Kalam and Hellenistic cosmology: Minimal parts in Basrian Mu'tazili atomism

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K alam an d H ellenistic cosmology: M inim al p a rts in B asrian M u ‘tazilT ato m ism Dhanani, Alnoor, Ph.D. Harvard University, 1991

Copyright © 1991 fay Dhanani, Alnoor. All rights reserved.

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE (T o be placed in Original Copy) T he undersigned, appointed by the Division

Department o f th e H is to r y o f S c ie n c e Committee

have examined a thesis entitled

Kal3m and H e l le n i s t i c Cosmology: Minimal P arts in Basrian M u c ta z ill Atomism

presented by

Alnoor Dhanani

candidate for the degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy and hereby

|f acceptani

T yped name

A... I.. S ab ra

Sign atu reA T yp ed /n a n .

rdoch

T yped name

Date

O ctober 1991

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Kalam and Hellenistic Cosmology Minimal Parts in Basrian Mu‘tazilT atomism

A thesis presented by

Alnoor Dhanani

to

The Department of the History of Science

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History of Science

Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts

October, 1991

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€> 1991 by Alnoor Dhanani Aii rights reserved.

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ABSTRACT The recent rediscovery of Basrian Mu'tazill kalam texts from the tenth and eleventh centuries provides us a wealth of information about their atomistic cosmology. This puts historians of kalam cosmology in a situation similar to that of historians of Presocratic cosmology, for, even with these rediscovered texts, kalam historians only have disconnected fragments about the cosmological views of mutakallimun of the late eighth and ninth centuries, when the subject matter and scope of kalam cosmology was set. I propose that the approach of Presocratic historians is relevant to kalam historians. In particular, they need to find the research program of the early mutakallimun. and to study the kalam cosmology of the rediscovered texts in order to illuminate the activity of the early mutakallimun. An analysis of the titles of now-lost works by the early mutakallimun. and other evidence, reveals that the problems of the constitution of matter and its attributes, the nature of life, and causality formed their research program. These problems also figured in their discussions with Dualists and the natural philosophers, who were eighth century representatives of Hellenistic cosmology. The second section of the dissertation undertakes an analysis of the atomistic cosmology of the Basrian Mu'tazill mutakallimun of the tenth and eleventh centuries. An examination of the linguistic and epistemological aspects of their atomism reveals that they, with their counterparts from the Baghdadi Mu'tazill and Ash'ari kalam schools, held a minimal parts atomism which shares many features with Epicurean atomism. In light of this, I re-examine fragments of the eighth and ninth century mutakallimun and conclude that they too held a

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minimal parts atomism. This conclusion solves the riddle of early kalam atoms, which had hitherto been considered to be unextended points. I suggest that ‘length’, ‘breadth’, ‘depth’, and ‘magnitude’ have different meanings in a minimal parts theory and in a theory of continuous magnitudes, and that statements by the early mutakallimun supportive of unextended atoms need to be understood in the contest of a minimal parts theory.

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In memory of my mother Gulshan Rajabali Dhanani

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T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S PREFACE...................................................................................................................... iii SECTION I: METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF KALAM COSMOLOGY C h apter One: Cosm ology an d K a ld m ..................................................................2 Cosmology in Islam .................................................................................................. 2 The methodologicalproblem .....................................................................................5 Sources for the study of kalam cosmology...................................................... 7 Periodization of the development of kalam cosmology............................... 13 The fragmentary nature of the sources and the historical context................ 18 The place o f cosmology in kalam..........................................................................24 Cosmology and the “difficult questions” of kalam.........................................24 Why was kalam interested in cosmological questions?................................... 31 C h apter Two: The cosm ological d iscu ssio n s o f th e ea rly m u ta ka llim U n w ith D u a lists an d N atu ral P h ilo so p h e rs......................46 The encounter o f early kalam with D ualism ......................................................... 47 Early kalam accounts of Dualist cosmologies................................................. 53 Dualist theories of matter and its attributes................................................... 64 Secondary qualities are incorporeal accidents....................................68 Secondary qualities are corporeal........................................................ 69 Secondary qualities are “attributes”..................................................... 75 The encounter o f early kalam with the N atural philosophers............................79 Kalam and the theory of “natures”.....................................................................79 Al-Warraq’s report on the cosmologies of the natural philosophers 86 The Stoic influence on the recent natural philosophers...................87 The first group of natural philosophers on the motion of the elements...................................................................................... 96 The ancient natural philosophers on the fifth element................... 100 The nature of life..................................................................................103 The ancient natural philosophers theory of motion......................... 106 The early mutakallimun and Aristotelian cosmology................................... 110 SECTION II: THE BASRIAN MUTAZILI THEORY OF THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE WORLD C h apter Three: A H isto rica l Sketch o f th e M ajor F igures o f K alam u n til th e F ifth/E leventh C en tu ry...................................................................121

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C h ap ter Four: O verview o f E pistem ology, th e T heory o f A ttrib u tes a n d th e T heory o f A ccid en ts............................................................................ 130 Ibn Mattawayh’s classification o f what is known................................................130 An overview o f the Basrian Mu ’tazilt theory o f knowledge................................137 Perception and the attributes of objects......................................................... 139 The theory of attributes..................................................................................143 The Basrian M utazili theory o f accidents and their properties....................... 160 The definition of the accident........................................................................ 160 The temporal duration of accidents.............................................................. 166 The theory of change......................................................................................171 How we acquire knowledge of accidents........................................................175 C h ap ter Five: The B asrian M u’ta zilC Theory o f th e A tom ..................... 182 Part I: Terminology and Definition....................................................................... 184 The equivalence of jawhar (substance) and juz’ (atom)................................ 184 Ibn Mattawayh’s definition of the atom........................................................ 191 Mutahayyiz, hayyiz, and makan...................................................................... 193 Part II: The composition o f bodies..................................................................... 205 Extension is not the result of the combination of certain accidents......... 206 The atom as a minimal part and the constitution of lines, surfaces, and bodies.......................................................................................................... 213 The atom has magnitude..................................................................... 225 Atoms are cubical in shape................................................................ 234 Atoms are homogeneous................................................................... 240 Atoms are physically and conceptually indivisible.......................... 245 Minimal parts of space, time, and motion.......................................................247 The early mutakallimun and the doctrine of minimal parts........................ 262 Part III The epistemological basisfo r Basrian Mu 'tazilt atomism................... 272 Perception and the atom................................................................................272 The primary attributes of the atom..................................................................277 Arguments for the existence of atoms......................................................... 280 The first argument for the indivisibility of the atom......................... 286 The second argument for the indivisibility of the atom.................. 296 The third argument for the indivisibility of the atom...................... 300 The fourth argument for the indivisibility of the atom..................... 301 The fifth argument for the indivisibility of the atom .......................304 Difficulties raised by atomism..........................................................................306 Conceptual difficulties posed by atomism..........................................306 Geometrical difficulties posed by atomism......................................314 Difficulties posed by the doctrine of the leap..................................320 Epicurean atomism and kaldm atomism: A comparison..................................327 The riddle o f kaldm atomism revisited............................................................... 330 Conclusion: A R econ stru ction o f th e D evelopm ent o f K aldm C osm ology to th e F ifth/E leventh C en tu ry...................................................334 A ppen dix: C h ron ology...........................................................................................342 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 347

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PREFACE During the last three decades, a wealth of previously unavailable texts by the Mu'tazilis of the fourth and fifth centuries A.H./tenth and eleventh centuries A.D. have come to light. The rediscovery of these texts provides us with a somewhat clearer picture of the intellectual world of the Mu'tazilrs, for our previous picture had been based almost entirely on hostile sources. From the perspective of the emergence and formation of the discipline of kalam in the later second and early third/later eighth and early ninth centuries, these newly rediscovered texts are already quite late. The world of the early practitioners of kalam. who established the subject-matter, range, and scope of their new discipline, was quite different from the world of their followers just a century and half later. These ‘founding fathers’, as it were, lived in the shadow of centuries of Hellenistic influence on the central lands of the Middle East; influence which had deeply penetrated the intellectual and religious activities of this region. Through their inevitable contact with the representatives of such Hellenized intellectual traditions, the founders of kalam were at times forced to confront and react to ideas whose origins distinctly or remotely lay in the major Hellenistic systems of Antiquity, and at other times used such ideas in their own analyses and formulations. Quite clearly, this encounter with Hellenism, shaped the content and the program of the emerging discipline of kalim. This is particularly evident, as I show in further detail, in the cosmological speculations of the founders of kalam. As a result of this fact, much scholarship has been devoted to this early period, and for just reason. But this has been to the detriment of the study of the somewhat later period which is represented by the newly rediscovered texts.

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The situation is complicated by the fact that no texts from the earlier formative period have survived and our information must all be gleaned from later texts. However, we are then faced with a methodological problem when we try to reconstruct the developm ent of kalam cosmology which is similar to the methodological problem faced by historians of Presocratic cosmology who also do not have texts from the formative period of Hellenistic cosmology. The discussion of this methodological problem is the subject of the first section of the dissertation. In the first chapter of this section, the claim is made that historians of Presocratic cosmology have, to a large degree been successful in charting the development of Presocratic cosmology because of their discovery of its underlying research program. They have therefore been able to direct their attention to problem areas that are intrinsic to their subject matter. Moreover, historians of Presocratic cosmology can rely on the strong foundation laid by the study of later figures like Plato and Aristotle whose works provide much of the information of the views of the Presocratics. I therefore propose an analogous two-step approach to the study of the development of kalam cosmology; deriving the underlying research program of kalam cosmology in the first step, and studying the cosmology of the later period which is represented by the newly rediscovered texts in the second step, in order to then illuminate the development of kalam cosmology. Since the underlying research program of kalam cosmology to a great extent derives from the encounter of the founders of kalam

with the representatives of Hellenistic cosmology, the second chapter is

devoted to examining the kalam view of this encounter. This examination reveals to us that the problem of the constituents of the world, the problem of the attributes of these constituents, the problem of the nature of life, and the problem of causality are the major problems that formed the research program

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of kalam cosmology. In addition, this examination also provides us with a somewhat detailed account of the specific features of Hellenistic cosmology which were known to the founders of kalam. The second section of the dissertation is devoted to an examination of the later theory of the constituents of the world, which was one of the problems of the research program of kalam cosmology. This section thus carries out the second step of the method that I propose to undertake, that is the study of the cosmology of the later period. Such a study can then help reconstruct the cosmological doctrines of the earlier period. A preliminary discussion of the epistemology, theory of attributes, and theory of accidents forms the subject of the fourth chapter. This provides the background for the analysis of theory of the constitution of matter, which is an atomistic theory, in the fifth chapter. In this chapter, we find that the atomism of the later practitioners of kalam is a minimal parts atomism which shares many features with Epicurean atomism. Therefore, the atoms must be extended. I then try to shed light on the hitherto supposedly unextended atoms of the founders of kalam. On the basis of the surviving fragments of their doctrines and an examination of the epistemological grounds for atomism, it is clear that even the founders of kalam subscribed to a minimal parts atomism. However, the problem of the reason for statements like ‘the atom has no length’, which were made by these founders and which lend support to the view that they must regard atoms to be unextended, needs to be addressed. The answer to this problem, I hold, lies in the fact that a discrete parts geometry must form the framework for a minimal parts atomism and therefore statements like ‘the atom has no length’, which are true within this framework, are not true in the Euclidean geometry championed by the opponents of atomism. Such a discrete parts geometry, from the perspective of Euclidean geometry, raises

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geometrical as well as conceptual difficulties which are exploited by these opponents. Since there are some grounds to believe that the Epicureans also rejected Euclidean geometry, the argument can be made that a modified form of Epicurean atomism was appropriated and further transformed by the founders of kalam. This raises the challenging question of the manner of the transmission of Epicurean doctrines to the founders of kalam. but this question falls beyond the scope of the dissertation and is not pursued here. I owe a debt of gratitude to the many teachers, friends, and family members, as well as institutions who have supported and provided words of encouragement over the many years since my first, and I am sure, faltering and probably embarrassing attempts at scholarship. I would like to express gratitude to Harvard University and the Social Sciences and Humanities and Research Council of Canada for financial support during my early years as a graduate student. A conversation on the nature of the atom in late Mu'tazill kalam with Professor Richard Frank in Washington in October 1987 was very helpful in clearing a path through the kalam minefield I was about to enter. I am also indebted to graduate students in the Department of the History of Science, in particular Kristin Peterson, who expressed an interest in my discourses on the intricacies of an area very remote from their own areas of specialization. I am grateful for the detailed comments of Professor Everett Rawson who read an early draft of the first section of the dissertation. Professor John Murdoch’s insistence on the profound influence of Hellenism on Islamic intellectual history is I am sure reflected in the dissertation. I am particularly thankful to him for reading the entire dissertation at very short notice. 1 am grateful to my advisor Professor Abdel Hamid Sabra for guiding my career as a graduate student at Harvard and for giving so freely of his time. His advice, support, and encouragement over the

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years, as well as his keen observations and comments on the problems that I encountered in the course of writing, are, without doubt, the necessary cause for the ‘generation’ of this dissertation. I can never adequately express my gratitude to my parents for their emphasis on education and excellence which they instilled in my sister Nasreen and I and their patience in answering, year after year, “Yes my son is still in school.’ Finally, I would like to acknowledge the love, support, sacrifice, and patience of my wife Noor Jehan and my son Muhammad. They graciously accepted the excuse, ‘Not today. I have to work on my dissertation’ countless times. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my mother Gulshan Dhanani.

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SECTION I METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF KALAM COSMOLOGY

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Chapter O n e Cosm ology and Kalam

C osm ology in Islam There are two senses in which the term “cosmology" is commonly used. Philosophers still use the term in its first sense to mean that branch of philosophy, quite distinct from ontology, theology, and psychology, whose task it is to consider “the meaning and validity of the individual objects which make up the experienced physical world, ‘extension,’ ‘succession,’ ‘space,’ ‘time,’ ‘number,’ ‘magnitude,’ ‘motion,’ ‘change,’ ‘quality,’ and the more complex categories o f ‘matter,’ ‘force,’ ‘causality,’ ‘interaction,’ ‘thinghood,’ and so forth.”1 The other sense of “cosmology” designates a science in which, through the joint efforts of astronomy and physics, an account of the large-scale properties of the physical universe as a whole is given.2 Both of these senses of “cosmology” have applications in Islamic intellectual history. The science of hav’a. in which the large-scale arrangement of the cosmos was studied, is equivalent to “cosmology” in its second sense. In this science, Muslim scientists, on the basis of the astronomy, physics, and geography of their day, constructed a unified physical system of all the constituents of the cosmos including the earth.3 The term “hav’a" was also appropriated by religious

1 A. E. Taylor, Elements o f Metaphysics, (London: Methuen, 1903), quoted by Milton K. Munitz, "Cosmology,’ in The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, (New York: Macmillan, 1967; repr. 1972), 1:237-238. 2 Munitz, ’Cosmology," 1:238. 3 Faiz Jamil Ragep, "Cosmography in the Tadhkhira of Nasir al-Dfn al-TusT" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1982), especially, "Section II: al-TQsf’s Tadhkhira and the 'Hay’a' tradition,” 70-127.

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3 scholars like Jalil al-dTn al-Suyutl (d. 911/1505), who were opposed to the study of the rational sciences and therefore to the efforts of these Muslim scientists. Instead, they used hav*a to refir to the collection of the statements (hadlth) of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in which natural cosmological entities like the earth, the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars, as well as “Islamic" cosmological entities derived from the Qur’an, like the Pen, the Throne, the Footstool, etc., were discussed. This latter use of the term “hav'a" can only be called “cosmology” in a loose and derivative sense since the large-scale picture that it provided was not systematic, nor did it rely on any astronomy or physics.4 “Cosmology” in the first sense, namely the philosophical sense, can be used to refer to the activity of at least two groups of medieval Muslim scholars. The first group is that of the Hellenized Muslim philosophers (falasifa) whose cosmologies were a combination of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements, although some favlasufs. most notably Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-RazI (d. 313/925), had incorporated Platonic and other elements into their cosmologies.5 In most cases, these falasifa relied direcdy on the texts of Aristotle and other Hellenistic philosophers as well as their later commentators through the well-known translations of Greek works into Arabic in the late second, third and early fourth/eighth, ninth, and early tenth centuries for their cosmological views. The second group of medieval Muslim scholars who were engaged in cosmology is that of the mutakallimun.6 Their cosmologies have not. as yet, been

4 See A Heinen, Islamic Cosmology: A study o f as-Suy& tf’s al-hay'a as-sanfya f t al-hay‘a al-surmtya, (Beirut; Orient-Institui der Deustchen MorgenlSndischen Gesselchaft, 1982).

5 S. Pines, “Philosophy," in The Cambridge History o f Islam, eds. P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton and B. Lewis, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1970). 2:801-3. 6 The term mutakallimun is usually translated as "speculative theologians," "rational theologians," or plainly "theologians," while the discipline of kalim is translated as theology, no doubt with the implicit assumption that kalim is similar to medieval Christian theology. This is

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4 examined as thoroughly as those of the falasifa because of methodological problems which I will examine later. However, their cosmologies are clearly opposed to the cosmologies of the falasifa. for they have fundamentally different conceptions of matter and its attributes, space, motion, change, and causality. Furthermore, the cosmologies of the mutakallimun were formulated for the most part in the period before the movement of the translation of Greek philosophical and scientific texts into Arabic had reached its peak in the later half of the third/ninth century, in the context of discussions and debates with the representatives of the other faiths and philosophical traditions which were present in the region which fell under the sway of the Muslim conquests of the first and second/seventh and eighth centuries.7 Discussions and debates with other Muslims w ho did not belong to the kalam tradition, and more importantly, discussions and debates between the mutakallimun themselves also played a

inaccurate for many reasons, one of them being the very different relation between philosophy and theology in the Christian setting, namely that philosophy or scienoe was considered to be the “handmaiden" of theology. In contrast, the activity of the mutakallimun is in many ways more akin to philosophical activity in the modern sense, albeit with a primary interest in the problems of philosophical theology (see the Introduction by Abu Rida to his translation of Shlomo Pines’ Beitr&ge z u r Islamischen Atomenlebre into Arabic with the title M adhhab al-dbarm Hnd al-m uslim fn, (Cairo, 1946), page dal). Therefore, I will use the Arabic terms favlasuf (plural falasifa) to refer to the Hellenized Muslim philosophers who were engaged in the activity of falsafa and the term mutakallim (plural mutakallimun) to refer to those engaged in kalam. rather than the more usual translation of philosophers versus theologians, since both groups were engaged in philosophical activity as we understand it today. 7 The intellectual and social background of the areas that were conquered by the Muslims, particularly the Hellenized areas of the Middle East, has not yet been adequately studied. Hence any discussion of the intellectual influence of late Hellenism on Islamic intellectual history has had to rely on the evidence of the transmission of the works of late Hellenistic authors like Philoponus, Simplicius, etc.. There is no evidence of the translation of Stoic or Epicurean works of this or any earlier period into Arabic, although, as we shall see, there are unmistakable traces of Stoic and Epicurean ideas in Arabic works and in particular in kalam cosmology. Recently Michael G. Morony has studied the situation in Iraq in his Iraq after the M uslim Conquest, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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5 significant, if not a more pivotal, role in their formation. The m eth od olo gica l p ro b lem The formation of the discipline of kalam within this context of debates and discussion gives rise to serious methodological difficulties for anyone who attempts to reconstruct the views of the mutakallimiin in general, and their cosmological doctrines in particular. This difficulty arises because of the nature of the textual sources which preserve the views of these early mutakallimun. namely those who were active in the middle of the second to the beginning of the fourth centuries/middle of the eighth to the beginning of the tenth centuries. The works by these early mutakallimun themselves have not survived, and all we have are lists of the titles of their works and fragments from them, and reports and testimonies about their views in later kalam works or in the works of their opponents. As I will show in the ensuing chapters, the surviving fragments show a strong continuity with the cosmological problems cf late Hellenism. Hence a plausible case for starting the study of kalam cosmology with late Hellenistic texts could be made. This approach, however, itself raises serious methodological difficulties. It is based on the assumption of the availability of late Hellenistic texts to the early mutakallimun. Since it is very unlikely that the transmission of these Hellenistic cosmological problems into kalam was textual, it is presumptuous on our part to assume detailed knowledge of the arguments or of the delicate nuances that are found in late Hellenistic texts. Moreover, such an approach cannot seriously deal with the appropriation of cosmological doctrines by the mutakallimun. that is to say, it does not address itself to the issue of which Hellenistic cosmological doctrines, or even which parts of these cosmological doctrines were of interest to the early mutakallimun and for what reason. Rather,

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6 historians of kalam cosmology must begin with kalam texts and with other reliable accounts of the doctrines of the mutakallimun by their contemporaries. They must base their case for early kalam's knowledge of late Hellenism on kalam texts and not on late Hellenistic texts, for, as we shall see, kalam texts reveal a very edectic understanding of Hellenistic ideas during the late second and third centuries/late eighth and ninth centuries, that is, before the movement of the translation of Greek texts into Arabic had reached its peak. The historical reasons for such an eclectic presentation fall within the purview of the kalam historian. Since my concern here is with the development of kalam cosmology, I am primarily interested in those problems which the mutakallimun. whether correctly or incorrectly, perceived to be the major problems of cosmology in their day—problems whose ultimate roots, as I shall show, lay in late Hellenistic cosmology—and which they appropriated into their own research program. Therefore, I believe that the surviving kalam texts must provide the starting point for any discussion of kalam cosmology.8 8 As I will show, pre-Islamic elements, whether Hellenistic or not, played a great role in the formation of kalam cosmology. However, the approach of seeking ‘Greek trees in an Islamic forest,* typified by the approach of Richard Waltzer to falsafa. is not a viable method for understanding the developm ent of kalam cosmology (or for that matter even the development of falsafa). The development of both kalam and falsafa must be understood in terms of their problem context, and not in terms of the interest of the classicist in tracing the survival of Hellenistic ideas into Islamic civilization (which is another research problem altogether). The Presocratic analogy is instructive here. There is no doubt, as some have argued, that Near Eastern mythology influenced Presocratic philosophy, but this does not help explain its subsequent development. The case regarding kalam and falsafa is analogous. The methodology I am suggesting here is to seek first to discover the problem context of early kalam cosmology. Since, as we shall see, some cosmological problems of late Hellenism were appropriated by kalam. it is legitimate to examine the late Hellenistic background to ascertain the kalam understanding of these problems. However, the transmission of late Hellenistic ideas to kalam was not always textual. Therefore the approach of looking at late Hellenistic texts and finding similar doctrines in kalim presents a major difficulty, namely, it tacitly assumes that these textual arguments and doctrines were known in their textual forms by the early mutakallimun. This is belied by the surviving fragments which indicate a poor knowledge of Hellenistic texts and doctrines. It seems to me that this problem can only be avoided if the problem is approached from the other side, namely by looking at kalam's knowledge of late Hellenism as

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Sources fo r the study o f kaldm cosmology The writings of the earliest mutakallimfln have not survived. The earliest surviving text by a mutakallim which preserves kalam cosmological views is the Kitdb al-Hayawan (Book of Animals) of the Mu'tazill litterateur Abu ‘Uthman al-J5hiz (d. 255/868).9 The beginning of the fifth volume of this work contains the cosmological views of his teacher, the early mutakallim Ibrahim ibn SayySr al-Nazzam (d. 220-230/835-845) and his arguments against the kalam and nonkalam opponents of his cosmological views. While this text provides a valuable glimpse into the formative period of kalam cosmology, al-Jahiz’s interests are limited primarily to al-Nazzam’s theory of change as a result of the manifestation of latent properties and the consequent “hiding" of previously manifest properties (namely the theory of zuhur and kumun). He therefore omits any substantive discussion of the views of other early mutakallimun. except, of course, for the rather negative account of the kalam opponents of al-Nazzam’s theory of change. The earliest surviving kalam text which discusses cosmological questions per se is the Kitdb al-Intisar by the Mu'tazill author Abu al-Hasan al-Khayyat (d. after 300/912).10 This work is a polemical treatise against the renegade Mu'tazill Ibn al-Rawandf (d. ca. 298/910), who had written many works against

revealed by the surviving fragments. As a working hypothesis, the knowledge of late Hellenism that is revealed by these fragments should be considered the starting point of research into kalam cosmology, because it is more representative of the actual situation than the implausible assumption of a thorough acquaintance with late Hellenistic texts. 9 Abu ‘Uthman al-Jahiz, Kitdb cd-Hayauudn, ed. ‘A. Harun, (Cairo, 1938-45). 10 Abu al-Husayn al-Khayyat, Kitdb al-lntis&r, ed. A. Nader, (Beirut; Imprimferie Catholique, 1957).

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Mu'tazili doctrines, including the Kitab Fadibat al-M u'tazila (The Scandal of the Mu'tazila) which was a response to the panegyric Kitab Fadilat al-Mu ‘tazila (The Excellence of the Mu'tazila) of al-JShiz. In his works, Ibn al-R£wandI had attacked the Mu'tazila in particular, and the Muslims in general, for their arguments in support of the creation of the world in time and prophecy, their discussion of the problem of God’s justice, and their polemic against Manicheanism.11 Thus the Kitab al-Intisar is mainly concerned with refuting Ibn al-Rawandl and does not present a systematic account of the views of the Mu'tazilis on these subjects. The many fragments of the cosmological views of mutakallimun of the early third/ninth century that it preserves are there only because of their significance in the polemic against Ibn al-Rawandr. They do not, in isolation, provide an adequate account of the cosmological theories of kalam in the late second and third/late ninth and tenth centuries. The most important source for the views of the early mutakallimun. however, is the Maqalat al-Islam iytn (The Doctrines of the Muslims) of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘arI (d. 324/935).12 Al-Ash‘ari was initially a Mu'tazili and a student of the famous Mu'tazili Abu ‘All al-Jubba’I (d. 303/915), who was one of the most important figures for the development of kalam cosmology at the end of the third/ninth century. Later, al-Ash'ari turned away from Mu'tazili kalam to found what would later become its major rival - Ash'ari kalam. His Maqalat is the best exemplar of the genre in which the doctrines or views of other Muslims, whether

11 This is the standard Mu'tazili evaluation if Ibn al-Rawandr. However, Josef van Ess has recently argued for a reevaluation of this account (see his, "Lecture i rebours de l’histoire du Mu'tazilisme," Revue des Etudes Islamiques, XLVl-XLVn(1978-9), XLVL164-191. The surviving fragments o f Ibn al-R2wandi have been gathered together in Abd ul-Amir al-As'am’s Ibn al-Riwandi's Kitab Fadibat al-M utaziiah, (Beirut and Paris.1975-77). 12 Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘a n , Maq&l&t al-islttm fytn wa ikhtildf al-musallin, ed. H. Ritter, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963).

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9 predecessors or contemporaries, on the variety of subjects discussed by kalam are preserved. In this work, al-Ash'ari has relied upon earlier Mu'tazili Maqalat works, particularly the Maqalat of Abu ‘Isa al-WanSq (d. 247/861), the Maqalat of Abu Ya‘la al-Misma‘I or Zurqan (d. 278/891), and the Maqalat of his contemporary Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhl (d. 319/931), and perhaps to a lesser degree on the the Maqalat of al-Nashi al-Akbar (d. 293/906). Al-Balkhl’s Maqalat has recendy been recovered in Yemen and the part of it which discusses the doctrines of the Mu'tazila has been published but it does not compare in its level of detail and breadth of subject matter with al-Asn'arl’s Maqalat. Al-Nashl’s Maqalat has also been rediscovered in a later rescension and edited, but it too is not as informative as al-Ash'arl’s Maqalat.1* The Maqalat genre, like the works of later heresiographers, for example 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadl (d. 429/1037), Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karlm al-Shahras&nl (d. 548/1153), usually only contains statements of the views of the various personalities on the topics of interest to the author, or, in the case of the heresiographers, their heresies.14 Even though the works of the later heresiographers sometimes add more detail to the account in al-Ash'arl, they are polemical and not always as reliable. By their very nature, the Maqalat genre and the later heresiographies, present only the rival views on a particular question

*3 Al-Bilkhf’s M aqalat has not been published in its entirety. Fu'ad Sayyid has published the section on the Mu'tazila in his edition of ‘Abd al-Jabbar's Fadtal-itizO l, (Tunis, 1974), 63-119. Al-Nashf’s MaqOlat has been edited by Joseph van Ess as KttOb al-awsat f i al-MoqalOi in the FrQbe M u'taziliscbe Hdresiograpbie, Zwei Werke des NOSh f al-Akbar (Gest. 293 f t ) , (Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1971). See also Chapter 2, note 17. 14 ‘Abd al-Qihir al-Baghdidf, Usid al-dfn, (Istanbul, 1928), Farq bayna al-firaq, ed. M. Badr, (Cairo,1910) and al-Milal u/a at-nibal, ed. A Nader, (Beirut 1970); Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal f t al-milal wa al-abuA’ tua at-nibal, ed. M. Nasr and 'A. TJmayra, (Jedda,1982); Muhammad 'Abd al-Kan m al-Shahrastinf, NibOyat al-aqdOm f i Him al-kaldm, ed. A. Guillaume, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931) and al-Milal wa at-nibal, ed. M. Badran, (Cairo, 1956).

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10

so that the context of this question within the larger study of cosmology as well as the arguments which were adduced to support these various views are no longer preserved. Rather, the views that are selected and dted serve the sectarian or antiquarian interests of the author. The biographical works of the Mu'tazili school, namely, the Fadl al-i'tizdl of Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbir (d. 415/1025), the section on the Mu'tazila from the Sbarh al-leyun al-masa’ilof al-HSkim al-Jushami (d. 494/1100), and the Tabaqat al-m u 'tazila of Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn al-Murtada (d. 840/1437), provide some biographical information, and interesting anecdotes, but on the whole are less informative regarding doctrines than the Maqalat works.15 Since the 1950s, however, texts of the Mu'tazili mutakallimun by Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar and his students which were discovered in Yemen have become available. These rediscovered works not only present a more sympathetic account of late Mu'tazili kalam. but also include many of the formative discussions of the early mutakallimun which are more complete than the fragments found in heresiographical works, as well as presenting the late Mu'tazili presentation of these discussions. No doubt, the most important of these texts is ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s twenty volume al-M ughni which provides a sum m a of the teaching of the Basran Mu'tazilis of the fourth/tenth century and includes many details about the views of the early mutakallimun. Unfortunately, its earlier sections, which discuss cosmological problems and would therefore have been germane to a discussion of kalam cosmologies, have not survived. ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s al-M uhit bilta k lifw hich was compiled by his student Ibn Mattawayh (fl. first half of fifth/first

15 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i'tizM, 139-350; Ibn al-Murtada, Tab&qdt al-m ulazila, ed. S. Wiltzer, (Beirut: Imprim&rie Catholique, 196l); al-Hakim al-Jushami, Sharh al-'uyun al-mas&’il, in Fadl al-itizM , 363-393.

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11 half of eleventh century) has also been recovered, but only its first volume has been yet published.16 Many other writings of ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s students have also survived. These include the M asa’ti al-khilafbayna al-baghdadiyirt wa al-basriyin, which deals mosdy with the differences between the BasrI and Baghdadi Mu'tazills regarding cosmological questions, and the Ziyadat al-Sharh, both by Abu al-Fashld al-NIsaburl (fl. first half of the fifth/first half of eleventh century), the Shark al-usul al-kbamsa of Mankadlm Shishdev (d. 425/1034), and the Tadhkira f i ahkctm al-jawahir wa al-a'md of Ibn Mattawayh. The Tadhkira is unique, for it is devoted solely to a discussion of the properties of atoms and accidents and provides a much better account of kalam cosmology than other kalam texts, particularly regarding developments in the period after Abu ‘All al-Jubba’I, as well as sometimes clarifying earlier developments. It brings together the kalam discussions of cosmology, which are otherwise widely scattered, into a more convenient form for the study of kalam cosmology. Finally, there are the heresiographical works of the later Mu'tazili scholar, Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn

16 ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Hamadhanf, al-M ughnifiabw O bal-taw hfd wa al-'adl, (Cairo, 1960-1969), idem, al-M ajmti 'a l-m u h tt bil-taklif ed.J.J. Houben, (Beirut: Imprimdrie Catholique, 1965). The first three parts of the M ughni have not survived. The fust part probably included a discussion of atoms, bodies, and accidents (see J. Peters, God's Created Speech: A study in the speculative theology o f the M u'tazili Q fldt l-Qud&t AbQ l-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbdr bn Ahmadal-H amad& ni, (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 30).

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12 al-Murtadil17 The works of fifth/eleventh century Shi'i mutakallimun. for example, of Shaykh al-Mufid Cd. 413/1022) who was very much influenced by the Baghdadi Mu'tazills, and of al-Sharlf al-Murtada (d. 436/1044), who also was a student of the Basri Mu'tazili 'Abd al-Jabbar, also record their participation in these late Mu'tazili cosmological discussions and are therefore valuable sources of information.18 The works of the Ash'ari mutakallimun. for example, of Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013), Ibn Furak (d. 406/1015), Abu al-Ma‘ali al-Juwaynl (d. 478/1085), and ‘Adud al-din al-iji (d. 756/1355) also discuss kalam cosmology, as does the work of the independent mutakallim al-Maturidi (d. 331/942). Finally, some opponents of kalam. namely the physicians and the falasifa. for example Job of Edessa (fl. ca. 203/817), ‘All ibn Rabban al-Tabari (d. ca. 247/861), Muhammad ibn Zakariya’ al-Razi (d. 313/925), Yahya ibn ‘Adi (d. 363/973), Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), Maimonides (d. 601/1204), Fakhr al-din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), and Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274) preserve the views of the mutakallimun in their

17 Abu al-Rashrd al-NTsaburf, M as& 'ilal-khilaf bayna al-bagbdOdiyin wa al-basrfyfn, ed. M. Ziyideh and R. al-Sayyfd, (Beirut, 1979). His ZiyOdat al-Sharh has been published as F f al-tawhfd, ed. M. Abu Rfda, (Cairo,1969). The Sbarh al-usbl al-kbamsa, ed. ‘A. ‘Uthman, (Cairo,1965) has been attributed to ‘Abd al-Jabbar by the editor, but as D. Gimaret has argued it must be ascribed to Minkadfm Shishdev (see D. Gimaret, *Les UsUl al-kbamsa du QadJ ‘Abd al-Jabbir et leurs commentaires,* Annales Islamologiques, 15(1979), 47-96); Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira f i abtitm al-JauOhir wa al-a ’rOd, ed. S. Lutf and F. ‘Awn, (Cairo.1975) (this is a partial edition in which the later psychological sections are missing). Moreover, a commentary on Ibn Mattawayh Sbarh al-Tadbkira by an anonymous author writing ca. 570/1124 exists in manuscript in the Teheran University Library (see the article on Ibn Mattawayh by W. Madelung in Encyclopaedia o f Islam—Supplement, new ed., 393); Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn al-Murtada, Kitab al-milal wa al-nibal and Kitab al-munya wa al-am alfi sbarh al-milal wa al-nibal, ed. Muhammad Jawad Mashkur, (Beirut, 1979). 18 Muhammad ibn al-Nu‘m in al-Muftd, Aw&’il al-maq& latfial-madhObib wa al-mukhtOrOt, ed. F. al-Zinj£ni, (Tabriz, 1951).

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13 arguments against kalam cosmologies.19 Periodization o f the development o f kalam cosmology These texts allow us to identify three periods in the development of kalam cosmology during the second to fifth/eighth to eleventh centuries: • The first period is the formative period (circa 163-235/780-850) during which the foundations of the cosmological questions that would be discussed in kalam was laid. Not only was a major part of the research program that was tc be pursued in later periods set, but the parameters within which the program was to be pursued were also laid at this time. Since the mutakallimun of this period were engaged in debates with the representatives of the cosmological doctrines of late Hellenism as well as rival religions, in particular Dualism, the ongoing problems of these cosmological doctrines as well as some of their elements were appropriated by the early mutakallimun. As a result, the formative period is characterized by different and competing cosmological theories, particularly regarding the fundamental constituents of the world, how

19 Abu Bakr al-BSqillanf, Kitab al-tamhfd, ed. R. McCarthy, (Beirut: Librarie Orientale, 1957); Ibn Furak, M ujarrad maqalat al-Ash'arf, ed. D. Gimaret, (Beirut,1987); Abu al-Ma‘alf al-JuwaynT, al-Sfj& m ilfiusfdal-dfn, ed. 'A. al-Nashshar, (Alexandria, 1969); ‘Adud al-din al-Ijf, M aw O qfffi Him al-kaldm, with the commentary of al-Sharif al-Jurjanf, Sbarh al-mawOqif (Cairo,1907-1909); al-Matundf, Kitdbal-Tawhfd, ed. F. Kholeif, (Beirut, 1970); Job of Edessa, Encyclopaedia o f Philosophical a n d N atural Sciences as taught in Baghdad about 8 1 7A.D. or Book o f Treasures, ed.&tr. A. Mingana, (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1935); ‘Alf ibn Rabban al-Tabari, Ftrdaws al-Hikma, ed. M. Siddiqi, (Beilin, 1928); Mahdf Muhaqqiq, ‘Shukuk-e Raa bar jalfnus va masa'elat-e qidam-e ‘ilam," M ajalla-ye Ddnesbkadeh-e Adabiyydt va Hdum-e insdnf, 15(1967-1968), 155-206; Yahya ibn 'Adi, Maqdldt, ed. S. Khalifat, (Amman, 1988); Ibn Sfna, al-Sbifit’al-Tabf'fyyOt, vol. 1, al-Sam d'al-tabf'f, ed. S. Zayd, (Cairo,1983); idem, al-SbifiI' al-Edhiyydt, eds. G. Anawati & Sa'Fd Ziyad, vol. 1, (Cairo,I960); idem, al-lshdrdt wa al-tanbibdt, ed. S. Dunya, (Cairo, 1957-1960)—this edition contains the commentary of Nasfr al-dfn al-Tusf; Fakhr al-dfn al-RIzf, Mubassalafk&r al-m utaqaddim fn wa al-muta’a khkhinn, with the commentary of Nasfr al-rifn al-Tusf, Talkhfs al-muhassal, ed. ‘A Nuranf, (Teheran: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Teheran Branch, 1980).

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14 they combine to form the sensible world, their properties and interactions with one another, the problem of change, the nature of life in general, and of man in particular. Hence, for example, some of the mutakallimOn believed that only bodies constitute the world and that this theory could account for all observable phenomena (for example Hisham ibn al-Hakam (d. 179/795?20), al-Asamm (d. ca. 200/815), and to a limited extent Ibrahim al-NazzSm (d. 220-230/835-845), who considered that motions alone were accidents).21 Others believed that only accidents constitute the world (for example Dirar ibn al-‘Amr (d. ca. 200/815), Hafs al-Fard (fl. ca. 195/810), Sulayman ibn Jarir (fl. before 231/846), Husayn al-Najjar (d. ca. 220-230/835-845)) and therefore that a body consists of a combination of certain accidents, or is a “bundle of properties.”22 The remainder of the mutakallimun believed that both bodies and accidents constitute the world. Strictly speaking, the proponents of kalam atomism belong to this third group, since they believed that atoms, which constitute bodies, and the accidents which inhere in them are the primary entities of the world. However, the partisans of the second group were also considered atomists by their contemporaries and later commentators in the sense that they considered accidents to be indivisible constituent parts (and therefore “atoms”) of bodies.23 We shall

20 There are conflicting accounts for the death-date of Hisham. Some reports state that his death occurred either shortly after the downfall of the Barmakids (186/803) or in the year 199/814-5, or during the reign of al-Ma’mun. Madelung does not regard these dates as reliable and prefers 179/795 (‘Hisham ibn al-Hakam,* Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new ed., 3:496-8). 21 al-Ash'an, Maqdldt, 59-60,369; 343; 191,358,362,378. 22 Ibid., 317-8; 305-6,345-6. 23 Thus al-Ash‘arf states, *Dirir, Hafs al-Fard, and ai-Husayn al-Najjar claimed that the atoms (or parts - aj2a 0 are color, taste, heat, cold, roughness, and smoothness* (Maqdl&t, 317).

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15 discuss this period in further detail in the next chapter. • The second period is the period of the triumph of the atomistic kalam cosmology (circa. 235-339/850-950) when the view that atoms, which constitute bodies, and their accidents were the constituents of the world replaced rival kalam cosmologies and was universally adopted by the mutakallimun. The reasons for its triumph are not entirely clear. The later part of this period also saw a redefinition of some of the key concepts of kalam atomism (circa. 287-339/900-950), when a range of cosmological and other kalam questions seems to have been re-examined, particularly in the discussions between the Basran Mu'tazilis ‘Abu ‘Air al-Jubba’I and his son Abu Hashim al-Jubba’I (d. 321/933) and perhaps including their contemporary from the Baghdadi Mu'tazili school, Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhl. This reformulation may have either been in response to the criticisms of kalam cosmology by Ibn al-Rawandr, and by the medical doctor and favlasuf Muhammad ibn Zakarlya al-Razi who were both the targets of many of the kalam works of this period; or the reformulation may also have been due to the rising influence of the falasifa and the consequently increasing acquaintance with the Arabic followers of Aristotle; or, finally, the reformulation may have been an attempt at the systemization of the triumphant atomistic kalam cosmology. These are all possible hypotheses for the reformulation of kalam cosmology at this time and need to be investigated further. The criticisms of kalam cosmology and the subsequent formation of a complete system seem to have been responsible for Abu Hashim’s redefinition of some primary cosmological concepts, for example of the atom, the renewed examination of old questions within this new framework, and even the

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16 investigation of new, previously undiscussed cosmological questions like the perceptibility of individual atoms. Moreover, logical and epistemological theories were also reformulated and incorporated into a theory of attributes which was to apply to all the objects in the world. The importance of this reformulation was not confined to the Basrian Mu'tazili followers of Abu ‘All and Abu HSshim, but eventually pervaded the rival Baghdadi Mu'tazili and even Ash'arl kalam Unfortunately, there is no trace of the emergence of these new questions, in a contemporary witness to these developments and our most important source of information for early kalam. namely al-Ash'arl’s Maqalat. This is surprising because al-Ash'arl had initially been a student of the innovator Abu ‘All al-Jubba’I, before he turned away from the Mu'tazila. Moreover, al-Ash'arl was in some sense the intellectual rival of his teacher’s son Abu Hashim, who was another major innovator. Perhaps this is an indication that al-Ash'arl’s Maqalat was written before these discussions took place or at least had assumed the importance they were to have for later Mu'tazili thought.24 In any case, the surviving accounts of this period, while perhaps more numerous than those of the first period, are still not so adequate so as to enable us to reconstruct the arguments which were the reasons for the reformulation of kalam cosmology and the impetus for the consideration of new cosmological problems. • In the third period (circa. 339-442/950-1050), the Mu'tazilis chose among the positions of Abu ‘All, his son Abu Hashim, and their rival Abu

24 See W.M. Watt, The Formative period o f Islamic thought, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 306-7.

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17 al-QSsim on these questions, with the Basrian Mu'tazilis mostly adopting the position of Abu HSshim and rarely the position of Abu ‘All, while the Baghdadi Mu'tazilis inclined towards the position of Abu al-Qasim. Even though there was general agreement regarding the outlines of the complete kalam system, there continued to be disagreements about its details along the lines of the disagreements among the followers of these three figures. In some instances the mutakallimun put forth new positions. However, a radical departure can be seen in the case of Abu al-Husayn al-Basrl (d. 436/1044), who accepted the criticism of Mu'tazili cosmological views by the falasifa and adopted their Aristotelian cosmology.25 Ash'arl kalam continued to maintain its atomistic cosmology, but not for very long. By the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century, the influence of Ibn SIna’s philosophy had led influential Ash'arl mutakallimun like Fakhr al-din al-Razi, and later ‘Adud al-din al-Ijl in the eighth/fourteenth century, to reject atomism in favor of a modified Aristotelian cosmology, while al-Shahrastanl may have proposed a modified theory of atomism in the sixth/twelfth century

25 Ibn al-Murtada, TabdqdU, 119. See also the article on him by W. Madelung in the Encyclopaedia o f Islam - Supplement, new ed., 25-26, and S. M. Stem, “Ibn al-Samh," JRAS, 1956, 31-44.

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18 which was not universally adopted.26 The fragm entary nature o f the sources and the historical context Clearly none of the surviving kalam texts are from the formative period of its development. The earliest texts in our possession are the Kitab al-Hayawdn of al-Jahlz, which is from the early part of the second period, followed by the Kitab al-Intisar o f al-Khayyat, the Kitab al-Tawhid of al-Maturldl, and the Maqaldts of al-Ash‘arl, of al-Balkhi, andal-Nashr, which are from the later part of this period, while the rest of the surviving kalam texts are from the third period or even later. Our knowledge of the formative early period must be therefore reconstructed from the fragments which have been preserved in these later kalam texts, as well as from reports in other historical and literary sources. The fragmentary nature of the sources presents the most challenging methodological problem for the study of early kalam. Since early kalam set the

26 This is what Nasfr al-dfn al-Tusf seems to imply in in his commentary to Ibn Sfna’s Jshdrdt. He states, ‘The third option is that it (i.e. the body] is not actually composed from pans but is capable of a finite number of divisions. This is the position that was preferred by Muhammad al-Shahrastanf in his book which he called al-M andhij wa al-baydnit. The excellent man [fadiL i.e. Fakhr al-dfn al-Razi?! said this in his work known as al-Jawhar at-fard" (.Isbdrdt, 129; see also Talkhfs al-Mubassal, 183). A text by al-Shahrastanf on the atom was initially published by A. Guillaume as an excursus to the Nibdyat al-iqddm, 505-514, and subsequently by A.S. al-Damardash, who had access to the Teheran manuscript as ‘Makhtut al-Shahrastanf ‘an al-jawhar al-fard," M ajatlat m a'had al-makbtOtdt al-'arabiyya, 25(1979), 195-218. Unfortunately, al-Damardash’s edition is full of errors, and can only be used in conjunction with Guillaume’s edition. Guillaume does not consider this excursus to have originally been a part of the Nibdyat al-iqddm on the grounds that the heading of Chapter XX, which is the immediately preceding chapter, does not mention the excursus, nor does the oldest and best manuscript contain it. Moreover, one of the manuscripts states ‘this is the end of the book" ftamma al-kirabl before it goes on to the excursus. Guillaume considers it to be a genuine work of al-Shahrastanf on stylistic grounds. The excursus does not suggest the radical departure from kalam atomism which is implied by al-Tusf’s comment, although it seems to be directed against Ibn Sfna’s arguments against atomism in the S b ifi'section on Physics. Since, in the introduction to his edition, Guillaume speculates that the al-M andhij wa al-baydndt was another work (which has not survived) and is not to be identified with the Nibdyat al-iqddm (page xiii), al-Tusf may be referring to another text by al-Shahrastanf.

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19 research program for later developments, particularly in the case of cosmology, it is very important to be able to delineate this early program, for a grasp of the problems underlying this research program allows the historian of kalam cosmology to identify areas of research which are intrinsically dictated by the subject matter and are not extrinsically imposed upon it. However, in most cases the chronology of these various fragments cannot be ascertained, and this makes the task of tracing the development of the cosmological Cor indeed any other) theories of any particular mutakallim very difficult if not impossible. Obviously the historical method of evaluating the sources and choosing the earlier accounts over the later more detailed and embellished accounts needs to be followed. Since some of the later kalam texts mention the sources from which their reports were derived, it is possible to reconstruct accounts of earlier sources, in particular from the early second period Maqalat works of Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq, al-Misma'I, etc.. These are perhaps not only more reliable, but are also more indicative of the problems of interest to the mutakallimun of the early second period. In many ways, therefore, the historian of early kalam cosmology faces the same kinds of problems as a historian of Presocratic philosophy. The latter also has to rely on a similar body of fragmentary information (which for the most pan cannot be precisely dated) about the Presocratics which has been preserved in later Greek sources. However, despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence and the problems that are thereby posed, historians of Presocratic philosophy have successfully attempted a reconstruction of the theories of the major Presocratics. They have been aided in this task by the philological groundwork laid by Classicists who have sifted through the surviving Presocratic fragments, discussed their authenticity, and elucidated the meanings of the terms and expressions employed in these fragments. Of equal if not greater importance to their

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20 reconstruction of Presocratic philosophy is their assumption of the logical progress of the Presocratic research program.27 Their method thus relies greatly on defining the cosmological program of the Presocratic philosophers. They are fortunate in that their sources spell out this research program. Indeed the earliest statements of such a research program are by Plato, who in the Phaedo (96-99) has Socrates criticize his predecessors’ doctrine of the materialistic constitutive principles of the world and argue instead for a place for teleology. Aristotle also states the research program of his predecessors in Book I of his Physics when he discusses their views on the natural principles or the constitutive elements of the world we experience and then goes on to criticizes their views before presenting his own positive theory of nature and change.28 Both Plato and Aristotle thus consider the research program of the Presocratics to have been about the principles behind the physical constitution of the objects of experience and their change, or, the one-many problem and the physis problem. The reconstruction of the views of the Presocratics has also been facilitated in large part because the major task of gathering their fragments has been largely completed by Diels and Krantz. In addition, the historian of Presocratic philosophy does not face the difficulty (at least not to the same degree as the historian of kalam) of how debates and discussions between contemporaries may have influenced a particular Presocratic philosopher to reconsider and to modify his cosmological views, because there is no reason to suspect that such debates or

27 J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Karl Popper, ‘Back to the Presocratics,' in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, cds. RE. Allen and D.J. Furley, (Atlantic Highlands,New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1975), 130-15328 H. Chemiss has examined Aristotle’s use of his predecessors in Aristotle’s Criticisms o f Presocratic Philosophy, (Baltimore, 1935; repr. New York: Octagon Press, 1983).

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21 discussions ever took place. In most cases (Anaxagoras and Empedocles are the exception) the spatial or temporal separation of the Presocratics allows the historian to consider only the views of earlier predecessors in attempting to reconstruct of the doctrine of a particular Presocratic or to discuss the development of Presocratic philosophy. Therefore, if the historian of kalam cosmology were to attempt to apply the methodology of the historians of Presocratic philosophy, he would need to— (a) gather together the fragments of the early mutakallimun. (b) engage in the philological examination of the meanings of the terms and expressions in these fragments, and (c) delineate their research program in order to reconstruct the development of their views. There have been some attempts to gather together the fragments of the early mutakallimun in the manner of Diels and Kranz. However this task, though daunting for the Presocratics, is Herculean for the early mutakallimun. The number of texts that must be examined for embedded fragments or testimonies are many times more numerous. Many of these texts are yet unedited while others may lie undiscovered in poorly cataloged manuscript libraries. Moreover, the problem of discussions and debates between contemporary mutakallimun themselves on the one hand, and with their opponents on the other, presents the problem of the chronological ordering the fragments, a situation which does not arise in the case of the Presocratics. Yet, the lack of a Diels and Kranz type of fragment collection need not, in principle, be the major stumbling block to discussing the development of early kalam cosmology. It may indeed be possible to reconstruct it on the basis of discovering its research program alone, which can be uncovered in the more

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22 important, easily available texts. Unfortunately, the surviving kalam texts do not define the research program of their predecessors, at least not as explicitly as Aristotle and Plato describe the program of their Presocratic predecessors. Therefore the major problems of the kalam research program need to be identified indirectly, through the analysis of kalam and other relevant texts. A reconstruction of the development of kalam cosmology based on the questions that underlie its development and provide its problem situation can then be attempted. Once these larger questions have been identified, it may be possible to then deal with the smaller points of disagreement among the mutakallimun and to better understand the function of these smaller questions within the larger cosmological enterprise of kalam.29 It is within this methodological framework that I have chosen to examine some aspects of the theory of matter and its attributes in fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh century kalam. The choice of this time period is in part dictated by the texts, for, as we have seen, the texts of the students of ‘Abd al-Jabbar, namely Ibn Mattawayh and Abu al-Rashld al-NIsaburl, provide us with a wealth of information about the late second and third period of the development of kalam

2? By smaller questions, I mean the disagreements among the mutakallimun about the points of detail of the cosmologies they believed in. An example would be the disagreement over the attributes of the atom, or whether it was perceptible by itself, or the number of atoms that make up a body. These points of detail are very important for the reconstruction of the development o f kalam cosmology, but do not explain, in my view, the problem situation in which the need for cosmological theories first arose in the middle of the second century/middle of the eighth century. Before this period, kalam seems to have been primarily interested in the problem of human free-will versus God’s determination of events (this has been discussed by several authors; for a summary of recent development see J. van Ess, ‘Early Development of Kalam.* in Studies on the First Century o f Islamic Society, ed. G. Juynboll, (Caibondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 113-4). However, at this early time, the problem of free-will does not seem to have been discussed in the larger framework of a cosmological system as it was later.

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23 cosmology. The early mutakallimun are therefore analogous to the Presocratics in another aspect, for they bear a similar relationship to the mutakallimun of the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries as do the Presocratics to Aristotle. The texts of the later mutakallimun preserve the fragments of their kalam predecessors in much the same manner as Aristotle preserves the fragments of the Presocratics. Moreover, just as the Presocratic research program reaches its culmination in Aristotle, so too does the research program of the early mutakallimun reach its culmination in the later mutakallimun. The identification of the major problems of early kalam cosmology can not only aid us in its reconstruction, but it can provide us with a framework for discussing kalam cosmology of this period and its development in later periods. It would seem that, just as in the Presocratic case the groundwork laid by the study of the later cosmology of Plato and Aristotle was essential for the reconstruction of the Presocratics, we need to first understand the cosmology of the later mutakallimun whose texts are available to us before proceeding to “deconstruct” these texts into their embedded fragments, in order then to reconstruct early kalam cosmologies. Actually, however, both Aristotle and Plato provide enough of a context for us to understand the place of their own cosmologies in relation to those of their predecessors, albeit they ‘remould’ the cosmology of their predecessors for their own purposes.30 The parallel initial study of the later mutakallimun would thus appear to be extremely valuable for illuminating the cosmology of the earlier periods. The actual case, however, is not so simple, for

30 The observation by Harold Chemiss that Aristotle was not a doxographer and that therefore his use of the Presocratics is that of a "philosopher seeking to construct a complete and final philosophy* and who therefore needs to "remould" the Presocratics ‘for his own purposes" is a warning that the kalam historian should take to heart (Aristotle's Criticisms, 347).

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24 the later mutakallimun do not, in most case, provide enough of a context to illuminate their own cosmological theories, independent of an inquiry into the cosmologies of their predecessors. Thus the key to unlocking the cosmologies for both periods is to search for the questions that guided their research program, and then to use them to illuminate each period with the aid of the other. The p la c e o f cosm ology in kalam Cosmology and the "difficult questions" o f kalam Clearly one approach to uncovering the problem situation of early kalam cosmology is to begin with the role of cosmology in kalam which was set during the formative period of the development of kalam. The mutakallimun of the second and later periods were aware that cosmological questions, though in some sense necessary for the the discussion of the principles Cy.sOD of religion, were yet quite distinctive, for, as I shall show later, they recognized that the exposition of these questions depended on reason alone. Thus, in his Kitab al-Intisar, Abu al-Husayn al-Khayyat uses this distinction between the principles of religion and the cosmological questions discussed by the mutakallimun to the advantage of the mutakallimun when he defends the Mu'tazilis from Ibn al-Rawandi’s criticism. He presents the argument that Ibn al-Rawandi’s criticism of the mutakallimun is primarily directed against Mu'tazili disagreements on cosmological questions. Al-Khayyat states that these cosmological questions are not of the same order as the basic beliefs on which all the Mu'tazila are in agreement. Rather, they are questions about the “obscure” or “difficult” questions of kalam fmin ghamidi 1-kalami wa latifihO. Furthermore, he boasts, these are questions which none but the Mu'tazila are capable of investigating and discussing. Al-Khayyat enumerates these “difficult questions" as questions about the annihilation (fanaO or

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25 permanence (baqaO of things (ashv3‘): the theory of ma‘ani which was expounded by Mu'ammar to explain the difference between a moving body and a resting body; the theory of knowledge (literally, what is known (ma'lum) and what is not known (maihulV): the theory of secondary causation (tawallud): the denial that God can perform unjust acts; the categories of the objects in the world (muianasa) and whether they interpenetrate (mudakhala): the nature of man (insan) and of knowledge (ma'arif).31 Elsewhere, he considers “the discussion of what was and what will be, the whole and the part, and the finite and the infinite” to be part of the obscure and difficult questions of kalam. and states that Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf (d. 226/841) devoted much effort to the solution of these questions.32 Al-Khayyat’s characterization of these cosmological and epistemological questions as constituting the difficult questions (latlf) of kalam is the earliest surviving usage that I have found for the term latlf to denote such questions.33 There are, however, many other examples of the use of this expression by later mutakallimun to include cosmological questions within these difficult questions. Thus for example, ‘Abd al-Jabbar in his biographical dictionary of the Mu'tazili school preserves the following report about Ibrahim ibn Sayyar al-Nazzam while discussing the biography of al-Nazzam’s uncle and teacher Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf:

31 al-Khayyat, al-Intis&r, 14-5. 32 Ibid., 18. 33 The word latlf usually means fine or delicate and therefore by extension has the meaning of light, airy, or subtle. However, it can also refer to abstrusities, obscurities, or difficulties (see E.W. Lane & S. Poole, Arabic-Englisb Lexicon, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863-93; repr., Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1984), 3010). In the kalam context, it seems to have been used to denote both the difficult questions of kalam. and questions about the cosmological ‘micro-structure’, i.e. the constitution of the world from atoms and accidents. These two usages are not mutually exclusive, rather, the latter is a subset of the former.

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26

... Ibrahim al-Nazzim was one of his students. Subsequently, he [i.e. al-Nazzim] left to go on the pilgrimage. He proceeded on the road to Mecca and met Hisham ibn al-Hakam and other persons with whom he discussed the minutae Cdaqlq) of kalam. He [also] read the books of the philosophers. Then he returned to Basra, thinking that he had reached a level of understanding about the difficult questions of kalim (min latl fl 1-kalamD which no person before him had reached.34 These two examples show that in the kalam context the terms ghamid. daqlq and latlf do not refer to basic beliefs, but rather were used to signify a class of questions which included cosmological questions. The Jewish mutakallim Sa'adiya’s (d. 331/942) use of the terms latlf and daqla further makes explicit that the terms refer to questions which depend only on discursive reason. In the context of arguing for the temporal creation of the world, he states: What was the state of things before our time? The premise for seeking an answer to this question is something difficult (latlf) and minute (daqfq) which sense cannot be grasp (la talhaquh^ hassaiun). Therefore one should try to attain it by means of reason (fikr)35

This sense of the use of reason is also implicit in al-Khayyat and ‘Abd al-Jabb3r. In the case of the former, it is precisely this claim that allows him to boast to al-Rawandl that only the Mu'tazila can engage in the discussion of these questions, because only they have the intellectual ability—their detractors are fools! The distinction between the rational and more properly theological

34 ‘Abd al-Jabbir, Fadl al-lHziU, 254. Ibn al-Muitada says that the meeting with Hisham took place in Kufa ( Tab&qOt, 44). 33 Sa'adiya, Kti&b ai-am&ndt wa al-itiq&d&t, ed. S. Landauer, (Leiden: Brill, 1880), 30.

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27 questions of kalam can also found in al-Ash'arl’s Maqalat, which is subdivided into parts. In the first part, he presents the beliefs of the various Muslim sects about the principles of the faith, namely the major theological questions, for he ends this part with the words “this is the end of the discussion of the major questions” Chadha akhiftt 1-kalami ft l-iallli). Differences of opinion regarding these major questions lead to the emergence of sects and schisms which are the subject of this first part. The second part bears the title “This is the account of differences of opinion among the people regarding the minutiae” Chadha dhikrii ikhtilafi 1-nasi fi 1-daqiqi).36 In most cases, differences of opinion regarding these “difficult” questions did not lead to the formation of new sects or schools. Rather, members of the same sect or school could disagree about these questions, yet agree over the “major” questions and therefore remain within the same s e a or school. This second part of the Maqalat is primarily concerned with cosmological questions, namely, questions about bodies, atoms, accidents, causality, etc.. The topics which are covered here include the “difficult questions” that are enumerated by al-Khayyat. However, as we would expea, al-Ash‘ari, the doxographer, includes many more cosmological questions than al-Khayyat, the polemicist. Al-Ash'arl also includes non-cosmological questions, in particular doctrinal questions, for example questions about devils, the jinn, angels, magic, or legal questions, questions about true and false reports, obedience, prayer, leadership (imama).

56 al-Ash‘ari, MaqOUU, 300-1. Al-Ash‘an anticipates the discussion of these difficult questions in the discussion of the Muiji’a in the first part of his work when he states, “We will discuss the views of the Muiji’a about the difficult questions of kalam when we come to the description of the differences of opinion about the difficult and obscure questions of kalam (fi. latifi 1-kalami w* gham idihil* (M aqalat, 154; See also the discussion in ‘Abdurrahman Badawf, Histoire de la Pbilosopbie en Islam. I: les Pbiloscphes Th6ologiens, (Paris: J.Vrin, 1976), 276-278).

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28 divorce, slaughter, etc., in his report of the difficult questions.37 Thus al-Ash‘arfs use of the term latlf in this context clearly refers to questions which were not the delineating criteria for determining membership in a sect, for which he uses the term jalll instead. Rather, latlf refers to questions over which disagreement was possible, even including some doctrinal questions, because these were difficult questions which fell under the domain of reason and to which there could be several different answers. This does not entail that these questions were minor or unimportant or questions of detail. They may not have been important for the heresiographical purpose of determining one’s sect, but they were obviously important enough to the mutakallimun to be recorded by al-Ash'ari. Evidence from accounts of the contents of al-Ash'ari’s other works which have not survived, as well as fragments preserved by Ibn Furak (d. 406/1015) in his discussion of al-Ash'ari’s views support my interpretation that in kalam the terms “latlf,” “daqiq." and “ehamid.” refer, for the most pan, to the cosmological and epistemological questions which were considered to fall under the domain of reason.38 Thus in his list of the books he had written, al-Ash'ari mentions that in his Kitab al-nawadir fid a q a ’iq al-kalam (Unusual points regarding the minutiae of

37 The second part seems to end at page 483 where the part called ‘This is an account of the differences of opinion among the people regarding names and attributes’ begins. The discussion of doctrinal questions is on pages 435-442, and the discussion of legal questions is on pages 444-482. Some cosmological questions, for example the nature of space (page 442) or of time and the world (page 443) are interspersed between the doctrinal and legal questions. 38 Ibn Furak, MujarradmaqMOt al-Asb'art, ed. D. Gimaret, (Beirut, 1987). Gimaret has discussed its contents in his *Un document majeur pour l’histoire du kalam: Le M ujarrad maqCd&t al-Ash 'a rtd lb n Furak,’ Arabica, 32(1985), 185-218, and has used it in his “Bibliographic d ’Ash'arf: Un rfexamen,’ Journal Asiatique, 273(1985), 223-292. Chapter 37 of the M ujarradis entitled, ’Another chapter on the elucidation al-Ash'an’s views on the difficult questions QatiD of kalam and the minutiae (daqiq)—One of these is the explanation of his views on the question of the invisible atom and the discussion of related issues* (M ujarrad, 202). The subsequent chapters (up to Chapter 58) continue the discussion of other cosmological questions (Gimaret, *Un document," 212-4).

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29 kalam) he had discussed bodies, atoms, the nature of man, space, accidents, motion, etc..39 He also states that his Kitab al-idrak (On Perception) was about “diverse points regarding the difficult questions of kalim." and that he had discussed the problems of perception, burning, and motion in this work.40 AI-Ash‘arI also includes a work titled al-Latifin his list, which was a refutation of a work by the Mu'tazili al-Iskafi (d. 240/854), who is notorious for his denial of the existence of accidents. Al-Ash'ari elaborates that he had discussed the nature of man in this work against al-Iskafi. Finally, al-Ash'ari also mentions that he had written a refutation of the positions of ‘Abbad ibn Sulaymin (d. after 255/868) on “the difficult problems of kalam."41 The litterateur Abu Hayyan al-Tawhldi (d. 414/1023) also considers difficult questions of kalam to be those that belong to the domain of reason. In his Risdla f i thamarat al-'uliim, he states, “kalam is divided into the minute part (daqiq) which is undertaken solely on the basis of reason (vatafarradtt l-‘aqm bihi) and into the part which deals with major questions (ialll) which depend on revelation (vufea'u ila kitabi llahi fihi).”42 Finally, Ibn Mattawayh’s Tadhkira f i ahkam al-jawahir wa al-a'rad (Treatise on the properties of atoms and accidents) which is also known by the alternative

39 Gimaret, *Bibliographic," 252-254. 40 Ibid, 254. The problem of burning refers to the ka!5m problem of causation, namely, when fire and cotton are brought into contact, is the fire the direct cause of the burning of the cotton? Or is God the direct cause of the burning? If God is its direct cause, then the regularity which is observed regarding the burning of cotton, when it comes into contact with fire, does not entail a causal connection between fire and cotton, but just a temporal simultaneity of the two without any logical connection (see Ibn Rushd, Tabajut al-Tabafut, tr. S. van den Bergh, (London: Luzac, 1954), 316). 41 Ibid, 254-5. Ibn al-NadTm confirms that al-Iskafi was the author of a Kitab al-Latif in his Fihrist, ed. R. Tajaadud, (Teheran,1971), 213. 42 Abu Hayyan al-Tawhldf, Kitab adab al-insba’ftal-sadO qa wa al-sadtq, (Cairo, 1323 A.H.), 192.

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30 tide Tadhkirafi lot ifal-kalam (Treatise on the difficult questions of kalam) is a kalam text which is solely devoted to cosmological questions, as is clear from the first of these tides.43 Ladf al-kalam. or the difficult questions of kalam. is therefore considered to be a synonym for ahkam al-iawahir wa al-a*rad. namely the properties of atoms and accidents. This evidence makes it clear that the mutakallimun drew a clear distinction between these cosmological questions, which they included within the difficult or minute questions of kalam and which they discussed solely on the basis of reason, and the fundamental beliefs of the faith which depend on revelation. Such a distinction may have been made in as early as the late second and early third/late eight and early ninth centuries, that is, by the mutakallimun of the formative period of kalam cosmology, as is evident from the report about al-Nazzam by ‘Abd al-Jabbar. It was obviously in use by the late third/ninth century as is clear from al-Khayyat’s report. Therefore, not only is kalam’s interest in cosmological questions present at the earliest period of its development, but in addition, these questions were recognized to be different in kind from its more properly theological questions, and also to depend on reason for their solution rather than on revelation. To consider kalam solely as “theology” is to fail to take account of this part of kalam. for this part of kalam is much more akin to philosophy in the

43 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 12. The Shi'f author Shaykh al-MufTd (d. 413/1023) also has a section called Bab al-qawl fi al-latff min al-kal5m (Chapter on the difficult questions of kalam) which contains a discussion of atoms, space, bodies, accidents, the world and its spheres, motion, vacuum, plenum, time, natures, causation, and accidents like motion in his Aw&'il al-maq&Uuf i al-madb&bib al-mukhtdr&t, 72-87. He then discusses doctrinal questions, and then adds more cosmological questions (al-qawl fT al-zivadat ft al-latff) on bodies, perception, motion, weight, levity, place, whether one can see beyond the celestial sphere or extend one’s hand beyond it, e tc (107-110). The genre of works in which the difficult questions of a discipline were discussed was very common. Ibn al-Nadfm (Fibrisi, 291) mentions that Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, the famous historian, wrote the Kitdb a l-la tfff i al-fiqh (On the difficult questions of law).

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31 modem sense. Indeed, it was in some sense recognized as such even during the medieval period. This is one way to explain the intense rivalry between the mutakallimun and the fatesifa. who regarded themselves as the true philosophers and therefore cosmologists, and thus berated the methods and cosmological theories of the former. Why was kalam interested in cosmological questions? Why, then, was kalam interested in these cosmological questions? This question is of importance for the discovery of the problem situation within which cosmological questions were discussed by the early mutakallimun for it seeks to understand their motives. A common thesis that was usually advanced by their contemporaries, in particular by the falasifa. was that kalam’s interest in cosmology was for the sake of the defence of faith, namely out of apologetic considerations. This thesis also has some support among modern kalam scholars. The remarks of the Mu'tazili mutakallim 'Abd al-Jabbar in his M uhit bil-Taklif seem to support this thesis. These remarks, which provide an insider’s view of the place of cosmology and cosmological questions in kalam as seen in the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries, are made in response to the question posed by an imaginary inquirer - why does kalam need to discuss the properties of accidents other than those of motion and rest (which are used in the premises that form the argument for the existence of God), that is, why enter into the discussion of accidents which play no role in the kalam argument for the existence of God? ‘Abd al-Jabbar answers that accidents play a role in kalam discussions of many problems: ... many of the questions about God’s unity and uniqueness

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32 (tawhld), His justice Cadi), and other subjects are based on the properties CahkSm) of several of the accidents. In the discussion that God exists, you need to examine the connection between the power of autonomous action (qudra). will (ir3da)r and other accidents. When you want to deny that the Creator of bodies is Himself a body or an accident, you have to examine the proposition that a body has power only through [an accident of] the power of autonomous action (qudra). and that anything possessing this kind of power is incapable of creating a body. This is also true of many of the other principle beliefs (usM) as well, aS ^rill be seen later. Therefore the discussion on establishing the existence of these accidents is clearly of great utility (fawa’id kathlra zahira-).44 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, it seems, is arguing for the theological utility of kalam cosmological theories here. Elsewhere in the M uhit, ‘Abd al-Jabbar turns to how, in his view, the mutakallimun were drawn to the discussion of these cosmological questions, the difficult questions of kalam. He argues that the belief in the oneness and uniqueness of God Ctawhld) is based on an argument in five steps (usfiD. In the first step, the source by which knowledge of God is obtained, namely by reason, is discussed. In the second step, the argument that temporally created things Cmuhdathat) must have a Creator (muhdith) is presented. In the third step, the attributes Csifat) which this Creator must have because they are entailed by His nature CdhSt) are discussed. In the fourth step, the attributes which cannot be said of Him at any time whatsoever, or can be said of Him at some times and not at other times, are discussed. In the final fifth step, the argument is made that He is

44 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, al-M ubit, 1:29-30. Tawhid and ‘adl are two of the five major principles of Mu'tazili kalim . The other principles are the principle of the promise of reward and the threat of punishment (al-wa‘d wa al-wa‘fd). the intermediary state of the sinner (manzila havna manzilatayn). and the command to enjoin what is good and to prohibit what is evil (al-amr bil-m a'rufw a al-nahv ‘an al-munkar) (see J. van Ess, "Mu'tazila,* Encyclopedia o f Religion, (New York: MacMillan, 1987) 10:224-5).

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33 one with respect to these attributes and that He is unique. These five steps, ‘Abd al-Jabbar maintains, in turn depend on subsidiary premises (tawabiO which must be established if the argument of each one of these steps is to be valid.45 He thus states: Each one of these steps has subsidiary premises which must be verified and without which the discussion is not complete. All the disagreements which arise in the course of the discussion of the oneness and uniqueness of God concern these subsidiary premises. Therefore, since the exposition of these steps cannot be completed without discussing the derivative questions (furuO which stem from these subsidiary premises, they too must be addressed. This is what compelled the representatives of our school CashabunS), may God have mercy upon them, to discuss the minutiae (daqlq al-masa’iDr because the exposition of a step of the argument cannot be completed except by addressing these subsidiary questions, whether it be for the sake of verifying an argument CtashTh dalil), or rebutting a question (daP su’aD or refuting a difficulty (ibtal shubhal [raised by opponents]. They cannot, therefore, be blamed for this. This shows that affirming the existence of these temporally created things (hawadith). which provides us with the argument for the existence of God, has to include a discussion of the temporal creation of bodies and other things. Innumerable (ma la vukadu yuhsa) minutiae also enter into this discussion. Therefore, the discussion of a step is closely connected with the discussion of the atom, for, if someone were to prove the eternity of bodies by arguing that they are infinite in number, he could only be refuted by affirming the existence of the atom.46 There is no doubt, then, that ‘Abd al-Jabbar is here defending the inclusion of these minutiae, namely cosmological questions, into kalam. His thesis of how these questions entered into kalam is clearly relevant to the question—why was kalam

45 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, M ubft, 26. 46 Ibid.

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34 interested in cosmology. In his view, these cosmological questions needed to be elaborated for the sake of verifying arguments which prove the existence of God, and which therefore depended on a cosmological theory47; or they needed to be elaborated for the sake of rebutting the difficulties which arose in the cosmological theory; or finally for the refutation of the objections of opponents. It would seem, therefore, that ‘Abd al-Jabbar is arguing that cosmology is the “handmaiden” of the more properly theological concerns of kalam. namely its five principles - God’s oneness and uniqueness, God’s justice, etc.. He seems to be supporting the views of the opponents of kalam. for example the favlasuf al-Farabl (d. 339/950), that kalam was basically engaged in the defense of the doctrines of the Islamic faith 48 ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s view that cosmological inquiry serves as a “handmaiden” to the more properly theological questions of kalam appears to be shared by some Mu'tazili and Ash'arl mntakallimun from the third and later periods of the development of kalam cosmology. ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s further contention that the discussion of the unity and uniqueness of God is the primary place where cosmological concerns arise is also repeated in their texts. We therefore find that the affirmation of the existence Cithbat) of bodies, the affirmation of the existence of atoms, and the affirmation of the existence of accidents, as well as the arguments for the temporal creation of these entities, and the objections that arise, are discussed as the subsidiary premises which need to be established in order to set up the kalam argument for the existence of God who is the Creator of

47 The eighth/fourteenth century historian Ibn Khaldun, therefore believes that when the atomistic cosmology was discarded, the proof for the existence of God needed to be reformulated CM uqaddimab, tr. F. Rosenthal, (Princeton: Bollingen, 1967), 10:51). 48 al-Farabr, Jbs6‘al-'uium , ed. ‘U. Amin, (Cairo, 1968), 131.

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35 these temporal entities.49 For example, the fifth/eleventh century Ash'ari mutakallim al-Juwaynl states: ... the argument (aawD regarding the temporal creation of the world requires the previous establishment of premises, the detailed discussion of the questions that arise from them, and the clarification of expressions and the technical terms used by the mutakallimun. One cannot arrive at the objective of the mutakallimun without stopping to consider their aims, and the meanings of their argument. The “thing" and what it means, the “atom” and its nature, and the “accident” and what it is - these are necessary for explaining the argument regarding the temporal creation of the world.50 One could, on the basis of both al-Juwaynf and ‘Abd al-Jabbar argue that the role of cosmology in kalam is relegated to the question of the existence of God, and in particular, the creation or eternity of the world. But should ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s or al-Juwayni’s remarks be understood to mean solely that cosmology is a “handmaiden" and that therefore kalam was engaged in the defense of the doctrines of Islam? Even if their remarks truly reflected the role of cosmological questions in kalam in the later fourth and fifth/later tenth and eleventh centuries, do they hold for the formative period of kalam cosmology? After all, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who is the earlier of the two, was writing about two hundred years after the first mutakallimun began to speculate about cosmological questions, and is clearly trying to defend the place of cosmological inquiry in kalam. One must also bear in mind that they were both writing at a time when kalam was under attack by the “orthodox,” who decried the

49 For the Mu'tazilfs see the Sharh al-ustil al-kham sa of Shishdiv Mankadim, 92-120; For the Ash'ans see the Kit&b al-tam bfd of Baqillanf, 16-25. 50 al-Juwaynf, Sb&mil, 123.

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36 rationalistic tendencies of kalSm. championing in its stead the sufficiency of revelation and the tradition of the Prophet, as well as under attack by the falasifa. who regarded it as a form of bastardized philosophy at best, and were very critical of its non-Peripatetic cosmological theories. There are ample grounds for rejecting the view that the early mutakallimun were interested in cosmology solely for apologetic reasons. Furthermore, both ‘Abd al-Jabbar and al-Juwaynl, to say nothing of their students, reveal a great interest in cosmological questions, and for the most part sidestep the supposedly theological rationale for entering into these questions in the first place. Their discussion of these questions is much more extensive than is necessary had their concerns been solely theological. In some ways, such fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh century kalam texts resemble medieval Latin commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences insofar as theological issues provide the occasion for the discussion of cosmological questions.51 The character of kalam texts easily allows for the incorporation of such cosmological questions into theological contexts. The fragments that have survived in the earlier Maqalat works and the heresiographical works do not allow us to determine the role of cosmology in the more properly theological questions of early kalam. While al-Ash‘ari has preserved a wealth of information about the cosmological views of the early mutakallimun in his Maqalat, he, like the late Hellenistic doxographers, tells us next to nothing of their context. In spite of this lack of information from our major source, a convincing argument that the role of cosmology does not seem to have played the role of a “handmaiden'’ to the theological concerns of early kalam can

51 Edward Grant, “Cosmology", in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D. Lindberg, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 266-8.

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37 be made on several other grounds, namely: • Al-Khayyit’s enumeration of the difficult questions of kalam. namely his incorporation of cosmological and epistemological questions into the latlfal-kalam (I have discussed this above); • Reports by the early mutakallimun of the cosmologies of the Dualists and Natural Philosophers which are illustrative of their own cosmological concerns (I shall discuss them in the next chapter); • The participation of the early mutakallimun in the cosmological discussions of the late second and early third/late eighth and early ninth centuries which can be gauged from the titles of their works as preserved in the Fibrist of Ibn al-Nadim Cd. 385/995). Ibn al-Nadim’s list shows the early mutakallimun engaged in a debate amongst themselves on cosmological questions, supporting al-Khayygt’s contention that they were at odds regarding cosmological questions or the minutiae of kalam. This is also evident in the diversity of opinion on such questions that has been preserved by al-Ash‘ari. Thus Ibn al-Nadim mentions that Abu al-Hudhayl wrote a book about secondary generation which was against the view of al-Nazzam, a book on the limit [to division of bodies?] against al-Nazzam, a book against al-Nazzam’s theory of the nature of man, and a book against al-NazzSm’s theory that motion consists of leaps. Abu al-Hudhayl’s contemporary Bishr ibn Mu'tamir (d. 210-226/825-840) also wrote a work criticizing al-Nazzam’s views on secondary generation. Al-Nazzam, in turn, wrote a work against his contemporary Mu'ammar’s theory of ma‘ng. Finally, Hisham al-Fuwatl (d. before 218/833) wrote a work against Abu Bakr al-As3mm’s denial of the

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38 existence of motions.52 Ibn al-Nadim’s list also shows us that the mutakallimun wrote treatises whose sole subjects, as indicated by their titles, were cosmological questions. Thus Hisham ibn al-Hakam wrote a book on proofs for the temporal creation of things. Abu al-Hudhayl wrote a book on questions about motions and other subjects, a book on motions, a book on atoms and accidents, a book on the affirmation of the existence of accidents, a book on the nature of man, a book on the nature of sound, etc.. Al-Nazzam wrote works on his theory of secondary generation, on the atom (fragments of which are quoted in al-Ash’ari’s Maqaldi), on his theory that motion consists of leaps, on the interpenetration of bodies, on the nature of man, on motions, on atoms and accidents, etc.. Mu’ammar wrote on the indivisible atom, on atoms and accidents, and on balances and mirrors. Al-Asamm wrote on motions. Dirar ibn ‘Amr wrote on the heterogeneity of the constituent parts of bodies and on the proof for the temporal creation of things. Finally, ‘Abbad ibn Sulayman wrote on the affirmation of the existence of accidents, and on the affirmation of the existence of indivisible atoms.53 Finally, Ibn al-Nadim’s list shows that the mutakallimun wrote against other

52 Ibn al-Nadim mentions the following works by Abu al-Hudhayl (Fibrist, 204): Kiidb al-tawtid 'aldal-Nazzdm, Kitdb al-badd 'aid Ibrdbfm , Kitdb 'aldal-Nazzdm fia l-in sd n, Kitdb al-tafr ‘a id Ibrdbfm . For Bishr he mentions (page 205), Kitdb al-tawallud 'aldal-Nazzdm. For al-Nazzam he mentions (page 206)-. Kitdb al-m a'nd 'aidM u'am mar. For al-Fuwatf he mentions (page 214), Kitdb al-radd 'aid al-Asamm f i nafy al-harahdt. Al-Ash'an states that al-Asamm denied the existence of accidents (M aqdldt, 344). 53 For Hisham ibn al-Hakam (.Fibrist, 224): Kitdb al-daldldt 'aid badatb al-asbyd'. For Abu al-Hudhayl (Fibrist, 204): Kitdb m asd’il j f al-harahdt wa gbayribd, Kiidb al-harahdt, Kitdb aljawdbir wa al-a'rdd, Kitdb tathbit al-a'rdd, Kitdb al-insdn m d buwa, Kitdb f i ai-sawtm dbuwa For al-Nazzam (page 206): Kitdb al-tawallud, Kiidb al-juz‘, Kitdb al-tafra, Kitdb al-muddkhala, Kitdb al-irisdn, Kitdb al-barakdt, Kitdb al-jawdhir wa al-a 'rdd. For Mu'ammar (page 207): K itdb al-juz'alladhf Idyatajazza ', al-Qawlbil-a’rddwaahjawdbir, and Kitdb "ilia al-qarasHm wa al-mir’a. For al-Asamm (page 214): Kitdb al-barahdl For Dirar (page 215): Kitdb ikbtildf al-qjzd', Kitdb al-daldla 'aid badatb al-asbyd'. For 'Abbad (page 215): Kitdb tathbit daldla al-a'rdd, Kitdb itbbdt al-juz’aUadbf Idyatajazza’.

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39 religious faiths. Their arguments against the other monotheistic faiths, namely Judaism and Christianity did not, for the most part, concern cosmological questions, and therefore their works against these sister monotheistic religions will not be of importance to us here.54 On the other hand, their polemic against the Dualists was too a large extent devoted to a discussion and refutation of Dualist cosmologies, and is therefore relevant to our discussion here. Ibn al-Nadfm’s list also shows that the mutakallimun wrote against other philosophical cosmologies, in particular, against the Peripatetics and Skeptics.55 Thus, Hisham ibn al-Hakam wrote against Aristotle on the subject of the unity and uniqueness of God, against natural philosophers (ashab al-taba’iO. against the “heretics” (zanadiqaY and the Dualists (ashab al-ithnavn). Abu al-Hudhayl wrote against the Skeptics, and against the Magians. Al-Nazzam wrote against those who believed in prime matter (ashab al-havula). that is the Peripatetics, against those who believed in the eternity of the world (dahriwa). and against the Dualists. Ja'far ibn Harb (d. 236/850) wrote against the natural philosophers. Al-Asamm wrote against those who believed in the eternity of the world, and against the “heretics”. Dirar wrote against Aristotle on the subject of atoms and accidents, against the “heretics," and against the natural philosophers. Abu Hashim wrote against Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, and composed a work on the elements (tab5’i‘) which included a refutation of the natural philosophers who believed in them.56

54 For example, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, in his discussion of the doctrines of the Christians, finds fault with their views regarding trinity and the unity of the natures of God and Christ, which he then refutes (Mugbnf, 5:86-125). 55 There are many reports of encounters between the early mutakallimun and the skeptics (sufista'iwa). but they are rather sketchy about the actual beliefs of these skeptics. See below Chapter 2 note 49 and the references cited therein for a late kalSm view of Skepticism. 56 For Hisham ibn al-Hakam (.Fibrist, 224): Kitdb 'aid Aristdlfs flal-taw bid, Kitdb al-radd 'aid ashab al-tabd'i', Kitdb al-radd 'aldal-zanddiqa, Kitdb al-radd 'aid ashab al-iibnayn. For Abu al-Hudhayl (page 204): Kitdb 'old al-suflstd'iyya, Kitdb 'aid al-majus. For al-Nazzam (page 206):

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40 This list could be lengthened to include works by other early mutakallimun which are not mentioned by Ibn al-Nadim, but I think two points are clear. The first is that the list shows that three grand cosmological problems encompass the early mutakallimun’s interest in cosmology: (1) the cosmological problem of the attributes and properties of things. This includes the discussion of the ultimate constituents of the world, whether or not they are exclusively atoms and/or accidents, and/or other entities—and therefore affirming or denying the existence of atoms or of accidents in general or in particular like motion; whether, if accidents exist, they are bodies and therefore mutually interpenetrating; what are the grounds for the differentiation of objects (for example a stationary object in contrast to a moving object); what are the properties and kinds of particular accidents (for example sound); (2) the problem of the nature of man; 0 ) the problem of causation, namely whether man can be causal agent directly or secondarily, or whether objects have “natural properties” which can be considered to be direct or secondary causes, as the natural philosophers held. The second point is that in the earliest period of their interest in cosmological questions, namely, the late second and early third/late eighth and

Kitdb 'aid ashdb al-hayuld, Kitdb al-radd 'aid ai-dabriyya, Kitdb al-radd 'aid asbdb al-ithnayn. For Ja'far (page 213): Kitdb al-radd 'aid asbdb al-tabd'i’. For al-Asamm (page 214): Kitdb al-radd 'aid al-dabriyya, KUdb al-radd 'aldal-zandaqa For Dirar (page 215): Kitdb al-radd 'aid Aristdlfs f t al-jawdhirwa al-a'rdd, Kitdb al-radd 'aldal-zanddiqa, Kitdb al-radd 'aid asbdb al-tabd'i'. For Abu Hashim (page 222): Kitdb al-naqd 'aid Aristdlfs f f al-haw n w aal/asdd, Kiidb al-tabd'i'w a al-rtaqd 'aldal-qd’ilfn bibd

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41 early ninth centuries, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that cosmological questions were of concern to them for other reasons, besides solely apologetic ones.57 Their arguments and disagreements with one olher about specific cosmological questions, as well as the altogether different and rival cosmological theories they were formulating, is sufficient evidence of their interest in cosmology for more than just the defense of Islamic doctrines. This is not to say that their contact with other cosmologies, and in particular cosmologies in which matter was eternal—namely their interest in the problem of the eternity of the world—was not important to their interest in this subject. Ibn al-Nadim’s list clearly indicates the importance of their debate with the partisans of other cosmologies, in particular with the natural philosophers (dahriwa. ashab al-tabST. ashab al-havula. and Aristotle), the skeptics (sufista’iwa). and the “heretics” (zanadiqa). namely the Dualists - the Manicheans, Daysanites, Marcionites, etc..58 This debate involved many issues, but the problem of the eternity of matter was a fundamental point of controversy, for the Muslims, like

57 See also J. van Ess, “Early Development of Kalam." 110, where he argues that the kalam technique was not an instrument of apologetics as has been assumed, but that it seems to have originated quite early, certainly before the problem of defending Islam against its opponents arose. 'A. Badawf also reaches the same conclusion in his Histoire de la Pbilosopbie en Islam, L Les Philosophes Th€ologiens, 9. On the other hand, the thesis that kalam was a defensive apologetic is advanced by many writers, most notably by L Gardet and G. Anawati, Introduction a la tb6ologie musulmane, (Paris: J.Vrin, 1948), 309-315. 58 The use of the term zindiq to refer to Manicheans and other Dualists and the term zandaqa for Manicheanism and Dualist sects was very common during the early Abbasid times. Thus the Christian mutakallim Theodore Abu Qurra (ca. 750-825) states, *A group of Manicheans ( q a w m U Q min al-manSm'win) met me, and they are the one who are called the zanadiqa* (Tha’udhurus Abl Qurra, M fm a rft uxgudal-kbdliq wa al-d(n al-qawtm, ed. I. Dfk, (Junieh, 1982), 204; see also J. Fuck, “The Role of Manicheanism under the Arabs,' in Arabiscbe K ultur u n d Islam im Mittelalter: Ausgewdblte Scbriften, ed. M. Fleischhammer, (Weimar: H. Bdhlaus Nachfolger, 1981), 260; G. Vajda, “Les zindiqs en pays dislam au d£but de la p&iode abbaside,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali, XVII(1937), 173). Most kalam accounts consider Manicheanism, Daysanism, and Marcionism to be among the sects of Dualism (‘Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughnt, 5:9; translated in G. Monnot, Penseurs M usulmans et Religions Iraniennes: 'Abd al-Jabb&r et ses Devanciers, (Paris: J.Vrin, 1974), 151).

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42 the Christians and Jews, believed in the temporal creation of the world and thus were all trying to uphold cosmologies based on this major tenet.59 But a discussion of the problem of the eternity of matter entailed presenting a viable alternative theory which would take observed phenomena into account, namely the everyday experience of things and their qualities. On the other hand, it is clear that the kalam discussion with the natural philosophers encompassed not only the problem of the eternity of the world (which some of the natural philosophers did not, in the kalam view, hold), but it also included the problem of causality, and the nature of man. In my view, the specific problem of the eternity of the world cannot by itself account for the early mutakallimun’s interest in cosmology. They could, in this case, have adopted the position taken by the Christian Aristotelian critic, John Philoponus (ca. 490-574 A.D.), who had argued for a temporally created world within a mostly Aristotelian cosmology.60 Or they could have later adopted the views of the favlasuf al-Kindi (d. 256/870), who had also argued for the temporal creation of the world within a modified Aristotelian cosmology, or the views of his earlier Christian counterpart, Job of Edessa, who was well-known to the mutakallimun of the early third/ninth century, both of whom were under the influence of John Philoponus.61 Rather, the mutakallimun were interested in

59 The arguments that were used by Judaism and Islam are discussed in H. Davidson, Proofs fo r Eternity, Creation a n d the Existence o f God in Medieval Islamic a n d Jewish Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Davidson also discusses the views of the Christian philosopher John Philoponus (ca. 490-574) who was a major influence on the medieval Muslims and Jews, and subsequently the medieval Latin Christians. 60 Philoponus argues for the temporal creation of the world in his Contra Aristotelem. Fragments of this work have been collected by C. Wildeberg in Against Aristotle, on the Creation o f the World, Gthaca.- Cornell University Press, 1987). 61 Al-Kindi makes his argument in his Fial-falsafa al-uld (edited by Abu Rida in Rasd'il al-K indi al-falsaflya, (Cairo, 1950-3), 1:97-162, and translated by A. Ivry as Al-Kindi's Metaphysics, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974)). Job of Edessa makes his argument in his

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43 broader cosmological problems, arising from their contact with adherents of late Hellenism and Hellenized religions, including the problem of the eternity or the creation of the world. In the course of this encounter, the mutakallimun appropriated cosmological problems from their opponents, the solution of which required the formulation and/or appropriation of cosmologies and epistemologies on their part. Cosmology was not just a handmaiden to the theological concerns of kalam. but it was much more. Some of the early mutakallimun were, like the Presocratics, trying to formulate answers to a broad range of cosmological problems which do not seem to have a direct bearing on their polemic with their opponents, but rather have a bearing on their discussions with each other. In this sense, kalam is not pure theology. Nor is it theology with just enough cosmology so as to be able to defend Islam against its opponents. It is, instead, both a theology and a cosmology, or to be more exact, theologies and cosmologies. Without doubt, the theologies are in most cases much better developed than the cosmologies, but in some cases the cosmologies are quite well thought out. Therefore, the question of whether the use of cosmology in kalam is apologetic is, in my opinion, moot, and does not help in understanding the development of kalam cosmology. Without doubt, the cosmologies of the mutakallimun are used to support the existence of God, the creation of the world, that God has such and such attributes, the role of man as a causal agent or not, etc.. Theological concerns also play a role in Hellenistic philosophies and yet this fact does not, and for good reason, lead to questions about the use of cosmology for

Book o f Treasures.

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44 theological reasons here.62 I have, in this chapter, examined the methodological problems that are encountered by a historian of kalam cosmology. I have shown that these problems arise as a result of the nature of the surviving accounts of kalam cosmology from the late second and third periods of its development and the loss of the earliest sources. The ensuing fragmentary account of the formative period of kalam cosmology is comparable to the fragmentary account of Presocratic cosmology. However, historians of Presocratic cosmology have made much progress in reconstructing the cosmologies of the Presocratics. One reason for this lies in the firm foundation provided by the understanding of Platonic and Aristotelean cosmological doctrines. This foundation serves as basis for then evaluating the fragments of the Presocratics that are imbedded within the works of Aristotle and Plato. Therefore, the study of the cosmological doctrines of the later mutakallimun. in whose works the fragments of the earlier mutakallimun are embedded, can provide a similarly strong foundation for historians of kalam cosmology. I attempt such a study, as it relates to the doctrine of matter and its attributes in the second section of this dissertation. Another reason for the success of historians of Presocratic cosmology lies in the explicit mention by Aristotle and Plato of the underlying research program of Presocratic cosmology, namely the one-many problem, and the pbysis problem. I have therefore argued that the discovery of a similar research program that underlies kalam cosmology can substantially aid the efforts of historians of kalam cosmology, for it allows them to sift through the surviving fragments and order their development as well as direct their attention to problem areas that are intrinsic to the subject matter of

62 Obvious examples of this are the Unmoved mover in Aristotle, or Plato’s demiurge.

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45 kalam cosmology. Since there is no statement of the research program of kalam cosmology on the lines of Aristotle’s and Plato’s account of the research program of Presocratic cosmology, historians of kalam need to uncover such a research program by other means. In this chapter, I have attempted to uncover such a research program by discussing the place of cosmology in kalam and showing that the “difficult” questions of kalam refer mostly to cosmological questions which fall under the domain of reason and not revelation. Next, I examined the role of such cosmological questions in kalam and argued that it cannot be dismissed as apologetic and therefore that cosmology serves as a “handmaiden” to the more properly theological aspects of kalam. This is clear from the controversies between the mutakallimun themselves over cosmological questions. The titles of the cosmological works of these early mutakallimun reveal three grand cosmological problems: the problem of the attributes and properties of things; the problem of the nature of man; and the problem of causation. Since the mutakallimun’s involvement with these problems was within the context of appropriation from, and debate with partisans of other cosmologies, it is quite useful to examine the earliest accounts of the kalam perspective of the cosmologies of their opponents. Such an examination, which is the subject of the next chapter, permits us to discern the mutakallimun’s knowledge of, interest in, and response to the cosmologies of their Hellenized neighbors.

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Chapter Two: The cosm ological discussions o f the early mutakallimun w ith Dualists and Natural Philosophers In the previous chapter, I have reviewed Ibn al-Nadim’s list of the works of the early mutakallimun. This list reveals the importance of the early kalam polemic with their opponents from other faiths, as well as with the “natural philosophers” who were exponents of particular Hellenistic cosmologies, for the development of early kalam cosmology. In the context of this dissertation, there are two reasons for examining the kalam account of such cosmologies. First, an examination of the earliest reports by the mutakallimun of the doctrines of their opponents, in particular of the Dualists and Natural Philosophers, allows us to determine the areas within such cosmologies which were of interest to kalam cosmologists, and which are therefore indicative of the research program of the early mutakallimun. The advantage of this approach to uncovering the questions which underlie the research program of the early mutakallimun is that the material that needs to be examined can be clearly delineated. Moreover, the material is not overwhelming, but yet covers the ground in sufficient detail. As we shall see, an examination of this material confirms that the problems of the constitution of the world, the nature of man, and the nature of causality, to which the titles of the cosmological works of the early mutakallimun in Ibn al-Nadim’s list mostly refer, are also the main topics of these reports. The second reason for examining this material is to show that the mutakallimun were the heirs of cosmological doctrines and questions which had a long tradition behind them, and that therefore, the mutakallimun’s interest in such questions was not solely apologetic. Rather, they became actively engaged in the discussion of these questions as they appropriated

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47 these cosmological doctrines and questions into kalam. The encounter o f ea rly kalam w ith D ualism The contact of kalam with the dualist sects of Manicheanism, Daysanism, and Mardonism began in as early as the early second/eighth century, perhaps in the circle of al-Hasan al-Basrl (d. 110/728), namely during the period in which the disdpline of kalam was formed. In particular, there is a report that al-Hasan’c two students, Wasil ibn ‘Ata’ (d. 131/748) and ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd (d. 144/761), the supposed founders of Mu'tazill kalam according to the later Mu'tazill tradition, were members of a discussion group which induded ‘Abd al-Karim ibn Abl al-‘Awja’ (d. 155/772), the poets Bashshar ibn Burd (d. 167/784) and Salih ibn ‘Abd al-Quddus (d. 167/784 or later), all three of whom were accused of Manicheanism, as well as an Arab from the Azdi tribe who had leanings towards the views of the Samaniya, an Indian group which espoused skeptidsm and therefore denied the possibility of any knowledge beyond that derived from the senses.1 Since Wasil 1 Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahanf, Kitdb al-Aghdnf, (Bulaq,i285 A.H.), 3:24, quoted in Vajda, “Les zindiqs," 193, note 6. ‘Abd al-Karim ibn Abf al-'Awja’ is said to have been a student of al-Hasan al-Basrf, as well as to have had discussions with the ShT'i imim Ja'far al-Sadiq and the mutakallim Hisham ibn al-Hakam. The authenticity of these reports has been questioned (see G. Vajda, "Abd al-Karim ibn Abf al-Awja’,’ Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new ed., 3:682; and the many accounts in Muhammad Biqir al-Majlisf’s B ihdr al-Anwdr, ed. J. al-Alawf & M. al-Akhundf, (Teheran,n.d.), esp. 111:31-47, which are derived from earlier sources). He was expelled from Basra and went to Kufa where he fell into the hands of the governor, Muhammad ibn Sulaymin, and was put to death. Vajda thinks that he may have actually been a Manichean (‘Les zindiqs,’ 194, 196). Bashshar ibn Burd composed some poems about Wasil, some of which are very flattering and are quoted by al-Balkhi in his M aqdldt (65-6). His later poems are quite critical of Wasil. His younger contemporary, the Mu'tazill poet Safwan ibn Safwin al-Ansirf, defends Wasil against Bashshar’s criticism in his poems and contests the Manichean idea of the superiority of fire over earth, which he associates with Bashshar ibn Burd, calling him a Daysinite (see Ch. Pellat, Le m ilieu Basrien et la form ation de Gdbte, (Paris, 1953), 175-178; idem, *Safwan ibn Safwan al-Ansarf et Bashshar ibn Burd," in Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, eds. R. Savory and D. Agius, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaevel Studies, 1984), 23). The circumstances surrounding Bashshar’s death are not clear. According to one account he fell victim to the vengeance of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdf’s vizier Ya'qub ibn Dawud, while another account has him executed by al-Mahdi, or turned over to the inquisition.

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48 died in 131/748, this report, if authentic, would suggest around 123/740 as the term inus ante quem for the beginning of the contact of these Manicheans with the mutakallimun. Additional evidence to support this early an encounter is provided by ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who, in his biography of Wasil, reports that wasil wrote a work against the Dualists in the form of one thousand questions. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Jabbar also preserves a report which states that when Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128/746) was questioned by the Manicheans of Khurasan and could not answer them correctly, he wrote to Wasil who in turn supplied him with the correct responses.2 This last report may be apocryphal, but it is reflective of the increasing contacts between the mutakallimun with Dualist sects at the end of the Umayyad period. The relationship between the Muslims and these Dualist sects deteriorated to its lowest point during the early Abbasid period when the accusation of zandaoa or heresy was levied against a multitude of persons with very heterogeneous beliefs, in large part for political reasons.3 The Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdi (reigned 158-169/775-785) initiated the inquisition of the zanadiqa in 163/780, and appointed the muhtasib ‘Abd al-Jabbar to the position of the

Vajda, however supports the former account (Vajda, "Les zindiqs,’ 201-2). Bashshar may not have been a teal Manichean, but his skeptical outlook may have led to the accusation of zandaqa (see Monnot, Penseurs M usulmans, 66). Not much is known about SSlih ibn ‘Abd al-Quddus. The sources are even unclear regarding the date of his death. Goldziher ('SJlih b. ‘Abd al-Kuddus und das Zindfkum wahrend der Regierung des Chalifen al-Mahdr,’ in Transactions o f the N inth International Congress o f Orientalists, ed. E. Morgan, (London, 1893), 11:109) states that he was hanged by al-Mahdi, while Sezgin points out that some sources place his death later in the reign of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid QGeschichte des Arabiscben Schriftums, (Leiden: Brill, 1975), II:46l). The skepticism of the Samaniya, i.e. their doctrine of gross sensualism, is sometimes also attributed to some Manicheans (Vajda, “Les zindiqs,’ 200-1, footnote 6). 2 Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl, 165. 3 Vajda, ’Les zindiqs,* 173.

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49 inquisitor (sahib al-zanadiqa). charging him to arrest all the zindlas. Some of them were executed and their books were burned. In the following years, the persecution of the Dualists became more systematic. They were arrested en masse and imprisoned. They were then brought before the inquisitor or the Caliph for an investigation. If they were found to be zindiqs they were given the choice of repenting and converting to Islam, or, if they refused, execution.4 The historian al-Mas‘udI (d. 345/956) tells us that al-Mahdi even recruited the mutakallimun into the crusade against the Dualists. He states: He [al-Mahdi] went to an extreme in putting heretics and apostates to death, because they emerged in his day and promulgated their beliefs during his Caliphate. [This occurred] when the books of M2ni, Ibn Days8n, and Marcion which ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Muqaflfa‘ and others had translated from Persian and Pahlavi into Arabic became widespread, and when Ibn Abi ‘Awja’, Hammad ‘Ajrad, Yahya ibn Ziyad, and MutT ibn Iyas had written works which endorsed Manicheanism, Dayslnism, and Marcionism. For this reason, heretical tendencies (zandaqa) flourished and their views spread amongst the common people. Al-Mahdi was the first Caliph who commanded the dialecticians, who belonged to the community of scholars, who were partisans of the mutakallimun Camara 1-jadalivyin min ahli l-bahth* min al-mutakallimin). to write works against the heretics whom w e have mentioned, that is the unbelievers and others. Therefore the mutakallimun set up arguments (barahln) against those who were skeptical (al-mu‘5nidln) and put to rest the objections of the heretics. They thus clearly set out the truth to the unbelievers (al-sharikinl.S

4 Vajda, *Les zindiqs," 183-4. 5 al-Mas'udt, M uniJal-dhabab wa m a'ddin al-Jawbar, ed. C. Pellat, (Beirut, 1966-1979), 5:212. The poet Ham m id ‘Ajrad is well known for his impiety, and Vajda considers he may have been a Manichean, perhaps holding a high office in the Manichean hierarchy. He was put to death for political reasons by Muhammad ibn Sulaymin, the governor of Basra in 155/772 or 156/773 or 161/778 or 168/784 (Vajda, *Les zindiqs,’ 206, n. 3). The poets MutT' ibn Iyis and Yahya ibn Ziyid al-Hirithl were friends and were both accused o f zandaqa. Muff' was put to death in the reign of the Caliph al-Hadf in 169/785. Yahya

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50 Despite a brief respite during the reign of al-Ma'mun, the persecution of the Dualists continued. By the late tenth century, the author Ibn al-Nadim knew only five Manicheans in Baghdad, whereas during the middle of the tenth century, he had known three hundred.6 As al-Mas‘u d i’s report states, some of the major literary personalities of this period were accused of being Dualists. The mutakallimun's response to this situation was in large part shaped by the thinly disguised Manichean tract of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (put to death by the al-Mansur in 139/756) in which he had attacked the major tenets of Islam, namely, creation ex nihilo. prophecy, God’s justice, the anthropomorphism in the Qur’an, etc., as well as by the translation by him and others of Manichean, Daysanite, and Marcionite works, and their open advocacy of these faiths.7 Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, who spent his life mostly between Kufa and Basra, is considered to have been one of the leaders of the Dualists, along with Bashshar ibn Burd, Hammad ‘Ajrad, and other men of letters.8

died earlier, in the reign of al-Mahdi (158/775-169/785) (Sezgin, CAS, 11:467-8; Vajda, “Les zindiqs," 210-4). The relationship between the Abbasid Caliphate and the mutakallimun may date back even earlier, to the days of the Abbasid Revolution. Shlomo Pines has shown that the term “mutakallim" was used for Abbasid propagandists in his “A Note on the early meaning of the term M utakallim,* Israel Oriental Studies, 1(1971), 224-240. 6 Ibn al-Nadim, Fibrist, 401. 7 The same kind of objections that were raised by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ were later the main themes of the works of the renegade Mulazilis Abu Is a al-Warraq and Ibn al-Riwandf during the later half o f the third/ninth century. Both were accused of becoming Manicheans, and were the targets of kalam polemics. 8 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mugbnf, 5:9; F. Gabrielli, “Ibn al-Mukaffa'* in Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new ed., 3:883. Hammad ‘Ajrad was a virulent opponent of Bashshar ibn Burd and wrote satirical verses against him (See above, note 8; Vajda, “Les zindiqs,* 206, n. 3; F. Sezgin, GAS, IL469). Ibn al-Muqaffa: may have been acquainted with the other accused Dualist—Ibn Abi al-‘Awja\ A report which claims that they were together in Mecca has been preserved by al-Majlfsi, B ib fr al-Anwar, 3:42.

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51 He was probably acquainted with the mutakallimun in these centers, or at least, as al-Mastidr’s report states, his work was known to them.9 Ibn al-Muqaffa"s Manichean tract has not come down to us in its original form, but fragments of it survive in a refutation by the Zaydi, al-QSsim ibn Ibrahim (d. 246/860).10 In this work, Ibn al-Muqaffa' had argued for the eternity of matter, asserting that “the generation of a thing from nothing is unimaginable (!& vaqumu ft 1-wahmi lahu mithalun), and whatever is unimaginable is impossible.”11 This fragment of his argument indicates that Ibn al-Muqaffa' was trying to present a philosophical argument for the belief in the eternity of the two principles of light

9 Ibn al-Muqaffa' had his own views on the role of the religious scholars ('‘ulama’-) in the emerging Abbasid state. In his Risdla f t al-Sahdba, he had advocated the establishment of an absolutist political system to the Caliph (probably al-Mansur). The Caliph was to be the head of a theocratic state in which the religious scholars Pulama’1 formed a state-instituted and financed hierarchy—a system which was modeled on that of the pre-Islamic Sassanids Emperors (F. Gabrielli, "Ibn al-Mukaffa'," 3:884). The mutakallimun were therefore to be employees of the state. However, as Pines points out, the mutakallimun had been employed by the Abbasids even earlier, before the formation of the Abbasid state, to disseminate propaganda during the Abbasid revolution (see above, note 5). 10 M. Guidi, La lotta tra I'Islam e ilM anicheismo: Un libro di Ibn al-M uqaffa' contro il Corano con/utato da al-Qdsim b. Ibrdbfm , (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1927). Hereafter referred by the title and pagination of the Arabic text, al-Radd 'aid al-zindfq a l-la fn Ibn al-M uqaffa'. Vajda, while accepting the fragments al-Qasim attributes to Ibn al-Muqaffa' to be incontestably Manichean, denies their attribution to Ibn al-Muqaffa* ("Les zindiqs," 228); F. Gabrieli, however, considers them to b e authentic ("Ibn al-Mukaffa'," 3:885). Van Ess has recently reviewed this contested attribution in the light of new evidence, but does not reach a definite conclusion in his "Some fragments of the M u'dradatal-Q ur’d n attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa'" in Studio Arabica et Islamica: Festschrift fo r Ihsdn 'Abbds on bis sixtieth birthday, ed. Wadad al-Qadi, (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981), 151-16311 al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim, al-Radd, 44.

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52 and darkness, which was normally stated in the form of a cosmogonic myth.12 This is not surprising. After all, Ibn al-Muqaffa"s family had been very prominent in the pre-Islamic Sassanid court, which had come under Hellenistic influences and which had even provided refuge to the philosophers Damascius and his pupil Simplicius when the Emperor Justinian had closed the Academy in Athens in 529.13 It is therefore likely that his family was acquainted with late Hellenistic philosophy. In addition, Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ himself, or, as some historians conjecture, his son Muhammad, is credited with the first translation of Aristotle’s Poetics, On Interpretation, Categories, and Prior Analytics, from Greek or Syriac into Arabic.14 Finally, the Dualist s e a of Daysanism had come under Hellenistic philosophical influences much more so than had Ibn al-Muqaffa"s own Manichean sect, and may even have been the immediate source for Ibn al-Muqaffa"s argument for the eternity of matter. The Hellenization of Bardaisan is evident in his Book o f the laws o f countries, as well as in the fragments of his views which are 12 Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s dissatisfaction with Manichean cosmogonic myths is attested by a report in ‘Abd al-Jabbar which rtates, "He [al-Misma'f] mentioned that Ibn al-Muqaffa“s own view was that he held that light had only sought to regulate darkness and to mingle with it because this would lead to a more suitable outcome for light. He denied the absurd myths (aqasfs) about the conflict between the two principles which were related by the Manicheans” (M ughnf, 5:20). These myths are preserved in Arabic sources and have been synthesized by B. Dodge in “Mam and the Manichaens," in Medieval a n d M iddle Eastern Studies in Honor o f A z iz Suryal Attiya, ed. S. Hanna, (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 91-93). 13 I. Hadot, *La vie et l’oeuvre de Simplicius d ’apr&s des sources Grecques et Arabes," in Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survte.- Actes du colloque Internationale de Paris (28 S ep t.-ler Oct. 1985), ed. Ilsetraut Hadot, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 8-9. Another bastion of Hellenism within the Sassanid Empire was the Christian school at Nisibis. As Hadot says, ‘Le Perse a done r&uni pendant une certaine pferiode toutes les conditions favorables auxquelles nos philosophes pouivaient aspirer: la tolerance en matidre religieuse et un centre de culture grecque.”

14 F. Gabrieli, *Ibn al-Mukaffa',’ 3:883; F.E. Peters, Aristotelus Arabus, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968,11. Paul Kraus challenged the ascription of the translations o f Aristotle’s logical works to Ibn al-Muqaffa', favoring instead their ascription to his son Muhammad, in his *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa',’ Rivisita degli Studi Qrieruali, 14(1933), 1-14.

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53 preserved in St. Ephrem’s (d. 373 A.D.) refutation of Daysanism, Manicheanism, and Marcionism.15 Earh kalam accounts o f Dualist cosmologies To reconstruct Dualist cosmological doctrines in the middle of the eighth century in the Muslim heartlands, and in particular as they were understood by the early mutakallimun is a challenging task. In the first place, the Dualist discussion was usually in the form of cosmogonic myths and not in the form of a philosophical cosmology. The response of the early mutakallimun to the Dualists was thus in large part shaped by the cosmogonic myths of the latter. Moreover, in the cases where there are glimpses of underlying cosmological theories, the preserved accounts of the theories of matter and its attributes of these cosmologies are contradictory, reflecting differences of opinion among the various Dualist sects, as well as among the individual members of the sects.16 The kalam accounts of Dualist cosmology which are preserved in ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Ibn al-Nadim, al-MSturidl, and al-Shahrastani are based primarily on accounts by earlier third/ninth century writers. An analysis of these earlier reports in turn reveals the diversity of opinion among the Dualists on cosmological questions.17 Even though later accounts of the views of the Dualists are sometimes

15 H. Drijvers, B ardaisan o f Edessa, (Groningen: Van Gorcum, 1966), 76 ff.; idem, ‘Bardaisan of Edessa and the Hermetica: The Aramaic philosopher and the philosophy of his time,* Jaarbericbt van bet Vooraziatiscb-Egyptiscb Genootschap, 21(1969-70), 209-210; C.W. Mitchell, S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations o f Mani, Marcion, a n d Bardaisan, (London, 1921). 16 ‘Abd al-Jabbar states that although the Dualists agree on the dual principles of light and darkness they disagree about the cosmological details (furu1) . He bases this statement on the earlier, now lost, Kitdb a l-d rd'u a al-diydndt of al-Hasan ibn Musa al-Nawbakhti (d. between 300/912 and 310/922) and the M aqdldt of al-MismaT (d. 273/891) (M ugbnf, 5:9-10). 17 G. Vajda, “Le tdmoignage d’al-Miturfdf sur la doctrine des Manich6ens, des Daysanites et des Mardonites," and "Note annexe. L’aperpu sur les sectes dualistes...du cadi ‘Abd al-Gabbar,* Arabica, 13(1966), 1-38, 113-128. Even though al-Maturidf does not name his source, Vajda argues that his account agrees with other accounts which are attributed to

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54 more embellished, the report of Abu ‘!s2 al-WarrSq (d. 247/861)18 being some fifty to eighty years prior to the fragments preserved in al-Ash‘ar! (d. 324/935) and other early surviving kalam sources (which ultimately rely mostly on al-Warr§q) is the earliest kalam account of Dualist cosmological doctrines. Abu ‘Isa’s contemporary al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim also preserves some Dualist cosmological doctrines in his refutation of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘. The fragments of al-Warraq and the account in al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim therefore are a more accurate reflection of early kalam’s knowledge of the cosmologies of the Dualists (and even of the Natural Philosophers) at the end of the second and the beginning of the third/end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth centuries than the more elaborate and embellished versions found in later kalam works. These fragments, as they relate to the Manicheans and the Daysanites, will thus be the main sources for the discussion of Dualist cosmologies here. ‘Abd al-Jabbar preserves extensive quotations from al-Warraq’s account of the Manicheans in volume five of the M ugbni which is devoted to a refutation of

al-Warraq. An earlier account of Dualist doctrines can be found in the al-Kitdb al-awsat Jt al-maqdldt of al-Nashf al-Akbar (d. 293/906). This text survives in a later rescension in the form of a collection of fragments of the original text collated by al-Saff Abu al-Fada’il ibn al-‘Assal (d. before 1260 A.D.). This later collection has been edited in by Josef van Ess as Frtibe M ulazuitiscrje Hdresiographie, (Beirut; Franz Steiner, 1971). The discussion of Dualist cosmological views in the surviving fragments is particularly poor, but this may reflect the interests of the later al-SafT and not necessarily those of the author al-Nashf. Another early source is the Kitdb al-Hayawdn of the Mu'tazill" al-Jlhiz. He reports some of the cosmological views of the Dualists on the authority of his teacher Abu Ishaq al-Nazzam. Even though his account is not as complete as the account of al-Warriq, it illustrates the points of contention between the early mutakallimun and the Dualists. 18 The sources are not in agreement about al-Warriq’s death date. Stem prefers the earlier 247/861 (Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new ed., 1:130; see also W.M. Watt, *Abu 'Isa Mohammad ibn Hirun al-Warraq,* Encyclopedia Iranica, 1:325-6), in which case the M aqdldt must have been composed somewhat earlier, before al-Warraq’s turning away from Mu'tazill kalam.

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55 the doctrines of the Dualists, Magians, Christians, and Sabians. He, however, begins his account of the Manicheans with a report by a somewhat later source, namely al-Hasan ibn al-MOsS al-Nawbakhti (d. 300-310/912-922), which serves to introduce Dualist cosmology in general, even though its stated context is specific to the Manicheans: The Manicheans (who are the followers of ManI), according to the report of al-Hasan ibn Musa [al-Nawbakhtrl, believed that the world (‘Slam) is composed of two things—light and darkness. They are eternal, they always have been and will always be. They denied the temporal creation (huduth) of anything, whether as a result of artifice (sina‘a) or composition (tarklb). except out of an eternal principle. They said, “We only believe in [the existence ofl two sensible objects, two powers, two objects of perception, two audible objects, and two visible objects. They are opposites (mukhtalifan) with regards to [their] soul (nafs) and form (sura), and they are contraries (mutadaddSn) with regards to [theirl activity (fi‘D and governance (tadbir). The substance of light is virtuous and good, characterized by clarity and purity, a pleasant perfume, and is beautiful to behold. Its soul (nafs) is good, generous, and beneficient. All good, righteousness, and happiness derive from its action. There is no evil or harm in it at all. [On the other hand,] the substance of darkness is the contrary of this, namely, defective, filthy, stinking, and ugly. Its soul is evil, with a stupid, harmful, foul imagination. Every evil, harm, sorrow, and corruption arises from it.”19 After describing these general features of Dualist cosmology on the basis of al-Nawbakhti’s account, ‘Abd al-Jabbar then turns to the report of Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq for details. Al-Warraq’s report specifies the view of the majority of the Manicheans regarding the spatial extent and domains of the two principles of light and darkness, namely that light was initially on top and extended without limit

19 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, M ugbnf, 5:10.

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56 towards the north, while darkness was at the bottom and extended without limit towards the south. Other Manicheans held different views on the spatial domains of the two principles. In addition, the Manicheans also disagreed regarding the boundary between the domains of light and the darkness, some of them believing that the two domains were contiguous, while others held that they were separated by a fissure.20 Al-Warraq then describes the Manichean view of the constitution of the world from these two principles, after light and darkness had intermingled: Tne Manicheans claimed that each one of the two [principles] consists of five kinds (ajnSs), four of which are bodies (abdari). For light, these are: fire (nar), light (nur), wind (rlh), and water Cma’). while the fifth is spirit (tiih), which is breath (nasiml. The breath moves within these bodies. The bodies of darkness are: conflagration (hang), darkness (zulm al hot wind Csamum). and fog (dabab-). Its spirit is smoke (dukhan-) and they call it hamm3ma.21 They claimed that the bodies of light are each different, but they all share in being light. The spirit of light does not cease to provide sustenance to its bodies while its bodies provide sustenance to it. The spirit of darkness, however, is harmful to its bodies, and its bodies are harmful to it. He [al-Warraq] related that the five kinds are black, white, red, yellow, and green. The white which is in the realm of light is good while the white which is the realm of darkness is evil. The two [principles] have five senses (hawSss-). Those which are in light are good, while those which are in darkness are evil. Most of them claimed that the bodies22 and spirits (arwah-) are living and sensing. However, some of them believed that [only] the two spirits are alive and that the bodies of light have a pure life, not the life of the senses and differentiation (tamvlz-). Moreover, [they believed that] the bodies of darkness and their kinds are corrupt and lifeless.23

20 Ibid. 21 For the use of this term see Vajda, *Le t£moignage,* 18-21. 22 reading abdan for ainas. 23 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, M ugbnf, 5:11.

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57 It is clear from this account that the Manicheans divided the constituents of the sensible world into ten kinds of objects, five of them being of light, and five of darkness. They also identified each pentad with the five colors of black, white, red, yellow, and green. Furthermore, they regarded some of these to be alive. While the formation of the other non-visual qualities of sensible objects is not apparent in this account, it would seem that the Manicheans equated qualities (like color) with bodies and therefore considered qualities to be corporeal. However, as I will show later, they were not in unanimous agreement on this point. On the other hand, the Daysanite view of the two principles and the sensible world they constitute is radically different. Al-Warraq reports: The Daysanites, like the Manicheans, claimed that [all] things are constituted from the two principles. Moreover, they claimed that light is alive (haw ), powerful (qadirl knowing (‘aliml sensing (hassas). perceiving (darrgk). and is responsible for action (fiT) and motion (haraka). Darkness is lifeless (mawat). weak (‘ajiza)r ignorant (jahila), and motionless CrSkida). It cannot act nor is it capable of differentiation (la tamviz& ma‘ah5). Evil arises from it naturally (tiba'an). They claimed that light is perceiving and seeing. Moreover, its hearing is its vision and [so on for] the rest of its senses. One says “hearing” or “vision” not because they are actually different, but only because of the difference in the composition (tarklb) [of the senseobject] and not because they [i.e. hearing or vision] are actually different. They claimed that colors are tastes and they are odors. One finds it [i.e. the object of sense] to be a color only because darkness has mixed with it in a particular manner, while one finds it to be a taste because darkness has mixed with it in a different manner. Their theory regarding the colors of darkness, its tastes, and odors is similar.24 Therefore, according to al-Warriq, the Daysanites rejected the Manichean

24 Ibid., 5=16-7.

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58 pentadic division of light and darkness as well as the spirits of light and darkness. 25 They regarded light to be alive and darkness to be lifeless and inert. Moreover, according to al-WarrSq, they considered the secondary qualities of color, taste, odor, and sound to be equivalent, suggesting that any distinction between these secondary qualities is due directly to a difference in the constitution of the mixture of light and darkness, which compose sensible objects. Such a conclusion is also supported by an earlier fragment on the views of the Daysanites which is reported by al-Nazzam: The Daysaniyya claim that the origin of the world is out of light and darkness. Hot and cold, color, taste, sound, and odor are results of the extent of their mixture.26 I will consider the implications of these reports for the Daysanite theory of matter and its attributes in the next section. ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s quotation of al-Warriq’s report of Manichean cosmology continues with a discussion of their view of the actions of the two principles:

25 However, according to the earlier Christian writer St. Ephrem, the Daysanites believed in the pentadic division of principles, namely light, air, fire, water, and darkness. St. Ephrem equates the elements of fire, air, water, and earth with the four qualities of hot, cold, wet, and dry, and it is quite conceivable that Bardaisan may have done the same, for it is a Stoic view (See E. Beck, ‘Bardaisan und seine Schule bei Eiphram," le Museon, 91(1978), 271-2; see also C.W. Mitchell, S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations, I:xc, I:xcvii-xcviii, H:lxxii-Ixxiii). This is not the only place where al-Warriq's account of Daysanite doctrine is in conflict with the account of St Ephraim. Whatever the reasons for this conflicting accounts (it is conceivable that the doctrines of the fourth century A.D. Daysinite may have been quite different from those of their eighth century A.D. brethren) the early kal5m understanding of Daysanite doctrine, as it is preserved by al-Warriq, is more relevant to the discussion here. Al-Warraq’s assertion of the Daysanite belief in two, and not five, principles is also found in al-Maturidf who reports, ‘The view of the Daysaniyya regarding the principles is the same as that of the Manicheans. However the Daysiniyya believe that all light is white and all darkness is black* (KU&bal-Tawhid, 163). It is quite possible that al-Matundi's report, in particular, and the reports preserved by the mutakallimun. in general, are based ultimately on al-Warraq, that is, most mutakallimun thought that the Daysanites believed in two constituent principles. 26 Abu 'Uthmin al-Jahiz, Ktidb al-HayauAn, 5:46.

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59

It has been related by Abu ‘Isa al-Warrflq that the actions CaPaD of the two souls are voluntary (ikhtivar). but their choice [of action] cannot extend beyond what is in their nature ('tab‘1127 The kalSm interest in the problem of causality underlies al-Warraq’s report of the actions of the two principles. The question of the causal efficacy of things was of great importance for the early mutakallimun and was hody debated among themselves. It was, as I shall show below, also a major topic in their discussion with the natural philosophers. The Manicheans, it seems, accepted that both light and darkness are capable of volitional acdons since both are alive. However, these actions are restricted by their natures. Presumably, this precludes darkness from committing good actions or light from bad actions. Since the Daysanites do not consider darkness to be alive, they must therefore assert, as al-Warraq reports, that its acdons are due to its nature and that only light is capable of volitional acdons. Finally, ‘Abd al-Jabbar quotes al-Warraq’s report of the Manichean theory of secondary qualities: The mutakallimun have related that they denied [the existence of] accidents (tanfl I-a‘rad*l But al-Warraq mentions in his book, and he [himself] was a Dualist, that they are divided into three groups. One group denies [the existence of] accidents, another affirms that they are real entities (vuthbituha aVanafl belonging to bodies (ajs3m). while a third claims that they are attributes (sifaO which cannot be said to be the body nor something other than the body flavuaalu hiva l-iismu aw ghavruhu).28 We shall discuss these three theories in detail in the next section. For now, on the basis of al-Warraq’s accounts of the cosmologies of the

27 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, M ugbnf, 5:11. 28 Ibid.

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60 Manicheans and Daysanites, it is dear that Dualist views on the constitution of bodies of the world, on causality, and on the attributes of bodies were of interest to the early mutakallimun. It is also dear that the early mutakallimun aware of the differences of opinion among the Dualists on these subjects. Since the Dualist belief in light as the regulator or sustainer of the cosmos directly conflicts with kalam’s view of God as its regulator and sustainer, the kalam debate with the Dualists could not be confined to ethical or theological issues alone, but had to encompass their cosmologies. However, the early mutakallimun's interest in Dualist cosmology was not only for the sake of refuting this and other tenets of Dualism. Rather, their interest in the specific theories of the primary constituents of the sensible objects of the world, causality, and the attributes of bodies reflects their own partidpation in the debate over these cosmological problems in the late second and early third/late eighth and early ninth centuries. ‘Abd al-Jabbar also preserves some of the cosmological views of individual Dualists which are very diverse, going beyond the simple Manichean versus Daysanite differences that are preserved in his quotations from al-Warraq. He states that al-Hasan ibn Musa al-Nawbakhtr had related their different views on place (makan). air (hawaO. acddents (a’rad) and other problems in his Kitab akim 'w aal-dfydrrit (which unfortunately has not survived) on the basis of the still earlier report of Abu Sa'id al-Husrl al-Sufi (d. ca. 225/840)29 without providing any examples. ‘Abd al-Jabbar does not, unfortunately, quote directly from this work. He instead reproduces the individual views of some of the “chiefs” of the Dualists from the somewhat later account of al-Misma‘I (d. 278/891):

29 Not much is known about him (see Monnot, Penseurs, 61-35-

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61

Al-Misml‘1 has related that Ibn Abl al-Awja’ held the doctrine of the Dualists, but he held the specific view that each of the two principles [of light and darkness! is divided into five senses. The sense which perceived colors is not the same as the sense which perceives tastes, while the sense that perceives tastes is not the same as the sense which perceives odors. He mentioned that Ibn al-Muqaffa' held the specific view that light had only sought to regulate (dabbara) darkness and to mingle with it because this would lead to a more suitable outcome for light. He denied the absurd myths (aqasls) about the conflict between the two principles which were related by the Manicheans. He affirmed [the existence of) motions (aqarr& bil-harakatD and that they are not the same as entities (a‘van) [in motion]. He claimed that the motion of the two realms (kawnavn) [of light and darkness! is natural (tab riw a) and the motions of light are good while the motions of darkness are evil. He mentioned that Nu'man the Dualist (he is the one who was put to death by al-Mahdi)30 held the specific view which denied [the existence of] (ankar* 1-harakata) motions in the manner of the Dualists. He claimed that bodies (ajsam) are divisible into indivisible atoms Cal-juz’ alladhi la vataiazza’^). and that the atom is a long, broad, and deep body, either of the substance (iawhar) of light or of darkness. He related that Abu Shakir [al-Daysanl (d. 180/796)]31 held the views of Ibn Days3n. He affirmed [the existence of] motion (vuthbit^ 1-harakat*). claiming that it is an attribute (sifa) of the body in motion, and that it is neither the body in motion nor is it something other than it. He denied that motion is either a thing (shav’l or a nothing (la shavO. He believed that [the predicate] “being other than" (taghayur) and the proposition (qawl) that “it is a thing” (annaha shat/ah) apply only to bodies, but that motion is not a body. HishSm ibn al-Hakam appropriated this theory of motions from him.

30 Monnot identifies Nu'man as Nu'man ibn al-Mundhir on the basis of al-Jahiz, "Hujaj al-nubuwwa," in Rasd'ilal-Jdbtz, (Cairo,1933), 145 (Penseurs, 68). Nothing is known about him. All that is certain is that he must have died during al-Mahdf’s inquisition of 163/780. 31 Not much is known about him apart from his mention in the heresiographical sources. He was imprisoned and put to death by al-Mahdf (Monnot, Penseurs, 64).

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62 He related that GhassSn al-Ruhiwi32 held the views of the Manicheans but he claimed that motions are minute bodies (airam litSD which inhere in the moving body. They are permanent entities (bSqiyat al-aV3n) which do not vanish.33 I shall examine al-MismlT’s report in much more detail in the next section. However, I would like to note the immense importance of this report. It not only illustrates the diversity of opinions of these individual Dualists on various cosmological question, but it also preserves the doctrines of matter and its attributes which were present in the late second/eighth century, namely the earliest point in the development of kalam cosmology. The report identifies some of the specific points of disagreement among the Dualists of this period, in particular on the ultimate constituents of bodies (whether they are atoms or not), and the problem of the attributes of bodies (whether they are the identical with the body or not). It therefore indicates the routes by which similar doctrines held by their contemporary, or near-contemporary mutakallimun may have been appropriated. I now turn to al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim’s report of cosmologies which deny creation ex nihilo, which is a view that he attributes to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, and in which he provides some interesting details about such cosmologies as they were known to the early mutakallimun. He states: ... those who believe that something can only come into being out of some [other] thing, and that all the things which we perceive by our senses are primordial and eternal (awwal; azalf) belong to various groups: [1] Some of them believe that generation (hadath) is coming together (ijtimflO and separation (furqa): [2] Some of them believe that it is the transformation of an entity 32 Nothing is known about him CMonnot, Penseurs, 65). 33 'Abd al-Jabbar, M ugbnf, 5:20-1.

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63 (taghawur al-‘avn~) by means of an opposite (ikhtilflf) which penetrates into it ('vadkhuluha). namely the changing [of the entity] Cmin al-taghyir); [3] Some of them believe that generation is [due to] the fact that some contrary and opposite things are [present] in other things. For example, the earth which is in water, and the water which is in earth. Because of this premise (asl), they all Ciami‘aa~) believe that everything (al-kulD is mixed in everything and that everything comes to be from everything. This is generation Chadath) and coming into being (kawn). However, because of the minuteness of the dimensions [of the parts] fsighar aqdarihfl they are invisible, insensible, and infinite in number. Every contrary is mixed with its contrary, white in black, animate in inanimate, bone in flesh, and flesh in bone. Nothing is pure and isolated. Even though this report does not mention any particular Dualists nor any of the Dualist sects, it is prompted by Ibn al-Muqaffa"s denial of creation ex nihilo. The report itself is contradictory, for in the end, the different views of the three groups are reconciled by the theory of homoiomerous parts, normally associated with the Presocratic Anaxagoras, although only the position of the third group is actually consistent with this theory. This confusion may perhaps be due to the corruption of the text or it may reflect an eclectic combination of Hellenistic doctrines or simply confusion on the part of al-Qasim. In any case, the premise that “all the things which we perceive are primordial and eternal” as well as the statement “every contrary is mixed with its contrary, white in black ...” suggests the view that holds that secondary qualities are corporeal.34 We may also note that the position of the first group is consistent with Atomism while the position of the second group is consistent with the position of the Peripatetics and

34 This was also the position which Anaxagoras seems to have held (Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 372).

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64 Neoplatonists. Dualist theories o f matter a n d its attributes It is dear from the early kal3m accounts which have been quoted above, as well as from reports in other kalim works, which do not for the most part indicate their sources and have not therefore been discussed here, that the Dualists who were the contemporaries of the early mutakallimun held a variety of views regarding the constitution of matter and of bodies and their attributes. Obviously, they all agreed that light and darkness were the two material principles from which the world and the objects therein are formed. However, they seem to have differed about everything else. Thus with regard to the nature of these material prindples, it is clear that Nu'man was an atomist and believed that they were atomic in their constitution. Yet almost none of the other Dualists were atomists. Moreover, they differed about the kinds of these two material principles. The Manicheans believed that there were five kinds of light and five kinds of darkness, while the Daysanites are said to have believed in only one kind of light and one kind of dark ness. 35 The categorization of the two material principles into these various kinds was in turn of consequence for their theories about the attributes of the objects constituted from these principles. Thus, those who believed in five kinds for the principles of light and darkness equated them to five colors, or even to the four elements (or bodies) of fire, water, wind, and light, and the fifth element of spirit or pneuma for the principle of light, and the four elements of conflagration, fog, hot wind, and darkness and the fifth element of smoke for the principle of darkness. Although this theory of the five kinds of

35 According to St. Ephraim, however, Mani believed in only one kind of evil while Bardaisan believed in five kinds (see Drijvers,137 and note 25 above).

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65 light and the five kinds of darkness is very different from the classical Stoic doctrine of the elements of fire, water, air, earth, and pneuma, it is nevertheless reminiscent of the latter (in particular because the secondary quality of color is considered to be corporeal). It suggests that the Stoic theory may have been approproiated by the Manicheans and transformed into their pentadic scheme. Stoic influences may also, as we shall see, have influenced the Dualists’ theory of the attributes of these principles and the bodies they constitute, but the kalgm accounts of this are somewhat confused. Thus, al-Ash’ari, for instance, tells us that the Manicheans held that bodies (ajsSm) were constituted by the two principles (as]) of light and darkness, and that each of them was of five kinds: black, white, yellow, green, and red. So far, his report agrees with al-Warraq’s account as it is preserved by ‘Abd al-Jabbar. Al-Ash‘arl, however, then adds that the Manicheans could not conceive of a body except as such (wa annahum la va'qiluna jjsmaa ilia ma kana kadhalika). This suggests that they considered color to be a primary attribute of any body, or in other words that the attribute of color was itself corporeal. Al-Ash‘ari further reports that they denied the existence of accidents (wa annahum d3nu bi-btali l-a‘radD.36 It follows, then, that in his view, the Manicheans believed that all secondary qualities were corporeal, which is a well-known Stoic doctrine. Elsewhere, al-Ash'arl presents a report by al-Warraq on the Dualist view of accidents which is in agreement with ‘Abd al-Jabb2r’s quotation of al-Warraq,

36 al-Ash'an, Maqdldt, 349. But as ‘Abd al-Jabbar states, the mutakallimun who claim that the Manicheans denied the existence of accidents failed to acknowledge that the Manicheans were not unanimous on this question. Drijvers’ reconstruction of the views of Bardaisan is in agreement with al-Ash‘a n ’s report of the Manicheans, except that al-Ash‘arT does not specify their theory of the matter of the four elements, namely whether it was atomic as Bardaisan held (see below, 71-3).

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66 namely, that there were three theories of attributes among the Manicheans, and that only one of them denied the existence of accidents. But al-Ash‘ari’s report specifies that they denied the accidents of motion, rest and “other actions” and not accidents in general as in ‘Abd al-Jabbir’s citation of al-WarrSq. Al-Ash'arl states: Abu ‘Isa. al-Warraq related that among the Dualists, some affirm that the accidents (a'rad) of motion, rest and other actions (sa’ir al-aPal) are not bodies; some claim that they are attributes (sifat) of bodies which are neither bodies nor something other than bodies CIS hiv* al-aisamu wa la ghavruha): while others denied and refuted their existence (nafaha w* ahtalaha) claiming that there is no motion, no rest, nor action apart from the two principles.37 It is therefore possible that when ‘Abd al-Jabbar states that “they are divided into three groups" he has the Dualists in general in mind, and not the Manicheans in particular, as the context would suggest. This would then agree with al-Ash‘arI’s report. But the two accounts are still quite different, for the question of whether the divergent views regarding attributes encompass all accidents, as in ‘Abd al-Jabbar, or whether they only include the accidents of “motion, rest and other actions,” as in al-Ash‘arI, still remains. For Aristotle, local motion or change of place is one of six kinds of change. Change can apply to substance, in which case it is generation and corruption, or change can apply to accidents. In the later case, when the accidents belong to the category of quantity, the change is increase or diminution; and when the accidents belong the category of quality, the change is alteration. Finally, change can apply to place (which to Aristotle is a continuous quantity), in which case it is local motion. As such, motion itself is a process and is not thus considered to be an accident. It

37 al-Ash‘arf, Maqdldt, 349.

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67 is therefore neither substance nor accident, even though there can be no motion independent of them both.38 The problem of the category to which change or motion belongs occupied Aristotle's commentators for many centuries. Some considered motion to be a continuously changing form, and as such, belonging to the same category as that of the kind of change. Local motion would then be a continuously changing form in the category of place. Others thought that motion, rest, and other actions, were actions upon bodies (which are then affected by them). Motion would, in this case, be an accident belonging to the category of affection. Both of these views on the category to which motion belongs affirm the existence of accidents as incorporeal entities inhering in bodies.39 Most mutakallimun disagreed with this Aristotelian view of motion as a process and instead regarded motion as just another accident, like color, inhering in the body. However, they were then faced with the problem of drawing distinctions between sensible qualities, for example the accidents of color, odor and taste, and actions, for example the accidents of motion and rest which they considered to be insensible.

38 Aristotle does not anywhere discuss whether motion is a body or an accident. This kind of analysis is alien to his conception of change as a process. In his discussion of change in Categories (ch. 14, 15al-15bl6), he states that motion is the contrary of remaining the same state. Thus local motion or change of place is the contrary of staying in the same place. Since contraries are what are received by substance which is thereby differentiated, it may be possible then to consider motion as a form, and as such, an accident However, the view that motion is a predicate of the body in motion and as such is neither body nor accident is, in my opinion, more in accord with Aristotle. 39 Alexander of Aphrodisias had discussed the relationship of motion to form, and how motion belongs to the more general category of action (see "Maqalat al-Iskandar fr al-sura wa annaha tamam al-haraka wa kam iluhi ‘H i ra’y Aristu" and *Maq3Jat al-Iskandar ff anna al-fi‘1 a’ammu min al-haraka ‘ala ra’y Aristu" in A rista 'indai-'am b, ed. ‘A Badawf, (Cairo, 1947), 289-90, 293-4). This problem continued to be discussed by the falasifa. and the formulations of Ibn S fni and Ibn Rushd were very influential in the Latin Middle Ages (see A. Maeir, "The Nature of Motion," in On the Threshold o f Exact Science: Selected Writings o f Anneliese M ater on Late M edieval Natural Philosophy, ed. & tr. S. Sargent, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 21-39).

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68 Clearly any of the three reported Dualist views on the status of secondary qualities, namely, that they are accidents exist which inhere in bodies, or that accidents do not exist and therefore secondary qualities are themselves bodies, or that secondary qualities are attributes of bodies and as such are not distinct entities in themselves, may be confined to sensible qualities only and does not entail adopting the corresponding view regarding the insensible qualities of motion, rest, and other actions. These two positions, though related, are logically distinct. They are related because if one denies the existence of accidents, one cannot then affirm that motions are accidents. However, one can affirm that accidents exist and yet consider motion to be an attribute of a body, and as such, neither body nor accident. Secondary qualities are incorporeal accidents The first theory of attributes, then, is the one which affirms the existence of accidents and therefore holds that secondary qualities like color, taste, etc. are incorporeal. This group of Dualists, according to al-Warraq, affirm “that accidents are real entities (av'an') belonging to bodies.” In al-Ash'ari’s more specific report, those who affirm the existence of motion, rest and other acdons as accidents also believe that these accidents are not bodies. Thus, affirming that “accidents are real entities belonging to bodies" must entail affirming that they are not themselves bodies, but rather are incorporeal. It follows then, that denying accidents does not mean denying the existence of the secondary qualities of things, but rather it means denying that accidents are incorporeal and consequently affirming that they are “bodies,” or in other words that accidents are corporeal. Denying accidents is therefore equivalent to the Stoic view that all secondary qualities are corporeal. Correspondingly, affirming the existence of motions entails that motions are

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69 incorporeal, while denying motions entails that they are corporeal (and is not an endorsement of the Eleatic denial of motion and change). Al-MismSTs account of the characteristic views of the Dualists mentions that Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ affirmed the existence of motions. It therefore follows that he must have also affirmed the existence of accidents, for to affirm the existence of motion is to affirm that it is an accident. Since Ibn al-MuqafFa‘ may have been a translator of Aristotle, it is not surprising that he should affirm the existence of accidents, albeit for Aristotle motion is not an accident but a process. However, the report that Ibn al-MuqafTa‘ believed motion to be an accident may reflea the kalam understanding of motion as an accident inhering in a body, or it may reflect a late Hellenistic position on the ontological status of motion. Neither :Abd al-Jabbar nor any other kalam sources mention any Dualist who adopted the position which affirms the existence of accidents but yet denies that motions were accidents. This logical possibility does not seem to have been contemplated by the Dualists (nor by the mutakallimun). Secondary qualities are corporeal The second theory of attributes is the one which denies the existence of accidents and therefore, like the Stoics, holds that secondary qualities are corporeal. Al-Ash‘arl states that the Manicheans held such a theory. Al-Warraq’s account of the Manichean theory of the five bodies of light and darkness and their correspondence with colors40 (as also the account of al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim) also suggests that the Manicheans held secondary qualities to be corporeal. These

40 Al-MismaT attributes the denial of accidents to the Dualists in general in his report on the individual views of Nu'man (see above, 61), but this is inaccurate as ‘Abd al-Jabbar recognizes (see above, 59).

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70 accounts do not explain how these Manicheans accounted for other secondary qualities besides color, but the Manichean denial of accidents entails that these other secondary qualities must also be corporeal. The theory of the corporeality of secondary qualities was also held by the Daysanites. This is clear from al-Warraq’s report of their doctrines in which they are reported to have equated the secondary qualities of color, taste, odor, and sound. Furthermore, the Daysanites are said to maintain that any distinction between these secondary qualities is due to differences in the mixture of light with darkness (which is in agreement with al-Nazzam’s report), and therefore it follows that these qualities are not the results of the inherence of an incorporeal accidents in bodies. Rather, the secondary qualities are themselves corporeal, for they are the result of the mixture of the two corporeal entities of light and darkness. The Daysanites thus agree with those Manicheans who deny the existence of accidents and as a result consider secondary qualities to be corporeal. Both these groups, then, represent the Stoic view that accidents are corporeal and are therefore bodies. But the Daysanites further consider mixture to be the cause for the generation of secondary qualities which, as I shall show later, is also the view of some natural philosophers with pronounced Stoic leanings.41 The corresponding position on motion, namely, denying that motion is an incorporeal accident and affirming that it is corporeal is attributed by al-MismaT to Nu’man the Dualist and GhassSn al-RuhawI, who believed that motions were subtle bodies. Nu’man’s view raises interesting questions, particularly because of his belief in atomism Was his view that motion is corporeal due to a

41 See al-Warraq’s account of the views of the Natural Philosophers (below, 86 ff.) and the following analysis.

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71 misunderstanding of Greek atomism? After all, in Greek atomism, atoms have the primary qualities of size, shape, hardness, and weight, and in addition, in Epicurean atomism, atoms are always in motion and thus have the additional primary quality of motion. Moreover, all secondary qualities are considered to be the result of the combination and arrangement of atoms. Hence, Nu'man’s denial that motion is an accident is consistent with Epicurean atomism, because it is not a secondary quality, but a primary quality. In addition, his belief that the atom is a long, broad, and deep body, and consequently having extension, is also consistent with Greek atomism. The view of Nu‘m2n may thus represent the influence of Epicurean atomism. If, on the other hand, by his denial of motion he means no more than to maintain that motion is corporeal and not an accident, that is, he rejects both, the Greek atomists’ theory that secondary qualities are a result of the combination of atoms, and the further Epicurean view that motion is a primary quality of all atoms, then his view would represent an eclectic combination of the Stoic theory of qualities and the Atomist view of matter. Such an eclectic position is also attributed to the Dualist Bardaisan, who, according to the heresiographer St. Ephrem, not only believed in the four atomic elements of wind, light, fire, and water, but also (according to both St. Ephrem and Sergius of Resh ‘Aina (d. 536 A.D.)) believed that the qualities of bodies are themselves corporeal.42 In his study of Bardaisan, H. Drijvers reconstructs BardaisSn’s theory of matter and its attributes as follows:

42 St. Ephrem's treatise ’Against Bardaisan’s D om nus' is almost entirely devoted to a critique of Bardaisan's naive Stoicism that made all entities, even thoughts (or ‘notions’) and dimensions like length, breadth, and height, corporeal (see C.W. Mitchell, S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations, II:i-xxii); G. Furlani, "Sur le stoicisme de Bardesane d ’fedesse," Archiv Orientalni, 1X0937), 350; Drijvers, Bardaisan, 137,164.

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72

The elements are of an atomic nature, so their mingling is not a collision of bodies, but the mingling of atoms, which in all kinds of proportions can produce new bodies. These atomic elements each have a different color: light is white, fire red, wind blue, and water green ... As each of the elements has its own color, so it has also its own odor, taste, form and sound, corresponding to the five senses of man 43 This reconstruction succeeds in clarifying what it means for the secondary qualities of color, taste, form, and sound to be corporeal and yet at the same time atomic. Furthermore, it suggests how differences in mixture can account for differences in secondary qualities. Even though early kalSm’s view of Bardaisan’s own views (as it survives in the fragments I have examined above) is quite different and does not mention a Days2nite atomistic theory of matter nor an atomic account of secondary qualities, it is not entirely incompatible with the theory that Drijvers attributes to Bardaisan. In any case Nu'man’s view on matter and its attributes is very similar to Drijver’s reconstruction of Bardaisan’s theory of matter. It quite conceivable, therefore, that Nu'man’s views may derive ultimately from the tradition of Bardaisan. But Nu'man’s belief in the corporeality of secondary qualities and his atomism can only be partially, and not fully, reconciled with Bardaisan’s position. Drijvers’ reconstruction of Bardaisan cannot explain, nor even suggest how to explain, the fact that Nu'man considers the secondary quality of motion also to be corporeal. This difficulty arises as a result of the Stoic belief in the corporeality of all qualities.44 It is, nevertheless, conceivable that Bardaisan,

43 Drijvers, Bardaisan, 137. See the discussion in E. Beck, ‘Bardaisan und seine schule". 44 Richard Sorabji has argued that the Stoic position that attributes are corporeal does not mean that they are bodies, but rather that they are dispositions of bodies (.Matter, Space, a n d Motion: Theories in Antiquity a n d their Sequel, (Ithaca: Cornell, 1988), 89-93) Therefore, since motion is a disposition of the body, one could argue that it is corporeal in the same sense as color. While Nu'man’s view of motion can be interpreted in this manner, it is more difficult to see how Ghasskn’s position that motions are subtle bodies can be considered to imply that

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73 or someone else from his school, considered all qualities to be corporeal along Stoic lines, including the qualities of motion, rest, and other actions, and that such a reading of Stoicism may ultimately be responsible for a doctrine in which motion is held to be corporeal. In any case, Bardaisan’s eclectic views are of great importance for the development of kalam cosmologies. Both the kalam cosmology which believed in an atomistic theory of matter and maintained further that qualities were incorporeal accidents which inhered in these atoms, as well as the kalam cosmology which held that secondary qualities were corporeal are compatible with certain aspects of Bardaisan’s theory of matter and its attributes. Since his intellectual followers like Nu’man were known to the mutakallimun. they may have been the proximate source from which such theories were appropriated by the early mutakallimun. What about Ghassan al-Ruhawl’s view that “motions are minute bodies” and that “they are permanent entities that do not vanish"? Unfortunately, al-MismaTs report, though tantalizing, does not provide enough information to reconstruct Ghassan’s theory of motion. On the one hand, his view seems compatible with Nu’man’s eclectic combination of Stoicism and Atomism, and even with the Epicurean doctrine of continual motion of atoms. On the other hand, it is also in agreement with the homoiomeritic theory reported by al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim, in particular because of the view that qualities are minute bodies. The problem of how motion can be a minute body remains, regardless of whether Ghassan’s

motion is a disposition of the body. Furthermore, to regard attributes as dispositions is more consistent with the view that attributes are neither bodies in themselves nor accidents in themselves, but rather are the qualified body, that is, precisely the third theory of attributes advocated by Abu Shakir (see below, 75*6).

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74 theory is ultimately Anaxogorean or Stoic in its inspiration. The implications of a theory that denies the existence of accidents and maintains that they are corporeal are significant. One of these is that a sensible body is nothing but the bundle of the bodies that constitute its sensible properties. Furthermore, this bundle can either consist of bodies that are contiguous, or bodies which interpenetrate into each other.45 The former view is compatible, in some sense, with Greek atomism where the atoms are solid and impenetrable. Therefore, the sensible body, in this system, would consist of a bundle of contiguous atoms, each of which represents one of the qualities of the body. Qualitative change, then, would be the addition of another atom to the bundle, or the replacement of one of the atoms in the bundle by another, or the removal of an atom from the bundle. However, in Greek atomism, atoms do not themselves represent secondary qualities, but rather, their combinations give rise to these qualities, and therefore qualitative change is the result of a change in the combination of the atoms which constitute the sensible body. But there is no report that any Dualist held the view that a sensible body consists of a bundle of contiguous bodies even though it would be compatible with what we know of the view of Nu'man. On the other hand, the view that a sensible body consists of a bundle of interpenetrating bodies is explicitly attributed to the Dualists by al-Ash'ari. He states that the Dualists believed that the mixture of light with darkness was a mutual interpenetration of the one into the other (Vnud5khala~).46 They may have therefore have held the more extensive theory of interpenetration of all

45 The late Hellenistic debate regarding the Stoic view that qualities are ‘bodies” and that they interpenetrate is discussed in Sorabji, Matter, 79-105. 46 al-Ash'an, MaqdlOt, 327.

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75 attributes, for light and darkness are the material ingredients of all things in the Dualist cosmos. In this system, qualitative change can be also be explained by the addition, replacement, or removal of certain bodies, whether in the manner of the Stoics or of Anaxagoras, or it can be explained by the theory of latency wliich is usually associated with the mutakallim al-NazzSm. The alchemist jabir ibn HayySn, however, reports in his Kitdb al-kbawdss al-kabir that the Manicheans believed change was the result of the hiding of a manifest “body” (kumunl and the manifestation of a previously latent “body” (zuhur). and that it was not a qualitative transformation Cistihala) in which an accident was either replaced by another, or ceased to exist, or came to exist in a material substrate.47 Hence, on the basis of this analysis, it would seem that those Dualists who denied the existence of accidents and held that the attributes of a sensible body were corporeal included atomists like Nu'man and perhaps Ghassan on the one hand, and those who regarded these corporeal bodies as mutually interpenetrating on the other. Furthermore, some of the latter held a homomereitic theory while others held that all of the latent qualities of a body were present in it, just as oil is present in the olive, and therefore change was nothing but the revealing of a previously hidden quality and the concealing of a manifest quality. Secondary qualities are “attributes" The third theory of qualities attributed to the Dualists holds that they are neither bodies nor something other than the body but are “attributes” (sifat) of

47 Jabir ibn Hayyan, Mukht&r ras&'ilJ&bir ibn Hayyan, ed. Paul Kraus, (Cairo,1935), 299, 300-1, quoted in the collection, M in i va dfn-e-u, ed. Ahmad Afshar Shfrazf, (Teheran, 1957), 76.

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76 bodies. The representative of this theory is Abu Shakir who, according to al-Misma'i, held that motion is neither the body nor something other than the body. It is not clear whether he also held the more general position that accidents are neither the same as the body nor something other than it, but rather are attributes of the body. Abu Shakir’s view is consistent with Sorabji’s interpretation that the Stoic belief in the corporeality of accidents must mean that accidents are “dispositions” of bodies and not that they themselves are independent corporeal entities.48 However the surviving accounts of the Stoic theory are at the very least, confusing, and are amenable to several interpretations, as indeed they were even by the late Hellenist philosopher and opponent of Stoicism, Alexander of Aphrodisias. It is quite clear that many interpreters of Stoicism understood the theory to state that attributes were bodies in a literal sense, as it is clear in the case of Nu'man and Ghassan, whether or not they were cognizant of its Stoic origins. Al-Misma’i also reports that Abu Shakir was a follower of Bardaisan. However, Abu Shakir’s view that motion is an attribute is not consistent with Bardaisan’s theory of the corporeality of qualities. It is, on the other hand, consistent with Aristode’s view that motion is a process and thus that it is neither a body nor an accident, and yet not apart from them both. Hence the claim that Abu Shakir was a follower of Bardaisan does not seem accurate if it means that he accepted the latter’s theory of matter and its attributes. This does not, however, preclude his being a Daysanite in the sense of belonging to the Daysanite sect. Finally, we may note that it is possible to interprete this theory of secondary qualities in another manner, that is, to regarded secondary qualities as

48 See above, note 44.

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77 accidents, but to maintain that bodies are formed by the the combination of certain secondary qualities and that there is no need for a material substrate in which accidents inhere. This is the theory that bodies are bundles of accidents. In such a case, a secondary quality like color, which is a constituent of a bundle of accidents that forms a body, is neither the body itself, for it is a constituent of the accidents that forms the body, nor something other than the body. It would follow, that according to this interpretation, the term ‘attribute’ (sifa) refers to a secondary quality, which is a legitimate use of this term. The kalam reports, which I have examined above, which are based on the mid-third/mid-ninth century accounts of Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq and his contemporary al-Qasim ibn al-Ibrahlm, and the somewhat latter accounts of al-Misma‘I and al-Hasan ibn Musa al-Nawbakhti, reveal the diversity of cosmological views of the second/eighth-century Dualists with whom the early mutakallimun were acquainted. They show that the Dualists were concerned with the problem of the primary constituents of the sensible objects of the world and of their attributes. They also show that the Dualists held conflicting views on these questions, which arose out of, and as a result reflect, the late Hellenistic debate regarding the nature of bodies and their properties. Finally, they show that this debate encompassed and then combined Stoic, Peripatetic, Anaxagorean, Neoplatonic, and Epicurean views on these questions, as Sorabji also shows in his Matter, Space, a n d Motion: Theories in Antiquity a nd their Sequel. Whatever the reasons for the initiation of the debate of the early mutakallimun with the Dualists may have been, it is dear that in the later half of the second/eighth century the mutakallimun had become acquainted with the tetter's various theories of matter and its attributes which are only dimly represented in the surviving reports in the personalities of Nu'man, Ghassan, Ibn al-Muqaffa‘,

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78 Abu Shakir, etc.. Many of these Dualists were the elder contemporaries of the first generation of kalam cosmologists like Abu al-Hudhayl, Dirar ibn al-‘Amr, Hisham ibn al-Hakam, al-NazzSm etc.. The Dualists, it seems, were engaged in the discussion over the problem of matter and its attributes, which was one of the major cosmological questions of late Hellenism and which continued to be discussed into the second and early third/late eighth and early ninth centuries. The early mutakallimOn were drawn into this discussion. In the course of this debate, the mutakallimOn appropriated several of the Dualists theories and reflea this diversity in their own cosmologies. The early mutakallimun thus became the torch-bearers in a new environment of a cosmological research program whose origins extended via the Dualists, through the late Hellenists, to early Antiquity.

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79

The encounter o f ea rly kalam w ith th e N a tu ra l p h ilo so p h e rs Kalam a n d the theory o f "natures" Apart from their works against the Dualists, the early mutakallimOn. as we have seen, also wrote works against Aristotle, the “ashab al-taba*i‘.” the “ashab al-havull” the “dahriwa." and even the “sufista’iw a.” These appellations allow us to identify the principle doctrines of these groups. Thus the term “dahriw a.” which is derived from “dahr" meaning eternity, refers to those who believe in the eternity of the world. The term “sufista’iw a " is the Arabized form for Sophists, namely those who were skeptical about the possibility of knowledge of external objects.49 The term “ashab al-havula” can stand for those who believed in prime matter (havOla). namely the particularly Aristotelian concept of prime matter, or in general those who believed in a primordial matter (havula). out of which the world was composed.50

49 There is a detailed account of the sufista’iw a in the rather late work by Ahmad ibn Yahya Ibn al-Murtada (d. 840/1437), Kit&b al-munya wa al-gbunya wa sbarb al-milal wa al-nihaL 52-54. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Murtada does not state his sources and therefore we cannot be assured that his report reflects the early mutakallimun’s understanding of the sufista’iw a. The relatively earlier account by Mutahhar ibn Tahir al-Maqdisi (writing ca. 355/966) states that the sufista'iwa ‘deny that knowledge of things, as they are in themselves, is possible” film ‘itinad al-shav' 'ala m i huwa bihi) (in his al-Bad' wa al-ta'rtkb, ed. C. Huart, (Paris, 1899-1903), 1:19). The problem of skepticism and its relation to Mu'tazilf kalam has been most recently discussed in M. Bernard, Le problim e de la connaissance d'apris le M ugnf d u Cadi 'Abd al-Gabb&r, (Algiers, 1982), 46-88. The article by Josef van Ess, ‘Skepticism in Islamic Thought,” ed. C. Malik, God a n d M an in Contemporary Islamic Thought, (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1972), 83-98) covers slightly different ground and offers a provocative hypothesis of the role of skepticism in Islamic intellectual history. 50 Al-Maturidl enumerates those who believe in the eternity of the world and includes, ‘those who believe in the principle (gsD which they call prime matter (havulaY ( Tawbtd, 30). He thus includes the ashab al-hayula within the dahriw a. The IsmaTll author N&sir Khusraw (d. 465-470/1072-77) identifies Abu al-’Abbas iranshahn (fl. 3rd/9th century) and al-Raa as belonging to the ashab al-havuli. who hold that ‘havula is an eternal substance (iawhar)* (Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Raa", Ras&'il Falsafiya, ed. P. Kraus, (Cairo,1939; repr. Beirut, 1979), 220).

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80 The “ashab al-tab3'i‘" are more difficult to identify. This appellation, which means “partisans of the theory of natures,”51 is not as indicative of their views as is the case with the other groups, and requires further explanation. Such an explanation is offered by al-Juwayni, who, in his Sham ilf t usul al-din identifies and classifies the ashab al-taba’I as follows: Those who subscribe to the [theory of] natures Ctabi'i1) belong to two groups: The first group agrees with the [view of the] Muslims regarding the doctrine of the temporal creation of the world and the affirmation [of the existence of] the Creator. However, they subscribe to [the view] that God created bodies in accordance with natures Ctaba’iO and properties (khawSss) which entails that [their] natural actions do not arise as a result of volition (ikhtivar). Thumama ibn Ashras and a group of the Mu'tazila subscribed to this view... The second group subscribed to the doctrine of the eternity of the four “natures” (taba'i1) ...52 This report makes it clear that by the middle of the fifth/middle of the eleventh century when al-Juwayni was writing this report, the term ashab al-taba’i‘ was used for both some Muslims as well as non-Muslims.53 Moreover, it also reveals the reason for this appellation, namely, the belief of some Muslims in the intrinsic

51 The Arabic term taba’i1 can, in some contexts, refer to elements and is thus used for the four Aristotelian elements of fire, air, water, and earth, as well as the four Aristotelian qualities of hot, cold, wet, and dry. Hence in the Arabic translation of Nemesius of Edessa's On the Nature o f Man, the Greek term for the four elements (orotxeia) is translated by the Arabic term ‘a n isir. while it is translated as tabS’i1 in 'he quotation from Nemesius in the Kit&b Sirr al-Khalfqa (Simone van Riet, ‘Stoicorum Fragmentum Arabica,* in Melanges d'Islamologie, ed. P. Salmon, (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 262). 52 al-Juwaynf, Sb&mU, 237-8. 53 I have not found the term ashab al-taba’i1 applied to Muslims in fourth/tenth century sources. The earliest mention is in ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Baghdidf (d. 429/1037) who considers al-Nazzam’s theory of change to be like that of the *ahl al-taba’i'" or the "tahr'iw un" {Milal, 95; Firaq, 121). Both al-Baqillani ( Tambfd\ 45) and Ibn FOrak (M ujarrad, 133-4) consider the Mu'tazilf doctrine of generation (tawlid) to be similar to the causal theory of the natural philosophers, but do not thereby include Mu'tazila among the ashab ai-tabS'i1.

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81 properties or “natures” of objects or the belief of some non-Muslims in the eternity of the four elements or the four qualities. Al-Juwayni also identifies the early mutakallim ThumSma ibn Ashras (d. ca. 213/828) as one of the Muslim ashab al-taba’i*. Fortunately, both al-Ash'arl and ‘Abd al-Jabbar have preserved Thumama’s views on the “natures" in their discussions of secondary generation (tawallud) and therefore allow us to reconstruct the perspective of early kalam on the theory of “natures.” Whether or not things have “natures,” and therefore properties which are the direct causes of phenomena that are exhibited as a result of these properties, is significant to the kalam discussion of causality. In the kalam view, the question of agency, and particularly whether a phenomenon is the result of the volition (ikhtivar) or intention (ir3da) of an agent, or whether it is entailed by the innate properties of an object and is therefore not the result of the choice of an agent as such, but rather is “natural” Ctabi'T). is at the heart of the discussion of causality.54 This is the reason for the early mutakallimun's interest in the causal efficacy of the two Dualist principles of darkness and light, namely, whether they act through volition or by nature which, as we have seen above, is discussed in the reports of al-Warraq.

54 Therefore a body is said to have natural properties as we would say, or "natures” as the mutakallimun would say, or "active faculties” as the seventeenth century European natural philosophers would say, which are the cause of the phenomena which it exhibits. The notion of "faculties” in bodies was attacked in the seventeenth century (under the banner of banishing occult forces or qualities) and the theory that bodies were wholly inert, which some of the Muslim mutakallimun had held in earlier centuries, was advanced. The seventeenth-century natural philosophers wanted to explain all phenomena as a consequence of matter in motion, while the mutakallimun regarded phenomena to be the direct consequence of the volition of an agent, albeit for Descartes, the motion of matter was governed by laws of motion established by God when the world was created (which was in a sense an admission of the existence of some minimal ‘natural properties* of all material bodies). Since Newton could not explain gravity (which is an acUon-at-a-distance phenomenon) in such mechanistic terms, the Cartesians accused him of admitting the "occult" quality of gravity into his physics.

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82 In the kalam view. God dearly is a volitional causal agent who not only wills phenomena, but generates them directly, or secondarily through occasional causes (tawallud). The early mutakallimun were however divided regarding the causal agency of man, that is, on whether or not man was the cause of phenomena, either directly or secondarily, and if so, whether of phenomena in his own domain, namely of his own motion or thoughts, or of phenomena outside his domain, for example bringing about knowledge in another by teaching, or bringing about motion in a stone by pushing it.55 Many mutakallimun denied that man could be the causal agent for a phenomenon outside his domain, even though it may appear as if he had some causal link with the phenomenon. Some mutakallimun went so far as to deny that man was the causal agent for any phenomena except for his own thinking. How, then, could phenomena like the descent of a falling stone be explained in this framework where every phenomenon was considered to be the result of the volition of a causal agent? Thumama’s solution was to postulate that there were some phenomena which had no volitional causal agent (la fa'iU laha). even though they could in a general sense be considered as God’s actions, namely, in the sense that He had endowed the body with the nature or property as a result of which the phenomenon occurs (taba‘* al-iism* tab'an vaqa'ir minhn dhalik*).56 The opposing viewpoint, as adopted by Salih Qubba, maintained that all such phenomena were directly caused by God.57 Thus the Muslim ashab al-taba’i* believed that objects had innate

55 Al-Ash'arf, Maq&UU, 401-408. 56

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