Kant's Projective Representation: Substance, Cause, Time, and Objects 1793651558, 9781793651556

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Kant’s Projective Representation

Kant’s Projective Representation Substance, Cause, Time, and Objects Lawrence J. Kaye

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2024 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. Quotations from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (translators and editors), Copyright ©1998 Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ‌‌‌ ISBN: 978-1-7936-5155-6 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-7936-5156-3 (ebook) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Preface vii Introduction

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Chapter 1: The Need for a Representational Reading Chapter 2: Representation and Unity





Chapter 3: Representing Time: Substance

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Chapter 4: Representing Time: Causation and Community Chapter 5: Intuitions, Concepts, and the Categories Chapter 6: Representation and Metaphysics Conclusion: Evaluative Reflections Appendix: Against Inferentialism References Index

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81 99 123 139 145

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About the Author



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Preface

In my (2015) book on the Transcendental Deduction of the categories I exposited Kant’s account of representation as constituted by the formal unity of consciousness that projectively represents the external world. However, I did not fully appreciate the significance of that view for Kant’s overall framework. I subsequently developed a new understanding of the First Analogy which revealed the fundamental role that the representation of time plays in the Transcendental Analytic. That is, I believe, fully clarified in this present work. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my colleague Steven Levine for very helpful advice. After hearing a presentation of my new understanding of the First Analogy, he reminded me of similar argumentation in the Dissertation, and subsequently gave me very useful advice on what to focus on in Sellars. And thanks to my colleague Yumiko Inukai, who over the years has given me various insights on Hume. She also usefully suggested that, in addition to posing Hume’s treatment of time as an apparent target for Kant, I look at Locke’s account as well. And I am grateful to all of my colleagues for their encouragement. Thanks as well to Jana Hodges-Kluck, my editor at Lexington Books, for her encouragement and support throughout this project.

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Introduction

The Critique of Pure Reason contains a revolutionary account of mental representation that I reveal and thoroughly explicate. We will see that Kant’s view of perception is neither phenomenalist nor direct realist but is rather representationalist. Crucially, he rejects the standard assumption that the content of perceptions is determined receptively and instead adopts a projective account. I will show that this new understanding of representation is at the core of his system, underlying each of the main doctrines. This is, fundamentally, a new understanding of the semantics of intuitions—of how they represent objects. I develop my reading via close textual analyses of passages in the A Transcendental Deduction (chapter 2) and in the First Analogy (chapter 3). We will see that in the A TD representation is equated with the formal unity of consciousness. That is, the representation of corresponding objects is a matter of the pure unification of intuitions. However, the projective nature of representation does not become apparent until the First Analogy, where Kant argues that the representation of time is grounded in persistence. But persistence is found only in the identities of matter that are represented by instances of the schematized category of substance. These identities exceed subjective, phenomenal similarities. So, intuitions, which are imagistic mental states, protectively represent a world that is external to consciousness thanks to the unification of (schematized) substance, as well as the unifications of the other schematized relational categories, viz., causation and community. Since anything that is perceptually represented conforms to this structure, this shows how the categories are objectively justified and also explains how we are able to have synthetic a priori knowledge of the world. And this understanding of representation also explains transcendental idealism: since our perceptual representations are constructed using the a priori forms of space and time, which are not derived from external input, the represented world is a mental projection rather than something that exists in itself. 1

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Introduction

The projective account of representation is thus a central and crucial component of Kant’s the doctrines of the first Critique, but it has not been previously appreciated primarily because the two main textual sources involve reasoning that is substantially under-explained. The treatment of representation in the A Transcendental Deduction invokes just a few rather cryptic paragraphs, where Kant identifies representation with the unity of consciousness. We will see that the latter follows from the analytic unity of empirical concepts. But he merely hints at this line of argument there, which the B TD helps, modestly, to fill in. However, the B TD also minimizes the discussion of representation in favor of focus on transcendental apperception, thus serving to disguise the other, key doctrine. And the crucial argumentation that establishes the strong and surprising result that persistence has conceptual priority in the representation of time is hastily sketched in the opening paragraph of the First Analogy, as though Kant thought that he was reminding readers of a result that they were already familiar with. And finally, we will also see that the idea of schematism plays a central role in the treatment of representation, since the unity of intuitions is not created by the categories themselves but is rather constituted by unifications that instantiate the same types of unifying functions as these pure concepts, and thus schematize them. Kant’s very brief treatment of this topic, presented at the outset of the Principles, fails to explain that it is the categorically schematized unity of intuitions that constitutes the unity of consciousness that is established in the TD. (It should thus be apparent that my project is the result of a substantial amount of careful textual and philosophical detective work.) As we will consider in chapter 4, the reasoning in the First Analogy also undermines Hume’s treatment of causation, since it shows that we cannot subjectively, contingently represent sequences. The Second Analogy’s claim that we represent changes as instances of necessary causal rules that characterize alterations in the states of substances is the only feasible explanation of how we are able to represent temporal sequences, and similarly for the Third Analogy’s treatment of simultaneity in terms of mutual causal influence. And my interpretation also allows us to understand that the seemingly problematic concept of the noumena is, as Kant maintains, a merely limiting notion. I will argue that this is nothing more than a semantic contrast with the perceptually represented world that does not exist in itself. Since the categories are representationally grounded in the formal unity of perpetual consciousness, we cannot coherently assert that the noumena exist or that they cause sensations. So, while my reading is initially primarily drawn from several key paragraphs in the A TD and the reasoning behind the First Analogy, the account of projective representation that emerges is comprehensive—it yields a new understanding of all of the main doctrines in the Transcendental Analytic as

Introduction

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well as providing a new understanding of the Aesthetics’ empirical realism and transcendental idealism. It is important to appreciate that I am not dogmatically adopting a representational (perceptually indirect) account of intuitions. In chapter 1 I provide textual reasons for thinking that intuitions are composed by syntheses from sensations, and are thus imagistic. I also argue that Kant’s account of time and inner sense shows that intuitions must be understood as representational states. And I argue that the temporal nature of existence undermines the relationalist view of objects that direct realist interpretations rely on. One might worry, though, that a representationalist reading will result in either skepticism or else a collapse into phenomenalism. However, we will see in chapter 3 that, under my reading, the Refutation of Idealism is a simple consequence of the main reasoning of the First Analogy which successfully counters perceptual skepticism, and, moreover, repudiates phenomenalism in general. The explanation of the representational status of intuitions that I develop here also differs importantly from conceptualist interpretations such as those from Sellars, McDowell, et. al. As I argue in chapter 5, advocates of conceptualism overlook Kant’s explanation of concepts as unifying functions and they also lack understanding of the doctrine of projective representation that consists of instances of the schematized categories. The resulting view is that we initially perceive the world by depicting it with imagistic intuitions. Judgments that apply concepts to these intuitions are a separate, secondary stage of the perceptual process—concepts do not create intuitional content but rather unify representations that are independently constructed. I also examine Landy’s inferentialist reading of Kant, both in chapter 1 and in the main appendix. I argue that there is no textual basis for this approach and moreover I show that it does not explain the content of intuitions. And in that appendix I additionally evaluate Brandom’s attempt at giving an inferentialist explanation of concepts, which is a rival to Kant’s account. I show that this approach cannot explain semantic acquisition and is thus unworkable. Finally, note that while I believe that I am presenting Kant’s understanding of this material, I have found it helpful at times to explain his views using some contemporary philosophical and psychological terminology. In particular, I sometimes use phrases such as “subjective consciousness” and “imagistic perceptual states” to characterize appearances and intuitions and I use phrases such as “perceptual processing” to describe what Kant thought of as the activity of the faculty of the imagination. I do this for the sake of clear explanation and also because, as I suggest in chapter 6, Kant’s framework, modestly updated, looks to be very plausible vis-à-vis contemporary philosophy.

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Introduction

Here is a more detailed summary of how we will proceed. (Readers may want to skip ahead to the next chapter and return here for reference). Chapter 1 makes the case for seeking a representationalist account of intuitions. I present five chief doctrines of the Critique that any successful reading must explain, viz., transcendental idealism, empirical realism, the world as appearance, synthetic a priori knowledge, and the externality of substances. I then argue that the major existing readings, viz., phenomenalism, direct realism, and the epistemic approach, all fail to account for one or more of the main doctrines. I raise the key point that for Kant existence is temporal which undermines both the direct realist relationalist account of empirical realism and similarly undermines the epistemic interpretation. In the process of critically examining these approaches, I make the case for understanding intuitions as imagistic representations that are composed via synthesis from sensations together with the a priori forms of space and time. This suggests trying to read Kant as holding a representationalist view of perception. But, since sensations do not represent, i.e., they do not have objects, we are confronted with the question of how intuitions become representational, which is an issue that previous intentionalist readings have been unable to answer. I close by suggesting that the path to a successful account involves abandoning a receptive, e.g., causal view of representation in favor of a projective view. In chapter 2 I exposit Kant’s account of representation, drawing primarily on his treatment of this topic in the A Transcendental Deduction. The initial phase of his explanation involves establishing the formal, necessary unity of consciousness. This general unity can be inferred from the analytic unity of concepts, which is the doctrine that all representable instances of a given concept are necessarily unified. We are able to apply empirical concepts, which are unifying functions, to intuitions because of this overarching unity. Kant then argues that since all intuitions are representational they necessarily all have something that makes them representational. But the only thing that they necessarily share is being part of the necessary unity of consciousness. He infers that the formal unity of consciousness is what constitutes representation. However, the A TD does not explain what this amounts to. Previewing the result of the First Analogy, I offer a crucial example that shows how the nonempirical unities that are the result of applying the schematized concept of substance to various intuitional images creates an identity that exceeds phenomenal similarities. This protectively represents matter, and thus objects, that exist externally from consciousness. I also examine the role that the treatment of representation plays in the TD. Since it is schematized categorical unification that makes intuitions representational, it follows that anything we represent must conform to the categories, thus objectively justifying them. The other aspects of the Deduction are

Introduction

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briefly elucidated as well. Kant’s explanations involving synthesis create an enhanced non-empiricist psychology that is required by the necessary unity of consciousness. And I maintain that transcendental apperception consists of nonempirical knowledge of this necessary unity. I also explain how Kant’s rewrite of this material (the B TD) focuses on the anti-empiricist aspects of it, which unfortunately resulted in a curtailing of the exposition of the notion of representation. This chapter closes with an appendix that critiques Longuenesse’s claim that Kant uses the term “concept” in two distinct senses. I argue that the unifying functions view successfully explains the passages that she cites in favor of her alternative reading. We then turn to the Analogies. In chapter 3 I criticize the standard reading of the First Analogy, by Allison, which attributes the argument that in order to represent change there must also be some represented constancy, even if only temporary; I maintain that this interpretation does not establish the Analogy and it is not textually supported. A new reading is developed that interprets Kant as raising the issue of how we are able to represent time. I show that the text sketches a critique of the possible ways of explaining the representation of time constructively, by beginning from representations of sequences, of changes, of simultaneity, or of durations. This analysis entails that the representation of persistence is conceptually prior to the representation of these other temporal modes. Since there is no persistence in consciousness, Kant concludes that identities of matter—the schematized version of the category of substance—provide the only feasible explanation of temporal representation. I also show that on this understanding of Kant’s reasoning in the First Analogy the Refutation of Idealism follows directly, since we must accept the actuality of the external world in order to represent time as actual. Chapter 4 is concerned with the other two Analogies, primarily the Second. I argue that the main reasoning of the First Analogy which establishes the primacy of persistent in temporal representation also leaves us with no explanation of how we are able to represent sequences. This shows that, contrary to Guyer’s reading, Kant’s reasoning cannot be understood as epistemic, since that interpretation takes the ability to represent changes for granted. Moreover, the First Analogy’s argumentation undermines Hume’s account of causation, since that similarly assumes that the representation of sequences is unproblematic. I argue that Kant’s reasoning consists of another inference to the only feasible explanation of temporal representation, viz., that sequences are represented as necessitated state transitions in substances. Thus, all changes are instances of causal rules. As Kant acknowledges, this is drastically different from the usual understanding of causation as consisting of sequences of events. I explore and develop this rule-based account, and

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Introduction

raise some issues, and then suggest ways in which they can be successfully dealt with. The Third Analogy is briefly examined as well. The First Analogy also leaves us with no explanation of how we are able to represent simultaneity, so the reasoning in the Third is again an inference to the only feasible explanation, namely to the necessary causal interaction (co-influence) of all substances, which Kant equates with the schematized category of Community. The result is the complete necessary unity of the universe. I close the chapter by applying this new reading of the Analogies to develop a full explanation of how we represent time, which Kant did not provide. Two important implications are, first, that that the representation of time for mental states is based on the representation of external time, and second that this account appears to reduce the temporal to the physical, viz., time is represented by substances, their state transitions, and their causal interactions. Drawing on the results of the three previous chapters, I develop a fairly complete account of Kantian semantics in chapter 5. We begin by considering why the view that intuitions have nonconceptual content, as advocated by those attempting a direct realist reading, is mistaken. I then examine Sellars’s treatment of the content of intuitions that supposedly involves empirical concepts. A careful analysis of his discussion reveals that the “this” phrases that he ascribes to intuitions are not actually conceptual. And since their supposed content depends on independent representations of instances by imagistic intuitions, Sellars’s postulation is shown to be redundant. I then proceed to develop the imagistic intuitions account, arguing that they should be understood as depicting rather than as having truth-valued content. This leads to consideration of schemata, which I maintain are best understood as rules that coordinate our imagistic and linguistic representations by providing imagistic types that correspond to concepts. So, the full representational account of intuitions is that, as a result of unities that are instances of the schematized relational categories, intuitions protectively depict instances of properties in substances and their changes. Two appendixes are included. The first examines the lone post-critical passage where Kant briefly characterizes animal psychology. I argue that this should be read as upholding the view that animals’ conscious perceptions do not have objects, which is consistent with the idea that animals lack concepts, and, in particular, the categories. In the second appendix I critically examine McDowell’s claim that for Kant intuitions are conceptual. I apply the point drawn from the examination of Sellars that concepts represent the general and thus require separate, nonconceptual representations of the instances that they unify. I further argue that when Kant describes perception as “spontaneous” (in the TD), he does not mean that it conceptual, rational, and free as McDowell assumes. Rather,

Introduction

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this term is used there to characterize cognitive processing that is not determined by the input. With a full understanding of Kant’s account of representation in place, chapter 6 takes up metaphysical issues, beginning with a dialectic discussion of Kant’s transcendental idealism and his empirical realism. I argue that with the projective account of representation he manages to separate existence that is external to consciousness from the idea of mind-independent existence, viz., existence in itself. While we both do and must represent a world of external substances, this is a projection of the forms of space and time that come from the mind. The external is thus mind-dependent. However, this does not mean that the world is an arbitrary invention, since Kant holds an epistemic view on which our perceptual representations are constrained by the on-going input of sensations. I then turn to the concept of the noumena and argue that the present reading allows this to be understood as a minimal, purely negative notion whose primary role is to serve as a semantic contrast with the idea of mind-dependent existence. And the projective account also avoids the problem of affectation since sensations do not have objects. We do need to conceive of them being somehow caused, but as Kant explains, the transcendental object can play this role. The transcendental object is not, as has sometimes been thought, part of the noumena, but is rather the completely abstract conception of an external object. I also point out that the present reading does allow us to attribute causes of specific sensations to specific objects, as long as we avoid assigning objects to sensations and continue to understand that the represented causes are protectively represented. The projective reading thus provides a new understanding of much of the Transcendental Analytic. The chapter closes with applications to two other sections of the Critique. I first explain how, on this view of representation, all that Kant needs from the Aesthetic is the thesis that space and time are the a priori forms of sensibility. Metaphysical realist alternatives are ruled out since the semantics of the categories is founded in intuitions. And the projective view also allows us to characterize the solution to the first two Antinomies as a matter of epistemic and representational limits—ideas enable us to conceive of metaphysical possibilities that lie, epistemically, beyond the humanly accessible realm. By way of wrapping up, the conclusion presents an inventory of the many substantial justificatory and explanatory results that have been developed throughout. I then provide some mostly favorable critical reflections—I maintain that under this reading, Kant’s representational, epistemic, and metaphysical system should be acknowledged as a strong contender in contemporary philosophy.

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Introduction

And in the main appendix I critically evaluate the inferentialist view that treats inferences as semantically primary and attempts to explain concepts as derived from them. Contrary to Landy’s reading, I argue that there is no textual evidence to support the attribution of inferentialism to the Critique. I also examine his attribution of an isomorphic view of representation to Kantian intuitions and show that it does not work. I then consider Brandom’s inferentialism as a potential competing account of concepts. I argue that when we consider concept learning, his view either results in circularity or else leads to a fatal holism. And I explain how, by contrast, Kant’s view of empirical concepts as unifying functions that derive their content from independently given intuitions avoids Quinean holism.

Chapter 1

The Need for a Representational Reading

In this chapter I motivate the quest for a successful representationalist reading by clearing the field of alternative interpretations. We will begin by reviewing five Kantian doctrines concerning idealism, realism, and a priori knowledge that need to be reconciled to yield a coherent overall interpretation of the Critique. I then evaluate attempted readings, viz., phenomenalism, direct realism, and the epistemic approach, as well as previous representational accounts. I will argue that each fails to uphold one or more of these doctrines, thereby showing that we are in need of a new, more successful approach. During this process we will examine some important aspects of Kant’s understanding of perception, in particular the role of sensations and the imagistic nature of intuitions. It will emerge that what we need is an account of how intuitions represent. The chapter closes with a sketch of the projective, correspondence account of representation, which I begin developing in the next chapter. This approach will provide a new perspective that promises success with the otherwise unattained goal of providing a complete and successful understanding of Kant’s epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological weltanschauung. MAIN DOCTRINES The first and foremost of the Critique’s doctrines is transcendental idealism. In the Aesthetic, following the presentation of a number of fairly succinct supporting arguments, Kant states the strong and surprising conclusion that (1) Space and time do not subsist for themselves nor are they properties of things in themselves. They are nothing other than the a priori forms of appearances thus of outer and inner sense, respectively. (A26/B42 and A31/B49)1 9

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The idea of a priori perceptual form can be readily comprehended and acknowledged. This is to say that our perceptions of the world involve a spatial form that is both not derived empirically and is the necessary framework of all intuitions—we cannot have or conceive of having nonspatial perceptions of the world. Similarly, we cannot have or conceive of having nontemporal awareness of either our thoughts or of the world. So, assuming that the attribution of these forms is correct, then we know a priori anything we perceive in the world, that is, any external object, will necessarily be at a spatial location with spatial properties, and we also know a priori that everything we perceive, both these spatial objects and our thoughts, must be experienced as occurring at a time. This would seemingly be consistent with a metaphysical realist view, where our spatial and temporal perceptual forms represent externally, mind-independently existing space and time. However, the further claim that space and time are not properties of things in themselves is what makes this idealism, thus seemingly implying that these spatial and temporal forms do not correspond to independently existing entities or sets of properties or relations. By itself, this might be understood as asserting skepticism about space and time, that is, that what our perceptual representations of space and time depict does not exist, thus making them all false. However, the second part of the main conclusion in the Aesthetic is that (2) There is objective, empirical reality for space in regard to anything that we can perceive as an external object and similarly time is objectively, empirically real for any object that we can experience, which thus includes both external objects as well as our thoughts. (A27–28/B44 and A35/B52)

But, Kant emphasizes, this holds only when characterized as relative to the “subjective” conditions of inner and outer intuitions, that is, as relative to the a priori forms of outer and inner sense. He does not explain what it means to be empirically real, and this is the chief obstacle to making sense of the conjunction of these conclusions. Since the empirical concerns perception and being real either is a matter of being true, or at least entails truth, the obvious way to understand this is in terms of the potential truth of empirical judgments. Thus, Kant is maintaining that judgments such as “there is now a table near me,” discounting illusion or misperception, are true, but only insofar as it is understood as relative to the perceptual form of outer sense, space. And thus, for example, “I am now perceiving a table,” should similarly be true, as understood relative to the form of inner sense, time. So empirical judgements can be true, but only in relation to the a priori forms of sensibility (1).

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This results in the most vexing problem in reading the Critique, viz., how to reconcile the combination of idealism and realism about space and time. The natural way to understand the truth of an empirical spatial judgment is that its truth is the result of a correspondence with an external, and thus mind-independent spatiotemporal world. And Kant advocates a definition of truth that consists of the agreement of cognitions with their objects (A58/ B52), which is seemingly a correspondence view. However, if empirical judgments involving space and time are true in virtue of agreeing with what exists in a corresponding spatiotemporal world, this is to say that there is a mind-external spatial world which appears to be direct conflict with the idealism of (1). Before examining ways that have been suggested to attempt to resolve this, we will also consider several additional main doctrines, beginning with: (3) We know the world, and also our minds, only in terms of appearance, not as they are in themselves. Appearances are “mere” representations.

This contrast is first introduced in the Aesthetic and is then mentioned at various key points, where the implication is that invoking this contrast is essential for that part of the investigation. The problem here is to figure out what Kant means by “appearance.” He provides the minimal definition at A20/B34 that it is “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition.” This may make it seem that appearances are external objects. However, Kant frequently tells us that appearances are representations, and in fact “mere” representations, seemingly in contrast to things that exist externally, in themselves, for example, A 101, B164, A104, A 369–370. So, at first pass, the way to understand this contrast is as mental vs. metaphysical, that is, since space and time are mere forms of representation, the spatial temporal world and temporal mind (consciousness) are somehow mere representations, in contrast to things as they are in themselves. A further doctrine, which is central to the positive part of the Critique, viz., the Aesthetic and the Analytic, is: (4) We have synthetic a priori metaphysical knowledge—we are able to make true nonanalytic, a priori judgments about the world.

Kant maintains we have nonanalytic a priori knowledge, both about geometry and mathematics and also about the spatial (external) world. In the Principles he presents justifications of principles containing the categories, that is, the nonempirical, thus “pure” (a priori) concepts. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, this results in a metaphysics that consists of persistent substances, that is,

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matter, whose changes of state involve necessitated causation and that necessarily stand in mutual causal influence. The final doctrine we will consider is much less textually obvious than the others: (5) Substance exists external to consciousness.

We will see in chapter 3 that this is established by the First Analogy. The argument is that in order to represent time we must primarily represent persistence—not limited durations, but complete persistence. Since there is no persistence in our conscious states we must represent persistence in the as external substratum of matter, which is not directly perceived. While this substantially bolsters (2), seemingly clarifying the nonmental existence of the external world, like (2) it seems to be in direct conflict with (1), since external substance is spatial. (5) appears, prima facie, to indicate that the world does exist nonmentally, thus in itself. How, then, can we reconcile these seemingly inconsistent doctrines? We will proceed to critically examine each of the available readings of the Critique. The focus will be primarily, but not exclusively, on transcendental idealism and empirical realism which is the primary source of conflict. I will return to the synthetic a priori near the end of the chapter. PHENOMENALISM Doctrine (1) can be read as asserting that the spatial world is purely mental, which is phenomenalism. This was the dominant interpretation throughout the 19th century, beginning with Kant’s contemporaries, but there are very few current phenomenalistic commentators (Van Cleve, 1999; Stang, 2022). On this approach, which amounts to a much more psychologically complex version of Berkeley’s outlook, external objects are understood as constructs from conscious, perceptual experiences. For example, the table I’m currently perceiving is constituted by my current intuition, together with all other intuitions I’ve had of this table. One immediate problem here, that arises for all phenomenalist views, is that if we use only actual perceptual experiences, then spatial objects such as the table do not exist when no one is having appropriate perceptual experiences. The more or less standard solution for all modern phenomenalists is to identify spatial objects with possible experiences. Thus, although I did not have any intuitions of the table when I had intuitions of being in a different room a few minutes ago, I would have had table intuitions were I to have had intuitions of being in the room where the table is located.2

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The phenomenalist interpretation is rooted in idealism about space (1). However, since the realism of (2) is conceived purely in terms of actual and possible conscious states, it seems disingenuous to call this realism rather than idealism—this would turn the seemingly paradigm idealist Berkeley into a realist. And, moreover, Kant was incensed by the Garve review that attributed a Berklelean view to him—in the Prolegomena (§290–293, 41–45) he asserts that his view is distinct from Berkeley’s phenomenalism, which he equates with turning the sensible world into mere illusion. Moreover, a phenomenalist reading faces several further daunting problems. The first is that this outlook does not seem consistent with the contrast between appearances and things in themselves (3), since, prima facie, it does not allow any basis for conceptualizing anything that is not mental. Similarly, this view faces the problem of understanding the basis of sensations, which as we will consider below are the primary input for Kant. It does not seem reasonable to hold that we cause our sensations, which amounts to solipsism. Or if we postulate an external, that is, noumenal world, that is the cause of our perceptions, this is inconsistent with the supposed reality of the phenomenal world—this unknowable external existence would seem to be the actual metaphysical reality thereby undermining empirical realism (2). This is thus not an acceptable reading of the Critique. There is a long history of attempts by Kantian phenomenalists to address the thing-in-itself, without any apparent success. However, we need not explore the details since the final difficulty is clearly fatal to this approach. As we will see in chapter 3, Kant produces an effective counter to external world skepticism in the argumentation of the First Analogy, which I have previewed above. He maintains that in order to represent time, we must represent non-directly perceived, external substances (5) which is inconsistent with a phenomenalist reading of the Critique.3 DIRECT REALISM The past few decades have seen the rise of attempted direct realist readings of the Critique, which seek an alternative to a phenomenalist interpretation (Langton, 1998; Collins, 1999; Allais, 2015). Kant aside, typical direct realist, or as they are often called, “naive realist” accounts understand perception as nonrepresentational—contact with the external world is understood as not mediated by mental states such as perceptual imagistic representations. However, Kant’s account of perception might appear to be contrary to the direct view. In particular, there is the notion of synthesis, which Kant defines as “the act of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A77/B103). This can

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Chapter 1

be plausibly understood as perceptual processing, to put it in contemporary language, where the synthesis unites representations. But this is seemingly to say that our perceptions, and specifically our intuitions, are representational mental states. However, those seeking to attribute direct realism have sensed an opening in Kant’s characterization of intuitions as immediately related to objects (e.g., A320, B377). It has thus been proposed, notably by Allais, that appearances, and thus institutions, can be understood as consisting of having direct contact with external objects. On this reading, synthesis, which is needed for concepts and thus judgments, happens after this initial presentation. So, the proposal is that there is an initial nonrepresentational awareness of objects. An immediate obstacle for a direct realist reading is that if what we are presented with perceptually are spatial/temporal objects that exist apart from consciousness, then this is not transcendental idealism about space and time since the objects’ existence would seemingly be existence in itself. To address this issue and using a brief passage in the Aesthetic (B67) as a springboard, Langston (1998) develops a reading on which the external objects that we are supposedly directly aware of in intuition also have additional purely internal properties that are unknowable for humans. Those external properties that are revealed relationally in perception are taken to be the appearances, while the intrinsic properties constitute the thing-in-itself. This reading thus interprets Kant’s assertions about the unknowability of things in themselves as a thesis about the necessary incompleteness of our knowledge of that reality, that is, it is not that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves at all, but rather that we cannot know their complete nature. I will argue below that this proposed relational reading does not work. In the meantime, we will examine the direct realist view further, in part to give it its due and, in the process, to develop a competing representationalist reading of Kant’s account of perception. Kant’s various characterizations of both appearances and objects as representations would seem to offer strong evidence in favor of a representationalist reading. As a counter in support of a direct realist interpretation, it has been suggested that “Vorstellung” which is normally translated as “representation” could instead be interpreted as meaning “presentation.” (See Allais, 2015, 23–25, for a summary of this approach.) Thus, passages that characterize objects as (mere) representations can instead be translated as characterizing the way they are perceived, for example, “objects are nothing other than mere presentations of our sensibility” (B45). However, this interpretation cannot be sustained. First, there are various passages where Kant uses “Vorstellung” in connection with other types of mental states that are not a matter of perceptual presentation. Thus, in regard to judgments at A69/B94, he mentions the “mediate representation of

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divisibility” and in regard to synthesis at B131 he describes the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. And, importantly, we have the inventory of types of psychological states at A320/B376–377, where the genius is representation (“Vorstellung”), that is, Kant is cataloging the various types of representations. Under “objective perception,” that is, “cognitions” he lists both intuitions and concepts. In other words, intuitions are types of representational states just as much as concepts are. In this last passage he does describe intuitions as “immediately related to the object,” thus indicating that the immediacy does not mean that intuitions are nonrepresentational presentations of objects. We do, though, need to understand what the immediacy of the representational connection involves, as we will consider below. We should also consider that, while a few passages such as B45 could perhaps be understood as emphasizing the direct presentational nature of intuitions, there are other passages where this approach will not work. One of the most significant occurs in Kant’s examination of the concept of an object of representation in the A Transcendental Deduction. He states that “all representations, as representations, have their object and can themselves be objects of other representations in turn” (A 108). On a representationalist reading, this makes perfect sense, since on that approach, to say that a mental state is a representation is to say that it has a corresponding object, which is the first point of the passage. The second point here is that this representational state can also itself be represented, for example, as “that appearance.” By contrast, if we substitute “presentation” for “representation, we get: “all presentations, as presentations, have their object,” which is fine, but for “can themselves be objects of other representations” we get something like “can themselves be objects of other presentations,” which makes no sense—what would a presentation of a presentation be? And the passage continues, “these appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be intuited by us.”4 On a representationalist reading this is a denial of what the direct realists are trying to defend, namely that we are not directly encountering objects themselves in appearances. Objects are rather outside of consciousness, and intuition cannot as it were stretch there. By contrast, on the suggested direct realist reading we get “these appearances are . . . themselves only presentations which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be intuited by us.” This is incoherent, since to say that an object is being presented in appearance supposedly means that it is right there in consciousness, and is thus intuited by us, contradicting the final assertion. So this particular passage, which we will see in the next chapter is an important part of the A TD, cannot be given a coherent direct realist reading, thus providing further strong support against the proposed reinterpretation of “Vorstellung” as “presentation.”

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There are also good reasons from Kant’s psychology for thinking that intuitions are representational, and, more precisely, that they are imagistic representations. Consider first the doctrine of inner sense, which has been almost completely ignored by recent direct realist approaches. We might attempt to understand outer sense as separate from inner sense, in that we have, psychologically and thus epistemically, direct intuitions of the external world via outer sense independent of our intuitions of our mental states, which inner sense provides. But this is not Kant’s view. His position is instead that all intuitions involve inner sense. We can readily see that by noting that time is the a priori form of inner, but not of outer intuition—we cannot intuit time externally, nor can we intuit space internally (A23/B37). An outer intuition that did not involve inner sense would thus seemingly consist of atemporal consciousness, which is impossible to imagine. And it is apparent that this is not Kant’s view, since he tells us that all representations, both those that result from external influences as well as those that result from inner causes, belong to inner sense (A98–99). But, since inner sense is the way that the mind intuits its inner state (A22/B37), it follows that we must regard our intuitions of spatial objects as consisting of internal, thus representational states. Corroborating evidence in support of the representational approach arises from the fact that Kant explains perception as beginning not with intuitions, but with sensations. In the first two paragraphs of the Aesthetic we are told that intuitions are given as a result of the way that the mind is affected. And sensations are defined, or explained, as arising from effects on our representational capacity (A20/B33–34). We can make sense of these assertions if we understand sensations as arising directly from external effects and intuitions as composed out of sensations, thus amounting to an indirect effect of the external. If, by contrast, we were to try to understand intuitions as something like nonrepresentations of immediate contact with the external world, then there would be no role for sensations in Kantian psychology. That is, we would have to conceive of objects as both causing sensations and separately causing intuitions. But, as we consider further below, Kant never says that intuitions are immediately caused by objects. And since as we have just noted, he does assert that intuitions are the result of the effects of objects on the mind, it follows that the initial stage of perception is the registering of sensations which then somehow lead to appearances and intuitions, thus making sensations mental intermediaries between the world and intuitions. Kant’s characterizations of sensations suggest that we are consciously aware of them as what we now call qualia—both the Lockean secondary qualities and also mental state qualia. He gives the examples of colors and tastes at least twice, A175/B217 and also at A374 where he includes pleasure and pain as well. A somewhat more complete list would thus apparently be color, sound, taste, odor, as well as heat, pleasure, and pain, and tactile

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qualities including bodily sensations. All of these are the matter for intuitions and space and time are the a priori forms (A20/B34). And since perceptual qualia—color qualia in particular—are imagistic, appearances and intuitions should be understood as imagistic perceptual representations that are composed by sensations being combined with the mental forms of space and time. Thus, as a very simplified example, sensed color qualia get assigned to specific locations in the spatial framework that is the visual field, resulting in what we now call visual perceptual imagery. We can thus understand appearances and institutions as consisting of imagistic perceptual states. This idea of constructing the visual field from sensations together with the a priori form of space appears to involve an empirical instance of what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension (A99, B160), viz., registering components of a complex representation, composing a unified whole, and then grasping the whole. We find confirmation that intuitions result from synthesis in a crucial passage—that we will examine further in the next chapter—where Kant states that intuitions are “produced through a function of synthesis” (A105). It is also worth noting that contemporary scientific theories explain perception in terms of many successive stages of computation that gradually produce the final product of conscious perceptual representations, for example, visual perceptual imagery. These theories look to be strongly consistent with Kant’s view of syntheses, that is, unifying mental processes that construct complex representations from simpler inputs. It is thus dubious for direct realists to reject the view that appearances, and thus intuitions are (synthetically) constructed out of sensations. An alternative would require providing some other account of the relation of sensations to appearances and intuitions. But no other explanation seems available. And, as just noted, since it looks like perceptual science is developing explanations that broadly uphold the Kantian view of synthesis in perception, it is preferable to read Kant in a way that foreshadows our current scientific theories. Allais, does, though, at one point admit that intuitions may be something like imagistic representations, but maintains that this is consistent with direct realism. As she characterizes it, A perceptual mental state is not merely a modification of an inner state of a subject but a relational state essentially involving the object and a conscious subject . . . [that] makes objects available for demonstrative identification and cognitive scrutiny in a non-mediated way, and the qualitative features of perceptual experience are of the objects perceived . . . rather than the properties of entirely inner, merely mental states. (Allais, 2015, 106–107)

The perceptual relation that constitutes a “spatial object’s being immediately present to consciousness is not the same as its being the last link in a causal

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process involving the object, the optic nerve, and the brain” (110). This seemingly allows her to grant that appearances and intuitions do indeed consist of mental states, but they are not representational but instead involve a direct relation to nonmental objects. So, her view is apparently that even though appearances and intuitions are not psychologically immediate, they are nevertheless somehow epistemically immediate. Turning to the final issue, a direct realist reading is prime facie strongly consistent with empirical realism (2) since intuitions are understood as directly related to nonmental spatiotemporal objects. However, this reading seems flatly inconsistent with Kant’s transcendental idealism about space and time (1), since nonmental spatiotemporal objects would seemingly have to be things in themselves, existing in space and time or with spatiotemporal properties. In an attempt to reconcile these doctrines, Collins (1999, 54 ff.) suggests that the things that are spatial objects exist apart from our minds, and we apprehend them with the subjective form of space—that is how they appear to us. But that does not mean that they are phenomenal entities, since appearances present the existence of nonmental objects. Allais provides a substantial development of this idea in terms of what she calls manifest qualities. They are supposedly “presented to our conscious experience” (2015, 117). These presentations are not to be understood as mental effects with external causes, but rather they are internal to the subject (118–119). And, most importantly, manifest qualities are not supposed to be understood phenomenally: This does not mean that they exist only in particular events of being perceived, much less as states in subjects. Although objects do not have essentially manifest qualities independently of the possibility our perceiving them, like manifest qualities generally, objects have their essentially manifest qualities even when we are not currently experiencing them. We can explain our perceiving such a quality in terms of the object’s having the quality, together with our being suitably situated and suitably receptive. This enables us to think about objects as existing outside us and distinct from us . . . even though the qualities through which we understand and engage with the objects cannot be divorced from a relation to us. (Allais, 2015, 210)

She thus attempts to reconcile transcendental idealism (1) and empirical realism (2) using the view that spatial and temporal properties of objects are not inherently mental but are instead qualities of external objects that are only revealed to suitable kinds of perceiving minds, such as ours. They are thus essentially relational to perceivers. If this account is to be workable, we must be able to conceive of objects apart from our perceptions of them—as she indicates in the above passage, objects need to be understood as existing “outside” of us. Objects with such

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mind-independent existence can then be understood as revealing their spatial and temporal properties to (suitable) perceivers. They are thus both empirically real and relationally transcendentally ideal. However, I believe that the following pair of points undermines this proposed view. First, external, physical objects are constitutively spatial and temporal. They consist of located clumps of matter that takes up space. Thus, my armchair consists of a distinctively shaped array of matter, located in a particular spatial location. And the atoms of which it is made are inherently spatial. The other qualities that we are aware of perceptually, viz., the secondary qualities, are dependent on spatial qualities. In particular, we (perhaps falsely) experience color as residing in the surfaces of objects, or in beams of light or gasses. Without spatial extent, there is no possibility of external color. So, without the supposedly manifest qualities of space and time, objects, as we know them perceptually, are nothing. That is, it is not coherent to say that objects, as we perceive them, have manifest spatial and temporal qualities since something cannot both be a quality and also be the thing that has qualities. We have, though, noted that Kantian direct realists, including Allais, following Langton, also attribute unknown and unknowable intrinsic properties to objects which is intended to be consistent with Kant’s view of the thing-in-itself. The view thus seems to be that these intrinsic properties are the anchors of the relational, perceptually knowable properties, apparently including space and time. I will now, though, present a second point that shows this is not a workable account. Existence is temporal, viz., things exist at times, as Kant notes in the First Analogy at A183/B226–227. But this is inconsistent with the claim that time is merely a manifest property. The temporal existence of intrinsic properties cannot be perceptually revealed, since that would require that these properties are knowable, viz., perceivable. Nor can we postulate a (presumably unknowable) non-relational, external time to patch up the view, since that would be temporal existence in itself, contrary to Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental ideality of time. The strategy of explaining empirical realism relationally thus fails. And without this, there is no basis for trying to read Kant as a direct realist—we should instead pursue a reading that accepts that institutions are constructed via synthesis from sensations.5 THE EPISTEMIC APPROACH Another apparent alternative is an epistemic approach to Kant’s idealism, influentially presented by Allison (2004, 2006). His interpretation turns on

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the notion of an epistemic condition, which is explained as “a necessary condition for the representation of objects, that is, a condition without which our representations would not relate to objects, or equivalently, possess objective reality” (2004, 11). Space and time are thus understood as sensible (epistemic) conditions. These epistemic conditions are supposed to be distinct from either psychological or ontological conditions. Allison’s view is apparently that we are not to think of space and time as psychological forms, since that claim when joined with the denial that space and time also have a mind-independent existence leaves us with phenomenalism. That is, if space and time are nothing but aspects of our psychology, it would seem that the spatiotemporal world must likewise be purely mental. He also claims that transcendental idealism about space and time is not an ontological thesis. Rather, it is “an alternative to ontology, according to which space and time are understood in terms their epistemic functions . . . rather than as ‘realities’ of one sort or another” (98). Allison’s account has been variously criticized for trivializing Kant’s idealism. However, I will focus instead on how he attempts to explain empirical realism. Allison states that this “may be viewed normatively as a “warrant for attributing spatiality . . . a priori to all objects of outer sense. It is, however, a ‘restricted warrant,’ with the restriction being to objects of human experience, as opposed to an ‘unrestricted warrant’ to apply them to things in general” (121). By “things in general” he apparently means the same objects but considered apart from human cognition. As he explains, “The claim is not that things transcending the conditions of human cognition cannot exist (this would make these conditions ontological rather than epistemic) but merely that such things cannot count as objects for us” (12). His view is thus that it is that while it is unproblematic for Kant to say that the table that I’m now perceiving exists independent of my or any other human cognition, I am only justified in attributing spatial or temporal aspects to it relative to human cognition, thus making it an object for me. However, we can see immediately that this proposed reading falls prey to the above objection to direct realism—each of the two points in the objection separately undermines this account. First, note again that existence is temporal so that a thing that, as he describes it, transcends the conditions of human cognition could not be said to exist since time is a condition of human cognition. Second, since external objects are constitutively spatial and temporal, and are thus nothing apart from space and time, this undermines his required contrast case of things in general—we are left without any way to understand what the phrase “things in general” can mean. We therefore cannot maintain that Kant’s empirical realism is a matter of a restricted warrant. And, if, so to speak, the warrant is not restricted, this means that apart from the spatial and temporal conditions of human cognition

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we cannot conceive of objects existing at all, which is an ontological rather than an epistemic result; and we are seemingly back again to unworkable phenomenalism. We should also note a wrong turn that Allison makes at the outset—he asserts that “cognition requires that an object somehow be given to the mind” (13) which he thinks that this is an implicit assumption on Kant’s part. By this he apparently means that representations of objects are somehow given as intuitions.6 One might think, with our above considerations, that the composition of intuitions via synthesis creates representations of objects, that is, that such representations are not given, but rather constructed, as we will consider below and throughout. However, Allison argues that on this type of reading, “to anticipate the argument of the Analogies, there would be no room for an objective ordering of states and events, as distinct from a subjective ordering of perceptions.” And this, he maintains, would either result in phenomenalism or else lead to skepticism (15–16). But, on the contrary, it hardly seems appropriate to think that Kant met these Humean challenges simply by assuming that we have veridical representations of objects. Rather, as we will consider in the next chapter, Kant’s account of how intuitions represent objects is central to the framework of the Critique. We will see in chapters 3 and 4 that a correct understanding of the Analogies consists of an account that undermines the collapse into subjective phenomenalism or skepticism. REPRESENTATIONAL PERCEPTION AND CAUSATION A different approach other than phenomenalism, direct realism or the epistemic reading is thus required. A straightforward way to understand the position that is described in (1) and (2) is that space and time are nothing more than forms of perceptual representation, although, in application, they do represent both external space and external (as well as mental) time. Both phenomenalism and direct realism, though, cannot acknowledge this, since neither allows for a representational view of perception. For phenomenalism, an intuition of, for example, a table does not represent something distinct from the intuition that corresponds to it; rather, the intuition itself is part of what constitutes the existence of the table. And direct realism similarly rejects a representational model of perception in favor of something stronger, where the intuition of a table somehow involves direct contact with the table itself. A representational approach to perception has occasionally been attributed to the Critique, both historically and in relatively recent literature by Sellars (1992, 2002b), George (1981), Aquila (1983), Guyer (1987), Pereboom (1988), Dickerson (2004), Jankowiak (2014), Landy (2015), and Shahmoradi (2019). A more fully developed treatment of Kant typically couples this

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understanding of perception with the claim that the represented external world is merely intentional (Pereboom, Aquilla, Jankowiak, and perhaps also Sellars). That is, an intuited object is nothing but a representation. This is different from the phenomenalist view in that it characterizes intuitions as representing external objects, that is, a non-mental spatial world, whereas for the phenomenalist the subjective experience is the object itself. The intentional object account, as I shall temporarily label it, has, though, not received very much attention, for three apparent reasons. First, advocates often label it a variant of phenomenalism, for example, “non-ontological phenomenalism,” which has led opponents to simply collapse it into phenomenalism. This is not, though, an appropriate label, since the phenomenal, especially in contemporary philosophy, is constituted by subjective conscious states. But the interpretation in question does not focus on such subjective states themselves, but rather on their representational content. It is thus preferable to use the “intentional object” designation for these readings. Further, though, the intentional object approach does not seem to do justice to Kant’s realism (2), since to say that objects are merely intentional suggests that the represented spatial world is a fiction. And finally, what I regard as the real underlying problem for this account is that proponents have not been able to offer an explanation of what makes intuitions representational. For instance, Aquila (1984) advocates the view that intuitions involve “an unanalyzable and primitive sort of ‘object-directedness’” (98). And, as we will consider In chapter 5, Sellars tries to explain the content of intuitions by appeal to concepts; but we will see that this attempt fails. And without an account of what makes intuitions representational, there is no way to definitively distinguish this view from phenomenalism. It thus seems that what we need is an account of representational perception that allows us wiggle room between how we subjectively experience objects and how we represent them as external to consciousness. However, we are immediately faced with the seeming implication that if Kant’s view is that there is a non-spatiotemporal world that causes our perceptual representations, then we falsely represent this world as spatial and temporal, contrary to (2). Or, if there is a way around that, then we are faced with veil of impressions skepticism, since as Kant readily acknowledges we cannot have knowledge of the cause of our perceptual representations. So, it appears that an intentional object reading will collapse into phenomenalism—this has become a standard assumption in the literature, as we see in Allison’s (above) remark. My diagnosis of these difficulties is that they rest, either explicitly or tacitly, on a causal account of representation. Thus, if the content of our perceptual representations is derived from external causes, and if space and time are mere forms of representation, then there either cannot be a correct

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correspondence between perception and a non-spatiotemporal world (thus a collapse into phenomenalism), or else we seemingly cannot know if there is such a correspondence or not (skepticism). The solution that I will develop in this book begins with the insight that Kant rejects a causal understanding of representation, that is, one that conceives of perceptual representation as receptive, where inner content is determined by the outer. If representation is not a matter of receptive relations to the external, then it must somehow consist in something purely inner, thus psychological states and relations. This might perhaps suggest the semantic inferentialist approach, suggested by Sellars and developed by Brandom. The fundamental idea of their views is that the primary basis for representation is found not in perception but in inferences, which can be used to derive concepts. It thus might appear that if we adopt an inferentialist understanding of concepts, then we can explain all representation without needing to rely on a causal account; and Landy (2015) provides exactly this kind of interpretation of Kant. However, in the main appendix, I argue that inferentialism is mistaken as a reading of the Critique, for at least two initial reasons. First, there is no substantial textual justification for attributing this approach, and there are also good textual reasons for rejecting it. Second, this results in semantic holism, which is unworkable for Kant, since he requires a hard distinction between the a priori and the empirical, especially in regard to concepts. But what is of chief important here is the further point that an inferential account cannot actually explain the representation status of intuitions, because, as we will see in an examination of Sellars in chapter 5, concepts require separate representations of their instances. Landy’s treatment is very revealing in this regard, since when explaining representation for intuitions he asserts that “when one encounters an object, a manifold of sensations is produced in the experiencing subject, which sensations correspond to the parts of the object encountered” (158). He is thus advocating the view that intuitionistic images represent in virtue of an isomorphic relation between the image and object, where the image consists of the parts arranged in the same way as those in the object depicted, as is exemplified in a scale model. An isomorphic account is distinct from inferentialism and might appear to be a way around a receptive causal account of representation. However, it does not address the issue of correspondence. Thus, if we have an imagistic intuition of, say, a tree, on a representationalist understanding of perception, our perceptual knowledge of the tree is solely a matter having the image in question. As Kant says in a crucial passage in the A TD that we will return to in the next chapter, “We have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it.” In other words, we have no independent knowledge of the intuited tree that would allow us to assign an isomorphic representational relation between image and object. The isomorphic account

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of representation thus does not explain correspondence, but rather presupposes it. But without a basis for conceiving of correspondence, the only available isomorphic relations are between various perceptual images of the tree, which is phenomenalism.7 It may be tempting to try to patch up the isomorphic account through a causal theory of the content of sensations, that is, by assigning objects to sensations. Thus, the parts of the represented object cause sensations that correspond to the parts. However, this lands us back again in the problems we have been trying to overcome, that is, if the causing objects have parts, then they are spatial, and thus are seemingly spatial in themselves, contrary to Kant’s idealism about space (1). And this understanding of sensations would also mire Kant in veil of intuitions skepticism, since we can doubt that the relations of the produced sensations correspond to the relations of parts of the object. It is, though, crucial to appreciate that this is not Kant’s view of sensations. While he repeatedly tells us that intuitions relate to objects or conform to objects or give us objects, he does not say that sensations have objects. Rather, sensations are described as “a perception that relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state” (A320/B376, my emphasis). Thus, this passage at the opening of the Aesthetic (A19–20/B34) should not be read as stating that sensations represent the objects that cause them, but rather as stating that sensations are known only as effects. If we understand appearances and thus intuitions as composed via syntheses, out of sensations and the a priori forms of space and time, then correspondence between intuitions and the objects they represent is not derived from the causal content of sensations. Sensations do, however, carry information about the effects of the world on our senses. We should thus instead understand sensations as purely internal informational states.8 Seemingly, to greatly simplify, sensations are qualia that are experienced as occurring at specific regions of the sensory fields, although more complex syntheses may be required, that is, in more contemporary terms, many layers of processing may be needed to produce fully constructed intuitions. PROJECTIVE REPRESENTATION Since sensations do not have causal content, and since intuitions are constructed out of sensations together with the forms of space and time, it likewise cannot be that the content of intuitions is causally based—intuitions do not get their objects in virtue of being the effects of the objects they represent.9 And so much the better, since, as we have considered, a causal theory of representation does not seem to be workable for Kant. But we thus need an

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alternative explanation of how intuitions get objects, that is, how they achieve correspondence with what they represent. As we will see in chapter 2, this is what Kant provides in his discussion of the object of representation in the A Transcendental Deduction. The key aspect of his view of representation is that it is not receptive but is rather projective—intuitions and thus concepts and judgments consist of content that is outward reaching. On the reading that I will extract from passages in the A TD as well as the First Analogy, what makes intuitions representational is that they involve unities that exceed their subjective connections and that thus project correspondents. This is not phenomenalistic content, that is, it is not (just) a matter of relations to other actual and possible perceptions, but rather involves correspondence—we project an external world that is distinct from our conscious states.10 We can thus understand what Kant means when he says that intuitions relate directly to objects (A19/B33, A68/B93, A320/B377). This is not a matter of a causal connection, since while sensations are caused, they have no objects; and they are synthesized to produce intuitions which thus are not causally related to the external. Nor is it some sort of metaphysical revelation as direct realists would have it. It is rather that intuitions are structured in such a way as to have content that projects corresponding objects. There is thus no gap between the intuition and the object, as the (indirect) causal view allows. The synthetic construction of intuitions is thus the construction of projected objects. As we will consider in detail in chapter 6, the projective reading, together with a full understanding of the semantic basis of the categories, will also allow us to avoid the worry that a representational reading fictionalizes the external world. Using the (schematized) category of substance, we represent a world that is external to consciousness (5). And the refutation of idealism, which is a simple consequence of the First Analogy, shows us that the actuality of time requires that we take this external world to be actual, contrary to Cartesian skepticism. But all the same, the world of external substances and events is protectively represented using the a priori forms of space and time. Since our representations of space and time are not derived from the external, this projected world does not exist in itself but is rather mind dependent. One might still object that this means that it is a merely fictional representation, as compared with the reality of what exists mind independently. However, we will see that the categories are semantically based in perceptual representation, and this includes the concept of reality, that is, existence. We are thus unable to form a positive conception of a world that exists for itself, mind independently. The only reality we are able to represent, viz., the world of external substances, is mind dependent. So, a correct understanding of Kant’s view of representation—consisting of the projective account together with the appearance-based semantics of the categories—shows how

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he can consistently maintain both transcendental idealism (1) and empirical realism (2). And consider the issue of synthetic a priori knowledge. We will see in chapters 3 and 4 that the Analogies argue for a metaphysics of persistent substances whose changes consist of necessitated causal alterations and that necessary stand in relations of mutual causal influence. This is, though, problematic for a direct realist approach. Thus, on Allais’s reading, we intuit singular particulars, where this consists of them being present to consciousness (2015, 153–163). She asserts that we can discriminate and track them, distinctly, and thus seemingly have knowledge of their continued existence, without any need of concepts. But this is at odds with Kant’s metaphysics of substances and necessary causal alterations. If, for example, I am being presented with a lightbulb—the object itself—and am able to track its continued existence and observe changes in its states, such as intuiting it turning on and off, then if Kant’s metaphysics is correct, I am consciously encountering a persistent substance undergoing necessitated alterations in state. But, if, as I think Allais intends, I can supposedly be directly aware of the continued existence of the lightbulb and observe changes in is state, then this is a competing account of our knowledge of existence and change compared to results of the Analogies.11 So if this proposed account of intuited particulars were accurate, it would follow that those principles are not true of intuited objects. By contrast, the projective realist reading that I develop below treats appearances and intuitions as representations, consistent with (3). We will see that the unifications that yield projection consist of the application of a priori unifying functions, viz., the schematized categories, in particular, the relational categories of substance, causation, and community. These are functional unities that correspond to the functional unities of the categories. So, since our intuitions project an external world that has functional unities that are characterized by the categories, we are able make true synthetic a priori judgments about the world (4). In other words, the way we perceptually represent the world guarantees that it has structures corresponding to synthetic a priori principles. And finally, as noted above, my examination of the First Analogy will show that Kant argues that the representation of time must be founded on the representation of external substances, that is, matter (5). It follows that the mere experience of time is contrary to skepticism about the external world that we projectively represent. The projective view of representation reading will thus succeed where the other attempted interpretations fail, yielding a successful reconciliation of doctrines (1–5).

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NOTES 1. Following standard practice, the page numbers in the text refer to the original pagination of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is listed in the margins of this and most other translations. ‘A’ is used to denote passages from the first (1781) edition and ‘B’ to denote passages from the revised (1787) edition. Italics in the quotations reflect Kant’s emphasis, unless otherwise noted. 2. Van Cleve, 1999, 91–95 offers an explanation of Kantian objects along these lines, with the additional first step of constructing objects from sensory qualia, for example, color patches. 3. In addressing what Kant says about substance, Van Cleve (1999, 120–121) suggests postulating noumenal substances. However, by the argument of the First Analogy that I will exposit in chapter 3, that would be to say that our representation of time rests on the unknowable, which would undermine our ability to have knowledge of time. But since we obviously do have knowledge of time, this attempt at preserving the phenomenalist interpretation is unworkable. 4. Kant, 1998, 233. 5. Additionally, the properly exposited proof of the necessary unity of consciousness from the Transcendental Deduction, presented in chapter 2, entails that intuitions must be united with the rest of consciousness. And in chapter 3 we will see that the First Analogy shows that the representation of time requires the representation of persistence. But there is no persistence in consciousness itself. So, this must be achieved by representing a persistent substratum that we are not directly aware of, which is to say that we are not directly aware of time. Each of these results undermines the direct realist view that appearances consist of discrete direct presentations of objects. 6. Personal communication—this is not obvious from Allison’s writing. 7. I provide additional exposition and criticisms of Landy’s account of Kantian representation in the main Appendix. 8. George 1981 defends the claim that sensations are not intentional and usefully documents this view in some of Kant’s predecessors. However, “not intentional” can either mean not (initially) having objects, which I believe is correct, or not being semantic at all, which as I indicate, is not correct in that sensations carry information about how we are affected. 9. Based on Kant’s view that sensations are caused through the affectation of something external together with the fact that the empirical portion of intuitions consists of sensations, Tolley 2013 mistakenly infers that “the having of an empirical intuition likewise depends upon affection and there being an affecting object” (p. 20). He thus appears to think that the objects of intuitions are the result of affectation. But that does result from the former points unless affectation is understood as producing sensations that have objects, which, as I have just argued, is not what Kant says about sensations. (We will examine Kant’s account of the cause of sensations in chapter 6). 10. This view of sensations and intuitions is broadly consistent with that of Jankowiak (2014), who argues that “sensations are the medium out of which empirical representations of external objects are constituted” (494). However, he maintains that representation of the external (“intentional directedness”) (507) is achieved

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merely by combining sensations with the form of space. He does, similarly using my preferred term, characterize sensations in outer intuitions as “projected into spatial arrays,” but this is ambiguous between merely plugging sensations into a subjective spatial array, which is not projective, and is thus phenomenalistic, versus protectively representing a corresponding space, that is, corresponding objects. Again, the question, that we will be concerned with, is how, according to Kant, projection is achieved. 11. Note the idea of nonconceptual knowledge of existence and distinctness similarly competes with Kant’s actual account since these are categories, namely, Reality and Plurality.

Chapter 2

Representation and Unity

The first step toward understanding Kant’s view of representation involves considering what he says about the concept of an object of representation in the A edition of Transcendental Deduction (TD). This will lead to an examination of how he establishes the necessary unity of consciousness. We will then see how this formal unity, and in particular the (schematized) relational categories, constitute representation. Having developed an appreciation of this primary framework, we will consider the role that representation plays in both versions of the TD. I also provide an appendix that critically evaluates Longuenesse’s alternative understanding of Kantian concepts.1 THE CONCEPT OF AN OBJECT OF REPRESENTATION Kant’s account of mental representation is presented in the three paragraphs of the A TD at A104–5 that analyze the concept of an object of representation. (This material is recapped with some variations in the language at A108–109). He first reminds us that “appearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regarded in themselves, in the same way as objects (outside the power of representation).”2 This clarifies that by “appearances,” Kant means our perceptual representations. He then poses the issue he is about to address: “what does it mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to, and therefore also distinct from cognition?” I maintain that this shows that Kant holds a representationalist understanding of perception. And he is seeking to explain the most important aspect of that outlook, the question of how conscious, perceptual states can represent corresponding objects. One might, alternatively, think that Kant is concerned with how we are able to make judgments about objects, since he often sues “cognition” to refer to judgments.3 However, in the list of types of representational states at A320/ B376–7 he explains that a cognition is “either an intuition or a concept” (my 29

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emphasis).4 We can see that “cognition” should be read as “intuition” in this passage, first because as we will consider below, the discussion ends with an assertion about the unity, not of judgments but of intuitions and second because the A108–9 repeat presentation of these points—discussed above in regard to direct realist readings—does not refer to cognitions but instead describes appearances (and intuitions). This passage underscores that Kant is not a phenomenalist, since on that reading objects are collections of intuitions, with nothing further that is distinct from intuitions. Likewise, this is not direct realism, since appearances are described as (nothing but) representations, which have objects. But for direct realism, objects are not “distinct from cognition.” On that reading, an intuition is not a representation of a correspondent but rather somehow presents the object itself. As I have argued in the previous chapter, this is a representationalist understanding of perception that explains our perceptual experiences as representing in virtue of having correspondence to that which they represent, viz., their objects. So, Kant is pursuing an analysis of our concept of representational correspondence. We are thus faced with the question of how an appearance, that is, a conscious awareness of a collection of qualia, such as an array of colors, can be conceived as corresponding to, and thus representing, the external world. For example, how can my perceptual visual image of a tree represent an external tree? It may perhaps seem that resemblance is an answer. Thus, a physical image of the tree will resemble the tree. However, resemblance requires a mapping between the image and that which is represented. But this is not feasible for a representationalist view of perception, since we are, so to speak, trapped behind the veil of appearances. This is what Kant points in the second part of the next sentence where he says that “It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in general =X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it” (A104). The point about conceiving the object as “something in general” can be understood if we try think of both a perceived object and the object itself, for example, my perceptual table imagery and also the corresponding external table. My only means of perceptually knowing the table is with this imagery, so my thought of the external table is just a judgment about the perceptual state that is my table intuition. So how can conscious perceptual states be conceived as being representational, viz., as something more than just purely phenomenalistic episodes? Kant’s answer is that all that is available for the conception of correspondence is a represented something or other that is completely general, that is, the conception of a bare distinctness from the representing mental states.

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As we have considered in the previous chapter, the standard philosophical conception of representation is causal, so that my perception of the table represents the external table that caused this perception. As we have also noted, this results in Humean veil of impressions skepticism since we cannot soundly infer back from effect to cause, for example, to the existence of the mug from the experience of mug perceptual imagery. On the causal understanding of representation, we are merely left with the conception of a cause that is distinct from the representation that is otherwise unknown. But this will not do, since an unknown cause is not a correspondent and there is thus nothing that can be understood as providing causal content. Kant proceeds to offer a very different approach to what underlies correspondence. The next paragraph contains a hard-to-decipher but important and intriguing argument: We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined a priori, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object. (A104–105)

Unfortunately, commentators have typically said little about this passage and have failed to notice that a conclusion is being drawn about what constitutes the concept of an object.5 Instead, it has been suggested that Kant is analyzing the unity of a representation of an object as consisting in the unification of various qualities in the representation. Thus, my representation of a mug full of coffee unifies cylindrical shape, blueness, coffee aroma and heat—as psychologists put it, they are bound together. However, this cannot be the correct understanding of the unity in question, since that is merely phenomenal unification, it does not result in correspondence.6 Kant’s point instead concerns “the relation of all cognition to its object.” This is a relation that holds for all intuitions since they all have objects. The unfortunately tangled wording indicates that he is concerned with a way that all intuitions are “determined a priori.” To see what this amounts to, consider that we are discussing and analyzing the concept of being representational, viz., of having an object. Thus, all cognitions fall under the concept REPRESENTATIONAL, that is, HAVING AN OBJECT. Further, note that members of the extension of any given concept all share the relevant features of the concept—this is both an a priori and a necessary truth. Since to be a triangle is to have three sides, we know a priori that in order for something to be a triangle it is necessary that it have three sides, whereas, for example, the

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lengths of the sides of triangles can vary “arbitrarily” and thus “at pleasure.” I maintain that this is the “something of necessity” that Kant is referring to—it is the necessity of analytic truths, and specifically the necessity of the essential features of concepts.7 So since all intuitions are representational, viz., they all have objects, there is thus something that they must all share in order to fall under that concept and we know that a priori. We are thus facing the problem of finding something that all intuitions share necessarily. Kant offers a solution: the unity in question “can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations” (A105). Here we connect up with the discussion of the unity of consciousness in the first two paragraphs of the section, and thus see why he has made this seemingly odd segue into the topic of representation. To understand how unity could constitute representation, we similarly need to temporarily switch topics—we need to spend some time examining both the justification for the unity of consciousness and what it consists in. This will also provide an initial treatment of Kant’s account of concepts. With that in place, we will return to the A 105 passage. CONCEPTS, NECESSITY, AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS The opening paragraph of the “synthesis of recognition” section continues the examination of reproduction, arguing that the success of this process requires the unity of consciousness, that is, an always identical consciousness: If we were not conscious that which we think is same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would be in its present state a new representation. (A103)8

The argument seems to be that in order for something to count as, say a memory, thus as a reproduced representation, I must be able to represent that it was previously experienced in my same consciousness. And while this is an interesting defense of why we need to represent consciousness as unified, there is both a stronger and more interesting path to this conclusion that is merely hinted at in the concluding remark of the second paragraph, where Kant says that unitary consciousness “must always be present; without it, concepts, and with them, cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible” (A 104).9 He seems to be asserting that concepts require the unity of consciousness, that is, the ability to apply concepts to intuitions necessitates such unity. However, there is no explanation in the A TD of the basis for this claim. So we must piece it together.

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We will begin by examining Kant’s view of concepts. In the list of types of (representational) states at A320/B377, while an intuition is defined as a singular representation that has an immediate relation to an object a concept is characterized as using a mark to mediately representing something that is common to several things. Concepts, unlike intuitions, are representations of generality. Further, in the long paragraph at A 68/B 93, Kant characterizes concepts as unifying functions. He explains that this consists of ordering differing representations under a common representation. We might perhaps take this to concern the unification of the marks of a concept in an instance, such as the representation of the marks “pages” and “bound” that are unified with BOOK.10 However, it is important to appreciate that this kind of unification is still in the realm of the representation of the singular, for example, the marks of a perceived individual book. In order to find the appropriate unity for concepts, we need to look at generalization over multiple instances.11 My concept BOOK unifies all of my intuitions of pages that are bound—all of my book intuitions. And, since there are many books that I haven’t yet perceived, and that I will never perceive, this will not only include all of my actual (past) book intuitions, but should also include future book intuitions, and generally any book intuitions that could possibly be experienced. If I intuit something that consists of bound pages and judge “that’s a book,” I thereby unify that intuition with all of my other actual and possible intuitions of bound pages. Any concept that is applicable to intuitions thus unifies all actual and possible intuitions that have the appropriate marks. This will sometimes involve a simultaneous perception of several instances of books, but it primarily involves unity over time, viz., books that I’ve previously intuited and that I will intuit, or that I might intuit. The apparent reason why the idea that concepts are unifying functions across multiple perceived instances has been almost entirely overlooked12 is that near the end of the very long paragraph that contains the reference to unifying functions near the start (A 69/B 84), Kant returns to the idea of unifying functions but this time applies it to judgments that hierarchically unify concepts. Thus, “dogs are animals” unifies all dog intuitions with all other intuitions that ANIMAL either directly or indirectly applies to, viz., cat intuitions, since cats are animals, horse intuitions, since horses are animals, etc.13 This might suggest that concepts only unify in relation to one another.14 However, it cannot be that all concepts are higher-order unifiers, there obviously must be first-order concepts that apply directly to intuitions, for example, single mark concepts such as RED, ROUND, and BITTER. Once we acknowledge this, there is no reason to deny that more complex concepts can also be directly applied to intuitions. And Kant indicates this a sentence earlier in the paragraph where he says that concepts are always related to other representations of objects and parenthetically clarifies that this includes not only other

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concepts but also intuitions. So higher-order conceptual unity compounds the unities of concepts that unify intuitions, that is, that unify multiple perceived and perceivable instances.15 To return to the point mentioned in the quote at the start of this section from the A TD, we can now propose that Kant’s view is that each concept’s unification of appropriate intuitions rests on an independent general unity of consciousness. Otherwise, an isolated judgment could not unite various actual as well as potential intuitions. In a case of extreme disunity, as for instance my conscious states versus those of another person, no possible applications of concepts by me can bridge the gap. I am thus apparently able to unify a given intuition with all other actual and potential intuitions that have the same features (marks) because all of my actual and potential intuitions are independently unified. So individual conceptual unities must be sub-unities of the overarching unity. This relationship between individual concept unity and the general unity of consciousness is confirmed in a footnote early in the B (second edition) TD (B133). In the main text, Kant, while discussing the unity of consciousness, distinguishes “analytic unity,” and “synthetic unity.” The latter is a matter of connecting representations via unifying psychological processes, that is “syntheses.” Such processes produce a unified consciousness, which can then be represented analytically, that is, as the same. As Kant puts it, the synthetic unity that is achieved by combining representations and then representing the result allows for the representation of analytic unity, viz., “the identity of the consciousness in these representations.” Thus, for two separate representations, A and B, in order to represent “I am aware of both A and B,” the representations A and B must be combined to produce a representation with this conjunctive content. In what is for our present purposes a key footnote to this passage, we find a discussion of the connection between the general unity of consciousness and the unity of individual concepts: The analytic unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think of red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered in anything, or that can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. (B133)16

As I read this, Kant is explaining that the representation of the sameness of redness across instances, that is, what makes RED a concept, rests on this unity of consciousness in general—“an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity.” Thus, if I am intuiting bound pages, I am able, using the concept BOOK, to unify this instance with all other actual and possible intuitions that

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have the same mark because all my actual and possible intuitions are independently unified. Without the over-arching unity, this unity across instances would seemingly be impossible. So, I suggest that the correct interpretation of what Kant means by the “analytic unity of concepts” is that this refers to their generality, that is, their unifying function across instances. This differs from the more or less prevailing reading of this phrase by Allison (2004) who tries to explain the analytic unity of concepts in terms of empirical concept formation (p. 80), that produces “a set of common marks . . . as products of the ‘logical acts’ of ‘comparison’ ‘reflection’ and ‘abstraction.’” He seems to be assuming that “analytic” here refers to the fact that we analyze various instances to find marks in common, which we then unify under a single concept, for example, by noting that “unmarried” and “male” co-occur, we form BACHELOR. However, this interpretation is mistaken. First note that there is no mention by Kant of empirical concept acquisition in any portion of the text of the TD, nor is this topic examined in the Critique at all. Second, his own (and only) example of analytic unity in concepts in the above passage does not involve common marks, but just a single mark, viz., redness. And, most significantly, Allison’s suggested view leaves us with no understanding of how analytic unity, so conceived, is supposed to rest on an “antecedently conceived” synthetic unity. I thus maintain that unity across instances of a concept is what the analytic unity of concepts consists in. And, in any case, and by any label, it is obviously true that concepts do unify their perceived instances. Moreover, the analytic unity of concepts, so understood, has an important status—it is apparent that it must be necessary. This is perhaps best described, for a sample concept, with: All intuitions that have the marks of books fall under the concept BOOK.

If this statement is merely contingent, this is to say that representations of books are only contingently related. It would follow that, for, for example, X and Y that both have the marks of BOOK, it is not determined that they both fall under the concept BOOK—merely contingent unity allows that each of these intuitions might not be so unified. But that would undermine conceptual classification. That is, if I judge that I’m seeing a book, it cannot be that it is possible that I am not co-classifying this intuition with others with similar marks. There is nothing further that is needed to create this unification—that is what an application of a concept achieves. So, for any cognizer applying this concept, there must be a necessary connection between all actual and possible book intuitions that allows them to all be conceived as books. And this must be true for any and all concepts, hence:

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The Analytic Unity of Concepts: for any concept C with mark(s) x, all intuitions that have x are necessarily unitable under C.17

Thus, portions of consciousness are unified by each empirical concept, for example, for someone possessing the concept BOOK, all their intuitions of books are able to be necessarily unified by that concept. This is a very substantial result for several reasons. First, it amounts to the discovery of a new kind of necessity. It is obviously neither the necessity of logical form nor of deductive entailment. Nor is it analytic semantic necessity as standardly understood. Thus, for Kant, “bachelors are unmarried” is a necessary truth since the predicate concept UNMARRIED is contained in the subject concept, which presumably consists of UNMARRIED, ADULT, and MALE. But that says nothing about necessary connections between intuitions of bachelors. This is thus a new type of conceptual (i.e., concept-related) necessity. Second, note that we can run the argument completely outside of the Kantian framework. Thus, conceptualizing something being perceived as a tree, regardless of how perception works, equally requires a necessary unity with all other perceptions of trees. This shows that the analytic unity of concepts is not somehow a relic of Kant’s perceptual psychology of sensations, syntheses, and intuitions. We should thus think of the analytic unity of concepts as a very substantial insight about the nature of concepts, apart from the complex collection of arguments and explanations (of the TD) that it is imbedded in. And third, this obviously stands in direct opposition to Hume’s assertion that there are no necessary connections between perceptions, viz.,” All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (1738/1978, appendix, 31:636). If, however, concepts necessarily unite their experienced instances, then perceptions will be necessarily related in a vast number of ways. So, a correct understanding of concepts effectively undermines Hume and the empiricists’ minimalistic view of necessity. But an even stronger anti-Humean result is looming. Returning to our examination of the relation between concepts and the unity of consciousness, we can immediately see that since the analytic unity of individual concepts involves necessary unity, the overall unity of consciousness will likewise be necessary. And, indeed, Kant refers to the “necessary unity of consciousness” several times, including A109 and A112. It is necessary because, as we have considered above, our ability to generally apply concepts, that is, unifying functions, to intuitions requires that all of our intuitions, thus all of consciousness, be universally united. Thus, my next intuition might contain marks of books or marks of cubes, etc. And if it does,

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then I am able to apply the appropriate concept, viz., BOOK, CUBE, etc. So, since concepts can be arbitrarily applied to consciousness, viz., any particular intuition could potentially qualify for unification by any of the concepts that I possess, it follows that all of my intuitions must be necessarily unified to allow for any and all such concept applications. This unity must hold both at a moment and over time. Since I am able to, for example, see two books at once, and so conceptualize them, it must be that this momentary experience is necessarily united. And since the concept BOOK unifies all of my actual and potential book intuitions, my intuitions must be necessarily united over time as well. We might, though, worry that what we are looking at is not a proof of conscious unity, but rather a psychological postulation for explanatory purposes, viz., to explain how the analytic unity of concepts is possible. And, here Kant might say that it is not simply a plausible explanation; it is rather the only feasible explanation—a methodological approach of his that we will encounter again in subsequent chapters. However, it would be preferable to be able to flat-out prove that consciousness must be necessarily unified. And, having fully understood analytic unity, we now have a very simple proof of this over-arching unity. For each of us, the concept MY CONSCIOUSNESS applies to all of our (actual and potential) conscious states. It follows, by the analytic unity of concepts, that for any individual all of their conscious states are necessarily united under that concept.18 That is, each of my conscious states in the moment, as well as over time, are necessarily united by MY CONSCIOUSNESS. So, each individual’s consciousness must be necessarily unified. And, in case it is not obvious, we have demonstrated the falsity of the account proposed by those pursuing a direct realist reading of Kant, viz., that intuitions involve perceptual content that is somehow not part of this general unity of consciousness. Thus, the (complex) concept ALL MY CONSCIOUS STATES INCLUDING INTUITIONS requires, necessarily, that all intuitions be subject to this general unity, and that they are somehow necessarily unified with other conscious states. Having firmly established the result, we next need to consider the nature of this unity. First, note that it is represented unity. In the above passage from B133, Kant describes it as conceived possible synthetic unity, thus represented unity. And we can appreciate why: since the unity in question is supposed to underwrite the analytic unity of concepts, which is represented unity across instances, for example, BOOK represents all books, it follows that we are seeking a represented general unity. By way of contrast, postulating a Cartesian mind that metaphysically unifies all my conscious states will not suffice unless I can somehow be aware of this substance-unity. But Kant denies that we can apply the concept SUBSTANCE to consciousness (B 291),

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as we will consider further in the next chapter. Thus, even if we do exist as unified mental substances, we are not able to be aware that we are.19 So the possession of a metaphysically unified mind is not what Kant means by a unity of consciousness. Nor can a necessarily unified consciousness somehow be an empirical given, since merely empirical consciousness involves disunities, as per the Humean conception of completely independent impressions. Moreover, our total collection of perceptual representations derives from dis-unified sources, viz., input from the various senses including the two retinas. So, as Kant tells us in the B TD at B133, the “identity of the subject,” viz., the represented identity of consciousness is the result of adding representations together and then being consciousness of this synthesis, that is, this synthetic unity. The unity of consciousness is thus achieved via psychological unification. So, there must be unifying psychology processes, that is, syntheses that produce the necessary general unity of consciousness. Nor, finally, can empiricist contingent unification, produced by the synthesis of association, explain the necessary unity of consciousness. It follows that there must be nonempirical unifying processes, that is, “pure syntheses,” that produce this necessary conscious unity. In particular, there must be both (pure) processes that unify in the moment, viz., the synthesis of apprehension, as well as (pure) processes that unify over time, viz., the syntheses of reproduction and recognition. The implications of the necessity of the analytic unity of concepts thus spread far and wide, both to the necessary unity of consciousness itself, and to the necessity of mental processes that produce this unity. UNITY AND THE CATEGORIES Returning from our digression, recall that Kant is in the process of analyzing what it is to be representational, that is, to have a corresponding object. He has argued that since we are epistemically isolated on one side of the representation relation, we must conceive of a corresponding object as a completely abstract something in general. So, what makes mental states representational, that is, what allows us to apply the concept HAVING AN OBJECT to them must be something to do with the mental states, viz., the intuitions themselves, since we are not able to determine that they stand in relations to objects by observing a relation between them and what they represent. And he has further argued that since all intuitions are representational, there must be some aspect of them, viz., some feature they all have or some relation that they all stand in that makes them all representational. And this must be something that they all necessarily have, rather than something they

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only contingently have, “at pleasure or arbitrarily.” That is, the fact that the concept HAVING AN OBJECT applies to all intuitions necessitates that they share something that makes this concept applicable. We are now in a position to consider Kant’s answer to this problem, “[it] can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of our representations” (A105).20 I take it that the argument is that, first, as we have considered, consciousness, and, in particular, all intuitions are necessarily united. So, this is a condition that they all necessarily share. However, the unstated further premise is that there is nothing else, no other feature or relation, that all intuitions have necessarily. If this is the only possible candidate, then it follows that this formal unification and unity must be what makes intuitions representational, that is, it is what gives them objects. As Kant paraphrases it, “It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object” (A105).21 However, prima facie, it is extremely difficult to see how it could be that merely unifying mental states, viz., intuitions, should produce correspondence. Kant does provide an example apparently meant to illustrate how a mental state’s having an object is a matter of being constructed according to a unifying rule. He states that we think of a triangle through awareness of a “composition,” that is, mental image of three straight lines that “accords” with a rule for producing this type of image (A105). An intuition thus counts as a representation of a triangle just in case it satisfies this rule. It is, though, prime facie, an unusual example to illustrate representation in that, while a specific intuition of something triangle-shaped represents the shape of something in the external world, an arbitrary triangle image, such as we are considering here, represents an imaginary object. But, as such, this example provides an excellent illustration of an alternative, projective understanding of representation since the image is mentally constructed and seemingly represents a triangle in virtue of that construction. This contrasts with a receptive account, which typically attempts to explain representation in terms of causation. But a mental image of a triangle is not caused by an external triangle. And, while I do not think that consideration of such an example can settle anything, it is worth briefly noting a likely exchange here. A causal theorist would probably assert that such an image represents triangle since it is similar to perceptual images that have been caused by external things that are triangle-shaped. However, we can alter the example to something that is rarer in the environment, say, a dodecahedron. Someone who has never seen a dodecahedron could nonetheless be taught a rule for constructing a mental image with this shape, and that image would represent a dodecahedron seemingly independent of causal, perceptual relations.

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This example thus presents an exemplary instance of how rule-based synthesis apparently underlies representation. However, it does not address the issue we are seeking an answer to, viz., how formal unification that applies the categories can give intuitions corresponding objects. To begin to appreciate how unity constitutes representation, first consider what kind of unity it is. The unity in question is necessary, so it cannot be a matter of accidental connections. So, there must be regular, nonempirical unifying functions that are applied by the unifying syntheses. And Kant has inventoried the 12 pure unifying functions in the Metaphysical Deduction; realized as concepts, they are the categories. And, to anticipate what we will fully clarify in chapter 5, since the unity of consciousness consists of temporal unity, it is the temporal realization of these unifying functions, viz., the schematized categories that syntheses apply to construct this necessary unity in intuitions. On the conceptual side, judgments that apply the pure unifying functions in their conceptual guise, as the categories, will thus validly apply to intuitions, affirming this unity. While none of this is explained in the passages we are examining, section 4 of the A TD does provide some confirmation: Thus the concept of a cause is nothing other than a synthesis . . . in accordance with concepts; and without that sort of unity, which has its rule a priori, and which subjects the appearances to itself, thoroughgoing and universal, hence necessary unity of consciousness would not be encountered in the manifold perceptions. (A111–112)22

Since the categories thus consist of the same types of unifying functions that make intuitions representational, they should collectively constitute the conceptualization of being representational, viz., of having an object. And this is affirmed in the second edition where Kant explains the categories as the concepts of an object in general (B128), that is, they are the concepts of all represented things. To, then, understand how unity can involve correspondence, with all the pieces in place, we need to look at how the (schematized) categories unify. This is not clarified until the Principles, and even there it is not exactly fully explained. However, by way of preview of what we will see in the next two chapters, I will now illustrate how the temporal versions of the relational categories, viz., substance, causation, and community, play this critical role—above all, substance. Here is what we can think of as the crucial missing example that Kant should have given to illustrate his view of formal unity constituting representational correspondence. Consider a typical example of a perception of an external object, say a coffee mug. My actual conscious experiences (to use the term nontechnically), characterized purely

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phenomenologically, can and often will vary radically. Thus, different viewing angles present differing shapes, such as the view from above or below. The phenomenological size varies with distance. The experienced color will change with varying background lighting, with very dim or colored lighting as extremes. I may identify the mug by the experience of (what I take to be) only a small portion of the surface, when, for example, it is almost completely occluded, say, in a stack of dishes. If I require corrective lenses, and do not always wear them, I will sometimes perceive the cup with blurred, out of focus perceptual images. When I look at the mug and cross my eyes, the phenomenological cup doubles. And, of course, I may reach for the mug without looking, thus just identifying it tactilely. However, assuming that I am normally able to reidentify the object, based on empirically perceived properties, I will conceive of all of these as perceptions of the same, continuously existing external object. The crucial point is that while these experiences do involve various phenomenological similarities, there is no complete phenomenological identity across all of them that would support this attribution of sameness—the identity is instead imposed. By taking these phenomenologically varied experiences to be of the same object I represent a corresponding, persisting clump of external matter, that is, a substance, that I am intuiting in varied ways. My intuitions of the mug thus have a content that exceeds the phenomenal and thus the empirical—the sameness of the mug over time is not a matter of phenomenal/empirical sameness.23 So it is this unification of various mug appearances that turns these into reorientations that involves correspondence, that is, that have an object. As a result, the mug is depicted as existing in a way that exceeds my subjective experiences of it. And similarly with all other external objects—my identifications in new experiences of sameness of objects with those in previous experiences represent continued existences through changing viewing angles and illumination, and also through potentially changing locations and states of the objects. Constant applications of the schematized category of substance to our intuitions thus project an external world. And judgments applied to these intuitions thereby have a content that exceeds the subjective. Thus, the truth of “the mug is in the kitchen” does not require that I am presently observing it there and can still be true even if I enter the kitchen and fail to perceive it, or even for that matter temporarily misidentify it. The (re)identification of external objects is based on empirically perceived qualities, and we of course sometimes make mistakes, which in turn are open to potential empirical correction. But yet, the nonempirical identities that we attribute as part of this process represent persistent substances that surpass the empirical. As we will see in chapter 4, the schematized categories of causation and community also play vital roles in projecting an external world. CAUSE allows us to represent changes and COMMUNITY allows us to represent

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co-existence, neither of which can be represented on the basis of subjective, phenomenal states. Here is one of various possible ways to illustrate the application of these schematized categories. Suppose that I feel a strong gust of wind and then spot a tree branch on the ground. These are consecutive intuitions that I undergo. But, for our purposes, they are consistent with at least two possibilities. One is that the branch has just fallen to the ground. Thus, a change has occurred. For reasons we will consider in chapter 4, I need to represent it as a necessitated occurrence, and in this example, the gust of wind is a plausible candidate for causing this change. So, in order to represent this as a change, I apply my (commonsense) causal rule that wind gusts can cause branches to fall. This in turn necessitates the order of my intuitions, that is, I thereby represent that the branch on the ground could not have been intuited prior to the gust. Or, to illustrate community by way of contrast, it may be that the branch was already down prior to the gust. To be able to represent the simultaneous existence of the branch on the ground and the wind gust, I need to represent my intuitions as sequentially interchangeable. Thus, I could have perceived the branch down first, since that existed simultaneously with the gust, that is, these states of the world are in nonsequential interaction with me. So, these (schematized) categorical orderings transform what would otherwise be subjectively ordered intuitions into representations of either necessary sequences or else necessary interactive relations in the external world. Applications of the relational schematized categories thus create identities across perceptual states as well as orderings of them that exceed the subjective and the empirical, thereby necessarily structuring intuitions, and thus projecting objects and events that are external to subjective perceptual states. Since these are formal unities, this explanation provides an understanding of how it could be that intuitions have objects in virtue of their formal unity. As we will see, these roles for the schematized relational categories are both uncovered and justified by Kant’s examination of the issue of the representation of time in the Analogies. The resulting metaphysics of this framework is that we project an external, spatial world of enduring substances that undergo necessitated changes and that stand in complete, necessary causal inter-relation. And by the way, we can now understand Kant’s seemingly odd explanation at B142 that empirical judgments involve “necessary unity,” although the representations do not “necessarily belong to one another.” Thus, “bodies are heavy” is contingently true, but it represents external bodies in virtue of the necessary unity of intuitions of bodies. So, there is an element of necessity in all empirical experiences, since it is the necessary unity of intuitions that gives them objects, and the empirical judgments that we apply to them thus involve this necessary unity.

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OBJECTS AND CONSCIOUSNESS We have been examining Kant’s treatment of representation without having considered precisely what he means by an object. Recent literature has shown an overwhelming preference for interpreting the term “object” (Object) as meaning “physical object.” But I will now argue that this is not quite right. There is substantial textual evidence against this narrow reading that supports the broader interpretation that “object” simply means anything that is represented. Thus, at A108 we are told that “All representations have, as representations, their objects and can themselves in turn become objects of other representations.” That is, thoughts, for example, intuitions, can be objects of other thoughts. And this should not be surprising; indeed, it is mandated by the inner sense view which requires that we are able to intuit, thus represent, our thoughts. And this Reflexion first mentions an example of a physical object, but then clarifies further: What is an object? That whose representation is a sum of several predicates belonging to it. The plate is round, warm, made of tin, etc. Warm, round, being made of tin are not objects, although the warmth, the tin, etc., [are]. (R 6350, in Guyer, ed. (2005) 387)

The contrast here appears to be between properties, that is, universals, such as “warm,” which Kant says are not objects, as opposed to instances of properties, for example, warmth, that is, being warm, which he says are. So, we can understand objects as including both what is represented by outer sense, viz., clusters of instances of external, thus physical properties, and what is represented by inner sense, viz. instances of mental qualities, for example, color qualia, taste qualia, and pleasure and pain qualia. Given this, I suggest that what we represent with spatial perceptual states, viz., appearances, should not be understood narrowly as physical objects, but rather more broadly as including the representation of instances of properties. Further, we often perceive aspects of the external world that do not count as objects in the narrow sense, for example, sounds, the sky, sunlight, and shadows. And, as we will see in chapter 3, the Second Analogy makes it very clear that what Kant is concerned with in terms of the representation of objects includes events as well, viz., changes in the states of substances. So, the objects of outer appearances consist of a broad ontology. However, when we turn to mental objects, we find that it is problematic to try to fully understand the representation of thoughts in the same way as the representation of the external world. Significantly, we do not think of the awareness of our consciousness as representing states that are typically only partially

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revealed in that awareness and that have a continued existence beyond our awareness of them. The way to begin to resolve this is to take “object” to mean correspondents in general, but then to read the analysis of representation as narrowly focused on the objects of spatial intuitions. They are the special class of representations that do involve representing an existence that exceeds what is immediately experienced, but that also thus invite skepticism about our knowledge of them including their existence. We get confirmation that this is how Kant thought of what he was explaining in a passage from the Second Analogy (A189–190/B234–235) where he tells us that while we can call anything that we are conscious of an object, the question of how appearances represent objects requires a “deeper enquiry.” So, we should understand spatial appearances and intuitions as a special class of representations, viz., that involve external correspondence. We can also now provide a clarification of what Kant means by “appearance” and “intuition.” He tells us “that in [appearances] which relates immediately to the object is called intuition” (A109). I have argued that we should understand appearances as our imagistic perceptual states. Some portions of these states will be identified with parts of previous and succeeding perceptual states. These are our representations of substances, that is, of chunks of physical matter—they are our representations of external physical objects. So, a momentary collection of appearances will typically consist of a few and often many simultaneous intuitions, as when viewing a room full of furnishings or a typical outdoor scene. But, again—and this is just a little speculative development—we may want to also think of the various aspects of appearances that are not substances as not being intuitions, for example, our perceptions of lights, sounds, and scents. Note that while that may seem fairly straightforward, Kant confuses matters by sometimes using “appearances” to refer not to perceptual states but instead to what they represent. Unfortunately, one instance occurs with the introduction of the term at the start of the Aesthetic where he tells us that appearances are the “undetermined” [i.e., unconceptualized] objects of empirical intuitions. (A20/B34).24 This directly contradicts A109 where, as we have considered above, he states both that intuitions are “in” appearances and that appearances are “only representations, which in turn have their object.” So, the way to coherently resolve this is, as I say, to take him to be using “appearances” both to characterize our perceptual states and also at times to characterize the objects of these states. Thus, appearances are imagistic perceptual states but they are also the perceptually (nonconceptually) represented world. But for all that, we do also need an understanding of how our conscious states are represented. And Kant makes it clear that on his account of inner

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sense, we do not represent our conscious states as they are in themselves, since that would mean that time exists in itself (A36–39/B53–55). And B155– 56 clarifies that we intuit ourselves as a result of affecting ourselves, thus, as with the external, creating an appearance. So, we must also projectively represent our consciousness. And presumably, it is the unification involving the categories—and here, via the unification of the a priori form of time, that creates this representation. The necessary unity of intuitions thus also represents our conscious thoughts as correspondents.25 There is one crucial difference, however, that accounts for the fact that we do not represent our thoughts as having an existence that exceeds what we represent. This is because, according to Kant, the category of substance has no application in conscious states—in the next chapter we will see that this claim is crucial to his argument against skepticism. However, this leaves us with no explanation of how we are able to represent thoughts as opposed to the external. I am not aware that Kant ever addressed this, and it does seem potentially puzzling. The manifold for both is presumably the same, for example, an array of colors for visual intuitions. Unifying them together with spatial form by applying the schematized categories represents physical surfaces, and thus objects, etc. But the very same sensations are presumably also the basis for inner sense. And, as we have considered in chapter 1, it seems that intuitions of the external must be a result of both outer and inner sense, since they are temporal as well as spatial, for example, the blue mug is now on the table. So, I can also represent that I am undergoing a blue, mug-shaped image, that is, intuition. Perhaps this is primarily due to a difference in concepts, that is, rather than applying physical concepts such as MUG I invoke IMAGE or INTUITION or PERCEPTION. And the latter concepts are not spatial but are only temporal. While I am not fully confident that this explanation suffices, as I say something along those lines should be correct for the schematized categories account of representation. Whether this way or another, a full development of that view would thus need to provide an account of representing thoughts, which, again, Kant does not take up. THE TRANSCENDENTAL While this completes my primary exposition of Kant’s account of representation, I have not yet mentioned two notions that might seem central to the topic, and that both involve the term “transcendental,” viz., transcendental apperception and also the transcendental object. We will proceed by first considering what this term means for Kant and then examine each in turn with an eye to relevance for his treatment of representation.

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There is an unfortunate history of understanding “transcendental” to mean supersensible existence, as in the occasionally suggested idea of a transcendental mind or self. However, Kant gives no indication of such a meaning. His all too brief explanation of the content of this term is that cognition is to be called ‘transcendental” “if it is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori” (A11/B25).26 The term is thus concerned with what underlies a priori knowledge of objects. Later he further clarifies that not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible. Hence neither space nor any geometrical determination of it a priori is a transcendental representation, but only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of experience can be called transcendental. (A56/B81)27

I maintain that both these quotes indicate that Kant is using “transcendental” to mean “the basis of a priori knowledge of objects” that is, that which underlies synthetic a priori knowledge. So, the concept TRANSCENDENTAL is not metaphysical, but is rather epistemological.28 Transcendental idealism is thus the view that synthetic a priori knowledge is entirely the result of our mental constitution, as opposed to having an origin and basis in the external world. We would thus expect the transcendental to encompass, along with the nonempirical basis of our concepts of space and time, the necessary unity of consciousness, the fact that this unity constitutes representation, and also the specific structures of that synthetic unity, which enable synthetic a priori principles about the represented world, and these are indeed the main results of the Transcendental Analytic. This puts us in a position to understand transcendental apperception. In the A version, Kant introduces this as “pure, original, unchanging consciousness” (A 107), which might be taken to be some sort of awareness of the supersensible mind or agent, if, again, we are not careful about what Kant means by “transcendental.” Further, given the primary role that this notion has in the B TD, and also based on the fact that Kant refers to it as “supreme principle” of the application of the understanding (B 136), we might have expected that both the unity of consciousness and the nature of representation are somehow dependent on transcendental apperception. However, this is an incorrect understanding of Kant’s view of representation that is inconsistent with his examination of the concept of an object in the A TD. As we have seen, he identifies that concept with the formal unity of consciousness, which is not the same as transcendental apperception, that is, these phrases are not

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synonymous. And in that first edition he does not introduce transcendental apperception until after he has exposited both unity and representation. We thus need an alternative understanding of transcendental apperception. I maintain that this consists solely in the knowledge of the necessary unity of consciousness. In the A TD, Kant briefly introduces transcendental apperception and then defends it by arguing that “this unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold [of sensations] the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition.” (A 108).29 Thus, if there could be two distinct moments of consciousness for an individual without knowledge of their unity, viz., that they are both necessarily part of the same consciousness, then this individual’s consciousness would not be unified. Moreover, it would seem that knowing that various conscious experiences are unified requires knowledge of how they are unified, that is, the “synthetic function(s)” that unify them. Without such knowledge, there would be no basis for the representation of the identity of consciousness.30 In the B TD Kant argues simultaneously for the necessary unity of consciousness and knowledge of this unity, viz., transcendental apperception: “For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not altogether be my representations, if they did not all together belong to a self consciousness” (B132).31 Here it may again seem that he is presupposing a new form of self-awareness. However, we can reconstruct this reasoning as involving a tacit appeal to analytic conceptual unity. Thus, as we have considered above, each of us is able to apply the concept MY CONSCIOUSNESS to all of our conscious states. So, by the analytic unity of concepts, for each of us, all conscious states are necessarily unified under this concept. It follows that there must be (synthetic) unifying processes that produce this unity in order to allow for the application of this concept, that is, that “makes them mine.” We now add that we must have knowledge of this unity to enable the applicability of this concept, thus transcendental apperception. Further, we can now appreciate that by “supreme principle” Kant does not mean a primitive, unjustified principle, but rather the most abstract, overarching principle. However, as we have seen, the object of this knowledge, viz., the necessary unity of consciousness—a truth about our psychology—is independently justified. And this awareness of necessary unity merits the label “transcendental” since it amounts to meta-knowledge of the unifying structure of consciousness that constitutes the basis of synthetic a priori knowledge. Thus, the unities produced by the syntheses that apply the schematized categories are what we are aware of in transcendental apperception, so in this sense we are aware of content; but it is not some sort of primitive awareness of content, but rather a matter of knowledge of synthetic structuring.

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The unities produced through the application of the schematized categories to intuitions are what constitutes representation, that is, the concept of an object. Kant adds the designation “transcendental,” viz., the concept of a transcendental object (A108–109), thus indicating that this concept is not empirical. And, following Allison’s (2015, 232) astute suggestion, it is preferable to call it the transcendental concept of an object. It is, as we have considered above, the completely abstract concept of an object in general, that is, of a represented something or other, that is of a correspondent. This concept underlies our empirical concepts of the external, objective world. For example, the ability of the concept BOOK to represent all such artifacts in the external world rests on the concept of the transcendental object, viz., being an external correspondent. Kant also reaffirms that this relation to an object “is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind, which combines it into one representation” (A109).32 And, as we have considered, these unifying functions are the schematized categories. REPRESENTATION IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION It is also useful to consider the role that Kant’s view of representation plays in the TD. We will additionally examine the diverging roles that the unity of consciousness, synthesis and transcendental apperception both do play and could play in the Deduction, which will help us to see why Kant was led to minimize his treatment of representation in the B version of the TD. He tells us that “the explanation of the manner in which concepts can relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction” (A85/B117).33 The account of representation is such an explanation, and with that in place all that is needed is to point out that intuitions have objects in virtue of the nonempirical unification that applies the schematized categories, so we know a priori that the categories validly apply to all objects we intuit, that is, the categories are the “fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general for the appearances, and they therefore have a priori objective validity” (A111).34, 35 For example, we could not perceive a book without representing it via the schematized category of substance, and thus the judgment that “the book is a substance” is guaranteed to be correct. So, the categories—and, more abstractly, the 12 pure unifying functions36—have objective validity, and without them we are unable to represent an external, objective world. And, as we have been contemplating, the schematized categories project and thus in a sense create that world. So, this passage thus provides a thoroughly successful deduction, that is, an objective justification of the categories.

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However, the treatment of representation and this brief deduction is only a small portion of the material in the A TD, and moreover it is all but eliminated in the B version. To see possible reasons why, consider that a major theme of both versions of the Deduction is to show the inadequacy of the sparse Humean/empiricist psychology which is based entirely on the synthesis of association. In the opening sections of the A TD, Kant argues that there must be additional syntheses and that they must have pure (nonempirical) applications as well as empirical ones. These are the nonempirical unifying processes that underlie the necessary unity of consciousness and thus representation. There is also a foundational critique of association itself, which is presented in the treatment of affinity in the A TD (A112–113 and A120–122). The argument, as I read it, is that in order for association to be a psychological law, as Hume would have it, there must be an overarching unity to consciousness, that we are aware of, viz., transcendental apperception. This then allows both that mental states, impressions in particular, are generally associable, since they are part of this one consciousness, and that we are capable of representing associations against the backdrop of necessarily united consciousness. The focus on unity, synthesis and apperception becomes the primary framework of the B TD, where Kant first argues jointly for necessary unity and transcendental apperception, very briefly mentions representation, and then proceeds to connect apperception first with judgments and then with the representations of space and time. The overall purpose of this material is aimed at establishing that the categories necessarily apply to experience by arguing both for the essential role of the syntheses that apply the pure functions and for the resultant knowledge of their application, viz. transcendental apperception. Since this concerns psychological unifying processes, this is a psychological result. As Kant puts it in the A Preface, it addresses the question “How is the faculty of thinking possible?” (Axvii) He tells us there that while this “is of great important for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it.”37 What, by contrast, is essential to his ends is an a priori demonstration of “the objective validity” of the concepts of the pure understanding, viz., the categories. As we have seen, that is effectively and also very concisely shown once it has been established that unity that is the result of the schematized categories is what creates correspondence, that is, projects objects, it follows of necessity that the categories validly apply to those objects. And after deriving this result in the A TD at A111 (quoted above), he remarks that this “was just what we really wanted to know.” Yet Kant is only beginning the extended discussion of the psychological side of the TD, that is, apperception and synthesis. However, showing by these considerations that the categories necessarily apply to experience fails to provide a demonstration of their objective validity unless it has been shown that rather than being merely subjective,

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categorically unified experience represents the objective world. The account of representation is essential for that result. Yet, Kant’s “connected” version of the A TD (Third Section) leaves out representation entirely, with only a few reminder hints near the end, viz., without the “transcendental function of imagination” sensibility would yield appearances “but would supply no objects of an empirical knowledge” (A124). And “the unity of this possible consciousness also constitutes the form of all cognition of objects; through it the manifold is thought as belonging to a single object [i.e., the transcendental object]” (A129).38 Thus, the project of establishing a “transcendental psychology” that is, psychology that underlies synthetic a priori knowledge,39 takes precedent over the seemingly primary goal of objectively justifying the categories. As I have indicated, the B TD makes transcendental apperception the central notion, again, switching the focus to the psychological side of the Deduction. And as we have seen above, apperception plays no role in the exposition of representation, nor does the exposition of transcendental apperception, viz., knowledge of the necessary unity of consciousness, require a treatment of representation. Unfortunately, the focus on transcendental apperception obscures all of this. While in #16 Kant clarifies that what we are aware of in transcendental apperception is the unity of consciousness that is the result of synthesis, from that point on he characterizes this necessary unity only in terms of transcendental apperception, thus making it seem as though this unity originates from apperception. And when Kant does cover representation, the discussion is curtailed to an absolute minimum, resulting in a rather obscure presentation that requires prior knowledge of his discussion in the A version: An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representation to an object, thus their objective validity. (B137)40

This is an attempt to restate the argument for the identity between representation and the unity of consciousness in a way that fits the theme of the opening sections of the B TD, which is presented in the second sentence of this passage. The first sentence, though, requires amplification. The point is that any given intuition, and thus all intuitions, have manifolds that are united under the concept of an object. As we have considered in regard to the parallel argument in A, it follows that there must be something in common to all intuitions that constitutes the concept of an object. By the second sentence, this commonality could be the unity of consciousness. And if we add the

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premise, which is also suppressed in the A version, that there is nothing else that cognitions all necessarily share other than being part of the overarching unity of consciousness, then the conclusion of constituting follows. We can thus see this as somewhat awkward attempt at reworking the reasoning about representation into the treatment of unity in the B version, which, again, unfortunately makes it nearly impossible to understand without having first appreciated the A version. Moreover, there is no explanation that what we are considering here is how cognitions can have correspondence. And without that, it is unclear how the leap to the conclusion of objective validity makes sense. Moreover, because of the lack of mention of correspondence, the B TD can mistakenly be read as phenomenalistic. Kant also provides a seemingly obscure contrast concerning the unity of consciousness between something I need in to cognize an object and something that is needed for anything to become “an object for me” (B 138). This is an effort to connect representation with the other cornerstone of the overall TD framework, the one emphasized in the B version, viz., transcendental apperception. Thus, if we regard awareness of the necessary unity of consciousness as self-awareness, that is, as the meaning of “I,” then anything I am so aware of is “mine.” (B132) And the unity that projects objects is what we are aware of in apperception, and thus makes them objects “for me.” And, while this is correct, it is also misleading since, as we have considered above, the analysis of having an object does not actually rely on transcendental apperception. So, Kant’s apparent desire to make transcendental apperception the central aspect of the unity-synthesis-representation-apperception framework in the B TD presentation unfortunately marginalizes the crucial doctrine of representation as formal unity, which not only provides the objective justification of the categories, but also, as we will consider in chapter 6, is essential for understanding his reconciliation of idealism and realism. APPENDIX: LONGUENESSE ON KANTIAN CONCEPTS There is a passage in the A TD that characterizes concepts as rules, and it might appear that this differs from the account of concepts that I have presented above. However, I will show that this, as well as a previous passage are most plausibly read as expanded explanations of the unifying functions view rather than as a divergent account. We will begin with a discussion that occurs in the paragraph that is just prior to the one that ends with the remark about concepts requiring the unity of consciousness:

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If in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition on of one to the other, and consequently, I would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis. The word ‘concept’ itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this one consciousness that unites the manifold that has successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation. (A 103)41

In examining this portion of the text, Longuenesse (1998) argues that Kant is using the term ‘concept’ in an unusual sense, since, as she reads this passage, a concept is not being described as “universal representation” but is rather being explained as consciousness “of an act of combining and bringing together” (46). This leads her to claim that Kant’s uses of the term ‘concept’ (‘Begriff’) have two different meanings. “On the one hand, it is the ‘consciousness of the unity of synthesis’ of a sensible manifold, and on the other, it is a discursive concept, a ‘universal or reflected representation’ of the act of synthesis which was common to several particular representations, and thereby made it possible for us to recognize them as identical” (p. 47). To evaluate Longuenesse’s interpretation, we will begin with her reading of the above passage. She understands the example of the concept NUMBER here to be a model that exhibits “an apprehension, reproduction, for each particular intuition.” And it is supposedly “the model (i.e., the pure form) of the relation of a concept to intuition, insofar as provides the rule for the generating of the unity of the manifold” (ibid.) It is, though, generally false that in identifying an instance of a concept, for example, CUBE, we are aware of psychological processes of independently apprehending each separate cube feature and of combining them. So, this suggests trying to find a reading that does not saddle Kant with a view that does not correspond to what we are introspectively aware of. Moreover, in the case of concepts of simple qualities, such as Kant’s own example of RED, there is nothing to combine, that is, there is no sensible manifold that we can somehow be aware of bringing together. But it is not reasonable to think that Kant somehow held a different view of simple quality concepts than he did of concepts with complex marks. A more plausible way of understanding this passage, then, is that Kant has selected a rather unusual concept, viz. NUMBER (specifically THREE), that, unlike most other concepts, does seemingly involve awareness of unifying psychological acts. And, tweaking the example to avoid any issues about the meaning of number concepts,42 an application of the concept (HAVING) COUNTED TO THREE necessarily requires having successively identified, that is, “apprehended” two distinct units and then another, while

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remembering, that is, “reproducing,” those previous apprehensions. However, this is rarely true of most other concept applications. In judging that something is a book or a cube, I am not aware of how many previous books or cubes I’ve encountered. I suggest that the purpose in choosing the unusual concept NUMBER is not to model what is involved in typical applications of concepts to intuitions, but rather to illustrate the general unity of consciousness. Thus, the last sentence in the above quote switches from concepts to the unity of consciousness. And, notably, in that sentence Kant does not mention “apprehension” but rather “intuitions,” that is, individual perceptions. So, the overarching unity of consciousness is being characterized as consisting of unities at moments, that is, each member of the succession is a unified manifold, that also have memory connections, that is, they are reproduced, thus unified over time. Part of what leads Longuenesse to think that these are two distinct meanings for “concept” is her entanglement with the complexity of Kant’s uses of the term “synthesis.” The “consciousness of the synthesis of the manifold” may suggest an awareness of some sort of esoteric mental process, which seems disconnected from idea of the representation of multiple instances. However, Kant defines “synthesis” as “the action of putting representations together and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A 77/B 103); he is thus using the term both to describe unifying processes and to refer to the unified representations that are the product of such processes. So, the “consciousness of the synthesis of the manifold” in the case of a concept with complex marks is normally just the representation of the co-occurrence of those marks. There must have been some combinatorial psychological process that produced this complex representation. But acknowledging this does not require that awareness of the product must also involve awareness of the process that produces it.43 So there is a somewhat of an ambiguity or, better, disjuctiveness of meanings here, but it involves the process/product aspects of the term “synthesis” rather than a duality of meanings of “concept.” We will now turn to the passage several paragraphs later in the TD where Kant offers the characterization of concepts as rules: A concept . . . is always something general that serves as a rule. Thus the concept of body serves as a rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it. However, it can be a rule of intuitions only if it represents the necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions, hence the synthetic unity in the consciousness of them. Thus, in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc. (A105–106)44

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I suggest that Kant is giving a slightly expanded explanation of the nature of concepts, in addition to their generality.45 To return to Longuenesse’s claim that Kant’s uses of ‘concept’ have two different meanings, we observe that this discussion reflects one of her supposed senses, viz., the unity of synthesis of a sensible manifold. Setting aside her account of awareness of processes, her suggested distinction amounts to the contrast between the unity of a given instance versus unity across instances, viz. the (unity) of “synthesis which was common to several particular representations.” But there is no need to treat these as different meanings; rather they are just two aspects of the way (most) concepts work. For a concept with complex marks, for example, CUBE, a given application of it can be described as a representation of the unity of the features in question, thus a synthesis, that is, the synthesis (combination) of “six” “equally sized” “square” and “face.” But it is this unity of marks in an instance that is a unifying function across instances, that is, CUBE is representation of multiple instances each of which consist of these unified marks. We can thus decode Kant’s description that concepts are rules that “represent the necessary reproduction of the unity of the manifold of given intuitions.” In simpler terms, concepts are specifications of repeatable unifications of marks; thus, for most concepts which consist of more than a single mark, they are types of feature clusters. Thus, to say that an experience is of a cube is to say that it contains several appropriately ordered (thus unified) features, and it is also analytically unified with other actual and possible cube intuitions via the necessary unity of consciousness. Having the concept CUBE requires the cognitive ability to (continue) to experience the appropriate combination of features, so, as Kant puts it, this concept requires the necessary reproducibility of the “manifold” of marks of a cube. It is thus a rule that if you intuit the collection of cube features, then that intuition can be necessarily unified with all other intuitions that involve the same synthesis of marks, that is, you can correctly judge that you are perceiving a cube. There are thus two “synthetic unities” for any concept that has complex marks, viz., the synthetic unity of the co-occurrence of that feature cluster in perceived instances, and also the analytic unity across instances, which is achieved via the necessary synthetic unity of consciousness. NOTES 1. This chapter is a further development of Kaye (2015) chapters 3 and 4. In that work I present and defend a much more extensive reading of both versions of the TD. 2. This passage as well as the subsequent quotes of A104–5 are from Kant, 1998, 231.

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3. Allais (2015, 267–71) argues that the “correspondence” and “relation to an object” that Kant is concerned with here concerns our ability to refer to objects with conceptual thoughts. However, the A108–9 passage that recaps these points, and which although it does not mention correspondence does mention relation to an object, cannot be read in that way since appearances and intuitions are not conceptual thoughts. 4. Watkins and Willaschek (2017) maintain that for Kant a cognition is solely judgmental/conceptual. However, they ignore the A320/B376–7 inventory. And as I indicate, that understanding of the term will not work for this particular passage. 5. Allison (2015, 220–221) and Landy (2015, 183) both discuss this passage but neither detects an argument. They instead assert that Kant is expressing a normative understanding of necessity. But as I now explain, the apparent reasoning here does not involve normativity. 6. Both Landy and also Allais (2015, 285–289) claim that Kant is addressing the binding problem here. I have indicated above why Allais’ reading of this entire passage is mistaken. And see my criticisms of Landy’s attempt to understand the unity of the concept of an object in terms of the unity of parts in the main appendix. 7. There is thus no reason to characterize it as “normative” necessity, contrary to both Allison and Landy, both op. cit. 8. Kant, 1958), 133. 9. Ibid., 134. 10. This is how Longueness (1998, 85–86) understands it—I examine her reading of Kant on concepts in the appendix at the end of this chapter. 11. Rosenberg (2005, 92–93) mentions this meaning of “unifying function,” but he insists that in the Transcendental Deduction Kant is concerned with unifying multiple encounters with the same object. However, that does not involve concepts but is rather a matter of memory. 12. One of the few exceptions is Watkins (2012) who explains Kant’s doctrine that concepts are unifying functions and then applies it to Sellars’ and McDowell’s account of the naturalistic fallacy. (I discuss their views of Kant in chapter 5). 13. Note that this passage lays the groundwork for the claim that the categories are the highest-order unifiers. We will return to this point below. 14. Or it may at least suggest that the higher-order unity—the unifying function of judgments—is the only thing that is important here, for example, Allison (2004, 136–137); we will consider his view of concepts and unity further below. 15. Watkins and Willaschek (2017, 26–28) distinguish two senses of concepts for Kant, viz., a “psychological” one which involves marks that are identified in intuitions versus a “logical” sense that concerns this hierarchy of types. However, I see no need to do that, since the hierarchy is a result of the fact that we apply concepts that are at varying levels of abstraction. These are simply two aspects of conceptual classification, i.e., of the application of unifying functions. 16. Kant, 1998, 247. 17. The qualification is because it is of course possible to experience an intuition with the marks of a given concept, but not notice that the concept applies to that intuition.

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18. Kant appears to be offering this argument in the opening paragraph of #16 in the B TD (B132), which we will consider further below. 19. This is clarified in the first Paralogism (A348–351). 20. Kant, 1998, 231. 21. Kant, 1958, 135. 22. Kant, 1998, 235. 23. Hume (1738/1978 1,4,2) is an extended reflection in support of the claim that there is no phenomenal basis for the identity of perceived bodies. He maintains that this shows that there are no grounds for attributing either continued or external existence to bodies. However, by assigning identities that exceed the phenomenal, Kantian schematized substance allows us to represent both the continued existence and externality of bodies. 24. Another key instance of this usage occurs in the First Analogy at B225. 25. Note that there is a second varying usage here, along with that of “object,” namely for “appearances,’ which Kant sometimes uses narrowly to refer just to what outer intuitions represent. 26. Kant, 1958, 59. 27. Kant, 1998, 196. 28. Note that for the psychological side of Kant’s epistemology, “transcendental” serves as a contrast term with “empirical,” referring to knowledge of objects that is based in the understanding, i.e., knowledge that transcends the empirical—cf. his mention of “faculty” in the Prolegomena 4:293 (Hatfield, trans., 2004, 45). 29. Kant, 1998, 233. 30. Thus, in agreement with Van Cleve (1999, p. 79), what Kant means by “transcendental apperception” is not awareness of “an entity or agent.” 31. Kant, 1998, 247. 32. Kant, 1958, 137. 33. Ibid., 121. 34. Kant, 1998, 234. 35. It is worth noting that we do not need the explanation that the unity of intuitions involves the schematized categories—an explanation which comes after the TD—in order to show that the categories have objective validity. Thus, the unity of intuitions that constitutes the representation of objects is necessary, so, conceptions of this unity will be a priori. However, the categories have been inventoried in the Metaphysical Deduction as the most fundamental a priori concepts. It follows that the categories will conceptualize this necessary unity of intuitions and thereby apply to represented objects. 36. As we will consider in chapter 6. 37. Kant, 1958, 12. 38. Ibid., 149–150. 39. I borrow this phrase from Kitcher (1990), although I am using it differently, and my understanding of the TD differs greatly from hers. 40. Kant, 1998, 249. 41. Ibid., 230–231.

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42. Kant seems to be asserting that the content of number concepts consists of the representation of temporal sequences, as in counting. 43. Thus, when Kant, in introducing the idea of synthesis, states that we are “seldom even conscious” of it (A78/B103) he is presumably saying that we are seldom aware of these processes occurring. 44. Kant, 1998, 232. 45. Bayne (2011, 134–136) provides additional textual evidence in support of the idea that the concept as rules view is an expansion of the concepts as marks view. However, his examination of Kant’s view of concepts overlooks the crucial aspect of generality, viz., that concepts are unifying functions that yield the analytic unity of their instances.

Chapter 3

Representing Time: Substance

The Analogies present justifications of synthetic a priori principles involving substance, causation, and community, using argumentation that concerns temporal representation. As we will see, the resulting view is that time must be represented as external to consciousness. This is achieved by representing external substances, their necessitated (causal) alterations, and their causal interrelations. These accounts strongly corroborate the account of representation that I have extracted from the A TD by providing explanations of how the schematized relational categories project objects. In this chapter we will examine the First Analogy. After noting the difficulties with the drastically understated text, I present and criticize the standard reading. I then develop a new understanding of Kant’s argumentation that overcomes these difficulties. This will both yield a new justification of the need for the category of substance in representing time and will further justify Kant’s view that the representation of objects consists of the a priori, formal unification of intuitions. And we will also examine the Refutation of Idealism and see that it is a straightforward implication of the First Analogy. THE TEXT AND EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS The most obvious place to look for argumentation that establishes the First Analogy is in the proof that Kant added in the second edition (B 224–225). The first sentence asserts that time, as persistent form of inner sense, is a substratum for the representation of simultaneity and succession. The second sentence infers from the claim that we must represent succession and simultaneity as “determinations” of time the conclusion that time “lasts and does not change.” Kant then states that time itself cannot be perceived. He proceeds to infer that “it is in the objects of perception, that is, the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can be perceived in apprehension through 59

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the relation of appearances to it.” He then additionally infers, or perhaps clarifies, that this substratum is substance, “of which everything that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination.”1 The next sentence states that this establishes that there is unchanging substance in all appearances, which is the first part of the (revised, second edition) principle. And the final sentence concludes with an inference to the second part of the principle, viz., that the lack of change in the existence of substance implies that the amount of substance cannot vary. Read in isolation, this proof seems both question-begging and also extremely under-articulated. The initial sentence and apparent inference from it to the idea that time lasts and does not change are sometimes taken to be intuitive, for example, by Allison, who reads this as a claim about the unity of time, viz., that “constant flux occurs in a single time” (2004, 238). However, as we will see shortly, the opening assertion that characterizes time as a substratum is not the same as the truism that time is unified. A second pair of concerns arise from Kant’s quick moves from the point that we do not perceive time directly to the claim that we must look to the “objects of perception” to explain how we represent time, and then to the concept of substance. As Guyer (1987, 220ff.) has emphasized, it is not apparent what the basis is for these crucial steps. That is, why exactly do we need to turn to the objects of appearances, and why should this require the notion of substance? The second step seems to be based on the idea that substance is the substratum of that which exists in the perceived, external world, which suggests that the representation of time requires a substratum, which in turn suggests that the opening sentences provide more than a truism about the unity of time. However, as we have noted, it is not apparent what the basis for this stronger claim is—prima facie, it seems to be simply assumed. And, finally, it is unclear both exactly how it follows that there must be a fixed amount of substance and if this is a change in view from that of the first edition. The details of the reasoning must therefore be found in the rest of the text, which consists of eight paragraphs that are common to both editions. But it is not easy to find argumentation there. The first paragraph again asserts the need for persistence, followed by some reflections on change and duration, leading to an assertion about substance(s) in the final sentence. The second paragraph contemplates the fact there has not been a previous proof of substance. The third paragraph begins with an anecdote and then presents what appear to be clarifying remarks about substance. The fourth paragraph briefly characterizes the idea of accidents, and the fifth paragraph coins the term “alteration.” In the sixth paragraph we finally find some reasoning, concerning arising and perishing, and the seventh paragraph offers an additional brief argument apparently intended to show that substances can neither arise nor perish.

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Given the need for additional argumentation in the proof, together with the apparent lack of clear argumentation at any other point in the text, the dominant approach to the First Analogy involves attributing reasoning that, while only hinted at in the text, may seem independently plausible. Allison, the foremost defender of this strategy, calls this the “backdrop thesis,” and initially applies it in defense of Kant’s move to finding persistence in the objects of appearances: If there were nothing that persists, if everything were in constant flux, then we could not even be aware of succession as such, not to mention simultaneity. Consequently, an enduring, perceivable object (or objects) is required to provide the backdrop or frame of reference by means of which succession, simultaneity and duration of appearances in common time can be determined. (Allison 2004, 239)

It is important to note that by “enduring,” Allison means a relative endurance, that is, a temporary constant against otherwise continuous change. Kant’s subsequent move to the notion of substance is explained by Allison via a reading that was apparently first proposed by Dyer (1966, 353ff.) The argument, which is ascribed to the sixth paragraph and which looks ahead to reasoning from the Second Analogy, is that an experience of an apparent change in attributes does not count as the attribution of an actual change, since such an experience is indistinguishable from an experience of noticing a pre-existing state of the world, as when looking first to the left then to the right. So, the representation of genuine change requires representing something enduring that the change occurs in, viz., that what is being perceived are the changing attributes of a continually existing subject, that is, a substance. Allison maintains that this establishes the existence of relatively persisting substances. Then, drawing on the seventh paragraph, he argues that the unity of time requires the absolute persistence of substances, since perishing and newly arising substances would cause a break in the attribution of changes, thus undermining our ability to connect the new state empirically to previous states. While most evaluations of this reading focus on the second stage, I will point out that the first step seems entirely problematic. It is not apparent why the needed relative constancy has to be in the perceived external world. Thus, if I phenomenologically experience a red spot changing into a green spot, there may be other temporary phenomenological constancy, for example, my simultaneous experience of a temporarily enduring tone. Allison is perhaps assuming that when Kant says that appearances are always changing (A180/ B225) he means that we experience all of our conscious states as constantly

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changing. But this is manifestly false—some conscious states have some, albeit limited endurance.2 As noted, there have been various criticisms of the second stage of Allison’s reading, that is, the replacement argument. I will highlight two. First, following Van Cleve (1999, 108), we can simply object that the argument does not establish the need for substance at all. Thus, the above phenomenological example would seem to be a perfectly good instance of a replacement change, sans substance, and similarly for a change of properties in the perceived external world, for example, when a light blinks on and off while the bulb-shape endures. Also consider Ward’s (2001, 388–393) objection that the replacement argument presupposes that we can successfully determine when a genuine change has occurred. But this is question-begging, since the supposed issue concerns our ability to detect changes.3 And as he also indicates, it appears that our ability to detect genuine changes is what the Second Analogy takes on, which thus cannot have been accounted for in the First Analogy. I suggest that what has happened here is that in the first stage of his reading, Allison leaps to the notion of enduring external objects, based on his supposition that Kant maintains that representations of objects are somehow given—an attribution of his that we have noted in chapter 1. And, playing along with this assumption for the moment, if we take external objects to be enduring things with potentially changeable properties, then we arrive at the second stage with the tacit notion of external substance together with their changes already in place. On the other hand, once we acknowledge the failure of the first stage, then it would seem that the replacement argument is really just a further elaboration of the backdrop thesis, which again, does not even take us to external objects, let alone to substances. We thus need to find another way to shore up the problems with the B proof. While not focusing on the proof itself, Ward provides an alternative approach to understanding the reasoning. He argues that Kant is trying to “account for our idea of a temporal continuum or duration” (393). If we have apprehended a change from A to B, then according to Ward “Kant’s position is that only if, having apprehended A and having apprehended B, we can think that there is something that has persisted throughout—something, permanent connecting A with B, of which each is simply a different determination—that we can be conscious of a length of time in which both A and B have successfully existed” (394). The attributed primary reasoning is thus that in order to be aware of a change, we have to represent a temporal persistence or permanence connecting the earlier state with the subsequent one. There is, however, an important problem here. Duration is not the same as persistence (let alone permanence). Thus, it might be claimed that only something of limited endurance is required to represent duration. So, in Ward’s

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attributed reasoning: “if having apprehended A and having apprehended B, we can think that there is something that has persisted throughout.” We can understand “persisting” as meaning temporarily persisting, and seemingly equally well explain the representation of a length of time. And, construed this way, we have what amounts to another presentation of the backdrop argument, viz., that the representation of a change from A to B requires representing something that remains constant as backdrop to the change, even if this is only a temporary constancy. Ward does not address this concern,4 beyond quoting the passage where Kant asserts that a duration is just a magnitude of that which persists (A 183/B 226). However, it seems imperative to determine what lies behind that remark. To appreciate why, consider an alternative explanation of how we represent time, along Lockean/Humean lines. We can begin by proposing that we become aware of temporal sequences as well as durations by reflecting on changes in our thoughts, or perhaps through perceptions of changes in the world. On this basis we can construct a representation of time in general, that is, of a general temporal sequence, where simultaneity is explained as that which exists or occurs at the same stage of this general sequence, and where further durations are measured by the number of stages of the general sequence. We can then understand the representation of what Ward terms “the temporal continuity” as constructed out of representations of sequences and limited durations without need of substances. And in keeping with the backdrop argument, we can grant that the experience of any sequence requires also representing something else that is at least temporarily not changing, but there is similarly no reason to think that that will require the postulation of substances. I will label this type of view, viz., one that attempts to explain all representations of the temporal via some combination of representations of experienced sequences or durations, an “empirical constructivist” account of the representation of time. Neither the backdrop argument nor Ward’s reading rule out such a view; but unless this is accomplished, we have no understanding of how Kant’s examination of how we represent time leads to the need to invoke the category of substance. The possibility of an empirical constructivist account of our representation of time also casts doubt both on the apparent initial premise in Kant’s (B) proof which characterizes time as a substratum, as well as his immediate inference, or clarification, that succession and simultaneity can only be represented as determinations of time. This alternative approach attempts to account for our representations of succession, duration, and simultaneity independent of any conception of a temporal substratum. So it is clear that the claim at the start of the proof is not intuitive, but rather requires justification.

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THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF PERSISTENCE I maintain that Kant’s primary reasoning in support of substance involves showing that an empirical constructivist account of the representation of time is unworkable. He accomplishes this by examining the possible starting points for this sort of account, viz., representations of succession, of simultaneity, of change, and of limited duration, and in each case arguing that we cannot explain how we represent this temporal aspect in isolation. It follows that that the representation of succession, simultaneity, change and duration all depend on an independent, conceptually prior conception of persistence, which is to say that the representation of persistence is the conceptual substratum of our representation of time. The argumentation is presented, or at least outlined, in the middle of the first paragraph of the First Analogy common to both editions (A 182/B 226), beginning with Kant’s assertion that “persistence gives general expression to time as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances, all change and all accompaniment.”5 This is a conclusion that, as we will now see, is established by the reasoning sketched in the next four sentences in which Kant first considers change, simultaneity and succession, and then turns to duration. Before examining these remarks, it will be useful to consider the typical attempted starting point of an empirical constructivist approach. The seemingly obvious place to begin is with the representation of temporal sequences, with the plan of then proceeding to durations. Thus, Locke bk. II, chap. XIV, sect. 4 (1689/1975, 182) claims that we acquire the idea of succession from reflection on “the train of ideas,” and then re-explains that the idea of succession originates from noticing that our ideas appear “one after another” sect. 16 (1689/1975, 186). This may give the appearance of a reasonable explanation, but it actually involves a flat circularity. While there is no mention of this criticism in the text of the First Analogy, Kant (2002) makes this point in the Dissertation: Nor does succession generate the concept of time; it makes appeal to it. And thus the concept of time, regarded as if it had been acquired through experience, is very badly defined, if it is defined in terms of the series actual things which exists one after the other. For I only understand the meaning of the little word after by means of the antecedent concept of time. For those things come after one another which exist at different times, just as those things are simultaneous which exist at the same time. (392, para. 14.1)

Locke’s quoted descriptions both involve this mistake. In the second, the ability to represent our thoughts as occurring one after the other, as Kant points out, requires the prior possession of a conception of things happening

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at different times, and thus in temporal order. And the description of our thoughts unfolding in a “train” simply means that they unfold in a temporal sequence, thus again invoking a prior notion of time. It is worth noting that turning to our perceptions of the external world provides no help here. Thus, the attempted explanation that we acquire the idea of temporal sequence from perceiving that an external event occurs and is then followed by another involves the same circularity. Hume offers an account that may seem the same as Locke’s, thus involving the same circularity problem, viz., “from the succession of impressions and ideas we form the idea of time” 1.2.3.7 (1738/1978, 35) However, his summary characterization suggests a slightly different view, that time “is always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.” (ibid.) We may take this to mean that we get the idea of succession from perceiving external changes. The suggested explanation is that the experience of change is the basis for our representation of temporal relations. But, in an apparent counter to this, Kant asserts that change affects the appearances that are in time but does not affect time itself (A183/B226). The claim would appear to be that if, say, A changes to B, this happens within the same unchanged time. However, it is not apparent that this sufficiently demonstrates that we cannot explain how we represent time by appealing to the experience of change, since it seems to simply assume that time is conceptually independent of change. But we can clarify what is behind this remark by again turning to the Dissertation (2002): For A and not-A are not inconsistent unless thought simultaneously (that is to say, at the same time) about the same thing, for they can belong to the same thing after one other (that is to say, at different times). Hence it is only in time that the possibility of changes can be thought, whereas time cannot be thought by means of change, only vice versa. (394, para. 15)

So, the argument is that to represent A changing to B (and thus also A to not A and not B to B), we must represent A and B as occurring at different times, which is to say that the representation of a change requires that we are independently able to represent time. We cannot represent a change atemporally—as Kant points out, this would be contradictory, that is, A and not A, for example, the light is on and off. Therefore, we cannot derive the idea of succession from the representation of change, since the representation of change involves the representation of succession, for example, representing the change from A to B involves the representation of B succeeding A. So, as he concludes, the representation of change requires time, that is, it conceptually presupposes the representation of the temporal, and not vice versa. And this is to say that change does not affect time itself, but rather requires it; thus,

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changes happen in time, that is, in relation to an independent representation of the temporal. We thus appreciate that the account suggested by Hume would have us represent time via perceived changes, but we once again are mired in circularity, since the representation of change presupposes the representation of time. Kant then states that if we were to ascribe a succession to “time itself” we would need to represent another time as the basis for this succession. This is a negative moral about trying to constructively explain time by beginning from the notion of sequence. It amounts to a summary of the circularity problem, viz., that a representation of succession presupposes a representation of the temporal. And, to underscore, this circularity is unavoidable. If we try to conceive of a sequence atemporally then we simply have an order, for example, a logical ordering or a physical ordering such as a list. To be able to understand the ordering—which is supposed to represent “time itself”—as temporal, we must relate it to a separate representation of on-going time. in other words, the ordering A, B can be conceived as B after A only relative to this separate representation of time, thereby undermining this version of the empirical constructivist view. He also notes parenthetically that simultaneity does not apply to time itself. Thus, we cannot have a primitive conception of two states as occurring at the same time—here the circularity is obvious. Simultaneity rests on a representation of the temporal and not vice versa. So, it is not possible to create a constructive representation of time that begins from sequence, from change, or from simultaneity. To avoid circularity, we instead need an independent, that is, conceptually prior means of representing time that provides the basis, that is, that serves as the “substratum” for these relations. However, it may seem that there is another option for the empirical constructivist in the notion of a limited duration. We could perhaps explain sequences and simultaneity relative to a series of durations, thereby achieving a constructive representation of temporality. Hume, though, provides the counter here—he argues that the experience of no change does not provide us with the experience of duration, since a duration “can never be convey’d to the mind by any thing steadfast and unchangeable” 1.2.3.7 (1738/1978, 37). Thus, the experience of no change may last for different lengths of time, that is, for different durations. In other words, we do not have a primitive perception of the length of a duration. So this cannot be the basis for an empirical constructivist explanation. We can read Kant’s assertion that “Only through that which persists does existence in different parts of the temporal series acquire a magnitude, which one calls duration” (A 226/B 183) as reflecting this point—we cannot construct the notion of persistence by beginning with

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duration; rather, the representation of a length of time, that is, a duration, requires the conceptually prior notion of persistence. One more possibility remains for the empirical constructivist, namely, to explain duration in combination with the representation of sequences. Thus, Locke asserts that “the distance between and parts of [the] succession, or between the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we call Duration” in book. II, chap. XIV, sect. 3 (1689/1975, 182) and Hume similarly claims that “the idea of duration is always deriv’d from a succession of changeable objects” 1.2.3.7 (1738/1978, 37). Now, we have seen that the empirical constructivist is not entitled to the assumption that the awareness of succession is somehow a given. But even setting this result aside, it is easy to see that this proposal will not work. Thus, suppose someone experiences three consecutive mental states, A, B, and C. The mere representation of them in this sequence does not dictate either the time, if any, between each of them, nor how long each lasted. Here we again face the experience of no change problem. Thus, if A occurs and then a second later B occurs, with nothing else happening in between, then the intermediary period is again an experience of no change which requires the notion of persistence in order to be conceived as a duration of a certain length. Similarly, the length of the occurrences of A, B, or C is an experience of no change of each of those states, which again does not provide a representation of their durations. Without this independent conception of persistence, we just have the bare sequential ordering. We thus appreciate why Kant asserts that in a “mere sequence” there is no magnitude of existence—changes simply begin and end (ibid.). So, all the alternatives for an empirical constructivist explanation of temporal relations are unworkable. The representation of sequence, change, simultaneity, and duration have been shown to presuppose an independent, conceptually prior representation of time. And the examination of duration shows that what is prior is the representation of persistence. Thus, in order to represent time at all, that is, to represent any temporal relation or states, we must represent persistence. In other words, time is primarily persistent. I will label this result the conceptual priority of persistence. We can thus understand Kant’s assertion that “that which persists is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself, by which alone all time determination is possible” (A183/B226)6 as characterizing this conceptual dependence. These considerations show that Allison’s approach to the reasoning of the First Analogy is completely mistaken. The “background” argument that there must be some constancy, if only temporary, as a frame of reference for representing change does not appear in the argumentation we have just examined, nor does the Alison/Dyer replacement argument play any role. And moreover, each of these arguments assumes that the ability to represent both change and duration. But as we now appreciate, Kant argues that neither change nor

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(limited) duration can be represented without an independent representation of persistence. And he does not first establish temporarily existing substances and then proceed to prove the existence of permanent substances, since the first stage would require a “relative persistence” as Allison terms it (p. 239). But a relative persistence would be a duration, which, again, Kant argues cannot be represented apart from unrestricted persistence. On the other hand, Ward is correct that Kant is maintaining that in order to sequentially apprehend a change from A to B, we must represent that there is a persistence (n.b., not as he says a “permanence”) “connecting A with B, of which each is simply a different determination.” However, we now appreciate that to even apprehend A or B as existing states, each presumably with some duration, already requires the representation of persistence. We also now understand the reasoning that Kant uses to establish this view, and also appreciate the full scope of his argumentation and the generality of his result, viz., that the representation of all temporal notions must be explained relative to the representation of persistence. FROM PERSISTENCE TO SUBSTANCE Returning to proof of the First Analogy in the second edition, it should now be apparent that the first two sentences gesture at the reasoning we have been considering. While the argumentation cannot be concisely summarized, a more complete statement of what is established in the criticisms of attempted empirical constructivist explanations of temporal representation is: Representation of succession, of change, of simultaneity, and of duration all require a representation of persistence, which is thus the conceptual “substratum” of our representation of time.

And, since time itself cannot be perceived, there must be something else that we represent as persistent that serves as the basis for our representation of the temporal. The next step in the proof is the move to the “objects of perception,” viz., the content of appearances, as the place where this persistence is found. As noted above, this is a puzzling leap which presumably rests on reasoning not mentioned in the Proof itself. We find the justification in the opening sentence of the main paragraph, where Kant asserts that persistence is not found in the “manifold of appearance,” that is, our conscious perceptual states, since “our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing.” This might be taken to rest on the fact that we are always experiencing time, and thus must always be experiencing succession,

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and thus change. However, that does not establish that all aspects of our experience are always changing, that is, that allows for some constancy, thus possible persistence. Another possibility is that this invokes the doctrine of the synthesis of apprehension that was introduced in the A Transcendental Deduction at A 99. The argument given there, on my reading, runs as follows: Our experience involves a “manifold,” that is, a collection of parts, of various qualities, for example, varying colors in the visual field. However, to be aware of a whole that consists of a complexity, we have to first successively grasp the various parts and only then apprehend the whole. But, while this is an interesting argument about how perceptual processing must work, the conclusion is not supported introspectively. Thus, while we are constantly experiencing a vast array of perceptual qualities, we have no awareness of having first experienced each separately—for example, each pixel of color in the visual field.7 However, it seems that the intended point is just that there is no persistence in our thoughts. And here, like Hume, we can simply appeal to introspection. We always find a continual change in our conscious states. Visual perception involves frequent eye movements as we scan the particulars of our environment with the relatively small area of detailed focus in the center of the visual field, yielding frequently altering visual experiences. And every blink interrupts any constancy. Other types of sensations, including the somatic, come and go. Our occurent, linguistic thoughts unfold in an ever-changing sequence. And while some feelings, emotions, and moods endure for a while, they eventually alter as well. On top of all this, any period of unconsciousness, such as sleep, obviously results in the temporary cessation of all conscious states. Yet time does not begin anew when we reawaken. So, while there are various durations of consciousness states, none are persistent. While we need to look elsewhere for this needed persistence, it is important to appreciate that this already shows that there is no purely subjective basis for the representation of time, that is, the perception of our conscious thoughts cannot provide a basis for representing time. It may have seemed plausible, a la Locke, that our experiences of changing conscious states constitute the fundamental clock that marks the passage of time, at least subjectively, for each of us. But since persistence is required to be able to represent time, and there is none in consciousness, we now see that that explanation is unworkable. This thus undermines another attributed version of the reasoning in both the First and the other Analogies, viz., that Kant is somehow arguing that to be able to represent objective as opposed to merely subjective time, we need to attribute substance (Strawson 1966, 122 ff.) The lack of persistence in our conscious states shows that we cannot begin from the idea of the subjective

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representation of time and then proceed to an account of the representation of objective time, so this cannot be Kant’s reasoning here. The explanation of how we represent the persistence that is needed to represent the temporal must instead somehow involve what we represent rather than the representational states themselves, thus “objects of experience”—the perceived external, spatial world. However, prima facie, there is no help here either. We perceive a physical world of features—properties and relations— that sometimes change and that are in general changeable. And we need to consider too that we are not just looking for something persistent, but something that can serve as the conceptual substratum for the representation of sequence, simultaneity, and duration. Since there is no empirical constancy in our perceptions, this must be a “pure” concept, that is, a concept that although it applies to perceptions is not derived from them. Since the category of substance has been schematized as persistence and since a substance is a substratum for attributes, this concept is the obvious choice and seemingly the only available option. How, then, can we apply and how do we apply this concept? Since neither our conscious states themselves nor our experiences of the world involve the needed persistence, Kant is thus maintaining that we both do and must represent changeable physical features as supported by an unchangeable substratum that we do not directly perceive.8 In order to represent time, we therefore must represent the external world as consisting of unchangeable substances, with changeable attributes. While the text of the First Analogy provides no explanation of how we represent substances, we do find one in the note to the second edition Preface, where Kant tells us “the representation of something persisting in existence is not the same as a persisting representation; for that can be quite variable and changeable, as all our representations are, even the representations of matter, while still being related to something permanent, which must therefore be a thing distinct and external from all our representations” (Bxli).9 This passage confirms that his view is that we represent perceived external states as states of underlying substances that we do not directly perceive, that is, the substratum of the attributes we do perceive. And it is this understanding of substance that is expressed in the first edition version of the First Analogy Principle (A 182), where Kant refers to substance as “the object itself,” that is, something that is “distinct and external from our representations.” And, to step away from the present line of inquiry for a moment, note that this remark also strongly corroborates the account of representation that I am attributing to Kant, viz., the application of (schematized) substance produces content that exceeds subjective conscious states. The objects so-represented are not collections of phenomenal states but rather are projected external existents, that, notably, and contrary to direct realism, are not directly perceived.

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And we can for that matter understand the reasoning we are examining as mandating a representationalist, projectivist view, since these alternative approaches to perception do not allow us to account for the representation of persistence. This establishes that we must somehow represent an external substratum in order to represent the temporal, but it does not dictate how we actually do so. That is consistent with what Kant says in introducing the Analogies, where he tells us that three members only allow for the a priori cognition of the relation to a fourth member but not member itself. He adds that we do though have a rule for seeking and discovering the fourth member in experience (A180/ B222). In other words, the analogy does not tell us how precisely how we represent substances, we know that we must somehow represent persistence via representing substances. So, while this allows for the possibility of representing the entire universe as a single substance, reflection on the content of experience indicates that that is not how we represent the external world. Rather, we understand it as consisting of many discrete clumps of “stuff,” that is, “matter,” that is, physical objects.10 Since we must somehow represent a substratum for change, this is to say that we represent a world of persistent substances with changeable attributes. However, saying that substance is persistent may seem to threaten circularity, since “persistence” means something like “temporally on-going existence,” thus again invoking an independent notion of time. While it is not apparent that Kant (fully) realized this,11 he does offer what amounts to a solution a few sentences later where he states that “the identity of the substratum” is what constitutes persistence. Since identity is not a temporal notion, the identity of matter provides a noncircular basis for the explanation of our conception of persistence. Thus, we represent persistent substances by the reidentification of external objects, thus representing the continued existence of the substratum of matter that underlies them. Our representation of substances that maintain their identity is thus the only available candidate for the required representation of something completely persistent to play the role of the substratum of the temporal. And since substance represents the substratum of the real, that is, the substratum of existence (B 225) this is the right kind of conception. That is, there is a parallel between temporal persistence conceived as the foundation of the representation of sequence, simultaneity, and duration and substance conceived as the foundation of all physical attributes and their changes. Indeed, it is possible that this is what Kant is thinking of as an analogy here, viz., just as the representation of sequence, simultaneity, and duration requires the substratum of the representation of persistence, so the representation of (physical) change requires the representation of a substratum of external substance.

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METHODOLOGY, AND THE REST OF THE TEXT We thus have a successful explanation of how we represent persistence. This does, however, raise a very substantial methodological issue. Although Kant labels the added second edition passage a “proof,” the sub-conclusion that introduces substance is not a deductive inference, but rather an explanatory solution. What has been proved, by a priori reasoning, is that the representation of persistence is conceptually prior to the representation of sequence, simultaneity, change and duration. Since we do not perceive time itself, and thus do not perceive persistence itself, we are faced with the question of how we do represent persistence. It is a broadly empirical truth that there is no persistence in conscious states—whether justified by introspection or by the supposed constant change of the synthesis of apprehension, which looks to be an empirical psychological doctrine, that is, a broad explanation of perceptual processing. And the very obvious empirical truth that we all undergo periods of unconsciousness secures the lack of persistence in consciousness. The fact that we do not empirically represent anything persistent in the perceived states of the external world is also an empirical truth. So, the only available option is the schematized concept of substance, which consists of the reidentification of matter. We should thus understand Kant’s support for the application of the category of substance as an inference to the only feasible explanation rather than as a deductive proof. However, the nondeductive nature of this result does not lessen its plausibility—it is not just a well-supported hypothesis but is rather the only workable explanation.12 We can think of the investigation as involving a double argument by elimination. The initial, conceptual phase shows, very convincingly, that there is no possibility of an empirical constructivist explanation of the representation of the temporal. But this sort of constructive account would seem to be the only alternative to beginning with persistence. The second, empirical phase of the investigation rests on very obvious facts about the lack of persistence in either consciousness or the perceived world. And, while arguments by elimination are often viewed with suspicion, this reasoning achieves a successful explanation, with no available alternative; it thus cannot be called into question simply because of the methodology. This puts us in a position to make sense of the fourth through the seventh paragraphs of the text of the First Analogy. Since we have determined that the reasoning that establishes substance as that which represents time has already been presented, I maintain that this portion of the text should not be read as arguing for substance, as in the Dyer-Allison interpretation, but rather as exploring further implications of this result. If we acknowledge that the external world needs to be represented as consisting of persistent substances, then

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it follows that everything else must consist of attributes of those substances, as the fourth paragraph notes. That is, accepting and applying the concept of substance also requires acknowledging and applying the dual concept of an attribute. And, since substances are conceived as unchanging, it follows that all change must be attribute change, as the fifth paragraph indicates, coining “alteration” as a reminder of this. The sixth paragraph should be read as making a modest point that sets up the reasoning in the seventh paragraph. I suggest that it is simply an argument to show that, with the persistence of time as (schematized) substance view in place, it follows that we can never perceive a change that consists of absolute newness. Rather, any change must be conceived relative to that which persists, thus, by the just-muted definition, as an alteration. Kant argues that if we try to conceive of an absolute creation of something, we must also conceive of a preceding time without the new thing. But since the representation of time requires the representation of substance—we thus cannot represent an empty time—the representation of a creation requires a representation of some other persisting substance, both prior to the creation and during it. But then the arising is not actually absolute, but rather happens relative to this persistence, and similarly for something’s ceasing to exist. The seventh paragraph begins with a reminder that substance is the basis for the representation of time. And, since as we have just seen, we cannot represent the creation or destruction of a substance relative to an empty time, the representation of a substance arising or perishing would be to represent time itself as arising or perishing. This would mean that there are different, distinct times that begin and end. But we do not experience time, or times, beginning or ending—this is, I suggest, what Kant means by the “empirical unity of time.” Or, to put it another way, when we empirically experience the passage of time, it makes no sense to ask, “Which time is this?” So the singularity of time requires the representation of substances that do not arise and perish.13 If all substances are thus fixed in their existence, then the second part of the second edition principle, viz., that there must be a fixed amount (“Quantum”) of substance, follows directly. There must be substances that serve for the representation of time, thus some quantity of them,14 and since the substances are unchanging—they do not begin or cease to exist—this quantity must remain fixed. The new understanding of the reasoning behind the First Analogy presented here thus allows us to appreciate the justification for this strong metaphysical conclusion; and we also see that this result is not a change in view in the second edition—it is entailed by the reasoning in the first edition.

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THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM Added in the second edition, the Refutation (B275–276) addresses Cartesian perceptual skepticism which asserts that our perceptual experiences are consistent with the nonexistence of the external world. There is no agreement in the literature on what the argument is, let alone if it is successful. We will now see that it should be read as an immediate and unproblematic consequence of the result of the First Analogy. It will be useful to begin by considering Kant’s response to skepticism in the first edition which is found in the Fourth Paralogism: In order to refute empirical idealism [Cartesian skepticism] . . . it is already sufficient that outer perception proves a reality in space, which space, though in itself is only a mere form of representations, nevertheless has objective reality in regard to all outer appearances (which also are nothing but mere representations). (A376–377)15

This is one of the passages that strongly invites a phenomenalist reading of the Critique. But we should instead read the projective view of representation into it: Kant is noting that outer perception projects a reality that is distinct from our subjective experiences. In effect, this is to say that the projective account in and of itself undermines the skeptical challenge. And at first pass, this is reasonable, if we formulate the skeptical argument along the following lines: My perceptual experiences are supposedly caused by the mind-independent external, spatial world, and we represent it in virtue of this causal transaction. However, the very same experiences might have other causes, so that the world might not actually exist. As we have seen, Kant, while acknowledging that the input to sensibility, viz., sensations, is externally caused, does not maintain that sensations represent their causes. And moreover, the represented world involves the a priori forms of space and time that are not themselves derived from the effects of the external on our minds, and it is thus what we may call an idealistic projection. This alternative treatment of representation thus rejects both aspects of the premise, that is, perceptual experiences caused by a mind-independent world, and perceptual representation that rests on this causation. Why, then, was Kant not satisfied with this response? An obvious problem is that saying that “objective reality” is “nothing but mere representations” does not seem realist at all; indeed, it seems to be granting the skeptic’s conclusion. One solution would be to provide a fuller (re)explanation of the projective view. But that might still leave doubts about whether it is truly a form of realism, an issue we will return to in chapter 6. The results concerning

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time and substance from the First Analogy, though, provide a much stronger response, as we are about to consider. And, moreover, the Cartesian skeptical attack can be reformulated to create problems for the projective view. While there is no textual evidence that Kant contemplated this, the following reasoning shows why mere appeal to projective representation does not undermine perceptual skepticism. On Kant’s account of perception, intuitions are not caused by the external, but are composed, via syntheses, from both the empirical input of sensations as well as the a priori forms of space and time. The skeptic can argue that the very same input of sensations is consistent with various alternative projected worlds, or for that matter with no projection at all. In other words, the projective account still allows us to doubt the actuality of the represented external world. Before we examine the text of the Refutation, we can consider a reconstruction of the argumentation, in order to better appreciate the upgrade from the A reply. We will drop the skeptic’s appeal to causal perceptual representation and formulate the challenge as: While I have perceptual experiences that represent an external, physical world, skeptical hypotheses challenge the veridicality of these experiences, although they do not undermine my justification in believing that I exist as a thinking being. So, my existence is consistent with the nonexistence of the external world that I seem to be perceiving. That is, I can doubt the actuality of the world while remaining certain of my own existence. Kant’s response is that existence is temporal. Thus, to assert that I exist is to assert that I exist in time. So, if I know, as Descartes claims, that I exist now, I am representing the present, empirically experienced time as actual. However, the representation of time rests on the representation of persistent, external substances. Thus, in order to be able to represent time as actual I must represent some substances as actually existing now. My existence as a thinking being is thus not consistent with the non-actuality of the entire external world that I seem to be perceiving, that is, at least some of the substances that I am currently representing must really exist—a very tidy and impressive response to the skeptical challenge. Turning to the actual wording, the first sentence (B275) asserts that consciousness of self-existence is determined in time, that is, I always represent myself as existing temporally, viz., at the present moment. The second sentence draws the consequence, from the First Analogy, that that representation of time requires the perception of something persistent. The (revised) next two sentences assert that this permanence “cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of existence that are encountered in me are representations and as such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined.”16 This reflects the reasoning at the heart of the First Analogy, although it gives the misleading impression that because something is a representation, it

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cannot be persistent. However, as we have considered above, it seems to be a coherent possibility that beings could have persistent consciousnesses that contained some persistent representations. It is a broadly empirical but very obvious truth that our consciousnesses are not like that, but instead involve very frequent change of all representations as well as gaps of unconsciousness. Thus, given the broad empirical truth that all of our representations are nonpersistent, it does indeed follow they require something that is not a representation in order to represent time, and thus my existence in time. So, we reach the desired sub-conclusion that the persistence thing(s) that allow us to represent the persistence of time is something other than intuitions, or any other representations. This is though, again, a result that involves an empirical premise—an issue we will return to below. We then reach the further sub-conclusion that “the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.” And the final inference takes us to the result that that the determination, that is, representation of my existence in time requires the perception of actual things outside me, that is, to represent my existence I must represent (some) perceived external objects as actual. Those supporting a direct realism reading of intuitions have focused on this next-to-last sentence, since it seems to assert that perceptions, seemingly, intuitions, are not after all representations, but instead involve direct awareness of external objects. However, we can also read this representationally: the skeptic poses the possibility that all our outer intuitions are mere representations, and that the spatial things they represent are all non-actual. But if they are non-actual, then we are left with nothing persistent for the representation of time. So, we must maintain the actuality of (as least some of) what we represent in outer sense, which is to say that there are “things outside me.” In other words, we should not read this as an assertion about the directness of perception, but rather as about the actuality of perception, viz., this persistent thing is possible only through the actuality of a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a possible thing outside me. (And this, by the way, explains why the Refutation is placed where it is, in the discussion of the category of actuality). It might perhaps seem that this is standoff between the direct realist interpretation of this sentence and the representationalist reading. However, along with the arguments against a direct realist interpretation that I have presented in chapter 1, as well as the way that the result of the necessary unity of consciousness undermines that reading, as we have considered in chapter 2, we can now add that a direct realist reading makes no sense here in regard to the reasoning about persistence in the representation of time. It cannot be that our supposed immediate awareness of physical objects is awareness of things that persist since that involves existence over time. The empirical

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falsity of the persistence of perceptual representations equally falsifies the claim that we are directly aware of anything persistent, with again, periods of unconsciousness definitively undermining that possibility. So, we should read the Refutation as concerned with the representation of the actuality of represented persistent things. Direct realists have also highlighted the remark in the third sentence of Note 1 says that he has proved that “outer experience is really immediate” (B276), taking this to be a confirmation of their outlook. However, given the present reading of Kant’s view of representation, it is preferable to see this passage as contrasting a causal view of representation and perceptual knowledge with the projective account, as we have considered in regard to A376–377. Thus, the Cartesian explains our perceptual beliefs as resulting from inferences from the perceptual states that we are immediately aware of. This of course leaves room for skepticism about what is actually behind the veil. But for Kant, the projected representation of the spatial world is not in any way indirect. Thus, the identities of matter across our outer intuitions immediately represent, that is, immediately project, the external, spatial world. Representation of our mental states thus plays no role in the representation of the external, and there is no epistemic gap to allow for skepticism about the world. Kant is obviously highlighting the realist aspect of his view in this passage, that is, he is putting a realist spin on things, in sharp contrast to passages that emphasize his idealist side, as in the Fourth Paralogism, his frequent remarks that appearances are “merely representations,” and his assertions that the understanding is the source of the laws of nature (A125, 127–128, B164). But the projective realist view of representation provides consistence between realism and idealism—we must maintain the actuality of the external world that we idealistically represent.17 On this reading, the Refutation is a simple consequence of the First Analogy. If the latter is successful then so is the former. As we have considered, the First Analogy is not a fully a priori proof, since while the argument for the need for persistence is conceptual, the move to the conclusion that external substance is the only way we can represent persistence is broadly empirical, since it is not an a priori matter that there is no persistence in our conscious states, even though it is very obviously true. So, we might instead term this a repudiation of Cartesian skepticism; but it is an impressive and seemingly successful result all the same. It is equally a repudiation of Berkelean phenomenalism (regardless of the fact that Kant seemed to think that the Aesthetic had somehow addressed Berkeley’s view). And it also serves to undermine any post-Kantian phenomenalist views—not descriptive phenomenalism, of course, but any outlook

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that rejects correspondence realism in favor of the view that the physical world somehow exists only in conscious states. And finally, the Refutation aside, simply accepting the argumentation about the priority of persistence in the representation of time definitively rules out a phenomenalist reading of the Critique. As we have considered, the periods of unconsciousness that we all undergo show that, contrary to phenomenalism, the persistence that underlies our representation of time is not found in conscious states themselves. NOTES 1. Both quotes are from Kant, 1998, 300. 2. We will examine the significance of this passage below. 3. Ward also notes that it is at best a stretch to read the sixth paragraph as expressing the replacement argument. 4. Landy (2014) offers a modification of Ward’s view that claims that the issue for Kant is the representation of time as a unity. Landy does not consider the just noted issue but appears to assume that Ward’s reading successfully establishes substances of limited duration. In a manner parallel to Allison, he then argues that fully persistence substances are established in Kant’s seventh paragraph. 5. Kant, 1998, 300. 6. Ibid. 7. In contemporary psychological terms, the successive (or simultaneous, but independent) representation of individual sensory qualities is likely registered in pre-conscious processing, consistent with the argument. But that does not yield the needed result here, viz., of constantly changing consciousness. 8. This interpretation of Kant’s understanding of the representation of substances is in agreement with O’Shea (1996, 73). Ward (2001, 394) offers a similar view. 9. Kant, 1998, 122. 10. Kant also uses the term “matter” for substance in Note 2 of the Refutation of Idealism (B277ff.) 11. Kant admits that the word ‘persistence’ does not accurately reflect existence at all times since it focuses on the future. (A185/B228). This is not exactly the circularity worry but in any case his expressed concern leads him to avoid it. 12. We find something similar in Kant’s discussion of why the view that space is the a priori form of outer sense is not merely a “plausible hypothesis” (A46/B63). The passage that follows looks to be an argument that this view provides the only feasible explanation of the synthetic a priori basis of geometric truths. 13. To underscore, we should not read this as a move from the idea of temporarily enduring substance to the idea of complete permanence, as Allison does. The result that temporal representation conceptually requires represented persistence, as opposed to mere duration, is established in the main reasoning. We should thus

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understand these paragraphs as drawing the full consequences of that result rather than as establishing (complete) persistence for the first time. 14. As Allison (2004, 245) points out, since matter is spatial, it must have a quantity; I will add a reminder that Kant offers a proof of this in the Axioms of Intuition. 15. Kant, 1998, 430. 16. This as well as the next quote are from Kant, 1998, 327. 17. We will examine Kant’s realism and his idealism further in chapter 6.

Chapter 4

Representing Time: Causation and Community

Having examined the role of substance in representing time and the spatial world, we will now turn to the Second and Third Analogies which argue for the need for causation and for community in temporal representation. And with a full understanding of the role of the relational categories in intuitions, I will develop a Kantian explanation how we represent both external and internal time. READINGS OF THE SECOND ANALOGY In sharp contrast to the drastic under-explanation of the First Analogy, the Second Analogy is somewhat overexplained. This is not surprising, since as Kant explain in the Prolegomena 4:258–260 (2004, 7–10) Hume’s skepticism about causation ended Kant’s “dogmatic slumber” and led him to develop the Transcendental Deduction. However, the Second Analogy does not discuss Hume’s case against necessary causation nor does it consider his skeptical solution—a matter that we will return to below. In explaining his view, Kant does rather uncharacteristically present a pair of examples, viz., successively viewing a house versus watching a ship being driven downstream. The order of viewing is arbitrary for the house, that is, the upper floor is, say, viewed before the ground floor, but the ground floor might have been viewed before the upper, since both exist simultaneously. By contrast, the order of the experience of the ship is not reversible—the ship must be experienced first upstream and then downstream in order to perceive it as being driven downstream. And, he maintains, a perception of change such as this requires that we attribute a rule to the prior and subsequent states of the world, where the former states necessitates the latter, which is the (schematized) category of causation. Although the broad contrast between 81

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the two examples is clear, that is, only in the latter case do we experience a change in the world, it is challenging to figure out the reasoning and resulting view that they illustrate. To appreciate the difficulties that arise here, consider Strawson’s (1966, 133–140) frequently mentioned critical treatment. He reads Kant as inferring from the irreversibility of subjective experiences of changes to the causal necessity of the represented change. Thus, “any succession of perceptions is a perception of an objective change only if the order of those perceptions is necessary; but the order of perceptions is necessary only if the change is necessary, i.e., causally determined” (138). Strawson rightly dubs this “a non sequitur of numbing grossness,” since this both “shifts the application of the word necessary [and] also changes its sense.” The change in application is from psychological ordering to physical ordering, and the change in meaning is from conceptual necessity, viz., in order to perceive a change, our perceptual experiences must be irreversible, to causal necessity, viz., the prior state of the world causally necessitated the succeeding state, in accord with some causal rule. We can agree that this formulation, considered in isolation from the rest of the Critique, and in particular, from the First Analogy, is obviously unsuccessful. But, as most other commentators agree that, rather than assume that this is in fact Kant’s reasoning, we should instead seek an alternative reading of the Second Analogy’s argumentation. Strawson does, though, raise two key questions, namely, what the basis is for attributing necessity to external changes and also why it should be causal necessity in particular. Guyer (1987, 237–266) presents an alternative reading that sees Kant’s argument as epistemic—he maintains that it is focused on how it is possible to have knowledge that an objective succession has occurred. Since the fact that one perceptual representation succeeds another is consistent with both objective succession and also with an unaltered state of the world, as the boat vs. house examples demonstrate, we need something further in order establish that the perceptions correspond to objective succession. Guyer explains that “Kant’s idea is that no alternative remains but that the occurrence of an event be inferred by adding to the omnipresent succession a rule, from which it can be inferred that in the circumstances at hand one state of affairs could only succeed the other, and therefore also that the one representation could only succeed the other” (248, emphasis in original). Here “only” indicates necessity, that is, occurrence of the antecedent state of affairs necessitates the occurrence of the consequent state, which is a causal law. Guyer thus reads this as an argument by elimination, that is, an inference to the only option, viz., since perceptual processing does not provide any basis for determining that an objective succession has occurred, the only other alternative that yields such knowledge is the attribution of a necessary causal rule.

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This serves to meet Strawson’s objection, since the attributed causal necessity is indeed distinct from the necessity of the order of experience; however, according to Guyer, this distinct kind of necessity is required since it is the only available way to have knowledge of objective succession. And here we may note since we have seen that Kant selects the category of substance by elimination as well, that is, as the only feasible way of representing persistence, it seems reasonable to predict that the Second Analogy would involve a similar methodology. However, Watkins objects to Guyer’s reading by arguing that there is another alternative, “it is entirely possible that objective succession could follow from a contingent rule, for example a rule that determines that state A does in fact happen to occur before state B, even if we can imagine world in which it does not occur in that order” (2005, 211). Watkins claims that most, but not all, of Kant’s uses of “necessity” in the text characterize the order of our perceptions rather than the order of states of the world.1 And, drawing on Kant’s precritical writing, Watkins maintains that Kant is not simply concerned with epistemic matters here, but with the metaphysics of time. Since time is not perceived by itself, “Kant’s idea is simply that any determination (and therefore successive determinations as well) requires a ground to posit it, since otherwise will be indeterminate in that respect” (215). But Watkins understands this as merely requiring the attribution of individual causes, which is not a matter of necessary causal laws. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE FIRST ANALOGY The new reading of the First Analogy in the previous chapter drastically alters our understanding of the Second Analogy reasoning. I will first indicate how and then proceed to apply it to the interpretations we have been considering. We have seen that in the representation of time, persistence has a conceptual priority, in that both temporal succession and simultaneity can be represented only relative to persistence. And since there is no persistence in our conscious states, external substance is the only candidate for representing persistence. It follows that (objective) successions, and thus changes, must be represented as alterations in the states of that which persists, viz., substances. Kant reminds us of this at the start of the B proof. But what he does not clearly explain, although it is crucial, is that we do not yet have an explanation of how we are able to represent successions, either in conscious states or in the external world. So, as we have considered in the previous chapter, we do not represent alternations in substances by subjectively experiencing these state changes, as in “first I experienced the light off, then on, so the light changed from off to on.” There is a brief attempt by Kant to clarify this

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at A194/B239 but the explanation is somewhat convoluted. Having presented his view that we represent sequences via causal rules, he then supposes otherwise, that is, that we have only subjective perceptual sequences to work with. He first asserts that we would not be able to represent objective changes, that is, “that something happens,” which does not indicate why we would not be able to so represent. But the paragraph concludes with this point: “I would therefore not say that in appearance two states follow one another, but rather only that one apprehension follows the other, which is something merely subjective, and determines no object, and thus cannot count as the cognition of any object (not even in the appearance)” (my emphasis)2 That is, the order of perceptual apprehension not only does not allow us to represent objective changes, it does not even allow us to represent the ordering of psychological sequences themselves. And, while one might object that Kant has not argued for that latter claim but has just asserted it, I again note that it is a consequence of the First Analogy reasoning. So, when Kant states that “the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive” (A189/B234), given what we have just considered, we need to treat this not as concerning what we represent subjectively, but rather as characterizing what we now call perpetual processing, as we will consider further below. We thus begin the Second Analogy still seeking an explanation of how we are able to represent successions. This shows that the argumentation cannot be understood as purely epistemic, contrary to Guyer’s reading. That is, unless we understand how we are able to represent successions, we cannot formulate the issue of how we have knowledge of such successions. Thus, Kant explains that says that the understanding makes representations of objects possible by conferring temporal ordering, and that this is not a matter of making objects distinct (A199). So he is not, as Guyer (1987, 246) thinks, concerned with epistemic preconditions of beliefs about objects—that would not be a matter of making objects distinct, but he is rather concerned with how we are able to represent objects, that is, events at all. So, this is consistent with Watkins’s claim that Kant is concerned with the metaphysics of time here. We should also note that since as we have noted, a successful explanation of how we represent succession must concern the objective, viz., states of external substances, the “objective” in both Guyer’s and Watkins’s characterizations is redundant. UNDERMINING HUME’S RIVAL ACCOUNT As noted above, despite the fact that Kant is attempting to establish an alternative to Hume’s skeptical treatment of causation, there is no criticism of this rival view, nor is there any mention at all of Hume in the text of the Second

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Analogy. This is obviously puzzling. Moreover, as Watkins discusses, we begin with a characterization of succession as concerning states of substances that involves a very different perspective from Hume, who formulates the issue of causation in terms of an event ontology—the issue of the necessity of causation thus becomes the question of whether one event can necessitate another. This leads Watkins to characterize what Kant is doing in the Second Analogy as in no way disproving Hume’s view of causation in favor of his, but rather as offering a “new alternative to Hume’s position (an alternative that he thinks has significant advantages when compared with Hume’s at an appropriate level of generality). That is, Kant’s strategy is not to use a set of explanatory terms and concepts he shares with Hume to show how Hume failed to see which implications they had (which would amount to a refutation of Hume’s position), but rather to provide a different set of concepts and doctrines that are supposed to obviate the very framework that Hume’s approach presupposes” (386). However, the First Analogy result that we cannot subjectively represent temporal sequences undermines Hume’s rival account of causation, both his case against necessary causation as well as his so-called skeptical solution. Hume argues that our experiences of successive, changing impressions reveal no necessary connections, we simply experience one state of the world contingently followed by an altered state, that is, that there is no basis in perception for the attribution of necessary connections between causes and effects. He explains attributed causal connections as a matter of habituated patterns— we experience B following A a number of times and thus come to expect B to occur after A. This habitual association offers no basis for the assertion that A necessitates B, and is a skeptical solution, viz., that accepts the rejection of necessary causation. Both the argument and the solution presume that we are unproblematically able to experience non-necessitated temporal succession in impressions and are thus on this basis able to represent contingent changes in the world. But since Kant’s reasoning in the First Analogy demonstrates that we are unable to represent succession, and thus changes, merely subjectively, Hume’s characterization of perceiving contingent changes via successive impressions is undermined. And similarly his explanation of attributed causation as a matter of habit is based on the experiences of subjectively experienced contingent changes, which is thus also undercut.3 So, contrary to what Watkins suggests, the First Analogy criticisms of empirical constructivist accounts of temporal representation effectively clears the slate for a new approach to causality, not as a rival, but as the only available explanation. This in and of itself does nothing in the way of showing that we represent necessitated causal changes. But it does explain why there is no need for criticizing Hume’s competing account of causation.

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RULE-GOVERNED ALTERATIONS We therefore begin the Second Analogy facing the open question of how we represent alterations of substances, and thus of how we represent temporal sequences, along with the main issue of whether we represent these changes as necessitated, thus seemingly necessarily caused. I maintain that, contrary to frequent attributions of multiple lines of reasoning,4 there is only a single argument that is repeated numerous times. It simply proceeds from the claim that we have no basis in empirical perceptual processing for representing alterations to an inference to the only available explanation, that of causal rules, as the basis for this representation. The text is thus largely explanatory rather than argumentative. Some passages including the opening of the B Proof elaborate on perceptual processing to fill out the initial claim, while other passages are devoted to explaining the causal rule view and noting several implications. And the account of representation—from the A TD—is rehearsed twice, in the beginning at A189/B234 and then again at A197/B242. We will begin by considering the point about empirical perceptual processing, which is unfortunately presented in terminology that makes it confusing. We should read the start of the Proof (B233) as analyzing what is required to be able perceive a change. Kant explains that perception yields successive appearances that represent “the opposite” of what previously existed, thus, as in boat upstream, boat downstream. He explains that this is to “really connect two perceptions in time.” In the cases at issue, successive representations somehow represent a change. And it may seem that this is given just in receptive perception, in “sense and intuition.” However, Kant argues, since we do not perceive time itself, perceptual processing must somehow “connect,” the representations, that is, represent them as temporally ordered. However, as he points out, the (empirical) faculty of imagination arbitrarily orders representations. Thus, in his example of perceiving a house—a stable state of the world, I can think of the perception of the roof and then the perception of the ground floor, or vice versa. But note that this applies just as much to the perception of changes—I can think of the ship upstream then downstream, but I can also think first of downstream and then upstream. So consecutive empirical ordering of perceptions does not always correspond to a change; mere, contingent psychological ordering does not in and on itself represent changes. It is useful to appreciate this initial point again apart from the reference to the imagination, and also without Kant’s other psychological terminology. When we perceive the world, we are detecting both features of what is around us and also ways that features might be changing, that is, altering. We do not apprehend all of the features of a given location instantaneously. Put in terms of cognitive processing, what we are getting are sequences of perceptual

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information, almost always with variations in the contents. For instance, we view a large object such as a house that cannot be taken in all at once by successively scanning it, say, roof, upper floors and then ground level. While this is a sequence of successive perceptions that differ in represented properties, that is, each part looks different, it does not correspond to a change in the world. And we, viz., our perceptual systems, represent that it is not a change by treating it as reversible, thus the sequences in any order would still depict the same stable state of the world. By contrast, when we do perceive a change, such as the boat upstream then downstream, our perceptual system represents it as nonreversible. But, the main point is that the way that we represent nonreversibility is not given by either the content of receptive perceptual processing—we do not perceive time itself—or by the fact that the processing of the two representations was successive. There thus must be some further explanation of how we represent that a change has occurred. So how do we represent a change in state as opposed to a newly observed stable state? Kant’s answer is that this is a matter of applying a rule of the form (property) A necessitates (property) B, for example, heating water to near boiling necessitates that it steams and flipping a switch necessitates electrification of a circuit. That is, to represent a change of state, A to B, we must represent that A necessitates B which requires that perceptions of state A and state B be ordered in that sequence. This reverses the standard way of understanding the perception of changes, viz., that we attribute a change from A to B because we subjectively experience A, then B, and so attribute an objective change to the world, as Kant notes in the seventh paragraph (A195–196/ B240–242). However, as he explains, “we must derive the subjective succession of appearances from the objective succession of appearances. Otherwise the order of apprehension is entirely undetermined” (A193/B238).5 There are not, of course, two experienced sequences. Rather, what Kant is saying is that it is because we represent the A to B transition as an objective sequence, thus a change, that we also represent our subjective experience of A to B as a nonreversible perceptual ordering.6 This appears to be similar to the First Analogy’s move to substance as the only feasible explanation of how to represent persistence. Kant does not deductively prove that rules of necessitated property sequences are the only possible way to represent change, however, it would seem to be the only viable possibility: One quickly sees that . . . appearance, in contradistinction to the representation of apprehension, can therefore only be represented as the object that is distinct from them if it stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. (A191/B236)7

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Given the way that he has framed the issue, viz., as the question of what it is that makes some successive apprehensions representations of changes rather than representations of stable states, there is little to work with other than necessary sequence of properties. And here it is important to appreciate how difficult it is to find a successful explanation. We need a way of representing sequences that does not itself rely on sequences, and we have ruled out both the subjective representation of time and also consecutive perceptual processing. A sequence is a unidirectional ordering. So, an ordering of states of substances is a candidate. However, without it being a necessary ordering, there is no way to represent the states as consecutive, again, given the fact that we cannot appeal to subjective experiences of consecutive states. The solution is that “A necessitates B” has no temporal content, which is similar to selecting identities of matter as the only feasible nontemporal candidate to represent persistence. To underscore, the representation of necessary ordering of properties is a workable candidate for representing temporal sequences, and it appears to be the only available candidate.8 As Kant himself notes (eighth paragraph A195–196/B240–241), we ordinarily conceive of causation as a matter of rules of necessitated property transitions. However, it is apparent that causation is, at a minimum, a type of change, and the reasoning of the First Analogy leaves alterations in states of substances as the only candidate for explaining change in general, and thus for explaining causation (as Kant indicates at the start of the Proof, B232–233). And by the argument, or explanation, of the Second Analogy, in order to represent a change, the ordering must be a necessitated property transition.9 This is very different from the typical means of understanding causation, viz., as a transition between two events, where, if causation is necessary, the first event necessitates the second. As we have considered above, this alternative characterization of causation is undermined by the result that other than through causation we have no means of representing temporal sequences. To be able to represent a sequence of events we need to be able to represent temporal sequences. But the only way to represent a sequence is by representing a necessitated state transition. So, the representation of state transitions is conceptually prior to the representation of temporal sequences, and thus, the representation of events rests on the representation of state transitions. Contrary to Watkins’s reading,10 these casual rules cannot concern individual instances, since they involve the necessitation of properties, not of instances of properties. Thus, in order to represent that on a given occasion, an instance of A leads to an instance of B, we need to be able to represent the successive states, an instance of A followed by an instance of B. But how we are able to do that is what is at issue. Kant’s view is that, having detected an instance of A, we apply the general rule A necessitates B to then represent the

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occurrence of an instance of B as a necessitated property transition, and thus as a representation of temporal succession.11 This means that the causal rules in question are causal laws, according to Kant’s characterization: “Rules, so far as they are objective and therefore necessarily depend upon the knowledge of objects, are called laws” (A126).12 And, that definition aside, once we have dispensed with the idea that causation is primarily a matter of events, it is reasonable to think of causal laws as consisting of necessitated property transitions. It is important to appreciate what a strong result this is. It does not merely establish some necessary causation, since the representation of any change must be a necessitated transition in order to distinguish it from an arbitrary, contingent psychological ordering. So, all changes are necessitated, and thus temporal sequencing is necessitated. This is confirmed at A199/B244 where Kant states that appearances of a past time determine all existence in the following time, which he describes as a “law of the empirical representation of the time-series.” To be able to represent time at all, we need to represent a completely determined physical world, a world of completely necessitated state transitions in substances. Kant thus asserts that the principle of sufficient reason grounds possible experiences (A201/B246). Or, to put it one more way, we know a priori that any perception of a temporal sequence will consist of necessary changes. The Second Analogy is therefore an account of how we are able to represent “happenings,” that is, “occurrences,” that is, events. It provides us with a further elaboration and also a further justification of Kant’s doctrine of projective representation, which he re-explains in the two paragraphs that begin at A197/B242, thus, by the way, strongly corroborating the present reading. After reviewing representation in general in the first paragraph, he then applies the result of the present reasoning and explains that in order to represent events, we must project the representation of external events from our otherwise merely arbitrarily ordered perceptual processing, by attributing determinate transitions. This is how we are able to represent occurrences, that is, things that happen—by representing their position in causally determinate sequences (A198/B243).13 CAUSAL RULES There are several aspects of the causal rules account that need clarification and development. First, although most of our causal attributions, both in ordinary life and perhaps in science as well, characterize causations in terms of events, Kant’s view implies that these must be reducible to descriptions of nontemporal state transitions. For example, the event of heating a pan of

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water over a flame that causes the event of the release of steam will amount to something like this: the state of the pan and the water it contains being adjacent to the flame necessitates progressive state transitions of increasing temperature in the water, up to the point of the water’s being at a temperature that necessitates that some of it is in gaseous form, that is, steam. Note again that I am not suggesting that Kant’s view does not allow us to represent and thus characterize causal event relations at all, but the representation of event causation must be understood as derivative from the representation of necessitated state transitions. In other words, we cannot explain the water being in a state of steam emission by appealing to this being caused by the event of its being heated, rather, as just indicated, the causal relation between heating and steaming must be reducible to causal rules of state transitions. Kant’s account of causation also implies that interactions between substances must be reducible to state changes of the interacting substances. Thus, take the paradigm example of one billiard ball striking another, halting, and sending the second one moving. This will amount to something like this: the impacting ball being in the state of contact with the second necessitates that it cease the state of being in motion and that its vector quality, that is, directed magnitude, is reduced to zero, and for the impacted ball, the state of being in contact with the first necessitates that it change from no motion and no vector to motion with a specific vector quality. A further, and potentially very problematic, issue arises concerning how we learn causal rules. As Kant remarks at A195–196/B240–241, we cannot, as Hume maintained, develop causal attributions through observations of repeated sequences of antecedent and consequent. This is because all observed change is a matter of necessitated state changes that are instances of causal rules. In other words, the very first observation of say, a light bulb changing from no light emission to light emission must be represented as an instance of necessary causation. But we might well worry that this is both seemingly implausible and that it leaves no room at all for learning causal rules. The implausibility arises from the fact that, while according to Kant we are constantly applying causal rules, this cannot mean the application of scientific laws, or lawlike generalizations, since all humans experience time, but ordinary people usually lack knowledge of such laws; and humans were representing causation long before the development of science. And, while it may perhaps be that humans have an innate commonsense physics, it is unlikely that we are generally equipped with enough commonsense causal laws to cover every perceived change. In particular, it is extremely unlikely that humans come innately equipped to represent the state changes in manufactured devices, which are of relatively recent invention. For instance, it is very implausible that we have an innate causal law covering the operation of

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on/off switches. This leads to the second and more pressing concern, namely, how, exactly, Kant’s causal rule account can allow for learning about causal laws, since, again, it would seem that to be able to witness a change, we must already have a causal rule to represent it.14 However, this apparent lack of ability to empirically learn causal rules is significantly mitigated once we note the following two points. First, Kant’s account is consistent with instances of attributed necessary state transitions where the interactive cause needs to be empirically determined. Thus, I may represent the circuit breaker tripping as a state change necessitated by excess electricity in the breaker, where the state of excess was necessitated by some interaction without knowing what caused it. Empirical investigation may lead me to postulate a rule of necessary interaction that is behind this state change, for example, the toaster and AC in simultaneous operation. And, second, it is possible to represent a state change as necessitated by an interaction, without detailed knowledge of which states of the substance altered. Thus, while we represent flipping a switch as necessitating that an incandescent bulb lights, most children and also many adults do not know that this change is a matter of flowing current necessitating that a filament increases in heat and glows. So, represented instances of necessary state changes allow for empirical investigation of rules of interactive causes, and representation of instances of rules of necessitated interactive causes allow for empirical investigation of more detailed rules of necessitated state changes. And, as we will consider further below, the representation of simultaneous states of the world allows for a much wider range of empirical learning of causal rules. THE THIRD ANALOGY Having established how we represent persistence by representing substance and how we represent change by representing causation, we still need an account of how we represent simultaneity. While there are various readings of the Third Analogy, I maintain that both the brevity of the text as well as the clearly articulated “Proof” show it to be essentially the same type of reasoning as in the Second Analogy. As Kant explains in the proof, the representation of simultaneous existence consists in the ability to have reciprocal perceptions of the entities, which is to say the order of perceptions is interchangeable. However, as in the case of the Second Analogy, merely consecutive perceptual representations of A and then B are insufficient to establish simultaneous existence. A simple sequence is also consistent with change, where B came into existence while A was being perceived. Nor, for that matter, is a longer sequence such as ABAB any help. This is to say that perceptions of A and B are necessarily reciprocal. To see this, suppose that I am glancing back and

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forth at a bulb to the left and another bulb to the right. Every time I look at each bulb it is on, but this is consistent with the possibility that they are both flashing, out of sync, so that only one is on at a time. What is needed is a way of representing that at the time that A was being perceived, B could have been perceived. The solution, not surprisingly, is to invoke the third relational category, which is community, that is, reciprocal causal influence, or, put concisely, interaction. This is, once again, not a deductive proof but is rather a move to the only feasible explanation. It would seem that the simultaneous existence of two substances should be sufficient for possible causal influence between them, and since there is no other candidate for explaining simultaneity, and certainly no other pure concept that can underwrite necessary coexistence, it is reasonable to think that if A and B exist simultaneously then they must causally influence each other. And, given that we so far have substances serving to represent persistence and causation to represent sequences, we should expect that the third temporal component, simultaneity, should be represented by something related to both of these, and the interaction of substances fits the bill nicely. Kant further clarifies that this influence may be either immediate or mediate (A213/B259). As he helpfully explains: From our experiences, it is easy to notice that only continuous influence in all places in space can lead our sense from one object to another, that the light that plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies effects a community between us and the latter and thereby proves the simultaneity of the latter, and that we cannot alter any place (perceive any alteration) without matter everywhere making the perception of our position possible. (A213/B260)15

So, if I have consecutive perceptual experience of A and B, then I can represent these experiences as necessarily reciprocal by representing A and B as necessarily causally interactive, that is, necessarily in a state of reciprocal causal influence. And as per the explanation, this may often be just a matter of the reflection of light, or, I will add, via the medium of air as well. This once again takes us from merely subjective perceptual experiences to a projected external world of simultaneously existing substances. And it is worth noting that without the representation of community we would be unable to coherently represent time, since represented sequential changes in various substances would each amount to independent temporal sequences, thus independent times. However, this is avoided by the representation of simultaneity since this allows us to represent the co-occurrence of both the states of all substances and their simultaneous transitions as part of a single stream of time. And, by the way, this also allows that during a typical

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perceptual sequence, while there must be at least two substances undergoing necessitated state changes—an issue we will return to shortly—many other perceived substances can remain stable. The essential role that community plays in representing simultaneity results in the overarching necessary unity of the universe. We must represent all matter as standing in relations of reciprocal causal influence. Kant’s account of representation thus involves the necessary unities of space and time, as well as the necessary unity of conscious representation. And all three unities are constituted in the same way, namely via the unification by the schematized categories. REPRESENTING TIME Even though the reasoning underlying the Analogies focuses on the issue of how we are able to represent time, Kant never fills out the details of how this is explained by his view. I offer the basics of a speculative development of this topic. In the process, I will further explore the issue of how we represent causation, and also the question of how the representation of the temporality of our thoughts is based on the representation of time in the external world. We may begin by noting that Kant’s account of temporal representation is constructivist, but not empirically constructivist since it is based on the schematized relational categories. Unlike empirical constructivism, it does not begin with the idea of experiencing and thus representing sequences, changes, or durations, but instead explains how we create temporal representation by projecting substances, causal sequences and interaction. The account rests fundamentally on the representation of unchanging, thus always identical substances, that is, matter. Temporal progression—the passage of time—is represented via necessitated state transitions, that is, causes and effects, in perceived substances. And simultaneity and thus the singularity of time is given by the depiction of complete reciprocal causal influence among all substances. Returning to considerations from the First Analogy, a puzzle arises about how we are able to represent sequences and durations. As Kant more or less indicates at A83/B226, the ability to represent a sequence does not explain how we can represent durations. This is because each member of a sequence must have a duration, but mere sequential ordering says nothing about how long each member lasts. On the other hand, the representation of a duration requires an independent representation of a sequence since durations may be of any temporal length. For example, in order to determine how long I am experiencing warmth, I must have a representation of passing time, as in a clock. But this results in a circularity problem since the representation of the

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passing time on the clock in turn requires the ability to represent the duration of changes to the clock. So, the ability to represent durations requires a separate representation of sequences, but the ability to represent sequences requires a separate representation of durations. It would thus seem that we are in a vicious circle where each requires the other. The solution, as I construct it, is that on Kant’s account the representation of sequence, explained as the representation of state changes in substances, is primary vis-à-vis the representation of duration. Our problem resulted from the fact that any sequential state changes, for example, A to B, will themselves last for some length of time, thus seemingly requiring a prior notion of duration. However, community allows that the durations of A and B can be measured via representation of other state changes happening simultaneously with the occurrence of A or B. And, in general, the duration of any particular state will be timed by the representation of other simultaneous state changes. This implies that we must always be representing more than one (physical) state change. At a minimum, one additional represented state change will be needed in order to time the duration of the other change. It may again seem that this threatens an infinite regression, since every represented change requires yet another represented change for the timing of the first. However, interaction also allows that we can switch back and forth, and around. For instance, I might represent the duration of various changes that I am perceiving via the representation of the movement of the second hand of a clock. But I can in turn represent the duration of the clock’s movement relative to other represented state changes. This means that there will be a relativity to the representation of duration, depending on which other changes are being represented relative to a given state change. It is sensible to pick one, completely regular set of alterations as the normal standard for measuring others, thus clocks. Since during all waking periods we always experience time, we must always be representing two or more kinds of state changes in at least some external substances. And we typically represent various changes around us. But in quiet moments, such as laying with eyes closed in an unchanging environment, almost all external perception may be absent. On such occasions we become aware of bodily sensations that are normally masked by other stimuli, in particular, the rhythmic sensations of breathing and heartbeats. It would thus appear that the experience of bodily state changes forms the default, fallback clock that underlies our temporal experience. We may now reconsider the question of how we are able to empirically learn causal rules, given that any attribution of causation would seemingly already require such a rule. Thanks to community, in a typical perceptual experience, we represent a number of substances simultaneously undergoing state changes. Thus, in an instance of perceived consecutive moments A and

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B, I must, for reasons just noted, at a minimum represent at least two changes in state of a substances as necessitated by causal rules at my cognitive disposal. However, community allows that I may also represent other changes simultaneously occurring that I do not have rules for. Thus, suppose that I represent that a light has come on, along with a few other changes, and further suppose that I am wholly ignorant of how lightbulbs work. I need to represent the bulb as having necessarily gone from a state of no light emission to light emission, according to some causal rule or other, in order to differential this as a change rather than a situation where the light was previously on and I did not notice it. But since I am able to represent bulb-off as simultaneous with states of other substances that I then represent as necessarily transforming their states according to specific causal rules, I can then represent bulb-on as simultaneous with the transformed states of these other substances. This allows that I can leave it for further empirical investigation (or learning) to determine the rule or rules that apply to the change of state in the bulb. It seems to me that this, together with the previous points about applying a rule to state changes and then being able to empirically investigate interactive causes, or applying a rule of interactive cause and being able to empirically investigate the resulting state change, are collectively sufficient to overcome the potential worry that Kant’s account of the representation of causation does not allow for sufficient explanations of how we empirically learn causal rules. However, it does seem that infants must begin with some innate set of causal rules in order to begin representing time, and which then allows for the bootstrapping of learning additional rules.16 One more issue to consider here is the representation of time for mental states. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the main reasoning of the First Analogy establishes that since there is no persistence in our conscious states, our representation of their temporality must depend on represented states and changes in the world. Thus, if I experience myself first thinking that today is Tuesday and then thinking that that I have a meeting to attend, this must be based on some perceived, necessary sequence in the world, for example, the wind causing branches in the tree outside to sway left as I have the first thought, and they then rebound right as I have the second. The latter sequence provides the basis for the former temporal ordering, since in each case I represent both as part of my total conscious states. But it is only the perceived, external alterations that make these consecutive temporal moments, that is, that allow me to represent my thoughts as temporally successive. Using this explanation of experiences of temporal sequences, we can also explain mental simultaneity: if the representation of external state A is part of what constitutes (part of) the primary basis for representing temporal sequences, then any mental state experienced together with A, that is, co-represented with A, is simultaneous with it, that is, with that moment of

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time. And the duration of mental states can be explained as well. For example, returning to the above example, my ongoing feeling of contentment is experienced as enduring relative to the representation of the unfolding changes of branches swaying in the breeze. The Kantian explanation of the representation of time thus has it that the subjective experience of the temporality of our conscious states is dependent upon our representation of external succession, viz., objective state changes. This is of course not to say that we are able to experience our conscious states atemporally, but rather that there is a conceptual dependence—the continued experience of the temporal flow of changing mental states is possible only through the equally continuous representations of (causally) determinate state changes in external substances. Our conception and representation of time is embodied in the represented external world; the changes represented there—that is, necessitated alterations in the substratum of constantly existing and interacting matter—are the basis for timing the succession, duration, and simultaneity of our thoughts. And it is, finally, worth noting that this account of how we represent time is physically reductive—time is a matter of sequences of states of changing and interacting physical substances. And this, in turn, raises a seeming difficulty. Time is supposed to be the form of inner sense. Yet it seems that it rests on the physical, spatial world, which is represented in outer sense. So, this might appear to be inconsistent with Kant’s insistence, in the Aesthetic, that time is not the form of outer sense but only of inner sense. However, we need to appreciate that inner sense is the psychological mechanism that creates the necessary unity of consciousness, and thus also the knowledge of this unity, transcendental apperception, as Kant explains at B153–156. So, the necessary unities of substance, cause and community that underlie time are created via the pure figurative syntheses that govern inner sense, thus producing temporal representation, and knowledge of time. On the other hand, as we have just noted, these unities that constitute time unite the representations of outer sense. Time is thus the form of inner sense not because time has a primary existence in the mind, but rather because inner sense creates temporal representations of the external.17 NOTES 1. I dispute this in a note below. 2. Kant, 1998, 308. 3. We could add Kant’s view of substance to Hume’s outlook, but that in and of itself would not provide an explanation of how we are able to represent sequences.

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4. Kemp Smith (1918, 363) is often cited as the extreme example since he attributes six separate arguments. Watkins (2005) attributes only two, but his reformulation of the supposed main argument in a non-epistemological form in his (2010) shows it to be little different from the supposed first argument, except for having no reference to perceptual processes. 5. Kant, 1958, 221. 6. So Strawson has it backward—Kant is not arguing from nonreversibility to causation, he is rather explaining that the basis for representing our perceptions as nonreversible is the attribution of causation. 7. Kant, 1998, 306. In this passage, apart from the quoted text, Kant is discussing representation in general, and thus the relational categories together, since, as he tells us in the Prolegomena (4:360, 10) he first figured out the role that causation plays in cognition and from this developed his full treatment of the categories. 8. As noted above, Watkins asserts that most of Kant’s uses of “necessary” in these passages refer to perceptual states rather than to states of the world. But that is simply false. In the fifth paragraph (A 93–94/B238–239), Kant refers to the necessity of an occurrence, and temporal progress “(in the object) being necessarily determined” then in the eleventh paragraph at A198/B244 “the determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows.” The twelfth through fourteenth paragraphs concerns the necessity of time, that is, of temporal sequences in the appearances—the represented world. And the fifteenth paragraph describes the necessity of preceding and following in the representation of an object (i.e., event), and then notes that positing a proceeding and a following without necessity would be “a subjective play of my fancy . . . a mere dream.” 9. Following Watkins (2005), we can label it a causal powers account. Watkins documents the development of this view in Kant’s precritical period. However, contrary to Watkins’ assertion, quoted above, Kant is not simply presenting a seemingly superior rival account to that of Hume and his event causation approach. Rather, as we have seen, the First Analogy undermines that alternative, and, moreover, the primary basis for invoking the causal powers view is that necessitated property transitions are the only available explanation of how we represent sequences. 10. And also contrary to Friedman (1992). 11. Note that, contrary to Guyer’s (1986, 260–261) reading, these causal rules cannot be mere temporal orderings, for example, of the form “A caused and thus preceded B (at some point)” since that would require the ability to represent a temporal gap between the cause and the effect, but, again, that is what is at issue. Rather, the transitions must be immediate in order to represent (immediate) temporal sequences. 12. Kant, 1958, 147. 13. I will again underscore that while Kant’s discussion of the representation of objects in the Transcendental Deduction passages is usually read as concerning external, thus physical objects, this and surrounding passages makes it very clear that what “objects” means in the TD, and throughout, includes not just physical things but also events.

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14. Guyer (1986, 258–259) raises this, or a very similar concern, although I think that the issue is much more problematic on the present reading of temporal representation as opposed to his epistemic understanding of the Second Analogy. 15. Kant, 1998, 318. 16. By the way, as far as I can see, while Kant’s view of causation requires that we represent all changes as necessarily determined states changes, it does not require that all of the rules we use turn out to be true. For example, if I throw a ball into the air and falsely represent that the arc of the ball is the result of the still acting, and gradually dissipating force of the throw, that serves to represent the moment-to-moment changes of the ball’s position, even though physics tells us that this is false—the correct explanation involves inertia and gravity. 17. Here is a way of making sense of the view that inner sense creates our representations of time, cast in terms of cognitive processing: perception, vision in particular, involves consecutively constructed images. The unities that constitute our representation of time involve establishing identities (of objects) across these images and also either necessarily ordering them or treating them as necessarily interchangeable. None of these involve the construction of the (spatial) images themselves—that is thus “outer sense”—but are rather relational operations on the constructed images. If we think of inner sense as the higher-order representation of our perceptual states, then it is not unreasonable to think that in creating this second stage of representation, (formal) relations are created between our first-order perceptual representations.

Chapter 5

Intuitions, Concepts, and the Categories

This chapter develops complete explanations of the semantics of both intuitions and the categories. We will begin with an examination of the representational status of intuitions. I first provide a review of our previous results and explain how the attempted direct realist treatment of intuitions is undermined by them. This is followed by an examination of Sellars’s account of intuitions that seemingly appeals to empirical concepts to explain their content. I reconstruct the line of thinking that leads him to this view but I argue that concepts actually play no role in his explanation of intuitions and that his attribution of this-clauses is unneeded. I then develop an interpretation of intuitions as consisting of imagistic states that depict but do not have truth-valued content. This suggests a contrast between sensibility and understanding as faculties that involve differing representational mediums, viz., images that represent particular instances versus linguistic states that represent generality. Schemata can be understood as rules that bridge the gap between these two types of representations. And this also points us to the idea that Kant’s core thesis of nonempirical representation consists not in the categories themselves, but in the 12 types of pure unifying functions which are realized in the form of judgments, in concepts, and temporally as the schematized categories. And I provide some clarifications concerning the categories and judgments, including the special status of the relational group. I also present two Appendixes. In the first I examine Kant’s primary remarks about animal psychology, which, I maintain, are consistent with the understanding of intuitions and representation presented here. And in the second I critically evaluate McDowell’s claim that Kantian intuitions are conceptual and show that the reasons he presents for this view are ill-founded.

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INTUITIONS AND UNITY We are now in a position to fully address claims about the semantics of intuitions. Let us begin with a review of the results of the previous chapters. As we considered in chapter 1, the empirical input to sensibility consists of sensations, which do not have objects, but consist of informational states about how sensibility has been affected. Appearances are generated via syntheses, which combine sensations with the a priori forms of space and time. Since sensations are qualitative, for example, colors, sounds, tastes, it would seem that appearances must be imagistic states, as we will consider further below. Based primarily on an examination of crucial passages in the A TD in chapter 2, we have also seen that intuitions are the parts of appearances that are representations of corresponding objects. The relation to an object is not a matter of an object affecting intuitions but instead consists of the formal, necessary unity of consciousness. (Because of the analytic unity of concepts, the concept MY CONSCIOUS STATES proves that an individual’s conscious states, including all intuitions, must be necessarily unified). The Analogies (chapters 3 and 4) clarify that the representation of objects is primarily a matter of unification via the temporally schematized relational categories. This is accomplished by identities of represented matter which underlie the representation of external, spatial objects, and also by rules of necessitated property transitions and interrelations of mutual influence, that is, causation and community, which underlie the representation of events and moments respectively. And the Analogies also serve to corroborate the correctness of Kant’s account of representation by offering the only feasible explanations of how we are able to represent time. I characterize this as a projective account of representation, since it rejects a receptive, causal view, along with the skeptical implications that go with it, in favor of the view that these unities create representations of things and events that exceed subjective, empirical imagery—intuitions so-unified are how we represent an external, objective world. Consider then the idea of nonconceptual content as it is understood by those attempting a direct realist reading. As a paradigm version of this view, Allais (2015, 153) maintains that appearances, and specifically intuitions (1) present particular objects to consciousness, where (2) this is understood as a matter of objects being present to consciousness, and where (3) intuitions do not “depend on concepts” to do this presenting. Our results show that this view is incorrect. First, Kant identifies an intuition’s having an object with the necessary unity of consciousness, and that unity is obviously not a matter of direct presence of the object. Rather, as we have seen in chapter 2, the formal unity of consciousness represents corresponding objects. Second, we

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have proof of the necessary unity of intuitions. This entails that there cannot be a bare presentation of objects to consciousness since isolated presentations would not involve the requisite unity. We have seen, rather, that this unity is achieved by syntheses that apply the schematized categories to create representations of corresponding objects. While as we will consider below, this is not conceptual unity per se, it is inconsistent with the idea of a presentation of objects that is not somehow mitigated by mental processes. And third, Allais’s account says nothing about time, but appears to take awareness of the temporal as an unproblematic given, for example, for the temporal existence of the supposedly presented objects. However, our examination of the Analogies shows us that, for Kant, any temporal representation is a matter of unities that involve the application of the schematized relational categories. So, objects cannot be present in moments of consciousness without the requisite unity. These considerations show that Allais’s presentation of particulars account of appearances and intuitions is mistaken, and similarly for any attempted reading that does not acknowledge the representational nature of intuitions, the necessary unity of all conscious states and the role that schematized relational categories play in temporal representation. It may perhaps seem that implies that the “conceptualist” view of intuitions is correct, since these have come to be understood as exclusive alternatives.1 However, we need to be cautious, since as we will see, that approach is not the only other alternative. SELLARS’S EMPIRICAL CONCEPTUALISM Consider first the extreme version of a conceptualist understanding of intuitions from Sellars (1992) and (2002b, chapter 1). While he acknowledges that the initial stage of the construction of intuitions consists of images composed by synthesis from sensations, he also maintains that the final stage of an intuition is a supposed conceptual representation containing a demonstrative along with sortal concepts, for example, “this red rectangle” or “that green tree.” One might think, prima facie, that this must be incorrect since at the start of the Analytic (A50–52/B74–76) Kant characterizes intuitions as belonging to the receptivity of sensibility as opposed to concepts which belong to the spontaneity of the understanding. This suggests that intuitions consist entirely of nonconceptual, that is, imagistic representations. Sellars, however, insists that intuitions must be conceptual (1992, 3). The primary motivation for this view seems to be that while he acknowledges that intuitions, understood as consisting of perceptual imagery, present attributes such as colors and shapes

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(although see below), he maintains they are unable to represent individuals, because of difficulties that he raises about the ability of imagistic intuitions to represent space. He examines the idea of the receptivity of sensibility and tries to show that this is inconsistent with the view that space is the form of outer sense. Specifically, he argues (7–8) that the claim that space is the form of outer sense is ambiguous; it can on the one hand mean that outer sense represents the form of space. But this has nothing to do with receptivity. On the other hand, it can mean that space is the form of received outer impressions, thus, apparently the form of intuitions understood as imagistic states. However, this would mean that sensations are spatial, that is, they exist in space, which he rejects as an absurd view that Kant would not advocate. Sellars supplements this point with an argument based on Kant’s explanation that while sensibility receives a “manifold of representations,” this is not the same a representation of a manifold, as the opening of both versions of the TD clarify. Sellars states that this implies that what is received does not represent anything complex; but, since space is complex, this means that what is received does not represent space. So, this two-pronged attack seemingly shows that intuitions understood merely receptively cannot represent space. As a fix, Sellars introduces the idea of supposedly conceptual “this” clauses as a corrective explanation of how intuitions represent individuals, and thus, presumably, space. By way of both clarification and criticism, I will first point out that Sellars focuses primarily on one passage (A86/B108) where Kant rather uncharacteristically uses the term “impressions,” perhaps addressing Hume and empiricism. However, as we have considered in chapter 1, it is clear that what is received by sensibility are sensations which do not have objects. They are informational states about how the perceiver has been affected, and which also seem to be qualitative, viz., exhibiting colors, sounds, tastes, etc. Now, while it is not reasonable to think that sensations are, say, initially received in a spatial matrix, as McDowell points out, the information on how sensibility has been affected should include a spatial ordering at the level of the raw sensations that serve as material for image models. For how else how could there, say, be a blue spot at the apex of an imaged pyramid presented in an image model with the apex upward, if the sensation of blue were not related, in a purely sensational space, by an analogue of the “above” relation to sensations of colour that constitute the material for the parts of the image-model that present the lowers parts of the imaged pyramid? (McDowell 2009, 117)

This would then mean that while the initial manifold of sensations is not itself spatial, nor a representational complex, it does contain information

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that enables the synthetic composition of images that consist of spatial, or quasi-spatial relations that are able to represent the complexity of space. This remaining issue in Sellars’s criticism of the doctrine of space as the form of outer sense involves the question of the spatiality of perceptual and other mental imagery. We of course do not say that consciousness is spatial. However, we routinely refer to locations in the visual field, for example, during eye exams. And we describe visual images in terms of spatial relations, as in McDowell’s example. Thus, it would seem that what constitutes having a mental image of a pyramid is the shape of the image. And it is even plausible to claim that part of the essence of visual imagery is that it involves spatial features. We can, in a cumbersome way, relabel imagistic spatiality as “quasi,” thus in the example, a quasi-pyramid with a blue spot quasi-above the quasi-lower parts. However, this does not seem to indicate a serious problem for Kant’s view of space and outer sense. I interject that the projective view of representation suggests that the space of conscious imagery is in a sense primary—we represent external space by projecting our perceptual images. But the space and objects thus represented are known only via this projection of what we are subjectively, imagisticly aware of. Sellars also insists that an image of a red rectangle is not red but has some counterpart quality that presumably represents a red surface. However, consistent with Kant’s apparent advocation of the subjectivity of secondary qualities (e.g., B69–70), the projective account allows us to maintain that colors, tastes, etc. are in fact only in consciousness while allowing that we incorrectly conceptualize them as existing in the external world. The nature of projective representation naturally leads to this mistake—in effect, we project too much. What, then, of Sellars’s insistence that intuitions must be conceptual? Since he does acknowledge that the first stage of intuitions comprises images, which consist of (quasi) spatial relations, it would seem that his position is that imagery alone is unable to represent individuals. However, as I will now argue, the reverse is true, namely that phrases such “this such and such” can represent individuals only because they draw their meaning from imagery that independently represents individuals. Consider, then, the phrase “this red rectangle.” Suppose we try to understand this phrase as containing the concepts RED and RECTANGLE. As we have seen, concepts are unifying functions. RED unifies represented instances of redness and RECTANGLE unifies represented instances of rectangles. The content of these empirical concepts is thus derived from these represented instances. And, having admitted an imagistic perceptual stage, it would seem that this is what plays the role of the required represented instances of properties, for example, of redness and rectangularity.2

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So, concepts, apart from imagistic intuitions, cannot represent individuals. Sellars seems to acknowledge this problem when he states that in the representation “this-cube” cube is not occurring as a general at all. The hyphenated phrase ‘this-cube’ expresses a representing of something as a cube in a way which is conceptually prior to cube as a general or universal representation. (Sellars 1992, 6–7; emphasis in original)

So presumably “this-cube” represents an instance of being cubic. I will point out that this little-noted aspect of Sellars’s view is crucial. Both Sellars himself as well as those who present his view characterize it as a conceptualist account of intuitions. But we have just seen that it is not actually conceptual. As Sellars indicates, the supposed “this-cube” types of representations do not consist of concepts—the use of words that are ordinarily used to express concepts such as CUBE mistakenly make these phrases seem conceptual. The account thus postulates (mental) phrases as go-betweens that connect imagery with conceptual representation. However, it is easy to see that there is no need for such intermediaries. As Sellars indicates, the content of “this-cube” is not derived from the concept CUBE. Its content must instead be derived from intuitional images of cubes. But if a perceptual image of a cube already represents a cube, then this account of representation by linguistic elements is not needed. That is, we can explain the concept CUBE as directly uniting all imagisticly represented instances of being cubic, without the need of appeal to Sellars’s postulated “this-such” phrases. As we have seen, Sellars seems to think that images alone cannot represent individuals. However, we now appreciate, with the seeming problems about the form of space sorted out, that if the intuitional image of a cube does not itself represent a cube, then the phrase “this-cube” cannot either, since it does not draw its representational status from concepts—it is, rather, supposedly prior to them. So, as I say, the attribution of “this-such” phrases is superfluous—there is no workable role in representing individuals for these phrases to play; that must be handled entirely by imagistic intuitions united by schematized SUBSTANCE. And we can thus simply move from, say, an imagistic intuition that represents a red rectangle, to judgments such as “that is a red rectangle,” “that rectangle is red,” etc. And there is thus no reason to think that empirical concepts play any role in the representational status of intuitions.

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IMAGISTIC INTUITIONS Let us return to the supposedly exclusive contrasting alternatives of conceptual content and nonconceptual content for intuitions. We have seen above that the direct realist version of the nonconceptual content view is mistaken, which might seem to imply that intuitions instead have conceptual content, although, we now appreciate, not in the way that Sellars advocates. However, I will proceed to argue via a series of considerations that the representational status of intuitions is not conceptual nor is it exactly a matter of content. To begin with the second part, calling it “content” is problematic. The content of a statement or judgment is something that has truth-value, that is, it is true or false, or at least is capable of being true or false. Thus, we might be tempted to characterize an intuition of a cup on a table as having a content such as “there is a cup on the table,” or perhaps something like “here is an instance of a cup on table.” However, in discussing illusion, Kant tells us that: Truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgement about it insofar as it is a thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err, yet not because they judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. Hence truth, as much as error, and also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding. (A293/B350)3

This indicates that the representational makeup of intuitions is not truth-valuable. Thus, an intuition of a rainbow does not falsely represent the existence of a rainbow in the sky, and an intuition of a straight stick half immersed in a glass of water does not falsely represent that the stick is bent. And, by the way, if we appeal to the prismatic effect of water droplets in the former case and the different refraction rates of light in water and air in the latter case, these appearances are as they should be. But this is not to say that either is a true or false representation, apart from judgments such as “the stick is bent” or “the stick appears bent but isn’t.” And this is of course true of physical images as well. Thus, cameras never lie in that their products are simply depictions—a picture of a bent-looking stick half immersed in water is not in and of itself a false picture. So rather than saying that our imagistic intuitions have content, it seems preferable to say that they depict. Our intuitions do not have truth values. However, they are unified by the pure the schematized categories, the relational categories in particular, and as a result, they depict external states of substances and their alterations. As a bit of an aside, we can consider the very widely discussed quote— a seeming motto—at A51/B75: “Thoughts without content are empty,

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intuitions without concepts are blind.” The first part may initially seem incoherent, since we might think that to have a thought is to have content. However, the focus here is clearly on what thoughts are composed of, viz. concepts. So, we can apply the point raised during our examination of Sellars that concepts are unifying functions that require independent representations to unify. Thus, in the absence of intuitional depictions of instances, concepts are devoid of content. The second part of the quote may seem to indicate that intuitions without concepts do not represent at all. But if that were the case, then intuitions would not “give objects to us.” And the previous sentence in this passage indicates that this is precisely what sensibility does. Instead, on the present interpretation, we should understand this remark as indicating that intuitions are blind to truth. Thus, for Kant, a thought of an object is a representation with truth-valuable content, which requires concepts, albeit with content that is drawn from the depictions of intuitions. Our considerations about the imagistic nature of intuitions also suggest a major contrast between the faculties. Since the understanding applies concepts, primarily in semantically composite judgments, and reason obviously involves formal inferences, it is reasonable to understand the “discursive” representations of these faculties as linguistic in nature. We can thus see the difference between the representational types of particular vs. general as rooted in differing mediums of representation, viz., sensibility is an inherently imagistic faulty and the understanding and reason are inherently linguistic faculties. And as the above quote indicates, interactions between these two faculties, which we now see is a matter of interactions between these two types of representational psychological states, is essential for producing fully formed perceptual representations. Let us then consider whether intuitions are in any sense conceptual. We have just seen in considering Sellars that intuitions do not involve empirical conceptual content. However, it may seem that the unity according to the schematized relational categories does show that the content of intuitions is conceptual, as, notably, Bauer (2012) maintains. That might be taken to mean that the categories themselves are what unify intuitions. However, as I have been emphasizing throughout, it is not the categories qua concepts that unify intuitions, but rather the temporally schematized categories. Thus, the application of the schematized categories occurs separately from judgments. Take “that plate is a substance,” for instance. As we have determined in chapter 2, the representation of substance is a matter of representing the identity of depicted clumps of matter across intuitions. The judgment in question does not create this identity, but rather relies on it—the demonstrative applies to the immediate intuition—while the identity stretches across all intuitions of the plate. To deny that would require that we have nontemporal conscious intuitions which only become temporal with the application of

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such a judgment. But that is absurd—we cannot conceive of atemporal conscious experiences. And a judgement such as “the plate is round” applies to the object in question even if the cognizer never judges that it is a substance. This point is apparent for causation as well. Thus, “the lightning caused the thunder” does not create the ordering of the intuitions of lightning and thunder, but rather applies to an ordering that has been created independent of the judgment. For this judgment to apply to the intuitions of the thunder and lightning, we must be able to consciously entertain these intuitions. But since we cannot consciously experience nontemporal intuitions, that means that they must be independently represented as so ordered. So, we should instead understand the unity of the schematized categories as created by the (imagistic) perceptual system, that is, the “pure productive imagination.” And we thus appreciate Kant’s assertion in the B Preface that “we can cognize of things a priori only what ourselves we put into them” (Bxviii) which indicates that the putting in and the cognizing are separate. SCHEMATA We need to understand what it is about these perceptual unities that make then temporal realizations of the categories, given that it is not applications of the categories themselves. One way to proceed here would be to consider what Kant means by the schematism of a concept, and then apply this account to the categories. However, as we now consider, it is actually easier to begin with the schematism of the categories, and then turn to the general account, as Kant does as well in the Schematism chapter. Let us first consider what gets established in the Metaphysical Deduction about the relation between forms of judgment and the categories, viz., there are, first, the same number of types of pure concepts (categories) as there are types of logical functions of judgments (A79/B106), and there is also a one-to-one correspondence between these types, as the two tables in that section indicate. The tables show that there are exactly 12 types of pure (nonempirical) unifying functions and that these functions are realized both by the unifications of judgment types and in the unifications that constitute the pure concepts, viz., the categories.4 As Kant reminds us at A139/B178, the Transcendental Deduction has established that there must also be a temporal realization for these functions. Since it has been proved that consciousness is necessarily unified, there must be nonempirical, that is, pure unifying functions that underlie this unity, and that achieve this via unification of the a priori form of all consciousness, namely, time. It follows that there must also be temporal versions of the 12 pure types of unifying functions, thus the schematized categories. We should therefore understand the forms of judgments,

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the categories qua concepts, and the schematized categories as three different kinds of realization of these unifying functions, with temporal schematization consisting of their imagistic realization. This shows that, in a sense, we do not need to consider the general doctrine of the schematization of concepts. However, it would seem odd if these were the only concepts that were schematized. And, perhaps more importantly, the general account of schematization is useful for deepening our understanding of both the nature of concepts in general and of the interaction between understanding and sensibility. And here, by the way, we are very explicitly straying into something like speculative empirical psychology, albeit the kind of proto-psychology that cotemporary philosophers often engage in. Turning back to the text, we see that Kant explains schemata as distinct from images: Thus, if I place five points in a row, . . . this is an image of the number five. On the contrary, if I only think of a number in general, which could be five or a hundred, this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in accordance with a certain concept than the image itself, which in this case I could survey and compare with the concept only with difficulty. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for the concept. (A140/B179–180)5

A schema is thus a mental process linking concepts and imagery. We may initially note that while, in use, the schema may take a concept and yield a particular image, it must involve types of images. Thus, the concept TREE is correctly illustrated by countless distinct images, and similarly for the vast variety of images that illustrate FIVE. We can thus think of a schema as a process that involves a mapping between a concept and types of images, that is, a class of images. This is confirmed when Kant tells us in the next paragraph that the concept DOG “signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without being restricted to any particular figure that experience, or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto, actually presents” (A141/B180).6 The point here appears to be that a schema-generated image of a dog need not be of a previously perceived dog and is arbitrary, viz., each application might be yield a distinct image. Schema are thus processes that span the two types of representations, viz., linguistic and imagistic, by providing instances of types of imagery that correspond to the concept. So, the “homogeneity” that Kant mentions in the opening of the Schematism chapter should be understood as a matter of coordinating these mediums. In the case of empirical concepts this

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coordination will often involve spatial types. Thus, most physical object concepts including those that Kant mentions, namely, PLATE, TRIANGLE, and DOG involve types of shapes and thus have schemata that generate images that are instances of these spatial types. Kant also describes the schemata of TRIANGLE and DOG as rules, and, in the case of the former, we can readily understand the possibility of a rule that can generate an arbitrary image of a three-sided figure.7 By contrast, the schemata of the categories as Kant explains at A142/ B181 does not generate images. He says that they are, rather, rules of unity for pure syntheses which are in accord with the categories. These schemata thus consist of processes that generate instances of types of nonempirical temporal unities. As we have seen, the relational schema create unities across perceptual states (substance) and order them (causation, community). I suggest, in addition, that the roles of the first six schematized categories are best understood as meta-rules. For quality, as it applies to vision, each spot in the visual field must be of some color (reality) and not of any other color (negation) and that color will be of some degree of intensity above a lower limit and up to up to a maximum (limitation). Kant’s discussions of the trio of categories of quantity usually collapses them into the notion of number. As the Axioms of Intuition establish, representations of space and time must be scalable by measurable and countable units.8 Perhaps expanding on what Kant actually says, we can also think of unity, plurality, and totality as requirements of logical coherence in the qualities of appearances. Thus, again as it applies to the visual field, there must be relations of sameness of color that hold between areas, those that are not the same color will be distinct colors and there will be a totality of colored areas. Another, and vital matter to consider here is the psychological origin and priority of the categories vis-à-vis the schematized categories. In the B TD Kant tells us that apart from intuitions, the categories are “merely empty concepts,” that is, “mere forms of thought.” He then states that only sensible, empirical intuitions “can give them sense and reference [Sinn und Bedeutung]” B148/9. This is important since it may have seemed that the categories are semantically well-formed independent of intuitions, and that the schematized categories are derived from them—indeed, this seems to be a standard assumption of commentators. The structure of the Analytic suggests this since Kant first introduces the categories and inventories them in relation to judgment types, proceeds to argue that they have valid applications to intuitions, and only then presents their schematization. But we now appreciate that this is just expository ordering. This passage clarifies that, psychologically, the schematized categories are primary and the categories are derived. This is most evident in the case of the modal categories, and for NECESSITY

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in particular. This concept is schematized as “true at all times,” but it seems that apart from time we have no way of characterizing it. The primacy of the schematized categories is also confirmed in later writing. In correspondence with Eberhard, in discussing nativism, Kant says that the “universal concepts of the understanding,” that is, the categories, “are acquired but not innate, but the acquisitio, like that of space, is orgininaria, and presupposes nothing innate except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity of apperception)” (136). However, we have seen that the unity of apperception requires the schematized categories. So, the explanation here is in effect that the meaning of the categories is acquired from these unifying schemata. We thus can think of intuitions as having not only empirical semantic primacy—as we have determined above in regard to Sellars—but also pure semantic primacy.9 And this shows that in the framework that is exposited and defended throughout the Analytic, it is not the categories that are fundamental but rather the 12 unifying functions, which are realized as temporal unifiers, as forms of judgment and as these pure concepts. One final issue involving this bit of material is Bennett’s (1966, chapter 10) claim that Kantian schemata are intended to explain conceptual recognition. I see no evidence of this. Kant introduces the synthesis of (conceptual) recognition in the A TD (A103) but then says nothing further about it. And this is perhaps not surprising, since explaining recognition is still an open issue in contemporary psychology. While some commentators (notably Strawson 1966) have alleged that Kant is engaging in a fair amount of speculative empirical psychology, I suggest that the Critique actually contains only a very modest amount of such speculation. The main psychological topic is of course synthesis, but we have seen in chapter 2 that the proof of the necessary unity of consciousness entails that psychology must involve appropriate nonempirical unifying processes, so there must be explanations of the general types of such processes. By contrast, while schemata may be involved with recognition, given Kant’s remark that schematism is “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul” (A141/B180–181), we can see why he did not venture into that territory. I will, though, briefly exceed Kant’s caution and note that it does seem plausible that schematizations underlie recognition for many empirical concepts. Thus, it is reasonable to think that recognizing that something is a coffee mug is primarily a matter of detecting an appropriately sized object with the shape of a cylinder, open at the top and closed on the bottom, and usually with some sort of handle shape on the side. However, it is also important to note that in the case of the schematized categories we are not concerned with recognition of independently given representations, since their application, in

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particular, the application of the relational schematized categories, projects and thus creates representation. *** We can now give a complete explanation of Kant’s understanding of perceptual representation. Initial sensations, which do not have objects, are united via syntheses into imagistic states, viz., appearances, that are necessarily temporally united by the schematized categories, turning parts of the appearances into intuitions which projectively depict external objects, but do not have truth-valuable content. We are aware of appearances and intuitions via apperception which consists of both empirical inner sense and also transcendental apperception which is the representation of these unities. Full-fledged perception, viz., “experience” consists of judgments that are applied to intuitions yielding truth-valuable thoughts. Perceptual judgments typically apply only empirical concepts, but this masks the pure unities of the depiction of objects. For instance, my perception of a tree consists of an imagistic depiction of an appropriately shaped clump of persistent matter, depicted as persistent by its identity across various perceptions, together with judgments such as “that is a tree.” So, both labels “nonconceptual content” and also “conceptual content” are at best highly misleading for the representational status of intuitions. The view that has emerged here is in some ways in agreement with Hanna’s (2005) and (2006, chapter 2) characterization of nonconceptual content, in that intuitions are imagistic, nonconceptual states that nonetheless represent objects. However, he fails to address the role of the schematized categories. So, if Hanna’s position is simply that intuitions do not involve empirical concepts, à laSellars (or McDowell10), then, as we have seen above, he is correct. But if he would also deny that intuitions involve formal, necessary unity, then his view is mistaken.11 On the other hand, Bauer (2012), who critiques the nonconceptual content reading, is correct in maintaining that the TD establishes that intuitions have nonempirical unity. However, he characterizes this as “conceptual content” since he mistakenly attributes this unity to the application of the categories themselves, rather than the schematized categories, which we now understand to be not only distinct from the categories, but also psychologically prior to them. So this label is misleading as well—it is preferable to describe intuitions as formally unified. And moreover, since we have also determined that intuitions do not have truth-valuable content, but instead depict pictorially, the label “content” is also misleading. Kant’s view of the representational status of intuitions is thus perhaps best described, albeit somewhat inelegantly, as formally unified projective imagistic depiction.

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Incidentally, in fairness to Bauer as well as other conceptualists, the Transcendental Deduction makes no mention of schemata, and thus makes it seem as though the categories underlie necessary unity. In the A TD Kant describes the necessary unity of appearances as being “in accordance with concepts” at both A108 and A111—the second passage makes it apparent that the concepts in question are the categories. It is easy to mistakenly take this to indicate that it is the categories that produce this unity in appearances, as I myself did in my (2015). However, the TD establishes only that there is a necessary unity of intuitions that is separate from judgments, and the Principles clarifies that it is the schematized categories that underlie this intuitional unity. Further, we can also now fully appreciate Kant’s primary epistemological result, viz., that we have synthetic a priori knowledge of the world. Intuitions are unified by pure, that is, nonempirical syntheses that apply the schematized categories. This guarantees that all intuitions of the external world will have this pure structure. And since the categories consist of the same types of unity, this ensures that there will be valid judgments that apply the categories to intuitions. For instance, since all intuitions must conform to schematized unity and plurality, we know, a priori, that all states of the world that we can perceptually represent will consist of measurable magnitudes. And since in order to represent changes we must depict necessary state alterations we know a priori that all perceptually represented events will involve necessitated causation. This also constitutes the objective validity of the categories, which as we have noted in chapter 2, is somewhat cryptically characterized at A111. Any intuitional representation of the external, that is, objective world will have the formal structure of the schematized categories, thus guaranteeing the valid application of the categories in judgments about the external, objective world. THE CATEGORIES AND JUDGMENTS To complete our investigation of Kant’s treatment of representation we need to briefly examine the relationship between the categories and judgments. This might seem to be a straightforward matter since Kant initially introduces the categories in connection with types of judgment. There are, though, several passages that seem problematic and will provide the needed clarifications. The 12 types of unifying functions are realized both as judgment types and as pure concepts, viz., the categories. However, the relationship between a given instance of judgment and its corresponding category is a bit tricky. In the paradigm case of conditionals and causation, Kant provides several

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examples in the Prolegomena that show that a conditional judgment may occur without the category of CAUSATION (4:299–301, Hatfield trans. [2004], 51–53). In slightly reworked form12 they are: “If I experience the sun shining on the stone then I experience warmth,” which is to be understood as a merely subjective observation, as opposed to “the sun shining on the stone caused it to warm.” And similarly, “If I experience release of air, then I observe expansion” vs. “If air is released then it will cause expansion.” It is generally apparent that it is possible to have a conditional that is not causal, and in particular, a conditional whose antecedent and consequent each describe states of a substance does not have to be causal, for example, “if X is huge, then X is heavy.” It likewise seems that an exclusive disjunction of states of a pair of substances need not involve interaction. And it is also apparent that many categorical judgements do not involve SUBSTANCE. Thus, neither “blue is a color” nor “intuitions are imagistic” refer to something that is capable of being a substance. However, it would seem that the other nine judgement types require the relevant category. This is most obvious for the modal forms. Thus, what would make a judgment apodictic other than NECESSITY? And it would seem that universal judgment must involve UNITY and similarly for a negative judgment and NEGATION. So, it looks like it is only the relational class of judgments that can occur without the corresponding kind of category. We have seen that this trio of categories play a very special role in that they are responsible for creating projective representations, so perhaps it is not surprising that they are also distinct in this additional way.13 Another passage that affirms the fact that relational judgments can occur without the categories is B128–129 which begins by providing an “explanation of the categories. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuitions are regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments.”14 Kant offers an example of a pair of categorical judgments where the concepts can occur in either the subject or predicate position. But he then states that “through the category of substance, however, it is determined that the empirical intuition must always be considered as a subject, never as a predicate; and likewise with all the other categories.” This may seem to suggest that the concept of substance as well as the other categories are constituted as meta-grammatical operators.15 And, while the idea of a formal analysis of these abstract semantic entities may seem appealing, it cannot be correct. This is so, first, because the categories, including SUBSTANCE can occur as subjects or predicates in judgments, for example, “Substance is persistent,” “Matter is a substance,” and “Anything that is actual is possible.” Second, as we have just considered, the non-relational judgment forms are not separable from their associated categories. So it

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cannot be that be that, for example, NEGATION is an operator that optionally applies to a negative judgment that does not yet involve negation. I thus suggest that what Kant is doing in this passage is showing that the unification produced by the category of SUBSTANCE is a qualified version of the unity produced by categorical judgements in general, that is, it is the same type of unifying function, but in a more restricted form. Similarly, we can understand CAUSATION as a qualified version of a conditional, although in this case it is not grammatically specified. Rather, in order to characterize causation, a conditional must have both antecedents and consequents that represent states of substances and must be necessary.16 COMMUNITY will similarly involve states of substances in a necessitated exclusive disjunction. So, this passage serves to uphold the Metaphysical Deduction thesis that the 12 unifying functions are realized both in judgment types and in the (primary) pure concepts. APPENDIX: ANIMALS Kant’s understanding of animal psychology has become a somewhat important topic in recent literature. While the primary focus has concerned whether or not Kant attributes any sort of consciousness to animals in regard to moral standing, there has also been some examination of his views of animals in connection with his overall views of intuitions, representation, and perception, which is relevant here. The literature is split between two opposing poles which correspond to those who favor a nonconceptual content reading of intuitions (Allais 2009, McLear 2011, Golob 2020) versus those who favor a conceptualist interpretation (Land 2018, Hutton 2021). The former attributes to Kant the view that while animals have nonconceptual perceptual representations of objects, they lack self-awareness and conceptual representations. The latter similarly attributes a view involving lack of self-awareness and concepts but also either denies that animals perceive objects or at least denies that they perceive objects as we do. We will examine the primary textual source, which I think clearly upholds the latter account. And I will also point out a misreading on the part of nonconceptualists. But I will conclude by noting some reasons for being dissatisfied with Kant’s position on animal psychology. There is only one textual source on animal psychology written by Kant himself during his Critical stage, namely a 1789 letter to his pupil Marcus Herz. The relevant passage (Zweig, 1967, 152–154), which is often inappropriately truncated by those advocating nonconceptualism, begins with Kant replying to concerns raised by Maimon about how Kant explains “the possibility agreement between a priori intuitions and my a priori concepts, if each has its specifically different origin.” In an initial paragraph, Kant clarifies

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his view that knowledge of objects consists both of the “manner of intuitions” (i.e., schematized categories) and of the “form of the understanding” (i.e., the categories), which are united in consciousness. He then states that “if intuition (of objects of appearance) did not agree with these conditions, objects would be nothing for us, that is, not objects of knowledge at all.” In the subsequent very long paragraph, he proceeds to argue that we have no basis for explaining either why we have these conditions or why they agree as they do, since we can only evaluate “an understanding by means of our own understanding.” But then, crucially, he further explains that “all sense data for a possible cognition would never, without these conditions, represent objects.” After noting that without “the unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of myself,” that is, transcendental apperception, “I would not even be able to know that I have sense data.” He then turns to animals: They could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence on my feeling and desire, without being aware of them. . . . This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Zweig, 1967, 154)

Kant is thus maintaining that animals have only imagistic mental states, consisting of sensations (“sense data”), subjected to empirical association, and thus likely formed into images via the empirical imagination. They are lacking not only transcendental apperception, and thus awareness of their mental states, but also concepts, judgments, and, crucially, the 12 pure unifying forms, which are the “conditions” that he has been discussing. Thus, applying what he says before turning to animals, their sensations and images do not have objects. They thus do not represent space, and, lacking transcendental apperception, they of course do not perceive time either. While it is clear to all those tackling this passage that Kant thinks that animals have no awareness of their mental states, those who look only at the portion of the passage that I have inset are misled into thinking that Kant is attributing perceptual representations of objects to them. (McLear, 2011, 8; Allais, 2015, 149n). However, we have seen in chapter 1 that the classification “representations” includes sensations, which do not have objects. He is thus referring not to states that have (truth-valued) content, but rather to sensations (and images formed out of sensations) that consist semantically merely of internal information. This is clear since the point of turning to animals is to illustrate beings who lack the crucial conditions, that is, the 12 unifying functions. And as the previous sentences indicate, without these conditions, animals not only lack knowledge of their sense data, but additionally this sense data does not represent objects.

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However, this position on animals might be taken as showing that Kant’s views on representation are problematic, since animals do seem to show obvious signs that they perceive the world. Their complex behaviors in interaction with the environment suggest that they represent external objects and are very likely also aware of the passage of time. But this is not all. Animals are generally able to represent types of shapes, colors, flavors, and so on, and also types of creatures including con-specifics, prey and predators. But the representation of types seemingly involves concepts. Further, the complex social behavior of various species suggests some sort of awareness of self vs. other. Moreover, a variety of species exhibit surprisingly sophisticated problem-solving abilities. All of this suggests that animal minds involve much more than the rudimentary objectless sensations and images that Kant attributes to them. Many species may have some sort of representations of generality, and have linguistic representations, which takes us into the difficult territory of speculating about what animal proto-languages could be like. But, more germane to Kant, this also suggests the need to attribute a unified consciousness and thus the pure 12 unifying functions, enabling the representation of the external world and allowing for concepts, and perhaps also supporting self-awareness. I am thus suggesting that the response to this type of concern is not to question the veracity of Kant’s views of human representation but rather to substantially enhance his view of animal psychology. APPENDIX: MCDOWELL’S CONCEPTUALISM McDowell (1996, 2009) defends the view that Kantian intuitions are conceptual. I present a critique of his support for this claim in an appendix since what he provides is not so much an interpretation of Kant’s actual view—for example, he rejects transcendental idealism—as it is a Kantian-influenced outlook. It is important at the outset to appreciate how McDowell understands the conceptual: It is essential to conceptual capacities, in the demanding sense, that they can be exploited in active thinking, thinking that is open to reflection about its own rational credentials. When I say that the content of experience is conceptual, that is that I mean by “conceptual.” (McDowell 1996, 47)

This says nothing about what concepts are, that is, how they represent, which has been our focus throughout. It instead concerns how concepts can be applied, viz., in reasoning and specifically in self-reflective justification. The primary thinking in McDowell’s account seems to be that anything that we are conscious of is something that we are capable of reasoning about. And I

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will begin by completely agreeing with this. In fact, on Kant’s outlook, transcendental apperception, which, as we have seen in chapter 2, is awareness of the necessary unity of consciousness, would seem to guarantee that we are able to think about, and thus reason about, anything that is represented in consciousness. It thus may seem initially that there is no room for disagreement with this claim, which invites the worry that this is a trivial issue. But McDowell thinks that his conceptualist account provides a very important epistemic result, viz., that it serves to undermine the idea of the so-called given, thus upholding Sellars’s (1956) view that the idea that perception rests epistemically on awareness of nonconceptual, externally caused input is a myth. McDowell’s position is that whatever is in the realm of reasoning is not an epistemic given but is rather subject to evaluation. However, the account developed herein presents a very different understanding of the issue of conceptual versus nonconceptual representation than that of McDowell. I have argued that we should understand Kantian perception as consisting of imagistic intuitions that are constructed via syntheses from sensations, which constitute the initial input to sensibility. Intuitions are independent from concepts and do not involve truth valued content, but instead imagistically depict objects and events. External objects are depicted as instances of properties, for example, instances of greenness, roundness, etc. By contrast with intuitions which represent the particular, concepts represent “what is common to several things” (A320/B376–377), that is, concepts represent the general. And they do so by unifying representations of particulars. Thus, in order to have concepts, we must also have non-general, that is, nonconceptual representations. An intuition of, say, a book is not an experience of the concept BOOK—it is not an experience of generality. It is rather a representation of one of many possible instances of an object with the features of pages and a binding that BOOK unites with all other particulars with these features. We think about and thus reason about perceived particulars, that is, the objects that intuitions represent, by applying judgments that typically involve a combination of concepts and indexicals, for example, “That’s a book.” But, as we have seen above in regard to Sellars, these judgments depend on separate representations of the objects corresponding to “that.” And here it is important to appreciate that judgments that apply concepts to intuitions do not somehow inherit the semantics of nonconceptual representations. Thus, “That’s a book” is obviously not itself imagistic and more importantly, as we have considered in regard to Sellars above, it does not represent the individual instance of the properties of having pages and being bound that the intuition depicts but rather unites an instance of this with all others of the same type, thereby classifying the object as a book. Therefore, the fact that we can reason

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about anything—any object—that we are conscious of does not imply that all of our conscious representations are conceptual. We represent perceptual objects in two ways, by nonconceptual imagistic depiction and by conceptual judgments; and only the latter are involved in reasoning. Let us then examine McDowell’s arguments against the idea of such nonconceptual representation. He points out that Kant conceives of perceptual experience as “categorically structured” (2009, 127). He infers that “the content of intuitions is of the same general kind as the content of judgments” (ibid.) which, he takes to be conceptual content. However, this is a gloss on a more complicated Kantian explanation, and the details matter. As we have seen above, intuitions are united by the schematized categories. The correspondence between these and the categories, that is, a priori concepts, is that they share the same types of unifying functions. However, this is consistent with the view that two different types of representational mediums are unified by these corresponding types, viz., types of temporal unities that unify images which depict the particular and the categories that unify linguistic representations and thus represent the general. As we have noted, McDowell’s main purpose is that of carrying out Sellars’s project of showing that there is no epistemological given. And, like Sellars, he focuses on Kant’s contrast between receptivity and spontaneity. In both versions of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant argues, contra-empiricism, that perception involves a large amount of non-receptive, thus spontaneous synthetic processing. In considering this aspect of Kant’s account, McDowell identifies spontaneity with both the conceptual and also with free will. Again reflecting Sellars, he states that: When Kant describes the understanding as the faculty of spontaneity, that reflects his view of the relation between reason and freedom; rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom but constitutive of it. (Sellars, 1996, 5)

If this is correct, then we can infer from the presence of spontaneity, understood as freedom, to the ability to reason and thus to the conceptual. Since Kant tells us at the start of the B TD that all synthesis is a matter of spontaneity rather than receptivity (B129–130), it follows by McDowell’s interpretation that in Kant’s examination of the roles of syntheses in intuitions in the A TD, for example, A98–102, he is attributing conceptual representation to intuitions. However, this seems obviously wrong. The synthesis of apprehension, for instance, is described by Kant as the process of creating a unified intuition from the manifold of sensations. Specifically, the mind must “run through and then take together this manifoldness” (A99). But there is nothing about this computationally unifying process that would suggest the representation of generality, that is, of types, and thus the conceptual.

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Similarly, the synthesis of reproduction (A100–101) consists of processes of regular, lawlike recall, which again gives no indication of anything conceptual. Kant’s purpose in arguing for these syntheses does not appear to be aimed at establishing the conceptual nature of intuitions; rather, as we have considered in chapter 2, it is aimed at showing that there must also be pure forms of synthesis, and this allows us to see how it is possible for consciousness to be necessarily unified. Further, since both versions of the TD have argumentation that shows that perception does not consist of passive receptivity but rather involves very substantial synthetic processing it follows that if McDowell’s interpretation is correct, Kant thereby establishes that there is extremely widespread free will, that is, this would imply that all perception consists of freely willed acts. However, when we look at the Third Antinomy (A444/B472–A451/ B479), which concerns the conflict between free will and determinism, no mention is made of perceptual spontaneity, either in the Antinomy itself, or in the solution (A532/B560–A558/B586). And, crucially, Kant explains that reason can be conceived as free only insofar as it understood as being beyond the world of appearances, that is, as not part of temporal happenings (A551/ B579–A555/B583). And this, we should note, is required because as we have seen in chapter 4, the Second Analogy establishes that all changes are necessitated, that is, deterministically caused. All of this strongly suggests that “spontaneity” is not to be equated with free will. If free will had already been established in the TD, it would seem that the Third Antinomy should not arise at all, nor should we need to go beyond the world of appearances in order to be able to conceive of free reasoning. I suggest instead that Kant’s use of “spontaneity” in the TD and related passages means something like “not input driven.” Thus, to say that perceptual syntheses are spontaneous is to say that the reception of sensations does not determine how they should be processed, for example, it does not dictate that they be assembled into images. And we can thus appreciate the purpose of establishing that intuitions, that is, perceptual representations, are structured in ways that drastically exceed the input, since this is the wedge that Kant needs to be able to establish that this processing creates a formal unity that is the basis for synthetic a priori knowledge. It is this goal that Kant is pursuing with arguments about perceptual spontaneity rather than the claim that intuitions are conceptual, let alone free. And although the understanding is the faculty of concepts, Kant’s frequent characterization of it as a faculty of spontaneity similarly does not mean that it operates out of free will.17 This is rather because having intuitions of objects of a certain type is distinct from actually forming a concept of that type and is further distinct from always applying it. For example, a person may judge that they are seeing a dog but not judge that it is also an instance of the concept

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TERRIER, either because they do not have the concept at all or because they do not notice the relevant features in what they are looking at. So, for Kant, the psychological given consists of sensations. They are not an epistemic given since they do not have objects and thus do not constitute knowledge. And as we have just considered, his arguments that everything else is spontaneous, that is, is not determined by the input, as empiricism would have it, are meant to create an opening for the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, not to establish the conceptual nature of intuitions as McDowell maintains. But despite the fact that intuitions are laden with a priori structure, they are distinct from and prior to concepts, judgments, and reasoning. So, contrary to McDowell, Kant does advocate an epistemic given; but it is not a psychological given. To more fully appreciate this, note again that according to Kant’s explanation of perception, objects often get represented twice, once by each faculty— and this is perhaps the source of McDowell’s misunderstanding. For example, I perceive a tree by first getting an imagistic, nonconceptual intuitional depiction of it. I then re-represent it by judging “That’s a tree,” thereby uniting this intuition with all others of the same type. But the fact that the second representation is conceptual does not in any way support the claim that the first is too. And the nonconceptual intuition provides a reason for thinking that the judgment is true, thus, as I say, serving as an epistemic given. We have yet to consider what seems to be one of McDowell’s primary reasons for the claim that intuitions are conceptual, but that actually has little to do with Kant. In responding to Evans’s (1982) assertion that experience presents instances of colors that we have no concepts for, McDowell introduces the idea of indexical concepts such as “that shade.” He explains that the meaning of such phrases is based on “a recognitional capacity that can be made explicit with the help of a sample, something that is guaranteed to be available at the time of with which the capacity sets in” (1996, 57). This, though, suffers from the same confusions that we have already diagnosed. The sample is not a concept, even if it plays the suggested role in creating a concept. But it is the representation of the sample that is the intuition here, not the judgments about it. I suggest that what is driving these considerations is the fact that experiences of simple qualities—color in particular—involve a strong inclination of potential similarity with other experiences. That is, the experience carries with it a sense of being able to reidentify that particular color again, as in McDowell’s discussion.18 Thus, the experience of a green surface might be described as an experience of a specific type of greenness. But we have to be careful here; it is an experience of an instance of a type, but not an experience of the type itself—it is not an experience of the concept, say, VERDANT GREEN, nor of GREEN. And, when we shift from qualities to objects, the

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instance/type confusion disappears. If someone, say, perceives a dog, they are not led to think that they are experiencing dogs in general. McDowell’s introduction of indexical concepts thus does nothing to support the claim that intuitions, let alone sensations, are conceptual. I will, however, point out that this device might be useful in defending the judgmental side of Kant’s account of perception. Thus, one might accept that we have nonconceptual perceptual imagery, but object to the view that we do not have full-fledged experiences until we make judgments that apply concepts to these images on the grounds that we sometimes lack appropriate concepts to make such judgments. McDowell’s explanation of indexical concepts such as THAT SHADE would seem to be a reasonable response to such an objection. In any case, since McDowell’s reasons for understanding intuitions conceptually do not succeed, we should accept that intuitions involve nonconceptual representations that are an empirical given for judgments. They present objects to the understanding—the conceptual faculty. And, while intuitionistic representation is laden with formal structure that constitutes the synthetic a priori, it is outside the realm of reasons and thus is not normative.19 NOTES 1. McLear (2021) provides a very usefully summary of conceptualist vs. nonconceptualist readings and the basis for each that, as I say, treats these as exclusive alternatives. 2. Watkins (2012, 521 ff.) makes a similar point in regard to Sellars’s view but focuses instead just on sensations. 3. Kant, 1998, 384. 4. The passage at B128–9, discussed below, provides both explanation of and support for this doctrine for the category of substance. 5. Kant, 1998, 273. 6. Kant, 1958, 183. 7. Kant mentions this very example in the A TD at 105 to explain how we think of a triangle as an object; so, in this portion of the text we learn that he was referring to the TRIANGLE schema in that earlier passage. 8. The remark about MAGNITUDE at B293 seems to indicate that this trio of categories applies primarily to spatial representations and only derivatively to temporal representations. 9. This is consistent with the apparent view of the Aesthetic that the concepts of space and time are derived from the a priori forms of intuitions. 10. See the second Appendix below on McDowell’s conceptual view of intuitions. 11. Hanna would apparently deny this since he maintains that animals have Kantian nonconceptual intuitions. However, in the first Appendix below I argue that Kant

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denies that animals have objects for their perceptual states precisely because they lack these unifying conditions. 12. Kant’s stated example, “if the sun shines on the stone then it grows warm” seems contrary to what he argues in the Second Analogy, since in order to represent this as a change of state in the stone it must be represented as an instance of a necessary state transition. 13. The relational category trio is also unique in that none of the concepts is equivalent to another via negation, while by contrast non-unity is plurality, non-reality is negation and not necessarily is equivalent to possibly not. 14. This as well as the next quote are from Kant, 1958, 128. 15. As I suggested for the relational categories in Kaye (2015), 213–214. 16. Note that necessity is also required for the restriction to subject position in the case of SUBSTANCE, also making that explanation more than grammatical. 17. Or that it involves reasoning—McDowell collapses the Understanding and Reason. 18. People actually turn out to be very bad at recalling specific hues and shades of color, so this sense of potential similarity is somewhat illusory—we are often not able to correctly reapply a “that color” concept. 19. In the main appendix, “Against Inferentialism,” I complete the case against the normative understanding of Kantian representation by arguing, contrary to Landy and also to Brandom, that Kantian empirical concepts are not derived from inferences.

Chapter 6

Representation and Metaphysics

With a full understanding of Kant’s account of representation in hand, we are now in a position to appreciate his metaphysical views. We will begin with an examination of his realist and idealist commitments. This will reveal how the projective view allows for a full resolution of these apparently conflicting doctrines. We will then turn to the issue of the noumena. I will argue that the projective account upholds Kant’s assertion that this plays a minimal, uncomplicated role in his outlook. And we will also examine the seemingly related issue of affectation and will again see how, under the present interpretation, Kant’s framework allows him to explain appearances as caused by the transcendental object without having to dubiously invoke the noumena. The chapter concludes with a very brief look at ideas and the limits of metaphysical knowledge. EMPIRICAL REALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM In order to explore Kant’s commitments to both realism and idealism it will be useful to engage in a dialectic evaluation of these two apparently opposing views. Consider first empirical realism. According to the projective account, our perceptual states, both imagistic intuitions and judgments that are applied to them, represent external objects. We represent substances that have persistent existence that exceeds occurrences of perceptual representations of them. So, this is realism as opposed to phenomenalism. It might perhaps be objected that this is just a matter of how we represent the world as opposed to the real metaphysical nature of the world. However, we have seen in our examination of the Refutation of Idealism in chapter 3 that our representation of time mandates that we take external substances 123

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to be actual; and the actual existence of external substances would seem to be metaphysical realism. However, metaphysical realism is prima facie inconsistent with idealism, which requires that existence is mental rather than physical. Kant’s idealism is presented and defended in the Aesthetic, where he argues that space and time are not features or relations of things in themselves. While it is beyond the scope of the present work to examine the Aesthetic in detail, the primary thrust of argumentation establishes that space and time are a priori concepts. The only workable explanation of this—seemingly an argument to the only feasible explanation, as with the Analogies—is that space and time are nothing but a priori forms of sensibility, which thus allows these a priori concepts to be drawn from them. If space and time are only forms of perceptual representation, this might be taken to mean that they are merely phenomenal (in the modern sense). But here we first need to distinguish, as we have in the examination of Sellars’ views in the previous chapter, the difference between space being the form of the phenomenal versus it being the form of what is represented. We can thus appreciate the significance of the projectivist account of representation. Rather than thinking that space and time are mind-independent existences that cause us to have representations and knowledge of them, they are understood as the forms that the mind imposes on the represented; they are not forms that are receptively perceived but rather they are the forms of the projected world. I will introduce the term “mind-independent” to characterize the idea of existence completely apart from human cognition. On Kant’s account, the world that we represent and know is necessarily constituted by space and time. But we also know that space and time are mind-dependent since they are nothing but forms of perceptual representation. So, while the guitar I am currently perceiving is represented as external to my consciousness with an ongoing existence when I’m not perceiving it, it is nonetheless mind-dependent, since its inherent spatiality and temporality as well as its externality are products of my/human representation. We can thus appreciate that while one might think that mind-external existence is either co-extensive with mind-independence, or at least entails it, Kant has separated the two notions. This allows us to understand how Kant’s idealism is consistent with his account of substance in the First Analogy and in the resulting Refutation of Idealism. In the former passage, Kant argues that we represent persistence by representing substances, thus matter, that although not directly perceived, underlies the spatial world, and that can neither be created nor destroyed. One might think that this is inconsistent with space being mind-dependent since the existence of such substances greatly exceeds our perceptions. But we now appreciate that this is to say that substances are represented as external existents that greatly exceed our perceptions, but since represented external

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existence does not entail mind-independence, there is no inconsistency in holding that substances so conceived are none the less mind-dependent. Moreover, and this is particularly important, being external is constituted by being spatial—without the representation of space there is nothing “beyond” consciousness.1 So on Kant’s account, being mind-external is constituted by being something that cannot exist in itself, that is, to be external is to be mind-dependent. It thus follows that an attempt to conceive of the spatial/temporal world as mind-independent, which seems prima facie like a very viable metaphysical option, actually results in incoherence. However, it may again seem that to say that the external world is mind-dependent is to say that it is only a representation. And indeed, Kant tells us that “external objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations. Apart from them they are nothing.” (A 370).2 This may appear highly problematic since to say that, for example, my current intuition and judgmental experience of a guitar is a mere representation suggests that the guitar is not real. However, as with any perception, I can evaluate further, for example, by viewing it from different angles, picking it up, playing it, and so on. If further investigation raises no issue for the truth of my perceptions, then I should (continue to) accept the guitar’s reality. It might well be objected that this is not what was intended; the complaint is rather an overarching, meta-philosophic one, viz., that that all perceptually represented objects are not real. But we have seen that The Refutation of Idealism successfully establishes that in order to represent time as actual we must represent substances as actual, and thus real. So the generalization “all external objects are not real” is false. Perhaps the objector might respond that the idea is that external objects lack reality in some further way. However, our considerations about the semantics of the categories in the previous chapter show that they draw their content from their applications to spatial/temporal intuitions. Thus, there is no further way in which the mind-dependence of the world could be understood as being not real. We thus find again, as with being external, that while it may have seemed that not being mindindependent means being non-real, in Kant’s representational framework that does not follow. There is, though, an even stronger characterization of the idealistic underpinnings of the external world in several passages where Kant uses the phrase “in us.” At A129 he describes an appearance as “merely in us,” since we do not “encounter” modifications of sensibility. If we understand “appearance” here as referring to what our imagistic perceptual states represent, then this amounts to phenomenalism, viz., the external world is in us. However, if we instead take “appearance” as referring to the perceptual states

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themselves—and as we have seen in chapter 1, a crucial passage in the TD demands this reading—then this is really just an advocation of perceptual representationalism, viz., contrary to direct realism, my current phenomenal awareness of a tree does not consist of contact with an external tree but is rather a matter of entertaining a imagistic depiction of a tree. However, the other similar passage at A370 seems more problematic. Here Kant, in defense of the transcendental idealist claim that “matter” “is only species of representation” asserts that space “is in us.” This, again, would seem to be straightforward phenomenalism. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in connection with the concern raised by Sellars, Kant cannot mean that space is in consciousness, since consciousness is not in space. Rather, space and thus the external world are protectively represented by the mind. So, a preferable catchphrase might be that space and its objects “come from us.” Or, even more clearly, but less simply, we can say that the spatial world is representationally constructed and projected by us, using forms, viz., space and time, that are not derived from the external. This passage points to the key issue that underlies Kant’s idealism, namely that our representations do not correspond to a world that exists in itself. In other words, unlike the conventional realist outlook, there is no mind-independent target, existing in itself, that we are seeking to correctly represent. The A129 passage connects this point with the causal status of sensations—an issue that we will return to shortly. But for the moment note that it is incoherent to try conceiving of perception as beginning with mindindependent external causes since the external is constructively projected by us and is thus not mind-independent. Kant also remarks that “we have to do everywhere only with appearances” A 129 (and A45/B62). At first pass, this may seem to be nothing more than a result of advocating a representational view of perception together with epistemic internalism. Thus, Locke can say that “we have to do only with our ideas.” However, as we have just noted, for Kant it is also true that there is nothing further than what appearances represent. And this is what allows for both the possibility and the reality of synthetic a priori knowledge: since the world is nothing beyond its representation, the formal structure that we use to project our representations simply is the formal structure of the world. Thus, as he explains late in the B TD (B164), the lawfulness of things in themselves would necessarily hold independent of the understanding’s cognitions, that is, independent of perceivers. But, since appearances are only representations, that is, projective representations, their laws are solely the result of what cognition prescribes to them. It is useful at this point to compare this understanding of the existence of objects with the other two main options. According to metaphysical realism, the existence of the physical has no connection whatsoever with human

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cognition and consciousness, while for (e.g., Berkelean) phenomenalism, the existence of objects is solely a matter of perceptual consciousness. On Kant’s projective account, contrary to phenomenalism, we represent objects as external to consciousness, but contrary to metaphysical realism, in order for objects to exist they must be connected with possible experience. This may seem similar to phenomenalism and might also appear to be a dubious claim, since the scientific realm is full of qualities that cannot be perceived with our ordinary senses. However, at A225–226/B273 Kant clarifies that the need for a connection to possible experience is weaker than requiring actual perceptions. He cites “magnetic matter,” which we would now characterize as a magnetic field. Although it is impossible for us to perceive a magnetic field “given the constitution of our organs,” he allows that if our senses were “finer,” we could sense it. This seems prime facie problematic, but in the Metaphysics, he further allows that we might need a wholly different type of sense organ in order to detect the magnetic.3 So the criterion is that for an object (or property) to exist, it must be connected to perception “and whatever is appended to it in accordance with empirical law . . . there too reaches our cognition of the existence of things” (A225–226/B273) Thus, anything that we can observe with scientific measuring equipment counts as existing. This means that the external world greatly exceeds the world of phenomenal experience. But, still, the scientifically characterized physical world is understood not as mind-independent, as metaphysical realism would have it, but rather as a projection of human cognition and thus of its laws. However, to raise one last worry, saying that appearances, which are not things in themselves, are instead “the mere play of our representations” (A101) suggests that the mind arbitrarily invents the world. How, we might ask, can truth be a matter of correspondence if there is nothing to correspond to? But consider the combination of a projectivist view of perception together with the view that what we are representing is a world of spatial objects that exist fully mind-independently, that is, in themselves. For such an outlook, truth is correspondence to independent targets, but yet, all the same, what we can know of truth is a matter of internal evaluation, based on the continual empirical input of sensations—we would never get any closer to the mind-independent world than our representations of it. And it is of course exactly the same for Kantian idealism, sans the conception of mind-independent metaphysical targets. It is thus important to appreciate that the (Kantian) projected world is constrained by the input of sensations, even though they do not themselves have objects. The on-going represented existence of a coffee mug, on a table, in a room, with trees outside, and so on is the product of continually receiving sensations that are formed into images that in turn are unified so as to represent the continuity of all of these substances. If I begin to get “recalcitrant” sensations that no longer sustain the construction of these

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intuitions, then I may conclude that I was somehow misrepresenting some of these objects. So, while it has occasionally been suggested that Kant needs to maintain a coherence theory of truth, what we have just considered suggests that this is not so. And he of course asserts the correspondence view of truth (A58/ B82) albeit with virtually no explanation. We now appreciate that this is as expected. However, the treatment of justification would seem to require some sort of coherence account. And Kant does indeed seem to be advocating something along these lines in the passage at B279 where he states that we establish that a putative experience is just imagination, that is, false, both by examining “particular determinations,” which presumably involves questions such as did I get a good look at that?” or “did I apply these concepts correctly?,” and also “coherence” with “actual experience,” thus coherence with my judgments about what is actual. This is to say that the judgments formed from the continual input of sensations are subject to internal epistemic standards. We can therefore say that the Kantian represented world is a joint product of the input that the mind receives together with the abstract, nonempirical structure that it uses to construct perceptual representations. But how, exactly, are we to understand the basis of this input? In particular, do things in themselves cause sensations? NOUMENA AND THE PROBLEM OF AFFECTATION This brings us to the pair of topics which are the final hurdles in understanding Kant’s metaphysics. First up is the noumena, which we have yet to consider, although this is often characterized as a central part of Kant’s outlook, I will argue that it is not. In the first edition, Kant introduces this concept in an unfortunately tricky manner (A249–253). He begins by distinguishing between phenomena which are the appearances that are “thought as objects according to the unity of the categories” and contrasts this with noumena that are “merely objects of the understanding” and that could be given in a non-sensible intuition. He then points out that we might have thought that the concept of appearance, as introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic, also gives us the objective reality of the noumena. And he argues a little later on that in order to avoid a “constant circle” the concept of an appearance must have a relation to an object that is “independent of sensibility” (A252). This might suggest that the noumena are the underlying reality that exist, unperceived, but that they are what we are representing with appearances.4 That would, though, threaten the doctrine of empirical realism, since the supposed objectivity if the projected external world would be undermined

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by this greater, hidden reality. However, we have good reasons for thinking that this understanding of the noumena cannot be what Kant is advocating, since as we have seen, the representation and conception of anything as an object requires the schematized categories. Since the noumena are conceived as completely independent of sensibility, we should expect that we cannot represent this realm at all, including not being able to assert that the noumena exist. As with all concepts, the categories are unifying functions that need independent representations to unite; they cannot reach out semantically beyond our representational realm. And this is precisely what Kant says in the revised version of these passages, viz., in regard to the noumena, “all employment, and indeed all meaning of the categories, entirely vanishes” (B308).5 In the A version, at 252, he clarifies that the concept of the noumena does not involve a “determinate cognition of any sort of thing.” And in the text common to both versions, he characterizes the concept of the noumena as completely negative, a “boundary concept” that serves to limit sensibility (A255/B310–311). To appreciate what Kant is trying to explain here we need to focus on the fact that in the A249–253 passage Kant also reminds us of the transcendental object and then proceeds to distinguish the noumena from it. As we have considered in chapter 2, the concept of the transcendental object is our concept of a general correspondence, a something in general apart from our intuitions. What Kant is explaining, then, is that the seeming role of the noumena introduced at the start of the discussion, as that which underlies appearances, is actually played by the transcendental object. And this amounts to another reaffirmation of the projective view of representation, viz., the objective reality of my guitar, and the objective reality of the world in general is a matter of the correspondence of our intuitions to objects that are protectively represented by us. Our conception of this correspondence, and thus of objectivity, is a matter of the formal unity of the schematized categories, which project this reality. And our concept of this reality is the concept of a corresponding object in general that consists of the synthetic a priori unity of the categories, thus, the transcendental object. The suggested understanding of the noumena as that which underlie appearances is thus unworkable, as Kant confirms in these passages, by re-explaining that the categories can only represent objects in connection with sensible intuitions (A251–253). We cannot represent the noumena as the unperceived reality that underlies the perceived world. Thus, there is no such thing as a noumenal object, for example, a noumenal guitar. Our intuitions do not represent the noumena. Rather, that is the role that the transcendental object plays.6 But the transcendental object, unlike the noumena, is positively related to representation. It is the most abstract conception of a projected object—a projected object in general.

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It follows that the idea of a world of noumenal objects is incoherent since we are not able to represent the noumena. This also undermines another influential attempt at understanding the noumena, namely the dual aspect reading which conceives the noumena as the same objects that we perceive, but “considered” apart from the sensible conditions of space and time (e.g., Allison, 2004, 51–53ff.) Just as we cannot represent noumenal objects since such entities would be completely apart from the sensible conditions that involve the schematized categories which constitute our representational abilities, so we cannot represent noumenal aspects of perceptual objects since that would similarly require our representational abilities to reach beyond the requisite sensible conditions.7 There is only one world, the phenomenal, that is, mind-dependent world.8 We might then wonder why this concept is needed at all. I suggest that this is first and foremost a matter of semantic contrast. Kant, in the A version, presents this as a contrast relative to the idea of appearance. Thus, to ensure that the assertion that the external world is (merely) one of appearance, we must have a concept of nonappearance. Without that, we would be “going in a circle”—that is, a semantic circle. Specifically, since what underlies the idea of appearance is the thesis that space and time do not existin themselves, the phrase “existing in itself” must be coherent. In other words, to classify the world of appearance as mind-dependent as I have suggested, the concept of mind-independence must be semantically cogent. There is, though, Kant’s statement in the above quotes about the noumena being an object (independent of sensibility). And we have just determined that we cannot represent the noumena as an object. This is clarified in the revised version of this passage where he clarifies that “if we call certain objects, as appearances, beings of sense (phenomena), because we distinguish the way in which we intuit them from their constitution in itself, then it already follows from our concept that to those we as it were oppose, as objects thought merely through the understanding, either other objects conceived in accordance with the latter constitution, even though we do not intuit it in them, or else other possible things, which are not objects of our senses at all, and call these beings of understanding (noumena)” (B306).9 This is consistent with the opening of the A version, but here the contrasting notion of the noumena is made only in connection with the faculties, not with appearances. (I suggest that this is a change in exposition not in view since there is nothing problematic about his explanation of the role of the transcendental object in the first edition version of this passage). Kant then explains that to have a positive concept of the noumena as object, we would need a purely intellectual intuition. This allows that while we do not have a representation of the noumena since we lack this sort of intuition, the concept of a noumenal object is nonetheless a coherent one.

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And, crucially, the coherence of this concept is required for Kant’s practical philosophy, which rests on the postulation of noumenal souls and a noumenal God. So it would seem that, at least as far as Kant’s theoretical philosophy, viz., the first Critique, is concerned, the concept of the noumenal plays the minor but indispensable role of insuring coherence for his outlook via semantic contrast. But this is a very modest role. Thus, up until this point, we have thoroughly examined the main doctrines of the Transcendental Analytic, that is, we have, as Kant eloquently puts it (A235/B294–295), explored the island of pure understanding—which we now appreciate that it is the island of human representation—all without need of the concept of the noumena. The other concern that seems to call for a major role for the noumena, and that has both dominated and frustrated attempts to understand the Critique, right from the start, is the so-called problem of affectation. As Jacobi, commenting on the original edition, points out, the Aesthetic opens (A19) with the remarks—that we have considered above—that assert that both intuitions and sensations depend on the effects of objections on the mind. The question thus is, what can the objects be that cause sensations and thus intuitions? And we may begin by noting that this is not just a matter of Kant somehow misspeaking here, since, as we have considered in chapter 1, although sensations do not have objects, they are understood as having been caused, and certainly not by the mind itself. So, there must be something, thus some object that causes this effect. Jacobi, as presented by Allison (2004), raises the dilemma that what affects sensibility must be either appearances or else the transcendental object, which he understands as being the same as the thing in itself. “The former, he argued, cannot do it because it is defined by Kant as a mere representation in us . . . ; the latter cannot do it because of its uncognizability, which precludes the application to it of any of the categories, including causality” (65). We can, though, immediately see that this is mistaken twice over. As we have just considered, the transcendental object is not at all the same as the idea of the thing in itself, that is, the noumena. And it is only the latter that cannot be conceived causally since it cannot be positively conceived in any way. Moreover, as we have also just considered, appearances are what we project, representationally. But that is not to say that the objects of appearances are themselves representations, as the Refutation of Idealism makes clear. So, the projective reading opens several avenues of reply to Jacobi. We will begin with Kant, who does state in a passage much later in the text that it is indeed the transcendental object that causes sensations and thus appearances. In Section Six of the Antinomies he briefly reviews some of the basics of the perceptual process, including the issue that concerns us:

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The nonsensible cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (as mere conditions of our sensible representation), without such conditions we cannot think any intuition. Meanwhile we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, merely so that we may have something corresponding to sensibility as receptivity. To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself prior to all experience. (A494/B522)10

We should thus understand the “object” of the opening of the Aesthetic as the transcendental object. So, putting together the seeming simple opening passages in the Aesthetic with this later explanation, and considering both of them in light of the projective account or representation, the explanation we get is that the conceptually represented but otherwise unknown transcendental object is the cause of our sensations. But sensations do not represent what caused them. It is only through combination via perceptual syntheses including the pure syntheses that underlie transcendental apperception that representational intuitions are produced. And our conception of the general idea of the representational correspondence of our intuitions gives us the concept of the transcendental object, which is assigned the role of being the cause of sensations. Kant thus apparently thinks that we cannot ascribe specific causal influences to the transcendental object. This makes sense since causal attributions consists of necessitated state transformations. But since the transcendental object is completely abstract and thus does not represent specific states, we obviously cannot attribute any such instances of causation. However, he obviously does think that it is coherent to attribute the general (causal) power to cause effects in sensibility to the transcendental object, and I see no reason why this should not be so. As we have noted in chapter 4, Kant’s account of causation, when considered together with the representation of simultaneity via community, allows that we can recognize a state as an effect, and thus as having some cause or other, without having identified the cause. This is consistent with representing the external in general as the cause of sensations, without a specification of specific states that produce these effects—that, I suggest, is what the transcendental object explanation amounts to. While I believe that this is workable, and that it exhausts Kant’s views on this matter, I will additionally proceed to critically examine the view that the specific causes of our sensations are unknown. George (1981) documents that this is a view that Kant inherited from his sensationalist predecessors, and he apparently saw no reason to challenge it. However, consider how we characterize perceptual causation in ordinary life. While we understand our

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imagistic perceptual states to be caused, we have no knowledge, and really, no clue as to what sort of immediate neural causes produce them. Further, in the cause of our dominant sense of vision, we are rarely aware of the fact that we are seeing only because appropriate reflected light has reached our eyes. And, while someone attempting to defend a causal account of perceptual representation may claim that our visual experiences are the result of a fairly simple transaction of light reflecting off of surfaces and striking our eyes, in reality most instances of vision involve a complicated mix of both direct and reflected light, often from multiple sources that we, again, are rarely aware of as we experience visual perceptions. So, for most run of the mill instances of vision, we do not know the causes of our visual imagery, which is completely in line with Kant’s account. We do, though, often ascribe causal connection in the case of other senses. Thus, I explain the coffee flavor I am now experiencing to the fact that there is coffee in my mouth, affecting my taste buds. And I may, say, experience a brief sharp pain that I represent as originating from my left shoulder, and explain this experience as caused by a muscle spasm in that shoulder. I will thus suggest, as a slight revision of Kant’s view, that it is fine to accept these ordinary causal explanations. However, the important thing is that we continue to understand my representation of the coffee, of my mouth and tongue, and of my shoulder muscles as protective. That is, neither my taste experience nor my pain experience has their objects as a result of this attributed causation. Rather, it is the projection of intuitions that allows me to represent coffee, mouth, and shoulder muscles in the first place; I can then ascribe appropriate causal rules such as coffee in mouth causes coffee taste sensations. That is, attributing specific causes to some sensations does not alter the view that the process of creating intuitions and thus perceptual representations begins from sensations whose only relevance to this process is their completely internal informational content. So, give or take this suggested revision, on the projective representational reading, there is no particular problem of affectation. There is, though, a passage in the Amphiboly that threatens to complicate matters. In discussing the transcendental object, which he affirms is the cause of appearance, and then says that if we want to call it “a noumenon” because it involves “nothing sensible, we are free to do so” (A188/B345). This of course seems to contradict his denial in the previous chapter of the Critique that the transcendental object is the same as the noumena. However, we must keep the context in mind. Kant is finishing up critiquing Leibniz’s outlook, which uses the term “noumena” for the real existents, viz., monads. And Kant has relegated this term to instead describe a mere boundary condition for the reality of the phenomenal world. I suggest that, as a minor conciliation to Leibnizians, Kant is suggesting a just slightly more positive possible role for this term. Not reading this passage carefully might suggest that he is saying that the transcendental

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object can be classified as part of the noumena, as he has previously characterized the latter.11 But this is mistaken—he says rather that we can call it “a noumenon,” which it seems to me should be understood as a second possible usage for this term, viz., as applying to anything non-sensible. In that case, that which exists in itself, apart from sensibility and appearance, would still be a subtype of noumena that, as above, would be a purely negative, boundary concept, while the transcendental object would similarly be the same as we have previously understood it, viz., conceived, positively, as the corresponding object in general. I take this to indicate that Kant did not see the concept of the noumena as a major part of his system. As he says variously, including in this passage, it is an indispensable, unavoidable notion; but it is not central to understanding his account of representations, knowledge, and metaphysics. Setting aside this last suggestion of a possible revised use of “noumena,” we now appreciate that in Kant’s framework there are three conceptions of things in themselves. There is the perceived external world that exists apart from particular perceptual states. Thus, I represent the guitar as having an ongoing existence that exceeds my experiences of it. Second, and more abstractly, the transcendental object is conceived of as general, external existence, apart from perceptions altogether. Nonetheless, our conception of it—the concept of an object in general—is the product of projective representation, which is the unity of consciousness that is achieved via the schematized categories. And lastly there is the purely negative conception of things as they are in themselves, viz., the noumena, which serves merely as a semantic contrary and conceptual boundary to the idea of the phenomenal world of appearances, that is, of projected reality. And, returning to the issue of how to understand the basis of sensations, we see that in one sense they are the nonmental input to our perceptions, in that their cause is represented by us as being beyond consciousness. But we now also appreciate that any cause we are able to ascribe to them, viz., the transcendental object, or perhaps also specific states of the world as per my suggested emendation, will still be part of the phenomenal world. So, the nonmental causes of sensation are mind-dependent—they are internal to our representational system, that is, the causes of sensations lie within the island of representation, they are not from beyond it. IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE AESTHETIC While a full examination of the Aesthetic is beyond the scope of this work, we will briefly consider several implications from the present reading for understanding that material. A standard assumption is that if Kant is to prove or otherwise establish that space and time are nothing other than the a

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priori forms of sensibility, then he needs to disprove alternative conceptions of space and time. The chief rivals of his day were the Newtonian outlook that postulated Space and Time as subsisting containers of matter and the Leibnitzian account that treats space and time as epiphenomenal perceptual representations of monads. Kant, however, offers a very modest amount of criticisms of these views in the Aesthetic. Moreover, support for these specific accounts aside, it has seemed to many readers over the past two centuries that Kant does not provide much in the way of argumentation against the general conception of space and time as things which exist in themselves, thus nonideal. Notably, there is Trendelenburg’s (1861)12 assertion that Kant has not proved that space and time cannot also exist in themselves along with sensibility having a priori spatial and temporal forms. The projective view of representation, though, undermines the possibility of this realist alternative since as we have considered above, existence can only be represented in relation to appearances, that is, in relation to perception. While it has often been noted, in support of Kant, that Trendelenburg’s suggested postulation of space and time as existing in themselves would amount to unknowable entities that play no role in human knowledge, we can now appreciate that this postulation amounts to aa attempt to provide a positive characterization of the existence of things in themselves and is thus semantically incoherent. We thus see that what Kant needs from the Aesthetic is just the thesis that sensibility has the a priori forms of space and time. With this in place, realist conceptions of space and time, Newtonian or otherwise, are ruled out by the representational framework where the meaning of “exist” is explained in terms of the idealistic projection of these forms. It might have seemed that to establish the a priori forms of sensibility thesis, Kant does need to disprove realist alternatives. But we now appreciate otherwise. Establishing that the concepts of space and of time are not empirical (A23/B38, A30/B46) takes us most of the way there since the only remaining alternative is that they are a priori concepts. This nonempirical basis can be further supported by pointing to our apparent synthetic a priori knowledge of space and time. And this leads to the postulation of space and time as a priori forms of sensibility as another instance of adoption of the only feasible explanation. Once that is in place, as we have just considered, together with the projective account of representation, metaphysical realist alternatives are undermined. And we should also note, somewhat crucially, that the argument for the concept of time being nonempirical at A30/B46 amounts to a preview of the reasoning of the First Analogy, viz., we can represent simultaneity and succession only with an a priori representation of time. We thus need to read the First Analogy argument for the conceptual priority of persistence—which, crucially, does not depend on the assumption that time is the a priori form

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of inner sense—back into the Aesthetic. The a priori concept of substance is the only feasible candidate for the representation of persistence, and thus for explaining how we are able to represent time. This shows that our conception of time is not empirical but must rather be a priori. And this, in turn, again undermines alternative metaphysical realist conceptions of time since they have no way to explain our representation and knowledge of persistence. IDEAS Finally, I offer a few short remarks about a very large section of the Critique. Ideas complete the inventory of types of representations. They are generated by adding the concept of the unconditioned to the relational, metaphysical categories, yielding three ideas, viz., of absolute existence, of an absolute series and of the absolute unity of parts of a system. Since these are representations of matters that exceed the realm of appearances, a priori reasoning is the only available method for attempting to establish truths that involve the ideas. The task of the Dialectic is to demonstrate that in each of the areas of possible application of the ideas, namely, the self, cosmology, and God, attempted a priori reasoning inevitably results in fallacies. The thesis is not that ideas are somehow ill-formed or otherwise semantically illegitimate, and thus not, in the manner of early twentieth-century positivists, that statements that contain ideas are nonsense. Kant’s view is rather that the only available method of seeking truths about the unconditioned is doomed to failure. We are thus in the regrettable position of being able to conceive of seeming metaphysical possibilities beyond the island of human knowledge that we can never legitimately investigate. Turing briefly to one important part of this project, consider that our above considerations allow us to understand the solutions to the first two Antinomies, where Kant tells us that Transcendental Idealism provides the resolution (A490/B519 ff.) The contrasting view that attributes a metaphysics of things in themselves would embody absolutes, that is, either a beginning to the universe or else an infinite prehistory, either boundedness or unboundedness of space, and either the smallest particle of matter or infinite divisibility. The proofs that form the Antinomies purport to show that in each case neither option can be true or false.13 Yet we ordinary think of these as legitimate metaphysical issues. Transcendental Idealism offers the way out since it tells us that the world is a mental projection. If this is so, then, while we can conceive of absolutes for the cosmology of the projected world, we need to accept that our representational and reasoning abilities do not take us beyond the realm of appearance. And for Transcendental Idealism there is no

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reality beyond what is potentially humanly knowable. Thus, though we are sorely tempted to think otherwise, the universe, that is, the human universe, does not embody such absolutes. NOTES 1. I suggest that this what underlies the argument (1) in the Aesthetic against the concept of space being empirical (A23/B38), viz., having an empirical perceptual representation of the external requires the ability to represent space, since without space there is nothing external. So, this ability cannot be explained as acquired from empirical perceptions of the external, which presuppose it. 2. Kant, 1958, 346. 3. Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29:883 Ameriks and Naragon, trans. and eds. (1997), 251. 4. This so-called “two object” reading, though historically influential, has few recent advocates, although see Van Cleve (1999), chapter 10. 5. Kant, 1958, 269. 6. Pickering (2016 section IV), fails to appreciate how Kant substitutes the transcendental object for this supposed role for the noumena. As a result he cites this passage as a central basis for his assertion that Kant holds a doctrinal belief in the existence of the noumena. But it is well worth noting that “the noumena exist” is not semantically coherent since existence (i.e., REALITY) is temporal and the noumena are not (spatial or) temporal since they by definition are not connected with perceptual representation. 7. In chapter 1 I argue that objects are constitutively spatial/temporal which is a parallel reason for thinking that we cannot represent noumenal aspects of perceived objects. 8. This also shows that the “one world” interpretation that been defended recently, primarily by those attempting a direct realist reading including both Langton and Allais, is equally mistaken. See Stang (2014) for a presentation and critique of that approach. I maintain that it is incorrect for very different reasons, namely the fact that existence is temporal together with a correct understanding of Kant’s view of representation. 9. Kant, 1998, 360. 10. Ibid., 513. 11. For example, Pickering (2016) makes this assumption. 12. See Scott-Taggart (1966). 13. To be precise, Kant proves pairs of contradictory theses. But these are indirect proofs that thus assume that either their conclusions or the negations of their conclusions are true. Rejecting this assumption avoids the contradiction.

Conclusion Evaluative Reflections

We will close with a brief summary along with some assessment. I have shown that the projective account of representation is at the heart of Kant’s view. The schematized categories, primarily the schematized relational categories, underlie the representation of the external world. The result is a very impressive outlook that spans psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. It is presented fairly concisely, given the enormity of what is covered, and, as we have seen, full explanations are lacking at a number of crucial points. Still, the framework is substantially complete. And, despite several centuries of misgivings about the Critique, I believe that I have shown that its doctrines and explanations are not only coherent and consistent but also plausible. The present reading encompasses much of the Transcendental Analytic. The most prominent results are: • A well-developed explanation of perception and representation. Kant provides us with a complexly detailed, justified elucidation of how sensory inputs can result in perceptual representations, both intuitions and judgements. The initially registered informational states, viz., sensations, are composed, via syntheses, into imagistic conscious states, viz., appearances, including the parts of these states that represent objects, viz., intuitions. Intuitions involve the a priori forms of space and time that are subject to the unifying structure of the schematized relational categories. Intuitions depict but do not have truth-valuable content. Judgments that are applied to them yield true or false content. • A straightforward and successful account of how the categories are objectively justified. Since perceptual judgments about the external world are applied to intuitions that are necessarily unified by the schematized categories and that represent in virtue of these schemata, it 139

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follows that anything that it represented by these intuitions will be in accord with the schematized categories, that is, this structure constitutes the framework of the projected world. The categories consist of this same structure, that is, the same types of unifying functions, in conceptual form. So, the categories are guaranteed to successfully apply to the world, since the unities that constitutes the categories consist of the same functional types as the unity that is depicted in the world. An equally straightforward and successful account of how and why we necessarily have synthetic a priori knowledge of the world. The objective justification of the categories also constitutes synthetic a priori knowledge since we know a priori that the represented world with have the synthetic structure that the schematized categories project. A very workable explanation of concepts. This is a topic that is almost entirely neglected in contemporary philosophy. Rather than trying to understand concepts as somehow connected with mysterious universals, Kant’s account explains them as unifying functions, a view that, by the way, is well-suited to cognitive psychological explanations as well as to philosophical concerns. The new, baffling problem of how we represent time, together with the solution. Kant aside, this topic has not been philosophically examined at all. And as we have seen in considering the First Analogy, the seemingly obvious explanation, viz., that we represent time through perceived inner or outer changes, is unworkable, creating a deeply problematic puzzle. But Kant’s explanations that apply the schematized relational categories offer an ingenious and successful solution. The unusual result that our representation of mental time is based on the representation of external time. The latter is constituted by representations of physical substances (matter), necessary causation, and reciprocal causal interrelation. The repudiation of both Cartesian perceptual skepticism as well as metaphysical phenomenalism. This far-reaching result is a simple consequence of the primacy of persistence in temporal representation. A metaphysics of substances. The First Analogy’s solution to the baffling problem of how we represent persistence requires that we are constantly representing unchanging substances, which is obviously a very strong ontological result, and again is drastically different from most contemporary views. A solution to Humean skepticism about causation via a drastic revision of the conception of causation. The reasoning of the Second Analogy, which partly depends on the results of the First Analogy, undermines the idea, Humean or otherwise, that causation is primarily a matter of relations between events. We represent sequences as instances of

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determinate alterations in the states of substances. And to be able to represent these alterations, necessary causal rules are needed. Thus, contrary to Hume, all changes are instances of necessitated causation. • An understanding of the Aesthetic’s transcendental idealism and empirical realism. The projective view of representation separates the idea of externality to consciousness from existence in itself, viz., mind independence. We can uphold Kant’s idealism since the external world is a mental projection. But we are able to avoid collapse into phenomenalism and are justified in maintaining the real existence of the external world. Methodologically, Kant’s framework is the result of a complex mix of conceptual arguments, adoptions of the only workable explanation, other philosophical and psychological explanations, and also assumptions about our psychological makeup. The empirical psychological aspects may give the appearance of an outlook that is not philosophically well-justified. However, there are two primary bases of a priori justification that, as I will now indicate, go a long way toward addressing this concern. The first is the proof of the necessary unity of consciousness, which is entailed by conceptual analytic unity which, in turn, as I have argued in chapter 2, is an a priori truth about the nature of concepts. This overarching unity implies that there must be some sort of nonempirical unifying processes that create this unity, thus pure syntheses. While the specifics of syntheses fall into the realm of speculative empirical psychology, the a priori result requires that, even if Kant’s explanations of syntheses are not precisely correct, something very similar must hold. The other primary a priori result is the reasoning from the Frist Analogy that demonstrates the conceptual priority of persistence in the representation of time. As we will consider below, the justificatory implications are far-reaching. And it stands as the only workable explanation of how time is represented. As for the account of projective representation itself, the primary justification, from the A TD, is the argument for the identification of representation and formal unity, viz., there is necessarily something that all representational intuitions share that makes them representational, and the only thing they so share non-accidentally is participation in the necessary formal unity of consciousness. While I think that this is both a clever and an interesting argument, it may seem somewhat insufficient to serve as the sole basis for justifying an account of representation. However, it is very strongly corroborated by the results of the Analogies which offer explanations of the projective representation of time. These apparently successful explanations of how we represent external objects and events greatly enhances the plausibility of the projective view.

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Kant is committed to the empirical psychological thesis that perceptual knowledge is created by two mental faculties, a perceptual faculty with imagistic representations, that is, sensibility, and also a faculty with linguistic representations, that is, the understanding. And his account also requires that perceptual knowledge involves a two-stage process where the imagistic system first develops representations that are then subject to evaluation by the linguistic system. While the topic of psychological architecture is very far from being a settled matter, it is notable that Fodor’s (1983) psychologically based model of the bifurcation of the input systems and the central systems seems broadly consistent with Kant’s two-faculty perceptual model. And it is generally true that scientific work on perception, and specifically on vision, continues to proceed more or less independently from scientific work on language comprehension and processing, suggesting that each of these areas concern relatively separate aspects of cognition. Sensationalism is another of Kant’s broad empirical psychological commitments. And while this might initially seem to be a long-abandoned view, a contemporary case can be made for something along the same lines. The key aspect of sensationalism for Kant’s account is the claim that initial perpetual inputs do not have objects, that is, do not represent their causes. This in turn supports the idea that these states are purely informational; that is, they are nonconceptual. And since we do ultimately achieve perceptual representations that have objects, the idea of initial purely informational initial input seemingly requires that full-blown perceptual representations are constructed rather than received. And, while the status of the primary claim of objectless informational states as initial input hovers in a gray area between philosophy and psychology, a case can be made for each of the two secondary claims, thus helping support the initial one. First, visual science tells us that a surprisingly modest amount of information is transmitted from the retina to the brain (e.g., Hardin 1988, 7 ff.), which has led to theories that, in a broadly Kantian manner, explain visual representations as gradually computationally constructed (Marr 1982). And from a more philosophical perspective, Stalnaker (1998) argues that the representations of input processes should be understood as informational rather than as conceptual. So, it appears that sensationalism is actually holding up reasonably well in current perceptual science. There is also the Metaphysical Deduction’s thesis that there are exactly 12 types of unifying functions in human cognition, which is seemingly also an abstract assertion about our psychological makeup. It involves the claim that the same types and number of unifying functions underlie judgment types, the primary a priori concepts (the categories) and also the schematized categories. The latter two contentions are very well supported in the Critique. While the inventory of the categories is supposed to be based on a one-to-one correspondence with judgment types, an intuitive case can independently be

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made for the list. Quantity, quality, relation and modality do seem to cover our abstract metaphysical conceptualizations, and each trio can be defended as a distinct group of concepts (B111). And the Principles both explain and support the unifying roles of the schematized categories in intuitions. On the other hand, the justification for the correspondence between judgment types and the categories seems somewhat problematic. In particular, the identity of function between community and exclusive disjunction appears to be a bit of a stretch. In light of modern logic, a biconditional judgment might seem more appropriate for community, but that would leave disjunctive judgments without a corresponding category. And the judgment “x is non-A” is now understood as equivalent to “not Ax,” thus collapsing the negative and infinitive judgment types. I have not examined these issues above since, as we have seen, judgment types play no role in Kant’s treatment of representation. They do not figure in either the Analogies or the other Principles, and it is notable that the A Transcendental Deduction makes no mention of judgments at all. It is likely that Kant thought of judgment types as crucial to the Transcendental Analytic since the correspondence between pure concepts and judgment types is the “clue” that led him to appreciate the systematic nature of the categories. However, I suggest that if problems such as those I have mentioned with the inventory of judgment types and of their correspondence with the categories prove intractable, this is not any deep loss to the overall system.1 We may also briefly consider how Kant’s framework fares against competing accounts. On the epistemological front, empiricism is the only approach that offers a thorough, systematic alternative. However, Kant’s two chief a priori results each appear to undermine that outlook. The necessary unity of consciousness is something that empiricism cannot account for, and it entails both that we have synthetic a priori knowledge of the structure of this formal unity and that there must be nonempirical psychologically unifying processes that underlie it. And the analytic unity of concepts by itself shows that the Humean doctrine that there are only contingent connections between perceptions is mistaken. Moreover, the conceptual priority of persistence independently undermines empiricism since we do not empirically perceive persistence. And, while there is even more in the Analytic to scuttle empiricism, notably the affinity argument at A 112–113, I suggest that each of these results is sufficient to show that we need to attribute much more than merely contingently associated mental states derived from sensory input in order to explain perceptual representation and knowledge. Approaches that are contrary to Kant’s projective understanding of perception and representation are receptive rather than projective. Direct realism is the chief alternative to his representational, indirect account of perception. The empirical case for sensationalism also constitutes scientific opposition to direct perception.2 And the conceptual priority of temporal persistence

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provides a substantial and likely fatal obstacle to a direct realist explanation of perception, since our conscious experiences of the world do not involve persistence—each gap in perceptual consciousness, from eye movements and blinks to the extreme of periods of sleep creates discontinuities. Direct realism thus seems to have no basis for explaining how we are able to experience time. A causal, thus receptive view of representation is the chief competitor to Kant’s projective account. But we have already noted various reasons against this approach. There is Kant’s argument from the A TD for identifying representation with the formal unity of consciousness, since it is the only thing that all representational intuitions necessarily share. By contrast, it would seem that, even if all intuitions are the causal result of what they represent—and this may simply be false—there is no basis for claiming that it is necessary that they are so caused. And further, the empirical case for sensationalism directly counters the causal view, since there is no basis for thinking that the initial inputs to perception register information about their causes. It thus seems that causal relations cannot constitute perceptual representation. And, finally, if Kant’s arguments in the Aesthetic in support of the view that our concepts of space and time are a priori rather than empirical are successful, then the causal view is hopeless since the senses are our only causal connection with the world—if these concepts are a priori then our representations of space and time cannot be explained in terms of causal content. The necessary unity of consciousness and the conceptual priority of persistence in temporal representation thus prove to be the primary pillars of Kant’s framework, although he himself may not have realized this, since both are under-explained and underemphasized in the Critique. Along with the projective account of representation, they form the basis of his systematic explanations of perceptual knowledge and the resultant metaphysics of substances and causes. It is not only an extremely impressive achievement from a historical perspective but is also very viable vis-à-vis contemporary philosophy. NOTES 1. Note that I am not denying that Kant’s list of judgment types is consistent with Aristotelian logic—see Wolff 2017 for a detailed defense of this point. I am, though, suggesting that modern deductive (specifically, truth-functional) logic yields a different set of judgment types (which Wolff [98] seems to acknowledge in regard to negation understood truth-functionally). 2. See, for example, Smythies and Ramachandran (1997).

Appendix Against Inferentialism

Inferentialism is the view that inferences are fundamental to the semantics of thought and language, while concepts are understood as derived from them. Its origins are in Sellars (1953), it has been substantially elaborated by Brandom (1994, 2007), and Landy (2015) ascribes it to Kant. An inferentialist account might thus be taken to be Kant’s actual view of representation, contrary to the present reading, or it might be suggested as a needed upgrade to Kant’s view, or it might be seen as a competing approach to the unifying function view of concepts. In what follows I will begin by focusing on the former possibility, but I will also point out why this would not be a helpful revision, and then conclude with a critique of inferentialism together with an explanation of how the unifying function account avoids Quinean holism. Let us begin by examining the two core ideas behind the inferential approach. The first is inspired by the result that truth-functional operators can be completely characterized by formal rules. As a paradigm example, conjunction introduction and elimination specify the operator that is true only if both parts are true. This can be understood as showing that the concept CONJUNCTION is constituted by this pair of rules. However, formal inference rules offer no possibility of explaining empirical concepts. Sellars (1953), though, argues that are necessarily true inferences, which he labels “material inferences,” whose correctness does not depend on logical validity. Here are typical examples, drawn from Brandom (1994) chapter 2: Inferring from: “A is east of B” to “B is west of A” “Today is Wednesday” to “Tomorrow is Thursday” “x is scarlet” to “x is colored” “Lightning is seen now” to “Thunder will be heard soon” 145

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Brandom (98), explains the goodness of these inferences as consisting in their material contents. For example, conceiving of something as scarlet materially entails conceiving of it as red.1 If we assume that there are a vast amount of material inferences, then, generalizing the result for truth-functional operators, we can propose that all (nonformal) concepts are constituted by material inferential relations. Landy (2015) attributes this sort of inferentialist view to Kant. However, prima facie, the Critique does not support such a reading. The book is organized as a systematic examination of our psychological faculties. Inference involves the faculty of reason which is covered by the Dialectic, while the Analytic examines the understanding’s concepts and judgments. It would thus be very surprisingly contrary to this organization if concepts consist of inferences. And, again prima facie, there is no discussion of the key idea of material inferences. Landy, though, tries to make the case that Kant’s inferentialism is presented in the Logic, and is (apparently) implicit in the Critique. He (66–68) argues that 1.  Kant equates concepts with rules; 2.  a rule is an assertion under a universal condition; and 3.  a syllogism is the subsumption under a universal condition. This entails that inferences such as syllogisms are concepts. He additionally clarifies that “concepts just are rules of inference from one judgment to another.” Citing a lone example from Kant to illustrate, Landy explains that a concept “serves as a rule for connecting distinct representations to one another via inferences.” Kant’s example is that “If I say: a body is divisible, this means the same as: Something x, which I cognize under the predicates that together compromise the concept of a body, I also think through the predicate of divisibility” Ak. 17:616, 4634 (2005, 149). So, the explanation here seems to be that the concept DIVISIBLE serves as an inferential rule for connecting things that are represented via the concept BODY. Thus, if I judge that x is a body, I can infer that x is also divisible. However, there is an obvious problem for this account. If BODY similarly only serves to connect judgments, then we would be unable to apply the concept directly to intuitions. This shows that the claim that “concepts just are rules of inference from one judgment to another” cannot be correct. Judgments apply concepts not only to other concepts but also to intuitions, for example, “This is blue.” There must be some concepts which are applied to intuitions by judgments that are not inferential connectors of judgments. In other words, it cannot be connecting inferences all the way down.

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What perhaps blinds Landy to the issue of how concepts apply to intuitions is that he adopts Sellars’s (so-called) conceptualist view (Landy (2015) 108). Along with both Sellars as well as my account above, Landy agrees with the understanding of intuitions as imagistic states that are composed by synthesis from sensations which do not have objects. According to Sellars, a perpetual image, say, an image of a red rectangle, does not represent anything. It is rather a “this” clause, for example, “this red rectangle” that when applied to such an image gives it its representational status, and seemingly thus conceptual content. However, as we have considered in chapter 5, this explanation does not work. The “red” and “rectangle” in the phrase cannot be understood as concepts, as Sellars acknowledges, since RED and RECTANGLE involve generality—they serve to unite instances of redness and of rectangularity. So “this red rectangle” must instead somehow represent a particular instance of redness and rectangularity. But “red” and “rectangle” in such a phrase cannot be understood as somehow inheriting their ability to represent instances from these (or any other) concepts, since, again, RED and RECTANGLE get their content by unifying such instances. We must instead understand the content as inherited from the image itself. Put another way, the application of “this red rectangle” does not create the shape or color of the image, it is rather what the image contains, or depicts that underlies the supposed “this” clause. And, vis-à-vis Landy’s view, note that this is not a matter of inference since each clause must draw its content from a specific intuitional image. As I have argued in chapter 5, this shows that Sellars account is not actually a conceptualist view of intuitions since the supposed this-clauses are not conceptual. The postulation of these clauses is thus superfluous. This then leaves Landy without an explanation of how concepts apply to intuitions and thus no account of the categorization of intuitions, that is, of the unity of multiple instances under a concept. A fix would involve admitting that base level concepts that apply directly to intuitions are not inferential, but instead are a matter of the detection of marks. Landy acknowledges various passages in the Logic that characterize concepts as representations of generality based on marks.2 But, following Walker (1978), he asserts that such passages reflect the vestige of the supposed Lockean view that concepts represent universals. Landy argues that Kant’s view of concepts in the Critique avoids this difficulty by conceiving of them as “rules for uniting manifolds of intuitions—and so [they do] not [represent] Lockean abstract ideas—and represent the objects of such intuitions as related to one another in determinate ways—and so have no distinct objects of their own” (p. 72). He thus assumes that the inferential view of concepts is required in order to explain how this unity is achieved and thereby avoid the dubious commitment to universals. However, we have just determined that the inferential view does not succeed in producing an explanation

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of this unity; instead, as we have seen in chapter 2, the unity of individual (empirical) concepts rests on the general unity of consciousness which is produced by unifying psychological processes, that is, syntheses. And Kantian synthetic, necessary unity merely involves unification of individual psychological states—it does not require abstract objects. For example, the generality of the concept BOOK consists in the fact that it unifies particular book intuitions, thus achieving the result Landy is seeking, but by an importantly different route. So, there must be a lot of concepts that apply directly to intuitions and that thus are not constituted by inferences. This shows that Landy’s reasoning presented above must be unsound. The apparent mistake is in equating concepts and rules (1). Kant certainly maintains that concepts are one type of rule, viz., they are specifications of repeatable unifications of marks, as we have seen by examination of A 105–6 in the appendix to chapter 2 that evaluates Longuenesse’s account of concepts. But this allows that inferences and judgments are different types of rules that apply concepts although they are not themselves concepts. Kant also labels rules that are objective—that apply to the world with necessity—“laws” (A 126). He characterizes both natural laws and moral laws as rules, but he never suggests that such laws are also concepts; rather, they contain concepts, and for natural laws it is the necessary connections between concepts that constitute the law. In support of his stronger view—that all rules are concepts—Landy quotes several passages from the Logic where Kant refers disjunctively to rules and concepts, for example, “Sensibility gives the material for thought, but the understanding rules over this material and brings it under rules or concepts” Ak 9:37 (1992, 547). But this is consistent with concepts being just one type of rule rather than thinking that they are one and the same.3 The lone passage that does seem to equate them is: “A rule is a concept under which much, a manifold of representations is contained” Ak 24:693 (1992, 431). However, this is from student notes, and it is possible either that the transcriber reversed ‘rule’ and ‘concept’ or that Kant misspoke, since the inverse, viz., that “A concept is a rule under which much, a manifold of representations is contained” is strongly consistent with everything we have been considering. So, this marginal source aside, there is no textual basis for identifying concepts and rules, and plenty of reasons for thinking that they are not the same. As we have considered in chapter 1, when it comes to the question of how intuitions represent, Landy appeals to the correspondence between parts and whole in both representations and objects. Using an example of having an intuition of an elephant, he states that the content of the intuition “consists of a representation of these elephant parts as standing in a certain relationship to one another. That is, because certain sensations correspond to the matter of the elephant that the intuition formed from such representations represents an

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elephant” (159). I have labeled this an isomorphic view since it understands representation as consisting of an isomorphic relation of the arrangement of parts of the image to the relation of the parts of the object. Now, while physical images do generally stand in isomorphic (spatial) relations to what they depict, this does not show that this is what representational correspondence in general consists in. And telltale here is the second sentence of the quote which appeals to correspondence between sensations and the matter of the elephant. As we have noted in chapter 1, since epistemically we have only our intuitions and cannot compare them to objects themselves, that is, we know objects only via having intuitions, there is no basis for this appeal to isomorphism. So, a characterization of the part-whole relations of images does not take us beyond the images themselves, and thus does not take us beyond phenomenalism. Landy (chapter 4) enhances the isomorphism account by adding necessity. Apparently drawing on Kant’s characterization of the necessary unity of the concept of an object at A103–4, Landy asserts that represented objects are “a complex of parts each of which is necessarily connected to all the others. As such objects exist independently of being perceived and are capable of continuing to exist while not perceived” (173). However, it is generally false that the parts of objects are necessarily connected. An elephant’s tail is not necessarily connected to its body, and losing it will not mean that the elephant ceases to exist or that it is no longer an elephant. Turning to an inorganic example, consider swords, which typically consist of two main parts, the blade and the hilt. These are usually made separately and are then attached, but they are only contingently connected, allowing for maintenance or replacement. So, it is false that the parts of a sword are necessarily connected, and, detached, the parts still exist while not perceived. It is true that a perceptual image of a sword must be an image of a blade and a hilt attached. But that does not get us beyond phenomenalism. It is also true that to have a sword you must have both blade and hilt, suitably joined, but that only concerns the application of the concept SWORD. Such an application does not create an object but rather applies to an independently existing object—I do not create the object that is the sword by recognizing that SWORD applies to it. Landy tries to explain the supposed necessity of parts in terms of material inferences, thus tying the isomorphic view to inferentialism. However, it is useful to note that the view that empirical concepts consist of representations of features (marks)—which I maintain is Kant’s actual view—allows for exactly the same kind of explanations of the necessity of parts. Thus, if the concept SWORD consists of the features WEAPON CONSISTING OF A BLADE JOINED TO A HILT, then this achieves exactly the same result as material inferences such as from “sword” to “blade joined to hilt.” So inferentialism is not required for the attempted explanation of representation in

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terms of isomorphism—these are independent doctrines. And, moreover, we have just seen that that the isomorphism view fails, both because part-whole connections, even if necessary, do not constitute correspondence, and, since, moreover, it is generally false that objects have their parts necessarily. There is also an attempt by Landy (190–193) to bring the categories into play here, as providing the over-arching necessity of connections of object parts. While, again, this is mistaken, it is at least somewhat in the ballpark.4 We have seen that the application of the (schematized) categories does underlie the necessary unity of consciousness, but this does not concern relationships among object parts. And empirical concepts play no role in constituting representation. It is, rather, representations of necessary temporal unities that achieve this, and primarily with the category of substance. The represented identity of the matter that makes up the sword protectively represents it as externally existing. I thus conclude that neither inferentialism nor an isomorphic view of representation play any role in the Critique. And we have also seen that inferentialism is not a successful explanation of Kant’s view of representation, since it does not explain how intuitions represent. It is thus at best an account of concepts. It might, though, be suggested that an inferentialist treatment of concepts is a needed revision to Kant’s view, or some sort of helpful upgrade. However, it is easy to see that this would not work. As Brandom acknowledges, (1994) 89–91 and (2010) 168–174, an inferential account will be holistic, since each concept will be understood as the product of a large number of inferences. As we will consider shortly, this holism leads to a fatal problem for inferentialism. For the moment, consider that for Kant, there must be a sharp distinction between empirical and a priori concepts. However, a priori concepts get applied in judgments and thus inferences that are mixed with empirical concepts. For instance, Brandom’s (above) example of inferring from seeing lightning to the expectation of thunder not only involves the empirical concepts LIGHTNING and THUNDER but also corresponds to a judgment is in fact not a semantic truth, but is rather a consequent of natural laws, that are discovered via experience. There are some apparently analytic judgments/inferences involving the categories such as “whatever is real is actual.” But there are also numerous seemingly material inferences that contain both empirical concepts and the categories, and that consist of inferences from one empirical truth to another, for example, from “books exist” to “things with pages exist” or from “it’s possible that it will rain today” to “it’s possible that clouds will release water today.” If, as holism requires, all such inferences are used to derive a given category such as REALITY or POSSIBILITY, the result will not be a pure, a priori concept but rather a concept that is, so to speak, contaminated with a vast amount of empirical content.

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Since inferentialism thus seems unable to uphold Kant’s distinction between a priori and empirical concepts it would not be a helpful revision or upgrade to his outlook. The remaining alternative is that inferentialism might be taken to be a competitor to Kant’s (actual) view of concepts as unifying functions that is somehow preferable. However, I will now show that inferentialism faces deep and likely fatal problems. The first is simply the question of feasibility. There are a vast amount of concepts and any given concept will require a substantial amount of relevant inferences for generating it. However, both Brandom and Sellars offer only a tiny number of examples of supposed material inferences.5 And the only example that either offers of a supposedly successful reduction of a concept to inferences is the extremely simple case of the conjunction operator. However, it is another matter to provide a range of examples from ordinary life. Without a number of convincing sample reductions, this is just a hand-waving proposal, not a full-fledged account. Note that we could take examples that seem to reduce semantically to representations of their features, such as the concept SWORD and use this as a basis for postulating a class of material inferences that supposedly underlie the concept. But that method presumes the correctness of Kant’s actual view of empirical concepts, viz., that they are composed of represented features and moreover assumes the legitimacy of resulting analytic judgments, for example, “Swords have blades.” But one account is hardly a superior advance over another if the latter is needed in order to sustain the feasibility of the former. Further, consider that if concepts consist of, that is, are generated by inferences, and specifically, material inferences, then this requires that learning a concept is a matter of learning these inferences. And this in turn means that the acquisition of the semantic lexicon of a language should consist primarily in such training. This is a very strong empirical prediction that appears to be very obviously false. It is simply not the case that children receive elaborate training in inference patterns, let alone material inferences; in particular, there is no general evidential basis for thinking that this occurs in the early stages of learning word meanings. Parents, rather, teach general kind terms to their children by showing them instances of the kind and then get them to repeat the kind term, for example, “That’s a table.” And adults typically learn the meanings of new words through a combination of definitions and through examples of use in sentences and depicted instances, but not through training in inferences. And, while these are just an anecdotal observations, it is likely that inferentialism is empirically falsified by scientific data about language learning from linguistics and psychology. Were these not troubles enough, I will now argue that inferentialism can be shown to be unworkable by looking at concept acquisition. Brandom states

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that his account “begins, not with the contents of subsentential components, but with what is expressed by whole declarative sentences.” (174) The “begins with” refers to the linguistic explanation that Brandom is giving. But again consider learning. Someone acquiring the concept DOG will presumably need to learn the apparent material inference from “That’s a dog” to “That’s an animal.” However, if we treat these as fully contentful statements that the learner already understands, as Brandom’s description seems to suggest, then the former will already materially imply the latter, and there is no need of the speaker to learn this inference. And, since this would hold for all relevant material inferences of this concept, it would thus seem that the learner already fully possesses DOG. To avoid this we would need both a non-inferential explanation of how such contents are learned and also need an interpretation of the learner’s words that does not already attribute the concepts DOG and ANIMAL to them. In other words, we need a non-conceptual proto-semantics that does not underwrite this inference. But if this proto-semantics treats the former assertion as true of dogs and the latter as true of animals, then we will still have this material entailment. And it is difficult to imagine any other sort of content that could possibly be invoked for these very simple sentences. So, attempting to understand the inferences semantically is a circular dead-end, since it requires that the learner already grasps the concepts that are supposedly being learned. The only remaining option is to construe the inferences that supposedly constitute concept-mastery syntactically. Playing along, learners will parrot inferences such as from “That’s a dog” to “That’s an animal,” which will become a material inference once semantics somehow emerges from the syntactic. However, imitative learners will also parrot inferences such as “That’s a dog” to “That’s probably someone’s pet.” With semantics in place, this should turn out to be a mere empirical generalization. Now, if we are trying to explain the acquisition of the concept DOG by beginning from purely syntactical inferences, then the best we can do is to isolate all of the inferences of a given speaker that involve the word “dog.” That will include all such empirical generalizations, along with apparent material inferences. This will thus result in an extreme holism for concepts. And although the usual worry is that this will mean that speakers do not share concepts, there is a much worse pair of problems here. First, if all inferences including those that are seemingly empirical are included in the characterization of the concept, then the inferentialist view will not be able to account for the supposed special class of material inferences since all inferences will turn out to be material, that is, semantic entailments. Inferences that follow formal inference rules can perhaps be isolated. However, that does not help with inferences that correspond to empirical beliefs, so those will be part of the reduction set. But without the notion of material inferences, Brandom’s inferentialist program collapses.

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Moreover, to top it off, if, for example, the inference from “That’s a dog” to “That’s probably someone’s pet” is part of what constitutes DOG, then this will be true in virtue of meaning alone. And since semantic truths are necessary, and since speakers are generally willing to draw inferences that are based on their (seeming) empirical beliefs, it would follow that all judgments and beliefs are semantic, necessary truths. But this is untenable. So, any attempt to explain concept acquisition for inferentialism will either result in circularity, or else will both entail that there is no way explain how the supposed special set of material inferences is grasped and will also absurdly imply the necessity of all beliefs. The inferentialist view of concepts is thus unworkable. By contrast, Kant’s unifying function view of concepts manages to generally avoid holism in; in particular, it avoids Quinean verification holism (Quine 1953, chapter 2). Empirical concepts are explained as unifiers of intuitionistic representations of particulars. But, as we have seen in chapter 5, the depiction of imagistic intuitions is outside of the realm of truth content. For example, the concept BOOK unites all intuitional depictions that have appropriate features. This is a cognitive role that is fixed prior to the formation of judgments and beliefs that contain this concept. And, while concepts will sometimes be modified in both individuals and communities for various reasons including Quinean “recalcitrant data,” Kant’s view implies that there is always an underlying psychological truth that determines which concept an individual is applying or expressing. Brandom, however, reflecting an understanding of Kant that has become common in the Analytic tradition, argues that concepts are not meaningful and cannot be grasped independent of judgments. Citing the explanatory remark that “the understanding can make no use of these concepts other than by judging by means of them” (A68/B93), Brandom asserts that “for Kant, any discussion of contents must start with the contents of judgments, since anything else only has content insofar as it contributes to the contents of judgments” (80). But this makes no sense. I cannot judge that I’m perceiving a book unless I know what constitutes books, that is, unless I already have a specification of book features, which is to say I have the concept BOOK. Detecting those features in an object thus licenses me to apply the concept by judging that what I’m perceiving is a book. The content of Kantian concepts thus does not derive from the contents of judgments but must be independently specified. The content of judgments is explained by appeal to the independent content of concepts, for example, the content of “this book is blue” derives from BOOK and BLUE. Without an appeal to the independently specified content of concepts there is no way to explain the content of judgments. So, we should understand Kant’s remark not as a specification about how concepts get their semantic values, but rather simply as a description of

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what can be done with concepts, vis., their only cognitive application is in judgments.6,7 So the content of Kantian empirical concepts must be established prior to their applications in judgments. If it is also correct that some, perhaps many concepts do consist of features and that they also stand in dominant and subordinate semantic relations to other concepts (A106), then there will be analytic truths, as Kant maintains, for example, “Books have pages” and “Books are artifacts.” The present understanding of his account thus provides the much sought after principled analytic/synthetic distinction. However, the distinction is postulated as determined by cognitive processing, which is not now, and may never be readily scientifically accessible. All we have to go on are semantic intuitions, which can be notoriously shaky. So, while my reading does not provide an understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction that allows for a precise armchair-accessible decision procedure, it does underwrite a general commitment to analyticity and legitimizes the task of trying to hash out disagreements over semantic intuitions.8 Kant’s view of concepts thus accounts for so-called material inferences such as the first three examples at the start of this section. And it is also consistent with Brandom’s insistence that “to understand a concept” is to know “what follows from the applicability of a concept and what it follows from” (89). Thus, speakers who possess BOOK, PAGES, and ARTIFACT will know that “that’s a book” entails “that has pages” and also “that’s an artifact.” But we do not need to appeal to inferentialism, nor for that matter to pragmatics, language games, knowing-how, etc. in order to explain this knowledge. Unlike inferentialism, the unifying function account of concepts does not explain mental content as being dependent on reasoning. Concept possession is understood as prior to concept application—one needs to possess the concept BOOK in order to be able to make judgments about books, reason about books, etc. Brandom, Sellars, and others9 who have advocated an essential role for reasoning in content have characterized it as normative, which means, as Brandom (1994, 13) explains, it both commits and obliges us to act in certain ways. Since Kant’s actual view of concepts and of representation is not inferentially based, it is not normative. It should instead be characterized as naturalistic since it is constituted by psychological processes, viz., perceptual syntheses and conceptual unifying functions. NOTES 1. Brandom (333) also says that the idea of material entailment is “not the only way” to characterize material inferences, noting Sellars’s view that these should be nomologically necessary inferences. However, that will be a much smaller class of

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inferences—only the last of these examples appears to involve natural law. And since there are few natural laws governing artefactual or social kinds, the class of nomologically necessary inferences would not seem to offer any hope of explaining the majority of ordinary concepts. 2. Also, notably, A320/B377 where a concept is described as being “mediate, by means of a mark.” 3. If concepts and rules are the same, then “rules or concepts” is redundant. In light of A 126, we can instead read Kant as referring to the two primary, distinct roles of the understanding, viz., to discover laws and to apply concepts. 4. Landy (179) reads Kant’s treatment of representation as addressing Hume’s concerns about objects’ “continu’d and distinct existence,” with which I concur—see chapter 2. 5. As Fodor & LePore (2007, 468–471) point out, Brandom does not present any guidance about how to isolate the supposed class of material inferences. 6. If this is correct, then Kant should also allow that a concept can be used otherwise than in a judgment, say, in reflection, for example, I can think about all books using BOOK. But since that typically does not achieve much of anything in terms of knowledge, we can take Kant’s remark as indicating the only epistemically worthwhile role for concepts. 7. The judgmental view of concepts has also been criticized by citing the use of concepts in sensible synthesis, as exemplified by Longuenesse (1998) 46–48. Land (2015) provides a recent defense of this approach, together with a summary of its history. My criticism of the judgmental view, by contrast, does not require that there are substantial uses of concepts other than in judgments, so I remain neutral on this topic. (And see my critical evaluation of Longuenesse’s treatment of Kantian concepts at the end of chapter 2.) 8. Since the unifying functions account avoids holism it is thus able to satisfy semantic compositionality by explaining the ability to generate novel semantic statements as consisting of novel compositions from independent conceptual components. By contrast, Fodor and LePore (1981) argue that inferentialism in unable to account for semantic compositionality. But also see the ensuing exchanges in Brandom (2007, 2010) and Fodor and LePore (2007). 9. Notably McDowell—see my arguments against his conceptualism at the end of chapter 5.

References

WORKS BY IMMANUEL KANT

German Kant, I. (1902). Kants gesammmelten Schriften, Akademie edition (29 volumes). Koniglichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. The Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) first (1781) and second (1787) editions, are contained in volumes IV and III, respectively.

English Translations Kant, I. (1958). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed, N. Kemp Smith, trans.). New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kant, I. (1967). Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99 (A. Zweig, trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kant, I. (1973). The Kant-Eberhard Controversy (H. Allison, trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Kant, I. (1992). Lectures on Logic (M. Young, trans. and ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1997). Lectures on Metaphysics. (K. Ameriks and S. Naragon, trans. and ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason. (P. Guyer & A. Wood, trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (2002). Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770. (D. Walford, trans. and ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (2004). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. (G. Hatfield, trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (2005). Notes and Fragments (C. Bowman, P. Guyer, & F. Rausher, trans.; P. Guyer, ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Index

aesthetic, transcendental, 9–11, 14, 16, 24, 44, 77–78, 96, 121n9, 124, 128, 131–32, 134–36, 137n1, 144 affectation, problem of, 131–32 Allais, L., 13–19, 26, 35, 55n3, 55n6, 100–101, 114–15, 137n6 Allison, H., 20–21, 23, 27n6, 35, 48, 55n5, 55n7, 55n14, 60, 61–62, 67, 68, 72, 78n4, 78n143, 79n14, 130, 131 analytic unity of concepts, 34–37 antinomies, 131–32, 137–38 appearance, meaning of, 44 apperception, transcendental, 45–51, 56n30, 96, 110, 111, 115, 116, 132 apprehension, synthesis of, 17, 38, 69, 72, 118 Bauer, N., 106, 111 Bayne, S., 57n45 Bennett, J., 110 Berkeley, G., 12–13, 77 Brandom, R., 23, 122n19, 145–46, 150–54, 155n1, 155n5, 155n8 causal rules, 84–91, 94–95, 97n11, 133 Collins, A., 13, 18 concept, definition of, 33–35, 51–54, 57n45, 116–17

consciousness, proof of necessary unity, 36–37 depiction, 105–6, 111, 117, 120, 126, 153 Descartes, R., 37–38, 74–77 dialectic, transcendental, 136–37, 146 Dickerson, A. B., 22 direct realism, 13–19, 21, 25, 26, 30, 70–71, 76–77, 126 Dyer, D. P., 61, 67, 72 Eberhard, J., 110 empirical realism, 10–11, 13, 18–19, 20–21, 26, 123, 128 Evans, G., 120 faculties, 106, 130, 142, 146 Fodor, J., 142, 155n5, 155n8 Friedman, M., 97n10 George, R., 22, 27n8, 132 Golob, S., 114 Guyer, P., 60, 82–83, 84, 97n11 Hanna, R., 111, 121n11 Hardin, C. L., 142

163

164

Index

Hume, D., 21, 31, 36, 38, 49, 56n23, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 81, 84–85, 90, 96n3, 97n9, 102, 140–41, 143, 155n4 Hutton, J., 114 idealism, transcendental, 9–11, 13, 14, 18, 20, 24, 46, 116, 123–28, 136 inferentialism, 23–24, 145–54 inner sense, 9, 10, 16, 43, 45, 59, 96, 98n17, 111, 136, Jacobi, F., 131 Jankowiak, T., 22, 28n10 justification, Kant’s view of, 128 Kitcher, P., 56n39 Land, T., 114 Landy, D., 22, 23–24, 55n5, 55n6, 55n7, 78n4, 146–50, 155n4 Langton, R., 13, 19, 137n8 Leibniz, 133–34 Lepore, E., 155n5, 155n8 Locke, J., 64–65, 67, 69, 126 Longuenesse, B., 51–54, 155n7 Marr, D., 142 McDowell, J., 102–3, 111, 116–21, 122n17, 155n9 McLear, C., 114, 115, 121n1 noumena, 13, 27n3, 128–31, 133–34, 136n6, 136n7 O’Shea, J., 78n8 outer sense, 10, 16, 43, 76, 78n12, 96, 98n17, 102–3 Pereboom, D. 22 phenomenalism, 12–13, 20, 21–23, 24, 77–78, 123, 125–27 Pickering, M., 137n6, 137n11 Quine, W. V. O., 153

Ramachandran, V. S., 142n2 reason, faculty of, 106, 122n17 refutation of idealism, 74–78 representation, meaning of, 15 Rosenberg, J.55n2 schemata, explained, 107–10 schematized categories, explained, 40–42, 70–71 Scott-Taggart, M. J.137n12 Sellars, W., 22, 23, 55n12, 101–4, 105, 106, 110, 111, 117, 118, 121n2, 124, 126, 145, 147, 151, 154, 155n1 sensibility, 14, 50, 74, 100, 101–2, 106, 108, 117, 124, 125, 128–29, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 142 Shahmoradi, A., 22 Smith, N. K., 97n4 Smythies, J. R., 142n2 Stalnaker R., 142 Stang, N., 12, 137n8 Strawson, P. F., 69, 82, 97n6, 110 synthesis, 13–14, 15, 17, 21, 32, 38, 40, 49, 50, 52–54, 57n43, 147, 155n7 synthetic a priori, 11, 26, 47, 50, 78n12,112, 119–20, 126, 129, 135, 143 things in themselves, 9–10, 13, 14, 18, 124, 126, 127, 128, 134, 135, 136 Tolley, C., 27n9 transcendental object, 48, 50, 129–32, 133–34, 137n6 transcendental, meaning of, 45 Trendelenburg, A., 135 truth, Kant’s view of, 11, 128 understanding, faculty of, 28n56, 56n28, 77, 84, 101, 106, 118–19, 121, 122n17, 126, 128, 130, 142, 146, 148, 153, 155 Van Cleve, J., 12, 27n2, 27n3, 56n30, 62, 137n4

Index

Walker, R., 147 Ward, A., 62–63, 68, 78n3, 78n4, 78n8 Watkins, E., 55n4 55n12, 55n15, 83, 84, 85, 89, 97n4, 97n8, 97n9, 121n2

Willaschek, M., 55n4, 55n15 Wolff, M., 144n1

165

About the Author

Dr. Lawrence J. Kaye is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He is the author of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: Unity, Representation, and Apperception (Lexington Books, 2015).

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