in politics and human relations which

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extended opportunities regarding the extermination of a race, and class inequalities (Chamberlin 1942, 5). The October Revolution, even though also a socialist revolution, cannot be equated with the predicted Marxian communist revolution despite some close analogical relations between the envisioned communist revolution and the political upheavals of October 1917. It should be clear that the allusion to the October Revolution as a falsification instance of Marxian prediction, most probably because Marx foresaw the revolution was most likely to occur in industrialised countries and later in backward countries, is not based on a thorough analysis of the available literature. The following commentary from Giddens quotation is a concise summary to that effect: But the October revolution took place in a country which was one of the least advanced in economic terms in Europe. It was not the clarion call for the revolutionary overthrow of Western European capitalism which Marx anticipated when, late in his career, he accepted the possibility that the communal organization of the mir could allow Russia to move directly to Socialism. Instead, it was a stimulus to revolutionary change only to countries of comparable or of a lower level of economic development than Russian itself (2008, 245).

Under Stalin’s rule, the Russian economy embarked on collectivisation of the means of production, which constitutes the first and foremost important feature of the communist revolution. However, the upheavals that had previously occurred in February 1917 had created a gap in terms of central control of Russia’s economy. First, the Supreme Council of National Economy was set up to fill the political gap and later by the Bolsheviks seizure of power under the leadership of Lenin in October. Lenin himself had conceded by 1906 that the direct movement from autocracy (which governed feudal Europe) to socialism was not possible owing to the unavailability of the ripe conditions for initiating socialism (Smith 2003, 218). It was a political crisis dating back to the February 1917 revolution for which a Marxist (Lenin) sought to experiment with his knowledge of Marxian theory but in the absence of the necessary preliminary conditions needed to instantiate the communist revolution. The cause of the October revolution was purely political ineffectiveness. After the event of bloody Sunday in Russia (1905), Lenin indicated that the proletariat class must retain their association with the Social-Democrats and remind themselves of the goal of ridding humankind of exploitation (Hookham 1967, 646). This clearly shows the intention of Lenin to experiment with the philosophy of Marxism given the opportunity of the crisis thereof. It was when Lenin seized power that he began to exercise an ideological match towards a communist state (Rogers 1992, 248). It was not surprising that, by 1918, Lenin had realised that the political structure was there but not the economic order (material base) needed to instantiate a revolution according to the communist project (Smith 2003). To push our conclusion through with further evidence, two issues are drawn from Engels’ letter to Zasulich in 1885. In the letter, Engels defines the Russian revolution as one that indicates Russia’s approach to 1789. However, the 1789 revolution in France is however categorically described by Marx as having “abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property” (Communist Manifesto). We are hereby led to the conclusion that the Russian socialist revolution was Russian’s turn in the

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course of dialectical revolutionary stages of society to experience its bourgeoisie revolution as it happened. If this inference is plausible enough, then one would have expected, as it occurred in France, property relations to be under the control of the bourgeoisie. The very fact that workers took control of the means of production, as applied to Russia’s case, vindicates the position taken here that the theory of Marxism was being forced by Lenin under premature economic conditions and hence a direct misapplication of Marxism. Again, Engels declared in the same letter: Supposing these people (Russians) imagine they can seize power, what does it matter? Provided they make, the hole which will shatter the dike, the flood itself will soon rob them of their illusions. But if by chance these illusions resulted in giving them a superior force of will, why complain of that? People who boasted that they had made a revolution have always seen the next day that they had no idea what they were doing, that the revolution made did not in the least resemble the one they would have liked to make (Marx and Engels 2000).

As such, formalisation could be established with the bourgeoisie revolution under the label ‘Leninism’, which Sabine and Thorson (1989, 725) define as “An adaptation of Marxism to non-industrialized economies and with a society with a prevailing peasant population.” Ultimately, the quest to demonstrate the falsity of Marxian prophecies on the anvil of the failures of the Russian revolution must be declared in unequivocal terms as a misguided analogy. The Russian revolution does not falsify Marxian prophecies. As two discrete items, the former is a necessary transitional stage required for the manifestation of the latter. Accordingly, the Russian revolution, far from serving as refuting orthodox Marxism, strengthens our anticipation of the communist agenda. The specter of communism which Marx predicted would haunt Europe has not been falsified. Indeed, set on its toes, it is gradually haunting the world at large.

13.3  F  rom Karl Marx to Kwame Nkrumah: The Science of Building an Ideal Africa We have established that Marx advocated for a revolution towards a communist state. This has inspired a number of societies to adopt the communist ideals. As in many other societies, Marxism inspired socialism to Africa. By way of this inspiration, we subscribe to Nkrumaism (the political ideology of Kwame Nkrumah) as the scientific basis typifying the construction of African ideal state. We do not claim originality in this situation. Some African independent leaders, notably Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Tom Mboya and Nkrumah, borrowed elements of Marxism to suit the African background. Nkrumah, in particular, attributes his political thought to Marx and Lenin and claims that all solutions to our problems are to be found in the philosophy of Marx and Lenin (Mehdi 2018, 541). Vladimir Lenin (1999, 9) writes, “Unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and its political and social significance is appreciated, not a step can be taken toward the solution of the practical problems. Thanks to Rooney (2007,

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36), Nkrumah, (1969, 56), Lenin (1999, 9), and Britwum (2017, 5–9) we now know the socio-economic challenges of Africa which has been blamed on colonialism and neo-colonialism, as indisputably the functions of capitalism. Therefore, capitalism, as exemplified by colonial rule, is a key contributing factor to Africa’s underdevelopment. To understand how colonialism militated against Africa’s development. First of all, colonialism disrupted the solidarity and goodness of the African communalist social order. In the words of Nkrumah, “In the traditional African society, no sectional interest could be regarded as supreme; nor did legislative or executive power aid the interest of any particular group. The welfare of the people was supreme. But colonialism came and changed all this” (Botwe-Asamoah 2005, 53). What we have in place of this communalist solidarity is a forgery, bribery, and corruption, all of which are attendant evils of colonialism, for they were not known until the coming of the Europeans (Rooney 2007, 81). The new order instituted by colonialism instigated the perpetration of economic exploitation. According to Engels (1996), this contradiction of someone working and another person pocketing the surplus-value is the impetus of social inequality which bears nothing but an unjust state. Hence, African political independent leaders, Nyerere for example, advocate for a move away from exploitative state to Ujamaa: the concern for brotherhood or familyhood; an idea which he thinks is originally African and hence the name African socialism (Okeregbe 2012, 45). For Nyerere, Ujamma is an attitude of the mind which ensures that individuals care for one another. As such, it is a prescriptive call to duty that requires the African to impose a welfare responsibility towards others on himself (Okeregbe 2012, 49). By so doing, Nyerere thought the idea of a class that is alien to Africa could be eliminated. For he writes: “I doubt if the equivalent of the word class existed in any indigenous African language (Nyerere 1968, 12). First of all, every societal epoch is a specific stage of development occasioned by the existing productive forces. For that matter, as Okeregbe rightly points out, advocacy for reinstatement of a past mode of production without the corresponding degrading of the available forces of production constitutes unattainable levels of thinking and hence utopian. The more serious problem is that any theoretical approach to solving African political predicaments that appeals to the conscious state as Ujamaa essentially does turns the table on its head. We are in full sympathy with Nyerere’s view that it is the attitude of the mind that inculcates welfare responsibilities for one another and hence eliminates greed. But as we have already shown regarding Lepore (1993), the world of ideas are themselves informed and typified by the existing mode of production from which they take their identity. For as Engels (1997, 73) avers, it is not one’s consciousness that defines his being, but it is one’s social being that determines his consciousness. Nyerere’s Ujamaa is anti-capitalist in spirit and hence worthy of commendation. Nonetheless, his focus on the superstructure; the moral plea to the conscience of individuals as his recommended approach to fighting the relics of capitalism is unfortunate. Nyerere is however interesting, as he gave a socialist mentality a try in his quest to set Africa on a development path. The fight for political independence rids a society only of old-fashioned colonialism and yet, as Nkrumah (1965, ix) avers, in place of colonialism as the main

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instrument of imperialism, we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-­ colonialism is that the political policies, as well as economic systems, are controlled from outside the sovereign independent state. A neo-colonialist power is not necessarily the state power that formerly colonized the independent state. Neo-colonialism is about the flow of financial capital and control of the financial market. For Nkrumah, neo-colonialism is the worst level of imperialism. Not only does the victim country lack the power to self-determination of destiny, but neo-colonialism is also an exploitative tool lacking the opportunity for redress (ibid, xi). For development, Africa owes it as a prima facie duty to turn the capitalist ordeal into the Nkrumaist ideal. What is to be done amidst this challenge? Nkrumah claims that neo-colonialism is the final stage of imperialism. Thus, neo-colonialism, in the illusion that it raises the living standard of victim countries in the form of foreign aids, is, in fact, a victim of its unfolding contradictions (Nkrumah 1965, xv). It is instructive to understand that neither can the goodwill of the developed power nor the wilful granting of economic freedom by the neo-colonialist ruler a possible solution expected from the neo-colonialist power. For the vested interest of the colonial power is to keep the victim state perpetually at the ruler’s mercy. Here we are in Africa. For the integument of neo-colonialism to burst asunder, Africans must present a unified economic front. Members of the African continent, unite! The evil of neo-colonialism works by obstructing the formation of large units that could prevent “limited wars” (Nkrumah 1965, xi). As said earlier, neo-­ colonialism is an extended policy of divide (the economy into unstable pieces) and rule. As the major instrument of neo-colonialism, balkanization which finds expression in Nigeria’s federalist system and the rejected federalist state proposal presented to Ghana before independence is no ill-intent exceptions to the phenomenon (Nkrumah 1963, 57). Whilst Marx called for unification on the part of the proletarians, the chief thesis of Nkrumah’s Africa must unite is a call for a united African economy as the measure to combat neo-colonialism. The unity of the African economy makes way for a common market to consolidate any division of the African market economy which forces competition among the African economy to sell raw materials at cheaper prices to the foreign economy. Nkrumah’s political administration suggests pieces of evidence to his commitment to a socialist policy that fosters economic independence. Using Ghana as an example, in 1961, over 60 new state-­ owned factories were opened to compete with multinational capitalism (1963, 111). The unity of the economies, coupled with industrialization denies capitalism of its major “oxygen”, competition among agrarian societies. Devoid of competitive tension, Africa at will can control its destiny in the form of economic decisions (ibid, 163). Nkrumah reiterates his commitment to the unity of African economies, as he writes in Neo-colonialism, the highest stage of imperialism: “a continent like Africa, however much it increases its agricultural output, will not benefit unless it is sufficiently, politically and economically united to force the economic world to pay it a fair price for its cash crops” (Nkrumah 1965, 8).

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13.4  Conclusion In conclusion, we can say that Popper’s philosophical methodology of science validates the scientific basis of Marxism. Marxian formulations which consist of coherent strings of claims augmenting the requirement of empirical adequacy has been demonstrated. From the first premise (i.e. the priority of serving our material needs), society gradually leads to the establishment of the communal mode of production, which is where all societies started. The dynamism of dialectics generates the needed contradiction and society breaks apart into the exploiter and the exploited. Global economic indications point to the gradual ripening conditions needed to exterminate the contradiction. Far from serving as a falsified instance, the Russian phenomenon of 1917 is proof of the inevitability of the communist agenda as deducible from dialectics. Some African political independence leaders adopted an Africanised model of Marxist scientific socialism as the way to set African countries on a development toe. Nkrumanism carries the fight from appeals to the superstructure to the call to unify African economies. Nkrumah’s institution of numerous state-owned factories in 1961 sheds of evidence of his commitment to providing a central non-bourgeoisie market. Because it is inconsistent to regard Popper’s falsificationism as an apt demarcation thesis whilst rejecting the scientific status of Marxism, Nkrumanism continues to remain a scientifically viable framework for organising the development of Africa.

References Bildt, Carl. 2018. Why Marx was wrong. Retrieved from https://www.project-­syndicate.org/commentary/why-­marx-­was-­wrong-­by-­carl-­bildt-­2018-­05?barrier=accesspaylog on 02/25th/2019. Botwe-Asamoah, K. 2005. African studies: History, politics, economics, and culture. London: Routledge. Britwum, Atta. 2017. The lure of the image in the mirror: A reading of Kwame Nkrumah’s towards colonial freedom. Legon Journal of the Humanities. https://doi.org/10.4314/ljh.v28i1.2. Chamberlin, William Henry. 1942. The Russian Revolution 1917–1942. The Russian Review, Vol. 2, No. Wiley on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/125268 on 10/03/2018. Engels, Frederick. 1996. .Anti-Dühring: Herr EugenDühring’s revolution in science. Retrieved from http://www.marxist.org/archive/marx/works/1877ad-index/htm on 11/11/2017. ———. 1997. Socialism: utopian and scientific. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Ethridge, E. Marcus, and Howard Handelman. 2010. Politics in a changing world: A comparative introduction to political science. 5th ed. London: Wadsworth, Cengage learning. Foster, John. 2005. Class struggle and the industrial revolution: Early industrial capitalism in three English towns. London: Methuen &Co. Ltd. Giddens, Anthony. 2008. Capitalism and modern social theory: An analysis of the writing of Marx, Durkheim and Marx Weber. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hookham, Maurice. 1967. Reflections on the Russian revolution. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), 43(4). Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International. Retrieved from: Affairs http://www.jstor.org/stable/2612802 on 16/12/2017.

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Howard, Dick. 2002. The specter of democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Jackson, Joseph Spielvogel. 1999. World history: The human odyssey. New York: National Text Book Company. Kautsky, Karl. 2000. The class struggle. Swiss: Charles H. Kerr &Co. Kenny, Anthony. 2010. A new history of western philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lenin, Vladimir. 1999. Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism. Sydney: Resistance Books. Lepore, Mike. 1993. Engels’ speech at the grave of Karl Marx. London. Retrieved from https:// www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.htm on 13/09/2017. Marx, Karl, and Engels, Frederick. 1867. Das capital. Retrieved from http://www./marxists.org/ archive/marx/letters/index/.htm on 3/12/2017. ———. 2000. Collection of correspondence. http://www./marxists.org/archive/marx/letters/ index/.htm on 3/12/2017. Mehdi, Syed Eesar. 2018. Re-inventing Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral’s critique of colonialism. International journal of research in humanities, Arts and Literature 6 (6). Nkrumah, Kwame. 1963. Africa must unite. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. ———. 1965. Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism. New York: International Publishers. ———. 1969. Consciencism, philosophy, and ideology for decolonization. Retrieved from https:// libyadiary.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/consciencism-­philosophy-­and-­the-­ideology-­for-­ decolonization.pdf on 9th/02/2017. Nyerere, Kambarage Julius. 1968. Ujamaa: Essays on socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. Okeregbe, Anthony. 2012. In A study in African Socio-Political philosophy, ed. A.  Okeregbe, S.B. Jegede, and D. Ogunkoya. Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Perry, Marvin, Joseph R. Peden, and Theodore H. Von Laue. 2003. Sources of the Western tradition. 5th ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Popper, Karl. 1962. Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York/ London: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1966. The open society and its enemies. Vol. 1-2. 5th ed. Rogers, M. Perry. 1992. Aspect of western civilization: Problems and sources in history. 3rd ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. Rooney, David. 2007. Vision and tragedy. Accra: Sub-saharan Publishers. Sabine, H. George, and L. Thomas Thorson. 1989. A history of political theory. 4th ed. New York: Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Smith, Stephen Anthony. 2003. Red Petrograd. New York: Cambridge University Press. Trotsky, Leon. 2002. In defence of Marxism. Retrieved from http://www./marxist.org/archive/ trotsky/idom/dm/dom.pdf on 20/11/2017. Tucker, Robert Charles. 1958. Marxism – Is it religion? Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Wiredu, Kwesi. 1980. Philosophy and African culture. London: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 14

Karl Popper’s Critique of Nationalism: Exorcising Tribal Mentality in Modern African Society Olayemi Salami

14.1  Introduction The African continent is a mosaic of tongues, culture, tradition and religion. Africa is a heterogeneous society with a history of slavery, colonialism and imperialism. A continent with leadership deficit, strife, war, political impasse, economic dependency and social inequalities. Africa is not alone in this encumbrances. Although all the other continents have their moments of negativism, it seems Africa is a continent condemned to strife both interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflicts have spiralled to exponential level, most of these conflicts are ethnic related and are not well managed by the political class, some of whom instigate and promote them for personal reasons. Ethnic conflict is a symptom of leadership failure which has greatly inflicted Africa with crises of political impasse, economic underdevelopment, social disorientation and poor nation-building. This paper is therefore an attempt to discuss the impacts of ethnic related strife on nation building in Africa.

14.2  Origin of Violent Conflicts in Africa The theoretical framework to be employed for this paper is the Social conflicts theory. Conflicts occur when actors pursue incompatible goals (Galtung 1973), and they happen in all human interactions. Social conflicts often occur in human society as responses to shortfalls in scarce resources, when actors struggle for power and prestige and in the process of achieving these they try to neutralize, injure or eliminate their opponents (Ologbenla 2017, 127). Conflicts are, therefore, inevitable in

O. Salami (*) University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_14

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human society. They are ineradicable. They are parts of human existence. They are rooted in human nature. In pre-colonial African societies; there were intra and inter-ethnic relationships that were either cordial or acrimonious (Babawale 2003, 19). The people of Africa had their ways and methods of interactions, association, legislation and commerce. There were also traditional political systems prevalent in Africa, though not democratic in the western sense, but acceptable to the people (Osemeka 2017, 19). However, the advent of colonialism in Africa led to the Berlin conferences of 1884/1885 by various European countries viz.: Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. The result of the Berlin conference led to the partitioning of Africa, most especially along economic lines. The dismemberment of African societies was not based on ethnic congruence but based on the economic interests of the European powers. Part of the effects of this partitioning is what confronts the continent of Africa in terms of persistent ethnic strife, violent religious crisis, poor nation-building, weak states failed states and collapsed states. Some of these hostilities have extended to post-colonial periods; viz.: Hutus against Tutsi in East Africa and the Mandiga/Hausa cultivators against the Fulani pastoralist in West Africa (Rodney 1981, 52). Without a doubt, the advent colonialism stultified the pre-­ colonial patterns of inter-ethnic intemperance which manifested in crises and wars (Akaruese 2003, 21). The post-colonial African society was characterised by a “breakdown of communication among natives” (Afisi 2009, 64). As a result of the partitioning, what now exists in post-colonial Africa are people of different tribes who speak different languages but were artificially bound together. These are people with supposed different or varied cultural and political administrations. These are People who never understood each other’s languages (Afisi 2009, 64). Post-colonial Africa also became highly centralized independent African states. Most of these states only exist by what Obafemi Awolowo (1947) called a mere geographical expression. To Akaruese (2003, 216), they are considered as a “manifestation of unbridled artificiality, inherent in colonial contraption”.

14.3  African Politics and Tribal Mentality Both the intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in postcolonial Africa are products of many factors. Some of these factors include; the divide and rule policy orchestrated by the colonialists as tactics to prevent the colonies speaking with one voice in order to continue their hegemony with little or no opposition; the new comprador leaders that emerged after independence had the same mentality like the imperial lords. They see themselves as lords of the state and the ruled as serfs. In other to silence any form of opposition to their rule, they sometimes declare one party system as state law, as it has been experienced in Cote d’ lvoire, Zambia, Senegal, Guinea, Cameroon, Malawi, and Sierra Leone. Even in places where two party or multiparty systems exist, the ruling party acts with impunity; opposition members are

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often hunted and hounded to submission or imprisoned, as it can be noticed in Nigeria, Malawi, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Groupson-­ Paul 2009). As it has been earlier mentioned, the partition of Africa at the Berlin conference in 1884/1885 set in motion the present politics of ethnicity pervading the continent. The impacts of the partioning on post-colonial Africa among other things; is fusion of ethnic groups in one polity, which consequently created multicultural societies within a state, thereby, resulting in failure of nation building and fragile nation-state. This action is further exacerbated by the inability of post-independence African leaders entrusted with governance to manage the ethnic diversities and forge unity among the plural ethnic groups. The failure of the political elites is encapsulated by A. Agbaje who opines that: “African leaders are known to purse dangerous policies, postures and statements to the utmost limits of national safety, survival and stability. Some political elites in Africa also prefer fission to fusion; coming apart rather sticking together at moments of great national crises. Furthermore, African political elite encourages a neo patrimonial distributive politics rather than a developmental state system” (Agbaje 2003, 2).

Two major acts percolate African politics, and determines who gets what in resource allocation: the politics of Prebendalism, which implies; allocation of political offices for exploitation and benefits of their immediate communities (Joseph 1987); and the politics of patrimonialism, which connotes the distribution of political offices based on patrilineal line and in exchange for political benefits (Lemarchad 1972). These acts have become tools deployed by some of these leaders to entrenched their positions and consolidate their powers in many African states. This apparent ethnic card displayed by African leaders sometimes result into resentment, protest, apathy and in worst scenario, violence, rebellion or outright war if the affected ethnic group(s) perceives that the system put in place is inimical to its interest and survival. Examples abound: Tiv against the Nigerian government in 1964/1965; Adaka Boro of the Ijaw nationality against the Nigerian government in 1966; The Niger Delta militants against the Federal Republic of Nigeria and international oil company in the Nigerian fourth republic; Nigerian civil war between the Nigerian military government and Biafra separatists. There were also the two Sudanese civil wars between North and South; the Ethiopian Civil War between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean separatists called the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front; and the Hutus and Tutsis genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. In order to continue their stronghold on power, many African leaders tap into their ethnic identities for purposes of survival and support; as observed in Uganda under Museveni, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Togo under late Gnassigbe Eyadema and his son Foure Eyadema, Malawi under Kamuzu Banda, Democratic Republic of Congo under late Laurent Desiree Kabila and his son Joseph Kabila, Gambia under Yayaha Jameh, Liberia under Samuel Doe, Ivory Coast under Laurent Gbagbo, and in South Sudan under president Salva Kier. Historically, ethnic crises in postcolonial Africa have consummated into: military coups, counter coups, insurgencies and war. However, the reason why ethnic

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strife was not pronounced during the colonial era was because the colonial powers were able to suppress ethnic tension and crisis by their repressive use of state cohesive apparatus in their respective colonies. British in Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana; Belgium in D. R Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. France in Cote’ de lvoire, Cameroon, Mali etc. The artificial creation of states in Africa was maintained by the coercion of the European powers. One important point of note is that the struggle for independence embarked upon by the different nationalists made ethnic differences to take the back seat. The nationalists forged a common formidable front against their colonialists. This minimized intra ethnic friction and scuffle. The believe was that as soon as self-rule was attained, other things shall be addressed.

14.4  L  eadership, Ethnic Conflicts and Nation Building in Africa Most African states are afflicted with leadership deficit and most if not all African states are heterogeneous. These two realities have led to factionalization of the social, economic and political system. The mechanism for dealing with such pluralism put in places had also failed in many African states, because some of these leaders initiated or manipulated ethnic conflicts to their own advantages. Africa is thus confronted with leadership crisis and crisis of governance. The crisis of governance is prevalent in Africa (Pumphrey 2003; Ottoh 2016). Some African leaders see their states as their personal property and political leadership as their divine rights. They misrule, misappropriate, misplace and mismanage the economy, and corruptly enrich themselves, friends and family members (IDEA 2000, 94). Any opposition to their maladministration is seeing as treason. They see themselves as the state and promulgate laws according to their whims and caprices. These scenarios were witnessed in the Military era of General Idi Amin of Uganda, General Babaginda of Nigeria, the civilian rule of Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Sesse Sekou of DR Congo, Yayah Jameh of Gambia, Omar Bongo of Gabon and many more. In all these countries, nation-building was impeded as relations between the leaders and the masses were strained. In many of these states ethnic differences became tools deployed by their leaders to further divide the people and consolidate their hold on power. This is a factor that weakens nation building, as various ethnic groups, rather than hold allegiance to the countries, become cocoons to their nationalities. Furthermore, some of the African leaders got to leadership positions through coup d’état, and later transmuted to civilian leaders. They see their positions as hereditary in such a way that upon their deaths, the baton of leadership and governance will rest on their children either through ascription or fraudulent electoral process. It was through this father to son crass opportunism that Joseph Kabila of D.R Congo, Faure Eyadema of Togo Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon and Mahamat Indris Derby of Chad became rulers in their respective countries. This disoriented

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and disconnected the people from active participation in nation building especially if the people perceived such leaders to be ethnic bigots. Class conflict among African political elite sometimes degenerate to using ethnic proclivity to whip up primordial sentiments in order to gain or retain power in plural societies. The Cote d’ Ivoire crisis between former leader Laurent Gbagbo and present president Alessane Quattara is one example of class conflict turned to ethnic conflict in Africa. However, it is not all conflicts in Africa that are ethnic coloured; some are religious, economic, political or clannish oriented, as observed in Somalia. A nation of clans, where every clan had disintegrated into its traditional clan segments (Loan and Mayall 2007, 118).

14.5  Popper’s View on Tribalism and Its Mentality In applying Popper’s view on what has been described as the underlying problems of tribalism in African politics, one will be apt to assert that all these crises are avoidable if Africans can exorcise their tribal mentality. This is espoused by Karl Popper in his critique of nationalism. Popper criticised nationalism, and proclaimed that nationalism is characteristically a ‘closed ideology’ akin to totalitarianism and the precise opposite of liberalism. Although the nationalists would support an agenda of national identity and the proclamation of one’s tribal or ethnic rights, Popper saw this as profoundly dangerous. Popper saw that view as akin to claiming rights of a collective social entity, such as a city, a state, society, a nation, or a race. Popper believed that it is the mentality of tribalism that makes a certain people who strongly hold the view that their tribe or ethnic group is stronger than others, or that their own tribe or ethnic nationalities are the chosen ones, thus, want to dominate or super-impose their wills on others. This tribal mentality, according to Popper made the Nazis, for instance, to emphasize the needs of the Aryan race to justify their brutal policies, whereas communists in the Soviet Union spoke of class aims and interests as the motor of history to which the individual must bend (Vincent 2005, 39). For Popper, therefore, nationalism is simply a closed tribal mentality which requires exorcizing. The world is a fluid mixture of cultures and there is nowhere in the world devoid of tribal tendencies, but the method and maturity adopted by the leaders bring out the best from the diversities. The is why the critique of nationalism that Popper carried out should be understood for African leaders to effuse statesmanship and not partisanship while addressing ethnic crisis that may arise in their political societies. Also, a conflict that involves parties drawn from faultlines (ethnic conflict) must not be allowed to degenerate into separatist agitations or civil war (Ologbenla 2017). African leaders need to strengthen the centripetal force to overwhelm the centrifugal elements in their communities. Clearly, ethnic differences are natural and should therefore, not be allowed to snowball to conflict of destruction (Babawale 2003). African leaders are therefore expected to engage in politics of inclusion instead of

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exclusion. Generally, Africa needs to shift from distributive politics to innovative and productive politics (Agbaje 2003, 14).

14.6  Conclusion The various political crises in Africa are borne out of ethnic schisms. Africans need to deconstruct their idea of ethnicity and begin to exorcize their tribal mentality, especially when it comes to politics. This will reduce incidences of conflicts and bring about discussions towards the ideal of development. It is in the light of this dialogue that we encourage what Popper calls an exercise in critical dialogue. In his book, The Myth of the Framework, Popper debunks the claim that customs and norms from different cultural settings are incommensurable and cannot engage one another in fruitful debate. On the contrary he sees tribalism as primitive or prototypic forms of totalitarianism, an enemy of the open society, the antithesis of a liberal society. (Sargent 2009, 203). Popper proposed the idea of the myth of the framework as a means of critical dialogue, a rational and fruitful discussion in which participants share a common dialogue in a multi-cultural society. He asserts that there is need to change from simply clinging to one’s culture as a badge of identity, to society with wider outlook (Sargent, p. 221). Popper went on to say that the “myth of tribalism” sounds like common sense, but is in fact ‘a vicious circle’ which, if not curtail greatly increase the likelihood of violence and war’ (Sargent, p. 357). However, the major character of the myth of the framework is critical dialogue and the respect of other people’s views. The right formulation for this critical dialogue is to accept that “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (Popper 1994, xii). It is therefore a truism that what is required in solving the problem of ethnicity and tribalism in politics is to transit from the tribal or “closed society” to the “open society” where dialogue is encouraged and individual views are respected.

References Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2009. Tracing contemporary Africa’s conflict situation to colonialism: A breakdown of communication among natives. Philosophical Papers and Review 1 (4): 59–66. Agbaje, A. 2003. The historical antecedent of the phenomenon of ethnic militias in Nigeria. In Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, ed. Tunde Babawale. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd. Akaruese, L. 2003. Beyond ethnic militias: Restructuring the Nigerian state. In Urban violence, ethnic militias and the challenges of democratic consolidation in Nigeria, ed. Babawale Tunde. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd. Awolowo, Obafemi. 1947. Path to Nigerian freedom. London: Faber and Faber. Babawale, Tunde. 2003. Urban violence, ethnic militias and the challenges of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

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Galtung, Johan. 1973. Theories of conflict definitions, dimensions, negations, formations. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. Groupson-Paulo, O. 2009. Military in politics and the third colonization of Africa: Beyond destruction and despairs. Sango Ota: Lawpat. IDEA, International. 2000. Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing dialogue(s) for nation-building. Stockholm: Nykopia press. Joseph, Richard. 1987. Democracy and prebendalism in Nigeria. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Lemarchad, R. 1972. Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarity in nation-building. The American Political Science Review 66: 68–90. Lewis, Loan, and James Mayall. 2007. Somalia as an International Problem. In United Nations Interventionism: 1991–2004, ed. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ologbenla, Derin. 2017. Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria: A critical review. In Nigerian politics: Issues and perspectives, ed. Derin Ologbenla. Akoka-Yaba: University of Lagos Press. Osemeka, Irene. 2017. Pre-colonial political system in Nigeria before the British. In Nigerian politics: Issues and perspectives, ed. Derin Ologbenla. Akoka-Yaba: University of Lagos Press. Ottoh, Ferdinand. 2016. Challenges of small arms to peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Saarbrucken Deutschland: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing. Popper, Karl. 1994. The myth of the framework: In defence of science and rationality. London and New York: Routledge. Pumphrey, Carolyn. 2003. Armed conflict in Africa. Maryland: The Scarecrow Press. Rodney, Walter. 1981. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. Sargent, L.  Tower. 2009. Contemporary political ideologies: A comparative analysis. Canada. Wadsworth. Vincent, Andrew. 2005. Nationalism and the open society. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 107: 36–64.

Chapter 15

Situating Postcolonial Africa within Popper’s Critique of Nationalism Adeolu Oluwaseyi Oyekan

15.1  Introduction Nationalism denotes both the loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state, particularly where the latter is conceived as a ‘nation-state (Walker Connor, in Daniele 2014). Conversely, liberalism refers to the political doctrine that takes protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics. Liberals typically believe that government is necessary to protect individuals from being harmed by others; but they also recognize that government itself can pose a threat to liberty (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2014). Liberals have always been concerned with the observation that for much of human history, nationalistic creeds, among other forms of group labels have attempted to submerge into, and subordinate the individual to his clan, tribe, ethnic group, or kingdom in order to obscure or/ in some cases stifle individual autonomy. Liberalism then is the culmination of developments in Western society that produced a sense of the importance of human individuality, liberation of the individual from complete subservience to the group, and a relaxation of the tight hold of custom, law, and authority. In this respect, liberalism stands for the emancipation of the individual. Karl Popper, perhaps the most notable philosopher of the twentieth century, was an avid advocate of liberalism and the open society. Popper’s liberal features include the primacy of individual freedom and identity as against collectivist categorizations. For Popper, in order to salvage the individual persona from being lost in the haze of the “group” mentality, he advocated for a cosmopolitan worldview that seeks to induce the right of the “individual” to self-determination rather than the “group”. Though Popper was right about the malevolent tendencies of nationalism, A. O. Oyekan (*) Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_15

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as evidenced in the level of divisions and destructions that xenophobic and discriminatory standpoints have generated across the world especially in recent times, it is worth considering whether all forms of nationalism warrant rejection. In this paper, I shall argue that anti-colonial nationalism is an exception to the form of virulent nationalisms that fuel much of the divisions across the world today.

15.2  Defining Nationalism Nationalism is yet again amongst the many concepts that lack a universal approach and a univocal definition. It is no surprise then that over the years, different strands and approaches to the subject matter has evolved. I shall attempt nonetheless to highlight some of the influential perspectives on the nature of nationalism both from the perceptive location of its protagonists and antagonists. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, nationalism is an “ideology based on the premise that the individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests” (2004). Hans Kohn (1965, 9), a well-known authority on nationalism defines the concept as “a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation state”. He further adds that “it is a state of mind inspiring the large majority of people and claiming to inspire all its members. It asserts that the nation-state is the ideal and the only legitimate form of political organization and that the nationality is the source of all cultural creative energy and economic well-being (1965, 10).” K.R. Minogue (1967, 9) depicts nationalism as “a set of ideas … a form of self-­ expression by which a certain kind of political excitement can be communicated from an elite to masses”. The supreme loyalty of man is, therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by group solidarity and welfare. It is essentially a state of mind, a strong feeling of personal identification with people around and a consciousness of a common destiny with them, acquired through a long habit of association. Furthermore, Anthony Smith (1991) observes that nationalism can be conceived of either as an ideology or a form of behaviour or both. Easman M. (1994) emphasized the ideological dimension when he said that nationalism proclaims the distinctiveness of a particular people and their right to self-rule in their homeland. Connor Walker (1998) in popularizing its behavioural dimension notes that nationalism is a question of loyalty. In this sense, it has to do with the devotion to the nation and the maintenance of its multidimensional attributes (common race, language, religion, traditions, history, geography and war). Montesquieu in his book The Spirit of the Laws observed for the emergence “that the government most in conformity with nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for whom it is established … Now, a government is like everything else … to preserve it we must love it” (1914). In terms of other philosophers, Machiavelli purported nationalism as a vehicle for power and control, contributing to the glory of the nation and the effectiveness of its

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government. For Rousseau, nationalism was a vehicle for freedom and equality, realizing the essence of humanity and providing for government legitimacy (Easley 2012). Nationalism, in various contexts has been categorized differently. However, much contemporary debate about the viability of nationalism from the liberal wing owes much to a peculiar two-fold distinction. For Kohn, nationalism was divided into two opposed types: Western and Eastern (Kohn 1965). This distinction keeps reappearing- in slightly different versions – in contemporary debates through the 1990s (for example, Ignatieff 1993, Vincent 1997 and 2002, Spencer and Wollman 2002). The former, premised on Enlightenment values of reason and universalist humanism, aimed at a more open, plural, outward-looking society, it tended towards democracy, liberalism and constitutional rule. Its aim was to liberate the individual. The latter was seen as more overtly authoritarian, closed, inward- looking, pathological, bellicose and xenophobic. The only important factor was that the nation should be free from others’ hegemony. Plamenatz echoed this distinction directly. He distinguished, qua Kohn, between an acceptable ‘moderate’ Western civic nationalism – essentially the candidate for liberal nationalism – and a more bellicose East European cultural nationalism (Plamenatz 1976). In elucidating these two strands of nationalism, Stephen Fisher (2019) notes that civic nationalism holds that national identity is about citizenship, and is acquired jus soli- through birth in the said place. In other words, it is the “nationalism of a nation that defines itself by social ties and culture rather than by common descent” (Kellas 1998, 66). Classic examples include Roman citizenship and post-revolutionary French nationalism. Similarly, Fisher conceives of Ethnic nationalism (or perhaps cultural nationalism) in terms of ancestry and cannot be acquired- jus sanguinis. A Classic example is German nationalism and it is related to anti-immigrant sentiment and hostility to ethnic minorities. Expanding further on this position, Kellas (1998) explains that ethnic nationalism stands for the movement and ideology of ethnic groups whereby its main goal is to form a “nation state” based on the group’s common history, language, territory, race, or other cultural markers that create a sense of belonging to what they might perceive as a nation. Beyond the two basic categorizations, Kellas adds a third which he nominalizes as the state or official nationalism. This, he defines as “encompassing all those legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity and culture” (Kellas 1998, 67). Having sketched out a conceptual framework of what nationalism entails, it is worthy of note that at the other extreme of nationalism stands a version of liberalism which denounces nationalist views. Some contemporary liberal political theorists such as Hayek, Berlin, Rawls, Taylor Miller and Tamir have tried wrestling with the idea of the extent to which they are complimentary or antithetical. It is also worth mentioning that just as there are liberal nationalists such as John Stuart Mill, Max Weber and Isaiah Berlin who are sympathetic to national identity, there have also been national-liberal political parties in western democracies (Kelly 2015). The debate about the compatibility of liberalism and nationality has been at the heart of the philosophical disputes between individualists and communitarians, and

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between cosmopolitanism and particularism as approaches to political rights and values. Liberalism’s social ontology denies the primacy of nationality as an account of political community and its ethical theory denies the moral primacy of nation or any other kind of community or association above the claims of individuals to equal concern and respect. Consequently, liberalism can only accommodate the claims for national recognition on liberal terms. Some liberal theorists assert that the logic of liberalism is that of a cosmopolitan order where the personal liberty and free movement of individuals dilute the ties of identity groups and national identity. It is precisely for this reason that nationalist politics often involves language protection policies, special social provision and other restrictions on individual behaviour in order to sustain the bases of national identity from the challenge of cosmopolitan culture and economic globalization. This does not mean that solidarity becomes less important for liberals but it does suggest that accounts of liberal solidarity can dispense with appeals to the social fact of national belonging and identity as their justification. Although liberalism can accommodate a place for national identity, where stronger claims are made for national identity, as in most traditional political nationalisms, the uneasy relationship completely breaks down. The challenge for liberalism remains the same as it was for the early precursors of liberalism such as John Locke or Immanuel Kant; to distinguish the legitimate claims of groups of individuals to organize their affairs collectively, from the idea that there are national communities which have a claim to recognition and self-determination that are not reducible to the rights and interests of their members (Kelly 2015). However, from the aforementioned categorizations of nationalism, philosophers and political theorists are prone to be more sympathetic the anodyne liberal Western civic variant. In this sense, there has been far too much of a swing towards the liberal variant in the last decade.

15.3  The Development of Popper’s Views on Liberalism No philosophy develops in a vacuum and so to understand the development and placement of ideologies as propounded by various scholars, it is important to investigate the historical configurations, culture, education and experiences that shaped and moulded their thoughts. It is to this end that a cursory incursion into the life experiences of Popper vis-à-vis his political theory is made here. The younger Popper was traditionally a Marxist but as we would see, the later Popper became anti-Marxist and more Kantian inclined due to an experience he describes: In Vienna shooting broke out during a demonstration by unarmed young socialists who, instigated by the communists, tried to help some communists to escape who were under arrest in the central police station in Vienna. Several young socialist and communist workers were killed. I was horrified and shocked by the brutality of the police, but also by myself. For I felt that as a Marxist I bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy—at least

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in principle. Marxist theory demands that the class struggle be intensified, in order to speed up the coming of socialism. Its thesis is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution (Popper 2002, 32–33).

At this point, further rumination on the subject matter revealed to Popper that Marxists were ready to sacrifice concrete individuals for the sake of an abstract humanity. He thus realized that he was an “individualist in the sense that it was clear to me that it is between separate individuals that justice should exist and that concepts such as those of ‘humanity,’ or even ‘class,’ are abstractions that can sometimes become very dangerous” (Popper and Marcuse 1985, 62). In the same vein, Anderson (1968) also unmasked the connection between the development of Popper’s Political theory and his experience. Of great emphasis were the traumas suffered by Europe in general and his native Austria with particular exposition of the period between the two world wars. Of principal interest was Hitler’s Nazism primarily directed against Jews (Popper had a Jewish descent). Popper according to Anderson left native land as a fugitive from civil war and fascism. This explains Popper’s anti-fascist stance. Moreover, interaction with other cultures, societies, and government structures that was more “public inclusive” also helped reshape Popper’s thoughts about the ideal nature of the society. The Open Society (1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (1961) represents Popper’s most celebrated works in the development of his socio-political thoughts and consequently embodies his systematic critique of nationalism. No doubt, his socio-political views also brew and corroborate his scientific instincts as marshalled out in his fallibilism. Though his ideas on the need for the freedom of the intellect may not be as thorough going as that of Paul Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge popularly branded as a theory of “anything goes”, Popper’s position on the necessity of scientific theories to be open to criticisms, severe testing and falsification is an attestation to his call for the application of a bold and critically free intellect which now expresses itself politically in his tendency towards liberalism and democracy.

15.4  Popper’s Critique of Nationalism Popper’s distrust and aversion for nationalism is manifested as he dissolves the typology of nationalism in all its variances as illiberal. Popper’s indictment of nationalism is wholesale and so we find that there are no real distinctions in his work between acceptable and unacceptable nationalism (Vincent 2005). Little wonder we hear Popper in one of his last public lectures in Prague in 1994 remark about Tomas Masaryk- the founder of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and its liberator President: I deeply admire Masaryk. He was one of the most important pioneers of what I have called… the open society. He was a pioneer of an open society, both in theory and in practice; indeed, the greatest of its pioneers between Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill.

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A. O. Oyekan However, there was from the beginning an unnecessary weakness built into the structure of the Czechoslovakian open society. I am alluding to the so-called Principle of National SelfDetermination, a principle that had acquired an almost absolute moral authority in the West… And Masaryk’s open society was unable to give these claims a deeply considered moral and political reply… I think that all lovers of peace and a civilized life should work to enlighten the world about the impracticability and inhumanity of that famous – or shall I say notorious – Principle of National Self-Determination, which now has degenerated into that ultimate horror, ethnic terrorism (cf: Vincent 2005, 38).

It is against this background that we next consider Popper’s critique of nationalism from four perspectives, which are the rational and philosophical, the sociological, the moral and the historical. Philosophy, Rationality and Nationalism  Popper’s first indictment of nationalism owes much to his conception of philosophy. For Popper, philosophy strives on a critical interrogation of realities, and consequently becomes diametrically opposed to a closed society as engendered by nationalism. It is in this light Popper says that the “rise of philosophy itself can be interpreted… as a response to the breakdown of the closed society and its magical beliefs. It is an attempt to replace the lost magical faith by a rational faith; it modifies the tradition of passing on a theory or a myth by founding a new tradition - a tradition of challenging theories and myths” (Popper 1974, 188). Furthermore, Popper is of the opinion that philosophical speculations are the product of individual ruminations on the question of reality and not a collective product. In this Socratic light, Popper conceives of nationalism as pathology characterized by neurosis and collective hysteria. Hence, against the “bucket” theory of the mind that passively receives data without critically engaging them as is analogous to a closed society, Popper advocates for a “searchlight” theory of the mind that actively engages, reorganizes, and reproduces knowledge (Vincent 2005). Popper also associates nationalism with Hegel’s conception of reason as a construct of the historical process, as well as Marx’s configuration of reason as a by-­ product of class struggle. Popper however begs to differ from this position as he observes that reason is ahistorical and classless. Reason for Popper can be associated with mature individuals loyal to the due process of logical reasoning and interested in the goals of the society (Vincent 2005). -. Sociology and Nationalism  Popper’s foremost sociological critique of nationalism debunks the idea of personal identity as a by-product of the community. For Popper, there is no such thing as a “collective” or “national” identity; only individual human identity. He thus observes that “human individuals and not states or nations must be the ultimate concern even of international organizations” (Popper 1974, 288). A term Popper employs in the forceful rebuttal of nationalism is the idea of the “tribal instinct”. This position corroborates the stance of other writers like Spencer, Maine, Tonnies and Hayek who similarly hold that tribal instincts represents a primitive drive characterized by the tyranny of the bourgeoisies in an in-­ group and the general hostility of an in-group towards other out-groups. Thus, while a progressive society ought to evolve away from this pervasive and bellicose instinct;

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if nationalism is anything to go by, it manifests an evolutionary regression towards this primitive instinct (Vincent 2005). While Popper does not consider all nationalists are racists, he is of the view that nationalism makes racism all the more inviting. In one instance, he observes that Zionism is the worst form of nationalism. Human freedom, then, is for Popper “intimately connected with novelty, originality, creativity, and unpredictability” (Anderson 1968). It is clear then that he proposes a worldview where individuals stand as primary- morally and methodologically. Morality and Nationalism  The arguments of the moralist in this regard acts as a rejoinder to their sociological stance. The argument here is that since national identity is constitutive of personal identity, then there is need to acknowledge and respect the moral status of the nation. Popper objects to this view and holds that morality can only be conceived in individual terms and a collective morality only does better as he clearly puts it at relieving “men of the strain of their responsibilities” (Popper 1974, 4). Popper traces the origin of this nationalistic tendency to the primitive societies where he notes that the “tribal community” represents the abode of moral security for its members and so relieves the weight of private moral sensibilities. He however notes that as societies develop, so also does rationality and the need for individual moral autonomy. Vincent observes that “Popper is adamant on this issue of individual moral responsibility and condemns all suggestions either that nations are the source of morality, or that they are morally significant in themselves” (2005, 44). In a similar light, Popper remarks that “many are ready to die for the nation, fervently believing that it is morally good, and factually true. But they are mistaken; just as mistaken as their communist bedfellows as few creeds have created more hatred, cruelty, and senseless suffering than the belief in the righteousness of the nationality principle” (Popper 1965, 365). History and Nationalism  In this regard, Popper is of the view that history and practical reality are both insufficient to substantiate the claim of nationalism since the “principle of the national state is not only inapplicable but it has never been clearly conceived because it is a myth, irrational, a romantic and Utopian dream, a dream of naturalism and of tribal collectivism” (Popper 1974, 5). His argument then is that nations often contain multiple sub-groups and lack the purported acclaimed homogeneity which is all but a deception. Hence, while states may be tolerated, “nation states” do not empirically exist since there are no unified homogenous ethnic groups coinciding with states. What remains therefore represents autonomous individuals that are self-determining, who contribute to the welfare of the state and should be the focus of the state (Vincent 2005).

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15.5  Popper’s Alternative Popper did not rebuff nationalism alone. His proposed alternative to nationalism can be coalesced in three themes viz. Kantian Marxism, cosmopolitanism and the juristic idea of multi-cultural federation brewed from the Habsburg Empire. Here again, these ideas were not formally labelled as such by Popper himself but a hermeneutical reading of Popper’s writing reveals a strong gravitation and approbation of these recurring themes (Vincent 2005). Kantian Marxism  Purposely obviating the younger Marx which Popper considered as dogmatic, positivist, materialist and historicist, Popper befriended the later Marx committed to rationalism, progress and concerned with redressing issues of social adversity and poverty. More so, apart from the fact that Kant’s ethics had a universal appeal, the rapprochement between Marx and Neo-Kantians such as Friedrich Albert Lange and Otto Liebermann with the aim of rehabilitating philosophy against claims of positivism and idealism as well as critiquing knowledge as an act of intellectual freedom was also attractive for Popper (Vincent 2005). Therefore, since Kant’s ideas reflected the moral autonomy of the individual through the accordance of inalienable dignity to each human and the need to treat all persons as an end in themselves; as well as Kant’s ideas of social democracy, moral/social progress and greater social/economic equality; a marriage of these ideas with later Marxist ideology seemed the perfect match. This match gratifies Popper’s political sensibilities towards his concern for the elimination of poverty, constrain of free markets, protection of individual liberty, restoration of public order and respect for the rule of law. Cosmopolitanism  Prompted by Democratic Kantian Socialism or Social Liberalism as well as in response to the challenges of ethnic identity faced by the assimilated Jewish Viennese intelligentsia who were in need of an “integration into a community that discounted religion, ethnicity and nationality”; the cosmopolitan world of Popper entailed the coalition of like-minded social liberal states with an international moral compass, legal structure and political setup. With the gradual decline of nationalism, Popper held that there was still need to find a common ground among liberal States with a shared concern for rationalism and Science and his cosmopolitan ideology was to meet that need (Vincent 2005). Seen in this light, the principle of national self-determination, Popper argued, was responsible for the catastrophes of modern European history, for the dissolution of multicultural and multi-ethnic empires, for ethnic cleansing and murder. It destroyed the blissful world of his childhood, shattered Central European culture and sent him into permanent exile. He was not even going to sanction national self-­ determination for the Jews. Indeed, they needed to be the first to give it up. As a result, they represented a group that, to emancipate itself from its own ethnicity, needed to dissolve all ethnicity and claim universal humanity Thus, Malachi Hacohen notes that “Popper’s vision of cross- cultural interaction provides a more

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faithful portrait of the internationalism of the Jewish intelligentsia, both in interwar Central Europe and in the post-war transatlantic world” (Hacohen 2012, 52). Habsburg  The Jews suffered a long history of persecution in Austria. However, in the 1880s, many assimilated central European Jews in the Habsburg Empire under Franz Joseph were accepted (to a degree) and prospered in various endeavours in the Empire although it was a little unexpected, it becomes understandable that Popper who came from a Jewish Viennese background would adopt the political model of multi-national federation as borrowed from the Habsburg empire (Vincent 2005). The late Habsburg Empire and interwar Central Europe evinced at one and the same time heightened multicultural interaction, rapid formation of antagonistic ethno-national identities, and the sporadic rise of cosmopolitan ideas (Hacohen 1999). Having observed the relative success of the Habsburg’s political structure in dealing with “sub-nationalities”, Popper extrapolates this idea to a particular institutional theory of how “national sub-cultures” can be treated and incorporated into a broad, moderately open political federation”. This was all in a bid to integrate non-territorial cultural nationalism within a multi-national federation in what Popper termed an “idyllic multiculturalism” that was all what nationalism was not in terms being true, progressive and possible (Vincent 2005). Just as nationalists denied the multicultural making of their own culture, so cosmopolitans ignored the ethno-national dilemma underlying their effort to rid ethnicity and nationality of significance by promoting international exchange and proclaiming humankind’s unity (Hacohen 1999). The call for the development of global institutions can also be found in the works of Habermas, who sees international law as the institutional embodiment and rational lynchpin of a minimalist, universal political consensus organized around the dual pillars of liberal democracy and human rights (Kurasawa 2004: 237). He envisioned a procedural process through which is secured, an agreement between free, equal and diverse citizens pertaining to the laws that govern them (Habermas 1996: 499–500).

15.6  Nationalism as Social Identity To respond to Popper’s objections to nationalism and its philosophical, sociological, historical and moral implications from a collectivist standpoint, it is important to note that these objections are diverse manifestations of his view on the ontological status of the individual, woven around a negative, consequentialist consideration of collectivism. This ontological consideration of man as an atomized property of society I believe, is both reductionist and flawed. It is guilty of what it charges holist thinking for, at the other extreme; which is a reductionist absorption of the individual into a collectivist framework of social analysis. As Craib (1998) argues, the

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question of identity is not necessarily an either/or question, and it is possible for us to be single, unified, and plural concomitantly. People form group identities from childhood, as the personal identity develops alongside the social (Volkan 2006, 14). To emphasize this point, Volkan refers further, to the Eriksonian postulation about pseudo-speciation, which avers that at the beginning of history, different groups of humans developed unique senses of identity which gave them the feeling that they are the best of humans, thereby adopting a sense of superiority over other humans (Volkan 2005, 11). While Erikson’s thesis offers a possible insight into how races and tribes developed their identities, it falls short in explaining how groups that cut across race, tribe and ethnicity, such as religious, gender, economic and other similar groups acquire their identities. In the opinion of Volkan, shared struggles, glories, collective history and trauma all play some roles in the formation of these identities (Volkan 1997, 50). Social identity thus, refers to those dimensions of a person that are definable in terms of his or her group memberships (Kay Deaux 2001, 1). Social identity entails the belief that we share many attributes with other members of the category and that, to some extent, events that are significant to the group as a collective also have consequences for the individual member. This is still true even if and when we do not know, or interact with every member of such a group. A professor for instance, sees himself as belonging to a community of academics even when it is obvious that he does not know all the professors that make up that community or even the fewer number within his own discipline. Possessing a given social identity means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group’s perspective (Stets and Burke 2000, 224). Burke and Stets have identified three types of identities: personal identity or an individual self-conception (or what some call core-identity); role identity tied to particular roles; and social identity tied to a social group (Stets and Burke 2009, 50). Also, a significant number of us are born into some cultural association, whether nationality, political or social (Hogg et al. 1995). These associations have a codified set of permitted behaviours and actions, which create the defining features of the group (Dewey 2002). Stryker et al. (2000) also suggest that people become members of a particular group as a result of shared identity and a common belief system that makes collective action possible. It is through routine activities within the group that individual, role-based identity is filtered, and collective identity is made stronger. When a group identity is especially strong, an “us” versus “them” attitude can emerge, causing high-group attachment and the desire to take behavioural risks (Smith et  al. 2007). The society and the self are defined through these symbolic social interactions, just as group social behaviour becomes delineated and shaped, as personal identity is developed in favour of the group standard (Stryker 2007).

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15.7  Challenges to Popper’s Cosmopolitan Turn As we have seen from the preceding discourse, Popper’s response is primarily a kind of cosmopolitanism; precisely the institutional one that seeks to manage relationships between different nations. Much as cosmopolitanism, especially of the institutional hue has its own appeals, it is doubtful if the optimism attached to it is not exaggerated. One prominent criticism against cosmopolitanism is that it is an idea that results in a net loss of identity (Palmer 2003, 1). The ideals of world citizenship, fuelled by advanced technology and increased interdependence has awakened not quite a few to the potency of the idea of cosmopolitanism. In the light of terrorist attacks, growing inequality and the struggle for political and economic rights by minorities and other collective groups, the non-existences of roots and the absence of allegiance to local entities representative of group interest has been questioned under a patriotic outlook (Silva 2008, 151). If one takes in to account the feeling of belonging to a confined sphere, one would realize that going beyond such ties involves the risk of losing one’s belongingness (Barber 1996, 34). In this vein, Gertrude Himmelfarb argues that: Cosmopolitanism … obscures, indeed the reality of the world in which a good many human beings actually reside. It is utopian, not only in its unrealistic assumption of communality of “aims, aspirations and values; but also in its unguaranteed optimism… To pledge one’s fundamental allegiance to cosmopolitanism is to try to transcend not only nationality but all the actualities, particularities and realities of life that constitutes one’s natural identity. Cosmopolitanism has a nice high-minded ring to it, but it is an illusion, and like all illusion, perilous (1996, 76–77).

The import of the criticism above is that cosmopolitanism does not merely ignore the importance attached to group identity by individuals, it ignores also the fact that such importance is attached because they go a long way in giving meaning to individual’s existence. The idea of cosmopolitan democracy, with universal, institutional abstraction that is at best indifferent to diversity is fraught with other challenges, one being that international relation is regulated by force and interest. This realist critique questions therefore, the possibility of a cosmopolitan order governed by democratic norms (Zolo 1997, Hawthorn 2000, Chadler 2003). Questions can also be raised as to whether it is possible to extend democracy beyond the state system. Pessimists often cite the less than democratic nature of the European Union (EU), which perhaps is the world’s most effective international union. According to Robert Dahl (2001, 38), international bodies cannot meet up the criteria needed for democracy to thrive in any society (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000, and Schmitter 2000). Furthermore, there are legitimate concerns not just about the democratic capacity of international organisations, but about the possibility of them disputing and depriving states of their democratic contents. This happens when such institutions concentrate powers in sites far from public control (Tnaa 2001, 519). One influential analysis in this direction is that of Wolf (1999, 343), who highlights the propensity of governments to use their obligation towards international organization as a

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decoy for limiting the sovereignty of their citizens. This breeds then, a widespread concern that such organisations might become the Trojan horse which enables technocrats to prevail over the democratic process (Archibugi 2004, 459). Indeed, one can find instances of this in the responses of some countries to the last global economic crisis. In Greece, Italy and a few other countries, austerity measures were prepared by international bodies and implemented by technocrats acceptable to creditors, in defiance of mass protests by majority of the populace. Some of these undemocratic practices were justified by the need to meet international obligations. Some scholars (Dahrendorf 2001; Morgan 2003; Urbinati 2003) have argued that the search for global democracy should be re-defined to reflect a quest for the rule of law on a global scale. For these scholars, there is a difference between both concepts, even if they are related in some ways. The suggestion here is that strengthening participation by all the parties involved is quite a different matter from having a framework for sanction and reward irrespective of status. Cosmopolitanism is also problematic both in the descriptive and prescriptive level. By this, I mean that some of the cosmopolitan assumptions about the contemporary world are debatable for a few reasons. The cosmopolitan attitude which conceives nationalism as parochial and narrow does not fully grasp the extent to which it can be accused exactly of the same charge. Cosmopolitanism reflects an elite perspective of the world … It is a perspective for example that makes nationalism appear one-sidedly negative. This is determined first perhaps by the prominence of ethno-nationalist violence in recent humanitarian crises, but also by tensions between states and international NGOs. It is also shaped by specifically European visions and projects of transnationalism. Nationalism looks different from, say, an African vantage point… looked at from the standpoint of India, say, or Ethiopia, it is not at all clear whether the nation belongs on the side of tradition or developing cosmopolitanism, or is it perhaps distinct from both – a novel form of solidarity and a basis for political claims on the state, one that presumes and to some extent demands, performance of internal unity and external bondedness (Delanty 2006, 636).

Also, cosmopolitan emphasis on apparent global integration underestimates the capacity of the nation-state to command loyalty, sacrifice and commitment from its members. In addition, the notion that the eventual integration of the whole world into a single polity is inevitable discountenances the possibility of other scenarios. Not only can nation states survive as basic units for ordering world affairs; another possibility is the emergence of supranational regional blocs, which may not proceed into the stage of collapsing into a single global structure. Added to that is the possibility of a world dominated by a super-power.

15.8  Nationalism, Conflict and Postcolonial Africa More specifically, situating Popper’s critique of nationalism within the experiences of postcolonial African states reveals its failure to appreciate the instrumentality of nationalism in the emancipation of erstwhile colonial states (Achankeng 2015). As

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history has shown, ethnicity, tribalism and other nationalistic affiliations were mobilized by early freedom fighters in the bid towards independence from imperialism. The instrumental value of nationalist mobilization is not only logical but defensible in my view, in the face of the racist, derogatory, discriminatory and exploitative logic of colonialism which finds for itself moral validation in the idea of Otherness and Difference. It is a great limitation of Popper’s perspectives on identity politics that he did not sufficiently deal with the question of European colonization of Africa and the deleterious consequences it brought about. Today, nationalist agitations manifest themselves in many postcolonial states, in ways that threaten instability and conflict. This however, does not warrant the blanket critique of nationalism, more so when these agitations are to a very large degree the mutating manifestations of colonial disruption of conquered. More broadly though, it also speaks to the ever present possibility of a people defining and redefining themselves as dictated by the realities of historical and existential experiences. The emergence of new states out of the old Soviet state, and the smaller, homogenous and more stable states that emerged from the Balkan conflicts demonstrate the fact that nationalist inclinations when positively managed rather than repressed or condemned; provide better routes to peace and social cohesion. Also, group mobilization and solidarity both within postcolonial states as well as others that are diverse, without a colonial history, has been a useful way of drawing global attention to potential and actual abuses of minority groups by dominant ones (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995). To resolve the crises that appear intractable in spite of all efforts, there are two plausible options worthy of consideration here. The first I would like is autonomous rule, through self-determination. Where, in the obvious case of incompatibility, it becomes reasonable for different groups to assert their independence from one another, self-determination in the mode of reasonable autonomy or total secession is an option that is worth considering. The artificiality of the colonial boundaries inherited from the colonialists provides a strong basis why in the face of conflicts, they need not be considered immutable or irrevocably binding. For the foreseeable future therefore, self-determination as a last resort, guaranteed indigenous groups in the article 20 of the Banjul Charter is an option that troubled postcolonial African States ought to seriously and periodically consider. While the right to secede should be guaranteed however, it is not necessarily the only reasonable cause of action. Self-determination, among other factors thrives on homogeneity. Most African states however are not just made up of many ethnic groups, but these groups themselves are in turn made up of many sub-ethnic groups with a strong sense of autonomy. Within these groups, suppressed but fierce competitions exist even at the moment, such that were the right to self-determination be exerted today, it is not a given that cohesion will be attainable. Second, the right to self-rule is not one that is practically pursuable in all multicultural postcolonial states without fundamental fragmentation. Self-determination, especially in the extreme sense of secession requires an indigenous homeland. Unresolved issues over land ownership mean that the possession of a homogeneous homeland is not one that can be taken for granted.

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It seems plausible therefore to explore possibilities that allow for the management of cultural and group differences within the state, as this if successfully done, avoids serious ruptures while enhancing cohesion. Such an approach needs to be able to recognize historical injustices and discriminations as well as current discontents within the different groups. This requires dialogue, understanding and an attitude that is other-regarding. While much of this dialogue and the implementation of the resolutions will (as they often do) take place in formal settings with institutional frameworks for facilitation and implementation, it is important to note that institutional policies work better when they are also made cultural. Therefore, beyond the formulation of integrative policies which no matter how representative, reflect the positions of political elites, it will help to also put measures in place that hasten integration among the diverse groups. This requires the deliberate creation of civic spaces of engagement and collaboration, the dilution of settlement patterns to promote class and ethnic inclusion, among others.

15.9  Conclusion As can be seen, Popper’s attempt to make a case for a cosmopolitan approach to the management of diversity and the attendant nationalist disposition captures the inherent dangers in the notion of essential otherness that perpetually discriminates, seeks to subdue as well as dominate or better still annihilate. Still, the cosmopolitan turn that can be distilled from his ideas do not appear sufficient in themselves to address the reality of diversity in contemporary times. More specifically, it fails to untangle the complexity of the cosmopolitan turn within the logic of imperialism, which effectively exacerbates differences within postcolonial states and stunting their capacity for relevance within a Universalist credo that perpetuates imperialist privileges. From a postcolonial standpoint therefore, nationalist inclinations are not just some basal, primitive elevation of kinship and tribal affiliation, but a mechanism for undoing, or at least mitigating the concrete historical and structural disruptions brought about by colonialism. Given the situated nature of nationalist tendencies in diverse, postcolonial societies therefore, what needs to be done is to find out how in spite of our differences and the attachments we have to our cultures and histories, we respect others’ rights to similarly enjoy whatever benefits their ethnic affiliations offer. That requires further, a mechanism or process for managing and resolving potential clashes of cultures and worldviews. As humans, we share a lot in common. That is why what Rawls calls overlapping consensus is possible. But the idea of overlapping consensus is not only political but moral. In fact, it cannot be much of the former without the latter. In the final analysis, one is of the view that nationalism need not be virulent to combat the vestiges of imperialism. It is possible and indeed desirable to reject imperialism simply because on account of its inherently discriminatory and exploitative nature without getting stuck in reverse essentialism. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the salience of personal identity without losing sight of the fact

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that people are born and socialized into a culture, which in turn significantly shapes the formation and development of personal identity. Thus, even though nationalist rhetoric alone does not address exploitation and injustice, yet, we sometimes need such commitments to the group in a world wherein identities, imposed externally or assumed by the self, have far ramifications for individual and collective existence.

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Chapter 16

Karl Popper, Tribalism and the Question of Africa’s Development Oseni Taiwo Afisi

16.1  Introduction Tribalism is Popper’s disparaging term in effect for nationalism. A tribal and closed society is not marked by rational intellectualism and democratic transformations. It is also a society that does not promote freedom, human rights, justice, free-market economy and accountability. Evidently, such a kind of society is closed to freedom of thought, and its institutional systems are often totalitarian. Such kinds of society promote a system which encourages the need to have a strong centralised rule by a few and a centrally planned economy. In spite of this view of Popper on tribalism, a grossly anthropological generalisation of the term “collectivism” or what Popper calls tribal “closed” intellectually stagnated society is often denoted to mean that Popper condemns all forms of collectivists societies, including societies that are collectivist in nature with a strong sense of community entailed by membership. This is not entirely the case. This position is well informed by Popper’s categorisation of certain societies as “tribal” with a classification of whether a society is marked or not by a critical attitude. Indeed, there are collectivist societies that are neither intellectually stagnated nor are they totalitarian in nature. Popper’s experiences with many of his intellectual colleagues of the political turmoil in Europe led him to assert that Europe at the time was a tribal and closed society because of the prevalent totalitarianism. Europe, during the time that Popper wrote, became intellectually stagnated through political manoeuvring and selfish nationalist ethnicity. Along with Popper, Nazism flushed the logical positivists out of German speaking territories mostly into English speaking lands. This did not end but rather changed the context for the mid-twentieth-century prominence in philosophy of logical empiricism. Nazism flushed Popper initially to England and O. T. Afisi (*) Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_16

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then to New Zealand. He later returned permanently to England and never again set himself up in German speaking lands. So, in New Zealand, Popper refocused his philosophical writings onto social and political philosophy. The reality of suffering, exploitation, war and totalitarianism that necessitated his move from Austria to New Zealand inspired this shift in interest towards the philosophy of the social sciences. His interest was motivated by the rise of totalitarianism in Europe. He made inquiries into the methodology of the social sciences. These inquiries resulted into his writings of The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism. In recent times, a good many expressions of nationalistic ugliness have again expressed themselves, for example, the xenophobic nationalism of far-right-wing political parties in various nations. This is a far cry from what Europe was in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century where European civilisation was almost already at its peak. Then in the twentieth century as Popper viewed things, Europe became tribalistic, ultimately returning civilisation to the era of barbarism. Popper traced the origin of this tribal totalitarianism in Europe to the theories of holism and historicism in which history is said to unfold according to inexorably ‘universal’ laws that can be found in the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx. If Hegelianism and Marxism had helped to produce political effects including the rise of nationalism and social radicalism in Europe, they also flushed some of their very significant intellectual critics to far parts of the world. The rise of Nazism and its impact on the European Jewish culture had significant consequences on the personal lives of intellectuals, such as Popper and the logical positivists. Of great importance about Popper’s venture into social and political philosophy was his attempt to establish an ideology for human freedom, which he realised was not present in the totalitarian society of Europe at the time. He became critical of Marxism which he averred motivated the rise of collective totalitarianism in the political society in Europe at the time. He termed Marxism a historicist/holist ideology, and instead introduced an anti-revolutionary cum conservative ideology in the form of piecemeal social engineering. He held Marxism to have encouraged a collectivist philosophy which had no respect for the sanctity of human freedom. Popper therefore made inquiries into the methodology of the social sciences in order to accentuate a liberal philosophy that recognises the primacy of individual freedom and that gives respect to the nature of human social character.

16.2  Communalism and Collectivism in Traditional Africa No doubt, Popper rejects collectivist societies that are not intellectually opened. He termed them, “closed tribal societies”. Traditional African societies were both collectivists and communalistic in nature, yet they were not necessarily totalitarian, anti-egalitarian and stagnated. Traditional African societies had a strong sense of community belongingness where individual right, liberty or freedom was guaranteed alongside the common good of the community.

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A community within the purview of traditional Africa played a significant role in guaranteeing freedom and the moral development of the individual. As a result, one may perceive a community in Africa as a social-political arrangement made up of persons, group of persons who are linked together by interpersonal bonds, which are not necessarily biological (Fayemi 2009, 172). This makes a sense of community to be predicated on the social being and belongingness of people with communal values. These values serve as the foundational basis of communalism which define and guide social relations in the form of attitudes and behaviour that should exist between individuals living together in a community who not only share a social life but also a sense of common good (Gyekye 1996, 35). In what Kwame Gyekye terms as shared beliefs and values of African thought system, he posits that “there is of course no pretence made that the moral values of various African societies are the same across the board, but there are some values that can be said to be shared in their essentials by all African societies” (Gyekye 1996, 55–56). Such shared beliefs and values are said to mean that the self-interest must be reconciled with communal interests” (Gyekye 1995, 195–210). In expanding the conception that a typical traditional African society was modelled on the conception of communalism and collectivism, yet it was not necessarily totalitarian, John Mbiti (1969) and Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) expounded on the notion of the place of the individual in relation to his community in traditional Africa. To the question: “what is it to be a human or individual person?” Mbiti asserts that to be a person is realisable in the arena of communal relations and is only determined in direct proportion to the quality of one’s relations. Mbiti (1969) takes this point further by attempting to find the place of the individual within the kinship system in traditional African societies. He argues that the kinship system ties the tribal group together. The tribe has a single common ancestor and members are related by blood ties. Tribal membership is closed but not open to other people except by marriage and betrothal. Mbiti argues that the kinship system is like a vast network of relations that spreads itself across large horizons to touch everybody. This network extends to include the living, the dead and those who are yet to be born. That tribal membership and kinship system gives an individual her identity. Mbiti reveals that within the African system this network of relationship binds everyone together such that they conceive their relations as familial. The family in the African scheme is not limited to the immediate relations of what he describes as a household. The household is constituted by parents and their children. According to Mbiti (1969), in African thinking, the family is not conceived in such narrow terms but is taken to include one’s grandparents, aunts, cousins, uncles, nephews and other distant relatives who belong to the same kinship system. Mbiti then moves to establish the position of the individual within such a system. He argues that the individual cannot exist alone but corporately. “He owes his existence to other people, including those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group” (Mbiti 1969, 141). Mbiti argues that physical birth is not sufficient for one to count as a person. What is required is the observance of social rituals throughout the individual’s

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life and these rituals are performed on her by the community as she goes through each stage of her life. Thus the community gives the individual the status of person through these rituals of incorporation at every stage of her life. The individual does not make herself. She finds herself standing in essential relationship to her community her fellow beings. It is that standing in relationship that gives her the status of person. Mbiti concludes by arguing that the individual is essentially in a corporate existence with others. Such a relationship is constitutive of who she is. She derives her identity from her shared fate with her other fellow human beings. The links between the individual and the community are of such an enduring nature. She cannot think of her existence apart from the existence of her community. Hence he coined his now famous phrase; “I am because we are; and since we are therefore I am” (Mbiti 1969, 141). A similar line of reasoning is given by Menkiti. The African way of understanding what constitutes personhood does not attempt to find a certain character or certain isolated characteristics in all individuals or ideal individuals and then hold it up for all persons to emulate. Rather, Menkiti proposes that this is a matter that is best decided by the community since “the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these maybe” (Menkiti 1984, 171). Menkiti contends that the individual comes to be aware of herself through the community. She comes to be whatever she is because of the community. Menkiti argues further that the individual can only become ‘man’ because of the existence of the community and the community. In his view, the community must take epistemic and ontological precedence over the individual. Menkiti makes it quite clear that in Africa, it is the community that defines and gives the status of personhood to individuals. In his own words; “in the African view it is the community which defines the person, and not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory” (Menkiti 1984, 172). In African communalism, the ‘whole’ takes precedence over the ‘individual’, as portrayed by both Mbiti and Menkiti. This view is likened to the concept of holism that Popper rejects. In Popper’s view, holists exude confidence that they can study, control and reconstruct society ‘as a whole’. Popper made the point that what the holist considers as studying ‘wholes’ may be viewed from two perspectives. The holist may see ‘whole’ as “(a) the totality of all the properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations holding between its constituent parts…” or may understand whole as “(b) certain special properties or aspects of the thing in question, namely those which make it appear an organised structure rather than a ‘mere heap’ “(Popper 1957, 76). Rather than for the individual to be consumed into the community, Gyekye reflects on a moderate communitarian outlook that is intended to reduce the charge of holism. This underscores a liberal basis for communalism, which allows for the individual, some sense of freedom that goes along with the social elements that can also be found in Popper’s conception of liberal-communitarianism (Afisi 2016, 83). Gyekye argues that while it is true that an individual is a social being, she is other things as well. The community may nurture the individual but she possesses mental

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attributes at birth which are not handed to her by the community. These mental features are responsible for the individuality of the person and the exercise of certain capacities such as rationality and free will. He argues that his own version of moderate communitarianism retains the attraction that it takes the rights of the individual seriously. Although, by his own admission, a communitarian society will not be overly obsessed with rights; his version will recognise the individuality of every person. He goes on to argue that within the traditional Akan society there exists a number of proverbs that show recognition of individuality of the person that is not wholly subsumed by the community. In spite of being a collectivist society, communal African traditional societies were not totalitarian. The interest of each individual was catered for since their views were essential to the growth and wellbeing of the common good. The style of social and political organization allowed for the realization of the freedom of the individual so far as it did not constitute a debauchery to public or social life. Asserting the uniqueness and utility of this political setting, Sophie Oluwole (2014, 180). maintains that “regrettably, most contemporary African scholars are ignorant of the fact that the organization of citizens into smaller units for easier handling is one of African legacies to the world.” She avers that “most democratic states of the world today adopt this system without acknowledging its source or recognizing its existence in various traditional Africans societies, long before its introduction in Western political theories” (Oluwole 2014, 180). According to Oluwole (2014, 179) “…the Oba (King) in traditional Yoruba society, unlike modern governors and heads of state, did not enjoy ruinous immunity against the legal charges of corruption or social misbehavior while in office. When Osugbo¸ the judicial arm of government in many Yoruba societies charges a reigning monarch, they privately strip him of all insignia and power of office. This is a sign of being temporarily deposed. If found guilty, the Oba may serve some form of punishment. This may be by mere scolding. At other times, it may be banishment or the death penalty!” Popper’s assertion that some tribal societies are closed and intellectual stagnated may apply to the rise of Nazism in Europe, it is not applicable to communal and collectivist societies of traditional Africa.

16.3  P  opper’s Openness and Contemporary African Societies Popper’s political liberalism defended intellectual openness by focusing on the protection of individuals: for instance, the individual’s right to information; the right to self-expression; and, a key interest in self-determination in his or her society. By this, the liberal principle of individual freedom, in Popper, presupposes the ability of the individual in an open society to make significant personal decisions within a social universe of choices that are free from the pervasive atmosphere of taboos characteristic of archaic as well as totalitarian societies (Levy 1978, 153). This

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depends not only on freedom of information and right to self-expression, but also on an individual’s being well-educated as emphasised by  J.S.  Mill in his On liberty (Mill 1859: 83). Certainly, for Popper, freedom depended on the individual engaging in critical thinking and rational criticism. Contemporary African societies require the Popper style-openness for the attainment of the desired scientific and political developments. Africa today is engrossed in ethnic and religious clashes, thereby escalating a status quo where lives and properties are in constant danger. Certainly, some of the long term implications of ethnoreligious violence are noted to affect Africa’s targets of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Openness about respecting individual preferences to religion and respecting the values of ethnic diversities will initiate the optimism to develop the capacity to dispel divisions, and foster a united status quo that will in turn inform national developments. The question of tolerance is one that aims at addressing the issues of quelling diversities and instabilities deriving from ethno-religious differences in order to initiate peace moves that will transcend the seeming impossible impasse of ethno-religious skirmishes. Africa today also needs to enhance its guarantee on freedom of the press as a precondition for the attainment of an open society. There are concerns regarding media personnel being detained for exposing classified information. There is also the effect on the polity of poorly remunerated journalists that have become the mouthpiece of the political class in order to disseminate information only what the political class want the public to know. These bitter veracities which are now characteristic of the present clime require a critical engagement towards the emergence of new ways to overcome the hurdles that beset the urgency of press freedom in an open society. It needs no further elaboration that Nigeria, like many other African countries, is enmeshed in clashes that are incited by ethnicity, religion, and resource-curse – all of them, politically and economically motivated in most cases. The role or function of the media, regarding the information that filters into the public sphere should deduce from these political and economic motivations. However, the media seems to be inspired by reportages that are conflicts related in their headlines because of realities that are connected for many reasons to profit. This seems to diminish the authentic coverage of news realities for the sake of proper dissemination of information to the general public. The media has become selective of what it publishes for the sake of being in business. More importantly, the discourse on consolidating democracy requires the need to revise the gap between the ideals that will consolidate democracy in the open society on the one hand and their implementations with the laborious non-partisan practice of same. It has become nearly the custom about democracy in Africa that cases of electoral fraud and riggings, and divisions and clashes among electorates arise on the platforms of religion and ethnicity. Both religion and ethnicity are usually employed by the ruling elites to further divide the people for the sake of achieving their private ends. The consequences are detrimental to the polity’s developmental process. The fallout, no doubts, inaugurates the emergence of incompetent leaders whose personal interests far override the social good. It is from this background that

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efforts can be made to confront these hindrances with the goal of providing practical resolutions. One of the most important discussions will concern the exploration of the linguistic dimension as a basis for consolidating democracy and attaining peaceful governance in Africa. The linguistic differences among the different ethnic groups have served rightly in the hands of the ruling class for the exploitation of the masses. Since the values and cherished beliefs of people are embedded in language, the use of English language as lingua franca has not allowed for effective communication, for example, among Nigerians, and this seems to have continued to fuel any honest attempts to unite the people. As a result, integration and diversity literacy need to be enhanced. There should be a language census to determine the accurate number of indigenous languages for effective communication and peace-building.

16.4  Conclusion The ideas that promote pluralism and diversity of opinions will reduce the tension of ethnic and religious clashes, promote media freedom and consolidate democratic governance in Africa. The idea of freedom of thought and expression and intersubjective criticism remains the foundation of an open society. Individual freedom of thought and free discussion are the ultimate liberal values. They are the values which ultimately allow the “transition from the tribal or ‘closed’ society,’ … to the ‘open society’ which sets free the critical powers of man” (Popper 1945, 1). They constitute the path which upholds individual freedom and allows the individual to engage critically with others. This path enhances the freedom to criticise and permits the growth of knowledge through error elimination. It enables a society to be modified by the value of openness, and the tendency for societies to be closed or bounded is transcended. While these liberal values are ideal, the challenge is to reconcile openness with the communal values of collectivism that gird the socio-political ideals of indigenous Africa. The panacea lies in the liberal-communitarian philosophy that I earlier mentioned. The response to the question of why both liberals and communitarians need always be in conflict with one another informs the philosophical justification of this thesis on liberal-communitarian philosophy. The arguments supporting how this new combined liberal-communitarian thinking can be realised as a sustainable political philosophy begin by my recognising the implicit social dimension to liberal politics. The uniqueness of this new thinking is that it is rooted in the social nature of human beings and the social dimension this brings into politics. At the same time, this liberal-communitarian ideology exemplifies a new thinking which seeks to address, in a new light, those normative concepts of freedom, rights, justice and equality in line with contemporary political realities in Africa.

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References Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2016. Popper, liberal-communitarianism, beyond the politics of liberalism. Philosophia: E-Journal of Philosophy and Culture 11: 67–86. Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem. 2009. Human personality and the Yoruba worldview: An ethico sociological interpretation. Journal of Pan African Studies 2 (9): 166–175. Gyekye, Kwame. 1995. An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Gyekye, Kwame. 1996. African cultural values: An introduction. Accra: Sankofa Publishing Company. Levy, David. 1978. Karl Popper: His philosophy of politics. Modern Age: 151–160. Mbiti, J. 1969. African religions and philosophy. New York: Doubleday. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1984. Persons and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R.A. Wright. Lanham: University Press of America. Mill, John Stuart. 1859. London: John W.Parker & Son Oluwole, Sophie. 2014. Socrates and Orunmila: Two patron saints of classical philosophy. Lagos: Ark Publishers. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies: The spell of Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1957. The poverty of historicism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 17

Karl Popper on Nationalism and the Issue of Indigenization in Lagos Bashir Olalekan Animashaun

17.1  Introduction At the core of his liberal politics, Karl Popper rejected the idea of nationalism on the premise that it possesses a potential for totalitarianism. His rejection of the idea was based on his conviction that people can be united to declare an autonomous single national political and cultural identity. According to Popper, the principle of national self-determination often degenerates into ethnic terrorism because it lacks as scientific objectivity (Popper 2006, 157). Although what Popper was opposed to was the establishment of a Jewish statehood, however, his rejection of nationalism cannot really stand the test of time because, nationalism is in actual fact, an aggregate of people whose cultural identity underlies their social condition. This remains a fact especially, when we consider that cultural differences are a fact of life, and it indisputably defines who a person is, where a person is from, and invariably distinguishes people in terms of racial, social and political affinities. This perspective is indisputable when we consider that human beings have always organized themselves in group formations, and loyalty to a nation-state is not unexpected (Afisi 2017, 5). This makes the case for reasons that indigenization and land ownership are powerful factors for nationalism in Lagos. The earliest occupation of Lagos by the Idejo largely conferred the right to land in Lagos on them prior to the colonial era (Alli 2002, 10). What we therefore seek to find out in this paper is how the nationalistic drive of the Idejo assisted in the restoration and sustenance of their land ownership status and their relevance in the politics of Lagos especially from 1861. This becomes necessary in view of the fact that the Idejo in spite of the domineering influence of the British Colonialist have continued to play prominent roles in the politics of Lagos as land owners. The significance of this paper is predicated on the fact that it B. O. Animashaun (*) Lagos State University Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_17

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explains in clear terms how, the Idejo in spite of their tribulations as land owners in the British colonial era, have continued to be relevant and influential beyond the colonial era. The paper further contends that, the continuing Idejo right to land and ability to assert this power largely explain their ability to survive the British colonial era and maintain their relevance.

17.2  B  ritish Crown Rule, the Idejo and Land Ownership in Lagos Prior to the 1861 introduction of British Crown rule in Lagos, the Idejo Chiefs had maintained their relevance as the land gentry and have been able to use same to survive the overwhelming influence of the Benin in Lagos. Although, the Idejo were integrated into an enlarged administrative structure as second class chiefs, they were able to sustain their right of control over land in Lagos until the British annexation of Lagos in 1861 (Alli 2002, 10). The annexation of Lagos as a British colony in 1861 informed the introduction of the Crown colony system. The Crown Colony system was designed in such a way that, Britain through the secretary of state for the colonies exercised final authority over the administration of Lagos. The Crown Colony system at the point of its introduction, was designed by the British colonial government to consciously remove all traces of relevance of the traditional authorities in the administration of Lagos (Lawal 1994, 80). The power and influence of the Idejo as land owners in the period of the Crown colony system in Lagos became circumscribed and this gradually paved the way for the involvement of the colonial government in land sequestration with total disregard to indigenous land law (Animashaun 2011, 119). To the Idejo Chiefs, land remains their major economic strength and in an attempt to protect their land owning rights the Idejo formed themselves into the Union of Lagos fishermen or Egbe Aladejo. In Lagos, the British colonial government designed a colonial land policy aimed at appropriating land in Lagos based on the colonial government’s misconception of the powers of the monarch regarding land ownership in Lagos. Consequently, the colonial government sought to apply the British land law in Lagos. The English land law from available documentary evidence as at 1861 was uncertain without a clear definition and it was not until the passing of the Birkenhead’s Acts by the British parliament in 1925 that some semblance of order was brought to it (Tew 1939). Moreover, while the English land law recognized fee simple land ownership, native land law did not give recognition to fee simple land ownership because land was not just a tribal or communal property it was the very cornerstone upon which the native edifice of native prosperity depended upon. In essence going by the native land law, land was inalienable (Simpson 1957). The above clearly indicates the absence of a distinct perception on land matters in Lagos by the colonial government and this is reflected in the manner with which they acquired series of land without regard to native land law. Although the British colonial government in Lagos embarked on

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land requisitioning as a result of the need to meet up with the increasing demand for land due to the influx of European traders and Officials both for government and private use. The acquisition was however carried out without any recourse to the indigenous land owners and this no doubt forms the background to subsequent confrontation with the colonial government by the Idejo. By 1910 for instance, it was estimated that over 50% of all land owned by the Idejo had been alienated and almost three-quarter of all civil litigation as at the above period were land cases. (Cole 1975, 197). Furthermore, the enactment of several ordinances such as ordinance No.9 of 1863 and No.10 of 1864 which recognizes the fact that private ownership of land could come from sources other than the Crown also paved way for the legal battle between the colonial government and the Idejo on land matters in Lagos. And one of the most important legal battle on land matters that inspired other land owners to sustain the fight against colonial land requisitioning in the history of Lagos was the 1921 Oluwa land case (Fasinro 2004, 12). The Oluwa land case indeed proved to be historic as it inspired other Idejo Chiefs to sustain their fight for Compensations and rights to land in the era of British Crown Rule in Lagos. The Oniru, one of the indigenous land owners in 1934 for instance, engaged the colonial government in a fundamental legal battle to demand amongst others adequate compensation for the lands that were compulsorily acquired in the various parts of present day Victoria Island traditionally known as Iru-land from the Oniru (Animashaun 2011, 119). The Oniru land case, just like the Oluwa land case, also dragged for several years, moving from Magistrate courts to high courts, and to the West African Court of Appeal (WACA) (Cole 1975, 16). Although unlike the Oluwa, the compensation awarded to the Oniru was not enough to cover their legal expenses. He was however able to establish the land owning rights of the family over Iru-land, that is, present day Victoria Island. The above instance of Oniru, just like the Oluwa’s case, no doubt brought about a new thrust in the relationship between the Idejo and the British Colonial government as land acquisition became a mutual issue. The new thrust led to their recognition and relevance as the land gentry in colonial Lagos, in spite of their tribulations. Furthermore, they were able to use the wealth that accrued to them as compensation from acquired landed properties to reposition themselves and play active roles in the social and political development of Lagos. Although the legal fees in most cases usually takes a larger part of the compensations paid to the Idejo as the land owners, they were however able to use the legal process, not only to regain their landed properties, but to also sustain their rights to land in Lagos especially in the era of British Crown rule in Lagos (Alli 2002, 10). In essence, the Idejo Chiefs who at the beginning of the British Colonial government had little say in the government and politics of Lagos had by 1921, symbolized the struggle against the British colonial administration. Thus, the richer the Idejo Chiefs became, the more important were the roles they assumed in the politics of Lagos such that by 1959 they had become fully integrated into the governmental structure in Lagos. And this no doubt further enhanced their involvement in the agitation against the British Colonial governmental policies especially on land acquisition being the worst hit.

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17.3  Nationalism of the Idejo Chiefs Nationalism, no doubt, shows how proud one is about his/her self-identity, and where one belongs to. Nationalistic tendencies, in most cases, give one the hope of belonging to a particular place, and belonging culturally and socially to a group or nation-state. Nationalism spurs the courage to seek self-rule or the ability to agitate to reclaim one’s possession. Nationalism as an activity points to the fact that the world is more of a multicultural entity with different culture, norms and practices which differs from society to society. Taking pride in where you come from does not imply that one does not appreciate the fact that others also exists alongside with you in the world (Cole 1975, 16). Popper is very critical about the issue of nationalism. He avers that nationalistic tendencies are evil and they lead to despotism and totalitarianism. In fact, Popper refers to the formation of the state of Israel as a negative case of nationalism. He said that allowing a people to form their own state based on nationalistic tendencies could lead to serious conflicts in the World. The state of Israel which was created under nationalistic tendency is, according to Popper, a crime. The reason that the state of Israel continues to be a source of conflict in the Middle East. Similarly, Popper mentions that the Second World War and its aftermath were as results of the nationalistic tendencies of the Germans, which Adolf Hitler took advantage of, with his beliefs that the Aryans (Germans) were a superior race and as such can rule the world. I sympathize with Popper because of the rise of fascism in Europe and the totalitarianism therefrom which led to his exile along with many other intellectuals who contributed to his version of nationalism. Popper was a product of his times, and he was reacting to the version of nationalism which led to horror being unleashed on the whole world. However, the kind of nationalism which the Idejo’s displayed towards the indigenization of land ownership in Lagos is driven by an identification with one’s own nation and support for its interests. The Idejo as descendants of Olofin Ogunfunminire, the progenitor of the Awori in Lagos, were heads of the various territories that made up Lagos and its adjoining settlements before the advent of the British Colonialists. They were also embodiments of state power and divine ruler-ship with titles that indicated the areas under their jurisdiction. As the land gentry, the Idejo derived their statute from traditions that are long rooted, recognized and revered by the people of their respective areas of authority in Lagos and this informs their relevance and recognition as the land owners in the administration of Lagos. In essence, land in Lagos had been vested in the hands of the Idejo as the earliest inhabitants of Lagos and this forms the main element of their socio-political power especially as it relates to its allocation. In the era of Benin imperialism for instance, the Idejo though experienced some changes in their status and nomenclature, this however, did not alter their essential character as the land gentry as they were able to sustain

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their relevance throughout the Benin era until the British annexation of Lagos in 1861. As the earliest inhabitants of Lagos, the Idejo exercises political authority and relevance in Lagos and its adjoining settlements as the land gentry. The British annexation and eventual introduction of the Crown rule in Lagos from the 1860s however, undermined the land gentry status and political relevance of the Idejo in Lagos (Lawal and Tijani 1994, 80). They were however able to regain their land ownership status and used same to gain prominence in the politics of Lagos especially from the 1920s and by the 1950s, they became a symbol of the struggle against the repugnant policies of the British Colonial government in Lagos as land owners. This historical fact is therefore contrary to Popper’s rejection of nationalistic tendencies. The Idejo’s ability to regain and sustain their right of ownership on lands in Lagos, despite several attempts by the colonial government to usurp their land ownership rights lends credence to the nationalistic drive of the Idejo and largely discredits Poppers idea of nationalism. The British occupation and their involvement in the local politics of Lagos indeed brought about radical alterations in the existing systems of authority distribution and influence especially with the introduction of the Crown Rule system (Lawal 1991, 12). Consequent upon the introduction of the British Crown rule system in Lagos, the political clout of the Idejo as the land gentry was transferred to the British Crown thereby making them answerable to the British colonial administrators. Thus, the basis of their legitimacy as the land Gentry was no longer from their people but from the Colonial administrators while their political relevance not only faded, they were also deemed to be anachronistic in the administration of Lagos. In spite of the above however, the Idejo did not become extinct rather, they were able to reassert their authority as land owners and sustained their relevance in the political administration of Lagos especially at the grass root level in the later period of the British Crown Rule and beyond. From all of the above, typically taking pride in one’s own nation-state, such as the Idejos have done with the indigenization of land in Lagos, does constitute an act of being nationalistic. As such, destroying the idea of nationalism is rife with the idea that one should be passive in the face of exploitation and allow the aggressor, in the case of the colonialists, to impinge upon what rightly belongs to one. Rather than reject nationalism wholesale, what Popper should have suggested is that our nationalistic tendencies should tilt towards polycentric nationalism, which accepts that some people have their own peculiar way of life different from others, and as this should be respected.

17.4  Conclusion The foregoing analysis shows clearly how the British Crown rule system was used as a bait to appropriate land in Lagos through the enactment of ordinances that were aimed at acquiring landed properties from the Idejo Chiefs without any recourse to

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the indigenous land laws. Although, Idejo Chiefs were incapacitated at the initial stage, they were however able through their nationalistic drive, to reassert their right to land in Lagos using the same legal process as to play prominent roles in the administration of Lagos especially from the 1930s. The Idejo Chiefs were not only able to sustain their land rights, they were also able to use their prominence and relevance in the politics of Lagos as the land gentry to oppose Colonial government policies. In opposing the sequestration of the Lands in Lagos by the Colonial government, the Idejo Chiefs, inadvertently, became the champion of the people’s right over their land and this has brought them closer to their people as the defender of the people from the various governmental policies introduced by the British colonial administration in Lagos. Their increased visibility and concomitant relevance also saw them at the forefront of opposition to the tax laws of the colonial administration in Lagos (Mann 2000, 25) . Although the introduction of British Crown rule in Lagos brought about some form of transformation in the political roles of the Idejo Chiefs, they were however able to remain not only relevant in the socio -political and economic development of Lagos, but also assert themselves as the symbol of the struggle against British Colonial administration in Lagos through their nationalistic tendencies.

References Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2017. Political pluralism, nationalism and the problem of cosmopolitanism. UNILAG Journal of Politics 9 (2): 5–18. Alli, Adekunle. 2002. Lagos from the earliest times to British occupation. In Centre For Lagos Studies (Cefolas), Distinguished Lecture Series. Ijanikin: Adeniran Ogunsanya College of Education, Otto. Animashaun, Bashir Olalekan. 2011. Colonial land requisitioning Island and the Idejo Chiefs: A study of the Oniru Chieftaincy 1850–1957. Maiduguri Journal of Historical Study 1 (1). Cole, Patrick. 1975. Modern and traditional elites in the politics of Lagos, 1975. London: Cambridge University Press. Fasinro, H.A.B. 2004. Political and cultural perspective of Lagos. Lagos: Academy Press. Lawal, Kunle. 1991. The Founders of Lagos State. First distinguished, lecture of the Awori Resource Group (ARG) 2 (1). ———. 1994. Lagos society before 1900. In Urban transition in Africa: Aspects of urbanisation and change in Lagos, ed. Kunle Lawal, 15. Lagos: Pumark Educational Press. Lawal, Kunle, and Kunle Tijani. 1994. The search for a viable urban administration: The era of mayoralty in Colonial Lagos. In Urban transition in Africa: Aspects of urbanisation and change in Lagos, ed. Kunle Lawal. Lagos: Pumark Press. Mann, Kristin. 2000. Slavery and the birth of an African City, Lagos 1760–1900. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Popper, Karl. 2006. Copied from Andrew Vincent, “Popper and Nationalism”. In Karl Popper: A centenary assessment, ed. Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford, and David Miller, vol. 1. Great Britain: Ashgate.

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Simpson, R.S. 1957. Report on the registration of titles to land in Lagos by State of Lagos Mega-­ City and other Nigerian Cities report, 2004. A publication of the Lagos State ministry of economic planning and budget, Lagos state Nigeria. Tew, Mervin. 1939. Report on title to land in Lagos. Lagos: Government Printer.

Part II

Popper and Knowledge Production in Africa

Chapter 18

A Popperian Perspective on Poverty and Epistemic Injustice in Africa Ademola Kazeem Fayemi and Paul Tosin Saint-Wonder

18.1  Introduction Africa, in many recent scientific reports especially the World Bank statistics, is ranked the home to the poorest of the poor globally (Beegle et al. 2016). While the conditions of poverty in Africa, its indicators, causes, effects, and strategies towards reduction, have continued to attract scholarly attention across disciplines, the main interest of this chapter is in the production of knowledge on poverty in Africa, which has gained little philosophical interests. As inhumane as poverty is in relation to the existential human minimum, poverty becomes more acute when it fosters epistemic injustice. This troubling dimension of poverty raises an important philosophical concern. Epistemic injustice constitutes one of the most significant and current discussions in social epistemology. As an essential human value, Miranda Fricker describes epistemic injustice as a situation where an individual is faulted and discriminated against in her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007, 1). Epistemic injustice occurs in many ways; we assert that one of such involves any occasion where a scientific report on the poor in Africa excludes the epistemic contributions and experiences of the very subject of poverty, the poor. Some of the scientific reports on poverty in Africa expressive of epistemic injustice include among others, Kates et al. (2004), Kates and Dasgupta (2007), and Kabuya (2015). Methodologies of researches on poverty in Africa subtly promotes (un)intended epistemic injustices against the subjects as the poor are underrepresented in knowledge about them; the experiences of the poor are often ignored, and their epistemic capacity for unearthing the push and pull factors of poverty entail much inferiority, skepticism and contempt. In other words, in the knowledge production on poverty in Africa, the subjects are most often consciously or otherwise treated as having negative epistemic qualities or lacking positive ones, and as such there is little or no A. K. Fayemi (*) · P. T. Saint-Wonder University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_18

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attempt to seek their contributions when gathering ‘facts’ about them. This chapter aims to address the question of what theoretical intervention can be made in addressing the subtle problem of epistemic injustice in poverty research on Africa in the light of plausible insights from Popper’s philosophy. While there is an emerging literature on epistemic injustice, indigenous African epistemologies, and epistemic decoloniality in contemporary African Studies (Grosfoguel 2007; Santos 2016; Falola 2018), to the best of our knowledge, none has engaged epistemic injustice in the scholarship context of pro-poor in Africa. To the extent that the use of indigenous theoretical frameworks might be competitively relevant to addressing local problems, the epistemic appropriation of ideas generated outside the African intellectual space might be illuminating as well. Choosing to employ the Popperian paradigms in addressing the problem of epistemic injustice in poverty research in Africa is not an underestimation of the apropos of other Afrocentric grounded epistemic frameworks. Rather, it is an attempt to connect the intellectual dots in global intellectual landscape by showing that cogent philosophical ideas, regardless of provenance, can be appropriated and concatenated in diverse existential contexts. Popper’s philosophy is one of such ideas that defy spatial and regional limitations. While exploring and applying Popper’s critical rationalism to the issue of inadequate knowledge production on poverty, this chapter contends that Popper’s scientific and political thoughts are cogent theoretical interventions in addressing the epistemic, methodological, social, moral and political problems of poverty in Africa. The elements of scientific method inquiry, rationality, piecemeal social engineering, liberalism and intellectual openness explicit in Popper’s philosophy shall be explored in this article and applied to promoting poverty research ideals and policy development in Africa and beyond. Following this introduction, this chapter is organized in five sections. It begins with a discussion of poverty in Africa and the state of knowledge production on Poverty in Africa. The second section provides some conceptual analysis of epistemic injustice. Next, an analysis of some of the essential tenets of Popper’s philosophy is provided. In the fourth section, this chapter employs the critical rationalism of Popper, showing how his scientific and political thoughts could be made to improve poverty research in Africa and indeed across the world. In the concluding part, this chapter suggests areas of further research on the subject-matter.

18.2  P  overty in Africa and Knowledge Production on Poverty in Africa The methodology and subject matter of various disciplines result in numerous definitions of the concept of poverty, making the concept difficult to streamline. Poverty originates from the Latin word pauper, rooted in words pau and pario, which means

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‘giving birth to nothing’ (Addae-Korankye 2014, 147). Poverty, however, is often measured in terms of acquisition, possession and levels of consumption and income; the threshold of poverty is gauged in terms of some identified basic needs, specific capabilities, and human development (Handley et  al. 2009, 1). Poverty signifies lack, insufficiency, powerlessness and deficiency. One of the ways of understanding poverty is through the prism of comparison. In describing poverty, a poor person or group would be considered so only when compared with someone or group with more possession of the particular characteristics of not being ‘poor’. The definitions of poverty range from those that describe situations involving limited resources and income to the unavailability of basic needs needed to sustain the daily activities of the average person. While the problem of poverty experienced by resource-poor people is understood by Mahatma Gandhi as the ‘the worst form of violence’, Amartya Sen construes poverty not in terms of lack of resources but essentially as the lack of freedom and inability to make life choices (Sen 2001). Poverty is attributed to the inability to make choices due to the unavailability of not just resources but also livelihood opportunities. It is the prevalent condition of hunger, lack of shelter, and other basic amenities especially access to health care, education, safe water, and security. The conceptions of poverty take either relative perspectives or are viewed objectively. Englama and Bamidele (1997) in “Measurement Issues in Poverty” agree that poverty refers to situations where people are barely or unable to cater for their necessities or their fundamental human requirements. Though as a global epidemic, most researches place poverty as being more domiciled in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa than any other parts of the world. World Bank Statistics show that most sub-Saharan African countries have majority of the population living below a dollar daily. The World Bank in 1990 introduced an absolute poverty line set at a dollar a day. In an attempt to keep pace with inflation however, this is constantly revised, and converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates, into local currencies (Handley et al. 2009, 69). According to World Bank reports in 2004, the number of people in developing countries living below this absolute poverty line reduced by more than 260 million from 1990 through to 2004, however, this number continued to increase in Sub-Saharan Africa by almost 60 million (Omideyi 2008, 9). The Average poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank places at 40 percent (Omideyi 2008, 9). Reports show that the number of internally displaced persons is exponentially increasing as the region experiences multitudes who attempt to flee their countries, often illegally, in search of better standards of living. Africa is often regarded as the home of poverty, and these researches show that the standard of living in Africa is extremely low. Arguably, poverty is transitional and dynamic; individuals, groups tend to move in and out of poverty overtime. However, scholars consider poverty in sub-Saharan Africa to be more chronic than transitory as most poor people experience poverty for all, or most of their lives, even to the extent that their offspring inherit it (Handley et  al. 2009: 1). In “Is Poverty in Africa mostly Chronic or Transient?” Hai-Anh H.  Dang and Andrew L.  Dabalen (2017) establish that within some sub-Saharan states, some individuals occasionally move in and out of poverty; thus, creating a

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shift in the general poverty statistics of the whole even when chronic poverty is still pervasive. In a survey of 21 countries, Dang and Dabelen (2017, 13) observed countries with positive growth and those with growth that are not pro-poor. Some examples of the former include Mauritania, Rwanda, Ghana, and of the latter, Nigeria, Senegal and Cameroon. They argue that while a third of the Sub-Saharan African population is persistently poor, another third move in and out of poverty (World Bank Group 2019, 109). The World Bank observes that the middle-class people who live under six dollars a day or just above the poverty line have a 40 percent chance of falling back into poverty (World Bank Group 2019, 109). Thus, as most of the standards used to determine the extent of poverty show, more than majority of the poorest countries are in Africa. African countries and their citizens show extreme levels of dependency on foreign goods and services. Besides the externalist explanations on the politics and unavoidable impact of international economic relations on underdevelopment in Africa,1 there are several internalist factors that drive poverty in Africa; ensuring that the endemic continues to foster. Among these factors include poor farming and harvest culture, failure of markets, and under-utilization of functional technological intelligence. The endemic of poverty also affects the health sector. This is characterized by loss of lives to illnesses that should under normal circumstances be easily curable but are not due to poor health facilities and unavailability of funds. This ultimately affects adversely, the mortality rate and consequently, human resource (Handley et al. 2009: 48). Poor health and poverty thus have a symmetrical relationship as poor health causes poverty and poverty contributes to poor health. While South Sahara Africa is undoubtedly rated the poorest region that is experiencing an unbaiting increase in poverty indexes, measuring poverty over the years has posed certain challenges; some poverty surveys are insufficient and inadequate representation of the extent of the endemic level of poverty. Beegle et al. (2016) show some of the challenges in acquiring accurate data on the poverty situation in Africa, but none that include an exclusion of the contributions of the subject. Among the challenges discussed are poor funding of such researches, lack of interest in funding, lack of regular and quality GDP, price and census data (Beegle et al. 2016, 1). Prior to this time, the major factor used in measuring poverty in Africa is the GDP growth rates. But over the past decades, other surveys have been applied to overcome some of the challenges of measuring poverty. These include gauging inflation by using alternative econometric techniques, using trends in other non-consumption data and sampling comparable surveys of good quality (Beegle et al. 2016, 7–8).

 Walter Rodney, for instance, is one of the foremost defenders of externalism in African underdevelopment discourse. He pointed out that “The presence of a group of African sell-outs is part of the definition of underdevelopment. Any diagnosis of underdevelopment in Africa will reveal not just low per capita income and protein deficiencies, but also the gentlemen who dance in Abidjan, Accra and Kinshasa when music is played in Paris, London and New York.” See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, with an Introduction by Vincent Harding, William Strickland, and Robert Hill. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982) p. 45. 1

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Most strategies employed in gauging poverty level in Africa also consist of analyses that take into consideration the fragility of economy of states as either being coastal or landlocked. However, some attention has been given to non-monetary perspectives to poverty which ultimately, seems to radiate more about poverty. These include longevity and good health, security, political freedom from violence, literacy, social acceptance and status (Beegle et al. 2016, 7–8). Measuring inequality at the level of economic opportunities, GDP, and general standards of living are among the strategies, but they are often attainable or at least mainly directed at the level of country comparisons, as opposed to the measurement of individual inequalities or social statuses. Nonetheless, while these measures have their distinctive shortcomings, the notion that there is extreme poverty in Africa is rarely disputed. In the next section, the notion of epistemic injustice shall be discussed before exposing the essential tenets of Popper’s philosophy in the succeeding section.

18.3  Epistemic Injustice As distinct from the very broad and controversial subject of justice, the philosopher Miranda Fricker identifies a specific category of injustice, an epistemic injustice which has spurred series of contributions in philosophical areas that include epistemology, feminism, ethics and political philosophy. The subject also expands into disciplines like medicine and law. Epistemic injustice basically expresses the idea that a person can be treated unjustly as it concerns his/her capacity to know. Fricker in “Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing” distinguishes two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007, 1). The former holds when there is a conscious or subconscious attribution of inferiority to the testimony of another, under the presupposition that the other lacks certain epistemic qualities. In this case, the credibility of a person’s testimony is held with little or no esteem. A person for instance, who holds a degree in Economics from a reputable institution may unduly assign low credibility to the postulations of say, a petty trader. Hermeneutical injustice on another hand constitutes the inability to make sense of our social experiences. It represents the presence of a lapse in a people’s collective interpretative resources; when a group of people altogether lack the capacity to understand peculiar and particular experiences (Carel and Gyorffy 2019). Havi Carel and Gita Gyorffy in “Seen but not heard: Children and Epistemic Injustice” recognize some degree of epistemic injustice as it concerns children in areas such as education and their general upbringing, particularly in their health care. Giving the instance of a five-year-old child who complained of double-vision even with one eye being closed, presumably due to an acute headache, but whose testimony was ignored until another physician was able to diagnose that she had been trying to describe blurred vision. Carel and Gyorffy (2019) note that the girl lacked the epistemic resources to describe her symptoms accurately, nonetheless, she was conveying important information.

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In such cases where epistemic injustice occurs, the subject often seems unfounded, possessing limited or even no powers of reason due to factors including the inability to assume mastery of a language to transmit thoughts effectively. As a result, their interpretative frameworks suffer rejection or are being treated with much levity. Asides epistemic injustice as it relates to children, there has also been recent attempts aimed at looking into the psychiatric narrative of mental illness, and the negligence of the voices of those labeled ‘mad’ in the course of psychiatric treatment. The discovery and presence of epistemic injustice reduces the potency of any knowledge inquiry or research. Fricker (2007, 6) argues that the wrong of testimonial injustice “cuts conceptually deeper than anything we have so far envisaged: a matter of exclusion from the very practice that constitutes the practical core of what it is to know.” In “Epistemic Injustice in Practice,” Franziska Dübgen (2016, 1–15) provides examples of epistemic injustice to include “experiences that we cannot make sense of because the society we live in does not provide a vocabulary to make them intelligible or because we are not entitled to give them a name due to our specific identity position, which supposedly disables us from judging matters objectively.” This view is instructive to this chapter as the production of knowledge on poverty in Africa falls within the prism of epistemic injustice in practice. Though the issue of epistemic injustice in poverty research in Africa has attracted little or no philosophical attention in philosophical discourses in Africa, it is important to peruse it as it is an expression of hidden research “practices of domination and exclusion that a conventional vocabulary of social critique cannot grasp so easily” (Dübgen 2016, 1–15). In line with the foregoing understanding of epistemic injustice, the fundamental question of immediate concern is: What roles do poor people play in the investigations that produce knowledge on poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and in the development of designs that will enhance the life conditions of resource-poor in Africa? In a recent study, Santosh Jagtap identifies three roles of the resource-poor individuals in the research designs on alleviating poverty and improving life circumstances of marginalized people in developing countries – consumers, as producers and as co-­ designers (Jagtap 2018). Consequently, it might be asked: are the poor epistemically engaged whether in the conception of investigations on their conditions as co-­ researchers or engaged in the formulation of designs and programmes that can potentially improve their life conditions? Largely, there seems to be epistemic marginalization of the poor in the knowledge production on poverty in low-resource states in sub-Saharan Africa. Whether by omission or commission, the capacity of the poor is largely reduced to object and beneficiaries of research investigations rather than subjects with respects for the cognitive reliability of the investigation processes and outcomes. Thus, the subtle and complicit testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustices in the production of knowledge on poverty in Africa deserve some critical interrogation. While this chapter is of the view that Karl Popper’s critical rationalism would be helpful in severing the intersection between poverty in Africa and epistemic injustice, it is important in the main to discuss the crux of Popper’s philosophy.

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18.4  Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism As developed by Popper, critical rationalism is a philosophical method of inquiry and investigation; it is a means of solving problems consisting of the concepts of trial and error. Popper’s critical rationalism is an offshoot from his attempt to provide an enduring solution to the problem of induction. The dominant scientific method of inquiry before Popper was the inductive method, which proceeded by observing particular instances to arrive at general conclusions. On the premise of having seen only white swans for instance, one can proceed inductively to conclude that all swans are white. In other words, one black swan can falsify the theory that ‘all swans are white’; hence the series of critique against the inductive reasoning in favour of the principle of falsification. Thus, Popper’s critical rationalism is one that emphasizes the need to be critical and analytical of all existing forms of knowledge. Critical rationalism “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience” (Popper 1945, 225). This attitude is a social one. Stefano Gattei explains the foregoing by saying that the balance of the individual and social aspects of Popper’s critical rationalism requires that every participant in the game of critical discussion be prepared to listen to criticism, to be able to accept criticism to practice self-criticism, and to engage in mutual criticism with others (Gattei 2002, 247). He argues further that once a conducive subjective attitude is established by individuals, reasoning is conceived as a social process of inter-subjective confrontation (Gattei 2002, 247). This social process of inter-subjectivity aids the way that individuals relate their experiences, and how experiences inherently transcend the individual’s sphere towards interpersonal relations. This analysis makes the case that the individual scientist is necessarily committed to engaging others on certain terms. In Popper’s view, this is how knowledge progresses. The method of science is a continuous process of conjecture and refutation (Dykes 2003, 6). By this method, theories are put under series of critical tests, an attempt to refute them which they may or may not survive. In the case that they do survive, they are not assumed to be certainly true but worked with until another attempt to falsify. Whereas in the case that they do not survive, they are ultimately discarded. Theories for instance like the existence of God can neither be falsified nor corroborated; Popper classifies them as non-scientific; for a theory to suffice as scientific, it must be falsifiable and must appeal to the realm of experience. Hence, critical rationalism served for Popper as a means of demarcating between science and non-science. While logical positivists regarded such metaphysical phenomena as nonsense or non-existent, Popper classifies them as simply non-scientific. Popper says that “the dogma of meaning or sense, and the pseudo-problems to which it has given rise, can be eliminated if we adopt as our criterion of demarcation, the criterion of falsifiability (Popper 2005, 315). The logical positivists championed the principle of verification; a principle resting on the notion that for something to pass muster as knowledge, it must be subject to empirical verification, otherwise it does not make sense, or does not exist. Thus,

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they condemned unverifiable statements to give meaning to the verifiable ones. This made them collapse in Popper’s view, two great philosophical problems; the problem of meaning and of demarcation. As opposed to the verifiability principle seeking to demarcate science from what they termed as rubbish or meaningless, Popper used falsification to demarcate science form pseudo-science (Popper 2005, 315). Popper also insists, in contrast to the language analysts that there indeed are genuine philosophical problems, he identifies one of those as the problem of cosmology; of understanding the world, ourselves and our knowledge of the world (Popper 2005, xiix). This consisted of Popper’s attempt to show that philosophical problems span beyond language analysis and that Wittgenstein’s criterion of demarcation which was the verifiability criterion as it pertains to scientific statements was inadequate (Popper 1963, 39). Popper implies by his critical rationalism that we can only embark on the journey of attaining truth but never actually attain an infallible truth. This assertion of Popper aligns with that of thinkers like Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, who both agree that while we may seek truth, at no point can it be concluded that we have found it.2 Thus, no scientific theory is irrefutable and certainly none is sacrosanct. In the same manner, Popper criticizes the concept of definitions, by virtue of his belief that things are in constant evolution and definitions tend to restrict them; they do not provide true knowledge of the nature of things (Dykes 2003, Chap.1). Popper regarded criticism as our intellectual heritage (Popper 1945, V), and he made attempts to manifest this critical attitude all through his works. Popper admonishes a society that paves a way for bold theorizing followed by unfettered criticism (Ormerod 2009, 441). His inherently skeptical approach led him to taking the principle of falsification as a distinguishing characteristic of science; while he sought to show how the principle not only solves the problem of induction and demarcation, but that it also makes provision for a productive perspective from which we can generally view the activities of science (Ormerod 2009, 441). Significantly, Popper intertwines philosophy of science with sociology and politics; his critical rationalism emphasizes falsification of theories in the natural sciences and social sciences (Afisi 2011). According to R.  J Ormerod, Popper’s social and political philosophy is potent with themes of the human ignorance and the need for critical analysis of ideas (Ormerod 2009, 441). Popper advocates the emergence of an ‘open society’, having the essential feature of liberty for those afflicted by policies to make known their various criticisms and also be able to change their rulers regularly, in a peaceful manner (Ormerod 2009, 441).  Alfred North Whitehead argues that “There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.” For details, see his Process and Reality, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. x. In a related sense, Bertrand Russell relays: “A candid philosopher should acknowledge that he is not very likely to have arrived at ultimate truth, but, in view of the incurable tendency to discipleship in human nature, he will be thought to have done so unless he makes his failures very evident.” For details, see his autobiography, My Philosophical Development, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959): 195. 2

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Consequently, Popper’s attack on historicism represents his dissatisfaction with the idea that certain courses of actions ought to be taken because they are in line with the practices of history. He attacks totalitarian tendencies and advocates that societal problems are solved through piece by piece mechanism, as opposed to an attempt to solve them holistically. Popper expresses gross repugnance for the method of the social sciences, one which he claims was stimulated by the rise of totalitarianism; he describes these methods as being backward (Popper 1945, 2). These social scientific methods largely entail prediction, characterized by totalitarian tendencies of approaching problems by means of a collective planning system. For instance, the scientists according to Popper operate with the notion that it would be naive to think democracy, unlike other forms of government that unfold in the course of history, would be permanent (Popper 1945, 2). They thus consider incumbent upon themselves, charged with the responsibility of making predictions, or as Popper calls them, historical prophesies; the scientists believe haven ‘discovered’ the laws of history further enable them to do so. Popper terms all philosophies that raise claims of this manner historicism, charging them as gross misunderstandings of the scientific method (Popper 1945, 3). Apart from yielding poor and ‘worthless’ results, scientific predictions of these kind for Popper tend to deter the fight against totalitarianism and consequently support the revolt against civilization. Worse still, predictions tend to make men abstain from responsibilities as knowing what is to come makes a man give up a fight (Popper 1945, 4). According to Popper, we can become makers of our own fate the moment we cease to pose as prophets. Popper sees destiny as a myth. Arising from his distaste for totalitarianism, at the heart of his critical rationalism are ethical and epistemological notions which birth his views on liberalism (Afisi 2015, iii). Popper’s liberalism entails a unitary societal construction with a network of mutual criticism, incorporated with mutual respect and tolerance. In The Open Society and its Enemies, Popper shows that civilization cannot thrive without criticism, especially of those conventions, accepted norms that endanger liberalism and openness, even of those originating from the so called ‘great men’. Criticism Popper insists, is part of our intellectual heritage and an open society sets free, the critical powers of man (Afisi 2015, 1). Useful for our focus in this chapter is Popper’s importation of the critical method into political philosophy. This method to Popper is applicable to all aspects of scientific knowledge, and more so for Popper, to the society. This represents, for Popper’s critical rationalism, an incursion into themes of liberalism, equality, mutual criticisms, mutual respect for others and quite significantly, an open society. According to Oseni T.  Afisi, Popper’s critical rationalism provides the necessary impetus to the freedom and individuality that the openness of society entails (Afisi 2015, 2). At this juncture the fundamental question is: How can Popper’s thought rescue the challenge of poverty and epistemic injustice in Africa? The next section addresses this concern while first exposing the flaws in Popper’s critical rationalism.

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18.5  P  overty and Epistemic Injustice in Africa: A Popperian Perspective Popper’s critical rationalism has been charged with some flaws. Nicholas Dykes identifies one of these as the absence of universality and the fostering of solipsism, which gives critical rationalism an unsecure footing (Dykes 2003, 10). Popper adopted some of Kant’s epistemological ideas, particularly that which saw the mind as imposing its laws on sensory experiences. Kant believed that the mind is not a passive receptor, but an active legislature in the affairs of the world. In other words, things do not just impress themselves as they are in the mind, but the mind brings order to things. Consequently, given our diverse genetic makeup, what flows out of the mind is suggestive as subjective. Despite Popper’s rejection of determinism and subjectivism in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Universe, Dyke’s (2003, 9) problem with Popper’s Kantian premise is that since every mind is determined by certain factors (e.g. genes, class, environment etc.), what comes out of it is also determined, just as it is subjective and consequently, it can only be relevant to the person who expounds it. Another problem highlighted by Dyke is the idea of growth via trial and error. Popper believed that the central problem of epistemology is the ‘growth of scientific knowledge’ and he aimed at contributing to the advancement of scientific knowledge through the method of conjectures and refutations. This to Dykes (2003, 11), however, presupposes an existing knowledge for the method of conjectures and refutations to work on, and not pre-existing conjectures. Consequently, Dykes poses the question, what exactly is the thing that grows? He concludes that it cannot be conjectures, as Popper’s theory presupposes that it is knowledge. In this, Dykes implies that Popper’s theory does not create anything new; it only works on pre-­ existing knowledge. In the process of falsification, a hypothesis is retained as long as it continues to be corroborated, as long as it withstands the test of falsifying which consists in its alignment with certain observed phenomena; it is replaced as soon as it is falsified. Now, the process does not clearly indicate if the eventual fault arises from the hypothesis in itself or the process of falsification, the test situation. Given those observed phenomena which are being used as instruments of falsification, Popper fails to realize that they are also theory dependent and hence susceptible to falsification. Kyrian Ojong (2008) observes that it may be the statement of the falsifying instance, and not even the theory under test that is false. Just like other critics, Ojong (2008, 55) concludes that an instance of falsification does not suffice for concluding that a theory is indeed falsified. Furthermore, he finds historically, that theories that are taken to be good were falsifiable and falsified as soon as they evolved (Ojong 2008, 55). He suggests that if Popper’s critical rationalism were to be applied rigorously, only a few theories would have ever got off the ground, if any would have. Ojong (2008, 56) concludes that the development of knowledge which Popper had originally intended would have been arrested long ago.

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Notwithstanding the various criticisms levied against Popper, we find certain elements of his method of critical rationalism useful for the development of poverty research in Africa. The current trend of marginalizing the poor by not being epistemically engaged and positioned in investigations and research about their conditions, by not being active participants in the formulation of designs and programmes aimed towards poverty alleviation deserves to be halted by African intelligentsia. A situation where the paradigms, theories and knowledge on poverty are formulated and produced outside of the agents and remodelled for implementation on them, without critical appropriation, is a case of epistemic injustice that deserves urgent intellectual checkmate. While the knowledge on poverty developed by others who might be charged on intellectual paternalism could be useful in understanding poverty in the continent, if the problem and solutions to poverty continued to be formulated outside of the very subjects of poverty, the answers and knowledge produced might continue to be illusive with disappointing results. Besides the pragmatic import, epistemic injustice is a disastrous malady independently on its own that queries the quality of knowledge on poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. When poverty knowledge is generated in a bottom-­up mechanism inclusive of grassroots research where the poor are key research stakeholders not just as respondents but as subjects of poverty’s inhumane conditions with recognized capacity of designing programmes for self-group-liberation from the cycle of poverty, the likely is that such epistemic interventions would be more efficient. The poor should be seen and recognized as epistemically capable of being poverty experts. To achieve this goal, we find Popper’s critical rationalism useful as an intellectual framework even when the idea did not have African provenance. Firstly, Popper’s critical rationalism allows a skeptical attitude to the pre-existing data on poverty in Africa. Popper has been criticized particularly that critical rationalism only works on pre-exiting knowledge and creates nothing new. Even if we were to grant that this is true, critical rationalism still remains invaluable to knowledge production on poverty in Africa; not directly as an attempt to bring about new econometric statistics, or synthetic panel data but one that takes our attention to the very logical fact that the testimonies or epistemological contributions of the very subjects, those labelled poor, if taken into consideration may reveal great lapses in the previously accumulated ‘facts’ about poverty in Africa, and may even prove some to be wrong. In other words, these epistemological contributions of the subjects of poverty may act as falsification theories to pre-established data ultimately with the intention of developing them. Bearing in mind however, just as Popper’s critics have highlighted that the falsification theories in themselves may be the problems, or the very things which are faulty, adequate comparisons and mutual criticism will ultimately yield better hypothesis. Popper allows for practical means of testing these data, latently disguised as an attempt to falsify but having more accurate means of praxis. This, in the context of this chapter, involves an interaction with the subjects of poverty, a means to determine if the prior assumptions made about them on a larger scale are as accurate as they pose to be. Furthermore, Popper has always been a critic of historicism and one

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can find that latent in poverty research methods about Africa. This may include for instance the same strategies employed over the years that do not take into consideration the dynamic nature of poverty. Now, the method of poverty research in Africa arguably proceeds inductively, having large degrees of probability. In a deductive process on the other hand, and as enunciated by Popper, the researcher bears in mind that first there ought to be a new idea yet to be corroborated, and then an anticipation, a hypothesis and a theoretical system (Ndubuisi 2003, 8). Research findings are to be derived logically from the carried-out tests, and then there is the process of comparisons. Conclusions derived from the deductive process have more degrees of rationality with implications for piece meal engineering. Popper’s notion of liberalism which allows in an ‘open society’, for those affected by policies to be capable of voicing their criticisms will in this situation, engineer a process where the subjects of poverty are given the opportunity in a qualitative research to voice the nature of their experiences and challenges. Such intellectual openness explicit in Popper’s critical rationalism paves the way for the elimination of the epistemic injustice that common researches apparently are guilty of. The notion that only ‘intellectuals’ and econometric data provided by same are capable of making any sort of contributions to poverty research in Africa, shows an epistemic injustice which in turn presupposes a distinct form of totalitarianism, an (un)intended unwillingness to accommodate distinct perspectives (in this case, those of the poor); Popper expresses incredulity towards such attitude. The foregoing makes the importance of Popper’s philosophy indispensable to discourses that directly affect human existence and knowledge. Though critics might perhaps question the use of a Western epistemic framework in addressing the problem of epistemic injustice in poverty research in Africa. Given the topicality of decolonizing theoretical interventions and appraisals of African problems using indigenously invented models, doubts might be expressed about the cogency of using a Popperian frame, which might subtly cause epistemic injustice that this chapter seeks to overcome. In responding to the potential charge, it is argued that the fact an idea is an endogenous creation is not a guarantee of epistemic infallibility. In the same vein, to the extent that a paradigm is exogenous does not necessarily mean it is inherently fallible and problematic. The cogency of an idea should be prized regardless of its provenance in so far as such an idea is accepted on the strength of critical appropriation with other indigenous resonant ideas. Employing a Popperian paradigm in the analysis and interpretation of the problem of epistemic injustice in Africa is for the purpose of appropriating reasonable ideas from Popper’s philosophy without being imprisoned by it and other conceptual imperialistic subtleties. As Africa grapples with endemic poverty and struggles to reduce its tide, the fundamental imperative is to connect the intellectual dots in global intellectual landscape by showing that cogent philosophical ideas, regardless of provenance, can be appropriated and concatenated in avoiding epistemic injustice in poverty research in Africa.

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18.6  Conclusion Poverty is an endemic problem in Africa deserving urgent and multi-prong approaches and researches. The process of knowledge production on poverty can worsen the state of poverty when epistemic injustice against the poor festers. In the context of poverty, epistemic injustice is expressed by the practices and designs of researches that ignore the contributions of the very subjects of poverty. This chapter has explored theoretical insights in Popper’s philosophy in addressing the epistemic, methodological, social, moral and political problems of poverty in Africa. If adopted, the elements of scientific method inquiry, rationality, piecemeal social engineering, liberalism and intellectual openness explicit in Popper’s philosophy can address the problem of epistemic injustice in poverty research in Africa. This chapter has established the importance of Popper’s thoughts as spanning beyond his time and space, to knowledge about Africa. His critical rationalism basically outlines his method of the growth of scientific knowledge demanding a critical attitude to every knowledge claim. Essentially, Popper defends the notions of liberalism and intellectual openness over historicism (Afisi 2015, 4). Popper tries to alleviate human suffering by institutionalizing the notion of piecemeal order for democracy and the reconstruction of society. His critical rationalism emphasizes liberalism and accountability, freedom, and very importantly, critical debates and feedback from the citizens (Afisi 2015, 1). The implementation of these ideals which Popper saw as being absolutely necessary for a society to be ‘open’ will not just eradicate epistemic injustice in poverty research, such ideals can be instrumental in promoting inclusive-pro-poor research agenda on poverty reduction in Africa and beyond.

References Addae-Korankye, Alex. 2014. Causes of Poverty in Africa: A Review of Literature. American International Journal of Social Science 3 (7): 147–153. Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2011. Karl Popper and the Idea of Liberal Social Reform. A paper presented at the Karl Popper Seminar Series, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. ———. 2015. Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism and the Politics of Liberal-Communitarianism. PhD diss., University of Canterbury. Beegle, Kathleen, Christiaensen Luc, Dabalen Andrew, and Gaddis Isis. 2016. Poverty in a Rising Africa. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Carel, Havi, and Gyorffy Gitta. 2019. Seen But Not Heard: Children and Epistemic Injustice. The Lancet Journals 384 (9950): 1256–1257. Accessed on July 1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-­6736(14)61759-­1. Dang, H.  Hai-Anh, and L.  Andrew Dabelen. 2017. Is Poverty in Africa Mostly Chronic or Transient? Evidence from Synthetic Panel Data, (English). Policy Research Working paper, no. wps 8033; Funded by the Strategic Research Program (SRP). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

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Dübgen, Franziska. 2016. Epistemic Injustice in Practice. Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women’s and Gender Studies 15: 1–15. Dykes, Nicholas. 2003. Debunking Popper: A Critique of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism. Philosophical Notes 65: 1–25. Englama, A., and Adedamola Bamidele. 1997. “Measurement Issues in Poverty” in Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria, Selected papers for the 1997 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economics Society. Falola, Toyin. 2018. The Falola Reader on African Culture, Nationalism, Development and Epistemologies. Austin: Pan-African University Press. Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gattei, S. 2002. The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper's Solution to the Problem of Rationality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2): 240–266. Grosfoguel, R. 2007. The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms. Cultural studies 21 (2–3): 211–223. Handley, Geoff, Higgins Kate, Sharma Bhavna, Bird Kate, and Cammack Diana. 2009. Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues. London: Overseas Developmental Institute. Jagtap, Santosh. 2018. Design and Poverty: A Review of Contexts, Roles of Poor People, and Methods. Research in Engineering Design. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00163-­018-­0294-­7. Kabuya, F.I. 2015. Fundamental Causes of Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 20 (6): 78–81. Kates, R.W., Dasgupta Sachs, and Jeffrey, et al. 2004. Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 117–240. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2004.0018. Kates, R.W., and P.  Dasgupta. 2007. African Poverty: A Grand Challenge for Sustainability Science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (43): 16747–16750. Ndubuisi, F.N. 2003. Epistemological Evaluation of Science: The Rationalist Tradition. Lagos: Foresight Press. Ojong, A. Kyrian. 2008. A Philosophy of Science for Africa. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Omideyi, K. Adekunbi. 2008. Poverty and Development in Nigeria: Trailing the MGDS? African Journal of Infectious Diseases 1 (1): 1–13. Ormerod, R.J. 2009. The History and Ideas of Critical Rationalism: The Philosophy of Karl Popper and Its Implications for OR. Journal of the Operational Research Society: 441–460. Popper, Karl. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. II. London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd. ———. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations; The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge. ———. 2005. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York/London: Routledge Classics. Puebla, C.A.C. 2013. The Onward Journey. In Indigenous Pathways into Social Research: Voices of a New Generation, ed. D.M. Mertens, F. Cram, and B. Chilisa, 390–402. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press. Rodney, Walter. 1982. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, with an Introduction by Vincent Harding, William Strickland, and Robert Hill. Washington, DC: Howard University Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1959. My Philosophical Development. New York: Simon and Schuster. Santos, B.S. 2016. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide. London: Routledge. Sen, Amartyre. 2001. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitehead, Alfred North. 1929. Process and Reality. New York: The Macmillan Co. World Bank Group. 2019. The Changing Nature of Work. New York/Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank Group.

Chapter 19

Karl Popper and Intellectual Openness in Africa: The Rationale for Political Emancipation Christabel Chidimma Ezeh

19.1  Introduction The development of a nation comes through many changes. Innovation is a welcomed development, but an upheaval, based on evidence, proves disruptive and destructive most times. This is because its effects claim more than they actually give. Maintenance of status quo often prevents social changes, and also repels innovation. Africa, as a continent, is usually a victim of these two extreme anomalies: (1) persistent upheavals (2) maintenance of status quo (coup d’état and long leadership tenure). This political debasement, whose tentacles usurp the flourishing of other sectors of Africa’s social, religious, economic, ethical, cultural, educational development, is the root of Africa’s status quo predicament. African nations, till this present time, suffer stagnancy and underdevelopment; and the causes proffered by S.  N. Agu (2005, 68) and other theorists point to bad governance. Bad governance is pioneered by leaders who do not want to welcome change, because change will work against the maintenance of their personal interests. Change as opposed to the super structure is often fought by all means. The Tools for this combat include bribery, ethnic sentiments, assassinations, disappearance of ballot boxes, riggings, etc. (Ogunba 1997, 8). Enemies of change are enemies of openness, positive development, transformational leadership and innovation. Intellectual openness as a democratic feature provides opportunity for testing institutions and their viability, and criticizing them when they overstep their bounds. The definition of democracy, by Mary Morgan (2013), as the rule of the people, connotes that truly democratic countries put the needs of the people above the egos of politicians. All-round openness can only

C. C. Ezeh (*) University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_19

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become possible when the leaders guide citizens on the right part. Openness must flow from the top. Just as it will be difficult, though not impossible, for children to deviate from the part shown them by parents, a good leader attracts good citizens to a great extent. Kealeboga Maphunye (2018) adds that collaboration by ordinary voters across the continents, through non-governmental organization and other cross-­ border institutional mechanisms, is needed so that these groups will share experiences and begin to enforce durable continental democracy. Democracy should be pursued from below. Promoting reforms in Africa encounters difficulties and require individuals with the vision to promote and sustain economic reforms. Africa’s developmental challenges, as posited by Malang Bobang (2017), depend on political development and these challenges range from bribery, corruption, bad governance, weak political systems, and undemocratic actions. These challenges debar accountability. Policies aimed at controlling corruption in African countries must begin with laying the foundation for strong institutions: economic, political, and social sectors. Clive Gray and Malcolm McPherson (2001, 1) postulate that the new generation of African leaders, though they are committed and qualified, are non-ideological. Three salient questions are useful to this work, and the solution to Africa’s growth and development may lie in the answers to these questions: (1). has there been any significant change in the leadership attitude of African countries over the past decade? (2). what leadership role will help determine African country’s prospects for improved economic policy that can transform and sustain rapid economic growth? (3). If leadership is a significant factor in enhancing the prospects of growth, what are the criteria that will enable it to play a more positive role than it has in the past? (Mcpherson and Gray 2001, 1). This work will adopt a historical approach by giving an overview of the master minds of political blue print, relating them to African situation. Table I will give a clearer picture of some African leaders that have served for decades despite the failure inherent in their leadership. The effects that political blueprint has on Africa will be exposed in order to disclose the extent it has eaten deep into the fabrics of African nations. Openness for change as a solution to Africa’s status quo predicament will be proffered using Karl Poppers critical approach. Popper’s critical approach grants freedom of expression that enable citizens to criticize a bad government without fear. It also makes provision for a search for better alternatives. His intellectual openness, if embraced in Africa will break the pseudo-democracy practiced in African nations and grant the opportunity to test new leaders’ capacities. The way forward for African democracy, as stipulated by Calestous Juma (2012), lies in general struggle to build modern political parties that can create genuine development platform, and project the initiatives that reflect popular needs.

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19.2  T  racing the Historical Challenge of Intellectual Openness Right from the ancient era, decision-making was the entitlement of the ruling class. Justice, for Plato, was regarded as the interest of the stronger (Plato 1968, Bk I, 338e–340b), and justice lies in every citizen remaining where nature placed him (1968, Bk II, 394e–395d). Plato’s state grouped citizens into three parts: rulers, guardians and workers. These three parts should live within their limits and should not dream of elevating themselves above their walls. Plato frowned at democracy because it promotes incompetency (Plato: qtd in Sabine and Thorson 1973, p.56), and grants people of common birth to have a say in government. Aristotle, on the other hand, agrees that all citizens in a democratic state should have the right to participate in the government, but he excluded people of producing class and slaves (Aristotle: qtd in Popper 1966, p.206). Innovation, for Plato, is evil and enemy of customs. In Plato, change is the most dangerous thing in everything (1980, Bk. VII, 797d). He stipulates: … the same person always plays at the same thing, with the same things, and in the same way, and have their spirits gladdened by the same toys; there the serious customs are allowed to remain undisturbed; but where the games change , and are always infected with innovation and other sorts of transformations, where the young never calls the same things dear… we would be speaking in an entirely correct way if we were to assert this of such a man: there is no greater ruin than this that can come to a city (1980, Bk. VII, 797b–797c).

The medieval era witnessed a closure when interpretation of reality was given a celestial under tone. Politics was hijacked as a divine right. The rulers were totalitarian in nature and were believed to have divine rights (Sabine and Thorson 1973, 146). The citizens, in turn, had the duty of passive obedience and cannot contribute, interfere or object the wishes of Rulers. Thomas Hobbes portrays the leviathan as the absolute authority that can never be wrong and give orders while the citizens obey. Hobbes’ leviathan hinders intellectual openness. This is justified by his assertions “… nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence so ever, can properly be called injustice or injury; because every subject is the author of every act the sovereign doth….” (1651, Chpt. XXI, p.131). By accepting the leviathan as the new leader, all citizens automatically submit their obligations, liberty, rights and opinions to the leviathan (Hobbes 1651, Chpt. XXI, p.133). Hobbes’ political blue print is being adopted in Africa. African countries’ independence appears an ironical reality. It may be regarded as a neo-colonialism, which connotes a neo-dependence; dependence of the citizens on their rulers for, apparently, everything. The hopes of the founding fathers of Africanism, according to Stanley Igwe (2010, p.11), is yet to be realized. The motives behind Africa’s nationalist for the fight for independence was for Africans to have the opportunity to lead themselves, make their own decisions and achieve openness for change in every sphere of Africans’ lives. Little did they know that their labour for independence will breed champions of lootocracy (Igwe 2010, 21). The African leaders who replaced the

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Table 19.1  Some African country’s political regimes and duration in leadership position Country Zimbabwe Cameroon Equatorial Guinea Uganda Angola Rwanda Sudan Chad Eritrea Swaziland

Leader Robert Mugabe Paul Biya Teodoro Obiang N. M. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Jose Eduardo Dos Santos Paul Kagame Omar el Bashil Idris Deby Isaias Afwerki King Mswati III

Year assumed office 1980–2017 1982 1979 1986 1979–2017 1994 1989 1990 1993 1986

Regime duration 37 years 37 years till date 38 years till date 33 years till date 37 years 24 years till date 39 years till date 28 years till date 26 years till date 32 years till date

Source: Okogba, Emmanuel. [Vanguard], 2017

colonialists after independence began to stay in power perpetually; issuing command and enforcing obedience. This is the major cause of intellectual closeness. There is urgent need for change and innovation in Africans’ political terrain. The list of some Presidents that have ruled for decades will clarify Africa’s level of openness in Political affairs (Table 19.1). In Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki projected People’s Font for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) as the only party allowed to participate in the country’s politics. These leaders got this political blue print from past leaders, in the persons of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie; who was removed in 1974 after ruling for 44 years; Libya’s Moamer Kadhafi who was a brutal dictator for 42 years and was later slain in 2011; Gadon’s Omar Bongo Ondimba who died during his reign in 2009, and ruled for more than 41 years (Okogba 2017). These pointers indicate African leaders’ urge to maintain status quo and repress every attempt to try other methods. This hinders intellectual openness. Closed system is also witnessed in other sectors because the leaders through dictatorship appoint their loyalties who will remain loyal while they make drastic decisions that put the growth and development of their nations in grave danger.

19.3  Political Systems and Intellectual Openness Evidences reveal that the political system of a country does not guarantee the success and development of its country. Any change of government must be such that all citizens will be willing and able to adopt. Giovanni Carbone (2007, p.1) states that the first political party on African continent was found in Liberia in 1860. About 143 political parties emerged between 1945 and 1968, but later party pluralism was abandoned for one-party regime or military regime. Multi-party was still practiced in Senegal, Zimbabwe, Gambia Mauritius and Botswana between 1970 and 1980. During the early 1990’s, many African countries shifted back from single-party system to democratic systems (Carbone 2007, 2). Little or no development

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prevailed in the midst of the shift from one-party system to multi-party system. Extreme poverty, low literacy level, state weakness, authoritarian rule, corruption, embezzlements of all sorts did not diminish. Whichever political system is in operation, Africa is ready and eager to be renewed. Nelson Mandela, a South African president from 1994–1999, ruled as a democratic ruler. He ensured economic growth and modernization, fostered harmony at home and abroad, and stabilized his nation’s security. According to Robert Rotberg (2014, p.249), Mandela transformed Africa, but his successors under the same political system (democratic rule) could not realize significant successes, because series of vices which range from looting, corruption, electoral anomalies to citizens’ marginalization were recorded. This buttresses the point that intellectual openness could be achieved in any political system, though it may be higher in some than others, depending on the leaders’ potentials. Some autocrats like Seretse Khama recorded huge success during their regime especially when citizens attested to it (Okogba 2017; Mcbride 2012, 504), while some degenerate to tyrants and bloody despots, concerned about their personal gains alone. Authoritarianism as a political system is usually characterized by blind obedience as against the freedom of citizens. (Anifowose and Enemuo 1999, 114) The ruler controls the economy, military and all related issues concerning the country. Its extreme form unveils when threats are exacted on citizens or when media censorship and citizens’ freedom are controlled by the dictator. Democracy as a political system grants citizens the opportunity to have a say in the government of their country; though this government does not always guarantee that citizens will be equally represented. Intellectual openness can only be realized in a country where citizens; including the rulers, are willing to be open to change whenever it is needed for the country’s development. A democratic government could be witnessed in any political system while a country known as a democratic government could only be paying lip service to democracy. In a democratic regime, African political parties, sometimes, convey the idea of patronage based on ethnic politics (Carbone 2007, 9; Juma 2012). Leaders often exploit tribal loyalties to satisfy their personal gains. Political parties, in this light, project diversity which weakens real competition and sabotages mutual acceptance. Electoral competition, in Africa, can take religious undertone when each religious group creates the mindset that the electorate must be from a particular religious group. Political parties could be understood from the dimension of ‘clientelistic’ point of view, where individuals with resources assemble. A political party becomes the vehicle that brings these individuals together “through a series of patron-client networks” (Carbone 2007, 10). Some African political parties, with the availability of amassed resources, dominate other parties and even win large majorities in two, three, or even successive elections (Carbone 2007, 14). This can be realized through party dominance or party hegemony depending on the nature of the long stay in power. It is party dominance when the dominance is as a result of the competitive nature of the party constantly winning popular mandates, probably, through genuine elections. It is a party hegemony when other parties only exist as a licensed party but hardly compete with the dominant party on equal bases. It can also be referred to as

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an authoritarian dominant party. The difference between these two party systems is that while the former may not employ violence or coercion as a means of retaining dominance, the latter can result to violence, conflicts, coup or other related means.

19.4  Intellectual Openness and Its Enemies Intellectual openness as a construct used here depicts the ability to be open to unending possibilities in every section of life, with a view to improving the status of situations. It does not connote an overthrow; rather it modifies an already existing system; a change that is metamorphic in nature. Popper’s idea of intellectual openness creates avenue for making continuous progress and getting better results. It does not rely on political template which cannot be altered. The political system of some African countries appears to be antithetical to openness. Many factors contribute to its lack of openness; blue print established by the colonial masters, greed, corruption and insecurity. These factors will be briefly discussed as they intercept the openness to change. Colonial Blue Print Ben Eboh (2004, 42) stipulates that Africans’ problem of governance cannot be separated from colonialism, though our decision to be influenced by it is entirely ours. The divide and rule system which was introduced by the colonial masters, according to Uche Nnadozie (2004, 275) and John Rogge (1977, 135), situated in Africa and begot the spirit of alienation, it brought with it the disintegration of many tribes. Disintegration encourages the blind support of a leader from the same ethnic region, who is not the right person for a leadership position. Tribal sentiments override the rule of law which enables governance to fall in the hands of African leaders. These leaders, having no respect for the law, with the support of their tribal members, get into power and desire to remain in it for as long as they like. Greed Having stayed in power for some time, and having reaped some dividends, leaders try all possible means to remain or die in that position. Most African leaders’ motives to remain in the corridor of power are not to induce change, because change will bring with it a negation of blue print; rather it is to grab as much wealth as possible. According to Denrele Animasaun (2013), Nigerian law-makers are the highest paid in the world, and this explains their struggle to remain in the corridor of power. Sehu Sani, a Nigerian Senator revealed the shocky information that Nigerian Senators are entitled to monthly expenses of 13.5m naira, in addition to their monthly salaries of more than $2000 (as cited in Malomo and Bonomi 2018, N.P). Corruption The alteration of set goals which can generate the required progress destabilizes openness. Corruption breaks up, mares, adulterates and falsifies defined goals which a nation aims at. The sole intention of corruption is to satisfy personal interest. This explains why Africa can hardly make progress and realize tangible developments.

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Corruption is a phenomenon of discrete failures of institutional control over bureaucrats or failure of the legal system that checkmates the behaviour of those who perpetrate the crime (Igwe 2010, 89). Insecurity This unfolds through various dimensions; fear of the future on the part of the leaders, and fear of the unknown on the part of the citizens. Fear of the future repels the leaders from loosening the grip they have on leadership position. Their inability to run an accountable and transparent leadership poses unending tension about what will be their fate when they evacuate the seat of power. It also motivates their decision to act as political godfathers in order to control their successors and make them conceal their misappropriations. Fear of the unknown on the other hand, makes citizens to dance to the whims and caprices of the leaders who the citizens see as a threat to their means of livelihood. Claudio Balderacchi (2017, 4) maintains that charismatic leadership contribute to the success of severe institutional confrontations through the development of loyal followers, which gives rise to some more cohesive followers that will promote social pressure on institutional opponents. These modes of thinking hinder intellectual openness. They stagnate Africa’s hope of being transformed. Despite the transition of Africa’s political systems, from one-party system to multi-party system, the emerged system is usually affected by old regimes. Nicolas Walle and Kimberly Butler (1999, 15) opine that the authoritarian rulers that survived after the emergence of multi-party system still have control and manipulate electoral policies for personal interests. Africa’s new democracies1 are usually perceived as illiberal, and the day-to-day practices of democracy are constantly abused; Political freedom and civil rights, though formally stated, are poorly observed during electoral practices (Walle and Butler 1999, 16). Freedom of press is often abused and radio monopoly by government is usually observed. Oluwole Owoye and Nicole Bissessar (2015, 8) postulate that the judiciary, though independent, is easily prejudiced. Most African leaders control all essential sectors of Africa’s economy. The main ambition of parties is either to gain control of the state, or gain an advantage over those in power, or get identified with the ruling party. The aim of most political parties in Africa is not to sustain democracy, rather, multi-party system is constructed in such a way that it accommodates the old single parties and does not threaten the control of the leaders (Walle and Butler 1999, 26). Political failures, as noted by Colin Jennings (2007, 84), is due to the inefficiency of putting the welfare of the members of the society on the “Pareto Frontier”. Jennings adds that if members are rational, such political reforms should be attainable.2 The construct “Nested

 Democracy used here reflects both the ability for intellectual openness, and not in the strict sense of democracy as a political system. 2  Jennings appeal to rationality could be appreciated from the fact that rationality is embedded in all human beings for them to always apply it when acting, though he neglected the fact that African leaders possess rationality but some fail to apply it. From this perspective, African leaders are not irrational but may be morally culpable. 1

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games” depict games hidden within the apparent game like the contests for leadership within groups. Political failure lies within the domain of nested games, and is usually ignited by group identity (Jennings 2007, 85). A political leader, even in a democracy, uses conflict as a strategy to retain his leadership position with the sole aim of enjoying office rents (Jennings 2007, 88). Transformative political leaders must possess among other qualities intellectual honesty, integrity and prudence. Leaders with the afore mentioned qualities, as proposed by Rotberg (as cited in Mcbride 2012, 503), are mostly needed in the developing nations of Africa to create a new political culture and lay foundations for the development of those institutions that will sustain development in the long run. The assumption that colonial experiences conditioned the growth and development of developing world’s leadership loses its grip in the face of countries that were colonized but have attained a high level of significant development. Robert Rotberg stipulates: “British rule, sometimes thought more benign, spawned Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Idi Amin in Uganda, Hastings Banda in Malawi, a series of Nigerian tyrants, and many others. It also gave us excellent leaders such as Seretse Khama and his successors….” (Rotberg 2014, 241). Poverty co-exists with the leadership that frustrates employment opportunities, good government, and the rule of law, media openness, attractive foreign direct investment, and strengthened prosperity (Rotberg 2014, 224). In the analysis made between the past leaders of South Africa, Mandela’s success lies in his techniques: “Macroeconomic openness, fiscal responsibility, the sidelining of old socialist nostrums, and an awareness that reducing high levels of unemployment should be a key palliative for prevailing poverty” (Rotberg 2014, 248). Mandela distributed power to others, rather than dominating power. Mandela’s legacy was not adopted by his successors. Mbeki, instead of distributing power, was preoccupied with preserving power and maintaining his position. Zuma, Mbeki’s successor, treaded the path of Mbeki. Zuma went as far as impeding free and fair elections, and supporting leaders who are despotic. Shaheen Mozaffa (1997, 154) opines that the interruption of electoral activities, using the advantage of incumbency, is a major challenge which African nations find malicious but have little or nothing to do about it. Most times the expressive decisions of the masses contribute to it, especially when voting is cast based on ethnic sentiments. Tribalism brought disunity in Kenya. The Ufungamano Initiative, as a social movement, emerged to pressurize and challenge the state’s hegemony in the constitutional making processes of Kenya. Mwathi Mati (2012, 72) posits that series of consultations between leaders of different religious beliefs occurred before the emergence of this initiative. This pro-reform movement arose because of the deteriorating economic situation in Kenya and corruption of the political elites who use the state agencies to evict people from their homes (Mati 2012, 73). John Mbaku and Chris Paul (1989, p.64) stipulate that the governmental apparatus is usually created for the purpose of extracting rents. This demeans the country from two dimensions: blocking competition in both political and economic sphere in order to exclude non-members from sharing the generated rents, and the extracted rents

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undermine economic growth and wreck the wellbeing of those relegated from the rents. The urge to extract rents masterminds several attempts to seize power. From 1956–1984, Mcgowan and Johnson (as cited in Mbaku and Paul 1989, p.63) maintain that 56 coups were noticed in Africa, and several more have occurred. These encourage political instability. The rate of government control over capital markets, to a great extent, should reflect the rate of economic growth of the country. In sub-Sahara Africa, it entails the opposite. It appears that the higher the governmental involvement into the capital market, the higher the misallocation of capital and the lower the rate of economic growth (Mbaku and Paul 1989, 67). Claudio Balderacchi (2017, 2) stipulates that competitive authoritarianism emerged as a new diffused form of hybrid regime where democratic institutions are subjected to systematic manipulation, and usually played in favour of incumbents. Competitive authoritarian regimes thrive as long as they escape international sanctions through their ability to hide under the cloak of democracy, while avoiding its violations. In Latin America, for instance, competitive authoritarian regime is an apparent political situation. Countries like Honduras, Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia experience such a regime under the guise of democracy. Zelaya in Honduras attempted to remove term limits, though it was rejected by the Supreme Court, the supreme electoral tribunal, and some institutions. Zelaya tried forceful measures as reflected in his words “it is going to happen and nothing will stop it” (Balderacchi 2017, 6). Some African Leaders adopt forceful measures to remain rulers: Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Teodoro O. Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Joseph Kabila of Democratic republic of Congo, Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi (Maud 2015). Whether leadership changes are frequent or not, leaders prefer to govern where institutions are weak or do not exist in order to sideline the accountability of their corrupt practices and abuse of office (Owoye and Bissessar 2014, 27). “Weaning African leaders of their intoxication for political power is an ongoing struggle,” (Maphunye 2018), owing to the fact that it will not be easy, though not an impossible task. Such hideous tasks can mostly be achieved if democracy is pursued from below. Collaboration between ordinary voters across the continent, through non-governmental organization and other cross-border institutional mechanism will help enforce durable continental democracy. African leaders’ refusal to step down, even when their tenure is due, hinders policies and reforms that can bring a change to the canker operations during the horrific long tenure held. International bodies, sometimes, feel reluctant to assist African countries because they seem  to have lost faith in Africa. According to Zaka Lugman and Momoh Zereri (2015, 1), The joint effort by East African Community and Organization of African Unity (ECA and the OAU) in April 1980, to improve African development which will serve as Africa’s blueprint from 1980–2000, was relinquished as it was not supported by the international financial institutions. This lack of support was due to the country’s lack of confidence, involvement, resources trust, and sincerity needed for financing a project.

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19.5  Popper’s Intellectual Openness and Its Applicability A brief overview of Popper’s political ideas is salient in order to reveal how his assertions are applicable to Africa’s condition of intellectual closure. Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies aims at revealing that the barrier of the transition from a closed society to an open society is an attempt to overthrow civilization and to return to tribalism; blue print (Popper 1945, 2). The political thought of Popper reveals his contempt for totalitarianism. He portrays this style of totalitarian leadership as an enemy of the open society. Popper (1945, 34) analysed and criticized the totalitarian tendency of Plato’s political philosophy, though he admired Plato’s ability to create a perfect state using the power of human reason. This ability to create something, Popper regards as ‘social engineering’: a notion that man is the master of his own destiny. The ruling class, with political power, reduces the challenge of preserving the state to preserving the internal unity of the master class. This narrow minded endeavour arrests all political change, and keeps the exploitation of the working class within limits (Popper 1945, 108). Plato’s theory of justice locates the fundamental challenge of politics in the question ‘who shall rule the state?’ Instead of asking such question that will immediately attract answers like ‘the wisest or the best,’ which is almost impossible to get, Popper proposes that one should concern oneself with how the political institutions can manage bad and incompetent rulers from causing severe damage. The question ‘who should rule’ leaves power unchecked once the presumed best or wise assumes office. Popper accepts the theory of checks and balances, since governments are not always good or wise. He advises that one should adopt the principle of preparing for the worst and hoping for the best instead of seeking excellent and impeccable rulers (1945, 122). African countries have been ruled by individuals who had sufficient power to implement reforms, if they had been motivated (Gray and Mcpherson 2001, 41). In making a distinction between two types of government, Popper prefers democratic government to totalitarian government, because it creates, develops and protects political institutions from tyranny. Although democratic institutions may not be faultless, they grant opportunities for control of these faults while a tyrannical government eliminates any room for control. This does not connote that democratic theories are inconsistent; rather, it gives one the strength to fight tyranny. Popper maintains that democracy provides the institutional framework of political institution, which is what a democratic institution is expected to do. He rejects the blame on democracy for the political shortcomings of a democratic state. The problem of improving democratic institutions rests on persons rather than on institutions. Laissez-faire, for Popper, is preferable to authoritative policy. The spirit of intellectual excellence is the spirit of criticism. It is also the spirit of intellectual independence. Popper regards Plato’s search for the best ruler as an instance of utopian engineering. Kelvin Womack supports Popper’s piecemeal engineering which serves as a tool for searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society (Popper 1945, 158; Womack and Asce 2008, 297). This does not

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imply that ideals may never be realized, but taking all projects at once may be difficult to handle owing to human’s limited experience. In his The Poverty of Historicism, Popper elaborates on piecemeal social engineering. The piecemeal social engineer design social institutions and reconstruct them to run those already in existence (1966, 63–64). An institution can reduce its uncertainty of the personal factors by assisting those who work for the goals set up by the institution, and on whose personal initiative and knowledge success largely depends (Popper 1966, 65). Although Popper has the concern of the society as a whole, he approaches the society by little modification and re-modification and by continually improving them. Arresting social change does not yield happiness; rather reliance on reason and the use of the power of criticism does. Popper’s theory of science answers the question of some political issues. His book, Conjectures and Refutations, according to W. H. Newton-smith (1995, 17), subjects theories to rigorous testing, and the more rigorous the testing is, the better it becomes. The same is applicable to political systems. There is great need for testing possible political systems in order to get better results, though not through radical means but through a gradual process. The objection that the method of testing and refuting theories will lead to relative truth rather than objective truth (Lipton 1995, 33) loses its flavour when the need for better results is sought. No finding should be labelled the best, and kept permanent. There are good brains that could discover more mind blowing findings; hence, endless possibilities. While the current truth is true, it will not block opportunities for further findings. Popper believes that the development of science and other areas could come through the process of change in accepted theory and through critical approach. John Worrall (1995, 75) maintains that it does not matter how impressed the accepted theory had performed in the past, “the real political task is not to actualize an ideal state of affairs that can then be preserved forever,” (Magee 1995, 261). Popper proposes that failures and shortcomings should be sought, and peaceful negotiation should be the medium for changing existing frontier (as cited in Magee 1995, 270). Popper acknowledges the fact that social institutions may function like a tradition. He stipulates that long-term proper functioning of institutions depends mainly upon such traditions. A person resists corruption as a tradition. Such person may see corruption as an anomaly because tradition abhors it (as cited in Shearmur 1996, 77). In a conversation involving Adam Chmielewski with Karl Popper, Popper maintains that peace should be sought, hunger should be eradicated and fairly full employment and education should be granted. He argued that politicians and philosophers failed to deliver their responsibilities towards their country, but it is one’s duty to be an optimist. Only from this point of view can one be active and do what one can, to make life better (1999, 40). The state, for Popper, exists for the individuals to have free social life, and for the sake of free society and not for tyranny (Popper qtd in Notturno 1999, 45). Free speech, in an open society, should be devised as an instrument for error discovery, and not a shield to hide errors (Notturno 1999, 46). For an open society to emerge, it is pertinent to realize the nature of leaders that will help protect openness. The merging of different leadership qualities is

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expedient: qualities of a servant, authentic leader, pragmatic leader and charismatic leader. If these four qualities are possessed by a leader, the leader will create an avenue for development in all sectors of a country. Mark Anderson and Peter Y. Sun (2015, 6) posit that while the servant leadership quality focuses on the growth of those being led, by leading an exemplary life; the authentic qualities reveal itself in the form of transparency and the promotion of positive psychological capacities and ethical climate. Barbuto and Gottfredson (2016, 59) maintain that Organizations can improve their ability to attract and retain top talents by promoting and training their leaders to become servant leaders. The pragmatic qualities will make the leader to focus on the examination of the causes responsible for the current state of the institution, and devise achievable goals that will save the day. Charismatic qualities in a leader articulate an inspirational vision of desirable future and motivate followers to devote their time and effort towards its realization (Anderson and Sun 2015, 2).

19.6  Intellectual Openness: A Way Forward for Africa The political blue print which Popper strongly detests is still vehemently upheld in Africa. African nations’ standards of living are relatively low. This was the theme of the 2017 AU Summit (Izugbara et al. 2018, 708). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), stated its motive in its preamble, stipulating thus: This New Partnership for Africa’s development is a pledge by African leaders based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic (Samba Mboup 2008, 96).

The pledge was for citizens to be developed and not to embezzle the resources that will be used for the development. Political leadership, as noted by Barbara Frost (2012, p.100), is by combining innovative service delivery and work to support consumer voices and citizens demands with targeted advocacy and campaigning at local, national and international levels. Universal sufferage, for her, does not occur without a focus on those who traditionally miss out. According to Augustsson et al. (2017, 2), there is need for openness and readiness to change in content and process at the leadership and citizen domains in all institutions. There should be immediate call for policy entrepreneurs and advocates of certain problems and/or solutions that are willing to invest resources (time, energy, reputation, money) to promote ideas for policy change. Neither the government nor private actors have the authority, knowledge and capacities to handle the development project alone. Thomas Block and Erick Paredis (2013, 182) assert the need for mutual dependence. This calls for intellectual openness which will salvage Africans and create avenue for change and reforms. Intellectual openness starts with telling oneself the truth by being open to oneself.

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Promoting African cultural values are expedient for Africa’s development. These values, amongst others, are reverence for posterity and leaders-as-community-­ proxy. Reverence for posterity will prevent African leaders from deviating from the path already established by past leaders, while leaders-as-community-proxy will remind the leaders that others look up to them as models hence the need to set good examples. African cultural values, as postulated by Izugbara et al. (2018, 711), will enable Africa’s legacy to be preserved and also motivate leaders to run an accountable government. Popper’s preference for democracy over authoritarianism is a pointer to the fact that democracy can better preserve the openness needed in Africa. His view of democracy as an institutional framework of political institution portrays that political leaders are the agents that should project democracy as a better political system. African democracy needs openness to purge it of every authoritarian tendency. Only then will Africa receive openness in other sectors of African nations: educational, social, ethical, and economical. Popper’s critical approach creates avenue for freedom of speech and expression. Individuals should be granted the opportunity to criticize a bad government without fear. The leaders should allow openness and independence of the media, press, and judiciary so that all malicious activities could be dictated and exposed, and the leaders can easily acknowledge their mistakes and rectify them. There should be openness in the mode of leadership selection. For scholars and citizens seeking to comprehend the nation’s history, there should be free access to documents from all branches of government, and there should be intellectual freedom  (American Association of University Professors 2003, 56). This will help citizens make informed decisions about current policy and keep government accountable. Elections should be free and fair and restrictions which could prevent potential candidates not to contest for leadership positions should be removed.3 These restrictions enable the same cliché to continuously contest, and the citizens will have limited choices to make. Party restrictions are one of the major challenges citizens face, especially, when they discover that the options available are wrong but they must select one. Intellectual openness should also spread to other institutions that have adopted the blue print set by the political leaders. Change, as a medium for seeking better alternative, should be adopted so that African nations can hope for a better future.

19.7  Conclusion The relevance of intellectual openness in Africa is undeniable. Its adoption will pave way for a well-practiced democracy devoid from all sorts of dictatorship. Openness to change will give citizens the will-power to develop and project

 Popper’s intellectual openness demands sincerity and does not aim at installing illusion as reality. Openness connotes transparency and aims at nothing less than it. 3

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themselves towards endless possibilities. It will further ensure that citizens’ voices are heard, and are adequately represented as well as their rights properly respected. Openness inspires transparency and accountable government which Africa seems to lack. Popper’s intellectual openness, if adopted, will transform African nations and install the long awaited development needed by Africa and the world.

References Agu, S.N. 2005. The Challenge of Democratisation. Uche Journal of the Department of Philosophy 11: 68–83. University of Nigeria, Nsukka. American Association of University Professors. 2003. Resolving Academic Freedom: Professional Groups Defend Intellectual Openness. Academe 89 (3 (June)): 55–58. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/40252471. Anderson, Marc, and Peter Sun. 2015. Reveiwing Leadership Styles: Overlaps and the Need for a New 'Full-Range’ Theory. International Journal of Management Reviews 00 (September): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12082. Anifowose, Remi, and Francis Enemuo, eds. 1999. Elements of Politics. Nigeria: Sam Iroanusi Publications. Animasaun, Denrele. 2013. Nigerian Lawmakers are the Highest Paid in the World. Vanguard, August 25 2013. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/ nigerian-­lawmakers-­are-­the-­highest-­paid-­in-­the-­world/ Augustsson, Hanna, Anne Richter, Henna Hasson, and Ulrica Schwarz. 2017. The Need for Dual Openness to Change: A Longitudinal Study Evaluating the Impact of Employees’ Openess to Organizational Change Content and Process on Intervention Outcomes. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science (February): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021886317691930. Balderacchi, Claudio. 2017. Political Leadership and the Construction of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Implications and Prospects for Democracy. Democratization (October): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1388229. Barbuto, John, and Ryan Gottfredson. 2016. Human Capital, the Millennial's Reign, and the Need for Servant Leadership. Journal of Leadership Studies (August): 59–63. https://doi. org/10.1002/jls.21474. Block, Thomas, and Erik Paredis. 2013. Urban Development Projects Catalyst for Sustainable Transformations: The Need for Entrepreneurial Political Leadership. Journal of Cleaner Production 50 (February): 181–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.11.021. Bobang, Malang. 2017. Critical Issues Affecting Africa’s Development: Egovernment, Democracy and Democratic Principle, and Governance as an alternative for Socioecononmic Development in Africa. International Journal of Youth Economy 1 (1 (May)): 41–55. https:// doi.org/10.18576/010103. Carbone, M.  Giovanni. 2007. Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives. World Political Science Review 3 (3 (January)): 57–86. https://doi. org/10.2202/1935-­6226.1023. Eboh, O. Ben. 2004. Improving Governance in Africa: An Ethical Re-orientation. Uche Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka 10: 41–51. Frost, Barbara. 2012. Working Locally and Globally for Lasting Change: Linking Community Demand and Political Leadership. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 43 (2 (March)): 97–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-­5436.2012.00313.x. Gray, Clive, and Malcolm McPherson. 2001. The Leadership Factor in African Policy Reform & Growth. Economic Development and Cultural Change 49 (4 (July)): 707–740. https://doi. org/10.1086/452522. Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. London: Green Dragon.

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Chapter 20

Verificationism and Falsificationism from an African Indigenous Knowledge Perspective Emmanuel Ofuasia

20.1  Introduction This inquiry agrees with Popper’s critics, concerning his falsificationist thesis, as no better than the verificationist principle he attacked. This study, however,  moves beyond merely conceding that these objections directed against Popper are valid. The primary preoccupation is to validate the implications of the flaws in both verificationism and falsificationism as valid methods of acquiring knowledge of the actual world. In addition, I tender in the pages ahead that a demarcation criterion is neither necessary nor useful. Contemporary scholarship has become more multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary. As such, the emphasis for a demarcation criterion is no longer popular as it used to be. To make clear my proposal, I employ the works of Ola Longe (1998), Gary Schwarz (2002), Fritjof Capra (1975) as instances. In a nutshell, the present study has two major aims. Firstly, it argues that a demarcation criterion is no longer necessary in contemporary scholarship. Secondly, after exploring the main thrusts of verificationism and falsificationism, the research establishes how both are useful  for knowledge acquisition in traditional Yorùbá ethno-epistemology.

20.2  Karl Popper’s Falsificationism Before exploring Popper’s recommendation, it is important to first provide a concise exposition of the proponents of verificationism and its aim. This, for me, puts in the right perspective, the antecedents of Popper’s reaction to verificationism.

E. Ofuasia (*) Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_20

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Verificationism is synonymous with the analytic orientation based in Vienna around the 1920s. it is however important to understand that even when it is clear that members were concerned with the distinction of cognitively meaningful propositions from those that are not, there is an arm of inquiry which discloses that “The Circle of Club was established in Vienna. The Circle was interested in demarcating science from non-science” (Alozie 2004, 40). Princewill Alozie’s conviction is corroborated further when one encounters the position of Brendan Shea (2016) on the subject matter. Regardless of this dilemma, it is instructive to state that the principal figures in the Vienna Circle cluster include: Mortiz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Alfred Jules Ayer, Hans Reichenbach, Friedrich Waismann, and Herbert Friegl who were the precursors of the distinctive research in the field of Mathematics and Logic. The Vienna Circle or Logical positivism, as they are popularly called, endorsed the verification principle, which considered as meaningless, any statement whose propositions cannot be empirically observed. Hence, metaphysical and theological propositions were the targets of their attack. The verification theory, taking the ‘Hume’s Fork’ even further, was aimed at unveiling some of the deep-seated issues surrounding the meaning and nature of what is scientific and those fields of knowledge, especially metaphysics, that guise themselves in this mould. Alfred Jules Ayer (1952, 22) is foremost in the call for the paragon for making the distinction among propositions that express cognitive meaningfulness from those that do not. Moritz Schlick (1926, 117) and Rudolf Carnap (1959, 36) have both voiced that metaphysics seeks vain illusion and that the propositions of metaphysics are entirely meaningless; that they do not assert anything. All of these, in the words of Brendan Shea (2016) are “…intended to among other things, capture the idea that the claims of empirical sciences are meaningful in a way that the claims of traditional metaphysics are not.” This is a similar outlook ably endorsed by Anthony Flew (1984, 156) who revealed that the logical positivists garnered the verifiability criterion of cognitive meaningfulness from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and pursued logicist reduction of mathematics to logic that was led by Bertrand Russell. It is however important to stress that Wittgenstein and his ideas were not part of this grand plan of the Veinna Ciricle. As Marie McGinn correctly relates, Wittgenstien’s ideas in the Tractatus was misrepresented and then misused. It needs emphasis that Wittgenstien’s pursuits and agenda for philosophy contrast sharply with the aim or goal of the Vienna Circle. The appropriate method for engaging philosophical problems, that differs from the members of logical positivism “remains characteristic of Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical development” (McGinn 2002, 2). However, it was Moritz Schlick who admired the Tractatus that encouraged Wittgenstein to attend regular intellectual gymnastics with the Vienna Circle. However, “Wittgenstein did not share their attitude to metaphysics, their commitment to science, or their views on philosophy and ethics, and his own manner of doing philosophy” (McGinn 2002, 3). The implication is therefore not far-­ fetched – the possibility of endorsement and interaction with members of logical positivism was limited if not otiose (McGinn 2002, 4).

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The entire thrust of verificationism was later reduced into two maxims, by William Quine for the purpose of his objection to the locus. The first “dogma” is the idea that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (Quine 1951, 21). He considers several ways of trying to define the notion of an “analytic” statement and argues that none of them works, because each requires the use of some other undefined and obscure term (e.g., “meaning,” “synonymous,” and “definition”) (Huemer 2002, 127). The second “dogma” is what Quine (1951, 22) calls “reductionism”, the view that every statement can be translated into a statement or collection of statements about sensory experiences (idealists hold this view). As verificationism places weight on the conformity of scientific claims or any proposition at all on sense observation, there is the implication of deducing that the senses and observation are adequate for knowing. Aside being reductionist in its stance, verificationism is also closely allied with the principle of induction. And the basic idea of induction is that “science starts with observation, and moves on from them to generalizations (laws and theories), and predictions” (Gilles 1993, 5). Popper debunks this idea, disclosing that induction is never actually used in science. Popper insists on the impossibility of observation without a theoretical background (Harris 1988: 23). In his words: “observation is always selective, and it needs a chosen subject, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem” (Popper 1963, 26). Popper noticed that the philosophers of the Vienna Circle had amalgamated two different problems: meaning and demarcation, and had proposed in verificationism a single solution to both (Afisi 2013, 506). In opposition to this view, Popper emphasized that there are meaningful theories that are not scientific, and that, accordingly, a criterion of meaningfulness does not coincide with a criterion of demarcation. The acceptance of induction was another major focus in his discontent. In all, Popper raises three objections against verificationism and its proponents. Firstly, Popper holds that verificationism fails to exclude some genuinely metaphysical statements. The reason for this is that verificationism essentially regards verifiability, rather than actual verification, as the line of demarcation. However, there are many verifiable statements, such as existential statements, that are also genuinely metaphysical. For instance, statements from Sigmund Freud’s psycho-­ analysis and Alfred Adler’s individual psychology have powerful explanatory power that makes them both verifiable in most cases. However, for Popper, they have “in fact more in common with primitive myths than with science, that they [resemble] astrology rather than astronomy” (Popper 1963, 5). Secondly, verificationism also fails to include some genuinely scientific statements. The reason, according to Popper, is that theories “are…never empirically verifiable” (Gillles 1993, 180). Donald Gillies amplifies in this mould that verificationism, for Popper “…did not exclude obvious metaphysical statements, but it did exclude the most important and interesting of all scientific statements, that is to say, scientific theories, the universal laws of nature” (Gilles 1993, 178). Thirdly, Popper ripostes that verifiability in itself cannot be verified. It is the case that verifiability shies as a criterion whose method can even be applied to itself. Popper contends that the demarcation criterion that cannot apply its method even to

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itself is inadequate (Afisi and Ofuasia 2018, 169). This objection springs mainly from the role of induction in the verification criterion. For Popper, the question is what justifies the principle of induction. For Popper, at first glimpse, there seem to be two alternatives. On the one hand, one could argue that the principle of induction is precisely justified inductively by experience; however, this way of thinking will obviously lead to a vicious circle. On the other hand, one could also venture to justify it by alluding to “a higher-order principle of induction.” (Popper 1963, 26). However, this line of thought unfortunately leads to infinite regress, because it will always require another and even higher level of principle (Afisi and Ofuasia 2018, 170). One point needs to be stated here before going any further! This point concerns with Popper’s position of the place of metaphysics in knowledge acquisition about the actual world. According to Jeremy Shearmur (2019, 5), “Popper, while well aware of the fact that he held various metaphysical views, was not sure how they could be critically appraised.” However, in later times, Popper soon developed ideas about how some metaphysical theories could be appraised. He also discussed how metaphysics might serve as ‘metaphysical research programmes’ for science. Popper also offered his own tentative metaphysical research programme for science, centred on the idea of indeterministic ‘propensities’ (Shearmur 2019, 5). For instance, in his Conjectures and Refutations, Popper even goes beyond metaphysics to disclose how myths inform scientific theories proper. In his words: “I realize that such myths may be developed, and become testable; that historically speaking all – or very nearly all – scientific theories originate from myths and that a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories” (Popper 1963, 36). As an alternative to verificationism and its thorny issues, Popper proposes his falsificationist thesis which takes care of fall outs of verificationism as a demarcation criterion. In his own words he harps: “My proposal is based upon an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability; an asymmetry which results from the logical form of universal statements. For these are never derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements” (Popper 1959, 19). It is the case that for Popper, falsificationism overcomes the three problems leveled against verificationism. Falsificationism is an approach to statements, hypotheses or theories with the inherent possibility to prove it to be false. A statement is called falsifiable if it is possible to conceive an observation or an argument which proves the statement in question to be false. In this sense falsify is synonymous with nullify, meaning not to commit fraud but show to be false. Falsification considers scientific statements individually. Scientific theories are formed from groups of these sorts of statements, and it is these groups that must be accepted or rejected by scientists. Scientific theories can always be defended by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses. Thus the new theory had to posit the existence of unintuitive concepts such as energy levels, quanta and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Ruse 2010, 12). As Popper puts it, a decision is required on the part of the scientist to accept or reject the statements that go to make up a theory or that might falsify it. At some point, the weight of the ad hoc hypotheses and disregarded falsifying observations will

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become so great that it becomes unreasonable to support the base theory any longer, and a decision will be made to reject it. Popper stressed that unfalsifiable statements are important in science. Contrary to intuition, unfalsifiable statements can be embedded in — and deductively entailed by — falsifiable theories. For example, while “all men are mortal” is unfalsifiable, it is a logical consequence of the falsifiable theory that “every man dies before he reaches the age of 150 years” (Keuth 1990, 45). By maintaining that “[testability] is falsifiability,” Popper regards any theories that are not falsifiable, that is, “not refutable by any conceivable event,” as non-scientific (Popper 1963, 7). This way of thinking makes positive use of the asymmetry between verification and falsification, and consequently works better to exclude pseudo-science and include science. To use Popper’s own examples, the virtue that astrology and the two psycho-analytic theories have verifiable explanatory power would help them to be included as genuine sciences if following the criterion of verifiability. However, once falsifiability is adopted, their virtue becomes precisely their vice, because the impossibility of being refuted excludes them from the scientific domain. Once falsifiability is adopted as the criterion of demarcation, it naturally follows that a scientific theory should (in principle) be able to produce bold predictions that bear the risk of being refuted and falsified later. Einstein’s theory of relativity, for instance, thus differs from such pseudo-scientific theories as astrology and the two psycho-analytic theories precisely in the sense that the former is able to produce bold and thereby risky predictions while the latter cannot; consequently, the former is much more likely to be scientific than the latter. In the words of Stephen Thornton (2018) summarizes the falsificationism thesis of Popper thus: “Formally, then, Popper’s theory of demarcation may be articulated as follows: where a ‘basic statement’ is to be understood as a particular observation-report, then we may say that a theory is scientific if and only if it divides the class of basic statements into the following two non-empty sub-classes: (a) the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent, or which it prohibits—this is the class of its potential falsifiers (i.e., those statements which, if true, falsify the whole theory), and (b) the class of those basic statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits (i.e., those statements which, if true, corroborate it, or bear it out).” While Popper correctly proposes a demarcation criterion that overcomes the problems latent and generated by the verificationist platform of the Vienna Club, his falsificationism has met with some problems too. When Popper’s falsificationist thesis upholds a method for science whose theories should in principle produce bold theories capable of producing bold predictions bearing the risk of being refuted and falsified later, Thomas Kuhn differs. Kuhn (1970) chronicles that this implication might restrict Popper’s critique of induction only to what he refers to as “revolutionary science” rather than “normal science.” Kuhn doubts if Popper’s conjecture and refutation gives a satisfactory account of scientific revolutions. This understanding is also implied in the proposals of (Gilles 1993, 39). In a related development, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998, 62) write:

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When a theory successfully withstands an attempt at falsification, a scientist will, quite naturally, consider the theory to be partially confirmed and will accord it a greater likelihood or a higher subjective probability. ... But Popper will have none of this: throughout his life he was a stubborn opponent of any idea of ‘confirmation’ of a theory, or even of its ‘probability’…[but] the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all because of their successes.

Owing to the problems deduced from both verificationism and falsificationism, one will be legitimate to find out what fate awaits any strand of demarcation criterion in the face of developments in contemporaneous times, where science, mysticism and spirituality are being fused. One is, therefore, not sure if there is any need for a demarcation criterion now that the predictions of science and religion and even ethno-philosophy now overlap. Within indigenous Yorùbá ethno-epistemology, an appreciation of verificationism and demarcation may be found albeit implicitly, without any attempt to make a distinction of science from non-science.

20.3  V  erificationism and Falsificationism as Embedded in Indigenous Yorùbá Ethno-Epistemology It is instructive to note that Barry Hallen and John Olubi Sodipo are the first to make critical assessment of indigenous Yorùbá linguistics via the Ordinary Language Analysis (OLA). OLA consists primarily in employing the method of analytic philosophy to assess the ways words and concepts are understood and used in any setting (Fasiku, 2008). OLA, according to Barry Hallen (1996: 6), places “emphasis upon ordinary, common and collective uses of language.” Greater importance being attached to description and to analysis rather than to criticism. In essence, the crux of the foregoing is that there are some other senses in which language may be employed. Language may be employed in sense that are generally accepted by a group of people but may be deemed faulty or wanting upon critical assessment from the perspective of mainstream Western-styled thinking (Ofuasia and Ojo 2016, 154). This is why upon a perusal of some concepts or words in the Yorùbá linguistic framework it is quite startling that a direct interpretation or translation into the English language would yield little or no comprehension, thereby affirming Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis. The discourse on the unique use of language by a people, when applied to the epistemic outlook of the Yorùbá, reeks in ethno-epistemology. Ethno-epistemology treats all human epistemological activities as fully natural phenomena to be described, understood and evaluated from a broadly anthropological and fully a posteriori perspective (Maffie 2005). It “insists upon studying the activities of philosophers in the same manner as anthropology studies the activities of priests, shamans, and scientists” (Maffie 2005). The above characterization is pertinent as it reveals the emerging blur between what is scientific and what is not accepted as scientific, in contemporary scholarship. It may be difficult to admit this characterization because of the kind of syllabus

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scholarship has employed hitherto. In this connection, Paul Feyerabend relays how each domain of knowledge is separated and given a logic for its modus operandi. In his words “A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process as well” (Feyerabend 1992, 11). Now, several scientists are usually prone to say some disciplines should adopt their methodology as though the scientific method is the best out of all. Feyerabend (1992, iii) insists that this not be the case, those who are perceived as “non-scientific cultures, procedures and assumptions can also stand on their own feet and should be allowed to do so, if this is the wish of their representatives.” With the foregoing preliminary observations, it is pertinent to then explore closely how fallibilism, falsificationism and verificationism are portrayed in indigenous Yorùbá ethno-epistemology. Hallen and Sodipo, who are well-versed in this method informs that the English word “know” does not translate literally and easily into Yorùbá, since “mọ̀,” the nearest Yorùbá equivalent, still requires eyewitness acquaintance. This implies that the degree of value attached to eyewitness cognition is variable among cultures (Wiredu 2004, 14). It is pertinent to remember that the eyewitness acquaintance hinted at here is redolent of verificationism. Hallen furthers that: Much of (Western) analytic philosophy is rightly identified with the analysis of language. This may involve the clarification of the meaning(s) of individual concepts that are of particular philosophical interest, such as “knowledge,” “belief,” “truth,” and so forth. It may involve as well studying the kinds of justification given to prove, for example, that a certain piece of information is worthy of being described or classified as “knowledge,” etc. One very remarkable oddity about the analytic tradition as practiced within the academy is that virtually the only language that it has been used to analyze is the English language. The most obvious explanation for this is that analytic philosophy is a product of English-­ language culture. But was this really sufficient to explain why its method and techniques had never been applied in even an experimental manner to any non-Western language? Was there not here also evidence, albeit implicit, of a tacit judgment on the part of the Western academy that such endeavours were likely not to be philosophically rewarding? (Hallen 2004, 279)

Hallen demarcates between knowledge derived from second-hand source(s) and the other which is characterised as first-hand experience. He articulates thus: “When one reflects upon what a member of Western society may “learn” in the course of a lifetime, it becomes clear that most people’s “knowledge” consists of information they will never ever be in a position to confirm in a first-hand or direct manner. What they “find out” from a history book, “see” via the evening news on television, or “confirm” about a natural law on the basis of one elementary experiment in a high school physics laboratory – all could be (and sometimes are!) subject to error, distortion, or outright fabrication” (Hallen 2004, 297–8). The knowledge derived from this source is what he terms propositional knowledge. He opines that “Propositional knowledge is therefore generally characterized as second-hand, as information that cannot be tested or proven in a decisive manner by most people and therefore has to be accepted as true because it “agrees” with common sense or because it “corresponds” to or “coheres” with the very limited amount of information that people are

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able to test and confirm in a first-hand or direct manner. Exactly how this coherence or correspondence is to be defined and ascertained is still a subject of endless debate in (Western) epistemological theory” (Hallen 2004, 298). On this showing, Hallen proceeds to expatiate that the Yorùbá criterion for what constitute knowledge (ìmọ̀), is not to be conceived in the Western sense. The distinction made in Yorùbá language and culture between ìmọ̀, knowledge and ìgbàgbọ́, belief reflects a similar concern about the evidential status of first-­hand versus second-hand information. Persons are said to know or have knowledge in indigenous Yorùbá contexts only of something they personally witnessed. The scenes that one saw, the book that one read for instance, fall within this cadre. Furthermore, ìmọ̀ applies to sensory perceptions generally, hence verificationism. In addition, however, ìmọ̀ also goes beyond sensory perception since perception implies cognition. This extends that the meaning that the persons concerned must comprehend is that which they are experiencing. I will now explore the place of truth, òtítọ́. The term “òtítọ́” is associated with “ìmọ̀” in certain respects that parallels the manner in which “true” and “truth” are paired with “know”/” knowledge” in the English language. In the English language “truth” is principally a property of propositional knowledge, of statements human beings make about things, while in Yorùbá, òtítọ́ may be a property of both propositions and certain forms of experience (Hallen 2004, 298). A truth statement, when uttered in the Yorùbá parlance, requires individual verification. Hence, òtítọ́ for A is not same for B outside the referential space-time of the state of affairs. An appreciation of òtítọ́ is mediated by the place of belief, ìgbàbọ́. Now, it needs to be stated at this point that ìgbàbọ́, is not belief in the Western sense. Hallen (2004, 298) relays that it applies to state of affairs that may be classed as second-hand information. It is the case that the foregoing is a testament to the obvious that the Yorùbá are very cautious in their claims to knowing so and so about what and what. Beliefs not subject to individual ‘verification’ cannot pass as truth. As Hallen (2004, 298) reveals, they are ‘possible truths.’ It is in this mould that the falsifiability caution lauded by Popper is admitted in their epistemology. The indigenous Yorùbá knows very well that there is no knowledge that is not fallible. In an attempt to oversee that there are minimal cases of ignorance, the criterion for knowledge is radically different and more stringent from what is common to the Western mind. What then is the connection between ìmọ̀ and ìgbàbọ́/gbàbọ́? In explicit terms, Hallen (2004: 299) clarifies that ìmọ̀ is firsthand knowledge of an individual whereas ìgbàbọ́ comprises of all data arrived at via second-hand sources. Ìgbàbọ́ connotes the knowledge that a Western mind may admit to be true  – the arguments in a book, the evening news, what is told or what one hears etc. Ìmọ̀ on the other hand is usually personal and any attempt to relay this knowledge to another automatically relegates it to the realm of belief, ìgbàbọ́. It is based on this showing that I tender that the Yorùbá employ approaches to knowing that bear semblance to both verificationism and falsificationism. It is the case that for the Yorùbá, the distinction between what is known, what is unknown, what is yet to be known and what is to be believed rests on fallible and falsifiable frameworks (Hallen 2004, 299). The Yorùbá, from the discussion so far

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admit the verification thesis of using the senses to observe and confirm. However, they have not allowed themselves to be swayed away by some of the problems that present themselves to the logical empiricists or positivists, by demarcating or compartmentalising knowledge. Analogously, the falsifiability thesis presents itself in the manner through which the knowledge of one person is automatically relegated to the belief of another person, in an attempt to underscore the fallibilistic tendencies surrounding the process of knowing. Despite holding an ethno-epistemology that exhibits the inner kernels in each of falsificationism and verificationism, the Yorùbá have made no attempt to demarcate what is scientific from what is not. To put this in crude way, they do not differentiate what is known via the senses and cognitively meaningful from that which is not. Critics may at this juncture interject that Africans have no idea of science, for if they did, these Africans would have also conjured a demarcation criterion. While the criticism is not lacking in substance, it is pertinent to question what passes as science. The monolithic way which Western science has placed herself as not only the universal and absolute way of knowing the world has been one of the impasses toward the recognition of the contributions of other peoples, non-Western. It is in this mould that I provide an explanatory justification, for the claim that in contemporary times, attempts to demarcate science from non-science is futile. Ola Longe (1998) gave an inaugural lecture over three decades ago at the University of Ibadan, which reveals the deep-seated connection between Ifá and Computer Science. Fritjof Capra chronicles the parallels between Eastern Mysticism and Modern Physics. He reveals how modern Physics of the twentieth century, through breakthroughs in Quantum Mechanics, confirmed ancient beliefs in Taoist and Buddhist mysticisms. While speaking on this subject, one of the foremost Whiteheadian scholars, David Ray Griffin (2007, 107) explains that: “The message of Fritjof Capra’s Tao of Physics is that modern physics teaches the same lesson as those forms of Buddhism, such as Hua-Yen and Zen, that speak of the mutual interfusion of past, present, and future.” Fritjof Capra in his own words inform that: “…the parallels between modern physics and Eastern mysticism are most striking, and we…encounter statements where it is almost impossible to say whether they have been made by physicists or by Eastern mystics” (Capra 1975: 4). There is semblance in the foregoing with what obtains for Gary Zukav (1979) who articulates how Eastern mystical insights have held a cosmology and metaphysics that Modern Science has come to corroborate. In the case of Yorùbá ethno-epistemology which is grossly under researched, one finds a unique way of explaining phenomenon, alien to present day epistemologies. Writing in this connection, Albert McGee (1983: 100), who was a professor of theoretical physics in Nigeria, reflects concerning the numbering system in the Ifá thought system by offering that the originators of Ifá could have been using “a more refined or different mathematics than what we know today.” This inference, to my mind, seems to validate the pivot of research developments in ethnomathematics – the study of the cultural aspect of mathematics (Rosa and Orey 2011, 32). Ethnomathematics in turn has eroded the assumption that mathematics is culture-free discipline removed from social values (D’Ambrosio 1990).

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It is not unfitting to deduce from the argument that has been rendered hitherto that the line between science and non-science is fuzzier than ever. Recent studies in the field of parapsychology have, in this regard attempted a fusion of the scientific and occurrences as the mystical, reincarnation, life/consciousness after physical death, further revealing the futility of a demarcation criterion thereby validating the main thrust of evolutionary epistemology (Schwarz 2002; Schwarz and Russek 1999; Wilber 1996; Zukav 1979). In his 2002 seminal and thought-provoking book, Gary Schwartz (2002, xvi) avers: “This journey unfolds a scientific adventure tale investigating life after death. The story illustrates the capacity of humans to cherish the process of scientific exploration and to follow the discoveries wherever they may lead. It is a story about the inherent potential in all of us to love people, nature and its entirety.” Elsewhere, Gary Schwarz and Linda Russek, reveal a deeper understanding of the Universe that takes cognizance the essential claims of both the scientists and those hitherto dubbed as engaging in pseudo-science. The work of these scholars echoes the following claims: (i) Every idea and awareness ever experienced throughout time is still contained in the memory of the universe; (ii) Consciousness and the soul survive our body’s death; and (iii) God exists—and is evolving (Schwarz and Russek 1999). It would be a case akin to flogging a dead horse if one ripostes that the Yorùbá does not hold any of the foregoing claims, albeit with some slight variations. There are extant verses of the Ifá literary corpus. These are documented in verses of chapters such as Òfún-Rẹtẹ̀ and Éjì Ogbe. Whereas an exploration of these verses are beyond the scope of the present study, this research remains convinced that  the Yorùbá ethno-epistemology admits the principal characters of each of verifiability and falsifiability without implying a demarcation criterion.

20.4  Conclusion The issue that the sciences have a method that distinguishes them from other human intellectual and mystical endeavors is no longer consensual. This essay has demonstrated this assertion by exploring Yorùbá ethno-epistemology in order to evince how the epistemic position of the Yorùbá, admits the underlying recipes of verifiability and falsifiability, yet avoid applying a demarcation criterion. The paper also revealed why it is difficult in recent times to dub one field as scientific and another non-scientific as research and intellectual explorations have become multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary in a bid to arrive at a more coherent and encompassing description of phenomena. This is exactly what Karl Popper (1963: 36) reminds us when he submits that nearly all scientific theories originated from myths. It is as a result of the analysis explored thus far that I submit the urgency to explore indigenous African epistemes with the aim of extrapolating ideals that may be useful for the contemporary age and also evince the authentic and original contribution of Africa to world intellectual history.

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References Afisi, Oseni Taiwo, and Emmanuel Ofuasia. 2018. Yorùbá Ethno-Epistemology and the Futility of the Demarcation Criterion. Sapientia Journal of Philosophy 9: 167–172. Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2013. Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism: Corroboration versus Confirmation. Philosophy Study 3 (5): 506–516. Alozie, Princewill Iheanyi. 2004. Philosophy of Physics. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1952. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications. Capra, Fritjof. 1975. The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Colorado: Shambhala Publications Inc. Carnap, Rudolf. 1959. The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language. In Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. Ayer. New York: Blackwell Publishing Co. D’Ambrosio, U. 1990. Etnomatematica [Ethnomathematics]. Sao Paulo, S.P: Editora Atica. Fasiku, Gbenga. 2008. African Philosophy and the Method of Ordinary Language Philosophy. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2: 85–90. Feyerabend, Paul. 1992. Against Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Flew, Anthony. 1984. A Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: St. Martins Press Gilles, Donald. 1993. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. New  York: Blackwell Publishers. Griffin, David Ray. 2007. Whitehead’s Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for its Contemporary Relevance. New York: State University of New York Press. Hallen, Barry. 2004. Yorùbá Moral Epistemology. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 296–303. New York: Blackwell Pub Ltd. ———. 1996. Does it Matter Whether Linguistic Philosophy Intersects Ethnophilo? APA Newsletters 96. Harris, Kevin. 1988. Education and Knowledge: A Structured Misrepresentation of Reality. London: Routledge & Kegal Paul Ltd. Huemer, Michael. 2002. Epistemology: Contemporary Readings. London: Routledge. Keuth, P. 1990. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. London: Routledge. Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Longe, Ola. 1998. Ifa Divination and Computer Science. An Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Ibadan, on Thursday, December 22, 1983. Ibadan: W. Giradet Press (W.A) Co. Maffie, J. 2005. EthnoEpistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Assessed February 3, 2019. www.iep.utm.edu/ethno-­ep/ McGee, Albert. Q. 1983. Some Mathematical Observations of on the Ifá Belief System Practice by the Yoruba People of Nigeria. Journal of Cultures and Ideas 1 (1): 93–102. McGinn, Marie. 2002. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. New York: Routledge. Ofuasia, Emmanuel, and Grace Oluwaseyi Ojo. 2016. On the Gettier Problem and Yorùbá Epistemology: Analytic Forays into Ethno-Philosophy. Philosophia: E-Journal of Philosophy and Culture 14: 145–161. Popper, Karl Raimund. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1959. Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. Quine, William Van Orman. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review. 60: 20–43. Rosa, Milton, and Daniel Clark Orey. 2011. Ethnomathematics: The Cultural Aspects of Mathematics. Revista Latinoamericana de Etnomatematica 4 (2): 32–54. Ruse, Michael. 2010. Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schwarz, Gary E. 2002. The Afterlife Experiments: Breakthrough Scientific Evidence of Life After Death. New York: Pocket Books. Schwarz, Gary E., and Linda Russek. 1999. The Living Energy Universe. New York: Hampton Road Publishing Co. Schlick, Moritz. 1926. Erblen, Erkennen, Metaphysick. Kant Studien XXXI: 115–135.

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Shea, Brendan. 2016. Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer Reviewed Academic Resource. Assessed February 3, 2019. www.iep.utm.edu/pop-­sci/. Shearmur, Jeremy. 2019. The Distinctive Character of Popper’s Critical Rationalism. Paper Presented at the Karl Popper for Africa International Conference. Lagos State University, Nigeria, March 28–31, 2019: 1–13 Sokal, Alan, and Jean Bricmont. 1998. Fashionable Nonsense. New York: Picardo. Thornton, Stephen. 2018. Karl Popper. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Assessed February 3, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ Wilber, Ken. 1996. A Brief History of Everything. Colorado: Shambhala. Wiredu, Kwasi. 2004. Introduction African Philosophy in our Time. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 1–28. New York: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Zukav, Gary. 1979. The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics. London: ­Rider/ Hutchinson.

Chapter 21

Interrogating Edmund Gettier’s Idea of Justification with Karl Popper’s Anti-­ Foundationalism Michael Aina Akande

21.1  Introduction Empiricists and rationalists during the modern period of philosophy adopted the Socratic definition of knowledge as true belief plus evidence or reason respectively. This definition was not just adopted; they addressed the concern of regress that Socrates had raised towards the end of his dialogue with Theaetetus. The resultant effect is foundationalism as a theory of justification. Foundationalists such as Rene Descartes, argue that infinite regress of knowledge or belief justification is avoidable when we recognised that some beliefs are basic and self-justifying, and such beliefs can serve as a foundation for non-basic beliefs. John Locke argues that facts and by extension human experience is basic to any knowledge claim. In the same tradition Descartes claims that idea and by extension reason is basic to indubitable knowledge (Stroll and Popkin 1993, 243–235). In other words, some propositions are known based on other facts, innate ideas or “on other justified beliefs” (Postonn 2016). This suggests that justification can either be inferential or non-inferential. It is inferential if it is argumentative (deductive or inductive). It is non-inferential if it is based on human attributes. It is in this sense that I will argue that Popper’s critical rationalism or anti-foundationalism is consistent with the character of iwadi (persistent investigation) associated  with Olubi Sodipo and Barry Hallen in Yoruba epistemology’s discovery of truth (1986:70). In 1963, Edmund Gettier did an analysis of the traditional conceptions of knowledge of Plato, Ayer and Chisholm and summates the conditions of knowledge as justification, truth and belief (JTB). His submission is contrary to all earlier proposals that knowledge is attained when one has justified true belief. He highlights two principles which form the basis of his critique. These principles are the basis for the counterexamples with which he debunks the traditional account of knowledge as M. A. Akande (*) Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_21

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justified true belief. In the first principle of Gettier, he says “it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. The second principle takes it further that, “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q” (Gettier 1963:121). Logically, Gettier’s position is that one can infer a true belief from a false belief and still be justified in accepting the inference if the false belief is justified by circumstantial evidence. What one observed in Gettier’s counterexamples is beliefs based on accidental truth or perception without critical questioning. The crux of the matter is that when an epistemic agent is justified in believing a proposition from uncritical experience, any logical inference from this proposition will equally be justified even when the proposition from experience turned out to be false. If the inference from this false proposition is true then the epistemic agent has met the trio traditional conditions of justification, truth and belief. Experience in this context becomes a source of basic beliefs or basic attribute in the foundationalist sense. Consequently, what we see, hear, taste, smell and feel become generators of basic beliefs for us and they can serve as bases of propositional or inferential knowledge (Audi 2010, 233–234). Karl Popper’s ‘non-foundationalist’ critical rationalism had been established before Gettier came up with his analysis of knowledge. Popper’s critique of foundationalism shook the foundation of the hall mark of Western traditional epistemology as defended by Descartes, the logical empiricists and invariably Gettier. The position I am defending is that, Gettier is not correct to have presented the epistemic agent (uncritical Smith) in his counterexamples as justified. I have arrived at this conclusion because it is uncritical of Smith to think that ‘Jones owns a Ford car’ can be inferred from the perception of ‘Jones drives a Ford car’, without a problem. In the same manner, Smith’s belief that the testimony of a company president (an authority) is basic and not questionable is faulty. The first belief ignores the fact that every perception is theory laden while the second ignores the problem of trust in testimonial knowledge. Popper just like in Yoruba epistemology subscribed to the position that observation itself is theory laden and that is why in Yoruba epistemology propositional knowledge falls within the scope of second-hand information which requires further personal investigation or questioning (Sodipo and Hallen 1986, 61). In his assessment of sociology of knowledge, Popper admits that “there is no doubt that we are all suffering under our own system of prejudices” (Popper 1957, 217). Popper however, thinks that this situation can be remedied when agents submit themselves to criticisms from professionals within the system (Popper 1957, 217). The argument presented above is that Gettier’s position fails because he does not realize firstly, that pseudo-propositions are not the same as scientific propositions just because they have a body of evidence in their support. Secondly, tentatively true propositions (verisimilitude as Popper will call them) inferred from observation are justificatory only if they have been tested or assessed by others to eliminate individual prejudices.

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21.2  T  he Philosophical Import of Gettier’s Analysis and Foundational Approach to Knowledge In buttressing his theory or position, Gettier presented two hypothetical cases which are known as Gettier’s counterexamples in which justification, belief and truth are present, yet the claimant cannot be said to know. The reason for this as Gettier holds is that the truth of this belief is a matter of accident, or the truth of the justified belief is not a consequence of its justification. In other words, the epistemic agent is unaware of how his/her belief came true since the justification s/he has of the false belief is only accidentally transferred to the true belief that is inferred from it. This work takes Gettier as a foundationalist because of his belief that knowledge is a conclusion drawn from premises, without giving corollary attention to the claimer’s virtue(s) adopted during collation and testing of beliefs. Seeing and hearing in Gettier’s opinion are basic and consequently veritable sources of knowledge. One clear observation in Gettier’s counterexamples is that the basic premises in the arguments which are derived from perception later turned out false while the ones which are non-evidential are true. An attempt to accept this idea of justification will make nonsense of the value of human efforts in achieving epistemic success and this will have negative impact on epistemic development. This is the reason why Linda Zagzebski emphasizes the value of perception or character-traits of agents in her hybrid virtue reliabilism (1996, 303). Yoruba epistemic position is equally instructive here because of it supports that the ideas of seeing and hearing are of epistemic relevance if only we see well and hear properly (Fayemi 2013:74). Some of the implications of considering virtues in justification of knowledge is to avoid bias, hasty conclusion and ambiguity. Though, human virtuous disposition does not alter the property of beliefs, they nevertheless determine whether one is justified in accepting or rejecting any belief. So, if perception or experience will serve as a foundation for knowledge, tested or critical perception should be preferred to its opposite. Popper’s testability method in his critical rationalism and Yoruba’s iwadi (investigation/underlying reason) then become relevant as methods of arriving at reliable knowledge. Foundationalism is the belief that once the foundation of an epistemic claim is strong, the claim is good. It assumes a pyramidal conception of knowledge with a broad and strong base that is likened to the structure of a house. The idea is that the base provides the strength for the structure built on it. If the structure refuses to be destroyed in the face of any storm or quake, then the base is good. It is in this respect that adherents of this principle ‘invented’ basic beliefs which are self-evident to serve as foundation for non-basic beliefs which are not. The claims that experience is the best teacher and reason is the best innovator by empiricists and rationalists respectively, suggest two foundations of knowledge that require no criticism. The foundation in this respect is the means to an end, where the end is knowledge. So much has been said on the philosophical implications of the notion of ‘means to an end’ and I need to stretch it because it is not all required ends that justify their means. In other words, if an uncritical means produced a required truth, it is not necessarily justified and as such the truth does not amount to knowledge.

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In political philosophy, the phrase “means to an end” was generated by the writings of an Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiaveli (1997) who wrote a book titled The Prince. In his book Machiaveli saw power as the goal or end of politics. He enumerated different strategies for would-be-politicians and politicians (Princes) to use in other to achieve power. Machiaveli acknowledged two broad ways (methods) of achieving one’s aims, the first is to follow the law (moral and legal) and the second is to use force (immoral and illegal). To Machiaveli, both means are useful or good as long as the end goal is realized. So, a Prince must know when to employ any of them when the time arises in order to achieve power. A prince that is able to cling to power using immoral means as foundation is a statesman as long as he is successful. Also, Joseph Fletcher  (1997) who propounded the ethical theory of Situation ethics recognized two important goals of moral judgments: first is good intention (love) and the second is happiness of the agent. He therefore recommends that any means is justified in order to achieve these. For Fletcher the principle of love is the foundation of good intention and happiness and as such “a person who lives in the concrete situation as either a giver or a receiver of love has priority over any moral, legal or abstract conceptions of what is right or good” (Honer et al. 1999:166). The achievement or success of an agent is the most important factor. Epistemologically speaking, Gettier is interpreted in the same vein, as saying that when truth is achieved the method of achieving it is justified but he admits that it is not the best since knowledge is not achieved. One’s observation is justificatory if it leads to truth, but if it turns out that the belief from observation is hasty or delusional, knowledge cannot be served. Therefore, the phrase “means to an end” refers to using any action or method (means) that the sole purpose of doing or employing it is to achieve something else (an end). My contention here is that uncritical employment of reason or experience by an agent is not a good means even when truth is achieved. So, the idiomatic meaning of the phrase which suggests using actions of less importance to achieve goals of great importance may serve a pragmatic purpose but it will result into accidental truth in some cases. The above illustration is necessary here because epistemologists focus on methodology of inquiry as a determinant of knowledge in relation to truth. Traditional epistemology mainly focuses on truth as the end of knowledge but pays little attention to the way in which truth is achieved. Descartes “cogito ergo sum” may be true but his method of doubt only leads to truth because the ergo is assumed ab nitio. Descartes could not have arrived at his self-evident truth if he did not start by assuming that the self exists in the first place. He started by assuming he exists and ends up proving the existence of himself. Just as Descartes truth is fraught with circular reasoning, Socrates definition of knowledge as true belief plus account is bedeviled with an assumption that reason is reliable. The problem of such foundational approach to knowledge by traditional epistemologists faces its greatest challenge in Gettier’s analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. In Gettier’s words: I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of ‘justified’ in which S’s being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S’s knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition

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P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q (Gettier 1963, 121).

Following from above, one can say that the justification of P because of the evidence in support is transferred to Q since Q is inferred from P. Gettier goes further to show in his counterexamples that it does not matter if at the end P is discovered to be false Q is still justified especially when Q is true. Though, Gettier asserts that S cannot be said to know Q, nonetheless he believes that S is justified in believing Q. It is in the light of this that we interpret Gettier’s position as a case of the end justifies the means. Gettier’s counterexample will suffice here for better analysis: CASE I: Jones and Smith applied for the same job. After the interview, Smith approached the president of the organisation to know who is going to get the job; to which the president responded “Jones is the man who will get the job”. Smith is also aware that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. So, he concluded that ‘the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket’. However, it was Smith who eventually got the job and when his pocket was searched, 10 coins were found there. This made his audience acknowledged that Smith knows who will get the job. But unknown to Smith himself, is the fact that he has 10 coins in his pocket at the time of announcing that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket”.

For Gettier, therefore, Smith has a true belief which is justified but unfortunately he does not know. This is because his conclusion that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” became true by accident or luck. The second counterexample goes thus: CASE II: Suppose Smith has good evidence for the proposition: (1) Jones owns a Ford because he has seen Jones driving one lately. And from that he inferred the three disjunctions below: (i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, (ii) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston, and (iii) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litosk.

If by coincidence Brown is indeed in Barcelona, we may say that Smith, by believing in proposition (i), has justified true belief even if proposition (1) is false. Smith’s conclusion cannot be a case of knowledge since Smith has no evidence whatever as to Brown’s actual whereabouts and so believes what is true only by accident or luck. In both counterexamples the proposition which Smith has evidence for are false but the conclusions which are products of deductive inference happen to be true even when Smith has no evidence for them.

21.3  Popper’s Anti-Foundationalism Karl Popper has demonstrated the unity of all knowledge with his principle of critical rationalism. For him a proposition is capable of being known if it is scientific and it is scientific if it is falsifiable. It is another way of saying a statement is not knowledge if it is not falsifiable. A known proposition is the one that has passed the test of falsification. In other words, a known proposition is not the one that more

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evidence is piled up to support it but the one that has not been falsified in spite of the various attempts to do so. Popper’s idea is uniquely fallibilist. His fallibilism was a reaction to the foundationalist theory of Descartes, logical positivism and invariably, Gettier. While Descartes had thought that his ‘cogito’ was the foundation of philosophical postulations, the positivists erected knowledge on perceptual ability; both barring prejudices and making claims to objectivity. However, for Popper, objectivity is not a characteristic of human personality, rather it is a product of being open to criticism (1957, 127). In essence, Popper disputed any philosophical theories of knowledge that are founded on any background information, a secure foundation of certainty or any justified belief, such as a conclusion inferred on a basis of sound premises, as the one championed by both Descartes and logical positivism before him. Popper systematically disputed both the very idea of foundations for science and also the very reality of empirical justification (Afisi 2017, 44). To Popper, empirical justification is inductive because it is inferred from observations and inductive justification of induction will lead to circular regress. Thus, in Popper’s view, without empirical justification, verificationism that is championed by the logical positivists is ultimately defeated (Afisi 2017, 44). So, instead of foundationalism, Popper’s philosophy of science is anti-foundational because of its disrepute for any theory of knowledge that is based on a secure foundation of certainty. However, one needs to point out that Popper’s position is against inferential foundationalism rather than non-inferential foundationalism. Since Popper advocates for consistent questioning as the best attitude for an epistemic agent in arriving at the truth, it follows that such human-trait is foundational to the discovery of truth. In place of absolute knowledge pushed forward by inferential foundationalists, Popper certainly prescribed the philosophical position known as fallibilism according to which all our knowledge of the world is provisional and amenable to corrections (Afisi 2017, 44). Though Popper’s critical rationalism may be seen as foundational to his idea of science, it does not give privilege to any form of belief as classical foundationalism had done by labeling some beliefs as basic to others. For him, every belief is open to test and must be falsifiable to earn the appellation of truth or knowledge. In his anti-foundationalist philosophy, Popper advocates two types of fallibilism. For the first, Popper maintains the position that “humans are fallible”. For the second thesis, “human knowledge is fallible”. It is based on these propositions that Popper rejects the idea that there are any infallible foundations (or sources) of knowledge (Popper 1959, 111). Popper acknowledges that there are all kinds and sources of knowledge, but none can have certainty. So, there is no solid bedrock of knowledge, and the structure of knowledge erected on piles driven into a swamp should be enough to carry the structure of our present knowledge (Popper 1959: 111). In other words, Popper’s anti-foundationalism embraces the idea of falsification and corroboration through critical and severe testing of theories. Popper’s position is that knowledge is fallible and as such should be held tentatively, precisely by holding it open to potential criticism. Popper’s critical rationalism emphasizes that all empirical forms of knowledge must be put to the test of criticism, and only those

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that are put to the test of criticism can properly be termed ‘scientific’ (Afisi 2017, 46). So, according to Popper, scientific knowledge is the type of knowledge that can be neither definitively proven nor established with certainty. It may quite possibly be false, and thus it should remain tentative forever (Popper 1959, 280). Thus, Popper insists that scientific knowledge should be regarded, not as a set of propositions, but as a series of problem situations, tentative solutions, error eliminations, and new problem situations. Popper attempts to unite all knowledge through his anti-foundationalism methodology of rational inquiry which shunned theoretical logic because it can hardly be used in other disciplines such as in political science and ethics. This attempt frowned at all forms of epistemological foundationalism which creates regress problem and maintained that this regress can only be stopped arbitrarily. In Yoruba epistemology, Popper’s attempt to unify knowledge has support. The attempt to unify knowledge can be seen in Yoruba concepts of iriri (experience), oju-inu (inner-eye) and eri-okan (conscience). In relating both perception and virtue to knowledge, externalism of justification is as important as internalism of justification (Akande 2018, 216–218). In otherwords, an epistemic agent should be armed with both perceptual trait and character trait in the attempt to discover truth. Character trait in this regard is the sceptical attitude of mind to question any proposition with open mindedness. For Popper and Yoruba epistemology, rationality and objectivity of knowledge should be determined by the relationship between a claim and how the claim is made, criticized or rejected. A common admonition in Yoruba tradition is expressed in the saying “e je ki a fi oju-inu wo” which means let us look at it critically. Objectivity, in this light, is not” a product of individual scientist’s impartiality” but a result of collective cooperation to subject claims to test among epistemic agents within a field (Popper 1957, 220).

21.4  Popper on Gettier’s Justified True Belief This anomaly of having justified true belief (JTB) without knowledge lends credence to Popper’s anti-foundationalist stance which posits that accumulation of evidence does not guarantee truth. The reason is not farfetched, since the premises of most deductive arguments are themselves products of inductive observations which are theory laden; if any of the premise fails, it will affect the outcome of the deductive inference. Though the certainty of valid deductive inferences is not in doubt comparable to that of inductive inferences, it is so only when the premises of deductive inferences are assumed true without investigation of the contents. Socrates envisages this problem in his dialogue with Theaetetus when he said that an attempt to present a proposition to justify another will lead to a regress. So, providing foundation as a means of justification will lead to infinite regress of justification in case of deductive reasoning or circular regress in case of inductive reasoning. For Popper, rationalism succeeds only if one is ready to adopt the rationalist

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attitude of holding argument and experience as important. However, Popper is of the opinion that neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rational attitude (1957, 230). So, he concludes that “the logico-mathematical probability of any scientific or pseudo-scientific theory relative to or in conjunction with any body of evidence is zero” (Aigbodioh 1997, 61). A rejection of such comprehensive rationalism as he calls is not an acceptance of irrationalism. In providing an alternative, Popper opines that criticism is possible without the demand of justification. It is in this wise his critical rationalism is seen as a minimal concession to irrationalism (Popper 1957, 232). Popper argues in this direction by saying the analysis of consequences of a claim may influence a decision without determining it (1957, 233). It is not surprising that Popper believes that a minimal moral consideration is necessary in testing a proposition because every method one chooses is a personal decision that should be considered when the claim to rationality and objectivity is being determined. The decision of Smith to choose three towns at random in determining the whereabouts of Brown his friend without recourse to any inductive history of how Brown travels, makes his claim to objectivity or rationality questionable. In the same vein, concluding that driving a car amounts to ownership of a car is suspect in a claim of objectivity. In line with the principle of critical rationalism one can fault this statement just by showing professional drivers who are not owners of the car they are driving. Smith’s conclusion that “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” will fail when faced with the question whether having ten coins is a condition or prerequisite for getting the job. With the above test, the conclusion of the random selection that led to the truth that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is an attempt to play smart, ditto the one that led to the truth that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket. So, seeing someone driving a car is not enough supports for belief in the ownership of the car just like hearing that “Jones is the man who will get the job” is not enough supports for believing that Jones will get the job. The choice of such a method is sometimes frowned at in moral circle as promoting degenerated ethics: the ethics that care less about social norms and procedures will justify a wife who commits adultery because she is using the proceeds to take care of her family; an ethics that allows leaders to subjugate their citizens in order to cling to power, an ethics that allows a police officer to prosecute an innocent person in order to create fear that can debar other people from committing crime. Such degenerated ethics is frowned at in contemporary epistemology such as Moral and virtue epistemology. For the philosophers in this circle, any analysis of objective truth or knowledge without recourse to the motivation (intellectual virtue) behind it is faulty. Critical rationalism admits the need for firmness and impartiality in scientific or epistemic propositions and the virtue of open-mindedness in testing scientific propositions. Popper argues that a statement is scientific or ‘trueable’ if it is falsifiable. The implication is that we must use the method of doubt where it is difficult to determine the status of a proposition because this promotes firmness and helps in avoiding ambiguity. Yoruba epistemology, which insists that propositional knowledge is in the realm of second-hand information and as such is mere belief (igbagbo)

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is not scepticism, but a matter of using the method of doubts to achieve truth. A statement such as “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” is not critically assessed else it would have been discovered that having ten coins is not a condition for getting the job asides the fact that it will be obvious that not only one applicant has ten coins in his pocket. In the same vein “Jones owns a Ford car” lacks the required probing in spite of the evidence that Jones always drives a Ford car. The message of Popper in this respect is that a pseudo-proposition can have a body of evidence or reason to justify it just like any scientific statement. So, rather than focus on building evidence as foundation for justification a scientist just like epistemologist should depend on propositions that are firm, non-ambiguous and consequently capable of escaping falsification or refutation. One lesson for Gettier here is that a false proposition that is justified because of the evidence in support of it is so because it harbours ambiguity.

21.5  Conclusion Fallibilism is an epistemic position that asserts that no belief can be conclusively proven with certainty. However, it does not mean that one should not make an attempt at proving. From our interrogation of Gettier, truth can absolutely be justified whereas knowledge is not. That is why the claims that “Jones owns a Ford car and Jones will get the job” could be accepted without much ado. Regardless of this similarity, contrary to Gettier, Popper believes that gathering of more evidence is not a proper way of proving a proposition to be true but by criticizing or attempting to falsify it. Truth in this respect is not absolute. Also, one can observe that while Gettier adopted foundationalist stance and arrived at a sceptical position, Popper only adopted scepticism as a method in his critical rationalism. The beauty of Popper’s method which is absent in Gettier’s, is that it helps to avoid problem from the beginning. Having said this, one cannot discard Gettier’s analysis. Although Gettier was right to say that knowledge cannot be served under the situations that he imagined, he was wrong to think that justification can be served without being critical of perception or evidence. This work concludes that a proposition or belief that is justified through observation or facts and later turned out false as it is in Gettier’s case is so because of certain ambiguity or inappropriateness in classification of facts. It seems suspicious to admit P and build on it when its status (of truth or falsity) is previously unknown. In other words, if S has evidence for P but S is not sure if P is true or false why should S infer Q from P? Though, in practical situations one can hold P tentatively as evident in Yoruba epistemology, but it does not follow that once it is discovered that P is false one cannot reasonably reject both P and Q its product. It is found out in the course of this study that Popper’s critical rationalism is also supported by Yoruba epistemology. Both assert the importance of adequate investigation, in addition to the virtue of critical mindedness in the course of discovering truth. The contention of both positions is that logical properties of arguments are not

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enough justification for accepting a belief, there is a need as well to consider the disposition of the agent during collation and the status of the beliefs involve. This is necessary in order to ward off any ambiguity or error inherent in an argument; a task that is in the purview of critical thinking in general and critical rationalism in particular.

References Afisi, Oseni. 2017. Karl Popper’s Fallibilist Anti-Inductivism and the “Whiff of Inductivism” in Science. Journal of Philosophy and Development 16 (1): 43–56. Aigbodioh, Jack. 1997. Philosophy of Science: Issues and Problems. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Akande, Aina. 2018. From Ontological Duality to Duality of Epistemological Justification in Yoruba Philosophy. Lasu Journal of Philosophy 1 (2, (October)): 207–220. Audi, Robert. 2010. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. 3rd ed. New York: Taylor and Francis e-library. Fayemi, Kazeem. 2013. “Epistemological Virtue in Yoruba Oral Media” Implications for Culture of Peace in Contemporary Africa. African Symposium 13 (1 (June)): 69–77. Fletcher, Joseph. 1997. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Louisville: John Knox Press. Gettier, Edmund. 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6): 121–123. Honer, Stanley, T. Hunt, and Okholm Dennis. 1999. Invitation to Philosophy: Issues and Options. 8th ed. Belmont: Wordsworth Publishing comp. Machiaveli, Niccolo. 1997. The Prince. (translation) C.E Detmold Hertfordshire. Wordsworth Classics. Popkin, Richard, and Avrum Stroll. 1993. Philosophy Made Simple. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd. Poston, Ted. 2016. Foundationalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved at https:// plato.stanford.edu on 12/6/2019 Popper, Karl. 1957. The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. 2. 3rd ed. London: Routledge. ———. 1959. Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge. Sodipo, Olubi, and Hallen Barry. 1986. Knowledge Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experience in African Philosophy. London: Ethnographica. Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 22

Popper’s Critical Rationalism and the Legitimacy of an African Epistemic System Ignatius Ifeanyichukwu Ogbodo and Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba

22.1  Introduction In some quarters, African epistemic system is believed to be largely based on beliefs, practices, legends and legendary activities that have not been subjected to critical scrutiny. Analytic philosophy of logical positivism developed as a reaction to this kind of knowledge with much emphasis on precision of terms and clarity of concepts. The logical positivists insist on verification as a criterion of meaning and reject, as meaningless, all non-empirical claims. Soon after, the positivist radical empiricist claims and verificationist criterion of meaning was, itself, in needs of verification. This development came against the background of the philosophical insight on the nature and meaning of language, especially, as offered by later Wittgenstein (Ormerod 2009, 441) and intellectual prowess of W. V. O. Quine evident in his own programmatic version of naturalism. Quine appreciated that meaning and reference are distinct, and that once the theory of meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, we recognize the business of the theory of meaning as ‘simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements’. (Quine 1961). All these were attempts to precision of terms regarding meaning of concepts or ideas. Karl popper’s critical rationalism is an attempt to respond to the flaws of analytic tradition, and became a search for the basis for progress in science (Afisi and Ofuasia 2018, 2). In this regard, Oseni Taiwo Afisi observed that Popper’s philosophy of science developed as a counter reaction to logical empiricism, and that Popper recognised many of the weaknesses of logical empiricism especially its conflicting problems of meaning and of demarcation (Afisi 2013, 507). The precise point of this disagreement with the logical positivist is that ‘science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology’ (Afisi and I. I. Ogbodo · A. C. Ojimba (*) University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_22

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Ofuasia 2018, 5). Popper proposed falsification as criterion for science, rejecting meaningfulness as a criterion of demarcation, and emphasizing the critical method. With this in mind, we can say that through Popper’s falsifiability principle provides credible ground for progress in the development of African epistemic system to the category of science by the means of falsification and elimination of false knowledge not necessarily because of its meaningfulness or non-meaningfulness, but because of the possibility of its capacity to be corroborated.

22.2  Popper’s Critical Rationalism Popper inaugurated his idea of critical rationalism by investigating the logic of holding all ideas open to criticism (Joseph Agassi and Ian Jarvie 2008, 2). In his intellectual scepticism, Popper believed that removing logical limitations cannot strengthen rational arguments in irrational situations, and this led him to believing that falsification is the distinguishing characteristic of science; that universal theories cannot be verified or confirmed with certainty, but can only be falsified. Popper demonstrates how this approach solves the problem of induction, identified originally by David Hume and the demarcation problem (Ormerod 2009, 442). Popper’s project, in this regard, was to stress particularly the intellectual significance of the need for science to grow, and that it is this aspect which makes science rational and empirical, and that science loses this character when it ceases to grow (Popper 1962, 214). By growth of knowledge, Popper meant the repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacements by better and more satisfactory ones. Popper believed that the study of scientific knowledge leads to the growth of knowledge in general (Popper 1962, 215). Popper exhibited a lot of interest in methodology. In the Logic of Scientific Discovery, he explains that methodological decisions are indispensable, especially because, empirical statements have the distinguishing characteristic of susceptibility to revision, criticism and be superseded by better ones (Popper 1959, 28). He believes the task of the scientist to be one of analysis of the characteristic ability of science to advance and to make crucial choices in crucial cases of choosing between conflicting systems of theories. He admitted the need for logical analysis of theories, but for those that take account of how they change and develop. However, he also admitted that this kind of analysis does not elucidate those aspects of the empirical sciences which he so highly prizes. He stated that a system of classical mechanics may be scientific to an accepted degree, but upholding it dogmatically to the extent of defending it against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved is adopting the reverse of the critical attitude which he considers proper to scientists. Popper argues that there never can be any complete disprove of theory. One can only say that an experimental result is reliable or that the “discrepancies which are accepted to exist between the experimental results and the theories are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advancement of our understanding” (Popper 1959, 28).

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Popper advanced the thesis that we can know whether a theory can be better than a certain other if it passes a certain test. This implies that we have a “criterion of relative potential satisfactoriness, or of potential progressiveness, which can be applied to a theory even before we know whether or not it will turn out, by the passing of some crucial tests to be satisfactory” (Popper 1962, 216). Popper argues that in science, striving at a higher informative content in the business of growth of knowledge leads to low probability; but probability, in this sense, is not the same as verisimilitude or truth-likeness, which is a cherished property of theories; it is probability in the sense of calculus of probability which he demonstrated. Nevertheless, for Popper, low probability, as indicated in his calculus of probability, implies high probability of falsifiability. And that falsifiability or refutability or testability is the aim of science, which incidentally, is also the aim for higher informative content. This means that only highly testable or, put differently, improbable theories are worth testing, and only those that stand severe testing are satisfactory (Popper 1962, 219). Popper illustrated this by making reference to Galileo’s theory which was superseded by Newton’s stronger and better testable theory. Fresnel and Faraday’s theory was replaced by Maxwell’s. Later, Newton’s and Maxwell’s were gallantly superseded by Einstein’s. In these cases, the progress of knowledge is more on more informative and logically less probable theory. If these claims of theory superiority survive testing, they are said to be corroborated. (Popper 1962, 220). On another note, Popper argues that if we characterise empirical science mainly by the formal or logical structures of its statements, then, we shall not be able to exclude from it that form of metaphysics which is the result of elevating obsolete scientific theories to an incontrovertible truth. These are the reasons why he advocated for scientific method. It is important to note that Popper accused the logical positivists of disliking the idea that there can be meaningful problems outside the field of positive empirical science; they fail to see that there is a general theory of knowledge, an epistemology or a methodology which needs to be genuinely dealt with, philosophically. They would wish to see in philosophical problems mere ‘pseudo problems’ or ‘puzzle’. For Popper, the positivists do not view this wish as just a proposal, but as a statement of fact which their misguided thinking would most likely play out gratified. Popper argues that if we accept, as meaningful, only problems in natural science, debates on the concept of meaning becomes meaningless. If the dogma of meaning is enthroned and elevated above debate, it becomes unassailable and definitive. This understanding, according to which methodology is limited to empirical science, observation and procedures of science, is known as naturalism or Inductive theory of science (Popper 1959, 29–31). Popper does not believe that it is possible to reach a decision about universal questions as whether science actually uses principle of induction in the method of empirical science or not. He believes that the application of the methods of induction and deduction will always give rise to inconsistencies. Based on this, he dismissed the naturalist views as  uncritical. It can only present a convention which might likely turn out a dogma instead of a fact (Popper 1959, 31). He is of the view

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that this criticism applies not only to criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science and consequently to its idea of empirical method. Popper described the methodical rules of the empirical sciences as convention or the game of empirical science. The rule of the game of empirical science or convention differs from the rule of pure logic just as the rule of Chess cannot count as logic, pure and simple. He observed that there is a difference between enquiry into method and a pure logical enquiry on the basis of which he called the results of an enquiry into the rules of the game of science the ‘logic of scientific discovery’. He used two methodological rules to explain this difference: firstly, there is no end to the game of science because if we decide that there is no need for further tests of our knowledge and that scientific statement is conclusively verified, then we retire from the game. Secondly, if a proposed hypothesis proves its mettle after having undergone testing, it remains valid until it is abrogated by another which is better testable or if one of its consequences is falsified. These two examples differ from the rule of pure logic. He argues that empirical sciences should be defined by the rule proper to it, just as chest is defined by the rules proper to it; and that the supreme rule in science is that other rules of scientific procedures must be designed such that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification (Popper 1959, 32–33). Granted, profound truths are not expected of methodology all the time, but they may help in clarifying logical situations and solve problems. It is worthy of note that Popper argues that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas or a logical reconstruction of this process. He believes that every discovery contains an ‘irrational element’ or a ‘creative intuition’. He quoted Einstein who spoke of the search for highly universal laws from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. For Einstein, there is no logical path leading to these laws; they can only be reached by intuition based upon something like an intellectual love (Popper 1959, 8–9). Popper proposed methods of testing of theories. Method of critically testing of theories always proceeds along the following lines. From a new idea tentatively put forward and not yet justified in any way, maybe in the form of anticipation, a hypothesis, a theory, conclusions are made by means of logical deductions. These conclusions are then, compared with one another and with other relevant statements so as to find out the logical relations between them. That is, to find out whether they are equivalent, derivable from, compatible or incompatible with one another. Testing of theories is carried out along the following four different lines or procedure: Testing of the internal consistency of the system by logically comparing conclusions. Next, we determine whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory or whether it is tautological by investigating the logical forms of the theory. We, then, determine whether the theory could constitute a scientific advance by comparing it with other theories. Finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it (Popper 1959, 17). A major concern of Popper’s project on methodology is to demonstrate that the various problems of theory of knowledge stand in systematic relation to one another. This is why he delved into the problem of demarcation. He believed that his

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principle of falsification is useful if only philosophers could accept the consequences of his proposals which could help in detecting inconsistencies and inadequacies in older theories of knowledge. Though he himself expressed doubt about the possibility of this acceptance (Popper 1959, 34). Regarding the problem of demarcation, Karl Popper’s business was not to overthrow metaphysics. It was, rather, to formulate a suitable characterization of empirical science, or to define the concepts of ‘empirical science’ and ‘metaphysics’ in such a way that we shall be able to say of a given system of statements whether or not it’s closer study is the concern of empirical science. His criterion of demarcation is regarded as a proposal for an agreement or convention. (Popper 1959, 17). Popper insists that there is an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability as criteria of demarcation. This asymmetry results from the logical form of universal statements. For universal statements are not derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements. Because of this, it is possible by means of pure deductive inferences to argue from the truth of singular statements to the truth of universal statements. This kind of argument to the falsity of universal statement is the only strictly deductive kinds of inference that proceeds in inductive direction (Popper 1959, 19).

22.3  A  frican Knowledge System and the Problem of Demarcation To critically assess the legitimacy and the possibility of progress of knowledge in Africa in the light of Popper’s critical rationalism, it is important to review African epistemic system to understand the problem of African knowledge system and how they are implicated in African science. In this section, we will discuss the problems which are determinant of the legitimacy of African epistemic system. We will be discussing the problems with an eye on how they support or mitigate the legitimacy of African epistemic system as a credibly possible science. Central to African epistemic system is the idea that African ontology is driven by force and that there is more to reality than is accessible through empirical observation. This smacks of a problem of demarcation in African knowledge system. In African knowledge system, one can have knowledge of natural phenomenon by appealing to experiences which are not empirical, and that non-empirical realities can also play out in the empirical domain. When certain phenomena are not scientifically testable, they are immediately attributed to metaphysical realities. In African epistemic worldview, physics is not dichotomous with metaphysics, and this fact compounds the problem of demarcation in African epistemology (Jimoh and Thomas 2015, 54). This is better illustrated in the philosophy of Placid Tempels where the progress of knowledge is rooted in African ontology. In Temples’ ontology, the driving elements in the progress of knowledge is the vital force. Vital force means being – to remain perpetually in prosperity, an expression of potent life. The

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vital force is an expression of dynamism in African epistemic system. Advancement in African knowledge, in this regard, is most relevant, or potent in magic or sorcery. (Cf. Temples 1959, 22). It is widely evident that the understanding according to which the legitimacy of progress in knowledge is limited to empirical procedures of logical positivists is diametrically contradictory to predominantly extant African epistemic worldview because there are still a lot of non-empirical or metaphysical clouds enshrouding African science as perceivable in rain-making, traditional medicine, and witch-doctoring. The ‘dibia’, for instance, purports to produce effects of which processes that produced them are neither empirically verifiable nor testable. A traditional medicine practitioner who inherited his skill from his ancestors actually knows how to combine herbs according to their proper proportions to produce anti-venom, but may insist that there exists an aspect of the skill which is beyond his control, because his father who taught him his skill also taught him that his ancestors give the efficacy. What it means is that some aspects of the processes happen beyond the physical. In this direction, Jimoh and Thomas (2015, 57) argue that in the scheme of African thought, theoretical and practical philosophy are not considered autonomous, but logically and metaphysically joined in a single epistemology. Thus, Akpan Chris O. (2011, 18) observed that the problem of the African scientist is the problem of making effort to explain the relationship between natural phenomena, and when he cannot, he still has the problem of accepting having met a dead end, so he explains it away on the supernatural. However, Popper provides a leeway to this problem. He argued, in his Logic of Scientific Discovery. that his business about the demarcation problem was not to overthrow metaphysics, but instead, to formulate a suitable characterization of empirical science, such that one can say of empirical science and metaphysics whether or not it’s closer study is the concern of empirical science. (Cf. Popper 1959, 17). In Science as Falsification, Popper demonstrates that no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made of Freud’s epic of the Ego and the Super-ego than can be made of Homer’s collection stories from Olympus because, though myth they may be, they describe some facts and contain interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form. He argued that almost all scientific theories originate from myths which may contain important anticipations of scientific theories and that such myths may be developed such that they become testable. (Popper 1963, 4). Furthermore, Popper in his accusation against the logical positivists of disliking the idea that there can be meaningful problems outside the positivists understanding of empirical science, when he argued that the logical positivists failed to see the fact of a general theory of knowledge, an epistemology or a methodology which needs to be genuinely dealt with philosophically, he seems to imply that non-science is not absolutely meaningless. (Cf. Popper 1959, 29–31). This position seems implied in support of the fact that the African epistemic system, though presently non-­scientific, is not a possible science. Thus, African knowledge systems may be found to contain some characterization of pseudoscience, non-science or metaphysics, but not by that fact unimportant, insignificant, meaningless or nonsensical. Moreover, it is a clear fact that Popper claims that all science is an exercise in critical problem

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solving, and this includes all range of problems we may not probably be inclined to classify as science. This means that we may even describe metaphysical aspects of African knowledge system as exercises in problem solving. Surmounting the gap between metaphysics and natural science in the problem of demarcation in African knowledge systems is also problem solving. On this ground, one can argue that if we accept as relevant only problems in empirical domain and dismiss as meaningless the aspects of metaphysics in African knowledge system, philosophy becomes a meaningless enterprise and, as a consequence, loses its legitimacy as a critical science. On this ground, we argue that the potency of African epistemic system to becoming science is to receive more attention at the moment. One major problem in African theory of knowledge is the problem of methodology. We argue here that popper’s critical rationalism gives impetus to reasonable progress in methodology that can put African epistemic system in scientific direction. Akpan (2011, 15), has argued that traditional African scientists apply the method of empirical observation in their day to day activities as evident in the production of gin from palm wine. This is inspite of Afisi’s query on whether there is a true methodology of science in African science. Afisi avers that the metaphysical method is one method that makes African science unique and thus defers from Western science (Afisi 2016, 67). In the great debate about the legitimacy of African philosophy, African thinkers have proposed various methods. L.  S. Senghor in Agbakoba (2004, 100), for instance proposed intuition as a way of acquisition of progress in knowledge. He believes the African mind to be fundamentally intuitive. Ruch and Anyanwu observed that knowledge comes from the cooperation of all man’s faculties: feeling, imagination and reason. They argued that the method through which the African arrives at trustworthy knowledge of reality is intuition and personal experience (1984, 146). Popper himself believed that knowledge must start from something  – not from a tabula rasa. He expressed the awareness that knowledge can start from intellectual intuition and imagination, though they may not be reliable. (Popper 1962, 28). Popper also argues, as already indicated in the previous section, that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas and that every discovery contains an irrational element or a creative intuition. (Popper 1959, 8–9). In this regard, Emedolu (2015, 68), admits ‘that magic was the mother, not just the “bastard sister” of empirical science…. Magic added the dimension of experimentation to science.’ He aserts that African magic may not be ‘considered as part of the paraphernalia of a clean logic of justification in modern empirical science. Yet, magic, in most of its forms, clearly play some vital role in the logic of discovery’ (2015, 81). This means that intuition or conjestures can lead to knowledge, though they may also be true or false. However, they are indispensable as the main resources of our hypothesis or theories. False or true the theories may be, the importance of intuitive reasoning and even of intuitive imagination, is to help us to start the process of critically examining those bold conjectures we have about African knowledge system, which are the means by which we probe into the unclear non-scientific or metaphysical aspects of African knowledge system. Popper, himself, proposed that one can, from a new idea, tentatively put forward in the form of anticipation and even not yet justified make hypothesis, theory or conclusions by

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applying logical deductions. (Popper 1959, 34). In this light, William A.  Gorton (2006, 51) pointed out that Popper insists that the method of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to problems from which our investigations start. He wrote that Popper held that all science involves proposing solutions to problems, and the method of problem solving is trial and error. In other words, in progress of knowledge, one proposes solutions to problems and, next, he tests those proposals. What this implies in African context is that science can begin with problems in what may be called pseudoscience or myth and then a tentative hypothesis is put forward to solve the problem. Next, the hypothesis is then subjected to test to minimize error. Then, from error elimination, one can arrive at new problems, and the process starts all over. Following Popper’s position, the African scientist can adopt this method by comparing emerging hypothesis, theories or conclusions with one another or other corroborating statements. From this, it becomes possible to discover logical relations among them. With this there can be progress in African knowledge system. Popper called this sort of process a method of learning from past mistakes. Akpan (2011, 11) might object to this claim about the method of African science by aguing that it poses a challenge to the legitimacy of African epistemic system as a possible science. For him, this method of African science seems more problematic that it would not allow African science to grow. But African epistemic system has to adopt this method as the starting point of reasonable progress in a positive direction to a stage where testability becomes a concern. It can lead to bursting the mechanism of African traditional epistemic phenomena like rainmaking, witch-doctoring and traditional medicine. It is only when we have got to this stage that popper’s principle of falsifiability can push African knowledge system to a boost in scientific direction. Another issue about the legitimacy of African epistemic system is the challenge of application of universal principles. Progress in science is possible through intellectual dialectical pendulum between universals and particulars, either by induction or by deduction. In African epistemic system, the problem of universals rears its head. If we proceed by induction, we must stop at the point where empirical observation stops and where the metaphysical or mystical aspect begins. Conversely, if one proceeds deductively one certainly stops at the point where the unravelled or mystical aspect of African science begins. The disturbing difficulty in African epistemic system is that its metaphysical ideas are very elusive to the scientific mind in the sense that some aspects of African epistemic system are anchored on mystery. On this level, the idea of African metaphysical realities becomes elusive, on account of which formation of clear universal ideas become problematic. The formation of universal categories become very difficult. We recall that Hume argued that the mind cannot form any notion of quality or quantity without forming a precise motion of degrees of each. We cannot, for instance, form a general idea of the length of a line without the idea of the line itself. Impressions present themselves in definite and determinant ways to the mind, and since ideas themselves are copies of impression, presentation of impressions themselves have to be determinate and definite. (Copleston 1959, 272). One cannot, for

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instance, form a coherent universal idea of African epistemic phenomenon out of something one cannot possibly picture. It is difficult to form an idea of something anchored on mystery. We do not have determinate and definite impressions of those ideas, nor do they present themselves indeterminate and definite manner to the mind. This problem makes formation of universal ideas in African science difficult. It is in this light that George Berkeley opines that there are no general abstract ideas becomes a general idea of something must include all its descriptive qualities (Copleston 1959, 215–216), which are elusive in the mystery realities of African epistemic context. The problem of universals in African epistemology, thus, poses as a challenge to the legitimacy of African epistemic system and, by extension, to its progress. This challenge seems to have been implicitly identified by Popper who believes that the application of both methods of induction and deduction in ideas of universals in science always give rise to inconsistencies that makes decisions about universal questions impossible, based on which he dismisses the naturalist view as uncritical in the sense that it only presents conventions which may likely turn into dogmas instead of facts (Popper 1959, 31). In this regard, R. J. Ormerod (2009), observed that Popper believes universal theories not to be confirmable with any positive probability. Another major problem confronting the legitimacy of African knowledge system, as possible science, is epistemic non-transparency. Science essentially is an organised body of knowledge, documented and open for criticism. A wide range of the phenomena that characterize African epistemic worldview are shrouded in mysteries, undocumented and closed to criticism. Until they become a body of knowledge documented and open to criticism, they remain myths. A better part of those in possession of such knowledge are neck deep in what one may call professional selfishness. Rainmaking or herbal medicine, for instance, may be a system of complex operation or even scientific to a certain degree, but covering the mechanism to the extent of protecting it against criticism is disprovable as adopting the reverse of the critical attitude which Popper considers improper for scientists. (See Popper 1959, 28). This fact classifies African epistemic system as a closed system. However, progress in knowledge is only possible in an open system. Popper observed the need for transition from closed Society (where there is epistemic non-transparency) to open society (where reason is allowed free assessment of human knowledge) which takes place when “social institutions are consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims or purposes” (Popper 1945, 247). It is with an attitude of epistemic transparency that African knowledge systems can be seen as man-­ made, and the various custodians or epistemic institutions can be subjected to critical discussions in terms of their credibility to giving rise to legitimate science. It is only with an attitude of epistemic transparency that African scientific system can experience any significant growth; that is the only condition on which propositions which can serve as premises to credible scientific conclusions can be generated. With this epistemic transparency, what used to be considered metaphysical could be discovered to be actually empirical, and with availability of more empirical

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statements, opportunity for comparison of propositions and theories also become possible. This is, especially so, because, empirical statements are the bedrock of any worthwhile scientific enterprise which, in turn, lead to testable theories as proposed by popper. Epistemic transparency is awesomely the only way African epistemic system can develop empirical statements which are susceptible to criticism that will pave the way for succession of theories by better ones. Then, the African scientist can have the duty to analyse the characteristic ability of African knowledge to advance; that is the only way he can have the task of making crucial choices in crucial cases of choosing between conflicting systems of propositions or theories. That is the only way the scientist can make logical analysis of theories and take account of how they change and develop. That is also how the emerging experimental results can become more reliable. The discrepancies which may exist between the experimental results and the theories become apparent. That is the only way science can develop out of African epistemic system. To cap it all, the legitimacy of African epistemic system, as a possible science, depends on all these.

22.4  Conclusion This paper has been examining the legitimacy of African knowledge system, in the light of Popper’s critical rationalism, with a view to assessing whether African knowledge system is capable of science. It has been able to demonstrate that Popper’s Critical Rationalism provides credible ground for progress in the development of African epistemic system to the category of science, especially because every scientific discovery has root from pseudoscience and myth. African knowledge system is rife with such pseudoscience, like rain making, traditional medicine, divination, witchcraft and witch-doctoring which can progress into science, if harnessed in the scientific direction. Popper’s critical rationalism bridges the gap between science and non-science, and paves the way for African knowledge system to take off and advance into science. It has been able to assess this possibility along the line of four problems which the authors consider to be determinants of the legitimacy of African epistemic system as possible science. These problems include problems of demarcation, method, universals and epistemic transparency. The papers argue that, though these determinant problems exist in African epistemic system, they are not sufficient grounds to dismiss African Knowledge system as incapable of attaining scientific status. In spite of these limitations, the paper shows that African epistemic system, though not yet science in the strict sense, is only capable of legitimate science if African scientists could adopt the critical attitude proper to science and apply Popper’s falsifiability method of testing of ideas. Such ideas could become hypothesis, which with further testing could become theories, and yet, with further testing, could become corroborated.

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References Afisi, Oseni T. 2013. Karl Popper’s critical rationalism: Corroboration versus confirmation. Philosophy Study 3 (6): 506–516. ———. 2016. Is African science true science? Reflections on the methods of African science. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 59–75. Afisi, Oseni T., and Emmanuel Ofuasia. 2018. Yoruba ethno-epistemology and the futility of the demarcation problem. Sapientia Journal of Philosophy 9 (January): 167–172. Agassi, Joseph, and Ian Jarvie. 2008. A critical rationalist aesthetics. In Series in the philosophy of Karl R. Popper and critical rationalism, ed. Kurt Salamun, vol. XVIII. New York: Rodopi. Agbakoba, Jacob C.A. 2004. An evaluation of knowledge in traditional African thoughts and its impact on contemporary times. In Philosophy and Praxis in Africa, ed. M.F.  Asiegbu and J.A. Agbakoba. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Akpan, Chris O. 2011. The method of African science: A philosophical evaluation. American Journal of Social and Management Sciences ISSN 2151-1559 (March): 11–20. http://www. scihub.org/AJSMS. Copleston, Fredrick .1959. A History of Philosophy 5, 2003. London/New York: Continuum. Emedolu, Christian C. 2015. From magic to African experimental science: Towards a new paradigm. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 4 (2): 68–88. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v4i2.5. Gorton, A. William. 2006. Karl Popper and the social sciences. New York: State University of New York Press. Jimoh, Anselm, and John Thomas. 2015. African epistemology approach to epistemic certitude and scepticism. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 5 (11): 63–61. Ormerod, R.J. 2009. The history and ideas of critical rationalism: The philosophy of Karl Popper and its implications for OR. Journal of the Operational Research Society: 441–460. www. palgrave.journals.com/jors. Popper, Karl R. 1945. The open society and its enemies. Vol. 1. London: Routledge. ———. 1959. Logic of scientific discovery. 2005th ed. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 1962. Congestions and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New  York/ London: Basic Books. ———. 1963. Science as Falsification, originally published in Conjectures and Refutations. New York/London: Basic Books. Quine, W.V.O. 1961. Two dogmas of empiricism. Harvard: Harvard University Press. https://www. theologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-­fbd6-­1538-­0000-­000070cf64bc/Quine51.pdf. Ruch, E.A., and K.C.  Anyanwu. 1984. African philosophy: An introduction to the Main philosophical trends in contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Temples, Placid. 1959. Bantu philosophy. Trans. Collin King. Paris: Présence Africaine.

Chapter 23

General Conclusion Oseni Taiwo Afisi

The essays in the present volume on Popper and Africa have made essential contributions to the cross-cultural study of Western and African philosophical traditions. This is made especially interesting by the critiques of Popper’s philosophy undertaken by the different African philosophers that have contributed to this volume. These scholars interrogated Popper’s discussions of closed and open societies, piece-meal engineering, critical rationalism, knowledge production, epistemology, toleration, and nationalism in contextualisation to science in Africa, African politics and social life, especially as it concerns the problems of governance in Africa. Aside from this, one must also note the essay by Adam Chmielewski, a Polish philosopher. It is one of the most remarkable critique of the open society in Eastern Europe. Chmielewski further went on to apply this critique to Africa. His point suggests that African societies’ attempt to adopt openness is the cause of their dysfunctionality. His discussion of these topics, as well as his account of diversity and recognition are highly reflective of the issues concerning many multicultural and/or heterogeneous societies today. Unlike many other collections on Popper, this volume is a critical evaluation of Popper’s philosophy and its practical application, if any, to the issues of knowledge, politics and development in Africa. These criticisms and applications of Popper’s general scholarship are well taken. The issues addressed by scholars in this volume with regard to the status of Popper in Africa are among topics such as, Popper and the non-West, especially Africa; Popper and non-western (i.e. African) systems of politics; extending critical rationalism and Popper’s philosophy to non-European systems of thinking; discussing at length Popper’s account of social reform and its application to Africa, especially Nigerian politics and its political situations; trenchant and searching analyses of Popper’s account of nationalism; Popper’s discussion of tolerance and toleration and its application to African politics, culture and O. T. Afisi (*) Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. T. Afisi (ed.), Karl Popper and Africa: Knowledge, Politics and Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74214-0_23

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epistemology; Popper, tribalism, and the ‘closed’ and ‘open’ societies; Popper and his contribution to epistemology and its application to Africa; Popper and the placement of his thought within various traditions especially, the tradition of liberalism and communitarianism. The chapter on Marxism in this collection is a very important one since anti-­ colonialism was and is a very significant factor in the development of Africa. Most often, many commentators usually take for granted the idea that to be anti-­colonialist one has to endorse Marxism. This seems to be one of the major impediments to the liberation of Africa. Although the chapter on Marxism in this volume contests Popper’s claim that Marxism is pseudo-scientific, it is itself a valuable effort at further re-establishing Marxian influence on Africa. In spite of this effort, Popper’s claims on Marxism are very legitimate and convincing. Popper offered two readings of Marxism, irrefutable and refuted. The chapter claims that Marxism is refutable-­ and-­not-refuted. However, it fails to acknowledge the conceivable refutation that Popper made of Marxism. The issue with Marxism often drags into the discussion of Africa’s development and its socialist/communal past based on some standard and apologetic view of Soviet history. One of the most essential things in research that this cross-cultural collection does is the critical efforts at solving some of the key problems in Popper’s scholarship, that is: how to apply Popper’s philosophy to work outside of a very narrow Western/European/occidental/mid-to-late twentieth century philosophy. Popper’s discussions of rationality, critical rationalism and the open and closed society are provocative and valuable, but how can they be applied outside of the narrow context of the ‘West’ and of the Cold-War/post-totalitarian world. This collection, from a number of scholars from Africa, has been chronically under-represented in philosophy, especially in political thought, epistemology and philosophy of science. This collection illustrates how Popper’s work can indeed grow and be appreciated in the twenty-first century beyond Popper’s ideas and that of his most notable adherents.