Justice Without Violence 9781685854799

Citation preview

JUSTICE WITHOUT VIOLENCE

JUSTICE WITHOUT VIOLENCE

edited by

Paul Wehr Heidi Burgess Guy Burgess

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of A m e r i c a in 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by L y n n e Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of C o n g r e s s Cataloging-in-Publication Data Justice without violence / edited by Paul W e h r , Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess, p. cm. Includes bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s and index. I S B N 1 - 5 5 5 8 7 - 4 6 5 - 7 (alk. paper) ISBN 1 - 5 5 5 8 7 - 4 9 1 - 6 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Nonviolence. 2. Justice. I.Wehr, Paul Ernest, 1937— II. Burgess, Heidi. III. Burgess, Guy M., 1 9 4 9 H M 2 7 8 . J 8 7 1994 303.6'1—dc20 93-33329 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A C a t a l o g u i n g in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of A m e r i c a

(S)

T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 .

This book is dedicated to two dear friends and members of the Justice Without Violence team, Elizabeth Mathiot (Moen) and Kenneth E. Boulding, who, sadly, did not live to see its publication. We all found Betsy's commitment to peace and justice to be both selfless and infectious. Kenneth's brilliant insights and, especially, his vision of the integrative system have provided key foundations for this project and countless others. We, and the field as a whole, will greatly miss them both.

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction Heidi Burgess

1

Justice Without Violence: Theoretical Foundations Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess

1

Research Questions and Hypotheses Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess

37

Peace, Justice, and the Faces of Power Kenneth E. Boulding

45

Nonviolent Direct Action and the Diffusion of Power Doug Bond

59

Violence, Nonviolence, and Justice in Sandinista Nicaragua Paul Wehr and Sharon Erickson Nepstad

81

Nonviolence and the 1989 Revolution in Eastern Europe Joel Edelstein

99

Violence Versus Nonviolence in the USSR and Its Successors Zaven Arabajan

125

China's Movement to Resolve Citizen/Government Conflicts Stephen C. Thomas

147 vii

viii

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CONTENTS

Nonviolent Versus Violent Ethnic Political Action in Africa James R. Scarritt

165

Foreign Threats and Domestic Actions: Sanctions Against South Africa William Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg, and Lynne Bennett

191

H. Naci

Mocan,

Belief Systems and Justice Without Violence in the Middle East Amin M. Kazak

217

Attaining Justice Through Development Organizations in India Elizabeth Mathiot (Moen)

233

Justice Without Violence: Theoretical Synthesis Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess

257

Index About the Contributors About the Book

291 299 301

Acknowledgments

T h e authors, editors, and the Conflict Resolution Consortium are grateful to the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, and the University of Colorado for providing financial support for this project. T h a n k s are also due to Carolyn S t e p h e n s o n a n d D o u g B o n d for their r e v i e w s of and helpful c o m m e n t s on the m a n u s c r i p t and to Delinda W u n d e r , the C o n s o r t i u m secretary w h o h e l p e d b r i n g the m a n u script to completion.

Introduction Heidi Burgess

This b o o k is the first m a j o r product of the C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n C o n s o r t i u m ' s Justice Without Violence Project. This project, which was f u n d e d by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the University of Colorado, was one of three t h e o r y - d e v e l o p m e n t programs undertaken by the Consortium in its e f f o r t to find better w a y s of resolving difficult conflicts at the personal through international levels. All of the contributors to this book, with two exceptions, are Consortium m e m b e r s w h o have been studying justice conflicts and approaches to resolving them in different parts of the world. S o m e contributors are political scientists, some are sociologists, s o m e are economists. Each has focused his or her e f f o r t s on studying either the theory of n o n v i o l e n c e or a particular area of the world in which n o n v i o l e n c e has been used (either successfully or unsuccessfully) to c o n f r o n t gross injustice. Unlike many other studies that use just one method, one case, or one region through which to e x a m i n e w h e n or how n o n v i o l e n c e works, this book takes a multifaceted approach, utilizing our combined theoretical and empirical expertise, to add a breadth of understanding of the problem of attaining justice without violence that was lacking in more narrow analyses. T h e first four chapters of the book are theoretical. Chapter 1 was written by Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, w h o co-direct the Conflict R e s o lution Consortium and, with Paul Wehr, the Justice Without Violence Project as well. This chapter gives a broad overview of the related literature on justice and nonviolence, e x a m i n i n g both the persuasive as well as the analytical literature on n o n v i o l e n c e as it has developed in modern times. This literature review f o r m s the basis of the second chapter, also written by Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, which sets out the research questions that were developed by the project team at the outset of its investigations,

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and that guided the chapter authors as they did their research and w r o t e their case studies. T h e third chapter, written by Kenneth Boulding, gives his thoughts on the nature of justice, the causes of violence, and the applicability of various types of power to the prosecution of justice conflicts. B o u l d i n g was, until his death in March 1993, one of the leading scholars in p e a c e research and conflict resolution for over thirty years. His chapter in this volume s u p p l e m e n t s his many other w o r k s on conflict, justice, and peace, which have deeply i n f l u e n c e d our initial theory and approach to the research questions set out in this work. T h e fourth theoretical chapter was written by D o u g Bond, Director of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and D e f e n s e at Harvard University. B o n d ' s chapter sets out an interesting theory of nonviolence, relating what he calls m e c h a n i s m s of action (what people actually do) to m e c h a n i s m s of c h a n g e (how those actions work to bring about c h a n g e ) . Like Boulding, Bond gives readers a synopsis of an important theoretical approach to nonviolence, which, while it grows out of Gene S h a r p ' s work, differs f r o m Sharp in certain critical respects. F o l l o w i n g these four theoretical chapters are eight case studies. T h e first is an examination of violence, nonviolence, and justice in Sandinista Nicaragua written by Paul W e h r and sociology g r a d u a t e student Sharon Erickson Nepstad. Wehr, w h o is one of the research directors for this project, has been s t u d y i n g and consulting on conflict m a n a g e m e n t , n o n v i o lence, civilian defense, and peaceful change in Central America for many years. Their chapter examines the role of both violence and nonviolence in achieving justice in Nicaragua within the context of the Sandinista/Contra conflict, as well as between the Sandinistas and the indigenous population of N i c a r a g u a ' s Atlantic coast. Wehr and Nepstad describe the factors that helped to m o d e r a t e c o n f l i c t and limit violence within the revolutionary context. They also develop the important notion of power strategy m i x — the exact combination of threat, exchange (that is, negotiation), and integrative strategies that, when combined, yields e f f e c t i v e nonviolent social change. T h e second case study, written by Joel Edelstein, a professor of political science at the University of C o l o r a d o at D e n v e r , e x a m i n e s the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Although the image conveyed by the media in the United States was one of total collapse precipitated by massive nonviolent direct action, Edelstein suggests that the process w a s m u c h more complex than that. Nonviolent direct action did play a role in the 1989 upheavals, of course, but other factors did as well. Edelstein d e s c r i b e s the conditions that spurred forces for reform both within and outside the political and social elites of the C o m m u n i s t bloc. T h e s e f o r c e s w o r k e d together, he suggests, to bring about the widespread collapse of C o m m u n i s m in 1989.

INTRODUCTION

3

T h e next case study was prepared by Zaven A r a b a j a n , a Soviet economist w h o w a s visiting the University of D e n v e r as this p r o j e c t w a s underway and then returned to M o s c o w , personally witnessing the events of the s u m m e r of 1992 and thereafter. A r a b a j a n ' s chapter o f f e r s a historical look at the way Russia has f a c e d justice conflicts over its long h i s t o r y — pointing out that the recent upheavals are but one of a series of such disruptive events that have occurred in Russia since the seventeenth century. What distinguishes the most recent series of changes is the extent to which they have c o m e about through nonviolent action, as opposed to violent disruption, which has occurred so often in Russian history. H o w e v e r , A r a b a j a n questions the ability of Russian society to maintain this nonviolent approach to its political and e c o n o m i c problems over the long term. Continuing social, political, and e c o n o m i c chaos, as well as a lack of i m p r o v e m e n t , even after significant attempts at reform, has once again p r e p a r e d R u s s i a n society, A r a b a j a n says, " f o r an outburst of violence and intolerance"—an approach that would not have been tolerated in 1991, in his analysis. S t e p h e n T h o m a s , also a political scientist at the University of C o l o rado at D e n v e r , e x a m i n e s the s t u d e n t s ' d e m o c r a c y m o v e m e n t in China, which was r e s o u n d i n g l y if not p e r m a n e n t l y c r u s h e d in the T i a n a n m e n Square Massacre in June 1989. Although the student democracy movement is c o m m o n l y thought to be a complete failure of nonviolent direct action, T h o m a s suggests that it was not, because the students lost in a principled manner. Although not immediately successful, their actions may still have laid the g r o u n d w o r k f o r the reformation or even the abolition of the C o m munist Party in China over the long term. W h e t h e r or not this c h a n g e occurs, he says, will depend on a variety of factors, including the health of the Chinese e c o n o m y , the responsiveness of party leaders, and events outside of China; these factors could influence both its citizens and its leaders to work either for maintaining the status q u o or for b r i n g i n g about social and political c h a n g e . F o l l o w i n g T h o m a s ' s analysis of China are t w o c h a p t e r s on A f r i c a . T h e first was prepared by James Scarritt, professor of political science at the University of C o l o r a d o at Boulder, w h o has spent years s t u d y i n g political change in Black A f r i c a . His chapter f o c u s e s on violent and nonviolent change and c o m p a r e s the antecedents to each. Scarritt uses both quantitative and qualitative data analysis to develop and test many hypotheses concerning the relationship between contextual variables and both violent and nonviolent m o v e m e n t s for social c h a n g e in Black A f r i c a . W i l l i a m K a e m p f e r , A n t o n L o w e n b e r g , H. Naci M o c a n , and L y n n e Bennett also contributed a chapter on Africa. William K a e m p f e r is a professor of e c o n o m i c s at the University of Colorado at B o u l d e r . Anton Lowenberg, formerly a professor of economics at the University of Colorado at Denver, has m o v e d to California State University at Northridge since this

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chapter was written. H. Naci M o c a n is a p r o f e s s o r of e c o n o m i c s at the University of C o l o r a d o at Denver, and L y n n e Bennett is a g r a d u a t e student. Their chapter examines the role that e c o n o m i c sanctions have played against apartheid in South A f r i c a . T h i s paper is part of a long series of studies K a e m p f e r and L o w e n b e r g have done e x a m i n i n g how signals and threats are transmitted from one nation to another in an effort to influence internal policies. Although the general perception of many economists and political scientists who have studied sanctions is that they are relatively ineffective, Kaempfer et al. suggest that sanctions can have signal and threat e f f e c t s that work independently of their income e f f e c t s and may be more important in b r i n g i n g about social c h a n g e . U s i n g interest g r o u p analysis and public c h o i c e theory, K a e m p f e r et al. e x a m i n e the relationships between sanctions, black strikes, black e m p l o y m e n t , black wages, and general South A f r i c a n e c o n o m i c conditions to determine the extent to which each is influenced by the other. A chapter on the M i d d l e East w a s prepared by A m i n Kazak, a L e b a n e s e political scientist now w o r k i n g at the University of C o l o r a d o . Kazak explores the multiple belief systems present in the Middle East and examines the extent to which these systems simultaneously support and inhibit successful nonviolent direct action in response to the Palestinian conflict. Although his chapter was written before the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli peace accord in the fall of 1993, the events now unfolding still illustrate the salience of his main points. T h e a d v o c a t e s of n o n v i o l e n c e are a m o n g the g r o u p s s u p p o r t i n g the p e a c e accord; the hardliners, w h o have long advocated violence as a remedy for the Palestinians, are a m o n g the g r o u p s o p p o s i n g the accord and v o w i n g to s a b o t a g e it with violent opposition. A final case study, on development organizations in India, was written by Elizabeth Mathiot (Moen), who, until her recent death, w a s a University of Colorado sociologist and studied and w o r k e d a m o n g the very poor of India in conjunction with the Quaker Rights Sharing Program. Based on her extensive personal k n o w l e d g e of and research on d e v e l o p m e n t organizations throughout India, but especially in Tamil Nadu, Moen describes the many obstacles to achieving successful nonviolent change in India. Dev e l o p m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s , M o e n explains, f a c e e n o r m o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s and obstacles that block their e f f o r t s to attain justice. T h e y persist, nevertheless, and are making effective nonviolent changes for some of the poorest of the poor in India today. In the final chapter Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess c o m p a r e the findings of these case studies to each other and to the theoretical chapters in order to develop a set of theoretical conclusions and hypotheses for further research. This effort was supplemented by a Synthesis C o n f e r e n c e , which w a s held with all the authors a f t e r their cases were written and shared. At this c o n f e r e n c e , all the authors together discussed the similarities and

INTRODUCTION

5

d i f f e r e n c e s t h e y o b s e r v e d a m o n g their c a s e s . T h e B u r g e s s e s then u s e d this d a t a , in a d d i t i o n to t h e i r o w n s y n t h e s i s e f f o r t s , t o p o i n t o u t the c o m m o n alities a m o n g the c a s e s , h i g h l i g h t the d i f f e r e n c e s , and d r a w c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t w h i c h v a r i a b l e s a p p e a r to h a v e the m o s t i n f l u e n c e o n w h e t h e r a n d w h e n n o n v i o l e n c e c a n s u c c e e d in r e m e d y i n g i n j u s t i c e .

1 Justice Without Violence: Theoretical Foundations Guy Burgess & Heidi

Burgess

If asked which is better, peace or w a r , most people w o u l d c h o o s e peace. Yet most of these people are o c c a s i o n a l l y willing to g o to war and are even more o f t e n willing to e n g a g e in violent c o n f l i c t w h e n the cause is something felt to be more important than peace. One value c o m m o n l y considered more important is justice. T h e tension between peace and justice is especially apparent in the extreme case of tyrannical g o v e r n m e n t s . Such g o v e r n m e n t s use the s t a t e ' s legal and political systems to violate f u n d a m e n t a l e c o n o m i c , political, and social rights of s u b o r d i n a t e g r o u p s . T h e r e f o r e , these s y s t e m s cannot be used e f f e c t i v e l y to obtain j u s t i c e . Negotiation is similarly unlikely to be effective, as dominant groups will rarely voluntarily negotiate agreements that give them less power or resources than they currently have. Very o f t e n in such a s y m m e t r i c a l p o w e r situations, the s u b o r d i n a t e group concludes that the only e f f e c t i v e strategy for pursuing justice is violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Yet violence tends to beget more violence. T h e cycle often escalates quickly to the point w h e r e the ensuing struggle b e c o m e s an even greater violator of fundamental human rights than the initial injustice. Just as often, violent struggles for justice fail, as the dominant group usually has a higher capacity to inflict harm than the subordinate group. T h e alternative approach to combating acute injustice is nonviolent resistance. This resistance can take many f o r m s . O n e is nonviolent direct action, as characterized by Sharp. 1 T h i s approach relies heavily on nonviolent threats or coercion to alter the p o w e r structure b e t w e e n the g r o u p s . Another approach is Gandhian satyagraha—an attempt to persuade the opponent to change its behavior largely through integrative or moral appeals. Many other f o r m s of nonviolence exist as well. O n e could argue that there are far more m e t h o d s of nonviolence available than there are m e t h o d s of

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violence. What is lacking is a thorough understanding of what the options are, how they are implemented, how and when they work, and when they do not. T h i s book is devoted to increasing our k n o w l e d g e about these questions.

Definitions Justice Justice can be defined in many w a y s . Sometimes the term is used to refer to the outcome of a particular interaction of individuals or groups (commonly called distributive justice). Sometimes it refers to the procedures used f o r allocation (procedural justice). A third use concerns the motive underlying a particular behavior or decision. 2 Within the context of distributive justice, further ambiguities are found. One of the most common definitions of distributive justice states that o n e ' s rewards should be proportional to o n e ' s contributions, or "inputs." This approach, commonly referred to as "equity theory," w a s proposed by A d a m s , 3 who based it on theories of relative deprivation, social exchange, dissonance, and distributive justice. Although equity theory has many proponents, it has also come under considerable fire. Folger observed that much of the recent theoretical work on justice is a reaction against the limitations of equity theory. 4 One common critique asks what inputs are or how they are measured. A r e they measured solely in economic terms? If so, critics charge, justice is relegated to economics alone. Sampson made a distinction between equity and equality, 5 arguing that the former is justice in economic exchange, whereas equality considers noneconomic factors—interpersonal harmony and status congruence, for instance—to be important. Deutsch suggested that justice should be measured in terms of need, with personal w e l f a r e as the primary goal. 6 Folger identified three alternative criteria for assessing distributive justice, independent of inputs. These are: equal treatment, in which everyone gets the same amount, regardless of input; leveling, in which everyone has the same cumulative amount; and social minimum, in which everyone is kept above a minimum level. However, all of these methods for measuring justice examine distribution only and ignore questions of procedure. Procedural justice examines what distribution procedures are considered fair, and which are not. Here, criteria include who is involved in the decisionmaking process, regulations governing the manner in which information is gathered and presented, who makes the final decision, the procedures used, the role the aggrieved parties play, and who has access to the justice system.

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9

T h e s e q u e s t i o n s have been addressed by m a n y authors. For our purposes, however, w e agree with Reis that answering the question " w h a t is j u s t ? " is a "hopeless and p o m p o u s task." 7 Rather, we rely on a c o m m o n sense definition. All of the conflicts examined in this book are ones most observers would agree are examples of serious distributive or procedural injustice. W e c h o s e to direct our attention to how this injustice might be remedied without the use of violence.

Violence and

Nonviolence

Although p e r h a p s easier to d e f i n e than justice, violence and n o n v i o l e n c e are also tricky. Joan B o n d u r a n t , a leading proponent of n o n v i o l e n c e , defined violence as "the willful application of f o r c e in such a way that it is intentionally injurious to the person or g r o u p against w h o m it is applied. [Here] injury is u n d e r s t o o d to include p s y c h o l o g i c a l as well as physical harm." 8 In Chapter 4 of this book, D o u g Bond defines violence more narrowly as the " u s e of physical force against a n o t h e r ' s b o d y , against that p e r s o n ' s will, and that is expected to inflict physical injury or death upon that person." This definition seems to exclude psychological harm as well as destruction of property, which are included in other definitions of violence. Sharp, another leading theorist of nonviolent direct action, also excluded the destruction of property from his definition of violence, although he acknowledged that "sabotage will seriously weaken a nonviolent action m o v e m e n t . " 9 W e agree with this s t a t e m e n t — l a r g e l y b e c a u s e we w o u l d argue that destruction of property is a violent act and is likely to harm a nonviolent m o v e m e n t in much the s a m e way as other intrusions of violence into such an e f f o r t . This fact, h o w e v e r , can be e m p i r i c a l l y determined, and, as such, can be tested by this and other studies of nonviolent action.

Scope of the Analysis Given these d e f i n i t i o n s (or lack thereof), this b o o k f o c u s e s on c o n f l i c t s that meet three criteria. T h e first is the presence of f u n d a m e n t a l political, social, or e c o n o m i c injustice. Examples would include clear-cut violations of political rights such as freedom of speech, religion, and accountability of a government to its people. Also at issue are e c o n o m i c rights (access to adequate f o o d , clothing, shelter, education, health care) and social rights (the right to live w h e r e one desires, to pursue a chosen career or lifestyle). T h e s e c o n d criterion is the d i s e m p o w e r m e n t of the unjustly treated group. T h e conflicts w e examine here are all characterized by the failure of political and legal institutions to protect these f u n d a m e n t a l rights. In s o m e cases, authoritarian g o v e r n m e n t s may have control of political and

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legal institutions, which deny appeals from the disempowered segments of the population. In other cases, societies may be threatened or attacked by outside aggressors. Such rights and empowerment issues are central to many of the w o r l d ' s recent trouble spots: Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, South Africa, the Philippines, Israel and the occupied territories, Eastern Europe, China, Central America, and the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, for example. The third criterion is that these conflicts were addressed by the lowpower group primarily without using violence. Few, if any, nonviolent movements are able to maintain their nonviolent character entirely. Therefore, the aberrant use of violence within a general context of nonviolence did not exclude a case from our analysis. Neither did we reject a case because it met one definition of nonviolence but not another. Rather, we took an inclusive view of nonviolence, including, for instance, negotiation, which is generally not considered to be nonviolent action. (More on the definition of nonviolence will follow.) However, conflicts that were pursued primarily through violent means were not examined, except insofar as they provided a context to this analysis of nonviolent methods for remedying injustice.

Kenneth Boulding's Theory of Power The most difficult problem in resolving the deeply rooted justice disputes of interest to this project is the extreme disparity of power between the dominant and subordinate groups. Because the dominant group has superior power, it has no need to alter the status quo—and, indeed, is likely to oppose any alteration. Simultaneously, the subordinate group has few methods available to it to persuade the dominant group to change. As we said before, the c o m m o n assumption is that violence is the only avenue available to victims of such situations. However, violence is seldom a successful method of attaining power or structural change. There are other potentially effective approaches, however. As a starting point for our research, we found Kenneth B o u l d i n g ' s analysis of power to be extremely helpful. 1 0 Boulding suggested that power has "three faces": threat, exchange, and love (that is, the integrative system). These principal sources of power can be employed singly or in combination, in varying degrees, and with different strategies, to effect change. Threats Threats, in Boulding's theory, can be violent or nonviolent. They usually take the form of "you do something I want, or I will do something you don't want." 1 1 They can be met with submission, flight, counterthfreat, or defiance. Threats can resolve conflicts when those threatened submit or

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f l e e . T h i s r e s p o n s e is c o m m o n , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n the threatening party has o v e r w h e l m i n g p o w e r , m a k i n g the threat h i g h l y c r e d i b l e . B u t if the threatened party is m o r e p o w e r f u l than the threatener, then s u b m i s s i o n is u n l i k e l y . R a t h e r , d e f i a n c e or c o u n t e r t h r e a t s are the m o r e l i k e l y r e s p o n s e . T h i s situation e v e n t u a l l y f o r c e s the perpetrator of the threat either to admit the threat w a s a b l u f f or to e n g a g e in a p o t e n t i a l l y c o s t l y p o w e r contest to f i n d out w h o really is m o r e p o w e r f u l . If the threat i n v o l v e s v i o l e n c e , d e f i a n c e and counterthreats are l i k e l y to e s c a l a t e into a v i o l e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n — w i t h all the attendant p r o b l e m s p r e v i o u s l y described. E v e n nonviolent threats are f r e q u e n t l y met with a v i olent response. S o m e nonviolent activists actually want such a response, as they f e e l it m a k e s their o w n moral position look better in c o m p a r i s o n . T h e b i g g e s t problem with nonviolent threats is that they generate what w e c a l l the " b a c k l a s h e f f e c t . " P e o p l e f a c e d w i t h threats s e l d o m s u b m i t w i l l i n g l y or h a p p i l y . If they s u b m i t , they do s o g r u d g i n g l y , all the w h i l e w a i t i n g f o r their c h a n c e to d e f y the threat and, if p o s s i b l e , get retribution. T h i s e f f e c t means that " v i c t o r i e s " obtained by threat tend to be h i g h l y uns t a b l e , as they c r e a t e a high l e v e l of hostility in the threatened p a r t y . H e n c e , if the g r o u p m a k i n g the threat should e v e r "turn its b a c k , " the prohibited b e h a v i o r s are l i k e l y to return. E v e n if eternal v i g i l a n c e can b e maintained by the threatening party, those f o r c e d to do things against their w i l l can f i n d h i g h l y c r e a t i v e w a y s to s u b v e r t the w i s h e s of those m a k i n g the threats. T h i s problem a c c o u n t s , in large part, f o r the f a i l u r e of e c o n o m i e s d o m i n a t e d by threat and their p r e c i p i t o u s c o l l a p s e w h e n e v e r the threat p o w e r is c a l l e d into question. R e c e n t e v e n t s in Eastern E u r o p e and the S o v i e t Union are p r i m e e x a m p l e s of this d y n a m i c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , nonviolent threats can be an e f f e c t i v e approach to c o n f r o n t i n g injustice. In this v o l u m e , w e e x a m i n e t w o t y p e s : threats e x e r c i s e d by the subordinate g r o u p s on their o w n behalf and threats e x e r c i s e d on b e half of these g r o u p s by outside p o w e r s . Threats

exercised

by subordinates.

T h e p o w e r that subordinate g r o u p s p o s -

s e s s to c o m p e l the dominant g r o u p to adopt m o r e j u s t p o l i c i e s rests, parad o x i c a l l y , on the unjust nature of their p o s i t i o n . A t the c o r e of i n j u s t i c e there is u s u a l l y a t r a n s f e r of political l e g i t i m a c y or e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s f r o m the poor to the rich. B e c a u s e the rich u s u a l l y b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t on this t r a n s f e r , they are v u l n e r a b l e to interruptions of it. A c t i o n s d e s i g n e d to e x p l o i t this vulnerability can g i v e apparently p o w e r l e s s g r o u p s the a b i l ity to c o l l e c t i v e l y f o r c e m a j o r c o n c e s s i o n s through such m e a n s as strikes and b o y c o t t s , a n t i g o v e r n m e n t demonstrations, and c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e . D e s p i t e their initial nonviolent character, n o n v i o l e n t threats are a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y that threatens the v i t a l interests of the d o m i n a n t g r o u p . A s s u c h , that g r o u p is o f t e n w i l l i n g to use v i o l e n t m e a s u r e s in res p o n s e ( f o r e x a m p l e , the v i o l e n c e used against S o l i d a r i t y in P o l a n d in the

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early 1980s or the Tiananmen Square suppression in China in 1989). The nonviolent group must then choose whether to revert to violence, to remain nonviolent, or to withdraw from the conflict. This book examines such decisions in terms of cause and effect. It also examines the larger question of nonviolent threat. How and when can such approaches be successfully used, and how can they be combined with other strategies to redistribute power to eliminate social injustice? Threats exercised by external powers. Similarly, nonviolent threats can be used by outside powers to influence justice conflicts. For example, the external threat or imposition of economic, social, and political sanctions may influence the balance of power between opponents. Although sanctions are difficult to implement and, hence, may be ineffective from a purely economic point of view, the research of Kaempfer et al. (reported in this book) indicates that sanctions may have persuasive effectiveness beyond their simple economic impact.

Exchange Exchange, as we use it here, refers to bilateral or multilateral negotiation, or "you do something I want and I'll do something you want." 1 2 As Fisher and Ury argued, if and when exchange works it is usually less costly and more effective than threats and power contests. 1 3 However, exchange strategies are dependent upon factors often absent in power and justice conflicts. The primary problem is that low-power groups have relatively little to trade. One way around this dilemma is for the low-power group to enlist help from external or more powerful groups. But outside powers may exploit a justice conflict for selfish motives—to overthrow an unfriendly government (for example, the U.S. government's use of the Contras in Nicaragua) or to strengthen a friendly one. These are situations in which the weaker party's pursuit of outside assistance may come at a very high cost. Exchange is potentially more useful, however, when linked with threat. For instance, low-power groups can threaten to withhold labor (that is, strike) or to withhold their political support of the government. If either their labor or their political support is sufficiently valuable to the dominant group, the latter may negotiate with the subordinate group on a more equal basis in the shadow of this threat. 14

The Integrative

System

Boulding's third source of power is what he called " l o v e , " which is shorthand for the integrative system. "In the love relationship, essentially, A says to B , 'You do something for me because you love m e , ' " 1 5 or (in our

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

13

words) "I'll do something for you because I like you, not because I expect you to do something for me in exchange or fear you might hurt me if I don't." Boulding suggested that if the word love seems too strong, one can substitute respect. Love has been largely ignored in the academic literature on power and conflict, but Boulding persuasively argued that it is the most significant source of power in his typology. "Without some sort of legitimacy," he explained, "neither threat power nor economic [that is, exchange] power can be realized in any large degree." 1 6 The integrative system is especially important in justice disputes because the prevailing social order cannot be sustained unless the dominant group is morally able to justify its continued dominance. Although dominant groups can usually justify their dominant position in some moral terms, they may also believe in other universal principles of justice that are antithetical to the continuation of their dominant role. This belief creates an opening for nonviolent strategies that confront people with these contradictions or show the superiority of the more universal standards of justice. Once the dominant group starts to believe that what they are doing is morally wrong, they must resolve what psychologists call "cognitive dissonance" by bringing their actions into line with their beliefs. 1 7 This was a primary strategy of both Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. The advantage of this approach is that it persuades people to do things they eventually feel good about, rather than forcing them to do things that they do not want to do. Therefore, this approach reduces the need for continued vigilance (to make sure the group being forced does not respond by shooting the other group[s] in the back). Further, this approach sharply reduces the threat of counterrevolutionary change.

Related Theory and Research Boulding's analysis of power provided an initial theoretical basis for our inquiry. However, his theory was supplemented by our review of the work of other nonviolence theorists. This literature can be divided into two groups: the persuasive literature and the analytical literature. Persuasive Literature on Nonviolence The persuasive literature generally accepts the value of nonviolence on faith. It neither examines if nonviolence works nor specifies what "works" might mean. This absence of critical examination occurs because most of the authors advocate nonviolence on moral or religious grounds. Nonviolence is seen as a more humane and civilized way of life or as a just and

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GUY BURGESS & HEIDI BURGESS

moral way of engaging in conflict in all circumstances. (This view is often referred to as "principled nonviolence.") Whether it works better than alternatives such as violence or disengagement is not questioned by advocates of principled nonviolence. Rather, nonviolence is seen as good in itself and is assumed to be superior to violence in all situations. Advocates of principled nonviolence include Gandhi, King, A . J . Muste, and Leo Tolstoy. Other persuasive literature suggests that nonviolence is a means, not an end, but a means not subject to scientific analysis. "If it fails it must be, inevitably, because it has not been tried long enough or was not properly u s e d . " 1 8 Thus, the literature of persuasion " s e e k s to incite, to persuade, or to record; only rarely does it attempt to a n a l y z e . " 1 9 Nevertheless, it does develop some theoretical concepts adaptable for analytical use. Key Concepts of Principled

Nonviolence

Satyagraha. Many of the key concepts of principled nonviolence were first developed by Gandhi, the founder of modern nonviolent action. The first of these is ahimsa, the refusal to do harm, even if one is hurt by another. A second key concept is satyagraha, frequently translated as "soulf o r c e " or "truth-force" and called by Gandhi the " l a w of s u f f e r i n g . " 2 " Satyagraha and ahimsa require believers to view and treat opponents and attackers with warmth, acceptance, understanding, even love. People's humanness is seen as more important than their current beliefs or actions. Therefore, satyagrahis will refrain not only from violence toward their opponents, but from hating or speaking ill of them as well. In Gandhi's words, A satyagrahi must never forget the distinction between evil and the evildoer. He must not harbor ill-will or bitterness against the latter. He may not even employ needlessly offensive language against the evil person, however unrelieved his evil might be. For it is an article of faith with every satyagrahi that there is no one so fallen in this world but can be converted by love. A satyagrahi will always try to overcome evil by good, anger by love, untruth by truth, himsa by ahimsa. There is no other way of purging the world of evil. 2 1

Therefore, satyagraha forbids all violent acts, words, and even thoughts about others, calling for love and truth to bring about social change. Conversion, not coercion. Gene Sharp, a leader of the analytic, techniquesoriented approach to nonviolence, distinguishes between coercion and conversion. Coercion forces opponents to change their behavior because the alternatives to such a change are nonexistent or unacceptable. Conversion, on the other hand, gets people to change their behavior because they want to. They have altered their beliefs about what is right, just, or true. They have had " a change of heart."

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15

In satyagraha, coercion is avoided as an intentional tactic b e c a u s e it is seen as violence in word or thought, if not deed. Although much nonviolent resistance might be interpreted as coercive, in most cases principled nonviolent activists seek to use conversion, rather than coercion, to bring about a c o m p l e t e c h a n g e of heart in the o p p o n e n t , 2 2 not simply a c h a n g e of situation. 2 3 Suffering as a strategy. T h e r e are many techniques for e n c o u r a g i n g conversion, but most a d v o c a t e s of principled n o n v i o l e n c e b e l i e v e u n m e r i t e d suffering is the most forceful way to affect an o p p o n e n t ' s conscience. Both self-imposed suffering, such as fasts, and the willing acceptance of sanctions i m p o s e d for civil d i s o b e d i e n c e or n o n c o o p e r a t i o n are c o n s i d e r e d most e f f e c t i v e f o r b r i n g i n g about a c h a n g e of heart in o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s , leading to social change. Again quoting Gandhi: T h i n g s o f f u n d a m e n t a l importance to the p e o p l e are not s e c u r e d by reas o n a l o n e , but h a v e to be purchased with their s u f f e r i n g . S u f f e r i n g is the l a w o f h u m a n b e i n g s ; war is the l a w of the j u n g l e . B u t s u f f e r i n g is infinitely m o r e p o w e r f u l than the law of the j u n g l e for c o n v e r t i n g the o p p o nent and o p e n i n g his ears, w h i c h are o t h e r w i s e shut, to the v o i c e of r e a s o n . 2 4

Analytical

Literature

on

Nonviolence

Much of the analytical literature on nonviolence focuses on definitions and t y p o l o g i e s . M a n y authors try to d e f i n e what is and what is not " n o n v i o lence" and to develop alternative ways of categorizing nonviolent action. Although most authors agree that an adequate d e f i n i t i o n of n o n v i o l e n c e goes considerably b e y o n d simple abstinence f r o m violence, there is little agreement on what constitutes nonviolence. At a m i n i m u m , most agree, nonviolence means the renunciation of violence. This renunciation may be absolute (as in principled n o n v i o l e n c e ) or limited (as in practical or strategic nonviolence). 2 5 Further, as H o l m e s suggested, definitions of nonviolence usually include a positive aspect as well, outlining what is to be done when one encounters violence or injustice. T h e s e definitions usually involve lists of t e c h n i q u e s such as n o n r e sistance, active reconciliation, moral resistance, selective n o n v i o l e n c e , satyagraha, nonviolent revolution, passive resistance, civil d i s o b e d i e n c e , direct action, 2 6 protest, noncooperation, and intervention without physical violence. 2 7 T h e definitions of these terms, too, vary f r o m author to author. N o n v i o l e n c e w a s long equated with p a c i f i s m and passive resistance. H o w e v e r , S t i e h m s u g g e s t e d that more recent w o r k d i s t i n g u i s h e s those terms, w h i c h are seen to be passive, f r o m n o n v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r , w h i c h is seen to be active. 2 8 This distinction agrees with S h a r p ' s view that nonviolent action is active, not passive, and is action, not inaction. 2 9

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To further distinguish nonviolent action from other forms of action in conflicts, Sharp contended first that nonviolent action is not verbal. 3(1 In his view, it is meant to persuade not through words, but through social, economic, and political acts. Second, in Sharp's opinion, nonviolent action does not involve negotiation or compromise, as these are traditional techniques that work within, rather than outside, the system. 31 Other authors, however, have stated that negotiation is indeed a part of nonviolent action. Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote that "negotiation is the purpose of direct action." 32 Third, Sharp considered nonviolent action to be massive or group action. 3 3 This view differs from that of Stiehm, who distinguished between individual and group nonviolence; 34 Sharp claimed that nonviolence is only a group phenomenon. Fourth, Sharp thought that nonviolence must involve active protest, noncooperation, or intervention. Fifth, nonviolence is extraconstitutional. It does not rely on institutional procedures of the state, but circumvents or violates these procedures to bring about social change. 3 5 Typologies of Nonviolence Closely related to the definitions of nonviolence are alternative typologies of nonviolent action developed for analysis by different authors. Stiehm identified the following seven schemes used to develop such typologies. 36 1. Categorization by resister's motive. Stiehm differentiated between two motives—the desire to act morally and the desire to act effectively. Here she seemed to be referring to the distinction between principled and strategic nonviolence made by many authors. Advocates of principled nonviolence see nonviolence as an end in itself and as the appropriate response in all situations to violent attack or injustice. Advocates of strategic nonviolence see it as simply a means to an end, which may or may not be effective and, therefore, appropriate. 2. Categorization by resister's intentions toward opponent. Is the resister's approach intended to change the opponent's mind about what is right or just (as in Sharp's conversion) or to force the opponent to change behavior without changing his or her beliefs (as in Sharp's coercion)? Sharp 3 7 also included a third category—accommodation. Accommodation is the middle ground, where the opponents change their behavior because it is easier to do so than not, but not because they have changed their mind about the fundamental issue nor because they have been forced to change by threat. Both Sharp and Bond termed these distinctions "mechanisms of change," differentiating them from "mechanisms of action," which are the techniques themselves. 3 8 3. Categorization based on the nature of the intended target. Stiehm set out two possible targets of nonviolent action: the opposing party, and unaligned outside, or "third," parties that might either join the opposition

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

17

group or otherwise aid its cause. To illustrate the latter, Stiehm cited U.S. civil rights activists who tried to provoke violence that would be witnessed by the media and hence the world and then called on the federal government to intervene with force to protect the " n o n v i o l e n t " protesters. This approach, Stiehm maintained, was not intended to change the nature of the relationship between the protesters and their opponents. Rather, the tactic was designed to make that relationship obvious while maintaining a high level of legitimacy for the protesters' actions and their cause. McCarthy categorized further by describing three groups and twelve subgroups that might be influenced by a nonviolent action. 3 9 The first group, direct beneficiaries, are those who are supposed to benefit from the action. They include the core action group, "waverers and peripheral activists," the uncommitted, and those afraid of change. The second group includes opponents: core adversaries, sympathizers, uncommitted and passive beneficiaries of the status quo, and those hostile toward change. The third group includes significant third-party subgroups: powerful outsider groups (such as nongovernmental organizations), conscience constituencies that support a struggle on behalf of others, potential indirect beneficiaries, and potential indirect losers. Nonviolent action may be directed at any of these groups, McCarthy wrote, and the method chosen should differ depending on which group is the target. However, choice of target and the goal of the action are often not adequately clarified, which impairs effectiveness. 4. Categorization by technique. Sharp, Kuper, Seifert, and others used this approach. 4 " An example is S h a r p ' s unequaled identification of 198 techniques of nonviolent action. 4 1 5. Categorization by parties involved. Does the conflict involve two individuals, two groups, a group and the state, or two states? Stiehm used a simplified version of this scheme, distinguishing primarily between individual nonviolence, which she saw as based on principle, and group nonviolence, which she argued is generally strategic and of a very different character than individual nonviolence. 6. Categorization by amount of preplanning. Was the action spontaneous, tactical, or strategic? Miller based this classification scheme on the distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence. 4 2 Tactical nonviolence is used as an expedient technique. Strategic nonviolence is used as a generally applicable, ethically based approach. Spontaneous nonviolence can be either principled or pragmatic but is unplanned. Sharp distinguished between improvised nonviolent struggle without preparation and civilian-based defense that involves extensive training and planning. Although improvised struggle has been successful on occasion, Sharp argued that it is significantly weaker than civilian-based defense. 4 3 7. Classification by goal. Stiehm suggested that the goal of the action may be nonviolence itself or some more limited goal in which nonviolence

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is seen as a means to that goal. 4 4 McCarthy distinguished three levels of goals. 45 First are ultimate goals, the changes an action group wishes ultimately to achieve. Second are process goals, which are the actions necessary to achieve ultimate goals. Third are achievement goals, which can be either immediate "hoped-for effects of a single action or group of actions" 46 or intermediate changes that contribute directly to reaching the final goal. Positive/negative distinction. Boserup and Mack 4 7 made a useful distinction between positive and negative approaches to waging conflict. Although this distinction divides nonviolent actors in largely the same way as does the distinction between principled and practical nonviolence, the differentiation is made for a different reason. The negative approach views conflict as simply a struggle, and utilizes compulsion (that is, coercion) and power freely to bring about social change. Appeals to the moral or human qualities of an opponent play only a secondary role in this approach, which stresses effectiveness. Negative conflict advocates see coercion as more effective than conversion. The positive approach, typical of principled nonviolence and clearly formulated in Gandhi's work, seeks mutually acceptable, rather than unilaterally imposed solutions. This approach makes strong appeals to the moral and human qualities of the opponent, and regards trust, openness, and love as highly important. Boserup and Mack saw this distinction as more useful than the more common distinctions between techniques (because the same action can be labeled differently) and less ambiguous than typologies based on how methods are supposed to function. (As an example, they noted that Gandhi's noncooperation and Sharp's noncooperation are very different.) The simple positive/negative distinction, they claimed, is much more theoretically useful because of its simplicity and clarity. (They then went on at length to demonstrate why negative approaches are generally superior to positive ones for developing civilian defense.)

How Nonviolence Works A smaller portion of the literature on nonviolence seeks to analyze how it works. The most analysis in this area has been done by Gene Sharp, viewed by many as the founder of the pragmatic, techniques-oriented approach to nonviolence, just as Gandhi is seen to be the major conceptualizer and practitioner of modern principled nonviolence. Sharp's key ideas were set out in his book The Politics of Nonviolent Action and have been adopted by most pragmatic nonviolence theorists. Sharp's central concept is that all government, no matter how tyrannical, is based on popular consent. When this consent is withdrawn, the

THEORETICAL F O U N D A T I O N S

19

power of the leader is destroyed. 4 8 Gandhi and most advocates of principled nonviolence would likely agree with this, but the concept of power is more central in S h a r p ' s theory of n o n v i o l e n c e than in G a n d h i ' s , w h e r e truth might be its counterpart. S h a r p identified six sources of p o w e r : authority, h u m a n r e s o u r c e s , skills and k n o w l e d g e , intangible psychological and ideological f a c t o r s , material resources, and sanctions. 4 9 T h e extent, quality, and availability of these f a c t o r s d e t e r m i n e s the p o w e r a r e g i m e can wield. T h e authority a r e g i m e c o m m a n d s , the a m o u n t and quality of h u m a n and material resources at its disposal, and the f o r c e f u l n e s s of sanctions it can use determine its p o w e r capacity, and c o n s e q u e n t l y its ability to i n f l u e n c e three g r o u p s — i t s agents and helpers, the general population, and f o r e i g n governments and people. If a r e g i m e ' s power capacity is high, then its ability to elicit cooperation f r o m these three groups will be high. Otherwise, the a m o u n t of cooperation they will give may be low, f u r t h e r d e c r e a s i n g the r e g i m e ' s sources of power. Nonviolent action diminishes a r u l e r ' s sources of power, S h a r p suggested, through "political jiu-jitsu," 5 0 an extension of G r e g g ' s concept of moral jiu-jitsu. 5 1 Both c o n c e p t s refer to the Oriental martial art in which an aggressor is thrown off balance when his victim fails to counter a physical attack. In G r e g g ' s f o r m u l a t i o n , the n o n v i o l e n c e and g o o d w i l l of the victim cause the opponent to l o s e his moral balance. . . . He suddenly and u n e x p e c t e d l y l o s e s the moral support w h i c h the usual v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e of m o s t v i c t i m s w o u l d render him. H e p l u n g e s forward, as it w e r e , into a n e w w o r l d of v a l u e s . He f e e l s i n s e c u r e b e c a u s e of the n o v e l t y of the situation and his i g n o r a n c e of h o w to handle it. JHe l o s e s his p o i s e and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e . . . . [In this w a y , the n o n v i o l e n t a c t i v i s t ] u s e s the l e v e r a g e of a superior w i s d o m to s u b d u e the rough direct force o f his o p p o n e n t . 5 2

S h a r p e x t e n d e d this c o n c e p t to include political and social i m b a l a n c e as well. T h e n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n i s t s d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f u s e to c h a l l e n g e the o p p o n e n t on his o w n l e v e l o f v i o l e n c e . V i o l e n c e a g a i n s t v i o l e n c e is r e i n f o r c i n g . T h e n o n v i o l e n t g r o u p not o n l y d o e s not n e e d to u s e v i o l e n c e , but t h e y must not d o s o lest t h e y s t r e n g t h e n their o p p o n e n t and w e a k e n t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y must a d h e r e to their o w n n o n v i o l e n t " w e a p o n s s y s t e m " [ w h i c h i n c l u d e s a variety o f t e c h n i q u e s of p e r s u a s i o n , m a n i p u l a t i o n , and c o e r c i o n ] , . . . N o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n t e n d s to turn the o p p o n e n t ' s v i o l e n c e and r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t his o w n p o w e r p o s i t i o n , w e a k e n i n g it and at the s a m e t i m e s t r e n g t h e n i n g the n o n v i o l e n t g r o u p . B e c a u s e v i o l e n t a c t i o n and n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n p o s s e s s quite d i f f e r e n t m e c h a n i s m s , and i n d u c e d i f f e r i n g f o r c e s of c h a n g e in the s o c i e t y , the o p p o n e n t ' s r e p r e s s i o n . . . c a n n e v e r really c o m e to grips w i t h the kind o f p o w e r w i e l d e d by the n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n i s t s . G a n d h i has c o m p a r e d the s i t u a t i o n w i t h that o f a

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man violently striking water with a sword: it was the man's arm which was dislocated. 5 3

T h u s , S h a r p saw n o n v i o l e n c e u p s e t t i n g traditional social and political p r o c e s s e s as well as the o p p o n e n t s ' s e n s e of m o r a l i t y . T h i s can be d o n e , S h a r p c o n t e n d e d , in three w a y s : n o n v i o l e n t protest a n d p e r s u a s i o n , n o n c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d n o n v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n . 5 4 N o n v i o l e n t p r o t e s t and p e r s u a sion is the m i l d e s t f o r m of action in S h a r p ' s t h e o r y . It i n c l u d e s s y m b o l i c acts s u c h as p a r a d e s , v i g i l s , p i c k e t i n g , a n d t e a c h - i n s , a n d any a c t i o n to voice p e a c e f u l opposition to a policy or law, or to p e r s u a d e others to a particular v i e w or action. S u c h acts g o b e y o n d verbal e x p r e s s i o n or n e g o t i a tion, but s t o p short of n o n c o o p e r a t i o n or n o n v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n . S h a r p ' s s e c o n d c a t e g o r y of n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n is n o n c o o p e r a t i o n , the r e f u s a l to do w h a t o n e n o r m a l l y d o e s to assist a p e r s o n , g r o u p , institution, or r e g i m e with w h o m the activist is in c o n f l i c t . For i n s t a n c e , p e o p l e m a y s t o p or s l o w d o w n their w o r k ; they m a y d i s o b e y l a w s they r e g a r d as imm o r a l ; they m a y r e f u s e to pay t a x e s . T h e intent is to d i s c o n t i n u e or d e f y certain e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . S h a r p f u r t h e r d i v i d e d such a c t i o n s into social, political, and e c o n o m i c n o n c o o p e r a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the type of relationship being discontinued. N o n v i o l e n t intervention, S h a r p ' s third c a t e g o r y , is s t r o n g e r yet, in that it i n v o l v e s direct i n t e r v e n t i o n ( a n d u s u a l l y the d i s r u p t i o n of an a c t i v i t y ) . These methods, Sharp maintained, pose a more direct and immediate challenge. If successful, the victory is likely to come quicker by the use of methods of this class than with the use of methods of the previous classes, because the disruptive effects of intervention are harder to tolerate or withstand for a considerable period of time. . . . However, . . . speedier and more severe repression may be a first result—which of course, does not necessarily mean defeat. 5 5

I n c l u d e d in this c a t e g o r y are p h y s i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s s u c h as sit-ins, r i d e - i n s (as in the " F r e e d o m R i d e s " d u r i n g s e g r e g a t i o n in the s o u t h e r n United States), n o n v i o l e n t i n c u r s i o n s into f o r b i d d e n a r e a s , and n o n v i o l e n t obstruction. Sharp also included "psychological interventions"—selfi n f l i c t e d s u f f e r i n g such as f a s t i n g , a n d " r e v e r s e t r i a l s " w h e r e d e f e n d a n t s c h a r g e the state with v i o l a t i n g a higher ethical c o d e . A l s o included in this category is social intervention w h e r e activists establish alternative social patterns, institutions, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m s , even g o v e r n m e n t s . In all three categories, S h a r p d o c u m e n t e d 198 different f o r m s of nonviolent action. 5 6 A l s o i m p o r t a n t in S h a r p ' s t h e o r y is the c o n c e p t of m e c h a n i s m s of change. Protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention (called m e c h a n i s m s of action by B o n d ) 5 7 p r o d u c e c h a n g e in o n e of f o u r w a y s — t h r o u g h c o n v e r s i o n , a c c o m m o d a t i o n , c o e r c i o n , or d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the opp o n e n t . T h e s e are w h a t S h a r p a n d B o n d call m e c h a n i s m s of c h a n g e .

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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

C o n v e r s i o n is the most d i f f i c u l t to a c h i e v e b e c a u s e it requires the highest level of internalization of values. In conversion, opponents b e c o m e convinced that their behavior or beliefs are w r o n g and should be changed. Here the change of policy or behavior is m a d e because the actor wants to change, not because he or she is forced to change. By contrast, coercion involves no internalized c h a n g e of v a l u e s and beliefs and is therefore easier to accomplish, according to many theorists. Opponents are forced to change their policy because nonviolent resistance has so eroded their sources of power that they can no longer maintain the policy in question. T h u s , "the o p p o n e n t has not c h a n g e d his mind on the issues and he wants to continue the struggle, but is unable to do so." 5 K A c c o m m o d a t i o n , the most c o m m o n m e c h a n i s m of c h a n g e , lies between these two extremes. In accommodation, the opponent does not agree with the changes demanded (that is, he or she has not been converted) and he still has the power to resist (that is, he or she has not been coerced), but he chooses to accede because doing so seems easier or cheaper than holding f i r m . S h a r p has recently added a fourth m e c h a n i s m — d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . 5 9 This state occurs when a ruler's sources of power are almost eliminated, to the point that the g o v e r n m e n t simply c o l l a p s e s . T h e r e is no longer a n y o n e to coerce. Related Theories of How Nonviolence

Works

Others have developed schemes similar to S h a r p ' s but differing in minor respects. For instance, Lakey thought that nonviolent change can be induced through conversion, coercion, or persuasion. His concept of persuasion is similar to S h a r p ' s accommodation in that opponents do not accept the actionists' view. Here opponents retain the ability to fight but choose not to fight. In Lakey's words, "The opponents can be overheard saying, 'Let them have what they want; it's too much of a nuisance to continue the f i g h t . ' " 6 0 But b e y o n d the notion of nuisance, Lakey described how persuasion c o m e s about when opponents c o m e to see actionists as human, and therefore, part of their group. All men, no matter how debased they may seem, treat well the members of their own group. . . . [It] is easy to be violent against those w h o are seen as either inhuman ("mad dogs") or non-human (foreign slaves, unseen faces). The task of the nonviolent campaigners, then, is to get the opponent to see them as human beings. 6 1

B o n d 6 2 combines S h a r p ' s approach with the theories of other social science theories of opinion change, power, and identifies eight mechanisms of action: physical and coercive m a n i p u l a t i o n , public c o e r c i o n , authoritative, intellectual,

R u m m e l 6 3 and conflict. Bond force, discrete and altruistic

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appeals, and exchange. These mechanisms are used singly and in combination to bring about change through conversion, accommodation, compliance (equivalent to Sharp's coercion), or disintegration. These terms are all defined and explained in Chapter 4 of this volume. The Positive Approach to Nonviolent

Change 64

As noted earlier, Boserup and Mack distinguished between the positive nonviolence theorists, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Johan Galtung, and the negative theorists, such as Gene Sharp, Doug Bond, George Lakey, and Clarence Case. Although the latter four might object to the label "negative," they do stress the utility of threat- and coercion-based approaches to conflict much more than Gandhi and Galtung, who seem to have a more positive or perhaps optimistic view of humankind's susceptibility to moral and intellectual appeals. Neither Gandhi nor Galtung developed the theory of positive nonviolence as much as Sharp and his colleagues have developed their theory of change, but the notion that people respond better to positive influences than to negative ones needs to be considered. Gandhi wrote: W e can o n l y w i n over the o p p o n e n t by l o v e , n e v e r by hate. Hate is the subtlest form of v i o l e n c e . W e cannot be really non-violent and yet have hate in us. . . . Violent non-co-operation only multiplies evil. . . . A s evil can only be sustained by v i o l e n c e , withdrawal of support of evil requires c o m p l e t e abstention from v i o l e n c e . 6 5

Even though Gandhi advocated the use of noncooperation and civil disobedience, for him those activities are not to force the opponent to change their behavior (that is, coercion), but rather to strongly influence them psychologically to change their mind about the morality or correctness of that behavior. Thus, although the so-called negative theorists see noncooperation and civil disobedience as coercive, Gandhi saw them as persuasive and advocated their use as conversion, not coercion. In addition to stressing noncooperation and civil disobedience aimed at unjust laws, Gandhi also directed his followers to undertake "constructive work," which often involved the creation of parallel social, economic, and political structures to undermine the unjust ones. Feminist Approaches to Nonviolence A third perspective on nonviolence, feminist theory, both supports and contradicts other nonviolence theories. Power is a central concept in feminist theory, though it is defined differently than traditional concepts. Meyerding distinguished between personal power—the power each person has to control her own life—and power-over-others, the power to force others

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

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to do something. 6 6 Woehrle referred to power-over and power-with;67 Bell and Kurtz used power-over and power-to.6S Power-over involves the ability to control others and is a "limited commodity owned only by an elite." 6 9 Power-with is a "resource gained through cooperation [and involves] the ability 'to be' rather than 'to have' or ' t o do."' 7 ( ) Bell and Kurtz defined power-to in terms of capacity, rather than as force, coercion, authority, or violence. 7 1 Power-to can be held simultaneously and equally by all parties, and it expands when it is shared. 7 2 Readers familiar with game theory might see these terms corresponding to zero-sum and positive-sum views of power. Feminist theory also envisions power as a group phenomenon, not a personal attribute. Personal empowerment is directly linked to community e m p o w e r m e n t , which is then translated into political action and social change. (The feminist phrase for this approach is that the "personal is political.") "By changing perceptions of power in this way," Bell and Kurtz argued, "individuals are able to envision and actually begin to live in a way that denies the inevitability of domination." 7 3

Assessing Effectiveness Obstacles Studies that analyze the effectiveness of nonviolence comparatively across cases are rare. A number of case studies assess effectiveness in one case, but few compare effectiveness across cases. The reasons for this are four-fold. First, much of the literature is written to persuade, not analyze. Second, there is the common assumption that studying the effectiveness of nonviolence is utilitarian, amoral, or even immoral. Nonviolence is judged superior for so many philosophical and ethical reasons that an assessment of practical goal attainment is viewed as a useless determination of the obvious—the goodness of nonviolence. Others (including ourselves) disagree with this view. W e think that nonviolence, although difficult to define, is an empirically observable process to be examined objectively just as other social processes. Nonviolent actionists have goals and objectives, the attainment of which can be measured. Some nonviolent actionists may choose nonviolence for ethical reasons, but many more are likely to be practically motivated. These actionists need to know whether nonviolence will work as they hope, how to make it work better, and when its costs are likely to exceed the benefits to be gained. It is towards this end that this book is addressed. A third reason why analyses of effectiveness are rare is that they are difficult to accomplish. Controlled experiments in the field are impossible. Experiments in the laboratory are of dubious value when extrapolated to

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the societal level. A n a l y s e s of a f e w cases such as ours can only be suggestive, as far too many variables are uncontrolled—hence, too many "what i f s " remain. S o m e empirically based studies are underway (most notably those by Sharp and his colleagues at Harvard), but the work is extremely expensive and s l o w . 7 4 Few researchers have been willing or able to undertake such exhaustive research. A fourth obstacle to such analysis is the indeterminate nature of the term effectiveness. Is nonviolence e f f e c t i v e only if it brings about complete revolution? Is it effective if it brings about only minor social change? What if it brings about changes in particular individuals, but not in society as a whole? Is it more e f f e c t i v e than violence or disengagement? How can one measure it? The simplest response to this problem is to examine the goals of those using nonviolence to determine their intentions. It should then be possible to assess whether or not those goals are met. A s McCarthy pointed out, however, goals are not always clear and can vary from one participant (or group) to another. He agreed that effectiveness is directly linked to one's goals. A group can have success, he wrote, in any of three w a y s . First, a group can achieve its process goals (that is, it can successfully conduct an action). Second, it can succeed or fail in reaching intermediate goals or intervening steps toward its ultimate goal. Third, it can reach its ultimate goal or not. "Groups conducting nonviolent action must be aware that success has these three aspects and that satisfaction with taking a step along the road does not end the j o u r n e y . " 7 5 Neither does failure to achieve the ultimate goal in one step mean an action is a failure on all counts. Although goal attainment is the most common measure of success, Sharp 7 6 noted two other important factors. One is the increase or decrease in the absolute and relative power of the contending groups. The second is change in each group's sphere of influence and the level of outside sympathy felt for its objectives. Factors Contributing

to or Limiting

Effectiveness

Sharp has written the most on determinants of effectiveness also. In V o l ume III of The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Sharp listed thirty-four factors that determine the outcome of nonviolent struggles. These include factors in the social context, characteristics of the contending groups, and factors associated with third parties. Elements in the social situation that influence the success of nonviolent action, according to Sharp, include: the degree of conflict of interest between the parties (the greater the conflict, the smaller the chance of success); the social distance between the groups (again, an inverse relationship); the number of shared beliefs (a positive relationship); and the degree

THEORETICAL F O U N D A T I O N S

25

to which power is dispersed throughout the groups and society as a whole (greater dispersion of power brings higher chances for success). Opponent group characteristics that are important are: the degree to which the opponent group is dependent upon the action group (the greater the dependence, the greater the likelihood of the nonviolent group's success); the degree of dissent that is normally tolerated (the less dissent is tolerated, the greater the impact of dissent); the degree to which the opponent group is convinced it is right; the means of control and repression available to the opponent; the degree to which the opponent's supporters (including its agents and the general population) support the opponent's position and the repression used against the nonviolent group (if they do not, the repression may break down); and the opponent's estimate of the chances of success of the movement and the consequences success would have. Characteristics of the nonviolent group that Sharp viewed as critical include: the degree to which the nonviolent group is convinced it is right; the level of confidence the nonviolent group has in nonviolent action; the soundness of the group's strategy and tactics; the level of discipline within the nonviolent group; the number of nonviolent resisters and their proportion in the general population (generally, the higher the better); the degree to which the actionists are willing to continue in the face of repression; the ability of the actionists to keep the struggle nonviolent; the presence and quality of effective leadership; and the degree to which the nonviolent group controls its own sources of power (for instance, the degree to which they have alternative organizations to bypass repressive governmental institutions and the degree to which the former can work together). In his book Civilian-based Defense, Sharp added some items to those listed above. Some refer specifically to civilian-based defense, and others apply more generally to nonviolent action as a whole. These factors include: the desire of the subordinate group to resist; the internal strength of the subordinate group; knowledge of nonviolent theory and methods; the skill of the nonviolent resisters in applying the technique; and the degree of sympathy and support for the resisters from third parties. Other hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of nonviolent action include those of McCarthy, Bond, Kuper, Oppenheimer, and Wehr. McCarthy agreed with Sharp that nonviolent action is a struggle. Therefore, he argued, strategy and tactics "assume immense importance." 77 Also important to success are an understanding of the technique, personal commitment, creativity, and spontaneity. Of these four, he implied that understanding of the technique is of highest importance. The latter three a l o n e , or b a c k e d o n l y by f a l s e a s s u m p t i o n s about the t e c h n i q u e , . . . h a v e led to a v o i d a b l e s u f f e r i n g and failures and to premature a b a n d o n m e n t o f n o n v i o l e n t m e a n s . E v i d e n c e is m o u n t i n g that k n o w l e d g e of the t e c h n i q u e contributes to s u c c e s s . 7 8

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He cited Kruegler 7 9 as the s o u r c e of such e v i d e n c e . Other f a c t o r s c o n tributing to success, McCarthy suggested, include knowledge of the opponents' strong and weak points, clarity about goals, the opponents' position, and their likely response. Most other a c a d e m i c analyses of e f f e c t i v e n e s s have been done through individual case studies. A few are worth noting because of the explicit h y p o t h e s e s they m a k e . For instance, O p p e n h e i m e r listed six independent variables that are likely to affect the o u t c o m e of nonviolent resistance e f f o r t s . 8 0 M u c h of this was drawn f r o m K u p e r ' s analysis of racial conflict in South Africa. 8 1 T h e six variables are as follows. 1. Relative size of opposing groups. Contrary to Sharp, Kuper and Oppenheimer argued that nonviolence is usually more successful if the subordinate group is relatively small. If it is large, they postulated, fear within the dominant group will increase and social change will b e c o m e more difficult. Further, even nonviolent techniques will be perceived by the dominant g r o u p to be violent b e c a u s e the scale on which they are used pose such a serious threat. 2. The differences in culture of opposing groups. If cultural d i f f e r ences are great, Oppenheimer asserted, the nonviolent challenge group will be perceived as " f o r e i g n , strange, s u b h u m a n or u n c i v i l i z e d . " 8 2 C o m m o n religion or culture will facilitate communication with the dominant group and will also facilitate L a k e y ' s "persuasion." 3. Differences in culture within the subordinate group. If "leaders use techniques [that are] strange to the masses . . . [then there is a danger that] they may get a ' c r a c k p o t ' reputation a m o n g potential f o l l o w e r s . " 8 3 Even without such problems, significant cultural d i f f e r e n c e s within the s u b o r dinate g r o u p w o u l d m a k e the sense of g r o u p identity and c o h e s i v e n e s s more difficult to maintain. 4. Threshold of resistance. Persuasion or conversion through v o l u n tary or unmerited s u f f e r i n g is a c o m m o n tactic of p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y motivated nonviolent resisters. Oppenheimer and Kuper suggested that the success of this approach varies according to the "threshold of r e s i s t a n c e " of the dominant group. This threshold will be higher if: a. The dominant g r o u p ' s culture places a premium on violence. If so, nonviolence may be seen as cowardice or contemptible behavior. b. T h e dominant g r o u p perceives the nonviolent g r o u p as inherently inferior or n o n h u m a n (as w a s true for blacks in South A f r i c a or J e w s in Nazi G e r m a n y ) . T h e n even voluntary s u f f e r i n g may be seen as merited. c. T h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p sees voluntary s u f f e r i n g as "ill-willed m a s o c h i s m " and hence deserved. 8 4 d. T h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p has a m o n o p o l y on violence and thinks that constitutes a m o n o p o l y on power. S h a r p maintained that such a

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

27

view, though common, is clearly wrong and can be overcome with political jiu-jitsu. However, Oppenheimer suggested that a monopoly on violence may lead the dominant group to feel that its "prerogative should never be challenged, hence any voluntary suffering undertaken by the subordinate group is seen as a usurpation of the ruler's function" (and hence, is not to be tolerated). 85 e. The suffering is not very visible. Totalitarian regimes can easily block media coverage of self-suffering or otherwise prevent the nonviolent actionists' message from getting to the people. f. The dominant group is simply resistant. Some societies may be more tolerant of the suffering of others, hence willing to hold out or continue to inflict violence upon the sufferers until they finally give up. 5. Attack versus defense. Nonviolence was seen by both Oppenheimer and Kuper to work better offensively (that is, to change existing customs) than defensively (to prevent alteration of the status quo). The literature does suggest, however, that this principle may not apply to civilian-based defense. 8 6 6. Psychological differentials. Some populations, Kuper and Oppenheimer asserted, may be more psychologically fit for nonviolent action than others. Those populations would include cultures that tend to repress or sublimate hostility and aggression. Cultures that permit or encourage violent response to aggression are less likely to be successful nonviolent resisters. (Although this hypothesis seems intuitively obvious, it has been challenged by other analysts, for instance, Zielonka—discussed below.) Another analysis, done by Wehr, analyzed Norwegian and Czechoslovakian nonviolent resistance to occupation. 8 7 The success of such resistance, Wehr wrote, depends on the following factors. 1. Perception of the invaders as the enemy. A strong in-group/outgroup dichotomy is essential, Wehr argued, to maintain a nonviolent resistance to occupation. Other analysts of civilian-based defense have agreed. Boserup and Mack, for instance, used this reasoning to support the idea that negative influence techniques (for example, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention) are much more successful for civilian defense than are positive (that is, integrative) techniques that tend to break down the in-group/out-group distinction. 88 2. Clear leadership. In order to be successful, the nonviolent resistance must have on-site, clearly identifiable, legitimate, and popular leadership. Without such leadership, organization of strategy and tactics becomes very difficult, as does maintenance of the opposition group itself. 3. Effective communication. The leadership must have access to an effective communication system. This communication system is important for the development and maintenance of the leaders' authority. All social

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movements, Wehr observed, can be viewed as developmental processes by which " c o m m u n i c a t i o n s networks are modified and built—to mobilize and sustain popular resistance." 8 9 4. Interpersonal communication networks. In addition to the m a s s media, strong interpersonal c o m m u n i c a t i o n networks can also help resistance m o v e m e n t s considerably. These networks operate even when access to mass media is blocked, and they not only work to transmit information but also help to integrate the resistance movement. 5. Clarification of indigenous values. Military occupation by outside forces, according to W e h r , creates a " t e m p o r a r y a n o m i e " in which traditional, indigenous values and norms may b e c o m e questioned or ill defined. 9 " Resistance values must be redefined and reactivated and norms of acceptable behavior must be established under the new conditions, so that resisters know what they should and should not do in response to changing circumstances and demands. 6. Resistance of subnational organizations. Resistance activities undertaken by voluntary and professional associations as well as professional g r o u p i n g s within o r g a n i z a t i o n s help to " m e r g e s u b - g r o u p and national identities and loyalties and activate them on behalf of [the] resistance." 9 1 These activities also contribute to the resistance c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and decisionmaking systems. 7. Geographical, political, and sociocultural factors. V a r i a t i o n s in these f a c t o r s can d e t e r m i n e both the propensity f o r nonviolent resistance to d e v e l o p and also the g r o u p ' s ability to maintain discipline and o r g a nization and e v e n t u a l l y s u c c e e d in a c h i e v i n g its g o a l s . A m o n g the f a c tors listed (drawn specifically f r o m the C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n and N o r w e g i a n cases) are literacy, b e h a v i o r of the o c c u p y i n g f o r c e , character of the social s t r u c t u r e , cultural p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d v i o l e n c e , and the futility of armed resistance. 9 2 A third case of interest is Z i e l o n k a ' s study of nonviolence in Poland. One of his main concerns was why Solidarity chose nonviolence over violence in its struggle for social change, despite several factors militating against the use of nonviolence. V i o l e n c e abounds in modern Polish history, and the Polish people have given widespread support to armed resistance, especially where it counters military invasion by a foreign power. One could even say that armed resistance was, in a way, cultivated by Polish culture and tradition. For instance, although during World War II there were many examples of civil disobedience and the successful application of various nonviolent actions by the Poles, the armed opposition to the Nazis enjoyed the greatest esteem and the support of the Polish population. The postwar history of social upheavals [in Poland] is also discouraging from the perspective of nonviolence. 9 3

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29

A second factor discouraging nonviolence is that " d e e p philosophical considerations about nonviolence never d e v e l o p e d in P o l a n d , and only a few examples of direct identification with the tradition of nonviolence can be f o u n d . " 9 4 H o w e v e r , the lack of a tradition of n o n v i o l e n c e in P o l a n d "does not d i f f e r dramatically from other historical cases of nonviolent action. Both G a n d h i ' s India and T h o r e a u ' s A m e r i c a have rich traditions of violence." 9 5 Zielonka attributed Solidarity's use of nonviolence to three factors: tactical considerations, doctrinal issues, and ethics. The most important tactical consideration was the belief that violent resistance w o u l d dramatically increase casualties, without bringing Solidarity closer to its objectives. Nonviolence w a s chosen, in a sense, because it was the only option left. Second, Zielonka noted, "Solidarity's struggle is aimed at the creation of a political s y s t e m based on s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t and g r a s s r o o t s participation. . . . From the doctrinal point of view, Solidarity c o u l d not use a means of struggle that would contradict its social goals." 9 6 Third, S o l i d a r i t y ' s choice of nonviolence was closely associated with the Christian concepts of love and social justice, promoted by Pope John Paul II and parish priests across Poland. A l t h o u g h these f a c t o r s are case s p e c i f i c , Z i e l o n k a suggested that e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r n o n v i o l e n c e must include social, ideological, and tactical factors that are far more important in the choice of n o n v i o l e n c e over v i o l e n c e than are history and tradition. T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s were echoed by C r o w and Grant in their analysis of nonviolence in the Middle East. 9 7 Nonviolent struggle is not c o m m o n l y associated with the Middle East, but it has been used occasionally with success and has been a primary tactic of the intifada. A l t h o u g h a f e w in the M i d d l e East, notably M u b a r a k A w a d , 9 8 have advocated nonviolence out of principle, its use has been mostly practical: It w a s the only c h o i c e available that w a s consistent with the i n t i f a d a ' s long-term goals. Like Solidarity b e f o r e it, the intifada is w o r k i n g toward self-determination. Nonviolence has strengthened grassroots participation and s e l f - r e l i a n c e and may better prepare the P a l e s t i n i a n s f o r a u t o n o m y than could violence. As Grant wrote: One of the most remarkable a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of the Intifada has been the growth of c o n f i d e n c e a m o n g Palestinians in their ability to resist the o c cupation. The practical experience in standing up to the Israelis has s i g nificantly contributed to a g r o w i n g sense of "nationhood," w h i c h in turn has led to important c h a n g e s in Palestinian political, s o c i a l , and e c o n o m i c relations. . . . [ A s ] in other popular revolutions, the s u c c e s s of the struggle has created a practical understanding of the m e a n i n g of "citizenship" in an e m e r g i n g Palestinian state. 9 9

T h e intifada, Grant stated, has altered social relations b e t w e e n the sexes, parents, and children as well as between traditional leaders and followers.

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W o m e n , children, and "ordinary p e o p l e " have been e m p o w e r e d and have b e c o m e more independent of traditional leadership. T h e intifada has also increasingly d e v e l o p e d f u n c t i o n a l i n d i g e n o u s organizations to supplant Israeli institutions. In analyzing the future of the intifada, Grant listed several factors necessary for the success of that or similar movements. T h e s e factors include: (1) the conviction that nonviolent struggle, alone, can succeed; (2) a disciplined leadership capable of quelling spontaneous violence; (3) strategic thinking; (4) development of f u n c t i o n i n g , indigenous institutions capable of supporting resistance and f u l f i l l i n g societal needs; and (5) an understanding of how nonviolence w o r k s and its likely e f f e c t s on target populations. Writing in 1990, Grant thought these e l e m e n t s w e r e not s u f f i ciently strong for the intifada to succeed. Still, the pursuit of n o n v i o l e n c e w a s far p r e f e r a b l e to further violent struggle. As noted by Ibrahim, although nonviolent political struggle has been less sensational [than the violent c o n f l i c t s in the Middle East], it has proven at least as e f f e c t i v e as armed struggle in r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s in the region. The fact that violent m e a n s h a v e settled no major M i d d l e Eastern c o n f l i c t s of the last four d e c a d e s strengthens the c a s e for serious e x a m i n a t i o n of an alternative nonviolent course. 1 ( ) < )

Although one might argue that the 1991 Gulf W a r did temporarily settle one conflict, its costs were so heavy and so many problems were left unresolved that the case for nonviolence in the Middle East remains strong. In his analysis of the Solidarity m o v e m e n t , Zielonka critiqued the strategies and tactics it used f r o m 1980 to 1985. He suggested that s o m e nonviolent sanctions can actually be counterproductive for the goals of the action group. Others, although " s u c c e s s f u l " in the sense of being well organized and increasing popular support, will not meet even the g r o u p ' s short-term o b j e c t i v e s . T h u s , nonviolent actionists must consider their choice of tactics carefully. He noted that much more research is needed to d e t e r m i n e a p p r o p r i a t e sanctions for particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s and objectives. This research will require examination of successful and unsuccessful uses of various sanctions, their long- and short-term costs and benefits, and the complex relationship between the sanctions, strategies, and objectives of the nonviolent resister. 1 0 1 T h e task is huge but a necessary next step in building nonviolence analysis and theory. This book, we hope, is part of that theory-building process.

Notes 1. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part I, Part II, Part III. 2. Folger, The Sense of Injustice-, R e i s , "The Multidimensionality of Justice."

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3. A d a m s , "Inequity in Social E x c h a n g e . " 4. Folger, The Sense of Injustice. 5. S a m p s o n , "Studies in Status C o n g r u e n c e . " 6. Deutsch, "Equity, Equality, and N e e d . " 7. Reis, "The Multidimensionality of Justice," p. 38. 8. Bondurant, Conquest of Violence, p. 9. 9. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part III, p. 6 0 9 . 10. B o u l d i n g , Three Faces of Power. 11. Ibid., p. 25. 12. Ibid., p. 27. 13. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes. 14. B o s e r u p and Mack, War Without Weapons. 15. B o u l d i n g , Three Faces of Power, p. 29. 16. Ibid., p. 109. 17. Festinger, Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. 18. O p p e n h e i m e r , "Towards a S o c i o l o g i c a l Understanding of N o n v i o l e n c e , " p. 123. 19. Stiehm, Nonviolent Power, p. 19. 20. Seifert, Conquest by Suffering. 21. Gandhi, " N o n - V i o l e n c e , " p. 95. 22. Oppenheimer, "Towards a S o c i o l o g i c a l Understanding of N o n v i o l e n c e . " 23. D e s p i t e their philosophical statements favoring c o n v e r s i o n over coercion, many a d v o c a t e s of principled n o n v i o l e n c e , including Gandhi and King, on o c c a s i o n a d v o c a t e d or used at least mild c o e r c i o n in their c a m p a i g n s . H o w e v e r , a strong preference for what w e will later call integrative t e c h n i q u e s d i s t i n g u i s h e s most principled n o n v i o l e n c e advocates from the pragmatic s c h o o l of n o n v i o l e n c e , w h i c h relies much more heavily on coercion to bring about social c h a n g e . 24. Gandhi, " N o n - V i o l e n c e , " p. 94. 25. H o l m e s , Nonviolence in Theory and Practice. 26. S e e Stiehm, Nonviolent Power; H o l m e s , Nonviolence in Theory and Practice; Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa, Seifert, Conquest by Suffering. 27. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part II. 28. Stiehm, Nonviolent Power. 29. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part I. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," p. 69. 33. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part I. 34. Stiehm, Nonviolent Power. 35. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part I. 36. Stiehm, Nonviolent Power. 37. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part III. 38. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part III; B o n d , Chapter 4 in this book. 39. McCarthy, "The T e c h n i q u e s of N o n v i o l e n t A c t i o n . " 40. Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa; Seifert, Conquest by Suffering. 41. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part II. 42. Miller, Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation. 43. Sharp, Civilian-based Defense. 44. T h i s distinction s e e m s very similar to her first categorization s c h e m e , although she maintains they are different. 45. McCarthy, "The T e c h n i q u e s of N o n v i o l e n t A c t i o n . " 46. Ibid., p. 116. 47. B o s e r u p and Mack, War Without Weapons.

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48. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part I. 49. Ibid. 50. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part II. 51. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence. 52. Ibid., p. 44. 53. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part II, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 . 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., pp. 3 5 7 - 3 5 8 . 56. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part II. 57. See Bond, Chapter 4 in this book. 58. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part III, p. 706. 59. Sharp, Civilian-based Defense. 60. Lakey, "The Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action," p. 385. 61. Ibid., p. 388. 62. Bond, Chapter 4 in this volume. 63. R u m m e l , Understanding Conflict and War; R u m m e l , The Conflict Helix Principles. 64. Boserup and Mack, War Without Weapons. 65. Gandhi, "Non-Violence," p. 96. 66. Meyerding, "Reclaiming Nonviolence." 67. Woerhle, Social Constructions of Power. 68. Bell and Kurtz, Social Theory and Nonviolent Revolutions. 69. Woehrle, Social Constructions of Power and Empowerment, p. 3. 70. Ibid. 71. Bell and Kurtz, Social Theory and Nonviolent Revolutions. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid, p. 7. 74. S h a r p ' s major work, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, represents years of research and uses a huge volume of case study data analyzed with largely qualitative methods. D o u g Bond, research director at H a r v a r d ' s Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, is n o w undertaking an equally massive quantitative study of m e c h a nisms of action and change. However, the project is proceeding slowly, and findings are not yet available. 75. McCarthy, "The Techniques of Nonviolent Action," p. 117. 76. Sharp, Civilian-based Defense. 11. McCarthy, "The Techniques of Nonviolent Action." 78. Ibid., p. 111. 79. Kruegler, "Implications of Prototypical Nonviolent Resistance." 80. Oppenheimer, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Nonviolence." 81. Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa. 82. Oppenheimer, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Nonviolence." 83. Ibid., p. 129. 84. Ibid., p. 129. 85. Ibid., p. 129. 86. Sharp, Civilian-based Defense. 87. Wehr, "Nonviolent Resistance to Occupation." 88. Boserup and Mack, War Without Weapons. 89. Wehr, "Nonviolent Resistance to Occupation," p. 217. 90. Ibid., p. 227. 91. Ibid., p. 227. 92. Ibid., p. 227. 93. Zielonka, "Strengths and Weaknesses of Nonviolent Action," p. 93.

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94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

33

Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 9 5 . Crow and Grant, "Questions and Controversies About Nonviolent Struggle." A w a d , " N o n v i o l e n t Resistance." Grant, " N o n v i o l e n t Political Struggle." Ibrahim, "Why N o n v i o l e n t Political Struggle?" Zielonka, "Strengths and W e a k n e s s e s of N o n v i o l e n t A c t i o n , " p. 103.

Bibliography A d a m s , J. S. "Inequity in Social Exchange," in L. B e r k o w i t z (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology ( N e w York: A c a d e m i c Press, 1 9 6 5 ) . A w a d , Mubarak E. " N o n v i o l e n t R e s i s t a n c e : A Strategy for the O c c u p i e d Territories," in Robert L. H o l m e s (ed.), Nonviolence in Theory and Practice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1990). Bell, N a n c y , and Lester R. Kurtz. Social Theory and Nonviolent Revolutions: Rethinking Domination and Rebellion (Austin, T X : U n i v e r s i t y of T e x a s at Austin Press, 1 9 9 2 ) . Bondurant, Joan V. Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict ( N e w R e v i s e d Edition) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 9 8 8 ) . Boserup, Anders, and Andrew Mack. War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defence ( N e w York: S c h o c k e n B o o k s , 1 9 7 5 ) . B o u l d i n g , Kenneth. Three Faces of Power ( N e w b u r y Park, C A : S a g e Publications, 1989). Crow, Ralph E., and Philip Grant. "Questions and Controversies A b o u t N o n v i o l e n t S t r u g g l e in the M i d d l e East," in Ralph E. C r o w , Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East ( B o u l der, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). Deutsch, M. "Equity, Equality, and N e e d : What D e t e r m i n e s W h i c h Value Will B e U s e d as the B a s i s of Distributive Justice?" Journal of Social Issues 31 ( 1 9 7 5 ) : 137-149. Festinger, Leon. Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 2 , 1957). Fisher, R o g e r , and W i l l i a m Ury. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: B e a c o n Press, 1981). Folger, Robert (ed.). The Senses of Injustice: Social Psychological Perspectives ( N e w York: Plenum Press, 1 9 8 4 ) . Gandhi, Mohandas K. " N o n - V i o l e n c e , " in Jeffrie G. Murphy (ed.), Civil Disobedience and Violence ( B e l m o n t , C A : Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1 9 7 1 ) . Grant, Philip. " N o n v i o l e n t Political Struggle in the O c c u p i e d Territories," in Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1 9 9 0 ) . G r e g g , Richard B. The Power of Nonviolence, Revised Edition ( N e w York: S c h o c k e n B o o k s , 1966). H o l m e s , Robert L. (ed.). Nonviolence in Theory and Practice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co, 1 9 9 0 ) . H o m a n s , G. C. " C o m m e n t a r y , " in L. B e r k o w i t z (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology ( N e w York: A c a d e m i c Press, 1 9 6 5 ) . Ibrahim, Saad E. "Why N o n v i o l e n t Political S t r u g g l e in the M i d d l e East?" in Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Nonviolent

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Political Struggle in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). King, Martin Luther, Jr. "Letter from a B i r m i n g h a m Jail," in Robert L. H o l m e s (ed.), Nonviolence in Theory and Practice ( B e l m o n t , C A : W a d s w o r t h Publishing Co, 1990). Kruegler, Christopher. "Implications of Prototypical Nonviolent Resistance for the Conduct of Civilian-Based D e f e n s e . " Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, 1987. Kuper, Leo. Passive Resistance in South Africa ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). Lakey, G e o r g e . " T h e M e c h a n i s m s of Nonviolent A c t i o n , " in A. Paul Hare and Herbert H. Blumberg (eds.), Nonviolent Direct Action American Cases: SocioPsychological Analyses (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968). Lerner, M. J. "The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to Its Origins and Forms." Journal of Personality 45 (1977): 1 - 5 2 . Mark, M. M. Justice in the Aggregate: The Perceived Fairness of the Distribution of Income (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1980). McCarthy, Ronald M. "The Techniques of Nonviolent Action: Some Principles of Its Nature, Use, and E f f e c t s , " in Ralph E. C r o w , Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). Meyerding, Jane. "Reclaiming Nonviolence: Some Thoughts for Feminist W o m y n Who Used to Be Nonviolent, and Vice V e r s a , " in Pam McCallister (ed.), Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1982). Miller, William Robert. Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation ( N e w York: Schocken Books, 1966). O p p e n h e i m e r , Martin. " T o w a r d s a Sociological Understanding of N o n v i o l e n c e . " Sociological Inquiry 35 (1965): 123-131. Pruitt, D. G. "Methods for Resolving Differences of Interest: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Social Issues 28 (1972): 1 3 3 - 1 5 4 . Reis, Harry T. " T h e Multidimensionality of Justice," in Robert Folger (ed.), The Senses of Injustice: Social Psychological Perspectives ( N e w York: Plenum Press, 1984). R u m m e l , R. J. Understanding Conflict and War: Volume 2, The Conflict Helix (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Halsted Press Division, 1976). . The Conflict Helix: Principles and Practices of Interpersonal, Social, and International Conflict and Cooperation ( N e w B r u n s w i c k , NJ, T r a n s a c t i o n , 1991; originally published in 1984). Sampson, E. E. "Studies in Status Congruence," in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: A c a d e m i c Press, 1965). Seifert, Harvey. Conquest by Suffering: The Process and Prospects of Nonviolent Resistance (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965). Sharp, Gene. The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston, M A : Extending Horizon Books, Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973). . Civilian-based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). . "The Role of Power in Nonviolent Political Struggle," in Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). Stiehm, Judith. Nonviolent Power: Active and Passive Resistance in America (Lexington, M A , and Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972).

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Wehr, Paul. " N o n v i o l e n t Resistance to Occupation: N o r w a y and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , " in S. Bruyn and P. Raman (eds.), Nonviolent Action and Social Change (Irvington, N Y : W i l e y , 1 9 7 9 ) . W o e h r l e , Lynne M. Social Constructions of Power and Empowerment: Thoughts from Feminist Approaches to Peace Research and Peace-making (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992). Z i e l o n k a , Jan. "Strengths and W e a k n e s s e s of N o n v i o l e n t A c t i o n : T h e P o l i s h Case." Orbis 3 0 (Spring 1986): 9 1 - 1 1 0 .

2 Research Questions and Hypotheses Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess

From the p r e c e d i n g review of the literature, and especially B o u l d i n g ' s theory of power, we developed a set of questions and hypotheses to form the basis f o r this research e f f o r t . T h e s e initial q u e s t i o n s and h y p o t h e s e s fall into several categories that w e r e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d and e x p a n d e d during the course of the project. Our initial categories, questions, and hypotheses are delineated in this chapter.

Nature of the Injustice T h e literature suggests that injustice can take several f o r m s . One distinction is between e c o n o m i c injustice and political injustice. E c o n o m i c injustice exists w h e n there is a large disparity of wealth and i n c o m e within a society. This situation can be f u r t h e r subdivided into cases in which poverty is a f u n c t i o n of the m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of the w e a l t h of society and cases in which the society has little wealth to distribute overall. (Technically, this might not be considered injustice, as everyone is poor together. This may be true, but the people s u f f e r i n g usually consider the situation to be unjust, nevertheless.) Political injustice, involves what w e in the West usually m e a n w h e n we speak of injustice—such things as voting rights, due process, f r e e d o m of speech and religion, and protection f r o m cruel and unusual punishments. Although the literature does not directly address the implications of these d i f f e r e n c e s for n o n v i o l e n c e , w e should ask w h e t h e r s o m e types of injustice are more easily addressed with nonviolence than are others. W e w o u l d h y p o t h e s i z e , f o r instance, that n o n v i o l e n c e w o u l d not be as successful against society-wide poverty as it w o u l d be against the other two

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types of injustice because, in the f o r m e r case, the dominant group does not have the power or the resources to remedy the situation, even if it wants to.

Characteristics of the Dominant and Subordinate Groups Relative power. T h e initial relative p o w e r of protest and dominant groups is clearly important, though the direction of the e f f e c t is unclear. Small, relatively powerless protest g r o u p s are likely to be v i e w e d by the dominant group as harmless. T h e latter may, therefore, conclude that efforts to repress these protests are not worth the trouble. On the other hand, if protest groups are stronger, they may invite repression. But they may also be more likely to generate the power necessary for success. Dominant group power base. Another likely determinant of the success of various nonviolent strategies is the nature of the dominant g r o u p ' s power. To what extent does it rely upon popular support? Widely believed moral principles? Violent repression? Outside military or e c o n o m i c support? Although none of these bases of p o w e r are unassailable, they imply d i f f e r ent "Achilles heels," which should be targeted by nonviolent actionists for greatest impact. Legitimacy. One factor that appears to be an extremely important aspect of power is legitimacy—for both the dominant group and the subordinate group. If a g r o u p ' s leaders, structure, policies, and actions are v i e w e d as legitimate by most of their m e m b e r s , this is likely to contribute greatly to their power and effectiveness. On the other hand, weak legitimacy is likely to be detrimental to effective action. Thus, we hypothesize, nonviolent action will likely be more effective when the challenge g r o u p leader(s), goals, and tactics are viewed as legiti m a t e — b o t h by the g r o u p ' s m e m b e r s and by outside third parties. Likewise, if a dominant g r o u p ' s leaders, policies, or actions are viewed as illegitimate by much of the p o p u l a t i o n , this f a c t o r will detract f r o m the dominant g r o u p ' s power and m a k e them more vulnerable to a nonviolent challenge. Sources of support. Successful resistance is also likely to depend upon the subordinate g r o u p ' s sources of support. Does it include only the victims of injustice or does it include sympathizers within powerful elements of the unjust society, outside powers, or international legal and political structures? T o the extent such external sources of support or power can be mobilized, the higher the chances are for the challenge g r o u p ' s success. Likewise, is the d o m i n a n t r e g i m e s u p p o r t e d by outside p o w e r s or other external sources of support? If it is, this is likely to make it more difficult

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39

to challenge s u c c e s s f u l l y . If these outside sources of support can be removed, however, then a nonviolent resistance is more likely to succeed. Commitment. The strength of virtually all subordinate groups lies in collective action. Collective resistance, however, requires broadly based, grassroots support. This fact suggests a hypothesis that e f f e c t i v e resistance only occurs when commitment to resistance is intense and widespread. Organizational skills. Nonviolent actions tend to involve large numbers of people. A s such, the probability of their success is likely to depend on strong organizational skills, including the ability to plan, the ability to influence and control the membership, and the ability to resolve internal conflicts. T o the extent that a challenge group has such skills, its likelihood of success should be greater; to the extent they are lacking, the likelihood of success is expected to diminish.

Historical Context History of previous nonviolent action and/or awareness of nonviolence options. We would expect nonviolent resistance to be similar to other complex human activities with respect to learning from the past. If a culture or a group within a society has used nonviolent action successfully in the past, it might be expected that they would choose such a strategy again. L i k e w i s e , if they had only relied on violence in past struggles, it seems less likely that the group or culture would turn to nonviolence in their future c o n f l i c t s — u n l e s s , of course, the past violence had been unsuccessful at achieving their goals, or was considered too costly in terms of human suffering. In that case a group might, indeed, turn to nonviolence for the first time. In such cases, the awareness of others' efforts in nonviolent action and a thorough understanding of how such actions work are likely to contribute to success. Without such understanding, the subordinate group would be forced to reinvent not only the wheel, but the entire automobile. Under such circumstances they can be expected to create a much lower performance machine. Credibility of nonviolent alternatives. The probability of successful nonviolent resistance may also depend upon the degree to which the potential success of these options has been demonstrated. People believe that military confrontation w o r k s — e v e n though a large percentage of military campaigns are unsuccessful. In the case of military endeavors, most people assume that any failure is attributable to either inadequate force or poor tactics—never the inherent limitations of violent confrontation.

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All too often, the failure of nonviolent resistance is interpreted in the opposite way. Failure is seen to result f r o m the inherent limitations of the technique, rather than simply poor tactics or inadequate p o w e r mobilization. This perception suggests that nonviolent resistance is more likely to succeed w h e r e subordinate groups are convinced of the inherent power of nonviolence and are, therefore, willing to be persistent in their e f f o r t s to build their base of power and identify the most e f f e c t i v e tactics, even after initial " d e f e a t . " Culture gap. It is easier to repress p e o p l e if they are seen to be significantly d i f f e r e n t f r o m oneself. Perception of d i f f e r e n c e tends to m a k e it easier to justify unequal treatment. This view suggests that nonviolent resisters are likely to b e n e f i t f r o m e f f o r t s to m i n i m i z e the d i f f e r e n c e s between themselves and the opposing g r o u p — t o e n c o u r a g e the opponents to see the c o m m o n a l i t i e s between them. It may further suggest that nonviolent resistance is more likely to be s u c c e s s f u l within rather than across racial or ethnic lines because perceptions of such d i f f e r e n c e s seem to be very deeply ingrained in many people.

Structural Factors Structural factors in the society, independent of the action group, are also likely to have significant e f f e c t s on the success of particular nonviolent actions. S o m e social structures are likely to inhibit successful nonviolent action; others might enhance it. At the same time, corrupt and inefficient r e g i m e s may simply collapse under their own w e i g h t — w i t h o u t requiring subordinate groups to mount an effective challenge. Such passive change may be without violence, but it is not the result of p o w e r mobilized through nonviolent action. Protest Group

Objectives

T h e objectives of protest groups can also be expected to have a profound e f f e c t on the success of any resistance e f f o r t . T h o s e w h o s e o b j e c t i v e is v e n g e a n c e — d e a t h (or at least exile) for the o p p r e s s o r s — h a v e , by seeking a violent resolution, a b a n d o n e d n o n v i o l e n c e in f a v o r of a fight to the death. Even those w h o nonviolently seek what a m o u n t s to an exchange of elites (with the deportation or s u b j u g a t i o n of the d o m i n a n t g r o u p ) are likely to find their opponents willing to do whatever it takes to resist them. Our hypothesis, then, is that those w h o o f f e r a vision of a more just society that o f f e r s the d o m i n a n t g r o u p a livable alternative have real advantages over the g r o u p that advocates r e v e n g e or e l i m i n a t i o n of the g r o u p currently in power.

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Tactical

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Considerations

Principled versus practical nonviolence. Commitment to nonviolence can be based on moral principles or pragmatic necessity. Although most of the literature in the field addresses principled nonviolence, w e suspect that nonviolence will be most appealing to those attracted by its pragmatic e f fectiveness. A similar hypothesis is that those practicing nonviolence would do well to understand the pragmatic "nuts and bolts" of how and when nonviolence works best, rather than taking its superiority as given and pursuing a particular strategy or tactic on the basis of principle or faith alone. H o w e v e r , a reverse argument could be made that only those w h o believe in principled nonviolence will be willing to stick with the approach long enough to attain success. Others are more likely to be quickly deterred by one or two short-term setbacks, and revert to violence b e f o r e they g i v e nonviolence an adequate chance to succeed. Resistance triggers. E f f e c t i v e resistance requires that people actively challenge social relationships that have often been accepted (though resented) for long periods of time. How does this happen? Does it require some sort of triggering event or sequence of events, which causes people who have accepted their condition before to suddenly (or not so suddenly) rebel? If triggers are necessary (or just helpful), what is their nature? D o they involve specific instances of outrage on the part of the dominant group? Or, perhaps, the emergence of a charismatic leader? Or the alteration of external public opinion or pressure? Dependency. Another likely determinant of success is dependency—the degree to which the dominant group is dependent on the subordinate group and vice versa. A r e there things that the subordinate group can withhold that are sufficiently important to the dominant group to persuade it to change its w a y s ? Is the subordinate group s u f f i c i e n t l y independent that it can function s u c c e s s f u l l y if the dominant group withholds certain important services and functions? For instance, does it have its own system of communication or does it rely on the dominant media? Has it developed parallel social and political structures, independent of those of mainstream society? T o the extent that it has, the more likely the resistance is to succeed. Poiver-with versus power-over. The literature suggests that it will be easier to achieve broad-based grassroots support with the "power-with" rather than the " p o w e r - o v e r " philosophy, as the " p o w e r - o v e r " approach is likely to generate much more resistance from the dominant group. It may also be more likely to initiate conflicts within the protest group, over questions about who is going to have power over whom, should the protest succeed.

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Protest strategy and tactics. S h a r p identified almost two hundred types of nonviolent action. Which ones are being used under what circumstances? How does the type of action affect possible success? Planned versus spontaneous actions. To what extent are the nonviolent actions planned or spontaneous? To the extent that actions are planned, how do the plans d i f f e r f r o m what actually occurred? What caused the d i f f e r ence? Do spontaneous actions or planned actions work better? Protest powers. T h e type of power relied upon by protest groups is also likely to be important. Possibilities include violent, economic, or political threats or sanctions; e c o n o m i c and political trade-offs; and moral appeals. We hypothesize that a mix of all three is likely to be most successful, although the mix, w e suspect, should include a stronger portion of integrative p o w e r than threat power, especially w h e n the parties must c o n t i n u e to live together over the long term. Bandwagon effect. Another possible determinant of success is what might be called the " b a n d w a g o n e f f e c t . " W e hypothesize that once the power of the resistance reaches a critical threshold, p e o p l e start to believe that c h a n g e is really going to happen. At this point m e m b e r s of the dominant group are likely to forsake the old order and attempt to a s s u m e the mantle of " r e f o r m e r s . " Others, w h o had either been neutral or had o p p o s e d the dominant regime but had been unwilling to assume the risks of protest, are likely to decide that the risks a r e n ' t so great a f t e r all and that it surely would be better to be on the winning side. Dominant

Group's

Responses

Dominant group ability to remedy injustice. We s u g g e s t e d earlier that n o n v i o l e n c e is more likely to s u c c e e d w h e n the d o m i n a n t g r o u p has the power to remedy the injustice. For example, if economic injustice is the result of a failed e c o n o m y that simply has no wealth to distribute, it is unlikely that nonviolence will be able to remedy that situation—except, perhaps, over the very long term, by b r i n g i n g about massive system c h a n g e (as is being attempted in the f o r m e r Soviet Union). Violent response. If the dominant group responds to nonviolent challengers with violence, does this effectively repress the nonviolence or is it likely to further e n c o u r a g e it, due to p e o p l e ' s outrage at the violent response? What is the best Way for a challenge group to deal with a violent response? No response. If the d o m i n a n t g r o u p simply ignores the nonviolent challenge, will it discourage it? Or will it e n c o u r a g e the c h a l l e n g e r s to

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intensify their actions in order to get a response? What is the best way for the challenge group to deal with no response at all from the dominant group?

Measures of Success A step-by-step process. Nonviolent resistance, like most everything else, is a step-by-step process. Its success should, therefore, be assessed by a number o f intermediate criteria in addition to its ability to deliver final victory. T h e s e intermediate measures of s u c c e s s include both process goals (being able to effectively carry out a nonviolent action e f f i c i e n t l y ) and short-term objectives (such as gaining members, getting media attention, or winning the support of powerful outside groups). Such intermediate goals are crucial to establishing the sense o f c o n f i d e n c e critical to building the bandwagon effect. Nonviolent groups that initially set their goals too high are likely to b e c o m e frustrated and ineffective. Long-term stability. S u c c e s s is often measured over the short term because that is most obvious. But long-term effects are also important. How e f f e c t i v e has each approach been in motivating short- and long-term change? How effective is each likely to be in the future? What determines the probable effectiveness of alternative approaches over the long term? Change mechanisms. It is also important to determine which o f S h a r p ' s four mechanisms of social change—conversion, coercion, accommodation, or disintegration—are most likely to result from nonviolent action and most likely to produce stable, long-term change. All of the contributors to this volume started with this list of questions and hypotheses. They then examined those that were most important for or best illustrated by their particular cases. As readers will see from the synthesis—Chapter 1 3 — t h e project has made significant progress toward answering many, but not all, of these questions. Further progress will require refinement and testing o f specific hypotheses and expansion of the underlying knowledge base with quantitative and qualitative studies.

3 Peace, Justice, and the Faces of Power Kenneth E. Boulding

Peace, of course, is more than the mere a b s e n c e of war. A c h i e v i n g peace also m e a n s e l i m i n a t i n g starvation, poverty, v i o l e n c e , threats to human rights, r e f u g e e p r o b l e m s , global e n v i r o n m e n t a l pollution, and the many other threats to p e a c e , and it m e a n s c r e a t i n g a c l i m a t e in w h i c h p e o p l e can live rich and rewarding lives. —City of Hiroshima Peace Declaration, August 6, 1991

T h e r e have been some attempts to create measures of overall human welfare, but they are all inadequate. Nevertheless, the concept, in a qualitative sense, cannot be d i s m i s s e d , and w e c o u l d visualize a kind of field of human welfare around the globe, with contour lines (or isomers) s h o w i n g various peaks and troughs. W e could similarly imagine a m e a s u r e of the probability of violence, based perhaps on the number of violent deaths, injuries, and d a m a g e to property. A similar contour m a p of the average expectation of life would be fairly m e a s u r a b l e and feasible. It might perhaps be regarded as a m a p of the original concept of "structural violence." 1 T h e peaks in the p r o b a b i l i t y - o f - v i o l e n c e m a p w o u l d undoubtedly show s o m e correspondence with the troughs of the human welfare map, though the correspondence would be by no means perfect. Nevertheless, areas like Northern Ireland, Lebanon, northern Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Burundi, El Salvador, Nicaragua, parts of Peru, and certain sections of New York and Washington, D.C., would show up as peaks in the violence field and troughs in human welfare. There would be troughs in the violence field in, say, Switzerland, Wales, New Zealand, Japan, and so on, which also might correspond very well to peaks in the human welfare field. What then makes for a peak in the violence field? T o misquote the fam o u s statement f r o m the Charter of U N E S C O , " V i o l e n c e begins in the minds of m e n " (and, w e might add, occasionally w o m e n or even children),

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a n d it is o n l y in the m i n d s o f m e n a n d o t h e r h u m a n s that it c a n b e e l i m i n a t e d . M a n y o f t h e s e i m a g e s in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s i n t e r a c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r , a n d with the p a s s i o n s a n d f e e l i n g s , in v e r y c o m p l e x w a y s . O n e e l e m e n t in the h u m a n m i n d that is i m p o r t a n t here is the s e n s e of p o w e r or p o w e r l e s s n e s s . T h i s m a y b e o n l y l o o s e l y r e l a t e d to the a c t u a l p o w e r that a p e r s o n h a s . T h e r e a r e m a n y p e o p l e w h o h a v e v e r y little p o w e r , e s p e c i a l l y in the p o o r e r part o f the h u m a n r a c e , w h o f e e l that the p o w e r that they h a v e is a d e q u a t e f o r their o w n l i v e s . F o r s u c h p e o p l e , the rich a n d the p o w e r f u l a r e r e m o t e f r o m their o w n little n e i g h b o r h o o d s , they a r e not b o t h e r e d very m u c h by e n v y , yet they l i v e their o w n l i v e s , hard a s they m a y b e , f r o m d a y to d a y w i t h o u t m u c h t h o u g h t o f an a l t e r n a t i v e . It is v e r y rare f o r the r e a l l y p o o r to r e v o l t . O d d l y e n o u g h , an i n c r e a s e in p e r sonal power for such people, through s o m e kind of e c o n o m i c developm e n t , f o r i n s t a n c e , m a y a c t u a l l y result in an i n c r e a s e d s e n s e o f p o w e r l e s s n e s s a s a l t e r n a t i v e s to their p r e s e n t s t y l e o f l i f e c o m e m o r e c l e a r l y into v i e w . T h i s is not, h o w e v e r , likely to l e a d to v i o l e n c e u n l e s s the s o u r c e o f p o w e r l e s s n e s s c a n b e i d e n t i f i e d a n d is in s o m e w a y w i t h i n r e a c h . P e o p l e w h o f e e l " p u s h e d a r o u n d " a r e m o r e l i k e l y to i d e n t i f y a p u s h e r . T h i s m a y l e a d to a l i e n a t i o n . It is o n e o f M a r x ' s c e n t r a l c o n c e p t s that the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a l a b o r m a r k e t a n d f u l l - t i m e e m p l o y m e n t o f an e m p l o y e e b y an e m p l o y e r l e a d s to a l i e n a t i o n o f the e m p l o y e e , s i m p l y b e c a u s e the e m p l o y e r is s e e n a s res p o n s i b l e f o r w h a t is felt to b e an i n a d e q u a t e w a g e . A s a theory o f a l i e n ation, this, o f c o u r s e , is m u c h t o o s i m p l e . N a t i o n a l i s m h a s turned out to b e a m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l s o u r c e o f pers o n a l identity than c l a s s . T h e w o r k e r s o f the w o r l d will n e v e r unite. T h o s e w h o d o unite in l a b o r u n i o n s d i s c o v e r they h a v e m u c h m o r e c o m m u n i t y w i t h their e m p l o y e r s than they d o w i t h the w o r k e r s in other i n d u s t r i e s or with u n o r g a n i z e d w o r k e r s . T h e r e l a t i v e p r i c e structure o f u l t i m a t e p r o d u c t s is a m u c h g r e a t e r potential s o u r c e o f e c o n o m i c c o n f l i c t than is the d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n l a b o r i n c o m e a n d p r o f i t . A r i s e in the r e l a t i v e p r i c e o f c o p p e r will t e n d to b e n e f i t all t h o s e in the c o p p e r i n d u s t r y at the e x p e n s e o f o t h e r s . B u t the r i s e in the p r o p o r t i o n o f n a t i o n a l i n c o m e g o i n g to l a b o r in the Great Depression, when profits b e c a m e negative ( 1 9 3 2 and 1933), effected an e n o r m o u s r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n c o m e w i t h i n the w o r k i n g c l a s s b e t w e e n t h o s e w h o w e r e e m p l o y e d a n d the 2 5 p e r c e n t w h o w e r e n o t . S i m i l a r l y , there w a s a g r e a t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n within the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s b e t w e e n interest r e c e i v e r s a n d p r o f i t r e c e i v e r s . A c l a s s w a r c a n n o t b e w o n b y the w o r k i n g c l a s s , a s the e x p e r i e n c e o f K a m p u c h e a s h o w s s o t r a g i c a l l y . If all the e m p l o y e r s a r e k i l l e d , the w o r k e r s a r e w o r s e o f f b e c a u s e p r o d u c t i o n c o l l a p s e s . A l i e n a t i o n is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to a s e n s e o f e n m i t y . A l i e n a t i o n f r o m " o t h e r s , " and especially from those perceived as enemies, may be s o great that it d e n i e s all h u m a n i t y to them. W h y this p e r c e p t i o n d e v e l o p s in s o m e c a s e s a n d not in others is by no m e a n s c l e a r . It m a y b e that the d e v e l o p m e n t

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of enmity has something to do with the extent to which childhood experiences and the general culture of learning in a society produce " a p p r o a c h e s , " w h o go toward what they w a n t , as o p p o s e d to " a v o i d e r s , " w h o go away f r o m what they d o n ' t want. As an economist would say, s o m e p e o ple maximize utility and others minimize disutility. This tendency however, can produce very different kinds of personality and behavior. Approachers tend to d e v e l o p what might be called a positive identity and a v o i d e r s a n e g a t i v e identity. A p p r o a c h e r s k n o w what they like, avoiders only know what they d o n ' t like. W e see this d i f f e r e n c e very strikingly in Ireland, w h e r e , in the Irish Republic, P r o t e s t a n t s are Protestants and Catholics are Catholics, and they tolerate each other and get along fairly well. In Ulster, Northern Ireland, on the other hand, a Protestant is s o m e b o d y w h o isn't a Catholic, and a Catholic is s o m e b o d y w h o isn't a Protestant. It b e c o m e s easy to identify the other as an e n e m y around which o n e ' s own personality f o r m s . Just what it is in a society that produces such differences, h o w e v e r , I c o n f e s s I do not understand. An important source of enmity may be mistrust in the sense of being deceived. There is nothing that destroys legitimacy more effectively than b e i n g caught telling a lie. H o w lies are perceived as such, h o w e v e r , is a complex process. Martin L u t h e r ' s discovery that the P o p e ' s sale of indulgences had no basis in the Christian scriptures had s o m e t h i n g to do with the success of the Lutheran R e f o r m a t i o n . T h e m i s i n f o r m a t i o n that the C o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t f e d the p e o p l e of the Soviet Union b e c a m e so clearly contradictory to daily reality that by 1989 all respect for the government on the part of the mass of the people had been lost. At the other end of a spectrum of p o w e r w e have something that could be called " m i g h t i n e s s " as a source of violence. Edward E l g a r ' s " P o m p and C i r c u m s t a n c e " Suite echoes this perfectly (in reference to the British Empire): "Wider, and still wider/May thy b o u n d s be set,/God w h o m a d e thee m i g h t y , / M a k e thee mightier yet." T h e French had s o m e t h i n g of this with la mission civilisatrice, feeling that they were called upon to civilize those w h o w e r e not f o r t u n a t e e n o u g h to have been born French. M i g h t i n e s s , however, can o f t e n b e c o m e very e x p e n s i v e for the mighty and can quite suddenly collapse, as we saw in the case of the European empires and as we are seeing today in the Soviet Union. T h e extraordinary collapse of the legitimacy of the C o m m u n i s t parties, in the Soviet Union and around the world, has something to do with the fact that they made promises that were not fulfilled, so that this created mistrust and a withdrawal of legitimacy. A n o t h e r factor was their belief in mightiness and a desire to c h a n g e and, in a sense, to dominate the w h o l e world. This desire again turned to dust, as did the empires. What, then, does all this have to do with justice, f r e e d o m , peace, and all these things that are arguments in the human w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n ? Justice is a particularly c o m p l e x concept. It plays an important part in the rhetoric

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of conflict. N o b o d y can possibly c o m e out in f a v o r of injustice. On the other hand, justice can mean very different things to different cultures and different people. T h e r e are at least two concepts of justice that are quite c|ifferent and may even be incompatible. One is the concept that people should get what they deserve. This concept raises questions, of course, as to w h o is to j u d g e what people deserve. Criminal justice is perhaps the clearest e x a m ple of this principle. Here the structure of laws and of courts is set up so that if people are caught b r e a k i n g a law, then they should definitely des e r v e — a n d e x p e c t — s o m e kind of punishment. What punishment for what misdemeanor or crime is frequently, though not always, spelled out in the law. S o m e t i m e s it is determined by juries or j u d g e s . If there is a general feeling that penalties are inappropriate, social processes usually exist that can c h a n g e them. W h e t h e r penalties are e f f e c t i v e in p r e v e n t i n g criminal b e h a v i o r is, of course, another question. T h e r e has been a big a r g u m e n t , for instance, over capital p u n i s h m e n t . T h e r e is a g o o d deal of e v i d e n c e suggesting that its deterrent capacity is at least obscure. On the other hand, there is a c o n s i d e r a b l e body of opinion in f a v o r of capital p u n i s h m e n t w h e t h e r it deters m u r d e r or not. This opinion is due to a sense of appropriateness of the penalty. A real economic question is, what are the circumstances under which it is cheaper to put up with crime than it is to try to prevent it by expensive p u n i s h m e n t s , like long i m p r i s o n m e n t s ? T h e United States, for instance, has a very large proportion of its population in prison as compared to most other countries. Yet there is not much evidence that this really diminishes crime. Indeed, over the last f e w decades crime has risen and the e x p e n s e of the w h o l e criminal j u s t i c e system has risen in about the same proportion. This increase certainly suggests that the c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n that punishment prevents crime at least needs to be reexamined. At the other end of the scale we have the problem of people w h o do not receive the benefits that they deserve, those w h o suffer costs that they do not deserve. U n e m p l o y m e n t is a good e x a m p l e . T h e r e is no question that 25 percent u n e m p l o y m e n t in 1932 and 1933 was unjust to the unemployed, but also unjust to the e m p l o y e d , w h o w e r e b e n e f i t i n g at the expense of the unemployed, and the capitalists w h o s e profits were negative. T h e other meaning of justice, s o m e t i m e s called " c o m m e n s a l justice," going back to the principle that everybody sitting around the table should get a fair share of the f o o d , is related to the distribution of i n c o m e and wealth and suggests that beyond a certain point the inequality of e c o n o m i c w e l f a r e is unjust. W h e r e this point lies, however, is not generally agreed upon. There is fairly widespread agreement in modern societies in regard to what is sometimes called a "safety net," that there is some level of econ o m i c w e l f a r e b e l o w which p e o p l e should not be allowed to fall. T h i s agreement goes back even to Queen Elizabeth I ' s "poor laws" in England.

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This principle is usually confined to the national state. Certainly w e seem to be a long way f r o m a w o r l d safety net, even though e x t r e m e cases of f a m i n e and destitution do tend to call forth grants from richer societies to ameliorate the suffering. Actually the proportionate distribution of income seems to be remarkably difficult to change. In the United States, for instance, it has changed very little in the last f e w decades, in spite of changes in tax structures and benefit payments. Poverty fell sharply in the United States between about 1950 and the mid-seventies, after which it rose slightly and then stabilized. Ironically enough, poverty stopped falling once the " W a r on P o v e r t y " got underway. These problems, obviously, are not easily solved. Another aspect of the j u s t i c e problem that is difficult to deal with is what might be called the lottery of life. Certainly everybody w h o b u y s a lottery ticket d e m a n d s inequality in the hope that they will benefit f r o m it. For a lottery is certainly a device to redistribute e c o n o m i c w e l f a r e more unequally. There is a fair consensus that the political structure and the tax and grant system should be devised to offset, up to a point, the lottery of life, to tax people w h o have good luck and subsidize people w h o have bad luck. How much this redistribution should be done, however, is a question that is very difficult to answer. Here again, the idea of a safety net receives a good deal of support. B e y o n d this, d e m a n d for equality is fairly muted. Nevertheless, an ideology of equality has a certain power, as the Declaration of Independence suggests. Even here the principle that all men are created equal (it does not seem to include w o m e n ) could have s o m e genetic objections raised to it. There are genetic deficiencies, even if genetic e x c e l l e n c e may be more a matter of good luck than good m a n a g e m e n t , considering that each one of us is about one out of eight trillion possible genetic children our parents could have produced. T h e concept of equality here edges toward the question of human rights. There is wide agreement that certain rights should be r e c o g n i z e d in the structure of society. T h e right to vote, of course, is an o b v i o u s one, although s o m e p e o p l e are alw a y s denied the right to vote by reason of youth or criminality or citizenship status. T h e Bill of Rights in the United States certainly sets forth certain ideals, which cut back, however, to prohibitions and to duties. Every right implies somebody e l s e ' s duty, either to refrain f r o m doing something or to do something. Without spelling these duties out, the rights tend to be merely rhetoric. A n o t h e r aspect of h u m a n life and society closely b o u n d up with the c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e is that of f r e e d o m . Here again, this concept is multid i m e n s i o n a l . It refers broadly to what might be called the " n a t u r e of the possibility b o u n d a r y , " which surrounds all of us, which divides what w e can do f r o m what we c a n ' t do. Physical o b s t a c l e s are not generally regarded as an e n c r o a c h m e n t on f r e e d o m . I am f r e e to fly to New York tom o r r o w if I want to, but I am not f r e e to fly to the m o o n , at least at the

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moment. It is where the boundary between what we can do and what we can't do is determined by other humans or by laws or other institutions of society that we run into the concept of freedom. Oddly enough, freedom for one person often implies a denial of freedom for another. Freedom of speech, for instance, means that somebody might want to stop me from saying something but is not free to do it. This concept edges over into justice problems, for when we try to determine the distribution of freedom in society it is obvious that the rich have a good deal more freedom than the poor. The possibility boundary of the rich is further out. Freedom is also closely involved with the concept of property. Property is a set of possibilities in which the owner has freedom and the nonowner does not. The establishment of mutually agreed-on property boundaries is a very important aspect of the resolution of conflict. A good deal of conflict arises over conflicting claims to property. And the legal system is very much involved with this. I once had an argument with Reinhold Niebuhr, 2 which I summed up by saying that he was afraid of freedom because he saw behind it the specter of anarchy, while I was afraid of justice because I saw behind it the specter of tyranny. It is clear that the balance between freedom and justice is a delicate matter. All this leads up to the question of the relation of all these concepts to power and especially to the various kinds of power. In my book Three Faces of Power,3 I distinguish between threat power, economic power, and integrative power. Threat power begins when A says to B, "You do something I want or I'll do something you don't want." 4 This threat again has two aspects, the more common being destructive power. A may have the power to injure B or B ' s property, or people or property that B perceives as part of his or her community, and the instruments of threat are very frequently the means of destruction. A and B ' s productive power, however, is not wholly irrelevant. A may say to B, "I won't do something nice for you" instead of saying "I'm going to do something nasty to you." Where the system goes depends on B ' s response to A ' s threat, and there are many possible responses. One is submission, as when we pay our taxes. Another is defiance, as when we drive above the speed limit. The success or failure of defiance depends on many things—whether we get found out, as we often do not when we exceed the speed limit, or whether it costs A too much to fulfill the threat, and so on. A third response is flight, which is not uncommon. It depends on the principle that the power of threat diminishes with the distance from the threatener. A fourth response is counterthreat—"You do something nasty to me and I'll do something nasty to you." This approach may result in deterrence, which may be successful in the short run, though it can be shown that it is bound to be unstable in the long run. A fifth possibility might be called "disarming behavior," such as " w e ' r e all in this together, aren't we?" This possibility has much to do with the development of courtesy, manners, and all that.

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D i s a r m i n g b e h a v i o r c a n s o m e t i m e s b e o f f s e t b y c o u r t e s y o n t h e part o f the t h r e a t e n e r — " Y o u r e a l l y o u g h t to d o this f o r b o t h o u r s a k e s . " T h e s e c o n d f o r m o f p o w e r , e c o n o m i c p o w e r , is m o s t s i m p l y d e f i n e d as w h a t t h e r i c h h a v e m o r e o f than t h e p o o r . A g o o d i n d i c a t o r o f its m a g n i t u d e is s o m e m e a s u r e o f net w o r t h in a c c o u n t i n g t e r m s , e s p e c i a l l y i f t h i s m e a s u r e i n c l u d e s the c a p i t a l v a l u e o f t h e p e r s o n , o f w h i c h it is p o s s i b l e to m a k e at l e a s t r o u g h e s t i m a t e s . T h e c a p i t a l v a l u e o f a p e r s o n d e p e n d s v e r y m u c h on a p e r s o n ' s e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i v i t y , t h e c a p a c i t y o f a p e r s o n to p r o d u c e t h i n g s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r e x c h a n g e , but a l s o t h e a b i l i t y to h o l d t h i n g s that are r i s i n g in r e l a t i v e v a l u e . R e a l net w o r t h in t e r m s o f " r e a l d o l l a r s , " w h a t e v e r t h e y are, c a n r i s e f o r t w o r e a s o n s . O n e is that p r o d u c t i o n e x c e e d s c o n s u m p t i o n , w h i c h l e a d s to a c c u m u l a t i o n . T h e o t h e r is t h a t t h e t h i n g s ( a s s e t s ) h e l d m a y r i s e in r e l a t i v e v a l u e . N e t w o r t h f a l l s , o f c o u r s e , w h e n t h e t h i n g s w e h o l d f a l l in r e l a t i v e v a l u e . E c o n o m i c p o w e r c a n a l s o b e

in-

c r e a s e d b y s u c c e s s f u l t h e f t o r by e x p l o i t a t i o n . E x p l o i t a t i o n in this c a s e is not e a s y to d e f i n e . It i n v o l v e s s o m e t h i n g l i k e an e x c h a n g e t h a t b e n e f i t s o n e p a r t y to t h e e x c h a n g e m u c h m o r e t h a n it b e n e f i t s t h e o t h e r p a r t y . W h e r e threats are brought into play, o f c o u r s e , e x c h a n g e m a y

actually

w o r s e n the position o f the threatened party. T h e third f o r m o f p o w e r g o e s b y a n u m b e r o f n a m e s , but I h a v e c a l l e d it " i n t e g r a t i v e p o w e r . " T h i s is t h e p o w e r o f l e g i t i m a c y , r e s p e c t , l o y a l t y , a f f e c t i o n , l o v e , a n d s o o n . It m a y , o f c o u r s e , b e n e g a t i v e w h e n t h e r e is i l l e g i t i m a c y , d i s l o y a l t y , d i s r e s p e c t , a n d h a t r e d . I n t e g r a t i v e p o w e r , I h a v e arg u e d , is a c t u a l l y t h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m o f p o w e r . I l l e g i t i m a t e t h r e a t a n d i l l e g i t i m a t e w e a l t h are v e r y u n s u c c e s s f u l as c o m p a r e d w i t h l e g i t i m a t e threat a n d l e g i t i m a t e w e a l t h . T h e l o s s o f l e g i t i m a c y h a s r e m a r k a b l e e f f e c t s in p r o d u c i n g d e f i a n c e in t h e t h r e a t s y s t e m , as r e c e n t e v e n t s in t h e S o v i e t Union have shown so dramatically. N o n e o f t h e s e f o r m s o f p o w e r is e v e r f o u n d in an a b s o l u t e l y

pure

f o r m . E c o n o m i c p o w e r , f o r i n s t a n c e , c a n b e d e v o t e d to d e v e l o p i n g t h e means o f destruction and so i n c r e a s e threat power. O n l y rich countries can a f f o r d to b e " g r e a t p o w e r s " in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h r e a t s y s t e m . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h r e a t o f t e n u n d e r m i n e s e c o n o m i c p o w e r , a s t h e r i s e a n d fall o f e m p i r e s o v e r h i s t o r y has c e r t a i n l y d e m o n s t r a t e d . R e s o u r c e s that m i g h t h a v e b e e n u s e d to i n c r e a s e e c o n o m i c p o w e r h a v e b e e n i n c r e a s i n g l y a b s o r b e d b y t h e m i l i t a r y a n d t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f t h r e a t , as t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y

has

s h o w n v e r y d r a m a t i c a l l y in t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e o l d e m p i r e s a n d t h e c o l lapse o f c o m m u n i s m

in t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . T h e r e a r e f r e q u e n t c a s e s in

w h i c h m i l i t a r y d e f e a t l e a d s to e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l e x p a n s i o n , a s in t h e c a s e o f G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n a f t e r W o r l d W a r II, V i e n n a a f t e r 1 8 6 6 , P a r i s a f t e r 1 8 7 1 , a n d s o o n . E c o n o m i c p o w e r c a n b e u s e d to e n h a n c e i n t e g r a t i v e p o w e r , in s o m e c a s e s b y r i t u a l s l i k e c o r o n a t i o n s a n d p a r a d e s , a n d in o t h e r c a s e s b y u s i n g e c o n o m i c p o w e r to c r e a t e an i m a g e o f " d o i n g g o o d " b y s e t ting up f o u n d a t i o n s , r e d i s t r i b u t i n g i n c o m e t o w a r d t h e p o o r , a n d s o o n .

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H o w then do these three f o r m s of p o w e r relate to the p r o b l e m of v i o l e n c e and its i n c i d e n c e ? It is c l e a r that the use of threat p o w e r is m u c h more l i k e l y to lead to v i o l e n c e than the use either of e c o n o m i c p o w e r ( e x c h a n g e s tend to be f a i r l y p e a c e f u l ) or integrative p o w e r . If most p e o p l e in a s o c i e t y r e g a r d that s o c i e t y and its institutions as b a s i c a l l y

legitimate,

there is not l i k e l y to be much v i o l e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y political v i o l e n c e . W e h a v e to distinguish b e t w e e n personal v i o l e n c e and political v i o l e n c e , e v e n though these are not unrelated. T h e r e is no doubt that certain i n d i v i d u a l s are m o r e prone to personal v i o l e n c e than others. In its m o s t e x t r e m e f o r m this inclination i n v o l v e s s a d i s m and perhaps e v e n m a s o c h i s m as an e n c o u r a g e m e n t to v i o l e n c e on the part of others. Whether this inclination has a g e n e t i c c o m p o n e n t , w h i c h now s e e m s to h a v e been d i s c o v e r e d f o r h o m o s e x u a l i t y , in certain aspects of brain structure, w e r e a l l y do not k n o w . If both h o m o s e x u a l i t y

and

s a d i s m w e r e strongly g e n e t i c in their origin, sheer natural selection w o u l d tend to e l i m i n a t e them, as t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s with these kinds of g e n e s w o u l d b e l i k e l y to p r o d u c e m u c h f e w e r o f f s p r i n g than those with m o r e " n o r m a l " g e n e t i c structures. It s e e m s l i k e l y , t h e r e f o r e , that personal v i o l e n c e is, like most things, a mixture of g e n e t i c s , culture, and e x p e r i e n c e , and it is hard to i d e n t i f y the mixture. Culture and the learning p r o c e s s can either s u p p r e s s g e n e t i c tend e n c i e s t o w a r d v i o l e n c e or p e r m i t and e n c o u r a g e them. O b v i o u s l y the atrocities c o m m i t t e d by a r m e d f o r c e s are p r i m a r i l y the result of a culture that l e g i t i m a t e s v i o l e n c e , but they a l s o o w e s o m e t h i n g to the e x i s t e n c e of s a d i s m . T h e s a m e g o e s f o r c i v i l i a n cultures that d e p l o r e on the one hand, or e n c o u r a g e on the other, hatred and f e a r of " o t h e r s " w h o do not s h a r e s o m e c o m m o n identity. B o t h personal and political v i o l e n c e are c l o s e l y related to s o m e kind of b r e a k d o w n or d e f i c i e n c y in the integrative structure. A n important e l e ment in this structure is personal identification with v a r i o u s g r o u p s . A pers o n ' s identity is v e r y c l o s e l y related to the g r o u p s with w h i c h that person identifies. W e all h a v e d i f f e r e n t identities d e p e n d i n g on the g r o u p in w h i c h w e are o p e r a t i n g . T h u s , I h a v e an identity as a h u s b a n d , as a f a t h e r , as a g r a n d f a t h e r , as a citizen of B o u l d e r , of C o l o r a d o , of the United States, and of the w o r l d , as an e c o n o m i s t , a p r o f e s s o r e m e r i t u s at the U n i v e r s i t y of C o l o r a d o , as a Q u a k e r , as a writer, and so on. I indulge v e r y little in v i o lence b e c a u s e I p e r c e i v e none of these identities to b e i n s e c u r e or to be threatened by a n y b o d y e l s e . I m a y use s l i g h t l y v i o l e n t l a n g u a g e , f o r ins t a n c e , t o w a r d s m a i n l i n e e c o n o m i s t s with w h o m I d i s a g r e e . B u t I w o u l d n e v e r think of hitting them. F o r w e both h a v e larger identities in a s u b c u l ture in w h i c h v i o l e n c e is r e g a r d e d as illegitimate. A great question, t h e r e f o r e , is h o w does v i o l e n c e b e c o m e legitimated? V i r t u a l l y all v i o l e n c e has to be legitimated in the mind of the perpetrator

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at the time when it is c o m m i t t e d . T h e r e may, of course, be split personalities, and people may be driven by sadism or anger that is out of their control. Even here, whatever is in control of action in the perpetrator must regard violence in some sense as legitimate. This sense of legitimacy may be confined to the perpetrator alone and c o n d e m n e d by most others. This, indeed, is what w e w o u l d identify as crime. Violence, h o w e v e r , can be legitimated by the group with which the perpetrator identifies, whether these are terrorists (1 have sometimes described them as "soldiers without a government"), regular military personnel, the police, and so on. T h e s e people may have their sense of legitimation approved by large sections of the society. T h e fact that the British are now building a m o n u m e n t to the man w h o ordered the totally unnecessary destruction of Dresden in World W a r II is an indicator as to how long this kind of legitimacy can last. It is hard for us to deny legitimacy to what w e have already done. Legitimacies, however, do collapse, as we saw in the European empires and in c o m m u n i s m , perhaps when expectations are sufficiently disappointed or when the critique of an established legitimacy b e c o m e s powerful enough. A particularly difficult situation arises w h e n violence is perceived, especially by the perpetrator but also by o b s e r v e r s , as a necessary cost of achieving justice. Much revolutionary violence and terrorism will fall into this category. T h e possibility that under certain circumstances violence can lead to a more just and a better world is believed very widely. Few A m e r icans, for instance, feel that the violence of the American Revolution was u n j u s t i f i e d . Such beliefs cannot be ruled out as e r r o n e o u s automatically. Nevertheless, the case against these b e l i e f s f r o m empirical e v i d e n c e and historical records is very strong. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand obtained their i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m Britain with virtually no violence. T h e y did not have a civil war like the United States, and they are certainly less violent societies than the United States is today, though they may not be quite as rich. T h e collapse of c o m m u n i s t regimes, almost entirely without violence except in R o m a n i a , may have something to do with the fact that v i o l e n c e and threat are very poor " m i d w i v e s for a new s o c i e t y , " to use Karl M a r x ' s expression. Building a society on centralized threat leads almost inevitably to an erosion of its internal legitimacy, which gets to the point where, to use a metaphor, the whole iceberg turns over and presents a different surface to the world. T h e bloodless "glorious revolution" in England in 1689 set off an extraordinary period of e c o n o m i c and cultural development domestically, although it was also followed by imperialist expansion around the world. T h e French Revolution, on the other hand, produced Napoleon and a virtual stagnation, or at least slow d e v e l o p m e n t , of the French e c o n o m y , almost until World W a r II, and also a period of overseas imperialism. From the early nineteenth century, however, it w a s the nonimperialist countries in

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Europe, especially in Scandinavia, that got rich, and the empires severely crippled the development of England, France, and the Netherlands. T h e Spanish Empire crippled the development of Spain much earlier. Since getting rid of their empires, European imperial powers have had a remarkable explosion of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , which certainly suggests that economic exploitation through threat is a poor way of getting rich. It is hard to correlate the d y n a m i c s of v i o l e n c e , that is, the rate at which it increases or decreases, with the many other characteristics of societies. T h e " c a u s e s " of violence are obscure. T h e actual perpetration of violence is a fairly random property of any given system, like automobile accidents. T h e percentage of drivers killed in automobile accidents is certainly a function of some characteristics of the system, such as the safety features of automobiles, roads, and so on. It is virtually impossible, however, to predict the time and place of actual accidents. Similarly, the time and place of acts of violence and war are virtually impossible to predict, but the quantity of violence in a society in any given period may be related to certain characteristics of the social system. A possible clue here, noted earlier, is the distinction b e t w e e n positive identities and negative identities, that is, between people w h o know what they want and go toward it, and w h o think they know w h o they are, and p e o p l e w h o go away f r o m what they do not want and know w h o they a r e n ' t . T h u s , a soldier is somebody w h o has to have an enemy in order to justify his identity. T h e r e can be queer mixtures here of positive and negative identities. National identities are often quite positive, but national defense, on the other hand, implies a negative identity towards at least potential enemies. As one Russian said to the A m e r i c a n s , " W e have done you great harm, we have deprived you of an e n e m y . " W h e r e there is a long established system of p o w e r a m o n g various groups, it may be legitimated simply by antiquity: just the fact that the system has been around for a long time and people are accustomed to it. T h e erosion of this power can potentially lead into violence. W e see this phenomenon sometimes, for instance, in what might be called " o u t b r e e d i n g , " where one g r o u p in a society is increasing its population f a s t e r than another g r o u p that may currently be more dominant. Possible e x a m p l e s are Fiji, G u y a n a , possibly Trinidad, where, thanks to the old British Empire, the East Indian population is e x p a n d i n g more rapidly than the original A f r i c a n populations. Sri Lanka is a case where a rather successful develo p m e n t fell apart because of the conflict between the Tamils and the Singhalese, even though the T a m i l s are still a minority. T h e e c o n o m i c results of this struggle seem to have been disastrous. B h u t a n in the H i m a l a y a s seems to be another example. In fact, almost w h e r e v e r there are refugees, some intergroup identity conflict is likely to be behind the need for refuge. T h e Indian subcontinent is an e x a m p l e of a society that is so diverse that it seems to have achieved unity only under a foreign ruler, whether the

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M o g u l s or the British. W h e n the British left, the s u b c o n t i n e n t split into Pakistan a n d India. Pakistan split f u r t h e r later on w h e n B a n g l a d e s h became independent. It is almost a miracle that India has managed to retain its d e m o c r a t i c institutions in the face of such e n o r m o u s diversity. T h e recent split-up of the Soviet Union, which had not been wholly unexpected, again arises out of its great diversity of cultures and people. It was held together first by simple Russian imperialism, then since 1917 by the C o m munist Party, which, h o w e v e r , did not seem to be able to fulfill the e c o nomic promises that it m a d e and, hence, lost legitimacy with astonishing rapidity. H a v i n g lost legitimacy, it could no longer exercise the threat power that it once c o m m a n d e d . It is still a puzzling question as to why s o m e countries, like Switzerland, after a fairly violent past, m o v e into a long period of mutual accommodation, with diverse languages, religions, and cultures, with only an occasional m u r m u r here and there. It is puzzling w h y W a l e s and Ireland reacted so differently to the English conquests of E d w a r d I. For 7 0 0 years there has hardly been any record of a Welsh revolt. T h e Irish seem to have revolted every generation. Yet the Welsh preserved their language and culture better than did the Irish, w h o except for the remote Western islands, lost their language, which they are now trying to recover. They made enorm o u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to England and to literature, even g o i n g back to Jonathan S w i f t in the last centuries, William Butler Yeats, George Bernard Shaw, and so on. One thinks also of A d a m Smith and David H u m e in Edinburgh in the late eighteenth century, after Scotland had s u f f e r e d severe defeat at C u l l o d e n and had lost even its p a r l i a m e n t . T h e r e s e e m s to be s o m e t h i n g in the proposition that the creative part of a culture tends to be at its periphery rather than at the center. Perhaps the core of the problem of violence is to see it as a system of potential and resistance, perhaps more like a system of b r e a k d o w n under a critical amount of stress. If I increase the pressure on a piece of chalk for a little w h i l e nothing h a p p e n s , and then crack, the chalk b r e a k s . O h m ' s Law does not provide so much for discontinuity, but here again the current is proportional to the potential d i f f e r e n c e divided by the resistance; if the resistance is high enough no current f l o w s . T h e violence equation, if there is one, is a g o o d deal more n o n l i n e a r . In political v i o l e n c e , especially, stress arises out of a sense of i m p o t e n c e . Here the O h m ' s Law parallel breaks d o w n , w h e n the resistance to violence, w h i c h consists largely of taboos, breaks. Then the system enters a new phase as violence creates enemies on both sides. It creates also a legitimation for further violence. T h e taboo on violence is of great importance here, but it is also hard to identify just w h e n it is going to break d o w n . When it does finally break, we pass into a new phase, a little more like the Richardson equations, 5 where A ' s violence t o w a r d B increases B ' s violence toward A, which increases A ' s violence toward B, and so on, until there may be a kind of equilibrium, as

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t h e r e a l m o s t s e e m s to be in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d o v e r the l o n g p u l l . Or the s y s t e m radically c h a n g e s , the m o s t radical c h a n g e b e i n g the e x t e r m i n a t i o n of o n e party. S o m e t i m e s , h o w e v e r , t h e r e is radical c h a n g e in identity, as both parties c o m e to r e c o g n i z e that w h a t they are d o i n g is r i d i c u l o u s a n d c o s t l y to b o t h of t h e m , and the n e w i n t e g r a t i v e s y s t e m t a k e s o v e r . Just w h a t the c i r c u m s t a n c e s are u n d e r w h i c h t h i s h a p p e n s , h o w e v e r , is still very o b s c u r e . W h a t n e e d s to be s t u d i e d h e r e is the i n t e r a c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t s u b c u l t u r e s in s o c i e t y — f a m i l i a l , tribal, ethnic, religious, a c a d e m i c , and so on. I think it is true to say that all the w o r l d religions put a low v a l u e on violence as such, r e g a r d i n g it as a cost. T h e r e is p e r h a p s a religion of nationalistic m i l i t a r i s m that r e g a r d s v i o l e n c e a n d w a r as a p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t in t e r m s of e x c i t e m e n t , unification of the g r o u p , a n d so on. B u t even a m o n g the military, w a r tends to be r e g a r d e d as a m e a n s to an e n d rather than as an end in itself, even though there is the d i l e m m a that the military can only j u s t i f y its b u d g e t if there is a high p r o b a b i l i t y of w a r . But this f a c t rarely gets e x p r e s s e d as a moral principle. A l t h o u g h all the w o r l d religions h a v e p e a c e as an ideal, n o n e of t h e m h a s a c h i e v e d it very w e l l . T h e y s e e m to h a v e f o u g h t m o r e w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s t h a n b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s , w i t h the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of the C r u s a d e s . T h e r e is, especially in B u d d h i s m , Hind u i s m , and Christianity, a certain pattern of w i t h d r a w a l f r o m v i o l e n c e , for instance, into m o n a s t i c i s m or even into the peace c h u r c h e s in Christianity. Karl M a r x thought that v i o l e n c e is the m i d w i f e of the new society, but, as w e saw in K a m p u c h e a , class w a r is the m o s t d e v a s t a t i n g f o r m of v i o l e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , p e a c e g r o w s by an a l m o s t u n c o n s c i o u s l e a r n i n g process. W e see this in the s p r e a d of areas of s t a b l e p e a c e a r o u n d the w o r l d in the last 150 y e a r s . W e see it in the rise of political d e m o c r a c y , w e s e e it in the labor m o v e m e n t , w e see it in G a n d h i a n d Martin L u t h e r K i n g , but I think w e still d o n ' t u n d e r s t a n d it very well. A n d the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e a c e rem a i n s o n e of the g r e a t e s t intellectual c h a l l e n g e s to the h u m a n m i n d a n d , o n e might add, the h u m a n heart. T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o m e s f r o m t w o s o u r c e s . O n e is an i n c r e a s i n g rea l i z a t i o n of the h u m a n c a p a c i t y f o r t h o u g h t . T h e o t h e r is i n f o r m a t i o n , m a i n l y f r o m the r e c o r d s of the past, w h i c h t h o u g h t f e e d s u p o n . T h e c a s e s t u d i e s of this, v o l u m e are an i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e of f o o d f o r t h o u g h t , and f u ture t h i n k i n g on this p r o b l e m will u n d o u b t e d l y b e n e f i t f r o m t h e m .

Notes 1. Galtung, "Feudal S y s t e m s , " pp. 1 1 0 - 1 8 8 . 2. S e e Niebuhr, " C o e r c i o n , S e l f - i n t e r e s t , and L o v e , " pp. 2 2 8 - 2 5 4 .

3. Boulding, Three Faces of

Power.

4. Ibid., p. 2 5 .

5. Richardson, Arms and

Insecurity.

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Bibliography Boulding, Kenneth E. Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989). Galtung, Johan. "Feudal Systems, Structural Violence, and the Structural Theory of Revolutions," in International Peace Research Association, 3rd Proceedings, vol. 1 (1970). Niebuhr, R. "Coercion, Self-interest, and Love," and K. E. Boulding, "In Reply to Professor Niebuhr," in K. E. Boulding, The Organizational Revolution (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953). Richardson, Lewis B. Arms and Insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960) and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960).

4 Nonviolent Direct Action and the Diffusion of Power Doug Bond

Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of "battles," requires wise strategy and tactics, e m p l o y s numerous "weapons," and demands of its "soldiers" courage, discipline, and sacrifice. . . . This view of nonviolent action as a technique of active combat is diametrically opposed to the once popular, though uninformed, assertion that no such phenomenon really existed, or that anything "nonviolent" was simple passivity and submission . . . —Gene Sharp, Post-Military Defense

A b o v e is the characterization of nonviolent action by o n e acclaimed even by his critics as "the patron theorist of n o n v i o l e n t action around the world." 1 In the wake of the widespread popular protests of the late 1980s, it is clear that the u n i n f o r m e d assertion that nonviolent action does not exist is no longer tenable. 2 Likewise, the notion that such action is either passivity or s u b m i s s i o n is fatally f l a w e d in light of the historic r e g i m e c h a n g e s that f o l l o w e d the recent prolific " p e o p l e p o w e r " revolutions, especially since 1989. Such increased visibility of nonviolent action ( N V A ) should help us to better understand it. But that understanding is hindered by a persistent and d e e p division a m o n g students of n o n v i o l e n c e 3 — t h o s e w h o see N V A as a set of "tactics" and those w h o view it as "a way of life." 4 (These views are often referred to as tactical and principled nonviolence.) This division inhibits c o m m u n i c a t i o n and collaboration a m o n g those w h o r e c o g n i z e the active nature of N V A but d i f f e r on w h e t h e r it is limited to principled actions. M o r e important, the business of d e f e n d i n g the respective c a m p s has drawn attention away f r o m a goal that remains in c o m m o n across the academic divide: to improve our understanding of how N V A works to effect and/or resist change.

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T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of N V A (either as a " t a c t i c " or as a " w a y of life") into a viable alternative to v i o l e n c e d e p e n d s upon i m p r o v i n g our ability to articulate both its limits and potential, its outcomes and dynamics. Such an improved understanding can be based upon an explanatory f r a m e w o r k of the m e c h a n i s m s of action and c h a n g e u n d e r l y i n g N V A . This chapter outlines these m e c h a n i s m s as a means of explaining how N V A works. It also o f f e r s a theoretical s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the process of power d i f f u s i o n , which is hypothesized to be operative in all nonviolent action, both principled and tactical. T h r o u g h this process the power relations between antagonists engaged in nonviolent action over time are expected to tend toward d e m o c r a t i c , decentralized political structures. In other words, all uses of nonviolent direct action (principled or otherwise, for status quo or anti-status quo objectives) may actually encourage, if not ensure, popular e m p o w e r m e n t . T h u s the means and ends of N V A may interact in w a y s not yet addressed in the divisive debate between the two academic camps. A couple of caveats are in order here. First, although I am suggesting that N V A nurtures popular e m p o w e r m e n t , I am not saying the process is always " p e a c e f u l " or its o u t c o m e s necessarily stable. N V A s o m e t i m e s is f o l l o w e d by protracted instability; witness the postrevolutionary Philippines or Eastern Europe. Also, N V A may be associated with heightened levels of low-intensity v i o l e n c e and d a m p e n e d levels of high-intensity (lethal) violence. 5 Still, I agree with S h a r p when he suggested that N V A "casualty rates . . . are usually much lower than in conventional or guerrilla w a r s . " 6 Second, I am f o c u s i n g on how N V A " o p e r a t e s " to e f f e c t or resist c h a n g e . T h u s , I discuss N V A as it is used to prosecute rather than eliminate conflict to a d v a n c e o n e ' s interests, even if these interests are presented as mutual or unifying. Although this presentation might appear to be heavily biased toward the nonviolence as "tactics" view, 7 I suggest it is precisely this focus on the underlying mechanisms of action and c h a n g e that could provide the basis for building bridges in our fractured and underdeveloped field.

A Framework for Inquiry One r e s o u r c e manual for n o n v i o l e n t action b e g i n s with the a d m o n i t i o n "People working for social c h a n g e need to understand the context of their labors." 8 People studying social change need to do the same. Our immediate task is to reduce the conceptual confusion surrounding nonviolent action by developing explicit definitions and eliminating terminological inc o n s i s t e n c y . T o place nonviolent action in context, w e can f r a m e our inquiry by distinguishing a m o n g several key concepts. 9 T h e conceptual map of the present f r a m e w o r k begins with a situation of acute conflict brought about by c o m p e t i n g or c o n f l i c t i n g interests. I

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d i s t i n g u i s h first b e t w e e n s e l e c t e d a t t r i b u t e s ( f o r e x a m p l e , m o t i v a t i n g b e liefs, goals, attitudes, a n d v a l u e s ) 1 0 and m a n i f e s t b e h a v i o r s ; a n d w i t h i n the b e h a v i o r c a t e g o r y , I distinguish b e t w e e n r o u t i n e a n d direct political action. T h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s are o u t l i n e d in T a b l e 4.1.

Table 4.1

A Conceptual Map Attributes

Beliefs, attitudes, goals, and values serve to motivate and inform the choice of approach and selection of particular methods of action. Behavior Routine political action is typically institutionalized and always entails, at least tacitly, the compliance of all parties; outcomes are determinate in that they are always prescribed by existing practices, procedures, and/or norms Direct political action is always unilaterally initiated, engaging, and indeterminate with respect to outcomes; it is manifested in both Nonviolent struggle, which works through coercion, manipulation, and appeals; and Violent struggle, which works through physical force and coercive force

Attributes M o t i v a t i n g beliefs, goals, attitudes, and v a l u e s , as attributes of an i n d i v i d ual or g r o u p , i n f l u e n c e the c h o i c e to e n g a g e in a l t e r n a t i v e b e h a v i o r s , inc l u d i n g the c h o i c e b e t w e e n routine a n d direct political a c t i o n . In my e f f o r t to e x p l a i n h o w N V A " w o r k s , " I f o c u s the p r e s e n t inquiry on these b e h a v iors. I s u g g e s t that the d i s t i n c t i v e nature of n o n v i o l e n t direct action is rev e a l e d m o r e in the d y n a m i c s and c o n s e q u e n c e s of b e h a v i o r than in the m o t i v a t i n g b e l i e f s in p r i n c i p l e d n o n v i o l e n c e that d r i v e s s o m e of it. E v e n a s t r o n g a d v o c a t e of the " w a y of l i f e " v i e w , G e o r g e L a k e y , a c k n o w l e d g e d that " m o s t p a c i f i s t s d o not p r a c t i c e n o n v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , a n d m o s t p e o ple w h o d o p r a c t i c e n o n v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e are not p a c i f i s t s . " 1 1

Behavior Routine versus direct action. R o u t i n e and direct political action are posited to be c o n c e p t u a l l y distinct and empirically d i s c e r n a b l e . T h e term direct action g e n e r a l l y r e f e r s to s o m e type of p r o t e s t , usually n o n v i o l e n t . B u t L o f l a n d c a u t i o n e d us about the p r o b l e m of i m p u t i n g this protest label (and t h e r e f o r e a cause or intention) to an empirical p h e n o m e n o n . 1 2 N e v e r t h e l e s s ,

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Wilson's distinction between "bargaining" and "protest" behavior hints at a critical difference between determinate and indeterminate actions. 13 The outcomes of determinate behavior are prescribed by some norm, procedure, practice, or routine. In contrast, the consequences of indeterminate behavior are not prescribed by any procedure or practice. Routine political action is determinate—it is prescribed by norms. Direct political action is indeterminate. That is, every direct action yields an indeterminate outcome, an outcome that is not bound by existing practice or procedures but is a function of its performance. Further, direct political action is always unilaterally initiated. It never requires the cooperation or consent of another party. Routine political action, on the other hand, is always reciprocal, if not entirely voluntary, at least to the extent that there is compliance. Routine political action generally follows, or is in accordance with, existing practice or procedures. The outcome of political action is bound by the system parameters for conflict resolution and is, therefore, a function of performance only within the constraints set by existing power relations. The notion that protest poses a radical threat to the status quo or system is explained by this distinction. Nonviolent direct action. April Carter described a context of "protest or resistance" associated with nonviolent direct action. She also noted, "There is no necessary connection between the resort to direct action and the resort to violence." 1 4 Eisinger made a similar point: "That protest may lead to violence, then, is undeniable; that the latter is just an extension of the former does not follow, however." 1 5 I, too, distinguish between direct action and violence, but find it useful to consider both nonviolent direct action and violence or violent direct action to be subsets of the more encompassing domain of direct action. The idea that nonviolent direct action can serve as a functional substitute for violence is consistent with this framework. 1 6 Conceptual clarity may be enhanced when the term nonviolent struggle is used in place of the more general term nonviolent direct action. The term struggle highlights the context of manifest conflict independent, or beyond the bounds, of the norms, customs, and procedures (both formal and informal) prescribed for routine interactions and to resolve differences. The term also captures, though is not bound by, Carter's emphasis on "protest or resistance" associated with nonviolent direct action. Violence. By violence, I mean any use of physical force against another's body, against that person's will, and that is expected 1 7 to inflict physical injury or death upon that person. This definition is offered only as an analytically precise, intuitively satisfying, and empirically useful measure for research into violent struggle, and may not be applicable in other inquiries. The mechanisms of direct action (discussed below) differentiate between social and physical bases of power. Social powers "work" through

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the human mind; but physical power " t a r g e t s " bodies, treating people as if they were mere objects. Thus I contend the use of physical force (violence) represents a definitive break from the realm of politics. A n d contrary to the Clauswitzian maxim that war is a "political act" or a "continuation of political intercourse . . . by other m e a n s , " 1 8 I suggest that violence, especially war, breaks the web of community, and in this important sense, is antithetical to politics.

An Example and Some

Implications

A tripartite concept of behavior is quite common in the social movement literature but is not without ambiguity. 1 9 The specific terms vary, but most frameworks present three categories of behavior such as " n o r m a l " politics, "protest" politics, and violence. Such f r a m e w o r k s highlight f o r m s of behavior without revealing how they work differently to e f f e c t or resist change. The present tripartite framework, however, illuminates the underlying mechanisms by which all direct action operates. This division is not based on the forms of organization or action, or even on style. 2 0 Rather, it is based upon what Eisinger called the " b a s i c d y n a m i c s " of action. 2 1 A n example may help to c l a r i f y the determinate-indeterminate criterion distinguishing nonviolent direct action from the " n o r m a l " politics entailed in routine political action. Contrast a formal petition drive to initiate an impeachment process with an election boycott to protest corruption. Both involve activities of protest and persuasion; both involve certain acts of noncooperation; and both may even involve acts of intervention (to relate these to Sharp's primary categorization of methods). Note that at this level of manifest behavior, the different methods of action (protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention) do not distinguish direct from routine political action. But a clear divergence in their operation, or mechanisms of action, is evident in that the petition drive works through a set (political) process, with specified procedures and known thresholds of " s u c c e s s . " That is, a certain number of signatures triggers a prescribed outcome. An accord, or at least tacit compliance, is operative, even though it may be broken, at any time, by any party to the conflict. A n election boycott, on the other hand, no matter how " s u c c e s s f u l " in terms of number of participants, has no a priori, set, or prescribed outcome. The indeterminate outcome of such direct action is a function of the actual interaction between antagonists; more precisely, it is a function of the dynamics of the nonviolent struggle. Direct political action, then, is usefully considered to represent a balancing of competing interests, capabilities, and w i l l s , the outcome of which is a new, or renewed, balance of powers and structure of expectations between them. 2 2 The assessment of this interaction or balancing is explicit in the strategic analysis below.

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T h e lack of a clear a n a l y t i c distinction b e t w e e n r o u t i n e a n d direct action h a s r e d u c e d the rich c o n c e p t of d i r e c t action to that of a s i m p l e m e t h o d or f o r m of protest at the level of m a n i f e s t b e h a v i o r . L y n d ' s shorthand e x p r e s s i o n " t a c t i c " 2 3 s u f f e r s f r o m this d e f i c i e n c y . T h u s it is not surprising that S h a r p ' s m e t h o d s of n o n v i o l e n t action h a v e b e c o m e the s y m b o l of his " t e c h n i q u e " a p p r o a c h . 2 4 Indeed, it is d i f f i c u l t to f i n d a s e r i o u s disc u s s i o n on n o n v i o l e n t d i r e c t action that d o e s not m e n t i o n S h a r p ' s " 1 9 8 m e t h o d s , " that is, the illustrative listing included in Part II of his Politics of Nonviolent Action. U n l i k e the discontinuity b e t w e e n direct action a n d v i o l e n c e , the transition b e t w e e n r o u t i n e a n d direct a c t i o n is v i r t u a l l y c o n t i n u o u s , m o r e a m a t t e r of a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , t h o u g h c l e a r l y d i s c e r n a b l e in e m p i r i c a l p h e n o m e n a . I find the term parapolitical to be h e l p f u l in h i g h l i g h t i n g the core characteristics of nonviolent direct action. T h e notion of parapolitical action is a n a l y t i c a l l y distinct f r o m , yet c o n n e c t e d to, the realm of r o u t i n e political a c t i o n . Both r o u t i n e political a n d p a r a p o l i t i c a l action are disting u i s h e d h e r e f r o m the antithetical r e a l m of v i o l e n c e in that they o p e r a t e through social powers; v i o l e n c e " w o r k s " against h u m a n b o d i e s as objects. C o n s i d e r the h u m a n digestive s y s t e m as an a n a l o g y . It f a c i l i t a t e s the c o n version of f o o d into energy for the b o d y . But the a l i m e n t a r y canal is not the only route t h r o u g h w h i c h a b o d y can be f e d . O n e can b y p a s s it altogether with an i n t r a v e n o u s injection of n o u r i s h m e n t or o n e can introduce f o o d directly into the tract in a w a y that d o e s not r e q u i r e the b o d y ' s c o m p l i a n c e in c h e w i n g or s w a l l o w i n g — t h i s a p p r o a c h , called p a r a e n t e r a l f e e d i n g , is useful w h e n the body rejects or is u n a b l e to take f o o d orally. Likewise, the will of the b o d y politic can be b y p a s s e d by the use of v i o l e n c e or it can be t r a n s f o r m e d via parapolitical action, w i t h o u t an accord or v i o l e n c e . P r e c i s e l y w h a t b e h a v i o r s are i n v o l v e d in e a c h of the c o n c e p t u a l dom a i n s ? A description of the m a n i f e s t a c t i o n s (that is, the m e t h o d s ) are useful " h a n d l e s " to talk a b o u t the d i f f e r e n t f o r m s of a c t i o n . A n d , as n o t e d a b o v e , S h a r p ' s listing of 1 9 8 m e t h o d s of n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n s t a n d s as the definitive c a t a l o g u e of m e t h o d s of n o n v i o l e n t struggle. 2 5 But the real v a l u e of the listing b e g i n s with his subtitle to Part I I — " T h e M e t h o d s of N o n v i olent A c t i o n : Political Jiu-Jitsu at W o r k . " W e n e e d to i d e n t i f y the u n d e r lying m e c h a n i s m s of action 2 6 to u n d e r s t a n d h o w the m e t h o d s " w o r k " to e f fect a n d / o r resist c h a n g e . T h e f o r m s of the individual m e t h o d s are c o n t e x t b o u n d a n d of little u s e in e x p l a i n i n g their o p e r a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , m a r c h e s , p a r a d e s and m o t o r c a d e s are a m o n g S h a r p ' s " m e t h o d s " of protest and p e r s u a s i o n . But a c a r e f u l r e a d i n g of his e x a m p l e s r e v e a l s that not all m a r c h e s , p a r a d e s , and m o t o r c a d e s w o u l d be a p p r o p r i a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d n o n violent s t r u g g l e . For e x a m p l e , a W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , p a r a d e by the N a t i o n a l A m e r i c a n W o m a n S u f f r a g e A s s o c i a t i o n in 1 9 1 3 c o n s t i t u t e s an illustration of s t r u g g l e not b e c a u s e it w a s a p a r a d e per se, but b e c a u s e it w a s a direct action. It s o u g h t to e f f e c t c h a n g e unilaterally and directly with, at the time,

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65

an indeterminate outcome. Thus, a focus on the manifest actions or methods serves only to describe the action, but a focus on the mechanisms of action begins to get at the ways in which methods actually operate. Sharp's methods are organized in three categories: (1) protest and persuasion; (2) noncooperation—social, economic, and political; and (3) nonviolent intervention. I seek here to refine and extend his organizing framework by specifying how these different types of methods operate, or "work." Accordingly, I have developed and operationalized a typology of the mechanisms of action by which the methods operate to effect and/or resist change.

Mechanisms of Direct Action The present delineation of mechanisms builds most directly upon Rummel's work and synthesizes a number of interconnected discussions in the social sciences focused on processes of opinion change, power and influence, and conflict. 2 7 Goldhamer and Shils stimulated much of the subsequent development, including the present approach, by distinguishing the three objects toward which actions can be directed: the (human) body, the will, and the environment. 2 8 These authors also initiated a discussion on the measurement of power use. Other social scientists who contributed to this synthesis include Kelman, French and Raven, Parsons, Gamson, Raven and Kruglanski, Wrong, and Boulding. Baldwin, Clegg, and Lukes presented good syntheses of the various strands of this diverse research. For the most part, this literature deals with both violent and nonviolent means, generally to effect change. Meanwhile a parallel body of literature developed with a focus limited to nonviolent action but that explicitly addressed means of both effecting and resisting change. Significant contributors here include Case, Gregg, Lakey, Miller, Seifert, and Sharp. Like Sharp's typology of methods and like Boulding's typology of powers, the present mechanisms-of-action typology is "offered as a way of organizing an extremely complex reality in a way that perhaps will make for more realistic appraisals." 2 9 Indeed, the similarity is not just one of purpose; the two typologies are fundamentally compatible in their views on the bases of power and the mechanisms of action by which the powers operate. Still, some differences are evident because of the different levels of specificity presented and because the present focus is limited to direct action, thereby excluding Boulding's exchange, a reciprocal mechanism in the domain of routine as opposed to direct political action. The present mechanisms of direct action are delineated at a level of specification that is relatively detailed and, therefore, readily operationalizable; that is, the specification of empirical indicators and coding rules for

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the variable can f o l l o w directly f r o m the m e c h a n i s m descriptions. Earlier v e r s i o n s of the m e c h a n i s m s of action h a v e actually b e e n

operationalized

and e m p l o y e d in e m p i r i c a l pilot research.3(1 A l t h o u g h B o u l d i n g ' s t y p o l o g y is p r e s e n t e d at a h i g h e r ( c o n c e p t u a l ) l e v e l , t h e b a s i c a p p r o a c h i s s i m i l a r . I o u t l i n e in T a b l e 4 . 2 a t y p o l o g y o f m e c h a n i s m s o f d i r e c t a c t i o n . T h e b a s e s o f p o w e r , t h e i m m e d i a t e a n d u l t i m a t e " o b j e c t s " o r " t a r g e t s " o f that p o w e r , a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l i n d i c a t o r s n e e d e d t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r u s e in p r a c t i c e are d e t a i l e d . T h e m e c h a n i s m s o f a c t i o n are to b e c o n s i d e r e d

against

t h e b a c k d r o p o f t h e t y p o l o g y in T a b l e 4 . 2 .

Table 4.2

M e c h a n i s m s of Direct A c t i o n As Manifested in Violence

Physical force is evident when an actionist wields physical power against another's body (an adversary), and, as a result, the adversary's body is expected to suffer bodily injury or death. Its base of power is physical power or strength. It is directed at an adversary's body • •

to displace (by physically moving) the adversary's body, to incapacitate (by injuring) the adversary's body, and/or to eliminate (by killing) the adversary's body, thereby preempting the adversary, and enabling the actionist to directly effect its objective

Coercive force is evident when physical force either is used coercively (rather than directly) or threatened. Its base of power is physical power or strength or the credibility of the threat. It is directed, via an adversary's and/or a third party's body, at the adversary's will to cause pain (by injuring or killing the adversary or third party) to affect the adversary's interests. As Manifested in Nonviolent Struggle Discrete manipulation is evident when an actionist wields discrete control over the physical, social, political, and/or economic situation confronting and/or opportunities available to another, and can thereby impose a cost upon or present a risk to that person's ability to sustain his/her livelihood. Its base of power is the ability to control physical, social, political, and/or economic resources. It is directed, via the environment, at another's will to affect the other's interests. Public coercion is evident when an actionist publicly threatens to impose material, social, political, and/or economic costs (negative interests or sanctions) on another. Its base of power is the credibility of its threats. It is directed at another's will to affect the other's interests. Demonstrative •

•

appeals

are evident

When an actionist invokes a common authority in an attestive plea to another. Its base of power is the perceived legitimacy of the common authority. These are authoritative appeals. When an actionist employs a shared system of logic or body of knowledge to persuade another. Its base of power is the persuasive capacity of the actionist. These are persuasive appeals. When an actionist attests to a sense of unity or coupled identity with another with self-sacrifice. Its base of power is the integrative capacity of the actionist's sacrifice. These are altruistic appeals. These attestive appeals are all directed at another's will to affect the other's interests.

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Mechanisms Manifested in Violence The physical and coercive force mechanisms operate exclusively

within

the d o m a i n o f v i o l e n c e . P h y s i c a l

likely.

i n j u r y o r d e a t h t o a n o t h e r is

H u m a n b o d i e s c o n s t i t u t e the i m m e d i a t e " t a r g e t " o f s u c h v i o l e n t d i r e c t a c t i o n , 3 1 a n d the u n d e r l y i n g m e c h a n i s m s o f p h y s i c a l a n d c o e r c i v e f o r c e a r e b o t h m a n i f e s t e d in the r e s u l t a n t v i o l e n c e . S t i l l the t w o m e c h a n i s m s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t in that p h y s i c a l f o r c e w o r k s s o l e l y a g a i n s t

physical

b o d i e s w h i l e c o e r c i v e f o r c e e m p l o y s v i o l e n c e to a f f e c t a n o t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t s . T h e " e x p e c t a t i o n " r e f e r r e d to in the p h y s i c a l f o r c e m e c h a n i s m is ind e p e n d e n t o f t h e a c t i o n i s t ' s i n t e n t ; a l s o it d o e s n o t r e f e r to the a c t u a l e f f e c t s o f the u s e . T h u s the s e t t i n g o f f o f a b o m b to d e s t r o y an o c c u p i e d b u i l d i n g in an u r b a n a r e a (a c l e a r u s e o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e a g a i n s t the v i c t i m s a n d o f c o e r c i v e f o r c e if a n o t h e r p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t s w e r e a f f e c t e d ) 3 2 is a p p r o p r i a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m the c o n t r o l l e d d e s t r u c t i o n o f an a b a n d o n e d a n d r e m o t e b u i l d i n g (a d i s c r e t e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f a r e s o u r c e to a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t s o f a n o t h e r , p r e s u m a b l y the o w n e r ) . A c l o s e s c r u t i n y o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e r e v e a l s its l i m i t e d u t i l i t y . S t r i k i n g , b e a t i n g , s e v e r i n g , o r e x p l o d i n g h u m a n b o d i e s c a n d o little m o r e than d i s p l a c e , i n c a p a c i t a t e , o r k i l l . B u t t h e n , the a c t i o n i s t still m u s t e f f e c t w h a t e v e r c h a n g e is d e s i r e d . A c o m m o n c o n s e q u e n c e o f the u s e o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e is the g e n e r a t i o n o f a t r e m e n d o u s a m o u n t o f h a t r e d a n d b i t t e r n e s s a m o n g the surviving victims. C o e r c i v e f o r c e h a s o n l y s l i g h t l y m o r e u t i l i t y . B e c a u s e h e r e , e i t h e r the u s e m u s t b e c o n t i n u o u s o r the threat to u s e m u s t r e m a i n c r e d i b l e to a f f e c t a n o t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t s . B o t h c o n s t i t u t e a c o n s t a n t d r a i n on the a c t i o n i s t ' s p h y s i c a l r e s o u r c e s . O n e n e e d o n l y l o o k at the e x p e n s e o f m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r at a p r i s o n , an i n s t i t u t i o n that r e l i e s a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y o n p h y s i c a l c o n f i n e m e n t a n d c o e r c i v e f o r c e . O r n o t e t h e c o s t o f m a i n t a i n i n g the m i l i t a r y in a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e , w h e r e r u l e is b a s e d l a r g e l y u p o n the u s e a n d threat o f u s e of physical force.

Mechanisms Manifested in Nonviolent

Struggle

G e n e r a l m a n i p u l a t i o n o f a s i t u a t i o n o r the e n v i r o n m e n t to a f f e c t the intere s t s o f a n o t h e r w o u l d b e v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e to a s s e s s e m p i r i c a l l y . A m o n g the m a n y o b s t a c l e s , the m e r e p r e s e n c e o f a p a r t y c o u l d b e s a i d to c o n t r o l the e n v i r o n m e n t u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . O p p r e s s i v e p o w e r r e l a t i o n s a l s o can limit opportunities f o r c h a n g e , thereby exerting a certain amount of control. C l e a r l y such control constitutes manipulation as d e f i n e d here. But it is e q u a l l y c l e a r that e m p i r i c a l a s s e s s m e n t o f s u c h o m n i p r e s e n t m a n i p u l a t i o n p o s e s a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e f o r e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h . In the i n t e r e s t o f d e v e l o p i n g testable theory, w e f o c u s our attention on discrete acts of

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DOUG BOND

manipulation. Discrete m a n i p u l a t i o n affects a n o t h e r ' s interests by discernable, discrete actions upon the e n v i r o n m e n t or a specific situation. T h e imm e d i a t e " o b j e c t " of s u c h m a n i p u l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an interest of a n o t h e r . T h u s , the discrete manipulation a f f e c t s the o t h e r ' s interest. A s w i t h all d i r e c t a c t i o n , d i s c r e t e m a n i p u l a t i o n n e v e r r e q u i r e s an a c cord with other party, but o n e d o e s need the ability to control r e s o u r c e s — physical, social, political, or e c o n o m i c . L i k e w i s e , p u b l i c c o e r c i o n r e q u i r e s t h e c r e d i b l e t h r e a t of t h e s a m e , if not the actual ability. Like the discrete manipulation m e c h a n i s m , a qualif i e r — p u b l i c — i s attached to the coercion m e c h a n i s m to facilitate empirical a s s e s s m e n t . T h i s q u a l i f i e r p r e s e n t s a r e a s o n a b l e t h r e s h o l d of clear c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t a l l o w s f o r s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r a l v a r i a t i o n s in t h e u s e of explicit threats. W e employ our "hypothetical, informed, and

impartial

t h i r d - p a r t y o b s e r v e r " to i d e n t i f y t h e p r e s e n c e of a t h r e a t s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m m u n i c a t e d to be characterized as public. It is t h r o u g h t h e s e t w o s o c i a l m e c h a n i s m s t h a t m a n y of t h e m o r e c o e r c i v e m e t h o d s of n o n v i o l e n t d i r e c t a c t i o n a r e w i e l d e d . F o r e x a m p l e , a n actionist g r o u p can control (mobilize) social resources (people) for a mass d e m o n s t r a t i o n to m a n i p u l a t e a s i t u a t i o n . T h e s a m e a c t i o n i s t g r o u p m i g h t a l s o t h r e a t e n ( t h r o u g h p u b l i c c o e r c i o n ) t o w a g e a g e n e r a l s t r i k e if t h e i r d e m a n d s a r e n o t m e t ; that is, t h e g r o u p w o u l d t h r e a t e n to e x a c t o r i m p o s e an e c o n o m i c o r p o l i t i c a l c o s t f o r n o n c o m p l i a n c e . N o n v i o l e n t i n v a s i o n s a n d o c c u p a t i o n s of m i s s i l e s i t e s , n u c l e a r p o w e r p l a n t s , a n d p r o p o s e d a i r p o r t s a r e o t h e r e x a m p l e s of a c t i o n i s t s u s i n g m a n i p u l a t i o n to a f f e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s , a n d e l e c t i o n b o y c o t t s t h r e a t e n to i m p o s e a ( p o l i t i c a l ) c o s t o r r i s k that can a f f e c t a n o t h e r ' s interests. M o r e o f t e n than not, the use of m a n i p u l a t i o n and c o e r c i o n a r e not s e p a r a t e d in p r a c t i c e . R a t h e r t h e y a r e u s e d t o g e t h e r , w i t h a t h r e a t ( c o e r c i o n ) m a d e c r e d i b l e w i t h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n i s t ' s a b i l i t y t o c o n trol r e s o u r c e s ( m a n i p u l a t i o n ) . T h e threat m i g h t c o n s i s t of a c o s t to be n e w l y i m p o s e d or an e x i s t i n g cost to be c o n t i n u e d . Both c o u l d a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t s of a n o t h e r , a s s u m i n g t h e y w e r e c r e d i b l e . A g a i n , t h e e m p i r i c a l a s s e s s m e n t of t h e s e m e c h a n i s m s is c o n d u c t e d a c r o s s all of t h e m s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , y i e l d i n g a p r o f i l e of t h e a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t , b u t e m p i r i c a l l y o v e r lapping, mechanisms. T h e three demonstrative or attestive appeals m e c h a n i s m s draw upon different social powers—authoritative, intellectual, and altruistic—to aff e c t a n o t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t s . All t h r e e d e p e n d n o t o n l y u p o n t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e b u t a l s o u p o n t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e o t h e r p a r t y a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e c o m mon, shared, or unified interests. All appeals constitute direct action, h o w ever, b e c a u s e they are always unilaterally invoked and have indeterminate outcomes. T h e a u t h o r i t y to b e i n v o k e d in a u t h o r i t a t i v e a p p e a l s m a y b e i n h e r e n t in a s i t u a t i o n , a r o l e , o r a p e r s o n . A d r o w n i n g p e r s o n a p p e a l i n g f o r h e l p

NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION & POWER

69

may hold a situational-based authority; a p r e s i d e n t ' s may be role based; and a charismatic leader may possess authority based on his/her unique personality. But whatever base is invoked, it must be perceived as legitimate by the other party for the mechanism to operate effectively. Intellectual appeals require a capacity to persuade, which is dependent upon resources, performance, and the extent of a shared system of reason. All appeals are alike in that they are invoked through attestation or an act of witnessing. For intellectual appeals, the attestation lies in the persuasiveness of the appeals. Altruistic appeals may stand out as the epitome of nonviolent appeals with their "success" dependent upon the other party sharing the actionist's sense of unified or connected identity or interests. Like all mechanisms manifested in nonviolent struggle, the manifestation refers to the process or operation, not to the outcome of the conflict. Indeed, a classic case of an attestative altruistic appeal is the hunger strike. Yet, physical harm, if not injury and death, often result. T o be clear, the distinction between m e c h a n i s m s manifested in violence and those manifested in nonviolent struggle lies not in the presence or absence of violent outcomes, but in how power is applied, either against human bodies or through human minds. All mechanisms manifested in nonviolent struggle may be characterized as social mechanisms, despite the violent outcomes that sometimes follow. Thus, the coercive use of force is distinguished from public coercion by its threatened or actual use of a human body as an immediate "target" of physical force. As indicated above, this presentation of mechanisms is restricted to direct action. Inclusion of the domain of routine political action would require the addition of a reciprocal exchange mechanism, not unlike Bouldi n g ' s use of the term. Some

Implications

Sharp has contributed to our understanding of the ways nonviolent direct action works by recasting G r e g g ' s notion of "moral jiu-jitsu" 3 3 into the concept of "political jiu-jitsu." 3 4 Whereas Gregg referred only to the integrative capacity of altruistic appeals, Sharp outlined the dynamics of nonviolent struggle more broadly, including the use of coercion and manipulation against an opponent to undermine his/her "political balance." A careful examination of the present mechanisms suggests the conditions under which one might be more e f f e c t i v e than another and illuminates their particular strength and limitations. For instance, not all nonviolent direct action works through the imposition of costs or sanctions. Many of the methods of protest/persuasion actually operate through appeals. And as noted above, these appeals require some degree of common, shared or unified interests to operate. Thus, in the case of a foreign or

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outside aggressor, strategies drawing upon the methods of noncooperation or intervention would seem to be more effective than those employing methods of protest/persuasion alone. The methods that operate through coercion do not require common interests to effect change. Neither do they require control over physical resources if social resources are available (mass actions have a credibility independent of the physical resources they may or may not control). A credible threat to employ coercion, therefore, stands as a special class of nonviolent direct action, a class of action that we term nonviolent sanctions. (But see my concluding caveat.) The strategic use of nonviolent sanctions, then, may function as a political equivalent to violence, where the opponent's control over physical resources (including military and police forces) and lack of concern (that is, common, shared or unified interests) for the actionist does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the nonviolent actionist. The development of strategy involves a series of complex, contingent decisions at several levels. First, one must choose the best approach or dom a i n ^ ) of action—routine or direct political action, and if direct, violent or nonviolent struggle. Next, one must relate one's goals and objectives to the available resources and make an assessment of the alternative mechanisms likely to be effective. Only then can one develop a plan of action based on the methods that are available and appropriate to the situation.

Mechanisms of Change To understand nonviolent action, we need, ultimately, to explain why some actions "fail" and others "succeed" in the realization of their objectives. To do this I have tried to develop our understanding of how the actions work. But mechanisms of direct action specified above lead us only to the point where change is effected directly (through the use of physical force) or to the point where change is obtained by affecting another's interests, either directly, or indirectly via manipulation of the situation or the environment. Now I turn to mechanisms of change to trace the processes through which these mechanisms of action actually yield or do not yield change. Sharp referred to his mechanisms of change as "the determining combination of influences, pressures and forces . . . " that emerge from the complex interactions to "influence the opponent and his capacity for action" in a struggle. 35 He suggested that they "determine" the outcomes of the struggle. The various mechanisms of change therefore embody distinctly different types of change, which may result from the mechanisms of action. Mechanisms of change bring about the cessation or closure of the manifest conflict and produce an imminent resolution of the struggle, even

NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION & POWER

71

if temporary. The mechanisms of change are arrayed in Table 4.3 along two dimensions: the capacity to effect change and the basis of change. The first represents the capacity of another to effect a viable alternative in response to the actionist's demand. This capacity to change relates to a party's willingness to adopt, accept, or comply in situations where available options may be limited. The other dimension represents the basis of change. The basis of change links action and outcome; it drives the change process and may be viewed usefully as that which is leveraged to effect the outcome. These two dimensions interact to promote change at different levels of internalization, from the completely internalized acceptance of reciprocal or mutual interests to the extreme of noninternalization represented by the default acquiescence to another's interests. The highly internalized adoption of the specific content of another's interests and the mere compliance of another's interests stand between these two extremes of internalization. 36 The accommodation mechanism of change bespeaks a depth of internalization that is wedded to and reinforced by the ongoing process of interaction; the mechanism yields change that is particularly stable because it is self-adjusting. The disintegration mechanism of change, on the other hand, is likely to create volatile situations with virtually no internalization of any change. It is the disintegration mechanism's inherent or definitional lack of a capability to effect a viable alternative, however, that reveals its limitation to produce stable change. This capability or lack thereof is useful in distinguishing between mechanisms that operate similarily but diverge in their outcome. It is not useful to speak of conversion if the capacity not to convert is lacking; in such a disempowered situation, cooptation is the more accurate term to describe the change mechanism. A seemingly trivial but important aspect of this two-dimensional perspective on the nature of change is that adoption requires the capacity to adopt. We need to distinguish the (misleading notion of) "consent" of a party who has little if any capacity to choose a viable alternative from the consent of an informed party possessing a full capacity to choose viable alternatives. I suggest the former "choice" is appropriately considered cooptation (when positive interests are leveraged) or coercion (when negative interests are leveraged) of a subordinate party (or sometimes even a victim); the latter is appropriately considered conversion or compliance (again, with positive and negative interests, respectively) by a party fully responsible for his/her choice. Ceding to another's interests, not being tied to the specific content of the change, may be effected by both convergent (positive) and divergent (negative) interests. The " c h o i c e s " embodied in cooptation or coercion do not constitute consent insofar as the "consenting" party lacks the capability to choose a viable alternative. In discussing control over people and the environment, Boulding notes explicitly the exploitative purposes for which economic power can be

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