Kant’s Theory of Value 9783110796056, 9783110795981

Citation preview

Kant’s Theory of Value

Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte

On behalf of the Kant-Gesellschaft edited by Manfred Baum, Bernd Dörflinger, Heiner F. Klemme and Konstantin Pollok

Volume 219

Kant’s Theory of Value Edited by Christoph Horn and Robinson dos Santos

ISBN 978-3-11-079598-1 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-079605-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-079614-8 ISSN 0340-6059 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022937775 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Table of Contents Introduction

VII

List of Sigla of Kant’s Works

XV

Gerhard Schönrich Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? Oliver Sensen Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

1

23

Robinson dos Santos Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

41

Steffi Schadow Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65 Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89 Rocco Porcheddu The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork 105 for the Metaphysics of Morals Federica Basaglia Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the 123 Analytics in Kant’s CPR Stephan Zimmermann The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139 Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163

VI

Table of Contents

Sofie Møller Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals Christoph Horn Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

181

197

Guido Löhrer Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this 217 Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law Micha H. Werner Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency About the Authors Index

267

263

241

Introduction Kant does not say very much about values or goods. The reason for this is obvious: the concepts of ‘values’ and ‘goods’ are part of the eudaimonistic tradition, whereas Kant himself defends a deontological version of moral philosophy. He famously criticizes eudaimonism for its flawed ‘material’ approach to ethics. Such an approach is false, for Kant, mainly for two reasons: by claiming that moral philosophy should be based on certain goods that ultimately lead to happiness, traditional philosophers (a) made ‘self-love’, not morality, the principle of their positions, and (b) they based their reflections on subjective and unstable grounds since ‘happiness’ and ‘goods’ mean different things to different people, both synchronically and diachronically. Eudaimonism, for Kant, is not only theoretically mistaken, it is also practically misguiding since striving for happiness tends to undermine our moral attitude: “all material principles are inappropriate for the highest moral law” (KpV, AA 05: 41.30 – 31) and “all eudaimonists are therefore practical egoists” (Anth., AA 07: 130.11). Nevertheless, we find some passages in his works where Kant discusses his own moral philosophy by making use of the notions of goods or values. Of course, this observation need not imply that he accepts these concepts unambiguously. Right at the beginning of Groundwork I, we find the well-known characterization of a ‘good will’ as ‘good without restriction’. In the first sentence of this text, Kant discusses the value of a good will and emphasizes its outstanding quality compared with those things we usually consider as goods, namely ‘talents of the mind’ (Talente des Geistes), ‘attributes of the temperament’ (Eigenschaften des Temperaments) and ‘gifts of happiness’ (Glücksgaben). Only a good will has what Kant calls ‘inner unconditional value’ (innerer unbedingter Werth). From this starting point he develops, in the GMS, his core ideas of an ‘action from duty’ (Handeln aus Pflicht) and of the categorical imperative. In Groundwork II, additionally, Kant expresses the categorical imperative in terms of a value theory: according to the ‘humanity as an end-in-itself formula’ of the categorical imperative, ‘humanity in each person’ must not be treated as a mere means, but always simultaneously as an end-in-itself (GMS, AA 04: 429.02– 431.18). Shortly after this passage, we find a text in which human dignity is defined even more directly in terms of the conceptual framework of a value theory. In this text Kant distinguishes between values that are based on “general human inclinations”; these are said to have “a market price”, whereas that which conforms to a certain taste has “a fancy price”. Both of these are contrasted with something that “can be an end in itself”; this “has not merely a relative https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-001

VIII

Introduction

worth, i. e., a price, but an inner worth, i. e. dignity” (GMS, AA 04: 434.35 – 435.04). Even if Kant does not say so explicitly (he only speaks about an “inner worth”), there can be no doubt that what he has in mind is dignity as an absolute value. This is obvious from the fact that the antonym in our text is that of “relative worth” (relativer Werth). Only one page later, there is a dense and complex paragraph in which Kant claims that “the morally good disposition” (die sittlich gute Gesinnung) has a “share” in “universal lawgiving”. In this context, we find the following much-debated claims (GMS, AA 04: 436.01– 08; transl. A. W. Wood): For nothing has a worth except that worth which the law determines for it. The legislation itself, however, which determines all worth, must for just that reason have a dignity, that is, have unconditioned, incomparable worth. The word respect alone yields a becoming expression for the estimation that a rational being must assign to it. Autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of the human and every rational nature.

Kant explicitly says that there is nothing other than the law which gives everything its value. Is this remark meant in favor of a metaethical anti-realism? A prescriptivist reading as that proposed by Oliver Sensen defends exactly this. According to the rational agency-reading (as held by O. O’Neill, Th. Hill, B. Herman, Ch. Korsgaard, or P. Guyer), Kant should not be seen as a pure formalist whose approach to ethics is primarily based on an abstract universalization procedure. Following this reading, the categorical imperative is not (or not primarily) an algorithmic test of the logical consistency of maxims. Instead, Kant is seen as taking the rational agency of an individual, i. e. his or her capacity of setting ends, to be the decisive intrinsic, even absolute value. Under this premise, the maxims of someone’s will must – following the interpreters – be suitable to foster the good of rational and self-determined freedom. The basic good thus has the rank of a higher-order good; it has a ‘value-conferring status’. A further crucial passage on value theory in Kant is the second chapter of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Here Kant maintains that the human will (Wille) in its normal or default state is always ‘contaminated’ by material ends and hence always directed towards happiness in the sense of a fulfillment of desires: we immediately judge the value of something according to the scale of pleasure and pain an object seems to provide. In this doctrine, Kant is, to a certain extent, a Humean (see, e. g. KpV, AA 05: 58.10 – 35). But when the moral law emerges and ‘formally’ determines the will, the goal-directedness of the will is not simply interrupted or limited but re-oriented. The will, i. e. the human striving for an ultimate end, is then guided towards the genuine value of human beings, the ‘highest good’ – which is described, in the second Critique, as happiness in the sense of desire fulfillment according to one’s moral dignity. As this

Introduction

IX

consideration shows, it is not the case that only a material determination of the will leaves its goal-directedness intact; the formal determination likewise preserves the purposiveness of the will. However, after a formal re-orientation of our basic inclination, the will has a new, morally appropriate final end. The will has then become a pure one, albeit not a holy one. This second aspect is the anti-Humean part of Kant’s theory of value. Therefore Kant, in the second chapter of the ‘Analytic’ of the second Critique, speaks of a necessary inversion of the procedure, namely under the title of a ‘paradox of method’ (KpV, AA 05: 62.36 – 63.21). This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a critique of practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it. In fact, even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a pure a priori law determining the will, yet, that we may not assume principles quite gratuitously, we must, at least at first, leave it undecided, whether the will has merely empirical principles of determination, or whether it has not also pure a priori principles; for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing that we wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from it the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling of pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with all the sensations of my existence, and in the second place the means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure.

What Kant describes here is precisely his idea of deontology: an adequate moral philosophy, he claims, should not derive the concepts of good and evil from the factual direction of the will, but, inversely, first determine the will by the moral law (which gives us an immediate concept of good and evil) and then see to which end the will must be directed. The description in this passage is fully in line with traditional appetence theories, even if not according to their spirit. In the context of this quotation, Kant starts with the Scholastic formula nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni (KpV, AA 05: 59.12– 13) and then explains how this sentence is to be correctly understood: namely by interpreting the underlying bonum-malum dichotomy not in terms of benefits and detriments (Wohl und Weh), but in terms of the moral good and the moral evil (Gut und Böse). This passage corroborates our observation that Kant preserves the traditional theoretical framework although he radically revises its intention. Several of the contributions collected in this volume were written to interpret the passages from the Groundwork and the second Critique mentioned above.

X

Introduction

Others are dealing with Kant’s value theory in general or with more specific issues of goods and values in his work. Gerhard Schönrich in his paper raises the problem of whether Kant’s conception of value is to be reconstructed realistically or anti-realistically; he discusses it based on the question of how the grounding of value and normativity in the “rational nature” of human beings should be understood. For Schönrich, Kant’s fitting attitude account that can solve the dilemma is a moderate anti-realism that embraces central realist insights. A different view is defended by Oliver Sensen. According to him, Kant should be seen as a prescriptivist about value. This means that expressions such as ‘something has value’ or ‘is good’ are not meant to describe something, but to prescribe it in the sense of an imperative command of reason. Kant distinguishes between two types of imperatives. When he contrasts dignity and price, he expresses both in terms of value, namely the first valuable as absolutely and the second as relatively valuable. But this is, following Sensen, a secondary way of reformulating the deontological language of imperatives. Robinson dos Santos likewise argues that Kant’s concept of value in the first Section of Groundwork is relevant and strategical for clarifying his notion of moral action, but it plays just a secondary role in the whole argumentation of the GMS. This is the main reason why his ethics is not properly what can be called a systematic theory of moral value. According to dos Santos, Kant’s concept of value should not be understood as the foundation of the validity of the moral law and duty, but, on the contrary, it is derived from the moral law and the categorical imperative. As Steffi Schadow points out, Kant’s use of the concept of maxims is not restricted to questions of the universalization procedure of the categorical imperative. For Kant, maxims play a fundamental role in the theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses his or her pro-attitudes, i. e., interests, preferences, and life plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of his or her practical identity. Schadow defends an interpretation of Kant’s action theory according to which practical deliberation should be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Additionally, she discusses the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims. Corinna Mieth and Jacob Rosenthal develop in their paper a more differentiated understanding of the ‘negative’ part of the formula of humanity. What does it mean to treat others not as ends in themselves? At first glance, one might think that this would mean treating others as mere means, and indeed, the focus within the literature has mainly been on that kind of wrongdoing, but there seem to be more categories. If you do not help persons in need whom you could easily help, but instead simply ignore, then you do not treat them as an instrument

Introduction

XI

for your purposes, but also not as an end in themselves. One could say that you treat them like a mere thing. Furthermore, if someone is in your way and you simply remove them, you treat them neither as a means nor as an irrelevant thing, nor, for that matter, as an end in themselves, but as a mere obstacle. Mieth and Rosenthal emphasize the relevance of the distinction between (1) treating or regarding someone as a means, (2) as an irrelevant thing, or (3) as an obstacle. Finally, they point out that the distinction between ends in themselves or persons, on the one hand, and things, on the other, still does not cover an important kind of moral wrongdoing: we can treat others as negative ends. This is the case when harming others is the ultimate purpose of our actions. Rocco Porcheddu discusses the way in which GMS II introduces the concept of an end in itself: Kant defines it as something whose existence has an absolute value. Kant then continues with the assertion that the ground of a possible categorical imperative lies solely in this end in itself. Following Porcheddu, Kant, in his remarks on the realm of ends, also operates with the notions of an end in itself and absolute value – seemingly in a different way. Basically, the supposed difference in these two ways of using the concepts of an absolute value and an end in itself consists in the fact that in the first case both serve as a precondition for the categorical imperative’s validity, whereas in the passages concerning the realm of ends both have to be seen as a consequence of its validity. Hence, at first glance, Kant seems to use both terms inconsistently in the GMS II. Porcheddu aims to show that the assumption of such a putative inconsistency is inadequate. In her paper, Federica Basaglia provides an interpretation of the second chapter of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. There, we find one of the few sections in which Kant deals explicitly and directly with the notion of good and value. Whereas recent Kant scholarship has highlighted elements of the argument in this chapter that support the interpretation of Kant’s strong formalism and concentrated upon Kant’s view about what is usually called the ‘priority of the right over the good’, Basaglia draws the attention to two other elements in Kant’s reflections. Firstly, she points at what may be considered to be the material element of Kant’s conception of the good. Secondly, she highlights what can be called the metaphysical (hyperphysical, non-natural) element of Kant’s conception of the good. The author argues that Kant’s formalism in fact requires that the property of being good is to be understood as a hyperphysical, non-natural property. Likewise, Stephan Zimmermann examines Kant’s understanding of the moral value of the human will in the second chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, especially with regard to the concepts of good and evil. One of his

XII

Introduction

considerations takes up the composition of the Critique which has not yet been, according to Zimmermann, sufficiently used by commentators to address this issue. The other consideration is of linguistic nature. Kant’s language, too, has not yet been employed in this regard, although it provides deep insights into his understanding of the concepts of good and evil as the moral values of our will. Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović argues that Kant’s practical philosophy contains a universal right to citizenship, i. e., that human beings have an acquired yet prepolitical right not to be excluded from becoming citizens of a state. In the first step of her analysis, she claims that the categorical imperative obliges us to consider all human beings as ends-in-themselves, thus acknowledging their absolute value, i. e., dignity. Then she investigates what the concept of dignity means for the legal personality of all humans and their innate and acquired rights. She sketches the structure of Kant’s system of rights to indicate how individual rights can only be enjoyed within a civil condition of a state. While focusing on the concept of a universal right to citizenship, Wyrębska-Đermanović explains how a claim for such a right can be argued for within Kant’s legal theory. Finally, she indicates the connection between Kant’s legal and moral cosmopolitanism. Sofie Møller examines Kant’s understanding of human dignity. As she points out, Kant’s definitions imply that if a human being has dignity, then she is a person and vice versa. Yet he also defines personality in juridical terms: a person is someone to whom actions can be imputed. Since any obligation presupposes imputability, personality is a condition of both ethical and juridical lawgiving. Møller maintains that asserting oneself as a person in relation to others implies, for Kant, taking legal responsibility for one’s free actions and not pretending that these were determined by other circumstances. Her main point is that honeste vive presupposes moral personality which is then given in juridical form. Moral personality as the freedom of morally practical reason is what ties the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals together. As this implies, honeste vive requires that moral personality be translated into legal responsibility in our relations with others. Christoph Horn discusses the value of marriage with regard to Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Kant sees this value as emerging from the perspective of a mutual contract. Although this approach has been widely criticized starting from its very publication, his procedure seems to contain some advantages: it seems to leave teleological naturalism behind and to emphasize the juridification of personal relationships. But at a closer look, Kant’s theory of the value of marriage suffers from several serious shortcomings. The fundamental problem is that he derives it from the perspective of our duties towards ourselves.

Introduction

XIII

Guido Löhrer investigates how Kant uses, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the principle according to which whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself. Kant believes that this principle helps to determine a priori from concepts the modus operandi of the moral law insofar as it is an incentive whose effect confers moral value on actions. Löhrer argues first that following a particular reading of what is meant by “hindrance,” “resistance,” and “furthering,” this principle is likely to be false. The removal of the hindrance or its absence merely permits or enables an event to occur; it does not bring it about. Either, then, the furthering of an activity is to be understood as limited to enabling that activity by disabling its disablers or the notion of furthering presupposes a lot more than can be seen a priori, independently of such a presupposition. The latter would be question-begging. Second, Löhrer points out that the pre-critical writing Negative Magnitudes presents a Kantian solution to the motivation problem that, albeit not satisfactory, is more promising than that of the second Critique. In the paper of Micha Werner, recent contributions to the philosophy of manipulation are discussed insofar as several of their assumptions have been understood as “Kantian”. This regards especially the assumption that the concept and the disvalue of manipulation could be explained by regarding it as a subversion of rational agency. Werner examines Robert Noggle’s concerns about Kantian accounts of manipulation and confronts them with Kant’s considerations about the “moral illusion”. He argues that, while the original framework of transcendental idealism makes it hard to understand the value and vulnerability of rational agency, an appropriately revised Kantian perspective on rational agency and manipulation is still promising. It would also overcome the limitations of Noggle’s own account of manipulation that result from a kind of methodological subjectivism. The considerations suggest that a multidimensional model is needed to fully account for the normative status and value(s) of (the different facets of) autonomy. The contributions were originally prepared for a colloquium entitled ‘Kant on Value’, held in Bonn in October 2019. A follow-up was planned for 2020 but had to be canceled due to the terrible worldwide pandemic. We wish to thank all the authors of the 2019 colloquium – and those who joined later – for their papers. We are indebted to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation which generously financed our workshop. Many thanks go to Zoë Bohlmann who very helpfully supported us in preparing this volume. We also wish to thank Manfred Weltecke for his linguistic improvements of the texts. January 2022 Bonn and Pelotas

Christoph Horn and Robinson dos Santos

List of Sigla of Kant’s Works Kant is quoted following the Academy Edition of the former Prussian Academy (now: BerlinBrandenburg Academy) (=AA, Berlin 1900 sqq.) with references to the volume, page, and line numbers. Only for the Critique of Pure Reason the reference numbers are those of the first (= A) and the second edition (= B) respectively. AA Akademie-Ausgabe Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 07) BDG Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (AA 02) FM Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (AA 20) GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 04) GSE Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (AA 02) GSK Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte (AA 01) HN Handschriftlicher Nachlass (AA 14 – 23) KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 05) KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft (zitiert nach Originalpaginierung A/B) KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 05) MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 06) NG Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (AA 02) RL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (AA 06) TL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (AA 06) Päd Pädagogik (AA 09) Refl Reflexion (AA 14 – 19) RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (AA 06) SF Der Streit der Fakultäten (AA 07) ÜE Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (AA 08) VAMS Vorarbeit zur Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 23) V-Met/Dohna Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1792/1793 Metaphysik Dohna (AA 28) V-Met/Mron Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1782/1783 Metaphysik Mrongovius (AA 29) V-Mo/Collins Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1784/1785 Moralphilosophie Collins (AA 27) V-MS/Vigil Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1793/1794 Die Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius (AA 27) V-NR/Feyerabend Naturrecht Feyerabend (Winter 1784) (AA 27) WDO Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren? (AA 08) ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden (AA 08)

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-002

Gerhard Schönrich

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? Abstract: Whether Kant’s conception of value is to be reconstructed realistically or anti-realistically is determined by the question of how the grounding of value and normativity in the “rational nature” of human beings (GMS, AA 04: 428.07– 11) is to be understood. Are values dependent on pro-attitudes or do they exist in a robust sense as metaphysically independent entities, and what does the answer to this question mean for the fundamental value of the rational nature? Both outright realism in its varieties and outright anti-realism fail to overcome insurmountable difficulties. Kant’s fitting attitude account that can solve the dilemma is a moderate anti-realism that embraces a central realist insight. Pro-attitudes need not simply fit the object of the attitude. They must meet an inherent correctness condition if they are to be indicative of value. A fact or property is valuable if it could be valued by an agent in a correct pro-setting. Yet does this not simply replace the metaphysical value fact of realism with an equally queer normative fact of correctness? This fact would be strange only if it had to be judged from a standpoint outside the normative considerations, we have engaged in with the grounding question. Our rational nature turns out to be a reflexive value-fact.

1 Types and Dimensions of Value Kant did not fully elaborate on a theory of value. However, scattered throughout his writings there are enough building blocks from which a theory of value can be developed.¹ Kant uses the expression “good” or “value” – and often synonymously “end in itself” – to designate different entities: A property of the will (e. g., a virtuous disposition), a property of man (his dignity), a disposition such as autonomy understood as the capacity for self-legislation, and finally a state of the world such as the highest good understood as the proportional correlation of morality and happiness. If we are looking for the types of value Kant differentiates, we find the following: 1. Personal values: The values that can be summarized under the term “happiness” are subjective and personal. Each individual can set such a value in  See Schönrich (2013) for a first attempt to reconstruct such a theory. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-003

2

2.

3.

Gerhard Schönrich

his or her own pursuit of happiness, e. g. power, wealth, honor, health. (cf. GMS, AA 04: 393.14– 24). Objective values: “Something, wherein […] an objective value is placed” (KU, AA 05: 210.05 – 06) such as money (Anth, AA 07: 275.03 – 18), is connected with an interest that is not just subjective. Social values, such as justice, or epistemic values like truth, knowledge, understanding, and of course moral values, such as a good will, and all virtues also belong to this type of value. Aesthetic values: The beautiful in art and nature occupies a middle position between personal and objective values; it is characterized by “subjective generality” (KU, AA 05: 212.01– 05) since it is not subject to any interest, neither to the faculty of desire nor to the faculty of cognition, yet it is “attributed” to everyone.

More important than questions relating to the types of value are the various dimensions of value. They can be reconstructed in pairs of terms. Kant mixes up many of these terms and he does not always use them consistently. The following scheme is to be understood as a unifying reconstruction: (1) absolute vs. relative: Something that is valuable in every respect is absolutely valuable; it is different from a value that is valuable only relatively, namely in one or more respects. Truth, for example, is not valuable in every respect; like knowledge, it is valuable only in epistemic respects, justice only in social respects, and so on. It can be left undecided here how fine-grained such respects are and how many value domains (epistemic, practical, social, etc.) they specify. For understanding Kant’s concept of value, a very coarsegrained picture suffices: Personal values are always relative values, insofar as they are valuable only in the very specific respect of a single individual. Only objective values are candidates for absolute values at all. However, the relativity of a value does not exclude its objective status. (2) unconditional vs. conditional: Something that retains its value under any condition or in all circumstances (contexts) is unconditionally valuable. A relative value, such as the epistemic value of truth, may be unconditional in the epistemic domain (depending on the epistemology endorsed), i. e., it may hold in all epistemic contexts; justification may not. According to Kant’s good will, on the other hand, retains its value in the practical domain under all circumstances. This distinguishes it from the value of prudence. In circumstances in which a scoundrel is prudent, prudence loses its value; it makes the scoundrel even more dangerous. (3) Final vs. instrumental: This value dimension captures an agent’s attitudes toward the object or propositional content towards which they are directed.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

3

Final values are values that are valued for their own sake. Kant often speaks here of an “end in itself,” i. e., x is valued and there is no y in relation to which x could be valued instrumentally. We are dealing with instrumental values when x is valued only for the sake of y. (4) Intrinsic vs. extrinsic: Intrinsically good is something that is good in itself, that has an “intrinsic” value (see, e. g., GMS, AA 04: 435.02– 04) that is not derived from another value. Accordingly, extrinsically valuable is something that has its value only because there is something else that has value. Thus all instrumental values are extrinsic. However, not all extrinsic values are instrumental, e. g., if they are valuable because they are part of a valuable whole. (The intrinsic vs. extrinsic distinction is not discussed further in what follows. It partly coincides with the final vs. instrumental distinction. What goes beyond this is captured by the term “fundamental”, which describes an extrinsic relationship of values). The different dimensions of value can conveniently be set out in the following table: Table 1: Dimensions of Value relative absolute

–

unconditional

x

final

x

conditional x – x

instrumental ? x –

In the case of the combination of “absolute” with “instrumental” one might hesitate. However, it is quite possible that something which is valuable in all respects still has only instrumental value. Thus, the orthodox Kant interpretation insists that morality alone, in the sense of moral autonomy, has the unique status of being an absolute and at the same time unconditional and final value. In such a framework, then, rational nature, as morally neutral autonomy, would not be a final value, but only an instrumental value, which is, however, at the same time absolute and unconditional. Such a value is comparable to a lockpick, which can open all locks in all domains under all circumstances, yet is never valued for its own sake. That morality has this unique status cannot be defended because of the untenable consequences (cf. Section 3) of this view. Only rational nature as morally neutral autonomy can claim this status, which, according to Kant, also distin-

4

Gerhard Schönrich

guishes human dignity as a value (cf. Schönrich 2020). Morality, on the other hand, turns out to be a relative, unconditional, and final value, for a morally constituted will is valuable only in practical respects, not in epistemic, aesthetic, etc. respects. Here morality is undoubtedly fundamental. The term “fundamental” does not describe a dimension in which something is valuable, but a grounding relationship between values. A value is fundamental if it becomes the source for other values. The question of the source of value arises from the regress triggered by the inevitable question: If x is valuable because y gives value to x, then why is y valuable?² Relative and conditional values can also be fundamental (only instrumental ones cannot). For example, truth is a relative value that is fundamental to values like justification, but not fundamental to justice. Values lower in the hierarchy can be fundamental for values lower still, but only the value at the top of a field is fundamentally grounding. The tableau can be simplified as follows: In the domains of epistemic, practical, social, personal, etc. values, which are determined by their different aspects, one or more lines of grounding relationships between values can result, where a fundamental value stands at the top. What does this overview mean for the unique position of rational nature as a value? Is it, like eudaimonia in Aristotle, a dominant value, above all domains at the top of all relative values, a value in addition to the other values? Or is the value of rational nature better understood, in an inclusive reading, in such a way that any realization of any value is appropriate only if rational nature is actualized at the same time? This difficulty can be resolved, as will be shown below (see Section 5).

2 Kant’s Idea of Grounding Does Kant advocate a value realism or a value anti-realism? And what does the answer to this question imply for the unique value of rational nature? In the realism vs. anti-realism debate, the following text has attracted a lot of attention – after all, it seems to support a value realism (cf. Kain 2018 and Schmidt/ Schönecker 2018): (1) “Suppose, however, there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws,

 For this line of argument cf. Korsgaard 1996, 123 – 4.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

5

(2) then in it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative – that is, of a practical law.” (GMS, AA 04: 428.03 – 06; trans. by Paton 1958). Hence, the categorical imperative, as the highest practical principle, is itself grounded in an absolute (and unconditional and final) value. According to Kant, it is the “rational nature” of man that has this value: (3) “The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. (4) This is the way in which a human necessarily conceives his own existence …” GMS, AA 04: 429.02– 04; trans. by Paton 1958). (1) is the antecedent in a conditional clause: If something exists, which in itself has an absolute value (add to this: and which as an end in itself is a ground of determinate laws). The consequence (2) maintains: then this entity is the ground for a categorical imperative. We may conclude by modus ponens that the highest practical norm is grounded in an absolute value if (1) is in fact true, i. e. if there really is an absolute value. In (3) The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. Kant now maintains the existence of such an absolute value (where “end in itself” is to be understood as synonymous with “absolute, final and unconditional value”). Thus the highest practical norm is grounded in the value-fact which Kant describes as our “rational nature”. In other words: It is grounded in us insofar as we are “rational human beings”, contrary to our animal nature (MS, AA 06: 435.14– 15). That seems to be a strong realistic claim. What it commits us to only becomes clear, of course, when we examine more closely what exactly this grounding amounts to. Before we clarify this issue there is one more difficulty to resolve. The statement (4) This is the way in which a human necessarily conceives his own existence is obviously ambiguous. By saying that this is the way human beings conceive their own existence, does Kant say that (de dicto) necessarily: There is a rational nature of the human being and this human being is an end in itself – according to the pattern: □Ǝx Fx.

or (de re) there is a rational nature of the human being, and that of this human being it is then necessarily true that it is an end in itself (i. e. that it has absolute value) – according to the pattern: Ǝx □Fx.

To start with this well-known Wikipedia platitude: In (de dicto) it is merely asserted that the rational nature of human beings is necessarily connected with

6

Gerhard Schönrich

the fact that they possess value, just as, famously, a man’s being a bachelor is necessarily connected with his being unmarried. This conceptual necessity is not opposed to the fact that this man, who is now a bachelor, can marry one day without ceasing to be a man. Thus, in the de dicto reading, human beings’ possession of value depends on their characterization as rational – which suggests an anti-realistic understanding. By contrast, in (de re) it is maintained that human beings cannot lose the characteristic of being ends in themselves – i. e. their value – without ceasing to be human beings. In this case, the possession of value is an essential characteristic of human beings and a feature that belongs to them independent of their characterization as rational – which favors a realist understanding. However, the question of whether Kant is to be understood as a realist or as an anti-realist is not answered merely by a decision for the de re- or the de dicto reading. The direction of an answer is set by the theory of grounding we use to make sense of the quoted passage. What does it mean to ground a fact in another fact? The expression “grounding” is used to describe the relation of two facts or properties A and B in at least four ways:³ (1) Fundamentality: If a fact A grounds another fact B, then A is more fundamental than B. (2) Determination: If A grounds B, then the existence and nature of B is determined by A. (3) Explanation: If A grounds B, then A explains why B exists in relation to A. (4) Mind- or attitude independence: The grounding of A is understood as something that is independent of the attitudes of any subjects or agents. In a formal respect (cf. Grajner 2021) the grounding is asymmetrical (if A grounds B, then it is not the case that B grounds A), transitive (if A grounds B, and B grounds C, then A also grounds C), non-monotonic (if A grounds B, then it is not the case that A and a random fact C ground B) and irreflexive (A does not ground A). However, for Kant in the case of the unique value fact of the rational nature the grounding is reflexive (see Section 5). We can speak of the grounding of a fact or property A in another fact or property B only if A and B are neither conceptually nor metaphysically identical. If value concepts were identical with certain facts or properties, e. g. if value were identical to certain attitudes of agents or any ontological entities, the application of the concept of grounding

 Cf. the summary of the debate in Grajner (2021). There are certainly more than the four types of grounding listed here. However, they seem to be the ones accepted by most authors.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

7

would be misleading. Identity is a symmetrical relation, whereas grounding implies asymmetry. The tool we receive with the concept of grounding was originally designed for an ontological analysis of the dependence of ontological entities. It captures the essential constituents of entities, but not their normative or evaluative properties. Methodologically, however, there is nothing to prevent us from using normative or evaluative facts or properties for facts A and B. By doing so we can describe the ontological properties of an entity such as a “rational nature” and ask how they necessarily determine and explain the evaluative property of the value of this nature. Complementarily, we can reverse the direction of explanation and determination. It then runs from the evaluative to the ontological properties. Starting from the evaluative properties of a rational nature, we here ask by virtue of which necessary ontological properties this nature can be valuable. Thus, how “a human necessarily conceives his own existence” (GMS, AA 04: 429.03 – 04) depends on which direction of explanation they prioritize: (i) If they start from the ontologically describable properties of their rational nature as a morally neutral purpose-setting autonomy, they will want to infer the normative or evaluative properties of this nature and show that the ontological properties are necessary for the rational nature to have absolute, unconditional, and ultimate, i. e. unique, value. (ii) If they start from the normative or evaluative properties of their nature as the unique value, they will infer the ontological properties of this nature which, like the morally neutral purpose-setting autonomy, are necessary for value to manifest itself in all circumstances and respects. Which direction we prioritize will determine whether we follow a realist or antirealist line of interpretation. The grounding dimension (4) thus becomes the pivotal point: The grounding in the absolute fact is either (i) independent from or (ii) dependent on the attitude of agents. Realism will give priority to the first direction: For realism it is mind and attitude independent ontological features that determine and explain what is a value. For a realist position, the de-re reading suggests itself: The human being necessarily and essentially has value due to the determination and explanation by mind- and attitude-independent ontological properties – regardless of how we describe the rational nature. For example, a rational nature that would not be capable of adopting attitudes would still retain its value. Anti-realism does not consider the grounding relation to be mind- and attitude-independent. When, in reversing the direction of grounding, it starts from normative or evaluative properties of a rational nature in order to ask which on-

8

Gerhard Schönrich

tological properties are appropriate for it, it will keep to the attitudes that constitute our rational nature as an autonomy capable not only of choosing purposes but also of adopting attitudes. The realist will look for those characteristics of the attitudes, which determine and explain the value of a rational nature, that can be given a value-free description, in order to ask in which ontological characteristics this value can manifest itself. In its dependence thesis anti-realism follows the de dicto reading: If it is part of humans’ rational nature to be capable of choosing purposes and adopting attitudes, a rational nature is not attributed value independently of its characterization as rational.

3 Outright Value Realism and -Antirealism By prioritizing (i) we commit ourselves to a value realism. It comes in two forms: (a) non-reductionist: values are irreducible non-natural facts or properties. (b) reductionist: values are reducible to natural entities (things and/or properties), be they entities of the natural or the social sciences. The outright-realist thesis then says: There is at least one (a) non-natural or (b) natural attitude-independent fact, which is fundamental, determining and explanatory for values and normativity.

Now such an outright realist interpretation seems to contradict the spirit of Kant’s philosophy in general. Kant is not a neo-Aristotelian. A grounding of ethics on a primitive value-fact (the good) that does not need further explanation seems to turn Kant’s ethics on its head. But even apart from this general objection, outright realism has serious problems to cope with:

a) What is a value-fact in the non-reductionist reading? Did Kant assume that the rational nature of humans is a supernatural value-fact that lifts them above nature? Amid natural things, as they are described by the natural sciences (or also the social sciences), there would thus exist a being that does not belong to the phenomenal world. It needs to be clarified in this regard that the outright-realist reading is not about the so-called two-aspect theory, according to which we can look at the only real phenomenal world in a different way, but about the assertion that there are value-facts in an ontologically robust sense. It is in no way to be denied that Kant’s remarks about the homo noumenon and his “intelligible” capabilities can be read in this robust sense (cf., e. g., KpV,

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

9

AA 05: 87.03 – 12; RL, AA 06: 223.01– 05, 295.09 – 18; TL, AA 06: 418.14– 23). Admittedly, this interpretation is acceptable only to die-hard adherents of a twoworld theory who follow Moore’s intuition of the metaphysical independence of values (cf. Moore 1903). Moore combines two claims that fit well the twoworld theory: Value is a robust supernatural entity and value is unanalysable. Though, ontologically robust entities whose properties coincide with evaluative properties would be metaphysically highly strange entities. Epistemically, the question is how we can recognize such entities. Mackie’s⁴ so-called queerness argument draws attention to the high costs of the assumption of the existence of such entities. For this reason, this line of interpretation is not pursued any further.

b) What is a value-fact in the reductionist reading? Value is analyzable – this is the guiding principle of this approach. The basic idea follows a demystification program with the sympathetic intention to reduce the talk of values to natural entities as they can be grasped by natural or social science. In this way, superfluous metaphysical ballast can be discarded and the epistemically intricate question of the recognizability of supernatural facts of value can be circumvented. What we call a “value” or “good” supervenes on underlying natural facts. In a weak form, the approach maintains: If two facts have the same natural properties, then they also have the same value properties. In the analysis, we can therefore limit ourselves to the entities that can be described in the natural or social sciences. Such a buck-passing account passes the buck – that, which is valuable – to the level of independent natural facts.⁵ In other words: The natural, i. e. themselves non-evaluative properties are the properties that bring about value. The realist reduction thesis says: (Rr) x is a value iff x has properties which can be described in a value-free way and which ground the value of x (i. e. they determine and explain it).

If the rational nature of human beings is the unique value in question, it is because there are natural properties that determine and explain that value, e. g., the natural disposition of an agent to be able to freely choose purposes and

 Cf. Mackie (1977), 38. For a thorough discussion, see Cuneo (2007), 89 ff.  For the original idea see Scanlon (1998), 97 f. For the many ramifications of the subsequent debate, see, e. g., Dancy (2005); Stratton-Lake/Hooker (2006); Väyrynen (2006); Reisner (2009); Schroeder (2009).

10

Gerhard Schönrich

adopt attitudes. The program fails if the relevant properties of the grounding fact cannot be described in value-free terms. No evaluative concept or evaluative judgment may occur in the explanans. Here is a frequently discussed example from everyday life: In a particular holiday location we value its tranquility, pleasant microclimate and recreational opportunities. The location has a value because it has exactly these natural characteristics. It does not have these natural features and, in addition, the property of being valuable to us (in the sense of a personal value). Otherwise, the explanation would be circular. Thus the natural properties are necessary for its value. Now, outright realism asserts that they are also sufficient. In a world where there are no agents looking for rest, the holiday location would have the same natural features, but would it also have a value? The reductive solution comes up against another limit: the open-question problem. If we answer the question of what constitutes the value of this location by saying, “Because it is quiet”, this inevitably evokes the follow-up question, “But why is tranquility a good thing?” “Because it serves our recreation”. “Why is recreation a good thing?” “Because it serves health” …, etc. At some point, we have to come to an end. This seems to be an arbitrary termination of the regress, which may perhaps be acceptable in the case of personal, but not in the case of objective values. Thus we would be thrown back to non-reductive realism.

What strategies are available to the anti-realist Kant fraction? By regarding value as dependent on attitudes, this fraction opts for the grounding relation according to (ii). It is the properties of attitudes that are supposed to determine and explain the value of something. Similar to reductionist realism, anti-realism must be able to describe these value-conferring properties in a value-free way. (Ra) x is a value iff there are properties of attitudes directed to x, which can be described in a value-free way and which determine and explain the value of x.

Like reductionist realism, anti-realism implicitly or explicitly pursues a demystification program, except that it does not take natural properties of the object of the attitude as an explanation, but rather properties of attitudes that can be described in a value-free way. This is the basic idea. In general, the anti-realist has four options:⁶  Here I broadly follow the overview of Tappolet/Rossi 2015.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

11

1)

Basic subjectivism: Something acquires value if it becomes the object of the attitude of appreciation, approval, etc. of an individual agent. 2) Group-subjectivism: Value is not explained by the attitudes of a single agent, but by those of a group or an entire culture. 3) Humeanism: Valuable is what we desire. 4) Constructivism: Values are constructs, which are valuable precisely if something is either a) approved by an ideal observer or b) in an ideal discourse or c) determined or explained by prescriptivism. Is the anti-realist fraction of the Kantians in a stronger position? This seems to be the case only at first glance. If we try to apply the four strategies, the weaknesses of outright anti-realism quickly become clear: The subjectivist strategy does not lead beyond personal values. Neither simple nor group subjectivism is acceptable to a Kantian position, not only in ethics but also in epistemology. A value such as dignity or an epistemic value such as truth or knowledge cannot depend on the pro-attitude of an individual agent. That would make values arbitrary – which contradicts our basic intuition that we can at least disagree about objective values by arguing about them. Under the universalistic premises of Kant’s philosophy, a relativization to groups or cultures is equally excluded. Such values would not be objective values; they would have – even if accepted by a large number of agents – only the status of personal values. Kant decidedly excludes Humeanism. A value like morality, for example, cannot depend on our desires. What remains is a constructivist strategy: Kant only provides starting points for (a) and (b). Kantians like Rawls have developed the variant (a); discourse ethicists like Apel and Habermas the variant (b). Since these are independent further developments of the Kantian position, they may be excluded here. In Kant himself, we find a variant of (c) that is textually well supported and brought into play by Oliver Sensen (2011). We may call it “prescriptivism”. Whatever is posited as a fundamental value (for Sensen, it is human dignity in the sense of the moral autonomy of the will): This value is not a metaphysical fact; rather, it is determined and explained in a non-arbitrary way by our pro-attitudes. We value this autonomy for its own sake because we are supposed to value it. “Value is nothing more than the prescription, and the prescription is justified with reference to the imperative (…)” (Sensen 2011: 33). Sensen thus clearly takes an anti-realistic stand regarding the grounding direction. What makes his proposal problematic is not only the claim that “value is

12

Gerhard Schönrich

nothing more than the presciption…”, which can be read as an assertion of identity, contrary to the asymmetrical concept of grounding, but above all, it is the narrowing of the grounding to morally required attitudes. This has untenable consequences for a value theory: 1. Epistemic values such as truth or understanding, or aesthetic values such as beauty, can neither be defined in their essence nor explained by a moral command (In the case of aesthetic values, Kant explicitly excludes such a grounding: It is a matter of a “free delight”). In the case of personal values, we would have to submit ourselves to a rigorist regime: Something not morally required, such as wealth, pleasure of various kinds, etc., would, even if morally permitted, simply be worthless. 2. In addition, in its very own field of morally relevant action moral value prescriptivism would have the consequence that the immoral agents (and even more so criminals) would lose their value (in this case: their dignity) as agents.⁷ Only an agent with a morally qualified will would have this value. This contradicts our intuitions of the absolute and inalienable value of every human being and of the inalienable human rights tied to it. If it is the moral law that ultimately determines and explains what a value is, then a normative or evaluative property of attitudes becomes necessary and sufficient for value. What outright realism – according to the motto “value does not need attitudes” – tries to achieve in terms of grounding work from the side of facts, outright anti-realism – according to the motto “attitudes constitute value” – wants to accomplish from the other side. Both strategies claim to have found necessary and sufficient conditions for the determination and explanation of value. They are not only mutually exclusive, but they both have equally unwelcome consequences. We end up with a dilemma. On which horn do we prefer to end up?

4 The Fittingness of Pro-Attitudes The key to resolving the dilemma lies in a more precise understanding of the dependence thesis that the outright anti-realist opposes the realist’s independence thesis. What exactly is the role of the pro-attitudes of valuing, approving, etc., in the determining and explaining of a rational nature? What are the properties of

 Regarding this question Kant himself was obviously ambivalent. Cf. Horn 2020, 27.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

13

the attitudes that give value to the rational nature? Obviously, the anti-realist is guided by the following basic idea: (V) x is a value, iff there is an agent S, so that: (i) S would have a pro-attitude ψ towards object x.

Values (or negative values, if one replaces contra-attitudes for pro-attitudes) are independent of factual, but not of possible pro-attitudes. S does not have to take a pro-attitude at the current time. Yet there can be no possible world in which there are values, but no pro-attitudes of agents. This statement excludes metaphysically independent value-facts. If we attribute a fitting-attitude account to Kant, we must also give an indication of the position he adopts in discussing the objections to this approach. They are linked to the much-discussed example of an evil demon who forces me to admire him under the threat of painful punishment. Although the object of the attitude here has ex hypothesi no property that makes it worthy of admiration and thus valuable, the attempt seems natural to admire the demon anyway (if that is psychologically possible) because it allows one to avoid the pain. The defender of the fitting-attitude approach must then show that no value arises from the pro-attitude to the demon. Kant’s resolution of this dilemma is to distinguish the positive (negative) value that the object can have and the positive (negative) value of attitudes. According to Kant, attitudes themselves can also have value, which presupposes that we can value them also. The problems involved cannot be discussed here.⁸ The fitting-attitude approach has to be augmented if we want to solve the problem of the (group‐) subjective arbitrariness of values. The following additional condition helps against this: (ii) it is fitting to adopt ψ towards x.

In a first approximation, we can say that a pro-attitude is not arbitrary precisely when it “fits” the object. The notion of a fit aligns two sides, namely, the properties that an attitude has and the properties of the object to which the attitude is directed. In order to clarify this further, we first need a more detailed analysis of attitudes. Attitudes are relations between an agent S on the one hand and propositions or intentional objects on the other – by analogy with propositional attitudes

 Cf. the detailed study Schönrich 2013.

14

Gerhard Schönrich

such as “believe”, “fear”, “hope”, etc. Kant’s umbrella term for pro-attitudes is “Wohlgefallen” (locus classicus KU, AA 05: 204.04– 18). For contra-attitudes, then, “Missfallen” would have to be used accordingly. As the Brothers Grimm note in their Deutsches Wörterbuch, the expression “Wohlgefallen” refers, according to the common usage in Kant’s time, not only to emotions – i. e. the “sensation of joy, pleasure in a sensual-aesthetic sense” – but also to “intellectual and moral reasons”. A “Wohlgefallen” thus also expresses the appreciation of something in a doxastic component. For Kant, a conative component is added to this. A pro-attitude then consists of three components: (1) Doxastic: The prefix “pro” expresses – in vague terms – a kind of approval in the sense of a “being in favor of” (the prefix “contra” correspondingly a “being against”) by S of the content represented in a proposition or of the object of the attitude. If we want to paraphrase “being in favor of” with a subjective “thinking well of”, we have to add that this expression cannot be analyzed further, for otherwise we immediately get into the circle that in the explanans a concept of value appears, which may not appear there: neither explicitly nor implicitly. The doxastic component secures cognitive access to attitudes and makes them sensitive to reasons. Attitudes can be adopted, avoided, or suspended as a result of rational consideration – no matter how strong is the emotional or conative component. (2) Conative: For Kant, pro-attitudes are associated with an interest: (KpV, AA 05: 119.27– 34). An interest, in turn, is understood as a “motive of the will” – however, not every motive becomes an interest: only “insofar as it is represented by reason” (KpV, AA 05: 79.19 – 22). In this component, Kant expresses the relation to the “faculty of desire” (KU, AA 05: 204.22 – 30). (3) Emotional: Affects and feelings come into play, according to Kant, through the reference to pleasure and displeasure, which are the ultimate points of reference for all emotions, be they esteem, fear, indignation, joy, etc. For example, “respect for the moral law” reflects all of the three components specified. Conatively, the “Wohlgefallen” is determined by a “highest interest” (KU, AA 05: 209.03 – 09). Due to the “dominion which reason exercises over sensibility” (KU, AA 05: 271.25 – 31) in the contemplation of the moral law, on the emotional level even the feeling of displeasure can arise. The main role is played by the doxastic component, namely, the feeling of respect turns out to be “evoked by pure reason” (KU, AA 05: 190.33 – 37). When we are cognitively confronted with the moral law not only do we take a supreme interest in this concept of reason. The concept of reason also immediately compels us to feel esteem. In the conative and emotional component this “high esteem” (KpV, AA 06:

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

15

84.16 – 21) then also explains the final and unconditional value we attach to morality. Each attitude type, such as respect, esteem, approval, etc., forms a specific profile with its three components, which makes it distinguishable from other types. This profile of characteristics must fit the objects to which the attitude is directed. Thus Kant considers that “a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no touch of a pure and good will” (GMS, AA 04: 393.19 – 22). To adopt a pro-attitude of esteem, as it would be appropriate towards a morally constituted will, is completely inappropriate in this case. Kant even goes one step further, when he declares that a downgraded “Wohlgefallen” in the sense of approval or appreciation would still be inappropriate towards this object. Obviously, the attitudes in question are subject to inherent standards or correctness conditions. For example, the correctness condition for fear states that the object must be dangerous. Therefore, the attitude of fearing a bear is correct, while fearing a house spider is not. However, by introducing correctness conditions, we accept a normative element on the side of the explanans. Not only are we saying that fear of a house spider does not “fit” that object, but that we should not have that attitude. Under the normative aspect of correctness, the description of fit is no longer neutral. That Kant explicitly assumes conditions of correctness is shown by his talk of the “worthiness” of the object to which the attitude is directed, e. g., in the case of the “worthiness of happiness” of a way of life (KpV, AA 05: 130.06 – 08), or the “worthiness of punishment” (KpV, AA 05: 37.22– 23) of actions. The pro-attitude of respect and admiration only fits an agent who has accomplished a task, in this case, the task of suspending inclinations that are contrary to a moral determination of the will. The correctness condition then says: achievements generally deserve respect, sometimes even high esteem. Not responding to this with an appropriate attitude is a failure. The anti-realist strategy comes under pressure here if it wants to hold on to an explanation that avoids circularity (cf. Section 5). However, the pressure also comes from the side of the object of the attitude. Intuitively, the properties of the object seem to play a more important role than the dependency thesis wants to admit. Values can be controversial, we are subject to value fallacies. If the fit between object and attitude fails, for instance, if we value “the uninterrupted prosperity” of an (undeserving) person, a value fallacy arises. This does not even require confusing a pro-attitude with a contra-attitude. As Kant’s example shows, all that is needed is an attitude whose property profile does not match the object at which it is directed. This description suggests that the attitude has to align itself to the object in order to avoid value fallacies.

16

Gerhard Schönrich

5 (Anti‐)Realism revisited There are two complementary questions that need to be answered: What are the properties (which can be described in a value-free way) of the attitude that make it correct in view of the object to which it is directed? And what are the natural (value-free describable) properties of the object that make it the appropriate object of the attitude? Does anti-realism have to revise its dependence thesis at this point and concede a “realistic” contribution on the part of the object? And if so: Has its program failed? If we explain correctness as the fit of the properties of the attitude to the properties of the object, we are in danger of an empty back and forth from the attitude to the object and back again. Suppose the object x has the properties F, G, and H, and an attitude with the properties φ, χ, and ψ turns out to be fitting. Both F, G, and H and φ, χ, and ψ must be value-free properties to avoid circularity. Now, it would be pure magic if in going back and forth suddenly a value would emerge. So what explains the value of the object? From this dilemma, Orsi and Garcia (2020) develop an objection to the fitting-attitude approach: (1) Fittingness requires attitudes. Fittingness is always one of attitude and object. (2) Value, however, does not need attitudes because value is explained by properties that make objects valuable. According to the authors, all the explanatory work is done from the side of the object. Thus, they clearly argue for a form of realism. Yet how should this look like? Orsi and Garcia reject the reductive version of realism. For them, buck-passing is not a solution, because the buck-passer idly jumps back and forth between “x grounds the reason for a pro-attitude towards x” and “the pro-attitude makes x valuable”. If this is correct, the only option left is outright realism, which maintains the existence of metaphysically independent facts of value. The alleged idle back and forth of the buck-passing explanation described by the two authors, however, differs from the idleness sketched above in one central respect. It contains an element we have so far excluded and that offers a chance to supply the idle explanation with content: The value-free object properties ground a reason for the pro-attitude. This is realistic enough. The reason itself is irreducibly normative, i. e., reducible neither to properties of the attitudes nor to those of the object. Scanlon analyses a reason as a relation between a fact or properties of a fact, an agent, and an attitude (as well as the circumstances of adopting the attitude (Scanlon 2014, 32) and thus also meets the Kantian understanding of a reason. For Kant, every kind of Wohlgefallen is based on reasons, even the “freie Wohlgefallen” that leads to aesthetic values (KU, AA 05: 211.10 – 18). An ontological description provides us only with independent prop-

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

17

erties, which are what they are. Only when agents capable of attitudes turn these independent properties into reasons for taking an attitude can independent properties become value-conferring properties. The idle back-and-forth between the two sides becomes substantive as soon as a reason comes onto the scene. Metaphysically, the grounding direction is from the object of the attitude to the attitude. This does not exclude that epistemically the emotional and conative components help to discover the relevant properties. In the case of personal values, it is my personal preferences and desires which select just those properties of the object that make the object “pleasant” for me (KU, AA 05: 207.05 – 12). Kant speaks here of “private conditions as reasons of the Wohlgefallen” (KU, AA 05: 211.19). Of the many independent qualities an object may have, not all are relevant: The resort, for example, that I value is valuable because it has the attributes of being quiet, having a good air quality as well as recreational opportunities; not because the houses have predominantly hipped roofs or are brightly painted. Conatively I want quietness, emotionally the place should be charming. This supports a corresponding pro-attitude, which is then doxastically expressed as being in favor of it. In the case of objective values, we are dealing with “public conditions” (KU, AA 05: 214.30 – 36). Here, the properties furnish reasons that can justify the adoption of a pro-attitude as correct, not only for my person but for all agents capable of adopting an attitude. In contrast to person-relative “private conditions,” “public conditions” cause a reason to be (i) accessible and (ii) citable as a reason in a generally intelligible way, not just to a particular person, but to any person. The reason generating structure is the same as in the case of personal values: A morally constituted will or a just social order for example may have many qualities, but they become reasons only through the fact that they support the attitude of respect and esteem. Thus, the properties of the object are not reasons per se. Following the lines of Scanlon’s definition, however, the properties of the attitudes, i. e., the agent’s desires, interests and emotions, are not reasons per se either. The mere fact that an agent has desires, interests and emotions helps decisively in identifying the relevant properties of the object, but as such is not yet a reason to take a pro-attitude. As Kant repeatedly points out, rational beings are able to take a step back and reflect on their desires and emotions by adopting a second-order perspective on them. The agent may desire to have (or not to have) certain desires and emotions. What H. Frankfurt (cf. Frankurt 1971) analyses as a two-tier nature Kant describes as the maxim structure of the will. According to Kant’s theory, the agent determines in maxims which will he wants to have, i. e., which first-order desires he includes (or excludes) in the maxim (cf.

18

Gerhard Schönrich

Schönrich 2020, 61 f.). Thus, contrary to Hume, only reflected and evaluated desires can achieve the status of a reason. To translate this general structure to our problem: The agent defines which desires, interests, and emotions should play a determining role in adopting a pro-attitude and which should not. What is desired or affectively wanted is built into a pro-attitude because it is desirable. From the view of the attitudes: The desirability, and not the desire as such is a reason to take a pro-attitude.⁹ With regard to the object of the attitude having a reason implies that for an agent there are properties of the object, so that taking an attitude of a certain attitude type is correct if the property profile of the attitude fits the properties of the object. Such reasons are usually referred to as “normative reasons”. They explain why an attitude is correct or appropriate. Normative reasons are not motivational reasons that explain psychologically why an agent has adopted a particular attitude. In the ideal case, the normative is also the motivating reasons. Kant makes it clear with the help of many examples that the two types of reasons can come apart. Famous is the example of a merchant (GMS, AA 04: 397.21– 32) who does not cheat even inexperienced buyers. He has the correct attitude of always charging fair prices; however, he does not adopt this attitude because it would be morally correct, but because he expects to make more profit in the long run. He acts correctly, but not for the reasons that make his attitude correct. Our merchant proves to be a competent agent. He can engage in deliberations that bring the properties of the object of the attitude into the focus of his interests as well as of the formation of his desires and convictions. Briefly speaking: He is able in principle to respond to normative reasons, only he does not do so in this case. Let us call this competence “sensitivity to normative reasons”. His failure consists in the fact that the correctness of his attitude is in this case not due to his sensitivity to normative reasons, but to the coincidence that his motivational reason also leads to the fitting attitude. However, this fittingness of the attitude is not identical to the correctness of the attitude. These types of attitudes respond to reasons, but to the wrong ones. They are not indicative of value. We can exclude such cases with the following conditions: (R-S) S adopts a pro-attitude ψ to x indicative of value iff I. II.

ψ is fitting and S has a sensitivity to normative reasons and

 Starting with an Aristotelian analysis M. Alvarez arrives to the same anti-Humean conclusion. See Alvarez 2010, 82, 85.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

19

III. the fittingness of ψ is due to S’s sensitivity to normative reasons.

Where do we stand? We have avoided outright value realism, opting instead for a moderate anti-realism that does, however, embrace a central insight of realism, namely, that attitudes must be object-grounded in the buck-passing sense. We have escaped the danger of remaining trapped in the empty back-and-forth between the value-free properties of the object and the attitude in the analysis of the fittingness of attitudes by recourse to the normativity of reasons and the corresponding sensitivity to the reasons of the agent. But at what price? Normativity can be analyzed only in normative concepts. Have we not, then, replaced the realist idea of a metaphysical value-fact with the idea of a metaphysical normativity-fact? Is this fact of anti-realism in the midst of the natural world not as queer as the basic realist assumption of robust value-facts? A fact or property is valuable if it is valued by an agent in a correct attitude. Correctness is a normative concept that we cannot judge from a standpoint outside normative considerations. For this reason, we introduced sensitivity to normative reasons on the side of the agent. In addition to the morally neutral autonomy of being able to choose purposes and adopt attitudes, our rational nature also has the property of being able to respond to normative reasons. It would be irrational for an agent not to respond to a property of the object with a pro-attitude if the private or public conditions for correctness are satisfied.¹⁰ A rational nature is manifested in every fitting value attitude. This explains the unique character of the value of a rational nature simultaneously as an absolute, unconditional and final value. When we value the rational nature, then there is not another value, in addition to the other values, that is to be realized also. Thus, the dominance solution in the grounding is misleading. Agents can assure themselves of the grounding of their valuations in rational nature by taking a step back and explicitly adopting a pro-attitude toward their rational nature. Only this self-relation fully describes the sense of rational autonomy as Kant conceived it. To value one’s own rational nature is a reflexive fact. A proattitude to one’s rational nature is correct precisely when that nature is valued for the sake of its correctness-enabling sensitivity to reasons. Once we have engaged in the question of the correctness of our attitudes, there is no way back to jumping idly between the descriptive properties of the object and the descriptive properties of the attitude. By understanding these properties as reasons, we irrevocably have lost our innocence.

 Wedgewood describes rationality as “reason-responsiveness” (cf. Wedgewood 2017, 11).

20

Gerhard Schönrich

References Alvarez, Maria (2010): Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cuneo, Terence (2007): The Normative Web. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dancy, Jonathan (2005): “Should We Pass the Buck?”. In: Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Vol. 17. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen/Michael J. Zimmermann (Eds.). Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 33 – 44. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971): “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. In: The Journal of Philosophy 68 [Harry G. Frankfurt (Ed.). Columbia], pp. 5 – 20. Grajner, Martin (2021): “Grounding, Metaphysical Laws, and Structure”. In: Analytic Philosophy. Dresden: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1111/phib.12216, visited on 5 October 2021. Horn, Christoph (2020): Absoluteness and Contingency. Kant’s Use of the Concept of Dignity. [In: Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Kant-Studien-Ergänzungshefte. Vol. 209. Yashusi Kato/Gerhard Schönrich (Eds.)]. Berlin/Munich/Boston: De Gruyter [pp. 11 – 29]. Kain, Patrick (2017): Dignity and the Paradox of Method. [In: Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. New Essays. Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte. Vol. 199. Robinson dos Santos/Elke Elisabeth Schmidt (Eds.)] West Lafayette: De Gruyter [pp. 67 – 90]. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackie, John L. (1977): Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin UK. Moore, George E. (1903): Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Orsi, Francesco/Garcia, Andrés G. (2020): “The Explanatory Objection to the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value”. In: Philosophical Studies 178, pp. 1207 – 1221. Reisner, Andrew, E. (2009): “Abondoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value”. In: Ethic Theory and Moral Practice 12, pp. 379 – 395. Scanlon, Thomas M. (1998): What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Scanlon, Thomas M. (2014): Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schönrich, Gerhard (2020): Kant’s Theory of Dignity. A Fitting-Attitude Analysis of a Value. [In: Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Kant-Studien-Ergänzungshefte. Vol. 209. Yashusi Kato/Gerhard Schönrich (Eds.).] Berlin/Munich/Boston: De Gruyter [pp. 49 – 72]. Schönrich, Gerhard (2013): “Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion”. In: Kant-Studien. Vol. 104, Berlin/Munich/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 321 – 345. Schönrich, Gerhard (2015): “Würde, Wert und rationale Selbstliebe”. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 69, pp. 127 – 158. Schroeder, Mark (2009): “Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis”. In: Philosophical Explorations 12, pp. 341 – 47. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity. In: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte. Vol. 166. Berlin: De Gruyter. Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth/Schönecker, Dieter (2018): “Kant’s Moral Realism Regarding Dignity and Value. Some Comments on the Tugendlehre”. In: Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. New Essays Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte. Vol. 199. Robinson dos Santos/Elke Elisabeth Schmidt (Eds.). Berlin/Munich/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 119 – 152.

Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?

21

Stratton-Lake, Philip/Hooker, Brad (2006): “Scanlon vs. Moore on Goodness”. In: Metaethics after Moore. Terry Horgan/Mark Timmons (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tappolet, Christine/Rossi, Mauro (2015): “What is a Value? Where does it come from? A Philosophical Perspective”. In: The Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology. Tobias Brosch/David Sander (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Väyrynen, Pekka (2006): “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value”. In: Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 1. Russ Shafer-Landau (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 295 – 324. Wedgwood, Ralph (2017) The Value of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolf, Ursula (2007): Aristoteles. Nikomachische Ethik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Oliver Sensen

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that Kant is a prescriptivist about value. I first argue that, according to Kant, expressions with the grammatical form that something ‘has value’ or ‘is good’ are not meant to describe this something, but to express an imperative command of what reason deems to be necessary. This includes the absolute command to respect all human beings. I then briefly describe the two kinds of imperatives Kant puts forth and relate his account of value to them. I argue that Kant’s distinction between dignity and price fits this interpretation, and I add a new discussion in which sense one can say that dignity is a value. Finally, I will meet the objection that – in the third Section of Groundwork – Kant does conceive of ‘value’ as the description of an ontological property all human beings possess in virtue of being part of an intelligible world. I argue that Kant reduces even this claim to what reason deems necessary. I conclude that Kant’s primary focus is on the imperatives that reason commands, and ‘has value’ is a secondary construction that expresses these imperatives of reason.

Introduction What do we mean when we say that something ‘has value’ or ‘is good’? It is a natural way of speaking that an expression such as something ‘has y’ is meant as a description of what an object is like. If I say, for instance, that the house has a square shape or is square, then my purpose is to describe what the house is like. We use the same construction when we talk about complex or hidden features, such as in ‘Paul has the flu’. Our aim is to describe what is going on with Paul. Sometimes the description is more about what the object lacks, as, e. g., in: ‘the roof has a hole’, or ‘the tire is flat’. It is therefore natural to assume that the expressions ‘has value’ or ‘is good’ are also meant to describe an object. However, as J. L. Austin argued long ago, describing an object is not the only function of language: “It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely” (Austin 1962: 1). Interestingly, he credits Kant for pointing out that the mere grammatical form does not determine the proper function of expressions. The grammar structure we use, such as ‘has y’, is not tied to one particular function of our language. We also use https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-004

24

Oliver Sensen

language, for instance, to perform a pledge, express a sentiment, or give a command: “Here too Kant was among the pioneers” (Austin 1962: 3). For instance, the expressions ‘is necessary’ or ‘has necessity’ might be used to describe, but also to command. When Kant, therefore, uses an expression such as that something ‘has value’, we cannot take it for granted by the grammatical form alone that he wants to describe a property an object has if it were the only thing existing in the world. But what function is there for an expression such as ‘has value’ other than to describe what an object is like? Richard Hare offers his prescriptivism as an alternative. Imagine that you hold a strawberry in your hand. The strawberry is “sweet, juicy, firm, red, and large” (Hare 1952: 85). What do you add by saying that the strawberry ‘is good’? On Hare’s account, the function of adding that something ‘is good’ or ‘has value’ is not to describe a further feature of the strawberry (such as ‘sweet, juicy, and good’). What the expression adds is that the speaker recommends the strawberry to the listener. The fruit is sweet, juicy, and red, and the speaker recommends it because of these features: “I have said that the primary function of the word ‘good’ is to commend” (Hare 1952: 127). In developing his prescriptivism, Hare, too, draws inspiration from Kant: “the greatest of all rationalists, Kant, referred to moral judgments as imperatives” (Hare 1952: 16). In this paper, I will argue that, according to Kant, expressions with the grammatical form such that something ‘has value’ are not meant to describe this something, but to express an imperative (Section 1). Kant distinguishes two kinds of imperatives, and accordingly different kinds of value (Section 2). After discussing his notion of price in the previous section, I then give a new discussion of whether Kant conceives of dignity as a value (Section 3). In the final section, I will meet the objection that Kant does conceive of value as an ontological property in his justification of morality (Section 4). My claim in this paper is that ‘value’ is a secondary concept for Kant that he uses to express imperatives of reason.

Section 1: Kant and Prescriptivism To readers of Kant’s Groundwork, it seems that ‘value’ and ‘good’ are central concepts of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant famously starts out the first Section that it is impossible to think of something that is “good without limitation except a good will” (GMS, AA 04: 393.05 – 07),¹ and he later refers to “absolute worth”

 All Kant translations, unless otherwise stated, are from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works.

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

25

(GMS, AA 04: 428.03 – 06) and “inner worth” (GMS, AA 04: 435.02– 04) in his discussions of the Formula of Humanity and the distinction of dignity and price (Notice that Kant only uses one word for ‘worth’ and ‘value’: Werth, and that he uses Werth and ‘good’ [gut] interchangeably at the beginning of the first Section of Groundwork, cf. GMS, AA 04: 393.05 – 394.12). It is therefore natural to read value to be a central concept of Kant’s moral philosophy. This first impression is misleading, however. At the beginning of the Groundwork, Kant refers to common moral cognition to show that the moral law is already embedded in ordinary thought (cf. GMS, AA 04: 402.09 – 15) and then to bring his formulations of it “closer to intuition” (GMS, AA 04: 436.13). However, value does not play a role when he explicitly says that he wants to justify morality – e. g., in the third Section of Groundwork – neither in the section on the prior concept to a Metaphysics of Morals (cf. MS, AA 06: 221.06 – 228.22) nor in his very extensive and explicit lecture notes on moral philosophy. In the Critique of Practical Reason, where we find again a section on the good, Kant explicitly argues that “the concept of good … must not be determined before the moral law … but after it and by means of it” (KpV, AA 05: 63.25 – 28; cf. GMS, AA 04: 436.15 – 32). If we extend our view beyond the first sections of the Groundwork, value is a secondary concept in Kant’s moral philosophy.² What is more important to note in this context is that even in the early parts of the Groundwork Kant does not specify the function of terms like ‘value’ or ‘good’ as descriptions of objects of what objects are like if they existed in isolation. In other words: The terms do not describe a property of an object that one would see under an ontological x-ray. Rather, when he specifies the function of ‘good’ and ‘value,’ he specifies it as a command of reason or something that reason declares to be necessary: “the will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good” (GMS, AA 04: 412.30 – 34). The grammatical expressions ‘has value’ or ‘is good’ are another way of saying what reason deems necessary. As such, it is not a description (of an object) but a prescription of how to behave. Kant is a prescriptivist about value. Kant distinguishes two basic types of prescriptions, and he deduces two types of value from them. Reason can prescribe something as a necessary means to something else, e. g., ‘if you want to get to Australia quickly, take a plane’. In this case, reason prescribes a hypothetical imperative: “Now, if the acPage numbers refer to the volume: page of the Academy edition of Kants Gesammelte Schriften (de Gruyter, 1902–), or the A- and B-editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.  For a fuller argument, see Sensen 2011: 14– 52; cf. Horn 2014: 98 – 110; and Stephan Zimmermann’s contribution to this volume.

26

Oliver Sensen

tion would be good merely as a means to something else the imperative is hypothetical”. The other type of prescription is “if the action is represented as in itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to reason, as its principle, then it is categorical” (GMS, AA 04: 414.22– 25). Since expressions of value are really prescriptions of what reason deems necessary, Kant reserves statements of what is good primarily to actions or the quality of a will: Thus good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions, … and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (and in every respect and without any further condition), … it would be only the way of action, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, … but not a thing. (KpV, AA 05: 60.19 – 25)

Even the respect that is owed to all human beings is not grounded in a value property that human beings have if one looks at them under an ontological xray: “the existence of man is not by itself a factum that produces any obligation” (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 545.15 – 16). Rather, the value of human beings is one that one can only give oneself by developing a good will: “Only through that which he does … does he give his being as the existence of a person an absolute value” (KU, AA 05: 208.35 – 209.02; cf. KU, AA 05: 443.10 – 13). Instead, the requirement to respect others is a categorical imperative of reason as well: “For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves” (GMS, AA 04: 433.26 – 28). Kant even argues that the requirement to respect others must come from one’s own reason: “since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason” (TL, AA 06: 417.24– 418.03; cf. MS, AA 06: 239.04– 12). This is the case because only (one’s own) reason can yield universal and necessary propositions: “Necessity and strict universality are … secure indications of an a priori cognition” (KrV, B 4). The requirement to respect all others should be universal and categorical as well: “This principle of humanity … because of its universality … must arise from pure reason” (GMS, AA 04: 430.28 – 431.09). Consequently, when Kant talks about the value of humanity or the requirement to respect all other rational beings, he is not trying to describe a property human beings have, but to express something that reason commands as (absolutely) necessary. But does Kant not also specify absolute value differently, i. e., as ‘inner worth’? For instance, he says that even if a good will does not achieve anything, “then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself” (GMS, AA 04: 394.24– 26). He also says: “The essence of things is not changed by their external relations; and that which, without taking ac-

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

27

count of such relations, alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he must also be appraised by whoever does it, even by the supreme being” (GMS, AA 04: 439.20 – 24). Do these passages not establish that ‘has value’ is the description of a property an object has if one regards it in isolation or for itself? It is important to note that both passages talk about the value of a good will, not of human beings as such. In the second passage, he refers to the proper moral motivation and says that “even this sole absolute lawgiver [the supreme being] would … have to be represented as appraising the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested conduct” (GMS, AA 04: 439.17– 20). Even in this context, Kant is not talking about a value human beings have a such, but about the value of a good will. This value of a good will, however, he specifies not as a distinct property, but he says that it “consists just in the principle of action being free from all influences of contingent grounds” (GMS, AA 04: 426.10 – 11). In other words: The goodness of a good will consists just in following the moral law for its own sake (cf. GMS, AA 04: 437.05 – 09). He also confirms it in the second passage I cited about the essence of things: “it is just in this independence of maxims from all such incentives that their sublimity consists” (GMS, AA 04: 439.07– 09). The expression: ‘has inner value’ is therefore not a description of a property an object has if it were the only thing existing in the world, but it conveys that a judgment about an object is valid independently of the relations the objects stand in. ‘Absolute’ and ‘inner’ value, then, mean the same thing in that they are something that reason deems necessary in all respects and under all circumstances (cf. again KpV, AA 05: 60.13 – 25): “The word absolute is now more often used merely to indicate that something is valid of a thing considered in itself and thus internally [innerlich]” (KrV, A 224– 325/B 381– 382). The emphasis of the jewel and essence passage is both that an observer esteems the will that follows the moral law for its own sake even if it does not bring about good consequences. The emphasis is not on the good will being a jewel, i. e., a precious property, but that it shines like a jewel, i. e., it presents such a will “as the object of an immediate respect” (GMS, AA 04: 435.21– 22).

Section 2: Worth and Price Kant shares, then, with Hare the general view that the function of an expression such as ‘has value’ is not to describe an object. However, this does not mean that for Kant all value statements are simply recommendations of the speaker, such as one might recommend a particular strawberry. Kant explains the distinction

28

Oliver Sensen

between two kinds of value further in his discussion of dignity and price. Here, too, it is important to keep the context of the passage in mind. Kant distinguishes dignity and price when he discusses the kingdom of ends. The kingdom of ends is a thought experiment that describes an ideal situation that would come about if all human beings followed the moral law: “a kingdom of ends would actually come into existence through maxims whose rule the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings if they were universally followed” (GMS, AA 04: 438.29 – 32). Following the moral law is a requirement for being a part of the kingdom of ends (cf. also Darwall 2008: 176): “A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws” (GMS, AA 04: 433.34– 36). However, the requirement is even stronger than merely acting in accordance with moral laws. The idea of ‘giving universal laws’ requires that “we abstract … from all the content of … private ends” (GMS, AA 04: 433.21). In other words, the agent does not only act in accordance with moral laws but also acts from the motive of obeying universal laws. As a member of the kingdom of ends, one also has a morally good will. As a result, “morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be … a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends” (GMS, AA 04: 435.05 – 07; cf. GMS, AA 04: 438.01– 07); this is because only morality “makes him fit to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends” (GMS, AA 04: 435.05 – 07). This context is important since it shows again that value is not a foundational concept that grounds the kingdom of ends, but that Kant argues from the command to follow the moral law to the values that would come about: “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity” (GMS, AA 04: 434.31– 32). Under these ideal conditions, price and dignity are exclusive but also assigned to every element of the kingdom. What is the first type of value? A price is closer to the cases that Hare had in mind. Supposedly, when I recommend a strawberry, I do it based on my empirical preferences and private ends. Kant distinguishes two types of these preferences: “What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste … has a fancy price” (GMS, AA 04: 434.35 – 37). Something has a price if it is the object of our attitudes (of inclinations or taste), not the other way around: that our attitudes react to a price an object has. A price is not a thing or property, such as a price tag that is attached to the object if it were the only thing existing. Looked at under an ontological x-ray, there is only the thing. What gives it a price is that it is recommended or coveted by our inclinations or fancy. One would first imagine that Kant has physical objects in mind when he talks about items that have a price. Physical objects, such as pencils, tables, and chairs, can be means to our ends. They “only have a relative worth, as

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

29

means, and are therefore called things” (GMS, AA 04: 428.18 – 21). Kant specifies a price as something that could be replaced by something that has the same function: “What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent” (GMS, AA 04: 434.32– 33). If, for instance, I break a pencil while taking notes, the pencil can be replaced by any other that fulfills the same function equally well. The pencil has a market price. If there is also a picture on my desk, the picture might have a fancy price. I might enjoy the picture for its beauty. But if the picture gets destroyed, it could still be replaced by an exact copy (or another picture that equally pleases). The picture is not a means in the same sense as the pencil, but it still has “merely a relative worth, that is, a price” (GMS, AA 04: 435.03 – 04). What is important to notice is that the relative value of things depends on our attitudes (cf. Korsgaard 1996: 115). However, not only is a price what is valued by a rational being, but in the context of a kingdom of ends, a price is even more dependent on attitudes. In the ideal scenario of the kingdom, Kant abstracts from all private ends and from all things as well: “we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends” (GMS, AA 04: 433.21). What remains is just “a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, … because what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means” (GMS, AA 04: 433.28 – 33). Accordingly, Kant’s own examples of what has a price in the kingdom of ends are not things, but the human attitudes themselves: “Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination and humor have a fancy price” (GMS, AA 04: 435.09 – 10). This confirms further that relative value or price is not a property a physical object would have if it existed in isolation. Correspondingly, the grammatical expression of ‘has a relative worth’ is not a description of features that one would see under an ontological x-ray of that thing. Kant, therefore, seems to agree with Hare that statements that ascribe (relative) value, such as saying that a ‘strawberry is good’, express that the agent commends the object based on personal inclinations or taste. But this cannot be Kant’s whole conception of value since he also talks about ‘absolute value’ and value that is not based on private preferences. Does ‘absolute value’ describe a feature of beings?

Section 3: Dignity and Absolute Worth There are important differences between relative and absolute worth, but also important similarities. So far, I have already argued that both kinds of value

30

Oliver Sensen

are a prescription of reason. The grammatical function ‘has value’ in both cases expresses that reason deems something to be necessary. I have also argued that ‘absolute’ or ‘inner value’ means that reason deems something to be necessary “in every respect and without further condition” (KpV, AA 05: 60.21– 22). Something that is absolutely good is therefore also unconditionally good or “good without limitation” (GMS, AA 03: 393.06). The essential difference is that in the case of relative value or price, reason deems something to be necessary based on the person’s private preferences, whereas in the case of absolute value reason deems it necessary independently of private ends and tastes. However, what is important to note is that the difference between relative and absolute value does not mean that absolute value is not an attitude of human beings. This is further confirmed when we look at Kant’s example of what has absolute value in the kingdom of ends. Again it is not a being, but an attitude or disposition: “on the other hand, fidelity in promises and benevolence from basic principles … have an inner worth” (GMS, AA 04: 435.11– 12). Ontologically, ‘absolute value’ is a command of reason, so that the grammatical form ‘has absolute value’ functions to express what reason deems absolutely necessary. The objects that have an absolute value are, in the first instance, morally good dispositions, or in short: a good will (cf. GMS, AA 04: 393.07; KU, AA 05: 208.01– 04, 443.11– 13). This includes “the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good … human being … but not a thing” (KpV, AA 05: 60.23 – 25). However, if only a good will has absolute value, but not all human beings have a good will (cf. MS, AA 06: 463.03 – 21, RGV, AA 06: 32.12– 44.11), does this mean that one should only respect morally good ones? I have argued elsewhere that value is not the reason why one should respect another (cf. Sensen, 2011: 14– 52). Think about the following trilemma: Kant says that (i) all human beings should be respected; (ii) only a good will has absolute value; (iii) not all human beings have a good will. The way out of this trilemma is that Kant grounds the requirement to respect others not in a value the other possesses, but on a categorical imperative of the agent’s own pure reason. However, does Kant not define ‘dignity’ as absolute value, and does not dignity ground the requirement to respect others (cf. MS, AA 06: 462.21– 32)? Kant clearly seems to define ‘dignity’ as an absolute, inner worth. For instance, he says: “an inner worth, that is, dignity” (GMS, AA 04: 435.04), and “a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth” (GMS, AA 04: 436.03 – 04) It is natural to argue that ‘dignity’ and ‘absolute value’ can be used interchangeably (cf. Wood 1999: 115, Allison 2011: 226). However, notice that this is not the only way that Kant defines ‘dignity.’ Even in the same context Kant also specifies ‘dignity’ as “prerogative” (GMS, AA 04: 438.03 – 04) and “sub-

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

31

limity” (GMS, AA 04: 439.35 – 40.13). These are not per se moral values. Kant uses ‘sublimity’ to say that something is absolutely great (cf. KU, AA 05: 248.05), i. e., that something is infinitely “raised above” something else (cf. GMS, AA 04: 434.33 – 34). Furthermore, he talks about the “dignity of a philosopher” (Päd, AA 09: 26.14), the “dignity of mathematics” (KrV, A 464/B 492), and the “dignity of a teacher [Würde des Lehrers]” (RGV, AA 06: 162.19; my translation). In which sense would mathematics have an absolute moral value? ‘Dignity,’ therefore, cannot simply be exchanged for ‘absolute value’ – in the sense of what reason deems to be necessary – for every usage of ‘dignity’. This also holds if one does not talk about the dignity of mathematics, but of the dignity of human beings. For Kant conceives of two levels of the dignity of human beings: “The dignity of human nature lies only in its freedom …. But the dignity of one human being (worthiness) rests on the use of his freedom” (Refl, AA 19: 181.06; my translation). On a first level, human beings have freedom or the ability to act morally. This Kant calls one’s “initial dignity” (SF, AA 07: 73.03). But one only gains an absolute value or worthiness if one makes proper use of one’s freedom and develops a good will. It is this ability to be moral that gives a human being the second level of a “dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural beings” (GMS, AA 04: 438.12– 13). Therefore Kant can say that “morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity” (GMS, AA 04: 435.07– 08). Otherwise, it would be implausible that two different things could be preeminently valuable (cf. Kerstein 2006: 217). But it makes sense to say that humanity and morality both elevate us over the rest of nature (in different respects). In the context of the kingdom of ends, Kant focuses on, as I have argued, the second level of dignity: “there is indeed no sublimity in him insofar as he is subject to the moral law, but there certainly is insofar as he is at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only for that reason subordinated to it” (GMS, AA 04: 439.07– 12). Under the ideal conditions of the kingdom, everyone has a morally good will and “fidelity in promises and benevolence from basic principles … have an inner worth” (GMS, AA 04: 435.11– 12). However, how can one reconcile all these claims? Not every instance of dignity (e. g., the dignity of mathematics) is an absolute value in the sense of a good will, i. e., what reason deems to be absolutely necessary. But one can reconcile Kant’s usages of ‘dignity’ if the core meaning of the concept is that something is raised above something else. What is raised and why has to be specified in every context. Mathematics is raised above other sciences by being purely a priori. A teacher is raised in the classroom, and morality is raised in terms of value because only moral commands are categorically valid. In the context of the kingdom of ends, Kant talks about different attitudes and says that moral disposi-

32

Oliver Sensen

tions are raised above attitudes of price. In terms of value, moral attitudes have dignity. But if price is a form of value, is not dignity also a species of value? In the context of the kingdom of ends, the answer is: yes. (Here I am slightly refining my earlier position from Sensen 2011: 180 – 191.) However, to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to keep in mind the points we mentioned earlier: (i) Kant does not introduce ‘absolute value’ to ground morality. He is talking about an ideal situation in which everyone already accepts morality. (ii) Kant is not talking about the value of human beings as such, but about the value of a good will. (iii) ‘Has absolute value’ is not a description of a property an object would have in isolation but expresses that reason commands a good will. The message is that fidelity in promises and benevolence are not based on private ends or taste, but are the object “of an immediate respect” (GMS, AA 04: 435.21– 22). ‘Dignity’ – in the kingdom of ends – refers to a special estimation³ or a valuing out of respect: “This estimation therefore lets the worth of such a cast of mind be cognized as dignity and puts it infinitely above price, with which it cannot be brought into comparison or competition at all without, as it were, assaulting its holiness” (GMS, AA 04: 435.24– 28). But, again, to say that a good will has dignity is not to ascribe a property to a good will, but to express that reason commands it or estimates it most highly: “Nature, as well as art, contains nothing that … it could put in their place; for their worth does not consist in the effects arising from them, in the advantage and use they provide, but in dispositions” (GMS, AA 04: 435.13 – 17, cf. GMS, AA 04: 393.07– 24). Finally, (iv) dignity is only a value – in the sense of what reason deems necessary – in the context of the kingdom of ends. In commanding something, reason deems morality to be absolutely necessary, not just necessary as a means. To put it differently: Moral value is priceless. In other contexts, such as the dignity of a teacher or mathematics, Kant does not use ‘dignity’ in this sense of ‘value’, but expresses that one thing is raised above another in a different sense. To be fair, one could also call it ‘value’, but one is then talking about a mathematical value, a reading on a scale, not about what reason deems to be absolutely necessary. For instance, in Kant’s time, ‘value’ was the price an object can fetch on a market (cf. Hügli 2004: 556 and Zimmermann in this volume). It described a mathematical value on a scale. If we talk about the dignity of a teacher, for instance, we might express how he or she has an elevated position in the class-

 On value as estimation cf, also Zimmermann’s contribution to this volume.

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

33

room (only he or she can dismiss the class, etc.). What has dignity in this sense, has the highest value on the respective scale, or is even off the charts. In sum: Kant’s account of value is not exhausted by Hare’s analysis. Kant does not merely talk about what we recommend based on our private preferences but proposes different kinds of values. We deem some actions to be necessary based on our personal inclinations, others on a (disinterested) taste, and moral actions for their own sake. The latter recommendations are absolute or have a dignity, i. e., a higher standing in terms of what reason deems to be necessary. But the grammatical expression: ‘morality has an absolute value’ is still a form of prescriptivism and refers to an imperative of reason, not a description of an object. To distinguish Kant’s position on moral value from Hare’s, I call Kant a ‘transcendental prescriptivist.’

Section 4: The Value of the Intelligible World What I have argued for so far goes against a popular reading of Kant’s moral philosophy according to which it is the value of human beings that grounds morality and the categorical imperative itself.⁴ This interpretation is mostly fueled by the passage leading up to Kant’s Formula of Humanity: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS, AA 04: 429.10 – 12). In this passage, Kant says: But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be the ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative. (GMS, AA 04: 428.03 – 06)

The argument for this supposition was the subject of a lively debate in Kant’s literature. The details, however, do not have to concern us here (cf. Sensen 2011: 53 – 95 for some of the main positions). For Kant directly says that at this point any assertion is just a postulate and that one would find the grounds for this stipulation in the third Section of Groundwork (cf. GMS, AA 04: 429.07). I will therefore leave this passage aside and focus on the third Section. However, I have already argued for a different reading of this (in Section 1). The Formula of Humanity is a categorical imperative as well, and as such Kant says that it must come directly from the agent’s own reason. In this section, I will discuss  Cf. Korsgaard 1996: 119 – 24; Stern 2015: 57– 73; and Kain 2018.

34

Oliver Sensen

whether the third Section of Groundwork contradicts the analysis I have given so far. If one follows Kant’s reference to the third Section and looks for a justification of why human beings have an absolute value that grounds the categorical imperative, there is no direct passage in the third Section that addresses this question. Kant only talks about value twice (cf. GMS, AA 04: 449.34– 36, 454.37), but there he refers to the value of a good will, not to the value of all human beings as such. In addition, there is no direct reference to ends in themselves. He does argue that everyone has to regard oneself as free (cf. GMS, AA 04: 447.06 – 09), and one possibility is that he regards freedom as absolutely valuable and the ground of the categorical imperative (cf. Guyer 2000: 170). However, while Kant does derive the imperative from freedom, he does not invoke a value (cf. GMS, AA 04: 446.13 – 447.07). Rather, he argues that freedom is a form of causality and that every causality needs a law. This law can only be the categorical imperative: “hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same” (GMS, AA 04: 447.07). This justification is in line with the one I have argued for so far, that morality is grounded in prescriptions of the agent’s own reason, rather than in a value of the victim. However, one could argue that Kant offers another justification in the third Section and that this justification grounds the categorical imperative in the value of human beings. In the later parts of the section, Kant refers to the superiority of the intelligible world. In this context, he repeatedly refers to a “proper self” (GMS, AA 04: 457.34, 461.04). Kant seems to argue that human beings are part of an intelligible world and maybe the argument is that this intelligible or noumenal self is absolutely valuable. If the argument is successful, it would be a serious objection to my interpretation as it could ground the requirement to respect others in a value of human beings. In this section, I will have a closer look at this alternative argument. The basic idea is that human beings are not only part of a phenomenal world that we know by experience, but are also part of an intelligible world. One could then argue that the intelligible world is ontologically superior and more valuable. Since the categorical imperative arises out of the proper self as a member of the intelligible world, moral requirements are grounded in an ontological value. It is “the superior ontological status of the world of understanding” that gives the proper self “a higher ontological significance than the human being as appearance, and that is why the law of the world of understanding is valid as an imperative” (Schönecker and Wood 2015: 209). Kant seems to support this “ontoethical principle” (Schönecker and Wood 2015: 207; cf. 207– 213) when he says:

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

35

A rational being counts himself, as intelligence, as belonging to the world of understanding … But because the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws … it follows that … the laws of the world of understanding must be regarded as imperatives for me. (GMS, AA 04: 453.17– 454.05)

One can read this passage as saying that a human being is ontologically superior or more valuable in virtue of being a member of the world of understanding. As such, the categorical imperative as well as the requirement to respect others might be grounded in a value that is a feature a human being would possess if it were the only being in the world (being a member of the intelligible world). ‘Has value’ might then describe a property one could see under an ontological x-ray after all. This would amount to a rejection of the view I have argued for so far. So, is the ontoethical principle the ultimate justification of Kantian morality? Even the proponents of the ontoethical principle caution that it would introduce “a philosophically implausible ontological claim that is inappropriate in the context of his own thought” (Schönecker and Wood 2015: 215). In the following, I will add three more reasons why the ontoethical principle does not undermine my interpretation of Kant as a transcendental prescriptivist:⁵ (1) The principle does not give a metaphysical description of the intelligible world, but a judgment of reason. (2) Kant introduces the principle to answer the question of why one should be moral, and already presupposes the existence of the categorical imperative. (3) The ontoethical principle does not appear in the Critique of Practical Reason.

(1) The principle does not give a metaphysical description of the intelligible world, but a judgment of reason. In the third Section of Groundwork, Kant seems to justify the categorical imperative by saying that “it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self” (GMS, AA 04: 461.03 – 04). However, Kant offers this explanation not as a description of what an intelligible world is like, e. g., that it has value features that ground moral requirements. Rather, the claim is that – in comparison – the intelligible world is more important than the empirical world because reason subordinates the world of sense to the intelligible world. Kant says that the categorical imperative “is valid for us as human beings, since it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self; but what belongs to mere appearance

 The following is a shorter version of a more thorough discussion in Sensen 2015: 231– 47.

36

Oliver Sensen

is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself” (GMS, AA 04: 461.02– 06). Again, Kant focuses on a necessary judgment of reason. In putting forth the ontoethical principle, Kant’s aim is not to describe what an intelligible world is like. Rather, he merely says that our reason subordinates an appearance to how a thing is in itself. Furthermore, reason does not subordinate it because it discovers a value property. Instead, Kant says that it “follows of itself” (GMS, AA 04: 451.12) that reason has to assume something beyond appearances that is not itself an appearance: No subtle reflection is required to make the following remark, and one may assume that the commonest understanding can make it …: that all representations which come to us involuntarily (as do those of the senses) enable us to cognize objects only as they affect us and we remain ignorant of what they may be in themselves … As soon as this distinction has once been made …, then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind appearances something that is not appearance, namely things in themselves. (GMS, AA 04: 450.35 – 451.08)

Kant’s claim about the relative subordination is therefore not based on a discovery of the thing in itself, but merely a natural inference. The same mechanism is also at work when one cognizes human beings, including oneself: “he can obtain information even about himself only through inner sense … although beyond this … he must necessarily assume something else lying at their basis, namely his ego as it may be constituted in itself” (GMS, AA 04: 451.22– 31). Based on this inference “he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which however he has no further cognizance” (GMS, AA 04: 451.34– 36). From this perspective, the intelligible world is merely a standpoint one can take, not an accessible realm of discovery: “The concept of a world of understanding is thus only a standpoint that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances in order to think of itself as practical” (GMS, AA 04: 458.19 – 21). So, instead of describing a value property, Kant’s reference to a proper self is qualified in two respects: It is merely a standpoint, and it merely relates to a relative comparison between the proper self and one’s empirical self. This, of course, is in line with Kant’s Critiques. There he says that the only thing we know of a supernatural existence is the moral law: “supersensible nature, so far as we can make for ourselves a concept of it, is nothing other than … the moral law” (KpV, AA 05: 43.23 – 26). From the command of the moral law, we are entitled to assume freedom, but any cognition is for practical purposes only, i. e., it is “limited solely to the practice of the moral law” (KpV, AA 05: 137.32; cf. 119.01– 146.12).

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

37

The limitation also extends to any knowledge of value features that one might want to ascribe to a proper self. As he argues in the first Critique, we are not entitled to ascribe any new and non-empirical (value) properties to a supersensible being, nor to assume a faculty that could detect such properties: we cannot cook up … a single object with any new and not empirically given property … Thus we are not allowed to think up any sort of new original forces, e. g., an understanding that is capable of intuition of its object without sense. (KrV, A 770/B 798; cf. B: 309)

In sum: The ontoethical principle does not try to argue for an absolute value of human beings, but it merely states that – if compared – reason regards the intelligible world as more important than the phenomenal realm. If you have to choose between the “law of our intelligible existence (the moral law)” (KpV, AA 05: 99.02– 03) or the empirical laws of our happiness, we should prefer the moral law. However, is not this subordination by itself saying that the intelligible world has a high value? If this were the case, then the ontoethical principle would prove too much. We have seen that the principle is an expression of a general point that it is natural to assume a thing in itself beyond appearances. This is also the case for any object, such as tables and chairs. Reason subordinates the appearance of a chair to the thing itself. However, from this, it does not follow that the thing in itself has an absolute value. Otherwise, any object would have an absolute value. One would need an additional argument to show that the proper self has an absolute value, but not the thing in itself that underlies a chair. The ontoethical principle does not supply such an argument. Instead, Kant reaffirms that we only know ourselves as we appear, not as we are in ourselves: “Even as to himself, the human being cannot claim to cognize what he is in himself” (GMS, AA 04: 451.21– 23). How could we cognize that a proper self has a value property, but not the thing in itself underlying a chair? Maybe one could reason one’s way from the moral law back to one’s own value, but this is not what Kant does when he addresses what knowledge we can from the moral law (cf. KpV, AA 05: 137.01– 146.04).

38

Oliver Sensen

(2) Kant introduces the principle to answer the question of why one should be moral, and already presupposes the existence of the categorical imperative The objection against my interpretation of how Kant uses phrases such as ‘has value’ includes two parts. I have first argued that Kant does not introduce separate value properties in the third Section of Groundwork. But one could add a further objection and argue that the ontoethical principle is meant to justify morality. I will now argue that the ontoethical principle does not justify the existence of the categorical imperative but already presupposes it. A justification of morality has different parts, and one can ask different questions regarding it. For instance, one can ask what a moral law would say and “search for” (GMS, AA 04: 392.03 – 04) the formulation of the law. One can also ask whether “there really is such an imperative” (GMS, AA 04: 425.08 – 09). But even if you know what the moral law says and that there really is such a law, there is still the question of whether it is also binding and motivating.⁶ A third question is therefore: “on what grounds the moral law is binding” (GMS, AA 04: 450.16). It is important to note that the ontoethical principle appears in the context of the third question. After Kant had formulated the categorical imperative (cf. GMS, AA 04: 402.06 – 09, 421.07– 08), he argues at the beginning of the third Section that there really is such an imperative. If there is freedom, then there is a moral law: “hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same” (GMS, AA 04: 447.07), and he gives a reason why we have to regard ourselves as free (cf. GMS, AA 04: 447.28 – 448.22).⁷ The ontoethical principle appears in the context of a third question. After he argued for the existence of the moral law, Kant asks: “But why, then, ought I to subject myself to this principle?” (GMS, AA 04: 449.11– 12). Even if you know that there is a moral law, your will might still be “at a crossroads” (GMS, AA 04: 400.08) between what you want to do based on your inclinations and what you ought to do. Kant asks why “the law interests us” (GMS, AA 04: 461.02), and the ontoethical principle tries to answer that question: “the law interests because it is valid for us as human beings, since it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self; but what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constition of the thing in itself” (GMS, AA

 The bindingness of and the motivation for the moral law are two different questions, but Kant often treats them as one, cf. KrV A 815/B 843.  This structure does not change in the second Critique (cf. KpV, AA 05: 29.38 – 31.34); Kant just gives a different reason for why we regard ourselves as free, cf. Sensen 2015: 247– 55.

Kant’s Value Prescriptivism

39

04: 461.02– 06). In other words: Kant tries to answer the question of why one should be moral. This question, however, already presupposes the existence of moral requirements, it does not ground them. The ontoethical principle does not generate the categorical imperative; it does not describe a value property, and it also does not talk about the value of other people. It just talks about an agent who is at crossroads between a moral command and his inclinations. It tells the agent that he should give preference to morality “since it is there, as intelligence only, that he is his proper self … those laws apply to him immediately and categorically” (GMS, AA 04: 457.34– 36). The ontoethical principle is therefore no objection to my claim that Kant is a transcendental prescriptivist about value and grounds morality in an imperative of reason.

(3) The ontoethical principle does not appear in the Critique of Practical Reason. Finally, the importance of the ontoethical principle is further qualified by the fact that it does not appear in the Critique of Practical Reason. If it were the foundation of Kantian morality, one would expect a treatment of it in that book as well. Instead, Kant reaffirms the grounding of morality that I have argued for in this chapter: “Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law” (KpV AA 05: 31.36 – 37).

Conclusion In this paper, I have argued that Kant’s use of grammatical expressions such as ‘has value’ does not mean that he aims to describe a property an object would have if it existed in isolation. Instead, Kant’s ethics is based on a categorical imperative. ‘Has value’ is merely another way of expressing what reason deems necessary without condition.

References Allison, Henry (2011): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

40

Oliver Sensen

Austin, John L. (1962): How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Darwall, Stephen (2008). “Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect”. In: Betzler, Monika (Ed.): Kant’s Ethics of Virtue. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 175 – 200. Guyer, Paul (2000): Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hare, Richard (1952): The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horn, Christoph (2014): Nichtideale Normativität. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Hügli, Anton (2004): “Wert I” In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 12. Ritter, Joachim (Ed.). Basel: Schwabe, pp. 556 – 58. Kain, Patrick (2018): “Dignity and the Paradox of Method”. In: Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Dos Santos, Robinson/Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth (Ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 67 – 90. Kerstein, Samuel (2006): “Deriving the Formula of Humanity”. In: Horn, Christoph/Schönecker, Dieter (Ed.). Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 200 – 221. Korsgaard, Christine (1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schönecker, Dieter/Wood, Allen (2015): Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin: De Gruyter. Sensen, Oliver (2015): “Die Begründung des Kategorischen Imperativs”. In: Schönecker, Dieter (Ed.): Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III. Münster: Mentis, pp. 231 – 256. Stern, Robert (2015): Kantian Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wood, Allen (1999): Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robinson dos Santos

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork …weil, wenn vom moralischen Werthe die Rede ist, es nicht auf die Handlungen ankommt, die man sieht, sondern auf jene innere Principien derselben, die man nicht sieht. (GMS, AA 04: 407.14– 16)

Abstract: In Kant’s work the term value is used with great frequency and in fact, it is not exclusive to the works of moral philosophy. Despite this fact, Kant has neither clearly nor sufficiently explained what this concept really means in his moral philosophy. In this paper, I shall argue that Kant’s concept of value in the first Section of Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals is relevant and strategical for clarifying his notion of moral action, but it plays just a secondary role in the whole argumentation of Groundwork. This is the main reason why his ethics is not what we call a properly systematic theory of moral value. As we will see, his concept of value is not placed before, upon, or maybe under, i. e., as the foundation of the validity of the moral law and duty, but, on the contrary, it is derived from the moral law and the categorical imperative.

Introduction: In his work Moral Value and Human Diversity (2007), Robert Audi refers to a very peculiar characteristic of moral theories, which seems quite reasonable and does not impose great difficulties for their understanding, namely: “All of the major ethical views either take some notion of value – such as the intrinsically good – to be central for morality or at least give an important place to value”.¹ In the case of Kant’s ethics, this seems to be no different, as it can effectively be analyzed from these two points of view. However, first of all, we need to understand the meaning of the concept of value. The other question that would need to be clarified is: to which of the two possible ethical perspectives pointed out by Audi, does Kant belong? In other words, can we characterize Kant’s ethics by a) taking a notion of value as central or b) giving an important place to value? In what follows, I intend to demonstrate that Kant could be understood, though with some caution, in this second perspective.

 Audi, 2007, p. 35. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-005

42

Robinson dos Santos

Clearly, the concept of moral value plays an important role in Kant’s argumentation, especially within Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. This concept appears to a large extent accompanied by other qualifiers such as absolute, relative, intrinsic, conditional, unconditional, subjective, and objective,² to name some examples. Kant’s initial position, precisely in the first Section of Groundwork (hereinafter abbreviated as GMS I), is that the moral value of an action does not lie in the effect it produces, but in the principle by which it is guided (GMS, AA 04: 400.17– 401.16). The analysis of this claim and the argumentative context in which Kant develops it is a necessary condition to understand the distinction between actions in conformity with duty and actions from duty, a central and decisive element in the argumentation of GMS I. If, on the one hand, it is possible to affirm that Kant did not write a specific, systematic, and comprehensive theory of value for his moral philosophy, this doesn’t invalidate, on the other hand, the hypothesis that it contains elements that allow extracting a theory of value from his ethics. I, therefore, share the thesis that his ethics implies a certain conception of moral value. This does not transform it, however, exclusively and directly into a theory of value, in the full sense that this expression carries. It remains, as I see it, much more like something subliminal in Kant’s ethics. Regardless of this initial theoretical presupposition, it is necessary to remember that this topic is not uncontroversial among Kant scholars. More important than identifying who is right or wrong in their approach (whether those who argue in favor of a theory of moral value in Kant or those who reject it) is to undertake the necessary task of clarifying from the Kantian text itself issues such as: what, ultimately, does Kant understand by moral value? What does the claim, in GMS I, that only actions out of duty have moral value mean? If the concept of moral value plays a role in Kant’s ethics, is this a foundational role or is it rather a result of his conception of practical reason and in itself a concept of lesser importance in the general context of the work? And finally, can his ethics ultimately be understood as a theory of moral value? To answer these questions, I intend to analyze the issue of moral value in Kant’s ethics in the following steps: 1. first, I present a preliminary overview of the main positions regarding value in the field of ethics; 2. I will analyze the most relevant definitions of moral value in the argument of GMS I; 3. I identify some problems concerning the Kantian definitions and refer to some interpreta-

 This concept appears about 791 times in Kant’s writings, including the letters. Cf. Bonner Kant Korpus. https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

43

tive questions debated in the literature, that I consider relevant in the reception of the theme; 4. I make my concluding remarks about the debate and about the questions I proposed to answer.

1 Approaches to Value Before looking at Kant’s conception of moral value, it may be appropriate to know, albeit briefly, some of the main approaches to or conceptions of moral value. To deal with this task, which consists more of a didactic and introductory exposition, insofar as I will not go into the accurate examination of each position, I will take as reference six different approaches or views on the subject. For the purpose intended here, I consider it sufficient to take as a starting point the distinctions and examination of the respective theses that Christoph Horn carries out at the end of the second part of his book Nichtideale Normativität: Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politischer Philosophie (2014). Horn addresses the issue of value when he analyzes the issue of human dignity in the context of his interpretation of the relationship between human rights and the foundations of political normativity in Kant. As Horn himself points out in this chapter of his work, the debate around dignity – which was also given a special analysis by Oliver Sensen in his book Kant on human dignity (2011) – requires a thorough analysis of Kant’s conception of value. Without this, it is very difficult to establish a coherent understanding of the question of dignity in Kant’s ethical thought. As far as I can see, Horn aligns himself, if not entirely, at least in part with the anti-deontological reading of Kant, something that Oliver Sensen and more explicitly Barbara Herman³ (like other Kantian interpreters) also proposed through their interpretations. To some aspects of these two approaches, I will return later. Horn initially notes that Kant’s vocabulary is not reduced to an exclusively deontological terminology. In his words: On the contrary, he makes use, to a relatively wide extent, additionally of concepts such as ’values’, ’goods’ and ’ends’, therefore, the fundamental concepts of traditional teleological ethics, although he generally rejects them as inadequate. (see, for example, KpV, AA 05: 39.05-13)⁴

 Not only these but also other authors such as Paul Guyer, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood, are identified as anti-deontological Kantian scholars. For a more detailed discussion see JOHNSON, 2007.  Horn, 2014, pp. 100.

44

Robinson dos Santos

For this reason, it is even necessary to carefully examine the language used by Kant, since he rejects teleological ethics (particularly when he criticizes the idea of happiness as the ultimate end of moral action) and, at the same time, defends a conception of duty. How, then, can these concepts (i. e., ends, goods and values), which belong to previous traditions, be placed consistently in the same context, with the “morally right and the morally due”? In other words, how are we to reconcile ethics of duty with a terminology that is not prima facie adequate for it, that is, with the language of value? As observed by Horn, “two options are open to Kant: Kant can either derive his theory of value or good from his conception of the categorical imperative or else, on the contrary, extract the procedure of the categorical imperative as we know it in the formula of universal law or the law of humanity-as-end-in-itself, from a previous axiological foundation”.⁵ Of course, this second option was not even considered by Kant. In this context, it is possible to see that value, although frequently mentioned by Kant, will not constitute the central ground of his moral philosophy. But it should be noted that value need not be postulated in just two ways, that is, either conceived as derivative (secondary) or else as the main basis of a moral theory. For this reason, we must take into account other possible positions regarding value. And here, again, I use the overview presented by Horn in the mentioned work.⁶ We can identify, according to Horn, six theories related to value: metaphysical moral realism, supervenience theory, relational theory (inclinations or needs) of value, oikeiosis theory, desire theory (which can be incorporated to some extent also in a subjectivism), and the imperative theory of value. 1. Values are objects, which exist ’in the external world’ (robust or metaphysical realism) and can be observed through a genuine sensory apparatus (value intuitionism); 2. Values are supervenient qualities that relate to natural qualities of things that are real or exist in the world (supervenience theory); 3. Values can exist because of an objective relationship of two entities in the world: what is valuable and who to whom it is valuable. Valuable in this sense is especially anything that corresponds to one’s inclinations or needs (theory of inclinations or needs); 4. Values are derived from the agent’s practical self-relation, that is, from the agent’s internal observation of value from the perspective of sensitively conditioned rational action (from the perspective of the Stoic tradition I call this the theory of oikeiosis); 5. The existence of values goes back to subjective desires. Something is valuable to me because I desire it (desire theory);

 Horn, 2014, pp. 100 – 101.  Horn, 2014, pp. 101.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

45

6. Values exist because of an imperative instituting act. Thus, for example, by the ethics of divine command, the valuable can be what helps in fulfilling the divine command or what is generated by such command (imperative theory).⁷

From these different approaches to moral value, we gain a basic map to locate ourselves within this debate. And, given these theoretical positions on value, it is natural for us to ask ourselves now: in which one does Kant’s ethics fit? Or, ultimately, if it doesn’t fully fit any of them, then which one would it come closest to? Horn looks for the answer to this question. Perhaps the most appropriate way to answer this question is primarily negative or by elimination: under no circumstances can Kant’s ethics be identified with the first three positions. Indeed, defining Kant’s ethics as realistic (in a robust sense) would imply assuming a theoretical commitment that would undermine the concept of autonomy. It is the case of placing value as an objectively existing property or essence (in the language of contemporary metaethics, affirming what are called moral facts) and understanding it as a foundation. This is the case with realist readings trying to place dignity as an absolute value or the condition of being end-in-itself of human beings as the foundation of morals, which is, to say the least, highly controversial.⁸ Kant doesn’t fit the thesis of supervenience (2) either, since besides it is not even a subject for him, this thesis belongs to contemporary metaethics. His position cannot be associated with the thesis of desires and inclinations (3), which would imply a theory of value with a utilitarian nature and the same goes for the subjectivist perspective of desire (5). Anyone familiar with the GMS text should remember that Kant will later analyze, in GMS II, certain aspects of these last two conceptions when he makes the distinctions between categorical and hypothetical imperatives (GMS, AA 04: 414.12– 17). They do not lend themselves to ensur-

 Horn, 2014, pp. 101.  I am referring here especially to the interpretations of Dieter Schönecker and Elke Schmidt (2018) on the one hand and that of Oliver Sensen (2011) on the other, regarding the question of human dignity as a “foundation” for the duty of respect. While Schönecker and Schmidt conceive dignity in the perspective on a moral realism in Kant, that is, of an absolute value, Sensen argues in favor of the thesis that dignity is a relational property and doesn’t play a foundational role, that is, it cannot be placed as a value that justifies the commandment of respect. In this sense, dignity would result from my obedience to the command of reason and would not be the “source” from which I deduce the duty to respect others. This debate is also related to Kant’s conception of value, but a detailed analysis of the arguments of both sides requires an essay devoted exclusively to this controversy. As my object here is more concerned with interpreting the value in Kant’s GMS I, I leave aside the details of the discussion focused on the theme of dignity.

46

Robinson dos Santos

ing the universal and necessary validity of moral principles, as they are linked to empirical aspects and are therefore contingent. Horn remarks, however, that although one can infer a kind of Humeanism in Kant, concerning certain aspects of his empirical anthropology (satisfaction of needs and desires, prudential actions, or briefly, the realm of hypothetical imperatives), that is, notwithstanding this concession, in the field of morality and specifically about the conception of value, Kant is decidedly anti-humean, as he clearly emphasizes the impossibility of seeking the principle of morality in a conception of human nature. Indeed, Kant’s argument leaves no room for doubt: …that one must put the thought right out of one’s mind that the reality of this principle can be derived from some particular property of human nature. For duty is to be practical unconditional necessity of action; it must thus hold for all rational beings (to which an imperative can at all apply), and only in virtue of this be a law also for every human will. By contrast, whatever is derived from the special natural predisposition of humanity, from certain feelings and propensity, and indeed even, possibly, from a special tendency peculiar to human reason, and would not have to hold necessarily for the will of every rational being – that can indeed yield a maxim for us, but not a law, a subjective principle on which propensity and inclination would fain have us act, but not an objective principle on which we would be instructed to act even if every propensity, inclination and natural arrangement of ours were against it; so much so that it proves the sublimity and inner dignity of the command in a duty all the more, the less the subjective causes are in favor of it, and the more they are against it, without thereby weakening in the least the necessitation by the law, or taking anything away from its validity.⁹

In this way, Kant’s perspective can be located in the position of number “6”, that is, the imperative theory. An imperative instituting act is properly what gives rise to the moral value in Kant. The notion of value is not placed before, upon, or maybe under that is, as the foundation of the validity of the moral law and from duty, but, on the contrary, it derives from the moral law and the categorical imperative. This interpretation, however, is contested by Kantian interpreters who assert a robust moral realism in Kant.¹⁰ Considering this brief characterization of the main approaches to moral value in the field of ethics and also a preliminary identification of Kant’s position, I think we have already some features in mind to analyze now Kant’s main references to value made in GMS I.

 GMS, AA 04: 425.12– 15  See the so-called “Ground-thesis” argument at Schönecker/Schmitd, 2017.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

47

2 Moral Value in GMS I In this section I will analyze three selected passages that I consider most important for understanding the definition of moral value in the first part of Groundwork: a) the value of an unrestricted good will (GMS, AA 04: 393.05 – 395.27); b) the value of actions from duty and in conformity with duty (GMS, AA 04: 397.01– 399.34) and; c) the value of an action is not in the effect it produces, but in the “maxim according to which it is decided” or “in the principle that determines it” (GMS, AA 04: 399.35 – 401.16).

a) The value of an unrestricted good will In the GMS I, Kant begins his argument, as we know, by analyzing what could be considered (ohne Einschränkung) good without limitations, as opposed to what can be considered good, but not always and necessarily good (good in a limited or relative sense). Good without any limitations is just the good will. Gifts of nature (mind’s talents and capacities, but also temperament) and gifts of fortune (power, wealth, health) are also considered as good, but only in a limited sense, as they can be used for all sorts of purposes. Hence, for this reason, Kant understands as something essential, that a good will must be operating on the conduct and the use of these gifts and qualities. Briefly stated, such qualities and abilities have a value though not absolute (they are good in the narrow sense) and for sure they can help the good will, but only the last one has an “unconditional intrinsic value” (GMS, AA 04: 394.01). One could ask, then, aren’t moderation, self-restraint, and sober deliberation, qualities that we consider valuable in themselves, that is, unrestrictedly and absolutely in a person? Kant’s answer is no. But for what reasons? Why are they valuable but ate the same time-constrained qualities? Kant’s argument goes on to demonstrate that they can even “constitute a part of a person’s intrinsic value” and, even recognizing that they were appreciated and extolled by the ancients, he understands that they cannot be unrestrictedly good, as they can also be used to causing harm, that is, when they are not guided by the principles of good will. As an example of this, the figure of the “evildoer” is mentioned, whose caution and “cold blood” make him even more “dangerous” and also more “abominable” (GMS, AA 04: 394.08 – 12). After examining the value of these qualities, Kant concludes that what defines goodness without limitations of the good will is not the effect or consequence it can produce, but only its willing is what it qualifies for. Kant concludes this paragraph considering that it (the

48

Robinson dos Santos

good will) has its “full value in itself” and, again, “utility or lack of fruit can add nothing to or subtract from this value” (GMS, AA 04: 394.26 – 31). At the end of 394, he refers again to “the idea of the absolute value of mere will” to prepare the next argument in which he examines the presence of reason in our natural dispositions and, therefore, the relation of reason to will. In this context, the main question can already be asked: what role does then the notion of value play from this first definition? First, one must consider that Kant’s aim here is to contrast two perspectives on what is good. What is good as a means has goodness merely conditioned on certain aspects such as usefulness, effect, or aptitude for something else: it is goodness with certain restrictions. Examples of this are the gifts of nature and the gifts of fortune: they are not good in themselves or at all. They are good as a means for something else. As we have seen, only the good will is good in the full sense and therefore without restriction. It is, therefore, a perfectly good will. It is not good because it is good for something else as a means, but because it is valuable in itself. It is worth noting that the good will “is not a value, but it has a value”, as Klemme observes. Indeed, these are two very different ways of considering. But even so, Kant’s explanation of good will remains to some extent unsatisfactory. From the analysis of good will, we obtain not enough to understand the question of value and, thus, we cannot yet have an adequate and coherent understanding of this question in Kant. However, at least, we already have a first clue about the way that the philosopher is going to work with this concept. For this reason, it is necessary to further scrutinize the text of GMS I, as Kant offers some more definitions that can support us to broaden our understanding. In the sequence, I proceed from the second characterization presented by Kant.

b) The value of actions from duty and in conformity with the duty The second most important moment in Kant’s argument in GMS I, where Kant makes use of the concept of moral value is situated in the context of his exam on duty, and therefore in the distinction between actions in conformity with duty and actions from duty, specifically at GMS (397)¹¹ In this context actions contrary to duty have no relevance to Kant’s analyzes and, in moral terms, they have at best only a negative value (absence of moral value), as well as they could only serve as examples of how not to act.

 GMS, AA 04: 397.01– 21

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

49

The philosopher uses three examples already cited and well-known. The first is the case of the merchant who doesn’t charge abusive prices for his customers, but who doesn’t, therefore, act on a principle of honesty, but is instead motivated by interest in his own gain: it is an action in conformity with duty but has no moral value. What this means exactly and how this definition is to be understood is what I will consider in what follows. The second example cited by Kant is the case of the preservation of one’s own life. But, taking care of one’s own life is, in addition to being a duty, a natural inclination, which is present in all human beings. Therefore, we already do this, somehow, by instinct. There is nothing there as “intrinsic value” so explain Kant and, for this reason, also no “moral content in the maxim” (GMS, AA 04: 397.33 – 398.01). When, on the contrary, someone who, in the face of grief and suffering in his life, would desire death and “yet preserves his life, without loving it, not from inclination, or fear, but from duty; then his maxim has a moral content” (GMS, AA 04: 398.03 – 07). The third example mentioned by Kant is that of charity. Similar to the case of preserving life, practicing charity is also a duty. However, it may be the case that someone practices it not necessarily aiming reward or having any gain’s interest, but because he feels a delight or satisfaction in doing it, that is, with inclination. Kant reiterates that “no matter how kind and in accordance with duty” may be that action, it has no moral value, as although it spreads contentment in those who are helped, it only accidentally coincides with what is expected, that is, with duty. It should be noted: it has no moral value, but it is an action, in Kant’s words, “worthy of honor, deserves praise and encouragement, but not high esteem”. But why? The complement in Kant’s argument is that what is essential is missing, that is, “for the maxim lacks moral content, namely to do such actions not from inclination, but duty” (GMS, AA 04: 398.18 – 20, my italics). It is worth asking here: why can praise and encouragement serve to encourage the performance in conformity with duty, if what is morally valuable and, therefore, required, is just to act from duty? Kant is saying by this that it is not wrong and it is not morally reprehensible to act in accordance with duty. And this should be encouraged as it may over time become a prudent practice in the agent. In other words, compliance with duty is a good thing,¹² but not perfectly good (in a moral sense), so it doesn’t deserve high esteem. The problem of an action in mere conformity with duty, but also of an action in conformity with  Wood is emphatic on this point, in his book Kantian Ethics, when he answers the question “what is authentic moral value?”. Kant doesn’t mean that only actions done from duty are approved by morality or have any value at all from the moral point of view. If an action is in conformity with duty pflichtmäßig), then it merits moral approval and hence clearly has value from the moral standpoint” (Wood, 2008, pp. 27).

50

Robinson dos Santos

duty accompanied by the presence of interest or inclination is, therefore, simply the absence of moral content. For Kant, the “genuine moral value” of an action resides, therefore, exclusively in the fact that it was performed from duty. To illustrate his argument, Kant also mentions the case of an individual with a cold heart and insensitive to the sufferings of others who, however, practices solidarity solely from duty. According to Kant, this is precisely where the “value of character” of a man begins, which is “a moral value” which is “without comparison the highest”, that is, when the individual does the good action “without any inclination, solely from duty” (GMS, AA 04: 398.37– 399.02). Now, one could ask, what is the character in Kant’s conception? Why does Kant place it in this context to refer to its value? It should be noted that he doesn’t clearly define in this section and perhaps even throughout the entire GMS what he means by “character”. In any case, in his Anthropology we find a distinction that may be enlightening: the character of the human being can be understood as physical, that is, considering his or her natural constitution or in the perspective on “what nature makes of man”; but the character can also be understood as “moral character”. The latter refers to his or her rational or intelligible constitution, that is, as a free being and, therefore, it refers to what he or she makes of himself. “The man of principles has character, from whom one knows what to expect, not from his instinct, for example, but from his will, has a character”, so argues Kant (SF, AA 07: 285.13 – 15). And which will is properly, the one Kant refers to? It cannot be other than the good will, in a moral sense, or the will as a practical reason. “The human being, who is conscious of having a character in his way of thinking, doesn’t have it from nature; he must always have acquired it” (SF, AA 07: 294.22– 24). It is precisely related to this context, that is, to the actions of duty and in conformity with duty that Schiller turns against Kant’s conception by understanding it as too rigorous and writes ironically in the verses of the Xenien (299): Scruples of conscience I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately, I do it with inclination And so I often am bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous. Decision There is no other way but this! You must seek to despise them, And do with repugnance what duty bids you.¹³

 Gewissenskruppel: “Gerne dien ich den Freunden, doch tu ich es leider mit Neigung, Und so wurmt es mir oft, daß ich nicht tugendhaft bin. Decisum Da ist kein anderer Rat; du mußt suchen, sie zu verachten, Und mit Abscheu alsdann tun, wie die Pflicht dir gebeut” (Xenien und Votivtafeln, 299). This english translation is cited by Wood, 2008, pp. 281.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

51

In his famous commentary on the categorical imperative, Paton¹⁴ had already called attention to this misunderstanding of Schiller’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of duty. It is an essentially inconsistent criticism from the first to the second, as it leads to a false inference (paradoxical), namely, that to perform duty for the sake of duty, would be necessary not to desire the duty (since to desire it, would already mean to act with inclination) or even to be contrary to it. This is not the case. It would be a gross misinterpretation of the Kantian argument.¹⁵ We can effectively act with personal (subjective) reasons (i. e., inclination or interest) in certain situations in the performance of duty. This is not to say that the action becomes evil or perverse. If it has been performed in accordance with duty, again, even though it has an interest in the motivation, it remains worthy of honor and deserves praise. It just lacks the moral content, which is necessary to be considered a morally valuable action. This attempt by Schiller to ridicule Kant in his analysis of actions from duty and according to duty was the object of analysis by several other interpreters of Kant’s work. Similar to Paton, they also observed in this respect that Schiller’s criticism is “undeserved”¹⁶ on Kant’s part and highly “mistaken”.¹⁷ The point Kant wants to draw attention to is that although our interest or inclination may be present in the action, that is not what matters most and therefore it is not what gives the “moral content” to the action. As many commentators have pointed out, Kant is not claiming that our actions only have moral worth if we do not want to do them. What he is claiming is that the question of whether we want to do what we should is irrelevant when we are considering whether these actions have any moral worth. Even when we want to do what we should, our actions only have moral worth when they are performed from the motive of duty.¹⁸

 Paton, 1948, pp. 48.  Regarding this question, I agree with Wood, when he observes that the most hurried readers distort the meaning of the Kantian text: “They think Kantian ethics must be positively hostile to all natural desires, feelings, and emotions, because it bestows moral approval only on people whose orientation to life is characterized by an unhealthy detachment from this side of their nature. These conclusions, combined with similar invidious readings of other points of Kantian doctrine, rapidly congeal into a familiar if unlovely picture. The Kantian moral agent is a selfalienated person rent by an unbridgeable gulf between the supernatural noumenal self and the contemptible empirical self. (…) There is little wonder that those who see Kantian ethics only in these terms regard it with a kind of horror. Or at best they may see Kantian ethics as expressing a limited truth, but in a monstrously exaggerated form” (Wood, 2008, p. 24– 25).  Stratton-Lake, 2000, pp. 93.  Sedgwick, 2008, pp. 67.  Stratton-Lake, 2000, pp. 93.

52

Robinson dos Santos

The clearest consequence of this distinction made by Kant, between actions performed from duty and in conformity with duty is that benevolence practiced with inclination, although worthy of honor, appreciation and even encouragement, has no moral value and, therefore, actions such as treating friends well – not from duty, but with inclination – as in Schiller’s example, however, so correct or virtuous as they may be considered, can ultimately be evaluated as actions for whom morality is ultimately indifferent. This also means, that there can be present a “happy coincidence” (moral luck, in current terminology), that is, a combination of external and internal factors for the agent, as Herman noted: nonmoral motives may well lead to dutiful actions, and may do this with any degree of regularity desired. The problem is that dutiful actions are the product of a fortuitous alignment of motives and circumstances. People who act according to duty from such motives may nonetheless remain morally indifferent.¹⁹

It is not, therefore, a Kant’s moral disapproval of this type of action, as has been said before. Kant just emphasizes that precisely because of the mixture or impurity of motives, the fact of serving friends with pleasure and inclination does nothing extraordinary. It is indeed a correct action, morally permissible, and still deserving of appreciation. But not, in Kant’s terms, “high esteem”, that is, it is not morally valuable. It is the same case for the philanthropist, who wants to do good to people and, therefore, spread happiness. I agree with Stratton-Lake’s argument when he states that “Kant is not claiming that spreading happiness is worthless. All he refuses is that it has a distinctive form of value – that is, moral value”.²⁰ Another important consequence that emerges from this definition of moral value is that the Schillerian-inspired interpretation that the will is good “only if it opposes inclination” is false, as pointed out by Sedgwick. Kant only maintains that inclination doesn’t add value to action because it is not an objective element, although it is part of what we call human nature. With this second definition of value, we have already arrived at two meanings of what Kant defines as a moral value, above all by analyzing the context of argument in which he employs this concept. But this second definition, even if added to the first, still doesn’t exhaust what Kant says about value and, therefore, our understanding remains insufficient. In GMS I there is a third passage that introduces a new element that deserves attention: the definition of value through the maxim, as a principle of action.  Herman, 1996, pp. 6.  Stratton-Lake, 2000, pp. 94.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

53

c) The value of an action is not to find in the effect it produces, but in the “maxim according to which it is decided” or “in the principle that determines it”. As already stated, Kant is not a consequentialist or utilitarian in moral philosophy. Therefore, it is not the result of an action that matters for the sake of moral judgment. If that were the case, then the case of the philanthropist, who wants to spread joy, would be morally resolved, that is, his or her action would have moral value, regardless of whether it was done with inclination, if only in conformity with duty or just from duty. In the second proposition about the concept of duty, located at the transition GMS (399 – 400),²¹ Kant introduces a new element to his conception of moral worth. It is precisely the concept of maxim, as a principle of will, that must be taken into account for moral judgment. In Kant’s words: (…) an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon, and thus it does not depend on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of willing according to which – regardless of any object of the desiderative faculty – the action is done. That the purposes that we may have when we act, and their effects, as ends and incentives of the will, can bestow on actions no unconditional and moral worth, is clear from what was previously said. In what, then, can this worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will with reference to their hoped-for effect? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will, regardless of the ends that can be effected by such action (…).

It is important to remark that Kant uses the German expression twice: “…unangesehen aller Gegenstände des Begehrungsvermögens…” and “…unangesehen der Zwecke, die durch solche Handlung bewirkt werden können…”.²² In Portuguese, the term “unangesehen” (which means not seen, ignored, not considered) was translated as “abstraction made from…”. The meaning of the term, however, could be also interpreted as referring, at least, to the same as “abgesehen”,

 GMS, AA 04: 399.35 – 400.10  In her commentary on Groundwork, Sedgwick also drew attention to Kant’s emphasis on the expression “abstraction made of all objects of the faculty of desire”. “The last ten words here are crucial: a good will is not motivated by objects of the faculty of desire. Its worth doesn’t lie in the “hoped for” or expected” realization of these objects. Its motivation doesn’t derive, then, from its empirical nature; it is governed by something other than what Kant in this paragraph refers to as “a posteriori” or “material” incentives. A good will acts to realize some end, but the principle that determines it to act is “formal” or “a priori” rather than material or empirical“(Sedgwick, 2008, pp. 73).

54

Robinson dos Santos

i. e., “independently of all objects of the faculty of desiring”, in the first case and “regardless of the ends that may be accomplished by such action”. Briefly stated: the moral value is considered not taking into account the result, but according to an element that is prior to it (and in this sense also independent), that is, through an abstraction, an ignorance or an indifference towards the effect of action or to the object of the faculty of desiring, that is, solely by the maxim of action. Kant corroborates this definition, that it is the principle that gives value to action, also later in the GMS II: “because when moral worth is at issue what counts is not the actions, which one sees, but their inner principles, which one does not see” (GMS, AA 04: 407.14– 16).²³ At this point an empiricist could ask: but exactly for the reason that we cannot see it, then how can we know this? This question would be extremely wrong since it presupposes that for discernment (an eminently intellectual task) the senses (in this case, vision) would be absolutely indispensable. The definition of value, presented by Kant in these passages, is of paramount importance: moral value lies in the maxim, that is, in the principle that guides the action. Maxim, as we know, is a subjective principle of willing and, as such, it is a kind of principle that needs to be submitted to examination, proposed by the formulations of the categorical imperative. Note, therefore, that it is not a question of any type of action, nor of any type of principle, nor even an isolated action of the agent. To affirm that the value is in the maxim means to think of this maxim already qualified, that is, with “moral content”, or morally approved. In other words, it is a maxim that has passed the examination and therefore serves as a universal principle.²⁴

 Immediately, in this passage Kant leaves the reader, that possibly is still unfamiliar with his terminology, somewhat perplexed, for stating precisely that the moral value we attribute to actions is not in what we see, but in principles, which we don’t see. Now, how is it possible to judge if we lack the essential element to determine the goodness or badness of the action? Kant’s position on this apparent impossibility becomes clear throughout the reading of Groundwork’s Third Section (GMS III).  At this point I would draw attention to an observation by Timmerman (2009, pp. 49, note 11), when he refers to a distinction between moral value and moral content, referring the first to actions and the second only to maxims. According to him: “Actions have moral worth, maxims possess moral content. Kant does not use these expressions interchangeably, though they are of course related. Only actions that result from such maxims – from an unconditional commitment to performing acts that are commanded by morality, not from inclination but from duty (GMS, AA 04: 398.06) – are morally valuable.”. My point here is that Timmermann doesn’t specify in his observation whether by “maxim” we must regard here a “not yet qualified maxim” or a suitable one, that is already approved “as a principle” of action, which seems to me to be the

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

55

Regarding this point, Baron²⁵ also drew attention in her reading of the Kantian conception of duty: perhaps it is easier for readers to understand the negative part of Kant’s statement, that is, that moral value is not in the objective or result of action. However, perhaps the most difficult part is to understand what Kant’s thesis means, that moral value is “in the maxim according to which action is decided”. According to Baron’s interpretation, insofar maxims “guide conduct” and, therefore, “are not simply related or linked to individual actions”, it seems to be much more “natural to attribute moral value to conduct and not properly to isolated actions”. Another very common confusion is to interpret Kant’s statement as meaning that the moral value of the action is not in the effect but in the motive of action. This inference that the moral value resides in the “motive” of the action is mistaken²⁶ according to Baron, because the term contains an ambiguity, in that it can suggest that the agent is internally moved or impelled to act, without making it clear if what moves him or her is a sensitive impulse or the “feeling of respect”, a feeling, according to Kant, that is not pathological, but is self-produced by reason. The expression “act for the motive of duty” is also misleading, according to Baron, and causes, for that very reason, a lot of confusion among readers. For these reasons she argues that we must change our perspective and refer to the thesis that “value lies in the maxim”. In this way, we can avoid all this confusion.

3 Moral Value in Kant: Some Approaches The reception of moral value issue in Kant is not properly a new philosophical question, but it is actually always current, even more in connection to the contemporary metaethical issues.²⁷ This problem has been analyzed by several Kant scholars. I am not able, of course, to cite all the studies concerning this question case. Now, Kant’s argument shows that a maxim may (or may not) have moral value. Of course, he also speaks of “moral content” as I referred to above. However, despite my agreement with many other points from Timmerman’s interpretation, I would disagree with this distinction (value is for action and content for the maxim) because it is not so clear in Kant’s text.  Baron, 2006, pp. 88.  “The mistake of thinking that moral worth lies in the motive is pernicious, because the word “motive” carries some theoretical (roughly, empiricist) baggage: it suggests a moving force that impels the agent so to act. This is, of course, quite far from Kant’s view of agency, but even those of us who are fully aware of that may still be laboring with a distorting image when we speak of “acting from duty” (or especially, “acting from the motive of duty”)” (Baron, 2006, pp. 88).  Regarding this connection, see Santos/Schmitd, 2017.

56

Robinson dos Santos

here, nor to analyze argument by argument in each of the cited authors, but I will sketch, as a complement to the questions I have analyzed, a brief overview on some topics and problems, which are identified by some interpreters. One of the best-known debates around the question of value in Kant is that of Herman²⁸ and Henson.²⁹ The problem is that if only actions done from duty have moral value, then actions performed for non-moral reasons have no moral value at all. Henson’s position is that, if there is a sufficient moral motive to produce the action, even if other non-moral motives are present, the action would still have moral value. From this perspective, possibly the problem posed by Schiller would be not just a false problem, as seems to be the case, but it would be no problem at all. This is the opening argument of Henson’s text: I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he actually said about it and notices a fact which he did not seem to notice: namely, that dutiful actionaction which, whatever its motive, fulfills a duty-can be over- determined, and determined in particular by both respect for duty and some consortium of inclinations and prudence.³⁰

Henson defends the so-called overdetermination thesis and proposes, moreover, that we should consider not only Kant’s arguments in Groundwork, but also elements from Doctrine of Virtue to understand the question of moral value. In a nutshell, for Henson, we have in Groundwork what he calls the “battlecitation” model, which shows a real dispute between duty and inclination, in which the value would come from the victory of duty over inclinations. On the other hand, in the Doctrine of Virtue, we would find the so-called “fitness-report”³¹ model, which holds that an action has value as long as respect for duty is present and has been sufficient to motivate, although other reasons could also have the same motivational force. Herman questions this thesis, but she also finds herself faced with the demand to offer an answer to the problem: what about those actions whose basis, in addition to the duty motive, are concomitantly present other nonmoral motives? Remarkably, this is also one of the major problems that divide interpreters: while some understand that the mere presence of other non-

 Herman’s classic paper “On the value of acting from the motive of duty” was first published in 1981, and later incorporated in her book “The practice of moral judgment”, published in 1993.  “What Kant might have said: moral worth and the overdetermination of dutiful action”, Philosophical Review, n. 88 (1979).  Henson, 1979, pp. 39.  “…the battle-citation model is prominent in the Groundwork, while the fitness-report model dominates the Metaphysic of Morals”. Henson, 1979, pp. 51.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

57

moral motivating elements eliminates the moral value of an action, others understand that what really matters is whether it was performed from duty. According to Herman, to resolve this problem, it is necessary to clarify what Kant properly means, when he refers to good will, in GMS (397),³² as being “under certain subjective restrictions and obstacles”. To respond to the question, of whether or not we should attribute moral value to the action, is necessary first to understand the former definition. In this sense, she also recalls that Kant did not analyze the aspect of overdetermination of motives in action and that, perhaps, for this reason, there is in the reception of Kant’s ethics an approach, let’s say “more orthodox”, aligned with the Kantian text, which defends the thesis that the presence of any other non-moral element in the action completely eliminates its moral value. Herman takes an opposite position regarding Henson’s interpretation. She argues that the moral value of an action can only be considered insofar as the moral motivation – no matter how conflicting the motives within the agent – is given by duty. To be morally valuable, an action requires only that the moral motive be effective and at the same time its original cause. The overdetermination thesis is therefore untenable for Herman. But Herman’s reading also seems to be problematic to other Kantian interpreters. Indeed, Ameriks drew attention to one of the problems that reside in Herman’s thesis. For him, this is practically a problem of a similar nature to the one for which she criticizes Henson’s position: the fact that there is space there to postulate the contingency of motivating elements, or the so-called moral luck. ³³ In this context, we have another extremely important element, to consider the value of the action: Johnson³⁴ called it a non-accidental condition: “a dutiful action is morally worthy only if its motive does not lead to the action by a mere accident”. Also, for Allison, both Henson’s and Herman’s views suffer from a gap because they do not take into account Kant’s theory of agency, that is because they are not “connected with the question of how motives motivate”.³⁵ Korsgaard draws a parallel between the role that “moral worth” or “duty” classification plays in Kant’s ethics with the notion of nobility in Aristotle. According to her, “it is not about an alternative purpose that we have in our actions, but the characterization of a specific type of value that a certain action

   

GMS, AA 04: 397.07– 08. Ameriks, 2000, pp. 57. Johnson, 1996, pp. 148 – 149. Cited also by Satne, 2013, pp. 8. Allison, 1990, pp. 116.

58

Robinson dos Santos

performed in function of a certain purpose that we can have”.³⁶ And, further on, she also considers that Aristotle and Kant would have in common the fact that they consider that “objects of choice are actions, acts performed with a view to certain ends” and that, according to this, they both consider actions as “bearers of values” and the “moral value, that is, the fulfillment of duty or nobility, is an internal property of actions”.³⁷ Schönecker and Schmidt³⁸ present two points of criticism: first, they argue, against Sensen’s reading and the reading from what they call “revisionists”. According to Schönecker and Schmidt, for Sensen and the revisionists the expression “has value” would have the same meaning as “should be valued”. Thus, for both Sensen and the revisionists, the concepts of absolute value and dignity are expendable. Against both tendencies, Schönecker and Schmidt argue on a textual basis – from the GMS and the Doctrine of Virtue – that Kant’s fundamental thesis is that dignity as an absolute value is the foundation of the categorical imperative and, therefore, the foundation of duty of respect. They call this Kant’s Ground-thesis. For both, Kant must be clearly understood as a moral realist. Furthermore, for Schönecker and Schmidt, the burden of proof remains on the revisionist and constructivist sides. This controversy remains open. Another perspective of approach, quite different from those mentioned above, regarding moral value in Kant, is adopted by Bader, in his contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Bader refers to a value dualism in Kantian axiology. According to Bader’s approach, on the one hand, Kant establishes theses about moral value (unconditional) and, on the other hand, theses about prudential value (conditional).³⁹ In this way, it would be possible to grant only prudential value in the case of actions performed out of sympathy or friendship (actions that would be committed to the agent’s happiness), for example, reserving the unconditional moral value only for those performed from duty, as in fact, the Kantian text itself makes it clear. However, Bader’s thesis seems to be problematic, insofar as it tacitly presupposes the need, without a more detailed justification, for axiology for the foundation of the principle of morality in Kant. Now, it is precisely this assumption that needs to be carefully analyzed, but Bader doesn’t do it.

   

Koorsgaard, 2009, pp. 11. Koorsgaard, 2009, pp. 18. Schönecker; Schmidt, 2018. Bader, 2015, pp. 176 ff.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

59

In his most recent studies on value, Schönrich⁴⁰ recognizes the merit of Sensen’s work, especially regarding the interpretation of value, related to dignity, but, at the same time, observes that Sensen did not adequately reconstruct Kant’s theory of value.⁴¹ It is not enough to argue, as Schönrich reminds us, that value is what must be unconditionally appreciated according to the moral law. Even if this thesis is correct, the question of what it would be to appreciate something unconditionally based on Kantian philosophy remains unanswered. He observes, moreover, that fundamentally, there is no explicit theory of moral value in Kant, but also that, despite this fact, it is possible to reconstruct what could be a theory of value in Kant, starting from the passages in which Kant refers to the theme. He calls it a fitting-attitude theory of value. In this sense, values would be, for Kant, dependent on pro-attitudes. In specifically Kantian terminology this pro-attitude would be the Wohlgefallen, that is, the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction. According to Schönrich, the idea would be, that what is valuable (Wertvoll) or good is an object, towards which the subject would assume “a positive attitude of favoring, appreciating, approving, etc.”,⁴² which could be translated into taking a pro-attitude. The opposite of this position, that is, contempt, disapproval, etc., would serve to understand the counter-attitude. However, precisely at this point, I would say that Schönrich’s interpretation could fit into what Horn classified as Humeanism in Kant’s ethics. I am not sure if Schönrich would agree with this point, but it seems to me that these could be interpreted in this way. I think that his interpretation, so like the formers above mentioned, needs an individual treatment, especially concerning the concept of pro-attitudes but also that of interest.

4 Final Considerations The concept of moral value has a function, within the GMS I, of serving as a reference for Kant’s explanations of what is morally good. To explain this notion, I tried to highlight and analyze three moments within this section: a) the value of unrestricted good will (GMS, AA 04: 393.01– 395.03); b) the value of actions by duty and in conformity with duty (GMS, AA 04: 397.01– 399.02) and; c) the value of an action is not in the effect it produces, but in the “maximum accord-

 Schönrich, 2013, 2020, but see also his chapter in this book.  Schönrich, 2013, pp. 325 – 326.  Schönrich, 2013, pp. 326.

60

Robinson dos Santos

ing to which it is decided” or “in the principle that determines it” (GMS, AA 04: 399.35 – 401.03). Kant’s text hides a lot of difficulties, through heterogeneous definitions and uses of value concepts, also accompanied by other qualifiers. This is one reason for so many different and, in some cases, conflicting interpretations. Perhaps, one of the few ideas that are consensual among commentators is that the term valuable refers to the morally good and vice versa. This definition is also valid for the unrestricted good value of a good will. It serves, moreover, to indicate the moral content of action performed from duty and to designate it as worthy of high esteem. In this way, it is a useful notion in Kant’s justification for the criterion for the moral judgment of actions, that is, for the evaluation of maxims. These three definitions may not exhaust Kant’s meaning of this concept. In fact, he will still talk about value throughout the other sections of Groundwork, as well as in other works of his practical philosophy. However, it is already clear from this section that the good as morally valuable is above the good as a means, or the good as useful for something else. Moral value – as a term that indicates the goodness of an action, free from interests or inclinations – results then from moral deliberation, that is, from the respect that the rational agent demonstrates in his or her obedience to the command of reason. In other words, what promotes the interests of reason,⁴³ has moral value. As such, it reveals a specific quality of a certain type of action, that is, actions from duty, without any mixture of sensitive motives or interests. This is the genuine sense of what Kant conceives of moral autonomy. Actions in mere compliance or accordance with duty, with the concomitant presence of interest or some inclination, are obviously not reprehensible as such, insofar as they can be considered as prudential values. And, as we have seen, such actions can even be the result of a benign coincidence, when the agent – albeit in an

 Raedler (2015), with a work dedicated precisely to the theme of the “interests of reason”, develops in the sixth chapter of the book a very plausible interpretation of the theme of moral value. Raedler defends the thesis that value or objectively good is what satisfies the interests of reason. For him, the interests of reason are at the heart of Kant’s theory of value. To defend his thesis, he examines the definition of natural dispositions, of which he highlights personality as being fundamental for us to be considered as ends-in-itself, that is, as beings to whom we have to attribute value, regardless of the contingent interests we may have. Raedler supports his study fundamentally in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and in the two fundamental pillars: the fact of reason and the supreme good. In this way, he stands against the interpretation of several Kantians who, supported by Grundlegung, defend the thesis that the only thing that has an unconditional value is good will.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

61

interesting way or by inclination – has done what is morally expected (to treat another person well). These considerations, therefore, can answer, I think, the questions posed at the beginning of this essay, that is: “what does Kant mean by moral value?” and “what does the statement in GMS I that only actions out of duty have moral value mean?”. In relation to what I said above, I consider that there is nothing controversial and that Kant’s readers have no difficulty in understanding. However, as for the other two questions, that is: “if the concept of moral value has a role in Kant’s ethics, is this a foundational role or is it, rather, a result of his conception of practical reason?” and whether “its ethics can ultimately be understood as a theory of moral value?”, the opinions, as I have broadly presented in the third part of this paper, are still far from consensus. I share the position that value does not play a foundational role in Kant’s ethics, although, sometimes Kant’s text may seem⁴⁴ to allow such an interpretation. This is the case, for example, with the formula of humanity as an end in itself. If the arguments I presented make sense, then moral value should under no circumstances be interpreted as an external property, or quality, independent of rationality, that is, as something that would serve as an instance from which moral duties would be derived. At this point an observation from Herman is very appropriate: it is not about “to connect rationality with some value (…). We need to understand rationality as a value, not the value of rationality”.⁴⁵ The way in which Kant conceives rational agency shows, therefore, that without practical rationality there is no moral value. In this sense, I agree also with a consideration of Sensen⁴⁶, presented in his analysis of value in Kant. Kant does not seem to have a conception of absolute value that is prior to or independent of the moral law. (…) Even if Kant had conceived of such a value, his arguments for his rule out that it could be the foundation of his moral philosophy. If value is supposed to be an independently existing fact, one would still need an account of how one can discern it.⁴⁷

 I fully agree with this point in Johnson’s analysis. He notes that, in fact, this is only an appearance, for neither the value of goodwill nor humanity as an end-in-itself subscribes to the authority of moral obligation. In effect, he argues that that authority must come solely from the fact that it is a demand of our reason. (Johnson, 2007, pp. 133.)  Herman, 1996, pp. 213, my italics.  Sensen, 2011, pp. 14– 52.  Sensen, 2011, pp. 51.

62

Robinson dos Santos

This perspective on value as an independent and foundational property, also sometimes understood as a “prerequisite”, “independent property” or “intrinsic, non-natural quality” is placed at the heart of the argument for Kantian moral realists (especially in the case of those who advocate a robust realism). When they conceive dignity, as an absolute value, or the condition of end-in-itself in a rational human being, as instances that justify the duty of respect, they do nothing but postulate a heteronomous foundation for morality. Now, such an interpretation perspective removes precisely what characterizes the core of Kant’s moral philosophy and which allows its position to be coherent as a whole, that is, the principle of the autonomy of the will.⁴⁸ The source of all value lies precisely in autonomy: For nothing has any worth other than that which the law determines for it. But precisely because of this, the legislation that determines all worth must itself have a dignity, i. e. unconditional, incomparable worth, for which the word respect alone makes a befitting expression of the estimation a rational being is to give of it. Autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature. (GMS, AA 04: 436.01– 07)

Now, the idea of value as an absolute, independent and understood as a source of moral obligation and, respectively, as a source of duties, is precisely what Kant endeavored to reject throughout his argumentation in Groundwork. Whether he was successful in this effort, well that is another story. But, according to these characteristics, the realistic interpretation of value represents nothing other than heteronomy in its full sense.

5 References Allison, Henry (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allison, Henry (2011): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ameriks, Karl (2000): “Kant on the good will”. In: Höffe, Otfried. (Hrsg.) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein Kooperativer Kommentar [3. Aufl.]. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag. Audi, Robert (2007): Moral Value and Human Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bader, Ralf ( 2015): “Kantian axiology and the dualism of practical reason”. In: Hirose, Iwao/Olson, Jonas (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175 – 201. Baron, Marcia (2006): Acting from duty. In: Horn, Christoph/Schönecker, Dieter (Eds.): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, pp. 73 – 92.

 Cf. IV 433, 440.

Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork

63

Brosch, Tobias/Sander, David (2016). Handbook of Value. Perspectives from economics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology and sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Formosa, Paul (2017): Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herman, Barbara (1996): The practice of moral judgment. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Hill, Thomas (1992): Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant′s Moral Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hill, Thomas (2012). Virtue, Rules and Justice. Kantians Aspirations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hills, Alison (2012): “Kantian Value Realism”. In: Ratio XXI, pp. 182 – 200. Hirose, Iwao/Olson, Jonas (2015). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Höffe, Otfried [Hrsg.] (2000): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein Kooperativer Kommentar [3. Aufl.]. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag. Hoffmann, Thomas S (2015): “Wert”. In: Willaschek, Markus/Stolzenberg, Jürgen/Mohr, Georg/Bacin, Stefano (Hrsg.): Kant-Lexikon. Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag, pp. 2632 – 2633. Horn, Christoph (2014): Nichtideale Normativität. Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Horn, Christoph/Schönecker, Dieter [Eds.] (2006). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Johnson, Robert N. (2007): “Value and autonomy in Kantian Ethics”. In: Shafer-Landau, Russ (Ed.): Oxford Studies in Metaethics [Vol. 2]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 133 – 148. Johnson, Robert N. (1996): “Expressing a good will: Kant on the motive of duty”. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy 34, pp. 147 – 168. Kant, Immanuel (1747 – 1756) [1902]. Kants Gesammelte Schriften [Königliche Preussische, bzw. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.)]. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Kant, Immanuel (1998). Werke in sechs Bänden [Wilhelm Weischedel (Hrsg.)]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Kato, Yasushi/Schönrich, Gerhard (2020): Kant′s Concept of Dignity. Berlin: De Gruyter. Klemme, Heiner (2017): Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten”: Ein Systematischer Kommentar. Stuttgart: Reclam. Raedler, Sebastian (2015). Kant and the Interests of Reason. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Santos, Robinson dos/Schmidt, Elke (Ed.) (2015): Realism and Anti-realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Santos, Robinson dos/Schmidt, Elke (2017). “Kant e a Metaética contemporânea”. In: Revista Studia Kantiana 14 [n. 1], pp. 67 – 86. Satne, Paula (2013): “Reliability of motivation and the moral value of actions”. In: Revista Studia Kantiana 14 [n. 1], pp. 5 – 33. Sedgwick, Sally. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Schiller, Friedrich (2013). Xenien und Votivtafeln [Originally published in 1796. Michael Holzinger (Hrsg)]. Berliner Ausgabe. Schönecker, Dieter/Wood, Allen (2002): Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einführender Kommentar. Paderborn, München, Wien, Zurich: UTB, Schöningh.

64

Robinson dos Santos

Schönecker, Dieter/Wood, Allen (2014): A “Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes” de Kant. Um comentário introdutório. [Tradution: Robinson dos Santos and Gerson Neumann]. São Paulo: Loyola. Schönecker, Dieter/Schmidt, Elke (2018): “Kant’s Ground-Thesis. On dignity and Value in the Groundwork”. In: Journal of Value Inquiry 52, pp. 81 – 95. Schönrich, Gerhard (2013): “Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion”. In: Kant-Studien 104. 3., pp. 321 – 345. Stratton-Lake, Philip (2000). Kant, Duty and Moral Worth. London: Routledge. Sensen, Oliver (2011). Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. Sensen, Oliver (2011). “Kant’s Conception of Inner Value”. In: European Journal of Philosophy 19, pp. 262 – 280. Timmermann, Jens(2009). Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Willaschek, Marcus/Stolzenberg, Jürgen/Morh, Georg/Bacin, Stefano [Hrsg.] ( 2015). Kant-Lexikon. Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag.

Steffi Schadow

Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity Abstract: In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the categorical imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses his or her pro-attitudes, i. e., interests, preferences, and life plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of his or her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations of Kant’s concept of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims will be debated.

1 Maxims: some basic features Kant uses the concept of maxims in an extended and manifold way: In the first 13 volumes of the Akademie edition alone, the term appears more than 700 times, in volumes 01– 23 we find it about 1100 times. In many of these occurrences, the word is not used in a strictly terminological way– which shows that Kant, in these cases, presupposes a widely shared meaning of what a maxim is. But in the context which is well known to every reader of Groundwork and the second Critique, he uses the word to refer to a concept with a narrower meaning: He then employs it to “enumerate some duties” (GMS, AA 04: 421.21) and to establish the doctrine of the categorical imperative by the ‘formula of universal law’ (FUL): “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (GMS, AA 04: 421.07– 08) and by the ‘formula Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Christoph Horn for invaluable discussions on maxims and values and his solid support in finishing this article. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-006

66

Steffi Schadow

of a law of nature’ (FLN): “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (GMS, AA 04: 421.18 – 20). The FUL and the FLN express universalization tests that can serve as moral decision procedures. For decades, it has been a controversially debated issue whether or not this test procedure is fit for its purpose.¹ Are all maxims which are universalizable at the same time morally permitted, as Kant maintains? Should we identify all maxims which cannot be universalized as immoral? What exactly is meant by the test procedure? And which sort of contradictions count as indicators of morally impermissible maxims? Perhaps the crucial point within Kant’s description of FUL and FLN as test procedures for the categorical imperative is that merely subjective maxims are contrasted with strictly objective moral laws; one of the key passages for this point can be found in an important footnote in Groundwork II: A maxim is the subjective principle for acting, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the practical rule that reason determines in conformity with the conditions of the subject (quite often his ignorance, or his inclinations), and thus is the principle according to which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle, valid for every rational being, and the principle to which it ought to act, i. e. an imperative. (GMS, AA 04: 420.36 – 37 und 421.26 – 30; see also GMS, AA 04: 400.33 and KpV, AA 05: 19.07– 10)

What Kant provides here is much more than a loose description of some features of maxims; the passage amounts to a full definition. We learn (a) that a maxim is a “subjective principle for acting”, (b) that it “contains the practical rule that reason determines in conformity with the conditions of the subject (quite often his ignorance, or his inclinations)” and (c) that it is “the principle according to which the subject acts”. Thus, Kant contrasts maxims and laws not only by the dichotomy of being subjective and objective rules respectively; what is also important is that the descriptive character of maxims is distinguished from the normative character of moral laws. The maxim is a practical rule by which the agent in fact acts. This implies that it is a self-given practical rule – but not an idealized one according to which someone wishes to act counterfactually. Kantian maxims do not resemble New Year’s resolutions.²

 See for example Mark Timmons’ fine-grained criticism of an affirmative reading in (2006).  A further problem of the passage is this: The quotation seems to imply that the distinction between maxims and laws is a mutually exclusive one. This, however, would be a misreading for three reasons. Firstly, according to Kant, the moral challenge is to see whether a maxim can be turned into a law (by the universalization procedure). Secondly, Kant describes morally unsatisfactory maxims as “mere” maxims (KpV, AA 05: 26.30), while moral maxims are at the

Acting for a Reason

67

Kant’s understanding of human action as free, self-determined behavior which is guided by self-imposed rules can already be found in the first Critique where he defines free, self-determined action as a self-causation through reason.³ While action in the sense of being active (operare, agere, handeln) is an expression of the relationship between cause and effect in general, acting (facere, tun) presupposes the freedom of a thinking substance that is not determined by external causes (cf. Refl, AA 17: 70.06 – 07). As Kant points out, with a will manifesting pure practical reason human beings have the “faculty of acting from freedom” (KrV, A 450/B 478). That is to say that they have the ability to set ends for themselves and hence are not fully determined by their desires and inclinations. In Kant’s practical philosophy the concept of free agency, therefore, implies imputability and, connected with it, the moral relevance of each individual free action (cf. MS, AA 06: 418.18 – 19).⁴ The fact that an agent makes something the rule of his or her behavior means that this is not forced upon him or her, but that on the contrary, it is chosen by him or herself. Thus, acting according to maxims shows the ability to determine oneself by one’s own will to pursue certain (at best moral) purposes in dealing with current inclinations on the one hand and general practical principles on the other (cf. Gregor 1990, p. XXVI). Kant expresses this thought in the Pedagogy where he writes that human beings, unlike animals, depend on consciously structuring their behavior if they want to survive: An animal is already all that it can be because of its instinct; a foreign intelligence has already taken care of everything for it. But the human being needs his own intelligence. He

same time practical laws (for the idea that laws can be maxims and vice versa see also KrV A 812/B 840, KpV, AA 05: 27.03 – 04, 36.09 – 10, and Beck 1969, p. 81. Critical on this: Allison 1990, pp. 88 – 9). Thirdly, we are obliged to turn moral laws into our maxims.  Cf. KrV, A 551/B 579; KrV, A 553/B 581; KrV, A 556/A 584.  According to Kant’s view that the causal relation is always bound to laws (cf. e. g. GMS, AA 04: 446.16 – 17), a “law of causality” is also the basis for the operation of free will (KrV, A 539/B 567). Kant therefore assumes that, under the aspect of freedom, human action is also subject to rules that make an action practically necessary. The causal law of freedom is a purely practical law of reason which Kant describes “in contrast to laws of nature” as “moral law” (MS, AA 06: 214.13 – 14). Thus, he thinks of freedom and morality as correlating concepts; “moral” actions are those where the action not “merely follows upon the laws of nature” (RGV, AA 06: 23.01). It follows that an action is free because it stands in a relation to the moral law or, as Kant writes in Metaphysics of Morals, “it comes under obligatory laws” (MS, AA 06: 223.18). As such, all free human actions are subject to moral judgment and hence “right or wrong” or rather ‘good’ or ‘evil’ (cf. MS, AA 06: 223.35 – 224.01). Kant calls such actions “deeds” in contrast to mere behavior (cf. MS, AA 06: 223.36 and Refl, AA 17: 70.06 – 07). Moreover, those actions and their effects are attributable to their author (because they are free).

68

Steffi Schadow

has no instinct and must work out the plan of his conduct for himself. (Päd, AA 09: 441.18 – 21)

We should also note that Kant explicitly characterizes maxims as determined by reason under sometimes relatively suboptimal conditions – namely conditions of individual ignorance or the dominance of his inclinations: “A maxim … contains the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations) …” (GMS, AA 04: 420.36 – 37 und 421.26 – 27). This phrase seems to mirror a certain ambiguity within the concept: A Kantian maxim is, on the one hand, a reasonably chosen subjective rule; but, on the other hand, it frequently implies personal shortcomings of ignorance and inclinations (In Section 3, I will come back to this ambiguity which turns out to be an important feature of maxims). According to this usage, maxims are, as we saw, the self-imposed practical principles according to which someone in fact acts, but they express, at the same time, what the agent wants. They must be, on the one hand, factually incorporated into an agent’s conduct (and not express merely idealized selfviews), and, on the other hand, they must be purposive or goal-directed. While being descriptive sentences, seen from a third-personal perspective, they are normative from a first-person standpoint. What that means, becomes clear from a look at the following five examples: (1) “… from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if, when protracted any longer, it threatens more ill than it promises agreeableness” (GMS, AA 04: 422.04– 06). (2) “…when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money, and promise to repay it, even though I know that it will never happen” (GMS, AA 04: 422.22– 23). (3) I prefer to indulge into enjoyment rather than to make the effort to expand and improve my fortunate natural dispositions (cf. GMS, AA 04: 423.02– 04). (4) I want to let no insult pass unavenged (cf. KpV, AA 05: 19.19 – 20). (5) I’m unwilling to assist others when they are in need (cf. MS, AA 06: 453.06 – 07). All of these examples formulate subjective practical rules which are applied in typical biographical situations or in certain areas of life, and all of them are intentional or goal-directed: Maxim (1) is about a situation of hopelessness and despair in which someone considers committing suicide; the end to be achieved by the agent is to evade a disastrous loss of happiness. Maxim (2) is about a situation of a dramatic shortage of money; the end is to escape from the financial straits. Maxim (3) is about the cultivation of natural talents; the end is to

Acting for a Reason

69

avoid the demanding efforts of self-cultivation. Maxim (4) implies the situation of endangered personal pride and social recognition; the end is to defend oneself against attacks. Maxim (5) concerns the situation in which others need someone’s support; the end is to keep all resources for one’s own benefit. Thus described, Kant’s maxims are firstly practical principles of certain situations or types of action; they can be applied in all similar cases. They include rules that can be applied to a particular situation or to rare cases (such as when someone contemplates committing suicide), or they can contain rules for many cases (cf. “I have … made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means”: KpV, AA 05: 27.22– 23). Secondly, they are practical principles of ends; they formulate the ends someone wants to achieve. In his late Doctrine of Virtue, Kant even uses the explicit concept of ‘maxims of ends’ (Maximen der Zwecke) – in addition to ‘maxims of actions’ – in connection with the distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue. Duties of virtue are duties to make certain ends (those of pure practical reason) one’s own (cf. MS, AA 06: 395.09 – 32).⁵ As this end-directedness implies, maxims are subjective reasons for an option for action and express a pro-attitude. Maxims seen as pro-attitudes are practical principles that make someone’s plans and intentions explicit.⁶ This is to say that maxims are those practical principles that ‘reason determines in conformity with the conditions’ (cf. GMS, AA 04: 421.26 – 27) of an individual agent. Even if some maxims deal with particular situations, they are never chosen for contingent or particular reasons, reasons that we might have today, but not tomorrow. The concept of maxims presupposes that we have generalized, in a certain way, the relevant reflections on which our reasons for actions are based. This generalist aspect of maxims becomes obvious in the logical form of the maxims which is as follows: ‘Given the situation S, I want to do x.’ Kant expresses this metaethical idea of a ‘generalism’ of maxims in the Metaphy-

 Though, as Nell pointed out, the idea of a maxim of ends is a rare, not well-developed concept of Kant’s mature ethics (Nell 1975, p. 38). For the role of pure practical reason in the process of the adoption of ends in maxims see Denis 2013.  Accordingly, the following well-known passage from the Groundwork can be read as a definition of human action as acting according to maxims: “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions, the will is nothing other than practical reason” (GMS, AA 04: 412.26 – 30). I do not understand laws here as moral laws in particular, but as objective principles in general. Thus, human beings can act according to laws and through maxims. This aspect of the concept of maxims is still influenced by the solution of the antinomy of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant distinguishes human action from the behavior of animals which is structured only by sensual drives (cf. KrV, A 534/B 562).

70

Steffi Schadow

sics of Morals when he writes: “A maxim is a subjective principle of action, a principle which the subject himself makes his rule (how he wants to act)” (MS, AA 06: 225.34– 36). Hence, acting from maxims stands in contrast to depending exclusively on drives and impulses, as he claims in the Reflections: “One depends on impulses (a person who is moved very easily), on ideas, flighty, or on maxims: set” (Refl, AA 15: 258.10 – 11, my translation). Note that Kant distinguishes between mere rules and maxims. He takes a practical rule to be a prescription for the regulation of actions (cf. KpV, AA 05: 20.06 – 13; KU, AA 05: 172 – 173). Reason, seen as our ability to identify principles (cf. KrV A 299/B 356), provides rules for the actions of free rational subjects. A practical rule, therefore, “is always a product of reason” (KpV, AA 05: 20.07); as such it prescribes a specific action as a means to an effect that is intended. Kant distinguishes “technically practical” from “morally practical” rules: The former are empirical prescriptions for the validity of which depends on whether an agent pursues the appropriate ends, which in turn are a prerequisite for the application of the rule. Morally practical rules, on the other hand, are non-empirical regulations and apply independently of the ends and intentions of the individual agent (cf. KU, AA 05: 172.14– 22). They are, in Kant’s terminology, not only practical rules, but, more precisely, practical laws, and this is why they are not mere rules but embodied principles.⁷ Whereas the rule itself is a practical rule because it determines a will as a prescription, it has an effect on action only if it is implemented by the person to whom the standard is addressed. As Kant points out in Groundwork, maxims “contain” practical rules (GMS, AA 04: 420.37– 421.26) in the sense that rules become practical principles. Hence maxims are practical principles directed to certain ends. Rules, on the other hand, must refer to a more general rule or principle, and they must be adopted by a subject in order to be meaningful. Maxims serve to personalize rules which would otherwise be without further practical relevance. The concrete practical rule ‘I want to do sports every day’ receives its relevance from the broader framework of the principle ‘I want to live a long and healthy life’ which is my maxim and serves as a principle of practical deliberation. As Jens Timmermann highlights, an essential aspect of maxims is that they help to adapt concrete practical rules according to the situation (cf. Timmermann 2000, p. 44). For example, if someone can no longer engage in

 “A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim; hence different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same law” (MS, AA 06: 225.01– 5).

Acting for a Reason

71

daily jogging because of a knee injury, this person will need to find other technical rules to stick to the maxim of living a healthy life. There is an interesting passage that sheds light on the interplay between rules and maxims: Maxims provide the context in which rules reach their full meaning; they thus represent the higher principles of practical deliberation.⁸ In his Reflections on Anthropology Kant writes: Character requires in the first place that one creates maxims and rules. Rules, however, that are not constrained by maxims, are pedantic when they restrict oneself, and stubborn, unsociable, when they restrict others. They are the guide (Gängelwagen) for the immature. The maxim determines the case under the rule for the power of judgment. (Refl, AA 15: 514.20 – 515.02; my translation)⁹

As I want to point out in the following section, Kant develops, by the idea of maxims, a special concept of practical principles which explains human actions according to the scheme of a practical syllogism.

2 Maxims as incorporated pro-attitudes To what extent is Kant’s understanding of the concept of maxims original, and to which extent is he following historical paradigms? Being inspired by three different sources, Kant seems to have interconnected several elements of them into a characteristic mélange. (1) To be sure, a relevant influence is that of the moralist tradition, from its classical representatives to the French moralists, in which maxims were firm, concise principles or tenets of wisdom serving as a practical basis for desire and agency. When Kant refers to the moralists, he primarily thinks of ancient moral philosophers such as Seneca (e. g. RL, AA 06: 20.08, 57.07– 08, 16.61). It is likely that he knew, in some detail, the moralist writings of Montaigne, Accetto, Bacon, and Descartes, whereas Castiglione and La Rochefoucauld were unknown to him. In the second Critique, he explicitly counts himself among the “critical moralists” (KpV, AA 05: 07.37). (2) More specifically, Kant

 That also means that regularity alone is not good in itself. As Kant points out, inclinations result from habitual desire (“A sensible desire that serves the subject as a rule (habit) is called inclination…” (Anth, AA 07: 265.26 – 7).  Cf. the original text: “Der Character erfodert zuerst, daß man sich maximen mache und Regeln. Aber Regeln, die nicht durch maximen eingeschränkt seyn, sind pedantisch, wenn sie ihn selbst einschränken, und störrisch, ungesellig, wenn sie andre einschränken. Sie sind der Gängelwagen der Unmündigen. Die Maxime bestimt der Urtheilskraft den Fall, der unter der Regel ist.”.

72

Steffi Schadow

adopts some aspects of the term ‘maxim’ from Rousseau. As Michael Albrecht (1994) pointed out, we can find an influence of Rousseau already in the Observations where Kant speaks of ‘principles’ (Grundsätze) that only a few people act on (cf. GSE, AA 02: 227.05 – 06). He adds that true virtue must be based on principles (GSE, AA 02: 218.01). (3) The third source appears to be the most important: Kant received crucial aspects of the concept from the rationalist tradition of his time, especially from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Christian Wolff.¹⁰ The plausibility of this hypothesis rests upon an important observation: In Kant’s lecture on moral philosophy, we find some passages in which the concept of maxims is combined with the idea of a practical syllogism. For example, Kant quotes Baumgarten’s advice: Avoid however to have an ambivalent mind which is habitually indetermined, be a lover of decisiveness in your choice. This will be much supported by 1) a mind that is well-prepared in having access to a deliberation by good major propositions called maxims, of which it should already live convinced without stubbornness.¹¹

As these passages and several others indicate, the Kantian concept of maxims seems to be historically connected to the Aristotelian tradition which survived in the German Rationalism of the 18th century. According to this tradition, a maxim is a propositio maxima that expresses a normative attitude in a generalized form.¹² In the classical theory of action, Aristotle’s idea of a ‘practical syllogism’ played a prominent role. Aristotle introduced this idea based on the reflection

 For the historical background of Kant’s use of the concept cf. Bubner 1982, pp. 196 – 200, Schwartz 2006, pp. 25 – 27, and Thurnherr 1994, pp. 27– 30. McCarty points out especially the connection to the Wolffian usage of the term in Kant’s Lectures (McCarty 2009, p. 5). – Even independently of the investigation of its historical background, Kant’s concept of maxims has been the subject of philosophical research for an extended period of time. See for an overview of the research up to 2010: Gressis 2010a and 2010b. Since then, among the new analyses, HerrisoneKelly’s detailed monograph dedicated to the concept of maxims with a focus on the connection of maxims and motivation is particularly noteworthy (cf. Herrisone-Kelly 2018).  Baumgarten 1751, § 246, AA 27: 800.21– 25: “Fuge tamen animum ancipitem et indeterminatum habitualiter, amator promtitudinis in eligendo […]. Hanc multum iuuabit 1) bene praeparatum esse pectus ad deliberationem accessurum bonis maioribus propositionibus syllogismorum practicorum, quas maximas vocant, de iis tam vive conuictum, ut constans sit sine pertinacia […]” (My translation; cf. § 449, V-Eth/Baumgarten, AA 27: 857.08 – 15).  For the view that Kant took the idea of maxims as major premises in practical syllogisms, especially from the Wolffian tradition, whereas Kant and Wolff differ in the logical form of a maxim, see Herissone-Kelly 2018, pp. 31– 36, against McCarty in whose eyes Kant’s concept of maxims here is close to Wolff’s (McCarty 2009, pp. 4– 9).

Acting for a Reason

73

that the explanation of action can be understood as a syllogism consisting of two premises (the ‘major’ and the ‘minor’) and a conclusion (the action itself). While the major premise is a generalized desire (in modern terms a pro-attitude), the minor is a particular statement on a given situation (cf. Corcilius 2008). Following Aristotle, the first premise must contain ‘the good’ (i. e. what someone takes to be his good), while the second premise is about ‘the possible’ (i. e. what can now be done to realize the good: De motu animalium 701a22 – 25). Hence, the scheme is as follows: Major: “It is (generally) good (for me) to do X”. Minor: “Doing A (which is now available) is a particular case of doing X”. Conclusion: “It is good (for me) to do A now”.

One of the examples used by Aristotle to present the syllogism is “One should try everything sweet” (major), “This thing here is sweet” (minor), hence one should try it (conclusion; Nicomachean Ethics VII.5, 1147a29 – 31).¹³ Kant’s version of the practical syllogism has been reconstructed by Herrissone-Kelly (2018) as follows: (1) Given the situation S, I want to do x. (2) This is a kind of S-situation. (3) I will do x.¹⁴

In the Rationalist tradition, the practical syllogism is understood in the following form (see McCarty 2009, p. 5, on the Wolffian version of practical syllogism): (1) X is good; (2) Doing Y will achieve X; (3) Therefore, doing Y is good.

One of the references for this point in Kant is a passage taken from Metaphysik Dohna (1792/93): Voluntary action (actio voluntaria) insofar as it comes about according to maxims (maxims , principles practically subjective because they would be the major premise in practical syllogisms). Involuntary – not with will, not according to one’s maxims. This is a very subtle matter – as a freely acting being, a human being actually cannot do anything without the will – he acts

 For a discussion of the similarities and differences of the Kantian and Aristotelian practical syllogisms see Placencia 2019, pp. 229 – 243.  Herissone-Kelly 2018, p. 36.

74

Steffi Schadow

always according to maxims even if not universally . (V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 678.21– 27)

Maxims are pro-attitudes by which we bring a structure into our behavior by consciously positioning ourselves with regard to various options for action (cf. O’Neill 1989, p. 84 – 5). In this way, new reasons emerge from generalized principles, so-called rules of life. In addition, maxims enable us to weigh up different goals and purposes against each other and to bring them into a hierarchical order. This also means that our wishes can only become motives for action through maxims.¹⁵ Kant expresses this thought in a well-known passage in the Religion where he comments that “the power of choice … cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim” (RGV, AA 06: 23.03 – 24.03). This claim, which Allison famously called the “Incorporation Thesis” (Allison 1990, p. 40), represents one of Kant’s central ideas on rational agency. It shows that inclinations and desires do not force a human being’s will but have an impact on their behavior only insofar as they have chosen to follow them. Since desires are reasons for action if and only if they are incorporated into maxims, acting according to maxims stands for self-determination and inner freedom. As Kant’s use of the concept of a maxim implies, human action is determined by self-imposed reasons which cause actions from freedom in a special way.¹⁶ In the following, I will examine this “deep structure” (Allison 1990, p. 90) of maxims in more detail.

3 Maxims and human agency All human agency is goal-directed. Goals pursued by action, however, can vary in their complexity. For example, I might have the goal to clean up my garden, and in order to achieve my goal, I start to cut the roses. But you may have a much more ambitious goal, such as getting a new job that is both meaningful and wellpaid. The selection of those means which are necessary to achieve your goal will be considerably more complex than in my case. Nevertheless, my goal might already lead to some challenges: The time-consuming rose pruning can conflict with my end to correct all of the students’ seminar papers today. The particular  Therefore, Herman is wrong when she assumes that inclinations can be motives by themselves (cf. Herman 1993a). Rather, we have to turn them into intentions if we want them to be effective for action (cf. Guyer 2000, p. 294).  For the view that Kant does not argue for an event-based, but a reason-based model of causality cf. Watkins 2005, pp. 243 – 252.

Acting for a Reason

75

actions which I have to do to achieve my goal reduce, at the same time, my chances to pursue my other goal, namely to finish the corrections. In the case of your goal, the difficulties are far greater. For instance, you are pursuing the end of getting an ideal job while, simultaneously, you want to be a good mother. In this case, you will have to weigh up, time and again, your preferences and the available means and resources and check alternative possibilities, in order to arrive at an optimally balanced equilibrium. It is a fundamental task of action theory to describe such a complex process of practical deliberation as adequately as possible. According to the view defended here, exactly this is what Kant’s concept of maxims is about. Maxims and their mutual relationship are crucial for an appropriate understanding of human agency in its full complexity. Rational and free agents reflect, adapt, and polish their ends in the light of second-order pro-attitudes.¹⁷ With the concept of a maxim, Kant describes human action as a behavior that is guided by such self-imposed rules of action. Maxims have the fundamental function to guide one’s actions in light of an abundance of stimuli, preferences, desires, sensible suggestions, chances, options, and personal intentions. According to Kant, acting for a reason can be described as acting according to maxims. The fact that we permanently act on maxims implies that we consider an option for action to be justified in the light of our fundamental ends and convictions. In this regard, maxims are prospective reasons for action, and every action can be reflected, judged, and justified in light of these reasons. On the other hand, through their incorporated volitional elements maxims also provide a psychological explanation for an action. In this regard, acting according to maxims stands for self-determination and inner freedom. An agent enjoys not only natural but also moral autonomy if he or she makes use of his or her ability to be self-legislative and to be motivated by universalizable rational principles that are not based on inclination.¹⁸ Because human agents can decide in principle to do the morally right thing and are motivationally receptive to the moral norm, they can also be bound by it. That is why maxims are not only essential constituents in (actual) actions of moral value but also reasons of moral obligation. Maxims are, as we saw, practical principles which an agent does not simply have, but which he, as Kant put it, produces (cf. GMS, AA 04: 422.04– 05). For  For a contemporary approach to define human behavior in terms of first-order-desires and second-order volitions see Frankfurt 1971.  According to this, Bittner differentiates between “natural” and “moral autonomy”. “Natural autonomy” means rational action according to maxims, while “moral autonomy” stands for the moral valuable choice of a maxim (Bittner 1974, pp. 494– 5).

76

Steffi Schadow

Kant, the concept of a maxim is “based” on that of interest (KpV, AA 05: 79.24– 25), which is itself a concept that reflects activity.¹⁹ In this way, initially unreflected intentions become reasons for action. In this process, various subjective attitudes flow into the formation of a maxim; Kant speaks of “interests” and “drives” or “motives”. Since, in the case of a morally valuable action, the moral maxim already contains a motivational element, namely the motive of duty, it is a practical attitude with the norm itself as propositional content.²⁰ In this sense, it is also a general reason for action, because it adequately represents the demands of the moral law. However, the maxim is a contingent reason for action in another respect: because it is a maxim (and not a law). For it is precisely the “subjective principle of volition” (GMS, AA 04: 400.34), which can take the form of a law, but is categorically not an objective reason for action itself.²¹ This is why there cannot be such a thing as unconscious maxims, as Barbara Herman rightly pointed out.²²

 See also Allison who argues for “an intimate connection between maxims and interests” (Allison 1990, p. 89). Allison also relates this activity to the identification that a subject performs when it forms a maxim: “A maxim I could never be aware of a maxim as mine, like a representation to which I could not attach the ‘I think’, would be ‚nothing to me’ as a rational agent. It might function as an unconscious drive or habitus governing my behavior, but it would not be a principle on which I act as a rational agent” (Allison 1990, p. 90).  In this regard, Kant’s thoughts on maxims and moral motivation give rise to question the unfortunate dichotomy of objective-rational reasons on the one hand and subjective-volitional motives on the other hand as it is usually implied by internalists and externalists about practical reasons. One should rather speak of the fact that the action-guiding intentions have rational and emotional and volitional components than to assume categorically different attitudes (reasons versus motives). Moral considerations and maxims are practical attitudes that are generated by motives and interests. Cf. Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 43 – 76.  This categorical difference between maxims and laws becomes particularly evident in one passage of the Metaphysics of Morals: “For maxims of actions can be arbitrary, and are subject only to the limiting condition of being fit for a giving of universal law, which is the formal principle of action. A law, however, takes arbitrariness away from actions …” (MS, AA 06: 389.27– 30).  “There may be subjective elements at work which the agent is not consciously attending to, some that would be brought forward easily on reflection, and some that might become available only through a kind of practical therapy. The effect of this opacity is that the maxims the agent sincerely takes herself to be acting on may not be the maxim she does in fact act on…. It does not follow from this that we sometimes act on unconscious maxims. Not, that is, if by unconscious we mean outside the arena of deliberative rationality. There are no such maxims. We may have, as Kant puts it, ‘secret incentives of our actions’ that appear in the guise of more respectable motives. Nonetheless, our maxims are shaped by our beliefs about circumstances of action – outside of and within ourselves…” (Herman 1993b, pp. 223 – 4).

Acting for a Reason

77

How do maxims interact, especially in cases of conflict? Is there a grid of situation-related maxims, or should we rather assume an ordered structure, maybe even a hierarchy of them? Kant develops the idea of a higher-order evaluation of our maxims, especially in the Religion. There he argues that in addition to the individual, partially mutually exclusive reasons for action and goals, which can also be referred to as ‘simple’ maxims, there is also a pro-attitude that is hierarchically above the individual reasons for action. Kant speaks here in this respect of a “supreme maxim” (RGV, AA 06: 36.06). A maxim, according to this understanding, is not the principle according to which someone de facto acts (cf. GMS, AA 04: 421.28), but the higher-level rule that serves as a guideline in practical deliberation. It is part of human nature that we don’t always align our more specific rules of action with these higher-level principles; as Kant puts it, “between maxim and deed there still is a wide gap” (RGV, AA 06: 46.13 – 14). As such, the higher-level rules have the function of evaluating the ‘simple’ maxims and then either turning them into strong reasons for action or downgrading or even abandoning them. Kant believes that corresponding to the two basic motives (Triebfedern) of morality and self-love, there are only two such supreme maxims: On the one hand, the maxim of wanting to follow morality (and therefore the maxim of duty) and, on the other hand, the maxim of self-love.²³ For Kant, freedom, therefore, does not mean being able to do what one wants but having to choose between many different options of action by means of superior prudential and moral attitudes. Thus, both our subjective desires and morals are always present as a criterion for the reasons that cause us to act. It seems reasonable to ask whether it is convincing to understand the weighing up of reasons in such a way that morality is always the (only) alternative. I do not want to defend the Kantian dualism of practical reasons here; on my view, it seems anything but plausible that all of our reasons for action can be reduced to reasons of prudence on the one hand and moral motives on the other. One could, e. g., argue that there can be aesthetic or authority-based considerations (in the externalist sense) that, in addition to the reasons of prudence and moral demands, represent genuine reasons for action for us as well. We do not need, however, a dualism of practical reasons to understand that the concept of maxims is

 All three levels of the propensity to evil can be understood as resulting from this confrontation of maxims. This becomes particularly clear in Kant’s description of the third level, the “depravity” or “corruption (corruptio) of the human heart” which is “the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones)” (RGV, AA 06: 30.09 – 12). “Self-love”, therefore, is “precisely the source of all evil” (RGV, AA 06: 45.14– 15).

78

Steffi Schadow

the central concept to describe human action if this is understood as goal-directed behavior for a reason. Acting on maxims essentially means to be free in the sense that we can distance ourselves from mere impulses through reflection in willing and in action by consciously pursuing certain goals and thus showing what is important to us. Thus, the crucial point of Kant’s concept of maxims seems to be that there is no alternative to consciously evaluating, selecting, and pursuing principles of action. Humans are those living beings who, through deliberation, are not only able to reflect on their options for action but have to do so in order to be able to act at all. Making something a principle in the face of many behavioral options and in a process of evaluation and thus determining one’s own actions is not a normative requirement, but what we actually do, if we act at all. In this way, the assessment and evaluation of practical principles are inescapable for human agents.²⁴ As agents, therefore, we have to acknowledge that self-chosen maxims are the basis of our actions. I call this the permanence reading of the concept of maxims which I want to defend here against the objections recently raised by Sven Nyholm. Nyholm proposes a ‘normative understanding’ of maxims according to which acting on maxims is not a description of human action but rather a normative ideal. He argues as follows (cf. Nyholm 2017, pp. 234 – 235): 1. If reason always guided our actions, we would always act according to certain principles or maxims. 2. But we are not always guided by reason (according to the ideal). 3. Hence, we don’t always act according to maxims.

According to this reading, humans should constantly try to act on maxims, but in fact, they do not always do so.²⁵ Bearing in mind what I have said about the central features of maxims before, I would like to raise three objections against the critics of the permanence (or descriptive) reading of maxims. The first objection concerns the shape of the argument in general: The argument suggests that we could derive a claim about action theory (we do not always act according to maxims) from an empirical truth (in fact, we do not always let ourselves be guided by reason). Such an approach, however, contradicts Kant’s method. Because the claim that we always act according to maxims is an analytical thesis. As I have argued, it arises from his concept of action and does not depend on facts about the world and our concrete actions. The second objection relates to the

 See also Gewirth 1978, p. 26: “Every agent implicitly makes value judgments – there are no indifferent rational actions”.  See for a similar interpretation Albrecht 1994.

Acting for a Reason

79

first premise. In my opinion, this is not a Kantian thesis, but a reformulation of passages in which Kant emphasizes the contingency of practical rationality in finite rational beings. Since Nyholm himself does not mention a passage, one can only speculate here; but think, for example, of Groundwork, where Kant says: However, if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is not in itself completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent … (GMS, AA 04: 412.35 – 413.03)

As the passage shows, Nyholm’s first premise ignores Kant’s distinction between a lower and higher faculty of desire (cf. KpV, AA 05: 24.32– 40 – 25.10) and suppresses the fact that we also act according to our own ideas, principles or maxims on the level of the lower faculty of desire. In addition, the so-called higher faculty of desire, as the capacity for pure practical reason, implies the possibility of failure or rejection: Rational agents act in the light of their knowledge of objective practical principles, but they do not necessarily act in accordance with those principles.²⁶ This characterizes voluntary action: Having a will means acting for reasons that one has chosen oneself as the principles of one’s behavior. Reason is required for this; the will is therefore “practical reason” (GMS, AA 04: 412.30). A third objection against the normative reading of maxims concerns the second premise of this reading, according to which we are not always (de facto?) guided by reason. It remains an open question what is meant here by ‘guided by reason’: practical reason in the broader, pure practical reason in the narrower sense? The normative interpretation of Nyholm, however, evidently refers to the ideal of moral autonomy, which we in fact do not always live up to in our actions. While Nyholm’s analysis thereby suggests that, according to Kant, we could also act without being guided by rules or maxims (cf. Nyholm 2017, p. 238), I sketched a view of Kant’s concept of action that excludes this interpretation. Even if we do not always live up to the ideal of moral autonomy, our natural autonomy remains. As shown, it consists of our ability to structure our behavior according to rules. This also includes the possibility of irrational and

 Moral considerations are practical attitudes that are themselves generated by motivation; thus, they represent genuine reasons for action. However, if the action is not performed, then not the reason for action but the rationality of the person has to be questioned. Cf. Schadow 2013, pp. 288 – 294; see also Allison 1990, p. 86, 261, n. 3, and Bittner 1974.

80

Steffi Schadow

weak-willed behavior. In this case, which is a form of non-ideal behavior, the originally adopted maxim does not become effective in our action.²⁷ Finally, the permanence reading touches on the issue of how to understand Kant’s theory of moral value, which considers the special connection between Kantian moral theory and action theory. If one sees maxims as active, volitionally founded practical attitudes that are constitutive for action in general, then this throws a special light on morally valuable action in the narrower sense. Acting from duty is only possible because an agent has to accept and hence also correct, revise, and reject his or her maxims again and again which are not – at least not exclusively – permanently fixed ‘rules of life’.²⁸ For someone can be bound by duty if and only if they can (always) freely choose the principles from which they act. As Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals: Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning… For, moral maxims, unlike technical ones, cannot be based on habit …; on the contrary, if the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty. (MS, AA 06: 409.21– 34)

These considerations affect Kant’s theory of moral value in yet another way. Kant understands morally valuable action as action according to law-compliant maxims that have a certain motivational basis. Though the focus on the concept ‘maxim’ does not add anything to the concept of value in terms of content, it does make it obvious that Kant at least has the conceptual background required from a psychological point of view to describe actions of moral value. Here, the concept of a maxim helps us to establish moral value as (1) a property of actions and as (2) a property of persons. First, moral value is realized in acting according to lawlike maxims with the ‘correct’ psychological genesis. However, it is not a metaphysical entity that exists independently of this context. And second, humans (as persons) have an inner value because of their ability to act according to moral maxims (cf. MS, AA 06: 418.17– 20, GMS, AA 04: 435.07– 37– 436.01– 07).

 Kant discusses forms of such non-ideal, but accountable behavior in the context of his analysis of evil in the Religion. As he wants to show in that context with the distinction of three levels of the natural propensity to evil, non-ideal behavior is either the result of weakness, insincerity or conscious wickedness (cf. RGV, AA 06: 29.16 – 30.18). Accordingly, original maxims can either be too weak, impure or replaced by other maxims. Even though Kant identifies the non-ideal with the immoral in that passage, this model can also be applied to non-ideal outcomes of morally neutral action. It is conceivable, for example, that humans have the latent maxim of not acting in accordance with the resolution they once conceived.  For the view that maxims are, because they are necessarily general, life-rules (Lebensregeln) cf. Bittner 1974 and Höffe 1979.

Acting for a Reason

81

Accordingly, “inner value” is not a distinctive metaphysical property of the will but is understood as a function of the content of maxims.²⁹ As I have shown so far, the generality of maxims implies that they are valueexpressions. A maxim indicates that something appears as important to a person. Precisely because it is a principle of action pursued with certain perseverance, the maxim is a non-trivial reason for action. As a closer look at one of Kant’s examples of maxims shows, Kant uses the concept to elucidate the deliberative situation in which an agent evaluates his firm principle of action. According to this reading, maxims are the subject matter of evaluation and justification, and as such, they tell us something about the psychology of human action, irrespective of whether or not the evaluation standard is a moral one or not. Humans, therefore, do not only act for reasons but also reflect on and evaluate their principles of action. As such, maxims are not either first-order principles resp. more specific intentions for singular actions or second-order principles of volition and intention.³⁰ In contrast, Kant’s concept of maxims is richer as it combines both types of principles. Moreover, the distinction between firstand second-order maxims does not concern the content of maxims, but their function in practical deliberation. As I would like to show in the remainder of this article, maxims are not just constitutional conditions for human action in general and morally worthy action in particular. The concept of maxims can also help to understand how the principles of an agent relate to his or her values in general and thus to his or her practical identity.

4 Practical identity and personal values A definitive reason for action is never isolated. It is always part of a network of beliefs and practical attitudes. This is what Kant expresses in his maxim theory. Maxims, he believes, can have different levels of generalization; only in this way

 This supports a reading of value defended by Oliver Sensen who sees value in Kant as a secondary notion. In his eyes, Kant does not defend a conception of absolute, external value. Instead, “value is something one is committed to valuing by the dictates of one’s own reason” (Sensen 2011, p. 4).  In this respect, many analyses of Kant’s concept of maxims are one-sided. While, for example, Nell 1975 understands maxims as specific intentions for singular actions, Allison 1990, pp. 39 – 40, 139 – 143, regards them primarily as hierarchically organized principles. Timmermann 2000, on the other hand, presents an interpretation that does justice to the various aspects of maxims.

82

Steffi Schadow

is it possible that we can drop maxims once accepted in favor of new ones. Kant holds the view that the pro-attitudes of an agent differ not only in terms of their content but also in terms of their quality. This quality has mainly to do with the coherence of someone’s conduct and the unity of their personality. Because people express what is important to them by consciously pursuing certain goals, every conscious choice of maxims can now be understood as part of a self-design. With every single action, we decide who we want to be because it is part of what is important to us. Kant makes this point by saying that we don’t just have a character, but acquire it by adopting principles (cf. HN, AA 15: 757.16 – 18). Christine Korsgaard interpreted this idea in her theory that the pursuit of self-chosen goals constitutes our practical identity (cf. Korsgard 1996b). Since we cannot choose to remain indifferent to whatever opportunities for action are presented to us, freedom does not only give us the opportunity to adopt our own purpose, but it also obliges us to do so. We cannot choose not to choose, and acting on maxims is inescapable for us. The idea of a normative self-image contained in Kant’s concept of maxims does, as such, not have moral connotations. It is perfectly possible for Kant that someone selects a practical identity built on “false” or “defective” maxims (Anth, AA 07: 292.10). The essential point of this process is the stability of one’s practical principles so that “even a man of bad character (such as Sulla) … can be the object of admiration” (Anth, AA 07: 293.17– 19).³¹ Independently of its moral value, the normative self-image chosen by someone indicates that he or she selected generalized reasons for action and sticks to them. Maxims can be understood as the grounds of one’s practical identity, because each choice of them is, at the same time, a conscious self-choice. It is almost self-evident that internal identity conflicts can arise. As I outlined in the last section, the ends and purposes that someone pursues in their actions can be difficult to reconcile with one another or even be mutually exclusive, so that the question remains how it is possible to describe such a weighing up and, if necessary, the adaptation of goals. Kant’s concept of maxims makes it possible to represent such internal conflicts conceptually. Since human beings are acting beings and, according to Kant’s quite pragmatic view, they need ‘a plan’ for their behavior in order to remain capable of acting, in case of conflict the demand for internal consistency already requires that one takes a position with respect to one’s goals and principles. Through reflection, it is then sometimes possible to recognize cherished

 Note, however, that wickedness is not conceivable as a character trait according to Kant (cf. Anth, AA 07: 293.28 – 30, RGV, AA 06: 37.18 – 23).

Acting for a Reason

83

principles as inappropriate or an entire self-image as mistaken. As Kant describes it in the Religion, where he in connection with his explanation of the possibility of moral evil makes the evaluation of principles a subject to discussion, we then sometimes see that we were dishonest with ourselves and thus threw “dust in our eyes” (RGV, AA 06: 38.23 – 24). To return to the line of thought outlined in Section 3: Perhaps you realize that your goal of getting a well-paid job actually goes back to your parents’ wish; your parents might share the Kantian advice that one should avoid starving in one’s old age (cf. KpV, AA 05: 20.30). Your stronger desire, on the other hand, is to be able to pursue an activity that fulfills you, and you realize that you are willing to accept limitations of a different kind because this corresponds more to your self-image. What you then do, you will do for the reason that is your genuine reason for action and that you can identify as such based on your overriding maxim. With the concept of maxims, Kant has an approach of higher-level attitudes that make it possible to reflect and weigh up desires or even less reflected proattitudes against each other. It thus proves advantageous when compared to, for example, a hierarchical model of action, such as that advocated by Harry Frankfurt. In this model, persons are supposed to be able to refer to their first-order desires reflectively through higher-order volitions, but it is not made clear what gives these higher-order volitions the authority necessary for a genuine deliberation process.³² Because they are not just further volitions, but conscious principles of action, maxims enable persons to appraise different options for action. Thus, maxims are linked to the practical identity of persons in a twofold way. On the one hand, the values that people express through maxims require a practical identity that makes it possible to position oneself in relation to various options for action and more or less reflected interests and desires. Stepping back behind short-term interests and reflecting on spontaneous options for action presupposes that there is a core identity that sets the stage for the possibilities for action and from which it first becomes possible to position oneself and to make choices.³³ On the other hand, Kant assumes that persons do not already have such a core identity naturally, but that someone first acquires a practical identity through their maxims and the values implicit in them. This idea is particularly  Cf. Frankfurt 1971; for a critical review of Frankfurt’s approach see for example Bratman 2007a.  Here I refer to a thought of Velleman 1992, who emphasizes that in describing action the actor himself should be seen as the stage of events.

84

Steffi Schadow

obvious in his anthropological and pedagogical writings, in which he claims that an essential task of human beings is to acquire and cultivate a character. While every human being has certain character traits or a certain ‘way of sensing’ (Sinnesart) already by nature, the character itself has to be ‘grounded’ first (Anth, AA 07: 295.01). In the Reflections on Anthropology, Kant denotes character as “that by which an object is identifiable and what determines the notion for which it is to be taken at any time” (“…das, wodurch ein Gegenstand kennbar ist und was den Begrif bestimt, wovor man ihn iederzeit zu nehmen hat.” Refl, AA 15: 756.06 – 07; my translation). It is thus, mutatis mutandis, the ’characteristic’ by which someone is recognized, as well as the sum of their peculiarities, and therefore stands for the identity of a person. Kant also refers to character as a ‘way of thinking’ (Denkungsart) and the ability to bind oneself to certain practical principles that one has set for oneself, qua reason, as rules of action (cf. Anth, AA 07: 292.06 – 09; cf. Päd, AA 09: 481.09 – 10). More precisely, this means that one behaves according to one’s natural temperament, acts according to firm principles, i. e. maxims, thereby acquiring originality (cf. Anth, AA 07: 293.04). Everything depends “on what the human being makes of himself” (Anth, AA 07: 292.16). This is possible by adopting principles in the first place and implementing them in one’s actions. Essential to the success of character formation is continuity and steadiness in following principles of action once adopted. This “firmness and persistence in principles” (Anth, AA 07: 294.28 – 29; cf. Anth, AA 07: 292.11) has a stabilizing effect on someone’s personality and is denoted by Kant, because it is “rare”, as “something precious and admirable” (Anth, AA 07: 292.13). He also expresses the idea that the stability of maxims is essential for the formation of a practical identity by tying the formation of character to the idea of a unified inner comportment of mind (Gesinnung).³⁴ Acquiring a character means “the absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct as such” (Anth, AA 07: 295.01– 02); for Kant, character formation is therefore always possible only as a whole and never only “in a fragmentary way” (Anth, AA 07: 294.33).³⁵

 Here I contradict the standard translation of “Gesinnung” as “disposition” and adopt Munzel’s translation as “comportment of mind”. As Munzel explains, her translation “seeks to capture both the notion of Haltung and the latter’s achievement by rigorously maintained principles, while also conveying the Latin reference to mind that is included in animus” (Munzel 1999, p. xvii).  In the Religion, Kant expresses this thought when he understands the change of heart from the evil to the good character as a “revolution”. Someone who is corrupted at the root of their principles (“This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims…”, RGV, AA 06: 37.11– 12) can also only improve as a whole, precisely through a “revolution in the comportment

Acting for a Reason

85

In this context, the continuity of the principles of action required for practical identity becomes apparent on several levels: On the one hand, at the level of the pursuit of principles adopted in previous actions, and on the other hand, at the level of the content of these principles. Although for Kant the appropriation of the identity of action does not seem to be limited a priori to moral action, it is important that the selected principles fit together and lead to a unified way of life.³⁶ For Kant, the practical implementation of the precept of uniformity in the conduct of life already begins in thinking. Thus, the maxim “to think always consistently” belongs to the principles of “common sense” along with the maxims of “to think for oneself” and “to think from the standpoint of everyone else” (KU, AA 05: 294.14– 18; cf. Anth, AA 07: 200.31– 37; HN, AA 15: 715.15 – 17). Kant also calls it the “maxim … of the consistent way of thinking”, which is, on the one hand, “hardest to attain” and, on the other hand, presupposes compliance with the first two maxims (KU, AA 05: 295.14– 15). According to this, both the unprejudiced self-thinking with the help of the intellect as well as the reflection on one’s own judgments supported by the power of judgment, which is only possible through the change of point of view, are prerequisites for the fact that a unified conduct of life by means of acting according to firm principles is possible through the correct practical use of reason.³⁷ In this way, the formation of a practical identity becomes a task that involves the entire personality, including the acquisition of intellectual virtues. Therefore, as Kant writes in the Pedagogy, acting according to principles can be prepared to a certain extent in education by giving children rules and making them understand the success of planned, deliberate action. It is essential that the child’s own thinking is trained so that

of mind” (RGV, AA 06: 47.24; my translation). Also, according to Kant’s rigorism, this inner attitude is a unity; we are either good or evil, never both at the same time (cf. RGV, AA 06: 16 – 22).  “The self-chosen and firm resolutions prove a character, … but only if they are similar to each other” (“Die selbstgewählte und feste Entschließungen beweisen einen Charakter, … aber nur, wenn sie sich ähnlich sind.” Refl, AA 15: 521.21– 22; my translation). Ultimately, the “supreme maxim” of “truthfulness” mentioned by Kant, which can be considered as “the only proof for a human being’s consciousness that he has character” (Anth, AA 07: 295.14– 17), also stands for the idea of unity of the comportment of mind. For someone who is dishonest with him or herself splits his or her own personality by not standing by what he or she actually thinks and wants. In the Religion, Kant has this case in mind when he describes the propensity to evil as “a … perfidy on the part of the human heart (dolus malus) in deceiving itself as regards of its own good or evil comportment of mind” (RGV, AA 06: 38.07– 09; my translation).  Therefore, Kant calls all three maxims “maxims of reason” (HN, AA 15: 715.15).

86

Steffi Schadow

at some point he or she no longer just follows “school maxims” but learns to adapt his or her own reflected principles (cf. Päd, AA 09: 481.03 – 18). As these considerations show, the appropriation of maxims, acting according to previously adopted principles as sources of valuable activities, forms the core of the practical identity of an agent, not least because in it a constituent of their ability to act is revealed. By accepting maxims and acting according to them, an agent makes use of his or her ability to be guided by reason – in thought and in action. Moreover, maxims are those practical attitudes that enable an agent to organize their desires and interests, as well as their own plans, intentions, and strategies, over an extended period of time. Singular intentions and plans, as can be shown with the help of the concept of maxims, always stand in a network of broader, more stable intentions: Only against such a background can an agent understand him- or herself as a practical identity.³⁸ Even though there can be irrational maxims and although individual actions need not have moral connotations, the formation of character as a “readiness to act in accordance with maxims” (Päd, AA 09: 481.09 – 10) is the prerequisite for moral action in the first place. Only those who have learned to act according to principles at all will be able to follow moral rules even when other reasons for action, such as reasons of prudence and self-love, are opposed to what is morally required.³⁹ Moreover, his actions are reliable; one can, as Kant says in the Reflections on Anthropology, “reliably count on him” (“sichere Rechnung (auf ihn) machen”: Refl 1494, AA 15: 756.15; my translation). The concept of maxims is therefore of twofold importance in terms of value theory, as shown in this contribution: For, on the one hand, it illuminates that attributable behavior is  This characterization of the special importance of maxims for practical identity is inspired by Bratman’s notion that they are so-called “self-governing policies” that enable the coordination of actions across time and thus stand for the self-understanding of an agent as a “temporally persistent agent whose agency is temporally extended”: “Indeed, this is part of what plans and policies are for. Such plans and policies have as their function the support of cross-temporal organization and coordination of action in part by inducing cross-temporal connections (for example, between prior plans or policies and later action, and between present intentional action and, later, planned activity) and continuities (for example, of stable plans and policies). A point of having plans and policies is to induce organization and coordination by way of such continuities and connections” (Bratman 2007b, pp. 32– 33).  In this regard, Kant writes in the Reflections: “A definite character: of whom one can judge in advance everything which may be determined in accordance with rules” (Refl, AA 15: 512.21– 22). “The invincibility of character is not based on whims but on principles, and this is the soil in which the most sublime good can be planted” (“Die unüberwindlichkeit des Vorsatzes im Charakter gründet sich nicht auf Launen, sondern auf Grundsätze; und das ist ein Boden, worauf das erhabenste Gute gepflanzt werden kan.” Refl, AA 15: 757.17– 23., my translation; cf. Munzel 1999, p. 61).

Acting for a Reason

87

based on practical attitudes, which in turn constitute value judgments and generate the practical identity of the agent; on the other hand, the ability to form such pro-attitudes, as maxims are, in the first place turns out to be a condition for morally valuable action.

References Albrecht, Michael (1994): “Kants Maximenethik und ihre Begründung”. In: Kant-Studien 85, pp. 129 – 146. Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kants Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt von Ursula Wolf. 3. Aufl. Reinbek: Rowohlt 2011. Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (1751): Ethica Philosophica. Repr. in: Immanuel Kant: Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 27. Berlin: de Gruyter 1900 ff., pp. 735 – 1015. Beck, Lewis W. (1960): A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bittner, Rüdiger (1974): “Maximen”. In G. Funke, J. Kopper (Eds.): Akten des Vierten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2, 2, Berlin: Akademie, pp. 485 – 498. Bratman, Michael E. (2007a): “Three Theories of Self-Governance”. In: Structures of Agency. Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 222 – 253. Bratman, Michael E. (2007b): “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency”. In: Structures of Agency. Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21 – 46. Bubner, Rüdiger (1982): Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Corcilius, Klaus (2008): “Praktische Syllogismen bei Aristoteles”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (3), pp. 247 – 297. Denis, Lara (2013): “Virtue and Its Ends (TL 6:394 – 398)”. In: Andreas Trampota/Oliver Sensen/Jens Timmermann (Eds.): Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 159 – 181. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971): “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. In: The Journal of Philosophy 68, 1, pp. 5 – 20. Gewirth, Alan (1978): Reason and Morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Gregor, Mary (1990): “Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”. In: Bernd Ludwig (Ed.): Immanuel Kant. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre. Hamburg: Meiner, pp. XXIX-LXV. Gressis, Robert (2010a): “Recent Work on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches”. In: Philosophy Compass 5, pp. 216 – 227. Gressis, Robert (2010b): “Recent Work on Kantian Maxims II. New Approaches”. In: Philosophy Compass 5, pp. 228 – 239. Herissone-Kelly, Peter (2018): Kant on Maxims and Moral Motivation. A New Interpretation, Springer E-Book, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05572-1. Herman, Barbara (1993a): “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty”. In: The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 1 – 22. Herman, Barbara (1993b): “Leaving Deontology behind”. In: The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 208 – 240.

88

Steffi Schadow

Höffe, Otfried (1979): “Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Kriterium des Sittlichen”. In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Ethik und Politik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 84 – 118. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996a): Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996b): The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McCarty, Richard (2009): Kant’s Theory of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Munzel, G. Felicitas (1999): Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nyholm, Sven (2017): “Do We Always Act on Maxims?” In: Kantian Review 22/2, pp. 233 – 255. Nell, Onora (1975): Acting on Principle. An Essay on Kantian Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press. O’Neill, Onora (1989): Constructions of Reasons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Placencia, Luis (2019): Handlung und praktisches Urteil bei Kant. Eine historische und systematische Untersuchung zu Kants Konzeption des absichtlichen Handelns und ihren urteilstheoretischen Voraussetzungen. Freiburg/München: Alber. Schadow, Steffi (2013): Achtung für das Gesetz. Moral und Motivation bei Kant. Berlin: De Gruyter. Schwartz, Maria (2006): Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Berlin: Lit-Verlag. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin: de Gruyter. Thurnherr, Urs (1994): Die Ästhetik der Existenz. Über den Begriff der Maxime und die Bildung von Maximen bei Kant, Tübingen: Francke. Timmermann, Jens (2000): “Kant’s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims”. In: The Harvard Review of Philosophy 8, pp. 39 – 52. Timmons, Mark (2006): “The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability (GMS II, 421 – 424)”. In: Christoph Horn/Dieter Schönecker (Eds.): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 158 – 199. Velleman, J. David (1992): “What Happens When Someone Acts?”. In: Mind 101, pp. 461 – 481. Watkins, Eric (2005): Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End?

Abstract: The aim of our paper is to develop a more differentiated understanding of the ‘negative’ part of the formula of humanity. What does it mean to treat others not as ends in themselves? At first glance, one might think that this would mean treating others as mere means, and indeed, the focus within the literature has mainly been on that kind of wrongdoing (recently Kleingeld 2020; Audi 2016, Part I; Kerstein 2013, Part I). But there are more categories. If you do not help someone in need whom you could easily help, but instead simply ignore them, then you do not treat them as an instrument for your purposes, but also not as an end in themselves. One could say that you treat them like a a mere irrellevant thing (cf. Sticker 2021). Furthermore, if someone is in your way and you simply remove them, you treat them neither as a means nor as an irrelevant thing, nor, for that matter, as an end in themselves, but as a mere obstacle. In the first part of our paper, we will explain the relevance of the distinction between (1) treating or regarding someone as a means, (2) as an irrelevant thing, or (3) as an obstacle. These can all be viewed as subcategories of the ‘thing’ part of the person–thing distinction that plays a central role in Kant’s ethics and which is the topic of the second part of our paper. In the third part we will point out that the distinction between ends in themselves or persons, on the one hand, and things, on the other, still does not cover an important kind of moral wrongdoing: we can treat others as negative ends. This is the case when harming others is the ultimate purpose of our actions.

Introduction One way in which Kant states his fundamental moral principle is his famous formula of humanity: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS, AA 04: 429.10 – 12). The first thing that comes to mind is that the formula of humanity forbids us from using others merely as means to our ends. This is explicitly stated in the

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-007

90

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

formula but is also implied by the requirement to treat others as ends.¹ Kant talks about “using as an end”, which seems awkward, as ‘using’ seems to be appropriate for means only. What could be considered a linguistic lapse here is due to the fact that he wants to use the same verb for the agent’s relation to means and ends. ‘Treating’ is more appropriate here.² The formula elucidates what is meant by treating persons as ends by making the opposite explicit. The answer to the question: ‘What does the formula of humanity require?’ is: ‘to treat every person, or the humanity within them, as an end.’ The answer to the question: ‘What does the formula forbid?’ is: ‘to use or treat persons, or the humanity within them, merely as a means’. The prohibition on using others as mere means to one’s ends, which is often referred to as the prohibition of instrumentalization, “is one of the best-known and most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory” (Kleingeld 2020, p. 389). The focus within the literature has mainly been on that kind of wrongdoing (Kleingeld 2020; Audi 2016, Part I; Kerstein 2013, Part I). But there are other kinds that are not captured by the prohibition of instrumentalization. This is why we speak of ‘blind spots’ in the formula of humanity. The focus on instrumentalization can obscure these other forms of moral wrongdoing, which are just as important. We aim to systematically explore in outline the different varieties of treating someone not as an end. Thereby the opposite, as it is required by the formula of humanity, is delineated indirectly and ex negativo, but we do not claim that this approach already yields a full understanding of what it means to treat persons as ends. We are not going to address the latter question directly; rather, we will focus on the ‘negative’ aspect of the formula. In the first part of this paper, we take a closer look at the kinds of wrongdoing not covered by instrumentalization. In the second part, we examine the person–thing distinction. For Kant, this distinction is connected to the absolute worth of persons and the only relative worth of things. This contrast is more ad-

 Kant refers to humanity in one’s own or another person, and it is this humanity in a person, rather than the person as such or as a whole, that is to be treated as an end. This is an important point to be kept in mind, but for reasons of simplicity we will mostly refer to treating persons as ends. Moreover, we will largely omit the case of conduct towards oneself, as it raises questions and problems of its own.  According to Kleingeld, “[t]he locution ‘using as an end’ is probably best understood as meaning ‘using qua end’ or ‘in accordance with its standing as an end’, that is, as indicating that one ought to use a human being in a way that is consistent with the latter’s moral standing as an end in itself” (Kleingeld 2020, p. 399). But ‘using qua end’ is still awkward, and moreover, a person affected by an action need not be used at all: they can, for example, also be treated solely as an end. And there are more possibilities, as we will see. Thus, a neutral and more encompassing term such as ‘treating’ is needed.

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

91

equate and more encompassing with respect to moral wrongdoing than the contrast between ends and means. But it still does not cover the category of ‘negative ends’ which we will address in the third part. The point here is that there are kinds of moral wrongdoing that do not amount to treating someone like a mere thing. Instead, they relate to the victim specifically as a person, albeit in a negative way.

1 What the focus on instrumentalization does not capture One could conclude from the formula of humanity that when we treat someone with our actions in a way that does not involve using them merely as a means, we are treating them as an end, i. e., in the morally required way. But this is not true in any intuitive reading of ‘using as a means’. There are at least two sorts of failure to treat others in the morally required manner even without using them as means: (1) treating them as irrelevant (cf. Sticker 2021; O’Neill 1996, ch. 7) or (2) treating them as mere obstacles. Both these categories constitute failures to treat others as ends in themselves. Once we treat someone as an end, we ascribe absolute worth to them and are treating them as the “supreme limiting condition” for our ends (GMS, AA 04: 431.07– 08; cf. GMS AA 04: 438.05 – 06). That is incompatible with using them as a mere means for one’s ends, a mere obstacle in one’s path or as completely irrelevant. But these are different kinds of wrongdoing. Not all moral wrongdoing is instrumentalization. Let us first have a closer look at the standard cases of instrumentalization: deception and coercion (see, e. g., O’Neill 1996, ch. 6). In deception, for example in the case of borrowing money from someone via insincerely promising that one will pay it back soon while having no intention of doing this, the other person is used as a mere means to get the money. He or she is viewed by and relevant to the agent only as a source of money, and that is why he or she is treated as a mere means (at least within this transaction). Another standard example is slavery. To the slaveholder, the slave is only relevant as a tool, e. g. to harvest the cotton. The slaveholder does not deceive the slave into labor by false promises but uses the more brutal instrument of coercion: the threat of physical punishment or death. Note, however, that in both cases, deception as well as coercion, although a person is treated as a mere means or instrument in one sense, in another respect they are not, since it is the person’s (free) agency that is required. The lender has to give the money, the slave has to harvest the cotton. Neither of them needs to

92

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

act in the required way; they could, at least in principle, refuse to do so. It is impossible to use an agent as an instrument in the same sense in which their body can be used when, e. g., a runaway trolley is stopped by pushing someone into its path. Instrumentalizing an agent as an agent, and not merely their body, means that the agent has to do something specific, and as long as there is agency proper the person can in principle refrain from doing this (lending the money, working for their master). This fact gives rise to a characteristic duty to oneself. In the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant refers to “rightful honour”: “Rightful honour (honestas iuridica) consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying, ‘Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.’ This duty will be explained later as an obligation from the right of humanity in our own person (Lex iusti)” (MS, AA 06: 236.24– 30). There are related passages in the Doctrine of Virtue, §12, where Kant states that there is a “duty with reference to the dignity of humanity within us” (MS, AA 06: 436.15 – 16), implying that “[b]owing and scraping before a human being seems in any case to be unworthy of a human being”, and even that “one who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him” (MS, AA 06: 437.12– 26). It is, however, not clear whether Kant would have been ready to apply these sayings to slavery; the context in §12 of the Doctrine of Virtue is rather that of servility. To be sure, in cases of instrumentalization the perpetrator would certainly wish to use the victim as a mere means and therefore applies deception or coercion in order to manipulate the victim’s agency. The perpetrator’s attitude towards the victim is indeed that of instrumentalization and in this sense, they treat the other person as a mere means, although literally using a person as a means would mean to directly use their body, as in the trolley case. Let us now look at kinds of moral wrongdoing other than instrumentalization. We can fail to treat others as ends even though we are not using them as means. One way to do this is to treat others as irrelevant. This kind of indifference comes in several varieties: for example, not helping others when they are in dire need and we could easily help them, or recklessly not caring whether others are disturbed, endangered, or otherwise negatively affected by our conduct. In both cases, we proceed as if the others were not there. It is artificial to subsume this under the category of ‘(merely) using as means’. It may be claimed that in such cases ignoring the others is a means to achieve one’s end (see, e. g., Prauss 2006, §17). This is a strange way of putting it, though, because calling ‘ignoring someone’ a means suggests other kinds of situations, in which, for example, the ignoring is deliberately employed to provoke or suppress a certain reaction from another person. But even if one were also willing to describe in

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

93

this way a failure to help, inconsiderateness, or, in general, cases in which the agent simply does not care, it would still not be true that other persons are used as means in these cases. Rather, they do not matter to the agent at all; they are treated as irrelevant.³ Another type of moral wrongdoing is that of removing or destroying someone who is in one’s way, of treating them merely as a hindrance to one’s plans. Perhaps there is a conflict of interest. The other person wants what you want: the position, the partner, the house. If you achieve your aim by killing or threatening the other person, or by deceiving them in order to distract them, or by damaging their reputation by making false accusations against them, etc., you treat them as a mere obstacle, as nothing but a hindrance to your plans that is to be removed. The removal of the other, to be sure, is a means to one’s ends, but it is not the case that he or she is used or treated as or like an instrument. On the contrary, you have to get rid of the other person in order to get what you want. Both treating a person as irrelevant or as a mere obstacle in one’s way are incompatible with what the formula of humanity requires: to treat each person as a supreme limiting condition for one’s own ends. But as long as one sticks to anything like the ordinary meaning of ‘using as means’, these kinds of moral wrongdoing are no instances of it. Thus, the distinction between treating others as ends in themselves and treating them as mere means is not exhaustive. We can mistreat others without instrumentalizing them.

2 The person–thing distinction Related to Kant’s end–means distinction is the person–thing distinction. It is insofar better suited to capture moral wrongdoing as ‘thing’ is a wider notion than ‘means’. Kant ascribes absolute worth or dignity to persons and relative worth to things, that is, value relative to the desires and inclinations of agents. Whether a thing has relative worth for an agent depends on whether it is useful or useless with respect to their goals. They judge the value of things in relation to their ends: if they are useful, they can become means to their ends; if they are useless, they will ignore them; and if they stand in the way of attaining their goals, they will try to remove or destroy them. Correspondingly, one could talk about the  The notion of ‘treating’ is used in a broad sense here, as is inevitable if every kind of morally relevant behaviour is to be covered by this term (cf. Parfit 2011, p. 184). If a person is affected by an action or omission of some agent and the agent knows or could reasonably be expected to know this, then he or she treats the person in his or her action in one way or another.

94

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

positive, neutral, and negative value of things. Other persons, as ends in themselves, limit the application of this view. They constrain the agent’s judgment of the value of everything according to its (positive, neutral, or negative) value for his or her ends. For, to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition of its universal validity as a law is tantamount to saying that the subject of ends, that is, the rational being itself, must be made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as a means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, that is, always at the same time as an end. (GMS, AA 04: 438.01– 07)

In the Groundwork, Kant refers several times to rational beings as ends in themselves or “limiting conditions” for the ends of others (GMS, AA 04: 431.07– 08, 436.21, 438.05 – 06). That is linked to their capacity to set themselves ends and thereby give value to things (GMS, AA 04: 437.21– 22). That a person has absolute worth or dignity in contrast to the merely relative worth of things implies that he or she is a supreme limiting condition for everyone’s setting of ends (GMS, AA 04: 428.22– 24). Using someone as a mere means to one’s ends is of course a moral wrong from this perspective, but it is only a subcategory of treating someone as a mere thing. ‘Treating’ refers to the agent’s attitude and not only to their outward behavior. ‘Treating as a mere thing’ means to regard other persons as if they were just things. The topic of the formula of humanity, like that of the other formulas of the categorical imperative and the moral law in general, is the morality, not the legality of actions (see Nyholm 2015, sect. 4.1– 4.3). The formulas distinguish conduct based on (respect for) the moral law from conduct based on inclination, and only indirectly, or secondarily, do they distinguish conduct in accordance with duty from conduct contrary to duty. It is the first contrast that is expressed in the formula of humanity, so ‘using’ or ‘treating’ are to be read as ‘regarding in practice’. For example, if you save the life of a drowning person just to become famous and be on TV, you are using the person merely as a means and thus treat her or him in a manner contrary to what the formula requires. To be sure, rescuing the person is still the right thing to do, because this is also what someone would do who did regard the person as an end.⁴

 This is also relevant for the following point: As Sticker has pointed out to us in conversation, the category of treating others as mere irrelevant things includes violations of negative as well as of positive duties (running over a person through reckless driving versus failure to help in an emergency), whereas ‘treating as a mere means’ and ‘treating as a mere obstacle’ always seem to imply violations of negative duties. But if you fail to help someone in an emergency not because they are irrelevant to you, but because they are your competitor and you are

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

95

The notion of ‘treating as a mere thing’ is better suited to conceptualizing moral wrongdoing than the notion of ‘treating as a mere means’, provided the terms are taken in their ordinary meaning. That Kant speaks as if (and may be understood as implying that) they amount to the same thing may be due to the fact that the end–means contrast is fundamental in the theory of action. Referring to it in the context of moral philosophy conforms to one of Kant’s main ideas: that morality directly arises from practical rationality, i. e., rational agency. So Kant talks about means also in places where he should rather and may indeed be taken to refer to things. ⁵ But tacitly turning ‘means’ into a technical term in this way invites misunderstanding. In particular, it wrongly suggests that instrumentalization is the core of all moral wrongdoing, when in fact it is merely a specific variety of it. Thus, treating or regarding other people as ends in themselves is opposed to treating or regarding them as (mere) things, and there are three subcategories of this: treating or regarding people (1) as a (mere) means, that is, as things useful to one’s purposes; (2) as irrelevant, that is, as (mere) useless things not mattering at all; or (3) as (mere) obstacles or hindrances, that is, as things opposed to one’s purposes. An alternative phrasing has been proposed by Parfit (2011, Ch. 9) and Sticker (2021). Sticker, instead of viewing treating someone as a thing as a comprehensive category with three subcategories, contrasts treating someone as a mere means and treating them as a mere thing. His idea is that we are indifferent toward things but not towards means, since the latter are useful to us. But this fails to do justice to the fact that there is a third possibility. Things that are not useful need not be indifferent to us: they can also be contrary to our goals. Thus it seems better to stick to the contrast between persons and things that Kant himself puts so much emphasis on and use ‘thing’ (or ‘treating or regarding as a mere thing’) as an overarching category to characterize moral wrongdoing.

happy that they are now incapacitated (while you would have helped them otherwise), you may be said to have treated them as a mere obstacle. In general, the categories we are dealing with here do not seem to track the distinction between negative and positive duties, so we leave that distinction aside. Likewise, these categories display no general connection to degrees of severity of moral infringements.  Another reason for Kant’s choice of terms will be addressed in the next section. It is the thought that acting from inclination always amounts to pursuing one’s own happiness, so that whatever one does out of inclination is only a means to one’s happiness.

96

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

3 What the person–thing distinction does not cover: treating others as negative ends Even if what we have argued so far is correct, the distinction between ends in themselves, or persons, on the one hand, and things, on the other, still does not cover an important kind of moral wrongdoing. Other persons can also be treated with malevolence or as ‘negative ends’. This is the case when hurting, harming, or humiliating others is the ultimate purpose of our action and is pursued for its own sake. These persons are clearly not treated as ends in themselves, neither are they treated as means to achieve something we want, nor as obstacles in our way, nor are they indifferent to us. On the contrary, they matter to us a lot. However, they matter to us not as things do, but specifically as persons, and even, in a sense, ‘in themselves’, albeit in a negative way. They have become the object of our envy or hatred or cruelty and thus motivated, we aim at harming or even destroying them as persons. They can be the object of malevolence only because they are viewed in that way. In contrast, the slaveholders who have their slaves harvest the cotton would be served just as well by a machine. Margalit (1996, p. 103) describes the behavior of “masters of grand palaces” towards their servants in this manner. Masters gave their servants orders and otherwise ‘looked through them’ as if they were things, part of the equipment of the rooms. This means in particular that “in essence, one may do anything whatsoever in front of them” (ibid.). Likewise, the insincere promise is made to raise money, regardless of the lender’s person, and there would be no relevant difference to the deceiver if the money came instead from an automaton or were simply to be found in the streets. To be sure, the deceiver knows very well that he or she is dealing with a person, but the aim is just to use this person’s agency for his or her own purposes, so the other person does not ultimately matter to the deceiver as a person.⁶

 It is, however, not clear whether all cases of instrumentalization work in this way. Are there not also cases in which the victim is treated specifically as a person, but still used as a mere means? Imagine someone craving for applause whose behaviour towards (certain) other people is shaped by the sole aim to bask in their admiration. Is he or she not using these other people merely as a means, while still needing them as persons – for only persons can admire? As long as the admiration is given voluntarily, it seems that the agent treats the other people also as ends in themselves and does not instrumentalize them after all. If, by contrast, the agent forces them to cheer, he or she certainly treats them as mere means. But then the applause is not given voluntarily, and the admiration is only simulated and worth nothing. If the agent is satisfied with this, he or she would indeed be served just as well by machines. Thus it seems that the envis-

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

97

Thus we arrive at a threefold distinction of practical attitudes towards others: treating (or regarding) them as ends in themselves or ‘positive’ ends, treating (or regarding) them as things, and treating (or regarding) them as negative ends; ‘treating as a thing’ in turn comprises three subcategories: treating as a means, treating as an irrelevant thing, and treating as an obstacle. Clearly, there are all kinds of ‘mixed cases’ in the treatment of others, and therefore the “merely” is important in Kant’s formula. What is morally required is to treat others always (also) as ends in themselves, never merely as means, obstacles, irrelevant things, negative ends, or any combination of these. In contrast to Kant, Schopenhauer ([1841] 2007, §§14– 15) puts forward three categories of attitudes towards others: first, egoism; second, altruism, benevolence or compassion; and third, malevolence or malice. Those who act out of (pure) egoism regard and treat others as (mere) things that can further or hinder their aims or be irrelevant in that respect. Altruism, benevolence or compassion mean that others are taken into account for their own sake. This attitude parallels Kant’s ‘treating as an end’, although, to be sure, for Schopenhauer the attitude is being emotion-based rather than reason-based. Malice, passively mirrored in ‘Schadenfreude’, means that the suffering of others is viewed with pleasure and pursued for its own sake. It is not that one wants to harm them because they are somehow in one’s way; rather, their degradation, distress, or even destruction is the ultimate aim of the action. This is what we call ‘treating as a negative end’. It is an everyday phenomenon that comes in various forms of greater or lesser severity. The difference between malevolence and egoism can also be explained in the following way: Egoism is about the manner in which one pursues one’s ends – that is, recklessly, without taking into account others for their own sake – whereas malevolence sets a certain kind of end with respect to another person. Therefore, the ‘thing’-category is relevant to how the egoist relates to others, whereas in malice, the other is conspicuously regarded as a person; there is no malice towards things, let alone ‘mere’ things.⁷ Characterizing malice as relating to other persons as negative ends is not what Kant himself does. The central point for him is that both egoism and malevolence in their numerous varieties originate in our inclinations. For Kant, an action is either motivated by inclination or by respect for the moral law. Moreaged distinction can be upheld also in view of such examples. We are grateful to Irina Schumski for raising this point.  Note, however, that some, but by no means all, kinds of malevolence can also be directed at animals, for example cruelty. Animals, or in general sentient beings that are not at the same time rational beings, constitute a category in between things and persons in that respect.

98

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

over, acting from inclination ultimately amounts to the pursuit of one’s own happiness, i. e., to self-love. These are Kant’s general titles under which he categorizes all our various inclinations and desires. This implies, first, that in acting from inclination others are generally treated as mere means to one’s own happiness, and second, that enjoying evil that happens to others, or taking pleasure in actively harming or humiliating them, are forms of self-love. To subsume motivation driven by inclination generally under the heading of ‘self-love’ is unjustified. Inclinations need not have anything specifically to do with oneself, except that they are one’s inclinations. One is the subject of one’s inclinations (and, in this sense, the lover), but not always also the object (or the beloved). It cannot be called self-love when one wants to help others for their own sake, or preserve the environment for its own sake, etc., even when the motive is not respect for the moral law, but, say, compassion or admiration of nature’s beauty. Acting from such emotions or sentiments does not mean that with or by way of the respective actions one ultimately aims at one’s own happiness, because the object of these inclinations is not oneself. They aim at states of affairs that do not involve oneself in any sense. Thus, Kant’s all-encompassing use of ‘self-love’ is misleading; for the same reason, as well as for the reasons given in the previous section, it is misleading to suggest that everyone following their inclinations treat other people merely as means to their own happiness. One may, however, suspect that in the case of malevolence or what we call ‘treating someone as a negative end’ there is always self-love involved in the substantial (not purely formal, or Kantian) sense of the term. Kant writes about malice in the Doctrine of Virtue, §36, where he, like Schopenhauer after him, describes it as “the direct opposite of sympathy”: Malice, the direct opposite of sympathy, is likewise no stranger to human nature; but when it goes so far as to help bring about ills or evil it makes hatred of human beings visible and appears in all its hideousness as malice proper. It is indeed natural that, by the laws of imagination (namely, the law of contrast), we feel our own well-being and even our good conduct more strongly when the misfortune of others or their downfall in scandal is put next to our own condition, as a foil to show it in so much the brighter light. But to rejoice immediately in the existence of such enormities destroying what is best in the world as a whole, and so also to wish for them to happen, is secretly to hate human beings; and this is the direct opposite of love for our neighbour which is incumbent on us as a duty. (MS, AA 06: 459.36 – 460.11)

So Kant acknowledges the existence of malice, but locates its source in self-love, because it is due to the motive to “feel our own well-being and even our good conduct more strongly”. Likewise, the concept of self-love seems to naturally include arrogance, contempt, defamation and ridicule (cf. TL, AA 06: 464.10 –

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

99

465.06) as vices that give oneself a higher standing in comparison to others. The problem of distinguishing between egoism and malevolence, as Schopenhauer conceives them, is that the latter may be rooted in our desire to be placed or place ourselves above others, which is an egoistic motive connected to selflove in the substantial sense. Although the desire to harm others can be so strong that it is pursued contrary to one’s self-interest (in an intuitive sense of ‘self-interest’), and so although in this manner malice mirrors altruism, a closer look reveals the self-interested motivation behind many forms of malevolence. Self-love, taken in a substantial sense, also contains the phenomena of hate and cruelty towards others if these are a reaction to a perceived lower standing of oneself. That kind of attitude can even spring from benefits bestowed upon one by others: When ingratitude toward one’s benefactor extends to hatred of him it is called ingratitude proper, but otherwise mere unappreciativeness. It is, indeed, publicly judged to be one of the most detestable vices; and yet human beings are so notorious for it that it is not thought unlikely that one could even make an enemy by rendering a benefit […] for we fear that by showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a dependent in relation to his protector. (MS, AA 06: 459.10 – 22)

While there are undoubtedly varieties of malevolence that are in this way rooted in self-love in the substantial sense, it is questionable whether this is so for other kinds of malice, for example, a general “hatred of human beings” (to use Kant’s own words). But even if all such vices had their roots in and could be analyzed in terms of self-love, they would still not fall into the category of regarding or treating others as mere things. Rather, the attitudes in question are directed specifically at persons. In these attitudes, we take a negative interest in the other person as a person and aim at degrading them as a person. While according to the person–thing distinction the moral wrongdoing consists in not acknowledging the other’s status as a person, it is the other way around with malice: we do acknowledge the status of the other as a person, but relate to that status in a negative way, wanting to degrade the other person and in extremis wanting to deprive them of that status: to destroy them as a person. When it comes to the desire for revenge, Kant uses the same terms as Schopenhauer does for malevolence, namely that we make it our own end to harm others even if we do not secure any advantage by it: “The sweetest form of malice is the desire for revenge. Besides it might even seem that one has the greatest right, and even the obligation (as a desire for justice), to make it one’s end to harm others without any advantage to oneself” (MS, AA 06: 460.19 – 22).

100

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

This, however, does not mean that Kant also arrives at a threefold distinction of attitudes towards others after all. He speaks of a desire for revenge that goes along with the misguided idea that we have the right or even the duty to harm the other. Such a desire of course goes back to feelings that would still be subsumed under self-love or egoism by Kant. It is only that agents in the grip of these feelings pretend before themselves and deceive themselves into thinking that they are doing the work of duty. Still, and to reiterate our point, the desire for revenge is an attitude specifically towards persons, not things, and in taking revenge the other is not regarded as or treated like a mere thing. On the contrary, in the desire for revenge the other person is even viewed as essentially on a par with oneself.⁸ In most cases of malevolence, there is a lack of recognition of the other and therefore, as one may say about the more severe of these cases, an element of dehumanization. This is a main theme of Margalit (1996). It does not contradict our claim that in malevolence one relates to and regards the other specifically as a person. Rather, it points to a paradoxical aspect of or even a contradiction in certain malevolent attitudes: they involve an acknowledgment of the other as a person, but at the same time they are denied (full) recognition.⁹ We cannot here discuss the question of whether this paradox is real or merely apparent, and for which forms of malice it is real; we only note that it constitutes a potential way of arguing for the irrationality of these forms of malice. But this kind of paradox does not seem to affect the desire for revenge. Another passage in Kant with respect to which one might think that he introduces a third possibility for an attitude besides self-love and respect for the moral law is a famous note on Schiller in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. ¹⁰ There, Kant addresses the possibility of a “hidden hatred of the law”: Now if we ask, ‘What is the aesthetic constitution, the temperament so to speak of virtue: is it courageous and hence joyous, or weighed down by fear and dejected?’ an answer is hardly necessary. The latter slavish frame of mind can never be found without a hidden hatred of the law, whereas a heart joyous in the compliance with its duty (not just complacency in the recognition of it) is a sign of genuineness in virtuous disposition, even where piety is concerned, which does not consist in the self-torment of a remorseful sinner (a torment which is very ambiguous, and usually only an inward reproach for having offended against

 We are grateful to Damiano Ranzenigo for pointing this out to us.  See Margalit (1996, pp. 109 f., 118). The possibility of expressing the (apparent) paradox by contrasting acknowledgment and recognition was brought to our attention by Eva Buddeberg.  We are grateful to Christoph Horn for pressing us to clarify the relevance of this passage for our topic.

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

101

prudence), but in the firm resolve to improve in the future. This resolve, encouraged by good progress, must effect a joyous frame of mind, without which one is never certain of having gained also a love for the good, i. e. of having incorporated the good into one’s maxim. (RGV, AA 06: 23.01)

Is this hatred of the moral law a third kind of motivation connected to the category of malevolence or treating others as negative ends? No: For virtuous persons, autonomy as self-legislation transforms what they ought to do into what they want to do, as they are vividly aware of their autonomy. They realize that respect for the law is nothing but self-respect for the law-giving capacity within themselves. To vicious persons, by contrast, the moral law appears as an alien law requiring their submission, i. e., it is experienced as heteronomous, and therefore with hidden hatred, since it is only seen as constraining. Thus, the hatred of the law the vicious person feels arises from self-love, which “is precisely the source of all evil” according to Kant (RGV, AA 06: 45.11– 15). So, Kant’s usual twofold distinction is maintained here, too. “Hatred of the law” as an independent motivational category would aim at moral evil for its own sake, at evil as evil, and therefore lead to actions performed ‘under the guise of evil’. That corresponds to treating someone as a negative end in a narrow and, from Kant’s perspective, literal sense of the term. In Kant’s system respect for the law corresponds to treating the humanity in persons as an end, and so hatred of the law as an independent motivational category would correspond to treating the humanity in persons as a negative end. It would mean mistreatment of persons, or of the humanity within them, independent of self-interested motives, or, to use Kant’s words: “to make it one’s end to harm others without any advantage to oneself”. This would in turn mean that in this respect other persons do not have a relative (positive, neutral, or negative) worth for the agent, conditional on his or her inclinations, but a kind of absolute value: namely absolute negative value, absolute disvalue. Other persons would be the supreme limiting condition of his or her ends, insofar as they are given by inclination, but again in a negative sense. The hatred of mankind in the sense of and due to hatred of the moral law would lead to a constraint on acting from inclination in a way that mirrors and is symmetrical to the constraint imposed by respect for the moral law. Kant rejects this possibility: The depravity of human nature is therefore not to be named malice, if we take this word in the strict sense, namely as a disposition (a subjective principle of maxims) to incorporate evil qua evil for incentive into one’s maxim (since this is diabolical), but should rather be named perversity of the heart, and this heart is then called evil because of what follows. An evil heart can coexist with a will which in general is good. Its origin is the frailty of human nature, in not being strong enough to comply with its adopted principles, coupled

102

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

with its dishonesty in not screening incentives (even those of well-intentioned actions) in accordance with the moral guide, and hence at the end, if it comes to this, in seeing only to the conformity of these incentives to the law, not to whether they have been derived from the latter itself, i. e. from it as the sole incentive. (RGV, AA 06: 37.18 – 31)

From this passage, it is again clear that Kant sees the human desires or inclinations, summarized by him under the label of self-love, as the basis of evil. The depravity of human nature does not consist in malice “in the strict sense”, which would be to aim at evil for its own sake. This – the “diabolical” – is not possible for humans, according to Kant (cf. RGV, AA 06: 35.03 – 04), and that explains why he, in contrast to Schopenhauer subsuming all inclination under self-love, does not see the need for a third category of motivation. Perhaps Kant was not altogether sure about this point, as there is a tension between the Doctrine of Virtue and the Religion on malice and the diabolical. He describes some vices as “devilish” in the Doctrine of Virtue (MS, AA 06: 461.14) and refers to “hatred of human beings” as “malice proper” (MS, AA 06: 460.01). So “malice in the strict sense” does not exist in human beings according to the Religion, but “malice proper” does, according to the Doctrine of Virtue. But even if this distinction could be upheld and Kant was correct in claiming that pursuing evil for its own sake or acting under the guise of evil is not a human possibility – a question that we do not try to settle here – it would still be true that malevolence in the broad sense, whatever its source, is an attitude that cannot appropriately be described by claiming that in (acting on) it other human beings are regarded or treated as mere things.

Conclusion What does it mean to treat persons always at the same time as ends? We approached this question by asking the opposite: what does it mean to treat someone not as an end? It turned out that this cannot simply be equated with treating them merely as a means. Therefore we speak of ‘blind spots’ in the formula of humanity. First, if we avoid treating someone (merely) as a means this does not necessarily mean that we are treating them (also) as an end. To ignore someone in dire need or to eliminate someone who is a hindrance to one’s plans are forms of not treating someone as an end even though they do not involve treating them as a means. In these sorts of cases, the person is treated rather as a mere irrelevant thing or as a mere obstacle.

Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity

103

Second, treating someone as an end implies not treating them as a mere thing. Treating someone as a (mere) thing means either treating them as a (mere) means, as a (mere) irrelevant thing, or as a (mere) obstacle. All these are subcategories of the ‘thing’-part of the person–thing distinction. We observed that Kant’s way of speaking is somewhat metaphorical, since, in particular, when we use someone merely as a means we rarely treat them literally like a thing in the sense of a lifeless object. ‘Using’ someone often means using their agency, and whether or not they act in the required way is ultimately up to them. Still, the attitude of the perpetrator is properly described as that of instrumentalization or treating others as a mere means. Third, the person–thing distinction is still not suited to capture all kinds of moral wrongdoing or moral wrongdoing as such. While it is more appropriate than the end–means distinction on the ‘negative’ side, as ‘thing’ is broader than ‘means’, it is less appropriate on the ‘positive’ side. Malevolent action of every kind relates to the other specifically as a person with the aim of degrading them as a person. Here, the other is not treated or regarded as or like a mere thing, but as a person, albeit in a negative way, which we have called ‘treating as a negative end’. To introduce this as a separate category of moral wrongdoing does not by itself mean to question Kant’s fundamental distinction between acting from respect for the moral law and acting from inclination. While the latter is a twofold distinction, it does not match the person–thing contrast (nor, for that matter, the end–means contrast): to be moved by an inclination to behave in a certain way towards another person does not imply that one relates to, regards or treats this person as if he or she were a (mere) thing. We arrive at a threefold categorization of practical attitudes towards others: treating or regarding them as ends in themselves or ‘positive’ ends, treating or regarding them as things, and treating or regarding them as negative ends.¹¹

 We are very grateful for the opportunities to discuss previous versions of this paper at a KantWorkshop in Bonn, the Conference Kant in Progress at Bayreuth, the Practical Philosophy Workshop at Ujue, the Kantian Rationality Lab, the Practical Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Konstanz, and the Colloquium for Practical Philosophy and Ethics at LMU Munich. We are especially grateful to Christoph Horn, Robinson dos Santos, Alice Pinheiro Walla, Anna Goppel, Martin Sticker and Thomas Sturm for the invitation to these events and comments on earlier versions of the paper. Corinna especially thanks the Berlin Institute for Advanced Studies for a fellowship in the academic year 2020/21 and for the support of Anja Brockmann from the WiKo library. Last but not least, we are grateful to Christopher von Bülow and James McGuiggan for improving our English.

104

Corinna Mieth, Jacob Rosenthal

References Audi, Robert (2016): Means, Ends, and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel [1785] (1996a): “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”. In: Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Mary J. Gregor (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37 – 108. Kant, Immanuel [1797] (1996b): “The Metaphysics of Morals”. In: Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Mary J. Gregor (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353 – 603. Kant, Immanuel [1793/1794] (1998): “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”. In: Allen Wood/George di Giovanni (Eds.). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31 – 192. Kerstein, Samuel J. (2013): How to Treat Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kleingeld, Pauline (2020): “How to Use Someone ‘Merely as a Means’”. In: Kantian Review 25(3), pp. 389 – 414. Margalit, Avishai (1996): The Decent Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Nyholm, Sven (2015): Revisiting Kant’s Universal Law and Humanity Formulas. Berlin, Bosten: De Gruyter. O’Neill, Onora (1996): Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parfit, Derek (2011): On What Matters. Volume One. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prauss, Gerold (2006): Die Welt und Wir. Band I, 2: Die Grenzen einer Absicht. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. Schopenhauer, Arthur [1841] (2007): Über die Grundlage der Moral. Hamburg: Meiner. Sticker, Martin (2021): “Poverty, Exploitation, Mere Things and Mere Means”. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10238-9

Rocco Porcheddu

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals Abstract: In the second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the concept of an end in itself and defines it as something whose existence has an absolute value. He continues with the assertion that the ground of a possible categorical imperative lies solely in this end in itself. Now Kant, in his remarks on the realm of ends, also operates with the notions of an end in itself and absolute value – seemingly in a different way, however. Basically, the supposed difference in these two ways of using the concepts of absolute value and an end in itself consists in the fact that in the first case both serve as a precondition for the categorical imperative’s validity, whereas in the passages concerning the realm of ends both have to be seen as a consequence of its validity. Hence, at first glance, Kant seems to use both terms inconsistently in Groundwork II. In the present paper, however, I aim to show that the assumption of such a putative inconsistency expresses an inadequate understanding of the internal structure of the concepts of the end in itself and absolute value rather than a real problem in Kant’s way of arguing.

In his remarks on the realm of ends in the second chapter of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,¹ Kant makes use of the concepts of absolute value and of an end in itself, which prima facie show a remarkable difference in the way they are used in the introductory passage on the end in itself and the formula of humanity (Cf. GMS, AA 04: 427.19 – 29.28). Basically, the difference consists  I shall make use of the following translations from Kant’s writings: Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, 2000 (KU). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood, with essays by J. B. Schneewind, Marcia Baron, Shelly Kagan, Allen W. Wood, 2002 (GMS). Critique of Practical Reason, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, general introduction by Allen W. Wood, 1996 (KpV). Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge, 1998 (KrV). The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary J. Gregor, 1996 (MM). However, all page numbers refer to the pagination of the so-called Akademie Edition: Kant, Immanuel (1900 ff): Gesammelte Schriften. Eds.: Vols. 1– 22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Vol. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-008

106

Rocco Porcheddu

of the following: In the introductory passage, the end in itself and its absolute value serve as a ground for the validity of the categorical imperative, whereas in the realm of ends, the end in itself and absolute value (dignity) are based upon the categorical imperative and hence presuppose its validity. The realm of ends is an intersubjective order in which every rational being is an addressee of the universal laws, and at the same time, a legislator. Now, in the realm of ends legislation is nothing but morality or, more precisely, moral autonomy. Since the realm of ends, according to Kant, is something to be realized, moral legislation in its context means real, actual morality, i.e. actual moral willing and agency – not only morality in form of a mere disposition.² Thus, the status of a law giving rational being, as an end in itself, is equally something to be realized and therefore a consequence of the absolute value of the moral principle, which presupposes the absolute value of the end in itself. So, we have to raise the question of whether Kant’s use of the concepts of an absolute value and an end in itself in the Groundwork is inconsistent. In the following, we shall call this the inconsistency problem. The reading defended in this paper has three main parts. The first consists of a more precise description of the inconsistency problem by taking a closer look at the relevant passages of GMS II. The purpose of the second part is to outline a possible solution to the inconsistency problem. In the third, we will discuss some key premises, implications of the proposed solution respectively, and argue for their plausibility.

1 The Inconsistency Problem – a Closer Look So, in our first step, we shall elaborate on the inconsistency problem by way of a more thorough examination of Kant’s remarks on dignity and the end in itself in the realm of ends. After having distinguished the concepts of price and dignity in the realm of ends and defined dignity as that ‘which is elevated above all price and admits of no equivalent’ (GMS, AA 04: 434.31– 34), Kant continues: [W1] That which […] constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have merely a relative worth, i.e., a price, but rather an inner worth, i. e., dignity. (GMS, AA 04: 434.31– 34)

 Cf.: ‘Such a realm of ends would actually be brought about through maxims, the rule of which is prescribed by the categorical imperatives of all rational beings, if they were universally followed’ (GMS, AA 04: 438.31– 32).

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

107

What is irritating about W1 is the fact that dignity or absolute value is ascribed to the condition of the end in itself, although, when he introduces the term, Kant already attributes absolute value to the end itself, not to its condition. The crucial passage reads: But suppose there were something whose existence in itself had an absolute worth, something that, as end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it and only in it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i. e., of a practical law. (GMS, AA 04: 429.02– 09)

Now, if the end in itself already has absolute value, it seems quite strange to assign this very value to its own condition. For one would suppose that something, whose value is based on something else and its value, for its part can have only a derived or conditioned and therefore no absolute value. The following passage even intensifies the impression of this lack of plausibility: [W2] Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, because only through morality is it possible to be a legislative member in the realm of ends. Thus morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, is that alone which has dignity. (GMS, AA 04: 435.05 – 09)

So, morality is the condition of a possible end in itself, and because it has the function of being this condition it has absolute value. However, W2 seems to present an inadmissible circular argument, since the end in itself, according to the passage introducing this term, already provides the basis for the validity of the categorical imperative or practical law. Yet W2, in turn, claims that morality is a condition of the end in itself. Let us take a closer look at the argument in W2. Only through morality can rational beings be law-giving members in the realm of ends. Since the realm of ends is a really possible order, in its context, one must consequently understand the legislation of rational beings as actual moral willing and acting, not as a mere disposition. In this sense, one must interpret the idea of morality as a condition of the end in itself. But then the rational being becomes an end in itself (through its moral actions) and consequently, the latter is something to be realized. Given some of Kant’s statements in later passages of GMS II, and especially in light of the majority of the interpretations present in t h e research, the opinion that the end in itself is something to be realized requires explanation. We will return to this point later. The next sentence of [W3] again confirms the impression of a lack of plausibility: ‘[W3] Thus morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, is that alone which has dignity’ (GMS, AA 04: 435.07– 09). Humanity, in so far as it is capable of morality, is nothing other than the human rational nature and

108

Rocco Porcheddu

hence the end in itself.³ As we have seen, morality has dignity, since it is a condition of the end in itself. But with this, in [W3] Kant obviously claims that the end in itself has equal dignity. Because, as a condition of the validity of the moral principle and consequently as a condition of morality, it is also a condition of the end in itself in the realm of ends, and therefore the end in itself is its own condition. To summarize, W1-W3 make and imply the following disputable claims: i. Both, the end in itself and its condition, have absolute value. ii. The end in itself is the ground of the moral principle and therefore a condition of the possibility of morality; at the same time morality is the condition of the end in itself. iii. The end in itself is something to be realized through moral action. iv. The end in itself is its own condition. In order to give a consistent interpretation of these results, we must take our analysis o f Kant’s remarks on dignity and the end in itself in the realm of ends a little further.

2 A Possible Solution The Absolute Value of the Legislation of the Will In the following passage, Kant hints at his understanding of the relationship between the autonomy of the will, absolute value, and the moral law or categorical imperative. In the research on Groundwork, this passage is discussed controversially.⁴ However, a proper understanding of it enables us to overcome the inconsistencies outlined above. The passage (W4) reads: [W4] For nothing has a worth except that which the law determines for it. [W5] The legislation itself, however, which determines all worth, must precisely for this reason have a dignity, i.e., an unconditioned, incomparable worth […]. [W6] Autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature. (GMS, AA 04: 436.01– 07)

The three sentences of this quotation are extremely complex in relation to their textual and systematic context, their internal structure, and how they are related

 We will argue for this identification below.  Cf. Sensen 2010, 118; 2009, 325; Schönecker, Schmidt 2018, 92 – 95.

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

109

to one another. Anyway, I suggest trying a sort of external access to this passage by posing the following question: Under which premises would the absolute value of this legislation follow from the property of the law that it determines all value? In order to prepare an answer, we should first recall some of the systematic reasons for introducing the principle of autonomy into the line of argument of GMS II. Kant introduces the principle of autonomy as follows: [A1] The ground of all practical legislation, namely, lies objectively in the rule and the form of universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at least a law of nature) […], but subjectively it lies in the […] end in itself […]: from this now follows […] the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law. (GMS, AA 04: 431.09 – 18)

In the sentence that precedes A1, the apriority of the formula of humanity is traced back to two of its aspects: first to its strict universality and secondly to the fact that in the formula of humanity the end in itself is conceived as an objective end. A1 now justifies this latter claim by basing practical legislation in general on two aspects: on the strict universality or lawfulness of the law as a rule and on an end in itself as the subjective or motivational ground for the legislation. Taking the broader context of A1 into account, its underlying thought can be outlined as follows: As is well known, the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives takes its starting point from the concept of an imperative in general, which Kant conceives as an expression of the rational determination of the will in the form of ‘necessitation’ (GMS, AA 04: 412.26 – 34). Thus, an imperative is always an expression of a will that is determined in some way. Since the categorical imperative is a law, it must express a law giving will, which is the pure will. Since, furthermore, Kant conceives an end as a defining property of a will (as ‘the objective ground of its self-determination’ GMS, AA 04: 427.22), it must be possible to specify the end of the pure, legislative will. This end, of course, is the end in itself. Now, the introduction of the principle of autonomy follows the introduction of the end in itself and the formula of humanity in Groundwork II (Cf. GMS, AA 04: 427.01– 429.13). Because in the introductory passage Kant ascribes absolute value to the end in itself and because of this property he provides it with a grounding function for the categorical imperative. Based on this introductory passage, one would ascribe absolute value not to the legislative will in general, but only to the end in itself, i. e., to only one defining aspect of this will. However, in W4, Kant ascribes absolute value to the legislation of the will as a whole, not merely to the end in itself. Why is Kant justified in doing so? Well, he would be justified if the legislative will would be identical to its end, i.e., the end in itself. If we suppose then, that the end of the legislative will would

110

Rocco Porcheddu

be the law-giving will itself, the latter would likewise have absolute value by virtue of the absolute value of its own end. Yet what does it mean that the pure, legislative will is its own end? This might become clearer if we speak of pure practical reason or pure practical rationality instead of pure will. The autonomy of pure practical reason would then consist in the fact that it has no other end than pure practical rationality as such, unconditioned.⁵ This, so to speak, self-reflexive willing of pure practical reason would provide the basis for a practical rule that demands actions for the sake of mere, pure and unconditioned practical rationality, i.e. for the sake of a rationality that does not serve as an instrument or means for t h e satisfaction of inclinations, or, as Kant puts it, that ‘does not […] administer some other interest’ (GMS, AA 04: 441.17– 18). This practical rule, the categorical imperative, would thus lend value sub specie of the value of mere or pure practical rationality to all concrete goals of the morally demanded actions and to these actions themselves. Since practical rationality, the end in itself has absolute value and therefore represents a value superior to all other possible ends, it is at the same time the supreme and ‘limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends’ (cf. GMS, AA 04: 436.19 – 22). It therefore also determines the value of ends based on inclinations. Let us take this thought a little further. All setting of ends, hence all actions, are acts of practical reason. If practical reason is not under conditions alien to it (satisfaction of inclination), then, according to its genuine nature, it wants nothing but itself. Assuming that reason – and practical reason – is always one and the same, then, in all actions, including those that are performed in order to satisfy inclinations, practical reason always at the same time and above all wants itself (unconditional practical rationality).⁶ Thus, W4 can be reconstructed consistently, if we interpret moral autonomy as a self-reflexive practical relationship of pure practical reason.

The End in Itself as Something to be Realized If then, the end of legislative pure practical reason were this practical reason itself, and thus moral autonomy a practical self-relation of pure practical reason, we could comprehend how the property of the practical law to determine all value is related to the absolute value of the legislation itself. However, this sol Cf. Schönecker/Schmidt, 2018, 84.  This could explain, for example, why ‘even the most wicked scoundrel’ (GMS, AA 04: 454.21) feels respect for the practical law – even in his or her evil actions. This would also imply that an evil will is simply a case of weakness of the will. Cf. Porcheddu, 2019, 3 – 28.

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

111

ution has a rather controversial implication. Since rational beings become ends in themselves in the realm of ends through real moral willing and action, the end in itself, at least in some respect, must likewise be something to be realized. Yet the opinion that the end in itself is something to be realized is shared by very few Kant researchers. They claim on the contrary that the end in itself is a so-called existing end, i. e., something for the sake of which we perform an action, yet something we do not have to realize since it already exists or has existed all along.⁷ We cannot analyze here in detail the general plausibility of this existence claim or examine evidence for it in Kant’s critical writings.⁸ Nevertheless, at least some aspects of a possible alternative to the existence claim must be outlined. According to this alternative, the end in itself as an end to be realized would be a special case of a practical end in general, defined by Kant in various of his writings.⁹ In these definitions, an end is conceived as a unity of an action-motivating or action-causing conceptual representation and the reality of the object of this representation. Put differently: According to these definitions, we call something an end, if a conceptual representation motivates those actions which realize the object or content of that very representation. An end is therefore in any case a (potential) goal of action and thus something to be realized. Hypothetical imperatives, but the categorical imperative as well, are grounded in an end and demand nothing other than actions for the sake of the realization of this grounding end. If the end in itself is such an end, we must in its case l i k e w i s e be able to differentiate an action-motivating conceptual representation of something, a practical rule or imperative based on this conceptual representation, an end-realizing action and finally the realized end itself. In light of the above interpretation of autonomy and the end in itself, this is to say: i.

The end in itself, in its function as a ground of the categorical imperative, would have to be conceivable as a rational and action-motivating representation of pure practical reason. ii. The categorical imperative would prescribe actions that are performed for t h e sake of the reality of pure practical rationality as such.

 Cf. Wood, 1999, 16 f.; Korsgaard, 1986, 125; Dean, 2006, 114 f.; Guyer, 2007, 95; Glasgow, 2007, 298; Allison, 2011, 208 f.  Cf. Porcheddu 2016, 29 – 34; 155 – 160.  In §10 of the third Critique Kant presents the probably best-known definition of an end: ‘If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental determinations […], then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis)’ (KU, AA 05: 219.31– 220.04). See also KPV, AA 05: 20.08; MM, AA 06: 381.04– 387.23.

112

Rocco Porcheddu

iii. Actions based upon the categorical imperative would then be those which realize the end in itself, that is, pure practical reason.

However, since in the performance of a moral action pure practical reason is already realized, as well as the legislation in a possible realm of ends, here the action that realizes the end and the reality of this end are in some respect one and the same. The latter describes only one of a number of peculiarities of the end in itself compared to ends in terms of concrete goals of action. However, it goes beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of t h e additional particularities. For our objective, it suffices to admit the possibility that the end in itself shares the central structural properties mentioned with concrete goals of action. Let us now see if the analyses provided can y i e l d a solution to the inconsistency problem. So why, then, is Kant justified in making the end in itself a condition of morality and, vice versa, morality a condition of the end in itself – and to ascribe to both an absolute value? We can now answer this question as follows: As the ground of the categorical imperative, the end in itself is pure practical reason, not yet realized under sensible conditions. However, it exists as a mere, yet motivating, representation, i . e . , as respect for the practical law (cf. GMS, AA 04: 402.31, remark). Since pure practical reason and moral legislation are realized in a possible realm of ends through actual moral agency and will, morality can also be addressed as a condition of the possibility of realized pure practical reason, and thus of the realized end in itself. Since both are just two perspectives on one and the same entity (the end in itself), both have the same, absolute, value. Yet why is Kant justified in making the end in itself its own condition? Thanks to the interpretation developed, this is no longer puzzling either: If we understand the end in itself as having an analogous structure to conventional ends (ends as concrete goals of action) – as has been done above – the end in itself is likewise to be understood as, on the one hand, a unity of a motivating cognitive anticipation of that which is to be realized, and as the reality of this motivating cognitive-conceptual anticipation, on the other. Both, the motivating representation of that which is to be realized, and the realized representation itself, we commonly call an end. In the mere state of respect for the law, that is, as a motivational representation prior to the actual performance of moral actions, it grounds the categorical imperative and is thus at the same time the condition of the reality of pure practical reason, i.e., of the end in itself. Why does the legislation of the will have absolute value due to the fact that it is the source of the law which determines all value? According to the interpretation developed here, the legislation consists precisely of the fact that the pure

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

113

will is its own supreme end and thereby gives absolute value to itself. Hence, moral autonomy means that the pure will wants nothing but itself. As we have seen, the value-determining law, the categorical imperative, expresses and is based on the fact that this pure, autonomous will has itself as its own goal. Therefore, it determines all value since it grounds the fact that the will is the pure, self-reflexive, and truly legislative will. Thus, strictly speaking, the law, the categorical imperative, determines all value since the legislation itself has absolute value. Let us finally turn to the question as to what justifies Kant’s claim that autonomy is ‘the ground of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature’ (GMS, AA 04: 436.06 – 07). I suggest reading this claim as a remark about t h e structural properties of rational nature and autonomy. These structural properties consist in the self-reflexiveness of rational nature developed above: Since the autonomy of rational nature (i. e., of pure practical reason) consists in having itself as its own supreme end, and, consequently, in attributing absolute value to itself, the reason for its dignity is its autonomous constitution. In other words: Since rational nature is autonomous, and thus ascribes absolute value to itself and has itself as its absolute end, it has at the same time absolute value – for itself.¹⁰

 In their paper Kant’s Ground-Thesis. On Dignity and Value in the Groundwork, Schönecker/ Schmidt provide a very detailed analysis of sentences W4-W6, which they call G3-G5. The results presented in their paper coincide with some of the findings of our own investigations. For example, the authors also hold that moral autonomous willing is to be reconstructed in parallel with empirical willing and the setting of empirical ends (Schönecker/Schmidt 2018: Cf. 89 – 92). To give another example, the authors also hold that dignity belongs to rational beings in two ways, first per se, by virtue of the property of autonomy and freedom intrinsic to all rational beings, and second insofar as they are moral agents (Schönecker/Schmidt 2018: Cf. 86– 88). I do not see, however, that the authors explain how exactly the two perspectives or levels are related. So, it is worth taking a closer look at this paper. Three passages shall be discussed. The first passage reads: ‘Note […] that according to [G4] the ‘legislation itself, however, that determines all value, must precisely for this reason have a dignity, i. e. an unconditioned, incomparable value’. This is to say: because the law, or rather: because legislation determines the value of whatever has value, it must itself also have value; this is Kant’s main thought in [G3-G5]. So as it stands, [G5] sums up what Kant says in [G4]. Even if one should be inclined to translate the German also with ‘therefore’ rather than with ‘thus’ and hence as a logical operator which indicates that Kant presents a real (deductive) argument, one has no difficulties in reconstructing it: 1. What determines all value has itself an unconditioned, incomparable value. 2. Legislation determines all value. Therefore, legislation has an unconditioned, incomparable value’ (Schönecker/ Schmidt 2018: 94).

114

Rocco Porcheddu

The following objections can be levelled against this reconstruction: 1) As before (cf. Schönecker/Schmidt 2018: 93), the authors apparently take the view that Kant talks about the “law” (G3) he means to refer to “legislation” (G4). Kant himself, however, makes this distinction expressis verbis, which should be maintained simply for basic conceptual reasons, since a law is not a law-giving (legislation) per se. 2) According to this reading, not only the legislation, but also the law itself would have to be ascribed absolute value. In the passage analysed here, however, Kant expressis verbis ascribes dignity only to legislation. 3) As Oliver Sensen h a s already pointed out (cf. Sensen 2010: 107), it does not follow per se from the mere function of a thing to determine value that this thing also has value itself. As we saw, it is at least true to say that the law determines all value because the legislation itself has absolute value. However, this connection can only be understood by analysing the internal structure of Kant’s concept of moral autonomy. This internal structure shall be presented, according to our reading, once again in nuce: That moral autonomy has absolute value (dignity) means that pure practical reason wills itself, or more precisely: that it sets its own reality as the supreme end of all the acts of practical reason. The categorical imperative, we said, determines all value sub specie the absolute value that pure practical reason attributes to its own reality under empirical conditions. More precisely, the categorical imperative, the law, ascribes a value to all conceivable actions and their concrete goals of action – or detracts i t f r o m t h e m – on the basis of whether and to what extent they realize pure practical reason under empirical conditions. The law is therefore not identical to legislation in all respects, but it expresses legislation, i. e. the self-reflexive willing of pure practical reason, in the form of a practical, imperative rule – just in the same way that hypothetical imperatives express their underlying willing. Let us also take a look at the reconstruction of W6 (G5) in relation to W4 (G3), which, in my opinion, illustrates the price the authors pay for their interpretation very clearly: ‘[1] [G3] states that ‘nothing has a value except the value which moral legislation determines for it’[…]. [2] Which things obtain value by strength of the moral law? [3] Given the basic elements of his ethical theory, two things come to mind first: actions and dispositions (Gesinnungen). [4] In some sense this is true, of course; but in [G5] Kant does identify what has dignity – it is the ‘human and every rational nature’. [5] In [G5] Kant also identifies the ‘ground’ of this dignity – it is ‘autonomy’. [6] Since ‘autonomy’ is ‘legislation’, we can now reconstruct [G3] as follows: [7] [G3]** Moral legislation determines the dignity of the human and of every rational nature’ (Schönecker/Schmidt 2018: 94). In the first sentence the authors turn ‘law’ into ‘legislation’ (G3). Thus, “legislation” (my emphasis) now determines all value. In sentence 2, however, ‘things’ receive value ‘by virtue of moral law’ (my emphasis). As is well known, the moral law determines maxims and actions, as the authors themselves concede in the third and fourth sentences. Yet in sentence 4 they reply that in G5 Kant identifies what has dignity. So the authors seem to equate not only ‘law’ and ‘legislation’, but also ‘value’ and ‘dignity’. Clearly, however, not every value is to be identified with dignity. In the fifth sentence, they apparently identify the function of being a ‘ground’ with the function to “determine”. Again, this does not match the textual basis. In summary, then, we can say that their reconstruction of W4-W6 (G3-G5) seems to rest on the fact that they level the conceptual distinctions expressed in Kant’s own wording of these sentences, and that they do this needlessly and without sufficiently good reasons.

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

115

3 Some More Implications of the Proposed Solution Not only is the proposed solution to the inconsistency problem quite complex, but it also has implications that might appear controversial. Therefore, these need to be addressed. We have already discussed one crucial implication: an interpretation of the end in itself as something to be realized. To give another example, the proposed solution requires an alternative reading of at least one passage in which Kant clearly seems to describe the end in itself as an existing end (Cf. GMS, AA 04: 437.08 – 12). Furthermore, good textual evidence must be provided for the view that the end in itself is indeed nothing but pure practical reason. To name another implication, a consistent and plausible description of the categorical imperative would have to be given, according to which it demands only actions for the sake of pure practical rationality as such. In what follows I will briefly discuss these implications.

The End in Itself as an Independent End In the second chapter of Groundwork, there is a passage in which prima facie strongly supports the existence claim. The following analysis, however, will show that this passage in no way compels one to embrace the existence-thesis. The passage reads as follows: Rational nature discriminates itself from the rest in that it sets itself an end. This [end] would be the matter of every good will. But since, in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without a limiting condition (of the attainment of this or that end), every end to be effected has to be thoroughly abstracted from (as it would make every will only relatively good), the end here has to be thought of not as an end to be effected but as a self-sufficient end, hence only negatively, i.e., never to be acted against, which therefore has to be estimated in every volition never merely as means but always at the same time as end. Now this [end] cannot be other than the very subject of all possible ends, because this [subject] is at the same time the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for this will cannot without contradiction be set after any other object. (GMS, AA 04: 437.21– 33)

I shall understand the first sentence of this passage in the following way: Rational nature is an exception to the rest of nature, i. e., sensible nature, because it sets ‘for itself’ and for sensible nature as well an end of its own, i.e., independently, or spontaneously – and this end is not sensibly conditioned. This end of rational nature is the end in itself. Kant here is repeating what is already to

116

Rocco Porcheddu

be found in Groundwork I, ‘that the good will is good not through what it effects or accomplishes, not through its efficacy for attaining any intended end’ (GMS, AA 04: 394.13 – 15), whereby the ‘intended end’ is that of the satisfaction of inclination, that is to say, of the sensible aspects of the human faculty of desire. On the previous page to the above-quoted passage, Kant identifies an end as the matter of a maxim and as the object of a will. (Cf. GMS, AA 04: 436.08 – 32 f) Regarding this identification, it would be consistent to describe the end in itself as a matter of good will. The subjunctive formulation (‘This [end] would be the matter of every good will’, my emphasis), however, indicates that Kant nevertheless considers the concept of matter as inadequate for the end in itself. This is not surprising since Kant – in the context of the definition of an end (cf. GMS, AA 04: 427.19 – 34) – defines material ends and principles as those that a rational being sets and pursues for the sake of satisfying its inclinations. The crucial point about material ends is that the expected satisfaction of inclinations and thus the anticipated pleasure are prior to the setting of the end. Kant obviously intends this meaning of ‘material’ when he writes that ‘in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without a limiting condition (of the attainment of this or that end), every end to be effected has to be thoroughly abstracted from […]’ (Cf. GMS, AA 04: 437.23 – 25). Anyway, at first glance, it is not easy to see how Kant can be justified in linking the materiality of an end and the fact that it depends on inclinations to the end’s property of being something to be realized. Moral actions, too, have concrete goals of action, i.e., things or states of affairs to be realized. But in t h e case of moral actions, this producing or realizing of something is not motivated by the drives of inclination. Therefore, I suggest that the words ‘material’, ‘to be effected’ and ‘to be produced’ can fit coherently together in the following way: Something is an end ‘to be produced’ not merely when the content of its conceptual representation is something to be realized but when, in addition, the bare fact of having been set as an end is also ‘produced’, namely by the causal affection of the individual’s set of inclinations. In the case of material ends the very fact that they are ends is due to this causal affection of the individual’s own contingent desires or aversions. The end in itself is, obviously, neither set nor is it a product of sensible affection of the faculty of desire. It is rather inscribed into the a priori, genuine constitution of practical reason itself. By means of this interpretation, the ‘independence’ of the end in itself, in Kant’s sense, is to be understood as its independence from inclination and, thus, as its apriority. The negativity of the end in itself lies in its property ‘never to be acted against, which therefore has to be estimated in every volition never merely as means but always at the same time as end […]’ (See also GMS, AA 04: 437.28 – 30). The ends for which the end in itself must never be merely a means are all relative, material,

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

117

or subjective ends. In this way, the end in itself is the “highest limiting condition” for such relative, material and subjective ends. This can be taken to mean that the end in itself is an entity being realized through and in all actions as their organizing and selecting principle.¹¹ Therefore the end in itself is indeed independent (a priori valid) and negative (as a limiting condition of all other ends), but nevertheless something to be realized.

Rational Nature as the End in Itself Kant refers prima facie to many different things as ends in themselves and attributes absolute value to them.¹² Nonetheless, I suppose that there is an original content underlying all of these so very different terms for the end in itself. Grasping this content enables us to understand why and in what respect Kant is justified to attribute the property of being an end in itself to these prima facie different things. My goal in what follows is, nevertheless, only twofold: I will first argue for the view that the concept of an end in itself refers to a genuine or fundamental content. Second, I will try to show that this content is of rational nature, that is, pure practical reason. In order to demonstrate this, I will take a look at a passage in Groundwork II which leads from the first mention of the end in itself to the formula of humanity. In the following sentence the concept of an end in itself occurs for the first time: But suppose there were something whose existence in itself had an absolute worth, something that, as end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it and only in it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i . e . , of a practical law. (GMS, AA 04: 428.03 – 06)

Immediately after this sentence, we read that ‘the human being, and in general, every rational being exists as end in itself […]’ (GMS, AA 04: 428.07– 08). Kant then traces this existence as ends in themselves back to the ‘nature’ (ibid.) of ra-

 Cf. Porcheddu 2016, 36 – 41.  Kant designates man and ‘every rational being in general’ (GMS, AA 04: 428.07), ‘persons’ (GMS, AA 04: 428.22), ‘rational nature’ (GMS, AA 04: 429.02), ‘humanity’ (GMS, AA 04: 430.28 f), ‘the subject of all (possible) ends’ (GMS, AA 04: 431.13; 437.31) as an end in itself. The good will is only once indirectly designated as an end, but unmistakeably so (cf. GMS, AA 04: 396.33), otherwise as that which has ‘pure’ i.e. ‘absolute’ (GMS, AA 04: 394.32 f.) value or ‘a value beyond any price’ (GMS, AA 04: 426.09) and so possesses dignity. Dignity is also applied to ‘morality’, ‘conventional moral values’ (GMS, AA 04: 435.05 – 28) and to ‘humanity as far as it is capable of the same’ (ibid.).

118

Rocco Porcheddu

tional beings. The latter ‘are called persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves […]’ (ibid., my emphasis). What Kant refers to as the ‘nature’ of rational beings is evidently that property that distinguishes a rational and willing being per se from other beings. This property must be attributed to each of these beings a priori as a defining aspect of their genuine constitution. Obviously, what per se distinguishes all rational beings from other beings is reason. Since we are dealing here with the ground of the categorical imperative, i.e., of a practical rule, we are concerned, more precisely, with all rational and willing beings whose defining property is, t h e r e f o r e , practical reason. Practical reason – understood as a faculty applying a priori to all rational, willing beings and which thus exists prior to everything that is a contingent, only empirically given, property – can in this sense be called pure practical reason. The introductory passage of the end in itself thus provides textual evidence for the view that the end in itself is nothing but pure practical reason.¹³ It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the argument Kant provides in that passage since this allows a more precise insight into the relation of rational nature and rational or human beings as ends in themselves. Shortly before the formula of humanity, we find a claim emphasized by Kant himself: ‘Rational nature exists as end in itself’ (GMS, AA 04: 429.02– 03). The fact that Kant himself emphasizes this sentence is important because, in my opinion, it can be interpreted as an indication that this claim is the conclusion of a longer argument. The steps of the line of this argument would be the following: (1) The ‘human being, and in general every rational being, exists as end in itself […]’ (GMS, AA 04: 428.07– 08). (2) Their ‘nature’ marks humans and all rational beings out as ends in themselves (and they are therefore called persons). (3) Their nature endows them with this property because this nature itself originally and genuinely exists as an end in itself (one might also say, as an end for itself). Rational beings are thus, in a way, individuation or manifestations of rational nature, which itself necessarily exists as an end in itself.

If rational nature is indeed pure practical reason, then pure practical reason is the end in itself or exists as an end in itself. If this interpretation is correct then existence as an end in itself can be attributed to rational beings and, con-

 At the end of his general reflections on the ‘idea of an unconditioned end’, Steigleder comes to a very similar conclusion: ‘As an unconditioned necessary end there can exist for pure practical reason nothing which is independent of it, only itself exists’ (Steigleder 2002, 63 f.).

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

119

sequently, to human beings only in a kind of derivative sense, i.e., only in form of the mentioned “individuation” of pure practical reason.

Pure Practical Reason as Content of the Categorical Imperative Let us finally give a brief sketch of how one can justify the claim that the categorical imperative demands nothing but pure practical rationality as such. A systematic reflection based on a passage from the second Critique will provide some evidence for this claim. Furthermore, this reflection will specify how we must understand the claim that pure practical reason is something that is to be realized. In the remark to §4 of the Critique of Practical Reason Kant provides an argument against happiness as a possible basis for a practical law: A practical law that I cognize as such must qualify for a giving of universal law: this is an identical proposition and therefore self-evident. Now, if I say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot cite my inclination […] as the determining ground of my will appropriate to a universal practical law; for this is so far from being qualified for a giving of universal law that in the form of a universal law it must instead destroy itself. (KpV, AA 05: 27.32– 28.03)

The justification for this claim is quite remarkable: For whereas elsewhere a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious, here, if one wanted to give the maxim the universality of a law, the most extreme opposite of harmony would follow, the worst conflict, and the complete annihilation of the maxim itself and its purpose. For then the will of all has not one and the same object but each has his own […]. (KpV, AA 05: 28.07– 13)

The pursuit of happiness cannot ground a practical law because a law, according to its genuine function, “makes everything harmonious”, i.e., it forms a system. This means that sentences within a system inferred from the system’s principle cannot be directly contradictory to one another, nor should contradictions be inferable from them.¹⁴ Otherwise, it obviously would not be a system. Due to the supposedly highly divergent or even contradictory individual concepts of what someone’s personal happiness consists in, a practical law that demanded to pur This is also true in general for what Kant calls ‘real repugnance’ i. e. real contradictions, (as opposed to logical ones) as they occur for example in the simultaneous desire for two things which cancel each other out. On the concept of real repugnance cf. Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, AA02, 171 f., and Seel 1989, 164.

120

Rocco Porcheddu

sue one’s own happiness, would possibly produce contradictory actions and practical rules. They would not form a system. The principle would therefore not be a law in Kant’s sense. Kant’s solution to this problem is as simple as it is brilliant: A system of all willing is guaranteed once the sentences following from this system’s principle, i. e., maxims and practical rules, themselves could take over the form of a basis for a system and, thus, qualify for being laws. Every person who takes a practical law as the determining ground of his or her own will necessarily act in such a way that it is conceivable that their own maxims might become a universal law. The demand for the universalizability of maxims, stemming from the practical law, is the consequence – and this is crucial – of a practical law’s property of being a principle of a practical system. With regard to the first Critique reason can be addressed as the faculty of systematizing the world of experience, as the capacity ‘to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed’ (KrV, A 307/B 364, my emphasis). Practical reason would be this systematizing faculty with regard to causal action, and, thus, the faculty of generating a system of action. Since for Kant, the practical law according to its concept demands no less than the complete – one might also say: Consistent and general – systematicity of all actions and since reason is genuinely the faculty of generating a system, the practical law is therefore nothing other than the concept of pure practical reason. So, the property of being a practical law implies eo ipso that such a law must be the principle of a practical system and, hence, must demand actions that realize it. Considering the practical law’s pure formality and the fact that reason is genuinely nothing other than the faculty of systematizing, we see that the practical law can express and demand nothing else than pure practical rationality.¹⁵

References Allison, Henry E. (2011): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 Cf. Stolzenberg 1988, 184: “So ist der Gedanke von einem Gesetz nicht der Gedanke von einem Gesetz unter anderen, sondern nur der Gedanke der Gesetzlichkeit oder der Form vernünftiger Allgemeinheit als solcher”. Jürgen Stolzenberg (cf. 2018b, 564 f.) conceives of the aspect of self-referentiality of the pure and autonomous will in such a way that it only makes its own rationality, which characterizes it essentially, its own determining ground. See also Stolzenberg (2018a, S. 52– 54) and Porcheddu (2019, S. 21– 26).

The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself

121

Dean, Richard (2006): The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Glasgow, Joshua (2007): “Kant’s Conception of Humanity”. In: Journal of History of Philosophy 2, pp. 291 – 308. Guyer, Paul (2007): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Continuum. Kerstein, Samuel (2006): “Deriving the Formula of Humanity”. In: Horn, Christoph/ Schönecker, Dieter (Eds.): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Berlin, New York, pp. 200 – 224. Korsgaard, Christine (1986): “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”. In: Kant-Studien 77, pp. 183 – 202. Korsgaard, Christine (1996): “ Kant’s Formula of Humanity”. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p p . 107 – 132. Porcheddu, Rocco (2016): Der Begriff des Zwecks an sich selbst in Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Berlin, New York. Porcheddu, Rocco (2019) “Der kategorische Imperativ als regulatives Prinzip. Eine Versuchsskizze”. In: Karasek, Jindrich/ Kollert, Lukas/ Matejckova, Tereza (Eds.): Natur und Geist in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie [Series: jena-sophia. Studien und Editionen zum deutschen Idealismus und zur Frühromantik]. Paderborn: Fink, pp. 3 – 29. Schönecker, Dieter/Schmidt, Elke (2018): “ Kant’s Ground-Thesis. On Dignity and Value in the Groundwork” In: The Journal of Value Inquiry 52, pp. 81 – 95. Seel, Gerhard (1989): “Sind hypothetische Imperative analytische praktische Sätze?” In: Höffe, Otfried (Ed.): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, pp.148 – 171. Sensen, Oliver (2009): “Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity”. In: Kant-Studien 100, pp. 309 – 331. Sensen, Oliver (2010): “ Dignity and the Formula of Humanity” [ ad IV 429, IV 435] In: Timmermann, Jens (Ed.): Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 102 – 118. Steigleder, Klaus (2002): Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft. Stuttgart: Mezler. Stolzenberg, Jürgen (2018a): “Kants Freiheitstheorie und Fichtes Theorie des Verhältnisses von Absolutem und seiner Erscheinung in der späten Wissenschaftslehre”. In: Danz, Christian/Stolzenberg, Jürgen/Waibel, Violetta (Eds.): Systemkonzeptionen im Horizont des Theismusstreites (1811—1821). Hamburg: Meiner, pp. 51 – 70. Stolzenberg, Jürgen (2018b): “ Die Natur der Freiheit. Kant und Fichte”. In: Waibel, V. L . /Ruffing, M. Und Wagner, D. (Eds.): Natur und Freiheit: Akten Des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 1. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 563 – 576. Stolzenberg, Jürgen ( 1989): “Das Selbstbewusstsein einer reinen praktischen Vernunft. Zu den Grundlagen von Kants und Fichtes Theorie sittlichen Bewusstseins”. In: Henrich, Dieter/Horstmann, Rolf- Peter (Eds.): Metaphysik nach Kant? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1987, Vol. 17. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 181 – 208. Wood, Allen (1999): Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Federica Basaglia

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR Abstract: The second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason in the Critique of Practical Reason represents one of the few sections of Kant’s published work, in which the authors deal explicitly and directly with the notion of good and it offers a quite precise insight into Kant’s view about practical (moral and non-moral) value. Whereas recent Kant scholarship has highlighted elements of the argument in this chapter that support the interpretation of Kant’s strong formalism and concentrated upon Kant’s view about what is usually called the ‘priority of the right over the good’, in my paper, I draw attention to two other elements in Kant’s reflections on the concept of good. Firstly, I point at what may be considered to be the material element of Kant’s conception of the good, which we become aware of by analyzing the argumentative structure of the second chapter. Secondly, I draw attention to what can be called the metaphysical (hyperphysical, non-natural) element of Kant’s conception of the good. I argue that Kant’s formalism in fact requires that the property of being good is to be understood as a hyperphysical, non-natural property.

Introduction The second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason in the Critique of Practical Reason deals with the ‘objects of pure practical reason’, which are according to Kant, the ‘objects of good and evil’.¹ This chapter represents one of the few sections of Kant’s published work, in which the author deals explicitly and directly with the notion of ‘good’ (as well as with the notion of ‘evil’).² It is in fact

 Whereas the title of the chapter and the first section refer to a single “object of pure practical reason” (KpV, AA 05: 57.15 – 16), in the second section Kant surprisingly introduces, both ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as “objects of practical reason” (AA 5: 58.06 – 07; cf. Basaglia 2009, 55, 112 and Brandt 2010, 71 f.).  Other well-know passages in Kant’s writings, in which he directly addresses the notion of ‘good’, are the beginning of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, where he presents the notion of ‘good will’ (GMS, AA 04: 393.07), and the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, where he introduces the ‘highest good’ (KpV, AA 05: 108.12). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-009

124

Federica Basaglia

the only chapter in all of Kant’s writings dedicated explicitly to the “concept of the good” (KpV, AA 05: 58.10, cf. also 57.15 – 16)³ and it offers a quite precise, although not easy to reconstruct, insight into Kant’s conception of practical, moral and non-moral, value. Recent Kant scholarship has highlighted elements of the argument in this chapter that support the interpretation of Kant’s strong formalism⁴ and have concentrated on Kant’s view about what is usually called the ‘priority of the right over the good’.⁵ In the following, I will draw attention to two other elements in Kant’s reflections on the concept of the good. Firstly, I will point at what we can call the material element of Kant’s conception of the good. It is generally agreed among Kant scholars that only actions, ways of acting and maxims can be, according to Kant, good in a moral sense.⁶ Kant himself seems to hold such a view, when he writes: “[…] if anything is to be good or evil absolutely […] it would be only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, that could be so called, but not a thing” (KpV, AA 05: 60.21– 24). I will show that contextualizing this passage in the broader argumentative structure of the second chapter makes a different reading possible, which gives a broader and more complex view of Kant’s formalism. Secondly, I will draw attention to what we may consider being the metaphysical (hyperphysical, non-natural) element of Kant’s conception of the good. Some recent literature on Kant’s moral philosophy defended the thesis that Kant’s conception of good rules out that ‘good’ can be a metaphysical property.⁷ Against such a claim I will argue that Kant’s formalism does in fact require the property of being good to be understood as a hyperphysical, non-natural property.

 In the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, Kant deals with the ‘highest good’ as the “unconditioned totality of pure practical reason” (KpV, AA 05: 108.11– 12) and as “the whole object of pure practical reason” (KpV, AA 05: 109.21– 22). Since the attainment of the highest good consists not only in being virtuous (by acting in accordance with the moral law and out of duty), but also in being happy in exact proportion to the virtue of our actions, Kant’s reflections on the highest good cannot be counted as an analysis of the concept of the moral good, nor as an explanation of “the good in itself” (KpV, AA 05: 62.08). About the differences between highest good discussed in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason and the good as the object of pure practical reason examined in the second chapter of the Analytic, see: Basaglia 2016.  Cf. Sensen 2011, 2018 and 2020; Timmermann 2018.  Cf. among others: Louden 2021, 65; Wahlschots 2021, 323; Bacin 2001, 133; Rawls 2000, 230.  See, for instance: Walschots 2021, 326; Bacin 2018, 1709; Kleingeld 2016, 37.  Cf. Sensen 2011, 17, and Sensen, 2018, 201.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

125

The Objects of Pure Practical Reason are the Purposes of Moral Actions In the context of Kant’s theory of knowledge, ‘object’ refers to what we can theoretically know. As he explains in the Critical Elucidation: “The Analytic of pure theoretical reason had to do with cognition of such objects as could be given to the understanding” (KpV, AA 05: 89.20 – 21). In the context of his practical philosophy, on the other hand, objects are not something given that we can have knowledge of, but rather something we, through our will, can bring about: Practical reason, on the contrary, since it does not have to do with objects for the sake of cognizing them but with its own ability to make them real (conformably with cognition of them), that is, with a will that is a causality inasmuch as reason contains its determining ground; since, accordingly, it does not have to provide an object of intuition but as practical reason, only a law, for such an object […]. (KpV, AA 05: 89.25 – 29)

For Kant, an object of the will is the matter of a practical – moral or non-moral – principle: “The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will” (KpV, AA 05: 27.07– 08). Such an object of the will or such a matter of the practical principle, according to which a person acts, is the purpose of the action he or she performs.⁸ This becomes very clear in the passages of the Dialectic in which Kant introduces “the highest good as the highest end of a morally determined will” (KpV, AA 05: 115.10 – 11). As a matter of fact, from the way Kant uses the termini ‘end’ and ‘object’ in this passage it is clear that for Kant the object of the will is the end, the purpose of the action, i. e. what the acting subject intends to bring about through his or her action (cf. also KpV, AA 05: 134.08 – 13).⁹ In the case of an empirically determined – heteronomous, non-moral – action the object of the will is its determining ground. In the case of a pure – autonomous, moral – action, the object of the will is not its determining ground, rather this is the moral law alone: The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. If it is the determining ground of the will, then the rule of the will is subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determining representation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure), and so is not a practical law. Now, all that

 See on this also Pieper 2002, 115. Against this reading see: Beck 1960, 129, and Timmermann 2018, 681.  For more detailed textual evidence, see Basaglia 2009/b, 107– 112, and Basaglia 2016, 20 – 26, where I have argued for this reading.

126

Federica Basaglia

remains of a law if one separates from it everything material, that is every object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law. (KpV, AA 05: 27.7– 14; cf. GMS, AA 04: 413.26 – 414.36, footnote)

Every practical principle, whether empirical or pure, according to Kant, has a material element and a formal one.¹⁰ As we established above, the matter of a practical principle is the object of the will, i. e. the purpose of the will. So, the object of the will can be its determining ground or not. In the case it is, the principle of the action is empirical and hence not moral. As a matter of fact, according to Kant, moral actions are not directed towards purposes or ends one intends to achieve, that is, the will is in this case not determined by its matter, but solely by pure practical reason. For Kant, however, as actions, moral actions likewise have a purpose, i. e. an object: Now it is indeed undeniable that every volition must also have an object and hence a matter; but the matter is not, just because of this, the determining ground and condition of the maxim; for if it is, then the maxim cannot be presented in the form of giving universal law, since expectation of the existence of the object would then be the determining cause of choice, and the dependence of the faculty of desire upon the existence of some thing would have to be put at the basis of volition; and since this dependence can be sought only in empirical conditions, it can never furnish the basis for a necessary and universal rule. (KpV, AA 05: 34.07– 19, my emphasis)

Such a distinction between material and pure determination of the will follows the distinction between “pure practical reason” and “practical reason as such” (KpV, AA 05: 15.26 – 27) or “empirically conditioned reason” (KpV, AA 05: 16.04– 05) which Kant refers to when he explains, in the Introduction, the title of his second Critique. He announces in this passage that his reader will not find in this book a critique of pure practical reason, but rather a critique of practical reason as such, i. e. of the empirically conditioned practical reason. The latter, as a matter of fact, presumes “that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will” (KpV, AA 05: 16.05 – 06). This presumes that empirically conditioned reason can overcome the limits of its legitimate judgments and demand for them the moral validity, that only the judgment of pure practical reason can legitimately claim. Hence, it is empirically conditioned practical reason – practical reason as such – and not the pure practical reason which needs a ‘critique’, i. e. an investigation that establishes its “rules, limits and use” (KrV, A

 On the indispensable material aspect of the morally determined will, see: Horn 2011, 50 – 52.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

127

XVI). Hence, the book is entitled Critique of Practical Reason and not Critique of Pure Practical Reason. ¹¹ Kant follows the same line of thought and makes use of the same conceptual distinctions at the beginning of the second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the representation of an object as an effect possible through freedom. To be an object of practical cognition so understood signifies, therefore, only the relation of the will to the action by which it or its opposite would be made real, and to appraise whether or not something is an object of pure practical reason is only to distinguish the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had the ability to do so (and experience must judge about this), a certain object would be made real. (KpV, AA 05: 57.17– 25)

The reference to “the possibility or impossibility of willing the action” (KpV, AA 05: 57.23 – 24) reminds us, in fact, strongly of the formulation Kant uses in the second chapter of Groundwork where he introduces the categorical imperative and explains what we should do in order to establish whether the maxim which guides our action has moral value or not: We should ask ourselves whether we can want that our maxim becomes a universal law (GMS, AA 04: 412.06 – 09; cf. 423.11– 13; 423.29 – 31, and 424.01– 03). Hence, Kant clearly distinguishes in this opening passage between the concept of an object of practical reason as such and the concept of an object of pure practical reason. The former is understood as the representation of an end that we can realize through any action a human being can purposefully perform, whereas the latter is understood as the representation of a purpose that we can realize through an action that we can also, according to the categorical imperative, will.¹² This distinction between empirically determined practical reason and pure practical reason, as well as the one between actions that result from an empirical determination of the will and (moral) actions determined solely by the pure moral principle, informs chapter II of the Analytic till KpV, AA 05: 65.04. We clearly find it, for instance:

 To the distinction between a material or a pure determination of the will and the one between empirically conditioned and pure practical reason corresponds also to the differentiation between hypothetical and categorical imperatives (GMS, AA 04: 414.12– 25) as well as to the one between the “higher faculty of desire” (KpV, AA 05: 25.01– 02) and the “lower faculty of desire” (KpV, AA 05: 25.34). Cf. Horn 2011, 42– 47.  For a detailed discussion of the literature on the ‘objects of good and evil’, see Basaglia 2009/b: 88 – 116.

128

‒ ‒ ‒

Federica Basaglia

in the distinction between “physical possibility” (KpV, AA 05: 57.27) and “moral possibility” (KpV, AA 05: 58.03 – 04) of an action; in the distinction between “the agreeable” and “the disagreeable” on one the side and “the good” and “the evil” (KpV, AA 05: 58.24– 25) on the other; in the further specification of the latter, which differentiates between “the well-being” (das Wohl) and “the ill-being” (das Übel) and “the good” (das Gute) and “the evil” (das Böse) (KpV, AA 05: 59.27– 28).¹³

These distinctions are fundamental to Kant’s argument. The thesis Kant defends in this second chapter is that we cannot derive the moral principle from an antecedent concept of good, it is, rather, the other way around: It has to be the moral principle that defines what is morally good.¹⁴ In fact, according to Kant, if the concept of the good was used as the foundation of the moral law, ‘good’ would simply refer to something whose existence gives pleasure and which determines the subject and its faculty of desire to achieve it. Since, according to Kant, it is impossible to determine a priori what gives us pleasure, in such a case, the judgment about what is good would be a mere matter of experience. The maxim of an action would therefore only indicate the means to realize our purpose and the object of the will would merely be instrumentally good and not (morally) good in itself (cf. KpV, AA 05: 58.10 – 35). It would be something that is only agreeable, it would only amount to well-being, not moral goodness.¹⁵ The literature in this chapter has already analyzed the response Kant gives in these passages to Hermann Andreas Pistorius’ objections against the concept of the good will and moral goodness that he offers in Groundwork of the Metaphy-

 That the distinction ill-being/evil and well-being/good is a further specification of the one disagreeable/good and agreeable/good is made clear in the following passage: “Well-being or Ill-being always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on this account we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure it causes” (KpV, AA 05: 60.09 – 13).  On Kant’s paradox of method, see: Brandt 1995. See also: Bacin 2001, 133; Timmermann 2018, in particular pp. 678 – 679.  So, when Kant states: “The only objects of a practical reason are therefore those of the good and the evil” (KpV, AA 05: 58.06 – 09), he is actually considering pure practical reason, and not “a practical reason” (KpV, AA 05: 58.06, my emphasis). In the passage: “Die alleinigen Objecte einer praktischen Vernunft sind also die vom Guten und Bösen” (KpV, AA 05: 58.06 – 07, my emphasis), Reinhard Brandt suggests rightly to replace “einer” with “reiner” (Brandt 2010, 72).

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

129

sics of Morals. ¹⁶ In his review of the GMS, Hermann Andreas Pistorius complained that Kant did not introduce the concept of the good before explaining what the moral law requires us to do and did not declare the former to be the foundation of the latter. Pistorius’s critique was directed primarily against the Kantian conception of the ‘good will’, according to which nothing can be considered good without limitations except the good will itself. This is, according to Kant, not good because of its ability to achieve its ends, but good in itself (cf. GMS, AA 04: 393.05 – 494.18). Pistorius argues against Kant that neither the will nor the moral principle that guides it can be declared good if we do not first define the concept of the supreme good as the final end of our will, on the basis of which our moral principles and our will can be judged as good or bad. Hence, according to Pistorius, we cannot investigate what is moral by disregarding the material elements of volition and action: We have to start our moral investigation with an object which is the final end of the human will and the basis of the moral law (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 27).¹⁷ As he announces in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant intends to answer Pistorius’ objection in the second chapter of the Analytic (cf. KpV, AA 05: 08.25 – 09.02). So, what Kant writes here regarding the deficiencies of all moral theories that derive the moral principle from an antecedent concept of good,¹⁸ represents his answers to Pistorius’ criticism in his review of Groundwork. ¹⁹ In replying to Pistorius, as we saw, Kant confirms the formalistic approach he set out already in his work from 1785. By opposing his formalism to Pistorius’ suggestion to define the concept of what is good as the final end of the human will before formulating the moral principle, Kant possibly tries to focus the reader’s attention, especially on the formalistic elements of his theory. Here, however, I would like to point at what we may call the material element of Kant’s conception of the good. As we have mentioned above already, it is a common understanding among Kant scholars that only actions, ways of acting

 Beck 1960, Basaglia 2009/b, Basaglia 2016, Kleingeld 2016, Timmermann 2018, Walschots 2021.  See Walschots 2021, 323 – 234.  Kant is directing his criticism not only against consequentialist theories (cf. Timmermann 2018, 685), but also against rationalistic ones: cf. Brandt 2007, 369.  As Michael Walschots has recently pointed out in his article on “Kant and Consequentialism in Context”, Kant’s response to Pistorius is very articulated and aims not only at the above-mentioned criticism against his formalistic moral principle, but also to the one concerning an alleged consequentialist element in his conception of moral appraisal (cf. Walschots 2021).

130

Federica Basaglia

and maxims can be, according to Kant, good in a moral sense.²⁰ Kant himself, as a matter of fact, writes: “[…] good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions […]” (KpV, AA 05: 60.19 – 20); and, a couple of lines later: “[…] if anything is to be good or evil absolutely […] it would be only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, that could be so called, but not a thing” (KpV, AA 05: 60.21– 24). As we saw above, the argumentative structure of the second chapter of the Analytic, at least till line KpV, AA 05: 58.05, is built on the distinctions between pure and empirical determined practical reason, agreeable/disagreeable, wellbeing/ill-being as well as good/evil. Moreover, as we saw, Kant’s argument tries to show, contra Pistorius, that any theory which starts its investigation into the moral principle from a concept of good presupposes a concept of an object of the will which is the source of some kind of pleasure. With this in mind, if we read the whole passage in which Kant allegedly affirms that only actions and maxims can be regarded as morally good, his claim sounds much less committed: Well-beeing or ill-being always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on this account we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure it causes. But good or evil always signifies a reference to the will insofar as it is determined by the law of reason to make something its object; for, it is never determined directly by the object and the representation of it, but is instead a faculty of making a rule of reason the motive of an action (by which an object can become real). Thus good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions, not to the person’s state of feeling, and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (and in every respects and without any further condition), or is to be held to be such, it would be only the way of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as good or evil human being, that could be so called, but not a thing. (KpV, AA 05: 60.09 – 25)

First of all, in lines 19 – 21, Kant opposes ‘actions’ not to ‘a thing’, but to “the person’s state of feeling” (KpV, AA 05: 60.20 – 21). In this passage, the focus is on the contrasting pairs good/evil and well-being/ill-being in relation to the law of reason and the feeling of pleasure/displeasure. Such a feeling always presupposes the existence of an object that our empirically determined action – as means to achieve an end – is trying to bring about and that therefore excludes a moral determination of the action. Kant wants to reassert that what is morally good has nothing to do with a person’s sensibility, that instead, it is a matter of what the moral law requires him or her to do. In this section, Kant positions himself

 Cf. among others: Walschots 2021, 326; Bacin 2018, 1709; Kleingeld 2016, 37, Puls 2013, 36, 40.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

131

against the view that an object of the will (as its final end) becomes (as Pistorius suggested) the source of moral legislation and hence of moral value.²¹ Moreover, we find in this section, besides the undeniably formalistic element, the reference to the material element of moral action as something that participates of its goodness in a moral, hence absolute, sense: “[…] good and evil always signifies a reference to the will insofar it is determined by the law of reason to make something its object” (KpV, AA 05: 60.14– 16). So, clearly, ‘good’ and ‘evil’ do not refer only to actions. They also refer to the objects that the moral actions aim to bring about, even if we cannot know prior to the determination of the will, solely through the moral law, what such objects are. This material element of his conception of the good is what Kant makes very clear at the beginning of the second chapter of the Analytic, where, as we saw before, he defines the concept of an object of pure practical reason – the object of good – as the concept of an object of practical reason in the case in which the will directed to this object is determined solely by the moral principle (KpV, AA 05: 57.23 – 25).

The Concepts of Good and Evil have a Metaphysical (Hyperphysical, Non-natural) Origin I would like to draw attention to a further element of this chapter, that I think can give us a broader understanding of this section and of Kant’s complex view about good and value as well as of his formalism. Among Kant’s scholars, it has been claimed that Kant’s moral philosophy is not based on hyperphysical, metaphysical properties and that for Kant moral value and good cannot be understood as metaphysical properties.²² Kant’s “paradox of method” (KpV, AA 05: 62.36 – 37), according to which, as we saw, “the concepts of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law […] but only […] after it and by means of it” (KpV, AA 05: 62.37– 63.4), seems at first sight actually to support such a reading. A closer look at Kant’s text, however, shows that his view is more complex.

 Cf. Schönecker 2015, 71.  “Kant does not consider the good or value to be a metaphysical property or substance” (Sensen 2011, 17). Cf. Sensen 2018, 201. See also Schöneckers and Bojanowski responses to Sensens claim: Schönecker 2015 and Bojanowski 2015.

132

Federica Basaglia

At the beginning of the second subsection of the second chapter of the Analytic,²³ for instance, Kant confirms the paradox of method and defines the concepts of good and evil as “the consequences of the a priori determination of the will” (KpV, AA 05: 65.05 – 06). At this point, he specifies his view by adding that – as a consequence of the moral determination of the will – the concepts of good and evil “presuppose also a pure practical principle and hence a causality of pure reason” (KpV, AA 05: 65.06 – 07). As we know, the pure practical principle, i. e. moral principle, is for Kant “a law of causality which puts the determining ground of the latter above all conditions of the sensible world” (KpV, AA 05: 50.18 – 21, my emphasis). Since the pure practical principle is conceived by Kant as the law of causality of a hyper-sensible (hyperphysical, non-natural) world, and the concepts of good and evil are the consequences of the determination of the human will by such a pure practical principle, the concepts of good and evil do likewise have a hyperphysical, non-natural origin. Thus I think we have good reasons to hold that for Kant the value ‘good’ is a hyperhysical, non-natural property. We receive confirmation of this metaphysical, non-natural element of Kant’s conception of the good when we consider what Kant explains about the structure of his book in the Introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason. ²⁴ Like his first Critique, the book has two main parts: a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Method. The Doctrine of Elements consists of an Analytic (“as the rule of truth”, KpV, AA 05: 16.18) and a Dialectic (“as exposition and resolution of illusion in the judgment of practical reason”, KpV, AA 05: 16.19 – 20). However, the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of that in the Critique of pure speculative reason. For, in the present Critique we shall begin with the principles and proceed to concepts, and only then, where possible, from them to the senses, whereas in the case of speculative reason we had to begin with the senses and end with the principles. The ground of doing so lies, again, in this: that now we have to do with a will and have to consider reason not in its relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality; thus the principles of empirically unconditioned causality must come first, and only afterward can the attempt be made to establish our concepts of the determining ground of such a will, of their application to objects and finally to the subject and its sensibility. Here the law of causality from freedom, that is, some pure practical rational

 The literature on the second chapter of the Analytic usually considers it as divided in three subsections: KpV, AA 05: 57.17– 65.04 on the concept of the objects of pure practical reason, KpV, AA 05: 65.05 – 67.23 on the categories of freedom and KpV, AA 05: 67.24– 71.25 on the ‘Typic’ of pure practical judgement. Cf. Walschots 2021, 325; Beck 1960, 126 – 127 and Sala 2004, 136 – 137.  I exposed this analysis already in Basaglia 2009/b, 101– 107.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

133

principle, constitutes the unavoidable beginning and determines the objects to which alone it can be referred. (KpV, AA 05: 16.22– 36)²⁵

Thus, the different topics developed in the Critique of Practical Reason are treated, according to the Preface, in the following order: 1) the principles of the empirically unconditioned causality; 2) our concepts of the determining ground of the empirically unconditioned will; 3) the application of our concepts of the determining ground of the pure will to objects; 4) the application of our concepts of the determining ground of the pure will to the subject and its sensibility. It is, I think, relatively easy to locate the elements under 1) and 4) in the main text of the book. The principles of the empirically unconditioned causality are treated by Kant in Chapter I of the Analytic, entitled ‘On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason’. Since Paragraph I ‘On the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason’ addresses the question of whether a deduction of the pure practical principle is possible, I think it can thematically likewise be counted among the topics listed under 1). Thus, the principles of the empirically unconditioned causality are what Kant treats in the passages KpV, AA 05: 19.01– 50.13. There can also be little doubt regarding what Kant means by ‘the application of our concepts of the determining ground of the pure will to the subject and its sensibility’. In fact, this is the topic of Chapter III of the Analytic – On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason (KpV, AA 05: 71.26 – 89.08). As Kant states at the end of the third chapter, this section deals with the influence of the (pure) moral law on the sensibility of the subject, which results in the moral feeling of respect for the moral law:

 Cf. KpV, AA 05: 90.9 – 92.17. In fact, Kant’s summary of the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason is not quite accurate. Actually, the Doctrine of Elements in the first Critique is divided in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic. The Transcendental Logic – and not, as Kant claims in the quoted passage from the Introduction to the second Critique and in further passages of the Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason (KpV, AA 05: 89.20 – 92.17) – contains the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. Beck (Beck 1960, 55) and Sala (Sala 2004, 194– 199) interpret this as a sort of gap in Kant’s memory. On the reason, why Kant reports the structure of the first Critique differently than it actually is in the book, see Brandt 2007, 361– 368.

134

Federica Basaglia

Thus the moral law, since it is a formal determining ground of action through practical pure reason and since it is also a material but only objective determining ground of the objects of action under the name of good and evil, is also a subjective determining ground – that is, an incentive – to this action inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject and effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the law upon the will. (KpV, AA 05: 75.20 – 26, my emphasis)

That such an influence of the moral law on the sensibility of the subject is understood by Kant as corresponding to the sensory perception he treats in the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first Critique, is confirmed in the Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason:²⁶ […] and only then could the last chapter conclude this part [the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, F.B.], namely the chapter about the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility and about its necessary influence upon sensibility to be cognized a priori, that is, about moral feeling. […] The Aesthetic there [in the Critique of Pure Reason, F.B.] had two parts, because of the twofold kind of sensible intuition; here sensibility is not regarded as a capacity for intuition at all but only as a feeling (which can be a subjective ground of desire), and with respect to it pure practical reason admits no further division. (KpV, AA 05: 90.5 – 23)

It is less easy to determine what the elements under 2) and 3) are and in which parts of the main text Kant deals with them. What are our concepts of the determining ground of the empirically unconditioned will? The title of the second chapter of the Analytic could mislead us into thinking that the concepts of the determining ground of the pure will mentioned in the Introduction are the concept of good and evil to which the third chapter is dedicated. However, as we will see in more detail in the next section, for Kant good and evil are not to be understood as the determining ground of the moral (pure) will. For Kant, they are, on the contrary, the consequences of the pure determination of the will by means of the pure practical principle of reason: “[…] the concepts of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori determination of the will, presuppose also a pure practical principle and hence a causality of pure reason […]” (KpV, AA 05: 65.05 – 07). So, the concepts of good and evil cannot be the concepts of the determining ground of the pure, empirically unconditioned will. As we established, the determining ground of the empirically unconditioned will is the “empirically unconditioned causality” (KpV, AA 05: 16.29 – 30) i. e. the “causality from freedom” (KpV, AA 05: 16.33 – 34). What are, then, the concepts of

 Cf. Brandt 2007, 365 – 366.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

135

such a determining ground? What are the concepts of the empirically undetermined causality, of the causality from freedom? Regarding the topics under 2), I suggest that the concepts of the determining ground of the pure will are those, which Kant deals with in the paragraph ‘On the warrant of pure reason in its practical use to an extension which is not possible to it in its speculative use’ (KpV, AA 05: 50.15 – 57.13). The reason why I think so is twofold. First of all, if I am right and the topics listed above under 1) and 4) are dealt with respectively in the first two sections of the first chapter – the one on the principles and the one on their deduction – and in the third chapter of the Critique – the one on the incentives – then the topics listed under 2) and 3) have to find their place in the text between the end of the paragraph on the deduction and the beginning of the third paragraph. Secondly, in the section ‘On the warrant of pure reason’, Kant provides a deduction i. e. a justification of the application of the concept of causality from freedom (see for instance KpV, AA 05: 55.11– 26 and 56.03 – 11)²⁷ and introduces the concept of causa noumenon (KpV, AA 05: 55.26 – 27). If my interpretation is correct and the concepts of the determining ground of the pure will are the concepts of causality from freedom and causa noumenon, then the elements under 3) must be what Kant deals with in the second chapter of the Analytic. Consequently, the Chapter ‘On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason’, where Kant introduces ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as the “only objects of pure practical reason” (KpV, AA 05: 58.06), addresses the application of our concepts of the determining ground of the pure will to objects. These concepts, as we established, are the causality from freedom and causa noumenon. Therefore, the concepts of good and evil are for Kant the result of the application of the concepts of causality from freedom and of causa noumenon to objects. On the other side, the noumenal causality, i. e. the causality from freedom, for Kant undoubtedly is an instance of a supersensible, hyperphysical entity:²⁸ “The moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and hence a law of the possibility of a supersensible nature” (KpV, AA 05: 47.30 – 32).²⁹ Hence, if my interpretation is correct, and if the second chapter of the Analytic Kant deals with the application of the concepts of hyperphysical entities to

 I dealt in more detail with the deduction of the faculty of freedom in Basaglia 2009/a and Basaglia 2009/b, 117– 156.  Cf. Brandt 2009, 378 – 384; Fantasia 2018, 1815 – 1816.  Cf., for instance, also KpV, AA 05: 55.19 – 22: “In the concept of a will, however, the concept of causality is already contained, and thus in the concept of pure will there is contained the concept of causality with freedom, that is, a causality that is not determinable in accordance with laws of nature […]”.

136

Federica Basaglia

objects, the concepts of good and evil are the results of such an application and have a metaphysical, hyperphysical origin.

Concluding Remarks The aim of my observations on Kant’s concepts of good and evil has not been to completely reject the interpretation, according to which we can regard Kant as a ‘transcendental prescriptivist’.³⁰ When it comes to the concepts of good and evil as objects of pure practical reason, it is surely true that “[v]alue is not the foundation of moral requirements, but follows from the a priori moral law” (Sensen 2020, 163).³¹ On the other hand, I take Kant’s view to be more complex. In fact, Kant’s transcendental prescriptivism about the value ‘good’ has to include what he writes about the concepts of the objects of pure practical reason, which are the objects of good and evil, and with his conception of the a priori moral law as a law of non-natural, hyperphysical causality.³²

Literature Kant KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Except for the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, which is quoted following the original editions A (1781) and B (1787), all page and line numbers refer to the Akademie-Ausgabe (AA): Kants Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe. Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900 ff. English translations of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft are taken from: Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary Gregor. Introduction by Andrew Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2015.

 Cf. Sensen 2020, 163, and Sensen 2011, 29 ff. Cf. also Timmermann 2018, 689.  Cf. Basaglia 2009/b, 116.  That objective values play a crucial role in Kant’s moral philosophy as intrinsic, non-natural properties has recently been convincingly, although in different ways, shown by Bojanowski 2015; Schmidt/Schönecker 2018a; Schmidt/Schönecker 2018/b; Schönrich 2020.

Some Remarks on the Concept of Good

137

Pistorius Hermann Andreas (1786): Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek 66, pp. 447 – 463. I have quoted Pistorius’ text from: Gesang, Bernward (Ed.) (2007): Kant vergessener Rezensent. Die Kritik der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie Kants in fünf frühen Rezensionen von Hermann Andreas Pistorius. Hamburg: Meiner, 26 – 38.

References Bacin, Stefano (2018): “‘Under the Guise of the Good’. Kant and a Tenet of Moral Rationalism”. In: Waibel, Violetta L./Ruffing, Margit and Wagner, David (Eds.): Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 1705 – 1713. Basaglia, Federica (2009/a): “The Deduction of Freedom in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. In: Šilar, Mario and Schwember Augier, Felipe (Eds.): Racionalidad Práctica. Intencionalidad, normatividad y reflexividad. Comunicaciones a las XLV Reuniones Filóficas [Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico]. Universidad de Navarra: Pamplona, pp. 135 – 144. Basaglia, Federica (2009/b): Libertà e Male morale nella “Critica della ragion pratica” di Immanuel Kant. Roma: Aracne. Basaglia, Federica (2016): “The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason”. In: Höwing, Thomas (Ed.): The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 17 – 32. Beck, Lewis White (1960): A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bojanowski, Jochen (2015): “Kant on Human Dignity. A Response to Oliver Sense”. In: Kant-Studien 1. No. 106, pp. 78 – 87. Brandt, Reinhard (1995): “Kants ‘Paradoxon der Methode”. In: Puster, Rolf W. (Ed.): Veritas Filia Temporis? Philosophiehistorie zwischen Wahrheit und Geschichte. Festschrift für Reiner Specht zum 65. Geburtstag. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, pp. 2016 – 216. Brandt, Reinhard (2007): Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Hamburg: Meiner. Brandt, Reinhard (2010): Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?. Hamburg: Meiner. Fantasia, Francesca (2018): “Freiheit und Natur in der einzelnen Handlung. Der Charakter als absolute Einheit des Phänomens und die Revolution der Denkung”. In: Waibel, Violetta L.; Ruffing, Margit and Wagner, David (Eds.): Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Vol. 3. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 1815 – 1822. Horn, Christoph (2011): “Wille, Willensbestimmung, Begehrungsvermögen (§§ 1 – 3:16 – 26)”. In: Höffe, Otfried (Ed.): Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, [zweite Auflage, erste Auflage: 2002], pp. 37 – 53. Kleingeld, Pauline (2016): “Kant on ‘Good’, the Good, and the Duty to Promote the Highest Good”. In: Höwing, Thomas (Ed.): The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 33 – 50.

138

Federica Basaglia

Louden, Robert (2021): “Kant and the ‘Old formula of the schools’”. In: Philosophical Explorations 1., No. 24, pp. 63 – 74. Pieper, Annemarie (2011): “Zweites Hauptstück (57 – 71)”. In: Höffe, Otfried (Ed.): Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [zweite Auflage, erste Auflage: 2002]. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 101 – 116. Puls, Heiko (2013): Funktionen der Freiheit. Die Kategorien der Freiheit in Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. Rawls, John (2000): Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Harvard: Harvard University Press. Sala, Giovanni B. (2004): Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Ein Kommentar. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (wbg). Schönecker, Dieter (2015): “Bemerkungen zu Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity, Chapter 1”. In: Kant-Studien 106 (1), pp. 68 – 77. Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth/Schönecker, Dieter (2018a): “Kant’s Moral Realism regarding Dignity and Value. Some Comments on the Tugendlehre”. In: Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth and dos Santos, Robinson (Eds.). Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 120 – 152. Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth/Schönecker, Dieter (2018b): “Kant’s Ground-Thesis. On Dignity and Value in the Groundwork”. In: The Journal of Value Inquiry. No. 52, pp. 81 – 95. Schönrich, Gerhard (2020): “Kant’s Theory of Dignity: A Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value”. In: Kato, Yasushi and Schönrich, Gerhard (Eds.): Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 49 – 72. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. Sensen, Oliver (2018): “Kant’s Constitutivism”. In: Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth/dos Santos, Robinson (Eds.). Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 197 – 220. Sensen, Oliver (2020): “How to Respect Someone’s Dignity”. In: Kato, Yasushi and Schönrich, Gerhard (Eds.): Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 159 – 175. Timmermann, Jens (2018): “The Law and the Good. Kant’s Paradox of Method”. In: Waibel, Violetta L.; Ruffing, Margit and Wagner, David (Eds.): Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Vol. 1. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 675 – 691. Walschots, Michael H. (2021): “Kant and Consequentialism in Context: The Second Critique’s Response to Pistorius”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 2. No. 103, pp. 313 – 340.

Stephan Zimmermann

The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason Abstract: The paper examines Kant’s understanding of the moral value of the human will. Relevant for this in the Critique of Practical Reason is the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil in the “Second Chapter”. One consideration takes up the composition of the Critique, which has not yet been sufficiently referred to by commentators to address this issue. The other consideration is of linguistic nature. Also Kant’s language has not yet been taken into consideration in this regard, although it provides deep insights into his understanding of the concepts of good and evil as the moral values of our will.

The concept of value (Wert) is not a basic concept in Kant’s moral philosophy. This is already evident from the fact that it does not appear at decisive places, where it would have to appear if it were a concept with a supporting function. For example, it does not play a noteworthy role in the “Third Section” of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), where Kant attempts to justify the validity of the highest principle of morality, the moral law; the term occurs five times, yet only in passing.¹ And in the “Introduction” to the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), where Kant summarizes the foundations of his moral philosophy before introducing the difference between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue and elaborating on them, it does not occur at all. Nevertheless, talk of value can be documented in various of Kant’s writings on moral philosophy. There are even passages where it appears frequently, for instance, at the beginning of the Groundwork. In the “First Section”, Kant argues that nothing “could be considered good without limitation except a good will” (GMS, AA 04: 393.06 – 07). In connection with this, he speaks seven times of a value within the “First Section”, which, in the original German version, he

 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 449.34, 449.36, 450.13, 450.15, 454.37. – Citations from Kant’s works are located by siglum, volume, page and line number of the Akademie edition, i.e. Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. References to the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A and B pagination of the first and second edition, respectively. Translations from Kant’s writings are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-010

140

Stephan Zimmermann

calls six times moralisch and once, synonymously, sittlich. ² (The German adjective moralisch stems from Latin, sittlich is its literal translation). The phrase ‘moral value’ can be documented twice already in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and then also in subsequent works.³ Furthermore, several technical terms figuring in Kant’s moral philosophy are sometimes explained with the help of the concept of value. This applies, for example, to the concept of dignity; according to Kant’s occasional suggestion, dignity, in at least one of the meanings of the word, is said to be the moral value of a person.⁴ And this applies also to the concept of certain actions; what Kant calls a moral action, as opposed to a merely legal one, is, as he often remarks, an action that has moral value.⁵ In the following, I am going to examine Kant’s understanding of moral value. In doing so, I will stick mainly to the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). More precisely, it is Kant’s understanding of the moral value of the human will – and not of a person or an action – that interests me here. Relevant in this context is the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil as it is found in the “Second Chapter” of the work. Kant there speaks of value four times in total. And as I will show, although the phrase ‘moral value’ is not mentioned explicitly a single time in the “Second Chapter”, Kant’s idea is that the will of human beings, in being good or evil, has a value, namely, a moral value. Knowing well that many astute things have already been said about the concepts of good and evil in Kant’s second Critique, but assuming that further clarification is still needed, I would like to provide some considerations pertaining to this issue. One of these takes up the composition of the Critique. That composition has not yet been sufficiently been referred to by commentators to address this issue. The other consideration is of linguistic nature. Also Kant’s language has not yet been taken into consideration by commentators in this regard, although it provides deep insights into his understanding of the concepts of good and evil as the moral values of our will.

 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 398.14, 398.27, 398.37– 399.01, 399.26, 399.35 – 36, 400.06, 401.03.  Cf. KrV, A 315/B 372, A 815/B 843.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 435.04, 435.25, 436.03 – 04; TL, AA 06: 435.02, 462.12– 13; V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27: 1319.34 and passim.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 398.14, 398.27, 399.25 – 26, 401.03, 406.13 – 14, 440.07; WDO, AA 08: 139.26 – 28; KpV, AA 05: 71.28, 81.17, 129.30, 147.20, 153.22; KU, AA 05: 444.18 – 19; RGV, AA 06: 48.26 – 27, 103.17; Päd, AA 09: 475.28 – 29 and passim.

The Moral Value of the Will

141

1 The Division of the “Analytic” into Three Chapters Rather than directly addressing Kant’s preoccupation with the concepts of good and evil in Critique of Practical Reason, it is worthwhile to at first consider them within their context. The aim here is not to collect Kant’s remarks on the concepts of good and evil which can be found in other passages of this text outside of the “Second Chapter” and to develop a prior understanding of them before proceeding to the relevant sections of the “Second Chapter” itself.⁶ Instead, I am going to have a look at the composition of the Critique, at the location of those relevant sections at the beginning of the “Second Chapter”. I would like to ask what it reveals about the concepts of good and evil that Kant treats them precisely where he treats them. The first thing to note here is the division of the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason” into three chapters. The “First Chapter” deals with the “Principles of Pure Practical Reason” (KpV, AA 05: 19.04). The “Second Chapter”, which has no title of its own, is divided into two sub-chapters, one of which covers the “Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason” (KpV, AA 05: 57.15). The title of this sub-chapter encompasses a discussion not only of the concepts “of good and evil” (KpV, AA 05: 58.06) but also of the “Categories of Freedom” (KpV, AA 05: 65.27), which here Kant treats for the first and only time in a text published by himself. The other sub-chapter then contains the “Typic of Pure Practical Judgment” (KpV, AA 05: 67.24). And finally, the “Third Chapter” discusses the “Incentives of Pure Practical Reason” (KpV, AA 05: 71.27). As Kant notes several times, this threefold division of the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason” does indeed have an equivalent in the Critique of Pure Reason. In each case, the self-cognition of reason is supposed to imply a cognition of its principles, its concepts as well as of the respective sensibility. For, because it is one and the same reason that is theoretically or practically used, the “Doctrine of the Elements” of the relevant Critique should have to encompass, among other things, an analytic of the principles, an analytic of the concepts as well as an aesthetic as the doctrine of the respective sensibility.⁷ But the two Critiques proceed in reverse order. The course of the investigation shall be determined by the peculiarity of the use of reason which is criticized in

 Cf. KpV, AA 05: 37.35, 38.05 – 06, 38.21, 75.23, 90.03, 90.34, 153.26 and passim.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 07.10 – 12, 16.13 – 16, 55.11– 15, 89.15 – 17; GMS, AA 05: 391.27– 28; KrV, B IX and passim.

142

Stephan Zimmermann

each case, and each respective use of reason maps out an opposing sequence for the investigation. While the first Critique has to start with the aesthetic of sensible intuition and from there pass over into the analytic, namely first into the analytic of concepts and then into that of principles,⁸ the second Critique must start in the “First Chapter” with the analytic of principles, then proceed, in the “Second Chapter”, to the analytic of concepts and conclude with the aesthetic of incentives in the “Third Chapter”.⁹ Why this is so need not interest us here. Unfortunately, Kant does not explain what an analytic of concepts as a whole has to achieve in a critique of practical reason. He does not even hint in this direction. However, the division of the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason” into three chapters as well as the order in which Kant proceeds provides some initial indications regarding the concepts of good and evil. For, insofar as the analytic of principles in the “First Chapter” deals with the grounds for determining the human will with respect to an action,¹⁰ which it articulates by two principles – the principles of heteronomy and autonomy – and insofar as the aesthetic in the “Third Chapter” deals with the motivation for acting, in that there Kant names the conditions for realizing our will under the title of the ‘incentive’,¹¹ the agenda of the “Second Chapter” is defined in both these directions. Insofar as the “Second Chapter” is located between the other two sections, the analytic of principles on the one hand and the aesthetic of incentives on the other, the analytic of concepts must concern the will itself and its object. And to this there also belong, besides the “Categories of Freedom” and the “Typic of Pure Practical Judgment”, also the concepts “of good and evil”. The concepts of good and evil find their application, whatever this may consist in, in relation to the will of human beings not yet realized but already determined with respect to an object.¹²

2 The Three Topics of the Analytic of Concepts This can be further specified by going into the composition of the “Second Chapter” itself. Although this consists of only two sub-chapters, it covers several topics. The first sub-chapter, under the common heading “On the Concept of an Ob-

 Cf. KrV, A 46/B 63, A 62/B 87, A 161/B 200. For this, see Brandt (1991) 92.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 16.20 – 26, 89.25 – 90.12.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 16.31, 19.09 – 12, 19.14– 16, 89.29.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 71.28 – 72.11, 90.20 – 21; RL, AA 06: 212.10 – 17; KU, AA 05: 204.22– 26.  In contrast, Bartuschat (1972) 68 f. classifies the function of pure practical judgment as “a subsequent one compared to the execution of an action [my translation; S. Z.]”.

The Moral Value of the Will

143

ject of Pure Practical Reason”, assembles the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil as well as that of the categories of freedom. This is followed by the doctrine of the so-called type of pure practical judgment in a separate sub-chapter. And all three parts together constitute the analytic of concepts in the Critique of Practical Reason. ¹³ It can be assumed that the arrangement of the parts of the “Second Chapter” – first the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil, then that of the categories of freedom and finally that of the type of pure practical judgment – is not arbitrary, as is already the case with the three chapters of the “Doctrine of the Elements”. Kant, however, does not speak explicitly about this anywhere, not even in a suggestive way. But in view of the fact that the analytic of concepts begins with the concepts of good and evil, we can nevertheless ask what this section concerns, given that it must precede the discussion of the categories of freedom and the type and that its subject cannot be treated afterwards. Or: why does Kant arrange his account of the three topics of the “Second Chapter” in the way he arranges it? According to Kant, the categories of freedom are (at least) this: the moral forms of willing that are appropriate to the sensibly conditioned willing of an action. They fulfill a function comparable to that of the “categories of nature” (KpV, AA 05: 65.28), as now Kant retrospectively dubs the pure concepts of the understanding. While the task of the latter is “to bring a priori the manifold of (sensible) intuition under one consciousness”, it is the task of the former “to subject a priori the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law, or of a pure will” (KpV, AA 05: 65.22– 26). This parallel formulation reveals that the categories of freedom in essence are for pure practical reason what the categories of nature are for pure theoretical reason. They are concepts – not of the experience of objects but – of the willing thereof. For our willing, while being subject to the principle of heteronomy and hence sensibly conditioned, is nevertheless always also characterized in the moral respect, i. e., in accordance with the principle of autonomy. It is subordinated to requirements the moral law places on us and which our willing may be in accordance with or contrary to.¹⁴

 It is a deviation that here the faculty of judgment falls within the analytic of concepts, whereas in the Critique of Pure Reason it is located within the analytic of principles, more precisely in the chapter on the schematism.  It can remain undiscussed here whether the categories are merely moral forms of willing or whether they perhaps concern our entire practical faculty, so that, as Kant notes, among other things, there are also “yet morally undetermined and sensibly conditioned” (KpV, AA 05: 66.13 – 14) forms of willing. For this, see my remarks in Zimmermann (2011).

144

Stephan Zimmermann

This is followed for Kant by the problem of how to identify the moral forms of willing that are appropriate to the respective object of a sensibly conditioned willing. How can I figure out the moral character of my intention? In what way can I investigate what my will, determined on the basis of an empirical feeling of pleasure or displeasure, is like when referred to the principle of autonomy and subjected to a test of its morality (the notorious thought experiment of universalization)? Is my maxim in accordance with or contrary to the requirements of the moral law? Is it, to use merely the modal categories listed by Kant, “permitted” or “forbidden”, “Duty” or “contrary to duty”, “Perfect” or “imperfect duty” (KpV, AA 05: 66.34– 36)? This is Kant’s problem at the end of the “Second Chapter”: the challenge, following from his previous discussion, of the moral examination of a determination of the will be subordinated to the principle of heteronomy.¹⁵ Compared with Aristotelian φρόνησις, this so-called pure practical judgment is a novelty in the history of moral philosophy. For Aristotle knows no employment of the human intellect that consists in such a moral examination of the sensibly conditioned willing of an action.¹⁶ With the typic, the Critique even dedicates a doctrine to this moral examination whose fundamental possibility and situational necessity Kant already advocates for in the Groundwork. The relevant criterion of the test is now supposed to be the concept of the type (whatever it may consist in). The faculty of our mind which is responsible for the execution of the test is pure practical judgment. And it is also an innovation in 1788 that such a moral examination stands in a certain connection with the categories of freedom, which are newly introduced here as well.¹⁷

3 Kant’s Assumed Meaning of the Term “Value” In order to get closer to the concepts of good and evil and to start providing an answer to the question of why Kant treats them before the categories of freedom and the type of pure practical judgment, it is helpful to draw attention to Kant’s language. Indeed, Kant uses the German term Wert (value) only four times in the “Second Chapter”: three times in the first sub-chapter, more precisely in the course of his discussion of the concepts of good and evil, and once in the second

 So already Zwanziger (1794) 78 ff.; Mellin (1802) 591 ff.  Cf. Höffe (1990) 545 ff.  For this, see Zimmermann (2015).

The Moral Value of the Will

145

sub-chapter, where he deals with the type of pure practical judgment. What is more, there is no explicit mention of ‘moral value’ here at all. Yet still. As inconspicuous as this expression may seem, which, in addition, occurs quite seldom here in the “Second Chapter” – after all, the Critique of Practical Reason speaks of “value” 38 times, among them fourteen times explicitly of a ‘moral’ (moralischer or sittlicher) value – to consider it nevertheless sheds light on the concepts of good and evil. And: why it is them Kant begins the analytic of concepts with. The expression ‘value’ is not introduced by Kant anywhere, neither in the Critique nor anywhere else. And nowhere does he explain it. Rather, he leaves it at that, merely assuming its meaning. This circumstance, however, that the word inconspicuously roams around in Kant’s texts and that he believes he can use it without explaining its meaning, can be seen as an interpretive advantage. For this circumstance suggests that Kant probably does not give the expression a meaning which might differ from the common German usage at the time. That is why he does not consider it necessary to focus on the term. Kant uses the word not only as a noun but also as an adjective. For instance, he uses phrases like ‘to be worth something (etwas wert sein)’¹⁸ or ‘to think something worth something (für wert achten)’¹⁹ as well as various composites, including “desirable [wünschenswert]” (GMS, AA 04: 393.10) in the sense of worth being desired,²⁰ “ridiculous [belachenswert]” (KrV, A 58/B 82) in the sense of worth being laughed at,²¹ “worthy of hate [hassenswert]” (TL, AA 04: 461.10), and “worthy of honor [verehrenswert]” (KU, AA 05: 476.34– 35). However, I will stick exclusively to instances of the noun form. Considered in terms of pure quantity, such usages also clearly predominant in Kant’s works.²² At least three meanings of the noun Wert can be distinguished in Kant. These meanings can all be found in the 5th volume of Adelung’s famous German dictionary Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, first published in 1786, in the critical period of Kant’s work. They can, to this extent, be considered common for German usage at that time. And all three of these

 Cf. KrV, A 237/B 296; Prol, AA 04: 258.11– 12; KpV, AA 05: 156.19 – 20; KU, AA 05: 334.04– 05; RL, AA 06: 333.22 and passim.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 10.16 and passim.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 110.20; RGV, AA 06: 49.15; SF, AA 07: 99.07– 08 and passim.  Cf. Prol, AA 04: 256.05; VT, AA 08: 393.27– 28; Anth, AA 07: 203.37 and passim.  In the following, I am going to use the English terms ‘value’ and ‘worth’ equivalently. As we will see, some German words belonging to the word family around Wert are to be translated by terms belonging to the word family around ‘value’ and others by terms belonging to the word family around ‘worth’.

146

Stephan Zimmermann

meanings of the expression “value”, which Adelung distinguishes and are still distinct in the German language of the present day, can be documented in Kant’s writings from the critical period of his work.

4 Three Meanings of ‘Value’ in Adelung and Kant Let us begin with Adelung. His dictionary defines Wert generally as the “degree of advantage in respect to the estimation of others, the opinion of the advantage, the goodness of a thing [my translation; S. Z.]”.²³ Being worth something is supposed to mean being preferable to something else. And to have a certain value is said to mean having a certain “advantage”. Yet this cannot be correct, which is actually shown by the examples Adelung himself gives. These examples are divided into three groups evincing particular meanings of the term. According to Adelung, then, there are three kinds of value. First, a value can be the result of numerical, quantitative measurement. It is then a quantity, a numerical value. One can read such values at a scale, one can calculate with them, along with increasing or decreasing them. As Adelung illustrates: “Especially with respect to money, the assumed yardstick of value. A good, 10,000 Reichsthaler [silver coin in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation; S. Z.] of value [Wert]”. The Critique of Pure Reason contains an example of this usage. In the chapter “On Having an Opinion, Knowing, and Believing” (KrV, A 820/B 848), Kant mentions a criterion for identifying the degree of conviction behind an assertion made by someone: “The usual touchstone of whether what someone asserts is mere persuasion or at least subjective conviction, i. e., firm belief, is betting” (KrV, A 824/B 852). Someone may declare a proposition with confident defiance and put aside all concern of error. A bet, however, may disconcert him, says Kant: “Sometimes he reveals that he is persuaded enough for one ducat [German gold coin until the 19th century; S. Z.] of value [Wert] but not for ten”.²⁴ Here, the “value” is the result of numerical, quantitative measurement. It is determined by applying a measuring measure; in the present case, the unit ducats is applied to the conviction underlying the bettor’s proposition. And the value of that conviction is the measured measure, which is numbered; in the present case it is “one” ducat and not “ten”.

 Adelung (1786) 187.  Here as well as in the rest of the paper, I refer to individuals using masculine pronouns only in order to ensure consistency with quotations from Kant.

The Moral Value of the Will

147

Second, ‘value’ can especially mean the price of a thing. It is then a purchase or market value resulting from supply and demand. A price can of course also be measured numerically and be quantified; it is then a numerical value as well. However, not every quantity is conversely a purchase or market value resulting from supply and demand. The value of a good or service may simply be greater or smaller than that of another one. As the dictionary illustrates: “Receive the value [Wert] for something, i. e., the amount of the value [Wert] according to money.”. The Critique of Practical Reason contains an example of this usage. In the first chapter, Kant makes a comparison. Whatever this comparison may concern, it begins as follows: “Just as, to someone who wants gold to spend it is all the same whether the material in it, the gold, was dug out of a mountain or washed out of sand provided it is accepted everywhere at the same value [Wert] […]” (KpV, AA 05: 23.33 – 36). The “value” for which the gold is accepted, that is to say, bought on the market, is its price. This corresponds to the example lying just prior, which involves an amount of “money” that, although unnumbered, is too small. Someone “now has only enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theater” (KpV, AA 05: 23.28 – 29).²⁵ Third and finally, ‘value’ can mean the result of a non-numerical, qualitative estimation. It is then the local value, thus something like the positive meaning, importance or special quality of a thing. For instance, someone may place value on something, or a thing may be said to be of artistic, sentimental, imperishable value. So also in Adelung: “To attach great value [Wert] to a thing. […] The sciences retain their value [Wert].”. An example of this can again be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the introduction to the whole work, Kant characterizes pre-critical, dogmatic metaphysics by stating that it does not put to a careful test the “cognitions a priori” the understanding claims to bring about. Pre-critical metaphysics does not examine those cognitions, and therefore it remains dogmatic, as to its “extent, validity, and value [Wert]” (KrV, A 3/B 7). Speaking of “extent” in this passage clearly aims at the amount and the boundary of the understanding’s “cognitions a priori”. Its speaking of “validity” means their truth and justification. And its speaking of “value” refers to their local value. When we have identified the amount and boundary as well as the truth and justification of the understanding’s “cognitions a priori”, the question  In this way, Kant expresses himself also in the Metaphysics of Morals. In a small chapter that pursues the question of what money is, he speaks of the “value [Wert] of money” (RL, AA 06: 287.12), which again means its price (so also RL, AA 06: 234.28). And Kant himself speaks of the “price” of a thing (see RL, AA 06: 288.33; TL, AA 06: 436.11). For this, see Lichtblau (2004).

148

Stephan Zimmermann

arises as to what can be done with this identification. In what sense can it be significant for us?²⁶

5 Etymology and Derivations of the Term ‘Value’ The three groups of particular meanings of the word Wert Adelung gives examples of in his dictionary are not covered by his general definition of the word. For a numerical value or price is not in every case an “advantage”. Being a quantity or having a purchase or market value does not always mean being preferable to something else. Quantifying indeed allows for comparisons with things being of the same kind of value, but that comparison may just as well show that the value of the thing in question is inferior to that of another. What a value qua talis is, therefore, remains unclear in Adelung. Today’s German adjective wert goes back to a Germanic adjective. In Old High German, i. e., the kind of the German language passed down in writing that falls approximately between 750 and 1050, this adjective is werd. Linguistic research assumes that it belongs to the Indo-Germanic word family around the now common verb werden, in Old High German werdan. This verb originally means something like (sich) drehen, wenden (to turn).²⁷ This is the origin of its meaning (sich) zu etwas drehen, wenden (to turn towards something) in the sense of becoming something (comparable to the English verb ‘to turn out’). According to its origin, the German adjective wert means something like turned towards something. This is also what is expressed by the noun Wert, which is common in German today.²⁸ According to etymology, a value is always something relative or conditioned: it stands in relation to or under the condition of something. A thing has a value only with regard to something else, it is turned towards something. Its value results – and in this way, we use the expression today quite naturally in German – from applying something else as a measuring measure. The value the thing has is then the measured measure, whether it is numerable or not.

 Similarly, also in the case of reason: “It is the transcendental use of pure reason, of its principles and ideas, whose closer acquaintance we are now obligated to make, in order properly to determine and estimate the influence and the worth [Wert] of pure reason” (KrV, A 319/B 376). What is to be determined and estimated is, once again, the significance of a thing but now, however, that of the “principles and ideas” of reason.  It is related to the Latin vertere, which also means ‘to turn’. Cf. Walde,/Hofmann (51972) 763 f.  Cf. Kluge (221989) 788.

The Moral Value of the Will

149

To remain within the framework of Kant’s examples and to explain what has been said above: the bettor’s conviction has the value of one with regard to the unit of ducats. The price of gold is measured with regard to what others are willing to trade for it. And some cognitions a priori of the understanding are assigned the value of a means by purposes lying within the intellect of human beings. Hence, for Kant a value – this is what we need to see – is as such something related. The insight that Kant uses the expression in this familiar manner is anything but trivial. For here, as elsewhere, one must not simply project the present usage of language back into past times. Only in the 19th century derivations emerged that we are still familiar with today. These derivations make it seem quite natural to us that, where speaking of a Wert in German, there is always some kind of relatedness in play, that an activity of referring and attributing a value underlies it. But Kant’s writings do not yet know such derivations. Verbs together with their corresponding nouns like werten (to value), bewerten (to evaluate), aufwerten (to upvalue) and abwerten (to devalue), and also adjectives like wertvoll (valuable) and wertlos (worthless) cannot yet be documented in Kant.²⁹ In general, the value of a thing is, contrary to Adelung, determined relatively to or under the condition of an – although Kant, as mentioned, does not call it this – evaluation basis. The thing in question is referred to something else, and a value is attributed on that basis. This applies to all three particular meanings of the German noun Wert, which have to be distinguished along with Adelung and can be documented in Kant’s writings from the critical period of his work. A value always owes itself to an activity of – again spoken in a non-Kantian way – evaluating. In the case of the numerical, quantitative measurement of a thing, a unit is required as an evaluation basis in order to measure the numerical value of that thing. In the case of a price, something like the dynamic of supply and demand is required as an evaluation basis; this determines the market value of a thing. And in the case of a non-numerical, qualitative estimation, something is required as an evaluation basis in regard to which the local value of a thing, i. e., its positive content, importance or special quality, is to be estimated.³⁰

 Cf. Duden. Das Herkunftswörterbuch (52014) 923.  Instead of bewerten (to evaluate), Kant says, among other things, schätzen (to estimate), which he uses both in the numerical and quantitative as well as in the non-numerical qualitative sense. Cf. KrV, A 319/B 376, A 824/B 852; GMS, AA 04: 394.33, 403.28, 436.05; MAM, AA 08: 122.03; KpV, AA 05: 38.27; RGV, AA 06: 184.40 fn.; TL, AA 06: 436.10, 441.28 and passim. Above all, however, Kant speaks of urteilen and beurteilen (to judge). For this, see Stolowitsch (1991).

150

Stephan Zimmermann

6 The Moral Value Among all things that Kant addresses as ‘value’, moral value stands out. It stands out already because in all Kantian texts that fall within the critical period of his work and contain reflections on moral philosophy we find talk of moralischem or, synonymously, sittlichem Wert. The phrase appears, for example, twice in the Critique of Pure Reason,³¹ nine times in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,³² fourteen times in the Critique of Practical Reason,³³ seven times in the Metaphysics of Morals (though not once in the Doctrine of Right but exclusively in the Doctrine of Virtue),³⁴ and thirteen times in the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793).³⁵ Moreover, as already mentioned, there are passages in Kant’s works where the phrase occurs frequently. And Kant’s explanations of some of the technical terms of his moral philosophy sometimes even apply the concept of moral value. At a closer look, however, it turns out that it is not always one and the same thing to which Kant attaches moral value. There are different things which, according to Kant, have or can have moral value. In the “Canon” of the Critique of Pure Reason, for instance, Kant says that the “supreme will”, i.e. God, must be “omniscient, so that it cognizes the inmost dispositions and their moral worth [Wert]” (KrV, A 815/B 843). According to this passage, it is the disposition of a human being that has “moral worth”. For Kant, whatever else may be said about it, the core of such a disposition (Gesinnung) has to do with the human will being determined to external action.³⁶ And it has a “moral worth” in that in this way the will is determined either contrary to the moral law or in accordance with it, or indeed on the basis of the requirements of this law.³⁷  Cf. KrV, A 315/B 372, A 815/B 843.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 398.14, 398.27, 399.26, 399.35 – 36, 400.06, 401.03, 406.14, 407.14, 440.07.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 71.28, 81.17, 93.25 – 26, 116.13, 116.18, 129.30, 145.06, 147.20, 147.37, 151.15, 153.22, 153.35, 157.30, 159.34.  Cf. TL, AA 06: 390.21, 435.23 – 24, 435.28, 436.01– 02, 441.33, 459.33, 463.35.  Cf. RGV, AA 06: 31.03, 48.27, 63.08, 64.36, 70.29, 71.16, 103.17, 111.37, 115.36, 169.27, 177.20 – 21, 182.15, 184.40 fn.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 435.15 – 16; KpV, AA 05: 86.03, 147.06, 147.13, 147.35. On Kant’s understanding of Gesinnung, which is by no means consistent, see Allison (1990) 136 ff.  “It is now clear that those determining grounds of the will, which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth [Wert] – the immediate representation of the law and the objectively necessary observance of it as duty – must be represented as the proper incentives to action, since otherwise legality of actions would be produced but not morality of dispositions” (KpV, AA 05: 151.13 – 19).

The Moral Value of the Will

151

In the Critique of Practical Reason, by contrast, one reads of the “moral worth of actions” (KpV, AA 05: 147.20).³⁸ An external action has such a value precisely when it is not merely accidentally performed in conformity with duty, but when it is performed from duty. Kant’s distinction between the legality and the morality of human action is affected by this distinction. For this distinction concerns the internal incentive by which a human being acts. And “that incentive”, as the Groundwork notes, “which can give actions a moral worth”, is none other than “respect for the moral law” (GMS, AA 04: 440.06 – 07).³⁹ But that is not all. It is not only the disposition underlying a person’s external actions or the actions arising from that internal disposition that can have moral value. According to Kant, the person itself also has such a value, that is, the subject which has a disposition and carries out actions corresponding to it. In the “Second Chapter” of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant distinguishes between the value of a person and that of a person’s condition. These are the first two of a total of four passages in the “Second Chapter” where we find talk of value. And there, value is nothing else, as can easily be shown, than moral value.

7 The Moral Value of the Person and Its Condition Kant makes the aforementioned distinction when, in the “Second Chapter”, he refers to “the Stoic” at whom one might laugh because he, “in the most intense pains of gout cried out: pain, however, you torment me I will still never admit that you are something evil (kakon, malum)!” (KpV, AA 05: 60.26 – 28). Kant agrees with the Stoic. For “the pain did not in the least decrease the worth [Wert] of his person”, as he explains, “but only the worth [Wert] of his condition” (KpV, AA 05: 60.31– 32).⁴⁰ The condition in question need not, however, be that of pain or even a feeling at all. It can encompass the entire internal mind of the person as well as his external actions. In every case, such a condition is a state in which the person

 Cf. KpV, AA 05: 71.28, 81.17– 19, 129.30, 153.22.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 406.10 – 14; KpV, AA 05: 71.28 – 30. That both the inner disposition and the external action can have a moral value can be found together in Kant’s note 6858 (see Refl, AA 19: 181.17– 30).  “[…] in order to find merely in our own person a worth [Wert] that can compensate us for the loss of everything that provides a worth [Wert] to our condition […]” (GMS, AA 04: 450.13 – 15).

152

Stephan Zimmermann

finds himself. But the value of the person himself, which cannot be decreased by his state – or increased, as probably one must add for the sake of completeness – is none other than his moral value. Kant does not explicitly say this here. But in the “Dialectic” he says so unmistakably: “Morality […] as the worth [Wert] of a person” (KpV, AA 05: 110.33 – 34). Thus, Kant distinguishes between the moral value of the person and the moral value of his condition, for example, his internal dispositions or external actions.⁴¹ Kant calls the subject of thinking a ‘person’ insofar as that subject is subordinated to the moral law. It is the “subject of a morally practical reason” (TL, AA 06: 434.32– 33) or the “subject of the moral law” (KpV V 87.20). The person, therefore, has qua talis a moral value because it is as such subject to the moral law. As, for instance, the Metaphysics of Morals remarks: an “exaltation and the highest self-esteem” of man is the “feeling of his inner worth [Wert] (valor), in terms of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an inalienable dignity (dignitas interna)” (TL, AA 06: 436.09 – 12).⁴² The moral value of the person is the “innate dignity of man” (TL, AA 06: 420.22– 23) or, according to the Conflict of the Faculties (1798), his “original dignity” (SF, AA 07: 73.03). By contrast, the moral value belonging to the condition of a person can be greater or smaller. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), for example, Kant contrasts that on the one hand “the existence of a human being […] has a value [Wert] in itself”, while on the other hand, “through that, which he does”, “he gives his being as the existence of a person an absolute value [Wert]” (KU, AA 05: 208.30 – 209.01).⁴³ Kant’s contrast between the moral value of the person and that of its condition appears in this formulation such that the former is a value that one has, while the latter is a value that one gives to oneself. And since I can do more or less to give a moral value to myself, this value – different from that I have because I am what I am, namely a person – can vary.⁴⁴

 Kant sometimes speaks briefly of the moral value of the person as a personal value. Cf. GMS, AA 04: 449.36; KpV, AA 05: 88.15, 127.14; KU, AA 05: 477.17.  For the conceptual opposition of price and dignity, see also GMS, AA 05: 435.02– 04; TL, AA 06: 434.25 – 31, 462.10 – 15; V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27: 1319.33 – 37. The concept that makes this opposition possible as tertium comparationis is that of a value. Price and dignity are two kinds of value for Kant.  Cf. KpV, AA 05: 38.25 – 27, 86.33, 153.22– 23, 155.04– 06; KU, AA 05: 443.07– 10.  At one point in the Groundwork, both kinds of dignity appear together: the kind of dignity one has and the one that one gives to oneself. The “dignity of humanity”, Kant writes, “consists just in this capacity to give universal law” (GMS, AA 04: 440.11– 13). At the same time, we “represent a certain sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfills all his duties” (GMS, AA 04: 440.01). In the former case, my dignity consists in being merely capable of moral self-legislation, while in the latter, it consists in the actual fulfillment of what I am obliged to do.

The Moral Value of the Will

153

It is against this background that the third of the four passages in which Kant speaks of value in the “Second Chapter” must be read: “morality of dispositions (in which, and not merely in actions, consists the high worth [Wert] that humanity can and ought to procure for itself)” (KpV, AA 05: 71.15 – 17). The morality of a disposition is its “worth”. Human beings can and ought to procure this value for themselves. They do this by determining their will with respect to an action on the basis of the requirements of the moral law, which they can fulfill to a greater or lesser extent. The “high worth” of the human will determined with respect to an action is thus its moral value.

8 Moral Value and Moral Law Whatever it is that has a moral value – the person or its condition, and if its condition, an internal disposition, external action or whatever else – the evaluation basis by which such a value is measured and which makes it a moral one is none other than the moral law. Kant is clear about this. Hence, for example, in the Groundwork, he states generally: “For, nothing can have a worth [Wert] other than that, which the law determines for it” (GMS, AA 04: 436.01– 02). This “worth”, which is determined by the moral law, is accordingly the moral value of a thing. What is evaluated by the “law” is evaluated sub specie moralitatis. And in the “Second Chapter” of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant remarks with special regard to the concepts of good and evil that they “must not be determined before the moral law […] but only (as is done here) after it and by means of it” (KpV, AA 05: 63.01– 04). He calls this the “paradox of method” (KpV, AA 05: 62.36) because with this he turns or means to turn against the entire previous tradition of moral philosophy for which the method of his own moral philosophy must seem paradoxical.⁴⁵ As a result, the concept of moral value is a secondary concept. Certainly, we can say that it is a basic concept of Kant’s moral philosophy insofar as it has its place in Kant’s basic writings on moral philosophy and does not first belong to the Metaphysics of Morals as the elaborated “system of the doctrine of duties in general” (TL, AA 06: 379.09). Nevertheless, according to Kant’s own statements, the concept of moral value is not a concept with a supporting function. The same applies to those technical terms that Kant himself sometimes explains by means of moral value, including the concept of dignity and that of a moral as opposed

 For this, see Pieper (2002) 116 ff.

154

Stephan Zimmermann

to merely legal action.⁴⁶ For none of these concepts can be set up without reference to the moral law. Kant does not explain them independently of the unlimitedly good will, nor does he found them in it. Rather, these concepts go hand in hand with it. They conversely depend upon the law of the unlimitedly good will. The moral law is the decisive point of reference. It must already be developed according to its content and justified in its validity so that those concepts in turn can be determined and founded. Some authors interpret this, not entirely wrongly, as the Copernican turn in the field of moral philosophy. In theoretical philosophy, Kant argues that objects are conditioned by representations lying within the constitution of our pure theoretical reason.⁴⁷ And similarly, he argues here that the concept of moral value, and thus that of dignity and moral action, presupposes the moral law, which is a part of the constitution of our pure practical reason.⁴⁸ This rules out from the outset the possibility that moral value belonging to a person or its condition is something individual, private or ‘subjective’. Certainly, like any other value, the moral value of something arises in view of an evaluation basis; what has a value for someone owes this value to an activity of evaluating.⁴⁹ For a philosophy that, like Neo-Kantianism, understands itself as a value philosophy, there conclude certain consequential problems. How can values, since they are of individual, private or ‘subjective’ origin – i. e., values for someone thanks to his activity of evaluation with regard to an evaluation basis used by him – nevertheless have general or ‘objective’ validity?⁵⁰ But values can very well be something general or ‘objective’. We simply have to break it down more finely. If I measure the width of a table, for instance, and apply the centimeter unit as a scale, I get, for example, the value 100; the table is 100 cm wide. It may be called ‘subjective’ that I chose this scale rather than any other. The choice of the scale in question is here left to the discretion of the individual. If I had applied the meter unit instead, I would have received the value 1; the table is 1 m wide. The numerical value, however, which I arrive at in each case, does not depend on me. The measuring measure, the unit of measurement, is my ingredient, but the measured measure, the value I arrive at through the nu-

 According to Guyer (2000), however, “the foundation of Kant’s entire moral philosophy is his belief in the absolute value of the freedom of rational beings” (155). See also Wood (1998) 189, 195, 196, 197, 199.  Cf. KrV, B XVI.  See, for example, Silber (1959/60); Engstrom (2009) 13 f., 183.  See also Hügli (2004) 557.  This problem is already mentioned by the Neo-Kantian Lotze, where the concept of value rises to become a central philosophical concept. Cf. Lotze (1882) 8.

The Moral Value of the Will

155

merical, quantitative measurement, is not. One may therefore call the latter ‘objective’. The quantity is not arbitrary at all, since every other subject who applies the same scale will come to the same result. Things are similar in the case of moral value in Kant. The moral value, that a person or his state is very well something general or ‘objective’. For every other subject, if it applies the same criterion for the non-numerical, qualitative estimation of a person or its condition, will come to the same result.⁵¹ The positive meaning, importance or special quality of something that is measured by the moral law – it is a decisive difference from the previous example that this estimation is not at the discretion of the individual – is as general or ‘objectively’ valid as, according to Kant, the law itself by which it is measured. The local value of a disposition, an action or whatever else, which everyone ought to estimate with reference to this criterion, can therefore claim validity for everyone.⁵²

9 Moral Value, Dignity, and Sublimity Moral value stands out among types of value in Kant for yet another reason. According to Kant, human beings are not endowed with reason in order to pursue their physical self-preservation by a more effective means than animal instinct. Kant surpasses empirical practical reason with pure practical reason. What empirical practical reason imposes on us or what is connected with its impositions has only a relative ⁵³ or conditioned ⁵⁴ value, one that stands in relation to or under the condition of an end given by our sensibility. Pure practical reason, by contrast, is not supposed to have the value of a means to an otherwise given end. What it imposes on us or is connected with its impositions shows, as Kant puts it, an absolute ⁵⁵ or unconditioned ⁵⁶ value.

 For Kant, therefore, the problem posed by Lotze’s value philosophy is solved from the outset. Unlike Moore (1993), too, he believes that “intrinsic values” (x) can very well be justified.  ‘Subjective’ and ‘objective’ can mean many things. In this context (as otherwise in Kant’s usage), they can refer to the range: whether a value is valid for only one subject or for all. Or, they can refer to the relationship to a subject: whether the validity of a value depends on the subject or not. And, according to Kant, moral value applies to all subjects because it depends on their common constitution, their pure practical reason, which implies the moral law. For this, see Sturma (2015).  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 428.20 – 21, 435.03.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 428.12, 428.31.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 428.04, 428.15, 428.30, 439.22; KU, AA 05: 209.01, 443.12.  Cf. GMS, AA 04: 394.01, 400.05 – 06, 436.03 – 04; RGV, AA 06: 133.05 – 06.

156

Stephan Zimmermann

What man has in common with animals, according to Kant, is that he is a sensible and needy being. His practical reason qua empirical has a commission that it cannot refuse from the side of his sensibility. But the fact “that he has reason”, Kant says in the fourth and final passage where he speaks of value in the “Second Chapter” of the Critique of Practical Reason, “does not at all raise him in worth [Wert] above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals” (KpV, AA 05: 61.32– 35). For reason would then “be only a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the same end to which it has destined animals” (KpV, AA 05: 61.35 – 37). Man, however, is to be determined by his reason for a higher end, one that exceeds all their neediness. And he is determined to this end by the moral law, which is implied in his practical reason qua pure. The value in question, which raises him “above mere animality”, is accordingly his moral value. According to Kant, however, this absolute or unconditioned moral value does not merely raise human beings above all animals. By means of it, human beings are even raised above everything finite in space and time. According to Kant’s occasional indication, dignity is the moral value of a person, or at least this is one meaning among others with which Kant uses the word ‘dignity’.⁵⁷ This usage does not come by chance, for today’s German noun Würde (dignity) has just as much developed out of the adjective wert (worth). It expresses a special kind of value: not everything that possesses a value has dignity, but everything that possesses dignity thus has a value.⁵⁸ And Kant occasionally mentions dignity in one breath with sublimity.⁵⁹ To have dignity is thus to be sublime, i. e., to be raised above something or to be of a higher rank.⁶⁰ It is dignity which, with Adelung, always expresses something’s “advantage”. Dignity estimates that it belongs to as being higher in comparison with something else. Adelung’s supposedly general definition of value in fact captures only a special kind of value. That some human beings have this kind of “advantage”, a higher rank than others, is expressed by Kant when he speaks, for instance, of the “dignity of the teacher” (RGV, AA 06: 162.19), “of

 For an overview of the different meanings of the word ‘dignity’ in Kant, see Sensen (2011) 164 ff.  For this, see Adelung (1786) 305 f.; Kluge (221989) 800.  Cf. BDG, AA 02: 117.35; NG, AA 02: 212.01, 215.20; GSE, AA 02: 241.18; GMS, AA 04: 425.28, 434.33 – 34, 439.04– 10, 440.01; KpV, AA 05: 71.21– 22; TL, AA 06: 434.32– 435.02, 435.19 – 20.  Kant mentions dignity occasionally in one breath with higher rank. Cf. RL, AA 06: 328.09; TL 06: 468.09, Anth, AA 07: 127.09.

The Moral Value of the Will

157

the regents” (ZeF, AA 08: 344.06) or “of a minister” (ZeF, AA 08: 344.07– 08).⁶¹ And the dignity which Kant ascribes to all human beings is characterized by their “advantage” over all things in space and time, by being raised above the whole of nature.⁶² This does not mean, however, that moral value does not have an evaluation basis by which it is measured, that therefore it does not owe itself to an activity of evaluating. It is not the case that Kant’s talk of an absolute or unconditioned value falls out of line; it does not contradict the etymology of the expression at all. It simply must be understood in such a way that the evaluation basis the thing under evaluation is turned to is turned is of a special kind, namely not finite. ⁶³ Not only is the moral value not relative to an end given by our sensibility and neediness, but it also is not at all subject to the conditions of something empirical and experienceable. According to Kant, the unlimitedly good will places us in a different order of things. On “this origin are based many expressions that indicate the worth [Wert] of objects according to moral ideas” (KpV, AA 05: 87.13 – 14). Consequently, the “worth of objects according to moral ideas” is absolute in the sense that it is not unconditioned per se but by such things that are experienceable. Like every other value, it must stand in relation to something by which it is measured. Something has a moral value for somebody only thanks to his activity of evaluation with regard to something else, and that is the moral law. Just as the moral law commands absolutely, namely not on the basis of an empirical feeling of pleasure or displeasure, moral value, which depends upon the moral law, is absolute in the same way. To declare this law of the unlimitedly good will null and void consequently means, as Kant states in the “Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason”, “to destroy all moral worth [Wert]” (KpV, AA 05: 93.25 – 29).⁶⁴

 Cf. KrV, A 62/B 86; KpV, AA 05: 71.21– 22; KU, AA 05: 327.14; RGV, AA 06: 113.25 – 26; RL, AA 06: 315.24; TL, AA 06: 467.26; Anth, AA 07: 131.09; SF, AA 07: 19.26; Päd, AA 09: 26.14 and passim.  The view of the starry heaven above me “annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature” (KpV, AA 05: 162.13 – 14). That of the moral law within me, on the contrary, “infinitely raises my worth [Wert] as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world” (KpV, AA 05: 162.17– 20).  “The worth [Wert] of a disposition completely conformed with the moral law is infinite” (KpV, AA 05: 128.12– 13).  That the moral value also has a source from which it springs is emphasized by Korsgaard (1986) 499.

158

Stephan Zimmermann

10 A Two-Stage Program of Moral Cognition What I have explained above, taking into account Kant’s language, is sufficient to answer the question that has arisen with regard to the composition of the Critique of Practical Reason. I have asked why Kant opens the “Second Chapter”, and hence the analytic of concepts, with the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil and why the doctrine of the categories of freedom and that of the type of pure practical judgment only follow afterwards. In the meantime, the foregoing explanations have indeed revealed a common thread that runs through Kant’s arrangement of the three topics of the analytic of concepts. The concepts of good and evil, which find their application in reference to the human will not yet be realized but already determined with respect to an object, serve, as has become evident, the moral evaluation of the object of a sensibly conditioned willing. What is evaluated as good or evil is, according to Kant, that action with respect to which the will of a human being is determined under the principle of heteronomy. The yardstick for this is the moral willing of the action in question, which is subject to the principle of autonomy. “But good or evil always signifies a reference to the will insofar as it is determined by the law of reason” (KpV, AA 05: 60.13 – 15). What I want on the basis of an empirical feeling of pleasure or displeasure I refer to the will determined by the moral law, and by it I measure the moral value of what I want, that is, whether it is good or evil. What exactly the moral value of the good consists in cannot be put to rest on the basis of Kant’s text. Surely it must be said that evil is what is morally forbidden, i. e., incompatible with the “law of reason”, and that the good is what is compatible with it. But being compatible with the moral law can in substance mean two different things. On the one hand, what we want to do on the basis of an empirical feeling of pleasure or displeasure can be identical with that is morally required. On the other hand, what we want to do can also be something the law is silent about; to do it or not is morally permitted. The moral value of evil, then, consists in being contrary to the moral law and that of the good in being in accordance with it; but the latter could include – and the wording of the “Second Chapter” does not allow a final decision about this – that towards which the law remains indifferent.⁶⁵

 The “morally indifferent action (adiaphoron morale)” is one, as Kant notes in the Religion, that “stands in no relation at all to the moral law” (RGV, AA 06: 23.13 – 15). In the Metaphysics of Morals we find: “An action that is neither commanded nor forbidden is merely permitted, since there is no law limiting one’s freedom […] with regard to it and so too no duty. Such an

The Moral Value of the Will

159

In any case, it is now apparent how the doctrine of the concepts of good and evil fit into the “Second Chapter”. The three topics that the analytic of concepts encompasses are not arranged arbitrarily. For, by treating the doctrine of the categories of freedom only afterward and ending with that of the type of pure practical judgment, Kant seems to be following a common thread: the analytic of concepts as a whole obviously covers a two-stage program of moral cognition. However, as Kant goes through the three topics, he deals with the stations of this program in reverse order, i. e., against the actual direction of the cognition.⁶⁶ The first stage consists in the cognition of the moral forms of willing that are appropriate to the sensibly conditioned willing of an action. The concept of the type serves this purpose, and the concepts of the moral forms of willing are the categories of freedom. The type functions as the criterion for naming those categories of freedom by which a determination of our will with respect to an action, standing under the principle of heteronomy and submitted for examination, is to be specified in moral terms, that is, under the principle of autonomy. Is my maxim “permitted” or “forbidden”, “Duty” or “contrary to duty”, “Perfect” or “imperfect duty”? The second stage then consists in the cognition of the moral value of the object of this sensibly conditioned willing. The concepts of the moral value of such an object of the will are the concepts of good and evil. After it has been clarified what the relevant intention looks like in moral terms, I can morally evaluate the action in question. The criterion for this is now the moral form of willing specified by the categories of freedom. From this, which probably concerns primarily or even exclusively the modal categories, it can be deduced whether the action in question with respect to which the will is determined is good or evil.⁶⁷ Thus, while cognition moves from the moral form of willing an object to the moral value of the object of the willing, Kant reverses his analysis of the stations of this program of cognition. Why this is so can only be speculated about. It is, however, easy to admit that the categories of freedom, at least, must be disaction is called morally indifferent (indifferens, adiaphoron, res merae facultatis)” (RL, AA 06: 223.05 – 09).  As a moral one, this program of cognition deviates from that which Dieringer (2002), following Beck, has in mind with his “two-stage process of the practical cognition of reason”. For the “first stage” of that process is still supposed to be a “practical cognition of reason in general [my translation; S. Z.]” (143). Cf. Beck (1960) 134.  Strictly speaking, therefore, it is not the willing of an object but the object of willing that is good or evil. Kant says so himself: good and evil are concepts of an object of pure practical reason, as the heading of the first sub-chapter of the “Second Chapter” indicates. That which I want is good or evil, and the fact that I want it is only so in a derivative sense. In other words, the fact that I want something is only good or evil because that which I want is good or evil.

160

Stephan Zimmermann

cussed before the type of pure practical judgment. For, if the moral examination of an intention is to be performed with respect to the categories of freedom, these categories must already be available in a systematic table⁶⁸ before the type can be tackled. But then it is hardly surprising that Kant retained the inversion of the method. It is only consistent that he raises his preoccupation with the concepts of good and evil even before this. Be that as it may, Kant adopts the concepts of good and evil, and especially the former, from an enduring tradition of moral philosophy. He finds them and relates to them by assigning them their place within the moral philosophy newly founded by him in pure practical reason. He explains what these traditional concepts mean in truth, what they can still mean now. But through their new foundation, these concepts lose their character as basic concepts. They lose their supporting function. And this is not only because – the “paradox of method” – the moral law is primary in relation to them but also because they are now grounded on the categories of freedom and on the universalization test to which we must submit our maxims.

References Adelung, Johann C. (1786): Versuch eines vollständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuches der Hochdeutschen Mundart W-Z [Vol. 5.1]. Leipzig: Hanse. Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bartuschat, Wolfgang (1972): Zum systematischen Ort von Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft [In: Philosophische Abhandlungen, Vol. 43]. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann. Beck, Lewis W. (1960): A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Brandt, Reinhard (1991): Die Urteilstafel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft A 67 – 76; B 92 – 101 [In: Kant-Forschungen, Vol. 4]. Hamburg: Meiner. Dieringer, Volker (2002): “Was erkennt die praktische Vernunft? Zu Kants Begriff des Guten in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. In: Kant-Studien 93/2. pp. 137 – 157. Dudenredaktion (Ed.) (2014): Duden. Das Herkunftswörterbuch [5. Auflage]. Mannheim: Dudenverlag. Engstrom, Stephen P. (2009): The Form of Practical Knowledge. A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Cambridge: Havard University Press. Guyer, Paul (2000): Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 That Kant claims completeness not only for the table of the pure concepts of understanding in the first Critique but also for that of the categories of freedom in the second Critique, see Zimmermann (2020).

The Moral Value of the Will

161

Höffe, Otfried (1990): “Universalistische Ethik und Urteilskraft: ein aristotelischer Blick auf Kant”. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 44, pp. 537 – 563. Hügli, Anton (2004): “Wert I. Einleitung”. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie W-Z. Vol. 12. Joachim Ritter/Karlfried Gründer (Eds.). Basel: Schwabe AG, pp. 556 – 558. Kant, Immanuel (1747 – 1782) [1900 ff.]: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ed.). Berlin: de Gruyter. Kant, Immanuel (1992 ff.): “The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kluge, Friedrich (1989): Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. [ed. by Elmar Seebold]. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1986): “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value”. In: Ethics 96/3, pp. 486 – 505. Lichtblau, Klaus (2004): “Wert/Preis”, In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie W-Z. Vol. 12. Joachim Ritter/Karlfried Gründer (Eds.). Basel: Schwabe AG, pp. 586 – 591. Lotze, Hermann (1882): Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen. Leipzig. Mellin, Georg S. A. (1802): Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie oder Versuch einer fasslichen und vollständigen Erklärung der in Kants kritischen und dogmatischen Schriften enthaltenen Begriffe und Sätze [Vol. 1]. Jena/Leipzig. Moore, George E. (1993): Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Acumen Publishing. Pieper, Annemarie (2002): “Zweites Hauptstück (57 – 71)”. In: Höffe, Otfried (Ed.): Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, [In: Klassiker Aulagen, Vol. 26]. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 115 – 133. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity [In: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, Vol. 166]. Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter. Silber, John R. (1959/60): “The Copernican Revolution in Ethics: The Good Reexamined”. In: Kant-Studien 51, pp. 85 – 101. Stolowitsch, Leonid (1991): “Immanuel Kant über den Wertbegriff”. In: Funke, Gerhard (Ed.): Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 2.2. [Sektionsbeiträge, Sektionen G-P]. Bonn/Berlin, pp. 199 – 205. Sturma, Dieter (2015): “Subjektiv”. In: Willaschek, Marcus/Stolzenberg, Jürgen/Mohr, Georg/Bacin, Stefano (Eds.): Kant-Lexikon. [Vol. 2. Habitus-Rührung]. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 2203 – 2205. Walde, Alois/Hofmann, Johann B. (51972): Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch [Vol. 2: M-Z]. Heidelberg: Winter. Wood, Allen W. (1998): “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature I”. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [Supplementary Volumes] 72, pp. 189 – 210. Zimmermann, Stephan (2011): Kants ‚Kategorien der Freiheit‘ [In: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, Vol. 167]. Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter. Zimmermann, Stephan (2015): “Wovon handelt Kants ‚Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft‘?”, in: Kant-Studien 106/3, pp. 430 – 460. Zimmermann, Stephan (2020): “Kant über die Vollständigkeit der ‚Tafel der Kategorien der Freiheit,‘”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 110/3, pp. 1 – 27. Zwanziger, Johann C. (1794): Commentar über Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Leipzig.

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Kant’s practical philosophy gives ground to a universal right to citizenship, i. e., that human beings have not only an innate right to freedom but also an acquired yet pre-political right not to be excluded from becoming a citizen of a state. In the first step of my analysis, I assert that the categorical imperative obliges us to consider all human beings as ends-in-themselves, thus acknowledging their absolute value, i. e., dignity. I also claim that the categorical imperative points to human freedom and autonomy, which contribute to the moral personality of human beings. Further, I investigate how the concept of dignity translates into the legal personality of all humans and their innate and acquired rights. I briefly sketch the structure of Kant’s system of rights to indicate how individual rights can only be enjoyed within a civil condition of a state. While focusing on the concept of a universal right to citizenship as I understand it, I explain how a claim for such a right can be argued for within Kant’s legal theory, especially his idea of cosmopolitan right. In the last part of my paper, I indicate the connection between Kant’s legal and moral cosmopolitanism in order to project the universal moral duty to create conditions for every human to enjoy juridical rights.

Kant’s practical philosophy gives ground to a universal right to citizenship, i. e., that human beings have not only an innate right to freedom but also an acquired yet pre-political right not to be excluded from becoming a citizen of a state. It would be futile to find textual evidence of Kant discussing such a right himself since the problem of the stateless persons (vogelfrei) for vast numbers of the world population did not emerge before the two great wars of the twentieth century. Yet, my claim is that Kant’s ethical and legal theory excludes the normative possibility of keeping human beings in a juridical vacuum of not only having no Acknowledgement: This paper has been concluded thanks to the support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation during my postdoctoral research stay at the University of Bonn, Germany. I would like to express my gratitude to my peers at the International Conference Moralischer Wert bei Kant, held in Oktober 2019 in Bonn, for giving their comments on an earlier draft and to Robinson dos Santos and Christoph Horn for their kind invitation. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-011

164

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

right to be somewhere, where fate put them (which opposes the cosmopolitan right), but also not having a right to belong to a polity, where they are considered not merely as members of human species, but as legal persons.¹ Moreover, the cosmopolitan community of moral beings is obliged to strive for creating conditions for such a right to be juridically granted. My approach does not intend to ground the universal right to citizenship in some quasi-Kantian theory of human rights since the overwhelming amount of Kantian research proves his philosophy to be unable to provide a theory of human rights consistent with our contemporary legal concepts.² Nor will I intend to lean on the concept of human dignity, which is present in the legal documents of the current and past centuries, although Kant’s account of this concept will play an essential role in my argumentation.³ In the first step of my analysis, I intend to show that the categorical imperative obliges us to consider all human beings as ends-in-themselves, thus acknowledging their absolute value, i. e., dignity. I also claim that the categorical imperative points to human freedom and autonomy, which contribute to the moral personality of human beings (1). Secondly, I show how the concept of dignity translates into the legal personality of all humans and their innate and acquired rights. I will briefly sketch the structure of Kant’s system of rights to show how individual rights can only be enjoyed within a civil condition of a state. (2). In the next section, I focus on the concept of a universal right to citizenship as I understand it and show how a claim for such a right can be argued for within Kant’s legal theory, especially his idea of cosmopolitan right (3). Finally, I indicate the connection between Kant’s legal and moral cosmopolitanism in order to show the universal moral duty to create conditions for every human to enjoy juridical rights (4).

1 The value of humanity. Persons as duty-bearers and right-holders In the beginning, I aim at putting down some general assumptions of my interpretation. It is vital to mark that Kant’s system of practical philosophy, which

 See Arendt (1949), where she introduces the concept of ‘the right to have rights’.  See for example Pinzani (2018), Pavao and Faggion (2016).  See, for example, the concept of dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) of the United Nations General Assembly and Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949).

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

165

covers both his moral and legal theory, is founded on the concept of duty. Therefore, there is no fundamental value, neither material (like utility or happiness) nor spiritual (like eternal salvation), that would constitute a justification of why, or for what sake, we ought to act in this or another way. Conversely, the concept of value (i. e., of good and evil), according to Kant, is secondary to the central normative term, i. e., the categorical imperative (KpV, AA 05: 59.10 – 66.15).⁴ The categorical imperative of reason is the form in which moral law is given to finite human beings. Since humans can oppose what is prescribed by reason, the moral law is a command. It determines an objectively necessary action, irrespective of humans’ empirical wishes and wants, and reveals their freedom, understood as the independence of inclinations and the ability to determine their will only by recognizing what is commanded by their reason. The ‘givenness’ of this imperative in human reason, the ‘fact of reason’, is Kant’s starting point for his theory of value, in particular, his concept of dignity as an absolute value (GMS, AA 04: 435.05 – 436.07, 440.01– 13).⁵ Kant derives the concepts of good and evil from what follows or opposes the categorical imperative and assigns the absolute value only to the human ability to act morally. Everything else in the universe has merely a relative value, which Kant calls ‘price’ (GMS, AA 04: 428.07– 429.13,435.01– 28). One must add that this fact does not deem the Kantian theory of value as overly simplistic but draws a clear line between what is valuable irrespective of empirical conditions and what is not.⁶ According to Kant, only a moral being and their action can possess an absolute value. This value attributed to humans is called dignity and rests not on the actual but merely on the potential quality of their conduct, i. e., every human, a being with the capacity for morality, has dignity.⁷

 Kant’s works are referenced to the volume and page number in the ‘Akademie Ausgabe’ of Prussian Academy of Sciences (1902 ff), the translation cited throughout the paper stems from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, volume Practical Philosophy, translated by Mary J. Gregor and edited by Allen Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 ff.  In my understanding of the concept of dignity, I agree with Sensen’s claim that the absolute value of humanity does not provide the foundation for the categorical imperative but is derived from it. I nevertheless side with Bojanowski, Schönecker and Schmidt, by claiming that Kant’s understanding of human dignity in his moral writings indicates absolute value and not merely the state of being elevated above something else. See Sensen, (2011), p. 2, 13, 21, 35; Bojanowski (2015), Schönecker and Schmidt (2018).  An appropriately thorough analysis of Kant’s theory of value exceeds the scope of this paper. For reference, see Schönrich (2013).  See Bojanowski (2015), p. 85; Schönecker and Schmidt (2018), p. 86. It should also be pointed out that along with these writers, I agree that, on many occasions, Kant uses the term ’dignity’

166

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

This dignity of humanity, which in this context expresses the capacity for morality, is to be found in two specific formulations of the categorical imperative. The first two formulations, which focus on the formal and universal aspect of the moral law, are expressed as follows: ‘act only in accordance with the maxim, through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ and ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (GMS, AA 04: 421.06 – 20). The other versions of this imperative are to be considered coextensive with the latter. Yet, they bring about the further aspect of humans being ends-in-themselves: ‘so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’. Finally, they point to the intersubjectivity and mutuality of moral obligations, when Kant states that we should act only ‘so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim’, as legislators in the Kingdom of Ends (GMS, AA 04: 429.03 – 09; 434.01– 436.07). Humans as ends-in-themselves have a certain inner quality, absolute worth. Using them as means is permitted if they are not treated as things, which means that their value is not merely market value (e. g., as workers), but also an absolute value of persons demanding respect. This respect is commanded in treating others and towards our inner value, and it is expressed both in legal and ethical duties, towards ourselves and others. The totality of all humans under universal moral laws, i. e., all beings as ends-in-themselves, which have inner value and obey the categorical prescriptions of reason, is called the Kingdom of Ends, where the total sum of duties towards oneself and others is considered the universal law in analogy to the law of nature. The dignity of humans plays the central role in depicting that they are to obey moral law and that others are morally obliged towards them. As ends-in-themselves, they cannot be treated as things, and as possessing dignity, they cannot be reduced to their empirical constitution. The concept of the categorical imperative, together with the absolute value of humans as having dignity, is the metaphysical core of Kant’s practical philosophy, which bears consequences for ethics and his legal philosophy. Before I analyze another concept, which is crucial for my argument, it is necessary to put down an important limitation to Kant’s concept of dignity. Now, recognizing the absolute value of humanity is founded on the categorical imperative alone and does not precede it. In other words, we are not to respect human beings because they have absolute value, but they have absolute value because

also in a different sense than the specific moral meaning (i. e., as absolute value), e. g., to express the dignity of a head of state etc.

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

167

we ought to respect them. The concept of moral obligation needs to be considered foundational for human dignity and not the other way around.⁸ If we take this into account, the contemporary understanding of dignity as the source of moral and legal rights is fundamentally non-Kantian.⁹ The concept of dignity of humans and the last two formulations of the categorical imperative are connected to another important aspect of human beings as moral subjects: that humans are lawgiving subjects (GMS, AA 04: 435.07– 436.07, 438.08 – 26). As Kant explains, because a human is an end-in-itself, i. e., a person, ‘such a being is not to be subjected to any purpose that is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will of the affected subject himself’ (KpV, AA 05: 87.21– 27). Persons must therefore be considered as giving laws to themselves in every aspect of their (co‐) existence. In personal morality, the laws are not imposed by some higher authority but are the expression of autonomy. Yet, the lawgiving of moral persons is universal and therefore does not rest on their contingent wishes but comes from practical reason alone. The idea of the Kingdom of Ends is the perfectly harmonious union of all moral subjects under the universal laws of reason. Everyday experience shows that these ideas are hardly realized in the empirical world, where moral and noble actions stand next to conduct driven by needs and inclinations (KpV, AA 05: 88.21– 37). Therefore, the moral world, as Kant describes it, is but an idea of reason. Nevertheless, the moral law must have practical reality in order to exercise impact on the empirical world, and so must also the absolute value of humans. Apart from their empirical character, which varies according to the circumstances, humans possess this ‘holy’, metaphysical aspect of themselves, which is the foundation of all normativity. By this, I mean the predisposition to personality, understood as the capacity for universal lawgiving and the inner freedom, allowing them to act on moral laws, regardless of the empirical conditions (Rel, AA 06: 26 – 28). Personality also determines the imputability of human beings, which can therefore be held accountable for their action (RL, AA 06: 224.04– 08). This is the ground for the validity of any normative system of laws, both ethical and juridical. From the above, one must stress one important conclusion: that the core concepts of Kant’s practical philosophy, with the categorical imperative as its foundation, point to humans being both duty-bearers as free and autonomous subjects, as well as right-holders, as ends-in-themselves having an absolute value.

 See Sensen (2011), Chapters 1 and 3.  See footnotes 3 and 4.

168

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

2 The rights of man. Kant’s system of rights. The concept of right¹⁰ in Kant’s philosophy corresponds to the set of duties, which can be subject to external lawgiving and enforced with coercion. This fact gives ground for many Kant scholars to deny Kant’s system of rights any connection to the foundational concepts of his moral philosophy. My interpretative approach does not follow this line of thought, as the concepts of dignity and personality play a crucial role in my argumentation. The purpose of the system of rights is to harmonize the use of external freedom among free and autonomous subjects. It, therefore, does not thematize the duties, which concern the inner disposition of human beings and any human relationships, which go beyond the external conditions for universal freedom. The origin of this set of duties partly lies in the human condition – the need to secure external freedom is linked to our embodied way of existence in space and time, and the need to regulate the individual spheres of freedom emerges from the limitation posed by the fact that earth is a globe and humans cannot disperse on it indefinitely. Nevertheless, while looking at Kant’s general division of the duties of right, one cannot deny that the subjects of rights are the same as those of morality: the imputable, autonomous ends-in-themselves, having absolute inner value. After all, the first duty of right, honeste vive, should be understood as a command: ‘do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them’ (RL, AA 06: 236.27– 28). Persons not only have a right to be respected as humans possessing dignity but also have a duty to protect this dignity against instrumentalization. A famous example of this duty is the prohibition of selling oneself into slavery, but this does not exhaust the meaning of this demand. To ’be an honorable human being’ also means to understand oneself as the subject of juridical rights and duties, from which there follows that one assumes the independence from one’s inclinations, the authorship of one’s deeds and therefore the imputability that makes one into a legal person. This first duty of right establishes the legal personality of every human, with their innate right to external freedom, which will be discussed further below. The second duty, neminem laede, demands not to wrong anyone (RL, AA 06: 236.31– 33). What follows is the demand not to infringe on rights of the fellow humans. As it becomes evident in further articles of the Doctrine of Right, the second part of the right theory is concerned not only with protecting freedom as an innate right but also with grounding the possibility of acquiring further  See Arendt (1949). In her essay, ’the rights of man’ are those, which every human should be able to claim as a member of the human species.

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

169

rights, which can be fully realized only in the rightful condition – a condition of distributive justice, i. e., a state. Therefore, the last general duty of right, suum cuique tribue, demands from all humans to enter such a condition, in which everybody can enjoy their rights (have them granted), and the provisional (acquired) rights become conclusive (RL, AA 06: 237.01– 03). There can be provisional rights in the state of nature, but there is no distributive justice that guarantees the acquisition of rights and gives citizens autonomy. The three general duties of right determine the structure of Kant’s concept of right, as protecting innate freedom, which possibly extends to further individual rights that in turn can become legitimate and secured only within a state of distributive justice, a civil condition.¹¹ Let us briefly discuss the rights, understood as enforceable legal titles within a state’s legal framework. The first and only innate right is equal external freedom of every human under universal laws. This freedom already entails further authorizations which are not distinct from it (as if they were members of the division of some higher concept of a right): innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can, in turn, bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone; and finally, his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs. (RL, AA 06: 237.29 – 238.05)

Therefore, the innate right must secure an equal status of all humans in their free interactions and prohibit enslavement, illegitimate domination and incarceration of one person by another and enable free interaction between persons within the limits of universal laws. The right to personal freedom (innate right) in the state of nature is limited only by the personal freedom of other people and, therefore, any action which does not violate the body and mind of another person is right. But it is insufficient to regulate the relationship between individuals solely based on their innate rights. Moreover, the innate right to freedom is not enough to justify the introduction of state power with its coercive laws. The human condition requires people to use external objects,¹² which are limited in supply. This fact generates a need for further, acquired rights. If people are to be able to exercise freedom as human beings and pursue their goals, they need to be entitled to possess objects

 See Pinzani (2005).  See Ripstein (2009), p. 58 – 62.

170

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

that are not in direct contact with their body (i. e., possess more than the space they occupy on the surface of the earth and things they can hold in their hands) and so, exclude others from using these objects. For the innate right to freedom not to be an ’empty concept’, Kant states that the practical reason asserts the necessity of intelligible possession. The possibility of such possession is postulated by pure practical reason as the postulate of private right. In this postulate, Kant concludes that we must be able to claim an intelligible possession of an external object, even though we are not in the physical possession of this object. In other words, we need to be able to claim that an object belongs to us even when we are not holding it in our hands. The postulate of private rights is a necessary condition for any acquired right. In Kant’s theory of right, possession of objects of one’s choice is possible prior to (or in abstraction from) the civil constitution, i. e., in a state of nature (RL, AA 06: 256.19 – 257.36). This possession, understood as a right, is by no means innate; it needs to be acquired, either by the unilateral will of an individual (original acquisition of land) or through a contract (bilateral will).¹³ The grounds for obtaining something on my own, which formerly belonged to everyone by virtue of original common ownership of the earth, is the permissive law of private right.¹⁴ This law states that I can acquire an object of my choice and, therefore, exempt others from using it, but only under the condition of entering with everyone into a rightful condition or a state of public right. In this sense, for Kant, the rights of individuals, both the innate and the acquired, are valid also in the state of nature. We do not need to enter the rightful condition to have rights as individuals, yet Kant claims that entering the civil condition is necessary. He asserts that even a peace-loving person must enter the rightful condition to avoid violence: Indeed, the state of nature need not, just because it is natural, be a state of injustice (iniustus), of dealing with one another only in terms of the degree of force each has. But it would still be a state devoid of justice (status iustitia vacuus), in which when rights are in dispute (ius controversum), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force. Hence, each may impel the other by force to leave this state and enter into a rightful condition; for, although each can acquire something external by taking control of it or by

 Kant also considers a third type of acquired rights, which are the rights to possess other individuals that are in accordance with the freedom of possessed persons. As examples of such legal relations, he mentions marriage, having children and house help (servants). Some Kant scholars rightly criticize this part of private right theory as outdated and inconsistent with the rest of Kant’s legal doctrine. Others subjugate this area of private right in the Doctrine of Right to the theory of contract. See, for example, Byrd and Hruschka (2010): 245 – 260.  See Pinheiro Walla (2016).

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

171

contract in accordance with its concepts of right, the acquisition is still only provisional as long as it does not yet have the sanction of public law, since it is not determined by public (distributive justice and secured by an authority putting this right into effect). (RL, AA 06: 312.22– 33)

According to Kant, the state of nature must be left, not because of the quarrelsome nature of human beings, but to give rights an omnilateral recognition followed by institutional protection with the use of coercion. He claims that only in a rightful condition, in which authority gives public laws and secures them, the rights become conclusive and not merely provisional. A provisional right can be taken away because there is nothing that protects it, except for our force and the goodwill of others. Conclusive rights, conversely, are guaranteed by the institution of a state and secured with the use of coercion. That is why entering the rightful condition does not interfere with the distribution of rights. Still, it changes the nature of these rights – they become legitimate through the omnilateral united will represented by a state and secured by its power. All the individual rights in the rightful condition of a state become protected by a system of public law and exercised with the use of coercion – the constitution of the state results in delegating the right to coerce the execution of rights from the individuals to institutions, that can have a final vote on the distribution of external objects.¹⁵ In conclusion, establishing a rightful condition (a state) is necessary for acquiring conclusive rights. The need for a constitution that puts an end to the state of nature and establishes the rightful condition is expressed by the postulate of public right, derived from the preexistence of private right in which persons bear both innate and acquired rights and the need to coerce its execution. Kant presents this postulate in paragraph 42 of Metaphysics of Morals: From private right in the state of nature, there proceeds the postulate of public right: when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a ’rightful condition’, that is, a condition of distributive justice. – The ground of this postulate can be explicated analytically from the concept of right in external relations, in contrast with violence (violentia). (RL, AA 06: 307.08 – 13)

Kant asserts that the postulate of public right is derived analytically from the concept of right in external relations.¹⁶ This concept enables ascribing the

 See Pinheiro Walla (2014).  The fact that Kant states that this derivation can be drawn analytically asks for further clarification. It is vital to highlight that the concept of right in external relations rests on the notion of the external freedom of all individuals. Freedom gives us the right to pursue any possible

172

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

above-discussed innate and acquired rights to persons and defines the relationship between legal norms and coercion. Kant claims that the concept of external right is bound to the authorization to use institutional coercion because protecting one’s freedom against violence is itself, not a violent act. The use of coercion in executing one’s rights is a permitted action, and as such, it does not violate anybody in the state of nature. Everyone is entitled to seek conflict resolution with the use of force. The problem with such conflict is that all the acquired rights are only provisional, as they lack the recognition of the entire community in the form of public laws. Coercing rights in the state of nature is equivalent to pure violence because the only deciding factor in a dispute concerning the rights of persons is the physical strength of the opposing parties.¹⁷ The verdict of such a dispute is random and often does not follow the intuition about what is just. Only the introduction of public laws and institutions providing justice can end the injustice and randomness of the state of nature. Following the imperative exeundum est e statu naturali (one must leave the state of nature) is the only way to fully exert external freedom. Rights are protected not by the individual use of force but by the power of state institutions. Moreover, only in the state of distributive justice, i. e., civil condition, persons can be secured in their possessions, as the originally unilateral acquisition of property gains legitimation in the idea of the omnilateral united will.

3 Kant’s cosmopolitanism(s) and the right to have (secured) rights. The rights and duties of humans are secured within a state, as long as they are its citizens, and its constitution is shaped according to the principles of the representative system and the rule of law. The legal relations between various countries admittedly remain in the state of nature due to the lack of one international,

goal, and its scope is limited solely by the freedom of others. The original symmetry in the free interactions of individuals, in abstraction from them using objects, does not suffice to ground public right and its use of coercion. Therefore, in addition to external freedom, the concept of right must contain permissive law to acquire objects of choice. The acquisition of possession creates an asymmetry between the unilateral act of acquisition and the will of others concerning the object of choice. This asymmetry can only be permitted if, in acquiring an object of choice, there is a presumption of omnilateral will, which gives its consent. Therefore, Kant’s postulate of public right is valid on the grounds put in the private right. See Ripstein (2009): 145 – 181.  In the state of nature, we might have some idea of justice, but there is no authority to judge who is right.

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

173

coercive legal system. However, they are still more or less regulated by a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Even the situation of strangers coming to a foreign country is not (usually) legally ambiguous due to the protection they can expect from their governments at home. But what about persons who lost the citizenship of their country of origin due to wars, political coups, persecution and other disasters? If such persons were scarce, like in Kant’s times, they were hardly constituting a distinguished group. Yet, since the two great wars of the twentieth century and the transformations that took place later (globalization, decolonization, the polarization of north and south), they grew in number and have become a perplexing issue, especially for the countries of the affluent west, who declared themselves committed to the values of human dignity, human rights, etc. As Arendt accurately pointed out over seventy years ago, these people, being stripped of membership in one political community, have suddenly found themselves outside of the entire family of nations.¹⁸ Even though Kant never endorsed a special right to citizenship, my purpose (as I mentioned above) is to investigate the possibility to ground such right within his practical philosophy. To show how Kant’s system of rights can function in the particular case of non-citizens, I refer now to two different accounts of his cosmopolitan right. It is a well-known fact that Kant’s legal doctrine opposes the tradition of broad cosmopolitan rights (also extending to the right to settle by Grotius) and limits such rights to ’the right to hospitality’: Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right, so that hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the right to be a guest (for this a special beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain time), but the right to visit. (ZeF, AA 08: 357.22– 358.07)

This right, from the perspective of a newcomer, does not give ground for any special treatment by the receiving state and has three distinct components. Firstly, there is permission to arrive in a state and propose oneself and one’s services for economic exchange. Yet, this permission is limited, and there is no right to settle since such a situation requires a separate contract. Secondly, there is a prohibition of treating such an arrival as a hostile act. Therefore, no person arriving at the border can be treated as an intruder or a criminal. Thirdly, in the case of dire

 See Arendt (1949), p. 26 – 27.

174

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

circumstances, in which the dismissal of a newcomer would put their survival at risk, there is a duty of a receiving country to take such a person in, up until the risk passes. These three laws that are inferred from the cosmopolitan right can be interpreted in two different ways. The first interpretation takes cosmopolitan right to be a legal relationship between a state and its non-citizen in separation from other domains of public right. Considering cosmopolitan rights outside of the context of the general assumptions of Kant’s concept of public right does not provide a human being with more legal protection than bilateral contracts signed by multiple states, such as humanitarian conventions. This approach nevertheless still grants the absolute minimum of rights to a person outside of their own country. As Kleingeld writes, Kant’s concept of cosmopolitan law, when taken in isolation from the rest of his political philosophy, is compatible with a range of views regarding what political bodies the world should contain. It is consistent with different opinions on this issue, as long as they provide for a level of public law at which humans have certain fundamental human rights as ’citizens of the world’ rather than as members of any particular lower-level political body. (Kleingeld 1998, p.87)

Within this framework and following Kleingeld’s lead, the cosmopolitan right would guarantee a right to request an entry freely and not be held in detention for arriving at the borders. One could also argue that reasons given to justify a denial by a particular country must be of non-discriminatory character (a state could, e. g., reject a person on the grounds of the specific business and individual conduct within a state – like selling drugs, but wouldn’t be allowed to base such decision on the person’s skin color). Moreover, as argued by Kleingeld, the right to safe haven can be broadened beyond the situation of an immediate threat of death, since Kant’s expression ‘Untergang’ allows for an interpretation that could cover many other cases, including extreme poverty, climate change and unstable political climate. I believe that Kleingeld’s interpretation already offers much more than it would be assumed by Kant himself. Yet, these solutions for rightless people do not go beyond what is being provided by current international agreements.¹⁹ Another approach considers cosmopolitan law as a normative domain that is valid only in conjunction with two other spheres of public right. In this reading, all levels of public right can only be held as prescriptive if taken together as a

 There always remains the question of whether these agreements are being treated with sincerity and a sense of responsibility, which is hardly the case when writing this text.

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

175

system. In Kant’s words, if justice is missing in any of the domains of public right, the entire structure of justice is doomed to collapse (RL, AA 06: 311.26 – 29). This reading would eventually pose more obligations to states regarding displaced persons and refugees as persons deprived of citizenship. The cosmopolitan right rests on the “original common possession of the earth”.²⁰ This is a contra factual claim that aims to express a simple thought – since people are embodied beings, and the earth’s surface is limited, they must find themselves “somewhere”, i. e., they cannot be expelled from every possible place on earth. The cosmopolitan right, so Kant, is nevertheless limited to “universal hospitality” and poses minimal duties to the states and newcomers. As mentioned above, the visitor is, rather unsurprisingly, obliged not to rob and violate the peoples whose territory he or she enters, but this right does not grant permission to settle. On the other hand, the receiving state must not treat the newcomer as a criminal and should allow him or her to enter the territory, given that the reason is not illegal. Finally, the receiving community has a right to deny entry to a newcomer unless it will not equal their destruction. The last condition has been subject to various interpretations as to what can be considered “destruction” and what are morally relevant obligations of a receiving state).²¹ There we find reference to the situation of people who cannot be dismissed due to their vulnerability (refugees) and their lack of membership in any state (stateless). This is not enough to ensure membership, as what needs to be proven is not only that people must be allowed to “be somewhere”, but also, when we refer to the universal duty of joining a state as an institution of distributive justice, they must “belong somewhere”.²² A general assumption of this interpretation rests on Kant’s remark that the community of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all (ZeF, AA 08: 360.03 – 04). Therefore, one cannot take justice on any level of public right to be separated from the other. The individuals are organized within states; the states have relations based on bilateral and multilateral agreements. Finally, there must be a legally mediated way in which states can refer to their non-citi-

 See also Behabib 2004, p. 32– 34.  For a thorough discussion, see Reinhardt (2019), p. 216 – 232.  See Höffe (1999), p. 355. Note that the general premise of this line of thought is that there are many states that control their borders. Therefore, my (normative) argument rests mainly on the status quo. There are brilliant analyses in migration literature that show a different (probably more desirable) situation. Nevertheless, I intend to address the current problem with possible means, which do not rest solely on the declarative documents on human rights, as I take the critique of the latter provided by Arendt as accurate. See also Benhabib (2004), p. 43 – 48.

176

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

zens. For such relations to be just, the non-citizens must be treated as legal persons and not merely members of a species. If such persons are not members of any state, they are remaining in the state of nature. For Kant, the state of nature is understood as ‘one that is not rightful’, and this claim is independent of both (good or evil) human nature and the presence or absence of wars. The fatal flaw of the state of nature lies not in the lack of rights within it or the violent way in which people pursue their goals but in its inability to secure the preexisting rights. The duty to leave the state of nature is universal and applies both to states and individuals. Nevertheless, only on the individual level, there is also an authorization to coerce others to enter the civil condition. At the same time, states, which already possess some legal order, are exempt from such coercion. The question remains, how the state of nature between a state and a stateless person should be considered: is the coercion permissible and is the duty of establishing legal relations strict? How could a cosmopolitan state of nature be overcome? I claim that, based on Kant’s account of the postulate of public right, there arises a strict, juridical duty to enter a rightful condition (i. e., become a member of a political community). This duty also applies to states, which must offer membership to persons who do not belong to any other state. There are two reasons for this duty. Firstly, every person must have a place he or she occupies (be somewhere). Since the earth is limited in surface, there must be a place where a stateless person can exercise their innate freedom and be granted other rights (the right to acquire further rights). Secondly, in the dense network of global legal relations, no person can be forced to remain in the state of nature. For Kant, this would be the most grievous violation of what is right: Given the intention to be and to remain in this state of externally lawless freedom, men do one another no wrong at all when they feud among themselves; for what holds for one also holds in turn for the other, as if by mutual consent (uti partes de iure suo disponunt, ita ius est.) But in general, they do wrong in the highest degree* by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is his against violence. (RL, AA 06: 307.27– 308.02)

Kant would necessarily oppose the idea of individuals being forced by states into becoming citizens, as such conduct would justify the exercise of colonialism. However, given the current political situation of stateless persons, this problem is of lesser concern. What is currently being exercised worldwide is denying the stateless persons a place to be and the right to belong, rather than forcing membership. Membership, especially in developed countries, is considered a privilege, not an impediment to freedom of self-legislation. I claim that, following this Kantian line of thought, membership must be regarded as a fundamental

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

177

right of the stateless persons, and the states have a strict juridical duty to offer them a way to membership.²³ Only then, as citizens in a state, these humans can enjoy their rights as legal persons be considered equal and free, and their dignity as humans can be fully respected. Any person, who possesses the citizenship of some country and arrives at a foreign border, can enjoy their rights (both innate and acquired) because the country of origin, together with the international legal order, secures them abroad. According to cosmopolitan right, such a person need not be admitted in since they can go back and enjoy their rights elsewhere. A person who has no country of membership and therefore no legal status in Kantian terms cannot enjoy these rights. Such a person must be first allowed to exit the state of nature and join the legal community of a state to be granted their individual rights and therefore have a place in the family of nations. Only then, sovereign countries can freely decide to let such a person in or ’send them back’ because they already possesses a place on earth and a community of peers where their rights are secured.

4 Cosmopolitan moral community Even if my argumentation for the right to membership can withstand critique, there remains the issue of implementing such a universal right. The claim, which ascribes to all states a strict duty to offer universal right to citizenship to all stateless persons, would belong to the domain of international law because these are states, and not individuals, who need to acknowledge such right. Now, all the states remain in an international state of nature due to the lack of a single supranational authority equipped with coercive power to enforce legal obligations. Therefore, even a viable proof of a juridical duty of a state cannot bring about the desired change in the situation of the stateless if such a state does not want a change. To propose a possible way to bring about the desired juridical change regarding stateless people, let me go back to the more general domain of Kant’s

 In contemporary political theory, Benhabib developed this idea further while considering the complexities of our times, mainly concerning cultural differences between the citizens and “the others”. On the other hand, Benhabib acknowledges the tension between the rights of individuals and the sovereignty of states. Therefore, she claims that the right to citizenship cannot be considered absolute. Quite conversely, the necessary minimum is the mere possibility of acquiring citizenship through a multistage procedure – from the first admission, via residency up to the full membership (Behabib 2004, s.171– 212; Benhabib 2006, s.27– 36).

178

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

practical philosophy. Kant’s cosmopolitanism cannot be reduced to its legal dimension.²⁴ In many writings, he introduces the normative ideal of a ‘moral whole’, which must be realized by a joint effort of moral agents, which are called to foster an ethical commonwealth of all people on earth.²⁵ The ethical commonwealth is the empirical realization of the ideal of the Kingdom of Ends, which Kant introduces in his ethical writings and is understood as a ’cosmopolitan moral community’ (Rel AA 06: 93.01– 98.14).²⁶ Such a community, united for the sake of moral progress and the highest good, would strive toward the full realization of the moral law in the world. Nowadays, we are the spectators, watching the calamities of other humans around the world. These humans are not only the members of our species but also ends-in-themselves, persons of absolute value, which we owe due respect. Moreover, as human beings, they need to be considered legal persons who have a claim to citizenship. As much as we are urged to practice beneficence towards anyone in need, we must also acknowledge the responsibility for persons deprived of their rights: the right to freedom and the right to membership. Since, for Kant, the violation of the duties of right in one place on earth must be felt everywhere (ZeF, AA 08: 360.03 – 04), it is the duty of the cosmopolitan community of moral beings to ensure that such violations seize to take place. The public use of reason has the power to exert pressure on acting government, especially in the states, where the constitution approximates the idea of reason and the progress happening through reform may end the situation of the stateless.

Conclusions In this paper, I aimed at showing the possibility of grounding a universal right to citizenship within Kant’s practical philosophy. I argued that the absolute value of humans, which is founded on the categorical imperative of reason, is the source of their personality and the ground for claiming their rights. I showed that the innate right and acquired rights could not be secured and conclusive outside of a rightful condition, which brings about the necessity of public justice in the form of a state. Only in a civil condition individuals can enjoy their rights and be considered free and equal. I then considered the situation of persons who are excluded from membership in any polity and therefore effectively stripped of

 For a thorough examination of the topic, see Cavallar (2012) and Kleingeld (2012).  Kleingeld (2012), p. 163.  Cavallar (2012), p. 109.

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity

179

any rights. While analyzing Kant’s cosmopolitan right, I discerned two modes of interpretation. The first, represented by Kleingeld, gave some protection to the stateless, yet no right to membership. I then proposed a different reading of Kant’s account of universal citizenship, possibly inferred from his system of rights. I argued that Kant’s legal cosmopolitanism enables a rightful claim of stateless persons to citizenship. Nevertheless, due to the absence of supreme coercive power over states and the international state of nature, such right may not be enforceable. In the final part, I called for the cosmopolitan moral community to act for the sake of making states recognize their obligations towards stateless persons.

References Arendt, Hannah (1949): “The Rights of Man. What Are They?”. In: Modern Review 3/1, pp. 24 – 37. Benhabib, Seyla (2004): The Rights of Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Benhabib, Seyla (2006): Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press Bojanowski, Jochen (2015): “Kant on Human Dignity”. In: Kant-Studien 106 (1), pp. 78 – 87. Byrd, Sharon B./Hruschka, Joachim (2010): Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cavallar, Georg (2012): “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy”. In: Ethics & Global Politics 5 (2), pp. 95 – 118. Höffe, Ottfried (1999): Demokratie in Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Munich: C.H.Beck Kleingeld, Pauline (1998): “World Citizenship for a Global Order” In: Kantian Review 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 72 – 90. Kleingeld, Pauline (2012): Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pavao, Aguinaldo/Faggion, Andréa (2016): “Kant For and Against Human Rights”. In: Faggion, Andrea et al. (Eds.): Kant and Social Policies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 49 – 64. Pinheiro Walla, Alice (2014): “Human Nature and the Right to Coerce in Kant’s Doctrine of Right”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (1), pp. 126 – 139. Pinheiro Walla, Alice (2016): “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right”. In: Kant-Studien 107 (1), pp. 160 – 178. Pinzani, Alessandro (2005): “Der systematische Stellenwert der pseudo-ulpianischen Regel in Kants Rechtslehre”. In: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (1), pp. 71 – 94. Pinzani, Alessandro (2018): “Recht der Menschheit und Menschenrechte”. In: Mosayebi Reza (Ed.): Kant und Menschenrechte. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 217 – 237. Reinhardt, Karoline (2019): Migration und Weltbürgerrecht. Zur Aktualität eines Theoriestücks der politischen Philosophie Kants. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber. Ripstein, Arthur (2009): Force and Freedom. Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on human dignity. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

180

Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović

Schönecker, Dieter/Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth (2018): “Kant’s Ground-Thesis. On Dignity and Value in The Groundwork”. In: Value Inquiry 52, pp. 81 – 95. Schönrich, Gerhard (2013): “Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion”. In: Kant-Studien 104 (3), pp. 321 – 345.

Sofie Møller

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals Abstract: Kant understands human dignity (Würde) as the dignity of a person. His definitions imply that if a human being has dignity, then he or she is a person and vice versa. Yet he also defines personality in terms of responsibility: a person is someone to whom actions can be imputed. Since any obligation presupposes imputability, personality is a condition of both ethical and juridical lawgiving. I maintain that asserting oneself as a person in relation to others implies taking legal responsibility for one’s free actions and not pretending that these were determined by other circumstances. My main point is that honeste vive presupposes moral personality, which is then given juridical form. Moral personality as the freedom of morally practical reason is what ties the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals together. This shows that honeste vive requires that moral personality be translated into legal responsibility in our relations with others.

Introduction For Kant, human dignity (Würde) is the dignity of a person. He conceives of personality and dignity as intimately connected: his definitions imply that if a human being has dignity, then he or she is a person. At the same time, Kant defines personality in juridical terms: A person is someone to whom actions can be imputed. Since any obligation presupposes imputability, personality is a condition of both ethical and juridical lawgiving. In this essay, I discuss the duty to assert oneself as a person, with a focus on the juridical implications of personality. I first review Kant’s understanding of persons in contrast to things. I then consider the relationship between human dignity and personality. In the third section, I discuss the legal implications of personality. I then relate this account of legal personality to the duty of honeste vive (section 4), before concluding. By defining personality among the “preliminary concepts” of the Metaphysics of Morals (MS, AA 06: 221.06 – 228.22), Kant suggests that the fundamental

Acknowledgement: For helpful comments and discussions I am grateful to Achim Brosch, Luke Davies, Marcus Willaschek, the participants at the conference “Kant on Moral Value” at Bonn University, and Marcus Willschek’s colloquium at Goethe University Frankfurt. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-012

182

Sofie Møller

notion of a person is the same in both parts of the work, that is the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. However, the implications of personality might still be different for the two parts of the work and the two types of moral legislation. My aim is to understand the implications of personality in the Doctrine of Right. From this overview, it is already clear that my chapter follows Kant in associating personality with many different concepts and terms—perhaps too many. Nevertheless, I think it worthwhile to consider these different aspects and implications of legal personality together in order to understand why Kant believes that asserting oneself as a legal person is a central aspect of human dignity.

1 Persons and things in the preliminary concepts to The Metaphysics of Morals Like all German legal thinkers of his time, Kant was greatly influenced by Roman law and its use in natural law theory. In the Pandects, Roman private law was divided into laws concerning things, persons, and acts. In an influential comment on the Pandects in 1791, Christian Friedrich Glü ck stated the central legal question: “What is a person?” This question came to define all following German accounts of private law (cf. Hofer 2016, p. 117). Kant adopts this focus on the person as the defining legal category and defines the world as consisting of exactly two types of entities: persons and things. Things can be owned, and their owner can trade them in exchange for a price. In contrast, persons can be neither owned nor traded and therefore do not have a price. Instead of a price, Kant writes, they have dignity (Würde). Dignity is rooted in transcendental freedom—that is, the freedom to cause actions spontaneously. Unlike things, persons can act freely and their deeds can be imputed to them. The dichotomy between persons and things is summed up in the way Kant defines persons in the preliminary concepts for both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals: A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws [unter moralischen Gesetzen] (whereas psychological personality is merely the ability to be conscious of one’s identity in different conditions of one’s existence). From this it follows that a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others). A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed. Any object of free choice which itself lacks freedom is therefore called a thing (res corporalis). (MS, AA 06:223.24– 34)

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

183

There are at least four intertwined elements in Kant’s definition of a person: freedom, moral laws, subjection, and imputation. Many steps seem to be missing in his inference of moral and political autonomy directly from freedom under moral laws and imputation. The passage reads more like a page in a dictionary than a philosophical inference, but I think we can reconstruct the series of dictionary entries in the following way: Person: Someone who can act freely and to whom actions can consequently be imputed. Moral personality: The freedom of a rational being under moral laws.¹ Moral laws: Kant here uses the plural rather than the singular, suggesting that he is not referring to the categorical imperative but to moral laws in general, which terminologically includes both ethical and juridical laws. Thing: Any object that is not a person. Kant identifies a thing with the Latin res corporalis— that is, a physical thing.

From this chain of definitions, Kant draws the following conclusion: “a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others)” (MS, AA 06: 223.29 – 31). This implies that Kant’s understanding of a person as someone who has freedom under moral laws constrains the way persons can be subject to laws. The inference rests on the following idea: If a person is someone who can act freely, then he or she can only be subject to those laws that he or she gives to themselves. By giving a law to themselves, they subject themselves to it and put themselves under an obligation.² The implication is that because persons are free, they can only be obliged by law if they give it to themselves. Otherwise, moral laws would be deterministic and the concept of obligation would be meaningless. In contrast to persons, billiard balls are not subject to any moral laws or rules of prudence. Instead, their movement is determined by the laws of physics, whether the billiard balls give these laws to themselves or not. Persons differ from billiard balls by being able to act freely, and their actions are not determined by moral laws. Instead, persons give

 I understand Kant’s term “personality” as “the quality of being a person” in this passage, and in the following I will use the term in this way. In other passages, Kant also connects personality with character, which I do not consider in this chapter. On the relation between character and personality, see Thomas Nenon, “Freedom, Responsibility, Character. Some Reflections on Kant’s Notion of the Person”.  On the notion of self-legislation, Pauline Kleingeld provides the following clarification: “Kant’s analogical description of the moral agent is not as someone whose primary concern is giving law to himself but as someone whose primary concern is giving law to the entire moral community” (Kleingeld 2018, p. 171).

184

Sofie Møller

these laws to themselves in the sense that they rationally understand them as binding. As I mentioned above, Kant provides one definition of personality for both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals. Bernd Ludwig has argued that the single definition of a person makes the categorical imperative central to both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals since persons are those to whom deeds can be imputed because they are subject to the categorical imperative. On the basis of this definition, Ludwig argues that a theory of right must presuppose a definition of a person based on a transcendental definition of freedom: “a system of rights is a unification of a collection of persons, i. e., of rational beings each of whom is subject to the moral law, that is, subject to the categorical imperative” (Ludwig 2015, p. 38). According to Ludwig, what distinguishes juridical from ethical lawgiving is not the concept of a person but rather the types of motives that are taken into account. For Kant, right in the strict sense is not concerned with motives for actions. Ludwig writes: Only when we talk about right in a strict sense can we abstract from all motives of complying with the principle of right. That does not imply, however, that strict right does not take into account the consciousness of obligation, that is, the personality of more than merely instrumentally rational agents. It simply does not concern itself with the motives people have for their actions. (Ludwig 2015, p. 40)

Ludwig rightly argues that juridical lawgiving must presuppose transcendental freedom in order for the legal system to hold persons accountable. For this reason, transcendental freedom must also be presupposed in the juridical part of The Metaphysics of Morals. Ludwig argues that since transcendental freedom is inseparable from the categorical imperative in Kant’s philosophy, freedom under the categorical imperative is presupposed by moral personhood. Although Ludwig correctly emphasizes that the notion of a person is the same in both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals, this does not necessarily entail that the categorical imperative is decisive in determining personhood. If we look closely at Kant’s definition of a person cited above, Kant makes no mention of the categorical imperative in the singular. Instead, he writes of freedom under moral laws in the plural. This leaves the relation between categorical imperative and freedom open to interpretation. In the introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant specifies that freedom of choice (freier Willkür) is sufficient for imputation (cf. MS, AA 06: 213.30). Ludwig argues that transcendental freedom is presupposed in both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals, but he cautions that juridical lawgiving does not need proof that citizens are indeed persons in virtue of transcendental freedom. In-

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

185

stead, a government is obliged to treat every human being as a person. Even if there were devils who are not conscious of being bound by the categorical imperative among us, we would be obliged to treat them as persons: There is no Kantian sympathy for the devil(s), to be sure. But since we do not know whether in fact there are (Kantian) devils in human disguise among us, and, if there are, who they are, every human government is obliged to treat every rational animal, that is all humans, as though they are persons, having duties and thus rights, that is, to treat them according to the universal principle of right—at least, as long as they claim to be free. (Ludwig 2015, p. 44)

Ludwig’s point is that although we have no certainty about the transcendental freedom of others, we are obliged to assume that they are persons and treat them accordingly.

2 Dignity and personality in the Doctrine of Virtue In addition to the definition of personality in the preliminary concepts, Kant provides a further explication of the notion in the Doctrine of Virtue, in which he associates personality with dignity: Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect [Achtung] from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity [Würde]; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality [Persönlichkeit]) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things. (TL, AA 06: 462.18 – 26)

Here Kant associates personality and dignity to describe the status of persons in comparison to things. This passage contains a number of claims concerning personality and dignity that are not defended but are again presented as they might be on a page of a dictionary. These are the main claims and definitions of the passage: 1a. Every human being has a right to be respected by all human beings. 1b. Every human being has a duty to respect all human beings. 2a. Humanity and dignity are coextensive. 2b. Dignity and personality are coextensive.

186

Sofie Møller

2c. Dignity and personality imply that no human being may be merely used as a means but must always be treated at the same time as an end. 3. All beings in the world that are not human beings are things. 4. Things may be used as mere means. 5. Persons have an elevated status over things.

Kant does not explicitly state the relationship between respect and dignity in this passage, but from the order of claims, it seems to follow that the respect owed to human beings consists in respecting their dignity as specified by 2b. It follows from 2a and 2b that humanity implies personality. In other words, all human beings have a right to be recognized as persons and a duty to recognize human beings as persons. A crucial implication of this passage is that by the most fundamental definitions in Kant’s moral framework, those who possess humanity may not be enslaved.³ The world consists of only persons and things. Since all members of humanity by definition belong to the category of persons, it is impossible to fit the slavery of human beings into this conceptual framework. Unfortunately, some passages suggest that some members of the natural class of human beings do not possess humanity to the full extent. For example in his Anthropology, Kant describes mental illness as “this most profound degradation of humanity” (Anth, AA 07: 214.22– 23). We see here why the distinction between persons and things is fundamental for both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals: It defines the scope of moral considerations, both juridical and ethical. Earlier in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant describes the value of a human being as follows: “a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price” (TL, AA 06: 434.32– 33). Kant understands a morally practical reason as a reason that can act as a moral incentive through respect for the moral law. As subjects to morally practical reason, human beings are persons. From the definition of a person in the “preliminary concepts” (MS, AA 06: 221.06 – 228.22), we know that persons can take responsibility for actions because they can act freely. This freedom, however, consists in their being subject to morally practical reason. Kant’s definition of a person repeats the humanity formula of the categorical imperative: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a

 In contrast, Gottfried Achenwall’s theory of natural law leaves open the possibility of slavery by allowing human beings to fall in the category of things (cf. Achenwall/Pütter 1995, § 855, pp. 284).

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

187

means” (GMS, AA 04: 429.10 – 12). According to the definition in the Doctrine of Virtue, personality consists in not being treated as a mere means. What distinguishes persons from things is consequently the categorical imperative in the humanity formula. This concurs with the idea that persons differ from things because they are subject to morally practical reason, whose principles Kant specifies in the formulas of the categorical imperative. And in the Doctrine of Right, Kant uses the humanity formula to define the universal principle of right (cf. MS, AA 06: 230.29 – 31).

3 Personality in the Doctrine of Right We have seen how the distinction between persons and things is common to both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals and how Kant connects this distinction with the right to and duty of respect among all members of humanity in the Doctrine of Virtue. Persons are subject to morally practical reason, which obliges them through moral laws. By moral laws, Kant means both juridical and ethical laws. He distinguishes the two in the following way: “All duties are either duties of right (officia iuris), that is, duties for which external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), for which external lawgiving is not possible” (MS, AA 06: 239.04– 07). This distinction allows for juridical lawgiving to take intentions and motivations for action into account. The difference between the two types of lawgiving lies in the setting of ends: Ethical lawgiving commands particular ends as duties, whereas juridical lawgiving commands only behavior, not the incentives behind it. Although there is one definition of personality for both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals, respecting oneself and others as persons takes different forms in ethical and juridical lawgiving. What the two have in common is that personality is a necessary condition for either kind of moral lawgiving. In a draft of The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states clearly that “personality is the highest condition of all rightful relation [Rechtsverhältnisse]” (FM, AA 20: 455.21– 22). Personality plays this fundamental role because it identifies potential bearers of legal duties and rights. Without personality, no one can be held responsible under juridical laws. As I argued above, personality presupposes freedom under moral laws, which makes juridical lawgiving presuppose transcendental freedom as a precondition of imputability. Juridical lawgiving presupposes that actions can be imputed to persons. For this reason, the distinction between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon is relevant for the definition of legal personality.

188

Sofie Møller

Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka draw on the distinction between homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon to clarify the concept of personality. They interpret homo noumenon as a person and homo phaenomenon as a thing. This distinction also appears in the Doctrine of Virtue, in which Kant describes the human being in the sense of a natural being as homo phaenomenon and the human being in the sense of a person as homo noumenon (cf. MS, AA 06: 434.34). Byrd and Hruschka write: The distinction between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon in part replaces the traditional Roman law distinction between a person and a thing. The homo phaenomenon as such is not, and cannot be regarded as, anything other than a thing. It is the homo noumenon that is a person. Since ‘person’ and ‘intelligible being’ mean the same, the human being is a person by virtue of his practical reason, meaning by virtue of his awareness of the moral law. (Byrd/Hruschka 2010, pp. 285 – 286)

While I do not agree that the distinction between the two homines partially replaces the traditional distinction between persons and things in Kant’s theory, I think that Byrd and Hruschka point to an important aspect of Kant’s definition of a person as a rational being. We have seen in Kant’s definition that he maintains the distinction between persons and things in both ethical and juridical lawgiving. As Byrd and Hruschka rightly point out, things are phenomena and persons are characterized by their noumenal freedom. This implies that the physical body of a person qualifies as a thing since there is no third category. While I agree that the homo noumenon is a person, I think the physical body as homo phaenomenon differs from other things because persons are not completely free to treat human bodies as they treat other things: Legally, a person cannot sell their body to another person, although they can do something similar in employment and marriage contracts. In law, hurting another person’s body is a criminal offense whereas hurting their property is a matter of civil law. Both of these circumstances indicate that the legal status of human bodies is different from that of other things. We also see this in Kant’s cautioning that human beings are their own master (sui iuris) but do not own themselves (sui dominus) (cf. RL, AA 06: 270.14– 23). Ethically, Kant accounts for suicide, mutilation, drunkenness, gluttony, and “an unnatural use (and so misuse) of one’s sexual attribute” (TL, AA 06: 425.20 – 23) as infractions against the humanity of one’s own person. All of these are examples that involve violations of one’s own body and indicate that the body has a different ethical status from other things.⁴ The examples

 The duties toward one’s own animal nature only apply to those moral persons that are also

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

189

from law and ethics show that for Kant the duty to respect other human beings as persons includes the duty to respect their bodily integrity. For this reason, the physical body of a human being is different from other things.⁵

4 Honeste vive and personality in the Doctrine of Right In the Doctrine of Right, Kant provides three formulas attributed to the jurist Ulpian in the section on the general division of duties of right: Be an honorable human being (honeste vive), do not wrong anyone (neminem laede) and if you cannot help associating with others, enter into a society with them in which each can keep what is his (suum cuique tribue) (cf. MS, AA 06: 236.24– 237.08). Here Kant connects the value of a human being with the formula honeste vive, which he calls rightful honor. In his reinterpretation of these pseudo-Ulpianic formulas,⁶ Kant describes the duty of rightful honor in the following way: Be an honorable human being (honeste vive). Rightful honor (honestas iuridica) consists in asserting one’s worth [Wert] as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying, ‘Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.’ This duty will be explained later as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person (Lex iusti). (MS, AA 06: 236.24– 30)

This is a very complex passage, which combines rightful honor with the value of a human being, the right of humanity, and personality. Kant associates these notions with three Latin expressions: honeste vive, honestas iuridica, and lex iusti. This definition is also similar to the categorical imperative in the humanity formula. The central term in the passage is rightful honor, which Kant associates with the Latin honestas iuridica. In its full definition, this imperative consists in not making oneself a mere means for others. As we have seen, Kant defines personality in a similar way in the preliminary concepts of The Metaphysics of Morals. physical persons. For an excellent defense of the imputability of nonphysical moral persons, such as societies, see Alexander Aichele, “Persona physica und persona moralis. Die Zurechnungsfähigkeit juristischer Personen nach Kant”.  For two lucid analyses of the duties toward oneself as an animal being, see Mark Timmons, “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being (TL, AA 06: 421.10 – 428.26)”; Yvonne Unna, “Kants Answers to the Casuistical Questions Concerning Self-Disembodiment”.  I follow Alessandro Pinzani’s suggested terminology since these formulas were attributed to Ulpian but most likely have a different origin. (cf. Pinzani 2005, p. 71)

190

Sofie Møller

We may therefore say that rightful honor consists in asserting one’s status as a person rather than a thing. By including a duty to assert oneself as a person, Kant imposes on the individual a duty to reject the status of a slave or a human being without legal standing. In the description of rightful honor, Kant uses the concept of a human being to describe the obligation to assert oneself as a subject of the law. The key to understanding honeste vive lies in Kant’s description of the relation between the three pseudo-Ulpianic formulas: So the above three classical formulae serve also as principles for dividing the system of duties of right into internal duties, external duties, and duties that involve the derivation of the latter from the principle of the former by subsumption. (MS, AA 06: 237.09 – 12)

This passage tells us the relationship between the three formulas: Given that we should assert our legal personality in relation to others and do wrong to no one, it follows that we should enter into a civil condition with others. Honeste vive cannot be asserted in the state of nature, but rather leads to the pursuit of a lawful way of interacting with others. Whether Kant conceives of the honeste vive command itself as an inner duty of right is unclear from the text. Kant first lists the pseudo-Ulpianic formulas and only then addresses the general division of the duties of right. Kant merely writes that the formulas serve to divide the duties of right, not that the formulas themselves are duties of right. From the passage alone we cannot conclude that honeste vive itself is a juridical duty. Rightful honor has aspects of both ethical and juridical duties. Since rightful honor has aspects of an inner duty, which cannot be coercively enforced, it appears to qualify as an ethical duty. On the other hand, it concerns legal relations with others and is a necessary presupposition of all legal relations. Rightful honor is analogous to the social contract to form a state, which establishes a people as a moral person. Both actions establish the legal implications of moral personality. Alessandro Pinzani points out that in this analogy, the establishment of the state makes legal relations with other states possible (cf. Pinzani 2005, p. 92). However, he does not mention that the social contract has another function, which is crucial to the analogy: It establishes self-government for a people. Both political self-government and asserting oneself as a person in relation to others presuppose lawful relations with others and thereby lead to the duty to leave the state of nature. Honeste vive establishes legal personality, neminem laede concerns the way we should act toward other legal persons, and suum cuique tribue allows for reciprocal relations among legal persons. According to Wolfgang Kersting, the duty of legal self-assertion formulates the inner conditions of external freedom (cf. Kersting 2016, p. 219). Because

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

191

the duty of rightful honor cannot be the object of external legislation, he remarks that it appears at first to be a contradictio in adjecto. However, for Kersting, this is because honeste vive represents a condition of the possibility of right: “If reason says that there should be right, then it says at the same time: be a person, honeste vive” (Kersting 2016, p. 220, my translation). Kersting does not mention where persons come from, but I think it is important that honeste vive is not a command to create a person; asserting oneself as a person in relation to others presupposes that one is already a person. As we know from the preliminary concepts, personality presupposes the ability to act freely. Honeste vive commands that the ability to act freely be asserted in actual relations to other people. Asserting oneself as a person in relation to others implies taking legal responsibility for one’s free actions and not pretending that these were determined by other circumstances. Honeste vive as a presupposition of rightful relations might appear to be bootstrapping personality out of the command that there be legal relations. But this objection misses the point since the legal assertion of personality presupposes moral personality. Moral personality as the freedom of morally practical reason is what ties the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals together. Honeste vive requires that moral personality be translated into legal responsibility in our relations with others. Although personality entails imputability in both parts, the implications differ. In the Doctrine of Right, personality requires that we take legal responsibility for our actions. Although honeste vive is introduced in the section on the general duties of right, it comes very close to the ethical duty to reject servility. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant calls the violation of the duty to assert oneself as a person servility. The servile person violates the innate dignity of a human being by disregarding the humanity of their own person (cf. TL, AA 06: 434.22– 437.26). Many passages suggest that Kant considered honeste vive as an ethical principle almost until he wrote the final version of The Metaphysics of Morals, and I think this shows clearly in his treatment of the concept. According to the available student notes from his lectures on ethics, Kant characterized honeste vive as an ethical principle and the remaining two pseudo-Ulpianic formulas as principles of juridical obligation. This division holds constant from the precritical Collins notes (cf. V-Mo/Collins, AA 27: 280.26 – 281. 26), to the 1784/85 Mrongovius notes (cf. V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 631.31– 33), to the 1793/94 Vigilantius notes (cf. V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 527.00 – 26). In a draft for The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant indicates that the three formulas are structures for the whole of the work, with honeste vive as the formula for the Doctrine of Virtue, neminem laede as the formula for the state of nature, and suum cuique tribue as the formula for the civil condition (cf. VAMS, AA 23: 386.25 – 32). This also fits with the Latin translation of the Doctrine of Virtue: Doctrina honesti. However, none of these passages cite

192

Sofie Møller

the same definitions of the three formulas as the ones Kant gives in the published Metaphysics of Morals. In the final text, Kant provides an important reinterpretation of the three formulas, which changes their content radically. Now Kant associates honeste vive with the Latin honestas iuridica, thereby redefining the formula to entail rightful honor as opposed to honor in general, as he defines it in the lectures and drafts. With this change, Kant also considers the three formulas as principles for dividing the duties of right into inner duties, outer duties, and duties that follow from the combination of the two. Kant changes the place of honeste vive in the division of ethics and right because he changes its interpretation to include only rightful honor and leaves virtuous honor to the Doctrine of Virtue. In the lectures and drafts, he understands the formula as describing honor in general, but in the published work, he reinterprets the formula to include only juridical honesty, which consists in taking legal responsibility for one’s actions. In the juridical reinterpretation, honeste vive becomes the duty to not make oneself into a means for others. This is not only a relation to oneself but also a way of interacting with others. Without personality, there can be no rightful relations, and such relations are established through the duty of rightful honor. Pinzani convincingly shows that the pseudo-Ulpianic formulas divide the structure of the entire Doctrine of Right into the triad of possibility, actuality, and necessity. Honeste vive makes up the possibility of rightful relations: Pinzani describes rightful honor as “an inner posture, which precedes the existence of legal norms” (Pinzani 2005, p. 75, my translation). This inner posture makes rightful relations possible and is consequently a condition of the possibility of right. Pinzani points out that this duty presupposes a relation to others as possible partners in a legal relation (cf. Pinzani 2005, p. 76). He thereby points to a difficulty in the understanding of honeste vive as a condition of the possibility of right: If honeste vive is imperative, then compliance is not guaranteed. If no one complied with honeste vive, would it follow that right is in practice impossible?⁷ Along the same lines as Byrd and Hruschka, Pinzani describes rightful honor as the normative presupposition that allows moral persons to enter into legal relations. It represents the connecting point that makes our moral personality legally effective in our relations with others (cf. Pinzani 2005, p. 77; Byrd/Hruschka 2010, p. 65). Luke Davies argues that honeste vive belongs to the general duties of right, which are not enforceable but remain duties of right (cf. Davies 2021, p. 333). He reads this in parallel with equity, which he also argues is a non-enforceable area

 I thank Marcus Willaschek for this point.

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

193

of right. Unlike strict right, general duties of right are not directly enforceable. They are not concerned with individual rights, but, as Pinzani describes, they map the possibility, actuality, and necessity of right in general. Because they are concerned with the modal conditions of right rather than individual external actions, they are not directly enforceable. In opposition to Pinzani’s account of honeste vive as a principle for the possibility of rightful relations, Kant explicitly describes honeste vive itself as a duty and not merely a principle for duties. This appears to favor Davies’s reading of honeste vive as an unenforceable, general duty of right rather than a principle for the possibility of right. However, Davies appears to overlook that Kant excludes equity from right proper in the introduction to the Doctrine of Right (cf. RL, AA 06: 238.21– 25). In addition, the duty not to be a slave can be coercively enforced, which implies that honeste vive at least has enforceable implications. I also think that Davies overlooks that the pseudoUlpianic formulas are not defined as general duties of right but only introduced under the heading “General division of the duties of right”. They might be interpreted as formulas that help us make a general division of the duties of right, but this does not necessarily mean that they themselves are duties of right. I have argued that honeste vive presupposes moral personality, which is then given juridical form. But we still need to understand the relationship between moral personality and its legal realization through rightful honor. Georg Mohr offers the compelling reading of honeste vive that only as a legal person is the human being fully a person.⁸ Mohr argues that for Kant there would be no duties if there were no duties toward ourselves since all duties presuppose the ability to put ourselves under obligation. For this reason, the duties to ourselves are logically prior to the duties toward others. These duties represent the conditions of having rightful relations with others. This then implies that there would be no external duties and therefore no duties of right if there were no duties toward ourselves. Mohr argues that for Kant, free agents are only obliged if they put themselves under an obligation: A duty is a self-obligation (Selbstverpflichtung) toward others (cf. Mohr 2011, p. 27). Mohr relates this circumstance to legal personality by arguing that only as a legal person can a human being enter into relations with others in which they are treated as a person rather than a thing. For this reason, he argues, only as a legal person is a human being fully a person. Both Pinzani and Davies point to a fundamental difficulty in Kant’s conception of honeste vive: the duty appears to fall outside the two categories of jurid-

 “Aus der Verbindung der inneren Rechtspflicht zur Rechtssubjektivität mit dem inneren Recht auf Freiheit ergibt sich schließlich in einer Zuspitzung: Erst als Rechtsperson ist der Mensch Person” (Mohr 2011, p. 36).

194

Sofie Møller

ical and ethical duties.⁹ In the standard distinction, juridical duties are those for which external legislation is possible (cf. MS, AA 06: 239.04– 07). In contrast, ethical duties cannot be coercively enforced, and they command that a person act “in conformity with duty from duty” (TL, AA 06: 391.04). On the one hand, honeste vive is not a straightforward juridical duty, because it is a non-enforceable duty, which concerns inner actions. These characteristics appear to disqualify honeste vive as a juridical duty. On the other hand, honeste vive is not a straightforward ethical duty, since it does not command that a person acts from duty. This implies that the motivation for asserting oneself as a person may be arbitrary; what matters is that the action is in conformity with duty, not that it is motivated by duty. To illustrate, imagine that I assert myself as a person not out of duty but merely because I want to impress my friends with my legal status. This motivation does not comply with the ethical imperative to act in accordance with duty from duty. However, it appears to comply with the duty of right to enter into rightful relations with others. This example suggests that at least the outer implications of honeste vive fulfill the requirement of juridical duties.

Conclusion Kant’s conception of personality conflates two status divisions in Roman law: A Kantian person is imputable and not enslaved. By including these attributes in his definition of personality, Kant excludes different levels of status within the category of persons, although he does distinguish between active and passive citizens. The value of a human being in the Doctrine of Right is contained in the duty of rightful honor. It is a duty of right toward oneself, which also has an outward direction. In this interpretation, the value of a human being as it is described in the Doctrine of Right entails taking legal responsibility for one’s actions. The value of a human being in the Doctrine of Right consists in taking on the legal status of an imputable person within a legal condition. In this essay, I have only considered the personality of individual human beings. However, Kant’s conception of moral personality also permits collectives to be regarded as persons. For this reason, the assertion of a human being as a legal person is analogous to the assertion of a collective as self-governing.

 On the distinction between ethical and juridical duties, see Marcus Willaschek, “Why the Doctrine of Right does not belong in the Metaphysics of Morals. On some Basic Distinctions in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”.

Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

195

References Achenwall, Gottfried/Pütter, Johann Stephan (1995): Anfangsgründe des Naturrechts (Elementa iuris naturae). Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag. Aichele, Alexander (2008): “Persona physica und persona moralis. Die Zurechnungsfähigkeit juristischer Personen nach Kant”. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 16, pp. 3 – 23. Byrd, B. Sharon/Hruschka, Joachim (2010): Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Luke J. (2021): “Whence ‘honeste vive’?”. In: European Journal of Philosophy 29, pp. 323 – 338. Hofer, Sybille (2016): “Zwischen Rechtsfähigkeit und Persönlichkeit. Der Personenbegriff im Privatrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts”. In: Forschner, Benedikt/Spengler, Hans-Dieter/Mirschberger, Michael (Eds.): Die Idee der Person als römisches Erbe?. Erlangen: FAU University Press, pp. 117 – 39. Kant, Immanuel (1902 – 2020): Kant’s gesammelte Schriften [Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften]. Berlin: Georg Reimer. Kant, Immanuel (1992): The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kersting, Wolfgang (2016): Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Kleingeld, Pauline (2018): “Moral Autonomy as Political Analogy. Self-Legislation in Kant’s Groundwork and the Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law (1784)”. In: Bacin, Stefano/Sensen, Oliver (Eds.): The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 158 – 175. Ludwig, Bernd (2015): “Sympathy for the Devil(s)? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant’s Doctrine of Law”. In: Jurisprudence 6, pp. 25 – 44. Mohr, Georg (2011): “Person, Recht und Menschenrecht bei Kant”. In: Klein, Eckart/Menke, Christoph (Eds.): Der Mensch als Person und Rechtsperson. Grundlage der Freiheit. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, pp. 17 – 38. Nenon, Thomas (1993): “Freedom, Responsibility, Character. Some Reflections on Kant’s Notion of the Person”. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 1, pp. 159 – 168. Pinzani, Alessandro (2005): “Der systematische Stellenwert der pseudo-ulpianischen Regeln in Kants Rechtslehre”. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 59, pp. 71 – 94. Timmons, Mark (2013): “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being (TL 6:421 – 428)”. In: Trampota, Andreas/Sensen, Oliver/Timmermann, Jens (Eds.): Kant’s “Tugendlehre,”. A Comprehensive Commentary. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 245 – 243. Unna, Yvonne (2003): “Kant’s Answers to the Casuistical Questions Concerning Self-Disembodiment”. In: Kant Studien 94, pp. 454 – 473. Willaschek, Marcus (1997): “Why the Doctrine of Right does not belong in the Metaphysics of Morals. On some Basic Distinctions in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 5, pp. 205 – 227.

Christoph Horn

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage Abstract: Kant discusses the value of marriage in the context of his Doctrine of Right from the perspective of a mutual contract. Although this approach has been widely criticized since it was first published, this procedure seems to have some advantages: it seems to leave teleological naturalism behind and to emphasize the juridification of personal relationships. But at a closer look, Kant’s theory of the value of marriage suffers from several serious shortcomings. The fundamental problem is that he derives it from the perspective of our duties towards ourselves.

Kant’s doctrine of sex and marriage in his Metaphysics of Morals was seen, in large parts of its reception history, as a strange peculiarity, if not an absurdity. Already his contemporaries ridiculed it or raised serious objections against it.¹ Kant’s fundamental intention in formulating this doctrine is to avoid the moral dangers which are connected, in his view, to sexuality. But what sort of evil might sexual intercourse be? In which sense is marriage a good or a value that outweighs this evil? According to Kant, sex endangers the correct observation of my ‘duties to myself’ since, performing sexual intercourse, implies that I transform myself for another person into ‘a mere thing’, and hence violate ‘humanity within myself’. Thus marriage is, for Kant, a request of pure practical reason: the danger of self-violation, he believes, is prevented by a bilateral contract (and solely by it) – a contract that can only be established between a man and a woman (i. e. not by two persons of the same sex) and that guarantees them, as husband and wife, the exclusive and lifelong use of the other’s sexual attributes.

Acknowledgement: I wish to thank Steffi Schadow and Martin Brecher for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  As early as 1797, two substantive critical texts have been written: a letter by Christian Gottfried Schütz and a review by Friedrich Bouterwek. They were followed by a huge number of critical interventions. Still, Hegel harshly rejects Kant’s theory in §75 of his Philosophy of Right (1821): “One cannot subsume marriage under the concept of a contract; this subsumption has been made in its turpitude – as one has to say – by Kant [….]”. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-013

198

Christoph Horn

All of this sounds very strange indeed. But is Kant’s standpoint really an absurdity? Not necessarily. Several attempts have been undertaken to defend Kant.² If one tries to give a benevolent reading of Kant’s position, one can do so, I think, mainly on the basis of three considerations. The first is his (at least partial) rejection of the natural law tradition: by formulating a legal concept of marriage, Kant seems to leave behind the teleological standpoint of medieval and early modern scholasticism. In this tradition, marriage was more or less completely linked to the value of the procreation of offspring. Kant, as several passages show, disconnects marriage and having children – which seems to be an epochal progress. Secondly, one can try to defend Kant based on his refusal of objectification or reification. It corresponds to a widely shared intuition that the main ethical problems of sexuality are due to the fact that persons are reified and humiliated for the sexual pleasure of their objectifiers. Kant seems to hit the mark with his criticism of abusive forms of sexuality that make an object out of a person, i. e. instrumentalize him or her. This point has been especially advanced from a feministic angle.³ And thirdly, it seems promising to defend Kant with regard to his idea of juridification. What Kant seems to do, in §§ 24– 7 of the Doctrine of Right, is to bring close personal relationships under the perspective of rights, duties, and laws. He might thereby liberate marriage both from private space (in which it has often been practiced like a form of slavery) and from the religious sphere and transform it instead into one of the civil and legal institutions of the state. And in fact, Kant, in his time, was to some extent involved in the controversy about the secular institution of civil marriage in contrast to its ecclesiastic form.⁴ In this respect, he also seems to bring about a significant modernization. In this article, however, I want to critically examine and reject these different attempts to defend the Kantian standpoint regarding marriage. I think that they are basically mistaken: Kant’s view is inappropriate, incoherent, and counterintuitive in many respects; in my view, we should return to the assessment that it is a weak and questionable theory. By raising several objections, I will show that Kant’s description of the ‘evil’ of sex and the ‘good’ of marriage is far from plausible. At least it is interesting and rewarding to see how he deals with the issue, which arguments he uses, and which principles he adopts for this purpose. And

 See especially Ebbinghaus 1936, Brandt 2004, Mertens 2014, Varden 2020 and Brecher [forthcoming].  E. g. Herman 1993, Kneller 2006, Kuster 2011, Papadaki 2007 and 2011.  Kant’s famous essay What is Enlightenment? (which appeared in 1784 in the Berlinische Monatsschrift) is originally situated in this context. By giving an account of ‘enlightenment’, Kant supports those who wanted to desacralize the institution of marriage; see Ebbinghaus 1936 and Kühn 2003: 334.

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

199

we can learn something about how Kant thinks about goods and values in general. I proceed as follows. In the first section, I will discuss the issue which normative problems Kant ascribes to sexuality and how he wants to solve them through the institution of marriage; an important point here is how natural teleology comes into the argument. Then, in my second section, I pass over to the form of right he develops for that purpose; I critically discuss the idea of a ‘right to persons akin to rights to things’ (auf dingliche Art persönliches Recht; in what follows DAPR) that Kant assumes in the case of marriage. In my view, the DAPR cannot provide an appropriate solution since it is not based, as we will see, on the Kantian ‘right to freedom’ or on the idea of human rights. Finally, in the third section, I enumerate the most important objections which persist, in my view, even after a benevolent evaluation of Kant’s theory. At the end of the article, I will raise some doubts regarding the Kantian idea that legal duties should fundamentally be regarded as obligations an agent has towards himself.

I Marriage is seen by Kant as a juridical means to rectify the problematic character of human sexuality. Being not only a possible means, but a necessary one, there is a request of pure reason to marry for everyone who wants to engage in sexual intercourse. With regard to these surprising claims, one wonders what Kant regards as the problematic feature of sexuality that ultimately finds an appropriate solution in marriage. In which sense might sexual behavior have a potentially destructive force on those who perform it outside marriage? What might make the difference between an acceptable enjoyment of physical pleasures (say, eating and drinking) and a dangerous sort of enjoyment whereby human beings are degraded and humiliated? One might advance three possible answers to this question (a-c). (a) Medical consequences: Kant might believe, following a strong medical (or rather pseudo-medical) tradition from antiquity up to his time, that the excessive practice of sexuality is physically and mentally detrimental to those engaged in it. Intense sexuality was widely seen as a danger to someone’s health. One may find traces of such a conviction in Kant – especially when he discusses the concept of a res fungibilis. ⁵ Yet on closer reading, these passages are not sufficient to

 In sexuality, the partners are treating one another as a ‚consumable thing’ (res fungibilis).

200

Christoph Horn

support his interdiction of non-marital sex. One could not understand why he should believe that intercourse should be practiced in a more measured form within marriage than in a non-marital relationship. Moreover, such a medical conviction would rather have inspired Kant to give prudential advice to practice sex less frequently or less intensely – as we know it from many sources since Graeco-Roman antiquity.⁶ But as we saw, Kant’s considerations are meant to be built on ‘pure practical reason’. Furthermore, solution (a) cannot account for Kant’s reification argument. (b) Consequences for someone’s moral character: Kant’s reason for believing that sexuality should only be practiced within marriage might be rooted in the observation that an excessive sexual desire is emotionally destabilizing for someone’s moral character: since erotic pleasure normally is an experience of high intensity, someone can easily go astray lead by his or her libido or concupiscence. Imagine cases in which excessive sexuality ruins someone’s moral personality – perhaps like that classically described in Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray. Dorian’s sexual excesses destroy his moral character: driven by his desires, he acts immorally by deceiving, instrumentalizing, exploiting, and even killing other people. If that were Kant’s view, it would amount to an indirect argument like that he advances in favor of animal protection.⁷ Good would be what strengthens the integrity of character, bad what undermines it. Again, we may find some evidence for this idea in Kant’s text. But this solution seems insufficient as well. A simple thought experiment might help here. Suppose that our libido or concupiscence endangered our rational or moral identity: how could such a danger be mitigated by a marital contract? Imagine a married couple that practices such excessive forms of sexual behavior that their moral personalities are corrupted (since driven by their desires, they are committing crimes of all sorts): what kind of limiting impact should marriage have here? Apparently, it cannot be the case that, for Kant, it is libido or concupiscence that constitutes the defectiveness of extra-marital sex.

From this, according to Kant, serious health problems can arise: 12:182. In this context, there appears Kant’s famous metaphor of a sexual ‘cannibalism’.  This tradition, as famously described in the late writings of Michel Foucault, Le souci de soi and L’usage des plaisirs (1984), emphasizes the dangers for someone’s self-constitution by an unlimited indulgence in sexual pleasures. Even if this aspect is not totally absent in Kant – he notoriously rejects what he calls ‘lustful self-defilement’ (wollüstige Selbstschändung) in §7 of the Doctrine of Virtue – he does want to warn us of the possible self-degradation by excessive sexuality. Kant does not reject a certain, superficial or animalistic, form of sexual satisfaction. He rejects every form of it practiced outside marriage.  Doctrine of Virtue §17, TL, AA 06: 443.10 – 25

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

201

(c) Teleological inappropriateness: Kant might ground his restriction of legitimate sexual intercourse to marriage on his idea of natural teleology. Following the tradition between Thomas Aquinas’ lex treatise (Summa theol. I-II. pp. 90 – 108) and Christian Wolff’s Ius naturae, he might subscribe to the principle that the practice of sexuality must be confined to a relationship that can possibly lead to the procreation of offspring. However, although there is no doubt that he actually defends this point, it cannot be the basis of the limitation he demands. If the natural purpose of intergenerational reproduction were the foundation of his theory, Kant should also have allowed unstable sexual relationships and polygamy, as long as the reproductive success is guaranteed or at least a probable outcome; and he should have claimed that marriage can come to an end as soon as the procreation period is over. But he refutes all of this. None of the three proposals (a-c) seems to be what Kant has in mind. In order to reach more clarity on the role of natural teleology, let us have a closer look at the texts. Kant’s position seems to be seriously inconsistent. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant advances two points: the first is the ‘non-natural’ use of one’s sexual capacities, and the second is self-reification (within ‘natural’, i. e. heterosexual forms of sexual intercourse); the first appears in Section §24, the second in Section §25. Kant tells us that in both cases, in the case of the unnatural use of one’s sexuality (§24), and in the case of using one’s capacities naturally, but outside marriage (§25), someone acts against humanity in his or her own person. However, non-naturalness and self-reification do not fit very well together. On page 278, lines 08 – 09, we read: “In this act, a human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity in his own person”, and on p. 277, lines 19 – 21, Kant claims that “such transgressions of laws […] do wrong to humanity in our own person”. A further important quote runs as follows (RL, AA 06: 277.11– 21): Sexual union (commercium sexuale) is the reciprocal use that one human being makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another (usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius). This is either a natural use (by which procreation of a being of the same kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman species. Since such transgressions of laws, called unnatural (crimina carnis contra naturam) or also unmentionable (unnennbar) vices, do wrong to humanity in our own person, there are no limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can save them from being repudiated completely.⁸

Kant as a legal thinker is often seen as replacing the naturalism of the scholastic tradition with an idea of right based on pure practical reason. But in the above  Transl. M. Gregor.

202

Christoph Horn

quotation, it is surprising how forcefully normative naturalism enters into the picture. Kant classifies ‘non-natural’ forms of sexuality as ‘unmentionable vices’ which must be repudiated without limitations and exceptions. There can be no doubt that Kant, in this text, integrates himself into the natural law tradition, at least to some extent. And in fact, within this tradition, the procreation of offspring has always been considered the legitimizing condition of sexual intercourse. Therefore, homosexuality and sodomy (zoophilia) count as unnatural or non-natural. Following nature, as this tradition maintains, sexuality is solely legitimized for the purpose of generating an equal being of the same species. Apparently, Kant here simply approves of a teleological purposiveness of basic human functions and capacities – namely in the sense that appropriate sexual intercourse must always be performed between males and females. But this observation makes it impossible to defend him as providing a non-teleological account of human sexuality.⁹ To be sure, it is somewhat disappointing to see that Kant here simply approves of the contents of the natural law tradition without using the opportunity to introduce, in his theory of law, some revisionary social practices and roles. We find, however, a slight turning away from the traditional standpoint. Look at the following quotation (RL, AA 06: 277.22– 32): Natural sexual union takes place either in accordance with mere animal nature (vaga libido, venus volgivaga, fornicatio) or in accordance with law. – Sexual union in accordance with the law is marriage (matrimonium), that is, the union of two persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes. – The end of begetting and bringing up children may be an end of nature, for which it implanted the inclinations of the sexes for each other; but it is not requisite for human beings who marry to make this end in order for their union to be compatible with rights, for otherwise marriage would be dissolved when procreation ceases.

As this quotation makes clear, Kant does not fully subscribe to a teleological functionalization of marriage. An additional point to mere ‘naturalness’ is, for him, the criterion of lawfulness. The legitimacy of a marriage does not depend on nature alone, but not either on the subjective intention of the partners to have sexual intercourse only in order to procreate offspring (cf. diesen Zweck sich vorsetzen). Otherwise, he argues, a marriage could be abandoned as soon as the phase of reproduction is over. But nevertheless, Kant emphasizes the natural purposiveness of sexuality, namely in the objective sense that ‘naturalness’ is a precondition of a legitimate sexual partnership.  A further teleological passage in which Kant characterizes masturbation as unnatural is §7 of the Doctrine of Virtue.

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

203

What Kant has in mind becomes clearer from his discussion of sexuality in the Casuistical Questions of §7 of the Doctrine of Virtue. There he unambiguously claims that sexuality is only permitted if the natural end of procreation is at least not acted against (TL, AA 06: 426.2– 4): Nature’s end in the cohabitation of the sexes is procreation, that is, the preservation of the species. Hence one may not, at least, act contrary to that end.¹⁰

This includes the consequence that even within marriage sex is not permitted if one of the partners is unable to generate offspring – and a fortiori sex outside marriage and masturbation are excluded. Consequently, the marriage partners need not have the subjective intention to generate children and, as we just saw, their marriage need not come to an end as soon as the period of fertility of the couple is over. Additionally, the passage from the Casuistical Questions implies that sexuality must not be continued after the fertile age.¹¹ But thereby, Kant’s position with regard to traditional teleology loses its consistency: either marriage should be understood as a legal contract, not as a natural arrangement; then one fails to see why, e. g., homosexual partners should not be allowed to make such a contract, or why the contract should not be conjointly dissoluble by a couple that wants to separate. Divorce must then be acceptable for Kant which is true only for very rare cases. Since a contract, by its very nature, leaves room for voluntarism, one fails to see why monogamy should be mandatory if a contract stipulating polygamy or polyamory is voluntarily accepted by each of the persons involved. Or marriage has a teleological purpose – the procreation of offspring, but then the reproductive success is the criterion for preserving a marriage or leaving it behind. And generating children in non-marital relationships would, as a consequence, be appropriate. What, then, is Kant’s criterion: lawfulness or naturalness? One might challenge Kant with the following thought experiment: imagine once more a married couple engaging in sexual intercourse to an excessive extent while cautiously avoiding pregnancy. Is their behavior appropriate while the attitude of an unmarried couple planning to have sex exactly at the time of ovulation to increase the likelihood of pregnancy is objectionable? Which is the normatively dominant aspect: the contractual character of marriage or the natural goal of sexual intercourse that should be accepted by the partners?

 Cf. The original text: “Der Zweck der Natur ist in der Beiwohnung der Geschlechter die Fortpflanzung, d. i. die Erhaltung der Art; jenem Zwecke darf also wenigstens nicht zuwider gehandelt werden.”.  A careful discussion of the passage is provided by Brecher 2018.

204

Christoph Horn

Kant apparently has no clear position, in the Doctrine of Right, with regard to the natural foundations of marriage. So we cannot defend him on the basis of his alleged modernization of the natural law tradition. Let us return to the question of what makes sexuality so dangerous and why lawfulness is needed for a partnership. In the lines that immediately follow the last quote from §24, Kant puts a strong emphasis on the normative foundation of marriage. Marriage is seen as “necessary by the law of humanity” (RL, AA 06: 277.33 – 278.04): Even if it is supposed that their end is the pleasure of using each other’s sexual attributes, the marriage contract is not up to their discretion but is a contract that is necessary by the law of humanity, that is, if a man and a woman want to enjoy each other’s sexual attributes they must necessarily marry, and this is necessary in accordance with pure reason’s laws of right (so müssen sie sich notwendig verehlichen, und dieses ist nach Rechtsgesetzen der reinen Vernunft notwendig).

The problem which originates from human sexuality is, as Kant formulates, that “in this act, a human being makes himself into a thing”. His idea is that, in the practice of sexual intercourse, some sort of animalistic pleasure is at play which is limited by marriage. Sexual behavior is shameful since one allows one’s body to be used as a mere object of someone else’s animalistic instincts, as Kant says in his Remarks on the Doctrine of Right (HN, AA 20: 463.22– 464.02): The fact that, regarding the permission of two persons of both sexes to have carnal intercourse, in each of the two – yet in the state of barely developing culture especially in the female part – there inevitably arises a timidity about the anxious violation of the dignity of humanity, called shame, consequently something moral, and that even in marriage this [i.e. the shame: C. H.] always demands concealment: this proves sufficiently that human beings, by this surrender of their body to be used as a thing, always do something for which they must be ashamed. For it is in itself really beneath the dignity of humankind; however, because of the natural desire it has become a permissive law to leave humankind and the procreation of its species not to rational choice, but to entrust it to animal instinct.¹²

 My translation. Cf. The original text: Bemerkungen zur Rechtslehre (RL, AA 20: 463.22– 464.02): “Daß in Ansehung der Befugnis zweyer Personen beyderley Geschlechts sich fleischlich zu vermischen jeder derselben vornehmlich aber dem Weiblichen Theil im Zustande der kaum anhebenden Cultur eine Scheu über den besorglichen Verstoß wieder die Würde der Menschheit Scham genannt mithin etwas Moralisches sich unvermeidlich einfindet und jene selbst in der Ehe immer noch Verborgenheit verlangt ist gnugsamer Beweis daß der Mensch durch dieses Hingeben seines Leibes zum Sachengebrauch immer etwas thue dessen er sich schämen müsse weil es an sich wirklich unter der Würde der Menschheit ist aber der Naturbedürfnis halber das Menschliche Geschlecht und die Fortpflanzung seiner Gattung nicht der wählenden Vernunft zu über-

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

205

For Kant, it seems to amount to a basic anthropological fact that sex causes shame since it immediately implies the danger of violating the dignity of humanity by reifying persons. It remains difficult, however, to understand how this reification comes about and to see why the reciprocity of an act of acquisition can solve the problem of objectification or reification. Moreover, one wonders why a temporary and limited objectification might be a loss of value at all. Sure, Kant seems to be right in his assumption that a sexual relationship can be immoral and inhumane if it is realized in a humiliating and reifying way. But what helps against the danger of sexual humiliation and reification? From our commonsensical standpoint, we would probably expect to hear a praise of love in a romantic relationship (as we find it, among Kant’s contemporaries, e. g. in Fichte’s Foundation of Natural Right (1796) or, more radically, in Schlegel’s novel Lucinde (1799)). The idea of personal love, we might think, provides a more satisfactory legitimation of marriage, since true love can only find its adequate expression in a sort of relationship that is stable, exclusive, loyal, and lasts for a complete lifetime; as seen from this point of view, only a committed relationship of mutual love includes the virtues of honesty and loyalty, trust and solidarity. But Kant, in the Doctrine of Right, tells us nothing of the sort. What he in fact says, sounds legalistic and even a bit rude: he speaks of the enjoyment that results from using the sexual organs of another person – a very strange description indeed of what marriage is about. One might say that the Doctrine of Right is the place to formulate a legal idea of marriage, not a romantic one. But this would be a questionable defense. Kant could have combined the two elements: a lifelong and exclusive marriage is, he might have said, the only juridical form that makes it possible to live a deep personal love that expresses our intelligible personality. There is, however, no trace of such a thought in Kant. Instead, he assumes that animality is an essential element of human sexuality. For him, this element cannot be transformed or sublimated into something more cultivated or subtle. Sexuality as a fundamentally and irreducibly animalistic phenomenon can only be enjoyed either under humiliating conditions or under appropriate ones. And marriage is the necessary and sufficient condition for the legitimate expression of sexuality. With regard to this view, questions like the following ones arise: how can sex within marriage be still shameful even though it does not violate practical reasons? Why is sex an embarrassing topic in society even if it is practiced accord-

lassen sondern dem thierischen Instinct anzuvertrauen zum Erlaubnisgesetz geworden ist.” (Cf. RL, AA 06: 359.23 – 32).

206

Christoph Horn

ing to the natural purpose of creating offspring? What justifies Kant’s inference from being ‘animalistic’ to being ‘contrary to humanity’?¹³ Even if the ‘determination of mankind’ (die Bestimmung des Menschen) is basically built on rationality and morality, one fails to see why this should exclude a harmonious integration of what we share with animals. Are eating and drinking shameful since we share these bodily functions with animals? The idea that sexuality is an irredeemably animalistic phenomenon appears again in the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant says that if “the permitted bodily union of the sexes in marriage (a union which is in itself merely an animal union) is to be mentioned in polite society, this occasions and requires much delicacy to throw a veil over it” (TL, AA 06: 425.23 – 36): The ground of proof is, indeed, that by it man surrenders his personality (throwing it away), since he uses himself merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse. But this does not explain the high degree of violation of the humanity in one’s own person by such a vice in its unnaturalness, which seems in terms of its form (the disposition it involves) to exceed even murdering oneself. It consists, then, in this: that someone who defiantly casts off life as a burden is at least not making a feeble surrender to animal impulse in throwing himself away; murdering oneself requires courage, and in this disposition there is still always room for respect for the humanity in one’s own person. But unnatural lust, which is complete abandonment of oneself to animal inclination, makes man not only an object of enjoyment but, still further, a thing that is contrary to nature, that is, a loathsome object, and so deprives him of all respect for himself (jene, welche sich gänzlich der thierischen Neigung überläßt, den Menschen zu genießbaren, aber hierin doch zugleich naturwidrigen Sache, d. i. zum ekelhaften Gegenstande, macht und so aller Achtung für sich selbst beraubt).

As the text surprisingly shows, masturbation is for Kant one of the most abominable violations of self-oriented duties one can commit. It exceeds suicide by being more detestable since it mirrors an attitude of weak lustfulness while suicide committed out of the weariness of life takes some courage.

II For Kant, the aspect of legality or rightfulness is what fundamentally characterizes marriage, not love. One might regret that view but can also argue in favor of it. If marriage is seen as a legal contract, it expresses the free will of the contractual partners, and it is protected by law. That is what Kant expresses in the Doctrine of Right by the triad of (i) the fact of an intercourse (facto) (ii) the marital

 The importance of the topic for Kant is highlighted especially by Brandt 2007.

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

207

contract between the partners (pacto), (iii) the pertinent law (iure: RL, AA 06: 280.01– 04). He understands marriage not simply based on (i), but also not completely (ii) as a treaty by which the male and female partner ‘acquire’ one another completely (since acquiring a limb of someone implies the acquisition of the complete body) and persistently (i. e. at every moment of a complete life). Rather (iii), Kant’s idea is that the partners receive a mutual exclusive right of using the other’s sexual organs and capacities based on a legal order. The idea of a juridification of sexuality in the form of a marital law seems to be, at first glance, a rather promising one. Let us, therefore, look at how Kant understands the moral problem of sexuality and the way in which he thinks that the danger of a possible reification in sexual relationships can be resolved by law. It will be particularly interesting whether or not the DAPR, ‘right to persons akin to rights to things’, turns out to be a helpful means to avoid sexual objectification. One crucial element for an appropriate understanding of Kant’s position is to see how he conceives here of the immoral action, by whom it is committed, and who is its victim. The curious thing is that, in this case, he describes the possible perpetrator and the possible victim as one and the same individual. Kant believes that someone who practices sex outside marriage makes a mere thing out of himself or herself by denying ‘humanity within his person’. This means that Kant does not think that the problem at stake is that A humiliates or reifies B by solely instrumentalizing B for his or her sexual pleasure. What he regards as the immoral act is that A humiliates or reifies himself or herself by giving B the opportunity to instrumentalize A for pleasurable purposes. Therefore, the individual is said to have the strict moral duty to defend himself or herself against possible sexual objectification. It is all-important to emphasize this point very clearly. One implication of it is that Kant’s intention is far from criticizing practices in which the female body is degraded, for example, into a mere visual object of male enjoyment. And so he should not be seen as a forerunner of modern feminist debates on pornography and prostitution. As I pointed out earlier, Kant cannot be regarded as belonging to the ancient medical and philosophical tradition of sexual self-limitation by the avoidance of sexual ‘consumption’. His emphasis lies neither on the other-directed damage of reification nor on the self-directed damage of consumption. Instead, Kant’s point is that he or she who presents himself or herself to another person for sexual intercourse violates the inner duty of right (innere Rechtspflicht), i. e. the duty to preserve and defend his or her inner intelligible personality (the homo noumenon). In the background, we find the Kantian interpretation of the first of the Ulpianic rules, the honeste vive, as formulated in the Doctrine of Right (RL, AA 06: 236.27– 28): “‘Do not make yourself a mere

208

Christoph Horn

means for others, but at the same time an end for them.’ This duty will be explained later as an obligation from the right of humanity in our own person (Lex iusti)”.¹⁴ In the Doctrine of Right, Kant confronts his readers with an interpretation of the three Ulpianic rules (honeste vive – neminem laede – suum cuique tribue) which is highly innovative, not only with regard to the older Natural Law tradition but also by contrast with his own earlier readings (RL, AA 06: 236.20 – 237.03).¹⁵ The commandment honeste vive is translated by Kant as “be an honorable human being” and understood in the sense of interdiction of self-abandonment. It hence commands some sort of self-protection and excludes a surrender of one’s intelligible, moral self. Kant combines this with his version of an exeundum e statu naturali, by rendering the neminem laede as a strict interdiction of injustice and the suum cuique tribue as the precept to leave the state of nature in order to avoid committing injustice. For us modern readers of Kant, this is quite a strange perspective. If asked what we consider to be the fundamental moral issues of sexuality, we would certainly not prioritize self-protection, but cases of rape, enforced prostitution, child maltreatment, sexual enslavement, or genital mutilation. All of these issues are violations of the capacities or goods or rights of an individual B by misdeeds committed by a person A. Kant, however, by claiming that the moral problem of sexuality is a topic of how A is self-related with regard to the activities of B concerning A, completely misses the point and, consequently, has not much to say on these serious issues – at least not in this context.¹⁶ What then is the legal element which produces, in a marital contract, the normative adequacy as far as the performance of sexual acts is concerned? Kant’s answer somewhat oscillates between the aspect of mutuality of the contract and the DAPR. Let us first consider the element of mutuality. At first glance, one might object that Kant sometimes describes marriage not in reciprocal terms, but unilaterally, namely by the words “a man acquires a wife” (RL, AA 06: 277.03).¹⁷ But in most of the relevant passages, Kant insists on the reciprocity of the marital treaty. Kant writes on marriage as a way of avoiding objectification (RL, AA 06: 278.10 – 13):

 See on this point Brandt 2004: 201.  These innovations are highlighted in Schnepf 2004.  Martin Brecher reminds me of the fact that Kant discusses rape and pedophilia in the Doctrine of Right 6.363. This is correct, but Kant only mentions these cases as examples of abhorrent crimes against humanity. They are not discussed under the heading of abusive cases of sexual objectification.  Male predominance in a marriage seems also to be claimed in MS, AA 06: 279.16 – 26.

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

209

There is only one condition under which this is possible: that while one person is acquired by the other as if it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for, in this way, each reclaims itself and restores its personality.

Both of the contractors, according to the text, acquire the other one like a mere object, but due to the mutuality of this process, Kant believes, they simultaneously re-establish their integrity as persons. The logic of this, however, seems rather obscure. What can we make of it? Imagine the case in which a slave might purchase his slave-holder so that both of them are, at the same time, slaveholders and slaves (given, for the sake of argument, that the social status as a slave does not preclude such an acquisition from the outset). In such a situation, both of them possess the other since both are owning subjects and owned objects. One possible consequence of this situation might be that both are giving, as slave-holders, orders to the other and that both have to follow these orders (without having, as slaves, the power to disobey); another possibility is that the commandments of the first can be canceled by the second (so that a sort of standoff arises). One can add lots of fancy details to this thought experiment. But how should the individual right to personal integrity be restored by such an idea of reciprocal ownership? This is impossible. Sure, Kantian marriage is not mutual slavery, but it differs from it only in degrees. Whereas a ‘slave in the strict sense’ (servus in sensu stricto) can be used following Kant as an object for all purposes “except the shameful ones” (RL, AA 06: 330.08), the marital partner can be used as an object only for sexual intercourse, not e. g. for working in a household. But the mutual power to command and the duty to obey in questions of sexuality does by no means lead to a reciprocal protective right of the two persons involved. I think this shows that in this case mutuality is an insufficient conceptual means: within a contract such as marriage, the partners are not protected simply by equally possessing one another. What should be the protective aspect in a relation of reciprocal ownership and possession? How should security arise from mutuality, if it consists of a balance of authority rights? If A abuses B, how can B react on the basis of the possession of A? Only by having inalienable protective rights against being violated or abused, and by an efficient legal system guaranteeing these rights, is someone safe. Furthermore, if the problem of sexual objectification can appropriately be revolved by an inalienable right of everyone against sexual abuse or reification, this also includes unmarried individuals and children. In Kant’s model, the protection is restricted to those who live within marriage. But of course, everyone should be protected by such a right. This is the point where we might have a closer look at the DAPR. The background of it is, as I already said, Kant’s intention in §§24– 7 of the Doctrine of

210

Christoph Horn

Right is to give marriage the form of a contract and thus to interpret it as protected by law. Since sexuality implies, for Kant, the danger I give someone the permission to use me instrumentally, his idea is that I have to observe certain limits when it comes to allowing the use of my personality as a mere instrument. Hence, the task of DAPR is hence to adequately formulate limits of my legitimate self-abandonment. Given such an unusual perspective, this right is about confining my freedom to abandon or to ‘surrender’ myself to another person. In the marital contract, I acknowledge that someone possesses me in the way that I am no longer free to give my body to someone else. In this function, we might expect that DAPR covers a wide range of phenomena of a possible instrumentalization such as enslavement, prostitution, the maltreatment of employees, exploitation, oppression, violation, and reification. In Section §23 of the Doctrine of Right, however, Kant confines it to three relations ‘in the household’, namely to the relationship between spouses, parents and children, and the family and its domestic servants. The background of this limitation seems to be that private right belongs to the ‘state of nature’ (status naturalis) – even if its validity continues in the status civilis – and private right is here mainly formulated as that of the family law, the law of domestic relations. It seems, however, inappropriate to restrict DAPR in this way. The basically valuable idea of a ‘Right to Persons Akin to Rights of Things’ is to formulate the adequacy conditions for the functionalization of human beings. Given that we inevitably have to instrumentally use persons in many contexts of our everyday life, one needs to find a way in which one can do so without thereby harming, violating, or humiliating them. So one might think that Kant should discuss all forms of contracts in which the contractors agree under which conditions a person A has to do a service for B. But unfortunately, he confines the range of DAPR to these few domestic cases. Here we see one of the very unwelcome consequences of the fact that Kant doesn’t accept the idea of human rights.¹⁸ Moreover, we find that the principles governing DAPR cannot easily be spelled out. We might expect that it is the ‘innate right to freedom’ (RL, AA 06: 237.29 – 32) that helps us to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate uses that individuals make of each other: what substantially undermines someone’s freedom would then be illegitimate. But this is simply not what Kant says. Additionally, the right to freedom cannot be the basis of DAPR since, otherwise, it must have been constantly preserved in the sense of a right to revise a contract at a later time – and so to leave a marriage, e. g. by divorce.

 I argued for this view in Horn 2014, ch. 2.

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

211

Therefore, it seems more adequate to consider DAPR as the juridical version of the ‘humanity formula’ of the categorical imperative. According to GMS 04,¹⁹ the demarcation line between adequately using someone and inadequately exploiting him or her lies in the use of “humanity as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means”. But can this be his idea? If this were the case, then Kant should allow for an instrumental use of a person if and only if (a) the person agrees (or would ideally agree) to a sexual relationship, or (b) the person is not physically or mentally violated, damaged, or hurt by it, or (c) the person is not (at least not permanently or irreversibly) deprived of his or her freedom, or (d) the person is not degraded or humiliated. Let us call these four points (a) the agreement condition, (b) the non-violation condition, (c) the freedom condition, and (d) the non-humiliation condition. I think they can be taken as an appropriate rendering of what the humanity formula would imply. Regarding the rights that govern the conduct in sexual relationships, however, Kant does not touch on these four points. He does not speak about a norm according to which (a) all the uses of a partner for practices he or she did not agree to are unacceptable, (b) all the uses that violate him or her physically or psychologically are to be excluded (even if the partner agreed upon them), (c) all practices are unacceptable which undermine the freedom of the partner and (d) all those which humiliate him or her are forbidden. On the contrary, marriage seen as a contract is for Kant indissoluble and irreversible – which cannot easily be reconciled with the idea of original freedom. And what is worse, he allows for some violence to be used when one of the contractors does not abide by the contract: Kant permits that a husband brings back his ‘escaped wife’ by using force, as in the case of a runaway employee (who thereby seems to be treated like a slave) (RL, AA 06: 278.18 – 22): That this right against a person is also akin to a right to a thing rests on the fact that if one of the partners in a marriage has left or given itself into someone else’s possession (wenn eines der Eheleute sich verlaufen, oder sich in eines Anderen Besitz gegeben hat), the other partner is justified, always and without question, in bringing its partner back under its control, just as it is justified in retrieving a thing (das andere es jederzeit und unweigerlich gleich als eine Sache in seine Gewalt zurückzubringen berechtigt ist).

Kant understands the protective function of DAPR as a defense of the marriage, not of the individuals within the marriage. Hence, the more appropriate procedure for the purpose of non-instrumentalization would be that Kant established

 GMS, AA 04: 429.10 – 13.

212

Christoph Horn

individual subjective rights, namely negative rights, in order to protect persons against the dangers of abuse. But this is not what he means when he says, in the Doctrine of Right, that the acquisition of the partners is cannot simply be based on the fact of intercourse (facto) and also not simply based on the contract (pacto), but that it is based on the law (iure: RL, AA 06: 280.01– 08): the law does not protect individual rights, but the contract as such. And so it protects especially the right of the pater familias to dominate those who live in his house.

III Note that the aspects (a-d) developed above are not what Kant is concerned with. Instead, he forbids the free, non-marital practice of sexuality on the basis of his idea of a duty to self-protection: someone violates this duty by letting another person objectify himself or herself, i. e. by giving this other individual the opportunity to use him or her as a sexual object. Marriage is seen, by Kant, as the necessary and sufficient antidote to this sort of reification by the stability of the marital contract and the mutuality of the possessive rights. But both the description of the problem and the proposal to solve it are inadequate. We cannot regard the Kantian account as helpful. Let me formulate a list of the systematic weaknesses of Kant’s theory of sex and marriage that makes it, as I believe, indefensible. (1) Neglecting the perspective of interpersonal love: Kant does not really consider the idea that a stable relationship of mutual love is an attitude that can possibly avoid reification. We would assume that intense love might transform crude forms of sexuality into a subtle and respectful form of deep personal encounter. Kant seems to substantially misconceive marriage by interpreting it as nothing more than a legal institution. Additionally, it is hard to see how a legal institution might help here: one wonders why it would be impossible to be treated as a mere object within marriage; without love, nothing protects against that danger. By confining his theory to the legal sphere, Kant ignores that personal love is the decisive constitutive element of freedom and autonomy in an erotic relationship. (2) Mixture of contractarianism and natural teleology: Given that marriage rests upon a contract, it seems inadequate to restrict legitimate treaties to the only possibility Kant allows for. Why should a legitimate contract between partners be confined to a marriage based on heterosexual monogamy? Polygamy, polyamory, homosexuality, and also separation and divorce, are likewise legitimate elements or implications of such a contract. As long as I assent, there arises, according to the principles of contractarianism, no damage for me at all (volenti non fit iniuria). In order to confine the idea of a contract, Kant inadequately

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

213

inserts elements of natural teleology into his contractarian account of marriage. The priority is somewhat unclear, but it seems as if Kant ultimately preferred the traditional teleological perspective. (3) Missing the crucial moral problems of sexuality: Kant misses the crucial challenges connected with sexuality. These real problems are in particular: enforced prostitution, child maltreatment, rape, sexual enslavement, or cases of hard pornography – and all of them concern the abuse of individuals by someone else. It seems strange to interpret, as he does, a lack of self-protection as the main normative problem of sexuality. Only in very rare cases, someone might be guilty of causing a situation in which he or she is lacking self-protection or presenting himself or herself as a possible object for reification. As this shows, Kant does not possess a theory of basic moral goods that are respected or endangered by moral and immoral action respectively. (4) False description of the problem of objectification: Kant defends the unconvincing claim that I am per se damaged by a pleasure someone receives from the use of my sexual organs. Either this other person acts without my consent and then violates me with regard to concrete goods or rights – my sexual autonomy, my physical integrity, my self-respect, my psychic health, my human rights, etc. – or I voluntarily agree to the pleasure the other one gets from having intercourse with me. However, in that case, we are again confronted with a case of the principle volenti non fit iniuria. Kant falsely takes the pleasure of someone else to be immediately a violation of myself as their sexual partner. Admittedly, such a violation can occur, but it need not. And if it is so, the violation must be explicable in terms of goods or rights. (5) Confusion between external and internal factors: moreover, it is not even clear in which sense someone might affect my inner humanity (homo noumenon) by feeling intense, animalistic pleasure. Sure, it might make sense to say that I violate my ‘intelligible self’ by harming others or that I endanger my psychological balance by indulging psychological sexual pleasures – but not by giving another person room for his or her sexual activity. Otherwise, Kant would have had to claim that my inner humanity is also damaged by someone who forces me to have sex, i. e., in the case of rape. But this he does not say – and rightly so. (6) Inappropriate formulation of a legal institution: the concept of a DAPR, a ‘Right to Persons Akin to Rights of Things’ is an inadequate attempt to solve the problem. Kant wants to overcome the problem of objectification by the idea that, in a correctly legalized marriage, each of the partners has a right to persistently control the use of the sexual organs of the other, thereby excluding cases of unfaithfulness, disloyalty, polygamy, and concubinage. But the real problems are not tackled: those of oppression, humiliation, violence and rape which persist within marriage. It can only be mastered by rights in the sense of negative

214

Christoph Horn

claim rights to sexual autonomy attributed to each person inside (and outside) marriage. A right of possession, i. e. a privilege in Hohfeldian terms, provides no sufficient solution to the challenge. There is an additional problem with the Kantian account which might, in the end, perhaps be the most far-reaching one for us: Kant’s account of sexual ethics is clearly formulated from a radically subject-based, self-focused perspective. The problem is that this goes far beyond what one might call ‘moral rationalism’. By moral rationalism I mean a position according to which reason is the power that gives an agent both the orientation and the motivation to do the ethically right thing. Consequently, the basic idea of moral rationalism is that immoral behavior is irrational, inconsistent, and self-contradictory, while a moral attitude can reasonably account for its acts. Now, while Kant is one of the most famous defenders of moral rationalism (by contrast to, e. g., Socratic ‘moral intellectualism’), we normally do not see him as a supporter of a certain ‘moral solipsism’. By this term, I mean a position that describes an appropriate moral attitude as a harmonious inner self-relation. To do harm to other people would then be false only since I thereby violate the consistency or unity of my moral self-relation. To shed more light on the extent of this problem, let me contrast it with the standard view: most moral philosophers would subscribe to the idea that morality is basically about what we owe to each other. Kant, by contrast, thinks that the fundamental question is what we owe to ourselves. Even worse, he seems to believe that a transgression of moral norms leads to self-violation in the verbal sense of a (complete or partial) self-destruction of one’s moral identity. He seems to give a priority to the inner duties of right (innere Rechtspflichten), a standpoint clearly expressed e. g. in the lecture notes Vigilantius (V-MS/ Vigil, AA 27: 604.14– 26): In short, supposed that there are duties to oneself, then the duties of right to oneself are the highest of all duties. They concern the corresponding right of humanity in one’s own person, hence they are perfect duties, and each obligatory action is irremissibly required by the right of humanity, and is duty in itself and for itself. Each infringement is therefore a violation of the right of humanity in one’s own person, he hence makes himself unworthy of the possession of the person entrusted to him, and becomes valueless since the preservation of his own value consists solely in the observation of the rights of his humanity: he loses all inner value and can only be considered as an instrument for others whose object he has become.²⁰

 My translation. The original text: “Kurz, angenommen, es giebt Pflichten gegen sich selbst, so sind die Rechtspflichten gegen sich selbst die höchsten Pflichten unter allen. Sie betreffen das correspondirende Recht der Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person, sind daher vollkommene Pflichten, und jede Pflichthandlung wird vom Recht der Menschheit unerlässlich gefordert,

Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage

215

Admittedly, it might be too much to characterize the Kantian standpoint here as ‘moral solipsism’. But nevertheless, his claim of a primacy of self-directed duties of right within the realm of duties gives his account of the ethics of sexuality a flavor of merely self-regarding narrowness. Within this self-focused model, the other person enters the picture only as a danger against which I have to guarantee my adequate self-protection. This is certainly not a helpful strategy for sexual ethics. Additionally, we see that Kant’s model of moral philosophy which is not based on values or goods, but on a formal procedure of value generation, turns out to be unsuccessful when it comes to concrete evaluations.

References Brandt, Reinhard (2004): “Kants Ehe- und Kindesrecht”, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52, pp. 199 – 219. Brandt, Reinhard (2007): Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Hamburg: Meiner. Brecher, Martin (2018): “Ehelicher Geschlechtsgebrauch und Fortpflanzungszweck in §7 der Tugendlehre”. In: Waibel, Violetta L. /Ruffing, Margit/Wagner, David (Eds.): Natur und Freiheit. Akten des 12. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 1761 – 1768. Brecher, Martin (forthcoming): “Vernunftrecht und Verdinglichung. Eine Rekonstruktion von Kants Eherecht” [unpublished manuscript]. Denis, Lara (1999): “Kant on the Wrongness of Unnatural Sex”. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 16, pp. 225 – 248. Denis, Lara (2001): “From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant”. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, pp. 1 – 28. Ebbinghaus, Julius (1936/1986): “Über den Grund der Notwendigkeit der Ehe”. In: Geismann, Georg/Oberer, Hariolf (Eds.): Gesammelte Schriften Bonn: Bouvier, pp. 47 – 94. Halwani, Raja (2010): Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage. An Introduction [Chapter 8.: Sexual Objectification, pp. 186 – 226]. New York: Routledge. Herman, Barbara (1993): “Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage?”. In: Antony, Louise M./Witt, Charlotte E. (Eds.): A Mind of One’s Own. Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Taylor&Francis, pp. 53 – 72. Horn, Christoph (2014): Nichtideale Normativität. Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie, Berlin: Suhrkamp. Kant, Immanuel (1963): Lectures on Ethics [Louis Infield (trans.)]. New York: Harper and Row.

und ist an und für sich selbst Pflicht. Eine jede Uebertretung ist also Verletzung des Rechts der Menschheit in seiner eigenen Person, er macht sich also des ihm anvertrauten Besitzes seiner Person unwürdig, und wird nichtswürdig, da die Erhaltung seines eigenen Wertes nur in der Beobachtung der Rechte seiner Menschheit besteht: er verliert allen inneren Werth, und kann höchstens als ein Instrument für andere, deren Sache er geworden, angesehen werden.”.

216

Christoph Horn

Kneller, Jane (2006): “Kant on Sex and Marriage Right”. In: Guyer, Paul (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 447 – 476. Kühn, Manfred (2003): Kant. Eine Biographie. Munich: C.H. Beck. Kuster, Friederike (2011): “Verdinglichung und Menschenrecht. Kants Eherecht und das Recht der häuslichen Gemeinschaft”. In: Kant-Studien 102, pp. 335 – 349. Mertens, Thomas (2014): “Sexual Desire and the Importance of Marriage in Kant’s Philosophy of Law”. In: Ratio Juris 27, pp. 330 – 343. Papadaki, Evangelia (2007): “Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism”. In: Contemporary Political Theory 6, pp. 330 – 348. Papadaki, Evangelia (2010): “Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why it is Worth Thinking about Kant on Marriage”. In: Hypatia 25(2), pp. 45 – 61. Schnepf, Robert (2004): “Systematisierung von rechtlichen Intuitionen? Die drei Formeln Ulpians bei Leibniz und Kant”. In: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 12, pp. 253 – 282. Varden, Helga (2020): Love, Sex, and Gender. A Kantian Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Guido Löhrer

Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law Abstract: As in the Doctrine of Right, Kant uses a principle in the Critique of Practical Reason according to which whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself. This is meant to help to determine a priori from concepts the modus operandi of the moral law, insofar as it is an incentive whose effect confers moral value on actions. I argue, first, that following a particular reading of what is meant by “hindrance,” “resistance,” and “furthering,” this principle is likely to be false. This is because a hindrance obstructs an event or prevents it from taking place. By contrast, the removal of the hindrance or its absence merely permits or enables an event to occur. It does not bring it about. Preventing or disabling and furthering (in terms of “making happen”) are not contradictory, but contrary opposites. Either, then, the furthering of an activity is to be understood as limited to enabling that activity by disabling its disablers or the notion of furthering presupposes a lot more than can be seen a priori, independently of such a presupposition. The latter would be question-begging. Second, I point out that the pre-critical writing on the Negative Magnitudes presents a Kantian solution to the motivation problem that, albeit not satisfactory, is more promising than that of the Second Critique.

1 Introduction At two pivotal points of his practical philosophy, Kant invokes a universally quantified law-like statement along the lines of Newton’s Third Law of Motion regarding the equality of action and reaction.¹ It says: “Resistance that counter-

! !  F = – F Newton 1687, 14: “LEX III. Actioni contrariam semper et aequalem esse reactionem: sive corporum duorum actiones in se mutio semper esse aequales et in partes contrarias dirigi.”. Cf. Kant, GSK, AA 01: 110.17– 20, and GMS, AA 04: 544.32. Kant, KrV A 273/B 329 “[R]eal conflict certainly does take place; there are cases where A – B = 0, that is, where two realities combined in one subject cancel one another’s effects. This is brought before our eyes incessantly by all the hindering and counteracting processes in nature”. See the corresponding passage in Kant, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-014

218

Guido Löhrer

acts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect” (MS, AA 06: 231.24), and “whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself” (KpV, AA 05: 79.09 – 10). In the Doctrine of Right of The Metaphysics of Morals, this principle serves to establish the law’s authorization to use coercion,² claiming that the right to remove hindrances to freedom by means of coercion is analytically linked to freedom in accordance with general laws (cf. MS, AA 06: 231.28 – 34).³ In the Critique of Practical Reason, on which I will focus, the statement is meant to help to demonstrate that pure practical reason “proves itself practically” (KpV, AA 05: 42.06 – 07.; my translation)⁴ twice by a single deed, factum in Latin, i. e., deontically and evaluatively, judicatively and executively or motivationally. At least, it is supposed to provide an a priori insight into its modus operandi. Pure practical reason not only “gives (to a human being) a universal law which we call the moral law” (KpV, AA 05: 31.36 – 37). It also generates the feeling of respect for it, which “weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations” (KpV, AA 05: 79.15 – 16) on this very same pure practical reason and ipso facto morally motivates the agent, and this, in turn, confers moral value on the morally right actions of the agent. This, I shall argue, is Kant’s theory of how practical reasons work when it comes to moral motivation. However, following a particular reading of what is meant by “hindrance,” “resistance,” and “furthering,” the statement that any reduction of hindrances to an activity is a furthering of that activity and that the “removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its causality” (KpV, AA 05: 75.15 – 16) is likely to be false. In that case, the analogy with Newtonian mechanics does not hold, especially as far as practical reasons NG, AA 02: 175.34– 176.01. – Volume, page, and line numbers refer to the German Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s writings, with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is cited according to the first edition of 1781 (A) and the second edition of 1787 (B).  MS, AA 06: 232.29 – 35: “Right and authorization to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing. The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori, by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action and reaction.”. Cf. V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27: 1335.27– 32: “Right is nothing but the law of the equality of the action and reaction regarding freedom through which my freedom agrees with universal freedom. If someone acts against this universal freedom and the other resists him then this resistor acts in conformity with universal freedom and thus right. So I have a right to coerce others to comply with right.”  However, Kant emphasizes in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, A 273/B 329) that the mechanistic analogue is not analytic. Cf. Willaschek 2004, pp. 276 – 278.  In the wording of the German Academy of Sciences edition: “durch ein Factum, worin sich reine Vernunft bei uns in der That praktisch beweiset”. Cf. the analogous phrase “practically effected” in KpV, AA 05: 75.34.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

219

are concerned. Practical reasons work differently. Here are two examples borrowed from Jonathan Dancy (2007, pp. 90 – 92). First, with a strong headwind, it takes me fifteen minutes to cycle to my university, whereas I get there in ten minutes without a headwind. The absence of the headwind makes my ride easier. However, it does not promote it; at least not in the same sense as a strong wind at my back would do so. The absence of the hindrance does not provide the driving force needed. Second, if I can stop you from preventing me from getting myself out of a predicament, I have not thereby helped myself out of a predicament; and not preventing me from helping myself is not the same as helping me. If I manage to get out of the predicament myself, then I do it under my own steam. This is different from ensuring by my own efforts that I can try to do so unhindered. For even if I successfully prevent you from hindering me, I may nevertheless not be able to get out of the predicament I find myself in. Indeed, I might not be able to do anything about it. The success of my resistance to an impediment to my activity is not a measure of the success of that activity itself, nor does it guarantee that it will take place at all. The removal of an obstacle in itself does not function as a catapult. It does not set free otherwise unavailable energies. Therefore, none of these examples provides a reason to see the removal of a hindrance as equivalent to a strengthening of a causal efficacy, i. e., to regard both as the same. This is because a hindrance obstructs an event or prevents it from taking place. By contrast, the removal of the hindrance or its absence merely permits or enables an event to occur. It makes its occurrence possible. It does not bring it about. Preventing or disabling and furthering (in terms of “causing”, “bringing about”, “making happen”) are not contradictory, but contrary opposites. Making something happen and preventing it from happening cannot both be true but can both be false, whereas permitting and not making it happen may both be true. Not permitting is preventing and vice versa and that which is prevented is not brought about and will not happen. However, enabling something – e. g., by removing a hindrance – is merely a necessary condition for it to happen, not a sufficient one (cf. Dancy 2007, p. 92). This is why in the Phaedo Plato’s Socrates cautions us to distinguish an αἰτία from the factors without which an αἰτία could not function as an αἰτία. Those who fail to do so are groping in the dark (cf. Pl. Phd 99b2 – 5). And this is why Dancy calls a reason no more than a fact that favors an action, distinguishing a reason from the context which enables a reason to favor an action. For example, the fact that one has given a promise is a reason to keep it. Having given the promise freely is not itself a reason, but rather a circumstance that enables the promise to function as that reason, in the same way that duress is a circumstance

220

Guido Löhrer

that would disable the promise as a reason for keeping it (cf. Dancy 2004, pp. 38 – 42 and p. 45 with reference to Plato). However, the choice of examples might be crucial. Of course, if I do not step into the pedals, I do not move forward even when there is no wind; and delaying payment to my creditors to provide me with the money needed to play roulette does not help me out of my calamity in the same way that a fortune won at the gambling table would. However, when floodwaters wash away a weir, the held back water does not stay in place. Its potential energy turns into kinetic energy, and the same water masses which overcome the obstacle take it away with them. The impression is that the removal of the obstacle guarantees that the event will take place. Causing and preventing seem to be contradictory opposites. Those who share Kant’s view, or at least consider it plausible, might have in mind a picture like this. According to this picture, the relation between the lowering of sensibility and the elevation of the morally motivating respect for the law can be understood a priori according to the model of a balance scale or the hydraulic model of communicating vessels (see, for example, Zinkin 2006, p. 45). I find this optimistic view questionable. The grounds for action Kant determines in the incentive chapter in the Analytics of his Critique of Practical Reason, are also to be distinguished from enabling conditions. If hindrance and causation are merely contrary opposites, this should be fundamental for what we can cognize from concepts a priori about the moral law as an incentive and about the moral value of an action. To show this, I will first outline Kant’s division of the field of normativity into the domains of duties and values and their relation to moral motivation (Section 2). I will then reconstruct and review the incentive argument which is crucial for Kant’s idea of the formation of moral value (Section 3) and finally, I will cast an analytical glance at revealing parallels with Kant’s pre-critical writing on Negative Magnitudes and the question of whether disabling a disabling condition is sufficient for moral value (4.). Few sentences shall suffice as a synopsis (5.)

2 Duties, Values and Motivations The field of normativity has two distinct domains: duties and values. The domain of duties includes what is mandatory for us and what we ought to do, with what is dutiful and what is not, the right and the wrong, as well as the obligatory, the forbidden and the permissible. The domain of values covers the good and the bad together with their comparative forms as well as value and value neutrality or, as Kant says, “deficiency in […] worth = 0” (MS, AA 06: 390.21). These domains of normativity are distinct, yet correlated. Consequentialist ethics includes the

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

221

view that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends exclusively on the value of its (longer-term) consequences. According to deontological ethics, like Kant’s, the dependency between duty and value is the other way around. The moral value of an action and its intention depend on the fulfillment of the duties addressed to an agent and the motive of his or her compliance. When, in the first section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the concept of moral duty, from which he subsequently derives our duties,⁵ he distinguishes actions that are dutiful, i. e., “in conformity with duty” (GMS, AA 04: 397.15), from those that are “contrary to duty” (GMS, AA 04: 397.11). As we learn later, this is precisely what the categorical imperative, in the form of which we encounter the moral law as a principium dijudicationis, is supposed to distinguish correctly. If we apply the categorical imperative as a test for the moral valence of actions, we operate in the deontic domain. The question is whether an action is morally right, i. e., permitted, or morally wrong, i. e., forbidden. Here, not all distinctions introduced by using deontic vocabulary are congruent. Sticking to the categorical imperative in the universal law formula,⁶ we ask whether a maxim can be willed without contradiction as a universal law of permission. If it cannot, the actions covered by this maxim are morally forbidden or morally wrong. If, on the other hand, the maxim is universalizable, these actions are morally right or permissible (arbitrary). That is, they are neither morally obligatory nor forbidden. We may do them or not. In this weak sense of “dutiful”, an action is dutiful if it does not contradict any duty (Ep ≡ ØOp ∧ ØVp). On the other hand, whether an action is dutiful in the stronger sense of “morally required”, requires indirect demonstration. An action is morally required according to the formula of universal law, if the maxim not to perform this action cannot be universalized as a universal law of permission and is therefore morally wrong or forbidden (ØEØp ≡ Op). A fortiori, this morally commanded action is also morally permitted, in a sense of permission distinct from arbitrariness. As a result, we must distinguish two meanings of the predicate “in conformity with duty”, while the predicate “contrary to duty” does not seem to be ambiguous.

 Velleman 2006, p. 16, cf. p. 31, points this out: “The overall strategy of Kant’s moral theory is to derive the content of our obligations from the very concept of an obligation. Kant thought that we can figure out what we are obligated to do by analyzing the very idea of being obligated to do something.”  “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS, AA 04: 421.07– 08).

222

Guido Löhrer

Kant makes a second distinction between actions performed from duty and those performed from inclination. Here, we are dealing with the motive for action that moves an agent to do something morally right or wrong. Whether an action has moral value depends on this motive for action. Actions performed from duty have moral value; actions performed from inclination have no moral value. According to Kant, duty and inclination are the only motives from which actions are performed.⁷ In said passage of the Groundwork, Kant first traces the relations between the deontic valence of an action and the motive for action. There are two cases in which one is an indicator of the other: Firstly, what is contrary to duty cannot be done from duty (cf. GMS, AA 04: 397.11– 14), and secondly, everything contrary to duty is done from inclination. If action φ is contrary to duty, then φ is not motivated by duty. The contraposition here shows that the motive from duty is sufficient for the action to be in conformity with duty: If an action φ is motivated by duty, it is not contrary to duty and is therefore in conformity with duty or dutiful. Why? Whoever acts from duty does the morally right thing because it is morally right or formulated with a teleological connective: Whoever acts from duty does the morally right thing in order to do the morally right thing. If, on the other hand, an action is done from inclination, the matter is not unambiguous with regard to the moral valence of the resulting action. For acting from inclination is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of the deontic status of being morally right; or dutiful. This motive is not necessary, because actions from duty are also in conformity with duty. It is not sufficient, because although all actions contrary to duty are done from inclination, actions motivated by inclination may well be in conformity with duty. This inclination may be immediate, as with philanthropists (cf. GMS, AA 04: 398.08 – 12). Yet it can also motivate indirectly, as in the example of the prudent shopkeeper who, without harboring sympathy for children, inexperienced buyers, and casual customers, nevertheless also serves them honestly in accordance with his duty. Because in doing so, he preserves his reputation, which in turn benefits him since it keeps him regular customers. Only the breach of duty clearly indicates the motive. If an action is contrary to duty, then, as Kant stipulates, inclination is always the motive.⁸

 Timmons (2021, p. 54; cf. p. 57) calls it Kant’s motivational dualism.  Kant scholars such as Gerold Prauss (1983, pp. 75 – 76) insist that actions can only be done either from duty or from inclination and cannot possibly be motivated by both duty and inclination. Numerous passages in Kant’s writings on morality support this view, yet the phrase “whatever diminishes the hindrances” (KpV, AA 05: 79.09, and 76.36 – 37) to action from duty seems to imply at least two conflicting real forces.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

223

If we consider the connection between moral motive and moral valence, we come across cases where the maxim cites a motive for action. This is the case with the example of the balance-sheet suicide in the second section of the Groundwork: “[F]rom self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness” (GMS, AA 04: 422.04– 06). Kant needs the additional element of inclination of self-love as a motive for suicide. Without it, not even the appearance of an inconsistency would arise in testing this maxim.⁹ For we can very well imagine without contradiction a possible world in which every human being would kill himself or herself as soon as the rationally considered expected value of his or her remaining lifetime would be insufficient. Yet still, “from self-love” as a component of the content of a maxim has no motivational force. It is not a motive, but the very mention of a motive, that is, a motive report. Mentioning it serves entirely to determine the deontic valence of the action covered by this maxim. Moral value cannot be fixed simply by citing a motive. Placing “I make it my principle out of duty” at the beginning of a maxim would neither guarantee an action from duty nor generate its moral value. If Kant says that the concept of duty requires that the maxim of an action shows subjective respect for the law, then it will likewise be insufficient to mention a motive in a subjective rule of action. The concept of duty, therefore, requires of the action objective accord with the law but requires of the maxim of the action subjective respect for the law, as the sole way of determining the will by the law. And on this rests the distinction between consciousness of having acted in conformity with duty and from duty, that is, respect for the law, the first of which (legality) is possible even if the inclinations alone have been the determining grounds of the will whereas the second (morality), moral worth, must be placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for the sake of the law alone. (KpV, AA 05: 81.10 – 19)

The question, then, is at what point the moral motive becomes relevant. If this were the case already during the genesis of the maxims, we should, when assessing the deontic valence of an action, not start with universalization but with the determination of the motive. If we discover that duty is the motive already at the point of the formulation of the maxim, testing the maxim with the categorical imperative would be superfluous. We would then already know that the action is morally right. Since the fact that it is an action motivated by duty would guarantee that. While a moral theory might look like this, it is not Kant’s theory. He probably thinks of it in this way:  See the detailed comments in Timmons 2002.

224

Guido Löhrer

We think of states of affairs which would give us pleasure or displeasure, which is why we would value or disvalue them and react to them with affection or aversion. We tend to bring valued objects about, but to keep our distance from strongly disliked ones or to prevent their coming into existence.¹⁰ Thus, in a prima facie sense, we would already be motivated. However, as rational beings, we are not forced to give in to our inclinations. Instead, we can consider what is possible or impossible useful or detrimental, and to make it come about in the situation or type of situation described earlier. We deliberate which of these inclinations to satisfy, taking into account the circumstances of our action. Kant calls this educated and deliberate appreciation an interest, for the pursuit of which we form a maxim (cf. GMS, AA 04: 413 n. and 460 n. See Willaschek 1992, pp. 74– 75). In doing so, we are already motivated. Let us now consider the following: I want something, so I am motivated by interest. I form a maxim, but do not leave it at that. I also subject my maxim to a test by the categorical imperative, say, in form of the formula of universal law. This means that I care about knowing whether my action is morally right or morally wrong. Thus, I also take interest in morality. It is important to me. Here, too, I am motivated. Now it turns out that my maxim passes the universalizability test. Actions covered by my maxim are morally right or acceptable. If I act accordingly, I am doing something morally right. Moreover, I have subjected myself to the moral law imposed by my own practical reason. Has this process cleansed me of all relevant inclinations so that my actions have moral value beyond mere legality? Will I do the right thing then, just because it is the right thing to do? Does the mere testing of a maxim, insofar as it gives the green light to my actions, already confer moral value on them? Testing maxims does not help to distinguish dutiful actions motivated by duty from those motivated by inclination: After all, in an action in conformity with duty, the motive of duty and the motive of inclination pull the agent in the same direction. If I fill my maxim with conflicting reports on inclination, as in the case of the balance-sheet suicide, or if I allow myself an exception to my law about a world without help for me, that matter should still be decided (see GMS, AA 04: 422.04– 06 and 423.31– 35). However, with a maxim like “Without distinction of person, I will always serve all my customers honestly”, the motive seems to remain unsettled. But if the very fact that I examine my maxims at all excludes inclination as a motive for action, I would only act out of inclination

 Kant (MS, AA 06: 399.21– 23): “Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.”

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

225

in accordance with my duty if my maxims remained unexamined. Their compliance with the law remains unrecognized. However, given these conditions, the drama of the incentive chapter and the antagonism of the motives of duty and inclination would be incomprehensible. To be sure, it is difficult to determine what it means to command a motive. However, there is little to suggest that Kant intended that an assertion such as “the moral law demands obedience from duty” (KpV, AA 05: 158.06) or a general ethical imperative such as “act in conformity with duty from duty” (MS, AA 06: 391.04) should be reduced to the imperative “test your maxims”. Thus, if there is an antagonism between duty and inclination, it can only be a matter of which of the two prevails in motivating in the same direction. In the following, I will review Kant’s a priori insight into the modus operandi of moral motivation from duty.

3 The Incentive Argument Kant’s incentive argument is an a priori epistemological argument. At first glance, what is at stake is the ratio cognoscendi of the transformation of a normative reason into an effective cause, a motivation by duty or by the moral law. Practical reason does not only issue the moral law, it also has a practical effect in the world of appearances in the form of moral motivation. Only if the moral law, which as a “principle of dijudication” determines the deontic valence of an action, does at the same time motivate – as a “principle of execution” (VMo/Collins, AA 27: 274.22– 24; my translation) – to do the morally right thing, because it is morally right, does the action have moral value.¹¹ Therefore, Kant states his argument with a proviso: “What is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately” (KpV, AA 05: 71.28 – 30). However, the incentive argument does not try to show how the moral law can be a directly will-determining motive for action, since – as Kant repeatedly emphasizes – this problem exceeds the power of human reason (cf. KpV, AA 05: 71.21– 23, and GMS, AA 04: 458.36 – 459.02). By contrast, the modus operandi of the moral law, “insofar as it is an incentive” (KpV, AA 05: 73.26), can be shown a priori. It is inscrutable how the moral law becomes a motivating force, i. e., how a normative reason becomes a motive for action. What can be determined, however, is how the moral law functions as an incentive, provided it is

 In other words, morality strictly differs from social engineering. An action has moral value if and only if it is performed for a reason of the right kind, that is, if it is done for a moral reason.

226

Guido Löhrer

an incentive. For this purpose, the argument takes a detour via a feeling. This is another crucial point involving two things. First, if free will must be determined by the moral law alone, not only must this happen without sensible stimuli: It can only be achieved against their resistance and by eliminating all inclinations contrary to the law. Second, what we can discern “a priori from concepts” (KpV, AA 05: 73.06 – 07) about the motivational modus operandi of the moral law is restricted to the resistance of the law to those inclinations that oppose it, with conflicting feelings operating against each other. This results in a cascade of insights to be gained a priori. We want to comprehend how one can see a priori that the moral law can have a motivating effect by recognizing how it works as an incentive. To do so, we must recognize where this incentive is having its effect and what it is acting on. In Kant’s view, therefore, it is a matter of showing a priori what happens in the mind, where feelings are situated. And finally, it is a matter of an a priori insight into the relation between the cognition of the deontic valence of an action by pure practical reason and the feelings of pleasure and displeasure (cf. KpV, AA 05: 73.06 – 08, and 78.27– 29). In a first step, Kant seeks to show how we can recognize the practical efficacy of the moral law by its negative consequences on inclination. That is: Evidence for this effectiveness is only possible if the moral law and the inclination compete for motivation and if inclination is first to occupy the place of motivation (cf. KpV, AA 05: 73.16).¹² “[R]egard for oneself” (KpV, AA 05: 73.11: Selbstsucht), under which heading all desires, inclinations, and the sensible feeling underlying them come together, is active in us even before the moral law comes onto the scene. Without it, we would not form intentions or adopt maxims, nor would we provide the moral law with a target. A person’s inclinations are about herself. For a subject of one’s own desires, this is inevitable and requires only to be restricted to conformity to the law. Kant calls the result rational self-love.¹³ But when a person, out of pleasure in herself, conceitedly declares his or her subjective inclinations to be laws, the moral law strikes down his or her

 See also Kant, KpV, AA 05: 74.08 – 15 (emphases added): “Now, however, we find our nature as sensible beings so constituted that the matter of the faculty of desire (objects of inclination, whether of hope or fear) first forces itself upon us, and we find our pathologically determinable self, even though it is quite unfit to give universally law through its maxims, nevertheless striving antecedently to make its claims primary and originally valid, just as if it constituted our entire self.”.  Kant, KpV, AA 05: 73.14– 18: “Pure practical reason merely infringes upon self-love, inasmuch as it only restricts it, as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational self-love.”.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

227

conceit and humiliates him or her, thereby exerting a negative effect on his or her inclinations. This is the effect of the moral law insofar as it is an incentive. In a condensed form, we have the following reasoning. (1) If the moral law exerts a motivational effect, it is a negative effect upon the inclinations (KpV, AA 05: 72.28 – 32). (P) (2) All inclination is based on feeling (cf. KpV, AA 05: 72.34– 73.01). (P) (3) If the moral law has a motivational effect, it is a negative effect on feeling. (1,2) (4) The negative effect on feeling is itself a feeling (cf. KpV, AA 05: 73.01– 02). (P) (5) If the moral law exerts a motivational effect, the effect is a feeling (cf. KpV, AA 05: 73.01– 02). (3,4) According to Kant, this last feeling has two aspects. I want to do something. Thus I am motivated by an inclination-based interest and I form a maxim, which I test for its deontic valence on the moral law. If the moral law is functioning as a formal, objective determining ground, then it restricts my inclinations and their motivational impetus by dijudication to compliance with that very law. This may be true not only due to the result of this examination, but because it displeases me already to have to subject what I want to do to an examination by law in the first place. Any diminution of pleasure causes displeasure. Thus, my inclinations are humiliated by the law’s repression of their claims to motivational supremacy. However, it seems somewhat awkward that the displeasure has two very different causes; one is the loss of the inclination’s authority because it is tested at all, the other is the negative result of the test. However, this duality precludes that actions in which inclination and duty pull towards the same direction cannot be motivated by the moral law. In both cases, there are resistances to be overcome. “So far, then, the effect of the moral law as an incentive is only negative, and as such this incentive can be cognized a priori” (KpV, AA 05: 72.32– 34). We can realize the motivating power of the moral law only when sensibility offers opposition to it, which the law pushes back. As the effect of a feeling on a feeling, the moral law produces the feeling of humiliation. At the same time, the judgment of reason recognizes that the moral law asserts itself as an objective determinant and thus commands respect. From this arises the feeling of respect. Strictly speaking, however, respect for the law, insofar as this feeling can also be recognized a priori, must refer to, and even be limited to, resistance to the inclinations and the feelings underlying them. This is why Kant emphasizes “that the effect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation, which we can thus discern a priori

228

Guido Löhrer

though we cannot cognize in it the force of the pure practical law as incentive but only the resistance to incentives of sensibility” (KpV, AA 05: 78.34– 79.01). This is a remarkable feature of Kant’s moral philosophy. For the demonstration that pure practical reason morally motivates our actions and gives them moral value, the inclinations that stand in its way are essential. It is true that the suppression of one’s inclinations is humiliating for the subject. But only through this humiliating suppression of the inclinations, which is linked to the feeling of displeasure, does the moral law generate the feeling of respect for that very law. In this indirect way, the moral law is supposed to obtain subjectively motivating force.¹⁴ “If something represented as a determining ground of our will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself insofar as it is positive and a determining ground” (KpV, AA 05: 74.26 – 29). This condition for respect is a necessary one.¹⁵ Only beings endowed with sensibility and reason can have respect for the law. There can be no respect for the moral law without humiliation of or intellectual contempt for the subject determined by his inclinations, no moral motivation and no moral value without sensibility. This is true at least in that part of the doctrine of motivation in which strict care is taken not to let reason become transcendent, i. e. in which Kant confines himself to what can be shown a priori. A second point is to be added here: Only to the extent that the moral law offers resistance to the competing motive of inclination is it the object of a priori cognition and thus the object of respect.¹⁶ According to this mechanical analogy, the sum of motives has a fixed volume. [T]he lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem – that is, humiliation on the sensible side – is an elevation of the moral – that is, practical – esteem for the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is respect for the law, and so also a feeling that is positive in its intellectual cause, which is known a priori”. (KpV, AA 05: 79.04– 08)

 Lauener 1981, p. 263: “In order for a human action to attain morality at all, i. e. to be done from duty, the law as a direct determining ground must at the same time also function indirectly – via mediation of the moral feeling – as a subjective motive. For without such an intermediary it would be impossible to see how a mere idea of reason can have an effect on the events in the world of appearance” (my translation; G. L.).  Cf. Kant, KpV, AA 05: 75.30 – 32, 76.10 – 12, and 79.29 – 32.  See Kant’s use of the conjunction “inasmuch” (“indem”) in the following passage: The law is “an object of respect inasmuch as, in opposition to its subjective antagonist, namely the inclinations in us, it weakens self-conceit; and inasmuch as it even strikes down self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the greatest respect” (KpV, AA 05: 73.29 – 32). Cf. Kant, KpV, AA 05: 74.34– 37.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

229

The efficacy of the moral law goes hand in hand with the suppression of inclinations. Thus, the suppression of the motive of inclination shows us the efficacy of the motive of duty. However, in order for the respect for the law to be more than an appreciation of humiliation, namely a motive for acting in the world of the senses, a further step is necessary. The universally quantified statement of the moral law with which I started is crucial for this: “[W]hatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself.” (KpV, AA 05: 79.09 – 10). In order for an argument like the following to be sound, this law-like statement must be true, and – to begin with – it must be clear which proposition is expressed by this statement. (6) Whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself (cf. KpV, AA 05: 79 – 80). (P) (7) When inclinations do not hinder the moral law, it is practically effective (cf. KpV, AA 05: 79.10 – 13). (P) (8) The moral law, as an objective determining ground of the will, diminishes the hindering influence of the inclinations and, as a subjective determining ground, furthers its own observance (cf. KpV, AA 05: 75.20 – 26). (P) (9) The moral law, or respect for the law, must be regarded as a positive though indirect effect of the moral law on feeling, i. e., as an incentive to compliance with the law (cf. KpV, AA 05: 79.13 – 19). (1,2,3) We recall: Compliance with the law resulting from respect for it amounts to acting from duty, which is what confers moral value on an action. Premise (1) refers to the principle of action and reaction from Newtonian mechanics, which Kant transfers to the working of practical reasons. Premise (2) specifies the reading of this principle. Premise (3) explains the operation of the moral law in terms of the principle and its interpretation. Sentence (4) represents the conclusion which can be drawn from these premises or – to put it more cautiously – which is at least sufficiently supported by them. Let us first take a look at premise (1). Following the remarks in the Critique of Pure Reason, which Kant aligns with the type of a real repugnancy (Realrepugnanz; real opposition in contrast to logical contradiction), we are not dealing here with an analytically true proposition to be verified only by the principle of contradiction, but with a synthetic proposition a priori.¹⁷ We are faced with a reciprocal relation, where effect and counter-effect cancel out each other’s effects. Minuend and subtrahend always produce “a zero = 0” (KrV, A 282/B 338).

 Cf. Willaschek 2004, pp. 276 – 277.

230

Guido Löhrer

“For real opposition always obtains where A – B = 0, i. e., where one reality, if combined in one subject with another, cancels out the effect of the latter, which is unceasingly placed before our eyes by all hindrances and countereffects in nature” (KrV, A 273/B 329; cf. NG, AA 02: 194.19 – 34). However, the statement from the Critique of Practical Reason is less clear. On the one hand, Kant uses it, as in premise (1), as a law-like statement about the relation between lessening a hindrance and furthering an activity. On the other hand, similar formulations refer to the statement that the removal of an obstacle and a promotion are equivalent in their effect: “The removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its causality” (KpV, AA 05: 75.15 – 16). Sometimes Kant talks about diminishing a hindrance as if it were a matter of degree. However, he also talks about removing, which does not suggest any gradual change. Finally, “diminishing” may denote both a process without an agent – so that even a depression or decreasing libido would diminish the influence of inclinations – and a process with an agent. The term “promotion of an activity”, in turn, can mean at least three things, namely, bringing it about, enabling it, or strengthening it.¹⁸ Thus, it is crucial which reading we give to premise (1) and how we interpret premise (2). Kant writes: “Recognition of the moral law is […] consciousness of an activity of practical reason from objective grounds, which fails to express its effect in actions only because subjective (pathological) causes hinder it” (KpV, AA 05: 79.10 – 13). If it is true that the efficacy of pure practical reason as an incentive can be proved a priori only on the basis of its resistance to subjective causes, then such a proof cannot go beyond the point at which the motivating force of the moral law neutralizes that of inclinations. Then again, it may also be the case that the moral law does not only diminish and weaken conceit, but even that it strikes it down and does infinite harm to it. But “the removal of the counterweight” (KpV, AA 05: 76.03) is nonetheless nothing but a neutralization of weight and counterweight. Kant characterizes this process as the deprivation of the effect of a force by an opposing force: “[T]he representation of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence” (KpV, AA 95: 75.35 – 36). It is not the forces that disappear. Rather, they cancel each other out. The law weakens the influence of inclination, just as inclination hinders the influence of the law. What “is produced in the judgment of reason through the removal of the counterweight” is always only a “relative  For the latter, see the “Doctrine of the Method” of the Critique of Practical Reason: “[T]hat which, by being removed strengthens the effect of a moving force must have been a hindrance” (KpV, AA 05: 156.31– 33). In order to understand the removal of a hindrance as a strengthening of a force, this force must be presupposed already.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

231

weightiness of the law (with regard to a will affected by impulses)” (KpV, AA 05: 76.01– 04; my emphasis). It results in what Kant elsewhere calls an equilibrium (cf. NG, AA 02: 181.26). However, when Kant goes on to affirm that “pure practical reason, by rejecting all the claims of self-love in opposition with its own, supplies authority to the law, which now alone has influence” (KpV, AA 05: 76.06 – 08; my emphasis), he seems to be making the case for a transcendent use of reason, lacking proper caution. For he goes beyond what can justifiably be shown from concepts, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that the moral law functions as an incentive. What Kant is claiming here corresponds to the above-mentioned example of the weir, which is removed by the same water masses that break their way through it. When the resistance of inclinations drops out of the picture, the epistemic task is to show that there is a surplus of a motivating force of law which ensures that we act from duty. Thus, an a priori proof would have to be offered showing that what determines the will in this situation is a practical reason by itself. But this is quite impossible according to Kant. If one interprets premise (2) in this way, one obtains a reading of the principle in premise (1) under which it appears false or not justified. By contrast, the kind of furthering that has chances of being demonstrated a priori is furthering in the sense of enabling. More precisely, it is an enabling by disabling a disabler, i. e., by removing a hindrance. The removal of the hindering inclinations enables another motive for action to become effective. This is different from bringing something about. Furthering in this sense corresponds to the above-mentioned example of a person in a predicament, who succeeds in fighting off an obstacle preventing him or her from freeing themselves. Again, the absence of the hindrance does not provide the driving force necessary to make freeing oneself succeed. Applied to Kant’s incentive argument, it might suffice to show how pure reason proves its agency in practice by being a motive, even if it does not suffice to bring about an action done from duty. Interestingly, the pre-critical writing on the Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy can make us see this more clearly than the Critique of Practical Reason.

4 Negative Magnitudes and Hindrances The negative magnitudes which Kant strives to introduce into philosophy in 1763, are called negative because, when combined as opposites, they cancel each other out or diminish each other by that proportion which is equal to both. These magnitudes are negative only with regard to each other. On their own, they must be

232

Guido Löhrer

something positive. Possible examples are mathematical quantities that can be added to or subtracted from each other, or entities that physically or psychologically affect one another, exert influence, and can mutually force back each other’s effects, according to the scheme A–A=0, where +A is the negative magnitude of –A, and vice versa.¹⁹ Kant sharply distinguishes this kind of opposition from a logical contradiction (^), consisting of the conjunction of two contradictory propositions, A ∧ ØA. Its consequence is nothing at all (cf. NG, AA 02.171). For there is nothing that makes it true that something is both the case and not the case at the same time. Whereas, if instead a positive reason is without a consequence, then – according to Kant’s corollary theorem – we are dealing with a real opposition. Here the rest, or the zero, is generated by real opposites, which deprive each other of the effect they would have on their own. Thus, a real repugnancy (i. e., a real opposition) is characterized by the following features: The conflicting factors are both factors of one and the same subject. They cannot be contradictories. One factor negates only what is being posited by the opposite factor. Viewed in isolation, they cannot both be negative. Rather, both must be positive. Nevertheless, their combination in one subject yields the effect of zero. This is what Kant calls a deprivation (privatio) (cf. NG, AA 02: 175 – 177, and 183.01). Reasons and counter-reasons, effects and counter-effects behave strictly additively. These principles are applied in very different areas. To begin with, Kant cites examples from the fields of mechanics and financial credit: In a one-dimensional model, equal, but opposing moving forces acting on a body result in it being in a state of rest, and debts are negative units of capital (cf. NG, AA 02: 171.18 – 22; 174.29 – 30: 175.20 – 21; and 172). Let us suppose I owe a person a certain amount of money. This is an obligation to repay him or her this amount. Furthermore, assuming I am also a creditor of another person who owes me the same amount, then I am entitled to receive that very same amount from that person. The two ratios together ensure that I make neither a profit nor a loss on these transactions. Income and expenses add up to zero. However, it also becomes apparent that such a real opposition does not generate capital. Removing a hindrance by itself does not start a movement, which would ensure that I could now afford something. Suppose I collect the money that the second person owes me to pay off my debt to the first person. The fact that I then clear my debt does not make me wealthy. It may be the case that afterward, I own nothing: A–A=0.  The formula A – A = 0 “expresses the following idea: there are two things, of which one is the negative of the other; both are A and therefore truly positive; but they are positive in such a way that one of them cancels that which is posited by the other; the cancellation is signified by means of the sign ‘–’.” (NG, AA 02: 177.05 – 08).

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

233

Analogously, in the case of the motive for action, the moving force of respect does not extend beyond ensuring that the inclination does not become effective as a motive for action. Thus, respect for the law by itself does not work as a favorer of an action from duty, but merely as an enabler of an effective alternative motive by suppressing the inclination, that is, by disabling a hindrance. Again, the equation is A–A=0. This hindrance is indeed a hindrance as long as the value zero is not reached. This justifies the transfer of Kant’s doctrine of real repugnancy to his doctrine of incentives. Yet when Kant claims in the Critique of Practical Reason that “that which, by being removed strengthens the effect of a moving force must have been a hindrance” (KpV, AA 05: 156.31– 33), he thereby merely cites a sufficient condition for a hindrance, not a necessary one. Therefore, that whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force cannot be called a hindrance. In his essay on negative magnitudes, Kant foreshadows another claim that he revisits 25 years later.²⁰ The concepts of real opposition also have a useful application in moral philosophy. Vice (demeritum) is not merely a negation; it is a negative virtue (meritum negativum). For vice can only occur in so far as a being has within him an inner law (either simply conscience or consciousness of a positive law as well), which is contravened by this actions. This inner law is a positive reason for a good action, and the consequence can only be zero if the consequence which would result from the consciousness of the law on its own is cancelled. What we have here is, accordingly, a deprivation, a real opposition, and not merely a lack. (NG, AA 02: 182.29 – 183.02)

The doctrine of real repugnancy is supposed to support counterfactuals. Since the inner law is a positive reason, it would cause a morally valuable action if it were not opposed by a vice that deprives the law of its good effect. This does not mean that the law does not exercise any force in the case of deprivation. Rather, its effect is neutralized by an equally strong counterforce. If the moral law were in play all by itself, its effect would unfold without any hindrance. That is the basic idea. “[O]nly in so far as an equal but opposed real ground is combined with the ground of a it is possible for a to be canceled” (NG, AA 02: 190.17– 19). This is what Kant means when he is talking about the removal of a hindrance. The above-quoted passage from the Negative Magnitudes is about the removal of the motivating force of the moral law by vices or inclinations. The Critique of Practical Reason, on the other hand, traces the modus operandi by which reason  See KpV, AA 05: 79.11– 13: “[A]n activity of practical reason from objective grounds […] fails to express its effect in actions only because subjective (pathological) causes hinder it.”.

234

Guido Löhrer

strikes down what hinders it. Whether something is a hindrance is a matter of perspective. Hindrances exist only under a description. Mother Nature draws no distinction between hindering and furthering. Anyway, it cannot be ruled out that the motivational force originating from the moral law does not extend beyond what we can determine a priori from concepts, i. e., up to the blocking of the inclinations and the respect caused to the humiliating force of the law. If the furthering of an activity amounts to merely permitting or enabling it, then there is no evidence that pure practical reason is not powerless beyond that. Had Kant not committed himself to only two kinds of motives, duty and inclination, one might think that he thereby gives free rein to other motives like acting from habit or out of boredom. Pure practical reason functions as a disabler of a disabler. But in the state of neutralization, this is true of both inclination and duty. Neutralization does not produce an action from duty, nor does it motivate such an action. However, a certain passage of the Negative Magnitudes suggests a path to an alternative conception of how actions obtain a moral value, provided the moral law is an incentive. Towards the end of his essay, Kant explicitly points out that zero, even in morality, must often be understood not as a lack, but as a deprivation. And if the principle of deprivation by a real opposition holds, a greater force cannot necessarily be read off from the greater consequence.²¹ To show this, Kant introduces units or degrees to which virtues and vices, or analogously duty and inclination or humiliation and respect, can be set off against each other. Vices and virtues are comparable and commensurable. Combined in one subject, they are in real opposition to each other. In the pre-critical writing, the grounds of desire are at the same time considered grounds of loathing (cf. NG, AA 02: 196.14– 15),²² just as in the Critique of Practical Reason the positive ground of intellectual contempt is at the same time the positive ground of the feeling of respect (cf. AA 05: 75.08 – 13). Thus, a strict additivity principle applies: i The motives of duty and inclination come in degrees. ii One can set off one degree of inclination, -1, against one degree of duty, +1, and obtain the value 0.

 Kant, NG, AA 02: 200.04– 07: “In moral matters […] zero is not always to be regarded as a negation due to lack; nor is a positive consequence of greater magnitude always to be regarded as proof of greater activity having been employed to bring about this consequence.”.  Kant, NG, AA 02: 201.02– 06: “No one ever desires an object without positively feeling aversion for its opposite. In other words, if someone desires something, that person’s will relates not only to the contradictory opposite of his desire; it also relates to that which is really opposed to his desire (aversion), namely, a consequence which arises from positive displeasure.”.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

235

iii In a one-dimensional model, inclination always pulls in one direction, duty in the opposite direction. iv The portion of the duty motive always improves the action morally, just as the portion of the inclination motive always deprives it of its moral value. v It is always a question of the moral value of the action of an individual person. Kant now asks us to compare two actions. Suppose that someone has ten degrees of passion – miserliness, say – and that this is sufficient, under certain circumstances, to conflict with the rules of duty. Let him apply twelve degrees of effort, and let them be exercised in accordance with the principles of benevolence. The result will be two degrees, and that will be the extent to which he will be benevolent and beneficent. Imagine another person who has three degrees of miserliness and seven degrees of capacity to act in accordance with the principles of obligation. The action will be four degrees in magnitude, and that will be the extent to which he will benefit another person after the conflict of his desires. (NG, AA 02: 200.07– 15)

Applied to the motives of duty and inclination opposing each other in the agent, we seem to obtain the following scheme: inclination

duty

moral value

action 

-





action 

-





This, however, is not the way Kant calculates the moral value of an action. Moral value is not measured by the surplus of the motive of duty, which is still effective beyond the suppression of inclinations and, as one should assume, ensures that a corresponding action is done from duty (Kant uses Leibniz’s concept of the living force). Rather, Kant makes it clear that the moral value of an action is determined by the degree of inclination that has been struck down.²³ He continues: But what is indisputable is this: in so far as the passion in question can be regarded as natural and involuntary, the moral value of the action performed by the first person will be greater than that performed by the second, even though, if one were to assess the actions

 For an example see also Kant, GMS, AA 04: 398.02– 07: “[I]f adversity and hopeless grief have taken away the taste for life; if an unfortunate man, strong of soul and more indignant about his fate than despondent or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has moral content.”.

236

Guido Löhrer

by reference to the living force, the consequence of the latter case exceeds that of the former. For this reason, it is impossible for us, with certainty, to infer from another person’s actions the degree of that person’s virtuous disposition. (NG, AA 02: 200.15 – 21)

The scheme must therefore look like this: case 1 inclination

duty

moral value

living force

action 

-







action 

-







Let us leave aside comparisons such as case 2, in which the actions differ only with regard to the degree of the motive of duty, but not in degrees of inclination overcome. Kant’s remarks do not provide sufficient evidence to judge whether the two acts have the same or different moral values: case 2 inclination

duty

moral value

living force

action 

-



+?



action 

-



+?



It is different with the following cases 3 and 4, which seem at least conceivable according to Kant’s remarks. case 3 inclination

duty

moral value

living force

action 

-







action 

-







If moral value depends solely on the quantum of suppressed inclination, which is accompanied by a corresponding respect for the law, then a certain behavior – in which there is no external action at all, due to a real repugnancy with the value of zero – can be morally better than an action done from duty, for which a smaller quantum of inclination had to be overcome. And finally, it

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

237

does not seem impossible that an act done from inclination has a greater moral value than an act from duty. This would be the case if one person, with respect for the law, succeeds with ease in restricting his or her inclinations to conform with that law, while a second person, with great effort, struggles against a passion that, as Kant says, conflicts with the rules of duty. Let us suppose that in the end this second person does not fully succeed in controlling the motivational force of his or her inclinations, and the action is motivated by a considerably weakened inclination after all. Then his or her action, measured in degrees of duty and inclination, may yet have greater moral value than that of the first person. case 4 inclination

duty

moral value

living force

action 

-







action 

-





-

If this is true, and Kant’s reflections from the Negative Magnitudes contribute to our understanding of the incentive chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, then it also becomes apparent that we must think of the activity of pure practical reason – insofar as it exists and its procedure can be known a priori – as the disabling of a disabler of a motive for action. The lesson we take away from the earlier writing for the Second Critique is that this is precisely what gives moral value to an action. The quantum of disabled disablers is the measure of moral value. Neither the incentive argument nor the argument from real repugnancy demonstrate how an action from duty comes about. They merely explain what enables such an act to occur. However, the earlier writing suggests that enabling a dutiful action from respect for the law is sufficient to confer moral value on that action.

5 Conclusion I have argued that, with the help of the mechanical analogy of the incentive chapter, nothing more can be justifiably derived a priori from the concept of the diminution of a hindrance of an activity than this very diminution of this hindrance (A – A = 0), not the furthering of an activity in the sense we were looking for. For, either the furthering of an activity must be understood as enabling this activity. In this case, we need to distinguish the function of the furthering factor

238

Guido Löhrer

from the proper reason or motive. Or the notion of furthering presupposes a lot more than can be seen a priori, independently of such a presupposition. The latter would beg the question. Then the claim that we could determine from concepts alone “in what way the moral law becomes the incentive” (KpV, AA 05: 72.18 – 19) and how actions gain moral value would stand on shaky ground. Kant’s proposal, according to which the removal of an obstacle to the motive of duty, i. e., disabling a disabler, already gives an action a moral value – presented 25 years before publishing the Critique of Practical Reason – seems more promising. This is also no good news for the friends of inclination. Yet the Kantian argument should work better this way and not be weakened by the ambiguities of the expressions “hindrance,” “resistance,” and “furthering”.

References Dancy, Jonathan (2004): Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dancy, Jonathan (2007): “Defending the Right”. In: Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, pp. 85 – 98. Kant, Immanuel (GSK): “Thoughts on the ‘True Estimation of Living Forces’”. In: I. Kant, Natural Science [Translated by J.B. Edwards and M. Schönfeld (2012), GSK, AA 01: 1 – 182]. Eric Watkins (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1 – 155. Kant, Immanuel (NG): “Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy”. In: I. Kant, Practical Philosophy [Translated by Mary Gregor (1996), NG, AA 02: 165 – 204]. Mary Gregor (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203 – 241. Kant, Immanuel (KrV): Critique of Pure Reason [Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (1998)]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Kant, Immanuel (GMS): Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [Translated and edited by Mary Gregor (1997)]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 385 – 463. Kant, Immanuel (KpV): Critique of Practical Reason [Translated and edited by Mary Gregor (1997)]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1 – 163. Kant, Immanuel (MAN): Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [Translated and edited by Michael Friedman (2004)]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 465 – 566. Kant, Immanuel (MS): The Metaphysics of Morals [Translated by Mary Gregor (1991). Edited by Lara Denis (2017)]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203 – 494. Kant, Immanuel (V-NR/Feyerabend) [2016]: “Natural Right Course Lecture Notes” [Edited by F. Rauscher. Translated by K.R. Westphal]. In: Kant, Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 81 – 180 [V-NR/Feyerabend, AA 27: 1317 – 1394]. Kant, Immanuel (V-Mo/Collins) [1997]: “Moral Philosophy: Collins’s lecture notes” [Translated by Peter Heath]. In: Kant, Lectures on Ethics. Peter Heath/Jerome B. Schneewind (Eds.): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37 – 222 [V-Mo/Collins, AA 27: 237 – 473]. Lauener, Henri (1981): “Der systematische Stellenwert des Gefühls der Achtung in Kants Ethik”. In: Dialectica 35, pp. 243 – 264.

Kant on Morality from Respect for the Law

239

Newton, Isaac (1687) [2010]: Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica [editio tertia aucta et emendate, reproduction]. Seaside, Oregon: Watchmaker Publishing. Prauss, Gerold (1983): Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Timmons Mark (2002): “Motive and Rightness in Kant’s Ethical System”. In: Mark Timmons (Ed.): Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 255 – 288. Timmons, Mark (2021): Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. A Guide. New York: Oxford University Press. Velleman, J. David (2006): “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. In: J. David Velleman, Self to Self. Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16 – 44. Willaschek, Marcus (1992): Praktische Vernunft. Handlungstheorie und Moralbegründung bei Kant. Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler. Willaschek, Marcus (2004): “‘Verhinderung eines Hindernisses der Freiheit’ und ‘Zweiter Zwang’. Bemerkungen zur Begründung des Zwangsrechts bei Kant und Hegel”. In: Merker, Barbara/Mohr, Georg/Quante, Michael (Eds.): Subjektivität und Anerkennung. Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 271 – 283. Zinkin, Melissa (2006): “Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88, pp. 31 – 53.

Micha H. Werner

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency Abstract: Recent contributions to the philosophy of manipulation have challenged assumptions explicitly understood as “Kantian”; especially the assumption that the concept and the negative value of manipulation could be explained by regarding it as a subversion of rational agency. This paper examines Robert Noggle’s concerns about Kantian accounts of manipulation and confronts them with Kant’s considerations about the “moral illusion”. It argues that, while the original framework of transcendental idealism makes it hard to understand the value and vulnerability of rational agency, an appropriately revised Kantian perspective on rational agency and manipulation may still be promising. It would also overcome the limitations of Noggle’s own account of manipulation that result from a kind of methodological subjectivism. The considerations suggest that a multidimensional model is needed to fully account for the normative status and value(s) of (the different facets of) autonomy.

Introduction Recent decades have seen a growing interest in the concept and ethics of manipulation. Starting with (Noggle 1996), it has often been claimed that an adequate account of the concept and the ethics of manipulation is still a work in progress (Coons & Weber 2014; Fischer 2017). Even though Kant uses the term mostly in peripheral remarks about animal magnetism and only rarely with regard to interpersonal exchange (MS, AA 06: 358.21), it may seem natural to expect Kant’s moral philosophy to be among the main resources for a philosophical account of manipulation (Noggle 2020). For manipulation is commonly thought to be essentially a subversion of autonomy and rational agency while Kant’s moral philosophy is centered around autonomy and rational agency. Insofar as Kantianism assigns some kind of intrinsic value to rational agency, it also seems to capture a common intuition according to which manipulation is at least pro tanto wrong. In fact, “manipulation” is sometimes taken to signify precisely that kind of instrumental treatment of rational agents that is prohibited by Kant’s “formula of humanity” (Rudinow 1978: 347; Hill 1980). Still, some of the latest contributions to the debate on manipulation are rather skeptical about Kantian accounts (Fischer 2017: 58 ff., 166 ff.; Fischer & Ilhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-015

242

Micha H. Werner

lies 2018: 34; Noggle 2020). Some authors claim that Kant’s interpretation of rational agency is overly demanding, “hyper-cognitive” and “hyper-intellectual” (Noggle 2020). Others argue against the assumption that manipulation always endangers autonomy or rational agency and/or against the claim that manipulation is therefore essentially bad. Even philosophers more sympathetic to Kantian ideas often refer to Kant only in passing (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 39, fn. 130) or not at all (Gorin 2014a; Gorin 2014b; Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019b) or develop their account of manipulation explicitly on a non-Kantian basis (Baron 2003). Engaging with issues of manipulation, even Kantians seem sometimes reluctant to draw too heavily on Kant’s resources. This paper examines some of the reasons for this reluctance. In a first step, I will introduce main concerns against Kantian accounts of manipulation (I). I will then try to evaluate the extent to which those concerns have a basis in Kant’s own writings by exploring Kant’s discussion of the so-called “moral illusion”. This exploration suggests that Kant’s position is more complex than his critics assume, but also that it is hard to find a proper place for the phenomenon of manipulation within the framework of transcendental idealism (II). I will then try to establish some kind of dialogue between Kantian ideas relating to the concept and value of rational agency and Robert Noggle’s influential account of manipulation. In doing so, I will follow a double agenda: On the one hand, I will argue that Kant’s moral philosophy may still help us to get a better grip on issues pertinent to the current discussion of manipulation, like problems arising from Noggle’s methodological subjectivism (III). On the other hand, I will maintain that the discussion on manipulation prompts us to extend Kant’s understanding of rational agency: We should understand rational agency as something tied to a shared communicative project of rational but finite individuals, individuals who need to collaborate in order to develop an appropriate idea of who they truly are and what they owe to each other (IV).

I Among the main concerns about the normative implications of Kant’s moral theory for the philosophy of manipulation are concerns about rigorist consequences. Alexander Fischer argues that Kant’s overly rationalist picture of human agency together with the assumption of its “absolute status” would lead to “counterintuitive evaluations”, i. e. strict moral verdicts on all instances of manipulative influence (Fischer 2017: 166 ff., esp. 169). Sarah Buss seems to share some of those fears, at least concerning some reconstructions of Kantian autonomy (Buss 2005). In his Stanford Encyclopedia article on manipulation,

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

243

Robert Noggle also warns that Kant’s moral philosophy would need to entail an implausible prohibition of all forms of interaction that “appeal to emotions”: Although Kant’s moral philosophy […] is a natural place to look for the idea that the wrongfulness of manipulation derives from a failure to treat the target as a person, there are potential drawbacks to tying the account too tightly to Kant. For Kant’s notion of rational agency appears to be of the hyper-cognitive, hyper-intellectual variety. Hence, if it is unethical to fail to treat someone as that kind of rational agent, we might be pushed toward the conclusion that the only acceptable basis for human interaction is the kind of coldly intellectual rational persuasion that excludes any appeal to emotions. But […] there are good reasons for regarding such a conclusion as implausible. (Noggle 2020).

On closer inspection, Fischer and Noggle seem to express two independent but mutually aggravating concerns: Firstly, that Kantian accounts of manipulation would be over-inclusive, because their standards of non-manipulative interaction are too high; secondly, that Kantian accounts would deem all instances of interaction that fall short of those standards absolutely unacceptable and, by doing so, would be implausibly strict. The first assumption is somewhat surprising. For Kantian accounts of manipulation are often taken to identify manipulation with cases of deception, lying, or trickery or with cases of bypassing, undermining, or subverting autonomy or rational agency, and Noggle agrees with authors like Barnhill, Fischer, and Gorin that such accounts do not capture all cases of manipulative behavior. This suggests that Noggle would deem Kantian accounts of manipulation under-inclusive rather than over-inclusive. Of course, both could be true at the same time: Kantian accounts of manipulation could inadequately include some cases of interaction while inadequately excluding others. However, there may be another and more interesting reason for the ambiguity as well: It may be hard to determine how inclusive a Kantian account of manipulation would be. For there may be fundamental difficulties in finding a proper place for the phenomenon of manipulation within the general framework of Kant’s philosophy. That Kant regards it as a perfect duty to respect rational agency seems relatively clear; at least if we take rational agency as equivalent to Kant’s demanding interpretation of “autonomy” and also, in some contexts, “humanity” (e. g. GMS, AA 04: 429.10 – 13, 435.08, cf. Sensen 2011: 128 f. about Kant’s different uses of “humanity”). It also seems relatively clear that he regards acts of lying as instances of disrespecting moral agency and hence as strictly prohibited – though, as Wood argues, the flip side of Kant’s strict verdict on lying is a certain amount of flexibility concerning the application of his “moralized” concept (Wood 2014: 19). What is not clear, however, is what other kinds of interaction, apart from lying, would, within the framework of Kant’s philosophy, appear to be dangerous, det-

244

Micha H. Werner

rimental, or destructive to rational agency. In other words, it does not seem easy to determine to what extent rational agency sensu Kant is “robust” (Fischer & Illies 2018: 35) and to what extent it is vulnerable (cf. Gerhard Schönrich’s discussion of “robust” vs. “fragile” dignity in Schönrich 2020). As a first step towards an answer, we need to specify the concept of rational agency at least a little bit further. What according to Kant deserves moral respect is not just something like the ability to follow any rules or to prudently maximize the satisfaction of one’s desires. As Kant explicitly states, it is because “nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it” that “the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have […] an unconditional worth” (GMS, AA 04: 436.02– 03). However, this does not yet settle the question of whether we owe respect to the (holders of the) capacity to be guided by the moral law or whether it is only the (author of the) performance of this capacity that deserves respect. This is an important question, and the evidence provided by Kant’s writings seems mixed. Focusing especially on Kant’s writings on politics and law, Christoph Horn provides ample evidence for the view that “the absolute value which Kant ascribes to ‘humanity in the person’ of a human being […] is not simply something innate and invariant” but “can be gained and lost by someone’s moral attitude”, and that “it is not the mere moral capacity of human beings which suffices for ascribing human dignity to them” but “that we grant and forfeit dignity by our own behavior” (Horn 2020: 18, 26, 24; cf. Horn 2014: 73 ff., 98 ff.). Still, Kant states that “respect” is due to human beings as such and that it belongs “even to a vicious man as a human being” (MS, AA 06: 463.02– 21), so that “[t]here seems to be a minimal degree of dignity even for the criminal” (Horn 2020: 26). From a systematic perspective, it would also seem odd if the respect we owe moral agents would be limited to their expressions of a good will. Firstly, we can never truly know whether an action – any action – did actually express a commitment to the moral law rather than some form of self-love (GMS, AA 04: 404.17– 19). Secondly, it seems hard to see how we could care only about the performances of the capacity to be guided by the moral law without also caring, at least to some extent, for the capacity itself. “[A]s a human being”, the “vicious man” must still be regarded as free and bound to the moral law; hence he could any second (re‐)take his role as a moral co-legislator, and if we must respect him as such, we must already grant him what he needs in order to take this step at any moment (a close examination of Kant’s interesting comparison between the appropriate attitude towards cognitive failures – an attitude resembling hermeneutical benevolence – and the appropriate response to moral failures could be helpful to provide a richer picture; MS, AA 06: 463.02– 36).

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

245

Even after the distinction between the performance- and the capacity-reading, important questions remain. It is certainly plausible to assume (with Kant) that rational agency, and, to some extent, the moral status or value attached to it, can be affected by the agent’s own free actions. However, can our rational agency not also be affected by external influences, including the behavior of other agents? Moreover, it is certainly plausible to assume that our rational agency appears especially “fragile” under the performance-interpretation (cf. Schönrich 2020). However, it seems plausible to assume that our capacity to be guided by the moral law – or at least our actual ability to make use of it – is not completely robust either. Can it also be impaired or enhanced? Talk about ‘diminished responsibility’ seems to indicate that our rational agency may actually come in degrees. However, it seems difficult to make sense of these ideas within the context of Kant’s philosophy. The ultimate reason for this difficulty lies in transcendental idealism itself. For how free rational agency, which can only be thought of as originating in the noumenal world, can nevertheless depend on and be facilitated or impaired by influences from the phenomenal world must ultimately remain an open question; independent from whether those influences originate from the inner workings of the agent’s own psychology, or from the interaction with and interference by other agents. However, to the extent that the mechanism of interchange between free rational agency and the phenomenal world remains mysterious, a reliable basis for determining the amount of robustness or vulnerability of rational agency must likewise remain elusive. Where Kant explicitly deals with questions concerning the stability, frailty, or vulnerability of rational agency, his main concern is often to defend individual moral responsibility. In Religion…, Kant does certainly not turn a blind eye to the “frailty” and “impurity” of human motivation. Alluding to the doctrine of original sin, he declares our “propensity to evil” – the tendency to override morality by self-love and thus act against moral reason – an irredeemable trait of human nature. Still, he assigns full accountability to the individual moral agent, even for this propensity itself (Kant 2018: 70, 125; MS, AA 06: 38.04, 93.15); a position that seems hard to defend and which prompts Richard Bernstein to declare Kant “at war with himself” (Bernstein 2002: 11– 45). Likewise, the corrupting influences of human society, which Kant sketches in a Rousseauean vein (MS, AA 06: 93.25 – 94.06), leave individual moral responsibility intact. As the famous gallows example from Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason suggests, this seems to hold true even in cases of overt pressure of extortion and explicit death threats (KpV, AA 05: 30.27– 28). This indicates that, at its normative core, the rational agency of individual moral subjects is robust rather than vulnerable – just as robust as the demand of the moral law, which confronts

246

Micha H. Werner

all rational agents with their own freedom, is irrefutable. The problem with this defense of moral responsibility from the “first-person perspective” (Darwall 2006) of the individual agent is that it makes it difficult to understand how free rational agency can depend on or be impaired by any “empirical” influences, including the communication with or interference by other persons – and hence to determine the specific limitations of legitimate communication or interference. All of this suggests that Kant may view rational agency as too robust to capture the intricacies of manipulation so that the resulting account of manipulation would probably be under-inclusive rather than over-inclusive.

II However, not all of Kant’s considerations fit neatly into this general picture. A passage from Kant’s Anthropology seems especially interesting. It offers a glimpse of Kant’s own interpretation of a phenomenon that could well come up in current discussions on manipulation and nudging. Under the caption “On permissible moral illusion”, Kant argues: On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. And it is also very good that this happens in the world. For when human beings play these roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition. – But to deceive the deceiver in ourselves, the inclinations, is a return again to obedience under the law of virtue and is not a deception, but rather an innocent illusion of ourselves. (Anth, AA 07: 151.07– 17)

This passage seems not to rhyme at all with Noggle’s assumption that Kantian accounts need to qualify all kinds of social influence aside from “coldly intellectual rational persuasion” as unacceptable. Kant clearly defends the practice of falsely pretending to be more social and sociable than we actually are in order to influence our practical dispositions. In doing so, he does not only echo Aristotle’s view that virtuous attitudes are to be internalized via habitual behavior. His focus is on something else: The role of public self-representations in reinforcing mutual expectations and, it seems, in thereby creating “empirical” incentives to conform with those expectations. The motivational mechanism at work is certainly not rational persuasion, for how could it be rational to act on something known to be illusionary? What is at work could rather be something like a natural inclination to conformity, a tendency to participate in shared practices, or

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

247

an inclination to stick to standards of social acceptability in order to earn the moral recognition of one’s peers. This interpretation gains some support from a passage from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals where he explicitly refers to the idea that we may be motivated to do the right thing in order to earn respect or esteem. In this passage, Kant claims that our judgments of other people’s failures should be mollified by the “veil of benevolence”. Not only should we judge those failures with clemency, but we should also even ‘keep them for ourselves’, because, Kant argues, the respect we express towards our peers may give them the motivation to really earn it (MS, AA 06: 466.30 – 32). In his considerations about the “moral illusion”, however, Kant goes much further. He wants us not only to withhold unhelpful truths from our peers but also to actively engage in falsely pretending to have moral attitudes that, in fact, we do not. Given Kant’s unforgiving attitude towards “transgressions against honesty” (“Vergehungen wieder die Redlichkeit”, Refl, AA 19: 262.26; cf. ÜE, AA 08: 269.01– 12), his apparent leniency towards intentionally presenting an inadequate, embellished picture – an inadequate picture not only of some trivial matter but of one’s own moral character – appears quite astonishing. Of course, Kant claims that the moral illusion works “without deceiving anyone at all” because everyone knows about its illusionary nature, but this assurance raises the question of why Kant still calls it an “illusion”. It also lets one wonder how an “illusion” that does not deceive anyone could still have any effect. Moreover, the assurance that no one is really deceived does not seem entirely plausible. Even if we know that most people tend to exaggerate their moral concerns, we may not be able to determine the scale of the exaggeration in specific instances. Anticipating the moral illusion may even incline us to misinterpret sincere concerns as a mere moral pretense, like the narrator’s parents in Proust’s Recherche do with regard to Bloch’s somewhat capricious but completely honest expressions of empathy. Finally, it may simply be false that all persons are able to identify the aspirational character of public displays of moral affection. After all, Kant’s defense of the moral illusion strangely reminds of the standard defense of “puffery” in advertising, the use of embellishments and exaggerations that are simply untrue when taken literally. According to this defense, puffery is not deceptive since we all know that we need to take advertisers’ claims with a grain of salt. However, empirical research suggests that some people do indeed take “puffery” seriously and that it can be deceptive under certain circumstances (e. g. Rotfeld & Rotzoll 1980; Lee 2014). Of course, this comparison between the “moral illusion” and puffery may seem rather odd. For puffery promotes the advertiser’s self-interest whereas the moral illusion serves the development or reinforcement of virtuous attitudes. This, however, hints at another puzzling aspect of Kant’s defense of the moral illusion, namely that it rests on a consequentialist

248

Micha H. Werner

argument: The moral illusion is justified because it serves moral progress. The consequentialist nature of the argument becomes even more obvious in a later passage from the same paragraph. “In order to save virtue, or at least lead the human being to it, nature has wisely implanted in him the tendency to allow himself willingly to be deceived” (Anth, AA 07: 152.14– 16). Kant alludes to the idea that our inclination to be susceptible to moral illusion is rooted in the teleology of wise nature itself. He also seems to take back his earlier assurance that no one is really deceived by the “moral illusion” – the illusion does involve an element of deception after all, albeit a “willing” one. Whatever we make of Kant’s arguments, he defends upholding a practice of influencing each other’s attitude and conduct not by means of rational persuasion but by play-acting and false pretense, a practice that even involves an element of “willing” deception. So far, one might think that Noggle is simply wrong in suggesting that Kantian accounts of manipulation would need to be both overly strict and over-inclusive. For Kant himself explicitly recommends a form of behavior that, whether we call it manipulation or not, is certainly far removed from “coldly intellectual rational persuasion”. It may be tempting to regard Kant’s leniency regarding the moral illusion as the natural result of his deep trust in the robustness of (the normative core of) free moral agency. This interpretation may find some basis in Kant’s insistence that the moral illusion works without really deceiving anyone. Still, it misses the main point of Kant’s argument. His defense of the “moral illusion” rests on an understanding of moral agency that seems far removed from the somewhat heroicizing picture that we find in the gallows example. Kant does not defend the moral illusion because he is convinced that, given the robustness of moral agency, a little play-acting can do little harm. Quite to the contrary, he defends the moral illusion because moral agency depends on a public culture that reaffirms and reinforces mutual expectations of moral concern and decency by public avowals of our moral commitments. In other words, it is not at all the robustness of moral agency but rather its vulnerability to the influences of public culture that explains why we should uphold the moral illusion. Our moral agency depends on our ability to trick our selfish desires, to “deceive the deceiver in ourselves”. Moreover, it seems that we cannot even be trusted to reliably manage that piece of self-trickery on our own; we need a little help from our friends. That Kant even goes so far as to call the cynical unmasking of the moral illusion “high treason against humanity” (Kant 2006: 44; AK 7, 153) can only be explained by his concern about the profound vulnerability of human agency to influences from the social environment. In my view, Kant’s considerations about the essential role of the community in upholding ethical standards even in the face of our shortcomings hint at the

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

249

potential of intersubjectivist or dialogical ‘transformations’ of transcendental idealism (Apel 1980; Darwall 2006). But much more would need to be said to drive this point home. So let me just maintain that Kant’s argument about the moral illusion raises serious questions about Kant’s moral philosophy – questions concerning the permissibility of deceiving those willing to be deceived, or of deceiving in order to promote the teleology of moral progress, questions about the responsibility of society to protect moral persons from the pressures of their own inclinations, or questions about the relation between the robust and the vulnerable aspects of rational agency. If it were true that Kant is actually “at war with himself” concerning some of those issues, Noggle’s concerns about the viability of Kantian accounts of manipulation would still be warranted in some way, albeit not necessarily in the way suggested.

III Let us now turn from concerns about assumed implications of Kant’s moral philosophy for the ethics of manipulation to concerns about the appropriateness of current rational agency-based accounts of manipulation with more or less “Kantian” traits. The general idea of those accounts is that manipulation should be seen as “an interference with rational self governance” (Greenspan 2003: 164), autonomy, or rational agency. The idea could be expressed by the following working definition: A manipulates B iff A influences B’s behavior or attitude by creating or exploiting limitations to B’s capability to express his or her own rational agency without A using force or open threats.

Hill articulates a similar idea, specifying the idea of rational agency by referring to the decision-making standards of rational persons: Manipulation, broadly conceived, can perhaps be understood as intentionally causing or encouraging people to make the decisions one wants them to make by actively promoting their making the decisions in ways that rational persons would not want to make their decisions. (Hill 1984: 258)

Wood emphasizes that manipulation “undermines” and “subverts” rational decision-making processes, defending what Gorin calls the “Bypass and or Subvert View (BSV)” (Gorin 2014a: 89) of manipulation. Unlike Hill, Wood does not define rational decision-making by reference to the standards of “rational persons” but

250

Micha H. Werner

by reference to the standards the manipulee herself would endorse under epistemically favorable circumstances: What is characteristic of manipulative behavior, I suggest, is that it influences people’s choices in ways that circumvent or subvert their rational decision-making processes, and that undermine or disrupt the ways of choosing that they themselves would critically endorse if they considered the matter in a way that is lucid and free of error. (Wood 2014: 35)

Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum likewise assert that “manipulative practices undermine autonomy”, “people’s capacity for self-government, their ability to pursue their own goals” (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 35, 43). However, they do not tie “autonomy” or “self-government” to the concept of rational agency but only to a “conscious decision-making process”, arguing that the relevant normative feature is not rationality but “awareness” (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 16, fn 61, cf. fn 60). As already mentioned, the most prominent concern about (rational) agencyor autonomy-based accounts is that they are under-inclusive; that one can manipulate without undermining or subverting rational agency or autonomy. In order to determine whether this is the case, it needs to be specified what rational agency is and how it can be undermined. Again, it may seem relatively uncontroversial that lying to another person, deceiving him or her, intentionally misleading or “tricking” him or her would count as undermining rational agency. For these acts aim at the recipient’s acquiring or maintaining false beliefs or unwarranted or inappropriate attitudes about factors that may be relevant for his or her choices and deliberations. What is less clear is whether all acts of manipulation are deceptive or misleading in that way. It is also less clear whether deception or trickery are always involved in acts of bypassing or undermining rational agency. Hence deception-based or “trickery”-accounts are often taken as a class or subclass of their own not co-extensive with agency-based or bypassing-accounts. As for deception, most authors agree with Rudinow that “manipulation” only “typically” but “not necessarily […] involves deception” (Rudinow 1978: 347; Goodin 1980 is often quoted as holding the opposite view according to which deception is a necessary element of manipulation). Some authors are convinced that even the somewhat broader trickery-definitions of manipulation are too narrow (Barnhill 2014: 59 – 60; Gorin 2014b: 74– 81; Noggle 1996; Noggle 2020). According to them, trickery-accounts would exclude a common class of actions that we should regard as acts of manipulation: acts of overtly “playing upon” or “taking advantage of another’s emotions or emotional needs” (Baron 2003: 44). Gorin, Noggle, and Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum offer similar examples for ac-

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

251

tions of this controversial type (Barnhill’s guilt-trip example, though different, may fall into the same category; Barnhill 2014). Noggle finds his in the bible: Satan tempts Christ who is fasting in the wilderness. He reminds him of his hunger and of the fact that he could turn the stones into bread. (Noggle 2018: 43, case 6)

Gorin (Gorin 2014a: 80 f.) and Susser et al. offer alcohol-related examples. The latter put theirs more briefly: Suppose you are a great lover of martinis but really ought not to drink. And knowing this, but not wanting to feel like lushes themselves, your friends parade the finest martinis before you, tempting you to have one. (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 18 f.)

Noggle and Gorin argue that such cases describe acts of manipulation, but Susser et al. disagree: If you really cannot resist the temptation, then your friends […] have coerced you. If you can resist it, and yet you do not, then you have simply been persuaded by bad reasons (e.g, “If a thing you love is paraded before you then you really ought to have it, regardless of the consequences”). Either way, you have not been deprived of authorship over your decision. (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 19)

In Gorin’s example, the person tempted to drink alcohol is a recovered alcoholic, so it may be harder for her to withstand, but Susser et al. maintain their position with regard to Gorin’s, Noggle’s, and Barnhill’s examples as well (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 20 – 21). Susser et al. do agree that manipulation is not always deceiving in the strict sense of intentionally instilling false beliefs; deception is “not the only” “tool in the manipulator’s toolkit” (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 21). Still, they insist that overt influences like those of Satan or the Martini-loving friends are not cases of manipulation, for “[t]he salient issue” to them “is […] whether the influence […] appeals to” the manipulee’s “conscious decision-making process […] the issue […] is not rationality but awareness” (Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum 2019a: 16, fn 60). The discussion between Barnhill, Gorin, Noggle, Susser et al., and Wood makes clear that there are different ideas about how the philosophy of manipulation should treat potential grey areas concerning autonomous or rational agency. Susser et al. propose a clear-cut distinction between cases in which someone can resist a temptation and cases in which he or she cannot. Tying this dichotomy to “authorship”, they suggest that our criteria for assigning agency and accountability in such cases could also be unambiguous. Others are more inclined to accommodate cases of diminished accountability and seem therefore willing to accept a concept of manipulation that is more inclusive and/or allows for de-

252

Micha H. Werner

grees of being manipulative. It seems to me that there is room for genuine conceptual disagreement and that the pros and cons of each position can only be determined in a wider context of practical reasoning. The discussion also indicates that there is disagreement about the right choice and interpretation of the concepts pertinent to the interpretation of manipulation (“autonomy”, “rational agency”) even among those who share a broadly “Kantian” perspective. Taken together with Fischer’s claim that authors like Gorin and Noggle, who are explicitly critical of trickery-, autonomy-, and rationality-based accounts, still share basic “Kantian” assumptions, this renders the landscape of discussion rather complex. Therefore, instead of trying to draw a full map of this landscape, I will highlight just one crucial feature of Kant’s moral philosophy, namely the universalist assumptions built into his understanding of rational agency, and emphasize its importance for the current discussion on manipulation. I will do so by contrasting it with what I will call Noggle’s methodological subjectivism. In this context, the “double agenda” of my argument should become apparent: On the one hand, I will try to show that certain problems of Noggle’s account result from a subjectivist interpretation of rationality, or, in his own words, of the norms and ideals of psychological “lever-setting”. On the other hand, I will maintain that the universalism built into “Kantian” accounts of autonomy and practical reason needs to (but also can) be reinterpreted in a way that accommodates and accounts for the value of pluralism – that it is crucial for understanding the value and the vulnerability of autonomy to understand how our practical deliberations depend on not only our own individual autonomy but the autonomy of other finite and embodied agents as well. Let us start with a short sketch of Noggle’s account of manipulation. According to Noggle, the general point of manipulation is that the manipulator intentionally leads the manipulee astray: There are the ideals to which we strive to get our beliefs, desires, and emotions to conform […]. I am suggesting that manipulative action is the attempt to get someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions to violate these norms, to fall short of these ideals. (Noggle 1996: 44)

Manipulators pull the “levers” of the manipulee’s beliefs, desires, or emotions away from those “lever-settings” that would conform to the relevant “norms or ideals”. However, what norms or ideals are relevant? After all, “[r]easonable persons often disagree” about such norms and ideals. They often disagree about whether, in specific situations, “anger” “is […] called for or mere annoyance, shame or mere regret, hope or worry” (Noggle 1996: 47). Facing this problem, Noggle distinguishes three alternative ways to specify the norms and ideals

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

253

from which manipulators lead astray. Firstly, we could try to refer to “objective” norms and ideals. Noggle dismisses this option because “it is not at all clear that there is any such thing as an ‘objective’ standard for appropriate emotion” or “for defining which information is relevant to which situation” (Noggle 1996: 47) so that the resulting concept of manipulation would remain unclear as well. Secondly, we could refer to the norms or ideals of the manipulee; but in this case “it would be possible, even common […] to unknowingly perform manipulative actions” (Noggle 1996: 48), which Noggle deems implausible. He, therefore, settles on the third option and identifies the relevant norms and ideals with those of the manipulator: “I act manipulatively if I try to get you to fall short of what I think is ideal, even if I am wrong” (Noggle 1996: 48; emphasis added). The addendum “even if I am wrong” may seem surprising, given Noggle’s argument against referring to “objective” norms and ideals; but there need not be any inconsistency. For Noggle does not need to deny that some norms and ideals can be objectively right or wrong. In fact, it seems quite plausible that there are different types of norms and ideals about our emotions, desires, and beliefs. Some of them may depend on subjective preferences, choices, or “practical identities” (Korsgaard 1996), while others may come with stronger claims to intersubjective validity, like certain standards of belief-formation, or empirical verification, and perhaps even certain ideals about appropriate desires and emotions. Noggle’s point is not to deny this; he just argues that, in determining whether an act is manipulative, we should not care about the validity of the manipulator’s standards. So Noggle does not defend some kind of substantive subjectivism concerning the norms and ideals for beliefs, emotions, and desires. He only defends some sort of methodological subjectivism according to which, in identifying manipulation, we should remain agnostic about the validity of the standards manipulators lead astray from. It suffices to know that they hold them. Still, there is something odd about this methodological subjectivism. It is not just the fact that it renders it hard and often impossible for all persons but the manipulator herself to determine whether her act was actually manipulative; a difficulty that Noggle concedes (Noggle 1996: 51). There is something even more troubling, something closer to the normative core of the issue: It feels odd to assume that the differences between the manipulator’s and the manipulee’s perspectives, values, and normative standards as well as the question of the validity of those values and standards should simply be irrelevant for distinguishing between manipulative and non-manipulative acts. With regard to the manipulativeness of our interactions, it does seem important whether we recognize and acknowledge the extent to which our individual perspectives, interests, norms, and ideals are in fact different, and it seems just as relevant to how we cope with that fact: whether stubborn, dismissive, and “arrogant” (Baron 2003)

254

Micha H. Werner

or rather sensitive, open-minded, respectful, and with the goal of mutual agreement or at least understanding and compromise at heart. Taking the perspectives of our interaction partners seriously – respecting them as autonomous persons – rules out an attitude of indifference towards the validity and scope of the norms and ideals they endorse. That Noggle’s methodological subjectivism is at odds with basic intuitions about manipulation and autonomy can be illustrated by some of his own examples. In one of them, Peter, Paul, and Mary have been planning to go on a picnic, but Mary is forced to cancel. Presumably, some sadness or regret is appropriate here. Now unbeknownst to Peter, Paul dislikes Mary and would like for Peter to do so as well. So Paul tries to get Peter to feel angry at Mary for canceling, rather than merely sad that she had to do so. On the analysis I am suggesting, Paul is acting manipulatively. For Paul attempts to incite an inappropriate – and thus a non-ideal – emotion. (Noggle 1996: 46)

The example as such does not yet bring out the distinctive feature of Noggle’s subjectivism, for one could likewise refer to objective standards or the standards Peter applies in determining the ‘inappropriateness’ of the emotion that Paul tries to incite in Peter. But neither position is Noggle’s. According to his interpretation, whether Paul’s intervention is manipulative or not depends entirely on whether Paul pulls Peter’s emotional levers towards or away from those emotional “lever settings” that Paul regards as ideal and appropriate for Peter. This seems implausible. If Paul wants to act non-manipulatively, he must not be indifferent about what emotions Peter deems appropriate. If he cannot be sure what Peter’s standards are, he should try to find out. If it turns out that Peter and Paul disagree about the standards of appropriate emotions, this should give both a pause. Ideally, they should try to find out why they disagree. They should try to determine the extent to which their disagreement can be settled by additional information about relevant circumstances or by reference to universal normative principles, and to which it is about individual tastes or choices of personal identity. In Noggle’s view, however, person A would not act manipulatively if he or she would simply try to adjust person B’s “psychological levers” to conform with what A regards as an ideal “lever-setting”. For whether A’s influence is manipulative does not depend on the method of influence but on “the direction in which she intends to move the other person’s psychological levers” (Noggle 1996: 49). The degree to which B had the opportunity to exert her own capacity of self-determination in bringing those lever-settings about appears to be not essential – it is the goal that distinguishes “behavior therapy” from “brainwashing” (Noggle 1996: 49 – 50; interestingly, Noggle does not mention informed consent at all in this context).

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

255

Of course, to the extent that A herself upholds certain norms and ideals that impose restrictions on the procedures by which beliefs, desires, or emotions may be brought about in order to count as “ideal”, Noggle’s account of manipulation may still imply some protection of B’s self-determination. However, the amount to which this is the case would again depend entirely on the norms and ideals that A happens to endorse, and, as we have seen, Noggle tries not to tie them to any “objective” standards. To that extent, Noggle’s approach does not fully account for the value of self-determination. I suggest that his explication of the term “manipulation” is ultimately implausible because of the subjectivist interpretation of the normative standards relevant to rational agency. In this respect at least, the problem is not that Noggle’s position is still too close to Kantianism (like Fischer 2017: 56 ff. suggests) but that it gives up on an essential ingredient of Kant’s moral philosophy: the universalist assumption that respecting other persons implies recognizing them as inhabitants of a space of reasons that all of us ultimately share – as co-legislators of a kingdom of ends. This universalist assumption, however, could also be interpreted in a way that would impede a full understanding of autonomy and rational agency, and, by the same token, of manipulation. Metaphorically speaking, it is important not to confuse our position as co-legislators with full, self-sufficient sovereignty. Moral autonomy is not the same as moral autarky. Developing and exerting our own rational agency essentially depends on communication and interaction with other rational but finite and imperfect persons, and it is only by reflecting on our mutual dependency that we can get a full picture of both the value and the vulnerability of rational agency. To zoom in on the relevant issues, let us come back to our earlier working definition of manipulation: A manipulates B iff A influences B’s behavior or attitude by creating or exploiting limitations to B’s capability to express her own rational agency without A using force or open threats.

To make the point as straightforwardly “Kantian” as possible, let us identify the “capability to express one’s rational agency” with the capability to act on one’s maxims within the limits of the categorical imperative (CI). At first glance, this proposal may appear overly moralistic, but this impression may be unwarranted. Firstly, the proposal deems only those acts manipulative that create or exploit limitations to the potential manipulee’s capability to express her own rational agency. Whether A’s act is manipulative does not depend on whether B decides or would decide to be governed by the CI or not; it rather depends on whether and to what extent B retains her chances to act on the appropriate

256

Micha H. Werner

maxim for the appropriate reasons. Secondly, the CI itself can be interpreted as leaving room for permissible acts that are not morally required. Moral requirements only arise in case maxims can not be universalized. Where they can, the appropriateness of one’s maxims just depends on the appropriateness of the agent’s understanding of the situation he or she is in and of the (expectable) consequences of his or her options, and on the authenticity and prudence of the desires and aspirations his or her maxims express. The Kantian rational agency does leave room for agents to genuinely express themselves by those of their maxims that they could will to become universal laws. Under this interpretation of the CI, even a strictly Kantian interpretation of rational agency is not as moralistic as is often feared, which may alleviate concerns like those expressed by Susser, Rössler & Nissenbaum.

IV By the same token, however, another danger becomes more visible. For the “I” that decides that it can actually “will” a maxim as the universal law (to be precise: One of those maxims that already fulfill the minimal condition of being “conceivable” as a universal law; in short: c-maxims) cannot represent some fully rational self. Since it is still in the process of applying the CI, it cannot yet know what a fully rational self would decide. Nor can that “I” just be an individual being that relies on its personal preferences. For its actions often affect other agents while those agents, also understood just as individual empirical beings, may well have different ideas about which “c-maxims” they can want as universal laws. Given this fact, the only possible way to maintain something like the universalism built into Kant’s moral philosophy is to accept that rational agency is tied to collective deliberation. To the extent that my maxims affect other beings, I can only rationally want those maxims to become universal laws that would be acceptable as such from the perspective of all those affected. Hence, we must not simply presuppose but aim at and argue for a consensus about the laws that would be acceptable from the well-understood perspective of all of us. While this interpretation seems to me just a rather obvious and unspectacular way to make sense of the formula of universal law, it does make things more complicated than Kant sometimes suggests (e. g. GMS, AA 04: 403.01– 37). It also does have significant implications for the interpretation of rational agency and manipulation and their respective value or lack thereof. To begin with, it seems to create room for some kind of gradualism within the concept of rational agency. For we can be better or worse in identifying our (resp. each other’s) true

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

257

and most important needs, and we can be more or less successful in developing an authentic understanding of ourselves. Consequently, we can be better or worse at identifying those laws that, given those needs or identities, we can truly will as universal laws. Most importantly, the interpretation implies that our own individual rational agency is not only vulnerable to interferences by other agents but also that it depends on their active collaboration and their capabilities to authentically express their rational agency. Firstly, it is only to the extent that they can develop and freely express an adequate concept of their own needs, aspirations, and practical identities that we can determine together what each of us can want as a universal law. Secondly, we may depend on their free and authentic reactions to our conduct and our experience of the plurality of their own various life experiments even to truly understand our own individual needs and desires, and to authentically develop our own practical identity. Thirdly, we may sometimes need a little help from our moral community to live up even to those norms and ideals we truly identify with – as Kant recognizes in his discussion of the “moral illusion”. In short, Noggle’s methodological subjectivism is implausible because nonmanipulative behavior cannot be indifferent to the validity claims built into expressions of rational agency. Taking these claims seriously, however, implies acknowledging the degree to which mutual understanding and a shared standpoint of practical deliberation are not yet a given but rather a work in progress. This may help us to better understand both the vulnerability and the value of our rational agency. How does this tie into the general discussion on the value of human agency? I can only give some brief hints. That Kant sometimes talks about the “dignity” of “lawgiving” and “autonomy” as some kind of “value” (GMS, AA 04: 436.12– 19) or “worth” (MS, AA 06: 462.10 – 16) is certainly in need of clarification. Firstly, he also sometimes contrasts “dignity” with “value” (GMS, AA 04: 434.28 – 29). Second, there are profound differences between Kant’s description of the value of autonomy and his subjectivist, “Humean” interpretation of “value” as some kind of “price” (GMS, AA 04: 434.31– 34) in other, non-moral contexts (Horn 2014: 98 ff., esp. 102). That there can be no continuity or analogy between those “Humean” values and the dignity whose “worth that has no price” (MS, AA 06: 462.13) seems already obvious from the nature of the corresponding attitudes: Respect as the proper attitude towards “lawgiving” autonomy is fundamentally different from and, as Kant describes it, even potentially opposed to those satisfactions, pleasures or enjoyments that correspond to other kinds of value. That we should also not ascribe to Kant an interpretation of dignity as some kind of objective value, understood along the lines of rational intuitionism or metaphysical value realism, is forcefully argued by Oliver Sensen (2011:

258

Micha H. Werner

esp. 148; 2020). Value-realist interpretations of the dignity of autonomy would certainly seem incompatible with Kant’s claim that his Copernican revolution involves moral philosophy. The second paragraph of section IV indicates that we may rather follow the paths of recognition-, dialogue- and discourse-theory and (re‐)interpret Kant’s transcendental philosophy within an intersubjectivist framework. This may help us to disentangle the different meanings of autonomy-ascriptions, and to better understand how they relate to each other, how they are tied to social perspectives and what normative, evaluative, and empirical aspects they comprise or entail. This is not an easy task, in part because autonomy-ascriptions can have quite different meanings. They can be understood to state, express, acknowledge or connote at least (1) certain capabilities of self-determination with regard to a certain domain; (2) certain opportunities to make use of those capabilities (within a given situation); (3) a property of the will and/or the performances of rational agents, seen as actual uses of (2) and (potential) expressions of (1), that are judged, based on certain normative standards of self-determination, as more or less autonomous; (4) normative claims to endorse and conform to the standards mentioned in (3), addressed to some agent who is taken to possess (1) and (2); (5) certain claims or claim-rights to (2) and/or to the protection (or even promotion?) of (1) (6) the recognition of (some aspects of) someone’s (5) (cf. Bobbert & Werner 2014; based on Christman 1989). To add to the complexity, even one and the same aspect of autonomy may have different types of normative significance and value. Obviously, agent A could value her own (1) or (2) for some prudential reasons, while the moral reasons to recognize (6) A’s right (5) to (1) or (2) could be completely independent. Much more would need to be said about how to make sense of these different aspects and their normative and evaluative dimensions than is possible here. At least one point, however, is already suggested by the second paragraph of section IV: Only a multidimensional model could account for the value(s) and normative status of (the different facets) of autonomy. For we have seen that the normative force of (4) as addressed to agent A can create duties for A to care for the capabilities and opportunities (1&2) of B, simply because A is not epistemically self-sufficient enough to know what c-maxims could be willed as universal laws by all affected.

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

259

Kant’s talk about “respect” in contexts of practical philosophy is focused on (4) with connections to (5) and (6) and mostly deontic rather than evaluative. However, as the phrasing of (5) already conveys, deontic prescriptions may by themselves state values and oblige us to promote them (cf. again GMS, AA 04: 436.01– 02: “nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it”). Value realist and first-personal reconstructions of Kantian ethics usually go the opposite way and try to deduce the deontic status of moral respect from some kind of ‘promotable’ value. For example, agency-based accounts like Korsgaard’s or Gewirth’s typically try to go the way up from some agent-relative or prudential value to some allegedly presupposed value of (1) or (2) and from there all the way to morally binding (deontic) statements concerning (4– 6). This strategy does not seem promising to me (Werner 2002; 2013). To vindicate the normative force of the moral law (4) and our corresponding duties to recognize (6) moral claim-rights (5) to the protection and promotion of autonomy (1 and 2), we need to show that the moral law is constitutive of the only social practice that allows members of a moral community to settle their practical disputes in ways that could be freely accepted by all affected (Werner 2017). This would allow us to accommodate different types of values connected to autonomy (e. g. prudential values concerning one’s self-understanding or related to the value of social esteem) without tying the normative core of moral respect improperly close to them.

V Philosophy may help us to understand the concept and ethics of manipulation, but considering the intricacies of manipulation may also help us to get a better grip on basic questions of practical philosophy. While common concerns about “Kantian” accounts of manipulation may express an overly simplistic picture of Kant’s moral philosophy, transcendental idealism does pose problems for a proper understanding of the vulnerability and value of human agency. Still, it seems possible to defend a broadly Kantian position within an intersubjectivist framework. A concept of rational agency as something tied to a shared communicative project of rational but finite individuals – individuals that need to collaborate in order to develop an appropriate idea of who they truly are and what they owe to each other – such a concept of rational agency may plausibly account for its value and vulnerability. It may therefore be rich enough to figure in an adequate explication of manipulation and to explain why manipulation is (pro tanto) wrong.

260

Micha H. Werner

References Apel, Karl-Otto (1980): Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Barnhill, Anne (2014): “What Is Manipulation?”. In: Coons, Christian/Weber, Michael (Eds.): Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 51 – 72. Baron, Marcia (2003): “Manipulativeness”. In: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77(2), pp. 37 – 54. Bernstein, Richard J. (2002): Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation. Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press. Bobbert, Monika/Micha H. Werner (2014): “Autonomie/Selbstbestimmung”. In: Lenk, Christian/Duttge, Gunnar/Fangerau, Heiner (Eds.): Handbuch Ethik und Recht der Forschung am Menschen. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, pp. 105 – 114. Buss, Sarah (2005): “Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis of Moral Constraints”. In: Ethics 115(2), pp. 195 – 235. Christman, John P. (1989): “Introduction”. In: Christman, John P. (Ed.): The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3 – 23. Coons, Christian/Michael Weber (Eds.) (2014): Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Darwall, Stephen L. (2006): The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. Fischer, Alexander (2017): Manipulation Zur Theorie und Ethik einer Form der Beeinflussung. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. Fischer, Alexander/Christian Illies (2018): “Modulated feelings: the Pleasurable-Ends-Model of manipulation”. In: Philosophical inquiries 6(2), pp. 25 – 44. Goodin, Robert E. (1980): Manipulatory Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gorin, Moti (2014a): “Do Manipulators Always Threaten Rationality?”. In: American Philosophical Quarterly 51(1), pp. 51 – 61. Gorin, Moti (2014b): “Towards a Theory of Interpersonal Manipulation”. In: Coons, Christian/Weber, Michael (Eds.): Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 73 – 97. Greenspan, Patricia (2003): “The Problem with Manipulation”. In: American Philosophical Quarterly 40(2), pp. 155 – 164. Hill, Thomas E. (1980): “Humanity as an End in Itself”. In: Ethics 91(1), pp. 84 – 99. Hill, Thomas E. (1984): “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies”. The Journal of Value Inquiry 18(4), pp. 251 – 267. Horn, Christoph (2014): Nichtideale Normativität: Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. Horn, Christoph (2020): “Absoluteness and Contingency: Kant’s Use of the Concept of Dignity”. In: Kato, Yasushi/Schönrich, Gerhard (Eds.): Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 11 – 30. Kant, Immanuel (1974) [2006]: Kant: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Robert B. Louden & Manfred Kuehn (Eds.)]. Cambridge University Press.

Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency

261

Kant, Immanuel (1785) [2012]: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [Christine M. Korsgaard, Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann (Eds.), 2nd Edn.]. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1788) [2015]: Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. [Mary Gregor (Tr.), 2nd Edn.] Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1797) [2017]: Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals [Lara Denis (Ed.), Mary Gregor (Tr.), 2nd Edn]. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1793) [2018]: Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings [Allen Wood/George di Giovanni (Eds.), 2nd Edn]. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lee, Sang Yeal (2014): “When Do Consumers Believe Puffery Claims? The Moderating Role of Brand Familiarity and Repetition”. In: Journal of Promotion Management 20(2), pp. 219 – 239. Noggle, Robert (1996): “Manipulative Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis”. American Philosophical Quarterly 33(1), pp. 43 – 55. Noggle, Robert (2018): “Manipulation, salience, and nudges”. In: Bioethics 32(3), pp. 164 – 170. Noggle, Robert (2020): “The Ethics of Manipulation”. [In: Zalta, Edward N. (Ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University] https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-manipulation/, Jan. 2022. Rotfeld, Herbert J./Rotzoll, Kim B. (1980): “Is Advertising Puffery Believed?”. In: Journal of Advertising 9(3), pp. 16 – 45. Rudinow, Joel (1978): “Manipulation”. In: Ethics 88(4), pp. 338 – 347. Schönrich, Gerhard (2020): “Kant’s Theory of Dignity: A Fitting-Attitude Analysis of a Value”. In: Kato, Yasushi/Schönrich, Gerhard (Eds.): Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 49 – 72. Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant on Human Dignity [In: Kantstudien. Ergänzungshefte 166]. Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter. Sensen, Oliver (2020): “How to Respect Someone’s Dignity”. In: Kato, Yasushi/Schönrich, Gerhard (Eds.): Kant’s Concept of Dignity. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 159 – 176. Susser, Daniel/Rössler Beate/Nissenbaum, Helen F. (2019a): “Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World”. In: Georgetown Law Technology Review 4(1), pp. 01 – 45. Susser, Daniel/Rössler Beate/Nissenbaum, Helen F. (2019b): “Technology, Autonomy, and Manipulation”. In: Internet Policy Review 8(2), pp. 1 – 22. Werner, Micha H. (2002): “Minimalistische Handlungstheorie – gescheiterte Letztbegründung: Ein Blick auf Alan Gewirth”. In: Burckhart, Holger/Gronke, Horst (Eds.): Philosophieren aus dem Diskurs: Beiträge zur Diskurspragmatik. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 308 – 328. Werner, Micha H. (2013): “Ist Wertenkönnen wertvoll?”. In: Hartung, Gerald/Köchy, Kristian/ Schmidt, Jan C./Hofmeister, Georg (Eds.): Naturphilosophie als Grundlage der Naturethik: Zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas. Freiburg i. Br.; München: Karl Alber, pp. 187 – 214.

262

Micha H. Werner

Werner, Micha H. (2017): “Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments”. In: Brune, Jens P./Stern, Robert/Werner, Micha H. (Eds.): Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 231 – 246. Wood, Allen W. (2014): “Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation”. In: Coons, Christian/Weber, Michael (Eds.): Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 17 – 50.

About the Authors Federica Basaglia is a research and teaching permanent staff member at the University of Konstanz. She is the author of Libertà e Male morale nella Critica della ragion pratica di Immanuel Kant (2009) and Coscienza di classe e storia in György Lukács. Il dibattito (2016), as well as of various articles on Kant’s moral philosophy, indirect moral consideration, and animal ethics. She has edited Ideengeschichtliche Quellen der Ethik Kants (together with E.M. Oggionni (2014)). Christoph Horn is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bonn. He is the author of Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit (1995), Augustinus (1995), Antike Lebenskunst (1998), Politische Philosophie (2003), Philosophie der Antike (2013), Nichtideale Normativität (2014), Einführung in die Moralphilosophie (2018). He has edited several collections, among them Augustinus, De civitate dei, Berlin (1997), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (together with D. Schönecker (2006)), Politischer Aristotelismus. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen ‚Politik’ von der Antike bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (together with A. Neschke-Hentschke (2008)). Gründe und Zwecke (together with G. Löhrer (2010)). Platon, Symposion (2011). Platon, Nomoi (Gesetze) (2013). Aristotle Metaphysics Lambda. New Essays (2016). Guido Löhrer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Erfurt. He is the author of Menschliche Würde. Wissenschaftliche Geltung und metaphorische Grenze der praktischen Philosophie Kants (1995), Praktisches Wissen. Grundlagen einer konstruktiven Theorie menschlichen Handelns (2003), and of numerous articles. He has edited several collected volumes, among them Handlungserklärungen (Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2008)) and Gründe und Zwecke (together with Ch. Horn (2010)). He is currently co-editor of the Berner Reihe philosophischer Studien. Corinna Mieth is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. She is author of Positive Pflichten. Über das Verhältnis von Hilfe und Gerechtigkeit in Bezug auf das Weltarmutsproblem (2012). Inter alia, she has edited Immanuel Kant. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (together with Ch. Horn and N. Scarano (2007)), Handbuch Gerechtigkeit (together with A. Goppel and Ch. Neuhäuser (2016)), and Migration, Stability and Solidarity (together with W. Cremer (2021)). Currently she is editing a special issue on Kant and Poverty (together with M. Sticker and G. Williams, in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice). Sofie Møller is a postdoctoral researcher at the Research Centre “Normative Orders” at the Goethe University Frankfurt. She is the author of Kant’s Tribunal of Reason. Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason (2020). She is currently co-editing the collection Kant on Human Nature. Rocco Porcheddu is a postdoc at the University of Siegen. He is the author of Der Zweck an sich selbst. Eine Untersuchung zu Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (2016). He is the author of several articles on Kant and German Idealism. He is currently working on Fichtes Theorie praktischer Subjektivität als Interpretation der Kantischen Moraltheorie.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-016

264

About the Authors

Jacob Rosenthal is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the University of Konstanz, Germany. He is author of Wahrscheinlichkeiten als Tendenzen (2004) and Entscheidung, Rationalität und Determinismus (2017). He has edited a special section on Kries and Objective Probability (together with C. Seck, Journal for General Philosophy of Science 47 (2016)) and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness – Gerechtigkeit als Fairness. Übersetzung und Kommentar (together with C. Mieth (2020)). Robinson dos Santos is Professor of Philosophy at Federal University of Pelotas, Brazil. Ph. D. at University of Kassel, Germany. He is the author of Moralität und Erziehung bei Immanuel Kant (2007). He has edited Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy – New Essays (together with E. Schmidt (2018)). Research stays at the University of Siegen and the University of Bonn. DAAD- and Alexander von Humboldt-Alumni. He is currently editor of Studia Kantiana, the journal of Brazilian Kantian Society (together with J. Klein and M. Hulshof), and Associate Editor of The Journal of Ethics. Steffi Schadow is Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany. She is the author of Achtung für das Gesetz. Moral und Motivation bei Kant (2013). She has written several articles and papers on Kant and is currently completing a book on moral obligation. Gerhard Schönrich is Professor emeritus of Philosophy at Technische Universität Dresden. He is author of Kategorien und transzendentale Argumentation (1981), Zeichenhandeln (1990), Bei Gelegenheit Diskurs (1994), and Einführung in die Semiotik (1999). He has edited several collections, among them Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne (together with Y. Kato (1996)), Institutionen und ihre Ontologie (2005), Wissen und Werte (2009), Persistenz – Indexikalität – Zeiterfahrung (together with P. Schmechtig (2011)), and Kant’s Concept of Dignity (together with Y. Kato (2020)). Oliver Sensen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University. He is the author of Kant on Human Dignity (2011), and the journal article Kant’s Conception of Inner Value. He is the editor of Kant on Moral Autonomy (2013), as well as the co-editor of Kant’s Tugendlehre (2012), Kant’s Lectures on Ethics (2015), The Emergence of Autonomy (2018), and Respect (2021). He is currently finishing a book on human dignity. Micha H. Werner is Professor of Philosophy with the Focus on Practical Philosophy at the University of Greifswald. He is the author of Einführung in die Ethik (2021), and Diskursethik als Maximenethik (2003). He has edited several collections, among them Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory (together with J.P. Brune and R. Stern (2017)), Konzepte normativer Minimalstandards (together with J.P. Brune and H. Lang (2016)), and Handbuch Ethik (third edition, together with M. Düwell and C. Hübenthal (2011)). Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović is Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Bonn. She is the author of Filozofia prawa Immanuela Kanta. Wprowadzenie [Immanuel Kant|s Philosophy of Right. An Introduction] (2018), as well as many papers on Kant and political philosophy. Most recently she published “Kantian Moral Education for The Future of Humanity: The Climate Change Challenge”, Journal of Philosophy of Education 55/4 (2021), and “Revisiting the ‘Difficult Passage’ from Perpetual Peace”, in: Himmelmann, B. and SerckHanssen, C.. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress

About the Authors

265

(2021). She is currently working on Kant’s practical philosophy and its applications to contemporary moral problems. Stephan Zimmermann received his habilitation at the University of Bonn. He is the author of Kants “Kategorien der Freiheit” (2011) and Vorgängige Gemeinsamkeit. Studie zur Ontologie des Sozialen (2021). He has published various papers and edited several collections, among them Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Historisch-systematische Beiträge (2016) and Sozialontologie in der Perspektive des deutschen Idealismus. Ansätze, Rezeptionen, Probleme (together with C. Krijnen (2018)). He currently conducts the DFG research project on Kant’s moral philosophy Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue at the University of Halle.

Index absolute value 2, 4 f., 26, 29 – 34, 37, 45, 48, 58, 61 f., 101, 105 – 110, 112 – 114, 117, 152, 154, 163 – 167, 178, 244 absolute worth 24, 29, 33, 90 f., 93 f., 107, 117, 166 Achenwall, Gottfried 186 Adelung, Johann C. 145 – 149, 156 aesthetic 4, 14, 77, 100, 133 f., 141 f. aesthetic values 2, 12, 16 agency 55, 57, 71, 86, 91 f., 96, 103, 106, 231, 250 f., 259 – free agency 67 – human agency 74 f., 242, 248, 257, 259 – moral agency 112, 243, 248 – rational agency 61, 74, 95, 241 – 246, 249 – 252, 255 – 257, 259 agent 1 f., 6 f., 9 – 13, 15 – 19, 28 – 30, 33 f., 39, 49, 51 f., 54 f., 57, 60, 65 – 70, 75 f., 78, 80 – 82, 86 f., 90 – 94, 96, 100 f., 113, 178, 183, 193, 199, 214, 218, 221 f., 224, 230, 235, 244 – 246, 252, 256 – 258 – agent-relative 259 agreement condition 211 f. Aichele, Alexander 189 Allison, Henry E. 30, 57, 67, 74, 76, 79, 81, 111, 150 Alvarez, Maria 18 animalistic 200, 204 – 206, 213 anti-deontological 43 anti-realism 1, 4, 7 f., 10 – 12, 16, 19 Apel, Karl-Otto 11, 249 Arendt, Hannah 164, 168, 173, 175 Aristotelianism 8, 9, 72 – 73, 144, attitude 2, 6 – 8, 10 – 19, 28 f., 31 f., 76, 79 – 81, 83, 86 f., 97, 99 f., 103, 246 f., 250, 257 – contra/counter attitudes 13 – 15, 59 – pro-attitude 1, 11 – 19, 59, 65, 69, 71, 73 – 75, 77, 82, 87 Audi, Robert 41, 89 f. Austin, John L. 23 f.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796056-017

autonomy 1, 3, 7 f., 11, 19, 45, 62, 101, 108–111, 113 f., 120, 125, 142 – 144, 158f., 163f., 167f., 251, 254, 258 – autonomy of the will 11, 62, 108 – moral autonomy 3, 11, 60, 75, 79, 106, 110, 113 f., 255 – natural autonomy 75, 79 Bacin, Stefano 124, 128, 130 Barnhill, Anne 243, 250 f. Baron, Marcia 55, 105, 242, 250, 253 Bartuschat, Wolfgang 142 Basaglia, Federica 123 – 125, 127, 129, 132, 135 f. battle-citation model 56 Beck, Lewis White 67, 125, 129, 132 f., 159 Benhabib, Seyla 175, 177 Bernstein, Richard J. 245 Bobbert, Monika 258 Bojanowski, Jochen 131, 136, 165 Brandt, Reinhard 123, 128 f., 133 – 135, 142, 198, 206, 208 Buss, Sarah 242 Byrd, Sharon B. 170, 188, 192 categorical imperative 5, 26, 28, 30, 33 – 35, 38 f., 41, 44, 46, 51, 54, 58, 65 f., 105 – 115, 117 – 119, 127, 163 – 167, 178, 183 – 187, 189, 211, 221, 223 f., 255 f. – formula of humanity 25, 33, 61, 89 – 91, 93 f., 102, 105, 109, 117 f., 241 – formulas of the categorical imperative 94, 187 – c-maxim 256, 258 causa noumenon 135 Cavallar, Georg 178 character 19, 50, 66, 71, 82, 84 – 86, 160, 167, 174, 183, 199 f., 203, 247 – moral character 50, 144, 200, 247 charity 49 Christman, John P. 258 citizenship 163 f., 173, 175, 177 – 179

268

Index

civil condition 163 f., 169 f., 172, 176, 178, 190 f. coercion 91 f., 168, 171 f., 176, 218 conclusive rights 171 conditional values 4 constructivism 11 consumable thing 199 contract 170 f., 173 f. 188, 190, 197, 200, 203 f., 206 – 213 – employment contract 188 – marriage/martial contract 188, 200, 204, 208, 210 f. – social contract 190 Coons, Christian 241 cosmopolitanism 163 f., 172, 178 f. counter-attitude 59 Cuneo, Terence 9 Dancy, Jonathan 9, 219 f. Darwall, Stephen L. 28, 246, 249 Davies, Luke J. 181, 192 f. Dean, Richard 111 deception 91 f., 243, 246, 248, 250 f. – lying 36, 147, 149, 154, 243, 250 – manipulation 241 – 243, 246, 248 – 256, 259 – trickery 243, 248, 250, 252 – undermining 243, 250 deliberation 47, 60, 72, 78, 83 – collective deliberation 256 – deliberations 18, 250 – practical deliberation 65, 75, 77, 81, 252, 257 deontology – deontic 221 f., 259 – deontic valence 222 f., 225 – 227 – deontological 43, 221 desire 2, 11, 14, 17 f., 44 – 46, 49 – 53, 67, 71 – 79, 83, 86, 93, 98 – 102, 116, 126 – 128, 130, 134, 143 – 145, 200 – 204, 226, 234 f., 244, 252 – 257 determination 6 f., 12, 109, 111, 127, – desire theory 44 – determination of mankind 206 – determination of the will 15, 109, 126 f., 131 f., 134, 144, 159, 223 f. – moral determination 15, 130 – 132

– pure determination 126 f., 134 – self-determination 74 f., 109, 254 f., 258 devalue 149 devil 185, 102 Dieringer, Volker 159 dignity 1, 4, 11 f., 23 – 25, 28 – 33, 43, 45 f., 58 f., 62, 92 – 94, 105 – 108, 113 f., 117, 140, 152 – 157, 163 – 168, 173, 177, 181 f., 185 f., 191, 204 f., 244, 257 f. disabler 217, 231, 234, 237 f. disagreeableness 128, 130 discourse-theory 11, 258 displeasure 14, 125, 128, 130, 144, 157 f., 224, 226 – 228, 234 disrespecting 243 Doctrine of Right 92, 139, 150, 168, 170, 182, 184, 187, 189, 191 – 194, 197 f., 201, 204 – 208, 210, 212, 217 f. Doctrine of Virtue 56, 58, 69, 92, 98, 102, 139, 150, 182, 185 – 188, 191 f., 200, 202 f., 206 doxastic 14, 17 drives 70, 76, 98, 116, 167, 200 – sensual drives 69 duty 41 f., 44 – 62, 65, 69 f., 76 f., 80, 92, 94 f., 98, 100, 124, 144, 150 – 153, 158 f., 163 – 169, 172, 174 – 178, 181, 185 – 194, 206 – 209, 212, 214 f., 220 – 225, 227 – 229, 231, 233 – 238, 243, 258 f. – duties of right 69, 168 f., 178, 187, 189 – 193, 214 f. – duties towards ourselves 197 – dutiful 52, 56 f., 220 – 222, 224, 237 egoism 97, 99 f. empirically conditioned reason 126 end 6, 10, 12, 26, 28 – 30, 32 – 34, 43 – 45, 48, 53 f., 60 – 62, 65, 67 – 69, 74 f., 82, 89 – 97, 99, 101 – 103, 107, 109 – 118, 125 – 127, 129 – 133, 135, 144, 155 – 157, 163 f., 166 – 168, 171 f., 178, 185 – 189, 199, 201 – 204, 208, 211, 214, 234, 237 – end in itself 1, 3 – 5, 33, 61, 90, 105 – 112, 115 – 118 – material ends 116 – kingdom of ends 28 – 32, 166 f., 178, 255 Engstrom, Stephen P. 154

Index

enlightenment 50, 198 enslavement 169, 186, 194, 208, 210, 213 equality 169, 217 f. erotic pleasure 200 ethics 8, 11, 39, 41 – 46, 49, 51, 57, 59, 61, 69, 73, 89, 103, 166, 189, 191 f., 215, 220 f., 241, 249, 259 – ethical 41, 43, 114, 163, 166 f., 178, 181, 183, 186 – 188, 190 f., 194, 198, 225, 248 – ethical laws 187 – ethically 188, 214 ethical lawgiving 184, 187 eudaimonia 4 evil 13, 26, 47, 51, 67, 77, 80, 83 – 85, 98, 101 f., 110, 123 f., 127 f., 130 – 132, 134 – 136, 139 – 145, 151, 153, 158 – 160, 165, 176, 197 f., 245 external freedom 168 f., 171 f., 190 external legislation 191, 194 extrinsic values 3 fact of reason 60, 165 Faggion, Andréa 164 Fantasia, Francesca 135 feminist 198, 207 final value 3 – 5, 19 Fischer, Alexander 241 – 244, 252, 255 fitting attitude 1, 18 fittness-report model 56 formal determination 134 formalism 123 f., 129, 131, 215 – formal 6, 53, 76, 98, 126, 134, 166, 227 – formal principle 76 formula of a law of nature (FLN) 66 formula of humanity 25, 33, 61, 89 – 91, 93 f., 102, 105, 109, 117 f., 241 formula of universal law (FUL) 44, 65, 221, 224, 256 Frankfurt, Harry G. 75, 83, 181 freedom 31, 34, 36, 38, 67, 69, 74 f., 77, 80, 82, 113, 127, 132, 134 f., 141 – 144, 154, 158 – 160, 163 – 165, 167 – 172, 176, 181 – 188, 191, 210 – 212, 218, 246 – autonomy 1, 3, 7 f., 11, 19, 45, 62, 101, 108 – 111, 113 f., 120, 125, 142 – 144, 158f., 163f., 167f., 251, 254, 258 – external freedom 168 f., 171 f., 190

269

– free agency 67 – right to freedom 163, 169 f., 178, 199, 210 – self-determination 74 f., 109, 254 f., 258 – universal freedom 168, 218 – freedom condition 211 Garcia, Andrés G. 16 generalism 69 Gesinnung 84, 114, 150 Glasgow, Joshua 111 God 150 good 1, 3, 8 – 10, 17, 23 – 27, 29 f., 41, 44, 47 – 50, 52, 59 f., 67, 71 – 73, 75, 84 – 86, 98, 101, 114 – 116, 123 – 125, 127 – 132, 134 – 136, 139 – 147, 153, 158 – 160, 165, 176, 178, 197 f., 200, 220, 233, 238, 243, 246 – absolutely good 30, 115 – good will 2, 15, 24, 26 – 28, 30 – 32, 34, 47 f., 50, 52 f., 57, 59 f., 115 – 117, 123, 128 f., 139, 154, 157, 244 – good without limitations 47, 129 – gut 25, 86, 128 – highest good 1, 123 – 125, 178 – intrinsically good 3, 41 Goodin, Robert E. 250 goodness 27, 47 f., 54, 60, 128, 131, 146 goods 43 f., 199, 208, 213, 215 Gorin, Moti 242 f., 249 – 252 Grajner, Martin 6 Greenspan, Patricia 249 grounding 1, 4 – 8, 10 – 12, 17, 19, 39, 109, 111, 168, 178 – explanation 6 – 8, 10 – 12, 15 f., 35, 48, 59, 73, 75, 83, 107, 124, 150, 158 – fundamentality 6 – grounding direction 11, 17 – grounding of value 1 – grounding question 1 – grounds of desire 234 – grounds of loathing 234 Ground-thesis 46, 58 Guyer, Paul 34, 43, 74, 105, 111, 154 Habermas, Jürgen 11 happiness 1 f., 15, 37, 44, 52, 58, 68, 95, 98, 119 f., 165

270

Index

Hare, Richard 24, 27 – 29, 33 heteronomy 62, 101, 125, 142 – 144, 158 f. heterosexuality 201, 212 Hill, Thomas E. 241, 249 hindrance 93, 102, 217 – 222, 229 – 234, 237 f. Hofer, Sybille 182 Höffe, Otfried 80, 144, 175 Hofmann, Johann B. 148 homo noumenon 8, 187 f., 207, 213 homo phaenomenon 187 f. homosexuality 202, 212 honestas iuridica 92, 189, 192 honeste vive 168, 181, 189 – 194, 207 f. honesty 192, 205, 247 honor 2, 49, 51 f., 92, 145, 168, 189 – 194, 208 Hooker, Brad 9 Horn, Christoph 12, 25, 43 – 46, 59, 65, 100, 103, 126 f., 163, 197, 210, 244, 257 hospitality 173 – universal hospitality 175 Hruschka, Joachim 170, 188, 192 Hügli, Anton 32, 154 human action 67, 69, 71, 74 f., 78, 81, 151, 228 human agency 74 f., 242, 248, 257, 259 humanity 26, 31, 33, 44, 46, 61, 89 f., 92, 101, 107, 117, 152 f., 163 – 166, 185 – 188, 191, 201, 204 – 208, 211, 213 f., 243 f., 248 – humanity formula 186 f., 189, 211 – humanity within 90, 92, 101, 197, 207 – right of humanity 92, 189, 201, 208, 214 human nature 31, 46, 52, 77, 98, 101 f., 176, 245 human rights 12, 43, 164, 173 – 175, 199, 210, 213 human sexuality 199, 202, 204 f. Humeanism 11, 18, 46, 59, 257 hyperphysical 123 f., 131 f., 135 f. hypothetical imperative 25 f., 45 f., 109, 111, 114, 127 ill-being 128, 130 – das Übel 128 Illies, Christian 242, 244

illusion 132, 246 – 248 imperative theory 44 – 46. incentive argument 220, 225, 231, 237 inclination 15, 25, 28 f., 33, 38, 44 – 46, 49 – 54, 56, 60 f., 66 – 68, 71, 74 f., 93 – 95, 97 f., 101 – 103, 110, 116, 119, 165, 167 f. 202, 206, 218, 222 – 231, 233 – 238, 246 – 249, 251 – theory of inclination 44 inclusive 4, 243, 251 – over-inclusive 243, 246, 248 – under-inclusive 243, 246, 250 inconsistency problem 106, 112, 115 independence 9, 12, 27, 116, 165, 168 f. – independence from inclination 116, 165 – mind- or attitude independence 6 individuation 118 f. institution 171 f., 175, 198 – institution of marriage 198 f. instrumentalization 90 – 92, 95 f., 103, 168, 210 – instrumental value 2 – 4 intelligible being 188 intersubjectivity 106, 166, 253 intrinsic value 47, 49, 155, 241 J. L. Austin 23 juridical 163 f., 167 f., 176 f., 181, 184, 186 f., 190 – 194, 199, 205, 211 – juridical lawgiving 181, 184, 187 f. – juridical laws 183, 187 Kain, Patrick 4, 33 Kantianism 11, 16, 35, 39, 42 f., 46, 49, 51, 55, 57 – 60, 62, 65 f., 68, 72 f., 77, 79 f., 83, 98, 103, 129, 149 f., 154, 164 f., 167, 176 f., 185, 194, 198 f., 207, 209, 212, 214 f., 217, 238, 241 – 243, 246, 248 f., 252, 255 f., 259 – Neo-Kantianism 154 Kato, Yashusi 264 Kerstein, Samuel J. 31, 89 f. Kersting, Wolfgang 190 f. kingdom of ends 28 – 32, 166 f., 178, 255 Kleingeld, Pauline 89 f., 124, 129 f., 174, 178 f., 183 Klemme, Heiner 48

Index

Kluge, Friedrich 148, 156 Korsgaard, Christine M. 4, 29, 33, 43, 57, 76, 82, 111, 157, 253, 259 Lauener, Henri 228 law 4 f., 12, 14, 25 – 29, 31, 33 – 39, 41, 44, 46, 59, 61 f., 66 f., 69 f., 76 f., 80, 94, 97 f., 100 – 103, 106 – 110, 112 – 114, 117, 119 f., 124 – 126, 128 – 136, 139, 143 f., 150 – 158, 160, 165 – 167, 169 – 172, 174, 177 f., 182 – 184, 186 – 190, 194, 198, 201 f., 204, 206 f., 210, 212, 217 f., 220 f., 223 – 231, 233 f., 236 – 238, 244 – 246, 256 f., 259 – juridical law 181, 183 f., 187f. – moral law 12, 14, 25, 27 f., 31, 34, 36 – 39, 41, 46, 59, 61, 66 f., 69, 76 f., 94, 97 f., 100 f., 108, 114, 124 f., 128 – 131, 133 – 136, 141, 143 f., 150 – 158, 160, 165 f., 178, 182 f., 187 f., 217 f., 220 f., 224 – 230 – 234, 238 – natural law 182, 186, 198, 202, 204, 208 Lee, Sang Yeal 247 legal institution 198, 212 f. legal responsibility 181, 191 f., 194 legislation 62, 106 – 110, 112 – 114 – law-giving 101, 107, 110, 114 – ethical lawgiving 184, 187 – juridical lawgiving 181, 183 f., 187 f. – moral legislation 106, 112, 114, 131, 182 – natural law 182, 186, 198, 202, 204, 208 – practical legislation 109 – legislation of the will 108 f., 112 legislation of the will 108 f., 112 lex iusti 92, 189, 208 Lichtblau, Klaus 147 limiting conditions 94 local value 147, 149, 155 Lotze, Hermann 154 f. Louden, Robert 124 Ludwig, Bernd 184 f. lying 36, 147, 149, 154, 243, 250 – deception 91 f., 243, 246, 248, 250 f. – manipulation 241 – 243, 246, 248 – 256, 259 – trickery 243, 248, 250, 252 – undermining 243, 250

271

Mackie, John L. 9 malevolence 96 – 102 – malice 97 – 102 manipulation 92, 241 – 243, 246, 248 – 259 Margalit, Avishai 96, 100 market value 147 – 149, 166 marriage 170, 188, 197 – 214 material 53, 116 f., 126 f., 134, 147, 165 – material element 123 f., 126, 129, 131 – material ends 116 – material incentives 53 maxim 17, 26 – 28, 30, 46 f., 49, 52 – 55, 60, 65 – 87, 94, 101, 106, 114, 116, 119 f., 124, 126 – 128, 130, 144, 150, 159 f., 166, 221, 223 – 227, 235, 255 f. – c-maxim 256, 258 means 25 f., 28 f., 32 f., 41, 48, 60, 70, 74 f., 77, 85, 89 – 98, 102 f., 110, 115 – 116, 128, 130 f., 134, 149, 153, 155 – 156, 166, 168, 170, 175, 185 – 187, 189, 192, 199, 206 – 209, 211, 218, 232, 248 – mere means 89 – 96, 98, 103, 168, 186 f., 189, 208 Mellin, Georg S. A. 144 merchant 18, 49 metaphysical moral realism 44 Moore, George E. 9, 155 moral 12, 14 f., 24 f., 27 f., 31, 33 – 39, 41 f., 44 – 46, 48 – 62, 66 f., 69 – 72, 75 – 77, 79 – 83, 85 f., 89 f., 94 f., 97 f., 100 – 103, 105 – 108, 111 – 114, 116, 123 – 136, 139 f., 143 – 145, 147, 150 – 160, 163 – 168, 171, 177 – 179, 181 – 184, 186 – 194, 197, 200, 204, 207 f., 213 – 215, 217 f., 220 – 231, 233 – 235, 238, 241 – 245, 247 – 249, 252, 255 – 259 – moral agency 112, 243, 248 – moral attitude 32, 77, 214, 244, 247 – moral autonomy 3, 11, 60, 75, 79, 106, 110, 113 f., 255 – moral character 50, 144, 200, 247 – moral determination 15, 130 – 132 – moral illusion 241 f., 246 – 249, 257 – moral intellectualism 214 – morality 1, 3 f., 11, 15, 24 f., 28, 31 – 35, 38 f., 41, 46, 49, 52, 54, 62, 67, 77, 94 f.,

272

Index

106 – 108, 112, 117, 144, 150 – 153, 165 – 168, 206, 214, 222 – 225, 228, 234, 245 – moral law 12, 14, 25, 27 f., 31, 34, 36 – 39, 41, 46, 59, 61, 66 f., 69, 76 f., 94, 97 f., 100 f., 108, 114, 124 f., 128 – 131, 133 – 136, 141, 143 f., 150 – 158, 160, 165 f., 178, 182 f., 187 f., 217 f., 220 f., 224 – 230 – 234, 238 – moral legislation 106, 112, 114, 131, 182 – moral possibility 128 – moral rationalism 214 – moral responsibility 245 f. – moral solipsism 214 f. – moral value 2, 12, 31 – 33, 41 – 43, 45 – 50, 52 – 61, 75, 80, 82, 117, 127, 131, 139 f., 145, 150 – 159, 181, 217 f., 220 – 225, 228 f., 234 – 238 – moral worth 51, 53 – 57, 150 f., 157, 223, 225 – moral wrongdoing 89 – 93, 95 f., 99, 103 motive 14, 28, 51 f., 55 – 57, 60, 74, 76 f., 98 f., 101, 130, 184, 221 – 225, 228 f., 231, 233 – 238 natural autonomy 75, 79 nature 2, 5 – 8, 17, 19, 31 f., 36, 45 – 48, 50 – 53, 57, 66 f., 69, 77, 84, 98, 101 f., 109 f., 115, 117 – 119, 135, 139 f., 143, 156 f., 166, 171, 176, 188, 202 f., 206, 217, 226, 230, 234, 245, 247 f., 257 – human nature 31, 46, 52, 77, 98, 101 f., 176, 245 – natural 8 – 10, 13, 16, 19, 23, 25, 30 f., 36 f., 44 – 46, 48 – 51, 55, 60, 62, 68, 75, 79 f., 83 f., 98, 123 f., 131 f., 136, 148 f., 170, 172, 182, 186, 188, 197 – 199, 201 – 215 – natural law 182, 186, 198, 202, 204, 208 – rational nature 1, 3 – 9, 12 f., 19, 62, 107 f., 113 – 115, 117 f. negative end 89, 91, 96 – 98, 101, 103 negative magnitude 217, 220, 231 – 234, 237 neminem laede 168, 189 – 191, 208 Nenon, Thomas 183 Neo-Kantianism 154 neutralization 230 – 234

Newtonian 217 f., 229 Nissenbaum, Helen F. 242, 250 f., 256 Noggle, Robert 241 – 243, 246, 248 – 255, 257 non-accidental condition 57 non-humiliation condition 211 non-instrumentalization 211 non-moral value 123 f. non-natural 8, 62, 123 f., 131 f., 136, 201 f. – hyperphysical 123 f., 131 f., 135 f. non-reductionist 8, 10 non-violation condition 211 normativity 1, 8, 19, 43, 167, 220 – normative 1, 7, 12, 15 f., 18 f., 66, 68, 72, 78 f., 82, 163, 165, 167, 174 f., 178, 192, 199, 202 – 204, 208, 213, 225, 241 f., 245, 248, 250, 253 – 255, 258 f. – Normativität 43 – normativity-fact 19 numerical value 146 – 149, 154 Nyholm, Sven 78 f., 94 objective value 2, 10 f., 17, 136, 257 oikeiosis theory 44 O’Neill, Onora 74, 91 ontoethical principle 34 – 39 Orsi, Francesco 16 overdetermination thesis 56 f. ownership 170, 182, 209 – possession 6, 170, 172, 175, 202, 209, 211, 214 Parfit, Derek 93, 95 pater familias 212 Pavao, Aguinaldo 164 peace 170, 173, 264 person 15, 17, 26, 30, 33, 47, 51, 61, 68, 70 f., 79 – 81, 83 f., 89 – 97, 99 – 103, 117 f., 120, 124 f., 130, 140, 151 – 156, 164, 166 – 178, 181 – 194, 197 – 199, 201 – 215, 224, 226, 231 f., 234 – 237, 243 f., 246 f., 249 – 255 – personal 1 f., 4, 10, 17, 29, 33, 51, 68 f., 75, 119, 167, 169, 205, 209, 212, 254, 256, 259 – personality 60, 82, 84 f., 157, 163 f., 167 f., 178, 181 – 194, 200, 205 – 207, 209 f.

Index

– personal relationship 197 f. – personal value 1 f., 10 – 12, 17, 81, 152 persona moralis 189 persona physica 189 physical pleasure 199 physical possibility 128 Pieper, Annemarie 125, 153 Pinheiro Walla, Alice 103, 170 f. Pinzani, Alessandro 164, 169, 189 f., 192 f. pleasure 12, 14, 52, 59, 97 f., 116, 125, 128, 130, 144, 157 f., 204, 213, 224, 226 f., 257 – animalistic pleasure 200, 204 f., 213 – erotic pleasure 200 – physical pleasure 199 – sexual pleasure 198, 200, 207, 213 pluralism 252, 257 political 43, 173 f., 164, 176, 178, 244 – political autonomy 183 – political coups 173 – political philosophy 174 – political self-government 190 – political theory 177 – political self-government 190 – pre-political 163 Porcheddu, Rocco 105, 110 f., 117, 120 possession 6, 170, 172, 175, 202, 209, 211, 214 practical 2, 4 f., 36, 39, 44, 46, 60 f., 66 f., 70 f., 76, 79 – 81, 85 – 87, 95, 97, 103, 107, 110 – 112, 114, 117, 119 f., 123 – 125, 127, 132, 134 f., 141 – 145, 158 – 160, 163 – 167, 173, 178, 217, 225 f., 228, 246, 252, 259 – practical identity 65, 81 – 87, 253, 257 – practical legislation 109 – practical principle 5, 67 – 71, 75, 78 f., 82, 84, 125 f., 132 – 134 – practical reason 25 f., 35, 39, 42, 50, 61, 69, 76 f., 79, 105, 110, 114, 116, 118 – 120, 123, 125 – 133, 136, 139 – 143, 145, 147, 150 – 153, 155 f., 158, 167, 170, 181, 186 – 188, 191, 205, 217 – 220, 224 f., 229 – 231, 233 f., 237 f., 245, 252 – pure practical reason 67, 69, 79, 110 – 115, 117 – 120, 123 – 128, 131 – 136, 141 –

273

143, 154 f., 157, 159 f., 170, 197, 200 f., 218, 226, 228, 230 f., 234, 237 – practical rule 66, 68, 70, 110 f., 118, 120 – practical syllogism 65, 71 – 73 – practical system 120 Prauss, Gerold 92, 222 preservation of one′s own life 49 prescriptivism 11 f., 23 f., 25, 33, 35, 39, 136, 174 principle of action 27, 52, 70, 78, 81, 83 – 85, 229 principle of a practical system 120 principle of deprivation 234 principle of dijudication 225 principle of execution 225 principle of heteronomy 142 – 144, 158 f. principle of honesty 49 principle of morality 46, 58, 139 principle of practical deliberation 70 f. principle of reason 134 principle of right 184 f., 187 principle of volition 76, 81 principle of will 53 private right 170 – 172, 210 pro-attitude 1, 11 – 19, 59, 65, 69, 71, 73 – 75, 77, 82 f., 87 prohibition 90, 168, 173, 243 property 1, 6 f., 10, 12 f., 15, 18 f., 23 – 29, 32, 35 – 37, 39, 45 f., 58, 61 f., 80 f., 109 f., 113, 116 – 118, 120, 123 f., 131 f., 172, 188, 258 propositio maxima 72 pro-setting 1 provisional right 169, 171 prudential value 58, 60, 259 pseudo Ulpianic 189 – 193 Puls, Heiko 130 pure determination 126 f., 134 pure practical judgement 132 pure practical rationality 110 f., 115, 119 f. Pütter, Johann Stephan 186 queerness argument

1, 9, 19

Raedler, Sebastian 60 rational agency 60 f., 74, 76, 79, 95, 184, 241 – 246, 249 – 252, 255 – 259

274

Index

rationality 19, 61, 76, 79, 95, 103, 110, 120, 206, 250 – 252 rational nature 1, 3 – 9, 12 f., 19, 62, 107 f., 113 – 115, 117 f. Rawls, John 11, 124 realism 1, 4 – 13, 15 f., 19, 44 – 46, 58, 62 – reductionist realism 10 realm of ends 105 – 108, 111 f. real repugnancy 119, 229 f., 232 f., 236 f. – real repugnance 119 – real contradictions 119 – real opposition 229 f., 232 – 234 – Realrepugnanz 229 reason 9, 14, 16 – 19, 23 – 27, 30 – 39, 41, 44 – 49, 51, 54 – 57, 60 f., 66 – 70, 74 – 79, 81 – 86, 90, 95, 97 f., 100, 105, 108 – 110, 113 f., 118, 120, 125, 130 – 135, 139 – 143, 146 – 148, 150, 154 – 156, 158 f., 165 – 167, 174 – 176, 178, 184, 186 f., 189, 191, 193 f., 199 f., 204, 214, 218 – 220, 225, 227 – 233, 236, 238, 242 – 245, 251, 255 f., 258 reductionist 8 f. – reductionist realism 10 Reinhardt, Karoline 175 Reisner, Andrew, E. 9 relational theory 44 relative value 2, 4, 29 f., 165 relative worth 28 f., 90, 93 f., 106 religion 74, 77, 80, 83 – 85, 100, 102, 150, 158, 198 res fungibilis 199 resistance 217 – 219, 226 – 228, 230 f., 238 respect 2 – 4, 6 f., 14 – 17, 23, 26 f., 30 – 32, 34 – 36, 45, 51, 55 f., 58, 60, 62, 76 f., 81 f., 91, 93 f., 97 f., 100 f., 103, 110 – 112, 114, 117, 130, 133 f., 142 f., 146, 151, 153, 158 – 160, 166 – 168, 177 f., 185 – 187, 189, 198, 206, 213, 217 f., 220, 223, 227 – 229, 233 f., 236 f., 243 f., 246 f., 254 f., 257, 259 responsibility 144, 174, 178, 181, 183, 186 f., 245, 249 – legal responsibility 181, 191 f., 194 – moral responsibility 245 f. Richard Bernstein 245

right

42, 44, 46, 67, 75, 94, 99 f., 123 f., 135, 163 f., 167 – 179, 184 – 187, 190 – 194, 197 – 199, 201 f., 204 f., 207 – 214, 218, 220 – 225, 247, 253, 258 f. – conclusive rights 171 – private right 170 – 172, 210 – provisional right 169, 171 – rightful honor 92, 189 – 194 – rightful honour 92 – rightful relation 187, 191 – 194 – right of humanity 92, 189, 201, 208, 214 – right to freedom 163, 169 f., 178, 199, 210 – right to hospitality 173 Ripstein, Arthur 169, 172 Rossi, Mauro 10 Rössler, Beate 242, 250 f., 256 Rotfeld, Herbert J. 247 Rotzoll, Kim B. 247 Rudinow, Joel 241, 250 Sala, Giovanni B. 132 f. Santos, Robinson dos 41, 55, 103, 163, 264 Satne, Paula 57 Scanlon, Thomas M. 9, 16 Schillerian 50 – 52., 56, 100 Schmidt, Elke 4, 45, 58, 108, 110, 113 f., 136, 165 Schönecker, Dieter 4, 34 f., 45 f., 58, 108, 110, 113 f., 131, 136, 165 Schönrich, Gerhard 1, 4, 13, 18, 59, 136, 165, 244 f. Schopenhauer, Arthur 97 – 99, 102 Schroeder, Mark 9 Sedgwick, Sally 51 – 53 Seel, Gerhard 119 self-determination 74 f., 109, 254 f., 258 self-governement 86, 190, 194, 249 f. self-legislation 1, 101, 152, 176, 183 self-preservation 155 – preservation of one′s own life 49 self-violation 197, 214 Sensen, Oliver 11, 23, 25, 30, 32 f., 35, 38, 43, 45, 58 f., 61, 81, 108, 114, 124, 131, 136, 156, 165, 167, 243, 257 servility 92, 191 sex 197 f., 200 – 207, 212 f. – heterosexuality 201, 212

Index

– homosexuality 202 f., 212 – sexual attribute 188, 197, 202, 204 – sexual behavior 199 f., 204 – sexual desire 200 – sexual ethics 214 f. – sexual excesses 200 – sexual intercourse 197, 199, 201 – 204, 207, 209 – sexual organs 201, 205, 207, 213 – sexual pleasure 198, 200, 207, 213 – sexual pleasures 200, 213 – sexual relationships 201, 207, 211 – sexual union 201 f. – sexuality 197 – 210, 212 f., 215 Silber, John R. 154 slavery 91 f., 168, 186, 198, 209 – slave 91, 96, 190, 193, 209, 211 – slaveholders 96, 209 social contract 190 society 189, 205 f., 245, 249 source of value 4 state 1, 15, 23, 37, 52, 89, 92, 98, 112, 114, 116, 128, 130, 133, 151 – 153, 155, 157, 163 – 166, 169 – 179, 186 f., 190, 198, 204, 224 f., 232, 234, 244, 258 f. stateless person 176 – stateless persons 163, 176 f., 179 state of distributive justice 169, 172 state of injustice 170 state of nature 169 – 172, 176 f., 179, 190 f., 208, 210 state of public right 170 Steigleder, Klaus 118 Stern, Robert 33 Sticker, Martin 89, 91, 94 f., 103 Stolowitsch, Leonid 149 Stolzenberg, Jürgen 120 Stratton-Lake, Philip 9, 51 f. Sturma, Dieter 155 subject 1 f., 6, 15, 31, 33, 38, 43, 45, 59, 66 – 68, 70 – 72, 76, 80 f., 83, 94, 98, 115, 117, 119, 125, 128, 132 – 134, 143, 151 f., 155, 157 f., 167 f., 175, 182 – 184, 186 f., 190, 209, 214, 217, 224, 226 – 228, 230, 232, 234, 245 – subjective 1 f., 13 f., 42, 44, 46, 51, 54, 57, 66, 68 – 70, 73, 76 f., 79, 101, 109, 117,

275

134, 146, 154 f., 202 f., 212, 223, 226, 228 – 230, 233, 253 subjectivism 11, 44, 241 f., 252 – 254, 257 – subjectivist 11, 45, 252, 255, 257 sui iuris 169, 188 supersensible 36 f., 135 supervenience theory 44 f. Susser, Daniel 242, 250 f., 256 suum cuique tribue 169, 189 – 191, 208 Tappolet, Christine 10 teleological naturalism 197 theory of action 65, 72, 95 theory of inclinations or needs 44 theory of oikeiosis 44 Timmermann, Jens 54, 70, 81, 124 f., 128 f., 136 Timmons, Mark 66, 189, 222 f. transcendent 228, 231 transcendental 33, 35, 39, 111, 133 f., 136, 148, 182, 184 f., 187, 241 f., 245, 249, 258 f. Ulpianic rules 189, 207 f. – honeste vive 168, 181, 189 – 194, 207 f. – neminem laede 168, 189 – 191, 208 – pseudo Ulpianic 189 – 193 – suum cuique tribue 169, 189 – 191, 208 unconditional value 5, 15, 60 undermining 243, 250 unified inner comportment of mind 84 universal freedom 168, 218 universalism 252, 256 universal law 28, 39, 65 f., 76, 106, 109, 119 f., 126 f., 152, 166 – 169, 218, 221, 256 – 258 unmentionable vices 202 Unna, Yvonne 189 unworthy 92, 214 upvalue 149 value 1 – 19, 23 – 39, 41 – 50, 52 – 62, 65, 78, 80 f., 83, 86 f., 93 f., 101, 107, 109 f., 112 – 114, 117, 123 f., 131 f., 136, 139 f., 144 – 157, 163 – 166, 168, 173, 186, 189, 194, 197 – 199, 205, 214 f., 220 f., 223 f., 233 f., 236, 241 f., 245, 252 – 259

276

Index

– absolute value 2, 4 f., 26, 29 – 34, 37, 45, 48, 58, 61 f., 101, 105 – 110, 112 – 114, 117, 152, 154, 163 – 167, 178, 244 – aesthetic values 2, 12, 16 – conditional values 4 – devalue 149 – evaluating 77 f., 81, 149, 154, 157, 159, 242 – extrinsic values 3 – final value 3 f., 19 – has value 3, 7, 23 – 25, 27, 30, 35, 38 f., 49, 56, 58, 113 f. – instrumental value 3 – intrinsic value 47, 49, 155, 241 – local value 147, 149, 155 – market value 147 – 149, 166 – moral value 2, 12, 31 – 33, 41 – 43, 45 – 50, 52 – 61, 75, 80, 82, 117, 127, 131, 139 f., 145, 150 – 159, 181, 217 f., 220 – 225, 228 f., 234 – 238 – non-moral value 123 f. – numerical value 146 – 149, 154 – objective value 2, 10 f., 17, 136 – objective value 2, 257 – personal value 1 f., 10 – 12, 17, 81, 152 – relative value 2, 4, 29 f., 165 – source of value 4 – unconditional value 5, 15, 60 – upvalue 149 – valuable 1 – 4, 7, 9 – 11, 13, 16 f., 19, 31, 34 f., 44 f., 47 – 49, 51 f., 54, 57, 59 f., 75 f., 80, 86 f., 149, 165, 210, 233 – value neutrality 220 – value of character 50 – value realism 4, 8, 19, 257 f. – value-determining law 113 Väyrynen, Pekka 9 Velleman, J. David 83, 221 vice 60, 67, 99, 102, 112, 181, 201, 206, 219, 232 – 234. victim 34, 91 f., 96, 207 virtue 2, 7, 23, 26, 35, 46, 69, 72, 80, 85, 100, 110, 113 f., 124, 170, 184, 187 f., 205, 233 f., 246, 248 volition 75 f., 80, 83, 115 f., 126, 129

Walde, Alois 148 Walschots, Michael H. 124, 129 f., 132 way of acting 26, 30, 124, 129 f. way of life 15, 85 way of sensing 84 – Sinnesart 84 way of thinking 50, 84 f. – Denkungsart 84 Weber, Michael 241 well-being 98, 128, 130 – das Wohl 128 Werner, Micha H. 241, 258 f. Wert 41, 139, 144 – 153, 156 f., 163, 189, 215 will 1 f., 4, 11 f., 14 f., 17, 24 – 28, 30 – 32, 34 f., 38, 46 – 48, 50, 52 – 54, 57 – 62, 66 – 70, 73 f., 79 – 83, 101, 106 – 110, 112 – 120, 123 – 135, 139 f., 142 – 144, 150 f., 154, 157 – 159, 165 – 167, 170 – 172, 184, 206 f., 223, 225 f., 228 f., 231, 234, 244, 248 f., 256 – 258 Willaschek, Marcus 181, 192, 194, 218, 224, 229 Wood, Allen W. 30, 34 f., 43, 49 – 51, 105, 111, 154, 165, 243, 249 – 251 worth 25 – 27, 30, 32, 48 f., 53, 62, 92, 96, 101, 108, 113, 145 f., 148, 151 – 153, 156 f., 189, 220, 244, 257, 259 – absolute worth 24, 29, 33, 90 f., 93 f., 107, 117, 166 – inner worth 25 f., 30 f., 106, 152 – moral worth 51, 53 – 57, 150 f., 157, 223, 225 – relative worth 28 f., 90, 93 f., 106 – unworthy 92, 214 – worthiness 15, 31 – worthless 12, 52, 149 – worthy 13, 49, 51 f., 57, 60, 81, 145 Zimmermann, Stephan 25, 32, 139, 143 f., 160 Zinkin, Melissa 220 Zwanziger, Johann C. 144